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Third Nature: Making Space and Time in the Great Limpopo Conservation Area

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Environmental conservation makes both space and spatial scale. Eighteenth-century French scientists first gained an understanding of the climate by studying deforestation and dessication on Mauritius and similar islands (Grove 1995:168). They then conceived of the “environment” itself and located it in terms of scale. In Lefebvre’s (1991) terms, this seminal “production of space” has yielded a corresponding set of environmentalist “spatial practices.” As geographers increasingly recognize, environmentalists erect and police many of the scales of Neil Smith’s “spatialized politics”: body, home, community, urban, region, nation, and global (Smith 1992; Swyngedouw 2004). For instance, Northern environmentalists extend their “global reach” (Shiva 1992) when they describe a problem of deforestation or pollution as planetary, rather than as regional or local (Taylor and Buttel 1992).

In the 1990s, environmental organizations invented “new conservation territories” (Zimmerer 2000), ranging from “heartlands” to “eco-regions” to “transfrontier conservation areas.” These zones often bear little relation to the actual movements of people, animals, or water. To use Tsing’s word, conservationists “conjure” these spaces and spatial scales (Tsing 2000b; cf. Gupta 1992:69; Katz 1998; Redfield 2000:247–48). Anthropologists have already discussed similar spatial practices produced by earlier anthropologists and state bureaucrats. Like the much-maligned colonial ethnographer, the conservationist often “incarcerates” rural people, fixing their location on a map for all time (Appadurai 1988:37; Malkki 1992:28). In common with states, environmental bodies increasingly exercise governmentality. Practicing what Ferguson and Gupta (2002) describe as “vertical encompassment,” they locate social groups with vast ecological regions. In short, the cultural politics of conservation—like the cultural politics of so many forms of administration—makes space.

Through representations that I call “third nature,” these cultural politics also make time. First nature refers to a pristine, prehuman environment, now understood as purely historical or mythical. Second nature refers to the environment...
as worked by people and shaped by extraction, agriculture, markets, and other anthropogenic factors. Third nature refers not to these observable factors but to the potential of landforms in a given area to support specific types of wildlife communities. Speculation, rather than exploitation, produces third nature. A rangeland for beef cattle might provide grazing for wild ungulates. Or in a more arid zone, if people piped water in, then new plant and animal communities would flourish. In this conditional sense, then, ideas of third nature often carry assumptions or predictions regarding human action or inaction. The imagined third nature of an artificially irrigated savannah requires that people import enough moisture for water holes but not enough water to support crops. Given its virtual quality, third nature is fungible in a way that second nature is not. To change second nature, one must actually replant the garden. Third nature requires no such action. It always lives—as a latent potential that remains dormant. In other words, third nature violates the laws of linear chronology. It is not past, present, or future, but conditional; not a tense, but a mood of speech. When they write or speak, cautious conservationists use “should,” “would,” and other markers of this mood. Just as often, however, conservationists misuse the indicative mood. They impute current existence to a desired future and conjure a material form for third nature.

Perhaps no single group of conservation planners has conjured more than those who are responsible for the Great Limpopo Transboundary Conservation Area. Heralded as the largest conservation zone in the world, the protected area spans the boundaries of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. In 1995, I worked for the World Bank’s Mozambican mission as an anthropological consultant on the original proposal, which had been relatively modest in its scope. By 1999, when I consulted for an NGO in Zimbabwe, the zone had expanded northward deep into that country. Meanwhile, agencies and individuals with close links to the South African tourism industry had captured the concept. What had begun as a scheme for groups of resident smallholder farmers and herders to benefit from tourism had now become a mammoth “landscape of leisure” (Wilson 1991) for the benefit of the hotel and game-viewing industry. In this new guise, smallholders would have to go. By 2003, authorities in Mozambique and Zimbabwe had made plans for the removal of populations inhabiting at least two parts of the conservation area. The more reasonable and humane conservationists began to criticize this new turn. “[Do not] glorify this latest conservationist land grab with the term concept,” cautioned the conservationist Richard Bell, when I told him of my research plans (personal communication, June 17, 2001). Clearly, the group I refer to as “Southern African conservationists” or “Southern African planners” contains a range of opinions. So far, dissenters among these natural scientists, social scientists, administrators, and investors grumble only in private or in muted tones. However, no one has yet undertaken a sustained critique of third nature. In this article, I hope that skeptical conservationists will find ideas exactly for that agenda.
Planning and Scale in Southern Africa

Southern Africa is in the midst of a geographical renaissance. Beginning in the late 1980s, a twin withering of socialism and nationalism shook spatial assumptions. Meanwhile, whites felt the long-term effects of independence: a sense of cultural displacement and spatial disorientation. The present moment, then, calls for new scales, and planners and conservationists have supplied them.

In 1990, Zimbabwe chucked its weak form of socialism and opened space for a new policy narrative about social change. The deregulation of prices, finance, trade, and land displaced the state as the key agent for transformation. Who would lead change in the future? Regarding the management of natural resources, conservationists provided a consistent and convincing answer to this question. “The modern state apparatus . . . imposed [itself] on communal Africa,” explained Simon Metcalfe, one of the originators of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in community-based wildlife management. Thankfully, the damage could be undone because “the traditional roots of communal life are still strong, providing a web of social and material security” (Metcalfe 1994:185). So inspired, natural and social scientists in government, NGOs, and universities (including myself, at that time a graduate student affiliated with the University of Zimbabwe) pushed the state to devolve authority over natural resources to “communities.” Communities, it was hoped, would then give up low-profit, unsustainable poaching and, in its place, contract with high-profit, sustainable tourism enterprises through programs like CAMPFIRE. In the early 1990s, the CAMPFIRE program achieved this result in two geographical regions, one of them in the eventual Great Limpopo zone. On the basis of this rather limited success—and huge grants from donors—CAMPFIRE’s format rapidly became a blueprint for conservation and development programs worldwide. Throughout, many Zimbabwean conservationists gritted their teeth. Local, district-level governments, they knew, wielded most of the power and controlled a large part of the income under CAMPFIRE. Decentralization, as James Murombedzi (1992) wrote, became “recentralization.” Yet this sentiment of the silent majority of conservationists only reinforced the logic of decentralization: “communities” should manage natural resources (Muphree 1991; Ostrom 1990). A Harare consensus emerged: small was beautiful, and it superseded the national collectivity.

