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Inter-organizational Infrastructure for Communication: A Study of the Generative
Aspects of the Communication Context on CSR Strategy and Instrumentation

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This longitudinal case study of the controversy surrounding Nike's shoe production from 1993-2004 examines the infrastructure that evolved for communicating about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues among the actors in the controversy. In contrast to conventional views about strategies and instrumentation for communicating CSR that highlights the decision-making of management, the present study highlights how the inter-organizational communication context contributes to the invention and reinvention of CSR strategies and instruments. By mapping the evolving web of relationships among actors, moves, and instruments of communication over the course of the controversy, the study articulates the infrastructure for communication about CSR issues. Infrastructure for communication is defined as the repertoire of rules, materials and practices that provides a tacit framework through which the ambiguities of meaning and action are managed. The study shows how the infrastructure evolved relative to the demands for interaction. The main finding of the study is that infrastructure shaped how the organizations behaved by acting as a coordinating device for the invention and reinvention of the symbolic and material qualities of inter-organizational communication

and interaction. Furthermore, the implication of this finding is that it provides a new way of looking at how the communication process itself shapes inter-organizational behavior.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to Paul and Marguerite - you are the light of my life and the reason I did this.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the burgeoning professional and academic research about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) there is considerable interest in the strategy and instruments used to manage the claims stakeholders make on organizations. Yet there remains a pervasive misunderstanding of the relationship between CSR strategy and instruments and the conditions of communication that arise as business interacts with stakeholders. The political, cultural, and economic orders are all readily recognized as forces that shape what is possible in terms of CSR, while communication is understood to be a conduit through which these larger forces flow. The conventional wisdom emphasizes that communication is about one actor informing or persuading another while missing how communication is the process that makes CSR strategy and instrumentation real. That is, communication generates the very contexts that give rise to the strategic and instrumental dimensions evident in informing and persuading.

Giddens (2000) hints at the fundamental importance of the communication context for inter-organizational communication when he describes how the landscape of today's marketplace has been influenced as much by the collection of complex processes that arise from systems of communication as the enormous volumes of financial transactions that are turned over each day. Organizations are not isolated bureaucracies in the vein of Fayol and Weber but erected out of and shaped by interactions with internal and external stakeholders relative to product and service pricing, the value of common stock, the handling of healthcare costs and pension funding, to name a few. Stakeholder interactions have also expanded to include issues about social and environmental

involvement, responsiveness, and accountability of organizations. To manage the social and environmental concerns of stakeholders, some businesses have adopted and implemented self-regulation in the form of CSR. Best described by Elkington's (1987) term the 'triple-bottom-line', CSR is a multi-stakeholder perspective that emphasizes that corporate performance should be judged not only against economic performance but on social and environmental performance. The assumption that business is accountable to a triple-bottom line raises numerous challenges for management including how to engage stakeholders over the increased social and environmental responsibility.

One of these challenges is how to mediate the variety of claims stakeholders make on the organization relating to societal expectations and the disagreements about the organization's actions that can arise. The response by business concerning disagreements has been to create corporate communication strategies and instruments that deliver on the new assumptions about their conduct in society. This includes, but is not limited to, Web sites, speeches, advertisements, stakeholder meetings and company letters. Following the development of these strategies and instruments, numerous academic studies that have attempted to explain theoretically what is happening as organizations engage in "CSR communication." But what is overlooked in the academic literature is that the communication context gives order to the invention and reinvention of these instruments and strategies. The context of inter-organizational communication impacts how messages are sent, received, interpreted and acted on. The main claim developed in the current study then is that communication, not just the political, cultural and economic order, constrains and enables organizational action such as the invention and reinvention of CSR strategies and instruments.

To illustrate how communication is constitutive of organizational behavior, some of the basic underlying issues with the organizational theories that explain CSR strategy and instruments must be navigated. Where the practical and theoretical literature explain strategy and instrumentation through Resource Dependency and Institutional Theories, the current study takes an alternative point of view and investigates how the emergence and maintenance of an infrastructure for communication influences organizational communicative strategy and instrumentation. The infrastructure for communication is a repertoire of materials that act as a tacit framework for the preferred forms of strategy and instrumentation among interconnected and interdependent organizations. Since infrastructure is largely tacit, its reconstruction depends on a form of analysis known as “infrastructural inversion” (Bowker, 1994). Infrastructural inversion is a reflective practice that involves assessing the communication practices relative to the actors to ascertain relevant patterns. The data for the current inversion was generated from Nike’s CSR struggles from 1993 to 2004, which included questions about how child labor was being used to make its products as well as how factory workers were exposed to CFCs and paid extremely low-wages. The inversion shows that an infrastructure did emerge in the Nike controversy to afford and constrain how the organizations invented and reinvented their communicative strategy and instrumentation.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The aim of this chapter is to explain the theoretical background and the justification for the current study. Where extant theories explain corporate strategy and instrumentation relative to CSR as a strategic behavior, the current study examines how these behaviors are influenced by the nature of the communication process itself. To do so requires developing a vantage point from which to pose research questions and to develop an approach to research focused on the communication process at the inter-organizational level. The study thus draws from the constitutive view of organizational communication (Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren, 2010; Deetz, 1994; Taylor & Cooren, 1987; Taylor & van Every, 2001) in general and, in particular, from theories of communication design (Aakhus, 2007; Aakhus & Jackson, 2005; Shön & Rein, 1995) and infrastructure (Bowker, 1993; Star, 1999).

Why Corporations Communicate CSR

Resource Dependence and Institutional Explanations

There are two main rationales in the CSR literature that explain the conditions under which business is likely to act in socially and environmentally responsible ways. The first rationale is best illustrated by Kotler and Lee's (2005) explanation that organizations act in responsible ways because they have recognized the opportunities for bottom-line benefits. This rationale underlies the idea that the strategic practices of CSR must provide tangible economic value to the firm (see also Porter & Kramer, 2005). The second rationale is best illustrated by Campbell's (2001) explanation that organizations act in responsible ways when the social context supports and enforces CSR. This

rationale underlies the idea that the strategic practices of CSR provide the organization legitimacy in its social-political context.

The two rationales for how CSR becomes part of business practice maps to two general theories of organizational behavior. The first, that CSR is a way to gain access to necessary resources (i.e., Kotler & Lee, 2005), corresponds to Resource Dependency Theory and the second, that CSR happens due to anticipation of, or response to, contextual pressures (i.e., Campbell, 2001) corresponds to Institutional Theory. Resource Dependence Theory argues that organizations look to establish relationships with other organizations in order to gain access to needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This approach to inter-organizational behavior explains that inter-organizational relationships are formed because organizations seek, in an instrumentally rational manner, the best opportunity for resource exchanges. Institutional Theory points out that organizational action, including instrumentally-rational action, are subject to routines, rituals, and the symbolic context in which the organizations act (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2004). Inter-organizational relationships are formed due to normative, mimetic, or coercive causes that may even be independent of instrumentally rationale resource exchange.

In both cases, Resource Dependence and Institutional Theories highlight a role for strategy and instruments. The emphasis is on how organizations invent and reinvent strategies and instruments to persuade others to provide resources (resource dependence) or to manage identity in ritual based symbolic fields (institutional). However it is also the case that the communication process takes on a life of its own and this has consequences on organizational communicative behavior. The current study articulates some of the

aspects of Resource Dependency and Institutional Theory that have been dormant in studies on CSR strategy and instrumentation. What both approaches presuppose is the role of communication when addressing the multiple competing demands from the various stakeholder backgrounds. That is, they miss the inherent problems associated with the potential for misunderstanding, disagreement, and opposition that arises over the actions of the organization.

This dissertation focuses on how the communication context (the way in which organizations deal with the demand for interaction) influences the form and content of the strategy and instrumentation that corporations use to deal with stakeholder claims relative to CSR. In other words, how the strategic and instrumental aspects of communication are afforded and constrained by communication's constitutive nature. To highlight the role of communication requires a shift in perspective from conventional business and managerial orientations toward pragmatic theories of communication and argumentation, which emphasize the importance of the communication context during interaction.

The Conditions of Communication

The natural order of interaction arises through the demands that interaction places on its participants. Mutual interaction requires attending to and monitoring the sequence and meaning of prior actions and anticipated actions (e.g., Clark, 1996, using language; Goffman, 1981, forms of talk; Levinson, 1979, activity types). This attention involves working through the inherent ambiguities in coordinating interaction, which includes the recurring problems of meaning, action, and coherence (Jacobs, 1994). The problem of meaning centers on how actors convey and infer meaning in saying something. The problem of action centers on how actors do things with words like make assertions of

fact, promises and requests. The problem of coherence centers on how actors coordinate meaning and action. These problems are always at stake in interaction and the knowledge and skill actors have for communication is built around managing these ongoing problems (Jacobs, 1994). In particular, interactants enter into mutually understood forms of interaction, or activity types, such as negotiating, planning, story-telling, and so on that indicate a set of commitments to mutual interaction and thus a framework of participation for managing the recurring problems of meaning, action, and coherence (e.g., Goffman, 1981; Levinson, 1979). Interactants may also invent activity types to convey a participation framework that enables the management of meaning, action, and coherence (e.g., Goffman, 1981; Levinson, 1979).

Pragmatic theories of communication point out that the demands of communication also give rise to commitments, methods and frameworks for managing the demands. Any action taken within interaction happens within a vast web of commitments and expectations that can be accepted or called-out and made problematic by any other actor. When called-out through expressions of doubt, disagreement, or opposition, a disagreement-space takes shape as parties to the interaction attempt to repair disruptions to the meaning, actions, or the sense of coherence that had been presumed to be in effect (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993). The ways that actors manage disagreement is by anticipating, expressing or responding to actual or potential doubt, disagreement, and opposition, which consequently shape the content, direction and outcomes of interaction. While pragmatic theories of communication have been predominately used to explain interpersonal and small group

interaction, the underlying principles appear to scale to other forms of interaction such as inter-organizational communication (e.g., Aakhus & Ziek, 2008).

For instance, in the 1990s a network of organizations emerged around questions about Chiquita Banana's treatment of laborers. The demand from society for Chiquita Banana to explain its behavior relative to a host of misdeeds including gender-based pay-inequality and forcibly preventing its workers to unionize forced the company to respond. The expression of opposition regarding the company's supply chain was so overwhelming that it couldn't go unchecked. To combat the criticism, the company partnered with NGOs to investigate the claims and identify the company's weaknesses. The action between the company and NGOs resulted in the invention of Chiquita Banana's CSR reports, which conveyed the firm's commitment to improvement (Radin & Calkins, 2006). The calling-out of Chiquita's behavior and the subsequent development of instruments reflect an instance of calling-out and repair that highlighted a set of commitments and shifted the participation framework among the stakeholders. The invention and reinvention of strategies and instruments used to manage meaning, action, and coherence were inspired by the ever present potential for disagreement to arise, which raises the practical strategic issue for an actor about how to manage the disagreement when it may, or in fact, does arise.

Managing the demands of interaction (meaning, action and coherence) and the potential for disagreement is a tenuous endeavor because interaction can spiral in multiple directions. But solutions to these problems do emerge in inter-organizational communication just as they do for dyads and groups in the form of rules, rituals, and habits that directly tie to the management of meaning, action, and coherence. So as

stakeholder and other influencers make claims on corporations, and corporations respond to these claims, patterns of routine and preferred roles, moves, and instruments of communication are generated that in turn provide a framework for how to achieve particular communicative effects and avoid others. Communication then is constitutive of the invention and reinvention of strategy and instrumentation for CSR. Moreover, the communicative context constrains and affords what is being done and what can be done through CSR strategy and instrumentation.

For example, to fend off criticism about not buying Fair Trade coffee, Starbucks relied heavily on strategic alliances with NGOs. According to Argenti (2004), Global Exchange first focused the spotlight on Starbucks in 2000 and from there dozens of NGOs began to attack the company for not pursuing fair labor compensation. After several years of disagreement, Starbucks began to collaborate with these NGOs to promote the coffee-growing practices of small farms (Austin & Reavis, 2002). In the end, the controversy was resolved to a certain degree where today Starbucks's is applauded for their fair trade practices and contributions to helping to raise consumer awareness about the plight of small farm coffee growers. Moreover Starbucks now continues to participate with NGOs in a way that attempts to both further address problems with their operations and as a support system to fend off criticism.

The insights from the pragmatic theories of communication highlight what has yet to be addressed in conventional studies of CSR strategies and instrumentation and what remains underdeveloped in Resource Dependency and Institutional Theories for explaining CSR communication. As organizations deal with the demand for interaction patterns of routine and preferred strategy and instrumentation emerge within inter-

organizational relationships to help the parties achieve particular effects. To further explain how organizations produce these strategies and instruments, and the patterns associated with them, requires consideration of another literature about the practice of communication design, which is a way of looking at how communication contexts are constructed out of complex situations.

Communication as Design

Communication as design extends the insights of pragmatic theories of communication to understand how forms of communication that were once difficult, impossible, or unimagined are brought into existence (e.g., Aakhus, 2007; Aakhus & Jackson, 2005). Communication as design takes the communication context (the demands of interaction and the problems of communication) as a central animating force in shaping the built-up human environment. A key implication of the design stance is that organizations and institutions should be seen as responses to the demands of interaction and problems of communication and not simply settings where interaction happens.

Studies of communication as design investigate interventions into and inventions for human interaction that aim to change communication from one form into another such as a quarrel into a negotiation. These include studies of dispute mediators, meeting facilitators, policy professionals, and the design and use of information and communication technology (Aakhus, 2007; Aakhus & Jackson, 2005). The focal point of the current study is the design work performed as organizations interact and the designs for communication that result for managing meaning, action, and coherence around issues about Corporate Social Responsibility. The present study though looks at how communication contexts are constructed by organizations without the benefit of a central

third-party and in the context of organizational interaction. These are key differences from prior communication design studies that have focused on the interpersonal and group levels and the role of third-party specialists and technologies. To show ways that communication design work and designs for communication constrain and afford the communicative possibilities in inter-organizational interaction, a key tension between intentional and emergent design needs further elaboration.

Designs for Collective Intentional and Collective Emergent Communication

An analytic distinction is made here between collective intentional and collective emergent design that will be useful for adapting and scaling the design stance to the inter-organizational level.

A collective intentional design happens when action is explicitly taken for the purpose of devising a means to foster a new form of communication that has otherwise been difficult or impossible to achieve. Intentionally created designs illustrate how means for supporting interaction are created (e.g., Aakhus, 1999; de Moor & Aakhus, 2006) to put constraints on what was communicatively possible and promote preferred forms of communication among organizations. The means for supporting interaction specify aspects of interactivity such as roles, contributions, topics, goals, and relevance and signal the preferred kind of interactivity to be taken-up among the organizations.

A collective emergent design happens when preferred forms of interactivity result from the ongoing engagement between actors. The actors do not set out to create such forms but such forms often emerge indirectly and unintentionally from other actions taken in an ongoing engagement between organizations. As organizations work to shape a situation, what gets built-up is a pattern of communication that enables actors to resolve

the situational exigencies (e.g., Shön & Rein, 1995). Indeed what was happening in these situations is a fundamental process of design rationality where organizations are attempting to resolve situations by framing and reframing communication under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.

In both cases, design shows that actors can shape or discipline activities in a way that enables the management of the problems of communication. Forms of interactivity provide a resource for resolving the problems of meaning, action, and coherence among the actors (i.e., Jacobs, 1994) and to manage the expandability of the communicative order (i.e., van Eemeren et al., 1993). The importance of looking at CSR strategies and instruments as a process of design then lies in the notion that design works because actors hold each other accountable for engaging each other in the preferred manner. In fact, recently there has been a turn to apply design to managerial and professional practices because it explains the construction of forms of communication that are otherwise difficult, impossible, or yet to be imagined.

Communication as Design and CSR

CSR “is the notion that companies are responsible not just to their shareholders, but also to other stakeholders” (Doh & Guay, 2006, p. 54). It is a business perspective for fulfilling social obligations through economic, legal, ethical and discretionary (philanthropic) initiatives and behaviors (Carroll, 1991; Carroll 1999). There are a series of reasons that contribute to the decision to increase a firm’s orientation to social obligation (Munilla & Miles, 2005). These reasons include: the positive impact CSR has on consumer behavior (Crosby & Sheree, 2006); how CSR programs and initiatives enable organizations to attract and retain employees (Turban & Greening, 1997); and,

how investors and investment indexes have a rising concern about corporate social responsibility (Hockerts & Moir, 2004). It is also the case that certain organizations are forced into acting more responsibly. In the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, a series of environmental disasters (e.g., Exxon Valdez) and exposed poor treatment of labor forces (e.g., Shell in Nigeria) damaged the reputation of many corporations. In an attempt to rebound from these scandals, Evuleocha (2005) explains that companies turned to CSR in the hopes that it would enable them to rebuild “their reputation and to manage risk across a diverse set of countries, cultures and socio-political situations” (p. 334).

CSR then is also an emerging business practice for responding to the tensions that arise with business activity in society (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). CSR has become embraced as a way for managers and executives to manage controversy by reconciling the impact business operations have on societal actors (Harrison & Freeman, 2003). CSR controversies occur when stakeholders push back on corporations regarding systematic social problems such as environmental sustainability, equal opportunity for the world’s poor, child labor, product testing on animals, etc. Indeed there has been considerable invention and reinvention of corporate communication strategies and instruments so that firms can engage stakeholders about controversial environmental and social conduct.

Controversy is a state of prolonged public disagreement that concerns a matter of opinion over certain values and beliefs. A controversy happens in the way that organizations frame their positions over meaning, action and coherence through strategy and instrumentation. An example of a CSR controversy can be seen with the activity built around how Coca-Cola has been criticized for anti-union violence in Colombia. The disagreement involves how activists and Coca-Cola framed their position regarding

several occurrence of violence against workers looking to unionize (Foust, Smith & Woyke, 2006). It is the case that both the corporation and the activists invented and reinvented numerous strategies and instruments that delivered on their assumptions about Coca-Cola's responsibility to workers in sub-contract factories. What the Coca-Cola example illustrates is that a controversy involves how organizations engage each other over the issues through their communication.

The essential point here is that strategy and instrumentation is a constantly evolving endeavor undertaken to maintain the sense, adequacy and motivation of acts. Yet from the back and forth activity that occurs between organizations within a controversy, preferred forms of meaning making and meaning management emerge that organize the actors into patterns of who talks, when and how. The collective intentional and collective emergent approaches to design explain that no matter the circumstances, designs for communication (i.e., ways to manage meaning, action and coherence) surface to shape interaction. However the collective intentional and collective emergent approaches to inter-organizational communication miss both the complexity in the range of ties that occur between organizations as well as the emergence of layered patterns of routines, like an infrastructure for communication, from these ties.

CSR strategy and instrumentation has not been studied from the perspective that it is also contingent on the emergence of environmental factors such as the nature of the communication process itself. In addition to the intentional invention and reinvention, CSR strategies and instruments can arise out of the communicative routines that develop as organizations interact. The contention here is that the communicative routines are bundled together in an infrastructure for communication. The infrastructure for

communication is a repertoire of materials that act as a tacit framework for the preferred forms of strategy and instrumentation among interconnected and interdependent organizations. Infrastructure for communication is the coding and classification of practices, procedures and identities so that organizations can work out the problems of communication. Sometimes the infrastructure for communication is created out of particular instruments, symbols or moves and sometimes infrastructure is created by linking all of these together in a genre. But in any case, the infrastructure for communication is a design for communication that arises in response to the demands for interaction.

Infrastructure for Communication and CSR

Infrastructure for communication has received considerable theoretical attention particularly as it is associated with the nuances related to technological networks and advanced information systems (see Ciborra, 2000; Grahm, 2000). Most studies endeavor to show a network or system's ability to perform actions and to permit, promote and facilitate the orderly, standardized and heterogeneous behaviors among users (Cronholm, Ågerfalk & Goldkuhl, 1999). Yet recently the notion of infrastructure has been widened to encompass the intersection between symbolic, technical and social mechanisms so that patterns of standards that reach beyond a single event (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) can be explained in a broad, relational sense.

Following in the relational line of thinking, Bra, Hanseth, Woinshet, Heywood and Shaw (2007) explained that infrastructure is determined by the constituting actor network (users, implementers, designers, etc.) and the links of various kinds between all of these actors. Frederico (2010) added that infrastructure is a domain of activity that

stems from the weight of how language creates and sustains authoritative guidelines for social behavior. To that end, infrastructure is a relational concept that grows out of the communication and interaction that connects actors, which gives it a natural link to the pragmatic perspective. Infrastructure structures relationships so that exigencies are controlled through rules and procedures. It is the framework of rules, procedures and arrangements that set out the prescriptions about situational behaviors. That is, as organizations attempt to shape a web of interactions relative to environmental and social issues, what gets built-up is an infrastructure of communication of preferred performed forms of communication and interaction.

It is particularly the case that the communication context generates an infrastructure for communication when discussing how actors frame issues through certain structures of belief, perception, and appreciation (i.e., Schön & Rein, 1994) during a CSR controversy. There are a plethora of anecdotal examples that can be used to demonstrate how infrastructure emerges as the blueprint for the communication relative to a CSR controversy. In the late 1990s, a controversy between Conde Nasté and its stakeholders over use of fur in the company's magazine layouts and advertisements revolved around the portrait of Anne Wintour, Conde Nasté's most iconic employee. This symbol was an emergent ground over which a standard line of reasoning could be played out. It provided one footing for both sides to argue about the corporation's policy. The debate over Microsoft's alleged monopoly from bundling of its operating system and web browser was settled through one instrument, the law suit. The assumption here is that within a web of relationships the rules, norms and procedures of strategy and instrumentation become fodder for organizational communicative behaviors. So as

infrastructure emerges it pushes organizations to respond to actions in particular ways and through particular means. This is not to say though that the infrastructure necessarily improves interaction as it can also be the reason for failed or negative interaction. Theoretically then, infrastructure builds out through interaction independent of whether organizations judge the interaction as good or bad.

L1 is a table that summarizes additional examples of infrastructure at work in CSR controversy.

Although there is anecdotal evidence of infrastructure at work within relationships, there has been very little empirical investigation into the modeling of infrastructure at the inter-organizational level and how it ultimately impacts organizational behavior. Indeed Star (1999) explains that “we need new methods to understand the imbrications of infrastructure and human organization” (p. 379). Accordingly, the goal for the current project is to model an inter-organizational controversy over time to see how infrastructure for communication happens and its consequences for how particular communicative possibilities are given shape in stakeholder interaction. The understanding generated here will then be important for understanding inter-organizational interaction more generally and CSR strategy and instrumentation more particularly.

The notion that history matters in inter-organizational relationships has been highlighted before in network studies of inter-organizational relationships (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004) (see also Flanagin, Monge & Fulk, 2001; Taylor & Doerfel, 2003). But what has received much less attention is how communication rules and procedures develop into an infrastructure for communication. Moreover there has not been any

research about how infrastructure for communication tacitly feeds back to organizations the ways in which they should navigate certain situations such as a CSR controversy. The study then asks the Research Question:

RQ: What role does the infrastructure for communication play in shaping the strategy and instrumentation of organizations in a CSR controversy?

Identification of infrastructure and its impact on organizational behaviors depends on layers of analysis. To investigate the role of infrastructure on the organizational behavior requires unearthing the patterns relative to the strategic and instrumental moves made by interconnected and interdependent organizations. To study infrastructure and its impact on CSR controversies, Aakhus & Ziek (2009) propose looking at the instruments developed for making moves in inter-organizational communication and then analyzing what these instruments make easier and more difficult in terms of joint actions, what these instruments highlight and hide in terms of meaning, and what these instruments enable or block in terms of coherence. So the Research Question driving the project implies that there are several empirical questions that need to be answered. What follows are three empirical questions that when answered will provide grounds for understanding the standardized patterns that support an infrastructure. These empirical questions are built out of the growing body of literature that describes inter-organizational communication and the conditions under which CSR strategy and instrumentation arise however none of this work describes CSR controversy or infrastructure specifically.

Actors

This section defines the key concepts and raises a particular question relative to the actors, or organizations, involved in a CSR controversy because they are a key

component in building the case about infrastructure. Although actors are an important aspect of all studies, there is an additional significance given to actors here. As Bra et al. (2007) explains, the constitution of an infrastructure for communication is determined by the actors and the links of various kinds between the actors. More to the point of the relational aspect of an infrastructure is what roles, or identities, actors take on during a controversy. Thus the first Empirical Question of the study is:

EQ1: What types of roles emerge in a CSR controversy?

The roles and identities used to define the relationship between a corporation and its stakeholders are typically based on essential transactions. The explanation for this is that studies of CSR are often heavily based on stakeholder theory which is very a managerial driven thinking (e.g., Freeman, 1984). However roles are classified in a very different sense in the current study – here a role is the part an organization plays in the particular activities relative to a CSR controversy such as that of an audience, bystander, argument generator, argument articulator and argument sense maker (Aakhus, 2009; Aakhus & Ziek, 2008). As an organization makes a claim on a corporation it is transformed through the act of calling out into playing a particular role in the controversy, which also gives the target corporation an identity or role to take on. Making a claim within the controversy transforms an actor into the role of participant actor. The point to be made here is that the controversy is generated in part by what roles organizations assume through their strategy and instrumentation. Organizations do not play the same role during CSR controversy as they might when engaging the company during another situation. Because of the missing theoretical piece to CSR, little is known

about the actors that call-out or question corporations about their social and environmental initiatives and programs.

Moves

This section defines the key concepts and raises a particular question relative to the moves involved in a CSR controversy. The business and organizational literature in general, and the CSR literature in particular, does not look at the problems inherent in communicative relations. The current study does so by examining the forms of activity organizations take-up with each other and how some of that activity becomes entrained in an infrastructure for communication. Of particular interest here is how organizations make moves based on expressions of doubt, or the potential for misunderstanding. So Empirical Question 2 is:

EQ2: What moves are made in a CSR controversy?

Attempts to describe and explain the strategic and instrumental links that tie the corporation to its stakeholders is generally limited because they overlook how the two sides coordinate activity, or that interaction is tenuous and ambiguous. This is not to say that the importance of studying communication practices between corporations and stakeholders is unimportant, just that it is underdeveloped. Indeed, as Frooman (1999) points out, studying the nature of communication between corporations and stakeholders may tell more about how the actors will interact than the attributes of the actors will. Explained below are the key terms used in the current study to overturn these problems - the move and joint action.

Moves and joint actions. To better illustrate the communication between corporations and stakeholders, the ties that bind organizations are defined here as joint

actions (Clark, 1996). The joint action conceptualization of inter-organizational communication is not drawn from the organizational communication literature but from pragmatics of communication. The importance of this distinction is that the notion of the joint action alludes back to the ideas set forth about design and the fact that as organizations work to perform joint actions, they are also constructing the activity in which they are engaged. However that is not to say that these pragmatic-type concepts have gone unnoticed in the organizational literature, just unused. As Powell, White, Koput and Owen-Smith (2005) explain, inter-organizational interactions can be, but often are not, conceptualized on a level where organizations are connected through joint things such as alliances. What Powell et al. (2005) points out is that inter-organizational communication is a means of creating particular common ground so that joint activities can be accomplished.

A joint action happens when organizations produce something in concert with others such as a conversation, chat or interview. Joint actions are the coordination of moves into either cooperative or competitive situations where multiple parties work together in incremental steps to pull something off (Clark, 1996). The coordination of joint actions through moves is a natural aspect of interaction and can be done conventionally or unconventionally. But in either way, moves lend towards certain meaning and action and not other meaning and action. More to the point of the current project is the idea that the move is part of organizational strategy and instrumentation – it is what the organization is trying to do and how during an interaction.

As Clark further explains, a joint action has 2 phases: a presentation move (utterance for someone to consider) and an acceptance or up-take move. There must be an

adjacency pair of individual moves between two or more organizations for a joint action to occur. Moves can be performed by an organization in a solitary fashion such as informing, criticizing, questioning or congratulating. Moves can also be directed at a particular audience or dispersed into the public sphere where the move can be picked-up by many organizations. The truly important aspect of a move is how it gets taken-up, and interpreted, by other organizations. Moves do not have to be recognized as they were meant when first circulated or publicized – and actually, moves do not have to be recognized at all (Jacobs & Jackson, 1991). The point is that these small actions spur others to defend themselves, negotiate, argue or ignore the claims, assertions and overtures made.

Moves and joint actions occur in a complex dynamic sequence that is full of intentional behavior where organizations are constantly reading the situation so that they can create their next move. Lind and Golkhul (2003) illustrate this basic insight of pragmatic communication theory for inter-organizational communication by explaining that what goes on between business parties is a layered exchange where actors, like a buyer and seller, act in pairs that eventually culminate in the completion of a transaction.

JA1 is a figure that illustrates how joint actions connect organizations.

The moves and joint actions that tie organizations are very important to how relationships unfold. As far as the theoretical and empirical understanding of these concepts is concerned, joint actions have been the center of far more work (i.e., Clark, 1996; Levinson, 1979; Lind & Goldkuhl, 2003) than has the move. However to understand how infrastructure for communication emerges at the interface between organizations, the nature and composition of the move must be elaborated. It is

hypothesized here that a move is composed of a combination of content, actional and instrumental materials.

The first material that is drawn on for a move is content material. As Kaufer and Butler (1996) explain, all texts depict the world for readers by providing fundamentally symbolic elements. The content dimension of the communicative move reveals an organization's views of values and assumptions about a situation, relationship, issue, person, etc. As Kaufer and Butler further state, the fundamental symbolic elements of any individual action can be determined through three categories of composition: depiction of portraiture (person), depiction of landscapes (scenes over time) and depiction of a look into the text (the writer assigning the reader invitations into the text).

The second material that is drawn on to enact a move is actional material. The actional aspect of the communicative moves adheres to the notion that the paradigm case for all communication is social action (Jacobs, 1994) and that it is the move that enables an organization to perform a function (or multiple functions) within social action. Searle (1965) provides one taxonomy of the actions performed which includes: assertive (commit the speaker to something being the case); directive (get the hearer to do something); commissive (commit the speaker to some future action); expressive (express a psychological state); and declaration (bring about correspondence between act and reality).

