QUEBEC AND NEW AMSTERDAM TO 1664:
A COMPARATIVE NETWORK ANALYSIS

By

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This study examines the techniques by which the French and Dutch secured preliminary information about the New World, claimed possession of territory in North America, and developed policies to secure possession against European competitors. It traces the development of French and Dutch colonial networks with an eye toward understanding the intentions of the colonizing powers. Finally, this study analyzes the dominant and significant flows of people, ideas, and goods along the colonial networks of the New France and New Netherland in order to map the interconnections of these colonies with the larger world. Tracing these flows reveals that the networks to which Quebec and New Amsterdam belonged were actually quite different, even though the dominant outflow—furs—was the same.

The thesis of the dissertation is that for reasons related to European politics, French and Dutch policymakers adopted the principle that settlement was the only legal and practical means of possessing territory in the Americas and that it was the intention of the respective metropolitan governments to create agriculturally based settlement colonies in New France and New Netherland. Moreover, this study proposes that because of competition from other European nations, “linear” trading-post colonies were
too weak to survive in North America, not only because they could not defend themselves, but also because they were not self-sustaining and did not become markets for manufactured goods from the metropole. This dissertation also asserts that although both New France and New Netherland made strides toward developing agriculturally based settlement colonies, the Dutch succeeded far better than the French because, as a node on a diffuse network, New Amsterdam was better able to attract settlers and connect to a wider range of markets than Quebec, which was more or less a node on a specific network. Finally, this study demonstrates that while both Quebec and New Amsterdam began to make the transition from simple primate centers on extractive dendritic/solar networks to gateway centers on more complex networks, New Amsterdam was far more advanced in this process and was rapidly facilitating the production of a new network of towns in its immediate hinterlands.
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INTRODUCTION

During the seventeenth century, two fur-trading colonies were established in the eastern part of North America, one by France along the St. Lawrence River, the other by the Dutch Republic along the Hudson. In as much as the fur trade has been seen as the economic backbone of each of these colonies, one would expect to find some similarities between them. But the similarities extend well beyond the trade in beaver pelts. In each case, the metropolitan government hoped to use its colony to challenge Spanish interests in the Western Hemisphere. Quebec and New Amsterdam were established as imperial outposts for expanding European powers, and in each case a private trading company under the sanction of the metropolitan government was given the task of planting and governing the colony for the purpose of challenging not only Spain’s economic hegemony, but also its *political* and *cultural* domination of the Western Hemisphere. In terms of economics, each settlement was dependent upon trade with the indigenous population. In each case, too, the Europeans set up a provincial capital that enjoyed seaborne communication with the metropolitan capital and served as an entrepôt for goods flowing between the European capital and a fur-trading settlement located farther into the hinterlands of North America.

Although there are no direct comparative studies of early Quebec and New Amsterdam, historians who have studied these colonial towns individually have, naturally enough, emphasized the fur trade as the *raison d’être* of their very existence. The lack of any comparative study, however, leaves a key question wide open. While the French prospered more from the fur trade than did the Dutch, New Amsterdam, during the period
under discussion, grew faster than Quebec and became a much more valuable asset. By 1664, New Amsterdam had achieved a degree of economic independence and status that far outpaced Quebec, in spite of the fact that the Dutch West India Co. never made a profit from the fur trade. Even its transfer from Dutch to English rule in September 1664 had little negative effect on New Amsterdam, which seemed to retain most of its far-flung network connections to the Atlantic World and to Native-American communities in the surrounding hinterlands. Quebec, by contrast, seemed stunted in its development, and had to be rescued from the outside by the French king.

The key question for this study, then, is why, if both colonies were set up, at least initially, for the purpose of pursuing profit through the fur trade, did the colony that prospered least in that trade outpace its competitor in terms of population growth and overall economic development? The answer likely lies outside of any study of the fur trade alone and perhaps outside of the colonies themselves and even beyond the bounds of the empires to which they belonged. To move beyond the superficial similarities between the two colonies and to begin to gain some perspective on the very significant differences between them requires an understanding of the landscapes in which these colonies operated, as well as of the global web of networks to which each belonged. Network analysis, which has been usefully employed to understand the development of colonial economies in Africa and South America, can provide the kind of broad perspective needed to understand the key differences in how Quebec and New Amsterdam related to the larger Atlantic World. By this means, the present study hopes to account for the difference in the rate of growth and in the self-sufficiency of these two colonies.
Until recently, American historians tended to view colonies in relative isolation as distinct bounded objects and gave relatively little attention to trans-Atlantic connections. The recent emphasis on Atlantic World history has partly remedied these deficiencies, but individual colonies in this context are still usually seen as part of a bounded European empire. In such studies—Jaap Jacobs’ recent work *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America* and Oliver A. Rink’s *Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York*, to cite two examples—the relationship between the mother country and the colony is the focus.¹ This approach, though, is too limited because nearly all North-American colonies were open to multiple influences—cultural, religious, economic, social, and political—from an array of sources outside the empire to which they belonged politically. A key to understanding any colonial enterprise, then, is to determine the extent and persistence of these “outside” influences.

Some Atlantic World studies, such as those of Ira Berlin, have attempted to reach beyond the bounds of national empire to show the circulation of people, ideas, and goods throughout the Atlantic. These studies are useful, but their focus is not the development of colonies *per se*, and while the flows are elucidated, the colonies and the structure of empire tend to disappear. Still another approach, exemplified by the work of Allen W. Trelease and Donna Merwick in the case of New Netherland and of Matthew Dennis and Daniel K. Richter in the case of the Iroquois, looks carefully at the interactions between European colonists and Native Americans. These works, while they establish the connections and conflicts between indigenous peoples and the colonizers, tend to have the same deficiencies as those studies that view colonies in relative isolation.²
A network approach, by contrast, allows the historian to move beyond the serious limitations of more traditional colonial studies. The analysis of flows of people, goods, and ideas to and from the colonies, as well as of the generation, capture, and control of such flows, provides new insight into the interactions among Europeans, Africans, and Amerindians as they created colonial networks and attempted to exploit them in different ways. It also reveals the connections that these nodes—Quebec and New Amsterdam—made to the larger Atlantic World. In this way, a network analysis permits the historian to move beyond the bounded approach while keeping the colonies and the empires to which they belong in view. Moreover, a network approach permits an analysis of multiple influences—social, political, economic, and cultural—which is difficult to achieve when using any other methodology.

The question then arises: Which people, ideas, and goods will form the basis of this study? The question of flows of people seems simple enough. All people traveling to and from the colonies who can be identified ought to be of interest. The difficulty is how to categorize them. Most people have multifarious interests, all of which form some part of their identity. This means that any individual person can fall into several categories at once—Roman Catholic, farmer, German—or change categories over time. A soldier, for instance, may leave the service and take up farming in his adopted land or a farmer may give up agriculture, move to town, and open a tavern. Even the most diligent research may not overcome all of the difficulties involved in categorizing people. Any categorization must, therefore, be approximate, but will nevertheless prove useful in assessing the similarities and differences in the populations of New France and New Netherland with an eye to understanding how the demographic make-up of each colony.
affected its overall development. For the purposes of this study, reasonable categories for people would include religious affiliation, nationality or ethnicity, class/occupation, and gender.³

Ideas also flowed along these colonial networks, and a good argument could be made that the ideas people carry with them or come to form are the chief catalysts in shaping history. This study cannot be an exhaustive analysis of the history of ideas even in relation to these rather diminutive colonies in the period under discussion, but a network analysis of the flow of ideas and of attempts to control them provides new insight into how beliefs affected the colonization process. This study examines three categories of ideas that seem most germane to colonial development—economic, religious, and political.

In terms of the flow of goods, beaver pelts were obviously the most important commodity to be exported from Quebec and New Amsterdam. As a consequence, the fur trade has been the subject of many important studies, including, in the case of New France, a classic work by Harold A. Innis and, in the case of New Netherland, a more recent study by Van Cleaf Bachman. Neither of these studies, however, is entirely satisfactory. Innis gives rather short shrift to the early seventeenth century and does not really attempt to show whether the fur trade was in itself capable of financing colonial development. Bachman stops his account at 1638 when the WIC abandoned its monopoly. Paul Chrisler Phillips also contributed a two-volume comparative study of the North-American fur trade, which surveys the French, Dutch, and English trade. Unfortunately, Phillips’s treatment of the seventeenth century also tends to be superficial and is hampered by many inaccuracies.⁴ For the purpose of the present study, a relatively
short but comprehensive account of the French and Dutch fur trade was necessary to determine to what degree the trade supported the settlement effort.

While furs, along with tobacco, and timber, flowed out of North America, European manufactures, such as kettles, knives, awls, needles, firearms, liquor, and cloth, flowed in and must be given some consideration with an eye toward assessing whether the Native-American population in this early modern period provided a significant market for European manufactures. Some commodities, such as corn and wampum, traded locally, not only among various Indian groups, but also between the Native Peoples and the Europeans. The Dutch, at least, also created an inter-colonial regional trade, which included European manufactures, but also locally produced commodities, such as livestock, grain, and tobacco. Following the flow of such goods helps to answer important questions about why and how the French and Dutch colonies were sustained.

The aforementioned items all fall easily within the category of “goods,” but there are some problematic cases, chief of which are people. Both the Amerindians and the Europeans commoditized people as slaves, placing not only a cultural value on them, but an economic value as well. In both cultures, women, even when not technically enslaved, were also commoditized—as prostitutes, hostages, and sometimes even as wives for sale. Moreover, both cultures also placed a value—often expressed in economic terms—on death. Trade in human commodities, as horrific as this might be to our own sensibilities, must also be part of this study. The presence of slaves in sufficient numbers within the European colonies, particularly in agriculture, would suggest an intention to develop a “territorial” type colony.
Finally, though it falls outside of the broad framework of people, ideas, or goods, the flow of disease is briefly examined. Disease was “traded” and flowed along the colonial networks, even if it was not, in the main, intentional. It also had important lasting effects in shaping New France and New Netherland. Small pox, measles, and the flu, for instance, decimated the Huron peoples on whom the French depended for trade and significantly altered the patterns of society and war of the Iroquois, on whom the Dutch came to depend.

*Linear and territorial colonies, nodes and networks.*

In attempting to explain why Canada developed so differently from the United States, the political economist Harold A. Innis and the historian J.M.S. Careless looked back to the colonial economies of each nation and advanced the idea that the early Canadian settlements were part of a water-based network whose chief orientation was toward the European metropole. This theory was developed in contradistinction to Frederick Jackson Turner’s idea that American democracy grew out of the egalitarian experience of the frontier, where hardy individualists became independent farmers who could stand on their own two feet. As Stephen J. Hornsby has recently explained, Turner’s expanding frontier was dependent upon settling the land and farming. By contrast, the Canadian colonies were based upon the extraction of natural staples—fish and fur—and so required little settlement and virtually no expansion into the hinterlands. Hornsby has called the agriculturally based empire “territorial” and the staple-based, seaborne empire “linear.” He also posits a third type of colonial “space”—a
commercial space—which is intermediate between the territorial and the linear. This space depends upon the overseas sale of agriculture staples, but is also connected to the immediately contiguous hinterlands.\(^6\)

Hornsby’s tripartite division of colonial settlement presents many problems, the first of which is the lack of empirical evidence to show that there were any agricultural-settler areas that were not connected at least to regional markets, which were in turn tied to overseas markets in Africa, Europe, or the Caribbean. Even in the seventeenth century, when European policymakers and colonists spoke of agriculture, they meant, not just simple subsistence farming, but commercial agriculture that could supply a local or regional market and perhaps create a surplus for export. Nonetheless, the colonies that were dependent upon the fish and fur trades do seem distinct from land-based agricultural colonies. To this degree, the idea of linear colonies seems to have some limited descriptive use.

In Hornsby’s account, linear colonies, which were not based upon settled and, presumably, subsistence farming, included Newfoundland, the West Indies, and Hudson Bay. He describes the settlements along the St. Lawrence—Quebec and Montreal—as more linear than territorial at least as late as 1763. Although Hornsby does not say so, New Amsterdam, too, seems to have been primarily a linear colony by his definition, at least for the first half of its existence. Its closest links were by water to Fort Orange further up the Hudson and to Amsterdam in Europe, though it also served later as the command post for Dutch colonies in the Caribbean. Donna Merwick has emphasized the “along-shore” quality of Dutch colonization in a way that would support defining New Netherland as a linear colony. By comparing the operations of the Dutch West India
Company to those of the East India Company, while at the same time ignoring important
differences in the indigenous communities with which these respective companies traded,
she is able to assert that the Dutch intended to establish no more than a trading post at
New Amsterdam through which they would create a mutually beneficial trade with the
Native Peoples. In the process, the Dutch would make no further territorial claims.7

That New France and New Netherland were organized in linear fashion describes
the spatial orientation of the major European networks of which they formed a part.
Quebec was a node on a network that stretched from Montreal to Paris. New
Amsterdam was a node on a network that stretched from Fort Orange to Amsterdam. In
other words, the chief orientation of these colonies could be plotted along a single line.
The problem with the concept of linear colonies, though, is that while it reveals
something about the overall orientation of these outposts of empire, it tends toward
oversimplification. Each provincial capital actually became a node in a complex (or
diffuse) network and, in the case of New Amsterdam more than of Quebec, of multiple
complex networks. A further difficulty with the linear concept is that it does not
adequately link various levels of analysis, such as the local, regional, and global, nor does
it seriously consider flows of goods, people, and ideas beyond the dominant economic
flow—in this case, the fur trade. But to focus solely on the dominant, or the perceived
dominant flow, is insufficient for understanding the inherently dynamic nature of
colonies. The key question for this study, then, is: How can the similarities and
differences of the French and Dutch enterprises in North America be assessed?
Superficially, Quebec and New Amsterdam, when viewed from a traditional historical
perspective as distinct, bounded colonies, or even as part of a bounded European empire,
seem remarkably similar. But when each colony is studied as part of a larger network with connections beyond those with Native Peoples or with the European metropole, the differences between them begin to outweigh the similarities.

All of this begs the question: How do we define nodes and networks? One of the best explanations comes from Giovanni A. Rabino, a civil engineer and urban planner, and Sylvie Occelli, an economist. Nodes, they write, are “entities which are categorized by punctual attributes.” For the purposes of historical analysis, nodes can be persons, homes, hamlets, villages, towns, or cities. Nodes exist always as part of a network or networks. They have “punctual attributes” because they are entities where flows originate or end. Flows, in historical terms, can include flows of people, goods, or ideas. Nodes are where people, goods, and ideas collect as a result of an inflow on the network. They are also the places where people, goods, and ideas are reorganized to produce new outflows on the network to other nodes. A network consists of nodes and the flows between them.

Engineers and economists such as Rabino and Occelli also categorize the types of flows that connect one node with another as either “dominant” or “significant.” A dominant flow occurs when nodes on a specific network are “interlinked” by one main relationship. This main relationship “reflects the intrinsic characteristic of the node.” In other words, the dominant flow defines the node. So we might say that New France and New Amsterdam could be seen as linear colonies, not because they exist on single linear networks, but because they participate in a dominant flow characterized perhaps by the fur trade that stretched from Montreal to Paris or from Fort Orange to Amsterdam. And yet, both provinces also participated in other “significant flows.” Significant flows,
such as slaves brought from Africa or the Caribbean to New Amsterdam or religious ideas that flowed from Rome or Paris to Quebec, can be traced to show that Quebec and New Amsterdam interacted with nodes other than those on the dominant linear network. A significant flow is any that is substantial and frequent enough to indicate that a node is linked to one or more nodes in a network.\(^9\) When a significant flow, which is non-defining, links a colonial settlement to nodes other than those that participate in the dominant flow, the significant flow creates, in essence, a new network. But significant flows might also be identified as traveling along the same network line as the dominant flow. For instance, clergy and information from the Roman Catholic Church certainly flowed from Paris to Quebec along the network created for the purpose of the fur trade. Indeed, the clergy often sailed in fur-trading ships.

The networks the French and Dutch created extended from Europe, across the Atlantic, and then by river far into the North-American mainland. In the process, they would link to preexisting Native-American networks to form new complex networks. In many ways, the Native-American networks would define the European colonies spatially and help to create two distinct systems—one connected to the Hudson River and the other to the St. Lawrence—that are echoed even today in the political geography of North America. But the initial impetus for creating these new complex interconnections came from the Europeans, who first mapped where the new European networks would be and then began to inscribe them on the landscape by creating nodes or settlements.

As network theory and spatial analysis have evolved over the last few decades, geographers and social scientists have begun to categorize different types of networks, providing in the process a new language for understanding the interrelations of places.
Scholars have primarily observed two types of networks—solar and dendritic—in colonial and postcolonial communities. In a solar configuration, writes Carol A. Smith, “a network of markets is organized by a single articulating center, typically urban, which creates a simple two-way hierarchy.” The “solar” center is relatively independent of other similar centers and therefore enjoys a monopoly in a closed regional system. Manning Nash has argued that the solar marketing system is “an aspect of general cultural differentiation” and tends to occur when “communities have cultural traditions which vary from each other in endless small ways.” As such, the solar network is often found in colonies or former colonies, which by their very nature are culturally diverse.10

The dendritic network is an extractive system also found in colonies. As Smith notes, scholars such as E.A.J. Johnson have observed that in a dendritic system “peasant produced goods flow directly from rural areas to urban centers or major ports and in the process leave the domestic or peasant economy poorly serviced and undersupplied.” Key attributes of dendritic systems, according to Smith, are that 1) “lower-level centers are tributary to one and only one higher-level center” rather than being located between two or more higher-level centers as in classical central place theory; 2) urban “centers become progressively smaller with distance from the major or primary center”; and 3) “lower-level centers are controlled by higher-level centers” so that consumers in lower-level centers have only one choice and cannot, therefore, shop for better prices. According to Smith, a dendritic system is typically inefficient in distributing goods to rural consumers “since all goods must first flow to and from a primate center” and would be available only at the highest prices.11
The question is: Do New France and New Netherland conform to either of the preexisting models—the solar or dendritic—which have largely been used to describe colonial networks in areas where an urban center is related to a nearby agricultural hinterland. This may not be precisely the case in either New France or New Netherland, where the trade in agricultural products from the indigenous population to the colonial urban center does not appear to have been particularly important. Although New France and New Netherland exhibit some of the characteristics of a solar network, one would expect, under the circumstances, to find dendritic systems in these seventeenth-century colonies, in as much as they relied on pre-Industrial Age forms of transportation that made river systems and sailing technology preeminent. In this regard, a key question for this study is whether in either of these colonies the Europeans were able to dictate the terms of trade along the entire network or whether the Native Peoples retained enough leverage to negotiate prices.

Stages of Development

A colony, like any other important human institution, does not spring up fully formed, but emerges as the result of an historical process. For this reason, any understanding of how and why societies establish and develop colonies must be concerned with stages of development. In his 1970 study, *The Merchant's World: The Geography of Wholesaling*, James E. Vance outlined a staged model to explain in economic terms how Europeans established and sustained their colonies in North America. For our immediate purposes, the first three stages of his model are instructive:
1. Once the mercantile policy had been adopted . . . attempts were made to secure preliminary information about trading opportunities in the New World. In this stage we find the fact-seeking voyages of John Cabot (1497), Jacques Cartier (1534), and others.

2. Before settlement was attempted, the economic potential of the area was tested on the basis of information collected and the pattern of trade that might be anticipated. Such testing of potential may be periodic rather than continuous.

3. Once the potential was somewhat determinate, initial settlement took place in terms of a mercantile model. The dynamics were exogenic, the extent of the system was given by long-distance trading, and growth depended as much on the ability of the external world to consume as upon the parochial area to produce.\(^{12}\)

Although Vance’s model provides a useful paradigm for how colonial networks are established, it leaves plenty of room for criticism. For instance, historicizing the development of colonial policy reveals that it is a more complex process than Vance describes. One might well ask, for instance, whether the conscious adoption of a mercantile policy is really at the root of French and Dutch colonialism in North America. Historical analysis reveals that the making of colonial policy is more ad hoc and involves diverse and sometimes conflicting motivations. Network analysis also reveals a multitude of factors at work, beyond simple economic motivations. These include political ideologies, religious notions, national pride, imperial rivalry, and even mistaken ideas about what various forms of exploitation might reap. Then, too, there is significant doubt as to whether the dynamics of any given colony, even in its initial stage, is completely exogenic. During all three stages of Vance’s model one might also point to other processes that are essential in establishing new colonial networks. Some of these include asserting possession over lands and resources, converting space into place (which is the usual way of establishing nodes on a network), and linking regions hitherto “inaccessible” to European markets. Still, in spite of its shortcomings, Vance’s model does describe a process by which the Europeans, from their own perspective, made
landscapes accessible to the metropolitan market, and from this point of view it retains some analytical value.

As William Cronon observed in regard to the development of the American West, making a landscape accessible, for the Euro-Americans who were engaged in developing new regions, required “linking it to a market, which meant fostering regular exchange between city and country” or, in the case of seventeenth-century colonies, between the colonial hinterlands and the European metropole. A key question emerges in regard to the ways in which Europeans asserted possession. Could the Europeans exercise effective control over riverine trade networks in North America without at the same time asserting control over the landscape? Or to phrase it another way using Hornsby’s terms: Were linear colonies sustainable, or did they need to develop into “territorial colonies” in order to be truly successful?

In her groundbreaking study, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640, Patricia Seed catalogued a number of different techniques Europeans used to claim possession of lands in the New World. These included conquest, but also scientific determination of the position of territories through celestial navigation; political declarations; ceremonies (often specious) involving Native-American acquiescence in having their lands possessed; settlement; the planting of symbolic stones, crosses, or boundary markers; mapmaking; description; and naming. As Seed notes, the cultural practices by which Europeans asserted political authority over vast areas of the New World were not calculated to appeal to Native Americans. “It was above all,” she says, “their own countrymen and political leaders that colonists had to convince of the legitimacy of their actions, not indigenous peoples.” Seed also argues
that the ceremonies of possession of one European power were, more often than not, opaque, not only to Native Peoples, but also to Europeans of other societies.\textsuperscript{14} She recognizes that Europeans often deliberately denied the legitimacy of each others’ ceremonies of possession through uncharitable interpretations, but in the main, her argument is that, more often than not, Europeans simply did not understand each others’ rituals and laws. As she explains:

No European power ever expressed curiosity about another’s ceremonial practices or legal beliefs or sought to understand them on their own terms. These hostile expressions were rooted in profound misunderstandings of the actions and cultural premises behind practices initiating and maintaining colonial authority.

Commentaries about other Europeans’ actions rested upon the erroneous belief that they understood what representatives from that power should be doing. Taking their own practices as the model, each set of Europeans was convinced that what the other Europeans were doing failed to perform some critical action. Such certainty rested upon the fundamental transparency communicated by their own cultural, legal, and linguistic system. Common vernacular language and shared everyday experiences created the assurance that their legal code, ceremonies, and other means of enacting colonialism were both obvious and right.\textsuperscript{15}

This study demonstrates, however, that the rituals by which Europeans took possession of colonies in the New World were not so different, one from the other, as Seed alleges. Moreover, as will be shown in chapters one through seven, the colonizing powers, in general terms, well understood each other’s ceremonial and legal practices, which is precisely why they did not need to express curiosity about them. By emphasizing differences in cultural practices, Seed may have missed the larger interpretive point. While engaged in a headlong competition to divvy up the New World, each European power had strong political and economic motives to deliberately deny the legitimacy of the legal and ceremonial means by which other powers asserted possession. The research presented here demonstrates that while the French and Dutch
used virtually the whole panoply of ceremonies of possession outlined in Seed’s study, they both came finally to adopt the policy that settlement was the only legitimate and practical method of claiming possession.

Closely related to the question of possession is the need to convert space into place. Social scientists have hotly debated the issue of space and place over the last several decades. In part, the debate has been one of definitions. As John Agnew has noted, “Place is one of those ‘contestable’ concepts whose application is a matter of dispute. In geography, it is sometimes used synonymously with location, point, area or space.” It is likely impossible to solve such definitional questions in a way that would satisfy all interested parties. But for the purposes of this study, “space” and “place” might be defined provisionally as analytical terms. “Space” may be seen as a term implying potential. It is an area that has yet to be described, named, settled, or designated on a map. A “place,” by contrast, has been described, named, settled or designated. A “space” is where social interactions and cultural, political, and economic activity might take place. Once they do—the space becomes “place,” though it retains, of course, future potentiality. “Place,” in other words, has a history and meaning—though these might well become contested and usually do. There is a definite relationship between the concept of a “node” and a “place.” With the exception of the idea of a person as a node, all other forms of nodality imply “place.” A node is a place to which and from which people, ideas, and goods flow with some frequency. This frequency means that a node is a place where social, political, cultural, and economic practices are repeated and evolve over time.
Social scientists and historians are not the only ones to contest notions of space and place. The history of colonialism, in itself, might be seen as a vast contest over the perception of space and place. As will be seen, particularly in chapters one to six, what to European explorers seemed “space,” which might potentially be possessed, named, settled, or designated on a map, might already have been a “place” from the perspective of Native Peoples, who had already named, settled, farmed, hunted, and fought over it. Moreover, it might already have been invested with sacred associations, collective memory, and symbolic or imaginative meaning. To designate Native-American places as “spaces” was to erase all of these social, cultural, political, and economic meanings, and where this was not possible in any absolute sense, these meanings would have to be overwritten and obscured if the Europeans were to be successful colonizers by their own lights. Then, too, the successful possession and development of colonies required that Europeans overwrite, not only native notions of place, but also each others’ designations, which was a relatively easy process so long as the sole techniques of possession were naming, description, and mapping.

Space, Place, and Central Place Theory

While this study will examine two colonial networks and their flows, it will focus on two places in particular—Quebec and New Amsterdam—which formed important nodes on the European-American networks. To create these nodes, the Europeans had to convert “space” to “place” or perhaps more accurately, they had to reinscribe Native-American places as Euro-American places, investing them with new meanings. A
question for this study is: What sort of places were these colonial outposts and how do we explain their development or lack thereof? What was their function and what did they “mean”? Each, of course, grew to become a cosmopolitan city, though New Amsterdam, as New York, would eventually outpace Quebec and become a major metropolis and a global city. But between their founding and 1664, neither place could be characterized as a city, even though the French referred to Quebec as such, and the Dutch had named the provincial capital of their colony after Amsterdam, the leading urban center of the Dutch Republic. If neither place could claim to be a city, each seemed to have the pretension of being so in the future. That was the vision, and it was perhaps this imagined meaning and the power of the Europeans to eventually effect it that is most significant. After all, Quebec and New Amsterdam were, it turns out, nascent cities, just as their founders had declared.

There is no shortage of theories among historians about how to account for urbanization. Probably the most important, though, is central place theory. In order to account for the development of towns in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe, historians and geographers have pointed to increased efficiency in agriculture, which in turn led to an increase in population and a surplus of wealth in the agricultural sectors of the economy. Towns emerged as places where surplus products of the soil were sold or exchanged for manufactured goods, services, and luxury items. As Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees have explained, “as the volume of local trade and the organization of civil society gradually increased, a large number of market and administrative settlements crystallized as central places for their surrounding areas.”\(^1\) According to this model, urbanization proceeded from the bottom up as new surpluses and needs
proliferated. Rural hamlets created the need for larger central villages to serve a number of hamlets, and central towns emerged to serve a region dotted with villages. Finally, cities made their appearance to serve a number of towns. The last urban centers to develop were the large metropoli.

One of the earliest proponents of central place theory is Johann H. von Thünen, who published *The Isolated State* in 1826 in an attempt to explain the emergence of urban centers in South Germany. Von Thünen’s model, which is highly abstract, posits that once a central place or town had developed in an agricultural area, the countryside itself began to be reorganized in zones relating to it. Von Thünen observed that the most intensive land use and the highest rents occurred closest to the town and progressively decreased in inverse proportion with the distance from the town. This theory was later expanded upon, more famously, in the 1930s by Walter Christaller, who incorporated the industrial production of central goods and their retail distribution into his model. All of the details of Christaller’s theory need not concern us here, but a few aspects of central place theory as he developed it seem worth mentioning. Christaller noted that the arrangement of towns in any given region in South Germany was irregular. He also observed that towns of different sizes were dispersed throughout the countryside. He sought to explain these phenomena and in the process created a hierarchy of central places, ranging from small rural “market spots” to large metropoli. The size of an urban center, he noted, was usually directly proportional to its importance as a market for what he called “central goods” and “central services.” Christaller defines central goods and central services as “goods being produced at the central place, just because it is central, and the services offered at the central place.” Such goods may be produced at another
central place of a higher order and shipped for distribution through a subsidiary central place, such as, for instance, Quebec or New Amsterdam. Christaller also defines central goods and services in contradistinction to dispersed goods and services, which are produced and offered at dispersed places throughout a region or landscape.18

During the period under discussion in this study, Quebec never progressed beyond what Christaller, following Robert Gradmann, might consider a “dwarf town” or hamlet, while New Amsterdam reached perhaps the scale of a “small town” or village. Neither, then, at least according to Christaller’s model, exhibited a high-level of importance as a market.19 Nonetheless, each was an administrative center for the colony with a direct connection to the highest level of the metropolitan government and to important markets overseas. This suggests a qualitative difference between these colonial capitals and the rural hamlets and villages in the continental European countryside. While the typical European hamlet or village very likely would be connected to markets of a higher order, it would not, except under some extraordinary circumstance, draw attention from the central government. Quebec and New Amsterdam, then, took on an importance in the eyes of the metropolitan governments out of proportion to their size and economic power. The question is why? As colonial centers, each town’s function as a market was subsidiary to its function as a processing and shipping area for goods extracted from the immediate hinterlands. Each also eventually developed some degree of importance locally as a market and administrative center for organizing its region. Then, too, New Amsterdam, at least, became an important node on a far-flung diffuse network and provided important services to people circulating on the network.
Central place theory, as Christaller conceived it, has been roundly criticized. One of the key problems, as Hohenberg and Lees have pointed out, is that Christaller saw “urbanization as an outgrowth of rural development.” Even in Europe many cities seem to have emerged not because of the production of a regional agricultural surplus but rather to facilitate long-distance trade in expensive commodities—spices and silks from Asia, for instance—a fact that Christaller does acknowledge.\textsuperscript{20} His critics, though, tend not to give him credit for recognizing, as he does, that central places are but one specific kind of urban center among many. Other types of urban centers, according to Christaller, include “point-bound” settlements where people live off the resources available only at a specific location, such as mining settlements or those located at river fords, customs places, or harbors. He notes, though, that settlements at harbors—such as Quebec and New Amsterdam—often become central places. There are also settlements that “are not bound to a central point, an area, or an absolute point” in terms of geography. He gives the example of a monastic settlement, which might be chosen as a site of religious significance. In these cases, the place has a symbolic or imagined significance and might be called a “symbolic place,” though Christaller does not give it this designation himself.\textsuperscript{21} One general criticism, though, of Christaller’s model is that it provides only economic explanations for the development of central places and does not pay close enough attention to social, cultural, and political explanations.

Even as a purely economic explanation, Christaller’s model is open to the criticism that it is too limited. Vance, for instance, has noted that Christaller was only concerned with retail trade and has argued persuasively that wholesaling also plays an important role in the creation of central places. M.J. Webber has also taken Christaller
to task for assuming consumer rationality, a point that must be taken to account when dealing with colonial establishments where people of different cultural backgrounds might have differing motivations for trade, which in turn would shape their practices. This is particularly true in North America were Native Peoples did not exhibit consumer rationality by the standards of European economic theory because they seem to have been operating on a radically different value system.\textsuperscript{22}

As Carol A. Smith points out, Christaller’s theory relies on some other general assumptions, which ordinarily do not hold true in reality. He assumes, for instance, an isotropic landscape and also perfect competition between suppliers. Moreover, he assumes that it is what he calls “threshold,” or the circular area containing sufficient consumer demand for a good to allow the supplier to survive, that ultimately determines the supplier’s location.\textsuperscript{23} Some suppliers provide goods and services, however, to transient merchants or clientele, such as ships, sailors, or to other types of periodic traders, a circumstance Christaller does not consider. But for all its flaws, researchers have generally concluded that Christaller’s model seems to be closer to what they find in their empirical studies than most other theoretical models. Therefore, rather than posit an entirely new theory, geographers and anthropologists have made some refinements to his model to bring it closer to what they have been finding in their case studies. These studies “generally support the notion,” says Smith, “that market economies are made up of hierarchically organized central places that are interrelated in patterned ways.” The case studies reveal that central places emerge in one of two patterns—rank-size or primate city—rather than the “stepwise progression of related centers” that Christaller predicts.\textsuperscript{24}
Because the “rank-size” pattern occurs in complex industrial economies, it is not likely to prove very useful as a model for understanding the establishment of Quebec and New Amsterdam in the early seventeenth century, well before Europe had entered the industrial age. The primate city model, however, does seem relevant. As Smith explains, the primate city pattern can occur at any level in the general distribution system and very likely indicates imperfect economic competition. Sometimes this is the result of the political restriction of trade. In a primate system, says Smith, “single or selected cities draw more than their share of suppliers and consumers, monopolizing the tributary area and leaving a relatively poorly serviced distant hinterland.” Primate cities also generally monopolize transport networks, capital, and industry. Researchers have observed a high degree of primacy in generally weaker economic systems that are open to intervention from stronger exogamous systems. The primate city establishes the link between the regional system and the external system. For this reason, colonial or former colonial capitals, such as Quebec and New Amsterdam, exhibit a greater degree of primacy than other types of central places. Observers have also noted that colonial primate cities, which emerge in “immature, small-scale, underdeveloped, and simple economies,” tend to be isolated from the rural—and agrarian—hinterlands, a circumstance that is found in the cases of both Quebec and New Amsterdam, which were isolated to a great degree from the Indian communities in their immediate hinterlands.

While Quebec and New Amsterdam began initially as primate towns, each made some strides toward becoming “gateway cities,” which A.F. Burghardt defines in contradistinction to central places. Like primate cities, gateway cities are normally located on the border between a tributary area—from which goods are to be extracted—
and “the outside world.” Burghardt notes, too, that gateway cities, like primate cities, “develop in the contact zones between areas of differing intensities or types of production, along or near economic shear lines.” Because of this, gateway cities usually provide a portal through a geographical obstacle that allows one type of economic system access to a less highly developed system. As Burghardt explains, “Since entrance into an extended hinterland is of the essence of a gateway, such a city will tend to be located on a site of considerable transportational significance, i.e. either at a bulk-breaking point or at a node of transport lines.” For this reason, the gateway cities hold a monopoly over transportation and communication between the tributary system and the exogamous system, the precise circumstance that defines a primate city.27

Burghardt’s definition of gateway cities bears such a close resemblance to that of primate cities that is tempting to see them as one and the same. But there does seem to be one important distinction between them. While both serve an extractive purpose, a primate city is more purely so and suppresses the development of central places in the tributary area. A gateway city, by contrast, serves a developmental function along with its extractive function. It opens up a landscape, not just to the external market, but also to settlement in order to create a new market for central goods and eventually helps to create a system of central places within the tributary (or colonized territory). Both Quebec and New Amsterdam began to fulfill this second important function, but as the present study indicates, New Amsterdam was far more advanced as a gateway center, to the point where one of its chief functions after 1646 was facilitating the creation of new towns.28
In many respects the famous “Frontier Thesis” of Frederick Jackson Turner mirrors Christaller’s model of urban development. In Turner’s model, American frontiersmen—Indian traders and hunters—pushed their way into the wilderness, a largely undeveloped space full of potential (though in Turner’s defense, he does recognize these areas as the ancient habitations of indigenous, but essentially “uncivilized” peoples). The frontiersmen served the function of pathfinders and explorers, as in Vance’s model, who gathered information and sent it back to the “civilized” east. Such information was used to organize the next phase in frontier development—the farming frontier. In Turner’s view, settlers were hardy individualists, who carved family farms and ranches out of the wilderness, turning it to rural production. The last phase was urbanization, as cities emerged to collect the flows of surplus agricultural goods from the newly developed rural frontier and also to provide manufactured goods to the farm folk in the hinterlands. This seems very much akin to the Christaller central place theory.29

Turner’s thesis has been under attack now for more than fifty years, and this is not the place to rehash all of these debates. Certainly, Innis and Careless proposed a different model of Euro-Canadian development. The French, they argue, did not need to wrest the land away from the indigenous peoples, but only needed a light colonial footprint along the waterways for a mutually beneficial trade. Thomas J. Condon and Donna Merwick reprise this model for the Dutch colonial enterprise in New Netherland.30 According to these later interpretations, Quebec and New Amsterdam were little more than small
trading communities, meeting places for Europeans and Native Americans, where commerce could proceed among peoples on a nearly equal footing. Under this model and in contrast to the English, the French and the Dutch never intended to subjugate or dominate the Native Peoples nor wrest their lands from them for the purpose of replacing them with European settlers.

In his study of Chicago, William Cronon has suggested a model of frontier development that differs markedly from both the Turner thesis and the Innis/Careless/Condon/Merwick “light footprint” model. In the case of Chicago, Cronon argues, distant investors in New York and London essentially financed the creation of an urban center in the “wilderness,” and it is from this command post that the rural hinterlands of the American Midwest were organized to produce commodities for regional, national, and international markets. In Cronon’s interpretation, the city creates the market for agricultural goods either before rural settlement begins or simultaneously with it. In brief, the existence of the city makes the agricultural settlements in the hinterlands possible, says Cronon, as he “reads Turner backwards.”

This whole debate about central place theory has a “chicken or the egg” quality about it. But it is an important debate, nonetheless, one that goes to the heart of the question about how modern cities develop. On the one hand, if all urban centers, even nascent ones like Quebec and New Amsterdam, are connected to a hinterlands of some kind—either close at hand or at a distance, one important question might be: Do the hinterlands create the urban areas, or do the urban areas develop the hinterlands? This study demonstrates that Cronon’s theory seems to best fit the case of these colonial towns, so that it is the towns which begin to organize the hinterlands, not the other way
around as in the classical Christaller model. Quebec and New Amsterdam are really not central places created because of the market needs of a nearby rural hinterland, but rather a projection of urban power from Europe into North America. In other words, these cities in bud were really the creation of other, older cities, Paris and Amsterdam, which developed them as command posts from which distant elites could make a remote landscape accessible. To see Quebec and New Amsterdam as budding gateway centers in accordance with the Cronon model brings into question the claims of Innis, Careless, Condon, and Merwick that these colonial centers were meant to be merely trading posts where Native Americans and Europeans met on a more or less equal footing in order to carry on a mutually beneficial trade.

In contrast to the contentions of these scholars, the thesis of this dissertation is that for reasons related to European politics, policymakers in France and the Dutch Republic ultimately adopted the principle that settlement was the only legal and practical means of possessing territory in the Americas, and that, having adopted this policy, it was the intention of the French and Dutch metropolitan governments early in the colonization process to create agriculturally based settlement colonies in New France and New Netherland. Moreover, this study proposes that because of competition from other European nations, “linear” trading-post colonies were too weak to survive in North America, not only because they could not defend themselves from competitors, but also because they were not self-sustaining and did not become consumer markets for manufactured goods from the metropole. This dissertation also asserts that although both the Dutch and the French made strides toward developing agriculturally based settlement colonies in North America, the Dutch succeeded far better than the French because, as a
node on a diffuse network, New Amsterdam was better able to attract settlers and connect to a wider range of markets than Quebec, which was more or less a node on a specific network. Finally, this study demonstrates that while both Quebec and New Amsterdam began to make the transition from simple primate centers on extractive dendritic/solar networks to gateway centers on more complex networks, New Amsterdam was far more advanced in this process, to the point where it was rapidly facilitating the production of a new network of towns in its immediate hinterlands.

*Historiography*

There are really no direct comparative studies of the development of New Netherland and New France outside of studies focusing on the relations of the two colonies with the Iroquois. Matthew Dennis in *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America* has attempted a multi-perspective “cubist” cultural history of relations among the Iroquois, French, and Dutch. In spite of this pretension, his work admittedly takes its start from the Iroquois perspective, and the book weights the Native-American perspective much more heavily than that of the Europeans. As a cultural historian, Dennis looks chiefly at the “nature and significance of the intercultural conversations, or cultural interactions” between the Iroquois and Europeans. 32 In *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization*, Daniel K. Richter traces the adjustments the Iroquois made to European influences. While the perspective is largely from Iroquoia, his study does provide a comparative analysis of Iroquois relations with the French, Dutch, and English during the seventeenth century.
The history of New France suffers from a lack of recent general works. The classic work on the “Heroic Age” is, of course, Francis Parkman’s *Pioneers of France in the New World* (1865), along with his study of the Jesuits in North America in the *Seventeenth Century* (1867). The most recent general study is Bruce G. Trigger’s *Natives and Newcomers: Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered* (1985), which relies on archaeological research from the late 1970s and early 1980s to more fully incorporate the contributions of Native Peoples into the story of Canada’s development. Peter N. Moogk has provided a cultural history in *La Nouvelle France: The Making of French Canada—A Cultural History*, which includes some discussion of the immigration of different social and religious groups to New France.

There are three recent book-length studies of New Netherland: Jaap Jacobs’ *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America*, Oliver A. Rink’s, *Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York*, and Donna Merwick’s *The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland*. Jacobs has attempted a comprehensive and thorough synthesis. To do so, he has surveyed archival manuscripts in the United States and the Netherlands anew. In the process, he uncovered some significant deficiencies in the translations done in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and set a new standard for scholarship on New Netherland. Still, Jacobs’ book is conventional in terms of Atlantic World history because its main purpose is to explore the connection between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic, though he also attempts to broaden the perspective “when relevant” to New Netherland’s relationship with Dutch expansion in the Atlantic world more generally. He does not go much beyond this to attempt an analysis that shows the
interactions of New Netherland across imperial boundaries. Jacobs’ stated focus is the
development of New Netherland from a trading post to what he calls “a settlement colony.”

Rink’s somewhat older study makes excellent use of the notarial archives of the period and is not wholly deaf to some influences from outside of the Dutch network. But his focus is primarily on the relationship of Amsterdam merchants to New Netherland. His thesis is that while the WIC’s administration of New Netherland was a political failure, the colony proved to be an economic success largely because of the control private merchants from Amsterdam exerted over its trade. His case is well-argued, but his focus is too narrow to explain why New Amsterdam continued to develop economically even in the face of the WIC’s deficient management. At best, he provides a partial explanation. A more comprehensive account requires a broader view that goes beyond a discussion of the linear relation between New Netherland and Amsterdam.

Merwick’s study, which does not attempt to be definitive or even thorough, compares the operations of the West India Company to those of the East India Company. She asserts that the Dutch intention was to establish no more than a trading post at New Amsterdam through which they would create a mutually beneficial trade with the Native Peoples. In the process, the Dutch would make no further territorial claims. She argues that the maladministration of Willem Kieft, which went against the wishes of the States General, subverted the original intention of the Dutch in North America and led the WIC to change direction and to focus more attention on settlement.

Journalist Russell Shorto has also contributed a recent popular history of Dutch New York, which concentrates chiefly on the political upheaval in the city of New
Amsterdam during the administrations of Kieft and Stuyvesant. While his work is based in large part on research in the primary records, it has not gained much respect among historians. Shorto’s chief concern is to show that the Dutch played a more significant role than the English in the nascent development of democracy in colonial America. While his argument might hold in terms of the toleration of diversity as an element of democracy, his contention that the Dutch were ahead of the English in terms of participatory government and democratic political institutions cannot be taken seriously. His study suffers from a lack of understanding of Puritan and Separatist values and institutions as they manifested themselves in New England.

Structure of the Study

The comparative analysis of the French and Dutch North-American colonies offered in this study is divided in two sections. The first (chapters 1-7) examines the techniques by which the French and Dutch secured preliminary information about the New World, claimed possession of certain territories, and developed policies to secure possession against the claims of European competitors. This section also traces the initial development of the colonial networks of the French and the Dutch, with an eye toward understanding the intentions of the colonizing powers. The second section (chapters 8-11) analyzes the dominant and significant flows of people, ideas, and goods along these colonial networks in order to map the interconnections of these two colonies with the larger world. Tracing these flows reveals that the networks to which Quebec and New
Amsterdam belonged were actually quite different, even though the dominant commodity outflow—beaver pelts—was the same.

Chapter 1: Reconnaissance and the Shaping of Colonial Policy:

Verrazzano under Francis I

The French government began the fact-finding phase of network building in the Americas with the 1524 voyage of Giovanni da Verrazzano along the East Coast of North America. Although Verrazzano did not systematically explore the region of North America that the French would ultimately colonize, his voyages, including those to Brazil and the Caribbean, provided the impetus for the French to develop policies for taking possession of lands in the New World and subjecting Native Peoples to French rule. Chapter 1 analyzes the evolution of these policies and begins to develop the argument that by emphasizing cultural history, Seed tends to overlook the important political context that shaped the colonizers’ claims of possession.

Verrazzano undertook the 1524 voyage at the behest of Francis I in an attempt to find a practicable sea route to Asia through North America. Failing in his initial mission, he initiated for France the exploratory and information-gathering phase of Vance’s staged model of colonialism. What is of particular interest in chapter 1 is that, at this early stage, Verrazzano is already viewing the landscapes he observes with the commercial eye of the early modern westerner, marking as he passes through various regions those areas from which lucrative commodities might be extracted.


Chapter 2: Reconnaissance: Cartier’s “Discoveries”

Chapter 2 looks at the intelligence-gathering voyages of Jacques Cartier. It was Cartier in the 1530s who first explored the St. Lawrence River, which would be the artery along which the French colonial network in North America would be established. Cartier was well-informed about Verrazzano’s voyages and employed many of the same techniques Verrazzano had used for claiming possession of territories in the New World. He also inscribed territories and even the Native Peoples themselves with French symbols and began to identify and give new names to places the French needed to possess—Quebec and Montreal—in order to control the network they were to establish along the St. Lawrence.

Cartier’s early voyages began the process by which the French took possession of a vast region north of the St. Lawrence River that hitherto had been the domain of a number of native groups. While Cartier explored and wrote accounts of the territories and peoples he visited, Francis I continued to develop policies aimed at asserting French possession over areas of North America that Spain had previously claimed. To do so, he persuaded the pope to reinterpret the 1493 papal bulls that divided the Western Hemisphere between the Spanish and Portuguese thrones. Cartier’s early voyages also demonstrated that the Christianizing mission of the French, by their own lights at least, conferred upon them the right to take possession of lands the Native Peoples inhabited.
Chapter 3: First Attempt at Settlement in New France

Cartier, with Sieur de Roberval, first attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish a permanent colony near the site of Quebec in 1541. Although this early attempt failed, it is worth considering as a precedent for Champlain’s later successful venture, particularly in light of the fact that the failure led to a seventy-year delay before France again pursued its colonial ambitions on the St. Lawrence, with consequential changes in the motivations for French colonization schemes.

Cartier’s 1541 expedition, which was authorized and subsidized in part by the French crown, helped to further shape the policies of the metropolitan government under which colonization subsequently proceeded. This chapter reviews the history of the development of French colonial policy and demonstrates that Francis I, in order to assert the legality of his imperial ambitions for New France in the period leading up to Cartier and Roberval’s 1541 expedition, adopted the policy that settlement was the only legal means of claiming territory in America. The French also adopted further policies that allowed them, from their own perspective, to legally divest Native Peoples of their lands and claim sovereignty over the Indians themselves.

Chapter 3 also analyzes why the French chose to construct their colonial network along the St. Lawrence rather than in the more southerly region that Verrazzano had explored, which seemed more suitable for colonization, trade, and defense. This chapter also begins to challenge the view of Innis and Careless that the French intended only to construct a trade network with a light footprint rather than a more densely populated agricultural settlement colony such as the English would soon begin to develop.
Chapter 4: Acadian Misadventures

This chapter surveys French attempts to plant a colony in the Americas in the period between the failed Cartier-Roberval expedition in the 1540s and Champlain’s successful settlement at Quebec in 1608. In the intervening years, the French attempted to establish colonies in Brazil and in what later became South Carolina and Georgia, but found Portuguese and Spanish resistance too difficult to overcome. Only after the failure of these experiments, did the French concentrate their effort in Acadia and then finally up the St. Lawrence, some 800 miles inland from the Atlantic. This was the region with which the French were most familiar and had the best claims to possess. It was also better protected from Spain and other potential enemies. Chapter 4 also demonstrates that during the exploratory phase of network-building, the French continued to employ the full panoply of Seed’s ceremonies of possession. It also shows that Champlain, at least, made his surveys with an eye toward establishing a self-sufficient colony based on settled agriculture.

Chapter 5: Building the Network: Champlain on the St. Lawrence

Every colonial effort is the work of many hands, but sometimes a singular vision is also required. In the case of New France, it was Samuel de Champlain whose vision brought France back to the St. Lawrence. Even his closest associates—de Monts and Poutrincourt—thought it better to plant colonies in Acadia rather than some 800 miles into the interior. For this reason, it is Champlain, more than anyone, who was
responsible for finally establishing the French colonial network along the St. Lawrence almost seventy years after Cartier and Roberval’s failure.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that a number of related factors convinced Champlain to follow Cartier’s example and found a colony at a narrow point on the St. Lawrence, siting it very near to where Cartier had established Charlesbourg-Royal. The first was the need to defend the French trade network from European interlopers. Quebec provided a defensible point from which French cannons on the north bank could command the river. But more importantly, at least in Champlain’s view, the area around Quebec was far more fertile than either Tadoussac or along the Acadian Coast, and the climate was more temperate, providing a longer growing season for the agriculturally based settlement colony he envisioned.

The spatial arrangement of Indian populations on the eve of French colonization in 1608 was also a key determinant of French strategy. By the time Champlain’s expedition sailed up the St. Lawrence, the Laurentian Iroquois, whose towns had been situated on the north bank of the river, had disappeared. This allowed Champlain to plant the French colony without any opposition from Native Peoples and without encroaching on their territories.

Finally, chapter 5 looks at the actual development of the colony under Champlain’s leadership with an eye toward a further critique of Hornsby’s linear model as well as of the Innis/Careless light-footprint idea. It also provides a continuing critique of Seed’s argument about how European powers asserted possession. By 1615, it is true, the French had established little more than a trading post at Quebec with fewer than twenty residents. For the moment, its chief raison d’être was as a node on an extractive
network, but those in charge of the colonization effort—Champlain and de Monts—envisioned the fur trade as an economic engine to drive the creation of a larger-scale settlement colony.

Chapter 6: Reconnaissance and Staking a Claim—New Netherland

Chapter 6 traces the fact-finding and early colonization phases of Dutch network-building along the Hudson River. The initial claims of the Dutch to the territory between the Delaware and Connecticut rivers can be traced to the 1609 voyage of Henry Hudson, who was looking for a passage to Asia through North America. Hudson like Cartier and Champlain, surveyed the lands through which he passed with a commercial eye and reported his findings back to Amsterdam.

Hudson’s voyage took place during the eighty-year war of independence the Dutch waged against Spain, and Dutch policymakers envisioned New Netherland, in part, as a base of operations against Spanish and later Portuguese interests in the Western Hemisphere. The Dutch were well aware that the Spanish crown received much of the revenue it needed to maintain its armies from the silver mines of Mexico and Peru. They hoped to interdict some of the flow of silver to Spain, but also to find their own sources of American wealth to enrich themselves and fund wartime operations.

Chapter 6 notes that early Dutch interest in New Netherland rested almost solely on the fur trade, which private merchant companies sought to exploit. From 1609 until 1614, the Dutch government evinced no interest in the province, and the companies that traded to the region did nothing toward settling it. In 1614, though, the States General
began to develop policies for the exploitation and settlement of the region. These included offering short-term monopolies to the companies involved in exploring and trading to the region.

The Dutch, in the early stages of fact-finding, used most of what must be considered the established ceremonies of possession. As chapter 6 indicates, these included celestial navigation, maintaining regular trade, published descriptions, renaming, mapping, and inscription through building forts. The only significant ceremony they did not initially undertake was settlement.

Chapter 7: Building the Network—New Netherland under the WIC

Chapter 7 analyzes the early development of New Netherland under the West India Company from 1621 to 1626. The WIC was established as a military arm of the Dutch government during the resumption of the war with Spain. But it was also as a trading company in its own right. Chapter 7 delineates the ways in which the motives and responsibilities of the WIC affected the meaning of New Amsterdam and New Netherland as nodes in the company’s Atlantic network.

This chapter also investigates the evolving policies of the WIC as interpreted by Donna Merwick and Thomas J. Condon, who argue that the Dutch had no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Native-American lands and intended only for their colony to be a trading network. Merwick says it was Director Willem Kieft, having blundering into aggressive wars against the local Algonkians, who forced the Dutch to change their
policy from one of establishing a light-footprint “along-shore” trading network to a policy of territorialism.

