ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE LAST WAR WE LIKED:
AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND SMALL WAR AVERSIONS

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This research explores the sources that shape content, continuity, and change in U.S. foreign policy from the period of 1968 through 2006 with a focus on American Army doctrine, and specifically the tension between counterinsurgency and more traditional forms of warfare. Unlike previous assessments, I argue that although international, organizational, and bureaucratic contexts of action are important to understanding the origins of doctrine, they are insufficient without reference to policymakers’ understandings of dominant views of the American way of war in the public mind. And where analysts have examined continuity under a bipolar international system as well as organizational culture, I trace the origin of policymakers’ ideas and their assessments of domestic political and cultural contexts of action against the backdrop of external threats to the state and dominant groups within the Army. Consequently, this study argues that the American experience in war does not readily fit the maxim that armies tend to fight the next war as they did the last, rather the American historical context suggests we fight the next war as the last war we liked. Last, this study equally concerns itself with the responsibility of policymakers to articulate to the American public the nature of the international environment and the required means to achieve policy ends.
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“Within the American body politic, a new realism must emerge regarding the challenge of unconventional conflicts. Within military and civilian policy circles, in the world of elected officials, and the body politic, particularly the media, there must grow an understanding of the nature of the Third World and a recognition of the long range threat of unconventional conflicts. Without this new realism, it is unlikely that the necessary national will, political resolve, and staying power can be developed to effectively respond to unconventional conflicts.”

Sam Sarkasian

This research explores the sources that shape content, continuity, and change in U.S. foreign policy from the period of 1968 through 2006 with a focus on American Army doctrine, and specifically the tension between counterinsurgency and more traditional forms of warfare. Unlike previous assessments, I argue that although international, organizational, and bureaucratic contexts of action are important to understanding the origins of doctrine, they are insufficient without reference to policymakers’ understandings of dominant views of the American way of war in the public mind. And where analysts have examined continuity under a bipolar international system as well as organizational culture, I trace the origin of policymakers’ ideas and their assessments of domestic political and cultural contexts of action against the backdrop of external threats
to the state and dominant groups within the Army. Last, this study equally concerns itself with the responsibility of policymakers to articulate to the American public the nature of the international environment and the required means to achieve policy ends.

Today’s account is not unlike earlier histories inasmuch as concerns over state security continue to plague policymakers. The origins of these concerns lie between the nature of war – *what is* – and long-standing assumptions regarding the appropriate ways – *what ought* – to achieve policy ends. Huntington noted that, “The military institutions of any society are shaped by two competing forces: a *functional imperative* stemming from the threats to a state’s security and a *societal imperative* arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.”

Counterinsurgency, in particular, is one element of American foreign policy where the competing forces of state security and broader cultural assumptions regarding the American way of war have collided. Counterinsurgency policy has been, as Michael Shafer notes, “among this country’s most important and contentious foreign policy undertakings.” Threats to the state that are best addressed through counterinsurgency are more difficult to define, gains in battle are less obvious, and costs are high. And, for better or worse, counterinsurgency has shaped the institution of the Army and its views regarding warfare. The degree to which functional and societal imperatives induce pressure on policymakers’ decisions is therefore fundamental to explanations of foreign policy outputs (allocation of resources and the use of force). Moreover, it raises important implications for doctrine in the post-9/11 environment and the enduring need for counterinsurgency and stability operations in warfare.
Much like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army had to conduct, in varying degrees, counterinsurgency and stability operations after each of its conventional wars during the late 19th and 20th centuries – 1898 Spanish-American War in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the occupations in Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War II. Consolidating victory required it, but policymakers could only invest in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice to the extent that the American public supported occupational efforts to preserve strategic victory. Consequently, low-intensity warfare has been, and continues to be, the most constant form of conflict though public support and resources and doctrinal investment has varied – this variance yielded tension between what the functional imperative required and what the societal imperative would allow. Indeed, where counterinsurgency and stability operations were required, foreign policy reflected changing political-cultural views to the extent that institutions carrying out the objectives of the American state succumbed to the masses at home or faced sharp rebuke. Conversely, where counterinsurgency and stability operations were not required such as during the 1991 Gulf War harmony existed between foreign policy decisions and the societal imperative.

In the discipline of international relations, however, national interest is often assumed as relatively defined and set. But in the case of American foreign policy and, in particular, Army doctrine, general theories of international relations do not explain changing views of states’ interest. To better explain foreign policy decisions requires, as Hudson notes, “understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them.” This research therefore looks to societal explanations of how states’ interests are defined, with a specific focus on the cultural milieu.
The remainder of this research proceeds as follows. In this chapter the research will discuss some of the broad theoretical and historical implications for the study of the causes of foreign policy. More specific, this chapter describes the continuity of low-intensity warfare over time, the Army’s experience in that typology, and the omission of low-intensity warfare from doctrine. Next, the research will summarize Waltz’s levels-of-analysis framework to organize the study for doctrinal content, continuity, and change. This chapter will also draw some empirical conclusions as to the causes that led to the American way of war. The second chapter will more specifically cover the research design, which includes a brief literature review of the approaches most commonly used to explain doctrinal content, continuity, and change; a closer inspection of the less understood and under valued approaches; key definitions; and this research’s methodology. In the remaining chapters the paper will empirically explore four cases: the Active Defense and AirLand Battle doctrines in the post-Vietnam era; Force Projection doctrine in the post-Cold War era; and finally Full-Spectrum, which includes Counterinsurgency, doctrine in the post-9/11 era. The aim is to equally explore four possible explanations for doctrinal content, continuity, and change, through the lens of international relations, with specific attention to the less understood, and, perhaps, under appreciated causal influence of culture and cognition.

CONTENT, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE

Policymakers’ understandings of war have been colored by strict definitions of the profession at arms. In the case of the Army, its definition of war has focused on defense of the nation vis-à-vis other state militaries to the near exclusion of the more probable
form of conflict, low-intensity warfare or insurgencies. The latter’s frequency, impact on state security, and its destructive nature – ability to erode state prestige in international politics and drain domestic resources – suggests that the means of the American state should equally consider doctrines necessary to achieve political-military objectives for low-intensity warfare. As Levy and Williams note, “The ratio of internal to external wars increased from about two to one before 1945 to nearly five to one after 1945.”5 And, moreover,

“This patterns suggest that there has been a shift in the nature of warfare over time – away from the great powers, away from Europe, and, increasingly, away from state-to-state conflict and toward civil war, insurgency, and other forms of intrastate and trans-state warfare.”6

As the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest low-intensity warfare has become the rule, rather than the exception. Yet, the conduct of these wars, by the American standard, adhered to the precepts of conventional warfare through the combined application of air and ground battle to achieve quick decisive results, as seen in the 1991 Gulf War. This, in part, may be attributable to Army policymakers’ observance of Huntington’s definition of war, which is confined to state-on-state conflict through decisive military battles.7 But more important, perhaps, is how policymakers’ understandings of the American way of war in the public mind restrict doctrine to such a strict observance. This is particularly problematic when considering grand strategy and “concepts of victory that link military actions to overarching policy aims.”8

As earlier experiences suggest, achieving strategic objectives often require a more holistic view of war – from shaping the environment before hostilities break out to
fighting insurgents while restoring basic security and governance. But policymakers often find themselves subject to the dictates of the societal imperative. Although this research focuses on the period after 1968, the competition between the functional and societal imperatives has been a nearly ever-present dimension of American democracy. For example, the wars in Spain and Cuba, in 1898 and Iraq in 2003 respectively, are examples of wars that were “won” in a short period but required prolonged, unpopular military commitments to “secure the peace.” To illustrate, the 1898 war with Spain resulted in its defeat in four short months. However, the Army was required to remain in Spain’s former colonies for nearly four years. With no formalized doctrine, the Army had to conduct low-intensity warfare, which included functions of security and governance. In Cuba, the U.S. Army developed a policy of attraction which included demobilizing the Cuban Revolutionary Army by pay rolling the soldiers and providing bonuses to those that surrendered arms. It also included economic and financial assistance to develop basic services, such as improving road networks, sewers, schools and health care. And, as Andrew Birtle notes, this policy “instituted incremental changes in Cuban law and government, rather than trying to rapidly make over Cuba in the American model.” Policies of attraction, however, came under attack by progressives within the McKinley administration and would soon be replaced by more aggressive policies that sought to achieve foreign policy objectives in a quicker fashion. The latter policy recognized that American citizens preferred wars that were quick and decisive, as to wars that were protracted and requiring nation building.

While the experience of the Army was different on the archipelago of the Philippines than that of Cuba the Army did, in its early stages of nation building, attempt a similar
policy of attraction. Unlike Cuba, however, the archipelago was comprised of various ethnic factions that differed in structure, language, and religion. And Filipino revolutionaries refused to disband, unlike their Cuban counterparts, mounting a guerrilla war under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. The Army, therefore, organized small unit constabulary forces dispersed across the archipelago to conduct offensive operations centered on wearing down the insurgents. In addition, the Army began to shift to a policy of chastisement that consisted of fines, communal punishments, concentration, imprisonment, and execution. The latter drew heavy criticism and had important implications for doctrinal development into the twentieth century. According to Birtle:

“Regardless of the way in which it was done, the Army treated concentration with extreme delicacy. Stories of the horrible conditions in Spanish concentration camps in Cuba had been one of the factors that had motivated the American people to support the war with Spain. President McKinley had roundly criticized Spain’s ‘cruel policy of concentration.’ Consequently, Army commanders did not launch any significant concentration campaigns until after the November 1900 elections, and even then they employed euphemisms such as ‘colonies’ and ‘zones of protection’ to masquerade the true nature of their activities.”

And when viewed through the lens of Army policymakers, Birtle notes,

“The issue was so sensitive that when MG Adna R. Chaffee forwarded to Adjutant General of the Army, BG Henry C. Corbin a plan for a major concentration campaign in southern Luzon in December 1901, he requested that Corbin “hand it to the Secretary to read and then destroy it.
I don’t care to place on file in the Department any paper of the kind which
would be evidence of what may be considered in the United States as
harsh measures or treatment of the people.”\(^{11}\)

Concerns over the societal imperative, therefore, led to the absence of formalized
counterinsurgency doctrine for most of the 20\(^{th}\) Century. Philippine counterinsurgency
operations had been unpopular among the American public, as well as within the Army,
and in its aftermath as Birtle writes, this sentiment prevented the Army from “exposing
the seamier side of the war to public scrutiny or even to record the lessons of these
experiences.”\(^ {12}\) So much was the concern over the experience in the Philippines that the
Army did not circulate any of the documented articles—such as the *Telegraphic
Circulars* of General Bell—beyond the archipelago, “allegedly because of the sensitivity
of the subject matter.”\(^ {13}\)

In 1940, in one of the few manuals to emerge from its counterinsurgency experiences,
the Army highlighted larger cultural concerns over the methods of chastisement in its
Field Manual 27-5, *Basic Field Manual, Military Government, which* states:

“A military occupation marked by harshness, injustice, or oppression leaves
lasting resentment against the occupying power in the hearts of the people of the
occupied territory and sows the seeds of future war by them against the occupying
power when circumstances shall make that possible; whereas just, considerate,
and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying army will convert enemies
into friends.”\(^ {14}\)

Thus, earlier histories, such as the Army’s experience in Cuba and the Philippines
during the first part of the 20\(^{th}\) Century, shed light on the tension between functional and
societal imperatives. In particular, Cuba and the Philippines reveal the durability of policymakers’ ideas and the limitations of the tools of coercion in international politics, especially when considering broader cultural-cognitive assumptions toward low-intensity warfare when compared to eras following the end of the Vietnam War. But equally the cases show that war often straddles the political and military realms “requiring a more holistic view of war, one that extends from prewar condition-setting to the final accomplishment of national strategic objectives.”15 In short, even when conventional warfare is the necessary response to threats to state security, shaping operations prior to and following the period of high intensity conflict often require counterinsurgency doctrine and resources.

Considering the Army as a means to achieving the ends of the state, we find that soldiers have been more frequently deployed in support of low-intensity warfare such as counterinsurgency, than confronting another state army on a conventional battlefield. “Much of the Army’s combat experience prior to World War II,” as Andrew Birtle notes, “was gained not in conventional battles against regular opponents, but in unconventional conflicts against a bewildering array of irregulars, from American Indians to Bolshevik partisans.”16 After World War II, during the period of the Cold War, the Army once again was deployed in support of counterinsurgency operations in the jungles of Southeast Asia and, to a smaller extent, later in El Salvador and Nicaragua, all against the backdrop of superpower competition. The end of the Soviet Union only heightened concerns over global instability, whereby soldiers deployed in support of operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. As the 1996 Governmental Accounting Office
Report found, demands of low-intensity warfare during this period increased the deployment rates of soldiers to 300-400 percent higher than during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{17}

Today, once again, civilian policymakers and military officials are wrestling with low-intensity warfare against the backdrop of competing ideologies. In the post-9/11 world, concerns over weak states – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, among others – have led policymakers to pursue varying degrees of counterinsurgency policy to limit the advance of a violent salafist ideology and terrorist organizations’ ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and establish bases capable of striking U.S. interests at home and abroad. Yet, these realities do not always result in the proper doctrines of the state. Indeed, during the early stages of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, low-intensity warfare doctrine was either half-hearted or ignored entirely. It was not until 2006 in Iraq and 2009 in Afghanistan, that formal doctrine was published and applied in a comprehensive manner. More important, these wars have revealed that our enemies will fight to their strengths across the entire spectrum of war, making low-intensity warfare doctrine a requirement, rather than an option.

**Levels-of-Analysis Framework**

Political scientists have long studied the causes of war and the foreign policy decisions of states. A common way to characterize these explanations is to divide them into categories that emphasize either external or internal determinants of state behavior.\textsuperscript{18} The most influential is the levels-of-analysis framework that emerged from Kenneth Waltz’s distinction between three different images of war in international politics: individual, state, and international system.\textsuperscript{19} Explanations that focus on the individual-level
generally focus on human nature and predispositions toward aggression. They also include, “belief systems, personalities, psychological processes, political socialization, lessons learned from history, management styles, and similar variables.” Those that place more emphasis on internal or domestic factors generally fall under state-level explanations. Analysts adopting this level generally disaggregate the state into governmental and societal factors. “The former,” as Levy and Williams note, “include variables like the institutional structure of the political system and the nature of the policy-making process,” whereas the latter, “include the structure of the economic system, the influence of economic and noneconomic interest groups, the role of public opinion, and political culture and ideology.” Explanations that emphasize external factors such as systemic-level changes primarily fall under variants of realism. These include “the number of major powers in the system, the distribution of military and economic power among them, the pattern of alliances, and other factors that are closely related to the distribution of power.”

For realists, the third image or functional imperative is the most powerful explanation for the cause of war and state foreign policy pursuits. In particular, realism suggests that anarchy – the absence of a world government – impels states to self-help and seek gains relative to other states. Moreover, anarchy, according to realists, is a permissive condition that leaves the international system in a constant state of war. For this reason, neorealists or structural realists view the state as a unitary actor whereby national interest is relatively defined and set, since, as Waltz suggests, competition among states sets in motion a nearly constant state of war therefore unifying the state. In his words, “In moments of crisis, and especially in the crisis of war, attempts to achieve a nearly
unanimous backing for foreign policy are most likely to be successful.” Like most realist analysts, Huntington’s military realism, which he attributed to the functional imperative that flowed naturally from the anarchic nature of the international system, embraces the conviction that violence is a permanent feature of international relations. Huntington notes that,

“Competition among the states is continuous, and war is only an intensification of this competition which brings to a crisis the ever present issue of military security. War is always likely and is ultimately inevitable.”

Military policy, according to Huntington, must reflect the realities of “the continuing likelihood of war” through the “maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces.” A corollary of Huntington’s thesis, then, suggests that the military-mind must therefore recognize the primacy of the functional imperative.

The continuity of low-intensity warfare in international politics and its omission from American Army doctrine, however, raise questions about system-level explanations, since the functional imperative demanded two types of doctrine – conventional and counterinsurgency. During the post-World War II period, the ominous threat of nuclear war and mutually assured destruction, along with the risk of elevating conventional war to a nuclear war, may have prevented a direct confrontation between the two superpowers, but gave way to an indirect approach to superpower competition through low-intensity warfare. Experiences of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan allude to this reality. But equally these wars cost the superpowers international political prestige and domestic blood and treasure, which left the United States and Soviet Union in a position that was relatively weaker than before these wars.
Alternatively, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches look inward to understand foreign policy decisions. These variants of international relations claim that states are composed of autonomous organizations that wield their own self-interests, often contrary to the requirements of the state and its security. “Organizations and bureaucracies,” as Hudson notes, “put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, and this survival is measured by relative influence vis à vis other organizations (“turf”), by the organization’s budget, and by the morale of its personnel.”

And as Nagl notes,

“Organizations favor policies that will increase the importance of the organization, fight for the capabilities that they view as essential to their essence, seek to protect those capabilities viewed as essential, and demonstrate comparative indifference to functions not viewed as essential.”

Analysts forwarding this approach suggest that the institutional imperative takes precedence over functional and societal imperatives. Interests of the organization are therefore the primary drivers of content, continuity, and change. These approaches, in particular, surged in popularity and importance during the Vietnam War because defense policy was envisioned as bungled by bureaucrats with specific agendas that were outside the interests of state security. Equally, the period that followed the Vietnam War and explanations for defense policy focused on organizational culture and bureaucratic approaches. As Shadlow and Lacquement, among others, suggest, “Widely embraced in military circles, the Powell doctrine narrowed civil-military discourse on the appropriate uses of American armed forces in ways that favored the military’s preferred conception.”
But again there is reason to doubt the accuracy of such an account for doctrinal content, continuity, and change. The doctrine that emerged after the war was designed, by in large, to “extirpate the complexities and relevance of the experiences of Vietnam.” Dr. John Bodin, retired Army colonel and professor at the U.S. Army War College, whom took part in several doctrinal revisions, suggests that after the Vietnam War the general outlook of the American public regarding military institutions was unfavorable. By in large, this was due to the length of the war, the high costs (blood and treasure), and the images that made there way to the living rooms of Americans. This, in fact led to the institution’s aversion toward counterinsurgency. Bodin states that,

“The military and Army in particular was deemed to have failed in Vietnam and had become the target of liberals who viewed Soldiers as ‘baby burners.’ The Army wanted to get back to conducting ‘good wars’ that would be seen as noble causes.”

The Vietnam War was therefore enigmatic to American ideals, as had been the earlier action in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. The Army’s attempt to cast a disadvantaged country in the image of the United States came under heavy scrutiny back home. Policymakers understood that to secure a lasting result in battle, the application of various elements of counterinsurgency warfare were required. Yet, public understanding and support for this form of warfare was insufficient. As Paul Herbert writes,

“From the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, to the twin shocks of the Cambodian invasion and the killing of antiwar protestors at Kent State University in 1970, to the 1971 investigation into the My Lai incident, to the withdrawal from Vietnam and the shift to an all-volunteer force
(AVN) in 1973, the Army found itself increasingly the focal point of public criticism...Public disillusionment with the war in Vietnam became a general sentiment against all war and all military institutions, especially the Army. The U.S. Army in 1973 was in danger of losing its institutional identity and pride of purpose.”35

Recognizing the political-cultural context of action after Vietnam the principal writers of the first post-war doctrine latched onto the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as it met certain cultural-cognitive needs and fit the American description of war – state-on-state conventional armor warfare. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War had espoused the use of advanced technologies and became a watershed for Army ideas, but only to the extent that these writers referred to the war as a “god-send,” providing a “wonderful excuse”36 to move away from nation-building and counterinsurgency warfare. This raises fundamental questions regarding organizational and bureaucratic analysts’ claims and whether interests of organizations and career bureaucrats are autonomous and distinctively different from the society it serves.37

Neither of these explanations is “wholly satisfactory.”38 Realists offer no explanation for the continuity of low-intensity warfare and its variation in doctrine. Organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches can explain, to an extent, the organization’s bias toward conventional warfare, but it cannot explain the origin of policymakers’ perceptions to that end. To understand content, continuity, and change, therefore, requires the analytic lens of culture and cognition to more accurately understand the forces that shape foreign policy decisions and state doctrine.
Outside of the work of political anthropologists, culture as a specific research agenda did not take shape in the discipline of international relations until after the Cold War. Much of this is attributed to the “insistence on retaining the state as a ‘metaphysical’ actor.” However, “if one replaces metaphysics with a more realistic conceptualization of ‘actor,’” whereby human policymakers are “placed at the center of the theoretical matrix,” research can more accurately draw inferences that link foreign policy decisions to functional, institutional, and societal imperatives. To account for underlying continuities and changes in U.S. grand strategy, then, requires a closer look at how functional, institutional, and societal variables are filtered through state structure and individual policymakers. This is often referred to as the “two-level” game whereby state decision makers simultaneously consider domestic and international politics. A cultural-cognitive approach, however, suggests that the societal imperative arising from the social forces and ideologies dominant within society often determine the ways in which policymakers view foreign policy and war, therefore having an independent causal influence on the content of foreign policy and state doctrines. Culture, as defined here, refers to the collective models or hunches that define identities and prescribe behavior.

As Hudson notes,

“The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa: it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conception. Each decision-maker’s mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology,
demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates.\textsuperscript{45} These multiple forces often impact the policymaker’s preferences in a way that reflects culture’s – and very likely his or her own – dominant views of war and, often, “the last war we liked.”

A cultural-cognitive approach also suggests that policymakers that adopt the societal imperative as primacy often fail to meet the requirements of the functional imperative. And the degree to which there is contradiction between the functional and societal imperative depends on the “strength of the value pattern of society.”\textsuperscript{46} The period following the American defeat in Vietnam, which this research is specifically focused, is yet another example where tensions between functional and societal imperatives led policymakers to very different conclusions regarding what was appropriate doctrine when viewed through the lens of the American body-politic, as opposed to the external threats that might necessitate doctrine. Army policymakers, on the one hand, decried doctrines that focused on winning the nation’s wars (conventional warfare), while steering clear of the more likely form of warfare (low-intensity or counterinsurgency warfare). What emerged were principles of war that espoused quick and decisive results with a clear demarcation between political and military objectives. Objectives in war thereafter are best encapsulated in the Weinburger-Powell doctrine. General Powell argued that, “Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives exact a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore one of the essential elements of our national military
strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win – the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with minimum loss of life.\textsuperscript{47}

General Powell and the officers that led the doctrinal revisions following Vietnam were “born” of the experiences of that war and, consequently, were acutely aware of American political-culture’s dominant views regarding warfare.

On the other hand, Les Aspin criticized decisive force as being “all or nothing,” portending limited use of the military for policy, which he argued was inconsistent with the uncertain strategic environment.\textsuperscript{48} Others, though a small minority, shared Aspin’s criticism and charged that the doctrine was leading to a culture uneasy about accepting risks in uncertain situations, such as Beirut, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, among others. Powell, however, charged back,

“Decisive means and results are always preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making.”\textsuperscript{49}

A mismatch between doctrine and the functional imperative, therefore, may be more accurately assessed through cultural (norms and values) and cognitive standards (rules and models) that define policymakers’ assumptions and which often limit foreign policy objectives. As Huntington notes,

“Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be
impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives.”\textsuperscript{50}

Operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and later Afghanistan and Iraq, suggest an adherence to the societal imperative whereby the lessons learned from Vietnam resulted in an aversion to low-intensity warfare. The result was an Army that embraced a very narrow conception of warfare and, which, limited American foreign policy in an evolving strategic environment. But an Army solely focused on low-intensity warfare risks, once again, its pride, prestige, and sense of purpose when viewed through the lens of the American body-politic.

This research, then, specifically addresses the “nub of the problem,”\textsuperscript{51} and the possible tensions that occur between the imperatives and the choices that policymakers make regarding state doctrine. Thus, this research asks:

- Are policymakers’ ideas shaped by the dictates of the functional imperative, focused ostensibly outward, and unconcerned with the moral dictates of society;
- Are policymakers’ ideas a reflection of the essence of the organization and the dominant groups from within; or
- Are policymakers’ ideas a mirror reflection of the societal imperatives that are drawn from broader cultural assumptions regarding the American way of war?