In comparison with Zimbabwe, Mozambique had farther to travel to reach the same consensus and did so with even more explicit attention to scale. Starting from a much more avowedly socialist concept of citizenship, government agencies voiced an even stronger commitment to “community.” Mozambican socialists Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel had seen rural people as a “peasantry”—a single class and unit of analysis. Their Frelimo party by and large discounted place of birth, regional identity, and geography. With an astonishing drive to homogenize—and, in Scott’s (1998) terms, to render society “legible”—the 1983 Party Congress heralded “the correct development of the Mozambican personality.” On the ground, however, war split the peasantry and the nation
into numerous factions, rendering it manifestly illegible. By the 1992 ceasefire, the state had abandoned socialism and single-partyism and was laying the groundwork for decentralization. Could it replace the “Mozambican personality” with a new concept that would make the ever fractious countryside truly “legible”? By 1994, various ministries had begun investigations. In an effort to chart a course of state decentralization, the Ministry of State Administration sent an anthropologist, Iraë Baptista Lundin, to previously rebel-held areas. A brief period of fieldwork led to profound conclusions. Lundin wrote: “The individual . . . (only) recognizes himself as a man and thus identifies himself, as a social being, in his territory.”

Concurrent efforts by the Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife reinforced the salience of territory. The directorate collaborated with Zimbabwean social scientists, some of them implementers of CAMPFIRE, to map chiefdoms in the east of the country. In the language of the day, they mapped “communities.” In 1997, a new Land Law recognized community rights in land, something Zimbabwe had never done. In short, projects from the field to the courts downscaled citizenship. Community replaced the category of the peasantry.

This rethinking of geographical units and scales answered an unspoken yearning in Southern African whites: it allowed them to escape the category of the nation and jump scales upward. Particularly in Zimbabwe and South Africa, whites felt marginal to the postindependence, black-ruled nation. Some, nonetheless, asserted their citizenship. Catherine Buckle, who lost her farm in 2000 to Zimbabwean paramilitaries, still proclaimed, “I love my country and all the people in it and I want this [violence] to stop” (Buckle 2001:vi). Other whites gave up sooner. For them, the nation-state failed in its usual role as a “geobody” or an “imagined community” for identities and aspirations (Anderson 1983; Thongchai Winichakul 1994). Among these Euro-Africans, some have chosen—almost as an act of will—to identify with the continent as a whole, rather than with any one country or even with the southern subcontinent. Alexandra Fuller, who grew up partly in the Great Limpopo and partly on a farm seized by the Zimbabwean government in the early 1980s, deplaned in Lusaka to meet, not Zambia, but Africa: “The incongruous, lawless, joyful, violent, upside-down illogical uncertainty of Africa comes at me like a rolling rainstorm, until I am drenched in relief” (Fuller 2001:287). Even whites who supported nationalist movements sometimes treat the nation-state as irrelevant in other contexts. “How to write about Africa?” asks the antiapartheid writer Breyten Breytenbach. “From what angle? From what background? Can it be done?” (Breytenbach 1996:124–125). How odd that Breytenbach should not obsess in this way about his newly liberated homeland of South Africa. His aspirations require a bigger container, a larger scale of citizenship—although he has not yet found it.

Among whites, conservationists have therefore developed vivid imaginings of a congenial postnationalist geography. Initially, Zimbabwe’s independence left many white civil servants aghast. They asked themselves, as one white conservationist recalled, “Why am I in Africa? I’m not speaking Shona. I almost want to
vomit when I think of marrying a black woman” (interview, Harare, April 24, 2003). By identifying with nature and nature-based tourism, my informant continued, whites found a reason for being in Africa. They gained footing on a moral foundation stronger and more lasting than the state and the nation together. Later in the 1990s, some whites lashed back at the nation: “Political boundaries are the scars of history,” denounces Willem van Riet of the Peace Parks Foundation (Godwin 2001:11). To heal these scars, some conservation-minded whites have lately revived Cecil Rhodes’s imperialist Cape-to-Cairo corridor. Rhodes never built the north–south railway, but in the 1920s, the British travel firm Thomas Cook and Sons organized tours from Cairo to Cape Town. Today, Noel de Villiers, a South African conservationist cum financier, pleads that “Africa should endeavor to join all of its game parks contiguously from Cape to Cairo.” Even Peter Godwin, a deliberately middle-of-the-road journalist and author born in Zimbabwe, raves in *National Geographic* about this “ecological Cape to Cairo dream” (Godwin 2001:17). Pan-Africanism, some of whose earliest exponents were white, has come back in fashion. In essence, a handful of Euro-African nature lovers have (re)asserted a continental space commensurate with a particular white history and hope for the future.

Thus, the Great Limpopo Conservation Area represents an ideological amalgam, concocted by strange bedfellows. Similar to the “globalist projects” Tsing describes, it contains “contradictory as well as charismatic logics and . . . messy as well effective encounters and translations” (Tsing 2000a:330). To the casual onlooker, the Great Limpopo Conservation Area seems more charismatic than contradictory and more effective than messy. How does this project stick together so well? As invented scales, both the bioregion, in the form of the African continent, and the community seem as true as nature. Peasants see “the landscape from the snake level,” explained one planner in a workshop near Pretoria; policy makers see “the landscape from the bird’s view.” This language functions as an “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1994): it helps direct attention away from issues of inequality and power and toward narrow, technical concerns. Rather than asking whether or why peasants live locally, planners begin to zone local areas for them. Without altogether intending to do so, even planners who are otherwise pro-peasant attempt to stop them from crossing boundaries that tourists cross. The Great Limpopo Conservation Area constrains small-scale farmers while freeing large-scale investors and tourists. Mobility is gained by one group and lost by another. All the peasants are black and almost all the tourists and managers of tourism are white (MacKenzie 1988; Wels 2000:233). Therefore, such planning exacerbates the structural racism so emblematic of Southern Africa. Although neither grey-green nor greasy, the Great Limpopo perpetuates the conceptual biases of Kipling’s era.