The third material drawn on for a move is instrumental material. The instrument as it is constituted within a move facilitates the linkages between organizations. An instrument is any extension of an organization (McLuhan, 1964) through which

communication of certain sorts is enabled. The instrument also has a dual purpose as it delivers the content and actional information.

To that end, links occur when organizations are working toward some end or some purpose, where in each actor enacts deliberate and intended moves. For example, organizations can be tied through the joint action of a broadcast exchange which includes a presentation (reporting) and an acceptance (informing) that can occur through a press release detailing a company's promise to eradicate environmental misbehavior. Or organizations can be tied through the joint action of a conversation that can occur within the confines of a stakeholder meeting where multiple organizations are drawing on different actional and symbolic materials. The joint action approach to inter-organizational communication best exemplifies how it is a complex and dynamic endeavor that includes many combinations of strategic and instrumental behaviors. As moves culminate in joint actions it can be seen how organizations anticipate, express or respond to actual or potential doubt, disagreement, and opposition.

Instruments for Communication

This section defines the key concepts and raises a particular question relative to the instruments for communication involved in a CSR controversy. Instruments for communication are central to joint actions (e.g., Wertsch, 1998) and consequently infrastructures for communication. The moves, or sequences of moves, that coordinate joint actions are built around the instruments for communication used by organizations to mediate the problems of communication and/or close a disagreement-space within a controversy. So as sequences come together over the trajectory of a set of relationships, what gets created is an infrastructure for communication that feeds back to the

organizations how to behave. Considering the importance of instruments for communication in the negotiation of CSR between a corporation and its stakeholders, Empirical Question 3 is:

EQ3: What instruments are used in a CSR controversy?

As Star (1999) explains, infrastructure is sunk into instruments for communication because they are sewers of standards and settings that enable a community to coordinate action. When instruments are invented and reinvented, their instrumental properties impact how social action gets carried out. In other words, the habits, rules and roles associated with the extension of the organization impact what happens during joint actions and consequently the trajectory of relationships.

Most notably researchers have shown that organizational meetings are tied to what participants talk about and the identities that they take on during them (e.g., Schwartzman, 1989). In much the same way as meetings, there is a great deal of research that demonstrates how certain CSR instruments for communication are embedded with properties of content and form that are consequential for the interactions that occur between organizations. For example, Non-financial reports convey social performance information in metrics and quantitative ratings to match the formal structure of financial reporting in the United States (Chatterji & Levine, 2005; Schafer, 2005). Corporate ethics statements such as value statements, corporate credo, code of ethics and Internet privacy statements provide guidelines for behavior by making references to corporate qualities as integrity, trust, teamwork and fairness (Bindu & Salk, 2006; Murphy, 1995; Murphy, 2005; Urbany, 2005). The non-financial report and code of conduct are not just communicative materials but act as background for the 2nd and 3rd order conditions such

as a particular quality of communication and the emergence of an infrastructure for communication.

The use of the non-financial report and corporate ethics statements stimulate a certain quality of interaction among organizations. They impact interactions with stakeholders because their associated properties constrain and afford the direction and content of communication. They are static instruments that restrict symmetrical and open dialogue between a corporation and its stakeholders. Any rejection of a move delivered by these instruments for communication requires stakeholders to do so through a separate follow-up move. Moreover any attempt to hold the corporation accountable for the statements made through these instruments means that stakeholders are calling-out well-accepted and agreed upon means of corporate communication. Therefore as corporations use these instruments, they force the controversy to play-out in a certain way.

Conclusion to Literature Review

What is missing from previous attempts to explain CSR strategies and instruments is the role the conditions of communication plays in shaping them. When relationships begin, organizations rely on their knowledge of moves and joint actions from previous experiences. However over time, organizations begin to develop an organization of strategy and instrumentation where particular moves (or aspects of moves) and joint actions become habits or customs. These standard forms of strategy and instrumentation can evolve either intentionally or unintentionally but in either case, they have a direct impact on how the relationship unfolds. So when organizations come together, they navigate the exigencies of the situation by drawing on their knowledge of the organization of communication. In other words, organizations rely on their understanding

of the infrastructure for communication and what stands as preferred forms of behavior. But since infrastructure is largely tacit, its reconstruction depends on layers of analysis. As such, the process of studying infrastructure requires unearthing the patterns of actors, moves and instruments that get built-up as a controversy plays-out. Therefore to uncover infrastructure the empirical questions must be answer so that there is an understanding of the actors, moves and instruments relative to a controversy.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology used to answer the Empirical Questions and the overall Research Question. The chapter is arranged as follows: first the data is described, second the infrastructure for communication as the unit of analysis is described, the third section explains the units of observation i.e., actors, moves and instruments, and the final portion is an explanation of how the infrastructure for communication will be measured and related back to the communicative behaviors of the organizations.

Data

The data for the current investigation was generated from Vogel's (2005) account of Nike's CSR struggles in the 1990s, which started with questions about the company's use of child labor and moved to encompass other social missteps such as how CFCs were released into factory atmospheres and the low-wages paid by sub-contractors. Vogel's account and the primary materials he used to create it provided the data on organizational moves. From there, a range of material and sources was used to fill-out information on the controversy. For example, Hoovers, a Web-site that offers proprietary business information was used to gather information on participating organizations and the Web site Academics Studying Nike, Reebok, Adidas & the Campus Apparel Industry was used to access the speeches given by Nike executives.

Key Features of the Case

According to Basu (1999), although there is no consensus for why and how child labor began to be seen as an evil, popular opinion about the practice began to change

around 1950. It was at this point that high-income countries started to view child labor in 3rd world countries as a form of abuse (see Edmonds & Pavcnik, 2005). Over the course of the next 30 years, civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Global Witness, began to step up pressure on the UN and corporations about reducing the use of child labor. This pressure culminated with the World Summit on Children in 1990 at which delegates adopted the *Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children* and a *Plan of Action*, documents that set out seven major and 20 supporting goals to be achieved by 2000 (Jones, 2005). The long-term involvement of organizations in Asia, like Global Witness, means that there was a network of organizations already debating the issue of child labor before Nike became a target. The network created conditions that gave the Nike controversy staying power so that when the company was questioned, denying responsibility or connection was not a justifiable response.

Nike is a retailer, and not a manufacturer, which makes it the most visible aspect of a broad supply chain. The company hires almost 500,000 contract employees in 350 factories (Locke, 2002) in countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, China and Malaysia to create its footwear, apparel and sporting goods. For decades Nike's sub-contractors had been accused of exploiting workers in these 3rd world countries by using child labor, providing squalid working conditions and paying sweat shop wages. Nike had always perceived of the relationship between it and its manufacturing sub-contractors as being at "an arm's-length" (Phillips, 2010) and thus denied connection to these issues. However in the early 1990s, changes in the global marketplace and the pervasiveness of news media

and activists forced Nike to change this approach to the manufacture of the products it retails.

Beginning at that time, Nike came under attack from a plethora of organizations regarding its supply chain. These attacks resulted in a controversy that damaged the reputation of the corporation. Reputation is a purely perceptual concept that stems from stakeholder impressions about a company, its products or executives (Wartick, 2002). A wide variety of stakeholders from NGOs to governments to consumers began to view the company in a negative light. Eventually, Nike was forced to take responsibility for its entire value chain and say farewell to the diffusion of responsibility (Phillips & Caldwell, 2003). The company did so by first adopting CSR programs and initiatives such as the World Shoe, which was a line of sneakers with a low price point compared to the rest of the Nike line (Hart & London, 2005). Although the World Shoe initiative failed, it set the stage for other programs such as LiveStrong, a cause-related marketing effort to raise money for cancer research. In addition to CSR programs and initiatives, Nike invented and reinvented communicative moves and instruments including non-financial reports, advertisements, Industry Apparel Association Membership and Codes of Conduct.

The situation was clearly a case of Nike defending its actions and attempting to lift a veil of suspicion or skepticism regarding operational decisions and social expectations. Nike approached its reputation as an asset and aggressively enacted a plan that would enabled the company to rebound from the torrent of activity to the point that they are now considered the parent of modern CSR (Epstein-Reeves, 2010), regular inhabitants on Fortune's list of Most Admired Companies as well as recipients of high scores on Fombrun's Reputation Quotient. What's more is that in developing their

strategy and instrumentation, Nike established unprecedented standards in CSR communication which has contributed to the way that all business discloses its conduct (Firestein, 2006).

Due to the fact that Nike was able to successfully mediate the situation, the controversy has become one of the most widely studied CSR cases (Boje, 2001). Researchers from many academic fields including communication have focused on the strategy and instrumentation that Nike invented and reinvented to manage the claims made by stakeholders. Most communication studies though overlook the nature of the communicative activity that occurred between Nike and its stakeholders. Researchers routinely discuss how Nike responded to the pressures from different external stakeholders through particular strategies and instruments but do not talk about stakeholder communication – the strategy and instrumentation enacted by stakeholders during the controversy (Moir, 2001; Sellnow & Brand, 2001). So what has been missed is the transformation from the first time the corporation was called out to the end-time of the case. In other words, at one time nothing existed in terms of CSR strategy and instrumentation and by the end of the case there was a host of different forms of corporate strategies and instruments.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for the current study is the infrastructure for communication. To draw conclusions about the nature of infrastructure for communication in the context of CSR, requires a form of analysis known as “infrastructural inversion” (Bowker, 1994). Since infrastructure is largely tacit, its reconstruction depends on layers of analysis that foreground some of its observable points (Star, 1999).

Infrastructure is not one thing to be identified; it is a framework of multiple patterns such as actor roles, content rules and instrumental procedures. Infrastructure signifies the institutionalized resources and practices that actors require to carry out their relationships (e.g., Kling, 1987; Kling & Scacchi, 1982). This includes things like rules for turn-taking; how text depicts the world, values and assumptions; the language of the text i.e. scientific, affective, jargon; the definition of words and acronyms; templates, timing and appearance of channels and instruments; how issues are introduced into a relationship; the social function of moves or action that an organization is committing to; and even the tone of depictions which constitutes the level of permissible reflections of emotional states. These boundaries of types and rituals evolve from the repeated practices of interconnected and interdependent organizations. Infrastructure then is an organization of communication that is not ready made but shaped through the social processes of actors (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1996) – it is a meaning making and meaning management type of system that is generated by communication and subsequently enables and constrains how relationships are forged, maintained and play-out over time.

To reveal infrastructure requires developing a variety of points of visible observation. Fredrico (2010) calls these points “facts” and Star (1999) and Star and Rutleder (1995) call them “features.” Here they are referred to as patterns. This term is not meant to be deterministic but emerges from the notion that infrastructure is the standardization of patterns (i.e., Hanseth & Monteiro, 1996). No matter what terminology is used the idea is the same – they are all describing the characteristics of the relationships that get standardized over time. By focusing attention on these patterns, the

researcher is able to read the invisible layers of control and access for managing meaning, action, and coherence.

The infrastructural inversion developed for the current study was a twofold process. The first step was to collect data on roles, moves, and instruments involved in the inter-organizational interactions around Nike's CSR issues so that patterns could be inferred about the data. Second, the analysis of the patterns provided a basis for claims about the nature of the infrastructure for communication and how it was consequential for organizational behavior. Describing the patterns of actor roles, moves and instruments was an important part in reconstructing infrastructure because they provided grounds for what the infrastructure was and how it mattered. In essence, answering the empirical questions provided the precise data for making claims about the infrastructure. The patterns extracted from the answers to the empirical questions were the infrastructural puzzle pieces.

Units of Observation

The units of observation are the elements of communication that are observed and about which information is systematically collected. Analysis of these units allows researchers to make generalizations about the major entity being studied. To define the units of observation, the basic design elements of a controversial situation (actor, moves and situation) developed by Shön and Rein (1994) was used. The reason for using Shön and Rein's approach to organize the units of observation is because their work best exemplifies how designs for communication emerge as organizations engage in a chain reaction relative to a particular circumstance. It should also be noted that the situation has already been defined as a controversy. As Shön and Rein (1994) explain, the object for

which organizations are designing interactivity is the situation that an organization is in. Nike and its stakeholders were involved in inventing and reinventing their strategies and instruments in an attempt to shape a controversy over the company's social and environmental responsibility. The remainder of the current section will describe the units of observations of time, actors and communicative moves.

Time

The first step was to create a yearly timeline of events from the case study. The timeline is a layout of the lifespan of the controversy and it includes actors, instruments, symbols, actions and moves. Although time is not a typical unit of observation, it is an important baseline that allows for the characterization of the controversy - infrastructure grows from sustained communication and interaction between organizations.

Figure T1 illustrates the entire timeline of the Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004).

As a trajectory study, the communication and interaction between Nike and its stakeholders was analyzed as dynamic process of forging and maintaining relationships in continuous time as well as observing the process at discrete moments (i.e., Snijders, 1996). Therefore to reveal which elements became institutionalized activity was analyzed as it occurred over the entire controversy but also in snapshots, or phases, of time. The notion of phases further speaks to the idea of controversies as evolving spaces that do not exist in a vacuum but rather are embedded in the social fabric that occurs between firms (i.e., Medlin, Aurifeille & Quester, 2005). Phases describe the quality of communication that is occurring at any one point in time during the controversy. Phases were qualitatively determined based on an ordinal scale of early, middle and late activity. The

timeline of events was dissected into phases so that the units of analysis could be studied in smaller, more manageable components.

Phase I occurred between 1993 and 1995 and it represents all of the early activity within the controversy. Phase I was kicked off by CBS's report detailing how Nike subcontractors used child labor. During Phase I there was a limited amount of activity as the communication between Nike and its stakeholders ended in 1993. Overall, the quality of communication that marks the phase centers on Nike turning a blind eye to its subcontractors. Essentially Nike was denying that they were responsible for how subcontractors choose to run their facilities.

Even though Phase I ended in 1993, Phase II did not start until 1996. The impetus for Phase II was when the manufacturers producing Kathy Lee Gifford's clothing line were found to also be using child labor. Although there was no direct connection between the two organizations, the Kathy Lee Gifford situation sparked a reactivation of Nike's child labor issues. Phase II encompasses the years from 1996 to 1997 and was most intense of all the phases. The quality of communication that marks this phase was a disagreement that centers on a break in friendly relations as the claims and counter-claims process was antagonistic.

Phase III is the late phase of the controversy and it occurred from 1998 to 2004. This phase was initiated by Phil Knight's speech to the National Press Club in which he candidly discussed the missteps taken by the company and how they are working to rectify the situation. This speech was monumental because it was at this point that Nike began to rebound from the damage done during the controversy. In fact it was during

Phase III that Nike starts to rebuild its reputation as a world leader in the sporting apparel industry (Vogel, 2005, see also Pollach, 2003; Spar & LaMure, 2003).

Figure T2 is a Timeline of Events that is color coded as per the phases of the controversy: Phase I is represented in red, Phase II is represented in blue and Phase III is represented in black.

Actors

For the actors unit, participating and plausible organizations relative to the controversy were observed. A controversy describes how organizations become involved in disagreements over issues such as poverty, environmental protection and the Third World. Within a controversy there is a shift from abstract stakeholder or potential stakeholder to taking on or being given an identity (and stake) relative to a particular issue. The idea that stakeholder organizations try to establish a stake in the company by making claims is different than standard stakeholder theory. So for the purposes of the current study, participation in a controversy happens in three different ways: Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3.

Type 1: Sanctioned Joint Action

The first way was when organizations pull-off a sanctioned joint action. An alliance is a sanctioned joint action because it is an instance when two or more organizations interact through a ratified association. An illustration of this type of joint action can be seen when Nike aligned with the Clinton Administration. The purpose of the alliance was to cooperate with one another to deliver specific goods related to the controversy such as the American Apparel Industry.

Type 2: Emergent Joint Action

The second way was when organizations pull-off an emergent joint action. An emergent joint action occurs when an organization takes-up a move that has been dispersed into the public sphere and treats it with a follow-up move. The broadcast exchange is an example of an emergent joint action. For example, CBS reported on Nike's use of child labor and the company subsequently treated the move with a follow-up move of their own – thus the two organizations collaborated to pull-off a joint action where moves were both presented and taken-up.

Type 3: Move Not Picked Up

The third way was when an organization makes a move that is not picked-up. Even though the move is not part of a completed joint action, the presenting organization becomes embroiled in the controversy. There is no limit of statutes on moves as they can be taken-up at any time so a floating move is really just something waiting for a response. An illustration of this type of involvement can be seen with *Business Week's* move relative to the Nike controversy. In 1999, *Business Week* brought attention to the fact that other sneaker manufactures were also using child labor in their supply chains. The move was not picked-up by any another organization therefore it was not part of a completed joint action. However *Business Week* had made a move relative to the controversy and thus became a participating organization. So the move may have been heard or read or even become part of what others believed but there was no direct re-use of the move or the move was not called-out in any way.

Actual, Plausible, and Possible Involvement

Based on the timeline, a list of the organizations that participated in the controversy through any of the three forms just described was created. But because many of moves that construct CSR controversies are publicly available, there is an indefinite number of possible joint actions that can be formed by an indefinite number of actors. For instance, an action taken by a company can, in principle, be taken-up, analyzed and treated with a follow-up move by almost any organization. Therefore both the actual connections within the controversy and some of the possible and plausible connections were observed.

Status of Involvement. In the current study inter-organizational interaction is a matter of participation and an organization can be involved in the controversy in a variety of ways. Indeed the nature of any organization's involvement in a CSR controversy will vary at any point in time. The status of involvement provided through the idea of plausible and possible organizations relates to Goffman's (1981) ideas about ratified participants, audience and bystander. Goffman's work is a way to advance the basic concept of stakeholder and influencer. These terms arise from stakeholder theory, which is not a communication theory but does draw out how communicative actions can change the status of relationships. So an organization can have many kinds of status related to the primary organization of interest that can shift over time – from the general audience to a bystander to a ratified participant. Compiling a list of possible and plausible connections then enables an examination of paths of strategy and instrumentation that were taken as well as those that were not to see exactly what impacted the infrastructure for communication.

The list of possible and plausible organizations was compiled through non-empirical analysis. As the case was dissected, I determined the list based on the events of the situation and organizations that could have become involved due to their size, type and mission. There is no literature to support this approach but it follows the idea that involvement is a distinction based on one's potential for being called-out or potential for doing the calling-out. For example, like CBS, the Associated Press, *Sporting News* and NBC are news and entertainment media organizations that provide in-depth coverage of North American sports and so they had the similar opportunity and motive to cover the Nike story. However unlike CBS, these companies are not identified in the case study as making a move thus they are marked as plausible organizations.

A1 is a table that shows all of the Participating and Plausible Organizations from the years of 1993 to 2004.

The institutionalized patterns that lie beneath an infrastructure for communication can come in a variety of shapes and sizes, which means that there is a need to have more than a cursory understanding regarding what organizations were in and out of the controversy. So rather than just map the actors, focus was given to defining the attributes of the organizations. Although the interest here is really the interactions between actors, and the roles and identities organizations take on during the controversy, knowing the attributes of the organizations will help to determine if certain types of organizations become standardized players within controversy. In other words, did certain types of organizations become entrenched ratified participants, bystanders or remain as the audience? The information on attributes included: type (corporation, NGO, Government, media, etc.), affiliation (industry, human rights, economic, etc.), mission, size, location,

length of existence and the history of the actor relative to situation. To gather attribute information, several Web sites were used including: the official organization Web site, Hoovers (a service that offers proprietary business information) and Charity Navigator (an independent evaluator for NGOs).

A2 is the Actor Table of Participating Organizations in the Nike controversy and A3 is the Actor Table of Plausible Organizations in the Nike controversy. Both tables list the organizations as per the entire case.

Moves

Moves are the basic building blocks of the joint actions that link organizations. Moves can either be nested within customary joint actions, part of emergent joint actions or floating around with no corresponding uptake action and thus not part of any joint action. There is both a presentation and up-taken move associated the completion of a joint action. So although the moves are described as the unit of observation, they cannot be separated from their respective joint action. For that reason, observation of the moves must be done in unison with joint actions. As such, the unit includes the moves presented and its content, actional and instrumental properties, the up-take move and the associated joint action.

To empirically classify the moves, instruments were collected and examined for symbolic and actional content. This technique was used for both moves presented and moves taken-up. This is because every move taken-up is conveyed through a follow-up move, which is delivered with an instrument. The joint actions were a bit more difficult to determine. In many instances it took interpretation to figure out was going on between the organizations. To help with the process of naming the moves and joint actions, a

coding scheme was devised based on various literatures that spotlight inter-organizational communication and interaction.

The move unit of observation is in the format of a yearly timeline. More specifically, two interrelated yearly sub-unit timelines were created: a move made timeline and a corresponding action timeline which shows the up-takes and joint actions associated with the moves presented. These timelines are a more delineated version of the overall timeline seen in T1. They describe actor entrance and exit, individual moves, joint actions that tie the actors and move materials that are enacted by the organizations. Actor entrance and exit was determined from the case study. Included in the action timeline is a description of the initiating move that was problematic i.e. what was called-out or rejected. Also added to the action timeline were the possible and plausible connections as they relate to the moves presented.

CM1 is the Moves Made Timeline for the Nike controversy (1993 to 2004) and CM2 is the corresponding Action Timeline for the Nike controversy (1993 to 2004).

Moves Made

Moves made are moves presented by an organization in a solitary fashion such as informing, criticizing, exposing or congratulating as well moves presented within a customary joint action such as a purchase. Moves can be presented in a variety of ways including being directed at a particular audience or dispersed into the public sphere where it can be picked-up by many organizations. The point is that moves are performed with a recipient in mind – they are presented for the purposes of completing a joint action. All moves are created to seek particular completing responses but messages are ambiguous and have more than one reasonable interpretation (Brown, 1990). Therefore even though

these initiating moves are bidding for a particular competing response, they do not have to be recognized as they were meant when first circulated or publicized. In that sense then, the most important aspect of the move presented is how it gets taken-up by other organizations.

Moves Up-take and Joint Actions

The uptake of a move is how it is received and interpreted. If a move gets picked-up and interpreted it becomes part of a joint action that connects two or more organizations directly. It is only when the uptake of a move occurs that something has been finished or pulled-off in joint activity. So really any organization can make a move within a controversy but it does not become part of a joint action until another organization picks it up, internalizes it and treats it with a subsidiary move. To that end, what a joint action is, or is supposed to be, is contingent on actual or predicted uptake of the initial individual move. Like moves presented, up-take moves can happen in a variety of ways such as attacking, negatively or positively criticizing, supporting, informing, etc. In addition, it is within the up-take of a move where an organization can call out the symbolic, instrumental and actional materials consequently further animating the controversy. Indeed this is why there is open-endedness to a controversy because almost anything can be called out and become fodder for more disagreement.

A joint action is the coordination of individual moves in situations where multiple parties are working together in incremental steps to pull something off (Clark, 1996). They are episodes where organizations coordinate content (intent) and process (physical and mental systems) so that something can be completed like a conversation or negotiation. Although Clark sees joint actions as the coordination of routines through

scheduled practice, the approach taken here is that joint actions can be scheduled as well as arising out of the spontaneity of subsidiary involvement with an individual move. As such, there are joint actions that are deliberately created to connect organizations such as an alliance, transaction or interview and there are also emergent joint actions, which happen on the fly such a cooperative criticism, broadcast exchange or take-into-account exchange.

Coding Communicative Moves and Joint Actions. The pragmatic approach to inter-organizational communication is different from any other, so to code the moves and joint actions a vernacular had to be constructed. Most of the research on inter-organizational communication remains largely descriptive and so it centers on the tactics and strategies enacted by organizations to create and disseminate messages (see Coombs, 2007). Although the work can be used as a basis for much of what happens during an inter-organizational CSR controversy, there are still certain parts of linkages that are theoretically underdeveloped such as the up-take of moves and the completion of collective actions. This required suspending the sender oriented models of communication to seek from other sources ways to define the remaining aspects of joint actions.

The process of developing the lexicon of inter-organizational communication was as follows: as the case was broken down move-by-move, what the organizations were attempting to pull-off was determined and then other literatures were used to define the particulars of the moves and joint actions. To be clear then, the pragmatics of communication was used as a background for the notion that organizations are connected by joint actions. The researcher then used literatures from other fields, including business

ethics, crisis communication, public relations, media studies and management, as a basis for describing features of the moves and joint actions that happen during the controversy.

Overall the scheme of coding actions was complicated by the fact that actions are always multifunctional. Any one move observed can potentially have multiple actions or meanings, which can only be seen as interaction unfolds. The evidence for description lies in both the interaction (presentation and up-take) as well as the subsequent chain of events (i.e. today's complaint is tomorrow's suggestion). Given this, two passes were made at the data. In the first pass at the data, characterizations were based on the action during the moment of classification. The second pass at the data came after the entire case study was coded. This second pass at the data was more of reevaluation of the moves to see if there were any ostensible changes in the classifications. In other words, an initial move of denying control might have been intended and picked-up as an assertion. However, after some time the move of denying control might get treated as an expressive with no assertive force -- that is, the propositional content can be dismissed because of the way the move was performed.

Table CM3 is a list of the Possible Communicative Moves Made during a CSR controversy. Table CM4 is a list of Possible Communicative Moves Taken-up during CSR controversy and JA2 is a list of the Possible Joint Actions that can occur during a CSR controversy. These lists are more comprehensive than what occurs in the Nike case because to determine what was happening here required compiling descriptions of all the possible actions regarding the context of CSR.

Instruments for Communication

For the instrument unit of observation, the instrument for communication identified was collected. Instruments are extensions of an organization (i.e., McLuhan, 1965) that impact perception, feeling and value (i.e., Postman, 1970). Instruments are central to moves because they generate a background of commitments, roles and expectations that influence how interactions play-out. Every instrument has at least one actor tied to it and in most instances, there are several actors tied through one instrument. For example, in 1997 Nike hired Good Works International to produce a report about the company's commitment to safe and customary working conditions at its factories. The report was the basis for much stakeholder criticism during 1997 as so it stood as the connection between Nike and several other organizations. Therefore the Good Works International report, as well all of the other instruments used during the case, was collected so that its properties could be analyzed. Like the actors and moves, also considered here were the instruments not used during the controversy because they too inform us about the behaviors taken by the organization.

Table II shows the Instruments Used and Not-used during the Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004).

Overall, what was observed was the back-and-forth move-countermove aspect of the inter-organizational communication that occurs in CSR controversies (e.g., Aakhus & Ziek, 2009; Vogel, 2006). The upshot is that any aspect of an initiating move (i.e. symbol, instrumental and actional materials) can be made problematic and as such called out. As Van Eemeren et al. (1994) explains, "any presupposed belief or intention associated with an act can be challenged and can give rise to argument" (p. 96). So as

organizations try to manage grievances and differences that arise out of questions regarding moves, a complex re-constructible disagreement-space evolves. The social structure is further built through an action-opposition sequence (Hutchby, 2001) where organizations are continually enacting moves to win the competition. Therefore the web of organizations that brought the Nike controversy into the public sphere was caught up in an indefinitely expanding structure with an endless number of open-ended standpoints for argument. But the current study was done to see what rules, habits and procedures of communication emerged to shape the content and form of the communication between Nike and its stakeholders. So after the actors, moves and instrument was observed and catalogued, the next step was to analyze the data so that the infrastructure could be identified and conclusions drawn regarding its role within the controversy.

Analyzing the Units of Observation for Patterns

This next section describes how the observed data was analyzed to see what became sedimentary, temporary and transitory within the controversy so that claims can be made regarding the infrastructure. Summarized in Figure D1, the approach taken here was to describe the actor-network, the communicative moves-network, and the instruments-network¹. The figure shows 12 quadrants as they fall over the three phases that represent the trajectory of the Nike controversy. Working down, Box 1 is the actor results for Phase I, Box 2 is the actor results in Phase II, Box 3 is the actor results for Phase III and Box 4 represents the overall understanding of the actors in the controversy including the patterns and standards that developed over the 11 years of the case.

¹ The term network is not meant to invoke the entire technical literature but more in a general sense that these elements exist in a web of interconnection.

Accordingly, Boxes 5 through 8 illustrate the communicative moves and Boxes 9 through 12 represent the instruments. Conceptually then, when all of these boxes were filled with data, Boxes 4, 8 and 12 were added together to get the infrastructure. The figure will be used throughout the study as a point of reference because it is a way to graphically highlight the relationship of a particular chapter to the overall purpose of the study. It is in the analysis of what was observed that the empirical questions relative to the Nike controversy were answered. At this point in the study then the empirical questions become specific to the Nike controversy as we are looking for patterns associated with just this particular situation.

Actor Network

Although actors are an important aspect of all studies, there was an additional significance given to actors here. As Bra et al. (2007) explains, the constitution of an infrastructure for communication is determined by the actors and the links of various kinds between the actors. During controversy, actors design communication so they can win the competition with other actors. However as organizations go back and forth what materializes are preferred forms of communication that organize the same actors into roles and sequences. As such, answering Empirical Question 1 was an important step in the investigation into the emergence of inter-organizational infrastructure for communication and its impact on the communicative behaviors of organizations within the Nike CSR controversy.

Three steps were taken to analyze the observed data and answer Empirical Question 1. The first step was to analyze A1 – the table that listed the actors relative to the entire controversy. This first step enabled an inclusive view of the organizations

involved and not involved in the controversy. The second step was to build tables that divided the actors phase by phase to see what actors were present during which times of the controversy. All of the tables in the second step included not only the participating organizations but also the list of possible and plausible actors. The third step was to determine frequencies relative to actors and their roles in both the context of the entire controversy as well as each individual phase. In addition to A1, three tables were used to answer Empirical Question 1. Tables A4 through A6 illustrate the Participating and Plausible Organizations as they correspond to each phase of the controversy.