**Conclusion**

In Andrew Birtle’s study of U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations from the antebellum period to World War II, he notes that many factors contributed to the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine notwithstanding its involvement in such operations. But, as he notes, “Perhaps the most important was the existence of broad, fundamental values,
both in American society and in the military in particular.”\textsuperscript{52} And, though, “This is not to say that individual officers did not differ, at times profoundly, on the proper conduct of sociopolitical affairs,”\textsuperscript{53} they shared cultural-cognitive understandings with American society at large. Indeed, as Birtle notes,

“But ultimately American soldiers reflected the society and institutions from which they came, and they could not help but be influenced by underlying currents of American civilization when called to administer foreign populations.”\textsuperscript{54}

Similarly, the doctrine that emerged in the period immediately following Vietnam, was, by in large, reminiscent of that earlier period in the American epic whereby policymakers neglected counterinsurgency doctrine to meet the requirements of the societal imperative. What emerged in the post-Vietnam era was a return to the traditional roots of American land warfare doctrine as executed during battles at the Bulge and Normandy. In its first battlefield test during the 1991 Gulf War, the massing of large mechanized armored forces, the use of advanced precision munitions, and low levels of collateral damage and American casualties had “finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome”\textsuperscript{55} and enshrined the doctrine as the reigning paradigmatic approach to American land warfare. The war, as captured by CNN and seen in the living rooms around America, also raised expectations regarding technology’s impact on the future of warfare. Policymakers since then have touted technology’s “prophylactic powers” where war did not appear and its ability to “shock and awe” where it did.\textsuperscript{56} Its false promise, however, was both unfortunate and realized on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The period under study here, then, we find two themes that emerged in U.S. Army doctrine: A conventional warfare focus that espoused the use of advanced technologies to achieve quick and decisive results; and the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine. Explaining these themes, and the preferred American way of war, against the backdrop and continuity of low-intensity warfare require a closer inspection of the various approaches and theories of international relations. This study therefore examines the independent causal variables from four differing international relations approaches – realism, organizational culture, bureaucratic politics, and cultural-cognitive – and the extent to which they explain policymakers’ ideas for doctrinal content, continuity, and change in the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 eras. Last, this study concludes with some stark realities regarding the American way of war and what it portends for the future.

This, then, raises the final purpose of this research. War, as realists contend, is a permanent feature of international politics. Today, however, weapons once limited to the possession of the most powerful states in the system have proliferated to weaker states and, in some cases, “rogue states.” And equally threatening is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terror groups and the increased frequency of civil wars and conflicts involving ‘non-state’ actors. These realities have made counterinsurgency and stability operations all the more important, as war will likely take the form of hybrid wars in the future. Moreover, war will likely require civilian and military policymakers to share the burden, since hybrid wars will likely straddle the realm of political and military affairs. This will require civilian and military policymakers alike to share a division of labor that is more malleable to the true nature of today’s warfare. As
Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, the lines between civil and military affairs have blurred, where civilians are deployed to the front lines and military men and women are in Washington formulating policy. The management of violence therefore extends beyond traditional conceptions of war, particularly within the American cultural-cognitive framework. Civilian and military policymakers alike must therefore develop strategies and doctrines that bridge both political and military objectives in war. As Clausewitz notes, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”\(^{58}\) And equally important, “The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature.”\(^{59}\)

NOTES

3 D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, p. 3
6 Ibid, p.12
7 Ibid, p.13
9 Ibid, p. 105
10 Ibid, p. 113, In WDAR, 1901, vol. 1pt. 6, p. 306. *Otis Report*, p.252. Here, Birtle captures the army’s strategy in the Philippines as expressed by COL William E. Birkhimer’s: “The object was to make things as uncomfortable as possible for the enemy, thus pursuing the policy which alone, apparently, will break down the rebel resistance, namely, the wearing-out policy; pounding away until the bandit chief's get tired of living in hiding in the far distant mountains, and the people wearing of their importunate demand for money and their impotent military efforts, withdrawal their material and moral support for them.”
11 Ibid, p. 130-31, In Welch Response to Imperialism, p. 138 and Letter from Chaffee to Corbin, 10 Jan 02, box 1, Corbin Papers.
13 Ibid, p. 139.
14 Field Manual 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government, 30 Jul 40, p. 4
19 Levy and Williams, Causes of War, p.14
20 Ibid, p.14
21 Levy and Williams, Causes of War, p.14
22 Ibid, pp.14-15
23 Ibid, p.15
25 Ibid, p.179
26 Samuel L. Huntington, The Solder and the State, pp. 62-79
27 Ibid, p.65
28 Ibid, p.65
29 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis, p.8
32 Shadlow and Lacquement, Expanding the Military Profession, p.7
33 Ibid, p.7
34 Dr. John Bodin, interview with the author, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2008
According to Huntington, the military-mind is better suited to the edicts of conservatism than liberalism in that it ensures the division of civilian and military responsibilities and effectiveness. In essence, Huntington described the military-mind as a distinct ideology, separate from the society it served. To falsify Huntington’s thesis, then, would require the analyst to show interdependence between the ideology of the military-mind and broader society belief-systems.
38 D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, p.7
40 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” p.4
41 Ibid, p.4
42 Ibid, pp.3-4
45 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” p.10
46 Samuel P. Huntington, The Solder and the State, p.2
49 Colin Powell, *Challenges Ahead*, p.40
50 Ibid, p.2
51 Ibid, p.2
53 Ibid, p.274
54 Ibid, p.274
55 George Herbert Bush, Memoirs (cite)
57 Levy and Williams, *Causes of War*, p.1
59 Ibid, p.88
CHAPTER 2

SORTING THROUGH THE POSSIBILITIES

A little over four decades ago, the United States Army was called on to prevent the further spread of communism in Southeast Asia. However, without clear objectives and an exit strategy, the U.S. Army faced a protracted war that tested the perseverance of the citizen soldier and the legitimacy of American foreign policy at home. Today, much like the era of Vietnam, Americans are again divided on central issues regarding U.S. foreign policy which addresses, along with the issues of great power relations, the equally urgent problem of advancing U.S. interests in a global environment marked increasingly by state sponsored and other forms of terrorism. The current problem for policymakers—when viewed through the lens of the American body-politic—is to define and implement a preventive strategy that is appropriate and proportionate to its intended ends. Pressures, both foreign and domestic, that led to a new institutional order for the Army following the war in Vietnam, therefore, allude to the potential for a similar transformation of Army doctrine now as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude.

The effort of this study is to explain under what conditions continuity and change are likely to occur in U.S. Army doctrine. Equally important, however, is ascertaining the origins of doctrine’s content. The conundrum that this study seeks to explain is the dramatic shift away from counterinsurgency doctrine after Vietnam, against the backdrop and continuity of low-intensity warfare in international politics, and the dominance of state-on-state conventional warfare doctrine, which left the U.S. Army vulnerable to the challenges of the counterinsurgency environment five years after the US had initiated a war in Afghanistan and three years after the war began in Iraq. Consequently, this study argues that the American experience in war does not readily fit the maxim that armies tend to fight the next war as they did the last, rather the
American historical context suggests we fight the next war as “the last war we liked.” The degree to which doctrine contradicts the functional imperative, then, depends upon the nature and the strength of the value pattern of American society.¹

**Sources of Doctrine Content, Continuity, and Change**

As covered in chapter 1, there are several different, but quite useful lenses that help explain the content of American defense policy and why such policy has remained stable over time, or in other periods, has evolved or revolutionized defense policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, prominent theories concerning the choices military organizations make include “realism” and the framework of “bureaucratic politics.” There is, however, a less prominent framework of “culture and cognition” that has not been sufficiently explored in the discipline of international relations. In part, cultural studies have been relegated to the margins of international relations due to their methodological elusiveness. Theorists tend to prefer simple, elegant, and parsimonious explanations, whereas culture requires “thick descriptions.” But neither realism nor bureaucratic politics are adequate in explaining the changing views of states’ interests against the continuity of low-intensity warfare in international politics. This research therefore looks to cultural explanations of how states’ policies are defined against the more dominant explanations. To do so requires a foundational understanding of these more dominant theories and their explanations for doctrinal innovation.

According to realism, systemic constraints and opportunities shape state goals and actions, and thus the likelihood of civilian intervention for the choices of military strategy and doctrine adopted by the state.² The bureaucratic perspective argues that organizations are generally resistant to change, regardless of systemic threats or constraints. According to the bureaucratic
perspective, threats to organizational power and survival—those that are more likely to originate from other bureaucratic actors within the state and which pose a threat to the organization’s health or budget—are more often the impetus to change in military doctrines and strategy.³

Some analysts have specified under what conditions military organizations are most likely to develop their own strategies separate from intervention by elected or appointed civilian leaders and the types of doctrine developed, whether offensive or defensive. Both Posen and Snyder suggest that organizational interests of the military during periods of low-threat environments are more likely to shape the type of military strategy employed by states, whereas high-threat environments often result in civilian intervention.⁴ And where low-threat environments enable military officials to pursue organizational interests, offensive doctrine is the preferred choice of the organization as it is often the most powerful strategy for militaries to adopt – since it increases autonomy, resources, certainty, and prestige.⁵

Analysts that adopt the bureaucratic approach argue that the primacy of the functional imperative is overstated and that state decision making is often determined by the character of the domestic political structure. For example, Kier suggests that Posen’s and Snyder’s argument exaggerates the power of systemic imperatives and misses what civilian policymakers often care most about. She suggests that the structure of the international system is indeterminate of the types of doctrine that states pursue and that the intensity of the security needs rarely results in civilian intervention for doctrinal developments. And when civilian policymakers do intervene it is often damaging to the state’s strategic objectives. More important, as Kier notes, “civilian intervention is often a response to domestic political concerns, not to the distribution of power in the international system.”⁶
Avant argues that different political systems explain the character of the military and its ability to adapt to change. In her study of the American political system she suggests that “complex oversight mechanisms” made it difficult for military officials to respond to change. In her words, “Differences in institutional structures that affect ensuing differences in the growth of parties, the issue-focus of voters, the interpretation of the international system, and the terms of delegation will lead to differences in the preferences of military organizations and civilian leaders. These variations explain the deviations in policy.”

Nagl suggests that this explanation is conflated and that changes within institutional structures are often limited, since the organization’s culture is largely resistant to change. Watts and Murray agree with the latter thesis and suggest that, “the potential for civilian or outside leadership to impose a new vision of future war on a reluctant military service whose heart remains committed to existing ways of fighting is, at best, limited.” Consequently, Nagl argues that, “The critical independent variable is not the nature of the national government, which in most cases has little impact on which policies the military chooses to adopt. It is the organizational culture of the military institution that determines whether innovation succeeds or fails.”

There is one additional approach that has not been explored sufficiently in the literature but provides a degree of explanatory power that warrants further explanation in this research – the cultural-cognitive approach. This approach suggests that military adjustment to a dynamic strategic environment results from intersubjective knowledge which is acquired through social constructions, and which shape and form a normative community that is either in support of or opposed to a particular idea, strategy, or doctrine. Individual policymakers and organizations therefore base their preferences, assumptions, and actions upon constructed identities, which
define routine patterned ways of thinking and the proper behavior of actors within a given collective.

“Though no two individuals may share precisely the same interpretations and experiences, there exist dominant political images.” These images provide a framework from which individuals interpret and react to their external environment. As an extension of politics by other means, war is one such image that has had a profound impact on how individuals, institutions, and cultures interpret, mobilize, and respond to their external environments. Its images have defined the social identities of states and there distinctiveness and purpose. But equally culture has defined the parameters of war and responses to it. For example, when images of war are no longer consistent with dominant views of culture, they become challenged, and at times displaced. As Aronoff suggests, “there can be either a relatively hegemonic situation in which a given cultural definition of reality dominates the society at large or a situation in which significantly different cultural perspectives compete.” To predict changes or continuity in states’ grand strategy and doctrine, then, depends on the dominant views of the collective and how they view/define responses to their external environment. As Rhodes suggests:

“To understand the choices states make in the acquisition of tools of violence and means of providing security – that is, to predict when and what strategic choices will be made – it is necessary to understand dominant political images of the state and war. These images do not exist in isolation: they are deeply grounded in political culture and serve important cultural cognitive needs. They are closely tied to the historical myths that are employed to facilitate self-identification and self-definition and are important in binding the nation together, in creating in-group/out-group distinctions, and in legitimizing potentially conflict-producing social relationships. These images play a key role in
defining the central rules of societal interaction, such as the appropriate boundaries or extent of state activity, and may be important in justifying state institutions or defining the essence of particular state organs. Given these functions, these core political images are likely to be reexamined only when the continued viability of the political society has been called into question.\textsuperscript{12}

The tools of violence and means of providing security are therefore contingent upon how individuals frame, perceive, and narrate the external environment – which are a function of the international political system and the social forces that arise from dominant cultural definitions of reality. Thus, the pressures that may be induced on defense policymakers lie between dominant views of war and its nature. Material world traumas such as war, then, often define “who we are” and “what it is we do.”

**METHODOLOGY: OVERCOMING CULTURE’S ELUSIVENESS**

Culture’s “elusiveness” and “seamlessness,” consequently, “rendered problematic attempts to separate and then relink in causal fashion the independent variable of culture and the dependent variable of national policy.”\textsuperscript{13} However, by placing the human agent or policymaker at the center of the theory, we can “trace” with greater probability the causal link between culture and foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{14} For example, if we analyze policymakers’ perceptions of domestic discourse and frame it against the context of functional and institutional imperatives, it will enable the analyst to determine whether policymakers’ ideas hang together with broader cultural assumptions in a uniquely holistic way – as Max Weber termed it, *Weltanschuaung* – that is empirically testable and falsifiable. Thus, by using the individual policymaker as the point of
intersection in the analysis we can with greater specificity explain the determinants of state behavior, whether material or ideational.15

This research, then, places the individual policymaker at the center of the theoretical matrix to act as a filter from which system-level and domestic-level variables pass through to determine what extent functional, institutional, and societal variables explain doctrinal content, continuity, and change. This methodology will help refine our understanding of how international, bureaucratic, and cultural factors affect state behavior. In addition, where available, survey data will be used to set the broader context and help explain the origin of policymakers’ ideas. Thus, the methodology employed in this research uses an eclectic approach that combines both quantitative (survey data) and qualitative methods (process tracing).

Last, defining doctrine requires care since policymakers have defined it in both expansive and restrictive terms. Doctrine is, as British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller defined, “the central idea that at a given time, as affected by strategic circumstance, is actuating an army.”16 It provides guides, methods, and agreed-upon concepts. Furthermore, doctrine furnishes a framework for combat and a common language and understanding about the art of warfighting. For the United States Army, Field Manual 100-5 *Operations* has served as the doctrinal touchstone by which the Army fought all land battles from 1939 to 1993 – after which the Army adopted the joint numbering system and replaced 100-5 with 3.0. During the period 1968-2006, Army doctrine underwent a series of revisions at clearly identifiable points and can therefore be analyzed and compared according to the various editions of the manual. Thus, changes in central ideas, methods, and rules of warfighting can be established by juxtaposing successive editions of Field Manual 100-5 (3.0 after 1993) to determine the differences as one replaced the other.
CASES

This research presents four cases: The post-Vietnam era which includes the *Active Defense* doctrine (1976) and *AirLand Battle* doctrine (1982 and 1986); the post-Cold War era and *Force Projection* doctrine (1993); and the post-9/11 era and *Full-Spectrum* doctrine with a specific focus on *Counterinsurgency* doctrine (2006). These periods, much like today, required policymakers to balance tensions between the functional and societal imperatives. In particular, policymakers were confronted with at least three central issues concerning foreign policy: (1) conventional versus unconventional warfare (to include support and stability operations); (2) heavy armored versus light-infantry operations; and (3) defensive versus offensive doctrine. Each offers sparse middle-ground for doctrine and reflects the dichotomy between the competing views within culture.

The 1970s and 1980s are particularly interesting because much like the present post-Iraq war period, the domestic context and the organization of the Army were then highly contested. By the mid-1970s the Army had come to refocus on the primacy of the tank and mechanized operations shortly after it had fought two light-infantry intensive wars in Southeast Asia (Korea and Vietnam). Third World contingencies were no longer a central focus nor were they included in post-Vietnam discussions of Army doctrine. Instead, while facing an intellectual crisis over its 1976 version of the Army’s most foundational doctrine manual (Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*) in the 1980s the Army chose to abandon the attrition-style doctrine informed by two smaller wars in Southeast Asia in favor of a conventional warfare doctrine that espoused the precepts of World War II. This latter version of the American way of war would become one of the few staples in Army doctrine for the remainder of the decade – termed AirLand Battle – and from it much of the success in the 1991 Gulf War is attributed.\(^{17}\) As a result, minimal changes in
doctrine occurred, and unfortunately this doctrinal stasis strongly limited the Army’s adaptability and effectiveness in Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 environment.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this chapter has outlined four alternative explanations for doctrinal content, continuity, and change as applied to U.S. foreign policy. Realists assert that the direction of state policy, and the military doctrine that it adopts, is patterned by the functional imperative or international political system. Organizational and Bureaucratic approaches suggest that the content, timing, and implementation of doctrine correlate highly with the view of the dominant group in the organization and individuals holding specific bureaucratic “seats.” In addition, when bureaucrats and the organizations that they sit atop are faced with dramatic shifts in routine and autonomy, they are more likely to engage in resistance. Last, analysts that forward a cultural-cognitive approach suggest that doctrine reflects broader cultural assumptions that are rooted in intersubjective knowledge attained through experiences during specific historical contexts of action. This approach posits that policymakers’ cultural-cognitive frameworks – how both Americans and their civilian and military leaders view the world and the state which governs them – are essential for understanding doctrinal content, continuity, and change. Thus, in order to determine what factors have the strongest influence on doctrine, this study will address the following four questions:

- To what extent does doctrine rationally reflect the functional imperative or external challenges facing the U.S. Army in both threat and technologies available?
To what extent does doctrine reflect the institutional imperative or organizational realities that would best preserve the Army’s independence of action in both wartime and peacetime?

To what extent does doctrine reflect the relative power of different groups within the Army (combat branches, such as Infantry, Armor, etc.), and within the Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc)?

To what extent does doctrine reflect the societal imperative that arises from widely held visions of “the American way of war” in the public mind?

In the next section, the answers to these questions demonstrate that doctrinal content, continuity, and change are better understood when considering policymakers’ perceptions of the American way of war in the public mind. Consequently, counterinsurgency’s exit from Army doctrine immediately following Vietnam is more accurately explained by policymakers’ perceptions, framing, and narration of the external environment as a function of cultural value. The need for counterinsurgency doctrine was evident, but the public’s repudiation of counterinsurgency as an American way of war was equally evident. Continuity in doctrine from the period marked by the advent of AirLand Battle in 1982, its application in the first Gulf War in 1991, and through the initiation of two successive wars in post-9/11 era is more accurately explained by policymakers’ understanding of broader cultural assumptions and the limitations that they impose on the institution of the Army. Simply put, Vietnam was antithetical to the norms and values of American society, whereas the Gulf War more closely matched American cultural-cognitive frameworks. The societal imperative and value policymakers attach to it therefore led military officials to separate war from its political, cultural, and psychological contexts, violating Clausewitz’s most important dictum.
NOTES

6 Ibid, pp. 11-15. Kier outlines a review of the literature on realist and bureaucratic explanations for doctrinal change and suggests, like Dudas and Snider, that domestic political concerns play an important role in understanding the likelihood for change, as well as the content for doctrinal choices of military organizations. However, Dudas and Snider argue that ideas at the individual and societal level have a greater impact than what had been previously studied for American doctrinal change after Vietnam.

11 Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Division*, p.xiv
CHAPTER 3

OUT OF THE Labyrinth: Counterinsurgency Doctrine Never Again

As early as 1961 the U.S. Military had begun to contend with the expanding influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Southeast Asia, among others. The question of “what should be done” was captured in the Pentagon Papers which led to rising stocks in counterinsurgency doctrine – an indirect approach to weakening influence of the Soviet Union and casting Third World countries in the western democracy mold.¹ A renewed interest in counterinsurgency therefore led Army policymakers to formalize their approach to low-intensity warfare for the first time in U.S. land warfare history, with later refinements in its 1968 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations – the Army’s most prominent document outlining guidelines for the conduct of war. However, Army policymakers’ attempts to employ counterinsurgency warfare to blunt Soviet influence in Southeast Asia came under scrutiny from political pundits and the American public.

During this same period (1960-1976), Army policymakers wrestled with developing a doctrine in an era marked by increases in nuclear arsenals and technological advances in conventional weapon systems while simultaneously contending with the problem of Soviet activism in the Third World. Though each of these realities remained after the Vietnam War, the Army sought to purge itself of counterinsurgency doctrine and dramatically shifted focus to a conventional-nuclear doctrine that would defend on the plains of Europe. Thus, this chapter seeks to explain the dramatic shift in U.S. land warfare doctrine by examining four plausible, but differing, approaches in the discipline of international relations.
**Sources of Doctrine Content, Continuity, and Change**

Realist analysis explains doctrinal shifts as a rational change that reflects the functional imperative arising from changes in states’ relative power. Organizational culture and bureaucratic politics models explain shifts as the organizational realities that best preserve the Army’s independence of action in both wartime and peacetime and the relative power of different groups within the Army (infantry and armor branches), and within the Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines). Yet, neither approach can fully explain why, given two recent low-intensity wars, and its continuity thereafter, that the Army would revert back to doctrine reminiscent of World War II.

While equally comparing the four approaches, the forthcoming analysis will suggest that changes in Army doctrine after Vietnam are more accurately explained through the cultural-cognitive approach which posits that the intensity of the security needs of the American state was overshadowed by the strength of its value pattern and dominant views of society. By placing individual policymakers at the point of intersection between primary determinants of doctrinal content, continuity, and change, then, we find that the dominant views of political culture have an independent causal influence on doctrinal decisions and content. Though some analysts will argue that such an approach is “too thick” in description, explanations absent a thorough understanding of the impact of broader assumptions regarding the American way of war largely miss the mark, as decisions are often more nuanced than “black box” analysts purport. Consequently, policymakers do not develop doctrine in a vacuum and often have to respond to the conflicting imperatives stemming from threats to society’s security and the dominant political cultural views regarding the boundaries of state action.
Changes and continuity in U.S. land warfare doctrine are therefore best explained through the filter of Army decision makers and the degree to which they evaluate and weigh the functional, institutional, and societal imperatives. More specifically, the cultural-cognitive approach suggests that the dramatic shift away from counterinsurgency doctrine after the Vietnam War was the result of policymakers’ aversion to low-intensity warfare, driven by the political cultural discourse that dominated American thinking. Policymakers’ assessments therefore suggest two critical and often conflicting factors impact their ideas: the intensity of the security needs stemming from threats to society’s security, and the strength of the value pattern arising from dominant images/views within society. Policymakers are therefore conditioned by the dominant views of society which limit the boundaries of state action in international politics. Thus, Vietnam revealed to Army policymakers that massing conventional forces and technology alone could not defeat an insurgency; it required exposing American soldiers and the public to the political realities of “small wars” (even when fought on a large scale) – an aversion that would drive doctrinal development well into the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.

\textbf{COMPARING CONTENT}

In 1968, Army doctrine addressed national security objectives and strategy, and the use of the military to meet those objectives. The manual outlined the Army’s role in three general levels of conflict: general war, limited war, and cold war: regional conflicts conducted conventionally or unconventionally, but well under the nuclear threshold. The manual emphasized the important role of land forces in the encouragement of friendly governments during periods of difficulty, such as stabilization of an unsettled area,
emphasizing their use to maintain or restore order, to assist in nation-building, and to protect U.S. personnel and property. In addition, the 1968 manual addressed stability operations, but largely in the context of a cold war which stressed U.S. efforts to aid friendly nations in preventing and combating insurgency. Finally, the manual defined stability operations as those that involve internal defense and development assistance, which are provided by the armed forces to establish, maintain, or restore a climate of order within which responsible governments can function effectively.

For the Army, the demands of limited war and cold war required tactical maneuverability wherein light infantry forces would conduct air movements rapidly to repel and defeat guerilla or insurgent forces throughout the threatened region. Under the operational concepts for these two types of expected warfare, the Army devoted five chapters in the 1968 edition which addressed the strategic and tactical requirements of counterinsurgency and contingency operations: Air Movement and Airborne Operations; Airmobile Operations; Unconventional Warfare; Cold War Operations; and Stability Operations.

In the subsequent post-Vietnam revision – the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* – the Army starkly omitted counterinsurgency and stability operations from the manual and centered its focus on conventional warfare that defended Western Europe. It also signaled a departure from light-infantry intensive doctrine. The central focus of the 1976 manual describes how the Army tactically destroys enemy military forces and secures or defends important geographic objectives – with no mention of the political aspects of war and the requirement to possibly stabilize a region after conventional conflict. The manual begins by addressing the context in which the U.S. Army is most
likely to be engaged – battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact. Within this context, the manual stresses the lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the primacy of the tank in conventional modern warfare. Thus, the manual directs attention away from strategy and concepts of victory that link military actions to overarching policy aims. The manual’s prescriptions for the Army are therefore battles that lead to force-on-force victory, and not prolonged fighting in small wars that only gradually lead to the accomplishment of political goals.