**Communities “in Their Areas”**

One Zimbabwean NGO confronted the issue of mobility more directly and more ambivalently than perhaps any other. The Southern Alliance for Indigenous
Resources (SAFIRE) arose in the midst of the most large-scale rural-to-rural migration ever to occur in the Great Limpopo area: the outflow of one-third of Mozambique’s population during the war of the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1993, Gus Le Breton, a Kenyan-born, British-educated Zimbabwean white, volunteered in Tongogara Camp, one of three refugee camps established for Mozambicans in eastern Zimbabwe. There, he observed tens of thousands of refugees exhausting natural resources and severely taxing neighboring Zimbabwean settlements. Within a year, Le Breton had founded an NGO, aptly named the Fuelwood Crisis Consortium. In 1994, Mozambique’s war officially ended, and the last of the refugees returned. At least, they left the camps—but often they were not home-bound. Le Breton and his colleagues observed firsthand the multifarious spatial strategies of refugees cum labor migrants cum crossborder traders. Meanwhile, Le Breton renamed his organization (SAFIRE) and expanded its presence in eastern Zimbabwe. Consequently, he adapted the organization to work with populations presumed to be more sedentary than refugees. SAFIRE hired Jeanette Clarke, a self-exiled South African white, to lead its work in “participatory rural appraisal” (PRA). The agency soon made a name for itself as Zimbabwe’s leading practitioner of this method for assessing rural needs. Meanwhile, the agency sponsored a number of its staff to train in the social sciences and encouraged them to engage with local and foreign social scientists (including myself). Finally, SAFIRE adapted the ideals of the popular CAMPFIRE program in community-based wildlife management to the comparatively wildlife-poor conditions of eastern Zimbabwe. Rural people could earn income from photo tourism and, SAFIRE hoped, from the sustainable harvest and sale of medicinal plants and plant-based handicrafts. Moreover, these were all activities that rural people could do in situ. SAFIRE embraced the community scale with gusto.

SAFIRE then applied the concept of community to some more unlikely locales. From 1995–97, I conducted fieldwork under SAFIRE’s aegis and at Vhimba, one of its long-standing project sites located on the Zimbabwe–Mozambique border (slightly north of the Great Limpopo zone). There small-holders were cultivating alongside or within the poorly marked boundary of a botanical reserve; SAFIRE tried to persuade them to cease doing so by providing them with economic alternatives: irrigating their fields outside the reserve, running a grain mill, and hosting tourists. As I document elsewhere, these ventures all failed because of Vhimba’s remoteness from markets and a lack of enthusiasm among some local residents for the ventures themselves (Hughes 2001a, 2001b). Indeed, SAFIRE’s chief ally in Vhimba had foretold this outcome almost from the beginning. Having advocated irrigation, he lamented, “The people of Tiyekiye’s village . . . prefer boundary issues to water.”16 Both Vhimba’s squatters and the Department of National Parks refused to make any territorial compromises with each other. Some years later, SAFIRE again tried to defuse a boundary conflict, this time closer to the former Tongogara camp and within the evolving Great Limpopo zone. During the 1970s war of independence, the Rhodesian government
had moved employees in ranches west of the Save River into east-bank irrigation schemes, such as Manesa and Chibuwe (see Figure 1) and “protected villages.” After independence, many would have returned to the ranches where they had cultivated their own gardens, raised bees, and collected wild plants. Yet the ranchers had other ideas: they had decided to convert from cattle to game and created the Save Valley Conservancy. They marked the river with a high electrified fence confining smallholders to the east bank of the Save. When I arrived in Manesa in 1999 as a consultant for SAFIRE, a headman’s son commented on this enclosure bitterly, “We have been shut in [tavharirwa]” (interview, Manesa, August 4, 1999). Could SAFIRE skirt around these territorial, boundary-contesting, “cadastral politics” (Hughes 2001a) and still promote natural resource–based development?

To help it tread this fine line, SAFIRE relied on “participatory rural appraisal” (PRA), but it could not avoid issues of territory and boundaries. The district officer
of SAFIRE scheduled a set of meetings and planning exercises for two days in August. I attended, as did a handful of SAFIRE’s regular staff, the rural district council, and a truant, boozy lot of agricultural extension agents. We understood little about Manesa—perhaps the agricultural extension agents knew more—and, hence, expected the workshop to proceed according to the by-now-conventional formula. On the first morning, SAFIRE’s PRA officer, who came down from Harare, kicked off with the usual script. After his introduction, he asked the assembled crowd of Manesa men and women to describe what are “the usable things in your area?” [zviwanikwa zviri mudunhu renyu]. Standard in such exercises, the phrase “in your area” initially passed without remark. The crowd broke into small groups to fill out a matrix of resources and their locations. Dutifully, they wrote down reeds, baobab fruits and bark, as well as bee hives, which were located “across the Save [seri kwaSave]” and “in the private estate [kupurazi]” (i.e., the conservancy). Alerted by this, I took one man aside, and he recounted, “We are chased away [tinodzingirwa]” from the private estate. Thus, land claims entered the appraisal to the evident dismay of some onlookers. Perhaps because he was now collaborating with the owners of the conservancy, the rural district council grew alarmed. Scurrying from group to group, he barked, “the resources in your area, please!” [zviwanikwa zviri mu area yenyu, please!]. Some of the note takers complied and deleted “across the Save,” confining their matrices in-boundary. Others retained the offending language. Perhaps, they intended to resist, or perhaps they did not understand the untranslated word “area” in the local politician’s instruction. In any case, he failed to complete his proconservancy cover-up.