Move Network

As Bra et al. (2007) explains, measuring infrastructure is contingent on tracing the links between actors and how or if earlier action influences what happens during subsequent interactions. The links between organizations are joint actions. But joint actions do not occur in isolation instead they are made-up of multiple moves. For that reason, analysis of the moves was done in unison with joint actions. By answering Empirical Question 2, an understanding was built-up of what moves and joint actions grew to become behavioral standards.

Infrastructure though has not been studied on an inter-organizational level and for that reason there is no prescribed methodology to draw out the how organizations design communication and the impact of the design work on an emerging meaning making and meaning management type system of communication. Infrastructural inversion is a reflective practice that involves assessing the communication practices relative to the actors to ascertain the relevant interventions and inventions. Making the inversion increasingly difficult was the fact that the joint action model of communication is a

complex way of describing interactions between organizations because there are many working parts (i.e., joint action, type of move, materials of move). For the study then, the inversion was done through qualitative means because as Lindloft and Taylor (2004) state, qualitative means provide solid footing when showing how groups of actors “develop unique rules and resources that guide members in how to act” (p. 6). The approach included building tables, counting frequencies and logically analyzing moves and joint action so that it became clear how the organizations came to rely on certain arrangements of behaviors.

Analyzing the moves and joint actions was a four step process. The first step was to build a table that just lists all the moves relative to the controversy. This first step also included a list of moves not made or taken-up because what the organizations chose not to do is obviously an important part of the behaviors of the controversy. The second step was to build tables to describe all of the joint actions relative to the controversy. The third step was to build tables that portrayed the moves and joint actions as they fall within the three different phases. From here, a nominal approach was taken where the frequency of each move and joint action was determined. After that, each move and joint action was analyzed to see what was going on between the organizations. In the end, what emerged was a plethora of data concerning move and joint action usage as well as an insight into understanding of the impact each had on the relationship between Nike and its stakeholders.

In all, eight tables were created to answer Empirical Question 2.

CM5 is a table of the Moves Made and Taken-up over the course of the Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004). There is no correspondence between the columns; they

simply list the Moves Made, Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Made and Plausible Moves Taken-up during the entire controversy. CM6 represents the Joint Actions that occur within the Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004). There is a relationship between the columns and rows in table CM6: each row illustrates an entire interaction i.e. move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three) and N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM7 is a table of the Moves Made and Taken-up during Phase I (1993 to 1995). There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Moves Made, Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Made and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase I (1993 to 1995) of the controversy. CM8 is a list table of the Joint Actions that occur within Phase I (1993 to 1995) of the controversy. There is a relationship between the columns and rows in the table: each row illustrates an entire interaction i.e. move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three) and N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM9 represents the Moves Made and Taken-up during Phase II (1996 to 1997). There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Moves Made, Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Made and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase II (1996 to 1997) of the controversy. CM10 is a list table of the Joint Actions that occur within Phase II (1996 to 1997) of the controversy. There is a relationship between the columns and rows in the table: each row illustrates an entire interaction i.e. move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three) and

N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM11 is a table of the Moves Made and Taken-up during Phase III (1998 to 2004). There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Moves Made, Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Made and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase III (1998 to 2004) of the controversy. CM12 is a list table of the Joint Actions that occur within Phase III (1998 to 2004) of the controversy. There is a relationship between the columns and rows: each row illustrates an entire interaction i.e. move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three) and N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

Instrument Network

An instrument for communication is any extension of an organization used to mediate stakeholder environments. As representations of the firm, they deliver actional and content material and as such are central to how organizations enact moves. As Aakhus and Ziek (2009) explain, the truly important aspect of instruments for communication is that they get bundled into an evolving tailored ecology that emerges based on the habitual exigencies of business relationships. This repertoire of instruments is the backbone of the infrastructure for communication because it arises relative to the misunderstandings, grievances and problems at the center of the controversy.

The starting point for answering Empirical Question 3 is the Move Presented Timeline because it details all the communicative data collected on the controversy including what ties exists between the organizations. The first step to understanding what

instruments were used and what impact they had on the relationships between firms was to build tables that portrayed the instruments present and not-present throughout the controversy. The next step was to build tables to describe the instruments as they are used and not used within the 3 different phases. From here, a nominal approach was taken where the frequency of each instrument was determined. After that, a more inferential approach was taken where the instrumental properties were examined in relation to the actors, moves and joint actions.

In all, there were three tables used to answer Empirical Question 3. Table I2 shows the Instruments Used and Not-used during Phase I (1993 to 1995) of the Nike Controversy. Table I3 is the Instruments Used and Not-used during Phase II (1996 to 1997) of the Nike Controversy. Table I4 shows the Instruments Used and Not-used during Phase III (1998 to 2004) of the Nike Controversy.

The focus of the current study is on interaction that surfaces due to the pressures brought on through the questioning or rejection of organizational activities and accounts by stakeholders. The presumption is that designs for communication emerge as the web of activity unfolds to resolve situational exigencies that result from the demand for communication. Therefore as organizations work to shape the controversy, what gets built-up is an infrastructure of communication that enables the situation to be worked out. However bringing together all of the different research trajectories under one methodological umbrella has never been done. So in many instances inferential means were used to answer the empirical questions so that the next level of abstraction could be taken, which was to determine the infrastructure that emerged within this controversy. After all of the data on actors, moves and instruments was analyzed for patterns, the next

empirical step was to take the information found and determine how it worked together to create an infrastructure for communication and how the infrastructure impacted the behavior of the organizations involved in the controversy.

Analyzing the Infrastructure for Communication

The final section of the current chapter describes the data and methods used to answer the overall Research Question. A research question poses a relationship between two or more things (Kratwohl, 1998) and in this case those things are the infrastructure that emerges within the controversy and the communicative behaviors of the organizations during the controversy. Considering that the communicative behaviors of organizations have been described at length (i.e., roles, moves and joint actions), what remains is an explanation of how the infrastructure for communication was determined and how its relationship to the strategy and instrumentation of the organizations was uncovered.

Articulating the Role of Infrastructure for Communication

The goal here was to express the logic of the infrastructure in its final state as it related to how the patterns of actors, moves and instruments fit together. Because infrastructure is a framework that reaches beyond a single event (Star & Ruhleder, 1996), articulating the infrastructure realized in the Nike controversy required analyzing how the patterns that emerged over the 11 years of the controversy worked in conjunction with one another. Indeed Star (1999) makes the methodological point that “reading” an infrastructure requires unfreezing the way that its observable points work in concert. Infrastructure in the context of an inter-organizational controversy differs from extant infrastructure studies that rely on first hand participant observation of technology use.

Given that first hand observation was not possible for the present case, the approach taken here was to document different networks of actors, moves and instruments over time as a means for engaging in infrastructural inversion. In other words, what the infrastructure for communication was and was not was inferred from the reduced data (Krippendorff, 2004) of actors, moves and instruments. As such, no tables were created for this portion of the analysis instead it was done by “reading” the findings to the empirical questions.

So after identifying the infrastructure, another level of abstraction was chased which was to measure the impact it had on the content and form of the organizational communication within the controversy. That is, after having a tangible infrastructure to speak of, the relationship between it and the particular moves made by the organizations was assessed. In other words, the articulated infrastructure was compared to the communicative behaviors of the organizations to see what they had in common. The idea was to determine how the infrastructure matched up to particular communication behaviors and see exactly if there was a clear association between what the organizations were doing during the controversy and the infrastructure for communication.

Conclusion to Methodology

The ultimate goal of the current project is to see how an infrastructure for communication impacts the behavior of organizations within a controversy. To answer the question, a great deal of data had to be collected and analyzed. The next chapters describe in depth what was found and how indeed Nike and its stakeholders came to rely on communicative rules, procedures and arrangements during the controversy.

CHAPTER IV

ACTOR NETWORK RESULTS

What types of roles emerge in the CSR controversy involving Nike? A variety of organizations became involved in the CSR controversy including corporations, governments, news and entertainment media, NGOs, NPOs and loosely formed social collectives. What emerged as the organizations became embroiled in the controversy were myriad roles. Beyond the corporation that is called-out, the activity within the CSR controversy is dominated by news and entertainment media, NGO and nonprofit organizations and the roles these organizations play. The concept of the actor-network in CSR is typically used to describe firm-stakeholder networks where society is continually evaluating the balance between business' conduct aimed at maximizing economic profit and conduct aimed at maximizing social welfare (Welcomer, 2002). Here actor network refers to the web of organizations that comes together relative to the CSR controversy. The creation of actor networks² in this way is evident in the present study because a network of organizations did form for the sole purpose of participating in the Nike controversy.

Infrastructure is a tacit design for communication, so the current study was created to uncover its most observable aspects through an inversion at the end of the time frame of the controversy. As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D2, this starts with describing the actor network. The methodological goal was to analyze the observed data on organizations so that patterns relative to actors could be identified

² This study does not use actor-network theory. Although there are certain compatibilities between actor-network theory and this study, the key concepts and terms of actor-network theory are not used here.

for each phase of the controversy. Answering the empirical question that frames the chapter then required analyzing the data in quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4. To do this, three steps were taken. The first was to create a table that simply lists all of the actors involved in the controversy. The second was to create tables which itemized the presence (and absence) of actors in each phase. Thus, these tables list participating organizations as well as actors that could have possibly become involved in the controversy. The third step was to establish the frequency at which actors, actor types and roles emerged in both the entire controversy and each individual phase.

The description and analysis reported in the chapter are arranged as follows. The chapter starts with an inclusive description of the organizations involved in the entire controversy and then follows with a description of the organizations involved in the specific phase of the controversy. Both of these levels of data are analyzed so that the patterns of actors can be identified. Finally, the chapter ends with a series of comments on related developments in the CSR literature. More specifically, because the attributes of the organizations (i.e. size, location, mission, length of existence) are examined, the results are used to discuss some of the more common explanations for the roles associated with CSR such as those taken-on by the news and entertainment media, NGOs and nonprofit organizations.

Actor Network Observations

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004): Nike and its Stakeholders

There were 28 organizations identified in the case study as being involved in the controversy. These include news and entertainment media, NGOs, government, educational, corporate and miscellaneous, social organizations. These 28 organizations

then are the participating organizations and their attributes and moves stood as the secondary data for the study. Out of these 28 organizations, 54% were a news and entertainment media, NGO or nonprofit organization, which are not direct stakeholders but by and large influencers. Although this is only a bit over half, the percentage becomes more significant considering that 21% of the organizations are only theoretically described as organizations. That is, 21% of the organizations in the controversy were deemed organizations because they were social collectives in which the activities of individuals were coordinated in order to achieve some sort of goal. These 6 organizations were not formal or structured like the rest of the participating actors. This includes Nike Employees, Nike consumers, reporters, Mark Kasky and Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice. In these cases, individuals were working together in a moment in time for some specific purpose. For example, Mark Kasky is a California citizen that acted “as a private attorney general” for the state (Vogel, 2005, p. 81) and brought suit against Nike for deceptive advertising. Mark Kasky assumed a role bigger than himself and thus for the purpose of the current study, an organization. These are loose descriptions of organizations but as Taylor and Cooren (1997) explain, organizations come in varying forms which means that the difference between interpersonal, group, organizational and inter-organizational communication is simply a matter of degree.

Phase I (1993 to 1995): The Media Starts It All

From 1993 to 1995, Nike and CBS were the only organizations involved in the controversy. Nike’s rejection of CBS’s claims about the company’s use of child labor began the controversy. Nike and CBS represented 7% of the participating organizations for the entire case. Because there are no other organizations involved in the controversy

at this time, it was important to consider as part of the analysis the organizations that were not explicitly active.

The list of non-participating organizations includes news and entertainment media organizations like the Associated Press, *Sporting News* or NBC and apparel manufacturers such as The Gap, Guess, Puma and Reebok. The reason for highlighting these three news and entertainment media organizations is that they are known for their coverage of North American sports and sports related stories. The plausibility of Gap, Guess, Puma and Reebok getting involved in the controversy lies in the fact that the media could have called out any of these organizations. In particular, both Puma and Reebok had been called-out by news and entertainment media organizations about the same practices that Nike sub-contractors were using (Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, 2000).

Phase II (1996 to 1997): Societal Stakeholder Variation

Phase II was the most intense of the three phases in terms of the number and types of actors involved in the controversy. Phase II had 61% of the entire number of actors in the controversy. And with news and entertainment media organizations, governments, NGOs, nonprofits, corporations and loosely based organizations all making moves it also had the most variation in organizational type. During Phase II, 38% of the organizations were news and entertainment media organizations, 25% miscellaneous, 18% NGOs, 6% government and 6% educational.

The organizations involved in Phase II included both organizations that were connected directly with Nike and a small clique of organizations that interacted with one another about the issues germane to the controversy. The organizations that are directly connected with Nike included news and entertainment media organizations *Life*

Magazine, Business Week, Doonesbury, New York Times and *Wall Street Journal*. The company was also connected to the Clinton Administration, Good Works International, Ernst & Young and the Tuck School of Business. And finally, during Phase II, Nike interacted with consumer groups that were boycotting the opening of their retail stores and the NGO TRAC, which heavily criticized the company regarding the Nike factory audit done by Ernst & Young. In addition, there are 5 organizations involved in the controversy but not through interactions with Nike. Nike Employees, UNIDO, reporters, Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice were all embroiled in Phase II because they are interacting with one another about the issues of the controversy.

Topping the list of organizations not involved in Phase II were apparel manufacturers such as Puma, Mitre and Adidas. Their absence is important because the purpose of Nike's alliance with the Clinton Administration was to create the Apparel Industry Partnership. Participation in the alliance meant signing an agreement that stipulated a workplace code of conduct and allowing outside monitoring of production plants. Nike was the first organization to join the alliance, which they did in 1996. Puma and Adidas didn't join until 1999 (De Wit & Meyer, 2010), which is well into the third phase of the Nike controversy.

There was also another group of organizations that were curiously absent from Phase II. In the mid to late 1990s, Ken Griffey Jr. was a major league baseball player who garnered just as much attention on and off the field as Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice. Griffey Jr. was also a Nike spokesman but he was not questioned about the company's operational procedures. In addition, all of these sports figures – Jordan, Rice and Griffey, Jr. – were employees of both franchises and leagues (i.e. Chicago Bulls, NBA, San

San Francisco 49ers, NFL, Seattle Mariners, and MLB) - none of which were active members in the Nike controversy. The absence of the sporting franchises and sports leagues is interesting considering that the most recognizable employees of these very public organizations were in some way connected to the use of child labor for profit.

Phase III (1998 to 2004): NGOs, Nonprofits and Kasky

Phase III involved 36% of the participating organizations. There were fewer organizations than in Phase II but still the same amount of variety among actor types. Of the organizations involved in Phase III, 40% were NGOs or activists, 30% news and entertainment media, 20% government and 10% educational.

The participating actors were Harvard Business School, National Press Club, British Broadcasting Company (BBC), an unnamed NGO (unnamed as per Vogel's account), Press For Change, Ministry of Education and Training, Vietnam, Mark Kasky, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), California Court System and Starter Apparel. There was a shift from the dominance of news and entertainment media organizations in Phase II to NGOs, governments and nonprofits. In other words, where in Phase II the media was heavily engaged in the controversy here there is a switch to NGOs and nonprofits.

Forty percent of the participating organizations in Phase III became so following the lawsuit that Mark Kasky filed against Nike. Due to the action between Mark Kasky and Nike, a host of other organizations became embroiled in the controversy. Acting on behalf of the public, Kasky was seeking monetary and injunctive relief under California laws designed to curb false advertising and unfair competition. The California Court System, ACLU, the Ministry of Education of Vietnam and Starter Apparel were all

drawn in because they pull-off joint actions³ with either Kasky or Nike relative to the lawsuit.

Some of the organizations not involved in Phase III include Vietnam Labor Watch, American Association of Advertising Agencies, *Advertising Age*, Nike Shareholders, Converse, Public Relations Society of America, the Bush Administration and The Body Shop. Of all these, focus should be given to the exclusion of American Association of Advertising Agencies, Public Relations Society of America and *Advertising Age*. Kasky v. Nike was a seminal event because it had severe implications for how commercial versus free speech is defined (McHale, Zompetti & Moffitt, 2007). Part of Nike's defensive maneuvering was the completion of an alliance with the ACLU in which the deliverable was a brief that argued in support of company's first amendment rights. Yet Nike did not choose to align with the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Public Relations Society of America or *Advertising Age*, organizations that advocate for the rights of companies to free speech. These organizations are leading sources of news and conversation for the marketing and media communities but they constructed themselves as bystanders by not directly participating.

Actor Analysis

After answering EQ1 what becomes obvious is that there are indeed some basic patterns of actor roles and organizational types. The first thing that bears attention was the increased variety of the types of organizations that got involved as the controversy unfolded. The controversy began small with just Nike and the media arguing over the use of child labor but as the controversy continued it expanded and enveloped governments,

³ Pulled-off is a technical terms that was created for the study. It means to complete a joint action.

NGOs, nonprofit, news and entertainment media and social collective organizations. These organizations were activated for different reasons but the point is that their involvement in the controversy pushed it in directions that Nike had to eventually consider and deal with. As Margolis and Walsh (2003) explain, there are factors within each environment that drive corporations to perform different behaviors, at different times, making CSR strategy and instrumentation contingent upon the nature of the relationships that consume the organizations. Calling out was generative of the relationships that formed during the controversy as well as the trajectory of the controversy. The controversy took shape through participation (and non-participation) of certain actors and the roles that emerge as participants become embroiled in it.

Although there were a variety of organizations that participated in the controversy, the action was dominated by news and entertainment media, NGO and nonprofit organizations. During Phase II, 38% of the organizations were news and entertainment media organizations and 18% NGO or nonprofit and during Phase III 40% were NGO or nonprofit and 30% media. Several studies regarding CSR have concluded that news and entertainment media organizations, NGO and activist organizations act as corporate monitors shaping the issues and consequently the behavior of companies (i.e., Harrison & Scorse, 2004). Indeed as Campbell (2004) explains, ensuring corporate social responsibility requires that outsiders beyond the state are powerful and organized well enough to provide a counterbalance to corporate power. The current study shows that Nike, and the controversy the company faced about its supply chain, was no different. News and entertainment media, NGO and nonprofit organizations played a principal role in pressuring Nike to make changes to its behaviors and subsequently communicate about

these changes. But unlike other studies, here we see that news and entertainment media organizations are more active early on in the controversy and their participation reduces as time goes on. This is opposite to the participation of NGO and nonprofit organizations as these types of organizations became more involved as the controversy unfolded.

But the deeper story told here is that with dispersed operations in the global supply chain what is happening is the construction of a disagreement-space bound by organizational participation. The way that CSR was made visible and accountable to the global public sphere is through the way the organizations become embroiled in the controversy. The controversy was not just about informing or persuading but how the attachment between organizations generates the future actions of informing or persuading. Therefore making sense of how Nike's CSR strategy and instrumentation emerges means finding new ways to understand the role organizations played during the controversy.

Comments on Related Developments in CSR Literature

Organizational types and organizational roles

The story of how Nike used certain CSR strategies and instruments is not a simple one. The company's CSR communication was built through the actions of the organizations that were embroiled in the controversy. These actions generated an infrastructure for communication where actor roles were emergent designs that filled the vacuum for how to invent and reinvent CSR strategies and instruments. So determining what roles become patterns is part of the infrastructure inversion. The aim here then is to describe how roles evolved relative to the controversy and how they are an aspect of the infrastructure for communication.

In the global economy, the news and entertainment media are conventionally understood to act as watchdogs constantly demanding that corporations behave in socially responsible ways (Schwartz & Gibb, 1999). The news and entertainment media draw attention to inconsistencies and ironies in corporate behavior. As O’Callaghan (2007) explains, over the past 50 years media outlets have proven their willingness to highlight corporate shortcomings. However the actual power of the news and entertainment media does not lie in their judgment but in their ability to stimulate others to act (see also, Birth, Illia, Lurati & Zamparini, 2008; Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). According to McHale et al. (2007), the reporting done by outlets such as the *New York Times* was “circulated and picked-up among” many different stakeholders consequently spurring them to act.

According to Dyck and Zingales (2002), there are three ways that the media can impact corporate governance. First, media attention can drive politicians to introduce law that reforms corporate behavior. Second, media attention can affect the standard channels of economic models such as consumers, customers and supply chain partners. Third, media attention can affect stakeholder’s perceptions and the view of the organization in the eyes of society at large. We see all three at work in the Nike controversy. Consumers, the Clinton Administration and TRAC, to name a few, all became active within the controversy as per some sort of media intervention. The media set the agenda for the controversy and stimulated other organizations to get involved with how it played out.

Much like the news and entertainment media, the rising influences of NGOs and nonprofit organizations is one of the most significant developments in international affairs in the past 20 years (Doh & Guay, 2006). NGOs are corporate influencers - they

impact how and why managers and boards of directors make decisions. According to Doh and Guay, the interactions between NGOs and corporations resulted in changes in the environmental and social performance of the corporations. And more to the point of the current project, they also argue that NGOs and nonprofits play a crucial role in developing communicative standards that can and are followed by companies as they attempt to deliver the messages of CSR. There is one caveat to the presence and impact of NGOs and nonprofit organizations - one thing that this study shows that is not developed in the literature - the role of these organizational types grows over time. Moreover the increased participation is not only due to the desire of these organizations to see changes in Nike's production process but also because the company comes to rely on these types of organizations to supplement their communicative strategy. Nike used the NGOs and nonprofit organizations for the resources they held relative to CSR reputation and knowledge. So although the media started the controversy, it was really taken over by NGOs and nonprofit organizations but not entirely in the way that conventional wisdom would dictate.

According to Spar and La Mure (2002), NGOs and nonprofit organizations became increasingly involved in the Nike situation because they wanted to see changes to the global production of sneakers and apparel. To a degree this worked as NGOs and nonprofit organizations mobilized resources and advocated for change, which forced Nike to make decisions regarding its social and environmental behavior. These decisions and changes happened gradually over the trajectory of the controversy. As Spar and Mure further explain, as the controversy went on the efforts of NGOs and nonprofits resulted in improved working conditions in Nike's factories in developing countries. Therefore the

presence of such organizations as UNIDO, TRAC and Press For Change stimulated changes to Nike's approach to the controversy. But it is also the case that the increased participation of NGOs and other nonprofit organizations such as activists and educational institutions was a result of how Nike chose to communicate during the controversy.

Nike comes to rely heavily on these organizations when developing and implementing their communicative strategy. For instance, during Phase II, Nike aligned with Dartmouth Tuck School of Business to investigate the wages paid to contract employees. The entrance of Dartmouth found moderate success in the arena of public opinion but it still stimulated the company to bring in more NGOs and educational organizations as the controversy moved forward. By Phase III, aligning with non-profit organizations had become a central part of Nike's CSR communication. When Jeffrey Ballinger, the CEO of Press For Change attacked Nike in a *New York Times* article, the company responded by using an NGO to investigate the language used in factories. And when Mark Kasky sued Nike, the company chooses to build an alliance with the ACLU. Therefore the increase involvement of NGOs and nonprofit organizations was not only due to their desire but also because of Nike's tactical communicative behaviors. This point expands on Hunter, Menestrel and de Bettignies' (2008) study of the 2001 consumer boycott over Danone SA's decision to close biscuit plants in Europe without properly notifying union workers. Hunter et al. explains that communication strategies must include a stakeholder-centric perspective as opposed to opinion-centric. In the latter, communicative strategies are focused on setting an agenda for opinion through the release of information. That is, management cannot simply attempt to control information

to control opinion but create instances where they create a shared means of information control.

Conclusion to Actor Network Results

Although there were a variety of organizations in the controversy, it was dominated by news and entertainment media, NGO and nonprofit organizations. Out of these 28 organizations, 54% were either a media organization, NGO or nonprofit. During Phase II, 38% of the organizations were media organizations and 18% NGOs or nonprofit and during Phase III 40% were NGOs or nonprofit and 30% media. However here we see that media organizations are more active early on in the controversy. Their participation reduces as time goes on. This is opposite to the participation of NGO and activist organizations as these types of organizations became more involved in the controversy as it unfolded.

The central concept of infrastructure is that at one point during the Nike controversy there was no infrastructure and through the struggle between the actors one emerged. The infrastructure for communication arose as actors assumed roles in an attempt to discipline the communicative order. The roles that actors invented and reinvented to win the competition were generated by the communicative process itself. So mapping the actors, and actor roles, is an important empirical step when investigating the emergence of infrastructure for communication. But analyzing the actors involved in a controversy only answers one piece of the puzzle. An infrastructure explains and is explained through the patternization of certain actors and actor types as well as the moves and instruments that they invent and reinvent when they are embroiled in a controversy.

The next step then is to add some complexity and turn the focus to moves and joint actions that tied the organizations during the controversy.

CHAPTER V

MOVE NETWORK RESULTS

What moves were made in the CSR controversy involving Nike? Organizations make variety of moves from reporting to informing to making the CSR case and, in turn, organizations respond to, or take-up, the moves of others. The back and forth move and counter-move makes the controversy shift in many directions. The present chapter conceptualizes this in terms of a move network which is closely aligned with the work that traces the creation and maintenance of a disagreement-space. However the move network here refers precisely to the web of communication and interaction that tied the organizations together during the CSR controversy.

A move network follows the idea that “communication is not just transformation of information” but the fact that when organizations communicate, they also act (Lind & Goldkuhl, 2003, p. 328). So it encompasses more than the symbolic messaging that is typically looked at in CSR communication studies (i.e., Seiter, 1995; Tyler, 1992). A communicative move network is evident in the present study because the organizations were constantly making moves based on other’s moves. There was a move-counter-move aspect to the CSR controversy where moves and counter-moves open-up and close-off opportunities for next moves, which can only occur if the moves were connected in a web of relations.

Infrastructure is a tacit design for communication, so the current study was created to uncover its most observable aspects through an inversion at the end of the time frame of the controversy. As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D3, this includes describing the move network. The methodological goal was to analyze

observed data on moves and joint actions so that patterns could be identified. Answering the empirical question that frames this chapter required analyzing the data in quadrants 5, 6, 7, and 8. To do this, tables were created to illustrate the moves and joint actions relative to the controversy as well as the moves and joint actions that occurred within each phase. From here, a nominal approach was taken by counting the frequency of each move and joint action relative to the entire controversy and to each phase. The final step was an analysis of the moves and joint actions to see the impact of each on the trajectory of the controversy.

This chapter is set-up as follows. First the inclusive list of moves and joint actions is described. Then, the moves and joint actions for each phase are described. After all of the information is analyzed for identifiable patterns, the chapter ends with a series of comments on related developments in the CSR literature. More specifically, the chapter argues that by looking at CSR strategy and instrumentation through the lens of pragmatics, the definition changes from a vehicle for public relations to a tactical corporate behavior used to mediate stakeholder environments.

Move Network Observations

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004): A Structure of Variation

Even though the Nike controversy has been studied by numerous communication researchers, there are still questions regarding the actual ties that existed between the organizations. In other words, there has been talk about the development of specific instruments such as the code of conduct (i.e., Kolk & van Tuldere, 2002) or non-financial reports (i.e., Locke, Qin & Brause, 2007) but not so much the linkages that existed between the company and its stakeholders. The linkages that connect organizations are

joint actions, which are composed of a presentation and up-take communicative move. Moves are actions performed by an organization in a solitary fashion such as informing, criticizing or questioning. Moves are composed of a combination of content, actional and instrumental materials and spur others to defend themselves, negotiate, argue or ignore the claims, assertions and overtures made. When moves occur in an adjacency pair (presentation and up-take), a joint action occurs. Joint actions are the situations where multiple parties are working together in incremental steps to pull something off (Clark, 1996) such as an alliance broadcast exchange or interview.

There were a total of 35 moves presented by 14 organizations during the controversy. Of these moves, 77% were taken-up to complete 31 joint actions with 23% of the moves not taken-up or treated with a follow up action. Nine percent of the moves made were taken-up by multiple organizations. In other words, these moves were the fodder for more than one organization's follow-up move. There was an almost equal split of 55% to 45% between sanctioned joint actions and those that consist of an emergent up-take of presented material. What that means is that beyond the 14 presenting organizations, the other 14 organizations were involved with the controversy because they were part of completed complicit joint actions such as an alliance, conflict resolution, interview, material transaction or a speech. Put another way, these 14 organizations were not coded as having participated in the controversy by picking-up a mass presented move but as mutual partners in scripted or formal joint actions.

There was a range of moves made during this controversy. Some of the moves were simple and straightforward such as informing, which is presented by both stakeholder organizations and Nike. At the same time, there were also more complex

moves made during the controversy including incidents like when Nike make a defensive move such as denying connection, which means to refuse the moral or legal liability of a distinct and separate organization (Phillips, 2010). In any case, to perform these moves, the organizations drew on a vast array of actional, content and instrumental material. Of the 35 presented moves, there were 30 different combinations, which included use of all seven of the actional materials from Searle's taxonomy, the three content compositions as described by Kaufer and Butler and 17 instruments for communication.

The top three moves used during the controversy were partnering, reporting and informing. Partnering was used 20% percent of the time, reporting occurred 17% of the time and informing, which is used by both Nike and stakeholder organizations, accounted for 11% of the moves. Other than these 3 moves, no other move is made more than 6% of the time. That means that partnering, reporting and informing make-up 49% of all the moves presented during the 11 years of the Nike controversy. As far as the up-take moves are concerned, at 23% partnering was taken-up more than any move. Nike drew on this move most as it accounted for 37% of the total number of moves made by the company. Attacking accounted for 19% making it the second most widely occurring up-take move. However what is most interesting about attacking was that it was only taken-up by Nike – no other organization sees a presented move as an attack. In particular, no other shoe company sees the moves made as attacks. Beyond attacking, no particular up-take happens more than 6% of the time.