**REALISM**

Realism claims that Army doctrine rationally reflects the functional imperative arising from changes in states’ relative power. Changes in doctrine, therefore, are caused by changes in external realties or emerging threats. Further, realism assumes that technology will be incorporated in an optimal, rational fashion. Ergo, changes in doctrine may also reflect changes in technologies available to the Army and its adversaries. Immediately after the Vietnam War, defense policymakers grew increasingly concerned about the relative power of the Soviet’s conventional military, much of which had increased during the early stages of Vietnam. One indicator of growing military power was Soviet spending for defense. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown summarized to Congress,

> “Over the past 15 years, Soviet defense spending has been gradually increasing; we estimate the average rate of increase, in real terms, at between three and four percent a year . . . For a substantial part of that same period (from FY 1964 to FY
1975), U.S. baseline budgets (with military pay and the incremental costs of the war in Southeast Asia excluded) have been declining in real terms.”

The Soviets invested these increases into both strategic and conventional forces. On the conventional side, between 1965 and 1979 the Soviets went from 148 to over 170 divisions, added 31 regiments to their tactical air armies, and increased their air inventory by about 1,400 tactical aircraft. Although many of these forces went to the Soviet Far East, the Soviets made qualitative improvements across the board.

Also commanding the attention of defense policymakers was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the war Egyptian and Syrian armored forces attacked into Israel and crossed the Suez Canal, penetrating the Bar-Lev Line and Golan Heights near simultaneously. The swiftness and devastation that took place in the first days of the battle left the Israeli military incapable of conducting counter-attacks. Much of this was attributed to the advances in Soviet technology and doctrine – notably long-range antitank guided missiles and integrated air defense systems. At the end of the conflict, the total tank and artillery losses for both sides together exceeded the entire tank and artillery inventory of the U.S. Army Europe. Noting the devastation and the proliferation of modern and highly lethal weapons to Soviet client states, General William DePuy, then the Army’s Training and Doctrine Commander, considered the ratios of weapon systems nearly overwhelming to that of ours in Europe. In his words,

“Arab Forces had some 4000 tanks; we have approximately 1700 tanks in Europe. We credit Arab armies with a starting inventory of 3000 artillery pieces; we have less than 500 in Europe. Losses were enormous. Egypt and Syria lost between
1500 and 2000 tanks and 500 artillery pieces; about equivalent to all the tanks and artillery we have in Europe.”

Moreover, as Herbert notes, “captured Arab equipment, supplied by the Soviets, showed that the Soviets were well ahead of the United States in combat vehicle technology.”

Consequently, the realities of the Arab-Israeli War were considered a watershed for Army policymakers’ ideas.

The resulting devastation induced by the advanced technologies and doctrine supplied by the Soviets to Third World countries such as Egypt and Syria, led then Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams, to order a study that extracted lessons from the war. Charged with this task, General Depuy turned to the Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth to put a team together under the lead of Brigadier General Morris J. Brady to visit the Middle East and collect lessons learned from available intelligence and spot reports. In July 1974, the Brady Study assembled a 162-page report in an attempt to raise issues regarding the U.S. Army’s ability to conduct conventional warfare under similar circumstances.

The study commanded Army policymakers’ attention due to the incredible losses of tanks, vehicles, guns, and aircraft, “which resulted from the proliferation of accurate, long-range, deadly weapons such as improved tank cannon and fire control instruments, antitank guided missiles, and surface-to-air missiles.” But equally commanding the attention of policymakers was the recognition that advanced military technologies no longer rest with great powers alone – they have spread to smaller client states and have been used at levels formerly considered within the capabilities of large states only. This
was captured in the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. The manual states that,

“The war in the Middles East in 1973 might well portend the nature of modern battle. Arabs and Israelis were armed with the latest weapons, and the conflict approached a destructiveness once attributed only to nuclear arms. Use of aircraft for close support of advancing armor, in the fashion generally practiced since 1949, was greatly reduced by advancing surface-to-air missiles and air defense guns. In clashes of massed armor such as the world had not witnessed for 30 years, both sides sustained devastating losses, approaching 50 percent in less than two weeks of combat. These statistics are of serious importance for U.S. Army commanders.”

In several preceding documents, all of which focused heavily on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, General DePuy sought to capture the magnitude of Soviet doctrine and weaponry, and technological advances. In his January 14, 1974 letter to General Abrams, DePuy outlined his major areas of concern and how each was relative to future Army doctrine. Most important, as DePuy notes, “was not the surprise attack and the ragged Israeli mobilization which differentiated the 1973 from the 1967 war although both were important, but rather, the concept [doctrine] and weaponry employed by the Arabs.” Of the critical lessons learned in the Brady Study that Depuy highlighted to the Army Chief of Staff, then, were the advances in modern military technology and their employment in modern battle. Each of these implications was later covered in the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, and in some cases entire chapters were devoted.
But the timing of the 1976 version of Army doctrine calls into question realist analysts’ claims regarding the functional imperative’s influence and importance to policymakers’ decisions. The 1976 edition of the field manual was nearly a decade too late as Soviet advances and growth in conventional forces had expanded by five tank divisions as early as 1965, and had also fielded new technology in the T-62 tank and was well on its way to developing a much more advanced tank in the T-72. Moreover, Soviet military spending had eclipsed U.S. defense spending as early as 1964. And prior to 1965 the American commitment in Vietnam was still at a low level, it was not until the end of 1965 that the troop commitment grew from 16,000 troops to nearly 184,000 committed in country. The United States could have shifted attention to Central Europe as early as 1965. Consequently, the timing of changes is problematic for realist analysts, which given the spending and relative growth of conventional military forces and qualitative advances in technology should have resulted in doctrinal change during the mid part of the 1960s.

But equally important Third World competitions on the periphery, which required counterinsurgency warfare capabilities, continued to be a reality in international politics. In fact, Soviet activism in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, as well as involvement in Portugal in 1974, Angola in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977-1988, Vietnam in 1978, Kampuchea in 1978, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 all suggest that the continuity of low-intensity warfare required Army doctrine to equally contend with its challenges. To understand the organizations penchant toward conventional warfare requires a shift in analytic focus.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Organizational culture and bureaucratic approaches suggest that changes in Army doctrine are the result of dramatic shifts in organizational independence, the relative power of individuals within the Army, and Army within the Department of Defense. Accordingly, organizational culture argues that the essence of an organization is dependent upon the dominant group and its views to what the best roles and missions are for the organization.\textsuperscript{17} Organizational analysts also argue that change is often infrequent, and occurs only marginally.\textsuperscript{18} However, this approach also implies that shifts in the external environment that cause new changes to organizational independence or to organizational budget will be reacted to with doctrinal change. The bureaucratic politics model, by contrast, suggests that individual players in specific positions matter and that one can predict with high reliability the “position” that individual players will choose based on the “seat” that they hold.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the bureaucratic approach suggests that the identity of the players and the seats they hold within the national security bureaucracy matters, and that their bureaucratic interests will determine the course of doctrinal content, continuity, and change.\textsuperscript{20}

From the period of 1969-1972, General DePuy held the position as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, where he took part in force planning and analysis for the Department of the Army. During this period DePuy gained a better appreciation for managing change under a large bureaucracy and understood the impact of organizational culture and bureaucratic interests. Prior to DePuy’s designation to become the Army’s first Training and Doctrine Commander, he oversaw the reorganization planning for Continental Army Command which split the responsibility of managing Army change
after Vietnam into two separate commands – Training and Doctrine Command and Forces Command. This experience formalized DePuy’s methods for bringing change to the Army, which he believed was best accomplished through small group decision-making. In his view, this was the only way to get things accomplished in a very large organization. As the Assistant Vice Chief, DePuy would generally seek consensus across the organization, but on the tough decisions, however, he would limit bureaucratic participation to a minimum, to the extent that decisions often reflected his own recommendations.\(^{21}\) Also, managing many of the changes during an uncertain time for the Army (1969-73) required General DePuy and his staff to make decisions under very tight time constraints. DePuy notes that during the program or budget decision cycles, “We’d sit up in my office all night long and make hundreds of relatively minor but always controversial decisions – take this out, subtract that, reduce this, scratch that out. It was arbitrary, but it had to be done! At the time such actions were regarded as high-handed by many people, which led to certain dissatisfaction with the A/VICE ideas on the part of the regular staff agencies. But, it was a way to make the necessary, tough decisions rapidly during a very difficult management period.”\(^ {22}\)

Also during this period, DePuy witnessed vast changes to the way the Department of Defense conducted business. When Defense Secretary McNamara came to the Pentagon, according to DePuy, he brought with him a small group of individuals from the systems analysis community, which was a five year defense program that conducted studies and analysis for changes that would be more cost-effective.\(^ {23}\) Due to McNamara’s dissatisfaction with the data that was coming from the Army, he created a conduit, later
known as the Force Planning and Analysis shop, which was a small group of people who provided information through the Secretary of the Army to McNamara. This perhaps codified DePuy’s ideas of how to manage such a large bureaucracy – decisions had to be made by very small groups to bring about change.

The drafting of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, was initially given to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the leadership of Major General John Cushman. Cushman, like DePuy, was an infantry officer who served in World War II, missed the Korean War, and held various leadership positions during several deployments to Vietnam. However, their intellectual approach to warfare diverged considerably. Herbert notes that “the same rigid tactical formations that DePuy decried in the wake of the October War, Cushman censured as patterns without thought.”

Indeed, the first draft that was presented at a meeting at Fort A.P. Hill in December 1974, omitted the primacy of the tank, devoted considerable attention to helicopter operations, as used in Vietnam, and elevated doctrine to the abstract. This was antithetical to DePuy’s view of land warfare. Depuy considered the tank the supreme weapon on the battlefield and believed that doctrine should be authoritative – focusing on the tactical level of warfare and leaving little room for imagination on the battlefield.

While the Cushman-DePuy clash attributed to moving the writing of the manual to Fort Monroe where DePuy could keep closer control over the process of drafting the doctrine, the “big” Army also recognized the importance of “shoring-up” the service’s equitable share of defense apportionments. As Herbert notes,

“General Abrams’s desire for closer relations with the Air Force emanated from his service in Vietnam and from his perception that, in a period of fiscal
retrenchment, the two services must avoid internecine quarrels that could jeopardize each other’s budget. As recently as 1972, Congress had stopped funding the Army’s Cheyenne advanced attack helicopter because the Air Force insisted it was to perform the Air Force mission of close air support of ground troops. The Army saw the Cheyenne as vital to its ability to shift antitank combat power rapidly on the battlefield and made a similar helicopter one of its “Big Five” procurement priorities of 1973 and beyond. General Abrams did not want the helicopter cut from the budget, nor did he want to suffer the professional embarrassment of openly arguing with another service in a public forum.”

To achieve the Army Chief’s directive, DePuy and U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Commander established a joint working group under the auspice of the Air Land Forces Application Agency. This organization developed a number of working papers for air-land doctrine and shared these ideas with the field. The commanders reviewed the organization’s work as well as sought periodic endorsement from their respective service chiefs of staff. The close collaboration of ideas between the Army and Air Force was therefore necessitated by each services concern over defense apportionments and the need to gain consensus over the division of labor between the two. However, air-land operations did not formally evolve into the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, due to organizational and bureaucratic concerns. Though recognizing the eventual need for air-land operations, neither DePuy nor Dixon were willing to redefine the roles of the services which could very well lead to a reapportionment of responsibilities, thus affecting each of the service’s budgets. As Herbert notes,
“DePuy and Dixon agreed on a safer, more productive approach: tacit acceptance of two arenas of battle, one on the ground and one in the air, each the primary province of a respective service, and explicit acknowledgement that the two arenas are mutually interdependent, leading to procedural, but not doctrinal, collaboration.”

While this marked an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the two services during peacetime, it also reflected the careful consideration of organizational and bureaucratic concerns. But these concerns were not limited to the interests of the services; they were also encapsulated in the different core constituencies of the Army – armor and infantry.

At the onset, the infantry was resistant to adopt many of the concepts that General DePuy wished to include in doctrine, which, in part, led to the appointment of General Donn Starry, an armor officer and a protégé of General Abrams, to head up the 1976 version of Army doctrine. Each agreed on the primacy of the tank in warfare, though DePuy himself was an infantry officer. Starry, like DePuy, saw the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as the locus for persuading change within the Army. Starry therefore proceeded by saturating the field with circulars outlining new tactics, methods, and procedures for warfare centered on armor forces and the lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. DePuy later formalized his approach by issuing a directive that outlined a three-step model for changing the Army and the way it thinks about war. This model essentially sought to convince the Army through the saturation of centralized ideas. This approach was intended to stimulate the process of doctrinal development, but it also sought to limit the ideas that came into direct conflict with DePuy’s own vision for the Army and its
doctrine. During the 1974 Oktoberfest Conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky, DePuy carefully orchestrated several live-fire exercises with the intent to display the new lethality of the battlefield to gain acceptance for the concepts that DePuy desired in doctrine.

Equally important was DePuy’s view that the Army’s primary role was combat by organized regular divisions. Though DePuy gained experience fighting the war in Vietnam, he shared the dominant group’s view that the Army’s “essence” was not fighting irregulars, but grounded in the organizational conception that warfare was fought between conventional state militaries. However, the name of the game in Vietnam was to establish contact with small units, which had to be done on the enemy’s terms, which “was more often than not a nightmare. It occurred in inaccessible terrain and usually on ground chosen by the other side.” Accordingly, DePuy’s ideas about the war in Vietnam were more closely aligned with the period of transition away from counterinsurgency support to direct American combat involvement. The latter, which DePuy had seen as his primary mission, included the controversial “search and destroy” missions, whereas the former required methods that included clearing, securing the population, and civic action. DePuy believed that counterinsurgency was not suitable for the mainstream Army. He argued that while the Army was not particularly good at fighting an insurgency it was good at fighting against the main forces of the North Vietnamese.

General DePuy noted:

“I have always felt that regular U.S. Army troop units are peculiarly ill suited for the purpose of ‘securing’ operations where they must be in close contact with the people. They can, of course, conduct ‘clearing’ operations, and are perfectly
suited for ‘Search and Destroy.’ The closer one moves toward the political and psychological end of the spectrum, the more inappropriate is the use of foreign troops who don’t speak the language, and who may well have a negative effect on pacification.”

As Paul Herbert notes, “by the time he arrived in Washington, his own tactical style and notions about combat were established. They rested solidly on his World War II experience and were only slightly modified by his experience in Vietnam, a war he considered a special case.”27 Thus, the ‘essence’ of the organization and its grudged acceptance of low-intensity warfare rested with its penchant toward high-intensity conventional style warfare.

But organizational culture and bureaucratic approaches fail to explain why an infantry officer would not protect his own constituency’s interests and limit the Infantry School’s participation in the drafting of the new doctrine. Indeed, after the Cushman-DePuy debate DePuy gave primary responsibility to the Armor School to lead the drafting for the new doctrine. And while the Nixon Doctrine outlined a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy, it did not take unconventional or stability operations away from the Army. Indeed, though Nixon’s strategy sought to reduce American Soldiers in combat, it was not a wholesale pull-out of U.S forces, but rather it placed soldiers in training and advisory roles, which supports one of the key principles of counterinsurgency doctrine. President Nixon states that,

“The defense of freedom is everybody’s business not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this
administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization plan was launched under Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered the first substantial increase in training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces.”

Thus, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches tell part of the story, but also fall short of the assumptions that each forward. To more accurately understand the omission of counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1976 version of doctrine, then, requires yet another shift in analytic focus.

**Cognitive-Cultural**

A cultural-cognitive approach suggests that military adjustment to a dynamic strategic environment results from intersubjective knowledge which is acquired through social constructions, and which shape and form a normative community that is either in support of or opposed to a particular idea, strategy, or doctrine. Since war is a social endeavor that is fought by human beings, how states respond to its dictates depends on the value pattern of society and how it is defined and constructed in the public mind. Individual policymakers and organizations therefore base their preferences, assumptions, and actions upon constructed identities, which define routine patterned ways of thinking and the proper behavior of actors within a given collective. To predict changes or continuity
in states’ grand strategy and doctrine, then, depends on the dominant views of the collective and how they view and define responses to their external environment.

**DOMINANT VIEWS AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ACTION**

At the close of the Vietnam War, the Army was in danger of losing its identity and its prestige within American society. The dominant images of the war spawned by a new era in media coverage led to a growing distrust of the “establishment” and growing disillusionment with the Army and the war in Vietnam. Prior to the Tet Offensive, a Gallup poll indicated that 56 percent of those Americans surveyed supported the war, whereas 28 percent opposed the war. However, one month after the Tet offensive, opposition to the war grew as both hawks and doves polled at 40 percent. The conduct of the war and its dominant images were therefore giving rise to competing views regarding the state and war. Though civilian and military officials claimed victory numerous times after battles such as Tet, neither the government nor the military could win the battle that was taking place in the living rooms across America. As Paul Herbert notes:

>“From the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, to the twin shocks of the Cambodian invasion and the killing of antiwar protestors at Kent State University in 1970, to the 1971 investigation into the My Lai incident, to the withdrawal from Vietnam and the shift to an all-volunteer force (AVN) in 1973, the Army found itself increasingly the focal point of public criticism…Public disillusionment with the war in Vietnam became a general sentiment against all war and all military institutions, especially
the Army. The U.S. Army in 1973 was in danger of losing its institutional identity and pride of purpose.”

These images, along with the dominant views of society, played an important role in defining the central rules of state activity and its appropriate boundaries. Indeed, during the height of the war (1968), Richard Nixon won the nomination as Republican candidate for the Presidency and promised to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam. Nixon’s campaign against Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey—who served as Vice President under Johnson—centered on foreign policy and the conduct of the Vietnam War. Central to Nixon’s understanding during the campaign was how the war had divided the country. The war had aroused competing political-cultural definitions of reality, where Americans were divided on central issues concerning foreign policy. On the one hand, some Americans felt that the war should be expanded, while on the other, the growing majority of Americans demanded an immediate withdrawal. On the day after Nixon’s victory for the Presidency, he spoke to a gathering of supporters stating, “I saw many signs in this campaign. Some were not friendly. Some were very friendly. But the one that touched me the most was—a teenager held up a sign ‘bring us together.’ And that will be the great objective of this administration, at the outset, to bring American people together.”

Kennedy’s earlier pledge to “help any friend” and expand the circle of democratic development sought to use all instruments of national power, with exceptional regard for the military and counterinsurgency doctrine. This strategy, as witnessed by massive teach-ins at universities and protests across the country, forced President Johnson to forego reelection and, as well, forced President Nixon to change direction in foreign
policy. Shortly after taking office in 1969, he enunciated the Nixon or Guam doctrine which shifted attention from Third World assistance (limited war and cold war) to a strategy of deterring the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies on the European Continent (general war). Furthermore, in 1971, Nixon formed the Gates Commission which ended the draft and set in motion by 1973 the All-Volunteer Force. Thus, the shift in strategies from Kennedy to Nixon was reflective of the dominant views within society, the strength of its value pattern, and the pressure it induced on civilian and military policymakers.

General DePuy’s ideas were equally affected by his experiences in Vietnam and his understanding of the American way of war in the public mind. Depuy held a number of positions during the Vietnam War, to include Commander of the 1st Infantry Division. His views of that war, and the dominant views of American society, led him to purge himself of the lessons of that war and return his thinking to his earlier experience during World War II. DePuy believed that Vietnam was antithetical to the American way of war in the public mind. Consequently, DePuy felt that the American people lacked the patience and stomachs for fighting the type of war that prevailed in Vietnam. In DePuy’s words,

“I was very worried about our staying power. I didn’t think the American people would put up with the war for very long, given television, and given what I was reading in the press from the United States. But, the big surprise was that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army were simply able to avoid enough direct confrontations that they were able to survive. They metered out their casualties, and when the casualties were getting too high, as for example in 1966 and ’67, and then again, during and after Tet, they simply backed off and waited. They
came back later, under circumstances in which they could afford to sustain more
casualties. Now, I wish that we had all been smart enough to say in 1965, when
we went in, ‘That’s what they are going to do to us.’ If we had been smart then
maybe we wouldn’t have gone in.”

Depuy’s own views regarding the war in Vietnam were further crystalized after the
Tet offensive where he was assigned as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency to
the Secretary of Defense. After Tet, he traveled with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Earle Wheeler, to Vietnam and supervised the writing of the Westmoreland
report – which some suggest provided the final blow to President Johnson’s aspirations
for seeking a second term in office. This report made its way into the Pentagon Papers
and later brought Generals DePuy and Gorman to testify in Los Angeles. Shortly
thereafter, President Johnson convened a group of men from the War Cabinet – General
Ridgeway, General Taylor, Abe Fortas, Clark Clifford, George Ball, among others – who
were briefed by Habib, Carver, and DePuy. After giving the President the report the
following day, there was a general view that the war was no longer sustainable due to
growing public disillusionment with the war effort. As DePuy recalled, the war had been
lost at home and “they [leaders in Washington] had already decided that before they ever
came to Washington.”

Depuy further notes that,

“They seized upon those parts of the briefing which supported their view and paid
very little attention to the other parts. However, I must say that the briefings were
not encouraging at that time. And, perhaps those of us who gave the briefings
were suffering a little bit from the Washington point of view, as opposed to the
field point of view, despite the fact that some of us had just been out there.”
These views were so pervasive that they penetrated the social fabric of American ideas, the soldiers abroad fighting the war, and civilian and military policymakers in Washington – to the extent that the dominant views and strength of the value pattern of society had usurped the direction of foreign policy and ultimately cost the democrats the White House and both houses of Congress. Indeed, two days after DePuy’s briefing to the President, Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. After Tet and the Westmoreland Report, DePuy notes that,

“It was rather shocking to return to Washington and see what the perceptions were. And, there’s no doubt that the perception in Washington was a gloomy one, one that pervaded all of the agencies of the government and the press. Tet had been a terrible blow to Washington. As I said earlier, it seemed as though people in Washington – not in the government but in the press – felt that somehow or other, we were the aggressors. We were the evil ones; we were the clumsy ones; and we were the ones who used the big bombs, whereas the other side used persuasion and intellectual means. Therefore, we certainly were bound to lose, and probably ought to lose! That was the impression that I had during 1968, 1969, and 1970. Now, don’t forget that there were riots and burnings in Washington at that time.”

And consequently DePuy’s own views regarding the boundaries of state institutions and their responses to functional imperatives were affected by the strength of the dominant views regarding the American way of war. In his words,

“Considering the attitude in the U.S., the effort was too expensive, lasted too long, became too frustrating, was too complex, involved too much
television, resulted in too much gore, and required too much patience. In short, the American people decided that Vietnam wasn’t worth it. The other way to have won the war was General LeMay’s concept—“Bomb North Vietnam back into the stone age.” In retrospect, his solution was more American than the sophisticated counterinsurgency efforts which couldn’t finish the job within the tolerances of the American people and their political leaders.”

Thus the strategy to “help any friend” with the exceptional use of the military and counterinsurgency doctrine came in direct conflict with the dominant views of society thus confining the boundaries of state action and ultimately making way for an alternative view regarding warfare – one that was consistent with broader views of war in the public mind.

CONCLUSION

In sum, each of the respective approaches provides plausible explanations as to why U.S. land warfare doctrine changed in 1976. However, the cultural-cognitive approach provides greater specificity to the timing and conditions that led to that change. And without reference to policymakers’ understandings of the dominant political images and views of society, the other approaches are misleading. Though realists posit that the Arab-Israeli war provides a parsimonious explanation as to the redirection of U.S. land warfare doctrine, the relative power of Soviet conventional military forces had begun to eclipse U.S. conventional military forces as early as 1965 – a time when the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was still at a relatively low level. Moreover, the realities of low-
intensity warfare and Soviet activism in the Third World continued to be a reality in international politics, thus requiring U.S. doctrine to equally consider its dictates – which it did not.