From that point onward, the PRA and side conversations careened between SAFIRE’s objective of in situ development and (some) Manesa people’s expansive hopes and practices. SAFIRE wished to support a more intensive form of entrepreneurship: earning more money from a fixed land area. Specifically, the agency wanted to help east-bank residents to utilize reeds to produce baskets and other goods in a sustainable and profitable fashion. Manesa people, however, wanted to use the landscape in a more extensive fashion. As cultivators and herders, they preferred to spread risk over multiple zones (Scoones 1996). As workers, male residents had already spread that risk quite far: indeed, so many men held jobs elsewhere that in Manesa women outnumbered men two-to-one (Vijfhuizen 2002:11). SAFIRE staff were aware of these migrant labor patterns—men from all over Southern Zimbabwe journeyed illegally to South Africa in search of employment—but they excluded it from the appraisal. Later in the workshop, I asked a number of men why they had not mentioned the mines and factories in South Africa [kuSouth] as sources of income. They laughed: “That is something else [Zvimwe],” one explained. Manesa people knew what SAFIRE wanted. Some complied and “invoked community” in hopes of securing some funding from the NGO (Li 2001:172–75; McDermott 2001). Other participants, however, refused to keep quiet about extensive claims. “The land was taken by the game [conservancy]”
[Nyika yakatorwa negame], recounted a woman. As if continuing her thought, a man later concluded, “Therefore, we will do as border-jumpers do” [Saka toita sema border jumper].19 The comment linked the practice of crossing the Save for honey with crossing the Limpopo for employment. Manesa people were busting out of SAFIRE’s community scale.

SAFIRE attempted to force them back in. Indeed, given the objectives of the organization and its funding, the staff felt they had no choice. “The project’s overall goal,” the director had written, “is the economic development of communal and resettlement farming areas based on sustainable, productive use of natural resources” (Grundy and Le Breton 1997–98:20). SAFIRE’s mandate did not allow it to enter the privately held conservancy; so the staff identified this expansive pressure from Manesa people as a constraint not an opportunity. “The problem is they are too much looking behind that fence,” complained one fieldworker (interview, Manesa, August 4, 1999). Neither he nor his colleagues wanted to try to solve the problem. “Effectively, we are part of the system,” confessed one manager to me at a later date, “We are not change agents anymore” (interview, Harare, 23 August 1999).20 Later still, the PRA officer’s final report on Manesa reflected this ambivalence and the search for a safer course of action:

The community felt that they should exhaust the issue of the [Save Valley] conservancy despite the fact that of current [currently] they were not realizing the benefits of the concept [the land grievance]. An assurance was provided by the SAFIRE staff on the commitments made [to relay the land grievance to local government], but...the enterprise department [of SAFIRE] would determine the direction in which SAFIRE was going to take. [Manasa Sibanda 1999:3]

Thus, a branch of SAFIRE not present at the appraisal overruled local sentiments. In-boundary containment would go forward—even in the teeth of known territorial priorities.

This private agency at least recorded peasants’ transboundary ambitions; local governments in the Great Limpopo sometimes ignored them completely. Within a few months of SAFIRE’s appraisal of Manesa, the Chipinge Rural District Council held a workshop involving a nearby locality called Chibuwe (see Figure 1). Also on the east bank of the Save, Chibuwe shared Manesa’s history of cross-river resource use, confinement, and fencing. As in Manesa, Chibuwe threatened to subvert the agenda of in-boundary development. This time during the PRA, participants included pit sand, reeds, and bee hives west of the Save River in their resource matrix. The PRA leader—known as Chipinge’s CAMPFIRE officer—later showed me the original map from Chibuwe (see Figure 2) and his adaptation of it for the final report (see Figure 3; Chipinge Rural District Council 1999:6). Astonishingly, his design deleted all the notations west of the Save and introduced a border around Chibuwe. As he put it, the officer “reproduced the information that was relevant for the workshop.” Presumably in the same spirit, the expert also introduced the notation “Save River Travelers Camp.” In fact, the camp was a completely foreign idea to Chibuwe. The council and the conservancy—now
working together—envisioned a “traditional village” in Chibuwe offering dances and crafts for day-trippers primarily touring the conservancy. Similar to baskets in Manesa, dances constituted intensive development for Chibuwe as a means of making more money within a bounded zone. In effect, implementers used the PRA to facilitate tourists’ desire to ford the Save going eastbound and, at the same time,
to dismiss peasants’ will to ford the river going westbound. Figuratively, planners erected a one-way gate around the smallholder settlement.

That gate—and its notion of spatial constraint—springs from the very language embedded in “community.” Zimbabwe’s “Communal Area Reorganisation Plan” articulates the principle of “planning defined geographical space to be occupied by defined communities” (Agritex 1988:2). Likewise, Mozambique’s National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife seeks to “empower communities to manage natural resources within their surrounding environments.” (Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia 1999:21). Thus, social action follows from a predetermined territorial unit—as the document assures: it will be accomplished through “effective and thorough public debate and community participation” (Agritex 1988:1). Such doublespeak makes a certain sense: community-based development empowers people in their areas and nowhere else. Hence, planners obsess about cartography and, in particular, about boundaries.22 “What is the purpose of a map?” asked a workshop facilitator in 1999. To “show boundaries,” responded the leader of Manesa’s PRA with alacrity.23 Another PRA leader operating in the Great Limpopo told me: “To draw a community map, [residents] . . . have to highlight the resources . . . as well as mark out a boundary, a rough boundary” (interview, Chimanimani, July 14, 2000). Beyond the boundary—in places such as the west bank of the Save—people may stake no claims. The boundary separates empowerment from disempowerment. And it certifies the community as a natural scale for development—as a container for people’s ambitions. In 1999, brochures of the Poverty Alleviation Action Programme exhorted Chipinge

Figure 3
peasants in English to “Participate in the development of your community.” The author, of course, translated this statement, but he or she found no Shona cognate for “community.” Resorting to the standard geographical lexicon, the Shona version of the brochure (when back-translated) urges: “Become a member in planning the development of your place.” By implication, only errant peasants, such as squatters and poachers, go transboundary. Proper communities stay where they belong.