Indeed there were many different moves presented and taken-up during the 11 years of the case study. However at the same time there were a plethora of moves not presented or taken-up. The following moves have been identified in prior literature as

occurring in inter-organizational communication but are not made during the Nike controversy. These moves include: bolstering, which is reducing the offensiveness of an act or situation by stressing the good traits of the organization (Benoit & Pang, 2008); denying responsibility, which is when an organization outright refuses to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of a behavior, conduct or activity (Benoit & Pang, 2008); differentiating, or reducing the offensiveness of an act or situation by stressing what others have done (Benoit & Pang, 2008); evading by accident, which is stating that the behavior of the organization was a mishap and not a conscious planned act (Benoit & Pang, 2008); evading by good intention, which happens when communication centers on how the behaviors of the organization were meant to do well (Benoit & Pang, 2008); over-confessing, which is when an organization turns public statements into therapeutic sessions and unburdens their frustrations by over admitting their role in the controversy (Doorley & Garcia, 2011); and transcending, which is a move to reduce the offensiveness of an act or situation by stating there are more important considerations (Benoit & Pang, 2008). The point to take away here is that the participating organizations had a plethora of moves to choose from but for the most part stuck to using the same moves over and over.

The joint actions pulled-off during the controversy fall into three levels of reoccurrence. The first level consisted of the broadcast exchange and the alliance. These two joint actions were the most widely practiced making-up 48% of all the joint actions. The second level consisted of the take-into-account exchange and conflict resolution. Although not as highly performed as the first level, these two joint actions occurred 23% of the time. These first two levels accounted for 71% of all the joint actions and so most

of the communicative action took place within them. The third level rounded out the action and consisted of the chat, cooperative criticism, interview, material transaction and speech. All of the variation among the individual moves and joint actions made the controversy a complex environment. Navigating the social context was a tenuous endeavor where the organizations needed to invent and reinvent strategy and instrumentation within the circumstances at hand. This becomes an important point when making a case for how the particular infrastructure for CSR communication emerged and its standards developed.

Phase I (1993 to 1995): Nike Denies Connection to Child Labor

Phase I lasted from 1993 until 1995. With two presenting moves and one joint action, it encompassed only 6% of the entirety of moves presented and 3% of the joint actions. CBS started the controversy in 1993 by reporting on Nike sub-contractor's use of child labor in Indonesia. The move was taken-up by Nike as an attack. Their response was to deny connection to the organizations in the supply chain. As Phillips (2010) explains, denying connection occurs when a company refuses to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of another organization's behavior, conduct or activity through the argument that the organizations are distinct entities. Indeed that is exactly what happened as the Nike's General Manager in Jakarta stated: "they are our subcontractors. It is not within our scope to investigate any allegations of labor violations." Although Phase I included only two moves, it upholds an important theoretical aspect of the study— not all moves are picked-up and treated with a follow-up move.

Nike tried to maintain an arms-length relationship to the issue of child labor though an unwillingness to accept responsibility for the behaviors of sub-contractors

(Phillips, 2010). Although the move has become something of academic lore (see Boji, 1999), it was never taken-up, it was not part of a completed joint action. It is an example of a move that just floated in the public sphere with no corresponding action and illustrates that not everything that a company does is the foundation for social action.

Phase II (1996 to 1997): Nike Under-Attack

Although it was the shortest of all the phases, with 18 joint actions, 17 moves presented and 18 moves taken-up, most of the drama activity within the controversy occurred in Phase II. 58% of all the completed joint actions and 49% of the moves presented within the entire controversy occurred between the years of 1996 and 1997. Within that, there were 10 different moves presented, 9 different moves taken-up and 6 different types of joint actions. Even though Nike was at the center of the controversy, they only made 29% of the moves meaning that most of the communication was done by stakeholder or influencer organizations.

The Nike controversy took a respite between 1994 and 1995 in that there wasn't any direct action between the company and its stakeholder. That is not to say that there wasn't activity regarding the issue of child labor. From 1990 to 1996, the number of articles in major newspapers about all types of sweatshops more than tripled, peaking at 1500 articles in 1996 (Harrison & Scorse, 2004). So the issue of child labor was being discussed heavily in the public sphere but the controversy relative to Nike was dormant. The Nike controversy was reactivated in 1996 when the company pulled-off a broadcast exchange with *Life Magazine*. Nike chose to treat an article by *Life Magazine* with a follow-up move of its own thus ushering in Phase II of the controversy.

It is important to note the change in the issues relative to the controversy. The content of the societal organizations' moves during Phase II began to encompass more than child labor. Societal organizations began to harass and assail Nike regarding a host of social and environmental issues associated with the company's supply chain. For instance, TRAC's move criticizing Nike was done by drawing on content that described how the 9,200 workers in the Tae Kwang Vina plant in Vietnam were forced to work 65 hours a week for \$10 a week. And the *New York Times* drew on content about how the same workers were also exposed to carcinogens. The introduction of the content pushed the disagreement-space in a new direction. The controversy moved beyond a disagreement about the use of child labor to a disagreement about how Nike treated all its workers. In terms of the relationship between the emerging structure of the controversy, as evident in the calling out behavior, and the formation of an infrastructure, the addition of other issues is interesting. The point is that the inversion here identifies a place and time where a key aspect of the future infrastructure was created. The back-and-forth moves and counter-moves made in Phase II generated the part of the infrastructure that worked to afford and constrain how CSR was defined during future interactions.

In addition, the introduction of these new issues forced Nike to invent and reinvent strategy and instrumentation that dealt not only with the issue of child labor but a series of other CSR-related aspects. For example, one of Nike's responses to the introduction of the new content was partnering with The Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth to pull-off an operational alliance. The goal of the alliance was to have the school investigate the wages paid in Indonesia factories. Nike's move here was very specific: they want stakeholders to see the company as transparent – that they were open

and willing to have all their operational procedures examined. So the way that the controversy developed led to the formation of the infrastructure for CSR communication around these issues. When the rest of the moves and joint actions are studied from Phase II, an even better understanding of how the organizations carefully develop their strategic communication begins to take shape.

Partnering was the most widely presented and taken-up move accounting for 22% of all the action. However partnering is associated with a completed, sanctioned joint action. Therefore to get a better understanding of what was happening during these years, it is better to discuss the second most widely taken-up move - attacking, which was taken-up 18% of the time. Nike takes-up numerous stakeholder moves as an attack. As stakeholders made moves and countermoves, Nike internalized their particular symbolic and material qualities as attacks on the company, its executives or reputation. So even though the moves made by stakeholders included commenting, criticizing and informing, Nike treats them as assaults supported by harsh or unfriendly words.

Another way of looking at the action in Phase II is by breaking down the joint actions. There were 2 kinds: joint actions that included Nike and joint actions that were completed without Nike but were still focused on the issues relative to the company's social and environmental behaviors.

Nike Interacts

The first kind involved Nike completing both emergent and sanctioned joint actions with stakeholders. Nike connected with organizations through emergent joint actions such as a take-into-account exchange with consumers and a cooperative criticism with TRAC. In addition, Nike pulled-off several broadcast exchanges with the news and

entertainment media including *Life Magazine*, *Business Week*, *Doonesbury*, *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*. The activity relative to these broadcast exchanges mirrors the action in Phase I and shows that the news and entertainment media were playing an important role in the controversy. During Phase II, Nike also interacted with a host of other types of organizations. Nike completed alliances (operational and strategic, i.e. Contractor, 2007) with the Clinton Administration, Good Works International, Ernst & Young and the Tuck School of Business.

The alliance is both a joint action and an instrument (like the interview or meeting) so it is a link between organizations and the accomplishment of something. In that way then, the alliance (like the interview or meeting) has both move and instrumental aspects, which convey different senses. To separate the two terms the communicative move is named an alliance and the instrument is named an inter-organizational alliance. The alliance is the completion of strategic interaction with other organizations and the instrument is the tie that enables the organizations to pull-off the interaction. The alliance can be further defined by the dimensions of joint actions described by Clark - the alliance is a scripted, formal interaction that has high collaboration between organizations. The inter-organizational alliance is the extension of the firm that gave Nike the actual access to certain resources (i.e. expertise in the area of CSR and the reputation of the organization) as well as the ability to adhere to certain cultural standards. Clearly they are closely aligned because there cannot be one without the other. But as far as strategy and instrumentation are concerned, they must be separated so that the current study can explain how both were attempts to discipline the communicative context.

Stakeholders Interact

There were a series of interactions that were consequential to trajectory of the controversy that did not include Nike. Nike Employees, UNIDO, TRAC, *New York Times*, reporters, Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice were embroiled in Phase II because they completed joint actions with one another about Nike's social and environmental misbehaviors. However this communicative action is nonetheless just as important for understanding the unfolding of the controversy and the parallel construction of an infrastructure for engaging over CSR issues as those that directly involved Nike.

These interactions were another way that the disagreement-space expanded and was given direction. For example, Nike Employees leaked an internal audit done by Ernst & Young to UNIDO. This document eventually ended-up in the hands of TRAC and became fodder for TRAC's criticism of Nike's social and environmental auditing. Therefore TRAC's involvement, which was vital to the trajectory of the controversy, occurred because it pulled-off a joint action with UNIDO. So although these organizations were activated for different reasons, the point is that the communication that occurred between them pushes the controversy in directions that Nike had to eventually consider and deal with. In other words, there were factors that became important to the controversy's trajectory that were not solely contingent on the actions of the company. To that end, compared to Phase I there was not only more communicative action in Phase II but significantly more variety in the scope of the communication. Moreover we can start to see how the ties between organizations are building the infrastructure which subsequently generates more ties. The construction of an infrastructure is evident because in Phase I there was limited action but as the controversy

moved into and through Phase II it expanded the ways that the participating actors were tied to one another. As the organizations attempted to discipline the communication context their efforts shaped the way the controversy played-out.

Phase III (1998 to 2004): Nike Rebuilds

Phase III lasted from 1998 to 2004. The 15 moves made turned into 11 joint actions. Overall, 43% of the moves made and 35% of the joint actions for the entire controversy occurred here. Although these percentages are close to those from Phase II, Phase III is 3 times longer. There was also more variety of moves made and taken-up than compared to any other phase. The moves presented included: minimizing, attacking, reporting, criticizing, partnering, informing, satisfying stakeholders, making the CSR case, buying and dealing. The moves taken-up included: acceptance of responsibility, greenwashing, acknowledging law, attacking, negatively criticizing, partnering, dealing and selling. However none of these moves happened more than 3 times so what the data shows then is that any and all strategy and instrumentation has the potential to matter in the trajectory of inter-organizational relationships.

Most of the action in Phase III was centered on Nike CEO Phil Knight's speech to the National Press Club. The specific move made was minimizing, which is a move that reduces the offensiveness of an act through diminishing the unpleasantness of the events surrounding the act (Benoit & Pang, 2008). Although Knight did not accept responsibility for any social and environmental issues, he did candidly discuss the missteps taken and how the company was working to fix them. Knight put the controversy "in perspective" by stating that "however bad you think Nike shoe factories are today, they are far, far better than those factories in Japan some 26 years ago"

(<http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/NIKphilspeech.html>). As Sellnow and Brand (2001) put it, even though Knight continued to minimize the problem, he set forth an agenda of unprecedented steps to avoid abusive working conditions in the future. Bringing further attention to the move was that it was the first time that the company used a scripted and collaborative joint action with an organization other than an alliance partner. And interestingly enough this joint action included a question and answer session with the very same actors that had been attacking the company over the past 6 years.

The up-takes associated with the completed joint action split the controversy into 2 different tracks. On one hand, Nike began to win over some of its critics because the speech was seen as “signaling a movement from resistance to engagement and capitulation” (Spar & LaMure, 2003, p. 24). On the other hand, a few organizations did not internalize what happened at the speech positively and acted accordingly. In particular, Mark Kasky’s follow-up move would take the controversy down the second path – one that did not have Nike as a clear-cut winner in the controversy.

Mark Kasky treated Knight’s speech as greenwashing, which is when moves are considered misleading through corporate posturing and deception (i.e., Laufer, 2003). Acting on behalf of the public, Kasky filed a lawsuit alleging that Nike’s public relations personnel and leaders misrepresented the truth in their denials that employees were mistreated (i.e., McHale et al., 2007). Kasky was seeking monetary and injunctive relief under California laws designed to curb false advertising and unfair competition. The joint action that happened here was conflict resolution, which is when parties in a dispute come together in a formal setting that is presided over by an authority that can adjudicate claims. This conflict resolution certainly had repercussions on the other moves and joint

actions relative to the controversy. For example, there were joint actions between Nike and the California Court System and Nike and the ACLU. And probably what is most telling about the impact of Kasky's move was that Nike held-up publishing its second annual CSR report because of it. Nike published its first annual CSR report in 2001 but it wasn't until 2004 that the second annual report was released. The reason for waiting to release the second annual report was described in Knight's opening letter of the second report: "we've been fairly quiet for the past three years in Corporate Responsibility because of the Kasky lawsuit. So we're using this report to play a little catch-up and draw a more complete picture" (Nike Corporate Social Responsibility Report Fy04, 2004, pg. 4).

There are two additional elements that further separate Phase III from any other. First is the fact that Nike was the most active organization. Nike's moves accounted for 60% of all the moves during the phase, which was a radical departure from Phase II where Nike only accounts for 29% of the moves made. Nike was approaching the situation differently than they did in Phase II. Nike aggressively flooded the controversy with CSR strategy and instrumentation and to some degree the approach started to work. Beyond the circumstances associated with Kasky, Nike began to effectively address their image problem and "its identification as a sweatshop employer and as a brand that had become less fashionable" (Vogel, 2005, p. 81). The second element that made Phase III different from any other is that 40% of the moves made were not taken-up at all including moves by both Nike and stakeholder organizations.

Having a large number of moves not taken-up is not so surprising given that to navigate a controversy, corporations in particular, must continually present moves that

will animate others to react, and react in a manner that will best suit the company. Corporations do that by not only connecting directly with other organizations through joint actions such as speeches, conversations, and conflict resolutions but also by making moves in the public sphere hoping that they get picked-up and internalized in the manner in which the company intended. Companies make moves that bid for a certain completing response and in some cases the move is taken-up as the company would like; in some cases, the move is taken-up in a way that does not match the bid; and in even other cases, the move is not taken-up at all. The latter happened at a greater pace during Phase III than during any other time in the controversy. For example, there were two moves not taken-up as the company would have liked. First is when Nike attempted to inform the public about an audit on verbal abuse in the supply chain and second when the company attempted to satisfy stakeholders through the Micro Enterprise and Micro Loan Program. These were premeditated moves meant to encourage other organizations to view Nike as committed to bringing about and maintaining positive changes to its global supply chain. However neither of these moves were picked-up, instead they just floated in the public sphere. In other words, Nike did not present any actional, content or instrumental material that stimulated stakeholders.

Move Analysis

As actors attempt to surface grievances and differences, and as others respond, a complex disagreement-space emerges that can be analytically reconstructed (van Eemeren et al., 1994; Hutchby, 2001). Disagreement-space is built through opposition to actions where organizations are continually enacting moves to position themselves relative to the controversy and other actors. In other words, as organizations make moves,

other organizations may question the validity and reliability of a move, which in turn requires the originator to provide additional moves to maintain the sense, adequacy and motivation of the primary action. Even though the answer to Empirical Question 2 shows that there is a great variety of moves and joint actions, patterns do arise. So although these moves and joint action result in a disagreement-space that moves in many directions, there is indeed some logic to the controversy and even some standardization of behavior within the controversy. This happens as certain elements of moves and joint-actions become routinized into a tacit framework on how to operate over the trajectory of the controversy and thus constitutive of any infrastructure. The point here is to identify and interpret these forms through the inversion so that the broader implications can be examined. The infrastructure inversion is a way to determine how meaning, action and coherence are managed among those directly participating but also those bystanders to the situation.

As far as the moves made are concerned, reporting occurs in each of the three phases. This move goes hand-in-hand with the only joint action that is pulled-off in each phase, the broadcast exchange. The fact that both reporting and the broadcast exchange were constant over the 11 years speaks to the important role that media organizations and more specifically their strategy played during the controversy. Furthermore it was the negative content presented within the moves that influenced the public's perception of the controversy (Islam & Deegan, 2008). The constant media coverage acted as fodder, keeping the controversy alive and Nike in a reactionary position. This is further illustrated by the point that *Business Week's* move stating that "European apparel makers such as Adidas have gotten away scot-free while Nike and other U.S. rivals have been

hounded” was not taken-up by any organization. The *Business Week* move was the closest any media organization would come to defending Nike. What that shows is that the moves presented by the media were used by other organizations as a reason for continuing the controversy instead of a reason for ending it. The moves made by media organizations were used by others as a means to carry on attacking Nike about the treatment of its workforce. In other words, stakeholder organizations did not use any of the actional, content or instrument material presented by the media as a basis for allowing the controversy to end or at least subside in any way. There was a kind of inertia that developed as certain routines developed around moves that worked to continue to entrench Nike in the controversy.

In so far as up-take moves, Nike treats something in each phase as an attack, meaning that no matter what was happening in the controversy Nike treated stakeholder presented moves as an assault on the company, its executives or reputation. Even though Nike begins to successfully navigate the situation in the late 1990s, the actual controversy was on-going. The controversy was what Putnam and Peterson (2003) and Putnam and Wondolleck (2003) would describe as intractable. As stakeholders introduced new content relative to social issues, Nike responded by making moves to win the competition thus taking the controversy in other directions. In essence, as moves were made on both sides, the action resulted in additional activities that spiraled in directions that took the controversy away from conclusion. The controversy developed a life of its own – it seemed to be attached to Nike even though it was plausibly much bigger than the one company. The impact on Nike was tremendous as the company had to continue making moves within the controversy even though they started to win over many of their critics.

Although partnering and the related joint action alliance do not occur in each phase, its strong presence in Phase II and Phase III bears mention. These alliances include both private-public and private-private. A private-public alliance is where business forms a coalition with governments, non-governmental organization and educational institutions and private-private is where federations consist of only private enterprise. Nike's alliances are an important aspect in how the firm communicates CSR and wins the competition with hostile stakeholder organizations. According to Livesey (1999), through partnering with eco-groups, NGOs and governments, firms can adopt both material and symbolic approaches to the issue. In that sense then, partnering is a rhetorical move that enables Nike to navigate the controversy by linking themselves to the credibility of the stakeholder organization. However it is also the case that the partnering organizations also benefit from these alliances, which would in part explain why Nike was so successful in building alliances. Partnering organizations, particularly NGOs and activists, are using this joint action as a way where they can play a proactive role in rectifying the issues with employee treatment and factory conditions (i.e., Livesey).

The controversy shifted in Nike's favor when the company was able to construct other places for the CSR issues to be handled such as the alliance. These alternative venues were places different than the mainstream media to engage over the issues. There were also places where the parties involved had more control over the engagement. Indeed Nike created certain venues that were alternatives to the court of public opinion adjudicated over by the news and entertainment media. Although it took a while for these alternative venues to become legitimate, the fact they eventually did points to how the

infrastructure was in part built around how organizations could create new venues for the controversy.

Content wise, Nike managed the situation by inventing and reinventing moves that are based on reason and credibility relative to the economic factors concerned with the maintenance of their supply chain process. From denying connection in Phase I, to partnering in Phase II, to the speech in Phase III, content material focused on how Nike managed its supply chain i.e. how workers are treated better than they would be otherwise and that their approach to manufacturing keeps the price of sneakers and apparel low (Sellnow & Brand, 2002). Therefore even though the attacks on Nike are treated as hostile and full of anger, the company does not engage in a matching behavior (see Seiter, 1995). Instead, Nike followed the lead of other US companies by not making emotional content the crux of their appeal (Pollach, 2003). In its place, Nike defended its self through bottom-line terms and arguments (Hartman, Rubin & Dhanda, 2007), which corresponds to the answer of Empirical Question 1 – that CSR strategy and instrumentation is a context specific activity where a corporation and its stakeholders operate has a tremendous impact on the design of the moves and joint actions enacted during a CSR controversy.

Comments on Related Developments in CSR Literature

CSR as Tactical Corporate Communication

A CSR controversy is a collaborative endeavor where the strategy and instrumentation between organizations generates a mutually constructed and sustained social reality. The reality of the situation is constructed through the moves and countermoves of the participants. The current study describes how over the trajectory of

the endeavor what gets created is an emergent design for communication that guides the participating organizations. The emergent design is the particular infrastructure for communication that didn't exist prior to the controversy but arose to afford and constrain the interactions between participants. However the argument made here is that to map the design, an alternative vantage point of CSR strategy and instrumentation is needed - one that enables the researcher to trace exactly what happens as organizations communicate and in so doing generates, the issues of the controversy. The pragmatic approach to inter-organizational communication, which is a joint action model, is this alternative. It gets at the idea that as organizations work toward interactivity their moves generate a background of commitments and implied completing responses that might not always be reciprocated.

Although many researchers have conceptualized the dynamic nature of the links between organizations and how they can be measured, many miss the notion that not all interactions are mutual or involve reciprocal communicative actions (i.e., Monge & Eisenberg, 1987; Stohl & Stohl, 2005). Because of the missing theoretical piece associated with the dynamic nature of inter-organizational communication, there has long been a call for more focus on the actual links between organizations (Monge & Eisenberg, 1987). As Doerfel et al. explain inter-organizational communication "research overlooks the relevance of the quality and nature of links" (p. 154). By focusing more on the linkages that tie organizations, research can better conceptualize all of the ways organizations are connected and the impact the communication context has on the evolution of CSR strategy and instrumentation.

Moreover by concentrating on the moves and joint actions within the controversy, CSR strategy and instrumentation can be reclassified as tactical corporate communication used to manage issues relative to reputation. As opposed to the more widely accepted characterization that it is part of public relations, CSR strategy and instrumentation is repositioned here as corporate communication used to manage internal and external stakeholders for the purposes of creating favorable perceptions (Riel & Fombrun, 2007). The shift from public relations to tactical corporate communication is because current public relations models do not effectively explain the gaps that arise as business interacts with society.

The conditions of communication and Accountability Gaps

Most research describes CSR strategy and instrumentation as “an adjunct of PR, a function of a company’s external relationships, a peripheral activity” (Frankental, 2001, p. 22). L’Etang (1994) argues this premise by explaining that public relations and CSR are not separate activities but interconnected in such a way that CSR becomes a tool for public relations. As Hooghiemstra (2000) further states, “in this respect then, corporate social reporting is ‘a public relations vehicle’ aimed at influencing people’s perceptions” (p. 57). The reason for this line of thinking is best described by Porter and Kramer (2006). As they contend, because CSR-related issues attract publicity, companies choose to use public relations techniques and strategies as a response.

The most widely used models of public relations are excellence theory (Grunig, Grunig, & Ehling, 1992), coorientation model (Taylor and Kent, 2006) and systems theory (Broom & Dozier, 1990). The popularity of these models lies in the fact that they are symmetrical and describe ways to reconcile the goals of an organization with the

expectations of relevant publics (Grunig, Grunig, & Ehling, 1992). These models then are great for explaining the “us and us” philosophy where strategic communication is used to integrate the needs and desires of relevant publics into organizational goals and activities (Austin & Pinkleton, 2006). So at their crux, models are centered on delving deep into how organizations can build and maintain long term relationships with publics and stakeholders. However all of these models overlook the impact that the conditions of communication have on the trajectory of organizational strategy and instrumentation.

These models are really meant to explain one-way versus two-way communication between a public relations client and its target stakeholder (Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Witmer, 2006). What is missing is a mechanism associated with the disagreements that arise as a corporation connects with stakeholders. The omission means that there is no way of illustrating how disputed communication impacts the design of future communication and interaction. The pragmatic-based joint action model explains how CSR strategy and instrumentation, to an important degree, are mutually constructed through the back-and-forth moves made by business and society as they manage meaning, action, and coherence of each other’s promises, requests and commitments.

The professional understanding of public relations does not correspond to the technical understanding of communication developed in the current study. The research on CSR strategy and instrumentation that has adopted the public relations perspective misses the point that it is a tactical behavior used to manage the issues at the center of these disagreement-spaces. Here CSR strategy is about how a corporation constructs engagements that solve reputational issues at hand. CSR strategy and instrumentation is about addressing and capturing the most important concerns of the public regarding the

business and society relationship (Carroll, 1999). Public relations assumes that the organization can control messages through strategy and instrumentation but the current study finds that the parties to the controversy often unwittingly construct new modes of expression and engagement that change the nature of the ongoing communication (Hunter et al., 2008). CSR strategy and instrumentation is something that corporations perform based on nature of their relationships - it is a behavior that is contingent upon the way that the infrastructure affords or constrains communication and interaction. The point is that CSR strategy and instrumentation should be looked at as a genre of communication that enables corporations to respond tactically to stakeholders and their issues and not so much a type of communication that falls within the purview of a particular department or set of communicative strategies.

The up-shot is that extant theories of public relations do not account for what happens in inter-organizational communication when differences occur. As Pratt (2006) describes, the issue with relating the theories of public relations to CSR is that there is no way of dealing with responsibility gaps. A responsibility gap is when stakeholder questions and rejects CSR strategy and instrumentation because they view it as limited in scope and transparency. For instance, TRAC questioned Nike about the limited amount of information that the company released about the treatment of its workforce in Vietnam. Aakhus and Ziek (2008) go further by illustrating that accountability gaps arise because CSR strategy and instrumentation cuts-off or undermines the potential for others to even raise questions. Both show alternatives to the standard public relations view of CSR by taking account of how counter-arguments impact the invention and reinvention of the way that corporations manage the claims about reputation, and the problems that

occur when these claims are made. CSR strategy and instrumentation then can be more usefully treated as being embedded in a communicative order with expectations about obligations and responsibilities like what is found in interpersonal communication where actors exist and act within a web of rights and obligations (Winograd & Flores, 1987; Taylor & van Every, 2000).

Conclusion to Move Network Results

There are a total of 35 moves made by 14 organizations during the controversy. To present these moves, 30 different combinations of material were drawn on. The top three moves used during the controversy were partnering, reporting and informing. 77% of these presented moves were taken-up to complete 31 joint actions. The broadcast exchange and alliance were the two most widely used joint actions. The variation among the individual moves and joint actions made the controversy a complex environment; navigation was a tenuous endeavor where the organizations are clearly designing communication to best match the situation.

As the organizations interacted, or attempted to interact, within a controversy they enacted a plethora of moves that construct the social reality the organizations experience and respond to. But over the course of the back-and-forth move-countermove path of the controversy, moves and joint actions, or materials from each grew to become behavioral standards. These rules, habits and procedures of organizational strategy and instrumentation were part of an infrastructure for communication that eventually grew to shape the activity between a corporation and its stakeholders. That is, exchanges created the grounds for standardized behaviors. However to come to an understand infrastructure and its impact on behavior requires an inversion which is more than just mapping and

examining what moves are made by the organizations. To fully understand how infrastructure arises and acts as tacit framework, instruments must be considered along with the actors and moves. Instruments for communication are central to the development of infrastructure for communication because they are central to the actions that enable actors to coordinate stakeholders. The next step then was to add even more complexity and investigate the role of the instruments within the Nike controversy.

CHAPTER VI

INSTRUMENT NETWORK RESULTS

What instruments were used in a CSR controversy involving Nike? There is a limited variety of instruments used during the CSR controversy. Organizations of all types in the case came to rely on the same instruments as they became embroiled in the CSR controversy; that is, an instrument network was formed. The concept of an instrument network is new to the study of CSR but it highlights the fact that certain CSR instruments for communication are connected and thus connect actors in the actor network. For instance, the non-financial report is an instrument created by an organization to convey facts and features of its social and environmental performance to others – in particular, investors and social and environmental advocates. But, non-financial reports often arise because another type of instrument for communication has been created – inter-organizational alliance (i.e., Locke et al., 2007). The inter-organizational alliance is an instrument for communication that connects organizations so they can complete partnerships dedicated to delivering social and environmental public goods such as the non-financial report, repositories of information and communication systems. But here this idea is extended to explain how instruments are connected in an evolving ecology that builds into an infrastructure for CSR communication.

Infrastructure is a tacit design for communication, so the current study was created to uncover its most observable aspects through an inversion at the end of the time frame of the controversy. As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D4, this includes describing the instrument network. The methodological goal was to condense the observed data on instruments so that patterns could be identified.

Answering the empirical question that frames the current chapter required analyzing the data in quadrants 9, 10, 11, and 12. To do this, the Move Timeline was used to construct tables describing the instruments present and not-present throughout the controversy as well as the three different phases. From here, a nominal approach was taken where the frequency of each instrument was determined. After these steps were completed, each instrument and associated instrumental properties was analyzed for their impact on the trajectory of the controversy. In the end, a great deal of data was amassed that included not only which instruments were used and how, but also the impact that certain instruments had on the interaction between the organizations.

The current chapter begins with a description of the inclusive list of instruments that appear during the case. Within the first section of the chapter lies an explanation of how although there are different instruments used there is actually little variety among them. This is followed by an illustration of instrument network relative to each phase. After all of the information is analyzed and the patterns are explained, the chapter ends with a series of comments on related developments in the CSR literature. More specifically, this chapter shows different usages of the non-financial report than has been previously described in the research.

Instrument Network Observations

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004): Little Variation Among Instruments

The 35 communicative moves described in the prior chapter involved 17 different instruments. The inter-organizational alliance was the most widely used accounting for 20% of the all instruments used during the controversy. The inter-organizational alliance is the tie that enables the organizations to pull-off strategic and operational coalitions

dedicated to addressing the policy and problems that underlie Nike's supply chain. Beyond enabling a proactive approach to eradicating systemic social issues, the inter-organizational alliance can also provide access to the resources of another firm, such as guidance on methods of communication and organizational representation (Livesey, 1999). This was certainly the case here because many of the inter-organizational alliances were used to complete Environment, Safety and Health (ESH) investigations and then Nike published the results for the purpose of encouraging debate and transparency (Johnson & Turner, 2010) (i.e., Ernst & Young Supply Chain Audit, Good Works Assessment of Code of Conduct, Dartmouth Survey of Vietnamese and Indonesian Domestic Expenditure Levels, NGO Verbal Abuses). Therefore Nike responded to stakeholder claims through their connection to other organizations as well as the document that detailed the firm's CSR performance. The relationship between the inter-organizational alliance and the supply chain audit also shows that controversy is an interconnected environment where variation is not haphazard but part of the social structure built between organizations.