Organizational and bureaucratic approaches imply that doctrinal content, continuity, and change often corresponds to the dominant group within the organization. Having appointed General Starry and the Armor School to lead the drafting of the new doctrine, then, arguably made the context of the Arab-Israeli War all the more important as the war was predominantly fought by heavy armor forces. Starry, however, did not frame doctrinal change in the context of the institution’s imperatives, but more accurately as a response to the strength of the value pattern of society. He notes that, “In the context of the 1970-1973—times of social, political and economic upheaval in our society—what did we see for our country and our Army as we tried to look ahead? We saw the possibility of two wars: mechanized war—such as we might have to fight in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Europe—perhaps even in the Middle East; the other war—a Korea, a Vietnam, a Lebanon crisis, a Dominican Republic. Each war obviously required different kinds of forces—mechanized on the one hand, light infantry on the other…”

Against the backdrop of Vietnam, then, the Arab-Israeli War served specific cultural and cognitive needs as policymakers sought to direct the Army away from the more pressing problems of low-intensity warfare. More specifically, the 1973 war provided the Army with a familiar narrative about the role of the institution in meeting specific U.S. national interests. Krepinevich makes a similar argument suggesting that the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a “godsend” for Army policymakers since it helped to displace
unconventional from among the types of warfare the Army and American political culture preferred. Many of the critics who responded to the introduction of the 1976 doctrine criticized it on the basis that defending Western Europe from the Soviet threat had more to do with the myth of what the Army had been rather than its strategic role in Europe. Thus, the Arab-Israeli War more accurately matched policymakers’ understandings of the appropriate boundaries and extent of state activity defining its essence as a function of core political images and views.

The tools of violence and means of providing security are therefore contingent upon how individuals frame, perceive, and narrate the external environment – which are a function of the international political system and the social forces that arise from dominant cultural definitions of reality. As DePuy suggested, a deep retrospect and analysis of the Vietnam War would have given the appearance of “revisionism, alibis, self-justification, rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, opening old wounds, [or] severe mental retardation, given public attitudes.”

And given the political cultural context of action, General Starry notes that, “There was the strong feeling that, after every war, armies always set out to figure out how they might have fought the last war better. There was an even stronger determination to avoid that pitfall, and this time to look ahead, not back.”

In reality, this “looking ahead” was a form of “looking back” toward WWII through the lens of 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Given the cultural definition of reality during the period that followed the failed war in Vietnam, there was even a stronger inclination for the Army to fight the next war as the last war we liked.

NOTES

4 Nadia Shadlow and Richard Lacquement, “Expanding the Military Profession: Incorporating Stability Operations” (Unpublished paper). This paper was presented at the United States Military Academy’s Senior Conference, entitled “Fifty Years after The Soldier and The State.”
7 William E. DePuy, “The Implications of the Middle East war on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine and systems,” typed transcript of briefing, February 1975, THO Files; and DePuy, “Keynote Address.”
8 William E. DePuy, Message to LTG Cooksey, *DePuy Papers* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Military History Institute, May 8, 1975) p. 2
10 Ibid, p. 30
11 Ibid, p. 30
12 Ibid, p. 31
13 FM 100-5, 1976, p. 2-2
14 Ibid, p. 70
15 Ibid, pp. 71-72
16 Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report,* p.3
20 Brownlee and Mullen, *Changing an Army,* p. 175
21 Ibid, p. 175
22 Ibid, p. 171
23 Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done,* p. 54
24 Ibid, p. 68
25 Ibid, p.72
26 Ibid, pp. 12-22. Herbert captures the significance of World War II from Brownlee and Mullen’s interviews with General DePuy in 1979. Of similar significance is the 1973 Arab-Israeli War on the development of the 1976 doctrine, however, the primacy of the tank and mechanized warfare similarly fit DePuy’s already entrenched schemas.
29 Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done,* p. 5
30 Schulman, *The Seventies,* p. 23
31 Brownlee and Mullen, *Changing an Army,* p. 161
32 Ibid, p.169. Here DePuy recalls his role in which many who were serving on the staff and other agencies in Washington suffered from the view that the war had already been lost and that a change in strategy was needed – specifically a withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Vietnam.
33 Ibid, p. 169
34 Ibid, p. 169
35 Ibid, p. 170

Starry as quoted by Lovell, “Vietnam and the U.S. Army,” p. 129
DePuy’s 1976 Active Defense was an attempt to move the U.S. Army away from Vietnam both doctrinally and operationally, but it did not go far enough. While Active Defense doctrine sought to portray the Army as ready for a fight but looking to avoid one, its emphasis on attrition and, essentially, wearing down the enemy’s personnel and equipment was still too reminiscent of the prolonged fighting of Vietnam. However, its 1980s successor – termed “AirLand Battle” – invoked overwhelming firepower and technology to achieve swift, decisive victory, thereby representing a sufficient break from the doctrines emerging from the Vietnam era.

AirLand Battle achieved a clear break from Vietnam because it represented a muscular, intense, and generally finite approach to defeating the enemy. Its characteristics were not only reflective of the historic American identity forged in WWII, but they matched well with the most dominant aspect of the U.S. functional imperative of the 80s: the conventional, existential threat posed by the Soviet Union’s 190 Army divisions.

While the U.S. understandably oriented its doctrine on conventional conflict (and nuclear threats at the policy level), lower-level threats that included covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion to overt intimidation – like Soviet activism, insurrection in Iran, and bombings (like Beirut in 1983) – persisted and should have served as a reminder that although a partial shift away from counterinsurgency in the 1980s was required, defining America’s threats too narrowly and overestimating the capacity of AirLand
Battle to address the entire range of external threats placed the U.S. military in the
difficult position of having to protect the nation from all threats using a doctrine
applicable to only some – because that doctrine had the benefit of conforming to the
dominant views and value patterns of society.

As the previous case revealed, the images of the Vietnam War in the public mind, and
in the minds of civilian and military policymakers, led to a general distrust of the
executive branch, military institutions, and decisions about war. The societal imperative
arising from the dominant images of Vietnam therefore defined the central rules for
committing forces in combat and led to the mandate that representatives of the people
(Congress) play a far more active role in defining the extent of state activity. These same
demands steered the Army toward more traditional conceptions of war – which led to
neglect of the functional imperative of low-intensity warfare, and a shift toward World
War II foundations.

Victory in World War II and subsequent U.S. military, economic, and political power
essentially defined the identity of modern America. Apart from achieving world-power
status, it confirmed a commitment to a cautious and morally mandated foreign policy.
The U.S. vision and leading role in the formation of the United Nations advanced a
conventional definition of war – which sought to strengthen state sovereignty and defined
war as an activity between states. Definitions that fell outside the boundaries of post-
World War II conceptions of “war” therefore proved difficult to address, which is why
counterinsurgency is often displaced from American doctrine (and why the United
Nation’s and other international institutions’ responses to internal state violence has
typically been slow, poorly defined, and ineffective). AirLand Battle is a direct contrast
to the doctrine and images of Vietnam, rooted in American identity formed in World War II, and necessitated by the formidable Soviet conventional threat. In short, AirLand Battle reflects America’s desire to move away from Vietnam and toward a way of war that projects strength, leadership, and decisiveness in battle – characteristics that are as comforting, and as American – as hotdogs, baseball, and mom’s apple pie.  

It is therefore the origin of these general assumptions that commands attention, especially in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The strong desire to move in the opposite direction of its challenges and lessons, the continuity of that form of warfare in international politics, and the return to the more traditional concepts of American Army doctrine, suggest an alternative approach to the more common explanations found in the discipline of international relations is required. This chapter argues that like the 1976 post-Vietnam revolution in Army doctrine, external threats, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches only partially explain the continued tension between the functional and societal imperatives in the post-Vietnam era. Indeed, Army policymakers’ assessments of the domestic political and cultural contexts of action offer a more concise explanation as to why AirLand Battle was “a direct repudiation of the dogged, pile on and slug it out” doctrine of attrition that had dominated Army thinking during and immediately after Vietnam.

**Sources of Doctrine Content, Continuity, and Change**

It is likely that the assumptions governing U.S. Army doctrine through the period of the 1980s were of necessity, rather than nested in the basic premise of how America ought to fight wars. The strategic reality posed by the ever-growing conventional and nuclear
capabilities of the Soviet Union posed a serious challenge to democracy world-wide and therefore presented Army policymakers with the most pressing strategic challenge of their time. It would be reasonable, therefore, to accept realist analysis that the Army adopted a doctrine that centered on the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and Army policymakers’ concerns over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the catalyst for doctrinal content, continuity, and change. It might equally be plausible that the Army developed AirLand Battle as a reflection of the organizational interests of the dominant group within the Army and its views as to the best roles and missions for the organization. This view also provides a plausible explanation to doctrinal content, continuity, and change since the doctrine reflected a conventional armor-centric focus, of which the Army Training and Doctrine Commander, General Donn Starry, was an armor officer.

Each approach, however, does not explain the origins of policymakers’ ideas, and what influenced those ideas. AirLand Battle doctrine is more accurately assessed through the societal imperative that arises from the dominant images and views of society, and the pressure that these images and views may induce on policymakers. A cultural-cognitive approach, therefore, suggests that doctrinal content, continuity, and change are the result of policymakers’ understandings of the domestic-political and cultural contexts of action which often limit the jurisdiction and policy space of those institutions charged with protecting the citizenry of the American Republic.
COMPARING CONTENT

The 1982 and 1986 versions of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, departed from the tactical defensive doctrine designed for fighting the Soviet Union on the plains of Western Europe in exchange for one that focused on deterring war through combined Air and Land power. Each version of the field manual emphasized conventional military operations but recognized that the strategic environment could include counterterrorism operations and chemical and nuclear warfare. Unlike the tactical battle focused doctrine of the Active Defense, AirLand Battle looked to move beyond battles to campaigns thus introducing the “operational level” of warfare – which focused on large-scale maneuver, highlighting operations from World War II and the Inchon maneuver during the Korean War. The 1986 version of Army doctrine was merely an affirmation of many of the ideas contained in the 1982 manual, though it did refine concepts such as the operational level of war. The 1986 manual, however, removed the casual language regarding nuclear fires and noted that decisions to employ such weapons were beyond the purview of the Army and rested with national leaders.

Separately, in 1986, the Army developed Field Manual 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*. This manual was mostly an extension of AirLand Battle, where the concepts of that doctrine “can be applied to counterguerrilla operations” and where the tenets and principles of the Army’s foundational manual are covered in the opening chapter. Though the manual devotes nearly 47 pages to counterinsurgency in its third chapter, its focus was primarily geared towards the active military element of the insurgent movement and therefore where the concepts of AirLand Battle are most applicable. In addition, an entire chapter is devoted to counterguerrilla operations as part of a conventional conflict, “such
as the partisan operations that occurred behind German lines during World War II." There is no substantial treatment of counterinsurgency as war on its own.

**REALISM**

Realist analysis explains policymakers’ decisions and the timing of those decisions for doctrinal shifts as the functional imperative stemming from the international environment and states’ actions. Considering the first, policymakers were confronted with three challenges, as noted in President Carter’s State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980: “the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.” As for the increased projection of Soviet military power, then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, directed two studies (1981 and 1983) entitled *Soviet Military Power*. The study noted that military power was the “principal” instrument of Soviet foreign policy. He specifically notes that,

“There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, modernization, and contribution to projections of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious. A clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths, and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective US and Allied armed forces.”

General Starry, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Commander during the development of AirLand Battle doctrine, equally noted the importance of Soviet military power which
led him to think “deeply about the full implications of the style and substance of Soviet doctrine.”

The rough timing of AirLand Battle doctrine can equally be explained by the interaction of perceived security threats and the possibilities of meeting them. The Soviet buildup of conventional and nuclear forces in Eastern Europe and the ability of the Army to meet that challenge began to rise consistently, and to some policymakers at an all too alarming rate. By 1981, the Soviets had “introduced additional nuclear-capable weapons to its forward-deployed divisions,” and began fielding the T-80 main battle tank, “adding to the extended combat capabilities of more than 190 Soviet ground force divisions.” As Wass de Czege, one of the principal writers of AirLand Battle, notes, “The crucial breakthrough for our preparation was when we began to grasp the real problem allied forces faced against the Soviet threat in Europe.” Consequently, “The Army of the early 1970’s needed to address new and serious realities very quickly because Soviet forces had modernized and presented a formidable threat while most of the Army’s institutional attention was focused on the effort in Vietnam. To face that threat, the Army changed its orientation completely.”

As for the press of social, religious, and political change in the many nations of the Third World and Middle East, exemplified by the revolution in Iran and the civil war in Lebanon, the Defense Department study presents those problems within the context of Soviet activism therefore placing little emphasis on local conditions and the challenges they present to the application of U.S. military force. The Defense Department study notes:
“Thus the main operative role of that formidable war machine is to undergird, by its very presence, the step by step extension of Soviet influence and control by instilling fear and promoting paralysis, by sapping the vitality of collective security arrangements, by subversion, by coercive political actions of every genre…Apart from the deterrence of direct attack, we must prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting its growing military strength – on and off the Eurasian land mass – to further its objectives through coercion and other indirect means.”

Noting the competing threats to the American state, General E.C. “Shy” Meyer, the Army’s Chief of Staff between 1979 and 1983, wrote about the likelihood of meeting challenges outside of the European Theatre in a 1980 White Paper. He wrote,

“The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe.”

To this end, AirLand Battle addressed but did not demonstrate a complete command of the various threats facing the American state. Threats that fell between the spectrum of peace and conventional state-on-state war were relegated to the periphery. In the words of Wass de Czege, “While AirLand Battle doctrine was found suitable for General Norman Schwarzkopf’s restoration of Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty, General Maxwell Thurman’s Southern Command Operation Just Cause planners needed to address a host of considerations beyond this doctrine.” Thus, Defense Department officials displayed an unflattering attachment to deterrence and direct confrontation through the annihilation of an adversary. To understand why requires a shift in analytic focus.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

If realist analysis explains why doctrinal change was necessitated by the functional imperative stemming from the threats to the American state, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics explain why content, continuity, and change often reflect the institutional imperative arising from the core constituency’s dominant view of its “essence.” Shortly after the 1976 Active Defense doctrine was published, General Donn Starry took command of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. A student and officer of armor, General Starry had been involved in the planning or direction of armored operations that dates back to when he graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1948 as a second lieutenant of cavalry.

During the period of 1973-1978, and after the end of the Vietnam War, the infantry had been supplanted as the dominant group and armored cavalry had begun to find its way into the Army’s leadership positions. General Starry’s rise was no exception. The shift in power began when General DePuy appointed the Armor School to head up the doctrinal revision for the 1976 Active Defense. Starry was deeply involved in the writing of the 1976 doctrine under DePuy, and thereafter commanded US Army V Corps (mechanized armor forces) in the Fulda Gap in Germany and later replaced DePuy as the Army’s Training and Doctrine Commander.

But it was his experiences in Vietnam that expose his proclivity for conventional military concepts that elevated armor in warfare. In a 1978 monograph published shortly before his nomination to become the next Training and Doctrine Commander, General Starry led a study that analyzed armor forces in Vietnam. He noted that,
“After eight years of fighting over land on which tanks were once thought incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to prohibit armored operations, and dealing with an elusive enemy against whom armored units were thought to be at a considerable disadvantage, armored forces emerged as powerful, flexible, and essential battle forces. In large measure they contributed to the success of the free world forces, not only in close combat, but in pacification and security operations as well. When redeployment began in early 1969, armored units was not included in the first forces scheduled for redeployment, and indeed planners moved armored units down the scale time and again, holding off their redeployment until the very end.\textsuperscript{13}"

Thus, the “organizational culture of the American Army “permitted no doubt in the Army’s leadership about the essence of the organization: its core competency was defeating conventional enemy armies in frontal combat.”\textsuperscript{14} As Nagl suggests:

“The institutional culture was too strong. An army that saw its raison d ’être as winning wars through the application of firepower and maneuver to annihilate enemy forces simply could not conceive of another kind of war in which its weapons, technology, and organization not only could not destroy the enemy, but usually could not even find or identify him.”\textsuperscript{15}

As noted in the Active Defense case, General Starry recognized that there were two distinct threats facing our nation coming out of Vietnam. On the one hand, there was a conventional-nuclear threat due to the massing of large Soviet conventional forces and “the threat of nuclear Armageddon.” And on the other hand “there appeared the equally ominous, but less well understood threat of the destruction of states and their peoples by
the work of radical revolutionaries of various persuasions from political to religious.”

Starry saw that the latter was the direct result of thermo-nuclear weapons and their role in stemming conventional-nuclear conflict between the two superpowers, noting, “Then thermo-nuclear weapons aboard intercontinental ballistic missiles extended the battle of annihilation to a potential Armageddon, from which there would be few survivors, and no winners. Thus the concept of Limited War – something short of Armageddon – emerged during Korea and Vietnam.”

While AirLand Battle doctrine included a chapter on contingency operations, it did not translate into substantive doctrine for low-intensity warfare. Indeed, it largely centered understandings on the main concepts of AirLand Battle which sought to meet contingencies in the same manner as it did for high end or conventional warfare, with decisive and quick results – which, in low-intensity warfare can be counterintuitive. As one policymaker noted, our response to contingencies is to go big and send the 82nd Airborne Division. Operations such as Urgent Fury in 1983 (Grenada) and Just Cause in 1989 (Panama) each reflect this paradigm.

Thus, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches add another dimension of understanding content, continuity, and change of Army doctrine in the 1980’s. They explain the incoherence between doctrinal content and threats facing the American state. Like realist analysis, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics also leave unanswered questions. In part, the answer lies in the theoretical shortcomings of the previous approaches and the “belief” that organizations and bureaucrats operate on separate orbits divorced from domestic political and cultural contexts of action. To more
precisely understand the content, continuity, and timing of doctrinal change during the 1980’s, requires yet another layer of analytical focus.

CULTURAL-COGNITIVE

Army policymakers shared the common belief that they could not afford another quagmire like Vietnam; its dominant images divided the nation on the appropriate boundaries of state activity and diminished popular trust in civilian and military leaders alike, leaving the institution in search of its essence. The war essentially displaced counterinsurgency as a viable policy – which was roused by the domestic political cultural context of its time and led policymakers to the reexamination of doctrine. But the war and the dominant views that emerged from it also shaped the direction of that change as well. As General Starry suggested in the previous case, there was a strong inclination not to look back at the lessons of Vietnam which steered the doctrinal revolution in the opposite direction.

The Active Defense doctrine that emerged between 1973 and 1976 refocused the Army from Vietnam to the Central Front of Europe. The doctrine emphasized the “first battle” which was viewed by critics as “reactive, and surrendering the initiative” and, more importantly, was viewed as a doctrine of attrition “tailored to whittle the enemy down to size by destroying his fighting men and machines.” The immediate problem that emerged for that doctrine was that its distinguishing features were not distinctive at all and in fact were too synonymous with the images and doctrine of Vietnam.

In addition, the 1976 doctrine was “centrally conceived and written” with “minimal consultation with the field (Army).” And equally the doctrine was challenged by
Congressional leaders, academe, and the media, which meant reduced influence, initially, from the pressures of the societal imperative that impact the Army’s top decision-makers. General Edward “Shy” Meyer, Army Chief of Staff “was sensitive to the unrest within the Army and the criticism from outside.” This led the Chief of Staff to direct the revision to the 1976 Active Defense doctrine. To build a consensus for AirLand Battle doctrine, General Starry appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine Brigadier General Donald Morelli who “did very little else for four years but expose the developing concept to staffs in the Congress and academia, even as the details were being written. Those who did not agree were invited to provide suggestions, with the assurance that their suggestions would, to the extent possible, be included or dealt with in the final product.”

Given the similarities of the Active Defense to the “dogged pile it on” doctrine of “attrition” during Vietnam, the closed process from which it was conceived, and the distrust surrounding the institution Army leaders had to revise the doctrine and seek broad consensus through the diligent and purposeful campaigning of ideas.

**DOMINANT VIEWS AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ACTION**

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the question – after the redeployment of Marines from Lebanon where a terrorist attack caused heavy casualties and ended their mission to support the host nation government during civil war: “Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decisions that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy?” His answer to that question is contained in his fifth principle: “before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.”

This question and response are of particular relevance when considering the conditions that led to the post-Vietnam doctrinal revolution and the contents of that doctrine that were, essentially, “designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement.”

Each doctrinal revision in the post-Vietnam era had to contend with a spectrum of threats – from covert aggression, terrorism and subversion to overt intimidation to use of brute force. But central to Army policymakers’ understanding were the types of doctrine “not” to pursue. In one of many articles that appeared in Military Review after the publication of the 1976 version of Army doctrine – the Active Defense – Lieutenant Colonel Donald Vought argued that “the US Army is preparing vigorously for the wrong type of war to the near exclusion of the more probable form.”

Data from 1975-76 that was compiled by Russett-Hanson and on which Alcala elaborated, shows that “Army officers predict that the arena for future conflict will be the lesser developed countries, that causes will be less traditional – that is, other than Cold War bi-polar incentives – and that the form of conflict will be below the conventional threshold.”

In a sample of 150 randomly selected combat arms and intelligence officers at the US Army Command and General Staff College during the academic year of 1975-76, Vought found similar results to that of the Russett-Hanson and Alcala surveys. When officers were asked what the most probable form of conflict would be in the next decade, 1.2 percent responded that a conventional war between superpowers would take place, whereas 9.8 percent thought unconventional warfare was most likely. What is even more striking is that 73.2 percent of the officers thought an unconventional war without U.S.
Armed Forces was the most likely. Enlightening evidence for officers’ responses to the first question is explained in a follow-on question, which asked what influenced their response: 42.7 percent stated that the most important factor shaping their response was U.S. domestic politics; whereas 24.4 percent suggested that their responses were due to superpower competition. As Vought points out, “It would seem from Question 2 that the public relations lessons of Vietnam have been impressed prominently in the thinking of the next generation of military leaders.”

General Starry’s own views reflected a similar skepticism regarding the use of the military for political ends in what he referred to as “limited war.” Consequently, Starry asked whether American society and its elected representatives were willing to contend with the issues of international politics when they fell between peace and conventional state-on-state war. He noted that, “Limited War raised inevitable questions: What political goals are sought by the use of arms; what does it mean to win; how is winning to be accomplished; what price are we willing to pay?” And when considering American foreign policy and using the military instrument of power to conduct limited wars he asked,

“Is it an appropriate policy for the United States to undertake to regulate world affairs? Meddle in other nations’ business? Keep everyone in every nation quiet, stable, happy, prosperous, healthy? If that is considered an appropriate role for the United States, then do we have, and are we willing to sacrifice ourselves in order to expend others, the resources – requisite time, energy, money?”

Answers to these questions were proposed during the January 1986 Conference on Low-Intensity War sponsored by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who along
with Secretary of State Shultz noted that, “the American nation is culturally disposed to quick conclusions – impossible in low-intensity warfare – and bound by moral scruples that discipline our power.”30 Others at the conference contended that the memory of Vietnam had, “divided American public opinion on the use of force, left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action, and bred a press that makes the prosecution of protracted inconclusive war impossible.”31 The images of Vietnam therefore played a central role in defining the boundaries and the “essence” of the Army and its doctrine.

Because American society sees itself as morally bound, it defines the state of nature and international politics in either a state of peace or war. As Ambassador Kirkpatrick suggests, “Our whole world view and view of history predisposes us to believe that peace is a norm and that war and violence are abnormal.”32 Those conflicts that fall between the social constructions of peace and war therefore prove difficult for defense policymakers and doctrine. Indeed, the dominant views that emerged after Vietnam conditioned American military doctrine to deterrence or direct confrontation and complete annihilation of an adversary.

These socially constructed dichotomies have their roots in America’s own unique experience. Starry suggests that America’s heritage and how it views war lie in the legacies of our own post-Napoleonic and World War II experiences. The former “provided a set of military concepts embracing mass conscript military forces in time of emergency”33 and a doctrine that embraced the “primary modus would be destruction of enemy armed forces and infrastructures, largely by overwhelming numbers – of soldiers, of units, of weapon systems.”34 And the latter “reinforced and facilitated our convictions
about mass armies and the nation in arms, and provided the material means for the ultimate battle – annihilation and unconditional surrender.” Nagl similarly notes that these characteristics emerged from, “a faith in the uniqueness and moral mission of the United States, and a remarkable aversion to the use of unconventional tactics.” These have their roots in what Eliot Cohen has called the “two dominant characteristics of American strategic culture: The preference for massing a large number of men and machines and the predilection for direct and violent assault.”

Consequently, Vietnam and its dominant political images made way for the rebirth of conservative realism that was founded in the era where the American state emerged as a superpower. This conservative realism rested with traditional views of the state and war, essentially defining state activity in relative terms – deterrence through military power – and war between sovereign states. It displaced Wilsonian conceptions and latter Kennedy’s “help any friend” that the use of military power could be used to bring about the “liberal peace” by shaping states in our own image. Similarly, Huntington described the American post-World War II policy as an abandonment of liberalism. He notes that the conservative course after the war “was well summed up in the name given by its creators and mocked by its critics: containment. There was nothing revolutionary about this policy and very little that was liberal. It was based on the limited national interests of the United States in self-preservation.”