Chapter 7 also demonstrates that in response to English challenges to Dutch territorial claims, the WIC, in 1624, adopted the policy that settlement, and not the right of first discovery, was the sole determinate of legal possession. Having done so, it was then incumbent upon the WIC to settle the territory it claimed. It began to do so according to the limits of its resources within a year after announcing this policy to the States General. After 1624, in spite of arguments to the contrary by Merwick, Seed, and Condon, the intention of the WIC was to develop an agriculturally based settlement colony as well as a riverine trade network in New Netherland.

Chapter 8: The Fur Trade—the Dominant Flow?

Historians have generally labeled both New France and New Netherland as fur-trading colonies, though this designation is usually more strongly attached to New France. That these colonies are so defined suggests that the dominant flow along these colonial networks was of furs. Although both the French and the Dutch constructed extractive networks with administrative nodes at Quebec and New Amsterdam, respectively, and revived industries in the metropole such as beaver hat manufacture to take advantage of the flow of furs from the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers, analysis reveals that none of the companies that held the fur-trade monopoly prospered in the long run. Most went bankrupt and those that survived—the Company of New France and the WIC—were propped up either by the government or by investors who were interested in
settlement or Christianization. In the final analysis, even though beaver furs provided the largest flow of any commodity from the extractive networks of the French and Dutch, the fur trade in itself was not profitable enough for monopoly holders to stay in business let alone organize the profits of the trade to support colonial development.

Chapter 9: Native-American Networks, Flows of Disease, and the Fur Trade

Pre-contact Native-American trade networks, the spatial arrangement of Native Peoples of the Northeast, and the effect of the fur trade and disease on Indian networks are all subjects of Chapter 9. This chapter demonstrates that Native Peoples engaged in trade, often over long distances, hundreds of years prior to European contact and adjusted their trade networks after contact in order to link to European overseas networks. Chapter 9 also examines the life-ways of the Native Peoples with whom the French and Dutch interacted, and gives particular attention to the Huron and Iroquois, who became key trading partners. The Huron and Iroquois were agriculturalists, who lived in settled towns and villages, most of which were larger in terms of population than even the provincial capitals of New France and New Netherland. This chapter traces the decline and destruction of the Huron through disease and warfare and demonstrates that while the Native Peoples were able to control the fur trade enough to negotiate high prices for beaver furs, they did not in the end provide a significant or growing market for European manufactures.
Chapter 10: Flows of People

This chapter investigates the flows of people to New Netherland and New France to determine what kind of colonies the European powers intended to create and how well they succeeded in realizing their intentions. Chapter 10 examines the occupational backgrounds of the colonists, as well as the ratio of men to women and the percentage of farmers among the colonists. An analysis of these categories gives some indication of the types of colonies the French and Dutch hoped to develop. This chapter also begins to account for the relative success New Netherland had in boosting population, particularly after 1646.

Chapter 11: Flows of Ideas

Chapter 11 analyzes the flow of ideas to Quebec and New Amsterdam, not only from the European metropole, but also from other nodes on the networks to which these towns belonged. In order to narrow the focus, chapter 10 concentrates on those ideas that were formative or transformative in the history of these colonies between 1608 and 1663. Chief among the categories that seem central are religious and political ideas, as well as notions of race and nationality as these developed during the first half of the seventeenth century. This chapter reveals that New Netherland, while not entirely tolerant of diverse religious and political opinions, was more so, relatively speaking, than New France, and that this difference in itself allowed New Netherland to rapidly increase its population and to expand the number of networks in which it participated. In the process, New
Amsterdam, to a much greater degree that Quebec, became a gateway center that facilitated regional population growth and began to create its own network of towns in the immediate hinterlands.


3 Many scholars today argue that in the seventeenth century, nationality, as it is commonly defined, had not yet developed to any significant extent. If this is so, then perhaps nationality should not be included as category of people. But the fact that the colonists themselves recognized differences in nationality along with cultural differences seems to contradict at least to a degree this current trend in scholarship. Some scholars, Donna Merwick and Patricia Seed among them, who generally ascribe to the current view that nationality only emerged later, have nevertheless suggested that the process of colonization in itself advanced the concept of nationality among Europeans. In fact, an analysis of nationality, even in its emergent stage, reveals distinct differences between Quebec and New Amsterdam. Settlers who came to New France chiefly came from France itself. The settlers in New Netherland, however, were much more heterogeneous—coming not just from the Dutch Republic, but also from the English colonies, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, Brazil, and various African kingdoms. Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 186-94; Merwick, *The Shame and the Sorrow*, 7-8, 168-69.


5 Turner himself recognized a distinction between French and English colonization. “French colonization was dominated by its trading frontier; English colonization by its farming frontier,” he wrote. See his *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), 13-14.


7 Hornsby categorizes the West Indies sugar colonies as linear colonies in spite of the agricultural nature of sugar production. The reason is that sugar was a staple for export overseas to the metropole, and the islands by and large did not produce their own food but purchased it from overseas. See his *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 6-7; Merwick, *The Shame and the Sorrow*, 7, 28, 53, 59-60, 91, 126, 202-5.


9 Ibid., 4.


11 Ibid., 34-36.
14 Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*, 11.
15 Ibid., 12.
21 Christaller, *Central Places*, 16-17.
24 Ibid., 26-28.
26 Smith, *Regional Analysis*, 1:30-32
28 Ibid., 272-3.
30 Condon argues that prior to 1639, the WIC had no intention of creating an agricultural settlement colony in New Netherland. He says the farm families the WIC sent in 1624 and 1625 were only supposed to create a small farming sector to provide on-the-spot provisions for the commercial establishment. But this argument ignores the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC’s own statement to the States General that settlement alone constituted possession of territory. The WIC then sent two types of settlers, company farmers, who were to supply the commercial establishment, and Walloon families. Initially, the WIC settled the Walloons at Fort Orange, at Manhattan, and on the Delaware and Connecticut rivers, as if to mark by settlement the boundaries of the territory the Dutch claimed. Thomas J. Condon, *New York Beginnings: The Commercial Origins of New Netherland* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 67-68, 71-73, 77.
The fisheries of the Grand Banks near Newfoundland seem to have sparked French interest in the northern part of North America. According to French historical tradition, Breton fishermen visited Newfoundland, which the French called Terre Neuve, as early as the late fifteenth century. But these voyages are undocumented, and the evidence for them has been passed down only as an uncorroborated oral tradition. Still, Norman fishermen were bringing cargoes of fish from the Grand Banks to ports in Northern France as early as 1504, and in 1506, Jean Denis of Honfleur is said to have visited Newfoundland and published a map of the eastern coast of the island. Denis’ exploration was followed up by Thomas Aubert, a Dieppois, who sailed out of Rouen in 1508 or 1509 in la Pensée, a ship that the merchant Jean Ango the Elder provided and provisioned. Aubert’s voyage was remarkable because he arrived back in Normandy in 1509 with seven Native Americans on board. He is also said to have reported that the country was rich in valuable furs and that the surrounding seas abounded in the prized morue or codfish.¹

But whether Aubert actually visited North America has been a matter of some dispute. While French historians tend to accept that he did, others are more suspicious. The earliest mention of Aubert’s feat appears in an appendix for the year 1509 to Eusebius’s Chronicon. This account, published in Latin in 1512, notes merely that in 1509 seven woodlands people from Terre Neuve, along with their boat, weapons, and
clothing, were brought to Rouen. The boat is described as being made of bark. Aubert is not mentioned by name. He is, however, given credit in an anonymous French letter dated 1539, which was published a few years later in Italian, for being the first Frenchman to bring Native Americans to France. Cardinal Pietro Bembo in his History of Venice, published in 1551, refers to a similar incident, which may also be a reference to Aubert’s voyage. Bembo notes that in the year 1508, a French vessel picked up seven persons in a wicker-work boat made of tree bark. But in his version, the Native Americans were not brought from North America, but were rescued in the open ocean not far from Britain. Bembo does not mention the French captain by name, but the date and story are similar enough to draw the conclusion that he is referring to Aubert. At least one anthropologist believes Native Americans could have drifted so far in a bark craft. Thus, the Bembo account leaves some doubt as to whether Aubert really made landfall in North America. Still, the historian Jack D. Forbes, who investigated the documentary trail for the Aubert voyage, believes that it is unlikely the Indians made it so far in their bark boat and so gives greater credence to the account in which Aubert encounters them near the shores of Newfoundland or Cape Breton.²

The Denis and Aubert voyages may well have been organized explicitly for exploration or fact-finding, which would meet Vance’s first criterion in establishing commercial colonies in the New World. Denis, after all, seems to have brought back cartographic knowledge of at least the east coast of Newfoundland, and Aubert seems to have investigated commodities beyond the morue that might have a value on the European market. Moreover, Aubert brought back human specimens from the New World—a key priority for most of the explorers who crossed the Atlantic. But too little
is known of these early voyages to explicitly rank them among the major fact-finding expeditions of the Age of Reconnaissance, as J.H. Parry has called this period.\textsuperscript{3}

In spite of these early French ventures, the eminent Canadian historian Marcel Trudel has held that the history of \textit{Nouvelle-France} properly begins with Giovanni da Verrazzano’s voyage to the east coast of North America. As Trudel put it, “New France was born in 1524.” The problem with this assertion is that the designation “New France” in the years immediately following Verrazzano’s voyage was nothing more than the Latin inscription “Nova Gallia,” which appeared on a map Giralomo da Verrazzano made to incorporate his brother’s discoveries.\textsuperscript{4}

What seems to have differentiated Verrazzano’s voyage, in Trudel’s mind, from that of Aubert or Denis is that it had some official authorization from the French king, Francis I. The French monarchy came rather late to the trans-Atlantic chase for empire, largely because the kings before Francis confined their efforts to reestablishing and developing traditional trade routes through the Middle East in order to break the Venetian hold on Far Eastern trade. But in 1523, Francis, like the monarchs of Spain and England before him, found his own Italian explorer—Giovanni da Verrazzano. To be sure, the French king did not foot the bill for fitting out Verrazzano’s expedition, though he seems to have provided the ship. Financing was left to Italian merchants and bankers then doing business out of Lyons. According to Trudel, the evidence that the king officially sanctioned the 1524 voyage lies in what Verrazzano did during and after his trip. He designated many of the places he discovered with names honoring France, Francis I, or the king’s family. These place names, including the aforementioned “Nova Gallia,” appeared on maps made soon after Verrazzano’s return to France, maps that incorporated
the new geographical knowledge he had collected. Moreover, when Verrazzano returned from his voyage, he made a formal report to Francis I. Trudel is right when he says that “there is no official document attesting to Francis I’s intention of sending Verrazzano on a voyage bound for Asia.” But he seems to have overlooked Verrazzano’s own statement in the letter he wrote to Francis I after the voyage. Here the explorer notes that the voyage was “facta per ordine di V. M³” or “made by order of Your Majesty.”

Very little can be said for certain about Verrazzano’s life prior to his epic voyage. In the documents he left after his trip, he always referred to himself as a Florentine, which has led generations of historians to assert that he was born in that Tuscan city—the epicenter of the Renaissance. But no record of the explorer’s birth or of his residence in Florence has appeared. The better likelihood is that Verrazzano, though of Florentine parentage, was born among the immigrant community of Italian bankers and merchants in the city of Lyons, France. Lawrence C. Wroth has speculated that Verrazzano was the son of Alessandro di Bartolommeo da Verrazzano and his wife Giovanna Gadagne, Florentine residents of Lyons. This would explain, says Wroth, why the Florentine bankers of that city, such as Thomassin Gadagne, would have been willing to finance Verrazzano’s risky voyage of exploration. They would have been, after all, his blood relatives. It would also explain, in part, why Verrazzano put himself in the service of Francis I. He would have been by birth a subject of the king of France.

In 1523, Verrazzano embarked on his trip from the Northern French port of Dieppe, likely to take advantage of local knowledge of North America among the fisherman and sailors there. But it may be, too, that Verrazzano already had a long association with the seafaring community of Dieppe. In 1785, the French historian Jean-
Antoine Desmarquets, on the basis of certain unnamed “ancient manuscripts,” asserted that Verrazzano had accompanied Aubert on the voyage to Newfoundland in 1508, having commanded a second ship on that particular expedition. This would explain Richard Hakluyt’s comment in 1582 vis-à-vis North America “that master John Verarzanus” had already “been thrice on that coast” when in 1525 or 1526 he presented Henry VIII with a map of his discoveries. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence, aside from these intriguing hints, does not exist to place Verrazzano with Aubert in 1508. Desmarquets’ “ancient manuscripts” have not been discovered, and Hakluyt’s comments suggest merely that Verrazzano, like so many French seafarers before him, had already crossed the Atlantic prior to his historic 1524 trip.

As Wroth has noted, the extant documents for Verrazzano’s 1524 voyage clearly show that the French king had authorized an official voyage of exploration, or “fact-finding,” to use Vance’s parlance. In his post-voyage letter, Verrazzano wrote Francis I to explain “what happened to the four ships which you sent out over the Ocean to explore new lands.” It is important to note, however, that it was not just new lands the explorer wished to discover, but a way through the lands that Columbus, John Cabot, and others had already explored, so as to find for the king of France a more convenient sea route to Asia than those Vasco da Gama and Ferdinand Magellan had already discovered. “My intention on this voyage,” wrote Verrazzano, “was to reach Cathay [China] and the extreme eastern coast of Asia . . .”

Francis I and Verrazzano were not the only ones who seem to have had a clear understanding of the purpose of the 1524 expedition. So did the Portuguese, who at the time held a monopoly on the only commercially viable sea route to Asia—that which
Bartolomeu Diaz and da Gama had found around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean. This route allowed the Portuguese to reach the markets of India, the Moluccas, and China while bypassing the troublesome Muslim middlemen of West Asia and Egypt. On 25 April 1523, the Portuguese ambassador to the French court, who seems well-aware of the importance of the French expedition, informed King João III, that “Master John Verrazzano, who is going to discover Cathay, has not left up to this date.” The Portuguese were obviously concerned that the French-backed voyage of discovery presented a danger to Portugal’s monopoly.

Although the documentary evidence clearly shows that the larger motives of Verrazzano’s voyage were to explore new lands and find a more convenient passage to Asia, other motivations ought also to be considered in order to provide the fullest explanation about what transpired during and after the expedition. Obviously, the Florentine bankers and merchants of Lyons who provided financial backing hoped for a return on investment. Ideally, this would come through the establishment of a shortcut by water to Asia and the eastern spices and silk so valuable on the European market. But if this were not to be, other resources from the New World might prove profitable. This meant that Verrazzano had to view any lands or waters he discovered with a commercial eye—for possible profitable exploitation. The French king, meanwhile, who was in a state of near-perpetual dynastic war with the Holy Roman Emperor, King Charles V of Spain, likely hoped that French inroads into the Americas might provide another means of challenging the emperor’s interests. The king’s ambition might also have been to find a New World treasure trove of gold and silver equal to that of the emperor’s, from which he could finance his expensive European wars. Certainly the court’s interest in overseas
expansion was piqued by the visit in 1523 of Antonio Pigafetta, who had accompanied Magellan and Elcano on their circumnavigation of the globe. Pigafetta may well have given new urgency to French plans for overseas exploration, though uncertainty about the precise date of his visit makes it impossible to determine whether his account of Magellan’s voyage and his “gift of certain things from the other hemisphere” to the king’s mother had any direct influence on Verrazzano’s expedition of 1524.10

Verrazzano’s own personal ambitions must also be taken into account. Although he does not explicitly say so, he obviously hoped that his voyage would have sufficient success that he might be accounted one of the great explorers of the age. Success would come if he could discover new and profitable lands that might be brought under the dominion of his sovereign, or better, if he could find a new passage to the East Indies. If neither of these goals could be immediately satisfied, he would have to bring back at least the promise that one or both of them could be, in order to entice his benefactors into supporting another expedition.

The question of whether the motivations for the voyages of discovery and for the colonization that followed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were an outgrowth of medievalism or were more closely aligned with the emerging humanistic values of the Renaissance has long been debated among historians. Many historians have looked at the European exploration and colonization of the Americas as an extension of the crusades. The crusades represented, so far as this argument goes, the first large-scale European attempt at colonization. The failure of this effort caused Europeans to turnabout and look west for new lands to bring under a type of feudal suzerainty. Those who emphasize the medieval roots of European expansion claim that the colonization of the
Canary Islands, the Azores, and then of the Western Hemisphere was predicated upon a
medieval greed for land that could be turned to lucrative agriculture and also upon the
same kind of religious zealotry that precipitated the crusades. Then, too, they see the
westward expansion of the European economy, in large part, as the expansion of the
crusades. In an extension of the argument for the primacy of medieval motivations and
values as a catalyst for European expansion, Charles Verlinden has argued that late
medieval institutions, including feudal land tenure, sugar production techniques, charter
and joint-stock companies, and slavery, provided the wherewithal for exploration. Philip
Curtin has also claimed that the earliest colonies were an attempt, at least in part, to
spread a form of feudalism to the New World.  

While motivations arising from an essentially medieval temperament might be
discerned in the case of Iberian exploration and colonization, it would be difficult to
connect early French efforts to the crusades, feudalism, or even to a greed for land per se.
Since no direct statement of his reasons for supporting Verrazzano’s voyage survives, it
is difficult to ascribe motives to Francis I, other than those mentioned above, namely to
disrupt Charles V’s colonial enterprise and perhaps to find a new source of wealth to fund
his wars against the emperor. Perhaps this last motivation might be an outgrowth of a
medieval understanding of hereditary empire derived in part from feudalistic
considerations, but, in the main, the king of France in 1524 was not deeply dyed in what
might be considered a medieval value system. Francis I, in general, supported the new
learning and culture that the Renaissance movement had produced. He built and
remodeled his palaces, including Fontainebleau, according to the principles of High
Renaissance architecture and stocked them with classical reproductions and with paintings and sculptures of the Renaissance masters, including Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Benvenuto Cellini, and Andrea del Sarto. He was a great admirer of Leonardo, not just as an artist, but as an innovative thinker. As a result, Francis invited Leonardo to France and provided him with a country manor at Cloux, where the great Florentine lived out his final days. Then, too, though he considered himself a defender of the Catholic faith, Francis refused to allow successive popes to goad him into joining forces with Charles V for a new crusade against the “infidel” Turks. On the contrary, he remained on friendly terms with the Sultan, chiefly because they both were at odds with Charles. Francis also refused to break with Henry VIII after the English Church severed its relations with Rome, and he maintained alliances with the protestant German princes at the height of the Reformation. So it would be hard to argue that Francis I was filled with a medieval or crusading zeal to spread Roman Catholicism or to war against “infidelity.”

The king’s incentive seems to have been purely economic, though perhaps for the sake of his own reputation, he also wished to be among the monarchs who might take credit for furthering geographic knowledge of the world. Whatever the king’s motivations, Verrazzano’s own seem to have emerged out of a Renaissance mentality. Jacob Burckhardt and scholars who have followed his lead have associated the Renaissance with the rise of individualism, specifically the rise of individualism among a social-climbing commercial class, who sought to achieve fame and fortune through education and deeds rather than through hereditary titles. More recent scholarship has questioned just how much the Renaissance mindset can be connected with individualism,
but in the case of Verrazzano and explorers like him, it does seem to fit. The likelihood is strong that Verrazzano was a scion of the Florentine men of commerce in the city of Lyons. He, therefore, does not seem to have been a nobleman *per se*, invested, that is, with a landed estate, so he sought an alternative route toward making a reputation for himself. Verrazzano did not pursue notoriety through literature or the arts, as many of the leading lights of the Renaissance did, but rather through a scientific exploration of unknown lands beyond the sea. While the rise of a new kind of individualism might be discerned in the Renaissance, this on its own does not seem to be the essential difference between the medieval mind and that of the Renaissance. The key difference seems to be in the response to authority. Medieval thinking emphasized obedience to authority—to the pope and to the Bible as interpreted by the church in religious matters, to the monarchs in civil and political matters, and in terms of understanding the world at large, to the ancient authors, particularly Aristotle and, at a later date, Ptolemy. Renaissance thinking was not built upon an out-and-out rejection of these authorities, but rather upon questioning and testing them. Verrazzano falls into this latter tradition. He set out for the New World to test, through direct observation, whether Aristotle and Ptolemy were correct in their descriptions of the world beyond Europe. As Verrazzano noted in his post-voyage letter to Francis I, his findings proved to contradict the ancient authorities who believed “our Western Ocean was joined to the Eastern Ocean of India without any land in between.” He also remarked that Aristotle supported the theory of the ancient authorities “by arguments of various analogies, but this opinion is quite contrary to that of the moderns, and has proven to be false by experience.”\(^{13}\)
Verrazzano, in good Renaissance fashion, also hoped to use celestial positioning and the longitude and latitude system to provide a precise and scientific spatial description of his findings. In his letter, he supplies the king with numerous coordinate positions of the landmarks he encountered. He also reportedly gave Francis a portolano chart and a journal of tide measurements that might prove “useful to navigators.” “I hope,” says Verrazzano explicitly, “to discuss the matter with Your Majesty with a view to promoting science.”

In spite of these ambitions, Verrazzano’s voyage of exploration began inauspiciously. In 1523, bad weather seems to have wrecked two of his ships and forced him back to port in Brittany. There, he outfitted his two remaining ships—Dauphine and Normandie—likely as privateers. Then, while waiting for a favorable time to make his trans-Atlantic crossing, Verrazzano seems to have engaged in raiding off the coast of Spain. It was not until 17 January 1524, that the Dauphine alone finally set sail for the Americas, leaving from an island near Madeira. After a crossing of fifty days, the crew sighted land in what later became known as the Carolinas. Verrazzano then sailed south along the coast until he reached the previously charted Spanish territory of Florida before turning about, likely to avoid running into Spanish ships. He then made his way back up the coast to the vicinity of Cape Fear, North Carolina. Here, he made landfall on 25 March. From the place of first landing, Verrazzano continued north, encountering the long barrier island along the coast of North Carolina. He would later write to Francis I that he took this to be an isthmus separating the Atlantic from the great western sea (the Pacific) that touched the shores of China. As Wroth has noted, more than one historian has attributed the explorer’s mistake to “wishful thinking.” But perhaps Verrazzano’s
characterization of the barrier island was really a deliberate attempt to pique the king’s interest with an eye to winning his patronage for a second exploratory voyage.\textsuperscript{15}

Coasting north, the \textit{Dauphine} passed Chesapeake Bay, though Verrazzano makes no mention of it, perhaps because he was sailing too far off the coast to see what it was. The crew then spent three days on the Eastern Shore of either Virginia or Maryland, which they found so pleasant that Verrazzano named it “Arcadia.” Here, the Europeans kidnapped a small boy of about eight in order to bring him back to France, though it is possible that the boy’s guardian, an old woman, gave the boy to Verrazzano as a gift in return for the food the crew gave her. The Europeans would also have taken a young woman of about eighteen or twenty, whom Verrazzano describes as “very beautiful and tall,” but for the fact that she objected so obstinately, uttering loud cries. This episode stands in stark contrast to the treatment the natives had accorded one of Verrazzano’s young sailors who had nearly drowned attempting to swim to shore somewhere south of “Arcadia.” The Indians rescued him from the surf, laid him on the beach, built a fire to warm him, and spoke reassuringly to him so that he would not be afraid. Once the sailor had revived, the native people embraced him and accompanied him back to the sea where he could easily make his way back to the ship’s boat.\textsuperscript{16}

Following the kidnapping of the boy, Verrazzano continued north along the coast of Maryland and Delaware. He sighted the Delaware River, but does not seem to have entered it. The \textit{Dauphine} did, however, enter New York Harbor. Verrazzano seems to have anchored the ship near the narrows, which the bridge that bears his name now spans. He then explored the bay in a boat, going half a league “up the river” toward the mouth of the Hudson. This reconnaissance was cut short when a violent storm arose, forcing
Verrazzano to return to the *Dauphine*. Once aboard and presumably after the storm abated, he steered an easterly course along the Atlantic shore of Long Island to Narragansett Bay, where he and the crew rested for fifteen days before proceeding north along the coast of Massachusetts and Maine. By the time he reached what would become Canada, Verrazzano had charted the coastline from Florida to Maine and, as Trudel reminds us, was the first to bring this unknown territory into focus for Europeans.

Perhaps it is understandable that Verrazzano ceased his careful charting and description of the coast once he reached the shores of what would become Canada. He noted only that at 50 degrees, he came, as he said himself, to “the land which the Britons once found.” His failure to document this part of his trip is unfortunate because we know next to nothing of where he went and what he saw once he reached the lands that would become New France. Very likely, though, he did not enter the mouth of the great St. Lawrence.

Verrazzano sailed back to France from Newfoundland, though the dates of both his departure from the Americas and his arrival in Europe are undocumented. It is clear, though, that he was in Dieppe by 8 July 1524, when he drafted his report, addressed from that port town, to the king. In his account, Verrazzano details the many methods he used to assert French possession of the lands he had “discovered.” Patricia Seed has argued that each of the European powers involved in overseas expansion devised distinct means of claiming possession of lands in the New World. The Spanish, she notes, employed a ritualized speech—*The Requirement*—that demanded the submission of the native peoples to the Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church and authorized a war of conquest against any who refused. The Portuguese claimed possession by right of first discovery,
which required mapping space in a scientific way, using celestial positioning and latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates. They also planted stone pillars to mark where they had been and sometimes placed crosses around the necks of native inhabitants. The Dutch, says Seed, used methods of mapping similar to the Portuguese, but reinforced these with other forms of description of the places they intended to make part of their empire. These forms included both literary description and graphic images. The Dutch also asserted that establishing continuous trade with native people gave them an exclusive monopoly and some degree of political control of the region in question. In this way, the establishment of a network connection, in and of itself, implied possession. Seed argues that the English relied on actual settlement, which required the building of dwelling houses and the fencing of property. The French, by contrast, relied on a specific ceremony—a solemn procession, which included the participation of the natives. Native participation indicated, in the French view at least, their acceptance of French political authority. The French also codified their possession by means of legal documentation. According to Seed, such diverse means of taking possession of newly “discovered” lands caused “profound misunderstandings” among the colonizing powers about one another’s “ceremonies of possession.” One technique all European powers used in common, however, was naming.19

What is interesting about Verrazzano’s expedition is that while he employed a number of different methods that might be used to claim possession of the lands he “discovered,” he did not authorize any solemn processions with native involvement nor rely on legal documentation. Verrazzano chiefly relied on what Seed has described as the Portuguese method of charting and, of course, naming, which together allowed for the
lands he discovered to be mapped. As has been seen, in addition to the many latitudinal
calculations he provided in his letter to the king, Verrazzano also took the trouble to keep
a journal of tides and soundings along the coasts as well as a portolano chart. His
naming practices likewise asserted French possession by right of first discovery. He
gave all of the lands he found the general designation of “Francesca,” in the king’s honor.
Other prominent geographical features were named for members of the royal family.
Verrazzano called the land around New York Harbor “Angoleme” after the king’s home
duchy of Angoulême. The harbor itself he called “Santa Magarita” after Francis’ sister.
He gave a triangular island to the northeast of New York—probably Block Island—the
name “Aloysia,” after the king’s mother, Louise of Savoy. He also designated a
promontory south of New York—probably Cape Henlopen, Delaware—as “Lanzone”
for the king’s brother-in-law, the duc d’Alencon. Verrazzano named a number of other
features for members of the court. He called a coast south of New York “Costa di
Lorena,” in honor of Jean de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine. He gave Cape May, New
Jersey, the name “Bonivetto” in honor of Admiral Bonnivet. The Delaware River
received the name “Vandoma,” in honor of the comte of Vendome, and a mountain near
the sea, perhaps the Highlands of New Jersey, he dubbed “di S. Polo,” after the comte de
St. Pol. In addition to marking the areas he discovered as French, Verrazzano likely also
used naming to flatter the king’s family and the members of the court so that, as Wroth
has suggested, they might be amenable to supporting further exploration.20

In what later would become a Dutch method of claiming possession, Verrazzano
provided a literary description of the lands and waterways he observed and also of the
Native Peoples he met. As Wroth notes, Verrazzano’s detailed description of the Native
Peoples might be seen as the first truly ethnographic portrait of the North-American
Indians. In general, most of the people he met favorably impressed him with their
manners and dignity. His most glowing description was reserved for the Native Peoples
he encountered around Narragansett Bay. “These people,” he reported,

are the most beautiful and have the most civil customs we have found on this
voyage. They are taller than we are; they are a bronze color, some tending more
toward whiteness, others to a tawny color; the face is clear-cut; the hair is long
and black, and they take great pains to decorate it; the eyes are black and alert,
and their manner is sweet and gentle, very like the manner of the ancients . . .
Their women are just as shapely and beautiful; very gracious, of attractive manner
and pleasant appearance; their customs and behavior follow womanly custom as
far as befits human nature.

Verrazzano took special note of the generosity of the Indians, who brought the crew food
and showed him the best place to anchor for the safety of the ship. It was only when he
got to the coast of what would become Maine that he made a critical comment, noting
that the people of this region lacked courtesy. According to Verrazzano, as soon as the
Europeans ran out of trade goods, the Indians of this region “showed signs of scorn and
shame that any brute creature would make.” Near Casco Bay, the Indians shot arrows at
the Europeans, who in defiance of the wishes of the natives, disembarked and under arms
made their way several leagues inland. In a gloss to his letter to the king, likely in his
own hand, Verrazzano noted that the natives in this region expressed their distaste of the
Europeans by “showing their buttocks and laughing.” As Samuel E. Morison has
surmised, it may well be that the Indians near Casco Bay acted this way because they had
already had some unfavorable experience with Europeans prior to Verrazzano’s arrival.
Verrazzano took careful account of the commercial possibilities of the new lands he visited, making special mention of suitable harbors. He described trees, animals, and freshwater supplies and took note of hills and promontories that showed signs of mineral or metal deposits. He also remarked that the people he met along the coast near Narragansett wore copper jewelry, which proved there were some metal resources in the region. He also took note of indigenous vines that might prove valuable for wine-making.24

Verrazzano was anxious to follow up his initial voyage, but circumstances in Europe made it difficult to secure royal patronage. It is not altogether clear when the French king received Verrazzano’s report of the 1524 expedition. Since the beginning of his reign, Francis I had been involved in a dynastic war with the Hapsburgs for control of Milan. French forces had lost the city and duchy of Milan to Charles V in November 1521, and since that time Francis had made every effort to get it back. French forces were engaged in this undertaking at the same time Verrazzano was making his historic voyage. In the summer of 1523, Francis’ army under the command of Admiral Bonnivet descended into Northern Italy but found the defenses of Milan too formidable to be overcome. Bonnivet therefore withdrew to Abbiategasso to wait out the winter. Here, in March 1524, the French met with a disastrous defeat at the hands of an imperial army. The imperial victory prompted Charles’ ally, the traitorous former constable of France, the duc de Bourbon, to invade Southern France in July 1524 and lay siege to Marseilles, an important port for the French Mediterranean fleet. This was a threat Francis could not ignore. On 12 July, four days after Verrazzano penned his letter, the king left Blois with his army to relieve the siege of Marseilles. By 29 September, Francis had lifted the siege
and turned his army toward Italy, bent on retaking Milan, which he did almost without opposition. His army then lay siege to the garrison city of Pavia, but on 24 February 1525, imperial forces surprised and soundly defeated Francis just outside the city, taking him prisoner in the process.25

It is likely that Verrazzano did have an audience with the king in Lyons, where Francis stayed from 7 to 11 August 1524 on his way to raise the siege of Marseilles. It is known that Verrazzano traveled to Lyons at about this time and that the king soon after authorized another voyage of discovery to the East Indies. For this purpose, Francis also agreed to pay for four ships to be put at Verrazzano’s disposal. The ships were to be provided by Allonce de Civille, a merchant of Rouen, and Simon de Gras, a merchant of Troyes. Unfortunately for Verrazzano, this expedition never came to fruition. Francis soon commandeered all four of the ships to defend the coasts of Normandy and Picardy during his war with the emperor.26

Following his capture at Pavia, Francis remained a prisoner, first in Italy and then in Spain. The French government was not able to negotiate his release until 17 March 1526, and even then Francis was required to turn over his two sons to Charles V as hostages. The treaty of Madrid, by which Francis secured his release, ostensibly provided for the end to further war between the emperor and the French king so that they might concentrate “the common arms of all Christian kings, princes, and potentates to bring about the repulse and ruin of . . . miscreants and infidels [Muslims] and the extirpation of the Lutheran sect and other disapproved sects.” The treaty also called for Francis to relinquish the key duchy of Burgundy as well as his claims in Italy and to
reinstate the traitorous duc de Bourbon. Another provision called for Francis’ ally Henri d’Albret to turn over his kingdom of Navarre to the Hapsburgs.27

In the meantime, Verrazzano seems to have sought other royal patrons for a new voyage. Although the available documents for determining the explorer’s activities in 1525 are few, they strongly suggest that he visited both Henry VIII of England and João III of Portugal, likely with the intention of securing support for a new voyage. These inquiries did not bear fruit, and it would not be until May 1526 that Verrazzano secured a commission and financial support for another trip.28

While Verrazzano cooled his heels, other powers sprang into action. The import of Verrazzano’s successful reconnaissance was not lost on rival powers, which indicates that, in this era at least, European governments well understood the methods by which their competitors asserted possession. The Spanish seem to have interpreted his voyage as a French attempt to claim possession of territories belonging to the Spanish crown by right of Pope Alexander VI’s bull of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided the New World between the Catholic kings of Spain and Portugal. That it was the policy of Francis I to challenge the papal arrangement for Spanish and Portuguese sovereignty over the Americas would become increasingly clear in the years after Verrazzano’s death. So it is likely that Spanish intuition in this case was on the mark. To counter these ambitions, the Spanish crown authorized two expeditions to the very parts of North America that Verrazzano had visited, named, and charted. Although both expeditions were in process before Verrazzano sailed, each took on greater urgency because of his intervention.29
The Portuguese navigator Estavão Gomes, in the employ of the Spanish Casa de
Contratación, or house of trade, sailed to North America on 24 September 1524, well
after Verrazzano’s return. Charles V had commissioned Gomes’ voyage on 17 March
1523, almost certainly after getting wind of the preparations Verrazzano was then making
to find a northern route to Cathay. The emperor ordered a ship to be built for Gomes at
royal expense, but construction delays forced the postponement of the expedition until
well after Verrazzano had returned to Dieppe. That Gomes was well aware of the French
voyage is evidenced by the route he took. After departing from Corunna, he headed
straight for the Cape Breton area—where the French had been making the greatest
inroads on Spanish claims. He then traced Verrazzano’s route along the coast in reverse.
It seems that Gomes did enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but he could not sail up the St.
Lawrence River because its mouth was choked with ice at that time of year (February or
early March 1525). Gomes then sailed south along the coast, rechristening natural
features with Spanish names. He coasted at least as far south as Cape Cod and perhaps
to Rhode Island or even further. By 1529, maps made with information from Gomes’
voyage gave the title “Gomez Land” to what would later become New England.30

A second Spanish effort to make good on claims to the North-American coast
above Florida was launched from Hispaniola in the Caribbean. In 1521, Luís Vasquez
de Ayllón, a justice of the supreme court in Santo Domingo, had sent a trading ship under
the command of Francisco Gordillo to the east coast of North America above Florida.
Gordillo encountered a Spanish slave ship in the area, and finding little else of value for
which to trade, he decided to join with the slaver in picking up a human cargo somewhere
on the coast of the Carolinas. The two Spanish ships seized seventy Indians before
sailing back to Hispaniola. There, Ayllón, with the understanding that it was illegal under Spanish law to enslave native peoples, freed the captives. Still, the episode seems to have convinced him that it was worth taking control of the lands north of Florida, both for himself and for the greater glory of Spain. In 1523, he applied for and received a patent from the king to explore the North-American coast and, if possible, to set up a colony, which, of course, would help to solidify Spanish claims of possession. Patent in hand, Ayllón first sent two ships to reconnoiter. Then in 1525, he organized another voyage, this time to plant a colony. Altogether, he managed to recruit some 500 men, women, and children, including slaves of African descent and a number of clerics. The colonists also brought about eighty or ninety horses with them. This expedition, which set out in four ships, landed somewhere on the coast of Carolina, likely along the Cape Fear River. Here Ayllón attempted to plant his colony—called San Miguel—in the face of insurmountable problems. These included the wreck of his command ship, the onset of malaria, and the refusal of the Native Peoples, who were perhaps disgruntled, and understandably so after the enslavement of many of their people, to provide any assistance. Ayllón himself died of fever in October 1526, and without his leadership, the colony failed. Of the 500 colonists who came out initially, only 150 made it back to Hispaniola. In spite of this failure, maps made after Ayllón’s venture began to designate the area from Florida to Cape Cod as “Ayllón’s Land,” a clear indication of Spanish possession. 31

The English, too, decided to reinvigorate their overseas exploration after Verrazzano’s return, albeit a bit half-heartedly. Under Henry VII, the English had been the first in the field after Columbus, twice sending John Cabot (Giovanni Caboto) to
North America. Cabot, who on his first voyage in 1497 had reached Newfoundland only to vanish without a trace on his second voyage of 1498, was the European “rediscoverer” of North America. Through his exploits, the English laid claim to the continent, or at least to the portion he had visited. Verrazzano seemed to recognize this preexisting English claim in his letter to Francis I. Henry VIII, though, who came to the throne in 1509, was never as interested as his father in overseas exploration. But in 1527, prompted in part no doubt by Verrazzano’s visit to England in 1625-6 and by a chiding letter from Admiralty official Robert Thorne, the king authorized the wine merchant John Rut to make an exploratory voyage to North America. Rut sailed from Plymouth on 10 June 1527 and reached Newfoundland on 21 July. After a brief exploration of the coast of Labrador, he made his way south. In the harbor at St. John’s, he encountered ten fishing vessels—seven from Normandy, two from Portugal, and one from Brittany—which proved that this part of North America was very well known to Europeans of the time. Rut apparently continued south along the coast because he wound up in Santo Domingo in November and later stopped in Puerto Rico to reprovision before sailing back to England. It was an epic adventure to be sure, but the English did little to follow up on Rut’s exploit.32

Verrazzano, too, finally won support for another expedition. This time backing came from a syndicate headed by Philippe Chabot, the admiral of France and a member of the king’s court. Other members included Jean Ango, the merchant of Dieppe, and Guillaume Prudhomme, who is described as the general of Normandy, which suggests that he was a tax collector. The express purpose of Verrazzano’s new mission was to visit the spice islands of the Indies—perhaps the Moluccas. The implication is that the
mission was meant to challenge Spain and Portugal’s monopoly of the trade routes to the Far East.33

The details of Verrazzano’s voyage of 1526, as well as of a subsequent voyage of 1528, are sketchy at best and do not allow the reconstruction of a reliable itinerary. The evidence is sufficient to show, however, that further exploration of North America was not on the agenda, so that neither of these voyages has a direct bearing on the exploration and colonization of New France. The story of these voyages is nevertheless worth the telling at least in outline, not only to provide the tragic denouement to Verrazzano’s adventurous life, but also because these expeditions seem to have had an important influence in shaping French policy toward the New World.

The best evidence, which comes from Portuguese sources, suggests that, in June 1526, Verrazzano, along with his brother the cartographer, sailed from the port of Honfleur with a fleet of three or four ships. One of these was likely a merchantman from Fécamp that Verrazzano contracted for himself. It is known that he hired a supercargo for this ship to conduct his private trade. The remainder of the fleet consisted of two galleons, which Chabot provided, and a ship that Jean Ango supplied. The best that can be said of this voyage is that the little fleet made an attempt to round the Cape of Good Hope, but that only one ship succeeded. Verrazzano’s own ship and that of his brother were forced to turn back. Perhaps to prevent the voyage from being a total loss, the brothers headed for Brazil to take on cargoes of brazilwood. From the date of a letter from the Portuguese agent Diogo de Gouveia to João III, it is clear that Verrazzano was back in France by 18 September 1527, having failed in his primary mission. His brother’s ship, meanwhile, had remained behind in Brazil to take on its cargo and must
have arrived in France at a later date. The ship that had successfully passed into the
Indian Ocean had even worse luck. Likely due to a navigational error, it sailed past its
intended destination—Madagascar—and made landfall in Sumatra. Here the natives
slaughtered some of the crew, including the pilot. The remaining men then sailed first to
the Maldivian Islands and then finally to Madagascar, where they remained for a short time
before attempting to sail on to Mozambique. En route, the ship was wrecked on a
sandbar. Miraculously, the crew managed to construct a small boat—a barcasse—from
the wreckage and finally made port in Mozambique. What transpired from that point is
unknown.34

Verrazzano’s final voyage of 1528 was, on the surface at least, a second attempt
to fulfill the Chabot agreement. The financial backers for this venture included Italian
merchants residing in Fécamp. These men, as Wroth notes, had ties to the Lyons
syndicate that had backed Verrazzano’s initial voyage. This time Verrazzano was to have
charge of a fleet of five ships, including La Flamengue of Fécamp, which may have
served as his command ship. Having failed in his attempt to follow the eastern route
around Africa the year before, the initial goal of this voyage seems to have been to find a
way to the East Indies through the American continents by way of a passage south of
Florida. This small fleet departed France sometime after 29 April 1528, the date
Verrazzano signed a contract with his crew. Although information for this voyage is
sketchy, it seems that Verrazzano crossed the Atlantic to North America, this time to a
point south of his 1524 landfall. He then sailed south along the coast to Florida. As
Wroth points out, Verrazzano would have been less afraid of encountering Spanish ships
this time because he had a small armada of ships under his command. From Florida he
made his way to the Bahamas and then into the Caribbean, his goal being to explore the coast of Darien for a possible passage through to the Pacific. It was during this leg of the trip that Verrazzano himself and some of his men landed on an unnamed West-Indian island—perhaps Guadeloupe—where they were captured, butchered, and eaten by cannibals within sight of their helpless compatriots, including Verrazzano’s brother Gerolamo, who watched from aboard ship. Thus ingloriously ended the career of France’s first great explorer.35

It remains to assess, then, the goals of Verrazzano’s last two expeditions. The Portuguese ambassador to France, João da Silveira, believed that the purpose of each of these voyages was to establish a French base in Brazil in order to contest Portuguese sovereignty in that part of South America. On 19 December 1525, Silveira wrote his sovereign that in his meetings with Admiral Chabot, the French had held to the principle that the natives “have the right to sell their products to whom they wish, if they are free and not vassals.” From this, it appears that French policy, albeit for self-serving reasons, was to accept a degree of Native-American sovereignty. Five days later, Silveira wrote his king again specifying that the aim of Verrazzano’s forthcoming voyage was to establish a base on “O rrio creo que he o que achou Christovão Jaques.” This was the Rio de la Plata. There may have been some truth to Silveira’s report. The French and Portuguese had engaged in an undeclared war on the high seas throughout the 1520s. João III, while maintaining publicly that he only wished to suppress piracy, had ordered the destruction of all French shipping trading to Brazil. Francis I played the same game. He was publicly conciliatory toward João even while Admiral Bonnivet issued a letter of marque against Portuguese shipping. In 1527, the Portuguese coast guard, under the
aforementioned Christovão Jaques captured and executed a number of Bretons who had been loading brazilwood in Bahia. It was said that Jaques’s method of executing French interlopers was to turn them over to cannibals to be eaten. The execution of the Breton merchants prompted a protest from the semi-autonomous governor of Brittany to Francis I. The king did ask for compensation, along with a massive loan of 400,000 cruzados from João to be used to ransom his two sons. João offered Francis 100,000 cruzados and countered that the Bretons might be paid by levying a sum against the compensation due the Portuguese for the 300 or more ships the French had illegally seized over the years. It was in this context that Verrazzano’s last two voyages took place.36

That the French meant to loosen the Portuguese hold on Brazil became even more evident in the years just after Verrazzano’s death. In 1531, the Portuguese managed to bribe Bonnivet’s successor, Admiral Chabot, who agreed to end an embargo of Portuguese ships in French ports, call in letters of marque, and suppress French trade to Brazil and Guinea. This might seem to have signaled French acquiescence in Portuguese possession of Brazil, but for the fact that the French about this time tried to establish a trading post at Pernambuco. Then, too, Francis’ own policy that the seas were open to all, conflicted with that of the Portuguese, who maintained that the discovery and celestial mapping of new sea routes to previously unknown lands conferred a right of monopoly on the discoverer. Alexander VI’s papal bull of 1493, which implied exclusive control of the New World for Spain and Portugal, seemed to support the Portuguese position. In 1533, however, Francis managed to persuade Pope Clement VII to reinterpret Alexander’s ruling. Clement held that the right of possession accorded to Spain and Portugal only applied to “known continents, not to territories subsequently
discovered by other powers.” This reinterpretation opened the door legally for France to challenge the grip of Portugal and Spain on the New World. 

Although the French failed to take further steps to assert possession of the areas that Verrazzano had formally “discovered” on his 1524 voyage, that expedition and his follow-up trips to Brazil, along with the voyages of other French captains to that region, prompted the French government to develop a policy toward the New World. Because the French came late to the process of discovery and colonization, it was necessary for Francis I to deny the methods by which the forerunners in the field—Spain and Portugal—asserted possession of lands, peoples, and trade routes. The French did not deny these methods because they did not understand them, but precisely because they did. In fact, Verrazzano initially employed some of the very same methods the French were beginning to argue against—naming, literary description, the right of first discovery, and most importantly map-making on the basis of celestial navigation. Soon after Verrazzano’s final fatal voyage, Francis I, to counter Portuguese claims, would argue that first discovery conferred no special right of possession or monopoly, that trade routes, no matter who discovered them, were free to all, and that native peoples had a sovereign right to decide with whom they would trade. Moreover, Francis I successfully lobbied the pope to modify the papal rulings that conferred possession of the New World on Spain and Portugal. It had also become clear that France, under Francis I, intended to challenge the position of the Portuguese in Brazil, as well as Spanish claims to North America. In short, the French had developed a set of principles that would become the basis of their colonial policy as they began to construct their network along the yet-to-be-discovered St. Lawrence.
first three wars, his goals were to limit the power of Charles V and also to regain control of the duchy of Milan, which Francis considered his by right of inheritance. The last war was largely defensive. By the end of his reign, Francis’ wars had largely bankrupted the royal government.

9 For motivations growing out of the Middle Ages, see Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration and Settlement 1450 to 1650* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1963), 1-5.

10 Francis was at war with the emperor from 1520-1525, 1527-1529, 1536-1538, and 1542-1545. In the first three wars, his goals were to limit the power of Charles V and also to regain control of the duchy of Milan, which Francis considered his by right of inheritance. The last war was largely defensive. By the end of his reign, Francis’ wars had largely bankrupted the royal government. Knecht, *Francis I*, 105-107, 160, 183, 277, 289, 362, 369-71. On Pigafetta’s visit to the French court see Wroth, *The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano*, 220-21.

11 For motivations growing out of the Middle Ages, see Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance*, 19-31.

12 Verlinden notes that “one of the principal aims” of his book *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization* is “to point out that the concept of continuity, or in other words the absence of a gap, between the Middle Ages and modern time can be applied to colonial history in the strict sense.” Verlinden also notes, however, that the origins of many of the techniques of colonization can be traced to the Italian city republics, particularly Venice and Genoa, which maintained colonies in the eastern Mediterranean in the late Middle Ages. Verlinden, it seems, does not strongly differentiate between Medievalism and the Renaissance humanism. Nevertheless, Venice and Genoa developed their Mediterranean colonies well before the beginning of the Renaissance movement. See Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization: Eleven Essays with an Introduction*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), xvi, 4-7, 17-19, 21-26, 29. Curtin says that although modern colonization is connected to the rise of capitalism, it employed certain aspects of feudalism, particularly the custom that the landowner in the plantation system employed...

12 From at least 1530 on, Francis maintained amicable trade and military relations with the Turks, which at times became a full alliance. From time to time, for political reasons, he agreed to participate in crusades against the Turks, but these agreements led to no action on his part. Knecht, Francis I, 49, 69, 214-15, 223-27, 236, 253-73, 290-91, 293-94; 327, 364-66, 370-71; Verrazzano in his letter to Francis did take note of the apparent lack of religious awareness among the native people and of their willingness to accept instruction. See Cèllere Codex, facsimile, p. 9, in Wroth, Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 113.


14 Cèllere Codex, Tarrow translation, Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 142. The portolan chart and journal have since been lost. Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 7.

15 Cèllere Codex, Tarrow’s translation, and Wroth’s analysis, in his The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 73-87, 133.

16 Cèllere Codex, Tarrow translation in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 133, 135-36, as well as Wroth’s own analysis, 74-89; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 3-7.

17 Cèllere Codex, Tarrow translation in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 137-41, and Wroth’s own analysis, 84-89; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 3-7; See also the map of Verrazzano’s anchorage in Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 302.

18 Cèllere Codex, Tarrow translation, in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 141. The quote from Verrazzano’s letter to Francis I in Italian reads, “Navigando intra Subsulano et Aquilone in spatio di leghe CL venimmo propinqui a la terra trovarono per il passa e Britanni . . . .” There has been some dispute about whether by the word “Britannii” Verrazzano meant “the Bretons” or “the Britons.” French and Canadian historians interpret the passage to mean that the Bretons first discovered the area of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. But Wroth asserts that “Britanni” stands for “Britishers not Bretons,” and therefore refers to the 1497 voyage of John Cabot to the area in question rather than to subsequent voyages by French seamen from Brittany. See Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 6 and Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 43, 54-55. In his letter to Francis, Verrazzano or his amanuensis spells Brittany, “Brectagna,” while he refers to those who discovered the eastern Canadian coast as “Brittani,” which seems to support the idea that he was referring to the English. See Cèllere Codex, facsimile, pp. 2 and 9 in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 99, 112.


20 The idea that Verrazzano used naming with an eye to buttering up the king and his court for future support gains credence by the fact that the naming of sites chiefly appears in the explorer’s glosses to his draft letter to Francis. In other words, they were very likely an afterthought. See Cèllere Codex, 2-2v, 4-11, along with the author’s comments in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 79-80; 84-85; 87, 99, 103-117, 133-41, 159-60; Knecht, Francis I, 330.

21 Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 81.


23 Ibid., 134, 138, 141.

24 Cèllere Codex, 2v, 4v, 5v, 6, 8-8v and Tarrow translation in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 100, 104, 106-7, 111-12; 134-41.