Beyond the inter-organizational alliance, there are 5 other instruments that became standard linkages between the organizations: magazine article, supply chain audit, sustainability report, CSR report, and newspaper article. These 5 instruments accounted for 37% of all the instruments used throughout the controversy and belong to two broader genres of instruments. According to Miller (1984), a genre is a set of formal and substantive features that create a particular effect in a given situation. The supply chain audit, sustainability report and CSR report, magazine article and newspaper article can and will be discussed separately but they can also be dealt with on a macro level in

which they are coupled together due to their properties and general uses. These 5 instruments fall into 2 distinct varieties of instruments: the non-financial report and the print media. They are described separately in the move chart so that the associated joint action and specific content and actional material can be more appropriately illustrated. The supply chain audit, sustainability report and CSR report are part of the non-financial report genre and the magazine article and newspaper article are part of the print media genre. Although Stam (2000) explains that defining any genre is problematic because to do so generic labels must be used, the idea here is to illustrate the important “family resemblances” (Swales, 1990) among some of the instruments.

A genre is a typified response to certain situations that highlights and hides courses of action which determine participant roles (Aakhus, 2004; Orlikowski & Yates, 1994; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992). The non-financial report is a one-way instrument where organizations inform others about metric based measurement systems that rate the social and environmental behaviors of an organization. Print media is also a one-way instrument designed and disseminated by media organizations to report to public audiences the details and description of another organization’s behavior. The important aspect of genres of instruments is that they set out the routines and expectations about who communicates, what is communicated and how they communicate (Fairclough, 1995). Therefore studying both the impact of individual instruments and genres provides an inclusive view of how the patterns that constitute infrastructure take shape and what consequences their emergence has on shaping the affordances of organizational communicative behavior.

Phase I (1993 to 1995): Nike's Press Release

In Phase I, there were 2 instruments used that accounted for 12% of the new instruments introduced to the controversy and 6% of the total instruments used from 1993 to 2004. CBS used a TV news story that reported Nike's involvement in sweatshops and Nike, in response, used a press release to deny its responsibility for the actions of sub-contractors. The press release is a popular instrument that can be used to accomplish a variety of moves by engaging mass media organizations such as newspapers, broadcast stations and magazines to disseminate the organizations move (Morton, 1992; press release continue to be used in the social media environment). The press release is an instrument that has particular properties that speak to transparency (i.e., the release of organizational information) and actor roles, which are two important aspects of understanding instruments in this study.

First, the press release is an instrument that (1) broadcasts an organization's move (e.g., informing) while also (2) bidding for an editor, representing a media organization, to incorporate the organization's move into an editorial or news story by the media organization. The aim of the press release is to get someone else to convey the essential move made by an organization. It is a one-way tool for broadcasting moves and motivating a particular stakeholder or influencer (i.e., media organizations) to convey that same point of view (Applegate, 2005). But in the case of the Nike press release, the instrument did not motivate the media. The instrument then did not close the loop between Nike and its stakeholders. In other words, Nike attempted to win the competition about child labor by putting forth an argument that diffused responsibility down into the supply chain but because no connection was made the controversy was free to expand.

Second, although the press release was used only once, its typified Nike's use of instruments that share one-way messaging characteristics. Nike continually utilized instruments for communication that limited two-way interactivity between organizations, including the Code of Conduct and more particularly the chronically used non-financial report. In using these instruments, Nike was setting strict boundaries for engagement by constraining the feedback they would receive about their social and environmental information. These instruments are controlling the environment, or at least appear to do so, as opposed to instruments that engage the environment such as stakeholder meetings, interviews, lectures, etc. For stakeholders to object or call-out a move delivered by these instruments, they have to do so with a separate move of their own, thus creating a particular context of exchange and affording particular trajectory for the controversy. The activity around the press release comes back to the point made in the prior chapter where the organizations involved in the controversy struggled with the infrastructure that was dominated by the news and entertainment media. The fact that the press release was used sparingly points to how the organizations looked to invent new approaches for engaging others – venues that fell outside of the purview of the news and entertainment media.

The one-way properties of the press release also reveal a more general point about how instruments are metacommunicative in the way they convey relationships (e.g., Fairclough, 1995; Goldkuhl and Lind, 2003). As discussed earlier, instruments signal how actors stand in relation to each other in terms of the way the instrument presumes or projects preferences for activity such as roles, actions, and topics. When companies and stakeholders choose instruments they also signal their relations to others. This metacommunicative aspect of instruments is allusive to determine for each and every

actor within the controversy because not only can an instrument be used to perform more than one action, instruments can have different meanings to the various actors in a setting. However, making sense of the metacommunicative aspects of instruments is fundamental to the nature of infrastructure (e.g., Bowker, 1993; Star, 1999). So during Phase I the instruments employed were adapted to the media and that context set-up a trajectory where the controversy was a traditional clash between business and the news and entertainment media. However what will be seen is that an alternative trajectory was realized as new instruments and new uses of new instruments were devised to support new forms of relationships.

Phase II (1996 to 1997): Formal, One-way Instruments Grow in Importance

Phase II was the height of the controversy. At this point, the disagreement-space had expanded to encompass a series of social and environmental issues. Although child labor was the most visible, the controversy now contained a series of issues. Organizations were questioning environmental issues such as CFCs being released into factory atmospheres and social missteps such as the low-wages paid by sub-contractors. What happened during Phase II was that not only do more actors enter the controversy, they bring with them topics that Nike must consider and deal with.

During Phase II, 10 actors used nine different instruments to communicate within the controversy: inter-organizational alliance, boycott, code of conduct, interview, magazine article, newspaper article, newspaper comic, supply chain audit and the sustainability report. These nine instruments were all different from those in Phase I meaning that 53% of the instruments for the entire controversy were introduced within this two year span. What follows is an illustration of the instrumental activity of Phase II

as separated into two categories. First is a description of the instruments that were stand-alone connections and second is a description of the instruments that were used multiple times during the phase.

Stand-alone Instruments

The interview, boycott and code of conduct represent this first group of instruments. While they were only used once during the controversy, their presence either started or maintained the disagreement-space down a particular trajectory. Vogel (2005) explains that reporters hounded Nike spokespersons such as Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice about the controversy. During interviews, reporters integrated questions about child labor in an attempt to catch Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice off guard. These interviews were a place where there could be a two-way exchange and a way for stakeholders to draw out the company. It was the reporter's intention to have these athletes answer questions about Nike's production process, which they clearly had little knowledge about. Consumers made their collective voice heard through a boycott of Nike retail stores in the United States. Beyond bringing in new actors, these two instruments were important for another reason. They illustrate how contentious this controversy was, at least during the early years. Both the interviews and boycott delivered actional materials that underlie this quality of communication. The interviews were built on assertive material, which is the commitment of the speaker to something being the case (Searle, 1975). By hounding Michael Jordan and Jerry Rice during interviews, reporters were asserting that as spokespersons speaking on behalf of the company they too were doing something wrong and should also be held accountable. The boycott delivered expressive actional material, which is when the speaker conveys a psychological state (Searle,

1975). Consumers were conveying their displeasure about the company. But, it is important to notice that more traditional instruments such as letters, phone calls, or individuals withhold purchases of Nike products gave way to an alternative instrument in the form of physically gathering at Nike stores to protest Nike and to convey anger over the use of child labor.

Rounding out this first group of stand-alone Phase II instruments was Nike's code of conduct. As Locke et al. (2007) explains, to combat the harsh criticism over child labor, Nike reformulated its code of conduct to include raised levels of compliance for contract factories. Nike also required all of its sub-contractors to sign the code. The significance of this instrument is not how many times it was used during the controversy but it's instrumental properties. The code of conduct is part of a genre of corporate ethics statements that includes value statements, corporate credo, code of ethics and Internet privacy statements (Murphy, 2005). This genre of instruments communicates a sense of integrity, trust, teamwork and fairness (e.g., Bindu & Salk, 2006) no matter what actual statements or words are used. The code of conduct is also a one-way instrument in that it is created and controlled by the corporation. The code of conduct is conventionally used to inform stakeholders about specific areas of CSR such as relationships with dealers, increasing workforce diversity, human rights and competitive intelligence (Murphy, 1995; Urbany, 2005).

All of these stand-alone instruments say a great deal about what was happening at a particular moment in the disagreement-space, but when considering if and how patterns of instruments develop they are really one-off connections. As far as rooting out infrastructure, we have to look to which instruments become standardized during the

controversy. Indeed during Phase II, patterns of instruments, and consequentially instrumental properties, do begin to take shape.

Standard Instruments.

Active media organizations such as *Life*, *Business Week* and the *New York Times* used their associated print related instruments to deliver moves and thus become part of the controversy themselves. For example, *Life* reported about the use of child labor in Pakistan and *Business Week* editorialized about the controversy by stating that the attitude of executives of disingenuously protesting that factories run by subcontractors are beyond their control "won't wash anymore." There are two important factors relative to mass media related instruments. First, they are a carryover from Phase I and as we will see they are also an aspect of the controversy in Phase III. Second, mass media related instruments had a significant impact on the controversy in Phase II because they dispersed information into the public sphere that had widespread appeal. The news and entertainment media invited a clash between business and society. These instruments delivered moves that drew in a dormant, yet particularly important, actor – the consumer. In other words, consumers took-up the moves delivered by mass media related instruments and became active in the controversy through moves of their own. Beyond the use of newspaper and magazine articles, the instruments used by Nike during Phase II had the greatest impact on the instrument network of the disagreement-space.

Nike used inter-organizational alliances to link with the Clinton Administration, Ernst & Young, Good Works International and Dartmouth Business School. The inter-organizational alliance in this way is an instrument for communication because it enables linkages between organizations dedicated to environmental and social issues (Arts, 2002).

In addition, Nike uses these connections for a specific purpose: to produce other instruments (sustainability and supply chain audits) that detail the company's work toward eradicating irresponsible behavior (Perrini & Russo, 2008). These inter-organizational alliances then enabled Nike to produce trustworthy and legitimate content. Nike distributes these non-financial reports to "offer a previously unavailable window into corporate environmental and social strategy and performance" (Cerin, 2002, p. 217). Nike relied heavily on both the inter-organizational alliance and non-financial report during Phase II, which actually wares off on other organizations. In fact, hints of how the non-financial report becomes institutionalized within the controversy start in Phase II with NGO TRAC's choice to produce and distribute a sustainability report critiquing Ernst & Young's supply chain audit. Considering all of the options that TRAC had at its disposal, they developed an instrument that was within the same genre as Nike's. There are dozens of instruments that could have been used in this instance from a stakeholder meeting to a press conference to an interview but the NGO decided to emulate the corporation. According to Seiter (1995) organizations mirroring each other in this way has happened numerous times before in environmental controversies. As he explains, imitating certain acts is done so that an organization can strengthen their position within the situation. So unlike the communicative moves, there is a matching behavior going on with the instruments.

Overall though neither Nike nor stakeholder organizations used any instruments that would have enabled genuine encounters and interrogation of the differences between business and society. This is evident with an examination of the instruments not present during Phase II. Some of the possible and plausible instruments that were missing and

would have facilitated value dialogue included the confidentiality person, the speech and stakeholder meetings. Even though theoretically the inter-organizational alliance does enable valuable dialogue between business and society, Nike didn't design their inter-organizational alliances in that way. They kept away from linkages with NGOs and activists instead choosing to connect with corporations and educational institutions. The gist of this final point is that both sides had a great number of choices and both sides choose to stay away from instruments that provided synchronous, two-way, feed-back oriented interactions.

Phase III (1998 to 2004): Phil Knight's Speech Stands and Mark Kasky's Lawsuit

There are 12 instruments used in the 6 years of the final phase of the controversy: inter-organizational alliance, CEO speech, charitable donation, CSR report, contract, interview, litigation, magazine article, newspaper article, settlement, supply chain audit, and the TV story. These 12 instruments represented 43% of all the instruments used throughout the 11 years of the controversy. The CEO speech, charitable donation, CSR report, contract, litigation, and settlement were introduced here and represented 35% of the first time instruments. During Phase III, Nike was the most active organization in the network. Of the 15 organizational moves made in Phase III, Nike made 10, which means that they were more active than others in managing the situation. However in these 10 moves, Nike only used 7 different types of instruments. In other words, the company was revisiting instruments within Phase III alone. And actually, Nike was relying on many of the same instruments that they did in Phase II such as the inter-organizational alliance and non-financial report. Phase III instruments group in two meaningful ways:

instruments new to the controversy and instruments that are carried over from other phases.

On one hand, any conversation about instruments must begin with Mark Kasky's use of litigation. Not only was the instrument new to the controversy, it was central to much of the action in the final phase. Mark Kasky used litigation to connect with Nike. Although it doesn't occur until 2000, it was the most important stakeholder instrument because it appeared to impact Nike's choice of instruments more than any other. Kasky's action intensified some directions already under way in the building out of the new infrastructure for CSR communication. Nike not only connects with stakeholders through the litigation but the firm also designs an inter-organizational alliance, settlement and CSR report due to the pressure brought on through Kasky's instrument.

On the other hand, Nike also used several new instruments to tie to stakeholders during Phase III. First, Phil Knight delivered a speech to the National Press Club to respond to the criticism that had befallen upon both him personally and the company as a whole. The importance in this instrument was that it connected Nike with the 3,500 members of the National Press Club, which includes journalists from every major news organization. Second, Nike used a Micro Loan Program, which gave people in Vietnam access to credit so they could engage in farming activities or grow small businesses. Although not a traditional corporate communication tactic, it is still a CSR instrument for communication as it engages a set of stakeholders in a new relationship with the company. In fact as Jones, Kashlak and Jones (2004) explain, microloan programs are an extremely efficient CSR instrument because the resultant benefits enhance managerial capabilities to coordinate encounters among stakeholders as well as economically enrich

local communities. Finally, Nike used a settlement to pay for damages related to the Kasky litigation. Like the microloan program, the settlement is not ordinarily discussed within the realm of corporate communication but it is still a tool used by firms to resolve exigencies within relationships. What is interesting here is that the invention of these instruments reinforces the theme of new venues of engagement. Moreover it points to the larger argument about infrastructure – that communication is generative of the way that organizations interact about CSR issues.

Like in Phase II, the inter-organizational alliance, magazine article, newspaper article, non-financial report and TV story are all used in Phase III. *Business Week* used a magazine article to point out that many other sneaker and apparel manufactures have gotten away scot free in the media. The BBC drew on a TV story to report how child labor was still being used in some Nike factories. For the second time in the controversy, the *New York Times* wrote a newspaper article detailing Nike's woes. But this time the piece centered on an interview with Jeffrey Ballinger of Press For Change, who stated that the wages paid by Nike subcontractors remain "below what is considered necessary to meet the minimum need of a single adult." Nike aligned with an unnamed NGO to produce yet another supply chain audit. This time however the report focused on the verbal abuses that contract workers were subject to. And finally, Nike drew on the CSR version of the non-financial report in both 2001 and 2004.

Instrument Analysis

Nike was not involved in creating or disseminating the magazine or newspaper articles, which means that there was much less variation in the instruments use by the corporation. Aakhus and Ziek (2009) have compiled a list of 32 instruments that have

been developed and modified specifically for the corporate communication of CSR. If this list is coupled with the research done for the current study there is plausibly no less than 45 CSR instruments for communication. That means that out of the possible instruments available to Nike, the company used 22% percent of them during this controversy. But because they draw on the inter-organizational alliance and non-financial report on multiple occasions, Nike exploited a very limited number of instruments to navigate the situation. The reason for the small number of instruments used is because Nike wanted to close the disagreement-space in a particular way – through proscribed formal means of instrumentation that provided low interactivity between business and society.

Table I5 is a list of the total plausible instruments that either side of the controversy could have chosen to deliver their messages.

The first pattern of instruments for communication that must be discussed are those used by media organizations. Specifically, the print media and electronic media genres played a crucial role in the trajectory of the disagreement-space. The print media genre includes newspaper articles and magazines articles, which are used in both Phase I and Phase II. Although print media instruments are the most heavily drawn on over the 11 years, there is a second type of mass media genre that does impact how the controversy played out. The second variety is the electronic media genre, which included the TV report and is used in Phase I and Phase III. The controversy is started by CBS's TV report and BBC used a TV report to document that the company is still complicit with its subcontractor's use of child labor.

These results relate heavily to previous research. Islam and Deegan (2008; 2010) show that the media was a major force in why Nike changed its social reporting practices and monitoring of the employment policies. This is because media organizations brought to the public's attention the issue of child labor, which activated other stakeholders such as NGOs, governments and consumers. The instruments served to set out topics of concern for other organizations (e.g., 'agenda setting,' McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Therefore the broader explanation of why media organizations were important to the trajectory of the controversy lies in the properties associated with their instruments and not just their messages and content.

While previous research focuses on the symbolic aspects of the moves made by media (i.e., Islam & Deegan), the current study looks at how the instrument affords and constrains interaction, which further explains why instruments are associated with genre theory - media organizations cannot be separated from their instruments. The instruments for communication are backbone of a media organization's existence - *New York Times*, *Business Week* and BBC are all organizations and instruments – one does not exist without the other. In other words, although many researchers describe how the media frame problems or situations in stories (i.e., Joslyn, 2003; Yioutas & Segvic, 2003), the impact the media has on a situation lies in the instrument they use to interact with other actors.

The second and third varieties of instruments that became standardized due to the fact that they get carried over from phase-to-phase are the inter-organizational alliance and the non-financial report. Nike used the inter-organizational alliance to connect with the Clinton Administration, Ernst & Young, an unnamed NGO, Vietnamese Ministry of

Education and the ACLU. The focal point of this instrument was the coordination of value conflict between the corporations and stakeholders. For example the inter-organizational alliance that connects Nike with the Ministry of Education and Vietnam provided the direct linkage so that the organizations could work toward providing a proper education for the workforce. Nike linked with the Vietnamese Ministry of Education so that the government organization could use the company's resources to hire teachers, rent classroom space and provide supplies so that sub-contract factory employees could receive education after hours. But even though the inter-organizational alliance enabled encounters of value differences with stakeholders, the interesting thing is that it was sparingly – not just any organization received the chance to interact directly with Nike. In other words, Nike carefully chose their partners. Therefore ultimately the inter-organizational alliance did not truly enable stakeholders to change the rules by which Nike operated. Heavily related to the inter-organizational alliance is yet another instrument that gets carried over from phase-to-phase - the non-financial report. 57% of the inter-organizational alliances created a non-financial report.

In Phase II, Nike hired Ernst & Young to produce a supply chain audit and published both the Good Works supply chain audit and the Dartmouth sustainability report. Also, during Phase II, TRAC's created a sustainability report detailing the problems with the Ernst & Young report. In Phase III, an unnamed NGO wrote a report about verbal abuses in factories and Nike disseminated their first two annual CSR reports. The features of the non-financial report genre, which all of these reports are part of, put organizations in one of two positions – either a writer or reader. Moreover the writer is using the features of the report (e.g., modeled after the science of financial reporting,

Schafer, 2005) to set-up a particular kind of interaction. The trappings of the report as a technical instrument based in facts, figures and statistics pressures other organizations to design similar communication. In fact, this can be seen with TRAC's choice to produce and distribute a sustainability report. TRAC wanted to connect with Nike regarding Ernst & Young's evaluation of the company's supply chain so the NGO mirrored the communicative behaviors of the company. The repeated action associated with the inter-organizational alliance and non-financial report meant that both Nike and its stakeholders were designing communication and interaction through each instrument.

The instruments used by Nike share the common thread of being tactical tools that enable the firm to control the forms of engagement with society. During the controversy, Nike comes to depend on proscribed formal means of communication that provide low interactivity. These instruments presuppose certain things about how the company perceives its relationship with society. They are shaping the discourse by putting stakeholders into relations that limit information flow and exchange of ideas. This is consistent with much of the previous research on CSR instruments. Most large firms rely heavily on formal tactics as opposed to two-way symmetrical methods of communication such as a confidentiality person, stakeholder meetings or third party developed business ethics and CSR certifications (Graafland et al., 2003; Ziek, 2009). This means that large companies, such as Nike, are not looking to solicit immediate feedback from stakeholders. Beyond the inter-organizational alliance and litigation, which are co-designed instruments, Nike only deviates from this transmission model of communication during Phil Knight's speech to the National Press Club. The speech is consistent with two-way symmetrical corporate communication instruments such as those discussed by

Graafland et al., and that is because the speech was combined with a question and answer session.

Interestingly enough, the speech is when the controversy turns in Nike's favor. It was with this instrument that Phil Knight emphasizes the conflict while at the same time opened himself up to an unstructured question and answer session. Allowing the interrogation of differences between the company and stakeholders was a major step in Nike's successful navigation of the controversy. Knight's speech was designed to enable the CEO to engage in 'strategic networking', which as Ibarra and Hunter (2007) explain, enables the CEOs to capitalize on certain opportunities for the company. In this instance Knight took advantage of an opportunity to interact with a particular set of actors - those that had heavily criticized the company for years. The instrument then structured the controversy by contributing to a particular expansion of the disagreement-space. The controversy expanded in a way that stakeholder moved beyond criticizing Nike's denial of the issues and now began to now criticize the company on how they were integrating CSR into the supply chain.

More so than any other instrument, there have been multiple studies that examine Phil Knight's speech to the National Press Club. Sellnow and Brand (2001) study the arguments made during the speech and conclude that it is an example of an organization attempting to frame the debate surrounding a crisis by reducing it to the smallest possible elements of CSR. Nijhof, Forterre and Jeurissen (2008) delve into the structure of the speech and explain that it worked because Knight delivered trustworthy, knowledgeable and truthful messages about the company and its sub-contractors (see also Pollach, 2003). It is not so much about the messaging provided by Knight but the instrument (i.e., the

speech) and the instrumental properties (i.e., the question and answer session) that are important here.

Reputation is one of the great paradoxes of corporate life because senior executives seldom focus on it the same way they address concrete aspects of their business (Firestein, 2006). But here Phil Knight demonstrated situational awareness by concentrating on the underlying events that were damaging Nike's reputation. CEOs, like Phil Knight, must coordinate stakeholders to manage their differences with the firm. They do that by first playing a large role in the adoption and implementation of CSR programs and initiatives (Hemingway & MacLagan, 2004). They then coordinate stakeholders by communicating about the changes to the firm's social and environmental behaviors. The CEO speech is a prime tool for many company's when communicating CSR (Ziek, 2011b) particularly during times of social and environmental predicaments (Mitroff, 2001). The speech provides an arena that makes the highest company employee available to stakeholders. It features an oral presentation where successful influence and persuasion of differences is contingent on the credibility and charisma of the CEO (Hackman & Johnson, 2004).

Finally, the main focus has been on Nike's instruments for communication. It would be short sighted not to discuss the importance of the instruments for communication that are enacted by stakeholder organizations. This controversy was made-up of both corporate instruments and also stakeholder enacted instruments. In other words, to really understand the controversy, it must be accepted that stakeholder organizations are also involved in responding to stakeholder claims.

As Bensiou et al. (2010) explain, stakeholder controlled communicative tools have effects on the opinions and actions of other stakeholders including consumers, media, activists and corporations. As was the case here with newspapers and magazines articles, lawsuits and non-financial reports, stakeholder instruments both directly and indirectly push Nike to develop and adapt tools for communication. The disagreement-space was active on many fronts and we cannot discuss how corporations respond to the communicative order without considering stakeholder responses. CSR instruments for communication are corporate tools but they only exist in the presence of stakeholder instruments. In other words, the design and enactment of Nike's instruments were driven by the struggles and negotiations the company had through the moves delivered by stakeholder instruments.

Comments on Related Developments in CSR Literature

Corporate Social Responsibility is an evolving perspective about the relationship of business to society from the point of view of business organizations. There has been a tremendous effort to develop instruments for engaging stakeholders with the aim of communicating the responsibility of corporations. Following this open market of CSR instruments, Nike presented its assertions of fair employee treatment, good factory conditions and equitable companywide standards through many corporate communication tools (Graulich, 2002). However even with the variation in instruments, two stand out: the inter-organizational alliance and non-financial report. Out of the entire list of instruments, Nike chose more times than not to use these two instruments. They became meeting points for how Nike communicated CSR during the controversy. And although both the non-financial report and inter-organizational alliance have been the focus of

enormous academic scrutiny, the findings here diverge a bit from what has been said about both of these instruments.

Inter-organizational Alliances

Organizational participation in environmental and CSR alliances dedicated to addressing public policy and systematic social issues has increased in recent years (Arts, 2002; Zadek, 2005). To that end, there has been a great deal of academic literature dedicated to CSR-related inter-organizational alliances, yet most of this work focuses on private-public alliances. Also known as green alliances (Stafford & Hartman, 1996; Hartman & Stafford, 1997, 1998), this is where business forms a coalition with non-governmental and governmental organizations dedicated to environmental and social management and sustainability. Nike completes several of these private-public alliances. Nike's alliances with the Clinton Administration, unnamed NGO, ACLU and the Ministry of Education, Vietnam fall into this category. These alliances enable Nike to communicate that they are seeking a source of guidance when it comes to rectifying the problems associated with employee treatment and factory conditions.

There are also many alliances that connect private organizations. Private-private alliances are federations consisting of only private enterprises. Even though these alliances also focus on working toward the reduction of systematic social issues at the heart of CSR, they are widely overlooked by academics. The alliances with Ernst & Young, Good Works International and Dartmouth Business School are three examples of private-private alliances. Nike uses these particular alliances just as they did private-public alliances - to connect with firms that would help them enhance their responsiveness to stakeholder expectations. However in the end, no matter what the

makeup of the alliance, these connections are collective actions for public goods (Ziek, 2011a).

Inter-organizational alliances, such as those that Nike built during the controversy, were created for the delivery of public goods, which are physical or tangible products that are provided for each person to enjoy or not to enjoy (Samuelson, 1954; 1955). The inter-organizational alliances were invented and reinvented during the controversy as new forms of engagement – they were venues not really seen before because they tied organizations that were working toward a particular end relative to CSR. Extant literature has not dealt with that point yet – that inter-organizational alliances are the invention of new and unique venues focused on CSR issues. Although the alliance can be seen as diverting political discussion, in the end, the organizations were connected to solve some of the most pressing problems facing humanity. They did that by producing physical public goods (i.e. reports that detail steps that can be taken to reduce the use of child labor) but also an intangible public good, which is the creation of collective intelligence. The issues are systemic and obtaining the collective good requires enormous interest, dedication, information sharing and resource allocation (Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira, 1985). Connecting with other organizations enables the creation of a single body of information. This single point of reference is a jumping off point for generating ideas and making contributions that will help deliver improvements regarding the problems at hand. So even though Nike's alliance were designed in a particular manner – to support a one-way kind of communication - they were still charitable in that they worked toward delivering public goods.

Non-financial Report

Even though reporting of environmental and social information is not mandatory (Morhardt, Baird & Freeman, 2002), to move toward greater transparency and disclosure of behaviors companies have committed to producing non-financial reports (Frankental, 2001). No matter what the reason, the use of non-financial reports is on an upward swing. In fact, according to Hebard and Cobrda (2009), four out of five of the world's largest companies now provide social and environmental information in the form of a report. With the popularity of non-financial reports increasing, academic research has followed suit. However research generally looks at two issues related to the non-financial report. First, non-financial reports are studied for their ability to enable corporations to navigate relationships with investors (Cerin, 2002) and investment analysts (Collison, Cobb, Power & Stevenson, 2008) that are interested in social and environmental programs and initiatives (see also Haddock-Fraser & Fraser, 2008; Tschopp, 2005). A second area of research focuses on how national or sectorial differences impact the content of the non-financial report (Chapple & Moon, 2005; Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Knox, Maklan & French, 2005).

The current study breaks from these traditions. It shows that the use of the non-financial report differs from how it has been previously described in two ways. First, Nike did not employ the non-financial report to connect with investors and investment analysis but media, NGOs, consumers and activists. In fact, shareholders or investment groups are not active within the controversy. Nike's non-financial reporting grows out of the verisimilitudes with New York Times, TRAC and Mark Kasky. The non-financial report was a tool then for connecting with all types of stakeholders interested how social

and environmental issues impact a firm – it was reinvented as a new type of venue for engaging over CSR issues. This gives new meaning to why more and more organizations are using annual reports as vehicles for the publication of CSR information (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2007). Given the fact that non-financial reports have a more mainstream audience than previously thought, it makes sense that corporations are looking more to the annual report as a vehicle for sharing information with highly specialized stakeholders such as investors, shareholders and analysts (i.e., Lewis, 2004).

Second, the results of this study draws out another point that has only been previously touched on in the CSR research. The non-financial report is also a tool used by stakeholder organizations. Although research has dealt with the concept before, it is not nearly as prominent of a theme as is the use of the report by corporations. According to Locke et al. (2007), the non-financial report is an instrument that enables stakeholders, such as NGOs, to monitor things like the code of conduct or specific operational areas such as factory work conditions. For instance, TRAC's report focused on the environmental, safety and health issues that existed within Nike's global supply chain. It is an instrument that TRAC designed to invigorate society's capacity to change how Nike and other sneaker apparel manufactures operate.

Conclusion to Instrument Network Results

During the Nike controversy, 5 of the 17 instruments used during can be seen as standardized – alliance, magazine article, supply chain audit, sustainability report, CSR report, and newspaper article – as they were drawn on multiple times by different organization. The routinization of these instruments becomes more significant when their

instrumental properties are considered. Overall these instruments share the common thread of being tactical tools that enable the organizations to control the dissemination of information to other organizations. These one-way means of communication provided low interactivity between organizations. The majority of the instruments used throughout the controversy did not provide a true, open dialogue between business and society.