AirLand Battle therefore harkens to an epoch where the Army, its policymakers, and its doctrine reflected political culture’s dominant views regarding war. The familiarity of these ideas served to lessen the societal tensions that were brought about by Vietnam and provided the Army, in particular, with a narrative that met certain cultural-cognitive
needs. As Don Holder, one of its principal writers, suggests, “AirLand Battle was really conservative doctrine, it retained some features of its predecessor, as it added some new ideas to doctrine while returning many older ideas to use.”\(^{39}\) In fact, “at its core, the doctrine reached back to the traditions of the U.S. Army during World War II.”\(^{40}\) And “the reformers of the late 1970s and early 1980s sought to capture historical conclusions about the nature of conventional warfare as well as to resurrect the fundamental tactical and operational precepts that the U.S. Army developed during that (World War II) conflict.”\(^{41}\) Thus, AirLand Battle stripped away the irrelevancies of Vietnam and “hypothesized that the host nation would tend to many of the very specific and very messy details that could be ignored by US forces when the strategic aim is the restoration of territory and not regime change.”\(^{42}\)

The strength of the value pattern of society during this period and its dominant views regarding war therefore led policymakers to define war in the strictest terms, leaving many of the “messy” realities of war out of its doctrine. Though the 1980’s continued to see a continued, and to some extent, growing problem of political and religious revolutions it would raise only marginal cause with Army policymakers. General Richardson, Starry’s successor, began to discuss the topic of counterinsurgency in the mid-1980s, but the institution was unwilling to risk another debacle like Vietnam and be the center of public animosity.\(^\)\(^{43}\)

Finally, the evolution of doctrinal change between the 1982 and 1986 versions were primarily to clarify ideas, such as the operational level of warfare and operational art. One significant change, however, is worth noting as it relates to a broader normative community regarding warfare and the treatment of nuclear weapons. The 1982 manual’s
an approach to managing nuclear and chemical weapons was seen by NATO counterparts as too cavalier and this specific aspect of AirLand Battle was not warmly received. To address these concerns, the 1986 manual highlighted “the primacy of policy and strategy over operations and tactics in all cases” and made clear that nuclear weapons use or chemical weapons retaliation were strategic decisions beyond the purview of the Army’s operational doctrine. Through AirLand Battle, then, the Army sought to distance itself from the doctrine and images synonymous with Vietnam and equally to restore its pride and prestige that it held in an earlier epoch.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the AirLand Battle case demonstrates the usefulness of four alternative lenses for understanding doctrinal content, continuity, and change in the post-Vietnam era. Realism explains Army policymakers’ perceptions of the security imperative to counter the expanding Soviet threat on the European continent. The organizational culture and bureaucratic politics approaches suggest that the Army trended toward conventional warfare due to the armor community’s views for the proper missions and roles of the organization. However, as Wass de Czege notes, “There were no bureaucratic controls between the authors and the senior generals to account for inclusion of any particular recommendations by anyone. This prevented the community at large from making doctrine a committee product. The generals cast a wide net for ideas.” This “wide net” essentially led to a “narrow” definition of doctrine due to Army policymakers’ understandings of the dominant views of war in American political culture. Indeed, despite the continuity of threats after Vietnam, which included covert aggression,
terrorism, and subversion to overt intimidation, AirLand Battle doctrine distanced itself from warfare synonymous with Vietnam and focused predominately on conventional warfare. The reason is best captured by then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger who noted,

“employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts – would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam War, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric of our society, endangering the single-most critical element of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.”

Over a decade removed from the war, Casper Weinberger’s address largely affirmed Vietnam’s lasting impact on foreign policy and the constraints that American political culture imposes on decisions for war. The breakdown in order during and after that war consequently led Army policymakers to “look” back to the WWII period to gain key insights regarding the doctrines most suitable and acceptable, given the duality of the functional and societal imperatives of the time. As Wass de Czege noted, “the decade after the Vietnam War was a rare period for the US Army when the pursuit of ideas was as serious and intense as the pursuit of technological solutions.”

NOTES

2 Discussion with former United States Military Academy colleague, John Gallagher. John and I share similar interests and views regarding strategy, policy, and doctrine which led us to discuss several of the
topics contained herein. John also helped me to refine my thinking about the problem this research addresses.


5 Ibid, p.1-1


7 Ibid, p.5


9 Ibid, p.106


14 Ibid, p.198

15 Donn A. Starry, “With Patience and Careful Teaching of Sound Doctrine: The U.S. Army on the Brink of Change,” *Armor* 115 (September-October 2006) pp.6-8


17 In numerous discussions with members who had or continue to serve on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon noted that the Army sought to mass forces to confront a potential contingency, or to mass technology in its place.


19 Ibid pp. 4-5


21 Caspar Weinberger, Address to the National Press Club (Washington, D.C., November, 29, 1984)

22 Ibid, p.1

23 Ibid, p.1


26 Vought, “Preparing for the Wrong War?” p. 65

27 Ibid, p. viii


34 Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Future Warfare Anthology*, pp. v-vi
35 Ibid, p. vi
40 Ibid, p. 52
41 Ibid, p. 52
43 See General William R. Richardson to Lieutenant General Carl Vuono, 21 January 1985, Box 5, The Richardson Papers, Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
44 For an example, see Arie van der Vlis, “AirLand Battle in NATO, A European View,” *Parameters* XIV, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 11-12.
45 Richardson, “FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986,” p.9
47 Caspar Weinberger, Address to the National Press Club (Washington, D.C., November, 29, 1984)
CHAPTER 5

BACK TO THE FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE GULF WAR

AirLand Battle of the 1980s helped align America’s military doctrine with Americans’ preferred way of war. The doctrine’s characteristics presented a sufficient departure from the nature of fighting in Vietnam, embodied America’s traditional military strengths, and deterred the much larger Soviet Army. In short, AirLand Battle resonated with the public and policymakers alike (against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race), resulting in a level of budgetary support that enabled significant technological advances both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union – advances that would decisively impact the 1991 Gulf War.

The decision to reinstate Kuwait’s sovereignty from Iraq’s hegemonic move marked a turning point in American warfare. The Gulf War had signaled what many heralded as a Revolution in Military Affairs. Indeed, “out of the Gulf War came the suggestion of a new technological face of war,”1 ushering in what many Army policymakers viewed as a watershed moment for future doctrine which challenged old assumptions, such as the need to mass large armies for decisive military victory. It had confirmed the notion that “information technology” would “result in a manner of war so dominated by high-tech weaponry and so different from that which we are accustomed that our current modes of thinking about warfare will become irrelevant.”2 It seemed, too, to confirm broader assumptions regarding the American way of war, noting that “when fielded and incorporated into doctrine, technology affords a significant advantage to soldiers, one that enables the employment of overwhelming and decisive combat power while minimizing risk to the force.”3 The Gulf War, therefore, posited a “new” and “improved” American
way of war and a doctrine that “reflects the lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today’s strategic and technological realities.”

But it is AirLand Battle’s success during the Gulf War and shift in doctrine shortly thereafter (noting the similarities with the “new” doctrine) that warrant attention. In part, the shift reflects the expanded roles that policymakers envisioned for the Army, necessitated by the rapid changing external environment, but that policymakers did not entirely embrace. The lessons drawn from AirLand Battle’s success and the dominant images of the Gulf War seemed to prove that high-tech precision munitions could supplant labor intensive armies as the means to accomplish quick decisive victory with the least cost in American blood and treasure. Fears that America’s ground forces could again be bogged down in a costly, irregular war of attrition were allayed by the technological superiority of the U.S. Air Force’s bombing campaign that left the Iraqi Army incapable of offering much resistance.

Through this prism Army policymakers attached deep importance, only considering secondary their efficacy vis à vis external threats to the state. As for the functional imperative, there is an inherent tension between Army policymakers’ understandings of the external environment and the content of doctrine that actuates the organization, since, much like the previous cases, the revised doctrine (introduced in 1993) does not fully embrace the external realities facing the American state. But, when taking a closer look at the content of that doctrine, there is a growing sense of an increasingly modernized American way of war and the enduring limitations that the American body-politic imposes on the ways to meet national security interests. Cultural undercurrents, therefore, may play a greater role in guiding our most basic understandings of
international politics and may define the parameters from which the institutions of the
state operate to execute foreign policy.

Thus, the 1993 Force Projection doctrine, which acknowledged a variety of potential
threats to the American state, pauses to recognize a very specific American way of war.
Though intended to be a much broader doctrine capable of meeting many new missions
and challenges, the “new” Force Projection doctrine devotes nearly all of its attention to
technological advances in weapon systems, how they shorten the duration of conflict, and
limit the need for massing large ground combat forces within the context of state-on-state
war. As Stewart concludes regarding the 1993 doctrine, “FM 100-5 acknowledges that it
must address the full operational spectrum, but examining FM 100-5 reveals it devotes
much of its content to the conduct of major conventional war.”5 And several others note,
“Because irregular warfare is often seen as a distraction from the real business of war, it
rarely receives significant emphasis in military academies and training centers. Despite
the American Army’s extensive experience in guerrilla warfare, it ignores the subject.”6
While the 1993 version does not completely ignore irregular warfare, “it does not”
entirely “embrace it either.”7 The question to ask, then, is why?

**Sources of Doctrine Content, Continuity, and Change**

Realist analysis points to the historic, world-changing events between 1989-1991 as the
catalyst for Army doctrinal content, continuity, and change. The unraveling of the former
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, coupled with the Conventional Forces in Europe
Talks – resulting in the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces – provide a
parsimonious explanation for why the Army shifted away from AirLand Battle (though
retaining several of its concepts) in favor of a more generalized doctrine focused on potential regional threats. Organizational culture and bureaucratic politics explain doctrinal content, continuity, and change as those missions and roles most suitable and preferred by the dominant group within the Army. Ergo changes also reflect the impact of shrinking budgets and the Army’s need to justify its existence vis-à-vis the other services. Therefore, the constrained budget climate coupled with the devastating effectiveness of the air campaign strengthened voices of the “Douhet” thesis thus weakening the utility of massing large land forces and strengthening the market of ideas for technologically driven doctrine affixed to firepower. Neither of these lenses, however, explains the similarities between AirLand Battle and the new Force Projection doctrine. The answer lies in Army policymakers’ understandings of the dominant views of war contained in American political culture. The limited objectives of the Gulf War – expel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait and prevent Iraq from making another hegemonic move in the region – underlie civilian and military policymakers’ understandings, whether accurate or not, of U.S. foreign policy and the impact of domestic political constraints imposed by dominant views of war. Consequently, the failure of Vietnam and the success of the Gulf War confirmed the conservative realism that dominated American thought after the failure “to help any friend” in Southeast Asia. The use of American military force after Vietnam reflected a cautious approach to international politics that, after due consideration with the American people, must be employed with overwhelming combat power (and precision) of relatively short duration.
COMPARING CONTENT

The quick decisive victory over Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard during Desert Storm confirmed AirLand Battle’s precepts. However, that battle tested doctrine during the hundred-hour land war would be dropped entirely from the lexicon in the 1993 version in favor of a more generalized doctrine. John Romjue notes that, “Eliminating the descriptor signaled that the Army had a new and broader doctrine that extended beyond air-land to sea and space.” The new version did, however, maintain the underlying premise that American Army doctrine would remain decisive through the application of overwhelming firepower through qualitative advantages in technology to achieve quick victory at least possible cost.

The 1993 doctrine also views the role of technology, particularly information technology, as a means to determine the pace of operations and an image of warfare wholly different from industrial age warfare. In addition, technologies such as space-based systems offer significant political and technological advantages in force-projection operations. According to the 1993 edition, space-based capabilities have a dramatic effect on ground combat operations and are likely to form greater interdependence between space and Army systems in the future. As historical examples, the 1993 doctrine refers to operations Desert Shield and Storm and joint task force (JTF) in Somalia, where the Army relied on satellite communications to provide for long haul connectivity due to limited infrastructures in the region.

Unlike the 1982 and 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine, which was based on large forces that were already assembled on the continent of Europe, the 1993 doctrine is centered on the principle that U.S. forces will project from the continental United States into various
regions or contingencies. According to the 1993 edition, “Power projection is a central element of US national security and national military strategy. The army contributes to this strategy as part of a joint team through force projection. Force projection applies to the entire army, active and reserve components, based in or outside the United States, and supported by civilians.”

The 1993 version also recognized the Army’s role at the strategic level of war – “an unprecedented departure in Army concept development.” Previous doctrines such as the 1976 Active Defense focused on the tactical level of war, and the 1982 and 1986 AirLand Battle emphasized the operational level. The new doctrine addressed the Army’s roles and missions from the strategic level to the tactical level, emphasizing technology and the synchronization of battlefield effects at the operational level to connect all three levels. Gone was the somewhat limited scope of AirLand Battle doctrine to “battles” characteristic of conventional force-on-force engagements. The capabilities displayed in the Gulf War, combined with the restoration of a degree of trust between civilian-military leaders and the people, allowed for a more comprehensive doctrine – and a more open discussion – covering the full range of threats America faced. The manual states, “Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual. Since wars are fought for strategic purposes, the doctrine addresses the strategic context of the application of force.” Consequently, the new doctrine stresses that fundamental to Army strategy is the ability to safeguard national security interests and objectives through deterrence and the ability to project power. To meet these requirements, the manual outlines five (5) principles at the strategic level:
“The army must be capable of full-dimension operations; the army must train to fight as part of a joint, combined, United Nations, or interagency force; the army must be deployable, which includes readiness, strategic lift, pre-positioned equipment, and improved infrastructures in potential theatres; the army must be expandable, which includes mobilization of reserve component forces; and the army must be capable of achieving decisive victory by producing forces of highest quality, able to deploy rapidly, to fight, sustain and to win with minimum casualties.”

The 1993 doctrine’s treatment of a wider variety of threats and missions included drug trafficking, natural or man-made disasters, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and intimidation by extremists who have available all manner of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. New to the Army’s lexicon and how it categorizes these missions was “operations other than war.” According to the 1993 edition of Field Manual 100-5, “operations other than war have been part of the army experience throughout its history. Their pace, frequency, and variety, however, have increased in the last three decades.” The manual suggests that the Army has increasingly been used as a strategic force to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad. Several historical examples are invoked in the 1993 doctrine, which include assistance to state and local authorities during Hurricane Andrew, support of the El Salvadorian Armed Forces in El Salvador, and relief for Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991. To guide Army leaders in operations other than war the 1993 Force Projection doctrine adds principles of legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint. Legitimacy is the use of force to maintain the willing acceptance by the people of their government, noting failure to or
undermining support of the government can be detrimental to long-term strategic goals. Perseverance is the preparation for protracted application of military capabilities through measured response in support of strategic aims. Restraint requires the prudent application of military capabilities. Finally, under the rubric of operations other than war, the rules of engagement may be restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political aims thus requiring leaders and soldiers to be sensitive and prepared for frequent changes.¹⁶

Lastly, the 1993 edition also addresses “jointness” or interservice interoperability. Integrating the efforts of the Army with other services, other national agencies, and allied and coalition forces enhance and quicken victory and lessen causalities. As a force that has no organic nuclear capabilities, the 1993 doctrine states that the Army must rely on Air Force and Navy nuclear capabilities to deter regional threats from their use.¹⁷

**REALISM**

The Revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Warsaw Pact, the Conventional Forces of Europe talks that led to the reduction of conventional forces by NATO and the Soviet Union, and Iraq’s hegemonic power move on Kuwait – all profoundly altering the bipolar system – provide realist analysts with a concise explanation for the timing and content of the 1993 version of Army doctrine. The uncertainty that emerged from the new world-order in international politics suggests that the Army’s new strategic level doctrine was the result of the end of the bipolar system and rise of regional hegemons. As John Romjue notes,

“Resting on radically altered security assumptions, those developments signified a new strategic world which demanded, for the Army, a revised and broader..."
doctrine by which American land forces could respond to the global and diverse military tasks assigned to them.”

Thus, the end of AirLand Battle and the advent of a world-wide applicable doctrine rested on, “the thinning-out and eventual disappearance of the strong-echeloned attack-ready Warsaw Pact armies opposite, the doctrinal stance shifted upon the assumption of an open, nonlinear front.”

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact thinning of forces in Eastern Europe led Army policymakers to much altered assumptions regarding the institution’s role in the post-Cold War era. As annotated in General Carl Vuono’s white paper, then Army Chief of Staff, the Army had become a strategic force with world-wide requirements that would require operations to cover war, conflict, and peacetime competition. And captured in General Frederick Franks précis for future doctrine was the recognition that the threat had changed from bipolar to regional, a much fuller appreciation for conflict beyond war, and the impact of technologies – which were equally procurable by adversaries.

Tracing that doctrine to the hierarchy of national and military strategies, several additional security concerns commanded policymakers’ attention during the rapid changing security environment. The 1990 National Security Strategy suggested that low-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug-trafficking will be among the most important issues confronting U.S. national defense. The strategy makes clear that it is “not possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree as at the higher.” However, given the realities imposed by the evolving functional imperative the strategy states that,
“Special Operations Forces have particular utility in this environment, but we will also pursue new and imaginative ways to apply flexible general purpose forces to these problems. We will improve the foreign language skills and cultural orientation of our armed forces and adjust our intelligence activities to better serve our needs. Units with unique capabilities in this environment will receive increased emphasis. Training and research development will be better attuned to the needs of low-intensity conflict.”

There was also recognition that Third World conflicts would no longer take place within the backdrop of bipolar system. Future conflicts within these regions – such as the Middle East – will continue to threaten American lives. Religious fanaticism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems will become more difficult to slow. As for advanced technologies and their proliferation, policymakers affixed great importance noting that, “Greater precision, range and destructiveness of weapons have extended the geographic area and many smaller and Third World countries have closed the gap in modern technologies, thus these battlefields will be as demanding as expected in Central Europe.”

Some of the questions raised in the 1990 National Security Strategy were: “how much risk can we accept in an era of strategic change; how do we adapt our forces to contingencies elsewhere in the world while maintaining a balance of power with the Soviet Union; and, how do we maintain cohesion as the perceived threat weakens?”

But the common thread linking the National Security and National Military strategies is that of the unknown. As indicated in the National Military Strategy,
“The decline of the Soviet threat has fundamentally changed the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning. We can still point to North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and perhaps even a hostile Iran as specific threats for which we must maintain forces…But the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected.”

These views were not lost on Army policymakers such as General Sullivan, then Army Chief of Staff, who noted that, “We can expect to operate across the entire continuum of military operations anywhere in the world – from fighting forest fires to fighting a heavily armed enemy, from building roads to assisting refugees, from conducting counterdrug operations to conducting counterinsurgencies. Our doctrine must take into account this breadth of operations.” Further, in recognition of both the new emerging environment and the increased candor and confidence policymakers had in addressing it, General John Foss, then Army Training and Doctrine Commander during the initial drafting of the 1993 doctrine circulated a document that focused on low-intensity conflict. The document states,

“While many of the challenges the Army may face in the future will require the use of military force in our traditional warfighting role, other types of threats to our national security interests will present qualitatively different challenges requiring the Army to operate in the low intensity conflict environment.”

This thinking suggested an emerging nuance in selected “never again” attitudes toward Vietnam. Instead of observing the “never again” dictate through denial or avoidance of unconventional, low-intensity conflicts, “never again” now could be fulfilled by
leveraging firepower, technology, and high-intensity force projection to accomplish the mission decisively and swiftly. These new attitudes were also embraced by key members of the writing team. Major Michael Rampy notes,

“We will be conducting a variety of missions – such as warfighting, stability, operations, noncombatant evacuation, counter-terrorism, security, arms control, and verification and protection of nuclear weapons – with a variety of government agencies, sister services, and the forces of other nations. The implications of these missions are significant and encompass the employment of the total force across the continuum of military operations.”

But the National Security Strategy also warns that the dominant reality of facing the Warsaw Pact in the postwar era has undergone significant change, and that national security must move forward cautiously. As the strategy suggests,

“Chairman Gorbachev’s declaration that ‘while reducing expenditure for defense purposes, we are not permitting the overall level of our defense capabilities to be weakened in any degree,’ thus represents prudent caution due to uncertainty and not hostility.”

While civilian and military policymakers shared increasingly common understandings of the most likely threats to national security, Army policymakers affixed greater importance to the high end of the spectrum, or “winning our nations wars.” Accordingly, the 1993 Force Projection doctrine devotes most of its attention to the “high-end” wars, in part on the assumption that a disciplined and highly technological all-volunteer force capable of high-end warfare can simply adjust to the various requirements across the spectrum of missions “other than war.” Thus, the contradictions that lie
between the strategic context of action, missions assigned to the Army, what the institution sees as its role in protecting the American state, and the content of its doctrine require further examination. To understand these contradictions requires another shift of analytic focus.

**Organizational Culture and Bureaucratic Politics**

If realist analysis explains why change was necessary and the timing of that change, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics explain doctrinal content, continuity, and change as those missions and roles most suitable and preferred by the dominant group within the Army. Ergo changes also reflect the impact of shrinking budgets and the Army’s need to justify its existence *vis à vis* the other services. A brief survey of the 1993 version of Army doctrine reveals a bias toward the high end of the conflict spectrum, or conventional war. Such a bias is noted in General Sullivan’s view of Army operations in the post-Cold War, where he suggests that though there are new and expanded roles for the Army in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, it could not be structured to deal with these expanded roles. In General Sullivan’s words, “The Army can do these missions that we’re asked to do: fight forest fires, go to Florida, go to Somalia (although there is a lot of mission-related stuff going on in Somalia and elsewhere, as there is in fighting forest fires and so forth.) We can do all of that as long as we keep our focus on the ultimate mission that must be uppermost in everybody’s mind – that we exist for one reason, and that is to fight and win the nation’s wars.”
Fighting the nation’s wars was therefore the institutions essence, though it acknowledged “other” types of operations. General Foss noted the Army’s resistance to incorporating low-intensity conflict into doctrine, specifying that, “While the mechanisms to integrate low intensity conflict considerations already exist, the problem has been the reluctance to recognize the extent and criticality of future Army involvement in low intensity conflict.”

In part, policymakers were concerned that focusing on threats that emanated from the low end of the conflict spectrum would divert the organizations focus away from its primary purpose – high-end warfare. When the draft manual went out for review, Brigadier General Lon Maggart noted the concern that, “Some reviewers expressed concern that by including references to operations other than war, TRADOC leaders had diffused the ‘warfighting’ intent of the book. ‘That’s just not so. This is a ‘warfighting’ book.’”

Colonel McDonough, the assigned lead for the 1993 rewrite, noted that the new doctrine required the Army to think beyond conventional war considerations where he noted that, “Our current warfighting doctrine, as expressed in the 1986 version of FM 100-5, is largely confined to considerations of conventional, mid-to high-intensity warfare. Yet we find ourselves engaged around the world in a variety of missions that fall outside that scope. Doctrine should address nonconventional operations in hostilities short of war and in conditions of war and its aftermath.”

However, when comparing earlier drafts to the final product, voices for a comprehensive approach to low-intensity conflict are nearly muted – perhaps because final reviewers of doctrinal manuscripts tend to be more senior in age and rank, and therefore more mindful of the painful lessons of
the Vietnam and immediate post-Vietnam eras. In comparing the first paragraph of the peacetime engagement chapter, Stewart notes that,

“A comparison of these drafts with the final product illustrates the dilution of the originally proposed content. Compare the initial draft’s opening paragraph with that of the final product. ‘Operations short of war, whether international or internal to a single country, are different from war…The purpose of activities conducted in these environments is to achieve a political aim without resort to war. Specific actions taken are primarily political, with the judicious use of military force to support political actions as a last resort.’ In the final FM 100-5, this paragraph begins: ‘The Army’s primary mission is to fight and win the nation’s wars.’”

As he notes, the contrasts are significant and the final product fell short of meeting the external realities facing the Army, as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Though there was an attempt to include a comprehensive approach to low-intensity conflict, Army policymakers’ intentions fell short of the functional imperatives requirements.

Further elaboration on the dilution of low-intensity conflict came at the senior leader conference that discussed the inclusion of insurgency and counterinsurgency to the peace engagement chapter. Senior leaders were divided into two camps, “On the never again side” which referenced a return to the Vietnam era doctrine, “was General Foss whose viewpoint was a succinct ‘paratroopers don’t fight guerillas.’ The other side was led by General Gorman whose view carried the day, i.e. ‘soldiers fight when and where their civilian leaders tell them to, and you cannot determine or limit national security policy by
Army doctrine.” Though many agreed with General Gorman, the 1993 doctrine only describes briefly the topics of insurgencies and counterinsurgency, and does not provide leaders with an explanation for how to best execute such operations.