In so negating peasants’ mobility and extensive dreams, community theory also denied them a future. Families on the eastern bank of the Save were growing and they knew it. “We have been forced to live together as in a resettlement scheme—the lines. . . . Our children have no place to live” [takagariswa semaresettlement, maline. . . . Vana vedu havana pokugara] (personal communication, Chibuwe, July 23, 1999). Here the reference to “lines” compares this policy to colonial regimes of drawing settlement grids. When I relayed their concerns, a district officer responded, “Land being scarce, we cannot set aside for futures” (interview, Chipinge, August 17, 1999). At the Manesa exercise, one of the agricultural extension agents defended his practice with regard to unborn children: “Normally we don’t plan for somebody who is not there” (interview, Manesa, August 4, 1999). Surely, such planning—based on an assumption of stasis—is no planning at all. It enters the realm of fantasy. “As time goes on,” mused a high-placed official in Chimanimani, “these villages will become urbanized. You never know” (interview, Chimanimani, July 21, 1999). With greater certainty, the head of a CAMPFIRE agency coached me on his architectural strategy for peasants: “OK, let us expand upwards, and, if we can have some five-storey buildings, rather than expanding that way [arms outstretched]” (interview, Harare, March 31, 2000). These planners and social appraisers saw tall towns where there were only dispersed huts in the process of dispersing further. Indeed, their bureaucratic vision suffered from a defect inverse to that of the rhino which cannot see people unless they move. A number of Great Limpopo planners would not recognize people unless they stood still.

“Afrikatourism”

Toward the end of the 1990s, a subset of Southern African conservationists worked to amend the “Harare Consensus”: small was beautiful as far peasants went; however, for wild flora and fauna bigger was better. In Harare and the regional capitals, highly trained ecologists and economists advanced this claim. They wrote a good deal of both academic pieces and unpublished “gray literature.” They also attended a movable feast of workshops and conferences at which I crossed paths with many of them. Chiefly, they pushed for larger and larger units for the management of natural resources and for the planning of nature-based tourism. They proposed the creation of a Great Limpopo Conservation Area and similar projects throughout Southern Africa. In so doing, they gave credence to the even more ambitious schemes of South African financiers: an Africa-wide
zone of tourism. Such expansive thinking—from the merely transboundary to the continental—often warped time. Notions of international wildlife ranges tended to make the potential future of third nature appear present. Time and space became as fluid as ecology; hand in hand with economics and entrepreneurialism, they crossed nearly all boundaries.

Regarding space, ecologists acted on a seemingly implacable hostility toward surveyed boundaries, an attitude known in the United States as bioregionalism (Aberly 1999; Berg and Dasmann 1977). In Southern and Eastern Africa, as in so much of the world, surveyors did not consult ecologists when marking their lines, even around protected areas. The results could be fatal. At the height of the 1970s drought, elephants hemmed into Kenya’s Tsavo National Park ate the woodland and then starved in enormous numbers. This carnage—the effect of “insularization”—incriminated the entire system of discrete, bounded protected areas. Somehow, farmers and grazers would have to cede land to migratory mammals. In Zimbabwe, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management crafted an incentive package to make wildlife more attractive to farmers. In 1975, white ranchers, and in 1989, the first local government units, gained the right to profit from wildlife through tourism and sustainable hunting. Down came the fences. White ranchers sold their cattle, restocked the land with wild ungulates, and amalgamated their parcels into the Save Valley Conservancy and similar new territories (see Figure 1; Wels 2000:211; Wolmer 2001:165–66). In black communal lands, the CAMPFIRE program expanded wildlife ranges in the 1990s by confining—or planning to confine—agriculture (Dzingirai 2002; Hughes 2001b; Moyo 1995:271). For bioregionalists, these reforms did not go far enough. In 2000, John Hanks, an elephant specialist directing the Peace Parks Foundation, described Southern African conservation as characterized by “fragmented small habitat islands” and “isolated populations” (Hanks 2000:240). “Borders often split what should be functioning ecological units,” wrote John Griffen in an influential USAID-funded study (Griffen 1999:5). The same report mapped 17 potential transboundary conservation areas in Southern Africa (map 10; 1999:152). At workshops and meetings, ecologists spoke repeatedly of the need for “ecological integrity” and “connectivity” among the existing protected areas.

Such pleas concealed deep contradictions in the temporal quality of pristine “nature.” The latter-day bioregionalists distinguish human-made boundaries from nature. The distinction holds up with respect to, say, mountains and sometimes with respect to forests. When applied to wildlife ranges, however, the categories collapse completely. Animal ranges and migration routes shift, expand, contract, and move—often in response to human intervention. How can one determine—to any lasting degree—whether a political boundary contains or crosscuts a migration route? Given this flux, the term “habitat” logically requires a temporal frame, but Southern African bioregionalists often neglected to give it one. “The [Great] rift valley,” Griffen writes in the same report, “provides a continuous landscape for the vast diversity of megafauna and flora” (Griffen 1999:11).

In a similar vein,
the late Richard Bell asserted vaguely that the Limpopo Valley contains “species that were formerly numerous in the Southern African lowlands” (Bell 2001:5). As both authors know, the ivory trade caused local elephant extinctions from the 16th century onward (Alpers 1975:70; Miller 1988:107–8).

Regarding the 20th century, conservationists acknowledged anthropogenic factors but not their full implications. “Wildlife was eliminated from large- and small-scale farming areas” writes a former director of Zimbabwe’s national parks, “as . . . intolerable competition with livestock and crops” (Child 1996:350; Mutwira 1989). Exotic crops, such as tobacco, replaced indigenous flora, and native species retreated to protected areas. These zones constituted the actual habitat in the 1990s. Why should they have been bigger? Griffen’s moralizing—that certain areas “should be functioning ecological units”—implied a past Africa of deep time, what more critical conservationists call “the myth of wild Africa” (Adams and McShane 1992, emphasis added).30 The myth relies on a selective, composite landscape, composed of each region at the time that trade bypassed it. At any one time since 1500, ecological units have reflected market forces. Past and present animal ranges began where commodity catchments ended.

The notion of “optimum habitat” allowed conservationists to escape from this uncomfortable history. Unlike past or present ecologies, optimal habitats did not and had never existed. Yet they did not completely not exist in a clear fashion either. Neither empirical nor frankly imagined, the idea of optimum habitats floated in limbo. They lacked a time frame—but not in an obvious way. For instance, Raoul du Toit, an ecologist at the World Wide Fund for Nature, declared, “The optimum black rhino habitats [in Zimbabwe] are in the semi-arid areas” (du Toit 1998:4). When he wrote those lines, the black rhinoceros was extinct everywhere in the Save Valley except in private conservancies. In truth, rhinos would thrive in the semiarid areas if managers solved two problems beforehand. First, they would have to add water. Second, they would have to remove agriculture, animal husbandry, and other activities. Du Toit’s statement pushed such hydrological and economic contingencies to the background, giving the optimal habitat greater certainty than it warranted.