38 Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 13
41 Ibid., 332-34
42 Ibid., 233-37.
43 Knecht, Francis I, 331; Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 219-25.
44 Some interpreters of the documentation for Verrazzano’s 1526-27 voyage believe he endeavored to find a passage through the American continents and may have attempted first to make his way through the Straits of Magellan. They argue that when this failed he turned east and tried to make his way around Africa into the Indian Ocean, a feat that at least one of his ships accomplished. When Verrazzano himself failed to round Africa, he then sailed with two ships, as all generally agree, to Brazil where he picked up a cargo of brazilwood. This interpretation, as Wroth points out, stretches credulity, in that it would require Verrazzano to have crossed the Atlantic four times in a single voyage. Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 219-26; 228-35.
45 Wroth and before him Prospero Peragallo have successfully refuted the story that Verrazzano was one and the same as the pirate Jean Fleury, whom the Spanish captured and hung in 1527. See Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 242-62; Morison speculates that Verrazzano met his death on Guadeloupe, see his The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 315.
47 Knecht, Francis I, 332-33.
CHAPTER 2
RECONNAISSANCE: CARTIER’S “DISCOVERIES”

In the years immediately following his release from captivity, Francis I concentrated his attention on two objectives—freeing his sons and frustrating the unfavorable terms of the Treaty of Madrid. For the purpose of freeing his sons, Francis worked throughout 1525 and 1526 to build an alliance with England and Pope Clement VII to put pressure on Charles V. He also delayed handing over Burgundy to the emperor, as the treaty required, and hoped to use a new system of alliances to convince the Charles V to give up his claims there. As far as Francis was concerned, the Treaty of Madrid had been signed under duress and was therefore legally invalid. His strategy was to honor the provisions that suited him while he negotiated the release of his sons, but to delay honoring any provisions he found disadvantageous. The keystone of Francis’ foreign policy was the Holy League of Cognac, which was really an Italian-based defensive coalition against Charles V, formed in March 1526. The members included France, Venice, Florence, the pope, and Francesco Sforza, the former ruler of Milan. In order to gain Sforza’s support, Francis promised to return Milan to him.\(^1\)

It seems that Francis meant only to use the League of Cognac as a diplomatic lever in order to put pressure on Charles V to release the princes. But the Italians saw the league as a military coalition for driving the imperial armies from Italy. With this in mind, the League, without French support, began attacking imperial positions at Milan as early as June. During the summer, though, the League suffered several defeats. In the meantime, Francis offered no military support. In July, Charles’ forces repulsed the
League’s attack on Milan and forced Sforza out of Milan castle. In the spring of 1527, the Imperial Army took Rome, sacking the city and forcing the pope and the curia to take refuge in the castle of Sant’Angelo. It was not until August that Francis decided to commit troops, and by then it was too late to retrieve the situation. The war lasted until August 1529, when a formal peace was concluded in the treaty of Cambrai. The treaty provided for Charles to give up his claims to Burgundy and to release Francis’ sons in exchange for a cash payment. Francis, meanwhile, was to relinquish his claims in Italy.²

Given his diplomatic and military preoccupations in Europe, Francis seems to have devoted little time to following up on Verrazzano’s discoveries. As has been seen, although a coalition of Admiral Chabot and French and Italian merchants had commissioned Verrazzano to find a suitable sea route to the Indies, these efforts had not been successful. With the exception of these voyages, French overseas efforts were chiefly in the hands of merchants, such as Jean Ango, who concentrated his attention on Brazil, where cargos of lucrative dyewoods might be had. Verrazzano himself had participated in this trade once his voyages of 1526 and 1528 had failed in their initial goal of sailing to the East Indies.³

It was Jean Le Veneur, the bishop and count of Lisieux, abbé of Mont St. Michel, and the Grand Almoner of France, who refocused Francis’ attention on North America. Le Veneur had a chance to discuss his ideas with the king in 1532 when Francis made a pilgrimage to Mont St. Michel in May of that year. Le Veneur also took the opportunity to introduce Francis to Jacques Cartier, a pilot from St. Malo, who had the wherewithal to fill the void left by Verrazzano’s death. As Le Veneur explained to the king, Cartier had already made voyages to Brazil and to Newfoundland and would be able to conduct ships
for the king on a voyage of discovery to the New World. The bishop agreed to furnish chaplains and to provide money for such a voyage, if Francis would commission Cartier to undertake it.4

Cartier, the son of the seaman and fisherman Jamet Cartier and his wife Jesseline Gensart, was born in St. Malo in 1491. St. Malo was part of Brittany, an area long known for producing intrepid seafarers. Brittany had been an independent duchy but came a step closer to formal union with France in the year of Cartier’s birth when the duchess of Brittany, Anne, married the French king, Charles VIII. Brittany was then formally annexed to France in August 1532, just a few months after Cartier’s introduction to Francis.5

St. Malo is said to have been founded by a “sea-going” monk named Maclaw or Maclou, from whom the town takes its name. The town itself is situated at the mouth of the Rance River on a part of a rocky coast that protrudes into the English Channel. For this reason, ships trading to and from St. Malo had fairly direct access to the sea. Although pilots did not have to enter into the Rance in order to gain the harbor, they were required to negotiate a tricky passage of reefs and rocks in order to make it safely to port.6

Aside from Le Veneur’s statement to the king, nothing is known of Cartier’s career at sea prior to the voyages of discovery he made under the king’s commission. Sources from St. Malo, though, record his marriage to Catherine des Granche in the spring of 1520. By this match, Cartier had connected himself to one of the most powerful and wealthy families of St. Malo. Catherine’s father, Jacques, was constable of the town and was the most heavily taxed of all the town’s inhabitants following the Mad
War, which ended in 1488. Cartier seems, then, to have been a respected figure in the town in his own right by the time of his marriage, which can also be seen by the number of times he was asked to stand as godfather to children and as witness to baptisms. In his *Relation de la Nouvelle France*, published in Lyons in 1616, the Jesuit Father Pierre Biard, after noting that the word “Canada” did not originally designate all of New France but only that which extended along the St. Lawrence River inland, makes the following enigmatic statement:

À Canada touché l’Acadie, ou pay des Souriquoy plus bas vers le Sud: Et plus bas encores au delà de la Baye Françoise est la Norambegue. De ces deux mot de Norambegue & de Acadie, il n’en reste plus aucune memoire sur le pays; ouy bien de Canada, laquelle fut principalement descouverte par Jacques Cartier, l’an 1524, & puis un second voyage dix ans après l’an 1534.

The historian Gustave Lanctot has argued that this passage, together with some cartographical information on a Scandinavian map of 1605, proves that Jacques Cartier had been with Verrazzano on the voyage of 1523-24 and that this was one of the voyages Le Veneur alluded to when he mentioned to the king that Cartier had been to Newfoundland. This would be more of a possibility if, as Lanctot asserts, Biard had used “Canada,” in the last instance, as a synonym for New France. But the context argues against such an interpretation. Certainly no one on Verrazzano’s voyage of 1523-24 had discovered the St. Lawrence nor the country along its banks or Verrazzano himself would have mentioned it in his extended letter to Francis I. Lanctot makes the even less supportable assertion that Cartier was also with Verrazzano on his last and fatal trip to the Caribbean in 1528, and that Cartier, after witnessing Verrazzano’s murder, had
then piloted his ship, first to Brazil and then back to France. All that can be said with certainty is that prior to his voyage of 1534, Cartier had been both to Newfoundland and Brazil and that he seems to have brought back from the latter place a native girl, whom he had baptized Catherine de Brazil, after his wife. Certainly, many French and Bretonnese ships aside from those of Verrazzano had visited both Brazil and Newfoundland between 1504 and 1532, so that Cartier could have visited North and South America without having been on either of the Italian explorer’s voyages.9

Between Cartier’s interview with Francis I and his first voyage under the king’s commission in 1534, Francis managed to persuade Pope Clement VII to reinterpret the 1493 papal bulls of Alexander VI, which gave Spain a monopoly of the lands in the Western hemisphere. Clement’s reinterpretation also contradicted the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which had revised Alexander’s ruling so that Portugal might have control of Brazil. Clement, it seems, in spite of the disaster Francis’ inaction had inflicted on the League of Cognac, was still well-disposed toward the French king. This was in part because the two remained united in opposition to the ambitions of Charles V. Moreover, in 1533, Francis and Clement became relatives, when the pope’s niece, Catherine de Medici, married Francis’ son Henri, the heir to the throne. Clement had come to France to attend the wedding, and Francis and his Grand Almoner, Le Veneur, met the pope at Marseilles to conduct him to the ceremony. Clement was sufficiently impressed with Le Veneur to elevate him to cardinal in short order. When Le Veneur traveled to Rome later to receive the red hat, he took the opportunity to lobby the pope for a reinterpretation of Alexander’s bulls, enlisting the pope’s nephew, Cardinal Hippolyte de Medici, to assist in the negotiations. Clement agreed to revise both the papal interpretation of Alexander’s
bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas and announced that the right of possession accorded to Spain and Portugal only applied to “known continents, not to territories subsequently discovered by other powers.” Clement’s restatement opened the way for Francis, through his new master-pilot Jacques Cartier, to explore and take possession of any previously unknown lands he could find in the New World.10

Although Cartier undoubtedly received the king’s authorization in 1534 to undertake a voyage aimed chiefly at finding a passage west to China, no formal commission has survived. Nevertheless, the circumstances of his voyage are well-known from what appears to be Cartier’s own account, which was published first in Italian in 1556 and later in English translation in 1580. An original manuscript of Cartier’s First Relation, as this document is called, was only discovered in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris in 1867. Contemporary documents dealing with the preparations for Cartier’s departure also attest to the official nature of his first voyage. On 18 March 1534, the king ordered 6,000 livre tournois to be issued to fund the voyage out of the general receipts of the department of Outre-Seine. Jean de Vymond, the treasurer of the marine, was to employ the money to purchase supplies and armament and to raise crews for Cartier’s ships. This document explicitly notes that the ships were to be outfitted in Brittany and that Cartier was to lead “a voyage from this kingdom to Newfoundland in order to discover certain islands and lands where it is said great quantities of gold and other rich things may be found.”11

A motive so explicitly stated cannot be ignored. Evidently, the French crown had at least heard some plausible rumors of quantities of precious metals and minerals to be had in the region of Newfoundland, but the source of this information is not entirely
clear. Perhaps it was Cartier himself, who had already been to those shores. Still, the question remains: Why did the French choose to make further exploratory voyages to this region in the northern reaches of North America rather than make a claim to the southern and mid-Atlantic region that Verrazzano had already explored and mapped? After all, though Verrazzano had brought back no gold, silver, or precious gems, he had claimed that there was a good prospect of finding these riches in some of the hills he had seen surrounding New York Harbor and also in the vicinity of Cape Cod. Then, too, the advantages of the more southerly region in terms of climate, soil, anchorages, and the friendliness of the aboriginal peoples seemed to far outweigh what had heretofore been found in the north. Two explanations, though speculative, present themselves. One is that the French still hoped to find a passage to Asia, which was the explicit aim of all of Verrazzano’s voyages. Verrazzano claimed to have seen the Asian (Pacific) ocean, just across a narrow isthmus in the region of North Carolina and Virginia. Although Verrazzano’s “observation” was wildly off-base, the French could not have known this in 1534. The concept of the Verrazzanian Sea continued to appear on reputable maps up through the beginning of the seventeenth century and was not disproven until English settlement of the eastern seaboard was well underway. Nonetheless, Verrazzano himself had found no way through to the Asian sea he reportedly had seen, and perhaps this discouraged further French efforts along the coasts he had explored. It is clear from the relations of Cartier’s voyages that one of his chief ambitions was to find a passage through the continent, and perhaps he and the French court believed the best place to look was in the region of Newfoundland, which still had not been fully explored and mapped.
There is also abundant evidence that Cartier and the king believed that Newfoundland was a part of the continent of Asia.¹²

A second reason the French may have concentrated their efforts in the north was likely sheer habit. French commercial ships had been frequenting the coast of Newfoundland since at least 1504 and continued to do so in relatively large numbers between the voyage of Verrazzano and the first Cartier mission, bringing back large cargoes of cod and some furs. In short, this was the area the French knew best. Although the earliest voyages of exploration—those of Denys, Aubert, and the official one of Verrazzano—had been from ports in Normandy, it may well be that it was the Bretons who had initially visited the area around Newfoundland, a fact that Verrazzano explicitly acknowledged in his report after the 1524 voyage. Cartier, with official backing, may have been reasserting not just a French claim but a Bretonese one. Then, too, although they had some competition from Basque and Portuguese fisherman in the Newfoundland region and also the prior claim of the English to contend with, it was a competition for control that the French were likely to win. The Northern reaches of North America had the advantage of being close to France, but far distant from the center of Spanish colonization in the Western Hemisphere, so that the French might build up a colony in the north slowly and on the cheap.¹³

Further confirmation that his initial voyage was royally commissioned may be found in Cartier’s complaint of 19 March to the Court of St. Malo that he was having difficulty raising crews for his voyage because several merchants of the town, in defiance of the king’s “pleasure and wish,” had hidden away shipmasters, master mariners, and sailors in preparation for their own voyages of profit to Newfoundland. Cartier, who is
referred to as the captain and pilot for the king, won his point, and the court prohibited
any ship from leaving port until he had raised his crews. The court’s directive also
provides some further information about the aim of Cartier’s voyage, noting that he is “to
go to Terre Neuve, pass through the strait of the Bay of Chasteaulx [the strait of Belle
Isle] with two ships manned by sixty crewmembers.” This document also demonstrates
the clear distinction between official voyages of exploration and purely private
commercial ventures.14

By the following month, Cartier had completed his crews. Charles de Mouy, the
vice admiral of France, in a ceremony at St. Malo, swore in the “captains, masters, and
crews,” who were thus obliged to faithfully serve the king. Then, on 20 April, Cartier,
with two ships of about sixty tons each with sixty-one crewmembers apiece, sailed from
St. Malo, beginning again the “fact-finding” phase of network building that Verrazzano’s
death and the captivity of the king had interrupted. With fortunate winds, Cartier’s
crossing took just twenty days. The first land he sighted was Cape Bonne Vista,
Newfoundland, but due to adverse winds, he did not harbor in the bay north of the Cape,
but just south in a smaller harbor he named St. Catherine, perhaps in honor of his wife.
Today this harbor is known as Catalina. After the crews rested and made repairs for ten
days, the two ships proceeded north along the coast and rounded Cape Bauld at the
northern tip of Newfoundland, which Cartier called Cape Degrat.15

Adverse winds occasioned a delay of several days, after which Cartier sailed
through the Strait of Belle Isle, as he was instructed to do, and hugged the northern coast
of the Gulf of St. Lawrence until he was a little southwest of the harbor at Blanc Sablon.
He continued to hug the east coast of Labrador, passing Bradore Bay. By 12 June, after
passing through some small islands, Cartier found a “good harbor,” naming it St. Servan’s Port. To mark it, he set up a cross. Several leagues south, Cartier reached the mouth of a river, which he named St. James. Here he encountered a fishing ship from La Rochelle, which he directed to a safe harbor at what is now Cumberland Bay, but which Cartier had named after himself. He then crossed over to the west coast of Newfoundland at Cap Double and continued to chart the coast.¹⁶

After reaching the vicinity of Cape Anguille, which he named St. Jean, Cartier, on 24 June, steered to the southwest. He anchored at a small island as “full of beautiful trees, meadows, fields of wild wheat and pease in flower as fair and abundant as I ever saw in Brittany.” Here he spent the night, naming it Brion, in honor of his patron, Admiral Chabot, sieur de Brion. After passing the Magdalen Islands, he continued southwest reaching Prince Edward Island on 30 June. Turning to the northwest, he coasted north, taking careful note of the beauty and fertility of the island. Finding no suitable harbor, he continued north to Chaleur Bay, which he reached by 3 July.¹⁷

In the course of his first voyage, Cartier employed tried and true methods to assert French possession. In his narrative, he provides both literary descriptions and latitudinal and longitudinal positions for the lands he visited. With an eye to setting up a seaborne network, Cartier made careful note of good harbors. He saved his most glowing description for Chaleur Bay, which because of its depth led him to believe that it might be a passage through to the East Indies. It was for this reason that Cartier named the northernmost point of Miscou Island, which marks the entrance to the bay, Cap d’Esperance. He made an extensive exploration of this bay, both by longboat and ship, making friends and trading with the Native Peoples along the way and taking note that
beyond the lowlands, which extended down to the bay, one could discern high mountains.

Unlike most of the land he had passed to this point in his voyage, which had been rocky and relatively barren, Cartier found the area around Chaleur Bay conducive to settlement:

Their land is more temperate in heat than the land of Spain, and the most goodly that may be possible to see, and as level as a pond. And there is not here any little spot void of woods and made up of sand, which may not be full of wild grain, which has an ear like rye, and the kernel like oats, and peas as thick as if one had sown and cultivated them; gooseberries, white and red, strawberries, raspberries, and red roses, and other herbs, and ponds where there are plenty of salmon.  

Here too, Cartier, with a commercial eye, noted that the mountains on the northern coast of the bay were “all full of trees of tall growth, of many sorts, and among others are many cedars and firs as goodly as it may be possible to behold for to make masts sufficient to mast ships of three hundred tons and more.”

While he was exploring the north coast of Chaleur Bay by boat on 6 July, Cartier was surprised to find himself suddenly approached by some forty or fifty canoes full of Mi’kmaq Indians from the south shore. A number landed near where Cartier’s boat seemed headed, held up peltries on sticks, and began beckoning to the French to come ashore. The Mi’kmaqs were presumably already familiar with Europeans with whom they had traded furs. Cartier, however, was unnerved and steered his boat away. Some of the Mi’kmaqs from shore then jumped back into their canoes and set out after the French boats. Although the Indians made signs of friendship, Cartier remained distrustful and fired two pivot guns over the heads of the Indians to make them disperse. This only drove the Indians off momentarily, and when they returned, Cartier had his sailors hurl fire lances at them to scare them off for good. The next day, however, the Mi’kmaqs returned, albeit in smaller numbers, and again brought furs to trade. This time
Cartier was secure in his ship and sent two of his men ashore to trade “knives and other iron wares” for the furs. Two days later while he was exploring a channel that entered into the bay, Cartier and his men encountered a group of some 300 Mi’kmaq men, women, and children who had come to trade sealskins. The French gave them hatchets, knives, beads, and other cheap wares in return. The Mi’kmaq women came over to Cartier’s party singing and dancing and, in a typical Native-American greeting in this part of the world, rubbed the arms of the French with their hands. Taking note of their cordiality, Cartier remarked that he judged “more than otherwise that these people would be easy to convert to our holy faith.”20

On 12 July, Cartier set out from Chaleur Bay, sailing northeast along the coast. By the 16th, he had reached Gaspé Bay, where he would remain for the next nine days. Here the French met a party of about 200 Laurentian Iroquois, who had come from their inland town to fish. Among them was Donnacona, their chief. The Laurentian Iroquois also proved friendly, and Cartier gave them knives, combs, and glass beads. Although the meeting between the French and this group of Indians was generally amicable, it was not without some friction. To mark the entrance of the bay, Cartier on 24 July set up a thirty-foot-high cross bearing the French monarch’s insignia. The French all knelt in solemn ceremony before the cross as the Iroquois watched. Cartier says that he and his associates by signs attempted to indicate to the Iroquois that they were thanking God who lived in Heaven above. Whether this was accurately communicated to the Indians is a matter of doubt, but the meaning of this attempt to reinscribe the territory was not lost on the Indian leadership. In The First Relation, the author remarks that soon after the ceremony, Donnacona came out to the French ship in his canoe and “made to us a long
harangue, showing us the said cross, and making a cross with two fingers, then showed us the country all about us, as if he had wished to say that all the country was his, and that we should not plant the said cross without his leave.” The French were able to assuage Donnacona’s feelings by persuading him somewhat deceitfully that the cross was meant only to mark the entrance to the harbor so that they could come again bringing ironware and other gifts. Cartier also convinced the Indians to allow him to take two of their number—Taignoagny and Domagaya—back to France. These were the teenage sons of the chief, and to reinscribe them, Cartier immediately dressed them in European livery—the sign not only that they were to be reaculturated, but also, in the symbolic language of European dress, that they were to be subservient. In France, Taignoagny and Domagaya would be trained as interpreters who might serve as guides on subsequent voyages.21

On 25 July, Cartier set out from Gaspé on a northeasterly course. He skirted the south coast of Ile d’Anticosti, rounded it, and by 1 August sailed into the strait north of the island that leads into the St. Lawrence River. But meeting with strong adverse winds and currents, he did not penetrate the strait and discover the great highway into the continent. Cartier took Ile d’Anticosti to be a projection of the mainland. From this strait, which he named St. Peter’s, Cartier sailed northeast, back to the Strait of Belle Isle between Labrador and Newfoundland. After consulting with his captains, pilots, masters, and companions, he decided to steer for home. The French then rested some six days at Blanc Sablon, before setting sail for Brittany.22

Cartier reached St. Malo on 5 September.23 His report, very likely made for the benefit of Francis I and his ministers, indicates that he had used a range of methods for asserting French claim to the territories he had visited. He had set up two crosses and
held a solemn religious ceremony at the one planted at Gaspé. Such a ceremony in front of the cross, says Patricia Seed, was the preferred French method of claiming possession. But in this case, the Native Peoples remained onlookers and did not, as she says was necessary, directly participate in the ceremony itself. Cartier also used other methods, which included careful description of the lands and waters, of the flora and fauna, and of the people he encountered. Much of this information, which would fall squarely into the fact-finding category, was detailed with a commercial eye and took note of promising fisheries, stands of timber, and areas that might support shipping and settlement. In addition, Cartier was the first to explore and, it seems, to map the west coast of Newfoundland, which asserted a French right of first discovery. To cement this, he made longitudinal and latitudinal notations based on celestial observation and other scientific means of navigation. In his circuit of the Bay of St. Lawrence, Cartier also furthered French claims by liberally dispersing French names on all of the prominent landmarks and waterways he visited or viewed. Of the methods for asserting possession that Seed details only reading the Requirement (as was the Spanish custom), conquest, and actual settlement were left out. The last of these, Cartier himself would soon attempt to employ.

Although he had sailed as far west as the Ile d’Anticosti, he had not discovered the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. He had not discovered a Northwest Passage to Asia, nor had he brought back any precious metals. But he did bring back enough of a possibility that these things might be found that the king authorized another voyage. On 30 October, at “the wish and commandment of the king,” Admiral Chabot issued a new commission. Under its terms, Cartier was ordered to conduct three ships, each manned
and supplied for a voyage of fifteen months, in order “to perfect” the exploration he had begun and to discover the lands beyond Terre Neuve. Cartier was given “total charge and superintendence of the ships, voyage, and navigation,” and all the pilots, ship masters, companions, and mariners were “to obey and serve” him “for the service of the king.”

Cartier’s second voyage was a much larger enterprise than the first. Although he was able to secure only 3,000 livres tournois from the king, he was given three ships from the royal navy. One—La Grande Hermine, which was 100 to 120 tuns with 12 guns—was much larger than either of the two ships Cartier had employed on his first trip. His second vessel, La Petite Hermine, was about 60 tuns with 4 guns. The third ship, L’Emerillon, was small, just 40 tuns with only 2 guns. In all, Cartier was to have 112 officers and men. As a sign of the greater importance of this voyage, three gentlemen were to accompany Cartier on La Grande Hermine, including Claude de Pontbriant, the son of the lord of Montreal and the cupbearer to the Dauphin. According to James Phinney Baxter, the provisioning of the ships for fifteen months, suggests that Cartier intended to winter in North America. Undoubtedly, the information that Domagaya and Taignoagny had provided about the St. Lawrence and lands to the west of Ile d’Anticosti must have prompted a more ambitious effort. It might be that Cartier thought it would be necessary to winter in the New World in order to proceed far enough west to discover a passage to the Indies. It is likely, too, that Domagaya and Taignoagny had discussed the fabled land of Saguenay with Cartier and his sponsors, which held out the promise of riches, if the French could only have the time to find it. Then, too, wintering in North America would help to firm up French imperial claims to any lands Cartier discovered.
This ambitious expedition required a good number of professional seamen, which would certainly have siphoned off a goodly number of men needed for the annual commercial fishing voyages to Newfoundland. In order to preempt any attempt on the part of local merchants to prevent him from raising his crews, Cartier had his royal commission read publicly at a town meeting in St. Malo. In spite of this, the local bourgeois complained through their spokesman Julian Cronier that Cartier had arrested all shipping from the port. Cronier asked that Cartier proceed quickly in raising his crews “because the season is coming for going to Terre Neuve.”

By 31 March, Cartier had enrolled his officers and crew, among them some seven carpenters, an apothecary, a barber, and a trumpeter. By mid-May, all was ready. On the 16th, Cartier and his crews made confession and heard mass at the Cathedral of St. Malo. Three days later, with the wind favorably disposed, the master pilot and his three ships set sail for Newfoundland. The little fleet enjoyed good weather for the first week, but on the 26th storms arose, which scattered the ships. Cartier in Le Grande Hermine sighted Newfoundland on 7 July and made landfall at the Ile d’Oiseaux. Here he took two boatloads of birds for provision and then proceeded to Blanc Sablon, the prearranged meeting point. On the 26th, both Le Petit Hermine and L’Emerillon arrived, and Cartier was ready to begin his exploration.

It was on this second voyage in 1535 that Cartier, guided by Taignoagny and Domagaya, first entered the mouth of the St. Lawrence and sailed 800 miles upriver to the future site of Quebec. Here he found a substantial Iroquois town, named Stadacona, that was but one of many such settlements in the surrounding countryside. This was the country of “Canada,” the word itself meaning “town” in the dialect of the Iroquois
peoples who lived along the river. The French, recognizing the strategic value of the point where the river narrows near the Indian town, wasted little time in reinscribing the territory, renaming the large island in the river Ile d’Orléans, after the king’s son, and the harbor on the St. Charles River near Stadacona, where he was to anchor his ships and build a fort, “Ste. Croix” or “Holy Cross.” When Cartier and his men came ashore, the local inhabitants fled until Taignoagny and Domagaya reassured them. Then the Indians reappeared, dancing joyfully and bringing the French presents of eel and other fish, millet, and pumpkins. The agouhanna (or leader) of Stadacona—Donnacona—also appeared and seemed to welcome Cartier.28

The French account describes Stadacona as little more than a “village” in a wooded area, but provides no estimate of the population. Still, the fact that eleven nearby towns were subject or tributary to Stadacona indicates its importance. Moreover, the relation of the second voyage does not reveal how many houses were clustered in the village or say anything about their construction. It mentions only that the houses were well-provided and that the people there subsisted chiefly by fishing, hunting, and gardening. Crops included maize, musk-melons, pumpkins, gourds, cucumbers, peas, and beans. The Stadaconans also grew tobacco, which they smoked in pipes, filling “their bodies full of smoke, till that it commeth out of their mouth and nostrils, even as out of the Tonnell of a chimney.”29

Cartier, who had sailed under the commission of the king, was eager to continue upriver as far as he could. He was in search of a passage to Asia as well as of precious metals or other resources that might enrich the French monarchy and himself. From the Native Americans he had learned of another Indian town, Hochelaga, about sixty miles
west along the St. Lawrence. But when he declared his intention to travel there, Donnacona tried to dissuade him. In order to maintain friendly relations with the Indians along his route, Cartier had dispensed small presents—chiefly iron knives for the men and glass beads or tin trinkets for the women. The Native Peoples were not unaware of the profits that might accrue from controlling the flow of goods and people along a trade network. They had long been engaged in trading furs for agricultural goods and other commodities, and it was typical for the Native Peoples to prevent traders of another tribe from passing through their territories unless a tribute was paid. In many cases, a strategically located tribe would prevent traders from passing through their territory altogether in order to capture the flow of goods and act as middlemen in a trade between native groups located at some distance from one another. Peter N. Moogk and Bruce G. Trigger speculate that Donnacona wanted to establish a monopoly of French trade goods for himself, essentially becoming a middleman between the French and the upriver Indians, and this is why he did all in his power to prevent Cartier from moving up the St. Lawrence. Donnacona realized that it would be to his advantage to make Stadacona a significant node, in fact a middle point, between two networks—the Native-American trade network to the west and the French network to the east.30

Cartier, though, was determined to see Hochelaga. He had orders from the king to explore inland as far as possible to determine, it would seem, first, whether the river led through the continent to China, and second, whether it led to lands where precious metals and gems might be found. But to go to Hochelaga, Cartier had to leave his larger ships behind, as the river was too shallow to accommodate them beyond Stadacona. He, therefore, sailed part of the way west in the pinnace L’Emerillon, stopping at a place
along the way called Hochelay or Achelacy, where a number of Native Peoples, including a leader of the region, came to visit Cartier. Hoping no doubt to make an important kinship connection, the leader offered the French captain two of his children, a girl of seven or eight and a boy of only two or three. Cartier accepted the girl, but refused the boy as too young. Upon reaching Lake St. Peter, Cartier made a reconnaissance, and finding the river upstream from the lake too shallow for the pinnace, he left it on the lake and transferred to small boats to continue to Hochelaga. The French arrived before town on 2 October, when more than a thousand men, women, and children came out to greet them. The Indians danced a welcoming dance with the men arrayed opposite the women. They also gave gifts of millet bread and fish, “throwing so much of it into our longboats” says the French chronicler, “that it seemed to rain bread.”

The next day, Cartier and twenty of his men prepared to visit the town. Determined to impress, the French captain “put on his armor.” Hochelaga was some distance from the river, and after the French had walked about four or five miles, one of the “chief lords” of the city greeted them and bid them stay were they were. Here the Indians had built a large fire to accommodate their visitors. It may well be that the Native-American leadership was also demonstrating to the French that they could not simply enter the town of Hochelaga at will. It soon became clear that the French were something more than tourists, that they, in fact, also meant to subordinate the Native Americans and their territory to the French crown. Cartier, as a sign of good will, gave the Indian leader two hatchets and two knives. But he also gave him a cross and made him kiss it before he put it about his neck. In a further act of inscription, Cartier
renamed the impressive mountain near Hochelaga “Mount Royal” in honor no doubt of Pierre de Pontbriant, lord of Montreal, whose son was of Cartier’s party.\textsuperscript{32}

Hochelaga was much more impressive to the French than Stadacona. The settlement was surrounded by “fine land with large fields covered with the corn of the country.” The town itself was round and encompassed by a well-constructed timber rampart about thirty feet high. The wall had a walkway near the top, which could be reached by ladders stationed at intervals. Heavy stones, which defenders could hurl down upon their enemies, were stored at the top of the wall. Through this wall there was a single entrance, which could be barred. Within the wall, the French found about fifty substantial houses. Each was about fifty paces long and twelve to fifteen wide. These were built of wood and covered with pieces of bark cut “as broad as a table, which are well and cunningly lashed after their manner.”\textsuperscript{33}

After meeting the “lord” of Hochelaga, who was afflicted with palsy, and saying Christian prayers over the blind, sick, and lame of the town, Cartier climbed to the top of Mount Royal, which gave him a commanding view of the countryside. What he witnessed, stretching between two mountain ranges, was “the finest land it is possible to see, being arable, level, and flat.” The St. Lawrence ran through this land as far as the eye could see. Cartier’s Indian guides told him that after passing beyond three rapids, the river was navigable westward for “three moons” and that another large river (the Ottawa) flowed into it from the northwest. The French imagined that this river, the Ottawa, must be the one that flowed past the fabled kingdom of Saguenay. The Indians then seized Cartier’s silver whistle-chain and one of the sailors’ daggers, which had a gold-colored metal handle, and said that such metal came from up the Ottawa River.
Cartier showed them some copper and asked whether this too came from that region, but the Indians said “no,” that copper came from up the Saguenay River.\textsuperscript{34}

Cartier and his men left Hochelaga late on 3 October or early the following day. The French account mentions only that they had made it back to \textit{L'Emerillon} on Lake St. Peter by 4 October. The next day they set sail down the St. Lawrence for Stadacona, arriving on the 11\textsuperscript{th}. Along the way, the French took notice of four islands in the St. Lawrence where the St. Maurice River flows into it. Cartier had a large wooden cross erected on the most prominent of these islands—St. Quentin. Thus, the French inscribed this area, which would later become a notable colonial settlement between Quebec and Montreal known as Trois-Rivières.\textsuperscript{35}

Back at Stadacona, Cartier found that in his absence the crew had built a defensive work to prevent a surprise attack from Donnacona’s warriors. The Native Americans, though friendly, had occasionally made some gestures towards the French that could be interpreted as threatening. Donnacona and Taignoagny, at this point, brought Cartier to see their houses, and during his tour the French captain took note of five scalps stretched on hoops. Donnacona said they had been taken from the Toudamanni, a people to the south with whom the Indians at Stadacona had been continually at war.\textsuperscript{36} It is interesting to note that the spatial circumstances of conflict for the colonial period had already been set and would run along the same fault line Donnacona described—with the Algonkian- and Iroquois-speaking peoples north of the St. Lawrence in a continual state of war with the Iroquois south of the river in what would become New York. The French would become party to this conflict in the time of Champlain, taking the side of the Huron and Algonkians who lived north of this border.
Cartier and his crew tarried some months at Stadacona. Likely, it had always been the French plan to winter in Canada, but after the middle of November, they had little choice. From that time until the fifteenth of April the St. Lawrence was frozen up. Cartier says the ice around his ships grew to a depth of two fathoms. This would prove to be one of the most severe disadvantages of establishing a colony along the St. Lawrence. From the late fall to the early spring the colonists would essentially be cut off from their European supply base. During the winter of 1535-36, the French, along with the Indians of Stadacona, were struck with a deadly illness that caused their gums to rot, their teeth to fall out, and their joints to swell. This was likely scurvy, brought on by a lack of fresh fruits and vegetables. Cartier’s men were also afflicted by the “French pox” or syphilis, which some of them no doubt gave to Indian women. Cartier himself remained in good health, but the condition of his men was such that they could hardly post a guard and had to worry lest the Indians, who had manifested some unfriendly intentions, take advantage of their weakened condition and wipe them out. As it turns out, it was salvation rather than annihilation that the Indians offered. Domagaya, who had himself been ill, approached the French fort as a cured man, and brought with him the secret of his recovery—the bark and leaves of the annedda tree, now known as the white cedar or arborvitae. Boiled and drunk and rubbed on the arms, it had effected a miraculous cure. Cartier immediately began to administer this treatment to his men. According to the French account, the beverage not only cured the mysterious scurvy, but also the French pox, from which some of the men had been suffering for five or six years. In eight days the French had used up the bark and leaves of an entire large tree, and the treatment “produced such a result,” says the author of the Second Relation, “that had all the doctors
of Louvain and Montpellier been there, with all the drugs of Alexandria, they could not have done so much in a year as did this tree in eight days.” Still, before finding this miraculous cure, the French lost twenty-five men.37

By early May, Cartier and his men, having survived a harrowing winter, were ready to depart for France. But before leaving, in order to assert possession of the territory they had “discovered,” they had a 35-foot-high cross bearing the arms of the king erected at Ste. Croix. Cartier, in typical European fashion, also contrived to kidnap Donnacona and his two sons, promising the people that he would return their leader within one year’s time. Abandoning Le Petit Hermine to the people of the neighboring village Sitadin so that they might have benefit of the old nails in her, he then sailed downriver and reached Newfoundland on 4 June. On 19 June, after meeting a number of ships from France and Brittany along the coast of Newfoundland, Cartier set sail for France, reaching the port of St. Malo on 16 July.38

The Second Relation makes it abundantly clear that Cartier’s second voyage was not solely exploratory. Addressed to the king, it notes that the French voyagers had returned with “the sure hope of the future increase of our most holy faith and of your possessions.”39 The Christianizing mission and the right of possession went hand-in-hand, for it was not in accord with the dictates of reason that the almighty creator—who, for the French, could only be he of the Christian conception—would give any part of his majestic creation to the legitimate dominion of unlettered heathen. Indeed, according to the Second Relation, Cartier had already converted the North-American lands along the St. Lawrence to the king’s possession.
And now through the present expedition undertaken at your royal command for the discovery of the lands in the west formerly unknown to you and to us, lying in the same climate and parallels as your territories and kingdom, you will learn and hear of their fertility and richness, of the immense number of people living there, of their kindness and peacefulness, and likewise of the richness of the great river, which flows through and waters the midst of these lands of yours.40

At the end of the paragraph, the Relation once again refers to the North-American lands through which the travelers had passed as “those lands and territories of yours,” in total disregard of any claims that “the immense number of people living there” might have. To assert the king’s claims to these territories, Cartier had employed the full panoply of ceremonies of possession, the Requirement, conquest, and settlement alone excepted, though a third voyage would be made in an attempt to effect the last. The king’s pilot had once again bestowed French names on particular landmarks—the names of saints, for instance, on the islands west of Newfoundland. None of these names, though, seems more important than that of the island near Stadacona, which Cartier called Ste. Croix. This was the strategically defensible place where the river narrows. A second key site was, of course, the promontory near Hochelaga, which Cartier had called Mont Royal.

The French had also set up markers—thirty-foot high wooden crosses bearing the arms of the king of France—one at St. Nicolas Harbor to mark the northern strait past Ile d’Anticosti into the St. Lawrence, a second at what would become Trois-Rivières, and a third inside the French fort near Stadacona. In no case did the French invite the Native Peoples to participate in a solemn procession, which Seed has described as involving the indigenes in the transfer of power over their lands to a distant European monarch.

Cartier did, however, use “Dutch” methods of description, making particular note of strategic harbors needed for establishing a seaborne network. He also carefully described
any useful flora and fauna and the fertility of the soil in places that might be suitable for settlement. In good Portuguese fashion, he charted unknown coasts and made note of depths and tides. Cartier seems to have made a map of his explorations on this second voyage, which, though now lost, was for some time in the possession of the constable of St. Malo, Jocet de Creméur. A good deal of this information was incorporated in subsequent maps made in Dieppe and also in the important Harléienne Map, now in the British Museum. Cartier did not have to employ much by way of celestial navigation because the parallel of the territories he explored was already well-known to the French. He did, though, began to inscribe the people themselves as future subjects of the French king. This could be seen most clearly in his gift of the crucifix, which he hung about the neck of one of the leaders of Hochelaga. In all of these ways, ways familiar to all of the colonizing European powers, Cartier established French possession of the great St. Lawrence and the territories along it. His mission had not been one of permanent settlement, but he had traced the outlines of a linear colony and made an effort to mark certain spaces, including Mont Royal and the land near Stadacona, as imperial possessions of the French king.41

It was during this second voyage, too, that the French began more demonstrably to assert their superiority over the Native Peoples of the St. Lawrence region. One device Cartier employed was European technological superiority, particularly in regard to weaponry. At Stadacona, at the behest of Taignoagny and Domagaya, Cartier had his ship’s guns fired to the amazement of the Indians. “These were all so much astonished,” says the writer of the Second Relation, “as if the heavens had fallen upon them, and began to howl and to shriek in such a very loud manner that one would have thought hell
had emptied itself there.” During the time of the illness, the French were suspicious that Donnacona had left Stadacona, not on a hunting trip as Domagaya told them, but on a diplomatic mission to organize a large force to attack the French in their fort. But French confidence in their military superiority was such that, from the perspective of the writer of the *Second Relation*, “had the whole of the armed forces of their country come against us, they would have been able to do nothing but gaze on us.”

In regard to the seventeenth century, Michael Adas has noted that, while technology played its part, it was religion that bore the strongest role in the formation of European attitudes of superiority toward Native Peoples, and this seems to hold true for the sixteenth century as well. Self-assured as to the truth of their own unprovable religion, the French ridiculed the beliefs of the Native Peoples. In their attempt to prevent Cartier from going to Hochelaga, the Stadaconans had said that their god, Cudouagny had warned through three messengers that “there would be so much ice and snow that all would perish” who attempted to go there. “At this,” says the French account, “we all began to laugh and to tell them that their god Cudouagny was a mere fool who did not know what he was saying, and that they should tell his messengers as much.” Part of the French mission was to disabuse the indigenes of any belief in their traditional gods and to catechize them in Catholicism, which at least since Charlemagne’s time had been used as a tool to make people obedient to the political status quo. In this case, the imposition of Roman Catholicism would be a useful tool in convincing the Native People to give up their independence and become docile subjects of the French king. The French began this process by reading the *Gospel of St. John* to the Hochelagans and by proselytizing the Stadaconans. Cartier and his men “informed” the
people of Stadacona “that their Cudouagny was a wicked spirit who deceived them, and that there is but one God, Who is in Heaven, Who gives us everything we need and is the Creator of all things and that in Him alone we should believe.” The French account says the Native Peoples believed this message of Christian faith “without trouble” and begged for baptism. But Cartier, distrusting Donnacona, Taignoagny, and Domagaya, held off taking this step and promised on his next voyage to bring priests who would perform the baptisms.43

The French also asserted a kind of superiority in terms of trade, alleging that the Native Peoples were naïve as to the value of various commodities. The Indians provided all kinds of useful commodities to the French—fish, bread, and meat—in return for the nearly worthless goods that Cartier bestowed upon them—small metal hatchets and knives, glass beads, and tin trinkets. The French noted that the Hochelagans placed no value on gold or silver nor indeed on any of “the goods of this world, both because they are unacquainted with them and because they do not move from home and are not nomads like those of Canada and of the Saguenay.” However, in a previous passage, the writer of the Second Relation had remarked, in contradiction to this, that the Hochelagans placed great value upon wampum, made from rare shells, and were happy to receive the nearly worthless gifts the French had distributed. The whole suggestion of the passage is that if the French could induce the natives to find gold and silver, they might easily divest them of it for next to nothing in trade. But there are certain obvious problems with French claims to being the more savvy bargainers. First, the willingness of the Native Peoples to provide food likely signified little more than traditional hospitality. Second, that far from having no value system, the Native Peoples simply had a different one,
more suited to their circumstances and perhaps more reasonable overall, since gold has really little intrinsic value other than its scarcity. Finally, the Native Peoples would easily come to understand European standards of value, which would allow them to become savvy bargainers in their own right. In fact, the French account takes note of the fact that after Taignoagny and Domagaya had warned the Stadaconans that the French goods were of little value, the Indians stopped coming to trade.44

1 Knecht, Francis I, 189, 207-10.
3 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 11.
4 Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 60; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France 11.
5 Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 51, 54-56, 60; Knecht, Francis I, 242-43;
6 Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 263. The phrase “sea-going monk” is Morison’s.
7 H.P. Biggar, ed., A Collection of Documents Relating to Jacques Cartier and The Sieur de Roberval (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada, 1930), 1-4, 6-8, 12-14, 18, 32, 36-37, 38; Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 56-57.
8 Jesuit Relations, 3:40.
9 The Scandinavian map was made by Hans Paulsen Resen and though it mentions Cartier as exploring the whole of Canada after Verrazzano had come to the isles of the Baccalaos, the date 1525 in the sentence refers to the voyage of that year made by Estevan Gomez. Lanctot interprets the fact that Resen discusses Cartier’s voyage prior to that of Gomez’ to mean that Cartier made a voyage earlier than that of Gomez. But it may well be that Resen chose to discuss all of the French/Breton voyages together before mentioning Gomez, so that the discussion is topical rather than chronological. Gustave Lanctot, “Cartier au Canada en 1524,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, 7 (1953): 413-425; Gustave Lanctot, “Cartier en Nouvelle-France en 1524,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, 8 (1954): 213-19; Gustave Lanctot, A History of Canada: Volume One: From its Origins to the Royal Régime, 1663, trans. Josephine Hambleton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 50, 52. Few historians seem to have accepted Lanctot’s argument that Cartier had sailed with Verrazzano, even while sometimes acknowledging its plausibility. David B. Quinn might have summed up the prevailing view when he wrote, “There is nothing which associates Jacques Cartier definitively with the Verrazzano voyage [to Newfoundland], even if it would appear that he was familiar with its results.” See his North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements: The Norse Voyages to 1612 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 169-70. Biard himself gives credit to Breton mariners for having discovered New France in 1504 and notes that the Bretons visited the area continually ever since. He seems to have ignored John Cabot’s voyage. See Jesuit Relations, 3:38.
10 Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:53; Knecht, Francis I, 333; Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery, 110.
12 Cellere Codex, Tarrow translation, in Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 137, 140; Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 301, 305; Wroth says the likelihood is that the French decided to explore the northern stretches of the coast because Verrazzano had done such a thorough job along the more southerly coast. “One can easily imagine, indeed one can almost hear,” says Wroth, “Chabot instructing Cartier to avoid the coasts already explored by Verrazzano and to take up the search for a passage to the Orient where in 1524 Verrazzano had left off.” This would make sense but for the fact that Verrazzano seems to have left off his account once he reached what became Canadian waters because this area was already so familiar to the Bretons. See Wroth, The Voyages of Giovanni da
Verrazzano, 188; for the history of the Verrazzanian Sea in European cartography, see Wroth, 165-68. 186-98; Baxter, A Memoir of Jacques Cartier, 16.

13 For a discussion of early French knowledge of the Newfoundland-Cape Breton area, see Charles de la Roncière, Jacques Cartier (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1931), 34-38; See also, Selma Barkham, “Documentary Evidence for 16th Century Basques Whaling Ships in the Strait of Belle Isle,” in G.M. Story, ed., Early European Settlement and Exploitation in Atlantic Canada: Selected Papers (St. John’s: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1982), 54.

14 Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 344-45; See “Grant of Money to Cartier for his First Voyage” and “Order of the Court of St. Malo that no Vessels were to leave for Newfoundland til Cartier had completed his Crews,” in Biggar, ed., A Collection of Documents, 42-43; the translations are mine.


16 “First Voyage” in Baxter, Memoir of Jacques Cartier, 80-88; Burrage, ed., Early English and French Voyages, 4-9. Morison says the place where Cartier erected this first cross was probably a small islet known as Le Boulet, where H.F. Lewis had found a cairn of stones that he thought might have been at the base of the cross. Le Boulet, however, is two leagues northeast of the St. Augustine River on Shekatic Bay (now Jacques Cartier Bay). See Morison’s The European Discovery of America, 248-352.


18 Morison, The European Discovery of America: Northern Voyages, 368-69; Roncière, Jacques Cartier, 52-57; The quote is from James Phinney Baxter’s translation Cartier’s First Relation, which is taken from the earliest known French manuscript and which may well be Cartier’s original account. See Baxter, Memoir of Jacques Cartier, 106-7.


20 Baxter questions whether the indigenes Cartier met were indeed Mi’kmaqs. “First Voyage,” in Baxter, Memoir of Jacques Cartier, 103-7, 107 n. 1; Morison, however, asserts that the Indians Cartier met during this stretch of the voyage were indeed of the Mi’kmaq group. Morison, The European Discovery of America: Northern Voyages, 369-70.

21 Scholars have referred to the Indians of Stadacona and vicinity as the Laurentian Iroquois in order to distinguish them from other Iroquois-speaking groups, most notably the Huron and the Iroquois of the Five Nations in what later became New York. Cartier’s biographer Charles de la Roncière, however, refers to Donnacona and his people as Huron. See his Jacques Cartier, 56; “First Voyage,” in Baxter, Memoir of Jacques Cartier, 107-13; Burrage, ed., Early English and French Voyages, 24-26.


23 The date comes from Hakluyt’s version of the “First Relation,” which is reprinted in Burrage, ed., Early English and French Voyages, 30; the earlier account, translated and published in Baxter, does not mention the date of Cartier’s return to St. Malo.


26 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 46-47, 51; Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 119; Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 85; Morison says Cartier had trouble raising crews because the mariners owed money to the merchants, who as a result prevented them “from signing on for a non-fishing voyage.” But since there does not appear to be any documentation to this effect, this would seem to be speculation on Morison’s part, though a plausible one. See his The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, 389.

Scholars have agreed, given the linguistic evidence contained in Cartier’s vocabulary of the Stadaconans and in the few items of material culture dating from the first half of the sixteenth century found at Montreal, that both the Stadaconans and Hochelagans spoke a dialect of Iroquois, but the ethnography of these peoples has not been determined beyond that. It seems from Cartier’s account that the people of Hochelaga and Stadacona were organized into separate groups, with the Hochelagans relying more on agriculture and the Stadaconans more on hunting and fishing. It is also unclear what relation either group bore to other Iroquoian speakers, for instance to the Huron or the people of the Five Nations. Likewise, the precise location of Hochelaga has been a matter of dispute. In 1860, workmen discovered a Native-American village and burial site in Montreal, just south of Sherbrooke Street between Mansfield and Metcalfe streets. The geologist Sir John W. Dawson investigated the site, which has since been named after him. Research has shown the artifacts from the site to be Iroquoian, and carbon dating has been able to determine that the site could date to the time of Cartier’s visit, but whether it is indeed Hochelaga has not been satisfactorily proved. See James F. Pendergast and Bruce G. Trigger, Cartier’s Hochelaga and the Dawson Site (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972), 45-46, 92-93, 340; Burrage, ed., Early English and French Voyages, 50-54; J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1909), 48; Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, 12; Bruce G. Trigger, “The Jesuits and the Fur Trade,” Ethnohistory, 12 (Winter, 1965): 33-34; Bachman, Peltries or Plantations, 3; Peter N. Moogk, La Nouvelle France: The Making of French Canada—A Cultural History (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 25.


Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 63-66

Ibid., 66.


Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 38.

Ibid., 37-38


Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 54, 80.

Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 3, 6; Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 56, 64, 68.

CHAPTER 3
FIRST ATTEMPT AT SETTLEMENT IN NEW FRANCE

When Cartier returned to France from his second voyage, he brought with him what appeared to be samples of gold, tales of further riches to be had from Saguenay, and word of the great river that cut deeply into the vast continent of North America—all of which seemed to warrant a follow-up expedition. But any further voyages at the behest of the king would have to wait upon events in Europe. In January 1536, Francis, preoccupied as ever with recovering his rights to Milan and ready to take advantage of the emperor’s recent campaign against Algerian corsairs, had invaded the Duchy of Savoy, likely as either a springboard for a campaign against Milan or as a bargaining chip in order to win the duchy diplomatically for his first-born son. The duke of Savoy was the brother-in-law and ally of Charles V, who quite reasonably interpreted the invasion as a violation of the Treaty of Cambrai. By the end of May, Francis and Charles V were engaged in a full-scale, if undeclared, war in Northern Italy, which was made more official in June when Francis broke off diplomatic relations with the emperor. Francis’s actions prompted Charles V to invade Provence on 13 July, just three days before Cartier’s return. While Charles spearheaded a drive into Francis’s southern domains, the emperor’s ally Henry of Nassau invaded northern France. Francis took up residence in Lyons to supervise the southern defense and later, from 8 August to 10 September 1536, made his headquarters at Valence. This time, he remained well behind the lines and left the direct command of the troops to Anne de Montmorency. The war in the north was similarly left in the care of able subordinates. Thus, it is unlikely that the king could
have met with Cartier upon the latter’s return to St. Malo or any time soon thereafter. The war lasted until November 1537 when a truce was declared. From that time until late 1538, Francis and his government were engrossed in peace talks, which ended fruitlessly but for the fact that they brought the war to an end. Francis’s forces had been well-organized to defend his realms and the imperial invasions north and south were largely repulsed. But at war’s end, control of Milan, Francis’s ultimate aim, remained with the emperor. It seemed that the campaigns of 1536-37 had done little but bankrupt the treasuries of both Francis and his nemesis.¹

With the failure of his efforts to gain Milan for his first-born son by force, Francis began what might be termed a charm offensive. The idea was to suddenly make friends with the emperor and see if he might gain Milan as a gift. It was during this interlude of peace and amicability between Francis and Charles that the French king began once again to think of establishing a French presence in the Americas. In essence, he was transferring his rivalry with Charles off-shore, where it would be less disruptive and less expensive.²

Francis seemed to turn once again with almost childlike enthusiasm to North-American exploration. Indeed, even in the midst of the campaign of 1537, he took time to make a gift of the *Le Grande Hermine* to Cartier in recompense for services rendered in his exploration of Terre Neuve. Then, in September 1538, only a few months after the formal truce had been declared, Francis ordered two payments made to Cartier, one for his past voyages, and the other as reimbursement for the providing for the Indians he had brought back to France. That same month, Cartier submitted a memorandum to the king detailing what he thought was necessary to plant a permanent settlement along the St.
It does not seem plausible that Cartier would have submitted such a report out of the blue. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Francis, who had lost none of his fervor for exploration, had asked Cartier for it.³

In a preamble to his memorandum, Cartier carefully explained the ostensible purpose of the expedition. He noted that in spite of the enormous debts Francis had accrued in recent wars, the king was still willing to incur new expenses “to establish the Christian religion in a country of savages remote from France.” Cartier then asserted that Francis’s ambition was selfless and noted that the “king well knows that there are no mines of gold and silver in the whole extent of this land, nor any other gain to be hoped for by the conquest of infinite souls for God . . .” This bold statement seems remarkable in that Cartier, though he was a devout Catholic, had not taken great pains to bring the Native Peoples to Christ. Nor did the king manifest much evangelical zeal. In his later discussions with the spy João Lagarto, for instance, Francis did not once mention his intention to convert the Indians. As R.J. Knecht has concluded, Cartier’s preamble “was probably intended to satisfy the new pope, Paul III, who had not yet declared himself on French activities overseas. By claiming exclusive religious intentions, Cartier may have hoped to obtain for his royal patron privileges similar to those the papacy had extended to the Portuguese and Spanish monarchs.” Then, too, the declaration that there were no mines of gold or silver in Canada and in the neighboring regions was likely contrived to eliminate any potential rivals.⁴

After having carefully attended to the political implications of the proposed expedition, Cartier laid out an ambitious and costly plan of colonization. This would require no less than six ships, the smallest of which would be 100 tonneaux, along with
two barks of forty to forty-five tonneaux and three river boats that could be assembled upon arrival in the New World. No fewer than 274 men would be needed. Of these, 120 would be sailors, sixty-five of whom would remain in the colony to man the ships and boats used for exploring the river system of the St. Lawrence. Another forty-eight men would be needed for the military establishment of the colony. Forty of these would be heavily armed arquebusiers. There would also be four cannoneers with four subordinates. In addition, the expedition would require at least thirty carpenters, not only to care for the ships, but also to build European-style houses. Joiners, cordwainers, masons, lime-makers, and tile-makers would also be necessary. Several iron forges would be needed, along with blacksmiths and locksmiths to man them. Charcoal-makers would provide the necessary fuel. Oddly, the only farmers Cartier mentioned are vinegrowers and their laborers, whose job it would be to supply wine. He also asked for two apothecaries with their servants, who would be employed in investigating the indigenous flora for marketable herbs (perhaps Cartier had in mind the miraculous and curative annedda). The colony would also need barbers, tailors, hosiers, and at least one physician. Six clergy would be necessary to care for the souls of the colonists and to begin the work of converting the Native Peoples. While this may seem like too few clergymen, given the stated purpose of the expedition, the call for two goldsmiths skilled with gems and two assistants reveals that Cartier, his professions to the contrary notwithstanding, still believed gold and other riches could be found along the St. Lawrence.5

Cartier also called for provisions for two years. His experience had demonstrated that it might not be possible for the colony to rely on resupply the following year, given
the uncertainties of transatlantic travel. It also seems that he did not expect the colony to become self-sufficient within the first two years, though he did ask for millstones to be sent. He also asked for large quantities of iron, salt, and tile, along with munitions, naval stores, and beds and bedding. Cartier proposed that “all manner and species of European domestic beasts and birds be carried to the New World, along with all kinds of grains and seeds. This is what Alfred Crosby has called the European colonists’ biological “portmanteau” that is meant to transform the newly claimed territories into “Neo-Europes.” It represents something more extreme than a simple ceremony of possession or even an inscription of the territories and indigenous peoples with markers. It aims at a wholesale transformation of the colonized land, as well as a complete cultural transformation away from the life ways and traditions of the indigenes. Oddly, though, Cartier did not ask for tanners, leather-workers, or furriers.