Content, continuity, and change in Army doctrine may also reflect the bureaucratic realities facing the institution during vastly shrinking defense budgets. As the 1991 National Military Strategy states, “The momentous changes in the international environment are occurring during a period of US budget and trade deficits and urgent domestic needs. This military strategy, which places a premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness, is designed to be implemented within a significantly reduced defense budget.”

Among those key players and personalities that shaped the 1993 doctrine under the restrictive budget climate was General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff. General Sullivan played an important role in the Army’s reformulation of doctrine and recognized that it would provide the framework during a period of shrinking defense budgets and domestic political change. As John Romjue notes,

“General Sullivan’s vigorous support of doctrine as the basis for the Army in the new strategic era laid the foundation for doctrinal change. In the shrinking American defense establishment of the post-Cold War, much was at stake. In the change of political administrations following the elections of 1992, even deeper reductions would be made.”

Indeed, General Sullivan believed that the implications for new doctrine would include its impact on defense strategy and the defense budget. “It would define the Army’s role in the national security structure and how the Army would carry out security aims.”
Thus, getting a “bigger bang for the buck” required Army doctrine and policymakers to focus on weapon systems with the primary function of “winning the nations wars.”

And though the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act outlined greater interservice cooperation and “jointness,” the services still had to deal with the realities of budget reductions. The Gulf War was, in essence, the proving ground for future service components’ structure. It brought to the forefront the effectiveness of joint operations, but also sharpened the differences between the services and what could be brought to bear during a regional conflict or contingency. It had, essentially, sparked a debate regarding the utility of airpower versus landpower. These concerns were highlighted during a briefing that was given by the School of Advanced Military Studies to General Franks, then Training and Doctrine Commander that oversaw the final version of the 1993 doctrine. The briefing posed several questions which were directly tied to the Gulf War and the challenge from disciples of the Douhet thesis – a view that quick victory could be won by early air attack on the enemy’s vital centers. Of those questions posed by the slides, two were fundamental to the claims of the “new” Force Projection doctrine: “Had the devastating effectiveness of the air campaign over Iraq changed anything fundamental? Was landpower still ultimately decisive in an era of increasingly precise air-delivered munitions?”

These issues recurred at the November 14-15, 1991, Army-Air Force Summit meeting, which was convened at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The meeting noted the increased lethality, precision, and ranges of weapons systems, and the impact that each of the services had on successful conflict termination. Critically important to the Army was its extended ranges in weapon systems and how it changed the forward support coordinating
At the heart of the issue was how Army systems were now impinging on traditional Air Force and Naval air and missile operational sectors. As Romjue, notes, “The November 1991 Army-Air Force meeting raised but did not resolve this major bi-service issue.”

Against this backdrop, then, Army policymakers placed a premium on technology as it forded the institution with a viable way ahead, especially within the national security bureaucracy and the reality of shrinking defense budgets. Moreover, a doctrine focused on conventional war (tanks, artillery, armor personnel carries, helicopters, etc.) vice low-intensity war (rifles, bayonets, and protective gear) insured that the Army would remain competitive with its sister services vis-à-vis budget allocations. This could, plausibly, explain why the Army affixed greater emphasis on conventional warfare and relegated “operations other than war” to a single, eight page chapter. It is, however, the content of the 1993 doctrine that leads the analyst to different conclusions regarding continuity and change. To understand why requires yet another layer of analytic focus.

**CULTURAL-COGNITIVE**

“A state’s success in war is not due exclusively to its absolute power. It is not only the economic strength, quality of weapons systems, training, and leadership that determine military outcomes. Such intangible factors as morale, popular support, and a tolerance for pain play a role – often a decisive role. A state’s war power is predicated on the society’s willingness to suffer (what is often termed “cost tolerance”) as well as on its ability to achieve the state’s military objectives.” As this quote suggests, it is often the factors internal to the state that shape the parameters of foreign policy. The story of
Vietnam and the doctrine that soon followed that war’s end demonstrate the impact of domestic political culture, and their assumptions regarding warfare, on policymakers’ ideas. The images of Vietnam, and its protracted nature, left many Americans disillusioned with foreign policy, thus compelling policymakers to change the course of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Conversely, the images of the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated to policymakers the type of war which was preferred – a quick decisive victory heavily reliant on U.S. technology. In fact, the sense that America was on the right path technologically after 1991 and doctrinally with the 1993 revision was only reinforced by the contrasting and disturbing images from Somalia in 1993, where U.S. forces had quietly deployed months earlier – and without the overwhelming firepower of tanks and other armored vehicles. Thus, without reference to policymakers’ understandings of the domestic political context of action and America’s strongly preferred way of war, explanations presented through other analytical lenses are misleading.

**DOMINANT VIEWS AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ACTION**

The international context of action during the redrafting of Army doctrine saw many changes – including the vast and sweeping revolution underway in the former Soviet Union. But equally salient to the American public and Army policymakers was the 1991 Gulf War. Several polls conducted during the early stages of the conflict show vast approval for President George Herbert Bush’s handling of his job and the war. A New York Times/CBS poll sampling 3,002 adults nationwide found that 86 percent of those
adults surveyed approved of the President’s overall performance and 76 percent supported the war.\textsuperscript{47} As the study suggests,

“The phenomenon of Presidents gaining public support when deeply involved in foreign crisis has a long history, but Mr. Bush’s gain was one of the sharpest ever measured, comparable to the 16 percentage points that President Richard M. Nixon gained in 1973 when the Vietnam peace accords were signed.”\textsuperscript{48}

On the one hand, as this poll suggests, Americans supported the conduct of war. On the other, it wanted an end to war due to its conduct. “Other major findings were that 77 percent of the public said they were “proud” of the United States role in the Persian Gulf.”\textsuperscript{49} The findings of the New York Times/CBS poll, however, may not have had the same result had American forces sustained high casualties, unnecessary collateral damage, and a war with no visible end. As Schwartz notes, “America’s pain threshold – specifically, it’s perceived sensitivity to casualties – is believed, by many U.S. policymakers and military leaders, as well as potential adversaries, to be its Achilles’ heel.”\textsuperscript{50}

The parallels to Vietnam are striking. Indeed, General Vuono, then Army Chief of Staff, who also played a vital role in the 1993 version of Army doctrine, noted that he “feared that America’s “political will” would be dealt a severe blow if U.S. casualties mounted, resulting in an end to hostilities before U.S. military goals were reached.”\textsuperscript{51}

This is further evidenced in the contents of the 1993 doctrine where the manual makes explicit the American view of war and its impact on Army doctrine. The 1993 doctrine draws the cultural linkage between the Army and the ideals of the nation it represents through the Constitution of the United States, which it states “establishes the fundamental
parameters of the national defense structure, while national attitudes affect the nature and employment of U.S. armed forces.” The precepts of those ideals are noted succinctly in the January 1991 National Military Strategy,

“Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win – the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with minimum loss of life.”

And equally noted in the 1993 version of Army doctrine,

“The people of the United States do not take the commitment of their armed forces lightly. They charge the government to commit forces only after due consideration of the range of options and likely outcomes. Moreover, the people expect the military to accomplish its mission in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary causalities. They prefer quick resolution to conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met…In the end, the people will pass judgment on the appropriateness of the conduct and use of military operations. Their values and expectations must be met.”

The 1993 edition also addresses the impact of instant communications available to the media and how this affects military operations. The media, in essence, serve as a conduit
of information to the American public and the rest of the world. Images available to the public through the media can have a dramatic effect on public and political opinion, therefore impacting strategy and the range of operations. The manual states that, “The effect of information-age technology has been not only to increase the tempo of operations but also to provide images of operations that begin to condition strategic plans and define time limits of operations.”

Consequently, Army policymakers’ ideas were conditioned by broader American assumptions regarding the conduct of warfare which is evident in the contents of the 1993 version of doctrine. No other doctrinal manual previously written had referenced “the American way of war” so explicitly. As Romjue notes regarding the 1993 version of Army doctrine,

“The 1993 doctrine emphasized its roots in “the American way of war” growing out of values stated in the nation’s founding documents and dependent on the special relationship between the government, the military, and the people. Subordinate to National Command Authority, Army forces had to attend to the reality of the American people’s requirement for decisive victory and no unnecessary casualties, and to deal with the media impact on events.”

Although several studies indicate that casualties alone do not generate a reduction in support for war, it is worth noting that American support for the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War was significantly different. In the former, there were exceedingly high casualties totaling 58,193, whereas the latter totaled 114 combat related deaths. While it is difficult to attribute a direct causal linkage between casualties and support for the conduct of war, the manual’s reference to “quick decisive war” and “limiting casualties” is clearly evident in the manual’s contents.
Several analysts of the war suggest that the Gulf War had emerged “as America’s most popular war since World War II.” Indeed, there was broad consensus inside and outside the institution that the AirLand Battle doctrine of the Gulf War was sound and future doctrinal changes should be put on hold. As Romjue notes,

“Believing that no Army consensus then existed for the direction U.S. Army doctrine should take, McDonough argued for a more deliberate approach, based on the unfolding lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. McDonough felt that his view accorded with a rising number of voices opposed to a rapid conclusion of the revision.”

This was apparent during the final campaign to gain acceptance for the new Force Projection doctrine, from which there was considerable resistance. “Resistance,” by in large was due “to dropping ‘AirLand Battle’ from the lexicon” since it “was viewed by many as a serious and unnecessary abandonment of a well understood and unifying doctrinal term,” though emphasis on “quick, decisive victory was good.”

General Richardson, then Army Training and Doctrine Commander during the 1986 refinements to AirLand Battle doctrine, “saw the deletion of the widely recognized, identifying term, AirLand Battle, as a distinct loss that would weaken the Air Force doctrinal tie.”

General Richardson “also believed the critical war fighting flavor was too weak and that operations other than war was overdone.”

In the early stages of its development, General Franks appointed Colonel McDonough to assemble writing teams from various institutions within the Army, such as the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Under this program, majors were solicited to write essays and papers on doctrinal subjects across the continuum of military
operations, encapsulating the American way of war. The writing team recognized, however, that the Gulf War had arrested doctrinal revisions to AirLand Battle, which began in early 1990. The success of the war, and future considerations for doctrine, required the writing team to develop a consensus building campaign, much like their predecessors did for AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s. Consequently, General Franks’ approach, and that of his writing team, sought to publicly gain approval for the new doctrinal concepts. The consensus seeking campaign would incorporate periodic conferences within the Army and also a wider-public campaign. The campaign that took place outside of the Army included,

“Reserve and retired Army leadership; defense industry; other military organizations in the Defense Department, including the unified and specified commands; other nations bound by treaty or bilateral relationship; and influential entities and individuals including Congress, influential academics, the media, opinion leaders, think tanks such as RAND and the Center for Strategic International Studies, and other government agencies, particularly those with a stake in operations short of war.”

Given the success of the Gulf War, “The Army needed to fully inform media writers and other opinion makers before uninformed opinions formed and were propagated.”

Among those lessons salient to Army policymakers’ was the role of technology and how it had enhanced operations and limited casualties. Technology was viewed as a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” which would alter future conflict, while further enhancing the American way of war. General Franks experience as the VII Corps commander during the Gulf War, and broad consensus that any revision to AirLand
Battle would require lessons learned from Desert Storm, therefore led him to consider technology’s impact on warfare in the 21st Century. During a March conference held at Fort Monroe, entitled “Desert Storm One-Year Later Conference,” General Franks sought to “garner for the doctrine the best experience from Desert Storm operations.” Indeed, among those lessons most evident were, “The existence of a precision munitions revolution,” and “that no army could afford to go to war outgunned or outranged.”

Military policymakers alike understood the importance of technology’s impact on modern warfare, as well as its impact on the American way of war. As the National Military Strategy states: “The United States must continue to rely heavily on technological superiority to offset quantitative advantages, to minimize risk to US forces, and to enhance the potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict.”

But the Gulf War also delineated a type of war preferred in contrast to the more prevalent forms of conflict that the Army found itself involved in – though the 1993 doctrine does acknowledge the Army’s frequent role in “operations other than war.” As the manual suggests, the variety and types of missions under “operations other than war” are extensive, such as nation assistance, counter-drug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping. The doctrine, however, spends greater time cautioning leaders about low-intensity conflict than it does explaining how to conduct them. The manual suggests that actions requiring Army forces in support of operations other than war, must be “quick” and with “minimal casualties.” Such doctrinal precepts include the recognition of limiting collateral damage. The manual states:
“A nation state that disregards the human rights of individuals makes warfare unnecessarily harsh, increases the resolve of the enemy, and changes the nature of conflict. How the Army fights is a mark of what it is and what it stands for. Laws of war are only effective in reducing casualties and enhancing fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike so long as trained leaders ensure those laws are obeyed. The commander ensures the proper treatment of prisoners, noncombatants, and civilians by building good training programs and reinforces the practice of respecting those laws and rules of engagement.”

As the above quote specifies, and implies, there is a caution in conducting operations other than war within the pages of the 1993 doctrine.

Returning, then, to the question of what factors influence counterinsurgencies relevance to doctrine, the 1993 manual covers, albeit small, the topic under operations other than war. While the intellectual shift to low-intensity conflict and operations short of war drew general approval from the Army, the latter operations are only briefly mentioned. Indeed, of the missions that fall under operations other than war, only one paragraph is devoted to counterinsurgency. Moreover, the word “counterinsurgency” appears only one time in the entire 1993 manual, compared to “decisive operations” in the context of conventional war which appears nearly 130 times. Central to the 1993 version, therefore, remains the core objective of “winning the nation’s wars” – quickly and decisively, and with least cost to American blood and treasure.

The 1993 doctrine, during a period of vast strategic change, sought to accommodate a broader range of possibilities with its inclusion of operations other than war. However, the 1993 doctrine focuses on prescriptions for the conduct of operations at the lower end
of the spectrum, where the human dimension plays an integral role in the development of doctrine and shaping the strategic environment. This recognition, as Romjue suggests about the post-Cold War edition, requires “Soldiers to adhere to the highest standards of professional conduct reflecting the ideals of American values”—to be “counted on to do what is right even when no one is watching.” Indeed, with the intent to cover operations at the lower end of the warfare spectrum, the 1993 doctrine makes explicit the American way of war and the ultimate influences that dominant views of war have on Army doctrine. The influence of the Gulf War on that doctrine is also unmistakable. It “kicked the Vietnam syndrome” by way of a quick decisive victory that resulted in few American casualties. Not even the onset of a new era in international politics, which saw the bipolar system and Communism come to an abrupt end, would alter the WWII-driven American identity of how best to pursue land warfare doctrine.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the 1993 version of Army doctrine demonstrates “a variety of sources that profoundly affect its development: strategy, history, technology, the nature of the threats to the nation and its armed forces face, interservice relationships, and political decisions that allocate resources and designate roles and missions.” Thus, on the one hand, realist analysis explains the deletion of AirLand Battle doctrine due to the end of the bipolar system and the rise of regional hegemons and instability. On the other hand, organizational culture and bureaucratic politics explain the proclivity of Army policymakers to focus on conventional “high pay-off” doctrine. And a cultural-cognitive approach explains content, continuity, and change through Army policymakers’
understandings of the dominant views of political culture regarding the American way of war. Without referencing the latter the former are incomplete or misleading.

Turning, then, to the broader purpose of this research, the 1993 version of Army doctrine demonstrates that the tensions between the functional and societal imperative is dependent on the central rules of society, such as the appropriate boundaries or extent of state activity, and may be important in justifying or defining the essence of the Army. “Given these functions, these core political images are likely to be reexamined only when the continued viability of the political society has been called into question.”

Consequently the Army’s caution in moving forward in low-intensity warfare after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact rests more squarely with the dominant political cultural views and the images of war. Civilian and defense policymakers’ explicit mention of these views contained in the 1991 National Security and Military strategies and the 1993 Force Projection doctrine make that clear. As Frederick Kagan notes regarding the 1993 doctrine, there was “a determination to move slowly and cautiously, avoid casualties at all costs, and achieve victory through planning.”

Moreover, if the technology of the Gulf War had advanced the American way of war, it had also conditioned Army policymakers to consider its double-edge sword. Since it “not only” increases “the tempo of operations,” but “also to provide images of operations that begin to condition strategic plans and define the limits of operations. This phenomenon must not be lost on tactical and operational Army commanders.” Indeed, “Reality on the battlefield is,” often, “reality in the household at almost the same time.”

“The Gulf war,” as Eliot Cohen notes, “did not end the “Vietnam syndrome” but, if anything, strengthened it.” On the one hand, it showed how America feels war ought to
be conducted, through the quick decisive application of combat power enhanced by advances in technology. On the other hand, it strengthened broader assumptions regarding wars of the Vietnam kind and a denial of the unpredictable nature of war and its termination. The Gulf War thus provided both cultural and cognitive needs and further arrested any tendency, whether real or perceived, to develop a comprehensive doctrine for low-intensity conflict. As Edwin Corr suggests, “The American public, government, and military have been slow to adapt attitudes, laws, and institutions to cope more effectively with the high incidence and prevalence of various types of low intensity conflict.”

In subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “they would reap the whirlwind” of consequences resulting from unconventional conflicts that inherently avoid America’s battlefield strengths while using improvised technology to exploit its weaknesses.

NOTES

3 Ibid, p.1-2
4 Field Manual 100-5 Operations, 1993, p.vi
5 Michael D. Steward, A Small View of War, p.4
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CHAPTER 6
COINdinistas:
REPAIRING A PLANE WHILE IN FLIGHT

Since World War II, Americans have never felt more “American” than in the years after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and victory in the 1991 Gulf War. These events seemed to validate U.S. foreign policy and the trajectory of U.S. military doctrine in the post Vietnam era. The bipolar system was gone, and the United States sat clearly atop the balance-of-power world – due in significant part to the capability and technological superiority of the “full spectrum” U.S. military. As noted in the previous chapters, AirLand Battle of the 1980s sought to define a somewhat limited scope and method of America’s way of war within the 1970’s shadow of the Vietnam mantra “never again.”

However, as the strength and capability of America’s increasingly professionalized, all-volunteer force grew, the connotation of “never again” began to shift. A phrase that originally meant America will never again allow itself to get bogged down in a prolonged, irregular fight of ambiguous strategic value, instead took on the connotation that America is able to engage in low-intensity, “small-war” interventions without a repeat of Vietnam simply because our doctrine has proven too right and our forces have become too capable to let it happen again. Interventions in Bosnia beginning in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – the latter relying heavily on airpower (like the Gulf War) to set conditions for ground forces – seemed to validate the view that the “new and improved” U.S. military can excel in the full spectrum of threats by focusing its training and doctrine on high-intensity force-on-force warfare, leveraging technology, and simply adjusting to the “lesser” missions of stability and support (or peacekeeping / “peace enforcement”) operations as required. In short, the American military experience of the 1990s suggested that the
consequences of purging counterinsurgency doctrine and lessons learned after Vietnam could be avoided.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) gave Americans a new “never again.” Suddenly policymakers and senior military leaders had to contend with the converging demands of both the functional and societal imperatives to interdict small numbers of non-state actors hiding “in the shadows” of weakly governed states to prevent similar attacks on the U.S. homeland in the future. Early success in Afghanistan in 2001, in which the U.S. military was able to oust the Taliban from power in only a few months, reinforced the belief in the full-spectrum capability of U.S. forces. The subsequent policy decision to invade Iraq in 2003 assumed a pre-determined result similar to the initial outcome in Afghanistan. However, America soon learned that the unconventional challenges faced in Afghanistan and Iraq were qualitatively different than the stability and support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Iraq and, later, Afghanistan would become widespread insurgencies with U.S. and Coalition forces seen as antagonists – not as a third party trying to keep the peace.

These counterinsurgency missions not only required a level of doctrinal and cultural understanding the U.S. military simply did not have, but the insurgents also fought in a way that mitigated much of the high-end warfighting strengths and technological capabilities the U.S. forces did have. For years, civilian and military policymakers struggled to achieve desired ends by applying the familiar and comforting ways-and-means of the successful full spectrum doctrine that emerged from the AirLand Battle and force projection approaches of the 1980s and early 1990s. After pulling all but two combat brigades out of Afghanistan and targeting insurgents largely with often imprecise close-air-support (causing repeated civilian casualties), a Taliban resurgence ensued. In Iraq, only a few months after the “shock and awe” campaign began,
President Bush declared “mission accomplished” on the USS Abraham Lincoln – giving many the impression that U.S. leadership (and doctrine) regarded the end of the high-intensity portion of the invasion of Iraq to be, essentially, the end of the military’s major mission there.

The consequences of abandoning the foundational principles of counterinsurgency three decades earlier were slowly realized, and ghosts of Vietnam reappeared through public distrust with its civilian and military leaders, disputes over claims of progress in the campaigns, and uncertainty about the strategic impact of our efforts (although public repudiation of the U.S. military and the sacrifices of its service-members did not reappear).

In the context of these two “never agains” – and out of necessity – a new counterinsurgency doctrine emerged. In response to the functional imperative from threats facing America and societal imperative to prevent “another 9/11” (while not repeating Vietnam) came a refined U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine that, unlike the search-and-destroy doctrine of Vietnam, sought protection and security of the population as its first principle. This would require a full scale review of military doctrine while fighting two complex counterinsurgency missions simultaneously. Indeed, some critics compared this undertaking to trying to “repair a plane while in flight.”

**Sources of Doctrine Content, Continuity, and Change**

Realist analysis would point to near failure in Iraq and its overall importance to the “war on terrorism” as the impetus behind policymakers’ decisions to change the direction of Army doctrine toward a deliberate institutional prioritization of counterinsurgency. Organizational culture would attribute the difficulty in developing a new doctrine even after years into the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as the attempt by the organization’s leaders to protect what
they believed was the Army’s essence (conventional warfare). But neither fully explains the four year delay and the contents contained therein which by the American definition of war is antithetical to its organization and the dominant views of political culture. The answer lies in Army policymakers’ understandings of the American way of war in the public mind and the competing definitions of reality that were deeply rooted in the historical myths of Vietnam and that were no longer relevant after 9/11. This chapter therefore examines why U.S. military and notably Army doctrine was ill-suited to meet the functional imperative’s realities after 9/11 and seeks to explain the origins of the new counterinsurgency doctrine.

**COMPARING CONTENT**

In June 2001, months prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Army developed a transitional doctrine that supplanted its Cold War and early 1990s doctrine by incorporating the Army’s experiences in the Balkans and Kosovo. This doctrine, however, remained fixated on technology and, more generally, conventional warfare doctrine that was equally fungible for “other” threats. The new manual’s main theme and contribution to future warfighting was the formal introduction of “Full Spectrum Operations” which sought to break the Army’s linear view of war, noting that operations could simultaneously span the spectrum of conflict combining offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. The manual, however, as Dr. John Bonin notes, “still held to the primacy of warfighting at the high end of the spectrum and stability operations, especially counterinsurgency, did not get much attention.” Indeed, the U.S. Army’s capstone manual, Field Manual 3.0, *Operations* (replacing the earlier nomenclature of Field Manual 100-5), devoted one page to counterinsurgency, primarily emphasizing minimal support to host nations to limit dependency on U.S. forces while enabling the local government to solve its own
problems. The AirLand Battle spatial construct of deep, close, and rear battle areas was retained, but de-emphasized for a new purpose based framework: decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. As it became clear that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required comprehensive counterinsurgency efforts, and that limited support to host nations would not establish security or enable local governments to govern, military leaders began to more thoroughly review archived and existing doctrine for applicability to the present conflicts. Of course, there was little. The result was a need for a manual offering a modern, comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency.

Although Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was not developed to replace the Army’s premier doctrinal manual, Operations, it did, however, become the most prominent and applied operational field manual for the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan after its publication in 2006. The manual proved both timely and important. As General Petraeus notes: “Following its publication in December 2006, it received such an enthusiastic response – to include 1.5 million downloads in the first month – that it was published not only in the normal military manner, but also by the University of Chicago Press. It even became the first manual to be reviewed in the New York Times Book Review.” So prominent was its publication that then Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, directed the revision of the 2001 version of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, to capture several of the concepts contained therein.

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is, as Sarah Sewall notes, “a stark departure from the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming and decisive offensive force…Instead of defining the requisite number of forces in relation to enemy forces, the manual calculates the ratio of friendly security forces to inhabitants.” The manual also “turns conventional military thinking on its head with the introduction of the Nine Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.” Where force
protection has been one of the most prominent principles of U.S. Army doctrine it now directs U.S. Army units to take more risk. The manual notes: “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted. Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction.”