CSR instruments are instantiations of the organization that enable the coordination of stakeholders in different environments. From the repeated use of certain instruments, or instruments that share similar properties, patterns of communication do emerge that come back to shape the web of relationships between organizations. This is because as Star (1999) explains, instruments are representative of the standards and settings that enable a community to coordinate action. To this point in the study, actors, moves and instruments have been collected and analyzed independently and in each case, patterns emerged that seemed consequential for the communicative behaviors of the organizations involved in the controversy. What still remains is to see how all of these patterns fit together to create the infrastructure and how the infrastructure became a generating factor during the controversy.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR COMMUNICATION

What role does the infrastructure for communication play in shaping the strategy and instrumentation of organizations in a CSR controversy involving Nike? As organizations responded to moves and countermoves in a controversy, an infrastructure for communication about CSR issues emerges. The concept of infrastructure is typically used to explain how information systems permit, promote and facilitate orderly and heterogeneous behaviors among users. Infrastructure means something similar here but, as discussed in the literature review, refers to the formation of means of engagement that give order to the inter-organizational relationships during a CSR controversy.

Infrastructure in inter-organizational relationships is evident in the present study because as Nike and its stakeholders attempted to manage the controversy a set of arrangements of communication emerged to constrain and afford the behavior of the organizations.

Since infrastructure is largely tacit, its reconstruction depends on layers of analysis that perform an infrastructural inversion. Infrastructure in the context of an inter-organizational controversy differs from extant infrastructure studies that rely on first hand participant observation of technology use. Given that first hand observation was not possible for the present case, the approach taken here was to document different networks of actors, moves and instruments over time as a means for engaging in infrastructural inversion. Star (1999) makes the methodological point that reading an infrastructure is a complex process of unfreezing some of its observable points. To reveal inter-organizational infrastructure requires developing a variety of points of visible observation relative to actor, move and instrument networks. Fredrico (2010) calls these points facts

and Star (1999) and Star and Rutleder (1995) call them features but here they are referred to as patterns. No matter what terminology is used the idea is the same – they are all describing the characteristics of the relationships that standardized over time.

As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D5, the approach taken here was to describe the actor network, the move network, and the instruments network. Answering the research question that frames the current chapter required analyzing the data in quadrants 4, 8, and 12. By focusing attention on the patterns of actors, moves and instruments, the invisible layers of control and access became visible (Star, 2002). The point is that a strategy of inversion aims to document patterns of behaviors from which inferences about the presence of infrastructure can be drawn and about the consequences of infrastructure on how things happen can be drawn. So describing these patterns is an important part in reconstructing infrastructure because they provide grounds for what the infrastructure is and how it matters.

The current chapter is set-up as follows. First, the infrastructure is identified and articulated through the patterns that emerged from the back-and-forth exchange among the actors. Second, the relationship between the infrastructure and organizational action is explained. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of how infrastructure is a complementary piece to Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory and how the infrastructure shows that the controversy was not a free flowing discussion but one where meaning was controlled as best as it could be by participating organizations.

Articulating Infrastructure in CSR Controversy

The Patterns of the Infrastructure Relative to the Nike Controversy

Theoretically speaking, infrastructure is simple to define: it is the preferred performed forms of communication and interaction that offer ‘solutions’ or patterns for the ongoing problematics of meaning, action and coherence. However empirically, infrastructure is difficult to unearth and articulate due to its implicit nature. It is not equivalent to the instruments of a controversy nor is it equivalent to the interlocking moves made within a controversy (although both are important to the development and maintenance of an infrastructure), nor is it equivalent to the network of roles actors take on. Infrastructure is evident in how the observable patterns of each work in conjunction with one another as a logic of communication. To highlight the infrastructure, the patterns that organized the meaning making and meaning management between Nike and its stakeholders is opened-up and described here.

There are five patterns relative to the actors, moves and instruments about the Nike controversy that point to the emergence of infrastructure. The previous three chapters have explained how these patterns came to be. In other words, the patterns described here are a summation of what is reported in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Pattern 1: US-Based Disagreement

The overwhelming majority of organizations that participated in the controversy were headquartered in the United States. Although the issues relative to the controversy were based on Nike’s operations in Vietnam, Indonesia and China, the controversy involved mostly US-based organizations.

Pattern 2: Roles of News and Entertainment Media, NGOs and Nonprofit Organizations

News and Entertainment Media organizations, NGOs, and nonprofit organizations dominated the controversy. Although their roles vary from argument generators to collaborators, these organizations make most of the stakeholder moves within the controversy.

Pattern 3: A Break in Friendly Relations

The nature of stakeholder communication was contentious. As stakeholders presented moves and countermoves throughout the controversy, Nike internalized the particular symbolic and material qualities of them as attacks on the company, its executives or reputation.

Pattern 4: Nike's Presented Moves Maintained a Sense of Rationality

To mediate the adversarial relationships that emerged with its stakeholders, Nike enacted moves and joint actions that were rational in the sense that they stayed away from affective symbolic content - even when the company was responding to stakeholder moves that targeted executives in a private and personal nature. Nike's moves and countermoves were based on metrics, numerical ratings and audits of the economic, social and environmental impact of the company's supply chain.

Pattern 5: Information Rich, Asynchronous Instruments for Communication

The instruments that were standardized within the controversy were one-way, asynchronous means of communication because they put organizations into the role of either sender or receiver. Although these instruments were rich in information they also provided limited synchronous feedback between organizations.

Expressing Infrastructure in its Final State

The infrastructure built-up through the conduct of the controversy was best typified around the logic of transmission as opposed to the logic of ritual communication. The legitimate forms of communication were those that limited interactivity among the participants. Carey (1988) describes the transmission logic of communication as the most prevalent type of communication in American culture. So, it is not surprising to see it deeply embedded in a controversy largely involving US-based organizations. Carey describes the transmission view of “communication as a process whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people” (p. 15). The infrastructure was evident in how the organizations developed one-way, asymmetrical communication that controlled the flow of information in the favor of the designer. The infrastructure gave order to the development of the means of engagement by tacitly pointing organizations in a particular direction – acceptable forms of communication were ones that persuaded through broadcasting information relative to the position of the organization be it a harsh and unfriendly or economically reasoned.

It is also the case that the transmission logic enables the analyst to see what was not afforded by the infrastructure. An infrastructure grounded in the ritual logic of communication would stand in contrast to the infrastructure that developed in the Nike controversy. As Carey (1988) explains, the ritual logic is one where actors share beliefs through participation. An infrastructure that is centered more on participation as opposed to informing would foster a greater understanding of the positions held by both business and society. As Campbell (2004) explains, “when communication extends beyond managers themselves and also includes other stakeholders, it appears that corporations

begin to better appreciate the concerns of these other actors” (p. 933). Although sharing did happen to a degree during the Nike case, the logic more prevalent in the controversy was transmission. That is, the ritual logic was not reinforced in the relationships among the organizations instead occurred sporadically throughout the case.

What also seems to point away from a ritual logic is that the instruments used to build and maintain the infrastructure realized in the Nike case were those that limited sharing, participation and understanding. A ritual logic would have been made available through the use of instruments such as stakeholder meetings, ombudsman, or a confidentiality person (i.e., Graafland et al., 2003), which were not present in the Nike controversy. Finally, implied in the participatory view is a difficulty in threatening the personal territory of an executive or reputation of an organization. So, contentious and malicious moves would not be routinized as they were during the Nike case. Challenging the positive face of an organization or its representatives is easier to do through public presentation as opposed to the close quarters of stakeholder meetings, ombudsman, or a confidentiality person. The upshot is that the framework of standards relative to either a transmission or ritual driven infrastructure affords and constrains vastly different behaviors.

So CSR strategy and instrumentation is not just the conduit through which corporations inform and persuade but something that arises out of the sequences of prior action and anticipated action. The current study then sheds some light on one of the least understood aspects of the field – the relationship between communication context and CSR strategy and instrumentation. Communication is constitutive of the practices, procedures, roles and identities that emerge as corporations manage the claims

stakeholders make. Now that there is a clear articulation of the infrastructure, the next thing to do is to see exactly what impact it had on the behaviors of the organizations. Specifically, how does the infrastructure create or diminish opportunities for organizations within the controversy to enact certain forms of strategy and instrumentation.

The Role of Infrastructure within the Nike Controversy

The group of organizations that came together to debate Nike's social and environmental behaviors was diverse. The key point of commonality, and sometimes the only point, was the controversy. Yet, from the struggle there arose patterns of interconnectedness and interdependence among the organizations – an infrastructure -- that provided further foundation for new forms of conflict management over CSR. The following section describes four examples of infrastructure in inter-organizational communication and its consequences.

Example 1: Inter-organizational Alliance

The first example of how the infrastructure was consequential for the content, direction and outcome of strategy and instrumentation was with the activity relative to the inter-organizational alliance. The inter-organizational alliance as joint action was constrained in a way that it limited interaction between Nike and stakeholders instead of opening it up. Nike did this by using the inter-organizational alliance to link to a select group of organizations. In other words, Nike designed both the joint action and instrument in a manner that while performing new forms of disclosure, the company still controlled the engagement.

The order observed in the inter-organizational alliance matches the infrastructure as it was articulated earlier in the chapter. Nike invented and reinvented the inter-organizational alliance so that it would provide access to necessary resources but did it in a way that they controlled the form and content of the alliances. Consider the organizations that Nike aligns with: Ernst & Young is one of the largest accounting firms in the world, Good Works International was founded by a former UN Representative and Mayor of Atlanta, the ACLU is the preeminent guardian of American liberty and the Ministry of Education, Vietnam and Clinton Administration are both major government agencies. The alliances Nike designed excluded smaller, lesser known organizations such as Vietnam Labor Watch and Child Labor Coalition as well as those organizations that harshly criticized the company such as Press For Change, TRAC or Mark Kasky. The inter-organizational alliance here was both a means for engaging society, parts of society, but closing off others. Consequently, when Press For Change, TRAC and Mark Kasky made moves within the controversy their hand was forced – they had to use certain methods of strategy and instrumentation and stay away from others. Partnership in alliances, or an open dialogue with Nike for that matter, was not available to them.

Again, identifying the role of infrastructure in this way also enables us to see what forms of strategy and instrumentation were not afforded in the controversy. The form of inter-organizational alliance deemed acceptable during the controversy was in direct opposition to alliances like the Forest Stewardship Council, Business and Biodiversity Council, Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GBC) and World Bank Institute where dozens and even hundreds of corporations, NGOs and non-profits work toward eradicating systemic societal problems. For example, World

Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) consists of over 150 companies from 35 countries and more than 20 major industrial sectors (Daboub & Calton, 2002). The mission of these alliances is to create an open-dialogue so that solutions can emerge from the interactions between business and society (Arts, 2002; Zadek, 2005). In essence these alliances are established to combat the approach taken by the likes of Nike where they are tools only used to win the debate between business and society. The form of the inter-organizational alliance during the controversy gets at the irony of Nike's transparency – it is only transparent so that the company can lay the ground work for the instruments that follow the transmission logic of communication. The inter-organizational alliance example then points to the metamessages of the instruments for communication – there is a struggle within the controversy that involves more than the issues but how actors work to design the nature of relationships (i.e., Aakhus, 2007; Aakhus & Jackson, 2005; Shön & Rein, 1995).

The form and content of the inter-organizational alliance shows that the infrastructure was an influencing factor in how the organizations communicated during the controversy. The infrastructure was influencing affordances and constraints but at the same time the infrastructure was an object of design. The alliance was a strategic move that gave Nike access to certain resources as well as the ability to adhere to certain cultural standards. But the company invented and reinvented the alliance in a way that it could access needed expertise in the area of CSR, and the reputations of particular organizations, while also limiting the interactivity with particular stakeholders. So although resources and institutions play a significant role in the communicative dimensions of organizations so too does the communication context.

Example 2: Non-financial Reporting

The second example of the role infrastructure in the controversy can be seen with the use of the non-financial report. The infrastructure realized in the Nike controversy was one where strategy and instrumentation restricted the role of organizations into ratified participants and bystanders with the ratified participants having control over form and content. No instrument better suits that logic than the non-financial report for two reasons. First, the non-financial report has certain built-in properties that match the one-way logic. Specifically, the non-financial report gives the producer an opportunity to develop quantitative ratings relative to CSR programs and initiatives. The non-financial report consists of dozens, even hundreds of pages, of metrics and numerical ratings of social responsibility and standardized compliance of environmental behaviors. The non-financial was the perfect instrument for the delivery of Nike's rational, economically-based content. Second, even though many of the non-financial reports created were products of an alliance between Nike and its stakeholders, the company had ultimate control in whether or not to publish them. In fact, although the report created for Nike by Ernst & Young was central to the controversy it was never supposed to be released to the public – it was leaked by Nike employees. Nike earmarked the report for internal use only because it showed that many of the criticisms of the supply chain were correct (see Vogel, 2005).

However what truly reinforces the influence infrastructure had on the network is the fact that the non-financial report was not exclusively used by Nike. TRAC's participation in the disagreement-space was done through the non-financial report. On the surface it seems that TRAC's move simply signaled a change in the types of issues within

the disagreement-space. But really the important part of TRAC's participation was that they followed the rules and procedures suggested by the infrastructure. TRAC was limited in their choice of strategy and instrumentation because they were not able to connect in the network through certain means (i.e. alliance, stakeholder meeting, TV report, etc.) so they picked-up the tacit suggestion that a legitimate form of communication was the non-financial report. Indeed after the organization used this particular instrument their expression of opposition couldn't go unchecked and thus their move was taken-up. To be an active and valid participant in the controversy an organization was required to adopt the recurring patterns through which the entire network managed meaning, action and coherence.

Example 3: Business Week Breaks from the Media's Role

The third example of the role of infrastructure is based on what happens when the taken-for-granted patterns of actor roles are broken. In 1999, *Business Week* broke the role that had been routinized with media organizations. The moves presented by media organizations were routinized as fodder for keeping the controversy alive and Nike in reactionary position. Therefore the role that media organizations were forced into by other stakeholders centered on the perception that the media's reporting was negative. In other words, stakeholders picked-up and treated media moves, or portions of media moves, that framed Nike as combatant and a destructive force within the global community. When *Business Week* stepped outside of that role and presented a move that seemed to defend Nike, the move was ignored – it was not picked-up by another stakeholder organization. The move was rejected because it existed outside of the infrastructure – that is, the communication from this type of actor was expected to

encourage attacks on Nike and not defend the company. Although it would seem that *Business Week* would naturally be a defender of Nike, in Phase II of the controversy the magazine made a move that included harsh content about the company's use of child labor. The infrastructure here then constrained the roles of the actors in a way that some were not permitted to break away from what had become standard within the controversy.

Example 4: Phil Knight's Speech to the National Press Club

The fourth example of the role of infrastructure in the controversy revolves around Phil Knight's speech to the National Press Club. Both the form and content of the move and the instruments used here broke the infrastructure. The speech was another moment of reinvention within the controversy. Nike performed a different type of move within the format of the speech instrument. The company took advantage of the connection (i.e., affordances with certain stakeholders) to do something slightly different than had been done during the controversy.

Many researchers feel that the speech was the climax of the controversy because it was the presentation of Nike's plan of how the company was going to change the conditions within its factories. Phil Knight announced six steps that the company would take to diminish the unpleasantness of the procedures surrounding the use of child labor. But really Phil Knight did not say anything radically different than he, and other company representatives, had said before. In fact, 4 years earlier Nike expanded its code of conduct to include raised levels of compliance in contract factories. Sub-contractors were required to sign the code and thereby promise that in "spirit of our partnerships" they would begin to live by the new rules. The reason the speech to the National Press

Club stands out is because of the differences it exhibited from the patterns that got built-up within the controversy.

First and foremost, unlike the previous moves, the speech included both affective and economically reasoned content about the controversy. Along with discussing the new plan, Knight played-up the idea that the controversy had impacted more than the company's bottom-line. He described in many ways how the controversy had personally impacted the employees at the company, including himself. In fact, he opened the speech by saying "Philip Knight has been described in print as a corporate crook, the perfect corporate villain for these times". The strategy was to personalize the controversy by making it just as much about the people at the company as it was about people that were 10 thousand miles away. In addition, the instrument was unlike any previously used. This instrument featured a question-and-answer session with a group of actors that had been very critical of the company. So Nike used this particular instrument to connect with the very same journalists that had kept the controversy going for the past several years.

By using the speech, Nike broke the infrastructure for just a moment. It was an interesting decision by Nike to promote its CSR through atypical strategy and instrumentation. The example proves then that the company implicitly understood what was being afforded by the infrastructure and that by stepping outside of it the move would garner great attention. But it also shows how difficult it is to change the trajectory of the infrastructure. As Star and Ruthleder (1996) and Ciborra et al. (2000) tell us, large infrastructures cannot be changed instantly but only piece by piece and over time. Indeed after the speech Nike reverted back to using strategy and instruments from earlier in the controversy including the non-financial report and inter-organizational alliance.

The contention in most infrastructure studies is that infrastructure is best seen when the invisible patterns are broken (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1996). However previous research does not sufficiently illustrate what happens when these breaks occur (e.g., Star, 2002). There is very little understanding as far as ruptures in an infrastructure is concerned. Since infrastructure is understood here as an emergent design for communication, it stands to reason that breaks would result in the creation of new routines and patterns of preferred interaction, as well as tools to aid these interactions or the reinforcement of what exists. That is, a break would result in interactional repair and thus set the organizations down a path where new patterns of content and form would emerge. Yet that is not the case here as the example of Phil Knight's speech and *Business Week's* move simply reinforce that infrastructure is present. Although breaks do occur over the 11 years of the case, they do not lead to the repair or reprogramming of the logic of the infrastructure. In the end these examples stand as support for the overall contention that an infrastructure emerges within a controversy to constrain and afford the form and content of inter-organizational strategy and instrumentation.

Nike Controversy and Infrastructure for Communication

Previous research has come to three basic conclusions about the Nike case. The first basic conclusion describes the entirety of the corporate communication that emerged relative to the situation (e.g., Boje & Kahn, 2009). The second conclusion illustrates how particular instruments were used by Nike to connect with certain identifiable stakeholders during the controversy (e.g., Collins, Zoch & McDonald, 2004; Ki, 2004; McHale et al., 2007). Finally, there are several studies that deal with how Nike responded to the pressure from stakeholder organizations (Harrison & Scorse, 2004; Islam & Deegan,

2010; Knight & Greenberg, 2002; Locke et al., 2007). These basic conclusions are standard views of how to study CSR strategy and instrumentation that miss the essential point that the current study makes – the struggle between organizations generates an infrastructure for communication that co-designs an organization’s strategy and instrumentation.

All of these studies do well to explain some of the basic points about the Nike controversy. They develop points about the roles, moves and instruments but none of these puts them all together. What is underdeveloped is how attempts to control interaction generated a particular common ground of activity. Expressions of doubts and misunderstandings created an infrastructure that constrained and afforded what happens next in the back and forth between organizations. By looking at the case the way in which this study did, what gets highlighted is a new perspective on influence. Influence is about shaping the disagreement-space by opening up new forms of interaction about CSR issues - new forms though that still adhered to the basic underlying rationale of the infrastructure. So the focus on infrastructure means that what gets drawn out is the fact that all of the aspects of strategy and instrumentation really work in conjunction with one another. In other words, the Kasky/Nike interactions do not happen in isolation, nor does the Nike/ACLU or Nike/Good Works. These instances, as well as all the others, are a product of what comes before them, and impacts what happens after them.

When discussing Nike’s role in the “sneaker wars”, Stabile (2000) argues that little has been done to understand the invisible aspects of socially responsible communication. She further explains that research analyzes what the corporation makes visible in the form of advertising and corporate communication but really research needs

to be concerned with making visible the practices and realities that are routinely kept out of site. Infrastructure is precisely this invisible aspect – it is the tacit design of strategy and instrumentation. It is the organization of undetectable meaning making and meaning management that constrains and affords who talks, when and how.

When the relationship between Nike and its stakeholders began, the organizations relied on their knowledge of moves and joint actions from previous experiences. However over time, particular moves (or aspects of moves) and joint actions became habits or customs for either rational purposes or for cultural acceptability. These standard forms evolved both intentionally and unintentionally, but in either case, they had a direct impact on how relationships unfolded. Therefore the current study explains a different side of the Nike case - that as the actors framed their arguments what was generated was a tacit standardized form of strategy and instrumentation. So considering the interlocking nature of the activity within the controversy it can be said that Nike abided by the implicit knowledge of the infrastructure so they could rebuild their image and reputation.

Given the findings of the current study, there are two main implications concerning the role of infrastructure relative to the Nike controversy. First, the impact infrastructure has on inter-organizational communication brings to the forefront some of the missing pieces in Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory. More particularly, over the trajectory of a relationship what gets built-up is an infrastructure that affords and constrains the strategy and instruments that enable resource sharing and adhering to institutions. Second, the emergence of an infrastructure shows that the controversy was not a free flowing discussion but one where meaning was controlled as best as it could be by participating organizations.

Implications for Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory

Resource Dependence and Institutional Theory run richly through the social sciences. Both emerged as efforts to explain how organizational behavior is shaped by the environment and, in particular, the impact organizations have on each other in an environment (often in unanticipated ways). Indeed they have been used by academics from a wide range of disciplines to examine a range of contexts and to explain many facets of organizational behavior including CSR strategy and instrumentation (e.g., institutional theory Campbell, 2006; Lammers, 2003; resource dependence, Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).

It is certainly true that communication enables organizations to share resources or adhere to cultural, social and economic institutions. However it is also the case that the communication process itself takes on a life of its own. Infrastructure tackles a variety of subtle and not so subtle factors associated with the conditions relative to inter-organizational communication and how resources are secured and institutions managed. Thus by looking at how infrastructure emerges within the context of a CSR controversy, we can add to given explanations about inter-organizational communication that are based on Resource Dependence and Institutional Theories.

Although each offers a different approach to explaining the relationship between organizational behavior and the environment both share implied, undeveloped assumptions about the role of the instrumentation and strategy used during interaction. So the work done under the Resource Dependency and Institutional umbrellas overlook how resources and institutions impact inter-organizational strategy and instrumentation but they do not sufficiently attend to the potential influence the communicative order has on

the behavior of organizations – or how communication is generative of the organization and ‘institution’. These missing pieces have been highlighted in the past. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) recognized over thirty years ago that Resource dependence Theory is silent concerning the sequences of actions and reactions that lead to various states within relations. And although institutionalization can only occur through interaction, which DiMaggio and Powell (1991) described as the existence of transactions tying organizations to one another, there is a limited explanation of the nature and impact of ties. It is as though all of these theorists would agree that there has been little reflection and certainly empirical studies on the ties between organizations and the consequences of these ties. The current study draws out a relatively unexplored premise shared in both resource dependence and institutional theories – that the communicative order matters for inter-organizational strategy and instrumentation.

As organizations demand interaction from one another to persuade others to provide resources (resource dependence) or to manage ritual-based fields (institutional), the moves and counter moves made are patterned into an infrastructure for communication. The infrastructure for communication is a solution to how organizations navigate the context – it provides a tacit mechanism for organizational meaning making and meaning management. It is not the only solution but it is one that emerges to shape the expectations, rules and routines that constrain and enable how resources are shared and institutions are adhered to. Therefore the communicative order is a factor in the ties between organizations because it generates a certain rationality of what is easy to do and harder to do during interaction.

By introducing an infrastructural view, it is possible to articulate the relationship between the demands and problems of the communication context and organizational attempts to discipline these demands and problems. Attention to infrastructure for communication provides insight into the ways in which organizations construct action and subsequently how this action is constrained by the social context as well as the vast political, religious and social affiliations in which organizations are situated.

Infrastructure for communication is a consequence of the communication process itself and it illustrates how when moves and counter-moves are made they naturally produce patterns of who talks, when and how. Although the contention here is that infrastructure is generated by the communication that takes place in carrying out the CSR controversy, the potential for misunderstanding, disagreement, and opposition can occur around any organizational action. In other words, theoretically an infrastructure for communication is generated through communication – that is both an intentional and an emergent design for addressing the ongoing problems of meaning, action and coherence. Infrastructure then is really a concept that can be related to any context in which an organization must contend with the recurring problems of meaning, action, and coherence.

As Kallinikos (2006) explains, an infrastructure is built with a backdrop set against the economic and social developments that are taking place within and around an organization. Therefore resource and institutional perspectives are not dismissed here as the current study is trying to add an element to how these theories explain the behaviors relative to inter-organizational strategy and instrumentation. The element is the generative aspect of communication that comes from working out meaning, action and

coherence. As organizations work through the ambiguity of interaction to share resources or adhere to institutions what gets generated is an infrastructure for communication that constrains and affords how the resources are shared and institutions adhered to.

Implications for Control versus Content

The view that corporate communication strategies and instruments are simply about effective information exchange, or effective persuasion, misses at least three important matters about communication as constitutive. First, strategies and instruments arise in response to and anticipation of the demands of communication. Two, strategies and instruments generate the grounds for further interaction. And three, strategy and instrumentation are as much about shaping the way interaction will unfold as they are about informing or persuading. In other words, strategy and instrumentation are not simply about convincing others to change their attitude but are also a way of working out, or struggling over, the content, direction, and outcomes of activities. Indeed, the interactivity among organizational actors becomes an object of work and struggle because the form of interactivity influences what meaning will be constructed. Given the facts about how the management of disagreement arises from the ongoing problems of meaning, it is obvious that corporations have a definitive interest in shaping and regulating stakeholder interaction but so do stakeholders. The conventional view of instruments and strategies misses this deeper interest and involvement in making certain forms of communication more possible and other forms less possible. Communication as design is a theoretical stance for investigating the work, or struggles, involved in constructing meaning out of interaction.

There are two basic senses to design – design as a verb referring to design activity and design as noun referring to pattern (Aakhus, 2007; Aakhus & Jackson, 2005). Put most simply design, as verb, leads to design, as pattern. The simplest case of design highlights the individual deliberately crafting an object out of some material. While useful, this simple case of design is insufficient when considering communication as an object of design. For communication, there are at least two actors but typically many who may be more or less cooperative and more or less aware of their role in design. The materials are social-cultural phenomena of interaction that include such things as roles, identities, contributions, topics, turns, and principles of relevance. Designs for communication are evident in the emergence and the invention of rules, procedures, techniques, and technology that specify the arrangement of the materials of interaction (e.g., roles, identities, turns, topics, and so on) to achieve form of communication rather than another form (i.e., to discuss rather than to quarrel). It is through the emergence and development of designs for communication that the open-ended possibilities for communication in interaction are disciplined. A design stance emphasizes how parties mutually construct and elaborate the communicative context through the actions they take and how that context shapes the next possible actions.

Driving the design process during the controversy is the way that the organizations are framing the reputation of Nike. Reputation is the perception stakeholders (Wartick, 2002; Whetten & Mackey, 2002) and instead of simply informing or marketing there is also a co-design of meaning (i.e., Schon & Rein, 1995) where participating organizations co-create what factors this perception is based on. That is not to say that the organizations were abandoning all attempts to control meaning. The

current study then points to how a design for communication, an infrastructure for communication, emerges to help in the meaning making and management of corporate reputation. As organizations design communication to control the meaning behind reputation, preferred forms of roles, moves and instruments develop to help define that meaning. The essential point here is that the design of strategy and instrumentation is a constantly evolving endeavor that is constitutive of corporate reputation.

Conclusion to Discussion: Infrastructure for Communication

As Doorely and Garcia (2011) explain, “communication has played a key role in every step of Nike’s journey through the frequently hostile and always complicated terrain of corporate responsibility” (p. 356). Although there has been a plethora of studies that have looked at the strategy and instrumentation Nike used to navigate the situation, none have focused on how the communication process itself impacted the strategy and instrumentation of both the corporation but also stakeholder organizations. The current study articulates this by mapping how an infrastructure for communicating about CSR issues evolved in the controversy about the production of Nike products. The interaction among the organizations constructed an infrastructure for communicating about CSR – a way of communicating that shaped what was highlight and what was hidden.

Infrastructure was evident in patterns of ties among actors, moves and instruments relevant to the controversy. The infrastructure for communication afforded and constrained the form and content of the actions of the organizations involved. There was an interlocking nature to the activity within the controversy which created, shaped and sustained important aspects of the strategies and instruments that did not exist prior to the controversy and so were developed through it.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Since the Nike controversy, there has been a rash of controversies over how corporations behave toward their stakeholders and the environment. These controversies have significantly impacted the reputation of the corporations. To respond to these situations, corporations invent and reinvent strategies and instruments to manage the way stakeholders make claims on the organization. Research and professional literature explains this by emphasizing how organizations communicate to persuade others to provide resources (resource dependence) or to manage identity in ritual based, symbolic fields (institutional). However as Powell et al. (2005) states, neither money, market or force of novel ideas dominates inter-organizational activity - it is the attachments of the companies to one another that motivate activity. It is the case that CSR strategy and instrumentation only exists within the presence of stakeholder strategy and instrumentation. Along the same lines as corporations, stakeholder organizations invent and reinvent strategy and instrumentation in an attempt to win the debate (Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, 2003). The fact is that these interchanges between the corporation and its stakeholders act as a regulative device maintaining acceptable levels of congruence between organizational activities and organizational claims (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). The current study illustrates the importance of interaction between business and society by showing that the communication context produces an infrastructure for communication that is fundamental to what is possible in terms of CSR communication.

Previous work on inter-organizational communication does not go far enough in theorizing the role that the conditions of communication play in the contexts that give rise

to the instrumental and strategic dimensions of communication. It is presupposed in much of the literature on inter-organizational communication that there are factors beyond political, cultural and economic that drive why and how organizations communicate with one another. But getting at what is missing from previous research is difficult because there are scant methods (Abbott, 1999) and data relative to how organizations debate issues in the public sphere (Rogers, 2009). To overcome these problems, the current study draws conclusions about the communication in the context of CSR through infrastructural inversion, which unearths the standardization of behaviors through the joint influence of actors.