Regarding the first contingency, numerous planners glossed over the question of water. They almost had to: if taken to their logical conclusions, the problems of aridity would subvert the entire basis for the conservation zone. In 1994, an economist working for the World Bank in 1994 admitted that, “Land [in Mozambique’s Coutada 16 reserve] is so dry that animals are forced to migrate some place else.” Not to be deterred, however, she assured in the same document, “the habitat is perfect for wildlife” (Agostini 1994:7–8). In truth, Coutada 16 reserve could be a wildlife range if (as the author recommended) someone drilled boreholes for water. In the same year, a report of the NGO Zimbabwe Trust treated the water issue in an equally perplexing fashion: “Before any translocation of game [to Mahenye] can take place (and this is where the ‘visible’ value lies), water for game is essential” (Fowlds 1994:2). Of course, one could add water, but,
if engineers were going to add a little water for wildlife, why could they not add a little more for agriculture? In 1989, a few years before the Great Limpopo idea, Du Toit himself recommended irrigation as a development strategy for the parts of the Save Valley outside the conservancies (Campbell et al. 1989:101). In fact, the Jatala canal first made irrigation possible in the 1930s and together with other water works created the vast sugar estates of the southeast lowveld (Mufema 2001:61). To the planners of that era, southeastern Zimbabwe presented optimal conditions for dry-season vegetables and sugar cane. In 2003, the government of Zimbabwe returned to this pattern of thinking. Having precipitated a food shortage by seizing white-owned commercial farms, the state proposed to irrigate the low-producing lowveld (Financial Gazette 2003). Environmentalists expressed shock and alarm. They did not recognize this new plan for irrigation as merely an extension of their own hydrological desires.

Climate change, as another hydrological issue, received even less attention. Virtually all Great Limpopo documents ignore the scientific consensus that industrial carbon emissions are warming the atmosphere. Climate models for Zimbabwe predict a shortening and intensification of the rainy season, endangering animals during the longer dry season (Magadza 2000; Makarau 1999: 14–15; Salewicz 1996). Globally, plant communities might migrate toward the poles (Pitelka and the Plant Migration Workshop Group 1997). If so, the Great Limpopo’s biota would head south and exit the conservation area. When I suggested this possibility, one Great Limpopo planner recoiled. “To me, it’s not a variable I can deal with—like AIDS,” he confessed, “One is trying to think within human management timescales” (interview, Harare, April 24, 2003). In short, the optimal habitat could be more accurately described as conditional: It depends on some future events happening with respect to water, and other events not happening.

Optimal habitats also depended on economic events and nonevents, the second set of contingencies. In this regard, Great Limpopo planners spoke and wrote with greater confidence. Indeed, in their language, the economic often seemed to substitute for the ecological. Du Toit described the Great Limpopo as optimal because wildlife held a “comparative economic advantage” over cattle (du Toit 1998; cf. Child 1996:358). A seminal 1992 study had established this principle as orthodoxy in Zimbabwe. Starting from a very low figure at independence in 1980, by 1994, tourism had grown by 325 percent and continued to grow throughout the 1990s. In 1997, when du Toit analyzed the lowveld, sport hunting certainly outperformed beef production on a per-hectare basis and on the basis of returns to investment. Yet the phrase “comparative economic advantage”—like “optimum habitat”—suggested something more permanent. Ecologists and economists treated the post-1980 boom in Zimbabwe’s hospitality industry as normal, and they projected a continuation of the current market into the future. On the basis of these implicit speculations, they then imagined a more profitable mix of land uses. Finally, they retrojected that mix of land uses back to the present, as a contemporary potential. The resultant notion of an “optimum habitat” and “comparative
economic advantage” reflected not current ecology but an anticipated economy—the third nature of future markets.

This futurism protected the Great Limpopo from reckoning with Zimbabwe’s evolving political economy. In 2000, when paramilitaries seized land and otherwise abrogated the rule of law, proponents of the Great Limpopo adopted the phrase “future government” (taking care, however, not to use that term in writing). Meeting me in the middle of a national strike in 2003, one conservationist referred to the previous three years as a “twilight” leading up to the “Big Bang” of the fall of the government (interview, Harare, April 24, 2003). Meanwhile, dictatorship and political violence destroyed the tourist trade (with the exception of sport hunting). In 2000, I found that a hotel on the northern rim of the Great Limpopo earned no profit from ecotourism (Hughes 2001b:588,592). When I published this datum, Great Limpopo proponents responded by dismissing the present. “Note,” admonished my sponsor, your “table reports data obtained during the current economic crisis and state of fear. Thus it does not represent normalized findings” (personal communication, February 7, 2002). In other words, the downturn I quantified was abnormal. At almost the same time, a leading ecologist dismissed his own findings from an area in the Great Limpopo called Chizvirizvi (see Figure 1). Rowan Martin’s digital slideshow acknowledges that “the [state-backed] invasion of the [Gonarezhou] national park seriously reduces the wildlife potential and opportunities for Chizvirizvi.” Then, a later slide asserts, “The potential earnings from wildlife are limited only by marketing skills.” The same Mozambican workers repatriated South African currency to their home areas. This functional dualism based on borders enriched all three countries, although in a highly skewed fashion. Of course, in the mid-1990s, South Africa closed its borders to migrant labor. The call for new international “cross-investment” not only denied this entire earlier trajectory of development but signaled that ongoing covert labor migration would not be recognized or reauthorized. Instead, consultants, officials, and journalists cited (mostly white) capitalists as the incipient economic engine for the Great Limpopo. For instance, in 1997, Maputo’s leading newspaper interviewed Hans Harri, a South African hotel magnate and president of the Phalaborwa Chamber of Commerce, on the subject of what he called a Limpopo “tourism corridor.” Warming to the topic,
Harri presented a regional manifesto for investor-led growth:

The entrepreneurial dynamic obliges the men who have big business in South Africa to look, in other parts of the globe, for other markets. This is dictated by development, and we are sure that, in addition to satisfying the ambitions of our businessmen, we will contribute so that, in record-time, a strong economy is implanted in your country [Mozambique]. [Notícias 1997: 9]

Although few such businessmen have actually invested in the Great Limpopo, their prophetic, regional thinking has conjured a new continental scale of economic thinking.