The manual’s teeth, however, are found in chapters 3, 4, and 5, which provide the Army with a new foundation for planning and executing counterinsurgency. These chapters incorporate sociocultural analysis which is paramount to understanding the mosaic nature of counterinsurgency. Unlike earlier conceptions of the American approach to counterinsurgency (“search-and-destroy”), Chapter 5, “Executing Counterinsurgency Operations” emphasizes a “clear, hold, build” approach that focuses on securing and protecting the population to ensure gains are more permanent, vice primarily assailing the enemy through kinetic operations.

**REALISM**

Realist analysis explains policymakers’ decisions, and the timing of those decisions, for doctrinal shifts as a rational change that reflects the external challenges facing the U.S. Army in both threat and technologies available. In a campaign speech to the Citadel in 1999, then-Governor George W. Bush described the evolving strategic environment, America’s preeminence in technology, and the role of the military. With regard to the strategic environment and revolution in technologies, he states:

“We see the contagious spread of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. We know that this era of American preeminence is also an era of car bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber terrorists and drug cartels and
unbalanced dictators—all the unconventional and invisible threats of new
technologies and old hatreds. These challenges can be overcome, but they can not
be ignored.7

But President Bush also noted that the role of the military is to “deter wars—and win wars
when deterrence fails, not to be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not
our strength or our calling.”8 After 9/11, however, President Bush advocated a much different
view signaling a historic shift from the long-accepted Cold War applications of military power
and based on the intensity of the security needs. He noted that,

“For much of the last century America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of
deterrence and containment, new threats also require new thinking. “Deterrence – the
promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on
missiles or secretly provide then to terrorist allies.”9

This position was further reinforced in the 2002 National Security Strategy. According to the
document, the President noted that the previous foundations of U.S. strategy were no longer
valid, requiring U.S. military force to be used in a preemptive manner. The document states:

“Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad
by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United
States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will
not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting
preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people
and our country.”10
However, the perspectives advanced in the 2002 National Security Strategy and the Army’s operational doctrine during the period from 2001 to 2006 subordinated local realities and emphasized America’s preeminence in technology as the primary means to disrupt ‘shadowy terrorists’ and deter despots from establishing alliances with them. Moreover, the strategy also implied that future military operations would focus on states in order to compel them to accept their international obligations. As the 2002 National Security Strategy stated, “Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.” Moreover, much like Thucydides writings on the Peloponnesian Wars and Athens’ efforts to compel those who challenged or threatened its power, America’s decision to use massive military force against Saddam Hussein was meant to also serve as notice to dictators in Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. This demonstrated effect had served America well in the 1991 Gulf War as well as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, the Army’s operational doctrine from the period of 1993 through 2001 focused on the higher end of the spectrum of violence, relying on technological capabilities for rapid victory over a wide-range of threats, with little to no consideration for the “messy” follow-on operations, such as counterinsurgency and stability and support operations. As witnessed nearly 40 years prior in Vietnam the “American” solution tends toward “more bombs, more shells, more napalm…’til the other side cracks and gives up.”

Finally, the rough timing of Army doctrine after 9/11, especially its capstone field manual, Operations, is problematic for realist analysis since as it was not published until February 2008. Though the Counterinsurgency manual was published two years earlier, it took three years in Iraq and over five years in Afghanistan to reorient doctrine away from the post-Gulf War doctrine that focused on massing firepower through advanced technologies. As early as 2003 the
wars had evolved into stabilization efforts, pointing to the need for counterinsurgency doctrine. To understand why requires a shift in analytic focus.

**Organizational Culture and Bureaucratic Politics Models**

“We were fighting against the Army—we were viewed as anti-bodies”

John Nagl

Organizational culture and bureaucratic politics analysis offers another layer of understanding to why Army policymakers steered away from limited and highly-constrained operations such as counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism, and preferred high-end conventional warfare. As Department of Defense officials saw it – especially in uniform and at higher ranks – consideration for land warfare operations (“boots on the ground”) was almost always based on such factors as time, footprint, and force protection. These factors have their roots in the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, which grew out of disdain and mistrust for civilian officials during the Vietnam War. The Army, in particular, saw the doctrine as a means to protect the organization from limited commitments or small wars that constrained military action and the organization’s essence. Consequently, Army doctrine after Vietnam is best captured by the Civil War Commander Nathan Bedford Forrest’s recipe for victory: “Get there first with the most men”\(^\text{13}\) or get there the first with the most technology.

Consequently, when the Army began to see the signs of an insurgency in late summer of 2003, U.S. civilian and military leadership was not prepared. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld – who, not inconsequentially was the Defense Secretary during the Vietnam years – initially refused to acknowledge the opposition in Iraq as an “insurgency,” reportedly prohibiting the use of the term for up to nine months after the March 2003 invasion. Other senior leaders in
the Administration referred to the insurgency as “Saddam loyalists” whose attempts to challenge our forces would not last. Further, the Army (and joint-operating U.S. military forces) were not organized, trained, nor equipped to meet the insurgency’s challenges. As John Nagl suggests, the Army in 2003 was a conventional army unprepared to fight an enemy who understood that defeating the US on a traditional battlefield would be suicide and who therefore opted to “fight from the shadows.”

As a result of over three decades of focus on conventional warfare, from the first post-Vietnam version (1976 Active Defense) of doctrine to the pre-9/11 version (2001 Full Spectrum Operations) of doctrine, the Army attempted to quell the rising violence in Iraq through conventional combat operations. Indeed, prior to the deployment, Army units continued to train on tasks that they traditionally prepared for as outlined in the Army’s operational doctrine. Moreover, the National Training Centers continued to grade units on conventional kinetic operations and tactics. In an interview conducted with the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, Lieutenant General William Wallace, then V Corps Commander, stated that “The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight.”

As late as 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review found that units continued to focus on cordonning off areas and conducting “search-and-destroy” operations. Of the 127 U.S. pacification operations in Iraq from May 2003 to May 2005, “most operations were reactive to insurgent activity – seeking to hunt down insurgents. Only 6% of the operations were directed specifically to create a secure environment for the population.”

Attitudes that American military doctrine following the Gulf War was rightly focused on conventional war (with the assumption that adjustments could be made quickly within the paradigm to account for the entire range of low-to-high end threats) were prevalent in a sample
taken from the services’ premier advanced study institutes – School of Advanced Military Studies, School of Advanced Warfighting, and School of Advanced Air and Space Studies – from the period of the 1991 through 2003. The sample found that mid-grade level officers attending these schools predominantly wrote theses on conventional warfare. Of the 1,124 sample, 34.2% wrote theses on conventional warfare, 21.8% wrote theses on traditional military operations, and most telling, only 2.7% wrote on topics concerning counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. Moreover, 55 were currently sitting generals and 84.13% were Army officers. The small percentages that wrote about counterinsurgency were often officers with a Special Forces’ background and not officers from the core combat arms constituencies.

The conventional warfare “bias” toward kinetic action was coupled with the organizational view that if civilian leaders were going to push for military action, the Army would pursue its most prominent organizational principle of war: mass. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki argued during 2002 Congressional testimony that operations in Iraq will require over 700,000 troops, a view widely shared among uniformed leaders in the Pentagon. In several discussions with Pentagon officers that have been part of past and present planning for deployed operations, they suggest that doctrine as a guide has almost always led them to overcome inherent risks in operations by “adding more capabilities,” whereas civilian counterparts advocated economy of force – seeking technological solutions that reduced “boots on the ground” – which aligned more closely with the pressure of the societal imperative not to get overly committed and entangled in an “occupying” posture. So, where General Shinseki seemed willing to challenge the Administration’s view (which was advanced in the 2002 hearing by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who famously stated that the General was “off the
Shinseki’s recommendation may itself have been overly oriented on the element of “mass” to avoid Vietnam-like results in Iraq.

When the initial draft of the new counterinsurgency manual was sent out for review and comment, a number of prominent critics emerged from within and outside the Army. Most notable was Ralph Peters, a former Army Colonel and prominent military commentator who wrote a scathing review of the manual in the New York Post entitled “Politically Correct War.” Peters’ main argument was that the manual was too soft and that “its recommendations are profoundly misguided when it comes to fighting terrorists intoxicated with religious visions and the smell of blood.”

Edward Luttwak also criticized the new doctrine as “military malpractice,” endorsing a population-centric approach, but much different from the manual’s focus. As Crane notes, “For Luttwak, the proper role models for counterinsurgency are the Romans and the Nazis, and success from intimidating the people by a willingness to “out-terrorize the insurgents.” Each of these heavy-handed approaches is more traditionally aligned with what the Army had become accustomed to during its Vietnam experience. Retired Army General William Odom, who served as director of the National Security Agency during President Ronald Reagan’s second term and opposed the Vietnam and Iraq wars, noted that “trying to win a counterinsurgency is like putting a roof on a house with no walls,” and, “that perhaps the Curtis LeMay approach of bombing an enemy back to the Stone Ages is the best way to break a culture and generation bent on war. Perhaps this view is more American than we’d like to admit.”

A number of staunch critics of the new doctrine also emerged from those in uniform. One of the most prolific, as Crane notes, has been Colonel Gian Gentile from the History Department at West Point and who also commanded a combat battalion in Iraq during 2006. Crane cites
Gentile as a leading spokesman of a “conservative school” within the Army established by Andrew Bacevich. Crane noted that,

“He (Gentile) asserts that an enemy-centric approach might be appropriate in some cases, and fears the Army is moving too far and too fast in the direction of reorienting to irregular warfare or French models of revolutionary warfare. In the process, there is a danger of losing important fighting skills that will remain essential to deal with conventional threats, as well as tough insurgents…His cautions about losing warfighting skills have been echoed by some generals, including Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, and must keep in mind for a future featuring the hybrid threats highlighted by Frank Hoffman.”

Organizational culture therefore provides a plausible explanation as to why doctrine was ineffective in meeting the challenges presented by the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, like realist analyses, organizational culture also leaves questions unanswered. While organizational culture may explain the Army’s desire to maintain its essence, preferred roles and missions, it does not explain the birth and timing of a doctrine that conjures the deeply rooted historical myths of the Vietnam War and “never again.” To better explain its delay and eventual publication requires yet another shift in analytic focus.

**Cultural-Cognitive**

“The United States is again wrestling with disillusionment about politics and military power. Iraq has bred a familiar cynicism that risks disengaging Americans from their government and America from the rest of the world. This manual directly addresses this phenomenon.”
Sarah Sewall

The dominant images as envisaged through the lens of the first Gulf War had essentially defined the post-Vietnam American way of war. U.S “dominance” in the desert in 1991 also proved fungible in Bosnia and Kosovo – two largely bloodless operations – which lulled civilian and military officials and the American public into an overreliance and over confidence in that doctrine. Consequently, the doctrine’s 1990s successes inspired confidence in decision-makers that interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq would be quick, decisive, and disproportionately dominant in our favor. Initial results in each war seemed to validate these projections. However, shortly after the “declared” victories, insurgencies mounted in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Revolution in Military Affairs that brought unprecedented technological advances in weaponry and communications to the respective doctrines of all U.S. military service branches had been partially neutralized by an enemy who avoided American strengths and exploited its weaknesses. Thus, AirLand Battle, technology, and the 1991 Gulf War (and consequently smaller operations) led to the conclusion that the American way of war was still viable for “other” forms of warfare – to include against “shadowy networks with no nation or citizens to defend.”

Much like Vietnam, then, the images of war in the 2000s began to redefine central rules and appropriate boundaries of state activity. These core political images have led Americans to reexamine the continued viability of socially constructed understandings of war. Sewall makes a similar argument, stating: “The unprecedented interest in a military field manual reflects confusion about the nation’s strategic purpose in the wake of September 11, 2001. Americans yearn to understand a world in which old assumptions and advantages no longer seem relevant.” The fact that there were nearly 1.5 million downloads of the new counterinsurgency
doctrine in the first month of its publication suggests a renewed interest in political-culture’s
desire to understand the competing views of reality that are deeply rooted in the historical myth
of Vietnam and that are no longer relevant after 9/11.

**Dominant Views and the Social Context of Action**

If realist analysis explains why the doctrine was necessary, organizational culture and
bureaucratic politics its delay, the cultural-cognitive approach explains doctrinal change due to
the competing images of war and the dominant views of culture. Chief of Staff of the Army
General Peter Schoomaker wrote about Vietnam’s impact on the U.S. Army, noting: “The U.S.
Army, predisposed to fight a conventional enemy that fought using conventional tactics,
overpowered ideas from within the Army and from outside it.” Further, former Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army General Jack Keane noted that in Iraq, “We put an army on the battlefield that
I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained to
deal with an insurgency…After the Vietnam War we purged ourselves of everything that had to
do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost the war.”

President George H.W. Bush noted two days prior to the end of the 1991 Gulf War how deeply
the Vietnam War had preyed upon his mind, stating that “It’s surprising how much I dwell on the
end of the Vietnam syndrome.” This view was also shared by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, General Colin Powell who was in deep opposition to pushing the war effort any further
than the immediate mission of driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. His fear was that extending the
war jeopardized both international and popular support at home – much of which was directly
attributed to concerns that news organizations would transmit images that would show the
seedier side of war, especially along the “Highway of Death.” And fifteen years later when
referring to the development of the new counterinsurgency manual John Nagl noted, “History and wartime experiences are hard to separate; the specter of Vietnam was in the room everyday.”

As a result of the dominant images that came out of Vietnam – America, its institutions, and its society sought to redefine the parameters of state activity and war. Out of that war emerged a conservative realism and doctrine that harkened back to America’s dominance after World War II. And after being proven in the 1980s and 1990s in Southern Iraq and Panama, and during peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, Americans’ preference for quick decisive operations that mitigated causalities with advanced technologies grew strong. As Sewall noted,

“The American way of war has long been characterized by the substitution of firepower for manpower, which helps to protect U.S. combatants. This has served the nation well, but also has acculturated Americans today to expect victory with limited loss of life.”

In particular, Kosovo and the first Gulf War reinforced the America’s preferred way of war – relying on technological (air) superiority to reduce the requirements on ground forces once introduced, and the notion that when ground forces are committed they will have clear and limited objectives with force protection as the first mission of the American Soldier.

After the 1991 Gulf War, several studies emerged adding to the durability of the Army’s doctrine and policymakers’ ideas. The 1993 Desert Storm Study Project, in Certain Victory noted that, “AirLand Battle, the warfighting doctrine applied by the American Army in Desert Storm, not only survived the initial clash of arms, but, in fact, continues as a viable foundation for the development of future warfighting doctrine.” It further noted that while some of the
The concepts of AirLand Battle had been well ahead of actual capabilities available, the doctrine served to facilitate what was viewed as a Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1990s. The revolution in ideas focused on information technology based weaponry, surveillance systems, networks and high speed computers which led to concepts such as “Shock and Awe”, “Rapid Decisive Operations”, and “Effects Based Operations.” “These ideas were attractive,” as Wass de Czege noted, “because they suggested that far fewer people would be needed, especially in ground forces, and that such savings would pay for the required technological investments.” But equally there was an implicit faith that high technologies could mitigate casualties.

The attractiveness of the doctrine and technology that led America to “certain victory” in the 1991 Gulf War and away from the “certain failure” of Vietnam was essentially the same doctrine that led policymakers to the notion that its precepts were largely applicable in the post-9/11 environment. However, that certainty led to an overestimation of the doctrine’s worth and an underestimation of post-conflict stabilization. After the initial phases in Afghanistan and, for example, when it had been decided that the Taliban would be ousted from power, the Administration had to consider filling the vacuum of Afghan politics with a stable government that could overcome centuries of warlord and ethnic infighting – and more importantly weakly-governed spaces that provided terrorist organizations the ability to train, plan, and launch attacks against the United States. When the Northern Alliance began to make progress against the Taliban, and Kabul looked like it was going to fall as Mazar-e Sharif did, the Administration began to realize how complex Afghan culture and politics were. At one point, White House Chief of Staff, Andy Card, asked: “What is the mission in Kabul? Is it a political mission? Is it a military issue?” Neither the Administration nor the military had a comprehensive understanding, strategy, or doctrine to provide a framework for establishing the conditions for
stable democratic governance after the initial conventional operations had toppled the hostile
regimes. And unfortunately, the same false assumptions that guided action in Afghanistan would
be applied in Iraq. As one Army officer noted in 2004 (referencing work by Dr. Hans
Binnendijk, National Defense University), “The U.S. military transformation to smaller, more
agile, more technologically lethal forces is problematic for the coverage needs in post-conflict
stabilization operations. The manpower needed to defeat forces in high-intensity conflict may
not be sufficient to ‘keep the peace’ afterward.”36

The implicit faith in technology and its impact on the American way of war essentially led
civilian and military policymakers to continue to throw old doctrine at a new problem.
Rumsfeld’s explicit denial of the threat early on and General Casey’s “search-and-destroy”
operations were bolstering an enemy who used the population and its own (improvised)
technology to maximum advantage. The short-lived narrative of the U.S. as a liberator in Iraq
had given way to impressions of the U.S. as an occupier and, in particular, the war was
beginning to look more like Vietnam by the day. There was a growing sense among those on the
ground that the war was unraveling, as General Petraeus noted: “Our effort in Iraq was
beginning to struggle. Despite progress in a number of areas, the insurgency was spreading.
Levels of violence were escalating. Political progress was at a virtual standstill…A sense of fear
and terror grew through the summer as the violence began to tear apart the very fabric of Iraqi
society.”37 Historical analogies that compared Iraq to Vietnam began to resonate at home and
support for the war had waned dramatically.

The urgency of the security needs was essentially meeting head on with the strength of the
value pattern of society. With the mid-term elections favoring the Democratic Party, there was a
sense that President Bush had to change the direction in Iraq. As Colonel Pete Mansoor, General
Petraeus’ then executive officer, noted, “Sensing that the time for a change in strategy had come, and pressured by the Democratic victory in Congressional mid-term elections, President Bush seized on the ‘clear, hold, build approach to the war,’ abandoning the enemy-centric approach – which was synonymous with the American way of war. The strength of societal pressures to uphold the “never again” dictate led policymakers to develop an approach that argued kinetic operations can often have a contrary effect, increasing violence against foreign forces and indigenous populations therefore requiring a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency.39

Returning counterinsurgency doctrine to the market place of ideas, however, required constructing doctrine that met the functional imperative’s requirements as well as the dominant views of society. General Petraeus recognized the urgency of the situation on the ground in Iraq, but he equally understood America’s disillusionment with the war effort. In his mind, building a socially acceptable doctrine was contingent on broad acceptance, and as he recalled within the context of Vietnam the military did not have the trust of the American public, he felt obligated to maintain that trust, and in some instances restore it. Petraeus noted that, “But those returning from Vietnam often were not treated as the heroes they were. Recalling that, those of us in the military today are thankful beyond words that the American people seem to have such high regard and affection for their men and women in uniform.”40 Consequently, Petraeus knew gaining acceptance for the counterinsurgency doctrine meant expending some of his own personal capital, but he would do so by building broad support for it.

General Petraeus was concerned about getting the “big ideas” right and therefore shared the initial draft with some of his most trusted advisors in academe for comment, to include Eliot Cohen who suggested much of the monograph be rewritten and urged a concerted effort.41 General Petraeus understood that the new doctrine would be a hard sell, particularly given the
American experience in counterinsurgency, and therefore set out to include a diverse group to refine the manual and broaden its acceptance. Petraeus notes: “We said, let’s have a big tent. I’d rather have people inside the tent and participating.”42 Crane also recalls the general’s concerns regarding the acceptance of the manual, he notes:

“It (“big tent approach”) was designed to garner all possible support for the whole effort, not just the legitimacy centric approach. He knew he would need a wide base of support for all he wanted to do, and he wanted to prove to the world the Army was serious about being a learning institution.”43

With the draft manual in hand, General Petraeus held a conference at Leavenworth in February 2006 that included journalists, human rights advocates, academics, and practitioners of counterinsurgency, each adding to the content of the final version of the manual. Prior to the final draft being published a copy was leaked, whereby members of academe, the media, military, and politicians gave critique and further enhanced the final product, “finding balance between the discriminate targeting of irreconcilable insurgents and the persuasion of less committed enemies to give up the fight with the political, economic, and informational elements of power.”44 Widely reviewed and lauded for its inclusive approach, and centered on the human dimension of warfare, General Petraeus had built into the manual the broad consensus necessary at a time of social upheaval in American domestic politics. He notes:

“We sought to broaden the usual pool of participants involved in drafting a doctrinal manual. In doing so, we engaged not just members of our military and partner militaries, but also diplomats, aid workers, representatives of NGOs and human rights groups, think tank members, journalists, and, also, of course, those with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. These individuals formed something of a guiding coalition for the
development of the manual and our overall process of change. Pundits even developed a phrase for those who contributed to the manual and embraced its concepts. They called us ‘COINdinistas.’”

Further, General Petraeus suggested that the wide dissemination of the draft manual not only helped to broaden consensus over its need, though very contentious, it also ensured that the contents of the manual captured those ideas used in previous counterinsurgencies. They highlighted, for example, ideas often antithetical to the U.S. military, such as: focusing on security of the population; living among the people to do so; holding and building in areas that have been cleared of the enemy; and promoting reconciliation, among others.

Shortly after the U.S. Army/Marine publication of new counterinsurgency manual was released, American, British, French, and German doctrine writers convened at a workshop in Paris to discuss counterinsurgency and a number of critiques (to include Edward Luttwak’s argument to model counterinsurgency after the Romans and Nazis approach to “out-terrorize the insurgents”). As Crane notes: “American, British, German, and French doctrine writers unanimously rejected such an approach, based on international law, the realities of the current media environment, and a shared conviction that such an approach is counterproductive.”

Crane suggests that such an approach would be detrimental to American ethical principles and would erode support for the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as he notes: “For Americans especially, maintaining home front support is a key factor.” Thus, the war that stirred public discourse and “never again” during the 1970s got the Army’s attention, shifting its focus away from counterinsurgency doctrine. And in the first part of the new millennium, the American public yet again has been stirred by the images of war, which essentially led the Army back to counterinsurgency. But the question is for how long?
CONCLUSION

In terms of this research’s broader purpose, the new counterinsurgency case offers several important conclusions. First, as in the previous cases, realism, organizational culture and bureaucratic approaches partially explain doctrinal content, continuity, and change. Realism explains the urgency attributed to Iraq, and organizational culture and bureaucratic politics the unaltering attachment to conventional warfare where it does not fit – the Army’s view that well disciplined soldiers fitted with the right technology can equally apply its “essence” of “fighting the nations wars” to unconventional warfare and low-intensity operations. Second, the counterinsurgency case is the exception that proves the rule. The absence of counterinsurgency doctrine prior to 9/11 is best understood by the dominant views that emerged during and after the Vietnam War. The Army’s doctrine, leading up to the Global War on Terror, “which focused on a pristine, depopulated desert environment far removed from the political, social, and cultural aspects of war, was based on the assumption that U.S forces would not be used beyond the strategic aim of restoring territory to a sovereign from another state aggressor.” Conversely, its return was the result of competing views during the Iraq war and the dominant images that drew strong analogies to Vietnam that led, in traceable ways, to changes in Army doctrine as it did during the 1970s and 1980s. Essentially, public discourse got the Army’s attention, and shifted its focus to new concrete developments in counterinsurgency doctrine.

Finally, counterinsurgency and all that it entails represents a largely unwelcome component to the preferred American way of war. The new Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, requires civilian and military policymakers and American political culture to revolutionize its thinking regarding the conduct of warfare in the 21st century. Jeffery Record, at the Air War College posits that American counterinsurgency efforts must account for the possibility of failure in
nearly every attempt, because the military tends not to be structured or motivated to conduct it, and Americans tend to be averse to limited wars where national interests and objectives are not obvious.\textsuperscript{49} The counterinsurgency manual makes clear that an Army accustomed to unsurpassed technologies, short operational missions, and low casualties, will have to adjust doctrinally and take greater risks if it is to succeed in the new operational environment – which is tied to both the complex strategic aims of counterinsurgency and the tactical vulnerability of immersing our forces into the populations of indigenous cultures.\textsuperscript{50}

Overall, the last decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed some of the consequences of purging counterinsurgency doctrine and lessons learned after Vietnam. Although AirLand Battle of the 1980s and transition to a full spectrum approach in the 1990s enabled important military successes, the combination of the two caused the U.S. to apply the doctrine “we liked” to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of the doctrine we needed. This tension between the functional and societal imperatives demanded a Herculean effort to develop a viable, population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine while fighting complex, violent, and resource-intensive wars in two places. Key leaders and thinkers leveraged experiences from the field and history into current doctrine (through the Army’s professional schools) and back out to the field again – essentially flying the plane while fixing it (or at least conducting emergency maintenance to keep the aircraft at a safe altitude).