Further convincing evidence that Francis’s fervor for overseas exploration had not diminished comes from the letter of the pilot and spy Lagarto to the Portuguese king João III, who had a vested interest in keeping abreast of French intentions in the New World. This letter, which H.P. Biggar has tentatively dated to 22 January 1539, but which likely was written sometime after March 1539, provided the Portuguese king with the details of the extended conversations Lagarto had had with Francis. Playing upon Francis’ zeal for exploration, Lagarto showed him two charts that contained “all the discovered parts” of, presumably, the Americas. Montmorency, in seeming fear that Lagarto was taking advantage of the king’s naïveté, entered the room while the king was studying these maps and advised Francis that his discussions ought to be held before the whole council. Francis, “a little abashed,” replied, “If so, let it be at dessert after supper.” The following
night, the king showed Lagarto two charts of his own, tracing out the great river that Cartier had found “in the land of cod.” Francis also brought before his guest ten or twelve “gold” nuggets “in the shape of small goose quills.” These were the samples of pyrite Cartier had brought back. Apparently, they had not yet been tested and found to be fool’s gold.7

Francis then explained to Lagarto that he had twice sent Cartier on voyages of exploration to the northern reaches of North America and that he intended to do so a third time. This time he planned to have the French build a fort on the river as a base of operations. He also intended to send two brigantines, which could be sailed upriver as far as the great falls and could then be taken overland around the falls before continuing to sail upriver to the land of Saguenay. Francis explained that he had met the Indian king Donnacona, who had assured him that at Saguenay the French would find clove, nutmeg, and pepper plants growing, as well as great mines of gold and silver.8

When Lagarto expressed some doubt as to whether gold and spices could be found in such a cold, northerly climate, Francis responded that gold had been found in Hungary, which was also a cold country. After Lagarto noted that Hungary was an anomaly, the king credulously explained that he had no reason to doubt what Donnacona had told him because in all the time the Indian king had been in France, he had never altered his story. Lagarto countered that perhaps Donnacona’s remarkable consistency was the product of cunning. “I said to the king, may he not be like him who tempted Christ who said ‘haec omnia tibi dabo,’9 so as to return to his own land.” But Francis, with a gullibility born out of wishful thinking, merely laughed and said that Donnacona
“was an honest man,” in spite of the fact that he had also told the king that there were flying men at Saguenay, whose arms were winged like bats.\textsuperscript{10}

The king had apparently been fed other false information, notably that there were oranges and pomegranates to be had at the mouth of the St. Lawrence or “Codfish River,” as it was called. Nowhere in his \textit{First or Second Relation} does Cartier mention finding oranges or pomegranates in the regions he had visited, so this information was likely another of Donnacona’s fabrications. Whether the prospective territories of the French king in North America would produce gold and silver, spices, or oranges and pomegranates was a matter of speculation in 1539. But of one commodity there was no doubt. As the king explained to Lagarto, along the St. Lawrence there was an abundance of “certain animals whose hides as leather are worth ten cruzados each, and for this sum they are sold in France, and that ten thousand of these skins being brought they are worth 100,000 cruzados.” As the king’s testimony demonstrates, as early as 1539, peltries had joined codfish as an important item of export from the St. Lawrence region.\textsuperscript{11}

In the late summer of 1541, Charles V received word from his ambassador to the French court that Francis had “given license to all of his subjects to go to the new lands, both those of Portugal and others, among which, according to what the Majordomo of the Portuguese Ambassador has told me, comprise those of your Majesty.” The ambassador also noted that some ladies of the court had informed him that it was Montmorency, now the king’s chief adviser, who was “the prime mover in what is being done in this matter.” Charles V, who was in Flanders, considered any such license from the French king to be a violation of the Treaty of Nice, which had concluded the 1535-38 war. In response, he began an unsuccessful diplomatic effort to persuade João III of Portugal to fit out a joint
fleet with Spain to protect their lands, people, and shipping from whatever evil intention
the French might have. João, who seems to have been better informed about what the
French were up to, refused to take on so expensive a task. He decided to confine his
efforts to liberally sprinkling bribes on influential members of the French court who
might be in a position to persuade Francis to call off any further French expeditions to the
Americas. The emperor was understandably concerned about his treasure fleets from
New Spain, but João reassured Charles through the Spanish ambassador in Portugal that
the French fleets were not being fitted out for piracy or plunder, but rather to discover
and settle lands that did lie within Charles’s “Indies.” For his part, the emperor remained
suspicious and set up a network of spies in France in order to glean better intelligence.12

In October, Cartier received his formal commission “as captain and pilot-general
of the ships that the king was sending to Saguenay.” The commission, in a rather heavy-
haanded way, once again promoted the religious purpose of the mission. Francis notes
that his explorers had brought “divers men” back to France to be “instructed in the love
and belief of God and his holy law and Christian doctrine with the intention of returning
them to the said country in company with a good number of our subjects of good will in
order to more easily induce the other people of those countries to believe in our holy
faith.” As it would turn out, by the time Cartier weighed anchor, nine of the ten Indians
he had brought to France were dead. The sole exception was the little girl from
Hochelay. The commission makes note of the fact that Cartier had discovered both
Canada and Hochelaga and that he was being sent back to those regions with the hope
that he might reach Saguenay. No mention is made of gold, silver, or precious gems, nor
of finding a route to Cathay, even though the commission reveals that the French
believed Canada and Hochelaga constituted the far western end of Asia. It also notes that the country Cartier had discovered was “well-supplied with goodly commodities.” Francis, no doubt aware of the difficulties of recruiting volunteers for a new mission to Canada, also ordered the various provosts, seneschals, bailiffs, and other officers in northern France and Brittany to allow Cartier to press into his service prisoners who had not committed crimes of heresy, lese majesté or counterfeiting, provided they were “proper, sufficient, and capable of service on this expedition.” Just three days after the king issued Cartier’s commission, the duke of Brittany issued letters patent granting Cartier permission to take prisoners from the jails.13

Word of Cartier’s commissioning further alarmed the emperor. Cartier himself had rather undiplomatically heightened Charles’s unease. While his commission had specifically laid out his destination as the St. Lawrence, Cartier had told the Spanish ambassador to the French court that “he hoped to obtain a license to go wheresoever he desired.” Charles and João seem not to have been overly concerned about French exploration of the St. Lawrence, reasoning that the coldness of the climate would make European settlement there impossible and that its remoteness from the Caribbean made it unsuitable as a base for attacking Spanish and Portuguese shipping. But as the emperor himself noted, a license permitting Cartier to roam anywhere constituted “a direct contravention of the treaty between us and the said King of France, and contrary to the grace and concession granted by the Apostolic See to the Kings of Castile and Portugal for the said conquest.” He once again appealed to the Portuguese to fit out a joint fleet. “And should they meet with the ships of the said Jacques or any other Frenchman sailing with a fleet bound to the said Indies,” said Charles, “let them engage and destroy them,
since the intention of these Frenchmen is known; and let all the men taken from their ships be thrown into the sea, not saving any one person, for this is necessary as a warning against the undertaking of similar expeditions.” In the end, the emperor, meeting once again with a rebuff from the Portuguese, would have to settle upon sending out two reconnaissance ships, neither of which was able to locate Cartier or any of his ships.14

In December 1540, meanwhile, Francis signaled through diplomatic channels what seems to be a definitive change in policy as to what the French would accept as constituting possession of lands in the New World. The French king told the Spanish ambassador that his ships would not “touch at places belonging to” the emperor, “but would only go to the parts discovered by his [Francis’s] predecessors and which had belonged to his crown more than thirty years before the ships of Spain and Portugal sailed to the new Indies.” After the Spanish ambassador reminded Francis that the pope had conceded to the predecessors of Charles V the sole right to navigate to those parts, Francis stated categorically that “the Popes hold spiritual jurisdiction, but it does not lie with them to distribute lands among kings, and that the Kings of France, and other Christians were not summoned when the partition took place.” Francis then added that the only areas to which his subjects would not be licensed to go were those where settlement had taken place. The French king noted that “passing by and discovering with the eye was not taking possession.”15 Although the French had heretofore used nearly all the same ceremonies of possession that their competitors had employed, Francis was now declaring that they would henceforth recognize only one—settlement. As Gustav Lanctot observed, “Having already claimed ‘freedom to navigate upon the common sea’ in contradiction to Portugal’s views, Francis I now laid down a new principle for the first
time in history: effective occupation of a territory alone constitutes a right to its possession.”16 This goes a long way toward explaining why Francis had commissioned Cartier to lead such a large-scale expedition to Canada. In order to take possession under his new policy, a settlement would have to be planted. The new policy also gave Francis the wherewithal to deny any and all European claims to lands where no settlement had taken place. This would leave most of the New World open to French colonial ambition.

Once again, though, Cartier had trouble raising crews. The difficulty was compounded by the fact that he had to find personnel for at least five ships. Then, too, as Samuel Eliot Morison has pointed out, word of the harshness of the Canadian winters and of the hardships Cartier’s crews had endured on his second voyage had undoubtedly spread among the seafaring communities of Brittany. Moreover, the commercial shipping interests in the channel ports could not have been happy about losing so many pilots, masters, and seaman for so long a time to Cartier’s mission of exploration and settlement. Cartier’s difficulties came to the attention of the king, who commanded officials at St. Malo and in the port towns of Brittany to report “diligently and secretly” on who was acting “perniciously and maliciously to divert and dissuade” suitable pilots, masters, and seaman from joining Cartier’s expedition.17

On 15 January 1541, Francis superceded Cartier as the overall commander of the expedition of settlement and exploration, appointing the Huguenot Jean-Francois de la Rocque, sieur de Roberval, to be “our lieutenant-general, chief, commander, and captain of the said enterprise, expedition and army going on the said voyage.” Historians have been mystified as to why the king made this decision. Morison, for instance, remarks that
“[n]obody knows why this protestant nobleman, who had never been to sea, should have been promoted over Cartier.” But Roberval’s commission itself makes Francis’s thinking on this score crystal clear. Although the French government had become increasingly bureaucratic in the late Middle Ages, even as late as the sixteenth century this bureaucracy rested firmly on a feudal foundation. Governmental authority flowed from the king through the members of the upper nobility. Cartier, as a bourgeois, could be authorized to lead expeditions of discovery, but Francis could not legitimately confer governmental power for a permanent settlement upon him. Such power could only be granted to one of noble blood. Cartier’s commissions only gave him authority over the ships and men during his transitory expeditions. Roberval’s commission contemplates taking possession of territories and whole peoples and bringing them under French governmental authority.

For this reason, Roberval’s powers were sweeping and encompassed military, legislative, executive, and judicial authority. His mission was to take control of the lands Cartier had explored along the St. Lawrence—specifically Canada, Hochelaga, and if possible, Saguenay. Francis commands him explicitly “to go to the said foreign countries, to descend and enter into them, and to put them in our hand, either by friendly and aimable means, if it is possible to do, or by force of arms, main strength, and all other hostile means.” The question is: what gave the French the right to subjugate and conquer Native Peoples and their homelands? This, too, the document spells out rather bluntly: the Native Peoples did not live with a knowledge of the Christian God, nor according to the dictates of reason. As such, from the perspective of the French, they could have no legitimate law or government and could therefore claim no lawful possession of their
own lands. Therefore, after due consultation, Francis had decided “to send to the said countries of Canada and Hochelaga and others adjacent, as to all other overseas countries that are not inhabited or are not possessed and ruled by any Christian princes, any number of our gentlemen and others, both men of war and civilians, of each sex and all liberal and mechanical arts” to essentially take control of the lands “up to Saguenay,” to “establish law,” and to make the Indians “live by reason and civility, and in fear and love of God.”

According to the French king, then, nobody legally possessed the countries along the St. Lawrence because under Christian doctrine, only a Christian monarch could legally possess and distribute lands. This gave Francis the right to seize these lands even when they had long been inhabited. If the people would not willingly recognize his suzerainty, he could then use force and conquer both the lands and the people. But the commission also recognizes the king’s duty to communicate Roman Catholic doctrine to the Native Peoples and to “civilize” them.

In a Roman Catholic context, where all legitimate political power flowed from God to his earthly representatives, namely, kings, the fact that the Native Peoples were not Christians could easily be used to justify—in the eyes of other Europeans—the conquest and possession of lands and peoples in the New World. But the fact that Francis committed this task to a Huguenot, whom the Catholic church considered an apostate and heretic, demonstrates that the religious purpose of the French colonizing mission, which is so prominently stated in all of the official documents leading up to Cartier’s third voyage, was at best only superficial and at worst a subterfuge. Given the giddy enthusiasm with which Francis discussed the rumors of the riches of Saguenay
with Lagarto and the total absence of any mention of gold, silver, and jewels in
Roberval’s commission, it seems clear that the true underlying purpose of the expedition
of 1541 was to colonize Canada and Hochelaga in order to use them as a base of
operations against Saguenay. Very likely, Francis believed the fabled Saguenay could
be his Incan Empire and Roberval his Pizzarro.

With the exception of finding Saguenay itself, Cartier had completed the fact-
finding mission of Vance’s model in his first two voyages. Roberval’s commission
makes it plain that the French were now to embark on phase two. Cartier had mapped
out where the French colonial network was to be. It was now up to Roberval, guided by
the master pilot of St. Malo, to construct the actual network that would make the
landscapes of Canada, Hochelaga, and potentially, Saguenay, accessible to the European
market. The ultimate goal was the extraction of wealth, and in Roberval’s commission,
Francis remarks that Canada and Hochelaga were “filled with many commodities.” But
the king no doubt had something more lucrative in mind than fish, lumber, and furs. He
hoped to locate and exploit the fabled riches of Saguenay.

But if the ultimate goal of the French enterprise was the extraction of wealth from
the St. Lawrence region to the metropole, this first required a flow of resources from the
metropole to the St. Lawrence in order to organize the network by which Canada and
Hochelaga would be reconstructed as a far-flung hinterland of the French channel ports
and ultimately of Paris. French international policy—that only settlement constituted
possession—required the permanent presence of French subjects in the territories along
the St. Lawrence. To accomplish this necessitated the flow of people, goods, and ideas
in some magnitude from France to Canada and Hochelaga. Roberval was responsible for
organizing this flow. As for the people, his commission committed him to conduct to Canada, as has been seen, French subjects of all ranks and every necessary occupation, as well as of both genders. The seamen would be drawn from the port towns of Brittany and northern France, but Roberval would also be authorized, as Cartier had been, to press into service prisoners from the jails of Paris, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Rouen and Dijon. The goods Roberval and Cartier would organize would include items for trade—hatchets, knives, trinkets, awls, kettles, and cloth that the Indians desired, but also all other necessities for imposing a French-style settlement on the Americas. These would include large quantities of tile and iron for building French-style habitations, military technology—ships, cannon, firearms, armor—and also a biological “portmanteau”—pigs, goats, horses, chickens, and seeds for a European-style agriculture that would overwrite the natural American flora and fauna with one transplanted from Europe. But most powerfully, the French would leverage their ideas in order to possess the lands and subjugate the peoples of North America.  

Roberval was specifically charged with imposing French ideas of religion, law, politics, and general culture on the St. Lawrence region. He was given the power “to make laws, edicts, statutes, and political ordinances” as well as to appoint captains, justices, and all other officers as “would seem necessary.” In accordance with this power, he could commission deputies to bring criminals and malefactors to justice, even to the point of imposing the death penalty. He was authorized to construct “towns and forts, temples and churches,” as well as habitations for the settlers and other buildings in “diverse places.” In this enterprise, numerous workmen—the carpenters, masons, tile-makers, and blacksmiths who would bring their knowledge of French building
practices—would be instrumental. He would also impose typically French notions of landholding that derived from feudal custom. The king’s commission instructed Roberval to distribute whatever lands he could acquire as fiefs and seigneuries to gentleman and “other people of excellent virtue or industry,” who would accordingly be required to give service and pay annual fees for their proprieties.22

But what really underlay flows of people, ideas and goods from the metropole to its newly opened American hinterlands was another somewhat more subterranean flow—the flow of capital. Money was needed to send people and their ideas and the goods to sustain them to North America. Money built the infrastructure that made the network a reality and paid for the ships and crews that conducted the flows between the metropole and its colonies. Here, too, Roberval might serve a useful purpose. Francis likely hoped that Roberval, as a high-ranking noble of Languedoc and Picardy, would be able to defray some of the cost of the expedition in return for a third share of any of the profits, the same percentage as the king himself. The final third would be reserved to Roberval’s companions. As it turned out, Roberval’s financial contributions were minimal and consisted in taking loans from merchant bankers in St. Malo and Rouen, including the Italian Allonce de Civille, who had helped to fund Verrazzano’s aborted second voyage. Roberval also granted the revenue of a mill in Pois to Nicolas de Mir of St. Martin in return for a cash payment of 1,200 livres and sold a seigneur in Bacouel for 2,000 livres to finance the trip. Cartier himself contributed over 8,600 livres tournois. But the bulk of the money came from the king, who paid out 45,000 livres tournois from the treasury of L’Epargne. This money was from the king’s own demesne and from traditional taxes. It would be hard to say, then, that this first attempt at settlement was the result of urban
capital seeking to establish a new commercial network. Although Francis, and certainly Cartier, had taken note of potential commercial possibilities in North America, their first thought was not to set up a new system of trade or to create overseas markets for French commodities. Their project was a treasure hunt pure and simple. They meant to conquer areas where gold and silver could be mined to be brought back to the king’s treasury. As such, the expedition was backed by royal capital rather than more modern urban business capital.23

But though Roberval did not play the financial role Francis perhaps expected, he did have, as Marcel Trudel has noted, other skills that the king no doubt thought useful for planting a settlement. Unlike Cartier, he was a skilled soldier who had fought in Francis’s Italian campaigns. He was also something of an expert in building fortifications. But chiefly perhaps, as an intimate of the king, Francis trusted him.24

By May 1541, Cartier was ready to sail from St. Malo with five ships fully manned and “victualled” for two years. Neither Cartier nor Roberval’s account indicates how many people Cartier had aboard his ships. The only information on this score comes from the widely varying reports of English and Spanish spies. On the lower end, one Spanish report claims that Cartier had 400 “sailors,” while another claims that between them Cartier and Roberval were transporting 2,500 people to the St. Lawrence. Since Roberval is known to have brought 200, this would have meant that Cartier carried some 2,300 people in his five ships—no doubt a highly exaggerated figure. Given that Roberval had some 200 persons in three ships, it is likely that Cartier had about 400 with him.25
When Roberval came down to the port to join the expedition, he brought with him a number of convicts of both sexes to serve as colonists. He found Cartier’s little fleet already down the roadstead ready to sail. Roberval, though, who was responsible for constructing fortifications and for the colony’s military establishment more generally, found that his artillery, powder, and munitions had not arrived from Champagne and Normandy. The king, however, was impatient for the expedition to get underway and ordered Cartier to depart immediately “on Payne of incurring his displeasure.” Roberval, accordingly, ordered Cartier to leave without him. The lieutenant-general then left for Honfleur to prepare a further three ships to bring the artillery and munitions. Once again on his own, Cartier’s fleet sailed from St. Malo on 23 May. His crossing was anything but smooth. His fleet, facing “contrary winds and continuall torments,” became separated at sea, except for Cartier’s own ship and the one in which his brother-in-law, the Vicomte Beaupré, had sailed. Nonetheless, all of the ships crossed safely and came to rendezvous at the harbor of Grand-Quirpon near Newfoundland. Here they waited for some time for the arrival of Roberval. The delay was costly, as Cartier did not reach Ste. Croix near Stadacona until 23 August. He had missed most of the summer, an optimal time for colony-building along the St. Lawrence.26

The people of Stadacona once again gave the French a warm reception, “making,” as Cartier notes, “shew of joy for our arrival.” Agona, who had become agouhanna in Donnacona’s absence, came out with six or seven canoes “with many women and children” to greet the ships. During this meeting, Cartier informed Agona that Donnacona had died in France, but lied and said the other Native-American men he had brought to France “stayed there as great Lords, and were married, and would not returne
backe to their Country.” Agona gave no show of anger at this news. He was perhaps contented, or so thought Cartier, with the idea that he could remain the ruler of the country. During this meeting, in what was perhaps an instance of reverse inscription, Agona took off his headdress and bracelets, which were decorated with the valuable esnoguy shells, and placed them on Cartier. In a symbolic gesture, Cartier placed the headdress back on Agona’s head. It was as much to say that the French were not about to be inscribed with Native-American symbols, though a secondary motive on Cartier’s part was no doubt to reassure Agona that the French did not come to displace him as ruler of the country. This, too, however, was a lie, to which Roberval’s commission fully attests.

After taking leave of Agona, Cartier took two boats upriver to scout a location for settlement. He decided not to rebuild the settlement from 1535-36 at Ste. Croix, likely because, as Trudel has surmised, it was too near to Stadacona and, therefore, presented defensive difficulties. Then, too, because this was to be a permanent settlement, Cartier probably did not want to crowd the Stadaconans too much. He soon found a spot about nine miles upriver at Cap Rouge, a location that he had remembered from his earlier voyage. Here, where the Cap Rouge River enters the St. Lawrence, was a more commodious and well-protected harbor for the ships. The French could also build a fort on the high promontory of Cap Rouge where they could install artillery to protect their ships and control the river. The location had other important advantages. On either side of the Cap Rouge River were “faire grounds,” which included many trees of different varieties suitable for building and for winter fuel. Here, too, could be found the annedda or white cedar, which had such miraculous healing power. The land on the south side of
the river was covered in vines, which produced grapes that were not so sweet as those in France, but could nevertheless be harvested and eaten. The soil was also good, and soon after arriving, Cartier detailed twenty men to clear an acre and a half and to plant cabbage, turnip, lettuce, and other seeds, which sprung up in only eight days. The French spent about a week unloading their animals and equipment, and then, on 2 September, Cartier sent two ships, *le Saint-Briac* under Mace Jalobert et the *George* under Michel Ernt back to France with orders to bring back new supplies and to inform the king of what had transpired in the colony so far.²⁸

The French erected two forts, one on the promontory of Cap Rouge, to which they constructed stairs, and another fort at the foot of Cap Rouge along the river. On the cliff top there was a spring for fresh water, and nearby, the French found stones they thought to be diamonds. At the foot of Cap Rouge along the St. Lawrence, they found ore that they took to be iron-rich. On the side nearer the Cap Rouge River, they discovered leaves “as thicke as a mans nayle” that appeared to be “fine gold.” To the west was meadow with “goodly grasse” for pasturing the animals, as well as hemp plants for rope-making. A hundred paces further, black slate could be found, which might be used for building purposes. The stone also had mineral veins running through it that appeared to be gold and silver.²⁹

On 7 September, with the construction of the settlement, now called Charlesbourg-Royal, well in hand, Cartier began an exploratory mission up the St. Lawrence toward Saguenay. His idea was to get a better understanding of the rapids in the river so that he might be better prepared to make the full journey to Saguenay in the spring. For this purpose, he took two longboats and enough men to man them, leaving a
garrison behind at the forts under the command of Beaupré. Cartier stopped at Hochelay, halfway between Stadacona and Hochelaga, where he received a warm welcome from the Iroquoian lord. On the previous trip, the leader of the town had warned Cartier of the potential treachery of Domagaya and Taignoagny. Now Cartier rewarded him with a cloak “of Paris red,” two brass basins, hatchets, and knives. He also left two French boys at Hochelay so that they might learn the Iroquoian language. Cartier then continued farther upriver. He does not seem, though, to have returned to Hochelaga.

At the first rapids, those of Ste. Marie, he left one boat behind and transferred additional rowers to the other boat in order to force his way upriver against the rapids. After this was accomplished, the expedition met with the more formidable rock-filled Lachine Rapids, where the current was so strong that it was impassable by boat. Cartier resolved to go by foot to survey the extent of the rapids. He followed a footpath going toward the rapids that eventually led to a small settlement. Here he met very friendly natives, four of whom agreed to show him the way to Saguenay. These men took him to another village where the people told him that although there was only one more rapid after Lachine, the river was not navigable to Saguenay.  

With this new understanding of the route, Cartier decided to turn back. When he reached the second boat at Ste. Marie’s he found there nearly 400 Native Americans, who seemed well-disposed toward the French. Cartier gave them “combs, brooches of tynne and copper, and other small toyes. To the “chiefe men” he gave hatchets and fishhooks. In spite of these “ceremonies of joy,” Cartier remained wary of the Native Peoples along the river, noting that “a man must not trust them for all their faire ceremonies and signes.
of joy, for if they had thought they had been too strong for us, then they would have done their best to have killed us, as we understood afterwards.

As he returned down the St. Lawrence, Cartier stopped once again at Hochelay, only to find that the agouhanna had left. The agouhanna’s son said that his father had gone to Maisouna, which the two French boys affirmed. Cartier would later discover, though, that this was a subterfuge and that the leader of Hochelay had actually gone to Stadacona, likely to prepare for concerted action against the French. Cartier became even more alarmed when he arrived back at Charlesbourg-Royal where Beaupré informed him that Stadacona was filled with warriors and that the Indians had stopped bringing the French garrison presents of fish and other provisions.

Cartier must have spent a tense winter at the fort. Roberval was nowhere in sight, provisions were growing short, and the Native Peoples seemed to be growing hostile to the French enterprise. Unfortunately, very little documentary evidence remains to fill out the picture. Cartier’s *Third Relation*, which only survives in fragmentary form in an English translation published in Hakluyt, breaks off after describing his return to Charlesbourg-Royal following the abortive reconnaissance up the St. Lawrence to Lachine. The only other tidbits of information about the winter settlement come from Basque fisherman who encountered Cartier’s ships in St. John’s Harbor and from Roberval’s brief report. The documents that preserve the testimony of the Basque fisherman are essentially affidavits that resulted from their interrogation by Spanish officials after they had returned to Europe. One of these fishermen said that he had learned from some of Cartier’s crew that the Indians had killed some of the French carpenters. The Basques also learned from some natives who came to trade with them
that the Canadian Indians, which would mean the Stadaconans and their allies, had killed thirty-five of Cartier’s men. This strongly suggests that the Native Peoples north of the river had resisted the French settlement with force. Many scholars have been reluctant to credit the truth of these stories, but the strongest corroboration comes from the fact that when he returned to Charlesbourg-Royal, Cartier had anticipated trouble and then, too, from Roberval’s report. As Cartier was returning to France with all of his surviving people, he encountered Roberval’s three ships in St. John’s Harbor. Cartier told his superior that “hee could not with his small company withstand the Savages, which went about dayly to annoy him: and this was the cause of his return to France.” Still, though archeologists have been painstakingly digging at the site of the upper fort of Charlesbourg-Royal since its discovery in 2005, they have to date found no human burials there and so have as yet unearthed no evidence to support the claim that the Canadian Indians killed some thirty-five of Cartier’s men. The archeologists at the site remain hopeful, however, that they will find the colonial burial site at some point in the future.\textsuperscript{33}

Sometime during the winter of 1541-42, Cartier seems to have resolved that he would return to France in the spring as soon as the ice broke up sufficiently in the river. Roberval, in the meantime, had finally left La Rochelle for Canada on 16 April 1542. In his three ships, he had two hundred men and women, including several “gentlemen of qualitie.” He reached Newfoundland on 7 June and by the 8\textsuperscript{th} his ships stood in the road of St. John’s Harbor, where there were some seventeen ships already engaged in fishing, some of them no doubt the very Basque fisherman the Spanish authorities would later interrogate. A few days later, Cartier emerged from the mouth of the St. Lawrence and
met Roberval’s little fleet. He showed Roberval a quantity of gold ore and diamonds he had brought from Canada, and about 18 June, the French put the ore in a furnace and found it, according to Roberval’s report, “to be good.” Roberval commanded Cartier to come back to Canada with him, arguing that with the artillery and a number of soldiers now at hand, there were “sufficient forces” to withstand the Indians. But Cartier decided he had had enough and, defying this order, slipped away during the night. Roberval concluded that Cartier and his Bretons had done so because they were “moved as it seemeth with ambition, because they would have all the glory of the discoverie of those partes themselves.”

Roberval, now on his own, sailed upriver and took over the accommodation at Cap Rouge, which he promptly renamed France-Roy. According to his own report, he either rebuilt the forts Cartier had left or significantly improved them. On the cliff top, the French constructed two courts of buildings for living purposes as well as a defensive tower. A second structure, which was forty or fifty feet long, included a number of rooms, a hall, kitchen, and offices. Nearby, the French erected an oven and a mill. At the foot of the river was another fort with another two courts of buildings and a two-story tower. Once the work was well-advanced, Roberval sent two of his ships under the command of Paul d’Aussillon, seigneur de Sauveterre, back to France to bring the king news of the settlement as well as some diamonds. D’Aussillon was also to ask the king to authorize a resupply of the colony. The lieutenant-general quickly learned that he had not brought enough provisions for the winter and ordered rationing. It appears that he maintained good relations with the local Native Peoples, who also brought the French shad, which they traded for knives and “other small trifles.”
Roberval, as his commission allowed, also instituted a system of law. On 9 September, five days before sending him back to France, Roberval drew up letters acquitting d’Aussillon of murder. D’Aussillon had killed a sailor in December 1541, before the expedition ever left France. Roberval judged that d’Aussillon had acted in self-defense. The lieutenant-general also took legal action in criminal cases that arose in Canada. He ordered one man to be hanged for theft and had other transgressors clapped in irons or whipped. The royal cosmographer, Andre Thevet, who knew Roberval personally as a friend, later accused him of cruelty, but Roberval himself declared that he had “used good justice,” which allowed the settlers to live “in quiet.”

Once again, winter brought serious illness to the French, likely scurvy again. About fifty died. But when spring came, Roberval decided to go in search of the illusive Saguenay. On 5 June, he and all but thirty of his colonists sailed or rowed up the St. Lawrence toward the Ottawa River. His relation reveals that he did not return to France-Roy before the end of July, but because Roberval’s report is also truncated, it is not clear precisely where he went or when he did return. During his trip, though, Roberval lost one boat, and eight of his men were drowned.

In the meantime, Francis I had ordered a relief expedition to bring new supplies to the colony. On 26 January 1543 he directed d’Aussillon to ready two ships with food and other supplies. One of these ships left France between 13 March and 29 May, but what became of it is unknown. Cartier himself chartered a ship to go in search of Roberval. This vessel seems to have made the trip to Canada and back in eight months. The record of this has led some historians, notably N.E. Dionne and Charles de la Roncière, to conclude that Cartier made a fourth trip to the New World. But as Yves Jacob has
shown, other documents place Cartier at St. Malo during the time the ship made the voyage. He likely, therefore, only took responsibility for chartering the ship. Whether this was one of the two ships the king had authorized d’Aussillon to prepare is not known.38

Whatever else may have transpired, Roberval with all the surviving settlers was back in France by 11 September, and with his return, French attempts to plant a settlement in the interior of North America were at an end, at least for the time being. Measured in light of its goals, the French expedition of 1541-43 must have seemed a dismal failure. Neither Cartier nor Roberval had been able to reach, much less conquer, the fabled kingdom of Saguenay. Nor had they been able to fix a permanent colony on the St. Lawrence in order to assert possession under Francis’ newly proclaimed policy. Even the gold and diamonds Cartier and Roberval had brought back from Canada proved on further examination to be false. All of this must have been a bitter disappointment to Francis, who did not authorize another expedition prior to his death in 1547.39

And yet, the Cartier missions, on the whole, did ultimately serve a larger purpose. In many respects, his expeditions completed the fact-finding phase of colonization, which was necessary in order to make a landscape accessible to the emerging world market. Cartier had mapped the western shore of Newfoundland and the entrances to the St. Lawrence, as well as the St. Lawrence itself as far as Hochelaga (Montreal) and the Lachine Rapids. In doing so, he had identified key places that needed to be possessed in order to control any network that might be established along the great river. His findings, along with many French place names, found their way into the Vallard map of 1547, which helped to assert French possession of the St. Lawrence region. Cartier had also
described with a commercial eye, the resources—fish, fur, timber, and minerals—that might be commoditized. Moreover, the French government, through its experience in planning and executing Cartier’s exploratory expeditions, had formulated policies for taking possession of vast territories in the New World. These boiled down to two significant assertions. First, that the Native Americans could not legally possess the lands on which they lived because they were not Christians and did not live according to the dictates of European “reason.” And second, that actual settlement was the only form of European possession the French would recognize.40

1 Knecht, Francis I, 233-34, 277, 283-89.
2 Ibid., 289.
3 The king signed the order, dated May 10, granting Cartier the *Hermine* at Dourlan in Picardy. At the time, Francis was with the army, defending the northeastern part of his realm from incursions by imperial forces. On May 6, the king had been at Pernes, and about this time Montmorency had noted the king’s intention to move south to Lyons in order to provide additional support for his army in Piedmont. Although Cartier did not sign the memorandum, historians attribute it to him, which only makes sense since he would be the only one with sufficient experience as to what would be needed to plant a settlement on the St. Lawrence. Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 66-67; 69-74; Knecht, Francis I, 285-86, 338.
4 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 70; Knecht, Francis I, 338.
5 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 71-72; the French “tonneau” was slightly less—about 5 percent—in terms of bulk or weight than the “tun” by which English ships were rated. A ship of 100 tonnes, therefore, would bear a burden of about 95 English tons. See David Hackett Fischer, *Champlain’s Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 620.
7 Roncière and Jacob have accepted Biggar’s tentative dating of the Lagarto letter. But in the letter itself, Lagarto says that Francis mentioned that two out of the three Native-American men which Cartier had brought from Canada had died. A record in the Archive communales de Saint-Malo shows that the three “saulvaiges hommes” were baptized in St. Malo on 25 March 1539, which proves that none had died by that date. This means the Lagarto letter must be dated sometime after the baptism. Lanctot gives a date of January 1540, which may be correct. Biggar, ed., *Collection of Documents*, 75-77, 82; Knecht, Francis I, 338-39; Roncière, Jacques Cartier, 148; Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 157.
8 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 75-77; Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:64.
9 “All this I will give to you.”
10 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 78-79.
11 Ibid., 78, 81.
12 Ibid., 102-103, 104, 108-109, 111, 113-14, 116-17, 133.
13 Ibid., 128-132.
14 Ibid., 140-42, 334-46.
15 The translation in Biggar from this Spanish document reads “nor go to the parts not discovered by his predecessors,” which while a more literal translation, is less clear and does not conform to usual English usage. Francis may also have been alluding to French claims that their ships had reached the shores of North America as early as 1462. Biggar, ed., *Collection of Documents*, 169-70.
16 Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:67; Trudel makes the same point. See his *The Beginnings of New France*, 38.
19 Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 178-84.
20 Ibid., 179.
21 Ibid., 70-74, 178.
22 Ibid., 178, 180-82,
24 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 35.
26 Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 96-98.
27 Ibid., 98-99.
28 Ibid., 99-100; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 43-44. Historians have generally agreed that Cap Rouge was the site of Cartier’s 1541 settlement, but this was not proved until the archeologist Yves Chretien discovered artifacts at the site in 2005. See Canwest News Service, “Long-lost Jacques Cartier settlement rediscovered at Quebec City,” Canada.com [Accessed 17 May 2010]; Roncière, Jacques Cartier, 171-72.
31 Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 104.
32 Ibid., 105.
38 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 52; Biggar, ed., Collection of Documents, 471-72, 483; Biggar, ed., Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 174; Roncière, Jacques Cartier, 183-85; Jacob, Jacques Cartier, 199-200.
39 Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:74; Knecht, Francis I, 416; Schlesinger and Stabler, Thevet’s North America, 51.
40 Roncière, Jacques Cartier, 169.
CHAPTER 4

ACADIAN MISADVENTURES

After Francis’s death in 1547, French fishermen and merchants continued to visit Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence region, but official policy turned away from Canada, though not from attempts to colonize the New World. Francis’s successor, Henry II, meant to challenge Iberian domination of the Western Hemisphere more directly than had his predecessor. Since the time of Verrazzano, French merchants had been visiting Brazil to pick up valuable cargoes of dyewood. But it was a perilous trade, one which the Portuguese authorities attempted to stamp out with brutality. Gaspard de Coligny, the admiral of France, convinced Henry II to plant a colony in Brazil in order to challenge Portuguese control of the dyewood trade and likely, too, as a base of operations against both the Portuguese and Spanish empires in the New World. Coligny was a Huguenot and harbored the ulterior motive that a French colony in Brazil would provide a safe haven for French Protestants. This possibility allowed the admiral to secretly enlist the aid of John Calvin in his enterprise. With these purposes in mind, two ships, which Francis Parkman says were prepared “in the name of the king,” left Le Havre in July 1555 and in November arrived in what became the harbor of Rio de Janeiro to plant the new French colony of *France Antarctique*. Under the woeful leadership of Nicolas Durand, chevalier de Villegagnon, this settlement lasted only until 1560. It was riven by internal religious differences, and eventually, after Villegagnon himself had abandoned it, the Portuguese attacked and destroyed it.¹
Coligny made a second attempt to found a Huguenot colony in the Americas in 1562. This new effort, which would be under the command of Jean Ribaut, had the approval of and perhaps some material support from the new king, Charles IX. Coligny’s purposes were once again to establish a French claim to territory in the New World, as well as a base for harassing and capturing Spanish ships. And once again, the admiral hoped the new colony would serve as a haven for French Protestants. Ribaut brought about 150 men to the coast of South Carolina, where he established a fort. He soon discovered that he had not brought sufficient provisions. Leaving the colony in the hands of a subordinate, he sailed to France to organize new supplies. But civil war in France prevented him from returning to the colony. In the meantime the colonists, who had antagonized the local Indians, were reduced to starvation and cannibalism. Early in 1563, an English privateer rescued the survivors and repatriated them to France.2

Coligny, though, was not deterred. In 1564, he sent out a new expedition under René Goulaine de Laudonnière. This time Charles IX provided significant support and named Laudonnière “lieutenant of New France.” Laudonnière sailed with three ships and about 200 settlers from Le Havre in late April 1564 and made landfall at Matanzas Inlet in Florida on 22 June. He decided to establish a fort on the St. John’s River, well south of where Ribaut’s settlement had been. Apparently, Laudonnière’s settlement was chiefly of military personnel, who were to build a fort and secure an area for a subsequent civilian occupation. One of the more interesting aspects of Laudonnière’s expedition is that he brought along the artist Jacques le Moyne, who was to make a visual record of the lands and people of Florida.3
Laudonnière’s colony fared even worse than Ribaut’s. The settlers became preoccupied with the search for gold and silver in the interior and left the fort in disrepair. Once again, the colony suffered from inadequate provisions, and the colonists resorted to harassing the Native Peoples for corn and other provisions. Under these circumstances, Laudonnière in late August 1565 was preparing to abandon the colony and ship out for home when Ribaut arrived with a relief expedition, along with enough men, women, and children to begin a permanent settlement. The timing could not have been worse. A few days after Ribaut’s arrival, Spanish forces launched an attack, massacring all of the French who remained within the fort with the exception of a few women, children, and musicians whom the Spanish commander managed to spare. Laudonnière and le Moyne somehow contrived to escape from the fort and from the Spanish and made it back to France. Ribaut escaped by sea, but after his ship wrecked, the Spanish captured him and put him to death “by the knife.”

This series of disastrous attempts to directly challenge Iberian control in Brazil and Florida no doubt influenced a change in policy once Henry III came to the throne in 1573. It may have been the Breton Troïllus de Mesguouez, Marquis de La Roche, who prompted the new king to reconsider planting a colony to the north, which might be done without arousing the opposition of the Spanish or Portuguese. With this in mind, the king in 1577 commissioned La Roche to found a new colony in the north. La Roche’s commission was in many ways similar to that which Francis I had given to Roberval. It named him governor and lieutenant-general of New France. It also conferred on La Roche the right to “possess the country” in his own right and to pass it on to his
successors, something never accorded to Roberval. Henry also gave La Roche a second commission in 1578, which named him as “viceroy.”

Although there seems to have been no official voyages to the St. Lawrence region between Cartier’s time and 1578, private commercial ventures had never ceased. In the same year that the king made La Roche viceroy, about 150 French vessels had gone to Terre Neuve to fish and engage in the fur trade. Although the French channel ports seem to have dominated this trade, they did not control it exclusively. Approximately 200 vessels from other nations made fishing and trading voyages to Terre Neuve in 1578, too. Most of these were from Spain, Portugal, and England.

Unfortunately for French policymakers, nothing came of La Roche’s initial attempt to carry out his commission. Charles de la Roncière says that La Roche first sailed in the late spring or early summer of 1578. Although he had gained support from Honorat de Bueil, the vice-admiral of Brittany, as well as from some Breton shipowners, La Roche had only one ship and a shallop. This expedition came to naught when La Roche ran into four smaller English ships just off France and met with defeat when he tried to seize them. Following this effort, he seems to have faded into the background until he was once again aroused by the possibility of making a fortune in the fur trade, which was becoming more and more lucrative as furs found a market in Paris and other leading cities in France.

As Cartier’s First Relation shows, the French had been trading for furs with the Indians of the St. Lawrence region from the very early sixteenth century, but this trade had really been a side business of the French and Bretonese fishing industry. By 1581, however, merchants in the channel ports of St. Malo, Rouen, and Dieppe began to
organize voyages to the St. Lawrence specifically to trade furs, which were beginning to establish a market in Paris that went beyond mere novelty. Richard Hakluyt notes that in 1583, a consignment of a variety of North-American furs sold in Paris for the immense sum of 20,000 crowns. That same year, Etienne Bellenger, a merchant from Rouen, with the financial backing of Cardinal de Bourbon, the archbishop of Rouen, and Anne de Joyeuse, the admiral of France, undertook an important voyage to Cape Breton. After reaching the cape, Bellinger sailed south for 100 leagues making a detailed description of the coast and trading for furs along the way. He brought back beaver, otter, and marten furs, as well as deer skins, all of which sold at Rouen for 440 crowns. As Gustav Lanctot has remarked, the sale marked a 1000-percent profit, since the trinkets Bellinger had exchanged for the furs cost only 40 crowns.8

This lucrative trade in furs prompted Cardinal de Bourbon and Admiral de Joyeuse to finance a new expedition of settlement, which once again brought La Roche, the viceroy of New France, back into the field. In 1584, La Roche put together a small fleet and embarked 300 colonists, but the scheme met with disaster when his largest vessel wrecked and sank near Brouage.9

By 1584, the fur trade had become part of the regular business environment for the merchants of Northern France. Competition between French and other European merchants became so keen that in 1587, fighting broke out among the ships trading to the St. Lawrence. In that year, Jacques Noël, a nephew of Cartier who was involved in this trade, had three of his vessels burned and one captured in the St. Lawrence. To better regulate the trade and to benefit from it, as well as to assert French control, Henry III, on 12 January 1588 issued a twelve-year monopoly of the fur trade and of mining to Noël
and Étienne Chaton de La Jannaye, who also claimed to be a relative of Cartier’s. Noël had already made a voyage up the St. Lawrence where he had retraced his uncle’s steps, viewing the ruins of the French forts at Ste. Croix and Charlesbourg Royal and visiting Hochelaga and Mount Royal. When Noël and La Jannaye petitioned the king for the monopoly, they argued that it would be a way of repaying the 8,630 livres the crown still owed to the Cartier family for the great explorer’s third voyage. In return for the monopoly, Noël and La Jannaye were to establish an exclusively Roman-Catholic colony, to which they were to transport sixty convicts each year. This commission marked a distinct change in policy, in that previous attempts had been largely Protestant affairs. The likely reason for the change is Henry III’s desire plant a French settlement somewhere in the Western Hemisphere without antagonizing Spain.10

Nothing, though, came of Noël and La Jannaye’s monopoly. It excited such opposition from the merchants of St. Malo, that in July, the king rescinded it, and the field was once again open. As Maurice Trudel has pointed out, the revocation of the monopoly clearly demonstrated the conflict between the merchants and the colonizers. On the one hand, without the monopoly, no settlement could take place unless the monarch decided to fund it completely, which he refused to do. On the other hand, no private individuals could be induced to undertake the labor and expense of settlement without the promise of riches the monopoly held out. As Trudel remarks, “Either freedom of commerce for all and no colony, or exclusive monopoly and colonization . . .

This same dilemma was to provide drama throughout the career of Champlain.”11

While the merchants of the channel ports were vying with one another to control the fur trade, the viceroy of New France, La Roche, was busy aiding Henry of Navarre in
his war against the Catholic League, the very war that would eventually bring Navarre to
the throne of France as Henry IV. In 1589, La Roche was captured and remained a
prisoner of war for the next seven years, which prevented him from attempting to assert
his authority in North America. But in 1597, Henry IV authorized La Roche, who had
been ransomed the year before, to reinitiate his North-American schemes. It seems that
in short order La Roche sent out a ship to scout areas of possible settlement, and the next
year, the king granted him new letters patent as the lieutenant-general of Canada,
Newfoundland, Labrador, and Norumbega (New England). By these letters, La Roche
received a monopoly of the fur trade, which allowed him to grant licenses to others to
engage in the trade. He was also permitted to confiscate the vessels and goods of anyone
plying the trade without his permission. The new patent did not renew, though, La
Roche’s position as viceroy, nor did it confer on him the proprietorship of the land.12

For colonists, La Roche corralled some 250 able-bodied beggars of both sexes,
from which he chose about forty. He also had a small number of soldiers, perhaps ten in
all. La Roche then set out with his colonists in two ships, landing them and all of their
provisions on Sable Island, an isolated outpost some 100 miles due east of Nova Scotia.
Once the colonists were settled and a habitation and storehouse had been built for them,
La Roche himself departed for France. He left the colony under the command of one
Querbonyer. The storehouse, which apparently was to be used to warehouse
commodities for shipment to France, was put under the command of a second officer
named Coussez. Henry IV was sufficiently impressed with La Roche’s effort that he
gave him 10,000 crowns to keep the colony going. For his part, La Roche dutifully sent
supplies each year and in this wise was able to maintain his colony. In addition to the
yearly resupply, the colonists in their isolated outpost were able to rely on fish and wild game as well as on the gardens they planted. They also had the benefit of cattle, which the Portuguese had left on the island at some earlier point. Sable Island, which La Roche had named Ile de Bourbon, was the first French colony in North America to last a full year. The colony ran into trouble, however, in 1602 when the relief ship failed to arrive, prompting the enraged colonists to begin fighting among themselves. It seems that they killed all of the soldiers, including Querbonyer and Coussez, and then began murdering one another. LaRoche did send out a relief ship under Captain Thomas Chefdhostel in 1603, who, it seems, carried on board a commissioner whom Henry IV had sent specifically to investigate how well the colonization effort was proceeding. Upon their arrival, Chefdhostel and presumably the royal commissioner found only eleven survivors, whom they brought to France to face charges.13

In any event, Sable Island was an unsuitable locale for a settlement made to assert possession of Canada, Hochelaga, and Norumbega. Nor was it an ideal position from which to control the fur trade up the St. Lawrence. Likely for these reasons, and perhaps also for the purpose of establishing a North-American haven for Protestants, of whom he was particularly solicitous, Henry IV on 22 November 1599, granted a fur-trading monopoly to the Protestant courtier and naval captain Pierre Chauvin. This new grant required Chauvin to plant a colony and settle fifty colonists each year. But it also seemed to impinge on the patent given to La Roche. After La Roche raised objections, the king revised Chauvin’s commission, making him a lieutenant to La Roche. Chauvin’s monopoly was also limited to the trade along the St. Lawrence, so that La Roche would retain the monopoly of the trade in the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
Newfoundland, and presumably in Norumbega. Chauvin, though, even with the more limited monopoly, had gained the better part of the fur trade if he could make good on it. He formed a partnership with merchants from St. Malo in order, as Lanctot observes, to mitigate their opposition, and in February 1600 sailed with two ships to Tadoussac, the point on the St. Lawrence where the Saguenay River flows into it. Here Chauvin built a house and installed sixteen colonists before returning to France. Once again, though, the colony failed due to a shortage of provisions and a poor location. While Tadoussac during this early period was well-situated for capturing furs coming down the Saguenay from the north, it is also bitter cold during the winter, and therefore proved unsuitable for a year-round settlement. When relief ships arrived in 1601 only five colonists were still alive, and these too would have perished had the Indians not taken them in.14

Up to this point, French efforts to establish a colony in North America and make good on claims to the St. Lawrence region provide a history of failure. But in 1603 things would begin to take better shape, largely because Henry IV remained committed to creating a French presence in the Americas and because a group of experienced and highly placed men were now ready to take control of the effort. This group included the able sea captain François du Pont-Gravé, who had encouraged Chauvin to seek a patent for his colony; the protestant aristocrat Pierre du Guast, sieur de Monts; and, most importantly, one of the king’s pensioners and geographers, Samuel de Champlain. Pont-Gravé and De Monts had sailed with Chauvin in 1600 to Tadoussac. Pont-Gravé was originally from Cartier’s hometown of St. Malo, where he had been baptized in the cathedral. But he had moved to Honfleur prior to 1600. De Monts and Champlain were from the region of Saintonge on the west coast of France. Their connections were not
solely with the channel ports that had dominated the fish and fur trade of North America
during much of the sixteenth century, and this allowed them to attract investors from
outside of Normandy and Brittany, where merchants sometimes used their influence to
curtail colonization efforts.\textsuperscript{15}

In the project of establishing a French trade network up the St. Lawrence, the role
of Henry IV should not be underestimated. If nothing else, he was persistent, and initial
failures did not discourage him. Two important and related factors seem to have been at
the root of Henry’s policies. One was the way Henry attained the throne and the other
was the model Francis I provided, both in terms of his idea of kingship and in his
overseas ambitions.

In 1562, soon after the death of Francis I, France had become embroiled in a
series of civil wars, known collectively as the religious wars, which pitted the Protestant
Huguenots against Roman Catholics. By 1583, Henry, as the king of Navarre, had
become the leader of the Protestants with his power base largely in the Protestant south
and in the Saintonge area on the west coast of France. The powerful Catholic League, to
which Spain leant financial and military support, opposed him. The sitting king, Henry
III, had initially aligned himself with Navarre, but in 1585 he did a volteface and signed
the Treaty of Nemours, which essentially made all Protestants outlaws. The treaty also
made the French king the ally of the leader of the Catholic League, the duc de Guise.
Henry of Navarre responded to this challenge with an appeal to French patriotism—
which might be seen as proto-nationalist. Even though he himself had sought and would
receive support from foreign Protestant powers, Henry was an early expert in modern
public relations, and in a public letter he condemned the Catholic League and the Treaty
of Nemours as part of a foreign plot against the greater interests of France. He then proposed to rally around him “all true Frenchmen without regard to religion,” arguing that the war had now become “a question of the defense of the state against the usurpation of foreigners.” In this way, for tactical reasons if nothing else, Henry began the process of broadening the essentially feudalistic “concepts of personal fealty . . . to embrace,” as James L. McClain and John M. Merriman have expressed it, “a more generalized and abstract loyalty to the state.” This was a long step toward the modern political conception of the nation-state, which French philosophers would begin to embrace in the seventeenth century and which, in many ways, was vital to the colonial enterprise.16

Henry of Navarre eventually succeeded to the throne of France upon the assassination of Henry III in 1589 and soon after prevailed in his war against the League. As a compromise measure and to gain the acceptance of the pope for his kingship, Henry reconverted to Roman Catholicism soon after taking the throne. For the pope to recognize his conversion and kingship, Henry had to promise to drive all heretics, who had been “denounced by the church” out of his realms. This would mean persecuting his Protestant supporters, who were largely responsible for bringing him to the throne in the first place. In spite of this solemn promise, though, he was not disposed to persecute anyone on account of religious beliefs. Once his kingship was secure, he issued the Edict of Nantes, which extended liberty of conscience to Protestants even while it preserved the Roman Catholic Church as the official state church of France. In emphasizing loyalty to the king above religious considerations, Henry IV was acting in much the same way as had Francis I, who had tended to be tolerant of religious
differences at least until political considerations caused him to institute a general
persecution of Protestants after 1534.\textsuperscript{17}

Henry seems to have taken Francis, the last king who had reigned over a unified
France, as his model in other ways. Francis had helped to create a more cohesive
kingdom by bringing Brittany directly under his suzerainty. For the duration of the
Religious Wars, the Catholic League controlled Brittany. Henry would once again have
to bring the duchy and many other regions back into the French polity, this time chiefly
through war. Moreover, when he came to the throne, much of northeastern France,
including Paris, and some parts of southern France, too, were still under League control.\textsuperscript{18}

Paris was a stronghold of the League, and Henry was not able to gain control of it
until 1594. The League’s grip on the city was so strong that some of Henry’s advisers
believed he might be better off retreating south of the Loire and establishing his capital
there. But as one of them, Anne d’Anglure de Givry, remarked to Henry, “Who will
believe that you are king of France, when he sees your edicts dated from Limoges?”