In the field of tourism, no African group has done more to produce this vision than an organization founded in Cape Town in 1999 called Open Africa. In that year, the group’s president, Noel de Villiers, called for “a revolution in tourism . . . [as] the leading catalyst of the African Renaissance.” “The best way I can describe the African Dream Project,” he continued, “is to ask you to imagine . . . route[s] . . . stretching in all directions across the continent” linking “macro attractors” for leisure and advertised under the brand “Afrikatourism.” As if the tourist-pilgrims would walk these paths, Open Africa’s logo depicts the continent as a footprint. Through an “economy of appearances” (Tsing 2000b), Open Africa is hoping to raise capital for hotels and other amenities throughout the continent. They have not succeeded to any great degree so far. Yet Open Africa and Afrikatourism are already manufacturing potential. “Africa covers one-quarter of the Earth’s land surface . . . and [enjoys] only a 2% share of the global tourism market,” notes Open Africa’s publicity (as if per-hectare values were comparable everywhere else in the world). Invoking the “staggering implications of this potential,” Open Africa conveys a moral message: travelers, like animals, should march across Africa. And surely they will: John Hanks predicts the “free movement of tourists across the boundaries,” and a USAID official endorses a joint Zimbabwe–Mozambique–South Africa “uni-visa.” All in all, the Great Limpopo will allow tourists and those who make money from tourists to move their themselves, their assets, and their dreams across national lines.

Conclusion

Southern African conservationists imagine a continental space for tourists and investors and village spaces for peasants. At the continental scale, economically minded ecologists seek to heal the scars of partition and to let game and game viewers run free. They dream the African dream, and they dream of making money. Indeed, this form of planning treats future profits as certain—it is a conjuring act with respect to time. According to this line of thought, the cattle ranges of the Great Limpopo hold the potential for high-value tourism and sport hunting. These zones are optimum habitat, a desired third nature that is treated as real. Thus, Great Limpopo planners see the future while looking at the present. Their African scale affirms growth and denies boundaries. Meanwhile, the village scale denies
growth and affirms boundaries. The “appraisers” of peasant societies describe a small-scale, bounded present while signs of an expanded, boundary-busting future are all around them. Above the din of children, planners speak of stable rural populations contained behind electric fences. But the fence, like the children, recedes from view. The Great Limpopo construes the village scale not as a limitation but as an opportunity for smallholders. Inequality—in the greatest feat of conjuring—becomes parity. After all, each party does according to its liking within its own space. Through intensive community-based projects, peasants can cultivate their gardens within their boundaries. In doing so, they free up land for extensive bioregions and travel routes. Tourists expand as peasants are enclosed. Large, vibrant (white) bioregions nestle against small, static (black) villages.

What is new about this sorry state of affairs? In part very little: since the earliest colonial days, outward-bound settlers and capitalists have squeezed Southern African smallholders into smaller zones. Britain made for itself a global scale, an empire over which the sun never set. For the colonized peoples, British administrators and social scientists crafted a “sedentarist metaphysics” (Malkki 1992)—the premise that tribes hailed from particular locales and should stay there. The Great Limpopo perpetuates this tradition of structural, spatial racism. Yet, because the British and other European empires ended long ago, conservationists have necessarily found new terms for their discourse. In some cases, they appear to have done so almost consciously and strategically. The “Cape to Cairo” conservationist dream smacks of imperial nostalgia. In fact, it recalls the late 19th century before formal Empire, when white explorers and visionaries mapped the continent. Unthreatening in an almost prepolitical fashion, the “Cape to Cairo” scale now passes without criticism precisely because it bears so little relation to history of the past century. The community scale, on the other hand, stems obviously from the postsocialist politics of the 1980s. In this era of “market triumphalism” (Peet and Watts 1996), NGOs and donors hunt for collectivities outside the regulatory ambit of the state. Small is beautiful, and local is authentic. Now, planners have set the stage for a conjuncture unprecedented since the age of the explorers: peasants and transnational investors confronting each other—greeting, negotiating, and misunderstanding—without mediation. In short, the state of affairs is not new per se, but it is new in terms of the recent past.

The Great Limpopo, then, would seem to represent a bizarre sort of capitalism or globalization. The project thrusts a protocolonial discourse into the postcolonial era of global capitalism. Or, it thrusts a discourse of capitalism into a protocolonial situation along the banks of the Save and Limpopo Rivers. Perhaps such juxtapositions are not unusual after all. People who make scales undertake difficult, sometimes dangerous work. They call on all the cultural resources at hand, even on traditions and ideas of dubious repute. Nowhere is this more true than in declining postcolonies where no model of progress can claim supremacy. On such fertile soil, scale-making projects make pastiches of history, invented history, dreams, and imposed dreams. Even if it has yet to happen on the ground—as in the
Great Limpopo—invented scales and third nature may radically alter the range of the possible. In rural Southern Africa, people may now plan to travel—and plan to prevent others from traveling—in ways that are shockingly unequal. Even more shockingly, few observers are shocked. Successful scale making covers its tracks.

If given the chance, would Southern African planners plan differently? In Zimbabwe, they have no choice. Poachers and squatters have overrun the Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe’s chief contribution to the Great Limpopo zone. In 2002, SAFIRE even tried to negotiate a lease on behalf of these smallholders (Wolmer 2003:25). A somewhat similar scenario is unfolding in the Save Valley Conservancy. In 2000, poachers began to decimate its wildlife. By 2002, in an effort to win allies among its neighbors, the conservancy was considering permitting some smallholders—not, however, those from Manesa and Chibuwe—to resettle on its land and embark in joint ventures in tourism. “This is not a well-beaten road in Africa,” a white officer of the conservancy told me. “It is pretty much blazing a trail, certainly for Zimbabwe” (interview, Mapari, January 13, 2002; cf. Wolmer 2001:212–13). The trail is more unprecedented than he imagined.