\textbf{Notes}

\textsuperscript{1} Dr. John A. Bonin interview, June 2008
\textsuperscript{2} General David H. Petraeus, “The Surge of Ideas: COINdinistas and Change in the U.S. Army in 2006,” American Enterprise Institute Speech (May 2006). This speech was developed by General Petraeus and his Commander’s Initiatives Group, U.S. Central Command. While serving on his personal staff, this speech was often referenced and used to explain the origins of the ideas and the manual’s development.
7 George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequence,” Speech delivered to the Citadel, South Carolina (September 23, 1999)
8 Ibid, p. 3
9 President George W. Bush, June 1, 2002, West Point, New York.
10 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, p.6
16 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006
18 General Eric Shinseki testimony to U.S. Congress, 2003
26 General Jack Keane on the Jim Lehrer News Hour, 18 Apr 2006
29 John Nagl, Interview with the author, August 14, 2011
34 Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor, U.S. Army War College, interview (Apr 2008). Dr. Bonin is a retired Army Colonel and now serves on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Bonin has been a prominent policymaker and author of Army Doctrine and helped author the 2008 version of FM 3.0, Operations.
35 Ibid, p.300
36 John Gallagher, “Islamist-Influenced Insurgency: The Importance of Coverage and Control (West Point, New York: unpublished paper, June 2004). This paper was part of a dialogue with General Petraeus in the months prior
to commencing development of the Counterinsurgency manual and presented several concepts later applied in Iraq. Transformation / manpower point from Dr. Hans Binnendijk, National Defense University in a speech at Cantigny Estate in Wheaton, IL 22 April 2004.


39 John A. Nagl, Interview with author, August 14, 2011


43 Conrad Crane, Interview with author, October 29, 2011.


48 Ibid, p.6


50 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. pp. 1-26-27. Here, the manual discusses the various paradoxes that soldiers and marines will face in counterinsurgency operations. Some paradoxes include: More protection may equal less security; more force may be less effective; more successful a counterinsurgency, the less force can be used and more risk must be accepted, and sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

Carl von Clausewitz

In the above quotation, Clausewitz captures the complex nature of war, the importance of recognizing the type of warfare that must be undertaken, and the challenge of this research. In the post-Vietnam era, U.S. military doctrine retreated from costly, protracted, and typically ambiguous counterinsurgency/unconventional operations—despite near-continuous demand (functional imperative) for this kind of warfare in various forms among America’s many threats. Tension between this functional imperative and the public’s conception and dominant view of an American way of war (societal imperative) more reminiscent of World War II has shaped the dialectic between civilian-military policy makers and the American people since Vietnam. Thus, the challenge of this research is to understand the origin of “old mistakes” in order to avoid disconnects between the imperatives of the international system, public support for the use of American military force, and the capabilities of U.S. instruments of national power. But analysis of past doctrine, coupled with today’s debate, offers little comfort for the way ahead. To the contrary: as major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close, careful analysis and deliberate action are required to avoid the mistakes of the past
– otherwise, as Michael Shafer wrote, “the underlying causes of failure will remain unchanged.”

This research addresses this pessimistic outlook and the possibility of an alternate way forward as the debate evolves in the halls of the White House and Pentagon. Stated succinctly, civilian and military policymakers understood that unconventional enemies are a persistent and significant threat to American national security, but aligned with the public’s strong views for state-on-state warfare, thus often prescribing the wrong doctrine, and in some cases over-estimating the role of technology in warfare.

Consequently, after Vietnam Army doctrine experts responded to the dominant views of political culture which shaped a way forward for the American way of warfare. And today, we face a similar dilemma due to the heavy costs and sacrifices from the Afghan and Iraq wars on American political culture. Although realism, organizational culture, and bureaucratic politics offer important insights into explanations of U.S. warfighting policy and doctrine during this period, as Rid and Keaney note, “War…is an expression of the national interests and the popular will, albeit perhaps the most extreme one. It cannot be separated from a nation’s expression of its political goals.” The extent to which there is contradiction between the functional imperative and doctrine, therefore, is more accurately explained through the unit-level variable of American political-culture and the strength of its value pattern.

After Vietnam, national political support for foreign policy, and the military in particular, wavered to the extent that policymakers defined the strategic context of action in terms that were amenable to cultural norms and values, rather than necessitated by functional requirements. Indeed, “National Political support for any use of military force
is one of the most fundamental elements of strategic reasoning, not something that is nice to have and unpleasant not to have." This is not to say that the doctrines pursued were entirely incorrect, but that policymakers pursued doctrines contrary to the more probable form of warfare to meet certain cultural and cognitive needs. The continuity of unconventional / low-intensity forms of warfare and their omission from U.S. military doctrine for nearly four decades therefore rests squarely with how policymakers perceive, frame, and narrate the external environment as a function of cultural value.

Before turning to norms and values, or broader cultural assumptions, it is important to relocate the claims of a cultural-cognitive approach among the alternative and equally plausible explanations for doctrinal content, continuity, and change. As argued in chapters 1 and 2, a cultural-cognitive approach must demonstrate that individual policymakers’ ideas are consistent with the societal imperative arising from the social forces and ideologies dominant within society in order to show independent causal influence on the content of foreign policy and state doctrines. To do so, the research compared the independent causal variables from four differing international relations approaches – realism, organizational culture, bureaucratic politics, and cultural-cognitive – and the extent to which they explain policymakers’ ideas for doctrinal content, continuity, and change in the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 eras. More specifically, the research sought to determine areas where the timing and content of doctrine revealed continuity or contradiction with functional, institutional, and societal imperatives.

The comparison yielded three themes. First, the cases revealed the relative durability of policymakers’ ideas regarding the American way of war. Though each of the eras
presented varying degrees of the same problem (low-intensity warfare), policymakers had an unfaltering attachment to conventional state-on-state warfare. Second, purely systemic level theories are indeterminate of foreign policy outcomes, such as the neorealist’s balance of power theory. To understand the level or extent the functional imperative induces pressure on foreign policy decisions requires a theory that emphasizes the filtering of systemic factors through the perceptions of policymakers. As Taliaferro, et al, note, “Unit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states – great powers as well as lesser states – to respond to systemic imperatives.” Factors inside the state, then, such as culture, can determine the “finite” possibilities available to policymakers for responses to external threats. Third, then, and most important, the cases show the interdependence of the societal imperative or dominant views of political culture with policymakers’ priorities. Where counterinsurgency and stability operations were required, foreign policy reflected changing political cultural views to the extent that institutions carrying out the objectives of the American state tended to succumb to the dominant views contained within culture. Policymakers were therefore inclined to pursue doctrines that expressed and conveyed the norms and values most important to the collective at the time, which did not necessarily result in a tight policy match with the dictates of the international system. Conversely, where counterinsurgency and stability operations were not required (or were not executed by policy decision), such as the 1991 Gulf War, harmony existed between foreign policy decisions and the societal imperative, thus making way for a rather stable set of ideas.

To review, realist analysis assumes that foreign policy and doctrine reflect the “perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of
scarce resources and pervasive uncertainly.” Systemic forces, such as relative power distributions therefore set the parameters for doctrinal content, continuity and change. During the period from 1968 through 1986, policymakers were faced with variants of the same security threat. However, policy changed from a strategy of containment, which initially focused on providing assistance to weak allies through counterinsurgency doctrine, to a strategy that sought to deter and compel the opposing superpower on the European continent through conventional warfare doctrine. And after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policymakers pursued variants of a conventional warfare approach applied to low-intensity environments like Bosnia and Kosovo.

However, the realities of the post-World War II and Soviet conventional-nuclear power periods made apparent that policymakers could not win by mass forces and firepower alone. This made more acute the problem of low-intensity warfare. But policymakers showed an unflinching attachment to conventional warfare, in light of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Beirut bombings, the invasion of Grenada, the insurgencies in El Salvador and Nicaragua, peace-keeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, several emergency non-combatant evacuations, the incipient stages of terrorism, and the 1990 invasion and regime change in Panama. As Rid and Keaney, among others, note,

“Even when engaged in unconventional counterinsurgency operations, such as Vietnam, the ultimate enemy – and the point of orientation – remained a conventional one, the USSR; although nuclear weapons and deterrence added another, altogether different, unconventional level.”
Indeed, policymakers recognized that the concept of “limited war – something short of Armageddon – emerged during Korea and Vietnam.” But equally, limited war raised political cultural questions: “what political goals are sought by the use of arms; what does it mean to win; how is winning to be accomplished; what price are we willing to pay?” And after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which gave way to increased global instability, policymakers merely pared down the principle strategic problem of the Cold War with an over reliance on technology, against the backdrop of increased deployments in support of low-intensity operations. Again, policymakers were cognizant of the functional imperative, but they ultimately shed themselves of its exigency. Realist analysis, therefore, does not entirely explain the motivations and timing of doctrinal content, continuity, and change during the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War periods.

The case studies, however, reveal the institutional imperative or the organization’s “essence” to define the strategic context of action in terms of a conventional warfare requirement. The Cold War, and in particular the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, provided the Army with “relative convenience” of focusing doctrinal efforts toward state-on-state warfare, “and therefore the imperative of concentrating doctrine and forces that triggered and justified staggering investments in conventional fighting power.” The inattention to low-intensity warfare after Vietnam therefore was more directly linked to the “essence” of the institution, its dominant group, and funding – “a powerful driver of innovation and doctrinal orientation.” Thus, post-Vietnam revisions were the result of armor’s prominence after the war, and key policymakers who wore its insignia, to reorient the Army away from low-intensity warfare. As John Nagl notes,
“The essence of the American Army, in the eyes of its career officers, is ground combat by organized regular divisional units. Although the American Army tolerates the existence of subcultures that do not directly contribute to the essence of the organization, these peripheral organizations do not receive the support accorded to the Army core constituencies of armor, infantry, and artillery. It is these combat arms that exert most influence on the way the Army approaches conflicts.”

And given the constraints of a particularly tight budget climate, policymakers pursued strategies that elevated the organization’s importance vis à vis the other services to ensure equitable shares of defense apportionments. Yet, organizations have to mobilize resources from domestic society, often requiring policymakers to seek consensus outside the walls of the institution to gain support. In the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 cases, approval for doctrinal content, continuity, and change closely paralleled public consensus – which included key members of Congress, academe, the think-tank community, and the media, among others. But more important, doctrine reflected the conceptions and dominant views of the American way of war in the public mind, the extent to which the content of doctrine and the jurisdiction of the organization were defined. In each of the cases, policymakers shared the same perceptions regarding the limitations of military power and its uses in support of foreign policy. More specifically, senior military leaders – from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chief of Army Staff, Training and Doctrine Commander to mid-level officers – believed that the external environment included the threat of low-intensity warfare, but were unwilling to commit
resources due to the constraints imposed by broader cultural assumptions and the
American way of war.

To the laymen’s eye, the institutional imperative (organizational culture and
bureaucratic politics) “seems” to explain policymakers’ interests and proclivity to focus
document on fighting the nation’s wars within the specific context of high intensity
conventional warfare. However, a cultural-cognitive approach is “required to understand
how policymakers perceived security threats” and “assessed possible responses to
them.”\textsuperscript{15} Here it is important to understand the two-level game that policymakers are
confronted with and how the societal imperative that arises from cultural (norms and
values) and cognitive (rules and models) standards define the policy space of the
institution and, more important, the American way of war. Without reference to
policymakers’ understandings of these standards, alternative explanations of doctrine are
indeterminate.\textsuperscript{16}

In part, international relations theory has only recently considered \textit{culture} as a possible
approach to the study of war and foreign policy. As a discipline it has placed a premium
on parsimony, where simple abstractions are preferred over “thick descriptions.” The
state has therefore been the center of the theoretical matrix, rather than unit-level
variables such as culture. But even neorealists recognize the importance of moving
beyond abstract generalizations, thus considering unit-level variables and the influence of
domestic societal actors and the degree to which they intervene on policymakers’
assessments of international threats.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, changes in the distribution of power alone
cannot explain the anomalies and variations of state decision-making. As Taliaferro, et
al, note, “the policies states pursue are rarely objectively efficient or predictable based
upon a purely systemic analysis.” More generally, the cases demonstrate that policymakers’ choices and responses to their external environment were byproducts of their understandings of the cultural milieu. In each case, culture defined the content of doctrine and the organization’s bias toward conventional state-on-state warfare. While there was recognition of low-intensity warfare, policymakers’ ideas were constrained by the domestic political cultural context of action and the dominant views of society. As several key policymakers have noted, “the American nation is culturally disposed to quick conclusions – impossible in low-intensity warfare – and bound by moral scruples that discipline our power – and so paralyze us before unscrupulous enemies.”

This observation is particularly important given the findings of this research. The longer, slower-moving, and more painful that war becomes, along with the problems that arise from its “moral syntax,” the greater the pressure from the societal imperative to shift away from unconventional forms of war toward warfare America likes – most notably WWII, with a modern expression in the victorious and celebratory conduct and conclusion of 1991 Gulf War. As Sarah Sewall notes, “even when an intervention stems from a realist assessment of national interests, the cause to which the foreign counterinsurgent commits must be perceived by its own population as not immoral.” Consequently, the conduct of counterinsurgency is counterintuitive to American understandings of warfare. Sam Sarkesian, among other notable commentators, believes the Army adopted the World War II model as the standard for future conflicts to overcome the social trauma induced by Vietnam. Doctrine that espoused massing large
armies and firepower therefore met specific rules and models that were familiar to policymakers, but equally it served a normative function of returning the institution to conducting “good wars” or “wars we liked.” As Andrew Krepinevich told the Senate Armed Services Committee during a 2007 testimony,

“Following the Vietnam War our ground forces were optimized for conventional warfare. The slogan ‘No More Vietnams’ reflected the military’s desire to avoid protracted, ill-defined conflicts. General William DePuy, one of the Army’s leading thinkers, viewed the 1973 Middle East War as a godsend of sorts, as it enabled the Army to reorient its thinking on the greatest threat to U.S. security, the Soviet Army in Central Europe. The attitude of ‘No More Vietnams’ was heartily seconded by the American people and the country’s civilian leadership. It spawned the Weinberger and Powell doctrines of the 1980s and the ‘Exit Strategies’ that obsessed political and military leaders during the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the 1990s. The force was organized, trained and equipped to fight short, decisive wars. When this was not possible, the intent was to set clear limits on the duration of U.S. force deployments and avoid another ‘quagmire’ like Vietnam.”

The Active Defense of 1976 served as a bridge, moving U.S. doctrine away from the style of fighting operations that Vietnam required. However, that doctrine did not present “enough” of a break from the past which led to the AirLand Battle doctrine that emerged in the 1980s and served the Army well in the desert during the 1991 Gulf War. But the war’s political objectives did not include ousting Saddam Hussein from power, which avoided fighting an insurgency and extensive nation-building. Had we sought in 1991
the same policy ends we sought in 2003 – regime change – our lack of investment in
counterinsurgency for nearly 20 years prior would have become apparent. In fact, senior
decision-makers at the time, like General Powell and Vice president Cheney, were
mindful of these inadequacies when recommending that U.S. forces remain outside
Baghdad. As Cheney stated,

“The idea of going into Baghdad…wasn't anything I was enthusiastic about. I felt
there was a real danger here that you would get bogged down in a long drawn-out
conflict…that [we] hadn't talked to the American people about…Maybe it's part
of our national character; we like to have these problems nice and neatly wrapped
up, put a ribbon around it. You deploy a force, you win the war, and the problem
goes away, and it doesn't work that way in the Middle East.”

For a time, the absence of low-intensity operations masked the limits of our
counterinsurgency capabilities – limitations that were partially revealed in Somalia and
later on the post-9/11 battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S. military successes in low-intensity environments in Bosnia and Kosovo during
the 1990s seemed to confirm that AirLand Battle precepts coupled with superior
technology and force projection capacity could tackle the full spectrum of threats
America faced. However, the reality of the U.S. military’s near-complete purge of
counterinsurgency doctrine and lessons learned post-Vietnam became evident as
persistent and deadly insurgent threats emerged in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Counterinsurgency’s return to Army doctrine in 2006 was, by in large, due to the
intensity of the conflict in Iraq and emerging complications from initial efforts in
Afghanistan. However, understandably, dominant views of society questioned both our
involvement and conduct of these wars. Indeed, the strength of the value pattern as witnessed by the wavering support at home elevated the debate to near piercing levels. Historical analogies that tied Iraq to the failure of Vietnam made any level on consensus difficult, but – perhaps counter-intuitively – it also provided policymakers with a powerful “never again” justification for the continued allocation of resources. The first Gulf War, had, in part, restored a degree of credibility and trust between civilian and military leaders and the people, which enabled military policymakers the policy space to provide their “best professional advice” – though counterinsurgency was a hard sell to the American public. General Petraeus and his writing team were cognizant of this, which, as other doctrinal revisions revealed, required building consensus across a broad swath of the American body-politic confirming an important condition to enable doctrinal change: broad public consensus, inside and outside the institution.

**Facing the Future**

There is little comfort that doctrine will accurately reflect the varied threats comprising America’s security environment as policymakers presently sit on opposing sides of two uniquely different and competing paradigms. The emergence of these paradigms are similar to those that arose after Vietnam, since, much like that war, Afghanistan and Iraq have starkly divided Americans on the use of military power. On the one hand, policymakers seek to advance the views of the traditionalists, whose ideas are tied to a “threat-oriented” approach or “realist” worldview that reorients doctrine to coerce and compel an adversary representing the greatest strategic risk in the shortest amount of time. On the other hand, there is the proactive approach that is more in line
with the Wilsonian-idealistic worldview. This paradigm forwards specific actions that preclude conflict by changing the conditions that underlie it. This approach suggests that through coordinated action and cooperation, conflicts may be avoided at less relative cost than the former.

The traditionalist approach leads to the development of high-end conventional capabilities that are designed to deter, coerce, or compel would-be adversaries, aimed primarily at near-peer competitors. This preferred paradigm is not unlike the one that emerged after Vietnam, which divorces itself from “lesser” forms of war and maintains a clear demarcation between political and military affairs. The idealist approach calls for a robust set of niche capabilities that are geared toward low-intensity warfare, which, as interpreted by constituents of Huntington’s normal theory, is undesirable and requires the military to expand its activities into political affairs. The origins of the conventional warfare paradigm, however, lie not in the imperatives induced by the international political system, but as a function of the American experience at war and a desire to shed the exigencies of low-intensity warfare. And since the proactive paradigm may require long commitments that entail high costs, and often only brittle political success, policymakers generally are averse to such an approach since it conjures up memories of a period in American history that few consider worthy. The desire to focus on a near-peer competitor to reorient doctrine away from the more pressing problems of terrorism and insurgencies, therefore, reveals how policymakers perceive, frame, and narrate the external environment as a function of cultural value.

Consequently, the current Administration prefers the traditionalist approach. As the war has recently closed in Iraq, and Afghanistan begins to wind down, the Administration
has given new strategic guidance, which is already reorienting the Army away from low-intensity warfare. The new strategic guidance states that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” but instead “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Though there is disagreement that the US is “abandoning” the ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations, “officials are shedding some of the force structure – meaning people – that was added to the Army and Marines after the 9/11 attacks that was used to wage the counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan.” As Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter notes, “No one wants to get into another Iraq or Afghanistan any time soon.” And as Rid and Keaney note, “But for political and psychological reasons that are already revealing themselves, it is unlikely that the United States or any of its allies will commit to an ambitious, large-scale war among the people any time soon…The price of being bogged down in two wars at the same time is coming to be perceived as high, perhaps prohibitively high – while the benefits of doing so remains more elusive…”

Moreover, during a January 2012 conference, hosted by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, Army senior leaders debated a return to doctrine reminiscent of AirLand Battle. One panelist noted that many officers are “nostalgic” for the Army’s “AirLand Battle” concept that dates back to the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, which focused on defeating the Soviet Union in Central Europe. He noted, “Both visions offer the clarity of a specific threat, a specific location, a simple narrative to present to the American Congress and the American people.”
However, “it is probably safe to say that Afghanistan will not be the last major counterinsurgency that will entangle NATO’s largest armies”\(^{30}\) which will require the Army to retain, and not dispense of, low-intensity warfare doctrine. And as the conference equally revealed, “By contrast, if you take the national security priorities recently released, there’s a bunch of things out there. We need to pick one, and the most important thing is focusing on hybrid threats”\(^{31}\) — threats that combine the use of guerrilla tactics and firepower of the state. Indeed, the shift in warfare that has been dominated by unconventional / low-intensity warfare away from conventional state-on-state war suggests a requirement to maintain current capabilities if America wishes to meet the challenges presented by the functional imperative. The enemies of Iraq and Afghanistan are not gone, and there is no shortage of similar adversaries seeking to establish themselves anywhere the “shadows” on weakly governed spaced will allow it. As Rid and Keaney note,

“Non-Western states and non-state actors threatened by prospects of regime change or military attack are likely to adopt highly developed strategies of insurgency and irregular campaigns, The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were fought for the most part against non-state actors waging loosely organized and weakly funded insurgencies. States lacking financial and military resources to field conventionally dominant military forces are likely to adopt many of the remarkably successful unconventional tactics seen on the battlefield against American and Western forces.”\(^{32}\)

The conditions that led the Army to purge itself of counterinsurgency doctrine after Vietnam consequently resemble that of today as U.S. forces return home from Iraq and
Afghanistan as the Pentagon begins to shift its focus to the Asia-Pacific region. The effects of the Vietnam War, and today the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, on American political-culture and its institutions suggest that the dominant views of the American way of war are again being called into question, as Krepinevich told the committee,

“To be sure, there is the possibility that a ‘No More Iraqs’ mood will dominate our thinking in the coming years. If by this we mean that we should not repeat the errors that have foiled our efforts to succeed in Iraq, the slogan is an apt one. If, however, the phrase is meant to indicate that the U.S. military should get out of the business of developing a strong competency in irregular warfare, this would almost certainly be a serious error in judgment. Yet there are some who argue that Iraq and Afghanistan are ‘one-offs’—that given the difficulties we have experienced in these wars, we will see a repeat of the ‘No More Vietnams’ attitude that dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly three decades after that war.”33

Though there is significant danger in not being ready to fight our nation’s conventional wars, and improving the balance between our preparedness for unconventional and conventional threats to reflect current realities in the security environment is prudent, there is significant danger in not having doctrine adequate to meet the challenges of the range of unconventional / low-intensity warfare threats when called to do so. As history has revealed, the Army is most likely to find itself conducting low-intensity warfare operations, as opposed to fighting the once-in-a-generation state-on-state war. While America prefers to define war with a discernable beginning and end, the enemies that we have pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan persist while simultaneously
seeking out other favorable locations from which to exploit “alienated people in the underdeveloped world with the motive, the means and the organizational skills to create disorder on a large scale.”

Huba Wass de Czege noted that in meeting the challenges of the day that “no doctrine is perfect, but getting it right often enough is strategically important.” Dire consequences followed for the United States in 2003 because heavy investments in its high-tech conventional weapons could not neutralize insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. American doctrine was based on flawed post-Gulf War interpretations of technological change and its impact on the nature of war. But most important, societal pressures within the American state can at times, “like switchmen, determine the tracks along which action has been pushed.” The important question, then, for the immediate future (with direct impact on American security in the many years ahead) is: Will the pressure from the societal imperative to again move away from the high costs and ambiguous gains of counterinsurgency cause the U.S. military to neglect the doctrine and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan? In light of this research, it is expected that there will be a policy and doctrine shift (along with associated resources and training) toward conventional warfare. However, because the U.S. Army of the post-Vietnam era has become much more of a learning organization, because the irregular threats to America remain ever-present throughout the international community, and because the U.S. is acutely aware of the massive costs (financial and human) or having to resurrect a wartime doctrine from nearly nothing – America will not shift so drastically toward conventional warfare that it ignores the hard fought and historic lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, one could say that repeating the mistake of purging U.S. military doctrine of
counterinsurgency lessons learned after a decade of complex and brutal war is America’s new “never again.”

NOTES

5 Ibid, p.256
6 D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, pp.276-277
7 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 4
8 Ibid, p.4
9 Rid and Keaney, *Understanding Counterinsurgency*, p.257
11 Ibid, p.vi
12 Ibid, p.257
13 Ibid, p.257
15 D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, p.279
16 D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, p.277
17 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp.2-4
18 Ibid, p.4
19 In D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, p.288
20 Ibid, p.260
26 cite National Security Strategy guidance, 2012
28 Ibid
30 Rid and Keaney, *Understanding Counterinsurgency*, p.257
32 Rid and Keaney, *Understanding Counterinsurgency*, pp.257-258
34 Ibid, p.10
36 Max Weber, *The Social Psychology of World Religions*
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