Henry knew that Givry was right. He laid siege to Paris three times, and upon
successfully taking control of the city, by subterfuge more than by force, he remarked,
“Only now am I the king of France.” Indeed, Paris had been the acknowledged capital of
France since at least the fourteenth century. As McClain and Merriman note, all roads in
France lead ultimately to Paris, and the Seine, through Rouen and ultimately Le Havre
and Honfleur, connected Paris to the sea and the larger world.\textsuperscript{19}

Being able to enter the city for the first time was, as Henry well knew, an
important step toward full acceptance as king. But it was only a first step. Henry, as
something of an outsider whose succession many Parisians had opposed, also had to gain
the acceptance of the city’s populace. To do this, he chose to make his residence at the Louvre, an old medieval fortress that Francis had remodeled. Francis had made his principal residence just outside the city, but Henry moved into the Louvre and spent great sums to refurbish and expand it, making it, in the words of McClain and Merriman, “the most tangible symbol of Bourbon power.” Henry also hoped to attract the aristocracy to the city and attempted to so by developing two new elegant public squares, the Place Royale (begun 1603; completed 1611) on the eastern side of the city and the Place Dauphine (begun 1607; completed ca. 1610) at the western end of the Ile de la Cité. These were to be mixed-use developments, featuring the townhouses of prominent members of the nobility, the neat apartments of the bourgeoisie, and a mix of fashionable shops. Here the elite and middling could rub shoulders, united by their common Frenchness. At least this seems to have been the dream of the king, though it met with only partial success. To attract the nobility to Paris, Henry also sought to make the city the most important producer of luxury goods (which by definition would be central goods). To promote this, he had a silk works constructed at the Place Royale and founded new companies to produce other types of luxury textiles as well as furniture and jewelry for the upper class. Eventually, the beaver hat would become one of the most fashionable of luxury goods, a new “need” that helped to expand the fur trade and keep the French trade network along the St. Lawrence afloat. The king also instituted a Conseil de Commerce to study how to improve commerce and industry throughout the kingdom and to encourage other manufactures, such as leather, paper, and fine glass. Henry’s economic program naturally served national ends. He hoped to preserve his kingdom’s reserve of gold bullion, which had been flowing to the Netherlands for
tapestries and to Italy for silk, and also to make France more prosperous and to provide employment. Not everyone approved. As a matter of course, the six medieval guilds that dominated the manufacturing and trade of the city resented Henry’s direct intervention in the economy, but the king’s economic interests helped to make Paris a manufacturing center.20

In his efforts to reform and refurbish his capital, Henry did not overlook the common people. In order to improve conditions for everyone, he systematically paved streets, repaired bridges, and provided for better sanitation. His engineers also constructed new levees to control flooding from the Seine. These construction projects also provided employment. His efforts seem to have worked. In the period between the death of Francis I and Henry IV’s entry into Paris, the population of the city had remained stable at about 250,000. But in the five decades following Henry’s capture of the city, the population grew dramatically, reaching 450,000 by 1650. Thus, as the French were attempting to develop a network up the St. Lawrence, Paris was developing into a true metropolis with an expanding market for goods extracted from its overseas empire. In this way, Henry IV might be seen, in large part, as the founder of the eastern metropolitan terminus of the trade network that would eventually reach Montreal and beyond.21

Henry’s redevelopment of the capital provided a physical representation of state and national power manifested in space. For this reason, the king and his architects could not rely on exclusively foreign models, as Francis had. For the Place Royale and the Place Dauphine, they created a new style entirely—though it was influenced by traditional French and Dutch architecture. This new architecture of brick and grey and
white stone is today called the style of Henry IV and is recognized throughout the world as emblematic of France.22

And yet, the revitalization of Paris was just one part of Henry’s comprehensive plan to unify his kingdom and restore its status as a great power. He encouraged and subsidized new manufacturing enterprises, not only in Paris, but in other cities as well. To protect his newly unified kingdom, he instituted a program to fortify all of the border areas and built a Mediterranean galley fleet based at Toulon to protect the southern coast from the Spanish. To promote internal tranquility, he ordered fortifications inside of France to be pulled down. And to modernize transportation, commerce, and communication, he began a canal-building program to link the great rivers of France in order to create a unified system. He likewise instituted a program to build roads and bridges throughout the kingdom. Henry’s attempt to create a French empire in the New World might be seen, then, as part of his general vision to raise France to national greatness. Apparently, he believed, as had Francis I, that New World colonies were part and parcel of what it meant to be a great power in the early seventeenth century.23

In an important step toward the creation of a French overseas empire, Henry established a center for the study of geography in the rebuilt Louvre. Here the king employed cartographers, geographers, astronomers, and experts in navigation to promote exploration and, eventually, colonization. As part of his nationalistic program to unify France, he sponsored a major cartography program, which provided the French with better maps of the kingdom than they had ever before possessed. These were published in a great atlas—Théâtre Français—which gave the French people a new understanding of their “nationhood.” But the work of the geography center extended beyond France.
The experts there gathered intelligence about the world at large and provided maps of all the continents, according to the latest knowledge derived from exploration.\(^\text{24}\)

One of the experts Henry employed in the geography center just below the Grande Galerie in the Louvre, was Samuel de Champlain, who would become the key operative in finally realizing Henry’s plan for establishing a permanent French presence in the New World. For the purposes of taking possession of foreign lands overseas and colonizing them, one would be hard pressed to find a better agent than Champlain. A native of the Saintongeois seaport of Brouage on the Atlantic Coast, he had gone to sea at an early age and learned all aspects of seafaring, navigation, and the merchant trade from his father, Antoine, who had himself worked his way up in the business from pilot, to master, to captain, and finally to shipowner. Champlain, though, was also a highly trained soldier who had seen all facets of warfare during his service in Henry IV’s army during the war against the Catholic League. Having first served as a logistics and supply officer, Champlain later became a staff officer for three different marechals in turn, and finally, at the pivotal battle of Crozon in Brittany, had led troops in combat as an officer of the line.\(^\text{25}\)

Champlain was also able to carry out on his own most of the ceremonies of possession Europeans considered necessary to carve out a colonial empire in the New World. As an expert sailor, he could naturally use celestial navigation to pinpoint places in space on a map. He also knew how to take depths and create portalan charts. But Champlain’s skills went far beyond those of a sailor. He was also a geographer and cartographer who was well able to make his own maps, which, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out, are a key device of empire-building. Moreover, Champlain was a skilled
draftsman and watercolorist who could make pictographic descriptions of the lands, peoples, and structures he encountered—which Patricia Seed argues was an important ceremony of possession for the Dutch. But beyond this, Champlain was a good writer, who could describe what he saw in words—another key ceremony of possession for the Dutch, in Seed’s view.  

There was also a good deal of the diplomat in Champlain, and diplomacy was always an important aspect of the colonial enterprise. As his biographer David Hackett Fischer has noted, Champlain was one of the least haughty of the prominent men of his era. He treated human beings with respect, no matter where they came from and what they looked like. He was, therefore, well-suited to deal with peoples—such as the Native Americans—who operated under very different systems of belief. Champlain, unlike many others of his day and later, did not view such differing systems as necessarily a sign of moral or intellectual inferiority.  

Fischer suggests that Champlain’s tolerance of difference arose from his family background and the time and place in which he grew up. Although Champlain was a devout Catholic, one side of his family was Protestant and, in fact, he may have been born a Protestant, and like the king himself, converted to Roman Catholicism later. In this way, perhaps, Champlain, unlike Cartier before him, learned to be tolerant of people of different religious beliefs and was, therefore, well-able to cooperate with Protestants and also with the Native Peoples in building the French network along the St. Lawrence. Colonial network-building, though, also required a good deal of continuous support from the metropole, and here, too, Champlain was an ideal operative because he had the ear and confidence of the king. Some historians, in order to account for the intimate
relationship he enjoyed with the monarch, have suggested that Champlain was the illegitimate son of Henry IV. The proof of this is beyond the scope of this study, but what is clear is that Champlain had earned the king’s trust through loyal service. By the time he embarked on his career as a colonizer, he had served the king as a soldier, espionage agent, and official geographer, and by 1601, if not before, he had become a pensioner of the king. In the latter capacity, Champlain had spent a good deal of time at the Louvre directly interacting with the king and his court. In this way, Champlain had been a courtier before he was a colonizer and knew well the intrigues and power struggles that surrounded every decision the king made.28

Champlain also prepared himself well. He began by making an extended tour of the Spanish Empire in the New World aboard one of the ships in a Spanish fleet sent to the relief of Puerto Rico after the English had captured and plundered that key island in 1599. He was able to make this journey because the Spanish admiral had hired one of Champlain’s uncle’s ships, and the uncle made his nephew’s presence aboard the ship a condition of the contract. As Champlain himself explains, this circumstance enabled him “to make inquiries into particulars of which no Frenchmen have succeeded in obtaining cognizance, because they have no free access there.” In this way, Champlain could study at first hand the most successful European colonization effort to that point. When he returned to France, he published his account, making, as he said himself, a “true report” to Henry IV, a report that earned Champlain the position of geographer to the king at the Louvre.29

Champlain drew both positive and negative lessons from his study of New Spain. He was impressed with the urbanized network the Spanish had constructed for moving
gold, silver, and other commodities from the New World to the Old. This consisted of a series of fortified commercial port towns on the Spanish Main and in the Islands of the Caribbean, and included San Juan, Vera Cruz, Cartagena, and Havana. He was particularly impressed, though, with Mexico City, 200 miles inland from the port of Vera Cruz. All of the wonders he had seen on his overland trip from the port, wrote Champlain, were “but little in regard to what I experienced when I beheld that beautiful city of Mexico, which I had not supposed to be so superbly constructed of splendid temples, palaces and fine houses; and the streets extremely well laid out, in which are to be seen the large handsome shops of the merchants full of all sorts of very rich merchandise.” If he did not think so at the time, Champlain at some point must have harbored the ambition that France, too, might be able to create such a city in the New World.30

He was less impressed with Spanish treatment of the Native Americans, which he found cruel and counter-productive. Champlain was particularly critical of the way the Spanish had initially attempted to convert the Indians to Catholicism through the introduction of the Inquisition. This policy, according to Champlain, only caused the Indians to run away and conduct a guerrilla war against the Spanish, who countered with a policy of enslavement and genocide. The new conversion policy, as he described it, was only marginally better. The Indians were forced to attend mass and those who shirked faced a humiliating beating in front of their own people. In this way, says Champlain, the Indians were kept in the faith “partly from fear of being beaten.”31

Champlain’s general impression of the Indians was favorable. He found them to be “good-natured” and took note of their lively intelligence, patience, and ability to learn
quickly. He was also impressed with their ability to draw sustenance from the natural world around them in ways that were sometimes opaque to the Spanish. Champlain does, however, cast aspersions on their religious beliefs, which he found “barbarous.” He describes the natives as pagan moon-worshippers, who are therefore by definition “devoid of reason,” in spite of their “quick intelligence.” By implication, then, Champlain provided a rationale by which Europeans might claim possession of Native-American lands and assert political authority over Native Peoples. As pagans, Native Peoples, by his definition, lacked reason, on which all law depends. Champlain’s attitude toward Native Peoples, then, seems to be that Europeans had a right to appropriate their lands and to rule them, but not to abuse them even when they persisted in their “barbarous beliefs.”

Of the labor regime the Spanish used to extract silver, gold, and other commodities from the New World, Champlain has little to say. He does note, however, that the Spanish employed African slaves in the Mexican silver mines, as pearl divers, and as ordinary laborers on many of the islands he visited. He does not, however, explicitly criticize the use of slave labor.

Champlain also made a study of French colonization efforts from Cartier to Chauvin. His assessment was that these efforts had failed because of poor planning, poor leadership, inexperience, a lack of adequate provisions, and the erosion of support from the metropolitan government. Perhaps most importantly, Champlain understood the importance of establishing a self-sustaining agricultural base for a colony. It is clear, from his first trip to Canada in 1603, when he was scouting locations for settlement, to the time he published Les Voyages de la Nouvelle France two years before his death, that
Champlain’s vision of the French empire in America was not that of a light-footprint trading-post network up the St. Lawrence, but of an agriculturally based, self-sustaining settlement network, which French immigrants would populate. For this reason, he was scornful at the end of his life of those “who cleared no land nor found means to do so for the two [and twenty] years that the country has been settled, having no thought but to make a profit from beaver pelts.”

In time, Champlain would become the key figure in building the French network along the St. Lawrence. But he would not have been successful without a network of associates that included key players, such as Pont-Gravé, de Monts, and, of course, the king himself. As Champlain noted, too often colonial efforts failed because of poor leadership. In Florida, at Sable Island, and at Tadoussac, the settlements failed at least in part because the leader of the effort planted the colony and then returned to France to attend to matters there, leaving the colony in the hands of a subordinate who lacked the power and leadership skills to maintain order. Champlain would find an able associate in Pont-Gravé, a merchant sea captain from St. Malo and former soldier, who had the leadership skills to maintain order in the colony itself, but was also an expert seaman who could be relied upon to conduct supply missions between the colony and the metropole. Then, too, the colonial effort seemed to require a high-placed and respected advocate at court, and this Champlain would have in the person of Sieur de Monts, who organized what David Hackett Fischer has called an “American circle at court,” consisting of Pierre Jeanin, the intendant of finances and the president of the Parlement of Burgundy; Nicolas Brulart, the marquis de Sillery; and Charles de Cossé-Brissac, a mareschal de France and the governor of the key region of Brittany. It also helped that both Pont-Gravé and de
Monts had first-hand experience in North America. As has been seen, they had both sailed with Chauvin in 1600, and Pont-Gravé had made several earlier trips, including one up the St. Lawrence as far as Trois-Rivières. As Trudel notes, it may well be that it was because of this particular voyage of Pont-Gravé that the place names Trois-Rivières and Quebec first appeared on European maps, beginning with the Levasseur map of 1601.35

A significant turning point in building the French network along the St. Lawrence came in 1603. This momentous change came at the behest of the king, who in spite of the failure of all previous efforts, remained committed to constructing a French empire in the Americas that might rival that of New Spain. By 1603, though, Henry seems to have become suspicious that the monopoly holders—La Roche and Chauvin—were concentrating more on profits than on colonization. It was in that year, after all, that Henry sent a commissioner out to investigate conditions at Sable Island. The Chauvin patent also came under scrutiny. Under pressure from merchants in the channel ports to end Chauvin’s monopoly, Henry, at the very end of 1602, formed a commission consisting of Aymar de Chaste, the governor of Dieppe and vice admiral of the navy, and Sieur de la Cour, the first president of the parlement of Normandy to determine what ought to be done. The commission was to call together at Rouen the current monopoly owner, Chauvin, and representatives of Rouen and St. Malo to advise the king on whether a new monopoly should be granted and to whom, as well as on how best to proceed with the colonization of New France. The king evidently hoped that in return for a share of the monopoly, the merchants of the port towns would fund the colonization effort. In his invitation to the meeting, Henry acknowledged that the colonization of New France was
beyond the capacity of any one man. Nevertheless, the king also realized that the creation of a new monopoly was the only way he could proceed with his scheme of empire. Henry faced strong opposition from his own court, in the person of the duc de Sully, who cast a cold eye on colonization schemes in general, but especially on any royal expenditure for such a purpose. Sully did not think North-American colonies would be profitable largely because he believed “great riches could never be found” at the latitude of the St. Lawrence. But he also believed colonization would fail because such efforts were unsuited to “the natural capacity and intelligence of the French people,” whom he believed had “neither the foresight nor the perseverance which are necessary.” Sully, who was in effect Henry’s finance minister and most trusted advisor, would provide the king with immense sums to spend on his mistresses or to purchase the loyalty of certain nobles, but balked at paying for any empire-building out of the royal treasury. While Henry did not agree with Sully’s assessment of the French people, he could not very well go against a minister who had made himself nearly indispensable. Sully had reorganized the finances of the entire kingdom and kept the treasury in surplus even as he put the army and navy of France on a stronger footing, funded improvements to the transportation system and to the fortification of the frontiers, and subsidized Henry’s ambitious plan to remake Paris. Sully was also against the formation of trading companies, too, likely because the Dutch East India Co. had bribed him to suppress any competition to it in France. Sully was able to countenance the establishment of a trading company to New France only so long as it did not cost the king anything more than political capital.36
Henry’s new commission met in January 1603. Unfortunately, no document survives to directly elucidate its outcome, though the king’s decision to allow the merchants of both Rouen and St. Malo to send one ship a year to the St. Lawrence for the purpose of participating in the fur trade likely implemented the commission’s agreement. In return for this privilege, the merchants of each city were to pay one-third of the cost of colonization. The final third would be paid by the owner of the Chauvin patent, which otherwise remained in place. Chauvin, himself, though, died before any new arrangements in regard to the monopoly could be made, and so the fur trade patent was transferred from his heirs to Admiral de Chaste, whom Henry commissioned to govern New France.37

Although the communauté of St. Malo immediately rejected joining the consortium because the merchants there did not want to bear the expense of colonization, they continued to claim a right to trade to the St. Lawrence based on first discovery. In light of this, Henry allowed the merchants of Cartier’s old town to send one ship in 1603. De Chaste then organized his own expedition in conjunction with the merchants of Rouen. All parties must have had advance notice of what the king’s ruling on the monopoly would be. Henry issued his directive on 12 March, and the ships of de Chaste and the merchants of Rouen sailed from Honfleur three days later. The ship of the St. Malo merchants also joined this expedition. De Chaste had raised money for this enterprise from among the merchants and gentlemen of the channel ports, including Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, and Le Havre. Because he was already an old man, he did not go himself, but appointed Pont-Gravé as overall commander. Pont-Gravé had aboard his ship two Montagnais men whom he had brought back to France on his last trip and
Champlain, who joined the expedition as an agent of the king. The Montagnais were to be repatriated and serve as interpreters. None of the ships brought colonists. The ships from Rouen and St. Malo, the latter under the command of Jean Sarcel de Prevert, went exclusively to trade, but Pont-Gravé’s ship, the *Bonne Renommée*, was fitted out for exploration and de Chaste had given its commander the task of finding a suitable site for settlement.38

The *Bonne Renommée* came in sight of Cape St. Mary, Newfoundland, on 7 May and anchored at the site of Chauvin’s failed colony, Tadoussac, on the 26th. It is easy to see why Chauvin, who was interested in making money via the fur trade, attempted to make a settlement at Tadoussac. Located just at the place where the St. Lawrence River widens to meet the gulf, Tadoussac was easy for seagoing ships to access and provided a safe harbor. From the perspective of the early fur trade, it was also strategically located at the point where the Saguenay River flows into the St. Lawrence. The best furs came from the North, and the Indians brought them south via the Saguenay to meet European traders at Tadoussac. From the Indian perspective, it was the Montagnais who controlled Tadoussac. As middlemen, they traded up the Saguenay to obtain beaver and marten furs from northern groups such as the Peribonka, Mistassini, and Aschuapmouchouan. This meant that whichever European power controlled Tadoussac would have a good chance to control the fur trade. Tadoussac’s openness to the sea, though, complicated any attempt to control it because a settlement there would be open to attack from a hostile seapower.39

Champlain made a chart of Tadoussac harbor on this trip and then explored up the Saguenay for twelve or fifteen miles. He supplemented the information he was able to
gather first-hand with intelligence he gleaned from the Indians. The Indians accurately described to Champlain the system of rivers and lakes that led into the Saguenay as well as a “salt sea” (Hudson Bay), which Champlain correctly surmised was a gulf of the Atlantic. Such discussions demonstrate that the Native Americans were adept at making mental maps of places far distant from their daily habitat, and further that they could express their geographic ideas rather accurately even to a complete foreigner. Champlain also seems to have been able to develop trust between himself and different Native-American groups, which sets him apart from Cartier, who had difficulty establishing cooperative relations with the Native Peoples, to the point that they seem to have deliberately misled him about geographical details. The maps that Champlain was able to make on paper, which incorporated what he was able to learn from the Native Peoples, gave physical and, when printed, permanent representation to his own mental map of the St. Lawrence region. These printed maps, which allowed for careful notation of distances, landmarks, and even water depths, while not much different from the mental maps of the Indians, proved to be a significant advantage to the Europeans, allowing them to assert possession of territory and to easily disseminate geographic information to fellow countrymen.40

Champlain did not find the area around Tadoussac suitable for settlement, noting that the region was “high, sterile, and produced no commodities.” It certainly was not conducive for European-style farming. Moreover, he reports that the harbor was small and could accommodate only ten or twelve ships, a statement which indicates that the French anticipated creating a robust trading colony somewhere in North America. Finally, Champlain concluded that the climate was much too cold to allow colonists to
winter at Tadoussac, which the failure of Chauvin’s colony seemed to have proved. Champlain was similarly unimpressed with the land bordering the Saguenay, calling it “a most unpleasant land, where, neither on one side or the other, did I find a league of meadow-land.”

When the *Bonne Renommée* arrived at Tadoussac, the French found a large group of Montagnais, along with their Etchemin and Algonkian allies, encamped nearby. The Indians were preparing a feast to celebrate a recent victory over the Iroquois. Pont-Gravé, Champlain, and the two Montagnais interpreters that Pont-Gravé had brought from France boldly walked in to the Montagnais encampment to introduce themselves. This introduction began a long period of alliance between the Montagnais and the French. Once the Montagnais warriors and their guests were seated as if in council, one of the Montagnais interpreters began an oration, reporting how well he had been treated in France and assuring his fellow Montagnais of the good wishes of the French king. He told the Indians that Henry “desired to people their country, and to make peace with their enemies (who are the Iroquois) or send forces to vanquish them.” After this speech, the Montagnais leader Anadabijou began to smoke the calumet, which he then passed on to Pont-Gravé and Champlain. Anadabijou said that the Montagnais would be well pleased to have the king for a friend and “that he was well content that His said Majesty should people their country, and make war on their enemies, and that there was no nation in the world to which they wished more good than to the French.” Champlain then reports that Anadabijou reminded his fellow countrymen of “the advantage and profit they might receive from His said Majesty.” He also notes that the Montagnais signaled their general agreement with the statements of their leader.

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1. Champlain
2. *Bonne Renommée*
3. Montagnais
4. Etchemin
5. Algonkian
6. Iroquois
7. Henry
8. Pont-Gravé
9. Champlain
10. Anadabijou
11. Calumet
12. Montagnais
13. Good wishes
14. French king
15. Country
16. Peace
17. Enemies
18. Nation
19. French
Champlain carefully provided his readers with a general description of the Montagnais. On the one hand, he says they are of cheerful disposition and also thoughtful speakers, making note of their good judgment and ability to learn. On the other, he characterizes them as “great liars” who are given to revenge. In other words, the Montagnais, with a bit of moral education, had the ability to become good subjects of the French king. Champlain then provides the rationale by which the French could legitimately assert possession of the Montagnais’ lands and make them subject to French political authority. Namely, the Indians lived under a false religion and therefore had no law. Champlain reports a lengthy conversation he had with Anadabijou on the subject of religion. After hearing several stories about Indian belief, Champlain informed Anadabijou about Christian belief, implying at the same time that the Indians worshipped the Devil. Oddly, Anadabijou seemed willing to immediately abandon his own ancient belief and “approve” what Champlain had just told him. Anadabijou then explained to Champlain that the Montagnais did not make much use of ceremonies in praying to their gods, “but that every one prayed in his heart as he thought good.” For a seventeenth-century Roman Catholic, even one of generally tolerant disposition, such an individualistic approach to religion left the door open to heresy and schism. The lack of formal structure among the Indians led Champlain to “believe that there isn’t any law among them,” nor did the Montagnais “know how to worship and pray to God and live for the most part as brute beasts.” For this reason, says Champlain, the Montagnais “would promptly be reduced to good Christians, if we inhabited their lands, which most of them desired.”43
A further justification for French colonization is what Champlain perceived as the poor quality of life among the Indians. In essence, his argument is based on European technological superiority. “All these people sometimes suffer so great extremity on account of the great cold and snow, that they are almost constrained to eat one another; for the animals and fowl on which they live migrate to warmer countries.” The remedy for this would be to have the French take possession of the land and teach the Native Americans to adopt European agricultural techniques. The irony of this statement would only be fully borne out after the French had indeed colonized North America.44

It is worth remembering that Champlain’s account was written from the perspective of a French imperialist, whose mission was to carry out Henry IV’s plan to create a French empire in North America. Champlain published his report of this voyage soon after his return in 1603. His primary reader was no doubt the king himself, who would, of course, be pleased to hear the high regard in which the Native Peoples held him. Secondarily, Champlain published this work to convince a reluctant court to support colonization or at least not to actively impede it. For this purpose, he had to, at one and the same time, portray the Native Peoples as technologically backwards and lacking reason and religion, yet paradoxically capable of reason, true faith, and technological understanding so long as they came under the tutelage of the French. In this way, French colonization could be rationalized as beneficial to the Native Peoples, who would be lifted up from brute beasts to full humanity. For this reason, Champlain’s report need not be taken at face value. It is very likely to have been crafted to a purpose.

Having ruled out Tadoussac as an area suitable for settlement, Champlain needed to search for a better site. This led him to retrace Cartier’s route up the St. Lawrence.
Pont-Gravé had, of course, already made this trip on an early voyage and was on hand to guide Champlain. On this re-exploration, Champlain and Pont-Gravé visited all of the key locations where nodes on the French colonial network would be established—Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal. The question is: what were they looking for? What would constitute a suitable site for a French colony in North America? As they anchored at Quebec, Champlain took note of the narrowness of the river at that point. It is only some 800 feet across, though he estimated it to be somewhat wider—300 paces. The word “Quebec” itself seems to have been an Algonkian word for “place where the river narrows.” With his soldier’s eye, Champlain no doubt saw Quebec as a position from which the French, with shore batteries, could control the flow of traffic on the St. Lawrence. It was also far enough upriver that a fleet from a hostile European power would have difficulty reaching it, giving Quebec a significant advantage over Tadoussac. But perhaps Quebec’s most important attribute, from Champlain’s perspective at least, was that the land surrounding it could support European-style agriculture and had a milder climate than the area around Tadoussac. As Champlain himself commented, aside from the rocky cliff-top where he would later establish his settlement, “all the rest is a level and beautiful country, where there is good land covered with trees, such as oaks, cypresses, birches, fir-trees and aspens, and also wild fruit-bearing trees, and vines; so that in my opinion, if this soil were tilled, it would be as good as ours.” As a further inducement, perhaps for the king, he also noted that there were “diamonds in the slate of the rocks which are better than those of Alençon.” Of course, these were the false diamonds Cartier had found, which Champlain may have anticipated when he compared them to the rock crystals of Alençon.
Traveling west from Quebec, Champlain noted that the “country grows finer and finer.” At Ste. Croix, which was not the area of the same name on what became the St. Charles River where Cartier had wintered on his second voyage, but some thirty miles further up the St. Lawrence where the town of Ste. Croix now lies, Champlain found the country to be “fine and level, and soil better than any place I had seen.” Moreover, here were extensive forests and plenty of natural sustenance from wild grapes, pears (likely the fruit of the shadbush), hazelnuts, cherries, and wild currents, as well as roots, which the Indians used in their diet. Champlain found the soil black and soft and noted that “if it were cultivated it would yield well.” Continuing west on the river, Champlain once again noted, “the farther we went, the finer was the country.”

Some two days after leaving Ste. Croix, the party reached Trois-Rivières. Here Champlain found several islands, which were “very pleasant and fertile.” One of these he found suitable for settlement, in as much as it commanded all of the others and could be easily fortified because it had high cliffs on the south side. Nearby was the large Lake St. Peter and also the St. Maurice River, which flows into the St. Lawrence at Trois-Rivières and provided a convenient trade route for Native Americans coming from the fur-rich north. Champlain learned from the Indians that the St. Maurice, through its tributaries, nearly connects to the Saguenay River, so that a settlement at Trois-Rivières might be able to divert the fur trade from Tadoussac, where the French would likely have plenty of competition. He argued that a settlement at Trois-Rivières would be a boon for the freedom of some tribes who dare not come that way [to Tadoussac] for fear of their enemies, the said Iroquois, who infest the banks all along the said river of Canada [the St. Lawrence]; but if this river were inhabited we might make friends with the Iroquois and with the other savages, or at the very
least under the protection of the said settlement the said savages might come freely without fear or danger, inasmuch as the said Three Rivers is a place of passage.\textsuperscript{48}

After exploring the lower reaches of the St. Maurice, Champlain and his party continued west, passing through Lake St. Peter on their way to Montreal.\textsuperscript{49}

At the mouth of the Richelieu River, as it would come to be called, Champlain made note of a fortress from which the Indians who lived north of the St. Lawrence were organizing an attack on the Iroquois. Champlain explored up the Richelieu some six leagues, increasing his knowledge of the river system of the St. Lawrence Valley. From the Indians he also gathered information about Lake Champlain and Lake George and about the great Hudson River, as these bodies of water would later come to be known. Champlain was quite impressed with the land west of the Richelieu, where he found many species of fruit- and nut-bearing trees, an abundance of game, and land fit for farming.\textsuperscript{50}

In his account of Montreal, Champlain mentions seeing Mount Royal in the distance, but does not seem to have climbed it in order to better survey the surrounding country. He makes no mention of any towns, which strongly suggests that Hochelaga had disappeared prior to 1603. He seems to have been chiefly interested in the rivers that pour into the St. Lawrence at Montreal, which marked it as a transportation hub. These rivers include the St. Pierre, the St. Lambert, the Montreal, and La Tortue. He also noted that the climate at Montreal “is milder and more equable, and the soil better than in any place I had seen, with trees and fruit in great quantity,” marking it as a possible settlement site.\textsuperscript{51}
Like Cartier before him, Champlain found it too difficult to pass the Lachine Rapids and continue beyond Montreal. In this regard, he noted the technological superiority of native transportation. European boats could not brave the rapids and were too heavy to easily carry overland, whereas “with the canoes of the savages one may travel freely and quickly throughout the country, as well up the little rivers as up the large ones.” He thought that with guidance from the Indians and by use of their canoes, he might be able to see the whole of the country within the space of a year or two. Although he did not come across any Indian towns in the vicinity of Montreal, Champlain certainly encountered friendly Native Peoples, whom he once again closely questioned as to what lay beyond the Lachine Rapids. He asked them to draw a map so that their highly developed “mental maps” of the region might be made manifest to him. In this way, he was able to glean fairly accurate geographical information about the Ottawa River, up which might be found the “dwelling-place of the Algonkians.” He also learned about Lake Ontario, Niagara Falls, Lake Erie, and Lake Huron, beyond which the Indians he met had not traveled. The Indians described Lake Huron as a salt sea, or at least this is what Champlain believed them to have said, which led him to incorrectly conjecture that Lake Huron was the Pacific Ocean. Once he traveled back downriver, he continued to question other Native Americans he met in order to confirm what those around Montreal had told him.52

Champlain met one such Indian party at Coudres Island, about halfway between Quebec and Tadoussac. Since the hope of finding precious metals was always a royal priority, Champlain asked them whether they knew of any mines. They showed him some bracelets made of copper and said that the metal came from a mine located to the
north in the land of the “good Iroquois” or the Huron, who came south to trade with the Algonkian for French goods. This demonstrates that French goods, traded chiefly to the Algonkians at Tadoussac were already making their way far inland along traditional Indian trading networks. Champlain and Pont-Gravé reached Tadoussac itself by the tenth or eleventh of July. Here Champlain gathered some further information from native sources about possible copper and silver mines in the maritime region. It seems that Prevert, who commanded the trading vessel from St. Malo, spent at least part of his time searching for these mines, and later provided Champlain with a very inaccurate account of the area around Cape d’Or that he claimed to have explored.53

By the end of August, the expedition was ready to return to France. At Tadoussac, one of the Montagnais leaders, Bechourat, on the recommendation of Anadibijou, entrusted Pont-Gravé with one of his sons, asking him to carry him to France to see what the other Montagnais had seen there. The French also asked to be given an Iroquois woman whom the Montagnais had captured and “were intending to eat.” This the Montagnais agreed to do. Prevert also carried four Native Americans back to France in his ship. Having made these arrangements, the French weighed anchor from Gaspé on 24 August, made it as far as Cape Race by 2 September, and reached Havre de Grace by the 20th.54

In 1603, then, Champlain and Pont-Gravé had in effect retraced Cartier’s steps, bringing the St. Lawrence region as far as Montreal back into focus for Henry IV and French imperial policymakers. Because of his connections at court and with publishers in the French capital, Champlain was able to go well beyond what Cartier had done in terms of bringing the attention of the literate public to the St. Lawrence and its potential as a
source of riches and as an area of settlement. By the end of 1603, Champlain had published a full account of his exploration. Nevertheless, it would be a further five years before the French would attempt to plant a settlement in the fertile regions he had explored. For now, French efforts would focus on the eastern maritime regions.

When the Pont-Gravé and Champlain arrived back in France, they were immediately apprized of a serious complication facing the imperial enterprise in North America. Their champion at court, Sieur de Chaste, had died. What might have been a major problem was quickly overcome, however, in the latter part of 1603 when Henry IV conferred a monopoly of the fur trade and the right and duty to settle a colony in North America on Sieur de Monts. Henry appointed de Monts vice-admiral and lieutenant-general with governing authority for the territory between the fortieth and forty-sixth parallels. He also conferred upon him a ten-year monopoly of the fur trade throughout the region. The commission, which Charles de Montmorency, the admiral of France and of Brittany, issued on 31 October in the king’s name, reveals that it was de Monts who approached the king to say that he wished to apply himself to the discovery of new lands that are peopled by “Sauvages” and “Barbares.” The key point is that these Native Peoples were “devoid of all religion, law and civility.” This, of course, from the time of Cartier, had provided justification for the French to appropriate Native-American lands and colonize them. De Monts’ commission required him to bring the Indians the Christian faith, civilization, the rules of life, and, perhaps most importantly, to solicit their due “submission to the authority and dominion of the crown of France.” This mission of Christianization and civilization provided moral cover for what the French intended to do. This, too, remained essentially unchanged from the time of Francis I. De
Monts, acting in the name of the king, was given the authority to do whatever he judged necessary “to advance the exploration, conquest, and peopling of” Acadia, so that the king’s authority might be established there. While extending Christianity to the Native Peoples cannot be completely dismissed as a motivating purpose, other perhaps more pressing motivations reveal themselves in de Monts’ commission. De Monts informed the king that he wished to explore and colonize Acadia because of its suitable climate, good land, and the friendliness of the Native Peoples. But he also hoped to take advantage of the commodities of the country. Only two such commodities are specifically mentioned—first, “the number of good mines,” by which de Monts meant certainly copper and silver mines, but also precious stones and perhaps even iron, and second, peltries, for which the king granted him the ten-year monopoly. Another motivation for the colonization of Acadia, which is explicitly mentioned in the commission, is to prevent foreign powers from encroaching on the region, which by 1603 seems to have been a real possibility.55

The king authorized de Monts to assemble such captains, pilots, sailors, and artisans as he thought necessary, as well as all the vessels and supplies he would need. He was also given the power to construct forts and fortifications in Acadia and to develop port and harbor facilities for French ships. He could also appoint military officers and establish garrisons at key locations. In addition, he could appoint subordinate officers to establish a French-style system of justice, although he was also cautioned to “carefully observe the edicts and ordinances of the Navy.”56

De Monts, it seems, was dissatisfied with his original commission and asked the king to confer the titles viceroy and captain-general on him, which would have elevated
him above La Roche. Henry initially seemed to agree, but then on 8 November issued a second commission, this time in his own name, confirming de Monts as lieutenant-general only. De Monts’ commission makes Henry’s intentions for Acadia, Canada, and the adjoining regions crystal clear. Although the king mentions first being moved by “a singular zeal and by a pious and steadfast resolution” to bring about the conversion of the Native Peoples, a task he calls on de Monts to further, he also notes that “the occupation, possession, and colonization” of Acadia from the fortieth parallel to the forty-sixth and as far inland as the French might venture would be “fruitful, advantageous, and useful” to France. To effect this, de Monts was given the power to act in the king’s name and to establish French systems of justice and police. He was also to subject the various tribes of the region to the king’s authority, by war if necessary. De Monts was also given the task of building forts, towns, houses, habitations, ports, harbors, shelters, and barracks. In essence, he was directed to construct an entire network to facilitate the flow of Christianity to the Native Peoples in America and also the flow American trade goods, particularly mineral wealth, to Europe. This network, though, was also to facilitate not only the movement of ideas and goods, but also people. To Henry’s mind, the purpose of colonization was not simply to build a trade network, but also to shift whole populations to the New World. While the king explicitly charged de Monts to “preserve, maintain, and keep” the Native Peoples, so long as they remained friendly to the French, the lieutenant-general was also to take special care to “people, cultivate, and settle the said lands as promptly, carefully, and wisely as time, place, and circumstance will permit.” New France, which was as yet just a name on a few maps and a vision in the king’s mind, was to be Frenchified not only by converting the Native People to the religion of the
For the purpose of trade and settlement, de Monts put together a company and induced merchants from Rouen, St. Malo, La Rochelle, and St. John de Luz to invest some 90,000 livres in the enterprise. The merchants extended this amount for a share in the fur-trade monopoly, in spite of their reservations about taking on the costs of settlement. Although de Monts himself was a nobleman and invested 9,000 to 10,000 livres in the enterprise at this juncture, the financing for this latest attempt at settlement came largely from merchant capital. De Monts put together a fleet of three ships and among the personnel were Pont-Gravé as second in command and Champlain, once again as geographer to the king. Also along was Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt, who would play a key role in the exploration of the eastern seaboard. Although de Monts was a Protestant, he included two Catholic priests who were to minister to the Catholic colonists. He also brought a Protestant minister. The mixed religious nature of the enterprise reflected the era of toleration that Henry IV had promoted among the French. In all, there were nine gentlemen of rank in the expedition, some 120 workmen, and a full company of sailors. This expedition, though it was meant to plant a colony, was essentially exploratory. The idea was not necessarily to establish a permanent settlement, but rather a base of operations from which further exploration of the Atlantic coast could proceed with an eye to locating the most suitable site for a permanent plantation. In light of its exploratory nature, the expedition included no women. De Monts’ decision to seek a settlement site in Acadia is an interesting one, particularly in light of Champlain’s glowing account of the climate and fertility of the soil west of Quebec. Perhaps his own
experience at Tadoussac in 1600 with Chauvin’s colony had soured him on the St.
Lawrence.  

In return for their investment, merchants from St. Malo were permitted to send
two fur-trading vessels in which the merchants from La Rochelle also had a stake. La
Rochelle merchants also invested some money with the Basque merchants from St. Jean-
de-Luz, who sent out a whaling ship to the St. Lawrence region as part of the overall
activities of de Monts’ company. All of these ships operated under de Monts’ monopoly
and could make a profit not only by engaging in trade themselves, but also by seizing the
ships and goods of those in violation of the patent. In all, de Monts’ company seized
eight such ships the first summer.  

In the early spring of 1604, de Monts departed from Le Havre in his flagship Don
de Dieu with Champlain aboard. Pont-Gravé set sail three days later in the Bonne
Renommée. By 8 May, the Don de Dieu was safely at anchor off the coast of Acadia.
Exploring the coast, the French came to Port Royal, which they noted as a possible place
of settlement. They also began to employ tried and, to them, true methods of possession,
erecting, for instance, a cross at the mouth of the St. John’s River. In entering the Ste.
Croix River, which today marks the boundary between New Brunswick and Maine, they
came to an island some four miles from the mouth that seemed an ideal spot for a base
settlement. It had sheer cliffs on three sides, a protected harbor on the fourth side, and
soil that seemed good for planting. It is likely that Champlain had already scouted this
island and convinced de Monts of its suitability. As Champlain himself noted, “This
place we considered the best we had seen, both on account of its situation, the fine
country, and for the intercourse we were expecting with the Indians of these coasts and of
the interior.” Here de Monts erected a fortified camp consisting of three buildings surrounded by a palisade with some small houses outside of the fort for the colonists. The colonists cleared land on the island and planted wheat, but also found better agricultural land on the riverbank, which was likewise cleared and planted. With everything well in hand, de Monts saw fit to dispatch the Don de Dieu and a ship he had seized for violating his fur-trade monopoly back to France under the command of Pont-Gravé and Poutrincourt. In the meantime Champlain, in command of a pinnace, explored the coast south as far as Pemaquid, making a French claim to this area by locating points according to celestial navigation, mapping, and providing a detailed written description. At the Penobscot River, Champlain met with a party of Etchemins or Penobscot Indians as they were later known. Through an interpreter he told them that he was an emissary of Sieur de Monts, who “wished to reconcile them with their enemies, the Souriquois (Mi’kmaq) and Canadians (Montagnais); moreover he desired to settle in their country and show them how to cultivate it, in order that they might no longer lead so miserable an existence as they were doing.” Given what was about to transpire on the Ile de Ste. Croix, Champlain’s speech could not have been more ironic.  

Trouble began at Ste. Croix soon after settlement. Black flies, which Champlain calls mosquitoes, immediately besieged the colonists, biting some so severely that their faces swelled to the point where they could scarcely see. Then, as the summer wore on, the land on the island, which had seemed so fertile, turned out to be little more than sand, and the settlers had all they could do to keep the crops watered under a scorching summer sun. But the real trouble came with the winter. What Champlain had taken to be a mild climate, turned out to be a severely cold one in the winter months. The Ste. Croix River
froze, but because it did so little by little with the unfrozen parts of the river still flowing, it solidified in jagged chunks that prevented anyone from passing over it. This proved a real hardship when the colonists began to run out of firewood and freshwater. During the winter of 1604-5, the settlers were reduced to eating snow. Scurvy also set in and thirty-five or thirty-six of the seventy-nine men who wintered at St. Croix died before Pont-Gravé returned with fresh supplies in the spring.61

But the difficulties of the winter were not enough to deter de Monts. In spring 1605, he and Champlain sailed south, seeking a more suitable spot for settlement. They explored the coast as far as Cape Cod, but in all that stretch, found no good location for the colony. Much of the coast was rocky and difficult to navigate, the soil in most places did not seem promising, and though de Monts made friends with the Indian groups he met along the way, it appears he did not sufficiently trust them to settle among them. Short on supplies, he decided to turn back to Ste. Croix and move the colony to Port Royal, where the French could settle in the midst of the Mi’kmaqs, who had become firm friends and would remain so. The Mi’kmaq leader, Membertou, was said to be more than one hundred years old. He was a great friend of the French and claimed to have seen Cartier.62

Before the onset of winter, de Monts returned to France to report to Henry IV and shore up support for his enterprise. Meanwhile, with Pont-Gravé in command, the colony spent another difficult winter at Port Royal. Between six and twelve colonists died of scurvy. When spring came, Pont-Gravé set out to find a new site for the colony, but was shipwrecked in his pinnace. By 16 July, when no relief had arrived, he prepared to give up the colony and return the settlers to France with the fishing fleet, as de Monts had
instructed him to do. He left two sailors behind who volunteered to look after the settlement compound and then on the 17th with the remainder of the company shipped out in two pinnaces. Pont-Gravé had gone as far as Cape Sable when he met de Monts’ secretary, Jean Ralleau, who approached in a shallop and informed him that Poutrincourt, who was to take command of the colony, had arrived at Canso with new supplies and fifty new colonists. Pont-Gravé’s party, accordingly, turned back to Port Royal, where they met Poutrincourt, and the colony was saved for another year.63

Poutrincourt thought that it was too late in the year to move the colony. He therefore had some further land near Port Royal cleared and planted with wheat, rye, and hemp. De Monts, though, had also asked Poutrincourt to spend the fall seeking a site for a permanent settlement. This Poutrincourt did, once again sailing south along the coast. He rounded Cape Cod and might have gone further but for the fact that the French suffered a surprise attack from the Indians, which compelled them to turn back to Port Royal to tend to their wounded. The circumstances surrounding the fighting between the Massachusetts Indians and the French warrant some comment. Apparently, Poutrincourt antagonized the Indians by marching parties of armed men through their villages, appropriating their corn without permission, and finally by erecting a cross at Port Fortune on Cape Cod. The Massachusetts Indians, unlike the Mi’kmaqs of Acadia, were agricultural people, who were willing enough to trade with the French, but seem to have resented any penetration into the interior of their lands. They, like Donnacona before them, also seem to have interpreted the planting of the cross as a sign of French possession. They pointedly pulled it down twice once hostilities broke out.64
It is likely, too, that the hostilities between the French and Massachusetts Indians developed because of a general lack of communication. Certainly, Poutrincourt, though he distrusted them, had no intention of bringing any harm to the Native Peoples of the region. The fact was, the French had no interpreter, and neither side could well understand the other, which may have bred mutual distrust. Champlain had noted that the region around Cape Cod was “strongly suited” as a place in which “to build and lay the foundations of a republic.” The French, however, did not wish to live in a state of war with the surrounding Native Peoples, and the skirmishing at Port Fortune seems to have brought to an end to any further thought of moving the Port Royal settlement to this area, which would subsequently become the site of the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies.

Champlain later said that Poutrincourt had made a mistake in reexploring the coast from Port Royal to Cape Cod, since this had already been done. He argued that a more prudent course would have been to sail directly to Cape Cod and explore the coast from that point south. Had this been done, it might well have been that the French would have found a suitable settlement site at Narragansett Bay, where Verrazzano and his men had rested so pleasantly in 1524, or even on Manhattan Island.

The winter of 1606-07 at Port Royal turned out to be much milder than the previous two, and the colony was well-supplied with food and even wine. The poet Marc Lescarbot, who had come out with Poutrincourt, put on a play, “The Theatre of Neptune,” which is the first play known to be performed in North America. Nevertheless, scurvy returned once again and carried off between four and seven settlers. Still, the general conditions of the colony had improved, and there was every reason to think that with the
spring new supplies and men would arrive to put it on an even firmer foundation. But
toward the end of May a pinnace arrived with letters from de Monts directing
Poutrincourt to abandon the colony and bring everyone back to France. On 12 July,
Rallau arrived in a shallop, to confirm the dissolution of the settlement. By the 30th, the
rank-and-file settlers left in three longboats to go to Canso where they would meet the
ship that would return them to France. Poutrincourt, Champlain, and a few others
followed on 11 August, bringing to an end this latest attempt to plant a French colony
along the Atlantic seaboard. This time it was neither the severe winter nor lack of supply
that brought the colony to an end, but the heavy expenditures needed to keep it afloat. De
Monts’ company had run deeply into debt and also into heavy opposition at court from
Norman, Breton, and Basque merchants as well as from the Hatter’s Guild, which
pressured and liberally bribed influential members of the court to end de Monts’
monopoly, more ardently so because the beaver hat had now become the height of
fashion. This pressure, no doubt, increased as de Monts’ company seized the ships of
those merchants who were bold enough to trade without a license. These seizures
inflamed opposition to the monopoly, but they were not enough to enforce it. As
Maurice Trudel has correctly observed, “it had been an illusory monopoly in any case”
and had been easily evaded for the most part. Moreover, new competition had sprung up
from the Dutch, who for the first time began to intrude in the waters of New France to ply
the fur trade. Then, too, the company may have been compromised from within. As
Trudel points out, notarized documents allege that company treasurer de Bellois, Pont-
Gravé, and even de Monts himself may have been defrauding the company.66

2 Quinn, *North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements*, 241-43.

3 Ibid., 244-45.

4 Ibid., 252-59.


7 Roncière, *Jacques Cartier*, 229-30; Trudel doubts whether the 1578 voyage ever took place. See his *The Beginnings of New France*, 56.


13 According to Lanctot and others, after initially settling the colony in 1598, La Roche himself sailed off to collect fines from those who were violating his monopoly. He did not return to the colony that year, says Lanctot, because storms blew him off course and he was forced to return to France. But Trudel notes that recent research has cast doubt on this story. Lanctot, *History of Canada*, 1:82-83; Quinn, *North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements*, 472-73; Trudel says Henry gave La Roche 12,000 crowns. See his *The Beginnings of New France*, 62-64.


18 Francis had also emphasized French cultural unity by elevating French over Latin as the official language of government. This was, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out, a key step in the development of the modern concept of nationalism. See Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 42; Buisseret, *Henry IV*, 29-41; Knecht, *Francis I*, 390-92.


23 Ibid., 116-17, 134-35, 142-44, 153-54.


27 Fischer, *Champlain’s Dream*, 35, 37, 58.
28 Ibid., 23-24, 37-38, 41, 57, 85, 100.
30 Ibid., 1: 36-38, 41-42, 68, 72, 74.
31 Ibid., 1:63-64.
33 Ibid., 1:13-14, 23, 42, 75.
38 Trudel, The Beginning of New France, 69, 74; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 121-26; Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 45-47.
41 Ibid., 1:95-96, 122; For his later assessment, see 3:307-309.
42 Ibid., 1:98-103.
43 Ibid., 1:110-17.
44 Ibid., 1:110.
46 Ibid., 1:130-31, 133.
48 Ibid., 1:137.
49 Ibid., 1:138.
50 Ibid., 1:141-46.
51 Ibid., 1:153.
52 Ibid., 1:153-63, 165.
54 Ibid., 1:188-89.
56 Morse, Pierre Du Gua, 4-6.
57 Lescarbot, History of New France, 2:211-16.
58 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 84, Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 154-58; Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 52-54.
59 Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 54-55.
60 The date of the departure is a matter of dispute among historians. Champlain says the Don de Dieu left Havre de Grace on 7 April and that Pont-Gravé left three days later. Fischer and Morison accept this date, but Trudel, citing Lescarbot’s account, pushes the departure back to early March. The problem for Trudel is that Lescarbot did not sail with de Monts’ expedition of 1604 and only arrived in Acadia in the summer of 1606. Biggar also accepts Lescarbot’s dating, noting that it was confirmed in Le Mercure Français for 1608, which was published in 1611. Trudel also says that de Monts’ expedition included a third ship, but Champlain only mentions two. Biggar, ed. Works of Champlain, 1:234, 234 n., 270-76, 295-99; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 158; Morison, Champlain, 36; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 84-86; Champlain tells us that it was on this expedition of 1604 that the French named the St. John River as they did because it was the feast of St. John when they arrived at its mouth. In his narrative, he makes no mention of the erection of the cross at this time, but the cross appears at the mouth of the St. John on his accompanying map with the caption “une pointe de cailloux, où y a une croix.” Biggar says, “Presumably the cross was erected in connection with ceremonies at the naming of the river on St. John’s day. See Champlain’s map opposite page 268 in Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, vol. 1.
64 Ibid., 1:410-21.
65 Ibid., 1:389-90, 393-94; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 90.
CHAPTER 5

BUILDING THE NETWORK: CHAMPLAIN ON THE ST. LAWRENCE

The French under de Monts had employed the full panoply of ceremonies of possession to take hold of the territories of Acadia and even of much of the coast of what would shortly become New England. Naming, mapmaking, determining geographic position with the tools of celestial navigation, engaging in commerce, setting up markers, and providing written and graphic descriptions had all played a part. And yet, De Monts’ company had failed to establish a settlement in North America, which French policy had long declared to be the only valid assertion of possession of territory in the New World. Moreover, after a thorough exploration of Acadia and New England as far south as Cape Cod, they had found—at least as far as de Monts was concerned—no suitable location for a permanent settlement. This meant that if settlement was to take place, it would have to be someplace else, and the logical spot was farther inland up the St. Lawrence. Champlain, after all, had already made a thorough inspection of this region, found it suitable for agriculture and settlement, and published a glowing account for all to see, which had refocused the attention of French imperialists on the St. Lawrence Valley. It is worth mentioning, however, that even if a settlement were to be planted somewhere inland along the St. Lawrence, the French would still have had to maintain a significant presence on the coast—in Acadia or at Tadoussac perhaps. Otherwise, a hostile European power could interdict all commerce to and supply of an inland colony.

It had been Sully, the king’s most powerful councilor, who persuaded the Royal Council that de Monts’ monopoly should be revoked. It appears that he had been the
recipient of some bribes to bring this matter before the council. In any case, Sully had
long stood against the French colonial enterprise and was only too willing to take up the
charge that de Monts had failed to live up to the terms of his charter, which required him
to settle sixty colonists per year in North America. Remarkably, in spite of all of these
setbacks and with powerful opposition at court, de Monts decided that he would make
one more attempt to plant a French colony in the New World. It seems to have been
Champlain who convinced him to locate a new settlement farther up the St. Lawrence
River. The St. Lawrence Valley near the future site of Quebec combined fertile soil with
a strategic point where the De Monts’ Co. might be able to control the fur trade and
enforce a monopoly, something that had proved impossible for any settlement in the
coastal areas of Acadia, but which was key to controlling the network they were trying to
establish. After a period of intense discussion with Champlain, de Monts applied once
again for letters patent from the king. Henry IV acquiesced and issued a new commission
that granted de Monts a monopoly of the fur trade and trade in all other merchandise for
“one year only.” The commission, as in the past, explained the king’s purposes, the first
of which was to continue the effort to establish a French settlement in the region. The
monopoly was given in order to underwrite this enterprise. The purpose of settlement,
according to the king, was two-fold. First, in peopling the country, the French would be
in a better position to do God’s work and to convert the native inhabitants to Roman
Catholicism, and second, boots on the ground would help to secure the trade of the
country for France. While there is some reason to doubt the sincerity of the first purpose,
there is no reason to doubt the second.¹
De Monts and Champlain’s motivations may have been slightly different. For his part, Champlain, as a professional geographer, seems to have been interested chiefly in exploration. A settlement well up the St. Lawrence would be needed as a base of operations for further exploration of the interior of the continent. As to the fur trade or trade generally, Champlain seems to have taken little personal interest. He catalogued the resources of the regions he explored chiefly for the benefit of those who funded his explorations. He seems to have convinced de Monts, too, that the “noble and worthy enterprise” of exploration should be continued. De Monts, of course, was much more interested in trade, not only so that he could fund settlement and exploration, but also so that he could recoup some of the enormous sums he had already lost in his American adventures, estimated at 10,000 livres. Like the king, de Monts saw settlement as a means of protecting trade, and in this case, of enforcing his monopoly.