All too often, a gap develops between what is claimed by an organization and counterclaims by stakeholders. The gap is constitutive of the moves and countermoves upon which the infrastructure for communication emerges. Organizations construct moves that attempt to exercise control over the situation, in this case the controversy at hand, by opening up and closing off opportunities to manage meaning, action, and coherence. During the Nike controversy, as organizations use certain moves to close-off disagreement and otherwise shape the disagreement-space relative to the reputation of the organization, what gets built-up is an infrastructure for communication that also frames these choices. In the end, the current project has brought us to an understanding of inter-organizational communication that was not evident when it started – the communication context influences what becomes easy or difficult to do in terms of communication instrumentation and strategy. The context here involved the standardization of certain roles, moves and instruments, including:

- The controversy was generated and maintained by the roles news and entertainment media and NGOs assume through their strategy and instrumentation.
- There was an interlocking nature to the moves which meant that the organization's had to navigate the complexity of the controversy by constantly reading the situation.
- The instruments predominantly used to mediate the controversy were one-way tools for information dissemination.

The study is an improvement over the way that communication is typically understood in the CSR and organizational literature because it gets right at the idea that as organizations work toward interactivity, what gets built-up is a background of promises, requests and commitments that shapes how corporations tell good stories about their behavior. This conclusion converges on the deeper meaning of how communication is seen in pragmatic studies (e.g., Aakhus, 1999; Katz & Aakhus, 2002). The infrastructure, like the underlying logics found in many pragmatic studies, creates an expectation that is hard to break. So the advantages of the infrastructure perspective and the inversion approach adopted here is that the study of how to mediate the conditions of communication can be elevated from face-to-face (e.g., Aakhus, 1999; Katz & Aakhus, 2002) to inter-organizational.

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
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FIGURES

JA1

Joint Action Model


Inter-organizational Communication



D1

Data Analysis Steps

Infrastructure for Communication




Note: This figure summarizes the approach taken to describe the infrastructure for communication. The figure shows 12 quadrants as they fall over the three phases that represent the trajectory of the Nike controversy. Working down, box 1 is the actor results for Phase I, box 2 is the actor results in Phase II, box 3 is the actor results for Phase III and box 4 represents the overall understanding of the actors in the controversy including the patterns and standards that developed over the 11 years of the case. Accordingly, boxes 5 through 8 illustrate the communicative moves and boxes 9 through 12 represent the instruments. Conceptually then, when all of these boxes are filled with data, boxes 4, 8 and 12 will be added together to get the infrastructure. This figure will be used throughout the study as a point of reference because it is a way to graphically highlight the relationship of a particular chapter to the overall purpose of the study.

D2

Data Analysis Steps

Actors in Infrastructure for Communication




Note: As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D2, answering Empirical Question 1 included describing the actor-network so that patterns of actors could be identified. This required analyzing the data in quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4.

D3

Data Analysis Steps

Moves in Infrastructure for Communication




Note: As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D3, answering Empirical Question 2 included describing the communicative move-network so that patterns could be identified. This required analyzing the data in quadrants 5, 6, 7, and 8.

D4

Data Analysis Steps

Instruments in Infrastructure for Communication




Note: As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D4, answering Empirical Question 3 included describing the instrument-network so that patterns could be identified. This required analyzing the data in quadrants 9, 10, 11, and 12.

D5

Data Analysis Steps

Articulating Infrastructure for Communication




Note: As explained in the methods section, and summarized in Figure D5, answering the Research Question included describing the actor-network, the communicative moves network, and the instruments network. This required analyzing the data in quadrants 4, 8, and 12.

T1

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)


Timeline of Events



T2

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Color Coded Timeline of Events



TABLES

A1

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Participating and Plausible Organizations

Participating Organization	Plausible Organizations
Nike	Associated Press
CBS Broadcasting	Gap
Life Magazine	Guess? Inc.
Business Week	NBC Universal
Clinton Administration	Sporting News
Reporters	Puma
Jerry Rice	Reebok
Michael Jordan	Umbro
Consumers	Mitre Sports International
Doonesbury	Chicago Bulls
Good Works International	Child Labor Coalition
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth	SF 49ers
Ernst & Young	Wal-Mart
Nike Employees	Ken Griffey Jr.
Transnational Resource and Action Center	Seattle Mariners
United National Industrial Development Organization	Major League Baseball
New York Times	National Basketball Association, Inc.
The Wall Street Journal	National Football League
Harvard Business School	Vietnam Labor Watch
National Press Club	American Association of Advertising Agencies
BBC Worldwide Limited	Advertising Age
NGO	Nike Shareholders
Press for Change	Converse
Ministry of Education and Training, Vietnam	Bush Administration
Mark Kasky	The Body Shop
American Civil Liberties Union	
California Court System	
Starter Apparel	

A2

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Actor Table of Participating Organizations

Organization	Type	Industry	Mission	Size	Location	Time Existence	First Appearance	History with Issue from 1 st Appearance
Nike	Corp	Apparel Retailer	“Our goal is to carry on his legacy of innovative thinking, whether to develop products that help athletes of every level of ability reach their potential, or to create business opportunities that set Nike apart from the competition and provide value for our shareholders.”	Operates in 160 countries; 19B in sales; 30,000 employees; Fortune 500; S&P 500	Beaver, Oregon	1972	1993 Phase I	Center of controversy
CBS Broadcasting (CBS)	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	Our ability to continue as a leader in the global marketplace relies not only on constant innovation and dedication but also on the pursuit of ethics, honesty, and integrity in all that we do. It is our strongly held belief that	ns in television, radio, online content, and publishing; Fortune 500;	New York, New York	1927	1993 Phase I	First Call out in case study

			competing with character and integrity is far more important to our long-term success than any single victory along the way.	S&P 500;			
Life Magazine	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	<i>Life's</i> motto became, "To see Life; see the world." The magazine was known for its pictures!	New York, New York	1883	1996 Phase II	Published a picture of boy stitching a Nike soccer ball. Editorialized that Nike was a company to watch regarding child labor. Created the American Apparel Industry Association
Business Week	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	Provides international <i>business</i> news & stock market news.	New York, New York	1929	1996 Phase II	
Clinton Administration	Government	Executive Branch	The United States Presidency of Bill Clinton, also known as the Clinton Administration. An organization that was founded and maintained by the job of reporters. In this case, they acted as an organization as many choose to seek interviews and quotes from the same sources regarding Nike's behavior. Also become	Washington DC	January 20, 1993 to January 20, 2001	1996 Phase II	
Reporters					1997 Phase II	Hounded Jerry Rice and Michael Jordan about Nike's use of child labor. Also members of	

	important as they are the members of the National Press Club.		the National Press Club.
Jerry Rice	Football player for the SF 49ers. Rice had an endorsement deal with Nike in the 1990s to wear apparel and gear. So Rice was part of Nike, SF 49ers and NFL organizations. Theoretically, Rice was sought after by reporters because he has agency for these organizations.	1997 Phase II	Was hounded by reporters concerning Nike's use of child labor.
Michael Jordan	Basketball player for the Chicago Bulls. Jordan had an endorsement deal with Nike in the 1990s to wear apparel and gear. So was part of Nike, Chicago Bulls and NBA organizations. Theoretically, Jordan was sought after because he has agency for these organizations.	1997 Phase II	Was hounded by reporters concerning Nike's use of child labor.
Consumers	Loosely described as an organization. Although not a formal organization	1997 Phase II	Boycotted the opening of Nike

			consumers banded together to boycott Nike. Also, an important group as far as Nike is concerning because they buy retail products. So Nike often develops messages to deliver to this organization.				stores.	
Doonesbury	N/A	Media Content	<i>Doonesbury</i> is a comic strip by Garry Trudeau that chronicles the adventures and lives of an array of characters of various ages, professions, and backgrounds. Frequently political in nature, <i>Doonesbury</i> features characters representing a range of affiliations, but the cartoon is noted for a liberal outlook.	Created by Garry Trudeau	New York	1970	1997 Phase II	Dedicated a week to Nike and child labor.
Good Works International (Andrew Young)	Corp.	Consulting	A consulting firm "offering international market access and political risk analysis in key emerging markets within Africa and the Caribbean."	15 people	Atlanta, Georgia	1996	Phase II 1997	Hired to audit the Code of Conduct in Nike sub-contractor factories.
Tuck School of Business	Non-profit	Education	Tuck provides a world-class business education.		Hanover, New	1900	1998 Phase II	Commissioned by Nike to

at Dartmouth			The faculty ensures that our students become leaders who can work in diverse environments and accomplish the most complex objectives.		Hampshire			examine wages and benefits paid to Vietnam and Indonesia contract factories.
Ernst & Young	Corp.	Accounting, Tax and Auditing Services	Ernst & Young is a global leader in assurance, tax, transaction, advisory services and strategic growth markets. We aim to have a positive impact on businesses and markets, as well as on society as a whole.	144,000 people; privately owned; As of 2009, it is ranked by <i>Forbes</i> magazine the 10th largest private company in the United States	New York	1849	1997 Phase II	Hired to audit subcontractor factories.
Nike Employees			Although not a formal organization, Nike employees acted together and leaked the Ernst & Young report.*				1997 Phase II	Leaked the Ernst & Young document

Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC)	Non-profit	Corporate Watch Dog	“To expose multinational corporations that profit from war, fraud, environmental, human rights and other abuses, and to provide critical information to foster a more informed public and an effective democracy.”	8 – as far as I can tell, \$700K from individual and institutional donors	San Francisco	1996	1997 Phase II	Analyzes and critiques the Nike’s Ernst & Young audit of the factories and finding poor methodology and missing information on health and safety, environment, and general working conditions.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	Non-Governmental Organization	Cooperative	UNIDO aspires to reduce poverty through sustainable industrial development. We want every country to have the opportunity to grow a flourishing productive sector, to increase their participation in international trade and to safeguard their environment.	Specialized agency in the United Nations system;	Vienna, Austria	1966	1997 Phase II	Leaked the Ernst & Young Report from Nike Employees to TRAC.

New York Times	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	The Company's core purpose is to enhance society by creating, collecting and distributing high-quality news, information and entertainment.	Part of the New York Times Company, revenues of \$2.4B.	New York, New York	1851	1997 Phase II	Reported on the leaked Ernst & Young report and TRAC's subsequent report about it.
The Wall Street Journal	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	Our publications inform the discussions and decisions of the world while our databases make the business world more transparent.		New York, New York	1882	1997 Phase II	Nike purchased space here to advertise the Andrew Young Report
Harvard Business School (Harvard)	Non-profit	Education	Harvard Business Press publishes the best thinking in the areas of business strategy, general management, technology, leadership, human resources and innovation. Intelligent business readers turn to us for answers to the questions they face every day, and for the guidance and debate that will have a profound impact on their lives — both personally and professionally.		Cambridge, Massachusetts	1908	1998 Phase III	Attacked Phil Knight saying that this case has taken a great deal of his bravado.

National Press Club	Non-profit	Social Club	Its mission is to be The World's Leading Professional Organization for Journalists. Global leaders in government, politics, business, music, film and sport visit the club every day.	3,500 members	1908	Washington DC	1998 Phase III	Site of Phil Knight's speech in 1998 where he partially accepted responsibility.
BBC Worldwide Limited (BBC)	Corp. Subsidiary	Media Content	The BBC is the largest broadcasting organisation in the world. Its mission is to enrich people's lives with programmes that inform, educate and entertain.	2,800 employees	London	1927	2000 Phase III	
NGO	NGO	DNF	Vogel explains that an "NGO whose report Nike had commissioned reported in 2001 that it found widespread verbal abuse and sexual harassment in all nine factories in Indonesia that it visited. (p. 80).				2001 Phase III	Hired by Nike to investigate factories.
Press for Change (Jeffery Ballinger)	Non-profit	Lobbying and Advocacy	A "political lobbying and educational organization, which campaigns to achieve equal civil rights and liberties for all trans people in the United Kingdom, through		1993	1998 Phase III		Jeffrey Ballinger was interviewed regarding Nike and he is the

			legislation and social change."					Director of Press for Change.
Ministry of Education and Training, Vietnam	Government	Department	The MOET is the Governmental agency implementing the function of nationwide state management of pre-school education, general education, professional education, higher education, continuing education; implementing the function of state management in public services.		Ha-Noi, Vietnam		2001 Phase III	Nike hired teachers, rented classroom space and provided supplies.
Mark Kasky (CA Citizen)			A California citizen acted "as a private attorney general" for the state (Vogel, 2005, p. 81) and brought suit against Nike for deceptive advertising. This individual acted on behalf of the state and assumed agency for this loose organization.				2003 Phase III	Argued that Nike's public claims of effectively addressing allegations were deceptive advertising. Partnered with Nike to argue again advertising lawsuit brought by CA citizen.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)	Non-profit	Lobbying and Advocacy	National organization advocating individual rights, by litigating, legislating, and educating the public on a broad array of issues affecting individual.	500,000	New York, New York	1917	2003 Phase III	The Supreme Court of California had jurisdiction
California Court System (CA Courts)	Government	State Judicial Branch	It provides for the orderly settlement of disputes between parties in controversy, determines the guilt or innocence of	2,000 judicial officers and 21,000	San Francisco, CA	1849	2003 Phase III	

those accused of violating laws, and protects the rights of individuals.

court
employee
es.

in
proceedings
between
Nike and the
CA Citizen.

Starter Apparel

Corp –
Subsid
iary

Apparel
Retailer

Low-priced sneaker brand.

New
Haven,
Connect
icut

1971

2004
Phase III

Purchased by Nike for \$43M.

A3

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Actor Table of Plausible Organizations

Organization	Type	Affiliation	Mission	Size	Location	Time Existence	First Appearance	Reason for possible involvement
Associated Press	News Cooperative	Media	“the AP’s mission is to be the essential global news network, providing distinctive news services of the highest quality, reliability, and objectivity with reports that are accurate balanced and informed”	3,700	New York, New York	1846	Phase 1	Nike’s response to the CBS story is to write a press release which would have been sent to the AP.
Gap	Corp – Public	Apparel Retailer	Every day, we look for new ways to connect with customers around the world, provide value to our shareholders and make a positive contribution in the communities	One of the world's largest specialty retailers, with approximately 3,100	San Francisco, California	1969	Phase 1	Had a child labor issue in the years of blank (book)

			where we do business.	stores				
Guess? Inc.	Corp – Public	Apparel Retailer	At Guess, we are committed to being a worldwide leader in the fashion industry. We deliver products and services of uncompromising quality and integrity consistent with our brand and our image. NBC Universal owns and operates a valuable portfolio of news and entertainment networks, a premier motion picture company, significant television production operations, a leading television stations group, and world-renowned theme parks.	12,000 employees	Los Angeles, California	1981	Phase I	In 1992, Guess contractors faced litigation from the US Department of Labor (DOL) due to failure to pay their employees the minimum wage or adequate overtime.
NBC Universal (NBC)	Public	Media Content		30,000 employees	New York, New York	1926	Phase 1	The possible connection here is that NBC could have either picked up the 193 press release or could have also run an investigative story about child labor.

Sporting News	Corp	Media Content	SN currently covers seven main sports — Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey League (NHL), NASCAR, and NCAA men's basketball and football — with occasional coverage of other sports.	540,000 circulation	Charlotte, North Carolina	1886	Phase 1	Covers sports like the other major media organizations that did get involved in the disagreement-space network.
		Apparel Retailer	We are committed to working in ways that contribute to the world by supporting creativity, sustainability and peace and by staying true to the values of being Fair,	9,000 employees and \$3B in sales.	Herzogenaurach, Germany	1924	Phase 1	Organizations promoting fair trade and workers' rights criticize Puma's employment practices in their developing world factories,
Puma	Corp - Public							

			Honest, Positive and Creative in decisions made and actions taken.				predominantly relating to workers in China, Turkey, El Salvador and Indonesia. ¹
		Apparel Retailer	Reebok's mission is to always challenge and lead through creativity. At Reebok, we see the world a little differently and throughout our history have made our mark when we've had the courage to challenge convention. Reebok creates products and marketing programs that reflect the brand's unlimited creative potential.			Phase 1	
Reebok	Corp – Public			Subsidiary of Adidas; has 9,000 employees	Canton, Massachusetts	1895	
Umbro	Corp .	Apparel Retailer	Today, the company combines its heritage in sports		Cheadle, United Kingdom	1934	Phase II
							Umbro makes soccer balls and were also in the 1996

			tailoring with modern football culture to create groundbreaking and iconic football apparel, footwear and equipment that blend performance and style.				Life story.
Mitre Sports International	Corp .	Apparel Retailer	Mitre strives to be the people's sports brand, built on twin foundations of heritage and technical expertise. Our world class products combine the highest technical performance with a sense of history to bring the Mitre brand alive for the current generation and those to follow.	London, United Kingdom	1817	Phase II	Mitre makes soccer balls and was also in the 1996 Life story.
Chicago Bulls	Corp – private	Sports Franchise		Chicago, Illinois	1966	Phase II	Michael Jordan was a player for this franchise as well as a Nike spokesman

							during the Nike case. He is widely considered one of the main reasons for Nike's success.
				Phase II			
Child Labor Coalition	Non-profit	Lobbying and Advocacy	The Child Labor Coalition (CLC) exists to serve as a national network for the exchange of information about child labor; provide a forum and a unified voice on protecting working minors and ending child labor exploitation; and develop informational and educational outreach to the public and private sectors to combat child labor abuses and promote progressive initiatives and legislation.	This is a coalition of organizations	Washington, DC	1989	CLC provides government, businesses, and other organizations with the consumer's perspective on concerns including child labor, privacy, food safety, and medication information.

SF 49ers	Corp – Priv ate	Sports Franchise		San Francisco , Californi a	1946	Phase II	Jerry Rice was a player for this franchise (one of its most visible) as well as a Nike spokesman during the Nike case.
Wal-Mart	Corp - publi c	Discount and Club Stores	Saving people money to help them live better was the goal that Sam Walton envisioned when he opened the doors to the first Wal-Mart more than 40 years ago. Today, this mission is more important than ever to our customers and members around the world. We work hard every day in all our markets to deliver on this promise.	Bentonvil le, Arkansas	1962	Phase II	In March 1995, Kathy Lee and her line of women's clothing came under attack when investigators from the National Labor Committee found teenage women sewing clothing at her Global Fashion plant in Honduras. The clothes were then exported to the U.S. for sale at Wal-

Ken Griffey
Jr.

Baseball player for the Seattle Mariners. Griffey Jr. had an endorsement deal with Nike in the 1990s to wear apparel and gear. So Griffey Jr. part of Nike, Mariners and MLB organizations.

Phase II

Mart. When Kathie Lee's clothing was being produced, approximately 10 percent of the workers employed at Global Fashion were thirteen to fifteen years old.

<http://www1.american.edu/teach/kathylee.htm>

Griffey had an endorsement deal with Nike but was not hounded by reporters as Jordan and Rice were. Theoretically, Griffey could have responded to questions because he has agency for these

Seattle Mariners	Corp – Priv ate	Sports Franchise		Seattle, Washingt on	1977	Phase II	organizations. Ken Griffey Jr. was a player for this franchise (one of its most visible) as well as a Nike spokesman during the Nike case. This is the governing body for the league that the Mariners and Ken Griffey Jr. play in. There were also numerous other players in this league that endorsed Nike at this time. This is the governing body of the league that the Chicago Bulls and Michael Jordan play in. There were
Major League Baseball (MLB)	Priv ate	Associatio n		New York, New York	1901	Phase II	
National Basketball Association, Inc. (NBA)	Corp – priva te	Associatio n	The National Basketball Association is one of the four major professional sports leagues in North America, with 30 teams representing	New York, New York	1946	Phase II	

			28 US markets and one in Canada.				also numerous other players in this league that endorsed Nike at this time.
National Football League (NFL)	Corp. – private	Association	The organization oversees America's most popular spectator sport, acting as a trade association for 32 franchise owners. Among the league's functions, the NFL governs and promotes the game of football, sets and enforces rules, and regulates team ownership.	New York, New York	1920	Phase II	This is the governing body of the league that the 49ers and Jerry Rice plays in. There were also numerous other players in this league that endorsed Nike at this time.
Vietnam Labor Watch	Non-profit	Lobbying and Advocacy		San Francisco, California	DNF	Phase III	Thuyen Nguyen, the director of Vietnam Labor Watch has been quoted several times about Nike but there is limited information about the

American Association of Advertising Agencies	Non-profit	National Trade Association	Membership "produces approximately 80 percent of the total advertising volume placed by agencies nationwide."	New York, New York	1917	Phase III	actual organization. Could have gotten involved with CA citizen's suit.
Advertising Age	Private Corp – subsidiary	Media Content		Total circulation is 57,000; Part of Crain Communications New York, New York	1930	Phase III	Could have gotten involved with CA citizen's suit.
Nike Shareholders			Organization of individuals or companies (including a corporation) that legally owns one or more shares of stock in a joint stock company. This is a formal organization that has explicit agreements with management			Phase III	Stockholders are granted special privileges which can include the right to propose resolutions, liquidate assets, vote on the board of directors, etc. All things that

			which depend on the class of stock.					could have impacted Nike during this case.
Converse	Corp - Private*	Apparel Retailer	It licenses its name to sports apparel makers. Converse makes products under the names One Star and Jack Purcell that it sells through retailers such as Target and licensees in some 160 countries and its more than 40 stores.		North Andover, Massachusetts	1908	Phase III	Converse was a competitor of Nike. It also produced its products in many of the countries that Nike did and does. **Nike bought Converse in 2003.
Bush Administration	Government	Executive Branch	The United States Presidency of George Bush, also known as the Bush Administration.		Washington DC	January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009	Phase III	The Nike case spans some of the Bush Administration .
The Body Shop	Corp - Subsidiary	Cosmetics	Body shop and many more manufacturing companies came under scrutiny in recent years due to their labor laws violations in overseas.	Part of L'Oreal; 5,000 employees	Littlehampton, England, United Kingdom	1976	Phase III	Came under scrutiny in recent years due to their labor laws violations in overseas. In September 1994, independent

journalist Jon
Entine [3]
wrote an article
for *Business
Ethics*
magazine (now
defunct),
"Shattered
Image: Is The
Body Shop
Too Good to
be True."

A4

Phase I (1993 to 1995)

Participating and Plausible Organizations

Phase I	Participating Organizations	Plausible Organizations
1993 to 1995	Nike CBS Broadcasting	Associated Press Gap Guess? Inc. NBC Universal Sporting News Puma Reebok

A5

Phase II (1996 to 1997)

Participating and Plausible Organizations

Phase II	Participating Organizations	Plausible Organizations
1996 – 1997	Nike	
	Life Magazine	
	Business Week	
	Clinton Administration	Umbro
	Reporters	Mitre Sports International
	Jerry Rice	Chicago Bulls
	Michael Jordan	Child Labor Coalition
	Consumers	SF 49ers
	Doonesbury	Wal-Mart
	Good Works International	Ken Griffey Jr.
	Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth	Seattle Mariners
	Ernst & Young	Major League Baseball
	Nike Employees	National Basketball
	Transnational Action Resource Center	Association, Inc.
	United Nations Industrial Development	National Football League
	Organization	
	New York Times	
	Wall Street Journal	

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Phase III (1998 to 2004)

Participating and Plausible Organizations

Phase III	Participating Organizations	Plausible Organizations
1998 – 2004	Nike	
	Harvard Business School	
	National Press Club	Vietnam Labor Watch
	BBC Worldwide Limited	American Association of
	unnamed NGO	Advertising Agencies
	Ministry of Education and	Advertising Age
	Training, Vietnam	Nike Shareholders
	Mark Kasky	Converse
	American Civil Liberties	Bush Administration
	Union	The Body Shop
	California Court System	
	Starter Apparel	

CM1

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Moves Made Timeline

Year	Organization	Move Name	Individual Action	Actional	Content (Symbolic)	Instrumental
1993	CBS	CBS_StreetStories	Reporting	Assertive	Person (Nike)	TV Report
	Nike	NK1_PressRelease	Denying Control	Assertive	Person (Nike) Landscape (Child Labor)	Press Release
1996	Life	Life_Magazinestory	Reporting	Declaration		Magazine Article
	Nike	NK2_RevisedCodeofConduct	Denying	Commissive	Person (Nike)	Code of Conduct
	Business Week	BW1_Editorial	Connection Commenting	Expressive	Person (Nike)	Magazine Article
	Nike	NK3_AIP	Partnering	Commissive	Person (Nike)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Reporters Reporters	Reporters_InvestigatingNikeReps Reporters_InvestigatingNikeReps	Questioning Questioning	Assertive Assertive	Person (Nike) Person (Nike)	Interview Interview
1997	Consumers	Consumers_BoycottNikeStores	Confronting	Expressive	Person (Nike)	Boycott
	Doonesbury	DB_Comic	Attacking	Expressive	Person (Nike)	Newspaper Comic
	Nike	NK4_Ernst&YoungHire	Partnering	Declaration (Expressive = state of operations)	Person (Nike)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Nike Employees	NikeEmployees_E&YReport	Exposing	Declaration - getting Nike to accept poor report	Person (Nike)	Supply Chain Audit
	UNIDO	UNIDO_E&Yreport	Disclosing		Person (Nike)	Supply Chain Audit
	TRAC	TRAC1_E&YReportAnalysis	Criticizing		Text (E&Y Report)	Sustainability Report

				Declaration - getting Nike to accept poor report		
	TRAC	TRAC2_E&YReportAnalysis	Informing		Text (E&Y Report)	Sustainability Report
	Nike	NK5_GoodWorksHire	Partnering	Declaration	Person (Nike)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Nike	NK6_GoodWorksCodeAuditRelease	Informing	Declaration	(Person (Nike))	Supply Chain Audit
	New York Times	NYT1_AticleTRACReport	Reporting	Expressive	Person (Nike)	Newspaper Article
	Nike	NK7_DartmouthBSchoolHire	Partnering	Declaration	Person (Nike)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Nike	NK8_DartmouthBSchoolReport	Informing	Declaration	Person (Nike)	Sustainability Report
1998	Nike	NK9_KnightPressClubSpeech	Minimizing	Commissive	Landscape (Child Labor)	CEO Speech
1999	Business Week	BW2_Story	Reporting	Assertive	Landscape (Child Labor)	Magazine Article
2000	Mark Kasky	Kasky_Lawsuit	Attacking	Directive	Person (Nike)	Litigation
	BBC	BBC_Documentary	Reporting	Declaration	Person (Nike)	TV Report
	New York Times	NYT2_NikeChanges	Reporting	Commissive	Person (Nike)	Newspaper Article
	PressForChange_Ballinger					
	NYTInterview	PressForChange_Interview	Criticizing	Declarative	Person (Nike)	Interview
					Landscape (Operational Procedures)	Interorganizational Alliance
2001	Nike	NK10_NGOAlliance	Partnering	Declaration	Landscape (Operational Procedures)	Supply Chain Audit
	Nike	NK11_NGOReportVerbalAbuses	Informing	Declaration	Landscape (Operational Procedures)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Nike	NK12_MinistryofEdAlliance	Partnering	Commissive	Person (Nike)	Charitable Donation (Loan Program)
	Nike	NK13_MicroEnterpriseLoanProgram	Satisfying Stakeholders	Commissive	Landscape (Operational Procedures)	CSR Report
	Nike	NK14_1stAnnualCSRR	Satisfying Stakeholders	Declaration	Text (1st Amendment)	Interorganizational Alliance
	Nike	NK15_ACLUAlliance	Partnering	Assertive		

	Nike	NK16_KaskySettlement	Dealing	Directive	Person (Nike)	Settlement
					Landscape	
2004	Nike	NK17_2ndAnnualCSRR	Making the CSR		(Operational	CSR Report
	Nike	NK_18_StarterPurchase	Case	Declaration	Procedures)	Contract
			Buying	Assertive	Landscape	

CM 2

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Action Timeline

Year	Organization	Move Name	Individual Action	Joint Action	Possible Connections	Connects	Completed or Taken-up	Material Called-out
1993	CBS	CBS_StreetStories	Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Gap Puma Guess? Sporting News Reebok Nike Consumers		Attacking	Actional (Assertion) (Nike disagrees this is not the case about the situation)
	Nike	NK1_PressRelease	Denying Control	N/A	CBS UPI AP NBC ABC WSJ NYTimes	N/A	N/A	N/A
1996	Life	Life_Magazinestory	Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Wal-Mart Nike Umbro Mitre Reebok Adidas	Nike	Attacking	Actional
	Nike	NK2_RevisedCodeofConduct	Denying Connection	Take-into-account	Life CBS Initiative to End Child Labor Sports	BW	Denying Connection	Actional

			Exchange	Illustrated			
Business Week	BW1_Editorial	Commenting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike Consumers Media Activists	Nike	Attacking	Content
	BW1_Editorial	Commenting	Broadcast Exchange	N/A	Consumer s	Exposing	N/A
Nike	NK3_AIP	Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Clinton Administration Reebok Addidas Gap	Clinton Administration	Partnering (Completed)	N/A
Reporters	Reporters_InvestigatingNikeReps	Questioning	Interview	Nike Jerry Rice SF 49ers NFL Michael Jorda Chicago Bulls NBS Ken Griffey Jr Seattle Mariners MLB	Jerry Rice	Denying Knowledge	N/A
Reporters	Reporters_InvestigatingNikeReps	Questioning	Interview	Nike Jerry Rice SF 49ers NFL Michael Jordan Chicago Bulls NBS Ken Griffey Jr Seattle Mariners MLB	Michael Jordan	Denying Knowledge	N/A

	Consumers	Consumers_BoycottNikeStores	Confronting	Take-into-account Exchange	Nike	Nike	Condemning	Content
1997	Doonesbury	DB_Comic	Attacking	Broadcast Exchange	Nike Consumers Media Activists	Nike	Attacking	Content
	Nike	NK4_Ernst&YoungHire	Partnering	Alliance (Operational)	E&Y	E&Y	Partnering (Completed)	N/A
	Nike Employees	NikeEmployees_E&YReport	Exposing	Chat	UNIDO	UNIDO	Supporting	N/A
	UNIDO	UNIDO_E&Yreport	Disclosing	Chat	TRAC	TRAC	Supporting	N/A
	TRAC	TRAC1_E&YReportAnalysis	Criticizing	Cooperative Criticism	Nike NYTimes E&Y UNIDO Consumers Child Labor Coalition Wal-Mart	Nike	Negative Criticism	Content
	TRAC	TRAC2_E&YReportAnalysis	Informing	Take-into-account Exchange	NYT	NYT	Informing	Content
	Nike	NK5_GoodWorksHire	Partnering	Alliance (Operational)	Good Works	Good Works	Partnering (Completed)	N/A
	Nike	NK6_GoodWorksCodeAuditRelease	Informing	Take-into-account	Nike Media Activists	NYT	Denying	Declarativ

								Severity	e
	New York Times	NYT1_AticleTRACReport	Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike Consumers TRAC Nike Shareholders Other Media	Nike	Attacking	Expressive	
		NYT1_AticleTRACReport	Reporting	Broadcast Exchange		TRAC	Supporting		
	Nike	NK7_DartmouthBSchoolHire	Partnering	Alliance (Operational)	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	Partnering (Completed)	N/A	
	Nike	NK8_DartmouthBSchoolReport	Informing	N/A	Consumers NYTimes TRAC UNIDO	N/A	N/A	N/A	
	1998 Nike	NK9_KnightPressClubSpeech	Minimizing	Conversation	National Press Club	National Press Club	Acceptance of Responsibility	N/A	
				Take-into-account Exchange	Activists Consumers Media	Mark Kasky	Greenwashing	Content	
1999	Business Week	BW2_Story	Reporting	N/A	Consumers Nike Adidas Reebok Converse Child Labor Coalition	N/A	N/A	N/A	

2000	Mark Kasky	Kasky_Lawsuit	Attacking	Conflict Resolution	Nike	Nike	Acknowledging Law	Actional
		Kasky_Lawsuit	Attacking (Nike)	Conflict Resolution	California Court System	California Court System	Supporting	
	BBC	BBC_Documentary	Reporting	N/A	Nike Global Exchange Consumers Press For Change	N/A	N/A	N/A
	New York Times	NYT2_NikeChanges	Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike Consumers Media Activists	Nike	Attacking	Content
	PressForChange_Interview	PressForChange_Interview	Criticizing	Cooperative Criticism	Nike	Nike	Negatively Criticizing	Content
2001	Nike	NK10_NGOAlliance	Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	NGO	NGO	Partnering (Completed)	N/A
	Nike	NK11_NGOReportVerbalAbuses	Informing	N/A	Press for Change Media NGOs Governments	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Nike	NK12_MinistryofEdAlliance	Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Ministry of Education of Vietnam	Ministry of Education of Vietnam	Partnering (Completed)	N/A

2004	Nike	NK13_MicroEnterpriseLoanProgram	Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	Vietnam Labor Watch NY Times WSJ Vietnam People	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Nike	NK14_1stAnnualCSRR	Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	Consumers Activists Media	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Nike	NK15_ACLUAlliance	Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	ACLU	ACLU	Partnering (Completed)	N/A
	Nike	NK16_KaskySettlement	Dealing	Conflict Resolution	Mark Kasky	Mark Kasky	Dealing	N/A
	Nike	NK17_2ndAnnualCSRR	Making the CSR Case	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Nike	NK_18_StarterPurchase	Buying	Material Transaction	Buying	Starter	Selling	N/A

CM3

CSR Controversy

Possible Moves Made

Move Presented	Description
Acceptance of Responsibility	To acknowledge the moral or legal liability of a behavior, conduct or activity (Coupland, 2004).
Acknowledging Law	To portray CSR activities as based on the role of law in the country of operation (Coupland, 2004).
Attacking	To vehemently harass another organization. This individual action occurs when one organization assails another with harsh or unfriendly words.
Bolstering	Reducing the offensiveness of an act or situation by stressing the good traits of the organization (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Buying	To acquire a product or service by sacrificing something else of equivalent value (Lind & Goldkuhl, 2003).
Criticizing	To judge the qualities of something through written or spoken word. This individual action occurs when one organization evaluates and analyzes another's operational procedures, reports, purchases or decisions for the purpose of discussion.
Commenting	An observation or remark expressing an opinion. Occurs when organizations editorialize about a situation or issue.
Dealing	This action presented is part of the transaction joint action where organizations dispense materials in hopes of coming to a resolution in relation with others.
Defending	To guard or stand up for the actions of an organization. In CSR terms, it is a defensive management move were the organization admits responsibility but fights it (Clarkson, 1995).
Denying Connection	To refuse to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of another organization's behavior, conduct or activity through the argument that the organizations are distinct and separate entities (Phillips, 2010).