The present collapse of tourism presents Zimbabweans with an opportunity to rebuild tourism as a marriage of wild landscapes and agriculture. Such an approach would recognize the fact—true even before the reoccupation of these protected areas—that people have always shaped the distribution of animals, plants, and water in the countryside. A reformed hospitality industry would exhibit second nature—composed of fields, pastures, and hinterlands—rather than strive for third nature, a potential wilderness. The struggle to realize third nature has squeezed peasants and thrown their future into doubt. Southern African conservationists can, at last, give the region’s tourism a human face.

Notes

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2. For comparison, see Bledsoe’s (2002:20) notion of “contingency.” I would distinguish this conditional time from Harvey’s (1990:260) “time-space compression,” which is more linear or, in grammatical terms, more like the indicative, wherein the acceleration of movement of goods and people shrinks distance worldwide.

3. See, for example, Jones and Chonguica 2001 and Katerere et al. 2001, both studies sponsored by the Harare office of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN).


7. The Portuguese original reads: “indivíduo que (só) se reconhece como homen e assim se identifica, enquanto ser social, dentro do seu território” (Lundin 1995:89).


9. In a fashion quite common among whites born in the 1960s and later, Fuller spent her childhood in multiple countries: Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia.

10. Shona is the majority language of Zimbabwe.

11. McGregor 2003 discusses this route and the way in which it shaped Victoria Falls as a destination.

12. This statement is taken from a presentation by Noel de Villiers to the first Agenda 21, “Indaba on Culture Conscious Transfrontier Conservation Areas,” May 18, 1999 (Wolmer 2003).

13. These remarks were made during a break-out group of the “Southern Africa Technical Workshop on Communities and Conservation,” Centurion, South Africa, 26–28 February 2003.

14. Meanwhile, the lexicon helps to broaden the reach of state technocrats. Schafer and Bell (2002) and Singh (2001:111) all make this argument with respect to the Chimanimani transboundary conservation area on the Zimbabwe–Mozambique border.

15. In “The Elephant’s Child” (published first in 1900), Kipling mentions the “great grey-green, greasy Limpopo River” (Kipling 1912:65).

16. This remark is recorded in the Vhimba Area Development Committee, Minutes of Community Meeting, 4 October 1995:2.

17. Wels (2000:211) and Wolmer (2001:170) detail the history of the Save Valley Conservancy and, in particular, the centrality of fences in conflicts within and involving the conservancy (Wels 2000:247).

18. Vijfhuizen (2002:178) provides further testimony on this eviction. See Moore 1998 for an account of such spatial politics in a nearby locale of Zimbabwe.

19. This exchange occurred in Manesa, 5 August 1999.

20. SAFIRE had formed a tight collaboration with the Chipinge Rural District Council, among other councils.


22. This is reflected in the attention devoted to “geomatics” from the 1990s onward (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002; Hughes 2001a; Peluso 1995).

23. These comments were expressed at a workshop on GPS/community mapping, Chipinge, 18 August 1999.


26. The term derives from the ecological theory of island biogeography, which exerted a strong influence on African conservation (MacArthur and Wilson 1967:176; Western 1994:42). Some experts, however, still subscribe to a minority view: that stochastic crashes of the elephant population are normal and would be expected even in the absence of humans (Richard Bell, personal communication, June 18, 2001).

27. Or, in Hugh Raffles’s (1999:345) more charitable formulation, their place making also made nature.

28. See, however, Fairhead and Leach 1996 for a discussion of anthropogenic forests.

29. The statement is all the more striking as it precedes a description of two millennia of anthropogenic landscape change, doubtless informed by Cumming’s (1999:13) related study.

30. Thomas McShane was a program officer at the World Wide Fund for Nature at the time he coauthored this book. See also Fairhead and Leach 1996 and Schroeder 1999:361–362.

31. Among conservationists, Cumming (1999:3) is an exception. He does mention global warming, but the report synthesizing his and others’ work excludes this issue from the relevant section (Griffen 1999:12).

32. This argument contravened the recommendation of an earlier report, coauthored by du Toi, in favor of intensive, irrigated agriculture in the Save Valley (Campbell et al. 1989:101). It also contravened an even earlier discourse that held that the low veld was ideal cattle country (Wolmer 2001:116).

33. Jansen et al. (1992) articulates the principle with far greater caution than did its later popularizers (as Wels 2000:234 explains). Bond (2001) has since added important caveats to their conclusions.

34. Tourism percentage was measured by the gross number of foreign visitors (Bond 2001:231).

35. Rowan Martin, “Chizvirizvi Resettlement Area: Development of a Land Use Plan.” Presentation in graphic design software, 2002. At almost the same time, conservationists closer to the ground gave a bleaker assessment. Sharman (2001:1) notes that Digby Nesbitt, chairman of the Chiredzi Conservancy, predicted “Even if the poaching and invasions stopped tomorrow, it’d take another 10 years to recuperate. I don’t believe this conservancy will last another 6 months.” “Our business is dead!” pronounced Willie Pabst, a ranch owner in the Save Valley Conservancy (Sharman 2001:4).

36. The quoted phrase derives from a Maputo-based consultant (personal communication, 3 July 2001).

37. Noel de Villiers, speech to the Community Tourism Association of South Africa annual general meeting, September 10, 1999.


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ABSTRACT  In Southern Africa’s “Great Limpopo Transboundary Conservation Area,” potential nature, envisioned as ideal habitats for wildlife, may outweigh actual nature. I refer to this notion of conditional biodiversity as “third nature,” distinguishing it from the equally anthropogenic, but tangible, second nature (“nature” as including human habitation). Conservationists and investors are inventing nature on a new scale that crosses national boundaries in elaborate ventures to develop ecotourism in the Great Limpopo zone. They now imagine a continent-wide field for (white) tourists to be created by fencing out local populations of (black) peasants. Few observers appreciate the structural racism involved in the profound material consequences of these dreams of third nature. [conservation, tourism, politics of scale, Africa, structural racism]