No doubt all three men were united in the purpose of securing the northern stretches of North America for the French crown. Champlain had witnessed the well-organized empire of Spain in the Caribbean and in Central and South America, and it seems to have been his dream, not to establish a mere network of trading posts along the St. Lawrence, but a robust empire which would rival that of Spain. Henry and de Monts also seem to have had this purpose in mind. Henry had done everything he could to unite the various regions of his kingdom to create, as far as he was able, a French nation. In order, though, to achieve true great-power status, such as Spain had achieved, he would need to establish an overseas empire, which was the seventeenth-century equivalent of joining the nuclear club. In this regard, it is telling that in the new commission to de Monts, Henry mentions first the reports he had received of “the good quality and fertility
of the lands.” The only reason the king would have had for mentioning this, even before he had addressed the issues of trade and the conversion of the Native Peoples, was his desire to create a North-American empire, peopled with French settlers who would employ European-style agricultural techniques in order to make their colonies prosperous and self-sustaining. Naturally, many of his close allies in consolidating his kingdom, people such as de Monts and Champlain, would also have an interest in furthering Henry’s imperial ambitions in North America. But there was little time to lose if France was to secure the Canadas for its empire. The Gulf of St. Lawrence was full of Spanish, Dutch, and Basque ships, which had come to fish and ply the fur trade. Although the Basques were nominally under the rule of the French king, they—like other European interlopers—stood ready to contest de Monts’ monopoly, and thereby defy the authority of the king. 3

With his commission in hand, de Monts set about the task of financing this renewed effort. He seems to have cultivated a good many friendships over the years among merchants in both the channel seaports and those along the Atlantic coast. This allowed him to make licensing agreements with merchants in St. Malo, Dieppe, Le Havre, Honfleur, Rouen, La Rochelle, and Paris, as well as with some Basque merchants from the southern port of St. Jean-de-Luz. No doubt, though, some of the merchants who intended to participate in trade to the St. Lawrence region in 1608 were also induced to take out licenses from de Monts because he wisely had his friend, the merchant Lucas Le Gendre, institute legal proceedings against several traders who had the temerity to violate his monopoly. Still, in spite of de Monts’ ability to find merchant investors, much of the
financing for the expedition of 1608 seems to have been borrowed, as David Hackett Fischer says, “at high interest.”

Although de Monts’ effort this time would be to establish a French base in the St. Lawrence Valley, his erstwhile subordinate Poutrincourt was not yet ready to abandon the effort in Acadia. According to Lescarbot, Poutrincourt was impressed enough with Port Royal and its environs that he asked de Monts to cede it to him. While he had been in charge of de Monts’ colony from 1606 to 1607, Poutrincourt had expanded its agricultural base, and when he received word to bring the colonists home and dissolve the colony, he had delayed his own departure some eleven days so that he could see the crops ripen. Poutrincourt had left the structures at Port Royal in the care of the Mi’kmaq chief Membertou, signifying that he intended to return. He also brought to France some specimens of the wheat, barley, oats, and hemp he had grown in the nearby fields. Soon after Poutrincourt reached France, he informed the king about the relative success of the Port Royal colony with an eye toward gaining the monarch’s approval for a continuation of the experiment. Poutrincourt showed Henry the crops he had grown, and the king was sufficiently impressed to confirm de Monts’s grant of Port Royal to him on the condition that he would plant a settlement there. Poutrincourt did not allow any grass to grow under his heels and promptly set about organizing an expedition. But he had trouble finding backers and could not afford to mount such a venture on his own. It would be a further two years before he made it back to Port Royal, and this left the de Monts expedition as the only French attempt to plant a settlement in New France during 1608.

De Monts did not encounter the same difficulties as Poutrincourt and was able to raise enough money to equip three ships. Vessels under the command of Pont-Gravé and
Pierre Champdoré were to concentrate on the fur trade, Pont-Gravé at Tadoussac and Champdoré along the Acadian Coast. The third ship, the _Don de Dieu_, under Champlain’s command, was to proceed up the St. Lawrence and establish a settlement. Pont-Gravé, who was to sail in the _Lévrier_, was also to render Champlain, who was in overall command, what assistance he could.⁶

The ships of the de Monts company were provisioned and ready to go by early spring. Pont-Gravé sailed from Honfleur on 5 April with Champlain following eight days later. In his own account, Champlain says nothing about the number of settlers he brought nor of their quality. Existing records, though, give some fragmentary sense of who these pilgrims were. There were woodcutters, sawyers, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, and general laborers. There was at least one locksmith—Jean Duval—who had been wounded in Poutrincourt’s battle with the Massachusetts Indians in 1606. Champlain also brought along a surgeon and at least one gardener. There were also two boys—Étienne Brûlé and Nicolas Marsolet. Although de Monts had attempted to persuade the Jesuits to send missionaries, he had been unsuccessful. On Champlain’s voyage of 1608, then, there were no clergy or missionaries of any kind, surprising perhaps, since the oft-stated goal of the entire enterprise was ostensibly to bring the Roman Catholic faith to the Indians. Of course, the absence of priests and missionaries would be less surprising if, as seems likely, the evangelical purposes of the expedition were merely a cover for other priorities. Moreover, there were also no women, which is also surprising, since establishing a permanent settlement seems to have been a key purpose, one that could not be accomplished without women.⁷
On 26 May, Champlain’s ship was in sight of Newfoundland, and by 3 June it had anchored off Tadoussac. Here Champlain found Pont-Gravé ashore but seriously wounded. When Pont-Gravé had first arrived at Tadoussac, he found Basque ships trading with the Indians in violation of de Monts’ patent. When he insisted that they desist, one Basque captain named Darache opened fire on Pont-Gravé’s vessel. During the ensuing fight, Pont-Gravé was hit. Darache, though, must have had second thoughts about carrying the hostilities further, especially after Champlain’s ship sailed into view flying de Monts’ ensign. Having already fired on one ship that was trading under the king’s commission, Darache now found himself confronted by another and decided not to press his luck. After consulting with Pont-Gravé and finding the Basques somewhat contrite, Champlain decided for the time being to compose matters between the parties, with the understanding that the trouble would be sorted out later in the courts of France. In this way, Champlain could continue with the work of settlement without further difficulty.8

After making a brief survey of the Saguenay River, Champlain left Pont-Gravé to recover at Tadoussac and sailed up the St. Lawrence to the site of Quebec, where the land was “fine and fertile.” Here he came ashore on 2 or 3 July and commenced building the first permanent French settlement in Canada. With him were the carpenters, locksmiths, and other experienced workman needed to build European-style habitations—a key element in the reinscription of the land. With Stadacona gone, there were no sizable groups of Native Americans to contest the French takeover. Near Quebec there were only a few rudimentary huts of Indians who survived by hunting and eel fishing. According to Champlain, winter found these Native Americans, who seemed to have
forgotten the agricultural techniques of the Laurentian Iroquois, on the verge of starvation. Gone were the gardens of corn and beans that Cartier had seen in the days of Stadacona. The few Native Americans left along the river seemed to be transients who had come to fish and who lived in constant fear of attack from the Iroquois to the south.⁹

Champlain found the remnants of Cartier’s fort of 1535-36 some distance to the west, on the St. Charles River, but he opted to build in a new place. He chose a site on the low-lying area close to the river. The French cut down local stands of nut trees and used these to build a storehouse and two residences. Each of these buildings was two stories. Champlain also had a gallery constructed around the second floor of each building and surrounded the whole settlement with a defensive ditch fifteen-feet wide and six feet deep. Redoubts for the emplacement of cannon were constructed on the outer perimeter of the ditches. One of the reasons Champlain seems to have chosen this site is that it was located at a narrow point in the St. Lawrence. From this vantage, Champlain’s cannon could prevent ships from passing upriver, which allowed him to secure the trade of the western country for sieur de Monts.¹⁰

Once the buildings were up, Champlain set his men to clearing some land and planting gardens roundabout. Part of the rationale for planting a colony so far up the St. Lawrence was that the climate and the soil along the river from Quebec to Mont Royal were far superior to what the French had seen elsewhere. From the first, Champlain seems to have believed that any successful, permanent settlement would have to be self-supporting and would therefore be dependent upon establishing European-style agriculture. It was for this reason that he always, when making his geographical surveys of various regions of North America, made note of the land’s potential to support
farming. As to the initial gardens around Quebec, Champlain explained that he had the workman sow “grain and seed, for the purpose of seeing how the whole thing would succeed, particularly since the soil seemed to be very good.” Later, in October, he had wheat and rye sown as well as some vines native to the country. He would later note, though, that the vines had been ruined after he departed the colony for France because of lack of care.\textsuperscript{11}

As the colonists busied themselves preparing the habitation and gardens, Champlain held the first French judicial proceeding in the new settlement. The locksmith Jean Duval had fomented a conspiracy to murder Champlain. The idea seems to have been for the workmen to join the Basques and enrich themselves as fur traders once Champlain was out of the way. Champlain took depositions, pardoned all but the four main conspirators, and convened a court of inquiry consisting of himself, Pont-Gravé, a captain of another French vessel, and the ship’s surgeon, mate, second mate, and other sailors. This court decided to execute Duval, but to send the three other conspirators back to France with Pont-Gravé so that de Monts might decide their fate. Duval was strangled, hung, and had his severed head put up on a pike at “the most conspicuous place” in the French fort. This was the first European judicial proceeding at Quebec since Roberval had pardoned d’Aussillon and hanged a colonist for theft in 1542, and it marks the flow of French jurisprudence along the network. As thin as it was, it represented the extension of French governmental power into North America. From this point forward there would be no interruption in the French legal system in the colony, until the 1630s.\textsuperscript{12}
On 18 September, with the building of the habitation well advanced, Pont-Gravé and the ships departed for France. They left behind just twenty-eight men to assert French possession of the vast valley of the St. Lawrence, all under the able command of Champlain. At its founding, Quebec was little more than the outpost of a French trading company, but as the only French settlement in continental North America, it had the best claim to be the capital of a significant province in the French empire.

Champlain had established a military presence at Quebec and, perhaps unwittingly, had also created an administrative center where judicial proceedings might take place, extending a system of French law into North America. He had certainly begun to inscribe the landscape with European symbols, including wood-framed buildings, cannon, and gardens. In short, though he may not have known it at the time, Champlain had succeeded in creating a node in a network that would extend French commercial, political, and military power thousands of miles west across the Atlantic and into the interior of another continent.

This new tenuous network, if it was to survive, had to compete to secure its economic lifeblood. To do this, Champlain and his colonists would have to establish steady trade relations with Native-American groups who could provide them with commodities that might be sold on the European market. The immediate problem was that the strong town-based Native-American society of the Laurentian Iroquois that Cartier had found along the north bank of the St. Lawrence was long gone. The Native Peoples Champlain encountered near Quebec were transient Montagnais who came to the riverside only in September and October to fish for eels. In the depths of winter, these same people went off to hunt beaver.
In his published accounts, written for the benefit of his royal master and his supporters at court, Champlain once again provided the justification for French colonization of Native-American lands in North America. As in the past, his argument rested on the Native Peoples’ pagan religious belief, which perforce defined them in European terms as lacking in reason and law. For the Europeans, the Christian god was the font of all law. This made it impossible for a people who failed to recognize the Christian god to have any legitimate, reasonable laws of their own. As a result, they could not legally own land or other important property, which in European eyes could only exist as they are defined in law. To justify the future peopling of the lands along the St. Lawrence with French immigrants, Champlain also reverted to the time-honored argument that the Indians lacked the technical know-how to make the best use of the land. He noted that they suffered from hunger to the point where they were reduced to eating their own dogs. If only they would adopt French farming techniques, said Champlain, this could be avoided. But Native-American shortcomings alone, from the French perspective at least, were not enough to fully justify a French takeover. Although from the European perspective the Indians lacked true religion, reason, law, and technical expertise, Champlain nonetheless had to hold out the hope that they could become “civilized” in so far as the French understood that concept. Without this possibility, the settlement of the French as saviors would be fruitless. Champlain therefore carefully noted that Native-American acumen was such that they could easily adapt themselves to European ideas and practices. “I consider that, if anyone were to show them how to live, and how to till the soil, and other things,” Champlain wrote, “they would learn very well.” This applied equally to religion. He noted that the Indians “would soon be
brought to be good Christians, if one were to live in their country” and added that this was precisely what a majority of the Native Peoples desired. The French should, therefore, do their duty to God and to the Native Peoples by settling along the St. Lawrence.\textsuperscript{15}

Normally these kinds of claims on the part of European colonizers—that the Native Peoples required a long period of mentoring on the part of their betters in order to learn how to live civilized and prosperous lives—were quickly followed by a period in which the haughty Europeans found that they had come unprepared for the vicissitudes of living in the New World. Facing starvation themselves, the Europeans soon found themselves dependent upon the Native Peoples just to survive the winter. Champlain, though, with long experience in the New World, seems to have been better prepared. The bands that came to fish for eels around Quebec entrusted him with their dried catch while they went off hunting. When they returned in December, he returned their provisions, and in the spring, because the hunting season had not been as successful as the Indians had hoped, Champlain shared some of his own supplies with them. In this way, he was able to convince them of the benefits of French settlement.\textsuperscript{16}

In spite of the aid he gave the Montagnais, Champlain must have wondered during the harsh winter of 1608-9 how he and his fellow settlers were going to make it through. Although his supplies held out, dysentery began to set in as early as November, and then in February the dreaded scurvy made its appearance and did not abate until April. Of the twenty-eight men Champlain had with him at the onset of the winter, between fifteen and twenty died. At least ten died from dysentery and five more from scurvy, including the surgeon.\textsuperscript{17}
With no one but some sick and starving Montagnais nearby, Champlain must also have wondered whether he had, indeed, chosen a suitable spot for settlement. On the one hand, the disappearance of the more-or-less permanent agricultural towns and villages of the Laurentian Iroquois was an advantage to the French. It meant that the local peoples likely did not have the power nor the interest to drive the French out. There is good evidence to suggest that the Laurentian Iroquois had balked at Cartier establishing a permanent settlement in their territory and had organized themselves to drive him out. Champlain, by contrast, did not encounter any resistance that threatened to destroy his diminutive colony.

But even while the sparseness of the Indian population near Quebec perhaps made initial settlement somewhat easier, it complicated trade arrangements. It was not clear that the transient bands that came down to Quebec to fish would be the robust trading partners the French colony needed to survive economically. The French had already established good relations with the Mi’kmaq in Acadia, and with the Montagnais, who lived chiefly in the region of Tadoussac and had proved to be at this early stage of French settlement, the chief connection to the fur trade. The success of the colony, however, would depend upon making connections to Indian trade networks farther west on the St. Lawrence. With the small settlement at Quebec in order, Champlain therefore set out to explore the country of the Iroquois, who were the implacable enemies of the Native Peoples north of the river. At the small island of St. Eloi, his party encountered a war party of Huron and Algonkian, who succeeded in enlisting Champlain and two of his men in their war against the Iroquois south of Lake Champlain.\textsuperscript{18}
Champlain and his men, along with their Montagnais, Huron, and Algonkian allies, traveled by canoe up what is today the Richelieu River and over Lake Champlain toward the territory of the Iroquois in the vicinity of Lake George. En route to his fateful meeting with the Iroquois, Champlain took note of the many beavers that made their home on Lake Champlain and in the streams flowing into it. He also noted that the entire region of the Richelieu and Lake Champlain was uninhabited, even though it was fine country, because of the incessant war between the Iroquois and the Indians north of the St. Lawrence. Although, Champlain does not explicitly say so, perhaps his idea was that if the French and their newfound allies could vanquish the Iroquois or at least convince them to come to terms, this uninhabited region could be repopulated with French.

On Lake Champlain, Champlain’s party of about sixty warriors encountered a much larger Iroquois war party headed north in their canoes. Each group landed on the lakeshore and prepared for battle. Each built a barricade and spent the night singing and dancing in preparation for the battle to come. The next day, the Iroquois sallied forth from their barricade, prompting the Huron and their allies to do likewise. At this moment, Champlain stepped forward with his arquebus and killed one of the three Iroquois chiefs. His two French companions then outflanked the Iroquois and in similar fashion killed the remaining two chiefs with their arquebuses. With their chiefs dead, the Iroquois, though a much larger party, suddenly fled, while the Huron and their allies took ten or twelve prisoners. Perhaps to commemorate the victory, Champlain took the liberty of naming the lake near which it was fought after himself.

French participation in the battle at Lake Champlain made the French fast friends with the Huron and their Algonkian allies. These Indian groups lived above the Great
Lakes and along the Ottawa River, west of Quebec. From the Indian point of view, trade, in the form of gift-giving, would be critical in maintaining this new relationship. Once Champlain had made his way back to Quebec, a number of Algonkian who had not participated in the battle gave Champlain a present of furs to show their gratitude for his support. Although the Montagnais, situated to the east of Quebec, had heretofore been the chief suppliers of furs, the Huron and Algonkian to the west would prove to be the key trading partners of the French, especially once the beaver, overhunted to furnish European demand, began to disappear from eastern regions. The Indians’ enlistment of Champlain in their ongoing war with the Iroquois also ensured that the locus of French settlement would be along the northern bank of the St. Lawrence, so that it would perforce follow geographic boundaries that Native Peoples had already established, boundaries that likely had been in place, more or less, from the time of Cartier’s visits, if not before.²¹

Taking commercial and military advantage of the connections Champlain had made with the Huron and the Northern Algonkian, though, would require extending the French network west along the St. Lawrence. But building such a network would be a work of time, chiefly because Champlain and his associates had difficulty attracting settlers. This meant that no permanent French settlement would be made at the key location of Montreal until the coming of the Jesuits in the 1640s. In the meantime, Champlain would manage to begin a small settlement between Quebec and Mount Royal at Trois-Rivières, a convenient meeting place for French and Indian fur traders. Récollet missionaries established a house at Trois-Rivières as early as 1615, but this had disappeared by 1628. In 1634, though, Champlain had his lieutenant build a fortified
post at the site in order to protect Huron and Algonkian fur traders from the Iroquois, and this time, new missionaries—the Jesuits—took up residence under the protection of the civil authorities.22

Montreal, where two rivers also converged, was for many years prior to French settlement a rendezvous for fur traders. It is likely for this reason that missionaries established a residence there in 1642. It was a convenient spot for meeting and proselytizing the Native Americans who came to Montreal from the regions both north and south of the St. Lawrence, and particularly from the vast interior region around the Great Lakes. The missionary settlement, though, soon gave way to commercial interests, and Montreal became for many years the gateway to the west, and the most important western node in the French fur-trading network. But the importance of the missionaries should not be overlooked. Champlain would establish the outposts of a commercial, military, and political network stretching from Paris to Trois-Rivières, and the Roman Catholic Church would use that network to extend European religious authority deep into North America—all the way to Montreal and beyond. In the case of the French, this religious network—which extended back to Paris and Rome, and around the world—and the secular commercial, political, and military network anchored at Paris would largely be mutually reinforcing.23

Building the more extensive French network along the St. Lawrence with nodes of settlement and trade at Montreal, Trois-Rivières, Quebec, Tadoussac, and in Acadia would be a work of several decades. At the end of 1609, there was only the meager habitation at Quebec. In September, Champlain himself left the colony in the hands of two able subordinates—Pierre Chauvin of Dieppe and Jean de Godet du Parc—and
returned to France to consult with De Monts about what should be done next. With Chauvin were just fifteen men, some veterans who had survived the winter and the onset of scurvy at Quebec and others, perhaps new recruits, who had come out with Pont-Gravé when he had returned with supplies and personnel in June 1609. As Champlain departed for France, he could not have known that this tenuous camp was the beginning of permanent French settlement in North America. But as it turned out, by the time he left and in large part because of his own efforts, the French had finally completed the first three stages of Vance’s model of colonization. Cartier, Champlain, and others had secured preliminary information about trading opportunities through exploratory voyages and had established French possession through positioning and mapping and by making frequent voyages to the area and establishing regular trade. They had also used nearly all of the other European ceremonies of possession, including naming, setting up markers on the land, drafting legal documents, and providing written and graphic descriptions. In the end, though, true possession from the French perspective, as established in the time of Francis I, could only be claimed through settlement. It was Champlain at Quebec who had begun, after many failed attempts, this first permanent settlement. Although Champlain’s colony would in time become the most important node on the French network, it remained to be seen what kind of network system the French meant to establish. Was it merely a temporary base for further exploration of the interior of the continent, was it a permanently established administrative center, was it some sort of trading center whose chief purpose was to extract resources at the least cost to metropolitan merchants as in a typical solar or dendritic system or was it meant to be something more? Did the French envision their new settlement as perhaps a nascent
gateway city that would open up the surrounding region not just to trade but also to settlement and the imposition of European agriculture with a view to establishing a whole network of new European towns in the landscape? Even at its first establishment, Quebec seems to have been all of these things in embryo. In September 1609, Champlain hurried back to France to see if de Monts and the king wanted to maintain this small settlement for another year, and if so, just what its purpose was.\

Champlain arrived at Honfleur on 10 October and hurried to meet de Monts, who was at Fontainebleau with the king. In this way, Champlain could report to both his immediate superior and the king all at once and discuss future plans. He seems to have placed special emphasis on the connection he had made with the Ochatequins or the Hurons and how they were willing to help the French explore the St. Lawrence River farther west in return for military assistance against the southern Iroquois. This suggests strongly that the chief interest of the king and de Monts was still to find an outlet to the Pacific and therefore to Asia. To do anything would, of course, require financing, to which the king, whose purse was under the watchful eye of Sully, would not contribute. De Monts, therefore, would have to seek help elsewhere, and he hurried off to meet with his business partners Sieur Lucas Le Gendre and Sieur Collier, who Champlain describes as “merchants of Rouen.” If the settlement at Quebec were to be continued, it would now be as an extension of merchant capital into the hinterlands of North America.

De Monts and his partners agreed to continue the settlement at least for another year for the purpose of continuing the exploration of the St. Lawrence. Pont-Gravé, in the meantime, would lead another trading expedition to Tadoussac to try to cover some of the costs. Le Gendre was in charge of organizing ships, crews, settlers, and provisions.
De Monts and Champlain subsequently went to Paris to try to persuade Henry to grant the former a new commission and a monopoly of the fur trade for another year. This time, though, Henry refused. De Monts, however, did not let this deter him. He could trade on an equal footing with others at Tadoussac, but with his outpost at Quebec and newfound relations with the Huron, he could exercise monopolistic control of the trade west of Quebec, or so he thought.26

After spending some six months in France, Champlain sailed back to the St. Lawrence in the early part of March 1610 without knowing whether the settlement he had founded at Quebec was to be any more than a base camp for the exploration of the interior. Over the next several years, he would shuttle back and forth between France and Quebec on a nearly yearly basis with the object of keeping the little colony on the St. Lawrence afloat. He arrived at Tadoussac toward the end of April and found Basque, Norman, and Breton ships in the harbor plying the fur trade. When he reached Quebec, he found the little settlement in good order. The winter had been mild, and there had been little illness.27

The summer campaign season was nigh when Champlain arrived, and the Montagnais, Huron, and Northern Algonkian soon enlisted his aid for another attack on the Iroquois. In return for his services, the Montagnais agreed to help Champlain explore the country, and the Huron and Algonkian agreed to take him west into their own country so he could see Lake Huron and the sources of the copper they used. Plans were fully in place by mid-June, and Champlain with four French arquebusiers joined the Montagnais, Huron, and Algonkian allies in an attack on a Mohawk fort at Little Sorel on the River of the Iroquois, now the Richelieu. With the help of the French, the allies once again
prevailed, though Champlain himself was wounded. Early in the fighting an Iroquois arrow pierced his neck. Champlain managed to pull it out and continued the fight. The Mohawks suffered some one hundred killed, warriors they could little afford to lose. By contrast, the allies’ casualties were relatively light. The engagement at Little Sorel also demonstrated how far French traders had already penetrated the country. As the battle reached its climax, the arquebusiers began to run out of ammunition. Just in the nick of time, French traders, who had been on the river and heard the fighting, arrived to join the fight. They also resupplied Champlain and his men with ammunition. Once the battle was over, even more French traders arrived to see what booty they could make off with from the Mohawk fort.28

The two campaigns against the Mohawk in which Champlain joined in 1609-10, had brought the eastern-most Iroquois significant losses. The Mohawk certainly realized that the French arquebusiers had given their enemies the advantage, and for the next fourteen years, they were not disposed to mount any serious challenge to the French and their allies. According to Fischer, Champlain hoped to use his advantage to conclude a permanent peace settlement with the Mohawk and bring them into the orbit of New France. But this would have been impossible without alienating his allies north of the St. Lawrence.29

Champlain spent the rest of the summer developing the little settlement at Quebec. He set his men to improving the fortifications, which might permit the French to withstand both Iroquois and European attack, if need be. Improved fortifications might also allow Champlain to control the trade west on the river should he be authorized to do so. French traders had been sailing down to Quebec since the latter part of the sixteenth
century, but the information Champlain and others had brought back about the region prompted traders to flock to the river in much greater numbers during the sixteen-teens, and many more made the trip as far as Quebec. For the colony to thrive economically, this trade would have to be regulated and controlled. As always, because his goal was a self-sufficient agriculturally based settlement, Champlain also turned his attention to the gardens. These he enlarged considerably. The French planted kitchen gardens but also wheat, rye, barley, and Indian corn. It may well be that his insistence on gardening allowed the little settlement to survive and to avoid the deadly scurvy that had so afflicted previous colonies.30

While Champlain and his men were engaged in these pursuits, the news arrived that Henry IV had been assassinated in Paris for reasons that remain obscure to historians. On 14 May, the assassin, who may have represented a Catholic conspiracy or who may simply have been insane, jumped into the king’s carriage soon after it had left the Louvre and stabbed Henry to death. For Champlain, the king’s death was a heavy blow. Although Henry had not contributed much financially to the settlement of New France, he had been in other ways an enthusiastic supporter—largely for imperialistic reasons. He had also taken a personal interest in Champlain’s career. Still, it was not at all clear precisely what the king’s death meant for Champlain nor for the future of the little colony on the St. Lawrence. To find out, Champlain left sixteen men at Quebec under the command of the redoubtable Jean de Godet du Parc and hurried back to France, reaching Honfleur on 27 September.31

Champlain discovered that the troubling rumors about the king’s murder were all too true. The new king was Henry’s nine-year-old son Louis XIII. At such a tender age,
he could hardly make decisions on his own about whether or not to offer support to the fledging colony in New France. The real power in the government lay with Henry IV’s widow, Marie de Medici, the queen regent. Unfortunately for Champlain and his ambition to build an agriculturally based empire along the St. Lawrence, she had little or no interest in America. But there was worse news still. De Monts, who had been New France’s chief advocate at court now found himself in disfavor. The queen regent was not disposed to keep Protestant courtiers in her service and dismissed him.32

It was plain to Champlain that his only hope was to build a new support network in France. He consulted with the members of the court on whom could rely to maintain some support for his efforts in America. These included his old commander Charles de Cossé, maréchal de Brissac; Pierre Jeannin, the president of the parlement of Burgundy; and Nicolas Brûlart, marquis de Sillery, who served as Lord Chancellor. Champlain also shored up his own personal financial position through an arranged marriage with Hélène Boullé, the twelve-year-old daughter of Nicolas Boullé, a financial officer of the king’s court. The arrangement brought Champlain a dowry of 6,000 livres—money he would surely need if he were to continue his activities in North America. The bride was to continue to live with her parents until she was fourteen, at which time the marriage could be consummated.33

Although he had taken some important steps to build a support system in the metropole, Champlain would require more time to build a firm political and financial coalition. With de Monts all but out of the picture, he now found himself as the chief architect of New France both in North America and in France. This meant that in the late winter of 1611, he would have to return to Quebec with supplies and fresh men. He
sought and received financial and organizational support from the Rouen merchants Thomas and Lucas Le Gendre, de Monts’ old associates, and was able to sail from Honfleur on 1 March. After an arduous crossing in freezing weather, the ship reached Tadoussac on 13 May, where he found the Montagnais virtually starving. He supplied them as best he could and then pushed on upriver in a barque through the still snow-covered landscape. Champlain must have been worried about whether the settlement had survived the severe winter, but when he arrived he found all in good order—Jean Godet du Parc and all sixteen colonists were alive and in good health.  

Champlain spent the late spring and summer exploring west on the St. Lawrence and reaffirming his alliances with Huron and Western Algonkian. The previous year, he had told Étienne Brûlé, a young man he had left with the Indians who lived west and north of Montreal, to learn their languages and gain intelligence on what lay up the Ottawa River and west toward the homeland of the Huron. Champlain said he would return to meet Brûlé at Lachine Rapids on 20 May, but because of circumstances he was eight days late and found no one at the rendezvous. When Champlain reached the area where the settlement of Montreal would eventually stand, he decided to wait and used the time to examine and map the land carefully. He chose a spot, which he named “Place Royale,” that seemed a suitable place “to establish oneself.” Here, where the Indians had formerly tilled the land, he found meadows that might easily be brought back into cultivation and others that could be used as cattle pasture. There was an abundance of timber, all manner of wild berries and nuts, and plentiful game. He had his men clear this area of trees and level the ground in preparation for building. Perhaps Champlain thought the site would be a good place to build a fortified habitation similar to that at
Quebec. This area was at the intersection of the trade route where the Ottawa River meets the St. Lawrence, and Champlain judged it to be both habitable and defensible. “Water can be made to circle the place very easily,” he wrote, “and a little island formed of it.”

A short distance away, he found another island “where a good strong dwelling place might be built.” In its vicinity, the French found deposits of “good rich potter’s clay suitable for brickmaking and building.” Champlain had his men build a wall of this clay some four feet thick, four feet high, and about ten yards long to see how it would hold up during the winter flood season. He also had two gardens planted to determine the quality of the soil and its suitability for European-style agriculture. Champlain noted that all the seeds “came up quickly and in perfect condition.”

In the midst of the river, Champlain found another, larger island, some three-quarters of a league in circumference. This he named Ste. Hélène, perhaps after his wife. Here, he thought, “a good and strong town” might be built. It seems that Champlain was imagining this landscape transformed in stages. First, perhaps a fortified dwelling place at Place Royale (later called Point Callières), then cultivated fields and pastures with European cattle and perhaps a further dwelling place on the small island where he erected the wall, and finally, in the more distant future, a whole town on Ste. Hélène Island. It would be, though, more than twenty years before the first permanent settlement would be built at Montreal. Still, Champlain had made some concrete steps toward that eventuality. He had inscribed the landscape as French—clearing land for European-style agriculture, planting gardens, and erecting his clay wall. He also made a detailed map of the area, which he would soon publish in France. On this map the name Montreal—which Cartier had given the place—would find its first published appearance. After
Quebec, this would become the most important node on the French North-American network.

On 13 June, Étienne Brûlé finally arrived at the rapids with a party of two hundred Huron. At their first meeting, the Huron presented Champlain with a gift of a hundred beaver skins. In return, he gave them “other sorts of merchandise.” Later, the Indians gave him a further fifty beaver skins, the gift of other chiefs who, for fear of some potential treachery, did not come to the meetings. Champlain’s chief goal seems to have been to facilitate his explorations, and he inquired about the territories to the north and west. The Huron, relying on their mental maps, made drawings of “all the places they had visited.” Champlain said he would ask Louis XIII for forty or fifty men to mount an expedition to these places. He also told the Huron that if he found “good and fertile” lands, he would “establish several settlements there whereby we [the French] should have communication with one another, and live happily in the future in fear of God, whom we should make known to them.” “They were much pleased with this proposal,” Champlain later wrote, “and urged me to see to it, saying that they would do their utmost to bring it about, and that, as regards provisions, we should no more lack these than would they themselves, assuring me anew that they would show me what I desired to see.”

In this series of meetings, the Huron declared Champlain their “particular friend,” but expressed concern about the number of French traders who were now making their way up the river, noting that “it was only love of gain and avarice which brought these people thither, and that when the Indians should need their help they would give none; and would not do as I had done, who used to offer to go with my companions into their country and to help them, of which I had given them proofs in the past.” The Huron
told Champlain that while they were under obligations to him for past services and for
treating Savignon, a Huron whom Champlain had brought to France, as a brother, they
feared that the French traders “would do them harm.” Champlain noted that he tried to
reassure them that all of the French “served one king,” but he also advised them that the
traders’ business was “a private affair,” over which he, Champlain, had no control.
Nevertheless, at a subsequent night meeting at their encampment, the Huron told
Champlain that “they were displeased at seeing so many Frenchmen, who were not very
friendly toward one another” and complained that the French had beaten some of their
people. According to Champlain, the Huron said “that should I return, I was to bring as
many people as I liked, provided they were under the leadership of one chief.”

Champlain’s account of these meetings, which were to be published in France, are
clearly self-serving and may well have been crafted to convince the crown to once again
grant a trade monopoly and broad governing authority to Champlain and his associates.
Still, since they are the only direct, contemporary accounts we have the early meetings
between Champlain and the Huron, they cannot be dismissed altogether.

Champlain also met with the western Algonkian, who began arriving en masse on
12 July, after the departure of the Huron. One Algonkian contingent was a war party of
some three hundred who stopped on their way south to confer with Champlain. They
apologized for not bringing more beaver skins, but explained that as a war party rather
than a trading party, they were not able to transport so many. Nevertheless, the
Algonkians gave Champlain some forty beaver skins as a token of friendship in return for
“similar presents of equal value.” A party that arrived a few days later gave Champlain
thirty more beaver pelts.
As usual, Champlain was interested in inducing the Algonkians to guide him in explorations to the north and west of the river. The Algonkians agreed to bring one of Champlain’s companions with them to “show him something that would please” Champlain. The latter, in compliance, turned over to them Nicolas de Vignau, “a young boy,” to whom he gave particular instructions as to the things he should observe. Champlain had also given a boy to the Huron. It does not seem, though, that the Algonkian agreed to conduct a formal exploratory party through their territories.41

Champlain mentioned to the Algonkians that he had decided to plant a settlement at the Lachine Rapids near Montreal. He had taken note that in spite of the fertility of the land, no Native Peoples lived there because it had become a virtual no man’s land in the war between the Huron and Algonkian allies to the north of the St. Lawrence and the Iroquois to the south. According to Champlain, the Algonkians and Hurons were well pleased that the French had decided to make a settlement at that location. It would, after all, provide protection for their trade route to Quebec and would serve them as a more convenient trading post as well.42

Once the Algonkian left, Champlain headed back downriver to Quebec where he “induced nearly everyone to remain” for another winter. He also had some oak planks put aboard ship, which he would have “tested in France both for wainscoting and for window-frames.” Champlain then sailed downriver to Tadoussac where he told Pont-Gravé that he had determined to return to France. Apparently, Champlain thought that he had better organize support in the metropole for his settlement and for the explorations he meant to undertake. One gets the sense that in his meetings with the Huron and the Algonkian, he had hoped, in lieu of the monopoly de Monts Co. had lost, to gain
something like most-favored trading partner to the Native Peoples so that the profits from
the trade might support a more robust settlement. But given the number of traders on the
river who made their way now as far as Montreal, perhaps this initial idea now seemed
unworkable. Champlain must have sensed that in order to support the colony
economically, he would have to organize some kind of monopoly, and that in order to
maintain good relations with the Native Peoples along the river, he would need some
authority by which he could control the French traders who came there. Perhaps with this
in mind, he boarded a Rochelais ship at Tadoussac on 11 August. On the 10th of the next
month, he was in La Rochelle.43

Having arrived on the west coast of France, Champlain immediately went to see
de Monts at Pons to explain what had transpired in Canada. After hearing that the Huron
and Algonkian would aid Champlain in his western explorations in exchange for his
assistance in their wars, de Monts decided that he would go to court “to get the matter
settled.” Likely, de Monts was seeking financial support to mount a more substantial
expedition. Then, too, to intervene in Native-American wars in all probability required
royal authorization. Champlain resolved to join de Monts at court, but was severely
injured en route when a horse fell on him. He was only able to join de Monts later at
Fontainebleau.44

De Monts had bad news. His business partners, since they had no hope that the
crown would grant them another monopoly of the fur trade, had pulled out. De Monts
had paid them off so that they could not encumber the settlement at Quebec, but he had
much less wherewithal to aid the colony. Champlain says De Monts, nevertheless, “sent
a few men to protect the colony” and still maintained some hope that he could persuade
the king to grant him the monopoly. In the midst of this, notes Champlain, “unexpected and important business forced him to abandon it, and to me he left the task of finding ways and means.” The administration of the settlement at Quebec—both in America and in the metropole—was now squarely on Champlain’s shoulders. De Monts would continue to aid him financially when he could, but he could no longer provide any kind of leadership. It seems he had suffered some financial reverses and had lost his influence at court. While Champlain set about reorganizing financial and political support for the colony, de Monts conveyed ownership of the habitation at Quebec to an association of Rochelais merchants, who used the building, at least in part, to store their furs and other merchandise.45

In 1612, ships arrived from the Saint-Lawrence with the news that some two hundred of the western Indians had come to the Lachine Rapids that spring expecting to find Champlain, who had promised to assist them in their war with the Iroquois. They were apparently displeased that he had not kept his promise, but Champlain’s associates apologized and assured them that he would come to their aid in the following year. The Indians seemed to accept this explanation, but the issue became complicated after several French traders arrived at the rapids who, for their own advantage, told the Indians that Champlain had died. “Thus does jealousy steal into bad natures in opposition to worthy objects,” Champlain opined.46 The episode led him to complain, in a passage that reveals something of his own motivations, that these French traders and their like only want people to run a thousand risks in discovering nations and countries in order that they may keep the profits and the others the hardships. It is unreasonable when one has caught the sheep for another to have the fleece. Had they been willing to share our explorations, use their resources, and risk their
persons, they would have shown that they possessed honour and a love of renown; but, on the contrary, they clearly show that they are driven by pure malice to seek to enjoy equally with us the fruits of our labors.47

Champlain was also bold enough to complain of the king’s neglect, noting that the settlement at Quebec and the exploration west had been undertaken without the king’s financial support, so it was the least his majesty could do to restore the monopoly to those who had undertaken these risks. For the moment, however, the king remained unpersuaded, and Champlain was compelled to look elsewhere for support. He realized, too, that even if he could persuade the king to grant him a monopoly, there was little prospect the he, as a commoner, could defend it. A new monopoly would engender howls of protest from the merchants in the seaports of Rouen, St.-Malo, La Rochelle, and elsewhere—protests that carried weight even with Henry IV. It was less likely that Louis and his mother would have any interest upholding such a patent in the teeth of such a political whirlwind. As Champlain explained it, “feeling certain that those who like to fish in troubled waters would find such regulations [the monopoly] irksome, and would seek ways of thwarting them, it seemed to me advisable to place myself under the protection of some great man whose authority might be useful against their envy.”48

He sought out a nobleman, a prince of the blood, whose near relation to the king would make it risky for anyone to openly assail him. Champlain first approached Charles de Bourbon, the comte de Soissons, who was also the governor of Normandy and Dauphiné. He explained to Soissons that for want of the monopoly and high-placed support, all that had been accomplished in Canada was now threatened “with complete ruin.” Champlain also showed the comte a map he had made of the vast domain France stood to lose. Soissons indicated his interest and promised, “subject to the king’s
pleasure, to take the enterprise under his patronage.” Champlain immediately petitioned Louis, who granted Soissons the governorship of Canada and issued him a monopoly of the fur trade. Soissons’s first act was to appoint Champlain his lieutenant, and as such he was given considerable powers. He could construct forts, make treaties with the Native Peoples or declare war against them as he saw fit, appoint military and judicial officers, enforce order, uphold laws and regulations, and continue to explore the interior of the country with an eye to finding the elusive route to China. Affairs in the metropole seemed well in hand, but then, even before Champlain could depart for Quebec, Soissons took sick and died.49

He then turned to yet another prince of the blood, Henri de Bourbon, the comte de Condé, who agreed to take responsibility for the colony so long as he was given the title “viceroy.” Marie de Medici assented to this on behalf of the king and on 13 November 1612 conferred on him the title of viceroy as well as the monopoly. For his part Condé, who had no intention of going to America, appointed Champlain his lieutenant with broad powers to govern the colony and regulate trade. The grant of the monopoly elicited, as expected, protests from the merchants in the seaports and from the parlement of Rouen. The merchants of St. Malo went so far as to bring suit against the monopoly. The king, however, interceded to uphold Condé’s rights and the suit and protests were soon dropped. It is also likely that Condé and Champlain reassured the merchants that everyone would be permitted to join a trade association to be created under the king’s commission.50

But creating such an association would unfortunately have to wait. Champlain felt compelled to return to New France to be sure his settlement and the agreements he
had made with the Native Peoples remained intact. He sailed in Pont-Gravé’s ship from Honfleur on 6 March 1613 and arrived at La Pointe aux Vaches near Tadoussac on 29 April. Here a number of his old friends, the Montagnais, came out to meet the ship in their canoes. They were starving and called out for bread. At Tadoussac, Champlain met more Montagnais, who were so famished that they scraped off the tallow with which the hull of the ship was greased and ate it.\textsuperscript{51}

Two ships from St. Malo soon arrived at Tadoussac to trade, and Champlain went aboard to apprise their masters of the king’s commission. The shipmasters agreed to abide by the king’s commands, and Champlain, in a mark of inscription meant chiefly to warn fellow Frenchman and other Europeans, publicly posted the king’s arms and commissions in the harbor.\textsuperscript{52}

The state of the Montagnais forced Champlain to conclude that the winter had not been severe and that the hunting season had been less than successful because the Montagnais had not been able to track game sufficiently in the snow. By 2 May he was ready to proceed to Quebec to inspect the settlement there. He arrived on the seventh to find everyone well, “having been in no wise indisposed.” The colonists noted that “the winter had not been severe and that the river had not frozen.” This no doubt confirmed Champlain’s original opinion that the climate at Quebec was well-suited for European habitation and proved to him the wisdom of establishing the settlement so far upriver.\textsuperscript{53}

After just six days at Quebec, Champlain was off to Montreal. He arrived on 21 May to find a French pinnace conducting trade. The traders told Champlain that a small Algonkian war party had passed through just before his arrival. The Algonkians had just returned from a raid against the Iroquois and had two prisoners in hand. The traders told
the Algonkian that Champlain was on his way and wished to aid them in their wars and
visit their country so that he might “enter into friendly relations with all of their friends.”
The Algonkian were said to be “very joyful” at this news, but elected not to wait for
Champlain. They were in a hurry to return home with news of their victory and to
celebrate it by putting the prisoners to death during a victory feast. But they left their
shields and some bows as a pledge to return.\textsuperscript{54}

Three days later, a small Algonkian trading party appeared with a few furs. They
complained to Champlain of the ill treatment they had received at the hands of French
traders the summer before. On this account, most of the Algonkian had decided not to
come to the rapids to trade. This was a disappointment both to Champlain and to the
merchants, who had come to trade now under the monopoly of the prince de Condé and
who, says Champlain, “had made large purchases of goods in hope that the Indians would
come down as usual.” The Algonkians also said that French traders had told them
Champlain would not return, which prompted some twelve-hundred warriors to go on the
war-path against the Iroquois without waiting for French help.\textsuperscript{55}

Resolving to make the best of it, Champlain decided to spend his time exploring
and mapping. He assured the Algonkian that they would receive better treatment now
and more favorable trade goods and promised again to help them against the Iroquois.
He then asked if they would provide him with three canoes and three guides so that he
could come to their country and encourage their people to come to the rapids to trade.
Champlain’s real desire, of course, was to explore and map the Algonkian homeland
north along the Ottawa. The Algonkian were resistant to this idea, likely for two reasons.
Although Vignau had spent the winter of 1611-12 with them, for security reasons they
perhaps did not wish the French to gain too firm a knowledge of their territory and living arrangements. The fact that Champlain had failed to keep his promise up to this point to join them in their war may have made them suspicious of the value of his friendship.56 Then, too, the Algonkian likely wished to protect their own trade network. They obtained their furs from Indian bands further up the Ottawa and did not wish the French to make direct contact with these “friends.”

After a difficult negotiation, in which Champlain had to give them “presents,” the Algonkians reluctantly agreed to give him two canoes and one guide. This meant that Champlain could only bring four men on his expedition, insufficient for the security of a party traveling through unknown parts. Vignau, his liaison to the Algonkian, had come to Paris in the latter part of 1612 and reported that he had seen “the northern sea,” now known as Hudson’s Bay, and that in seventeen days one could make the trip from the Lachine Rapids to Hudson’s Bay via the Ottawa. Vignau said he had even seen wreckage of an English ship from which eighty men had escaped to land. He claimed the English had attempted to seize corn and other supplies from the local Indians, who responded by killing and scalping them all, except for one boy who was still in their custody. Vignau’s story prompted Champlain to make a report on these findings to high officials at court, including Sillery, de Brissac, and Jeannin, and to take on the risky venture of exploring up the Ottawa with such a small party. It was on this trip that Champlain became aware the Vignau had seen none of these things.57

As Champlain and his companions traveled up the Ottawa, they met a party of Algonkians from Allumette Island who were headed south to trade. The Algonkians were surprised to see Champlain, especially with such a small party, and gave him a
second guide to help him find Allumette Island, which forms one bank of the upper Ottawa. In order the pass the Rideau Falls, as they have come to be called, Champlain’s party had to leave the Ottawa and detour north through a series of lakes to the west of the river. While so engaged, Champlain’s party reached an Indian camp, where an Algonkian chief, Nibachis, gave the French two canoes, and presumably some men, for the trip to the village of Tessoüat, which was located in Lake Allumette, just off Allumette Island.58

Tessoüat was surprised to see Champlain so far north, but nevertheless gave him a warm welcome. But once Champlain told the Algonkian leader of his plans to follow the river north to the northern sea (Hudson’s Bay), Tessoüat and his people became alarmed. They claimed that Champlain had been misled, and that his informant Vignau was a bald-faced liar who had never left their village. Champlain had warned the young man even before they had left France that if he had lied before the court about what he had seen, he would pay for it on the gallows. Champlain was, therefore, considerably irritated to find that Vignau’s stories did not comport with reality.59

For their part, the Algonkians threatened to put Vignau to death so that he could tell no more falsehoods. They alleged that Vignau had lied in order to lead Champlain to his death. At this juncture, Champlain protected Vignau. Scholars have debated whether it was Vignau or the Algonkians who were telling the truth. It was clear that the Algonkians did not want Champlain to pass further upriver and meet the Native Peoples with whom they traded, since this might compromise their potentially lucrative position as middlemen. Champlain hoped to go to the country of the Nipissing, in order “to invite them also to go on the war path” against the Iroquois. For this purpose, he asked the
Algonkians to give him four canoes and eight men. The Algonkians were not so willing to assist Champlain in this undertaking. Tessoüat reminded Champlain that though they remained on good terms, the Algonkians had lost some confidence in him because he had failed to keep his promise and join them the previous year in their campaign against the Iroquois. The chief noted that some two thousand warriors had come to the rapids, but Champlain had not appeared. The French who were there, said Tessoüat, refused to help them and “treated them badly, so that they resolved among themselves not to come to the Rapids any more.”

Since some 1200 of their warriors were even then on the “war path,” the Algonkians advised Champlain to postpone his exploration up the Ottawa until the next year when they would be better able to assist him. They then agreed to give him the four canoes, but strongly urged him not to undertake the journey to the Nipissing, who, they claimed, “were sorcerers and had killed many of Tessoüat’s people by magic and poisoning, and consequently were not considered friendly.” Tessoüat also argued that the Nipissing lacked courage and would therefore be of little use in the war. All of these statements were meant to dissuade Champlain from continuing his exploration. And none of them were true. Modern scholarship has shown that, in fact, the Algonkians on the Ottawa and the Nipissing enjoyed friendly relations. Champlain soon learned this when he got news that the Algonkians were preparing to secretly send a canoe to the Nipissing to warn them that the French might be coming. At this juncture, Champlain saw an opportunity to exploit the Algonkian belief in the prescience of dreams. He told them he had dreamed that they “were going to send a canoe to the Nebicerini [Nipissing] without letting [him] know. . .” Naturally, the Algonkians denied this and purported to
be astonished that Champlain would put more confidence in a liar like Vignau than in “so many honest chiefs.”

The whole incident demonstrates that Champlain’s attempt to build a network of alliances with the Ottawa Algonkians for trade and security was frayed at best. In these meetings nobody was telling the truth. Vignau, while still at Tessoüat’s camp and again before French and Native-American witnesses at the Lachine Rapids, admitted that he had lied and that he had not ventured farther than Tessoüat’s camp. As a young and somewhat inexperienced man, he likely did so so that Champlain would think he had carried out his assignment and also, as he said himself, so that he could be brought back to Canada (Quebec). Apparently, he did not care much for living among the Algonkians. Champlain, prompted by the Algonkians, held to a more sinister explanation—that Vignau’s lies—which would have taken the party of exploration on a more difficult route— were meant to lead Champlain to his death. This, though, seems hard to swallow in that following such a route would also have put Vignau himself in danger. But, of course, Vignau was not the only one who lied. The Algonkians also told untruths in order to prevent Champlain from venturing farther upriver, and Champlain lied about the dream in order to catch the Algonkian in their own lies and to further his own ambition of visiting the Nipissing. In this context Vignau’s lies might seem the most innocent.

While at Tessoüat’s village, Champlain took note of how poor the soil was. It prevented Tessoüat’s people from growing very much by way of crops. Champlain asked the Algonkians why they didn’t move to the Lachine Rapids, where there was an abundance of good land that had already been cleared but was now abandoned. The
Indians explained that they were forced to live where they did for security reasons. The “roughness of the region” and likely its remoteness from the Iroquois “served as a bulwark against their enemies.” The Algonkians assured Champlain that if the French could provide security at the rapids in the form of a French settlement there, they would move there.63 This passage was no doubt crafted for an audience in the French metropole, meant to convince Condé, the court, and the merchants in the seaports that it was worthwhile providing financial support for a new settlement in the vicinity of Montreal. Still, it is not likely that Champlain made up the episode out of whole cloth. The Ottawa Algonkians certainly could derive advantages from a French settlement at the rapids in terms of trade, security, and better overall living conditions. The difficulties that might arise for the Native Peoples from a French establishment in their midst were not so readily apparent in 1613. In this exchange between Champlain and the Algonkians, both sides had begun to imagine the creation of a mixed French-Native American node that would link their two networks, and Tessoüat and his people seem to have understood that it was to their advantage to have that node further south along the Ottawa where that river intersects with the St. Lawrence rather than in the north where the French might have easier access to the Nipissing and other tribes to the north and west. This explains why, when Champlain told them that “this year we should prepare wood and stone in order next year to build a fort and plow the land,” the Algonkian “gave a great shout in sign of approval.”64 Champlain, though, would find that establishing a permanent French presence near Montreal was not so easily accomplished. It would be more than two decades before the French planted a permanent settlement there.
Ultimately, Tessoüat and his people, having been unsuccessful in dissuading Champlain from continuing into the Nipissing country, simply reneged on their promise and refused to give him the canoes and men he needed. On 10 June, therefore, he left for the Lachine Rapids in company with almost forty canoes of Algonkian who were going to the rapids to trade. On the way, nine large canoes with forty men from the Petite Nation of the Algonkian joined them. When Champlain arrived at the rapids on 17 June, his subordinate sieur de l’Ange came out in a canoe to give him advance word that a sieur de Maisonneuve from St. Malo with a passport from Condé had come to the rapids to trade. In an attempt to control the joint French-Native American trading network that now intersected at Lachine Rapids, Champlain called an immediate meeting of all of the Indians to warn them not to trade any goods until he gave them permission. He promised that he would supply provisions so they would not have to trade simply for these. The Algonkians agreed, pledging their friendship to Champlain. Champlain then set off to meet Maisonneuve and examine his passport. Seeing that the papers were in order, he then announced to the Algonkian that they were free to trade both with Maisonneuve’s party as well as his own.65

At the rapids, Champlain also had Vignau explain himself before an assembly of French and Indians. Vignau admitted that he had misled Champlain and asked for a pardon. He said further that if Champlain would leave him in the country, he would make good on his previous promises and visit the northern sea. Champlain, “on account of certain considerations,” agreed to the pardon and “left him in God’s keeping,” in as much as none of the Algonkian would take him in. In this way, Vignau vanished from the pages of history.66
For Champlain it was time to return to France. He had explored some 120 miles northwest on the Ottawa River, bringing this region within French purview. In the course of his trip, he had also seen the mouth of the Petite Nation River, which led to the territory of the Algonkian nation for which it was named. Moreover, he had passed near the Gatineau and seen the mouth of the Rideau. To claim the entire region for the French king, he had planted crosses—one of red cedar with the king’s arms on an island perhaps near Braeside, another of white cedar near Tessoïat’s village, and perhaps others as well. He asked the Algonkians to preserve these French inscriptions on the landscape, which they promised to do. He had also done his best to shore up his alliances with the Algonkians, which Champlain’s own inability to keep his promises and Vignau’s dissimulation had strained. With some difficulty, he had convinced the Algonkians to take two new French boys, who were to maintain friendship with the Indians and learn their language and customs.67

Champlain left the rapids on 27 June, hurried downriver, likely stopped at Quebec, and reached Tadoussac on 6 July. Here he spent a little more than a month, preparing for the voyage and awaiting favorable weather. He sailed from Tadoussac on 8 August on one of Maisonneuve’s three ships and reached St. Malo on the 26th.68 On the trip, Champlain must have contemplated what must be done to strengthen his colony and New France as a whole. He had seen the necessity of planting a new settlement at Montreal, which was the new nexus of the fur trade. If he were able to create a node there—where the French trade network met that of the Huron and Western Algonkian—he could more or less control the fur trade for the good of the colony. He might also have thought about creating another French settlement at Trois-Rivières, which he had
surveyed on an earlier trip and found conducive to settlement. Then, too, even the settlement at Quebec needed bolstering. One task, then, was to organize support in the metropole for a more robust colonization, one based on settled agriculture of the European style. Another important task, which his dealings with Maisonneuve must have brought home, was to better enforce a monopoly of the fur trade so that it would provide some financial support for the colony. A new trading company under Condé’s patent might help to solve all of these problems.