Denying Control	To refuse to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of another organization's behavior, conduct or activity through the declaration that there is little or nothing the corporation can do about them (Phillips, 2010).
Denying Knowledge	To refuse to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of another organization's behavior, conduct or activity by stating that the corporation did not know (Phillips, 2010).
Denying Responsibility	Outright refusal to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of a behavior, conduct or activity (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Denying Severity	To downplay the significance of an issues (Doorely & Garcia, 2007).
Differentiating	Reducing the offensiveness of an act or situation by stressing what other organizations have done. In other words, this is when an organization points to another organization's acts as more offensive then theirs (Benoit & Pang, 2008)
Exposing	To uncover and reveal something about an organization. This includes making accessible records, facts and figures about particular organizational activities, deeds, decisions or procedures. Based on other-reporting transparency where information is provided by an actor on other actors' behaviors (see Mitchell, 2002).
Evading by Accident	To present to an audience the notion that the behaviors of the organizations were a mishap and not a conscious planned act (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Evading by good intentions	Contending that the behaviors of the organization were mean to do well (Benoit & Pang, 2008). This move is based on the notion that the organization had the best intentions in mind when the organization performed a particular act.
Informing	To notify, tell or update an organization or organizations about something. This action centers on providing information or knowledge about things like the achievement, exploitations or deeds of an organization. Based on both other-reporting transparency and also self-reporting transparency where information is provided by an actor on its own behaviors (see Mitchell, 2002).
Making the CSR case	To make known the business case for CSR programs and initiatives (Coupland, 2005).

Minimizing	To reduce the offensiveness of an act or situation by stating that the act is not serious (Benoit & Pang, 2008). This move is based on an attempt to diminish the unpleasantness of the events surrounding organizational acts.
Over-confessing	To turn public statements into therapeutic sessions and unburden their frustrations by over admit to their role in the controversy (Doorely & Garcia, 2007).
Partnering	To become involved in a sanctioned and rigid activity with another organization(s). This action involves establishing a regulated joint association with another organization(s) such as a coalition, alliance, society or federation (Contractor, 2007).
Reporting	To tell a story in a newspaper article, television report, radio spot or Internet article. This move includes providing details and description of another organizations behavior for public consumption (e.g., Wright, 1986). This action differs from informing because it involves a mass media organization.
Satisfying Stakeholders	To satisfy the competing demands of stakeholders through CSR programs and initiatives including communication activities (Coupland, 2010).
Selling	To act as a vendor and offer a particular product or service (or range of both) for sale or barter (Lind & Goldkuhl, 2003).
Supporting	To be in favor of something such as a cause, policy or action of another organization and uphold this as right or valid.
Transcending	To reduce the offensiveness of an act or situation by stating there are more important considerations or worse situations in the world (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Questioning	To inquire either formally or informally about an organizations actions, behaviors, decisions, products or services.

CM4

CSR Controversy

Possible Moves Taken-Up

Communicative Moves Taken-up	Description
Acceptance of Responsibility	To take a move as outright acknowledgment of the moral or legal liability of a behavior, conduct or activity (Coupland, 2004).
Acknowledging Law	This up-take occurs when CSR statements are seen as satisfying the role of law in the country of operation through the acceptance of responsibility (Coupland, 2005).
Acknowledging Responsibility	This occurs when a move that is interpreted by the receiver as proactive and anticipatory. This happens when management expects problems associated with their social and environmental expectations and presents moves that is perceived as moderating or mitigating future problems and issues (Clarkson, 1995).
Attacking	An organization can take-up almost any kind of individual action as an attack. The idea here is that an organization sees a move as an assault against some aspect of the organization.
Condemning	To interpret a move as blame for something like an operational decision or procedure.
Commenting	To see a move as an observation or remark expressing an opinion.
Dealing	This action presented is part of the transaction joint action where organizations dispense materials in hopes of coming to a resolution in relation with others.
Defending	This up-take occurs when an organization views another's move as protecting against hostile attacks, negative criticism or mocking. In CSR terms, it is a defensive management move where the organization admits responsibility but fights it (Clarkson, 1995).
Denying Connection	An up-take that an organization is drawing the distinction between organizations (Phillips, 2010).
Denying Control	An up-take that an organization is making a declaration that there is little or nothing the organization can do (i.e. Phillips, 2010).
Denying Responsibility	This up-take occurs when an organization sees another as rejecting or refusing to acknowledge the moral or legal liability of a behavior, conduct or activity. In CSR, this move is perceived as reactive and the denial of responsibility (Clarkson, 1995).
Denying Knowledge	An up-take where a move is seen as a denial of knowledge about a behavior or situation (Phillips, 2010).

Denying Severity	To accept that an organization is downplaying the significance of a controversy (Doorely & Garcia, 2007).
Differentiating	To see a move as the reduction of the offensiveness of an act or situation by stressing what other organizations have done. (Benoit & Pang, 2008)
Evading by Accident	To take-up a presentation as a mishap and not a conscious planned act (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Evading by good intentions	To see a move as a description of how an organization meant to do well but the situation turned out badly (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Greenwashing	Also known in the popular press and literature as “whitewashing”. This uptake happens when moves are considered as corporate posturing and deception regarding CSR in the absence of external verification (i.e. Laufer, 2003). It is considered misleading public opinion and perception so that a company’s policies can be seen as environmentally and socially friendly.
Informing	Informing can also be the way that an organization takes-up a communicative move. In this sense, the up-take centers on the notification or release of information (Mitchell, 2002).
Ignoring	When an organization’s moves, or lack of moves, are seen as being unaware of a situation or the seriousness of a situation (Doorely & Garcia, 2007).
Lying	This up-take happens when an organization’s moves are viewed as deliberately untruthful with the intention of deceiving (Doorely & Garcia, 2007).
Making the CSR case	This up-take surrounds the idea that moves given off the sense that an organization’s statements are making the business case for CSR programs and initiatives (Coupland, 1995)
Minimizing	The up-take happens when a move is seen as diminishing the unpleasantness of the events surrounding organizational acts (Benoit & Pang, 2008).
Negatively Criticizing	The take-up of a move as disapproval or condemnation of an organizational behavior or activity.
Over-confessing	This occurs when the up-take is one where the presentation is seen as acknowledging more than what is exclusively at the center of the controversy (Doorley & Garcia, 2011).
Partnering	To become involved in a sanctioned and rigid activity with another organization(s). This action involves establishing a regulated joint association with another organization(s) such as a coalition, alliance, society or federation.
Positively Criticizing	The take-up of an action where the statements are seen as positive affirmation of an organizational behavior or activity.
Satisfying Stakeholders	Here the up-take acknowledges that communicative actions are conveying that an organization is attempting to satisfying the competing demands of stakeholders through CSR activities (i.e. Coupland, 1995)

Selling	To act as a vendor and offer a particular product or service (or range of both) for sale or barter.
Shooting the messenger	Moves that are internalized as punishing the organization that first publicized the situation or brought the issue to the attention of the corporation (Doorley & Garcia, 2011).
Supporting	This taken-up is when a move is seen as endorsing and advocating a particular move made by an organization. To be in favor of something such as a cause, policy or action of another organization and uphold this as right or valid.

CM5

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Moves Made and Taken-up

Moves Presented	Moves Taken-up	Plausible Moves Presented	Plausible Moves Taken-up
Attacking	Acceptance of Responsibility	Bolstering	Defending
Buying	Acknowledging Law	Denying Responsibility	Denying Control
Commenting	Attacking	Denying Severity	Denying Responsibility
Confronting	Buying	Differentiating	Differentiating
Criticizing	Condemning	Evading by Accident	Evading by Accident
Dealing	Dealing	Evading by Good Intention	Evading by Good Intention
Denying Connection	Denying Connection	Over-confessing	Lying
Denying Control	Denying Knowledge	Supporting	Positively Criticizing
Disclosing	Denying Severity	Shooting the Messenger	Shooting the Messenger
Exposing	Exposing	Transcending	Transcending
Informing	Greenwashing		
Making the Case for CSR	Informing		
Minimizing	Negatively Criticizing		
Partnering	Partnering		
Questioning	Supporting		
Reporting			
Satisfying			
Stakeholders			

Note: There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Communicative Moves Presented, Communicative Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Presented and Plausible Moves Taken-up during the entire controversy.

CM6

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Joint Actions

Organization and Moves Presented	Joint Action	Organization Up-Take
CBS – Reporting Nike – Denying Control	Broadcast Exchange N/A	Nike – Attacking N/A
Life – Reporting Nike – Denying Connection BW – Commenting	Broadcast Exchange Take-into-account Exchange Broadcast Exchange Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking BW – Denying Connection Nike – Attacking Consumers – Exposing
Nike – Partnering Reporters – Questioning Reporters – Questioning Consumers – Confronting Doonesbury – Attacking	Alliance (Strategic) Interview Interview Take-into-account Exchange Broadcast Exchange	Clinton Administration – Partnering Jerry Rice – Denying Knowledge Michael Jordan – Denying Knowledge Nike – Condemning Nike – Attacking
Nike – Partnering Nike Employees - Exposing UNIDO – Disclosing TRAC – Criticizing TRAC – Informing	Alliance (Operational) Chat Chat Cooperative Criticism Take-into-account Exchange	E&Y – Partnering UNIDO – Supporting TRAC – Supporting Nike – Negatively Criticizing NYT – Informing
Nike – Partnering Nike – Informing	Alliance (Operational) Take-into-account Exchange	Good Works – Partnering NYT – Denying Severity
NYT – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking TRAC- Supporting
Nike – Partnering Nike – Informing Nike – Minimizing	Alliance (Operational) N/A Speech Speech N/A	Dartmouth – Partnering N/A National Press Club – Acceptance of Responsibility Mark Kasky – Greenwashing N/A
BW – Reporting Mark Kasky – Attacking	Conflict Resolution	Nike – Acknowledging Law

	Conflict Resolution	California Court System – Supporting
BBC – Reporting	N/A	N/A
NYT – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Press For Change – Criticizing	Cooperative Criticism	Nike – Negatively Criticizing
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Unnamed NGO – Partnering
Nike – Informing	N/A	N/A
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Ministry of Education, Vietnam – Partnering
Nike – Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	N/A
Nike – Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	N/A
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	ACLU – Partnering
Nike – Dealing	Conflict Resolution	Mark Kasky – Dealing
Nike – Making the CSR Case	N/A	N/A
Nike – Buying	Material Transaction	Starter – Selling

Note: There is a relationship between the columns and rows in this table. Each row illustrates an entire interaction – move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three). N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM7

Phase I (1993 to 1995)

Moves Made and Taken-up

Moves Presented	Moves Taken-up	Plausible Moves Presented	Plausible Moves Taken-up
Denying Control	Attacking	Acceptance of Responsibility	Acceptance of Responsibility
Reporting		Acknowledging Law	Acknowledging Law
		Bolstering	Bolstering
		Buying	Condemning
		Criticizing	Dealing
		Defending	Denying Connection
		Denying Connection	Denying Control
		Denying Knowledge	Denying Responsibility
		Denying Responsibility	Denying Knowledge
		Denying Knowledge	Denying Severity
		Denying Severity	Evading by Accident
		Differentiating	Evading by Good Intention
		Evading by Accident	Informing
		Evading by Good Intention	Making the CSR Case
		Making the Case for CSR	Negatively Criticizing
		Transcending	Over-confessing
			Shooting the Messenger

Note: There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Communicative Moves Presented, Communicative Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Presented and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase I of the controversy.

CM8

Phase I (1993 to 1995)

Joint Actions

Organization and Moves Presented	Joint Action	Organization Up-Take
CBS – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Nike – Denying Control	N/A	N/A

Note: There is a relationship between the columns and rows in this table. Each row illustrates an entire interaction – move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three). N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM9

Phase II (1996 to 1997)

Moves Made and Taken-up

Moves Presented	Moves Taken-up	Plausible Moves Presented	Plausible Moves Taken-up
Attacking	Attacking	Acknowledging Law	Acceptance of Responsibility
Commenting	Condemning	Bolstering	Acknowledging Law
Confronting	Denying Connection	Buying	Bolstering
Criticizing	Denying Severity	Defending	Defending
Denying Connection	Exposing	Denying Control	Denying Responsibility
Disclosing	Informing	Denying Knowledge	Denying Knowledge
Exposing	Negatively Criticizing	Denying Responsibility	Differentiating
Informing	Partnering	Denying Severity	Evading by Accident
Partnering	Supporting	Differentiating	Evading by Good Intention
Reporting		Evading by Accident	Greenwashing
		Evading by Good Intention	Ignoring
		Making the CSR Case	Lying
		Minimizing	Making the CSR Case
		Over-confessing	Over-confessing
		Satisfying Stakeholders	Positively Criticizing
		Transcending	Satisfy Stakeholders
			Shooting the Messenger

Note: There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the Communicative Moves Presented, Communicative Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves Presented and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase II of the controversy.

CM10

Phase II (1996 to 1997)

Joint Actions

Organization and Moves Presented	Joint Action	Organization Up-Take
Life – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Nike – Denying Connection	Take-into-account Exchange	Business Week – Denying Connection
Business Week – Commenting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Nike – Partnering Reporters – Questioning Consumers – Confronting Doonesbury – Attacking	Broadcast Exchange Alliance (Strategic) Interview	Consumers – Exposing Clinton Administration – Partnering Jerry Rice/Michael Jordan – Denying Knowledge
Nike – Partnering Nike Employees – Exposing	Take-into-account Exchange	Nike – Condemning
UNIDO – Disclosing	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
TRAC – Criticizing	Alliance (Operational) Chat	Ernst & Young – Partnering UNIDO – Supporting
TRAC – Informing	Chat	TRAC – Supporting
Nike – Partnering Nike – Informing	Cooperative Criticism	Nike – Negatively Criticizing
	Take-into-account Exchange	New York Times – Informing
	Alliance (Operational)	Good Works – Partnering
	Take-into-account Exchange	New York Times – Denying Severity
New York Times – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Nike – Partnering Nike – Informing	Broadcast Exchange Alliance (Operational) N/A	TRAC – Supporting Dartmouth Tuck School – Partnering N/A

Note: There is a relationship between the columns and rows in this table. Each row illustrates an entire interaction – move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three). N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

CM11

Phase III (1998 to 2004)

Moves Made and Taken-up

Moves Presented	Moves Taken-up	Plausible Moves Presented	Plausible Moves Taken-up
Attacking	Acceptance of Responsibility	Acknowledging Responsibility	Acceptance of Responsibility
Buying	Acknowledging Law		
Criticizing	Attacking	Acknowledging Law	Condemning
Dealing	Buying	Bolstering	Commenting
Informing	Dealing	Denying Connection	Defending
Making the CSR Case	Greenwashing	Denying Control	Denying Connection
Minimizing	Negatively Criticizing	Denying Knowledge	Denying Control
Partnering	Partnering	Denying Severity	Denying Responsibility
Reporting	Supporting	Differentiating	Denying Knowledge
Satisfying Stakeholders		Evading by Accident	Denying Severity
		Evading by Good Intentions	Informing
		Over-confessing	Ignoring
		Supporting	Lying
		Transcending	Making the CSR Case
		Questioning	Over-confessing
			Shooting the Messenger

Note: There is no correspondence between the columns; they simply list the

Communicative Moves Presented, Communicative Moves Taken-up, Plausible Moves

Presented and Plausible Moves Taken-up during Phase III of the controversy.

CM12

Phase III (1998 to 2004)

Joint Actions

Organization and Moves Presented	Joint Action	Organization Up-Take
Nike – Minimizing	Speech	National Press Club – Acceptance of Responsibility
Nike – Minimizing Business Week – Reporting	Speech N/A	Mark Kasky – Greenwashing N/A
Mark Kasky – Attacking	Conflict Resolution	Nike – Acknowledging Law
Mark Kasky – Attacking	Conflict Resolution	California Court System – Supporting
BBC – Reporting	N/A	N/A
New York Times – Reporting	Broadcast Exchange	Nike – Attacking
Press For Change – Criticizing	Cooperative Criticizing	Nike – Negative Criticizing
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Unnamed NGO – Partnering
Nike – Informing	N/A	N/A
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	Ministry of Education, Vietnam – Partnering
Nike – Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	N/A
Nike – Satisfying Stakeholders	N/A	N/A
Nike – Partnering	Alliance (Strategic)	ACLU – Partnering
Nike – Dealing	Material Transaction	Mark Kasky – Dealing
Nike – Making the CSR Case	N/A	N/A
Nike – Buying	Material Transaction	Starter – Selling

Note: There is a relationship between the columns and rows in this table. Each row illustrates an entire interaction – move presented (column one), joint action (column two) and move taken-up (column three). N/A represents a portion of the joint action that is missing i.e. a move is presented without an uptake.

II

Nike Controversy (1993 to 2004)

Instruments Used and Not-used

Instruments Present	Instruments Not Present
Alliance (7)	Advertisements
Boycott	Annual Meeting
CEO Speech	Annual Report
Charitable Donation	Board Membership
Code of Conduct	Cause Related Marketing
Contract	CEO Letter
CSR Report (2)	Confidentiality Person
Interview (3)	Customer Hotline
Litigation	Focus Group
Magazine Article (4)	Ethical Training
Newspaper Article (2)	Ethics Committee
Newspaper Comic	Mission Statement
Press Release	Newsletter
Settlement	Product Labeling
Supply Chain Audit (3)	Proxy Statement
Sustainability Report (2)	Rack Card
TV Story (2)	Service Labeling
	Signage
	Social Handbook
	Stakeholder Engagement Meeting
	Social Media
	Volunteering
	Web site
	Weblog

I2

Instruments Used and Not-used

Phase I (1993 to 1995)

Phase I	Instruments Present	Instruments Missing
1993 to 1995	TV Story Press Release	Alliance Annual Report Cause Related Marketing Code of Conduct Confidentiality Person Litigation Non-financial Report Representative Speeches Social Handbook Stakeholder Meeting

I3

Instruments Used and Not-used

Phase II (1996 to 1997)

Phase II	Instruments Present	Instruments Missing
1996 – 1997	Alliance (4)	CEO Letter
	Boycott	Customer Hotline
	Code of Conduct	Focus Group
	Interview (2)	Lawsuit
	Magazine Article (2)	Mission Statement
	Newspaper Article	Newsletters
	Newspaper Comic	Social Handbook
	Supply Chain Audit (2)	Stakeholder Engagement
	Sustainability Report (2)	Meeting
		Volunteering

I4

Instruments Used and Not-used

Phase III (1998 to 2004)

Phase III	Instruments Present	Instruments Missing
1998 – 2004	Alliance (3)	
	CEO Speech	CEO Letter
	Charitable Donation	Code of Conduct
	CSR Report (2)	Customer Hotline
	Contract	Focus Group
	Interview	Lawsuit
	Litigation	Newsletters
	Magazine Article	Social Handbook
	Newspaper Article	Stakeholder Engagement
	Settlement	Meeting
	Supply Chain Audit	Volunteering
	TV Story	

I5

Total Plausible Instruments

Instruments
Advertisements
Alliance
Annual Meeting
Annual Report
Board Membership
Boycott
Cause Related Marketing
CEO Letter
CEO Speech
Charitable Donation
Code of Conduct
Confidentiality Person
Contract
CSR Report
Customer Hotline
Ethical Training
Ethics Committee
Focus Group
Interview
Litigation
Magazine Article
Mission Statement
Newsletter
Newspaper Article
Newspaper Comic
Press Release
Product Labeling
Proxy Statement
Rack Card
Service Labeling
Settlement
Signage
Social Handbook
Social Media
Stakeholder Engagement Meeting
Supply Chain Audit
Sustainability Report

TV Story
Volunteering
Web Site
Weblog

JA2

CSR Controversy

Possible Joint Actions

Joint Action	Description
Alliance	When two or more organizations develop a treaty to cooperate for specific purposes (Contractor, 2007). This joint action results in a merging of efforts so that a specific goal or public good is delivered (i.e., Fulk, Flanagan, Kalman, Monge & Ryan, 1996).
Broadcast Exchange	This interaction type is specific to what happens between mass media organizations and audiences. This joint action defines what is pulled-off when a media organization presents a move and an external organization takes-up and internalizes the move. This joint action is similar to a take-into-account-exchange in that both involve messages sent in the public sphere that are not necessarily mutually cooperative. The key difference lies in the fact that a broadcast exchange occurs between media organizations and audiences.
Chat	This interaction type occurs in an informal setting and manner and involves a short series of moves from all actors (Clark, 1996). Although the chat shares the parameters of multiparty speak with a conversation and a meeting, this joint action is separated by formality and functionality. The chat occurs in a less formal manner than the conversation and does not include the structure and effect on behavior as a meeting (i.e., Schwartzman, 1989).
Conversation	This interaction is a prolonged dialog between organizations that involves multiple moves made on each side (Clark, 1996). A conversation falls between a chat and a meeting because it is more prolonged than a chat and yet less formal than a meeting. The conversation also includes multi-party speak which separates it from a lecture and an interview.
Cooperative Criticism	Here organizations are sharing in the act of criticism. This action occurs when one organization assesses, evaluates and critiques some aspect of another and the receiver acknowledges the validity of the criticism in their next move.

Conflict Resolution	This is when parties in a dispute come together to present information (in the form of evidence) in a formal setting. These joint actions are presided over by an authority that can adjudicate claims or disputes. This joint action is typically associated with lawsuits, mediators and arbitrators.
Interview	This joint action is a formal, structured gathering in which an actor questions or consults another actor to obtain information (Clark, 1996). The structure is formal and based on the notion that the interviewee(s) enters into the joint action with an understanding that it is a process of information gathering through a question and answer session. The interview is multiparty speak which separates it from the lecture and speech and it more formal than a chat or conversation.
Lecture	This joint action is an oral presentation directed toward a willing audience. The intension is to present information or teach people about a particular issue or topic. Although both the speech and lecture can be open to the public, a lecture is often an instructive talk often given in a more formal, specialty setting (i.e, Clark, 1996; Schwartzman, 1989).
Material Transaction	A formal agreement between a buyer and seller. Procurement can be in a variety of ways from exchanging money to a quid pro quo where researchers have access to an organization for the dual purpose of data as well as the delivery of a product or service. In this instance, a transaction falls in more the short term category which is what separates it from alliance formation (Goldkuhl & Lind, 2008).
Meeting	The meeting joint action is an event involving actors who agree to assemble for a purpose related to the functioning of an organization or group (Schwartzman, 1989). The purpose can range but the overall idea behind this joint action is that it is purposeful event entered into by organizations. Moreover according to Schwartzman, this form falls between a chat and a lecture because a meeting is more formal than a chat but less formal than a lecture.
Speech	This interaction occurs when an oral presentation is directed toward an audience to convey critical information about an issue or topic (Clark, 1996). The speech involves single-party talk to an audience and allows for question and answer sessions. The speech is different from a lecture because it is less formal (Schwartzman, 1989).

Take-into-
account
Exchange

This type of joint action is based on Thayer's (1987) idea that communication involves two or more actors take each other into account. This is a short presentation and uptake between two or more organizations within the public sphere that is not mutually cooperative. This category best explains joint actions that involve more off record (Brown, 1990) statements where organizations do not connect on the meaning or intent. Different from broadcast exchange because this joint action explains interactions between organizations that exist outside of the mass media.

L1

CSR Controversy

Infrastructure Examples

CSR Controversy	Infrastructure
Chiquita Banana	To combat the criticism around treatment of laborers, the company partnered with NGOs to investigate the claims and identify the company's weaknesses. The action between the company and NGOs resulted in the invention of Chiquita Banana's CSR reports, which is still used today to convey the firm's commitment to improvement (Radin & Calkins, 2006)
Coca-Cola	Coca-Cola has been criticized for anti-union violence in Colombia. The controversy involves how framed their position regarding several occurrence of violence against workers looking to unionize (Foust, Smith & Woyke, 2006). Most of the instruments used by activists and Coca-Cola have centered on the news media as they have been used to substantiate the claims made on each side.
Conde Nasté	In the late 1990s, a controversy between Conde Nasté and its stakeholders over use of fir in the company's magazine layouts and advertisements revolved around the portrait of Anne Wintour, Conde Nasté's most iconic employee. This symbol was an emergent ground over which a standard line of reasoning could be played out. It provided one footing for both sides to argue about the corporation's policy.
Nestle	There are currently two controversies involving Nestle - cultivation of palm oil and accusations about the advertisement of baby formula. These controversies are playing-out through Facebook, Twitter and YouTube which are built on infrastructures where practices and social norms emerge to enable the deliberation about social issues specific to a community (e.g., deMoore, 2007).
iffycaffè	Since the early 1990s, iffycaffè has been developing a communication network between suppliers in hopes of enhancing knowledge transfer and innovation concerning the coffee growing industry. This network has resulted in several goods such as the University of Coffee, an increase in the competitive advantage of smaller players in the global coffee industry and an acceptance of responsibility to fair trade and increased wages by the larger manufacturers (Perrini & Russo, 2008).
Starbucks	Too fend off criticism about not buying Fair Trade coffee Starbucks relied heavily on strategic alliances with NGOs (Argenti, 2004; Austin & Reavis, 2002). Moreover Starbucks now continues to participate with NGOs in a way that attempts to both further address problems with their operations and as a support system.
Unilever	Unilever and the NGO Oxfam began a collaborative project that would study the value chain of Unilever's activities in the global markets. The explicit deliverable of this project was an action plan that would provide

Unilever with actual steps that could be taken to improve their social obligation to the poor. The Unilever-specific plan can and does serve as a diagram for how a larger body of organizations, all of which interact with Unilever, can better their obligations to the poor (Smith & Crawford, 2008).

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