Once Champlain reached France, he set about creating just such a company. He first met with the merchants of St. Malo, to whom he explained “how easy it was to form a good company for the future.” He then appealed to the merchants of Rouen and La Rochelle and made them see that some regulation of the trade was needed if anyone was to make a profit, a conclusion to which the Dutch, who were perhaps more experienced in organizing overseas business, would also come. The merchants of all three towns decided to form a new company—the Compagnie de Canada. For this purpose, the merchants of Rouen and St. Malo met before Condé on 15 November and signed an agreement of association. Condé granted the new company an eleven-year monopoly of the trade to the St. Lawrence. The region of the monopoly included both banks of the great river west of the Matane River, which empties into the St. Lawrence from the Gaspé Peninsula. This meant that the grant covered the key point of Tadoussac as well as Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal. Although the merchants from La Rochelle did not attend the organizational meeting, those of Rouen and St. Malo reserved a one-third share for them. The merchants agreed to provide some pay for Champlain as lieutenant. But the contract made only minimal requirements for settlement. Although Champlain hoped
to persuade the merchants to provide for thirty men to winter over at Quebec, the original agreement provided for only nine or ten. Champlain was also to have the use of four men from each company ship that came to New France to trade. He could employ these in any way he saw fit—to fight the Iroquois, explore, or aid in the development of Quebec or other settlements.69

No sooner had this agreement been hammered out than trouble arose. The merchants from La Rochelle did not show up in the spring of 1614 to sign the final contract. Instead, they sought and received a passport from Condé to send their own ship to trade separately on the St. Lawrence. This eventuality demonstrated that Condé, at least from Champlain’s perspective, could not be relied upon. He seemed to have little interest in developing New France beyond holding the title of viceroy and making something out of the deal. In return for granting the monopoly, he was to receive each year a horse worth three thousand livres. It is unlikely that he decided to break the monopoly without also receiving something in return.70

Whatever the difficulties, Champlain had created a governmental and financial structure for the support of New France that would last for the next twenty-one years. Governing authority flowed from the king to his viceroy, who never left France, to the viceroy’s lieutenant—Champlain—who was given full authority to govern New France from the Matane River west. In conjunction with the governing authority, the trade of the St. Lawrence would be in the hands of a private trading company, which, at least theoretically, in return for its monopoly, would agree to pay Champlain’s salary, provide supplies to the colony, and presumably finance settlement.71
In 1613, Champlain also took the trouble to publicize his efforts in New France. In that year, he published the books *Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain* (book 2), which covered the founding of Quebec and his subsequent activities up to 1612, together with *Quatrie voyage*, which detailed his explorations of the Ottawa in 1613. He also published three new maps. In effect, Champlain had very efficiently surveyed the vast St. Lawrence Region, identified places—Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal—where nodes needed to be developed for trade, settlement, and security, and helped to construct a governmental and financial structure that could develop the network he envisioned—albeit slowly. In many ways, it was an auspicious beginning for the French colonial enterprise.72

But while Champlain had been given jurisdiction over the St. Lawrence Region from the Matane west, there was one significant area that lay outside of his authority—Acadia. It was clear that for their network along the St. Lawrence to succeed over time, the French would have to establish and maintain a node in Acadia to protect ingress and egress to and from the great river. As has been seen, with the collapse of his first monopoly, de Monts, in February 1608, had given Poutrincourt the former settlement of Port Royal. Poutrincourt attempted to resettle Port Royal that same year and had a ship ready to go when his financial backers pulled out. The shipowner refused to allow the ship to sail and seized the cargo in lieu of payments owed. This fiasco left Poutrincourt in considerable debt so that he did not have the financial wherewithal to mount another expedition for two years.73

At the end of February 1610 Poutrincourt sailed from Dieppe in the *Grâce-de-Dieu* along with his son Charles de Biencourt and a number of settlers and workman. He
also brought with him a Catholic priest, Jessé Fleché, who was to begin the conversion of the local Mi’kmaqs. The Grâce-de-Dieu took some three months to reach the Acadian coast, but Poutrincourt must have been encouraged to find that the Mi’kmaqs had preserved the old habitation and the mill to the extent that they were able. While the workmen and settlers set about making repairs and bringing the land into cultivation, Fleché began the work of baptizing the Native Peoples. He began with the aged Mi’kmaq chief Membertou and twenty members of his family.  

The baptisms of Membertou and his family were the first the French had carried out, in spite of promises dating back to Cartier’s time to Christianize the Native Peoples. Very likely Fleché performed them in order to meet the terms of Poutrincourt’s agreement with Henry IV. Although the documents have not survived, it seems that Henry IV had confirmed Poutrincourt’s right to Port Royal on the condition that he begin the process of Christianization. Henry, though, undoubtedly influenced by his close adviser Father Coton, had envisioned Jesuit missionaries carrying out this work. He had agreed to pay to maintain two—Pierre Biard and Enemond Massé—in Acadia. Although Poutrincourt was a devout Catholic, it seems that he harbored some suspicions against the Jesuits and did not want to brook their interference with his colony. This is why he ignored the king’s provision and brought along a secular priest to perform the baptisms. As Trudel has argued, “There is no doubt that the publicity value of the ceremony had been uppermost in Poutrincourt’s mind.” Poutrincourt undoubtedly thought that once news of the conversions reached France, devout Catholics of high rank would come to the aid of the colony. “Perhaps, too,” says Trudel, “the performance of this mass baptism
by a secular priest was designed to demonstrate that the Jesuits were not indispensable to New France.”

In July, Poutrincourt sent his son back to France with the *Grâce-de-Dieu* to bring the news of the baptisms to court and to organize new financing and resupply. Henry IV was now in his grave, so Biencourt applied to the queen regent for a monopoly of trade and financial support. Marie de Medici seemed willing to support the Port Royal colony so long as Poutrincourt admitted the Jesuit mission that Henry IV had originally agreed to finance to the tune of 2,000 livres. She was willing to provide 1,500 livres for the Jesuits with further monies to be raised through subscription. The Jesuits also had the promise of ongoing support from Madame de Guercheville, one of the queen regent’s ladies-in-waiting. Since resupply of the colony was of dire necessity, Biencourt had no alternative but to accept the Jesuit mission. All other schemes to finance a new expedition had fallen through. In the end, he had cobbled together financing from an unlikely mix of the Jesuits and their supporters and Protestant merchants in Dieppe. Since Madame de Guercheville had provided some 4,000 livres, by far the most of any investor, she insisted that the Jesuits be given a share of the profits of the trading voyage.

After long delays, Biencourt set sail on 26 January 1611, carrying with him the two Jesuits and the apothecary Louis Hébert, who had been to Acadia before. The *Grâce-de-Dieu* took an incredible four months to reach Port Royal, only to find that the settlement had suffered through a difficult winter. The new supply, it was soon clear, would hardly be adequate for the coming year. Moreover, Biencourt had arrived late in the trading season so that traders from La Rochelle and St. Malo had already bartered for
all of the available furs on the Acadian coast. This meant that both the investors in the voyage and the colony would suffer a financial loss for the year.\textsuperscript{77}

To save his colony, Poutrincourt hurried back to France to seek additional financing and new supplies. Only Madame de Guercheville was willing to commit to any substantial new investment. This time she demanded not only a share of the profits from the fur trade but also from all of the lands that Poutrincourt had received in his grant from de Monts and the king. Poutrincourt claimed that his grant included not only Port Royal but all of Acadia and refused de Guercheville any part of the profits from his lands. Having grown suspicious when Poutrincourt could not produce any papers, she sought the advice of de Monts, who, after informing her that Poutrincourt held only the right to Port Royal, agreed to cede to her all of the rest of \textit{his} Acadian territory. With this in hand, she formed a partnership with Poutrincourt and financed a resupply ship, which sailed from Dieppe in November 1611.\textsuperscript{78}

Unfortunately for the Port Royal colony, the Guercheville-Poutrincourt partnership was built on a foundation of mistrust. Poutrincourt’s mismanagement of de Guercheville’s investment and Biencourt’s mistreatment of the Jesuits prompted de Guercheville to withdraw her support. She decided instead to establish her own Jesuit colony on the lands she had acquired from de Monts. For this purpose, de Guercheville mounted a formidable expedition of between eighty and a hundred men, thirty of whom were to be permanent settlers, which the courtier René Le Cocq de La Saussaye was to lead. Their ship, the \textit{Jonas}, sailed from Honfleur on 12 March 1613.\textsuperscript{79}

The \textit{Jonas} reached Nova Scotia in mid-May, stopped at Port Royal to pick up Biard and Massé, and then made its way to the coast of Maine. La Saussaye chose a
spot—Fernald Point—near Mount Desert Island and began the work of planting the colony, which was to be named San Sauveur. On 2 July, an English ship, the *Treasurer*, under Capt. Samuel Argall, which had sailed from Virginia likely to trade and explore the coast, came by chance across the Jesuit colony when it was at its most vulnerable. Argall, a member of the Virginia council, attacked the French, sacked the colony, and carried most of the men, including Biard, as prisoners to Virginia. He allowed La Saussaye and Massé to take a small boat to Acadia, where they found passage for France.\(^8^0\)

Argall, however, was not done. Upon his return to Virginia, the provincial council ordered him to return to Acadia to drive the French out and raze all of their settlements there. In October, Argall returned to San Sauveur with three ships and destroyed the buildings the French had begun. He then moved on to St. Croix Island and burned the old habitation there. Finally, he came to Port Royal, which was uninhabited at his arrival. Argall seized anything of value and burned all of the buildings there, too. Biencourt happened to return to Port Royal before Argall departed, and the two men held a lengthy conference. Apparently Biencourt hoped to achieve some kind of cooperative agreement with the English in order to preserve his establishment, but Argall refused, claiming Acadia and all the territory to the south for England.\(^8^1\)

Biencourt and the remaining settlers spent a miserable winter in the forests near Port Royal. Poutrincourt returned from France the following spring to their great relief, but his ambitions for his colony were at an end. He soon departed for France and was killed in the civil disturbances that rocked the kingdom in 1615. Biencourt, however,
Some seven years after the establishment of Quebec, the French had made little headway in their colonization effort, in spite of expending a great many lives and a great deal of money and effort. But by 1615, they had at least marked the outlines of a network of settlement and trade and established small posts at Quebec and Port Royal. Champlain had also surveyed at least two areas where he thought additional nodes of settlement should be established—Trois-Rivières and, more importantly, Montreal. It had taken almost a hundred years, but the French had completed the first three stages of James E. Vance’s staged model of colonial development—1. Fact-finding, 2. Testing the trade potential, and 3. Initial settlement. This initial settlement was tenuous at best. Quebec from 1608-1615 had fewer than twenty inhabitants, Poutrincourt had failed to reestablish Port Royal, and his son had only been able to maintain a trading post there at best. To make matters worse from the perspective of French imperialists, the Jesuits first attempt at settlement had ended in disaster. But while the colonization effort seemed stalled, trade by 1615 was robust. Father Biard, who ought to have known, claimed that upwards of 500 French ships traded to America each year during this time. This trade—chiefly whaling, fishing, and some fur-trading—was almost purely extractive, and lucrative as it was, it contributed almost nothing to the colonization effort. This suggests—in contrast to Vance’s overall idea of why settlement colonies are established—that in the French case there was a disconnection between extractive trade and colonization. Colonizers—such as Champlain, de Monts, and Poutrincourt—understood that establishing a
profitable trade between New France and the metropole was indispensable, but it does not
seem altogether accurate to say that the purpose of the colonization effort was chiefly to
extract commodities from North America. That could and was being done on a rather
large scale with no settlement at all. For the colonizers, it seems, it was not chiefly the
purpose of settlement to establish an extractive trade. It was rather the purpose of trade to
support settlement. Nor could it be said, as Vance seems to argue, that the motivation for
establishing settlements was almost wholly exogenic. Certainly, it was the French with
their ships and knowledge of ocean navigation who provided the link from North
America to markets in the metropole. But, at least in regard to furs, there would be no
trade at all without the participation of Native Peoples. The Mi’kmaq, Etchemin,
Montagnais, Huron, and Ottawa Algonkian seemed willing to join the French in creating
an extensive trade network in North America, but would do so for their own reasons,
adapting the trade to their own cultural needs and enlisting the French in their security
arrangements. But for whatever reasons and however tenuously, the French had begun to
settle permanently along the St. Lawrence. In the meantime, just as the French were
completing this third stage in Vance’s model, the Dutch were beginning phase one—fact-
finding—along the Hudson River a few hundred miles to the south.

1 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 231-35; Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, 2:4-6.
3 Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, 2:5; W.L. Grant, ed., Voyages of Samuel de Champlain, 1604-1618
   (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1907), 5, 121-22, 125, 131.
4 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 235-36.
5 Lescarbot, History of New France, 2:234; Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:94; Trudel, The Beginnings of
6 Fischer says Champlain’s ship may have been the Fleur-de-Lys. See his Champlain’s Dream, 240.
7 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 238-39.
9 Grant, ed., Voyages of Samuel de Champlain, 131, 141-43.
11 Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, 2:44, 52
What caused the disappearance of the Laurentian Iroquois has never been satisfactorily explained, though it has been a subject of widespread scholarly debate and disagreement. For an overview of scholarly theories, see Pendergast and Trigger, *Cartier’s Hochelaga and the Dawson Site*, 71-93; Grant, ed., *Voyages of Samuel de Champlain*, 5, 121, 130-31; George M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, 1:171; Careless, *Canada*, 37-38.

Lescarbot gives a somewhat different account of Champlain’s initial meeting with the Huron and western Algonkian. I follow Champlain’s account, since he was present. Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, 2:67-68.

Once again there are discrepancies between the accounts of Champlain and Lescarbot. Lescarbot says twenty died altogether, but Champlain mentions only fifteen, noting that ten died of dysentery and five of scurvy. Trudel and others seem to accept Lescarbot’s figures and give a different breakdown than Champlain, saying that thirteen died of dysentery and seven of scurvy, though neither Lescarbot nor Champlain give such figures; Lescarbot, *History of New France*, 3:8; Fischer, *Champlain’s Dream*, 251; Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, 2:59; Trudel, *The Beginnings of New France*, 95.

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Ibid., 218.
47 Ibid., 243.
48 Ibid., 242-45; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 301.
49 Ibid., 243.
52 Ibid., 251.
53 Ibid., 249, 251-52.
54 Ibid., 252-53.
55 Ibid., 253-54.
56 Ibid., 254-55; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 102; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 303-5.
58 Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, 2:264-78; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 308.
63 Ibid., 280-81.
64 Ibid., 281.
65 Ibid., 294-98, 303-4.
67 Ibid., 267, 271-72, 297, 307; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 102-4
69 Ibid., 298; Trudel and Fischer, modifying Biggar, say that the company agreed to transport six families in the course of eleven years. Biggar said the company had promised to settle six families “each season” over the course of eleven years. Recent scholarship casts doubt on these provisions. See Gervais Carpin, “Migrations to New France in Champlain’s Time,” in Litalien and Vaugeois, Champlain, 171; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 105-6; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 310-11; Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 94-95.
70 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 310-11; Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 94-96; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 105.
71 Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 95; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 105.
72 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 105; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 311-12.
74 Ibid., 107-8.
75 Ibid., 108-9; Buisseret, Henry IV, 138.
77 Ibid., 111-12; Biggar, Early Trading Companies, 78-79.
78 Jesuit Relations, 3:231-36; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 111-13; Parkman, France and England in America, 1:217, 221-22;
82 Parkman, France and England in America, 1:232-39;
83 Ibid., 1:239 n 3.
CHAPTER 6

RECONNAISSANCE AND STAKING A CLAIM—NEW NETHERLAND

The experience of the Dutch in network-building along the Hudson River is a simpler story than that of the French on the St. Lawrence. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the Dutch came very late to the exploration and settlement of North-America, so the history of their effort is considerably truncated. Second, Dutch attempts at settlement, after a short period of exploration, were immediately successful. And third and finally, there is a paucity of primary sources for the earliest Dutch exploration and settlement, which perforce simplifies in some respects the historian’s task. Nevertheless, enough documents do survive to provide an understanding of the Dutch process of network-building in something more than outline.

While the French had begun their North-American explorations with Verrazzano’s voyage of 1524, they did not achieve any permanent settlement until the first decade of the next century, and only after many exploratory expeditions. Without some kind of permanent node, there really could be no network, so that the French network was not established on the St. Lawrence until Champlain founded Quebec in 1608, and it would not be fully developed until the 1640s, if then. In sharp contrast, the Dutch claim to the region between the Delaware and Connecticut rivers was more or less established through a single voyage of exploration, that of Henry Hudson in 1609. Within six or seven years of this voyage, the Dutch had already established in rudimentary form a trade network up the Hudson River, or North River as they
sometimes called it, to the vicinity of Albany, and had also established regular trade up
the Connecticut and Delaware rivers.

The Dutch exploration and settlement of North America took place during a time
when the newly formed Dutch Republic was engaged in an eighty-year war of
independence against the Habsburg monarchy. By the 1430s, the French duke of
Burgundy, through conquest, had gained control of most of the provinces that would later
constitute the Dutch Republic. These provinces then became loosely connected
politically to the duke’s French-speaking provinces immediately to the southwest. After
1477, a good portion of these lands passed to the control of the Habsburgs when the duke
of Burgundy’s daughter married Maximilian of Habsburg, who would later become Holy
Roman Emperor. Maximilian then married his son Philip, known as “the Fair,” to a
daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, and it was by this means that the Habsburgs gained
control of the Spanish throne. Philip the Fair died before his father and thus never
acquired the imperial title, but Philip’s son Charles V would unite in his person
sovereignty over the former territories of the dukes of Burgundy, including the Dutch
provinces, the Holy Roman Empire, and the kingdom of Spain.¹

As has been seen, the wars between Charles V and Francis I had an important
impact on French policy toward the exploration and acquisition of territory in the New
World. They also affected in consequential ways the development of the Dutch Republic
and its subsequent participation in the quest for New World possessions. In his wars
against Francis, Charles, who was born in Ghent, used what became the Spanish
Netherlands as a base of operations against Northeastern France. In order to neutralize
any threat to his rear, Charles conquered the provinces of Gelderland, Groningen, and
Friesland and united them with his Burgundian holdings. This brought into a political unity, the seven provinces that would ultimately form the Dutch Republic. In the course of these wars with France, Charles also forced Francis to give up any pretension to rule Flanders. This, as it turned out, would help to mitigate any threat France might have posed in the short term to the independence of the Dutch provinces to the northeast.²

The threads of a Dutch nationalism had been weaving themselves together since the late Middle Ages and were predicated chiefly upon language and literature, but also upon economic interests that were separate from both France to the west and Germany to the south and east. By the sixteenth century, the center of this distinctive Dutch civilization was Antwerp, which had taken precedence of place in terms of culture and commerce from Brugge, after the trade of the latter city succumbed to the silting up of the Zwin. Antwerp was the inheritor of a Renaissance tradition of humanism and art—a specifically Dutch art. The city was also a university town and the commercial capital of all of the Netherlands. It was essentially a node on a worldwide network of commercial exchange. Textiles from nearby Flanders and Brabant flowed in to the city, and metals from Liège and Hainault flowed out of its port. Colonies of foreign merchants attest to the city’s international importance. Portuguese merchants, who controlled the Indian spice trade, and Spanish traders, who dealt in American silver and gold, set up shop in Antwerp to distribute these commodities throughout Northern Europe. Even though the city was not ultimately destined to be included in the Dutch Republic, it was from Antwerp, says historian Pieter Geyl, that Dutch culture and language flowed along the trade routes to the interior of the Netherlands provinces and helped to lay the cultural groundwork for Dutch independence.³
After 1520, successive waves of Protestantism swept into the Netherlands, first Lutheranism, and later, in the 1540s and 1550s, Anabaptism, though Charles V did his best to suppress them. One of the leading centers of Anabaptism in Northern Europe was Münster, and the movement seems to have spread from that city, which was outside of the imperial domains, to the Netherlands in 1533. Anabaptism became particularly strong in Holland, especially in Amsterdam. Meanwhile, the Anabaptists actually succeeded in taking over Münster in 1534, establishing there a commune and theocracy under the leadership of the Netherlander Jan Matthijs, a baker from Haarlem. This prompted Franz von Waldeck, the reformist Roman Catholic bishop of Münster, to besiege the city. Waldeck retook Münster in June 1535 and executed the leaders of the Anabaptist movement there. As Geyl notes, thousands of Anabaptists from Holland had attempted to make their way to Münster to support their brethren against the bishop, but Charles V’s government blocked them. After the fall of Münster and the brutal suppression of the ringleaders of the revolt, the Anabaptist movement in Holland grew quiescent and individualistic under the leadership of the Frieslander Menno Simons. But the fact that the Baptists had ceased their militancy and attempted to make themselves relatively inoffensive in pursuing their religious beliefs did not deter Charles V from efforts to suppress and persecute them. In the process, the emperor stirred up widespread resentment throughout the Netherlands and created many martyrs whose memory would keep that resentment alive for the next two decades or more.4

All that was needed to bring this subrosa resentment to the surface in opposition to the monarchy was an organizing principle, and this arrived in the form of Calvinism from Geneva. Calvinism provided a more coherent Protestant theology than did the
individualistic and other-worldly Anabaptism of Menno Simons. It also provided a blueprint for social and political organization that could shape, organize, and sustain a revolt against the monarchical state. Calvinism first filtered into the Netherlands from Emden in East Friesland, where the Polish noble Johannes à Lasco had established a church and community that attracted Dutch membership. After Charles V defeated the Schmalkaldic League and reinstituted strict Catholicism in Germany, Lasco and some of his adherents fled to London where they succeed in establishing a Dutch-language Calvinist community. Lasco and the leadership of this community returned to Emden, though, in 1553, when Mary ascended the English throne and made London too hot for non-Catholics. As Geyl has shown, ministers from Emden fanned out into the Dutch provinces to spread the Calvinist creed. Then, after 1559, a new wave of Calvinism spread from France into the Walloon areas of the Netherlands. Dutch and French Calvinism met, connected, and cooperated with one another in Antwerp.

But though it would be the Calvinist element that provided backbone to the eighty-year revolt against the Habsburgs, it would not be Calvinists who initiated it. The early resistance to the monarchy would instead come from the high nobility of the Netherlands, most of whom were Catholics. 5

Trouble erupted after Charles V in 1555 conferred governmental authority over the Netherlands on his son Philip II of Spain. The transfer seems to have allowed the troubles that had been stewing just beneath the surface to boil over into open defiance. In part this may have been because during the long dynastic wars between Charles and Francis I, the nobles had cooperated loyally with the emperor, and this history prevented any open break with him personally. This longstanding relationship, of course, did not
exist between the nobles and Philip. Then, too, Philip, who was reared in Spain and spoke no French, let alone Dutch, seemed a much more alien presence than his father, who was, after all, born in Ghent and was often resident in the Netherlands. After his installation ceremony in Brussels in October 1555, Philip never returned to the Netherlands, but governed through his regent and half-sister Margaret of Parma and a council of state under the control of Antoine Perrenot Granvelle. In exchange for his loyal service to the king, Granvelle would be elevated to archbishop of Mechlin in 1560 and to cardinal in 1561, promotions which in themselves were bound to cause trouble in the Low Countries.6

It was Philip’s ill-luck to come to power at a time when Dutch nationalism was beginning to coalesce. This process began during his father’s reign, when the Dutch first began, self-consciously, to distinguish their own language from German, adopting the name “Nederlandsch.” This proto-nationalist sentiment also led Dutch students in foreign universities to begin to organize themselves separately from the Germans.7

Philip’s policies, which differed little from those of his father except perhaps in the zeal with which he intended to effect them, included a reorganization of the church that would allow him to take greater personal control and weed out moderates who had not acted aggressively enough to thwart the growth of Protestantism. In connection with this church reform, Philip insisted on a more systematic persecution of Protestants, whom he considered heretics. The king also intended to move the government of the Netherlands toward absolutism. To do this, he had to break the back of traditional privileges, which dated back to the Middle Ages and conferred some independent power on the nobles and the towns. Philip also planned to reduce the traditional power of the
council of state, on which the high nobility served, so that it would become little more than a rubber stamp for his imperial edicts. Finally, he would move to impose new taxes, the most important a ten percent tax on all goods sold within the Netherlands, which became known as the “Tenth Penny.”

Taken together, nothing could have been better calculated than Philip’s program to unite the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands against him. The high nobility at once saw in it an attempt to break their longstanding privileges and to subordinate the interests of the Netherlands to the foreign policy, not just of the empire as a whole, but to that of Spain in particular. Merchants saw the attack on the independence of the towns and the Tenth Penny, which was instituted later, as an assault on their interests, while the prospect of religious repression and foreign taxes appalled the lower classes, many of whom had adopted Calvinism or some other form of Protestantism.

On its own, the attempt to restructure the church led to massive violent resistance throughout the Netherlands, from Catholics and Protestants alike, and put the high nobility in a position to oppose Philip within the council of state. The members of the nobility formed a league and sent an emissary to the king to ask him to suspend the reforms. In the meantime, the high nobility withdrew from the council until such time as their demands were met. This forced Philip to momentarily bend, and in 1564 he cashiered Granvelle, whose promotion to cardinal had associated him with the reforms in the public mind. This left the governess in charge of affairs in the Netherlands.

In August 1564, Philip ordered Margaret to publish and strictly enforce the edicts of the Council of Trent throughout the Netherlands. In essence, the edicts made all non-Catholics personae non gratae and made possible a severe persecution of Protestants as
heretics. As edicts now issued from the throne, they also conflicted in some respects with the ancient rights and privileges of the nobility and the towns in the Netherlands. The governess was open to adopting a more moderate policy, but she also could not very well ignore Philip’s express command. Since the edicts were almost universally despised in the Netherlands, when the nobles met again in the council of state at the end of the year, they decided to dispatch one of their number, the Count of Egmont, to discuss the matter with Philip so as to obtain some relaxation of so strict an enforcement.\textsuperscript{11} It was on this occasion that the Willem, the Prince of Orange, who would in a few years’ time become the leader of the revolt against Philip, remarked:

> The king errs if he thinks that the Netherlands, surrounded as they are by countries where religious freedom is permitted, can indefinitely support the sanguinary Edicts. However strongly I am attached to the Catholic religion, I cannot approve of princes attempting to rule the consciences of their subjects and wanting to rob them of the liberty of faith.\textsuperscript{12}

Philip, however, was unbending. In November 1565, the governess received his final decision. The edicts were to be rigorously enforced.\textsuperscript{13}

In the ensuing months, more than four hundred nobles from the Netherlands formed a secret league to oppose the enforcement of the edicts. While the leaders were chiefly Protestant, the membership included Catholics, many of whom also hated the edicts. In April 1566, the league felt itself strong enough to march into Brussels en masse and present to the governess a petition urging the abolition of both the edicts and the inquisition in the Netherlands. Naturally, the governess could do nothing of the sort on her own, so the petition was directed to Philip in Spain. In the meantime, she agreed to what amounted to a suspension of the edicts to await the king’s decision.\textsuperscript{14}
The dispute over the edicts and the inquisition seems to have engendered in the Netherlands a tradition, albeit perhaps only a strong minority view, of respect for freedom of conscience among both Catholics and Protestants. This tradition and its counterpoint—that there ought to be a state church, whose doctrine was rigorously enforced—would live in dynamic tension as a result of the unique history of the Dutch Revolt. As a consequence, both ideas and the dynamic tension between them would be transferred to New Netherland.

In 1566, though, the governess’s moderation strengthened the hand of the more militant Protestants, namely the Calvinists, who upon hearing the news of her decision, soon took matters into their own hands. They interpreted the suspension of persecution as a toleration. Public preaching was soon rife and gave way to violent attacks against the Catholic establishment. Public Calvinist preaching also soon led to iconoclasm and even to the murder of Catholic clergy.15

The virulence of these attacks horrified the members of the league as much as it did the governess herself. In the emergency, she and the nobility came together and struck an “Accord.” Public preaching would be allowed, but only where it was already practiced and with the proviso that the Catholic Church would not in any way be disrupted or inconvenienced. The “Accord,” though, lasted only until December. By then Margaret had divined that the violent uprising of the Calvinists had split the league so that she had regained enough support from the more conservative nobles, particularly in the French-speaking provinces, to act militarily against the Protestant uprising in the towns. Still, the governess was prepared to be moderate in order to maintain the allegiance of a majority of the nobles. She had, in fact, at this stage won a great political
victory, having split the opposition and regained her position as the recognized ruler of
the Netherlands under the king.\textsuperscript{16}

Philip, however, was not disposed to be moderate. When news of the iconoclasm
reached him, he resolved to punish those responsible, not only for the violent attacks on
his church, but also for any resistance to his rule, however mild it might be. He therefore
dispatched the Duke of Alva to Brussels with four regiments of Spanish infantry and
1,200 cavalry. Alva systematically arrested any of the nobles he could find who had
participated in the protests as well as the leadership in any of the towns that had
supported the league. These he had tortured and executed. He stripped the nobles of
their property and ransacked the towns as a punishment. He also began rigorous
enforcement of the edicts and of the inquisition and instituted the hated “Tenth Penny.”
Naturally, his draconian approach reunited the fragmented opposition to Spanish rule that
Margaret had very deftly divided.\textsuperscript{17}

By 1572, unrest in the Netherlands had erupted into a full-fledged war of
independence with the Dutch forces under the leadership of the Prince of Orange, who
had hid out among his Lutheran cousins in Germany until the time was ripe to strike
against Alva. The revolt was centered in the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland,
which was only natural since Alva had no naval support and the Protestant Dutch could
count on its fleet of privateers, which operated out of a base at La Rochelle, the Huguenot
stronghold on the Atlantic Coast of France, so near to Champlain’s hometown of
Brouage. It was, in fact, a raid by this “Beggar’s Navy” that struck the first important
blow of the war against Alva, seizing The Brill. This allowed Orange to return to the
Netherlands and begin to organize the resistance.\textsuperscript{18}
The War of Independence subsequently took many twists and turns. One of the most important came as a result of the emergence of Henry IV as the new king of France. Henry and the Dutch had a common enemy in Spain, and in 1596, they concluded an alliance against Philip II. Elizabeth I of England also reluctantly joined this alliance, so that the Dutch had at least some support from both France and England in their cause. By 1598, though, Henry, now secure in his power, concluded a peace with Philip, which would allow Philip’s new military commander in Northern Europe, the duke of Parma, to turn his full attention to the reconquest of the Netherlands.19

In this emergency, the States General, which had in effect become the government of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, strongly signaled its intention of challenging Spanish and Portuguese control of trade to Asia when it formed the Dutch East India Co. (VOC) in 1602. The chartering of the VOC was, in part at least, a wartime measure meant to deflect resources from Spain to the Dutch Republic. One of the most important results of the Dutch Revolt and War of Independence in terms of world history was the development of both a Dutch Navy as an outgrowth of the Beggar’s Navy and also an independent, specifically Dutch, merchant marine. Prior to the revolt, the Dutch chiefly relied upon the Spanish and Portuguese to transport their goods. The development of a Dutch Navy and merchant fleet was, in essence, a manifestation of budding Dutch nationalism. Both were also a necessary precursor to the Dutch construction of a worldwide trade network and colonial empire. The VOC was a major step forward in organizing this network and empire. Its roots traced back to the 1590s, when Dutch merchants began to participate in earnest in the spice trade and found that enormous profits might be made that could enrich the Dutch Republic and help fund its war against
Spain. In 1598 alone, some twenty-two ships sailed from Dutch ports to the Indies. In essence, the States General chartered the VOC to prevent Dutch merchants from engaging in ruinous competition with one another and also to organize the trade for the purpose of injuring Spain and Portugal. The new company was to be a public-private partnership. It would organize and develop trade to the Indies on behalf of investors, but its heavily armed ships would also provide the Dutch with a naval force that could be used to effect against Spain and Portugal, which in 1580 had become united under the dual monarchy.²⁰

As early as 1591, even before the formation of the VOC, Willem Usselinx, an Antwerper who had immigrated to Holland after Alva took control of his native city, had called for the creation of a West India Company that could organize the trade of the Atlantic for the Dutch. As a military arm of the States General, it would challenge Spain’s supremacy in the Atlantic and prey upon the Spanish treasure fleets. Usselinx had spent some time in Spain and in the Azores, probably as the agent for a merchant company, and he had seen the great treasure fleets bringing immense wealth to the enemies of the Dutch. He believed a West India Company could bring some of the wealth of the Americas and Africa to the Dutch Republic and also make it more difficult for Spain to do business on the high seas. In addition, Usselinx thought the company could organize Dutch settlements in the New World, which would provide new markets for Dutch manufactures—a key and highly modern insight. But political events in Europe delayed the formation of a West India Company for some fifteen years. By 1606, the States General, under the leadership of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, began peace talks with Spain. Naturally, Spanish officials would interpret any attempt to form a West India
Company during the negotiations as provocative and unnecessarily belligerent, which led Oldenbarnevelt to suspend plans to establish the WIC.  

In 1604, following the death of both Philip II and Elizabeth I, Spain and England concluded a peace in the Treaty of London. As Geoffrey Parker has noted, the peace of London was “a heavy blow” to the Dutch. It deprived them of critical English financial support, opened the English Channel to Spanish shipping, including to troop transports, and meant that Dutch ships could no longer count on finding safe haven in English ports. After 1604, the former allies—France and England—urged the Dutch to commit to a long-term truce with Spain. Both sides were becoming war-weary, and in the last nine years of fighting neither side had made any substantial gains. The truce would allow both sides to recover financially, and the Spanish hoped that it would relieve any danger to their annual treasure fleet, which the Dutch had captured off Gibraltar in 1607. The Dutch Republic and Spain therefore called a ceasefire in April 1607 and concluded a formal truce in March 1609, as a result of which the Spain recognized the seven northern provinces of the Netherlands as an independent state. Although the truce would last twelve years, each side recognized that the ceasefire was only temporary. By 1609, however, the war seems already to have resolved some issues. It was clear that the seven northeastern provinces of the Netherlands would be independent of Spain—a new Dutch Republic—and that this new national entity would be Protestant and largely Calvinist, even though at the start of the revolt the Protestants were still a minority in all seventeen provinces of the Netherlands. It was also clear, that given its history, the Dutch Republic would be guided by a general policy of religious toleration. Although the formal truce halted the fighting in Europe, clause four allowed the Dutch to compete for the Asian
trade. This clause rather ambiguously implied, though, that the Atlantic trade of the Spanish-Portuguese empire was off-limits. The Dutch conveniently ignored this and rapidly increased trade to Africa and the Americas during the period of the truce.\textsuperscript{22}

Support for the truce in the United Provinces was not universal. Maurice of Nassau, the commander of the army and the stadholder of five provinces, stood against it, and a political party, largely of nobles who supported a continuation of the war, formed around him. The irony is that Oldenbarnevelt, the advocate of Holland in the States General since 1586, had helped to elevate Maurice to overall command of Dutch forces. Naturally, Maurice saw that the end of the war would reduce his political influence and elevate that of Oldenbarnevelt, whose power came from the backing of manufacturing and commercial concerns in the cities. It was also natural, that the members of the war party were among the chief advocates of a militarized West India Company.\textsuperscript{23}

It was in the midst of the war for independence that the Dutch first took an interest in trade to North America. Their late start was predicated chiefly upon the fact that earlier in the century the Dutch had no national government to sanction and protect such trade and also because its leading city, Antwerp, had no merchant shipping of its own, but rather relied on foreign shipping from Portugal and Spain. Dutch participation in North-American trade began in 1597 with an interest in the Newfoundland fisheries. In that year, merchants from the rebel province of Zeeland outfitted a ship to sail to the fisheries. This interest seems to have continued up through the early seventeenth century and coincides with the exploration, settlement, and development of New Netherland. The Dutch do not seem to have engaged in fishing themselves, but rather picked up cargoes of
fish in Newfoundland from fishermen of other nationalities. They then transported these cargoes to Spanish or Mediterranean ports. As Simon Hart has noted, “the Dutch had no knowledge of the techniques of cod fishing off Newfoundland and no shore rights to dry their fish.” Occasionally, Dutch merchants employed Portuguese fishermen to do the fishing for them and confined their own activities to transporting the fishermen and their gear to Newfoundland and bringing both the fishermen and a cargo of cod back to Portugal. It seems that the Dutch sold their cargos in the Iberian Peninsula and in Mediterranean ports because the Netherlands itself had no market for North-American cod. Dutch fish markets were fully supplied with the catch from the North Sea, close at hand.

As it had for the French, the initial interest in the fisheries naturally led to an interest in the North-American fur trade. In 1606, a company of Dutch merchants from Amsterdam sent out the *Witte Leeuw* under Captain Hendrik Cornelisz. Lonck to engage in the fur trade along the Canadian coast. This, of course, was a direct violation of what the French crown considered its sovereign rights to the territory and de Monts’ monopoly. Perhaps to assuage the French, Lonck took on a Frenchman, Nicolaes de Banquemaire, from de Monts’ home base of Rouen, as supercargo. Upon its arrival in New France, the *Witte Leeuw*, which Hart has described as a heavily armed ship, traded for furs with the coastal Indians. But Lonck also engaged in some privateering, as he was no doubt commissioned to do during the ongoing war with Spain. He seized goods and ordnance from a Spanish ship and confiscated 24,000 pieces of cod from a Portuguese vessel. The French likely would not have been unhappy about these predations on the Iberians, but it also seems that Lonck intercepted two of de Monts’ vessels and carried off
their guns and ammunition. This, along with the Dutch trade with the coastal Indians, prompted Henry IV to fire off a letter to the States General, advising that body to forbid any ships from the Dutch Republic to sail to Canada, which the French crown claimed as sovereign territory by dint of the fact that the king of France had financed its discovery and had begun the process of peopling or settling it more than a hundred years before. In this letter, Henry IV once again held to the French position that settlement alone—no matter how sparsely accomplished—conferred a full claim to European possession of lands in the New World.25

The States General, which took up the king’s letter on 2 February 1607, had no intention of alienating its near and powerful neighbor, particularly at a time when the Dutch were still engaged in hostilities with Spain. It thereby directed the Admiralty of Amsterdam to seize the guns, ammunition, and equipment Lonck had taken from de Monts’ ships. Four guns and two anchors were eventually returned to de Monts, even though these may have belonged to the Spanish ship. But in spite of these concessions, the States General was unwilling in principle to accept France’s prohibition on trade to New France and replied to Henry IV through the Dutch ambassador to France “that whereas trade and commerce are according to the law of nations,” trade should be free to all. As a practical matter, however, the States General forbade the Amsterdam Company from making another voyage to New France.26

These early voyages to New France might well have prompted the Dutch to engage in further exploration of the coast to the south of Acadia, since the French had made access to the St. Lawrence region difficult. But, in fact, the most important Dutch exploratory voyage, that of Henry Hudson, seems to have had no connection with Dutch
aspirations to open up an American trade in fish and fur. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Hudson’s momentous voyage to North America is that it was wholly unplanned and came about as an afterthought once he was unable to carry out his initial mission.

The Dutch East India Co. hired Hudson, an Englishman formerly in the employ of the Muscovy Company of London, to search for a northeastern passage to Asia. After a brief attempt to sail north of Scandinavia, which ice thwarted, Hudson turned back west, sailed to the Faeroe Islands, where he replenished some of his stores, and then set sail for North America.27

Hudson initially left the Texel in the Half-Moon on 6 April, within a month, incidentally, of the conclusion of the formal truce between the Dutch Republic and Spain. But due to the initial attempt to sail northeast, he did not reach the coast of Newfoundland until July. Here he spotted a large fleet of French fishing vessels. On 8 July, the crew did some fishing themselves, catching 130 large codfish before proceeding to Nova Scotia. Hudson then coasted south. Off the coast of Maine, he encountered some Indians who spoke a smattering of French and who told him tales of nearby gold, silver, and copper mines. Although Hudson’s primary task was to find a practicable route to Asia, it is clear from the scant records of the voyage that the Dutch were also interested in any valuable commodities the lands they explored might produce. At what was probably Penobscot, two French shallops filled with Indians approached the Half-Moon, bringing “Beaver skinnes, and other fine Furres, which they would have changed for redde Gownes.” As Robert Juet, one of Hudson’s officers, noted, the Indians were already in the habit of trading furs to the French in return for “red Cassockes, Knives, Hatchets, Copper, Kettles, Trevits, Beades, and other trifles.” In spite of these friendly
encounters, Juet makes it clear that the Dutch and English aboard the *Half-Moon* “could not trust” the Indians. On 25 July the crew seized one of the Indian shallopsh and brought it aboard the ship. They then attacked an Indian village, apparently without provocation, driving the inhabitants away with muskets and artillery before plundering the houses. On 4 August, at or near Cape Cod, some of the crew once again went ashore and discovered that the local people there possessed green tobacco, which was customarily smoked in red copper pipes. Both of these items were of interest to Europeans because they indicated that the land might produce profitable commodities. Hudson continued south along the coast to the latitude of Roanoke Island before turning back north. He briefly entered Chesapeake Bay, where Juet seems to have mistakenly thought that the English had established the Jamestown colony. On 28 August, the *Half-Moon* anchored in the Delaware River, which the Dutch called South River, marking the southern border of what was to become New Netherland.

During the first few days of September, Hudson coasted north along Lenapehoking (New Jersey) and sailed into Sandy Hook Bay, where he anchored and sent five men in the ship’s boat to explore the mouths of the rivers to the north, very likely the Kill van Kull and the Hudson, or North River. As these men were returning to the *Half-Moon*, native warriors in two canoes attacked them, killing one man outright with an arrow through the throat and wounding two others. In spite of this incident, the English and Dutch sailors did not find all of the Native Peoples hostile, and while still in Sandy Hook Bay they traded small knives and beads for corn and tobacco. The Europeans also seized two Indians at Sandy Hook, apparently with the thought of
transporting them back to Amsterdam to be trained as guides and interpreters. This plan was ultimately foiled, though, when the Indians later escaped.29

On 11 September, Hudson sailed into the narrows and therefore into New York Harbor and on the 12th or 13th entered the river that now bears his name, where the Europeans took note of the “very good Harbor at its mouth.” The sailors continued to trade with the Indians along the lower Hudson, even though, as Juet noted, “we durst not trust them.” The Half-Moon then turned upriver and sailed without incident all the way to the future site of Albany, where the river became too shallow to accommodate oceangoing vessels. Hudson then sent the ship’s boat seven or eight leagues beyond Albany. Above Peekskill the crew found the local Indians to be friendlier than those whom they had encountered on the lower Hudson. They also traded beads, knives, and hatchets to the Indians for the commodity that would prove to be the economic lifeblood of New Netherland—furs. In a further sign of what was to come, the Europeans invited some of the Indians aboard the ship where they plied them with wine and aqua vitae—liquor that would eventually help to destabilize Native-American society.30

On the trip back downriver, the Dutch were already surveying the land for the purpose of settlement. On the west side of the Hudson, somewhere between Orange and Stony Point, some of the crew went ashore. Here, says Juet, they “found good ground for Corne and other Garden herbs, with great store of goodly Oakes, and Wal-nut trees, and Chest-nut trees, Ewe trees, and trees of sweet wood in great abundance, and great store of Slate for houses, and other good stones.” Further downriver, at a place where the Dutch traded some knives and other trifles for some small skins, Juet took note of “a very pleasant place to build a Towne on.” Clearly, he and his companions were imagining
settlements of European houses in this landscape, which seemed to them devoid of
habitations. As Hudson himself noted in his journal, the Native Americans “had no
houses, but slept under the blue heavens, some on mats of bulrushes interwoven, and
some on the leaves of trees.” He came across only one substantial dwelling, the home of
a chief, which was “well constructed of oak bark, and circular in shape, with the
appearance of having a vaulted ceiling.” Otherwise, the land along the Hudson seemed
open to European-style improvement. There were no towns, such as Cartier had found,
that might impede settlement. To European eyes, the land produced grapes, pumpkins,
and other fruits naturally, and, as the contemporaneous historian Johan de Laet noted, the
country “seemed to lack nothing that is needful for the subsistence of man, except
domestic cattle, which it would be easy to carry there.”

Native villages surely existed in the interior of the country, but Hudson and his
sailors made little attempt to probe beyond what was immediately visible to them. The
groups Hudson encountered were likely hunting or fishing parties that were, in effect,
“camping out” some distance from their dwelling places. The Europeans, though, seem
to have preferred characterizing the Native Peoples as essentially homeless.

The Europeans also kept a keen eye out for minerals that might be of use.
Hudson himself took note of the Indians’ copper tobacco pipes. He also heard from the
indigenes that iron was available. Juet made note of mountains that looked as if they
might have metal or minerals in them and remarked upon a high cliff “on the side of the
River that is Manna-hata” that “looked the colour of a white greene, as though it were
either Copper, or Silver Myne.” All that was necessary, in the Dutch view, was to apply
European systems of knowledge to put these metals to profitable use.
Near Stony Point, the Dutch experienced another violent episode with the local people. One native man, who had been shadowing the *Half-Moon* in a canoe as it made its way downriver, managed to climb up the rudder and enter the ship. Juet says he stole a pillow, two shirts, and two bandoleers. As the Indian made his escape, the master’s mate shot and killed him. This caused several other Indians who were nearby in their canoes to flee, some by leaping out of their canoes into the river. Some of Hudson’s crew then set out in the ship’s boat to recover the stolen items. At this point one of the Indians in the water took hold of the boat, but a crew member employed his sword to cut off his hand. The next day, two canoes of warriors came after the ship and shot arrows at the Dutch, who replied with musket fire, killing two or three more Indians. Farther downriver, the Native Americans mounted a more serious attack. Juet says about a hundred warriors came to a point of land from which they might shoot arrows into the ship. Nine or ten warriors also approached the ship by canoe. The sailors fired a small cannon into the crowd on shore, killing two and scattering the rest. They also drove off the canoes with cannon and musket fire, killing about five more Native Americans. After this engagement, the Europeans, as they descended the river and anchored near Manhattan Island, saw no other native people.33

What Hudson himself thought of these incidents is unknown. Most of his journal was lost. What little is preserved in the writings of de Laet suggests that he had a relatively high opinion of the Native Peoples, particularly those on the upper Hudson, who had invited him to stay overnight in the chief’s house. Of these he wrote, “The natives are very good people; for when they saw that I would not remain, they supposed that I was afraid of their bows, and taking the arrows, they broke them in pieces, and
threw them into the fire.” He described the people who lived further down the Hudson as “friendly,” though “much inclined to steal.” Hudson himself was faced with a mutinous crew on this voyage. While in New France, they had badly mistreated the natives and may have continued to do so on their trip up and down the Hudson, bringing trouble on themselves. Under these circumstances, it would be interesting to know how Hudson himself described the running battles with the peoples along the river.34

Having once again descended the river, Hudson ceased his exploration and in October sailed for Europe. He did not, however, immediately make his way back to the Dutch Republic to report to his employers. Instead, he first went to Dartmouth, England, where authorities promptly arrested him for trespassing in areas of North America that the English claimed were by charter under the control of English trading companies. Whether Hudson ever returned to the Netherlands is unclear. De Laet, writing after 1625, claimed he did. But this seems not to have been the case. De Laet, who lived in Leiden and later became a director of the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Co., had access either to Hudson’s journal or to some kind of report that Hudson had compiled and must have assumed that Hudson himself brought this document back to the Netherlands. But as Simon Hart notes, Hudson may have sent a report with “a rough draft of a map” from London to the Dutch East India Co. in Amsterdam. Certainly, the East India Co. managed to retrieve the Half-Moon, perhaps with Hudson’s journal still aboard. As Hart notes, further information may also have been acquired from sailors who participated in the voyage and from the Dutch consul in London, the historian Emanuel van Meteren, who might have been able to interview Hudson and/or members of his crew. Any reports would likely have included news that Hudson had been able to trade for furs with the
Indians along the river. Hudson’s employer, the East India Co., though, was not disposed to act on his discoveries and seems to have taken no interest in the fur trade. But the information about Hudson’s findings that did trickle back to Amsterdam was enough to pique the interest of other Dutch merchants who were more than willing to consider the prospects for further exploration and trade in the Hudson River region.35

Because Hudson’s journal has largely been lost and Juet’s Journal provides little more than navigational notes, it is not possible to determine precisely what ceremonies of possession the Dutch employed on this initial voyage. Patricia Seed has concluded that the Dutch method of claiming possession included verbal and graphic descriptions of the land and people and the establishment of regular trade. It is clear from the excerpts of Hudson’s journal and also from Juet’s account that both of these ceremonies of possession were used during Hudson’s initial exploration and that pinpointing the position of the lands they surveyed using the best celestial navigation methods available also came into play. But at this remove, it is unclear whether naming and inscription played a part in Hudson’s voyage.

For the Dutch merchants interested in pursuing trade to the Hudson River, information was similarly spotty. They knew Hudson had discovered a great river, a fabulous harbor at its mouth, fertile lands likely rich with natural resources, and Indian peoples willing and able to provide coveted furs, but, as Simon Hart has surmised, they did not know from Hudson’s reports exactly where the Hudson River was. And yet, even with the lack of information, the Dutch wasted very little time following up on Hudson’s discoveries. There seems to have been at least one follow-up voyage under Hendrick Christiansen in 1610, but its purpose, or if it even took place, is a matter of
some doubt. Nicolaes à Wassenaer, in his *Historisch Verhael Aller Gedenckwaerdiger Geshiedenissen* (1621-31), says Christiansen was the first of the Dutch to sail to the Hudson River. According to Wassenaer, Christiansen sailed north along the coast of North America after making a voyage to the West Indies and sailed into the mouth of the Hudson only by a happy accident. Wassenaer says that Adriaen Block and Cornelis Rijser were also on this trip, which would account for their interest in the Hudson River region over the next several years. Unfortunately, Wassenaer gives no date for Christiansen’s initial voyage.36

Aernout Vogels, a merchant of Amsterdam, is a key figure in the early development of trade to the Hudson River. He was the son of a merchant and fur trader of Antwerp and Amsterdam and as early as 1599 was involved in importing lambskins from Bilbao on behalf of his father. In 1611, in order to evade the prohibitions the French government had imposed against the Dutch and others who attempted to trade for furs in Canada, Vogels took on French partners and established a fur-trading company in Rouen, the very same city where de Monts made his headquarters. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this joint Dutch-French venture is that one of the four partners was none other than François du Pont-Gravé, Champlain’s associate in establishing Quebec in 1608. It seems that in 1611, the company’s ships sailed from the Seine with Pont-Gravé as supercargo and another partner, Jehan Andries, as overall business manager. It is not clear how successful this voyage was, but it was encouraging enough to convince the company to send out at least one further ship, perhaps in 1612. This was the *Esperance*, under Master David Dalart, who may once again have been accompanied by Pont-Gravé. A deed of conveyance from 29 April 1613, which shows that Vogels sold his one-third
share of this ship’s cargo of furs to his brothers-in-law, attests to the success of this venture.\footnote{37}

Vogels, though, was by no means content to confine his activities to the Canada trade. In the very same year that he became involved with Pont-Gravé, he formed a partnership with several merchants in Amsterdam, including Lambert van Tweenhuysen and François Pelgrom. These merchants, all Lutherans, were encouraged no doubt by information from Hudson’s voyage and perhaps by reports from Christiansen, Block, and Rijser to attempt to expand trading operations in North America. Although the excerpts from Hudson’s own report included in de Laet’s history contain no word of trading furs and Juet’s Journal, which does mention this trade, had yet to be published, some word that furs were to be had along that river must have made its way back to Amsterdam. Otherwise, as Simon Hart notes, Vogels very likely would not have had much interest in trade to the Hudson. The Van Tweenhuysen Company, as the new trading firm has come to be known, was formed for the express purpose of carrying on trade with the Indians along the Hudson, and it immediately dispatched a ship under Rijser—the St. Pieter—to establish this trade and gather information. In 1612-13, Adriaen Block, who may have sailed with Rijser as a supercargo the year before, made a second voyage for the Van Tweenhuysen Co., during which he may have established a fortified trading post—Fort Nassau—on Castle Island near Albany. Block also encountered competition. In New York Harbor, as it later came to be called, he met another Dutch ship, the Jonge Tobias under Captain Thijs Volckertz. Mossel, which the Hans Claesz. Company of Amsterdam had sent to open trade with the Indians. Mossel’s presence significantly complicated Block’s trading mission because the Claesz. Co., in order to garner the Indian trade for
itself, paid double the price the Van Tweenhuysen Co. had been offering. Such competition drove up the price and significantly cut into the profits of both companies. Block and Mossel seem to have worked out a temporary arrangement in which they agreed to pay a uniform price for pelts, but once they had returned to the Netherlands, their parent companies were not able to work out a permanent agreement to cooperate in the trade.38

It is a matter of speculation still as to whether Block established a fort on Castle Island as early as the 1612-13 voyage. Had he done so, it would have been in conformity with Dutch practice in the New World. As Hart notes, in the Guiana trade it was usual for the Dutch to establish a fortified trading post and to leave some men behind to establish regular relations with the Native Peoples. These manned posts likely also served as a signal that the Dutch had established a monopoly of trade in the area. Whether Block accomplished this so early has not yet been definitively established, but there is no doubt that Mossel left a mulatto named Jan Rodriguez behind as a liaison to the Native Americans before he and Block sailed for the Netherlands in the spring of 1613. Mossel’s initial trip to the Hudson seems to have been made by way of the West Indies, where he picked up Rodriguez as a crewman during a stop in Santo Domingo. For his services, Rodriguez received eighty hatchets and a number of knives, no doubt as trade items, and also a musket and a sword, presumably for self-defense. Mossel would later claim that part of what he paid Rodriguez was an advance for future services to the Hans Claesz. Co.39

It appears that some time in 1614, the Van Tweenhuysen Co. received a patent from Prince Maurice to trade on the Hudson. Naturally, the company made the most
liberal interpretation it could of this license, asserting that it granted a monopoly—at least this seemed to be Adriaen Block’s opinion. With this in mind, the Van Tweenhuysen Co. felt free to reject all of the proposals of the Hans Claesz. Co. for organizing the trade on a cooperative basis. As Hart notes, had the States General, which exercised sovereign power in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, issued the patent, the Van Tweenhuysen Co. might have had a better chance to enforce a monopoly, but a patent from the Prince of Orange, who at this stage had yet to obtain the near dictatorial powers he would later enjoy, was of little value. The prince, up until 1618, was really little more than an official operating under the purview of the States General. The burgomaster of Amsterdam seems to have interpreted the patent only to have granted the freedom to trade to the Van Tweenhuysen Co., which the prince seems also to have extended to the Hans Claesz. Co.\(^{40}\)

In late 1613, the Van Tweenhuysen Co. and the Hans Claesz. Co. once again both sent out ships to trade along the Hudson and the adjoining coasts. The Van Tweenhuysen Co. sent two ships, the *Fortuyn* under Hendrick Christiaensen and the *Tijger* under Adriaen Block, though the expedition seems to have been under the overall command of Block. Mossel, in the *Nachtegael*, once again represented the Hans Claesz. Co. Christiaensen and Mossel sailed sometime before 30 September, when the Van Tweenhuysen Co. made a counter proposal to the Claesz. Co., offering the latter one-third of the overall trade to the Hudson River region. The Claesz. Co. rejected this offer. Block seems to have awaited the outcome of these negotiations and did not sail until October. When Christiaensen and Mossel arrived on the Hudson, Christiaensen enlisted Jan Rodriguez in *his* service. Mossel would later claim that, in joining Christiaensen,
Rodriguez had violated his agreement to arrange trade with the Indians for the Claesz. Co. Soon after, Block arrived, bringing news that their respective companies had been unable to reach an agreement. The failure of negotiations in the Netherlands left the respective ship captains to organize the trade among themselves. They soon reached an agreement by which Mossel would receive two-fifths of the beaver pelts and Block and Christiansen three-fifths. In addition, Block agreed not to trade on the Hudson itself, but only along the coasts. Unfortunately, after having made this agreement, he found himself unable to leave the bay because of ice in the river, and toward the end of January 1614 his ship accidentally caught fire and burned. Block turned to Mossel for help, though it is unclear why, since Christiaensen was still in the vicinity. Mossel, though, said he would only aid Block if the previously agreed upon terms of the trade were altered so that each company would receive half. In spite of his troubles, Block would not go along with this plan, and instead had his carpenter Hans Hillebrantsen build a yacht, which was named Onrust, “Unrest,” perhaps as an expression of the troubles Block encountered on this trip.41

The disagreements between Mossel and Block continued. On 3 March, Christiansen sailed further up the Hudson to trade, and the next day Block, having got wind that Mossel’s supercargo Hans Hontom intended to sail into the East River to explore and trade, came aboard the Nachtegael to protest that such an expedition would violate their agreement, since the East River was not part of the Hudson. Hontom disagreed, and on 6 March, with the better part of the Nachtegael crew, he made his way to the East River in two sloops. The next day, when Mossel and some of the remainder of the crew went ashore, eight of Block’s sailors mutinied, boarded the Nachtegael, and
seized it. Block and Mossel immediately began negotiations with the mutineers. Block promised to give them full pay and amnesty if they would give up the ship, but they refused. Mossel and some of his crew, perhaps with the remainder of Block’s crew as well, then went up into the heights overlooking the river and began firing muskets down into the ship. The mutineers promptly fired back. Since his attack on the ship proved to no avail, Mossel, with Block’s permission, sailed up the Hudson in his sloop in order to enlist the aid of Christiansen. In the meantime, Block led a further attack on the \textit{Nachtegael} from the river bank, only to have the mutineers return fire with the ship’s guns. Christiansen did return downriver and picked up the remainder of Block’s crew. By 8 March he had sighted the \textit{Nachtegael} in the bay and had just begun to close with it when his crew balked at engaging with the mutineers. Unmolested, the \textit{Nachtegael} weighed anchor and sailed out of the bay. The mutineers steered then for the West Indies, where they engaged in piracy for several months. Later they returned to the Hudson to make repairs and ended up sailing to Ireland, where they finally left the ship.\footnote{42}

Soon after the \textit{Nachtegael}’s departure, two other Dutch ships sailed into the bay to trade—the \textit{Fortuyn}, under Cornelis Jacobsz. May, and the \textit{Vos}, under Pieter Fransz. The \textit{Fortuyn}, in the employ of a company from Hoorn, had arrived to take part in the trade along the river. The \textit{Vos} had been sent out by an Amsterdam trading company in cooperation with the Admiralty of Amsterdam, which gave its mission an official cast beyond mere trading. The key partners in the \textit{Vos} mission were Jonas Witsen and Simon Willemsz. Nooms, both of whom would subsequently become a founders and directors of the New Netherland Co. Although the \textit{Vos} was equipped to trade, its chief purpose was exploration. Fransz seems to have been given the task of checking out rumors from
English sources of a Northwest Passage to China. After having failed in this initial mission, he sailed to the Hudson to carry on trade, undoubtedly with an eye to covering the expenses of the exploration.43

The unexpected arrival of new interlopers required a new, on-the-spot trade agreement, particularly in light of the fact that it would have been dangerous to attempt to exclude the Vos, which had the backing of the admiralty. Then, too, Block, Christiaensen, and Mossel were in no position to resist, having been reduced to a single ship. Block, Mossel, May, and Fransz, accordingly, agreed to divide the trade equally. Fransz’s attempt, however, to trade on the river turned out badly when the Indians murdered him and two members of his crew.44

It seems that all three ships arrived back in the Netherlands sometime in July 1614, after which legal wrangling began over which pelts belonged to which company. It must have been readily apparent that the competition between four different companies for the fur trade along the Hudson would make it difficult for any of them to make a profit. These kinds of difficulties could be avoided in the future if any one of the companies could persuade the States General to grant it a monopoly or if the interested merchants of all the companies could form a new company and secure a monopoly grant from the States General.45

Up to this point, the Dutch government’s interest in the Hudson River and the surrounding territories had been minimal. Certainly the East India Co. (VOC), which was a government-backed trading company of private merchants, had sent out Hudson, so that his voyage bore, at least to some degree, the imprimatur of an official act of the States General. But Hudson’s real mission, in accord with the trading interests of the
VOC, was to find a new, practical, and shorter route to Asia. Having failed to find a Northeast Passage, he had turned west in what seems to have been an unauthorized mission to find a Northwest Passage. When the Hudson River turned out to be a dead-end, the VOC lost interest, to the point where Dutch merchants in Amsterdam had, it seems, some difficulty getting enough information out of Hudson and the VOC to retrace his route.

From 1609 to 1614, Dutch interest in the Hudson, then, was confined to private trading companies. These companies were interested in what appeared to be a profitable trade in furs with the Native Peoples along the great river and on the nearby Atlantic coast, but had little or no interest in claiming possession of territory or in asserting sovereignty over the indigenous peoples of the region. Each company no doubt desired monopoly trading rights to the Hudson, but until 1614 the Dutch government seemed disinclined to offer such a patent. In light of the interests of the private trading companies, the Dutch did little by way asserting possession of anything other than the exclusive trade to the Hudson by right of first discovery and through regular trade there. By this they meant only to keep other Europeans out. Although these companies left agents behind in the region and the Van Tweenhuysen Co. seems to have established at least one fortified trading post, none of the companies made any attempt to settle the region.

In 1614, though, Dutch interests in the Hudson region began to intensify, as can be seen by the competition on the river. Even before the ships returned that year to the Netherlands, the States General began to make decisions that would affect future trade and settlement. On 27 March, the States proclaimed that it would issue to the discoverer
of new territories an exclusive patent for four voyages undertaken over the course of
three years to the territory so discovered, so long as the discoverer or the company for
which he sailed submitted an application, including a detailed report, within fourteen
days of his return to the Netherlands. In this way, the government could encourage
voyages of exploration and discovery and begin to regulate trade to newly discovered
regions. It could also collect information that might prove useful in expanding Dutch
trade and constructing an overseas empire.46

The four companies that had been involved in the Hudson trade in early 1614
banded together and applied for a patent from the States General under the new
provisions of 27 March. Strictly speaking, neither the new company, any of the four
original companies, nor any of the individuals involved in those companies had a clear
right to such a patent, since none could claim to have discovered the Hudson River. Only
Henry Hudson himself or the VOC could make such a claim. But the States General, for
its own purposes, saw fit to overlook this and issued a patent on 11 October to the newly
formed New Netherland Co. for exclusive trade rights for four voyages within three years
to all of the territory in North America between the fortieth and forty-fifth parallels. This
territory henceforth would be named “New Netherland,” as appears on a map that the
new company seems to have submitted to the States General as part of its application.47

The members of the New Netherland Co. included Lambert van Tweenhuysen,
Paulus Pelgrom, and Hans Hunger from the old Van Tweenhuysen Co; Arnout van
Co.; Gerrit Jacob Witsen, Jonas Cornelisz. Witsen, and Simon Willemsz. Nooms of the
old Witsen Co.; and Pieter Clementsz. Brouwer, Jan Clementsz. Kies, and Cornelis
Volckerts, all from the city of Hoorn, who had sent the second of the two Fortuyns to the Hudson. 48

The new company controlled New Netherland from 1614 to 1618. With an eye to securing the fur trade, it either built or reestablished Fort Nassau on Castle Island in the Hudson River just south of what is now Albany. The fort, which seems to have been erected as early as 1614, was a redoubt protected by a moat some 18-feet wide. It contained two cannon and eleven smaller guns and maintained a garrison of ten to twelve men. In 1615, the company seems also to have established a fort on either Noten Island (now Governor’s Island) or at the tip of Manhattan itself. This fort was the beginning of New Amsterdam. Almost nothing is known about the circumstances under which these settlements were made, and some historians dispute whether any fort existed at the mouth of the Hudson so early. But Father Isaac Jogues, the French Jesuit who came out to New France in the 1630s, says the Dutch had built a fort by 1615 on Manhattan Island. Because the journals of the company’s captains were subsequently lost, any more detailed account of the New Netherland Co.’s activities at its earliest stage is impossible. But it is clear that the company had projected, albeit thinly, military and commercial power from Amsterdam to Fort Nassau, establishing a network heavily dependent upon the fur trade. 49

Records indicate that the New Netherland Co. was also interested in developing the region around the Delaware River as an avenue of trade and perhaps for settlement. For three summers, 1614-1616, Cornelis Hendricksz. made a detailed survey of the Delaware and adjoining lands. As Hart notes, it seems that Hendricksz. stayed behind after the trading ships left and used the sloop Onrust, which Block had built, to make his
explorations. The company hoped the States General would grant it a patent for these new regions, but the government was reluctant to do so during the truce with Spain. The New Netherland Co. also asked the States General for a renewal of its original patent in 1616 and again in October 1618, but each time its request was rebuffed. The expiration of the New Netherland Co.'s patent in November 1618 opened up trade to the Hudson and Delaware once again to other companies. An Amsterdam company, whose principals were Hendrick Eelckens and Adrian Janszen, immediately dispatched a ship, the *Schildpad*, to the Hudson under skipper Jacob Jacobsen. The New Netherland Co. also sent a ship, the *Swarte Beer*, under Hendrick Christiaensen. The government warned Christiaensen, prior to his departure, not to interfere with Jacobsen. Christiaensen had made a yearly trip to the Hudson since 1611, but this was to be his last. Indians who came aboard the *Swarte Beer* to trade as it lay at anchor off Manhattan surprised the crew and killed him and all but five of his men before they were driven off. The remaining crew then made peace with the Indians. Adrian Joriszen, the captain of a ship from Flushing that arrived in the Hudson sometime later, commandeered both the *Swarte Beer* and its remaining crew and brought them back to his home port, at which time the New Netherlands Co. had to institute legal proceedings to reclaim its ship.

Very likely the reluctance of the States General to renew the New Netherland Co. patent stemmed from the fact that the government had already decided even prior to Hudson’s voyage in 1609 to create a West India Company to administer Dutch affairs in the Western Hemisphere and along the coast of West Africa. In 1607, the States General went so far as to resolve to issue a charter for the WIC. But during the twelve-year truce with Spain, the government could not very well act on its intention. Like the VOC, the
WIC was to be, not simply a trading company, but also a military arm of the States General, and to have created it during the truce would have been prematurely provocative.52

The reluctance of the States General to permit any significant settlement in the region between the Connecticut and Delaware rivers prior to 1621 must also be understood in the context of the truce. In 1620, the New Netherland Co. petitioned the States General to provide two warships to safely conduct 400 colonists “both out of this country and England” to settle in New Netherland “under the protection and government” of the States General itself. These families would be under the leadership of the English minister John Robinson, who was then resident at Leiden and was, according to the petition, “versed in the Dutch language.” The petitioners claimed to be “discoverers and first finders” of the Hudson River region and made note of the fact that they had in essence taken possession of the region for the Dutch Republic and presumably for themselves by submitting to the States General a map of the territory and a written report describing the region and its usefulness. The company had also maintained a regular trade to the Hudson both during the period of its exclusive monopoly and after. Here then, were three important ceremonies of possession, all well-recognized among European colonial powers—maintaining regular trade, written description, and map-making. The last two, of course, implied that the Dutch had also pinpointed the position of the region between forty and forty-five degrees of latitude using celestial navigation and had begun to overwrite this territory with Dutch names.53

The petitioners outlined the benefits that would accrue to the States General and to the Dutch Republic more generally should the government permit such a settlement.
As is common in most documents proposing colonization, first and foremost, settlement would allow the States General and Prince Maurice to earn “the greater glory” of furthering the conversion of the Native Peoples to “the true, pure Christian religion.” In New France this true religion was, of course, Roman Catholicism, but for the Dutch government, at least, it was Calvinistic Protestantism. The sincerity of the petitioners on this score, who, it must be remembered, had done literally nothing to convert the Indians in the four years they held a monopolistic patent, might be doubted. But there were, of course, more compelling political and economic reasons for the government to support a rather large-scale settlement. First, James I had made it clear that he desired “to people the aforesaid lands with the English nation” by which Dutch possession would be rendered fruitless and their longstanding trade to the region cut off. A robust settlement under Dutch auspices would preempt these English designs. Moreover, Dutch settlement would secure the resources of the country—namely timber for shipbuilding—for the yet-to-be established West India Co. Settlement, then, at least in the view of the petitioners, would be the surest way to maintain possession of the territories in North America that the Dutch already claimed.54

The States General twice rejected this petition, the second time after consultation with the admiralty and Prince Maurice. Why the government would refuse the offer of so large a number of settlers who were willing to volunteer to take possession of territories the Dutch already claimed has been variously interpreted. According to Donna Merwick, the reason was two-fold. First, the company was appealing for the protection of a Dutch state that “didn’t exist.” She argues further that “becoming a nation was something the northern Netherlanders had determined to avoid.” The chief difficulty with this argument
is in the conflation of the terms “state” and “nation.” While the degree of “nationhood” the people of the United Provinces had achieved by 1620 can be debated, chiefly because the idea of what constitutes a nation is not easily determined, there can be little doubt that the Dutch had formed a “state” and that this state was fully capable of settling, governing, and defending colonies in the New World. After all, this state—though it was in the form of a loosely organized confederation—had financed and waged a forty-year war against Europe’s most powerful state, namely Spain, and in 1609 had won its independence as both a state and, one might argue, a nation. The second reason, says Merwick, that the Dutch government rejected the petition is that the States General was concerned not with settling regions in the New World, but rather in exploiting them commercially. The government was on the cusp of forming the monopolistic WIC to do just that, and Merwick claims that the States General and the merchants who were ready to form the WIC imagined, for the foreseeable future anyway, that this commercial exploitation would be peaceful. All that would be necessary would be a trading station, preferably on an island off-shore, so that the Dutch presence would not provoke hostilities, through large-scale settlement, with the Native Peoples whom they intended to exploit. I.N. Stokes also connected the States’ rejection of the petition to the prospective formation of the WIC, but without going so far as to say what the new company’s plans were to be. He argues simply that the “final refusal of the Dutch government to assist these colonists was undoubtedly largely due to the ambitious plans of the promoters of the WIC, which was then in the process of formation.”55

The problem with these arguments is that the petitioners themselves were fully cognizant that the WIC was even then in the planning stage. One of the benefits of the
settlement, which they put forward in the petition itself, was that the settlers, under the protection of the warships, would “secure to the state the aforesaid Countries” so that said countries would be available to the WIC upon its formation. A more likely explanation for the refusal, which Merwick alludes to but does not accept, is that the settlers were English, even those said to be from Holland. Many of these same settlers would later become the pilgrims of the *Mayflower*. But to accept the idea that the English ethnicity of the settlers was at least part of the reason the Dutch government refused them as colonists would be to recognize that the Dutch had developed some degree of nationalism, something Merwick is not prepared to do.56

A second reason the Dutch decided not to grant the petition is connected to the general state of European politics. The twelve-year truce was set to expire in 1621, and the States General, which Prince Maurice had come to largely control, was committed to a resumption of the war with Spain. Although the truce may have temporarily impinged a bit on the political power of the Prince, it had even more dramatically undermined the power of Oldenbarnevelt, the architect of Dutch independence and of the truce itself. Oldenbarnevelt’s only official authority in the States General was as the representative of the States of Holland. His leadership of the confederated government stemmed from the position of Holland vis-à-vis the other states of the confederation during the war. As a maritime province, Holland was insulated from the actual fighting—by the sea, which the Dutch controlled, and by the interior provinces to the south and east. In this way, the interior provinces, which were less populated and less wealthy than Holland, bore the brunt of the warfare. While the war continued, these interior provinces were dependent almost entirely on Holland for troops, supplies, and money. As long as the war lasted,
the inland provinces were politically, financially, and militarily beholden to Holland and therefore to Oldenbarnevelt’s leadership in the States General. But once the truce came, they could offer opposition. In 1618, Oldenbarnevelt, who generally supported freedom of conscience, unwisely involved himself in a direct political dispute with Prince Maurice over the protection of the Remonstrants—Protestants who were opposed to some of the more rigid beliefs of the Calvinists, in particular to the concept of predestination. When the Calvinists violently attacked the Remonstrants in several towns, Maurice, as head of the army, refused to intervene, largely because he drew his political support from the Calvinists. Oldenbarnevelt then acted, allowing the Remonstrants to form their own militias. Naturally, Maurice saw the formation of the militias as an attack on his own power. He had Oldenbarnevelt arrested for acting unconstitutionally and charged him formally with treason. The decline of Oldenbarnevelt’s influence was such by 1618 that Maurice was able to convince the States General to have Oldenbarnevelt tried, convicted, and executed. With the architect of the twelve-year truce out of the way and Maurice more powerful than ever, it was a foregone conclusion that the war against Spain would resume in 1621 and also that the advocates of a West India Co. would realize their ambition.

It is in this political context that the refusal of the States General to allow a large-scale colonization along the Hudson in 1620 must be understood. Simon Hart shows that the Admiralty argued against the settlement proposal at this juncture because such a large influx of people on the Hudson might antagonize both France and England, which had established colonies to the north and south. Both of these powers also had claims to the Hudson River region—France by virtue of Verrazzano’s voyage and England by that of
John Cabot. With the expectation that war with Spain was in the offing, the Dutch could not afford to alienate either of its former allies. Another reason the States General turned down the New Netherland Co.’s petition could be that it did not wish to provoke Spain prematurely. Certainly, Spain would have viewed any Dutch settlement in North America at this time as a further encroachment on its New-World empire—and one that was likely to be used as a base of operations against Spanish interests.\(^5\)

But though the Dutch were unprepared in 1620 to begin any large-scale settlement of New Netherland, they had completed the first two phases of Vance’s model. They had assiduously collected information about the commercial prospects of the region and had initiated a regular trade to test its economic potential. In the process, they had employed most of the established ceremonies of possession—celestial navigation, the maintenance of regular trade, published description, claim to discovery by means of renaming, mapping, and inscription through the construction of forts. In this way they had, in essence, outlined their network, which even at this early stage was more complex than the French network along the St. Lawrence. It included what might be considered the main, linear branch along the Hudson that connected Fort Nassau, near Albany, to Amsterdam and the other ports of Holland and Zeeland through a base near Manhattan Island. But it also included two subsidiary riverine trade routes—one up the Delaware and the other up the Connecticut River to the vicinity of Hartford. All that was required was to flesh out the network, and this would require the final ceremony of possession—effective settlement.

3 Geyl, *Revolt of the Netherlands*, 41-43, 62-64.
5 Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 78, 80-82
7 Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 65.
8 Ibid., 70-78, Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 116-17.
9 Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 70-78; 110.
10 Ibid., 74-75.
12 As quoted in Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 78.
13 Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 78.
14 Ibid., 85-90.
15 Ibid., 90-94.
16 Ibid., 93-100.
17 Ibid., 98-104; 108-10.
18 Ibid., 100; 133-14; 116-17; 119-20.
19 Ibid., 225-26.
21 J. Franklin Jameson, William Usselinx: Founder of the Dutch and Swedish West India Companies (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1887), 14, 18, 21, 28; Jacobs, New Netherland, 38; Geyl, Revolt in the Netherlands, 253-54.
22 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 237-39, 263; Geyl, Revolt in the Netherlands, 249-51; 254-57; Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 2, 5-6, 20-21.
23 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 252; Geyl, Revolt in the Netherlands, 216, 251-54; Jameson, Usselinx, 25-28.
26 Ibid., 13-15.
31 Ibid., 33, 35; Jameson, Narratives of New Netherland, 48-50.
32 Ibid., 49; Juet’s Journal, 35-36.
34 Ibid., 7, 48-49.
37 Ibid., 15-16, 20, 41.
38 Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland, 31-33; Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 20, 22; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 32.
39 Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 23, 27.
40 Ibid., 24-25.
41 Ibid., 25-29; Jacobs, New Netherland, 32-33.
43 Ibid., 30-31, 62-63.
44 Ibid., 30-31.
46 Ibid., 33.
47 DRCHNY, 1:11-12; Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 33.
48 DRCHNY, 1:11-12; Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 34.
51 Ibid.
52 Jameson, Usselinx, 34.
53 DRCHNY, 4:45.
54 Ibid., 1:22-23.
55 Ibid., 22-24; Merwick, The Shame and the Sorrow, 29-31; Stokes, Iconography, 4:45.
57 Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 37.
The formation of the West India Co. did not immediately follow the execution of Oldenbarnevelt and the rise of the war party in the States General. The government, which had seen fit to delay the settlement of New Netherland, remained committed to the establishment of the WIC, but similarly chose put it off. The new company, as it was plain for all to see, would be modeled on VOC, as both a private trading company and a military wing of the Dutch Republic. Obviously, its establishment would be highly provocative, particularly to Spain. With this in mind, the States General deemed it wise to hold off chartering the WIC until the expiry of the truce in 1621.

Both the Dutch Republic and Spain were content to allow the truce to run out. During the truce period, Spain had suffered a series of military setbacks in Europe and abroad. Particularly galling were the inroads the Dutch had made against Portuguese interests in both the East and West Indies. Portugal and Spain had been united under a dual monarchy since 1580 and would remain so until 1648, so that from the Dutch perspective an attack on Portuguese interests was also an attack on Spain. The “Truce of Antwerp” of 1609—as the Dutch interpreted it—provided for peaceful relations only in Europe, permitting them to attack Spanish possessions overseas without giving Spain a legal pretext for renewing the war. In 1620, however, Spain enjoyed something of a reversal of fortune. While England and the major Protestant powers in Germany stood by, the Habsburgs and their allies smashed a Dutch-supported rebellion in Bohemia. This victory led Philip III to conclude that it would be best to allow the truce to expire.
Neither Philip nor his chief advisor, Don Balthasar de Zuñiga, believed that it was possible to reconquer the provinces of the Dutch Republic. Their war aim, which was much more limited, was to pressure the Dutch to renegotiate the terms of the peace. In particular, Spain hoped to strike a new agreement that would bar the Dutch from any further attacks on Spanish interests overseas and end any renewed attempts on the part of the Dutch Republic to conquer the southern Netherlands provinces still under Spain’s control. Philip and his advisors seem to have thought that the threat of war might be enough to bring the Dutch to the negotiating table. At the very least, a renewal of the war in the Netherlands would keep Dutch troops at home so they could not be sent to complicate matters for Spain in Italy or overseas in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.¹

Spanish authorities, however, seem to have miscalculated. Philip seems not to have taken into account the changes in internal Dutch politics after the fall of Oldenbarnevelt that had brought Maurice and the war party to power. A key constituency for Maurice was made up of the émigrés from the south Netherlands, who still believed those provinces could be freed from Spanish control and incorporated in a larger Dutch state. Only a renewal of the war could achieve that end. As a result, the Dutch government had no interest in negotiating. This meant that both sides were committed to war, and hostilities resumed when the truce formally expired on 9 April.²

With the end of the truce, the creation of the WIC was a foregone conclusion. The States General granted the company a charter, the famous Octroy, on 3 June 1621, expressing the opinion in the preamble that only a monopoly with state support could carry on, protect, and maintain a profitable business in long-distance trade. It conferred such a monopoly on the WIC, consisting of control of all navigation and trade along the
Atlantic coasts of Africa between the Tropic of Cancer and the Cape of Good Hope, as well as of the Americas between Newfoundland and the tip of South America. It also granted the WIC a monopoly of trade for the Pacific Coast of the Americas and in the Pacific Ocean generally from the American coast to eastern New Guinea. This monopoly was to last for the next twenty-four years and included all trade except the salt trade at Punta de Araya, which was already profitably under way. The Octroy put into the WIC’s hands an already robust and profitable trade, well beyond the somewhat meager pickings of the fur trade in the Hudson River region. Although the Portuguese still controlled El Mina, the principal trading station off the Gold Coast of Africa, the Dutch had already substantially cut into the African trade, so that by 1621, Dutch merchants were importing more than 4,000 Amsterdam pounds of gold a year from West Africa. With the connivance of Portuguese officials, the Dutch were also importing about 50,000 chests of Brazilian sugar a year through the Portuguese ports of Oporto and Vianna, along with other Brazilian products—particularly brazilwood for dye. This trade had become so substantial that by 1622 the Dutch were operating twenty-nine sugar refineries at home, chiefly in Amsterdam. Brazil also provided a market for Dutch exports—particularly textiles.3

In addition to the trade monopoly, the States General granted the WIC the power “to make contracts, leagues, and alliances with the princes and natives” of foreign countries, and allowed it to build fortresses and “to appoint, transfer, discharge, and replace governors, troops, and officers of justice” and all others necessary to the good order and policing of its territories. The WIC was also given the authority “to promote the settlement of fertile and uninhabited districts.”4
The West India Co. was truly a public-private partnership. The company had the right to choose and issue instructions to its overseas governor-general, but the States General issued his commission, and he and all other officers were required to take an oath of allegiance both to the States General and the company. Moreover, since the WIC was born during a time of war, it was clear that troops would be needed to secure and defend its overseas trade, which essentially encompassed the Atlantic trade of the Dutch Republic itself. The States General would supply such troops, but it was up to the company to pay and provide for them.5

The States General and the company shared additional military responsibilities. The States promised to “maintain and defend” the company’s rights to “free navigation and trade.” To carry out this responsibility, the States General gave the WIC sixteen ships of war and four yachts, along with cannon and other armaments and ammunition. The company was to bear the expense of manning and victualling the ships and was required to provide, man, and supply sixteen warships and four yachts on its own. Although it seems clear that the WIC was to be a military arm of the Dutch government, the States agreed not to commandeer the company’s ships for state use without the company’s consent.6

The WIC also received special trade privileges within the Dutch Republic. The States General allowed the company’s ships and goods to pass anywhere in the United Provinces without paying tolls. The company was also free to bring goods in and out of the Netherlands without paying any convoy charges. In this way, the WIC had freer access to the Dutch trade network than many purely private merchants or merchant companies.7
In order to blunt any political opposition to the new company, the States General attempted to make it as open as possible to merchants who wished to participate. The goal seems to have been to give the WIC broad support among the provinces, while ensuring at the same time that the city of Amsterdam remained in control. The governance of the company was, therefore, complex and mirrored to some degree the government of the Dutch Republic itself. It was divided into five chambers, representing Amsterdam, Zeeland, the cities on the Maas (Meuse) River, the Noorderkwartier (or North Holland), and Friesland/Groningen. The towns of Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Edam, Monnikendam, Medemblick, and Permerende were represented in the chamber of the Noorderkwatier, while Rotterdam, Delft, and Dordrecht were represented in the Chamber of the Maas. The chief city in the Zeeland Chamber was Middleburg. 

The five chambers did not, however, have equal representation in the administration of the WIC. The States gave Amsterdam, which was allowed twenty directors, a four-ninths share of the management. Zeeland, with twelve directors, received two-ninths. The chambers of the Maas, Noorderkwatier, and Friesland/Groningen, which were allotted fourteen directors each, each received a one-ninth share in the management. Provinces that had no chambers could appoint directors to one of the five chambers, one director for each 100,000 guilders invested.

The overall direction of the company would be in the hands of the Heren XIX or “the Nineteen,” an executive board of representatives to the chambers. Eight of the Nineteen represented the Amsterdam Chamber, four represented Zeeland, and there were two from each of the other chambers. The States General appointed the final member. The Nineteen would decide all matters concerning the company, though the States
General reserved the right to make further regulations for the company’s governance and, in matters of war, had the right to approve all resolutions.\textsuperscript{10}

The States General agreed also to subsidize the WIC to the tune of one million guilders, with the first 200,000 guilders to be paid when the private investors made their first payment. The bulk of the money to support the company, though, was to come from merchant capital from the urban seaports. Since the WIC had a monopoly, any merchant who wished to participate legally in the Atlantic trade had to subscribe. Those who did would not be permitted to withdraw their capital until the charter expired—a period of twenty-four years. Investors would be paid in dividends, and the States General would receive income in the same fashion as all other investors.\textsuperscript{11}

The directors of the company would receive a commission of one percent on the outfitting and return of ships, on prizes, and on any gold and silver the company could bring back to port. Prizes taken as a result of the war, along with any goods on board, would be sold and the proceeds divided after the company had deducted any expenses, which included the dues that had to be paid to Maurice as admiral. Ten percent of the prize money was reserved for the officers, sailors, and soldiers who had participated in the capture. The rest was awarded to the company to pay troops, build fortifications, and outfit ships. If there were a surplus, ten percent was to go to the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the rest to the investors in proportion to their investment.\textsuperscript{12}

Werner Sombart has usefully described the Dutch West India Co. as the very model of the kind of “semi-warlike, conquering” companies that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “to whom sovereignty rights, backed by forces of the state, had been granted.” Born in a time of war, the West India Co. was created as a public-
private entity to fund and serve the military interests of the Dutch Republic. While settlement is mentioned in the charter, it is only mentioned once, which indicates that setting up colonies was merely a subsidiary interest in relation to the main aims of the WIC—trade and war. Even in terms of trade, the WIC’s chief goal was to disrupt the networks of the Iberians, who controlled the vast majority of the trade and resources of the Atlantic World from Africa to the Americas. Where possible, the WIC was to take over these networks.¹³

Superficially, the West India Co., in terms of its purpose and the conditions of its establishment, does not seem much different from the French colonial trade monopolies, such as the De Monts’ Company. Both the De Monts’ Co. and the WIC were given state-authorized monopolies of trade in a certain region of the Atlantic, and each was authorized to plant and maintain settlements and to organize the trade between its respective nation and Native Peoples. Each also sent out armed ships with military personnel in order to enforce the monopoly, to capture prizes on the high seas, and, potentially, to cow the native populations whenever they might offer resistance to European trade and settlement. But the similarities soon exhaust themselves, and major differences emerge, which in themselves would bring about quite different outcomes in terms of the development of Quebec and New Amsterdam. The first and most obvious difference is the identity of the granting power. In each instance, this was the national government, but in the French case this was the monarch, while for the Dutch, it was the States General, a quasi-representative body with fairly broad popular support. The French monarch, while he was in no wise immune from political pressure, in the main, represented his own interest. By contrast, the States General represented chiefly the
commercial interests of Dutch merchants in the urban seaports. For this reason, Robin Blackburn, following Sombart’s analysis, could assert that the WIC, while it had certain similarities to the Italian trading companies of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, was in other respects something new, in that it was symptomatic “of the emergence of a new type of aggressive and plundering bourgeoisie.”14

Such a bourgeoisie had also emerged in the French seaport towns in Normandy, Brittany, and along the Atlantic Coast. Although it was fully capable of making its influence felt in politics, this French commercial bourgeoisie had not achieved the kind of direct representation in government that its Dutch counterpart enjoyed. Sovereignty in France still lay with the king, who continued to work within the feudal tradition of granting monopolies and governmental authority only to members of the nobility, such as Roberval, La Roche, and de Monts.

De Monts had done his best to enlist in his company merchants from the seaport towns of Normandy, Brittany, and the Atlantic seaboard. He managed to achieve broad geographical support, but ultimately this proved somewhat superficial. In the main, he failed to win the loyalty of the emerging bourgeoisie because it saw greater advantage in breaking his monopoly than in participating in it.

The French king’s interest was profit, no doubt, but also empire, which required acquiring territory and holding it through settlement. This was the only way to achieve great-power status, for which Spain provided the model. The crown, though, also hoped to achieve these ends with as little cost to itself as possible—hence the monopoly. De Monts failed to sustain the support of the commercial bourgeoisie because the merchants—as businessmen—saw the colonial enterprise, which the king required, as an
unnecessary expense against profit. Here was the classic Catch-22 to which Maurice Trudel alluded: “Either freedom of commerce for all and no colony, or exclusive monopoly and colonization.” The only way to break the stalemate would have been for the king to fund the whole enterprise, which, of course, he was unwilling to do. He also seemed quite as unwilling to entrust the monopoly to bourgeois interests, preferring to grant governing power only to members of the nobility. In the early French attempts at colonization in the New World, there was a distinct division between the state and its monopoly on the one hand and the commercial interest of the towns on the other.

The Dutch initially experienced no such division. To a great degree, the government—as embodied in the States General—and the monopoly—as embodied in the WIC—both largely represented the commercial interests of the towns. Unlike the French merchants, who saw their chief interest in opposing aristocratic monopoly and upholding freedom of trade, the Dutch, through their experience with the East India Co. and also with the ruinous competition among independent traders in the New World, believed that a regulated monopoly, which allowed private concerns to buy in and achieve a share in the monopoly’s direction, best served the economic needs of both the state and the private economy.

Because the WIC had the potential at least to reconcile competing commercial interests and to represent broadly the overseas commercial interests of the Dutch Republic, the States General was willing to grant it a long-term monopoly of twenty-four years. The French king, by contrast, would commit to no such long-term arrangement. In 1603, Henry IV granted de Monts a ten-year monopoly, but this lasted only until 1607 when opposition at court along with outside commercial interests convinced the king to
revoke it. The subsequent monopoly, which Henry granted in 1608, was for one year only.

Perhaps the most significant difference, though, between the early companies that governed New France and New Netherland respectively was geographic scope. The French company’s monopoly encompassed only the St. Lawrence region. But the WIC was given a monopoly over navigation and trade that encompassed the entire Atlantic outside of Europe, as well as the Pacific coast of the Americas and the trade to Australia. This, on its own, meant that New Netherland on the Hudson would be part of a complex trade network that encompassed more than half the world. The French enterprise was much more limited.

In spite of these differences, it should be said that the overall goals of the French and Dutch companies were, in general terms, the same. Each was responsible for turning a profit for its investors and for serving the interests of the state by engaging in privateering, trade, and settlement. The real difference was in terms of emphasis. The French placed settlement and trade before privateering, and the Dutch, who were once again involved in a world-wide war with Spain, naturally placed privateering before trade and settlement. But this does not mean that the Dutch, as Merwick and Seed suggest, were culturally indisposed to settlement.

While the aims of the French and Dutch monopolies were in some ways the same, they initially differed in at least one respect. The original charter of the WIC in 1621 makes no mention at all of religion. The States General, at this formative stage, did not make Christianization of the native population a goal nor a responsibility of the WIC. By contrast, this is the first aim mentioned in the commission to de Monts, however feebly it
would be pursued in reality. This omission in the Dutch charter points to another
difference in how the French and Dutch viewed the colonial enterprise overall. While de
Monts’ commission reads much more like a blueprint for empire, however small the
scope of its operation, the WIC charter reads like a business agreement, pure and simple.

The WIC’s Charter of 1621 makes it clear that the development of a colony in the
Hudson River region and of the fur trade in North America was not foremost in the minds
of the members of the States General nor of the merchants who formed the company.
New Netherland, or “Virginia,” as it was sometimes called in early documents, is not
even explicitly mentioned in the charter. Nevertheless, the Hudson River could prove
useful as a base of operations from which to attack the American interests of the Spanish
and Portuguese. In fact, Manhattan Island seemed ideal for such a base. Its magnificent
harbor could accommodate and shelter any number of ships, and its distance from the
Spanish Main would make it difficult for the Spain to muster any retaliatory attack. The
Dutch also seemed to think the Hudson River extended all the way to the St. Lawrence,
which would allow them to divert the French fur trade down to the vicinity of Albany. ¹⁵

The chartering of the WIC, though, had no immediate impact on the Dutch
enterprise along the Hudson. In part, this is because it took a few years to organize and
finance the company. Investors were slow in coming to the company’s support.
Moreover, as Jaap Jacobs notes, some of the towns that did invest significantly—Utrecht,
Deventer, Haarlem, and Leiden—had not previously participated in overseas trade to any
great extent and seemed interested for religious reasons. This meant that some of the
most important investors in the WIC would emphasize Christianization, an aim that had
not figured at all in the original charter of the company. The WIC also had difficulty
attracting capital from Hoorn and Enkhuizen, as well as from other cities of the
Noorderkwatier that were engaged in the salt trade. As long as the salt trade was
excluded from the monopoly, these merchants saw little reason to join the WIC. This led
the States to reconsider, and on 10 June 1622, it gave the WIC control of the salt trade at
Punta de Araya as well.\textsuperscript{16}

A further agreement between the directors and shareholders of the WIC dated 23
June 1623 increased the control that principal shareholders had over the directors.
Anyone who owned 6,000 florins in stock in a chamber could vote to elect members of
the Nineteen. Further changes to the charter also gave principal shareholders direct
oversight of the activities of the directors. In effect, the whole scheme increased the
power of the individual chambers vis-à-vis the Nineteen. These alterations in the charter
would have long-term repercussions. As Oliver A. Rink notes, “This complex system of
shared governance, originally designed to prevent the Nineteen from making reckless
decisions, paralyzed decision-making in the Company.”\textsuperscript{17}

In light of the difficulties the WIC encountered in raising money, the States
General allowed independent merchant companies to continue to trade to the Hudson.
No doubt the States wished to maintain a regular trade to the region as a means of
asserting possession. Seed has argued that maintaining such trade was the chief Dutch
ceremony of possession. In this case, it was born of necessity, since the Dutch were
unable or unwilling to commit themselves to any true colonization of New Netherland
prior to 1624. With this in mind, the States allowed the New Netherland Co. and the
Eelkens Co. to continue to trade along the river from 1621 to 1623.\textsuperscript{18}
Nevertheless, the deficiency of regular trade as a method of establishing possession began to become apparent by the end of 1621, even before the WIC was ready to take charge of its territory. In December of that year, the English Privy Council ordered Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador to The Hague, to issue a protest to the States General about Dutch encroachment in the parts of New England north of Virginia. The English claimed the whole of the eastern seaboard of North America from North Carolina to Maine by right of first occupation. Carleton was to make known to the States that the English king had “taken possession of the whole precinct, and inhabited some parts of the North of Virginia” and had granted possession of the rest “unto particular persons.” James I was now given to understand that the Dutch had “entered upon some parte of the Countrie, and have left a Colonie and given new names to the severall ports appertaining to that part of the Countrie, and are now in readinesse to send for their supply six or eight shipps.” Carleton was to insist that the Dutch cease sending ships to the parts of North America in question and arrest any further development of their colony.

Carleton decided to gather some information about the state of affairs in New Netherland before bringing the king’s demand before the States General. He interviewed some merchants he knew in Amsterdam and sought information from both the Prince of Nassau and the States. His February 1622 report to the Privy Council provides a snapshot of New Netherland just as the WIC was about to take charge of it. Carleton says that two Amsterdam companies began a trade in furs to the region between forty and forty-five degrees latitude some four or five years before and had continued to send ships every year to engage in the trade. For this purpose, the companies left “factors there
continually resident trading with savages.” These merchant companies had also named the region “New Netherlands” and had sprinkled other Dutch names over the landscape. Carleton, though, found no evidence of a settlement colony “eyther already planted there by these people, or so much as intended; & I have this further reason to believe there is none, because within these few months divers inhabitants of this country to a considerable number of families have bene suters unto me, to procure them a place of habitation amongst his Majies subjects in those parts.”

In response to Carleton’s protest, the States General designated Amsterdam Burgomeester Michael Pauw, himself a director of the WIC, to write to his partners for an opinion on the question of possession. The WIC’s answer seems not to have survived, but it is very likely that the company held that settlement alone conferred the legal right to possession. That the WIC adopted such a policy can be inferred from the actions it took over the next three years as well as from the regulations and orders the company promulgated during that period. The first extant evidence that the WIC was acting on such a policy appears under the date of 3 November 1623, when the Nineteen resolved to dispatch a ship to the Virginias (New Netherland) to “continue the trade” there in defiance of the English king’s wishes. This ship was to carry “five or six families to plant a beginning there.”

By November 1623, the WIC had raised sufficient capital to begin operations. In fact, it had outpaced the VOC in the amount of start-up capital it had been able to amass. The five chambers together had raised 6,608,099 florins in subscriptions. Amsterdam contributed 2,846,520, Zeeland 1,379,775, Maas 1,039,202, Friesland/Groningen, 836,975, and Noorderkwartier 505,626. The contributions from the States General along
with other outside monies seem to have raised the company’s total capital to 7,108,106 florins. Some of this money came from foreign investors—particularly from France, Geneva, and Venice. There was also some minor investment from eighteen Jewish refugees from Spain then resident in Amsterdam.22

In spite of being flush with cash, the WIC made little attempt in 1623 to set up a colony in New Netherland. It managed to send only one ship, the trading yacht Mackreel to Hudson that year. The Mackreel, which sailed on 16 July, first accompanied the Duyf to Guiana, where the WIC also sought to establish a colony. From Guiana, the Mackreel then set sail for New Netherland, where it remained until the following summer. In the meantime, the WIC’s chief focus was Brazil, which had two lucrative commodities—dyewoods and sugar. The company sent an armada of twenty-six ships with some 3,300 men to Brazil. One part of the fleet sailed in December with a second contingent following in January 1624. After a rendezvous off the Cape Verde Islands in March, the unified fleet made its way to its destination and managed to capture the Bahia, the capital of Portuguese Brazil, which the Dutch managed to hold only until spring 1625. This would, though, by no means be the end of Dutch interest in Brazil, which the WIC meant to make a key component of its Atlantic trade network.23

While the Mackreel was trading with the Indians along the Hudson, the Nineteen decided to establish a more robust trading colony on that river in order to better secure for the WIC both the fur trade and the territorial claim to the region. In January 1624, the ship Eendracht (Unity) sailed from the Texel under the command of Capt. Adriaen Joriszen Thienpont. Thienpont was to govern New Netherland while he was in residence. The spotty evidence for this first real attempt at settlement comes from two depositions
that the settler Catalina Trico gave some sixty years or more after the fact, when she was in her eighties. The two depositions do not agree in every detail, but it is plain that the West India Co. had recruited as settlers at least eight and possibly as many as eighteen or twenty families along with some single men and women. These initial colonists chiefly seem to have been French-speaking Walloons, who were perhaps wartime refugees from the Spanish-held part of the Netherlands.24

According to Trico, these settlers, all of whom sailed aboard the Eendracht, were dispersed to strategic points, likely to uphold the WIC’s claim to New Netherland under its new policy of effective settlement. Two families and six men were sent to settle on the Fresh (Connecticut) River near what became Hartford, two families and eight men were dispatched to settle on the South (Delaware) River, and eight men were left at the mouth of the Hudson “to take possession” there. The remaining families, including presumably that of the deponent herself, went up the Hudson to the vicinity of Albany. Here the WIC established a new fortified trading post, named Fort Orange, to replace Fort Nassau, which unfortunately had been built in a flood plain and was washed away in 1617. Fort Orange extended Dutch military power further into the hinterlands, but it was also a place of civilian settlement. This settlement was by any account rather rustic, consisting of the fort and some bark covered huts. No sooner had the Dutch settled themselves than the Iroquois of different tribes, along with the Mahicans and the Ottawa, came to pledge peace and establish trade, bringing presents of beaver pelts and other skins to Thienpont. Trico says she lived three years at Fort Orange, during which time the Indians “were all quiet as Lambs & came & Traded with all yᵉ freedom Imaginable.” Thienpont sent the Eendracht home and spent the next year in charge of the settlement at
Fort Orange, an unofficial governor of sorts, until the arrival a few months later of Cornelis Jacobsz. May.25

In the meantime, the States General received word that the French were also chartering a West India Company to trade to the Americas and make war on Spain. The States expected that the English would soon follow suit, so that there would be three independent, state-backed companies competing for the trade of the New World and operating against Spanish interests. The members of the States General had good reason to believe that the English and French would leave the Dutch West India Co. to do the bulk of the fighting against Spain, which had just sent out a fleet of fifty ships to crush the WIC. In this way, the WIC would be seriously weakened so that, unable to defend its interests, the French and English companies could easily enter into trade in areas where the Dutch claimed exclusive rights. Might it not be better to form one multinational West India Company in cooperation with France and England so that the allies might better organize the war effort and also regulate trade to the New World in a way that would allow the Dutch to assert their rights peacefully? This was the question that the States General posed to the Heren XIX on 22 March 1624.26

Just a week later, the Nineteen sent the States General a report from its agents in Hoorn, who had discovered in that city a ship under French commission that was preparing to sail to New Netherland to trade in violation of the company’s patent. The WIC had city officials in Hoorn seize the ship and arrest its Dutch captain—David Pietersz. de Vries. The volatile de Vries immediately began making noise that his arrest and the detention of his ship, which had been commissioned out of La Rochelle, was an affront to the King of France. The States General, which was very sensitive on this point,
warned that the WIC “ought not to enter, in the beginning, into a dispute with the subjects of neighboring Kings and Princes. . .” The States strongly recommended that the WIC resolve the issue amicably by purchasing the French ship, by convincing the French sponsors not to trade within the limits of New Netherland, or by some other agreement that would allow the ship to trade in New Netherland under the auspices of the WIC.27

It is not clear what course the WIC pursued in the matter of the sequestered ship at Hoorn. The French challenge, though, coming so close on the heels of the English protest, seems to have prompted the WIC to sharpen its policy about what constituted legal possession of territory. The company must have realized that continual trade would not stand up in the face of the English claim to right of first occupation nor against French claims backed by force. On 9 April, the WIC responded negatively to the States General’s proposal to form a multinational cooperative company. In so doing, the Nineteen took the opportunity to assert that the only legal ground for possession of territory was settlement, ruling that “Any nation who for itself possesses . . . places, harbors, and rivers . . . and already occupies the same with colonists, cities, or forts containing at least 50 persons from the respective kingdoms and countries sent there, does possess and therefore has exclusive rights to said districts.” This left the field open for the Dutch in the area between the Connecticut and Delaware rivers. It would also require the Dutch to send settlers. In this way, European political considerations forced the Dutch, much like the French before them, to deny all other methods of possession, and to adopt the position that only effective settlement could constitute true possession of territory in the New World. But the statement of the Nineteen, while crafted to meet the immediate political difficulties English and French competition posed, also threatened to
present future troubles for the Dutch, since it appeared to require the erection of cities or forts, and the colonists who inhabited them, at least according to the statement, had to be “from the respective kingdoms and countries” that claimed the territory.\textsuperscript{28}

For the moment, though, the WIC was prepared to carry out its preferred method of possession. Even while the controversy with the French was playing out, the company was readying its next expedition. In March, the WIC dispatched the \textit{Nieu Nederlandt}, under Captain May, which conveyed perhaps another thirty Walloon families to the colony. Over the next several months, the Dutch strengthened their position further, erecting Fort Wilhelmus on the Delaware. In conjunction with May’s voyage, the WIC also issued its first set of “provisional” regulations for governing the colony. These noted that the colonists, who were to swear allegiance to both the WIC and the States General, were to settle on the Mauritius (Hudson) River, meaning that they were not to be dispersed as were those who had come in January. They were to obey the orders of the company, and though the WIC offered “freedom of conscience” in the sense that no one was to be persecuted for his or her religious belief, the colonists could practice only the Protestant reformed religion. This meant presumably that the Dutch Reformed Church would be the only religious denomination allowed to erect churches and to practice its faith publicly. There were, however, limits to freedom of conscience as well. Anyone who blasphemed or reviled God or Jesus would be “punished by the commander.” For the first time, the WIC also broached the subject of Christianization, ordering the colonists to “seek to convert the Indians.”\textsuperscript{29}

The privileged position of the Dutch Reformed Church in the provisional regulations was likely calculated to promote some cultural unity within the colony while
not giving way to the kind of repression that might make it difficult to attract settlers. A further provision in this regard was the requirement that all public business—“civil, military, or judicial”—be conducted in the Dutch language, an odd injunction perhaps in a colony chiefly populated by French-speaking Walloons. But perhaps that is the point. The language restriction pointedly put the Walloons on notice that the colony was a Dutch colony—not a purely Netherlandish one.30

The station commander and other officers were given the authority to make alliances and treaties with Native-American leaders. The provisional regulations required all colonists to abide by these agreements, even to the point of “going to war if it is advantageous to the company’s interest.” The commander also had the power to assign places of residence for the colonists, who were admonished to fortify them. The colonists, under the commander’s orders, were also required to participate in constructing any necessary public buildings and were “to establish trade relations as far as possible.” In return for these services, they would receive free transportation to New Netherland as well as farmland in the New World. The commander was to allot land in accordance with family size and willingness to work. The WIC would also supply the colonists with two years worth of supplies and clothes, for which the settlers would reimburse the company in installments with goods received.31

The colonists were permitted to trade inland with the Indians, but could only sell the commodities they acquired to the company. They were also allowed to supplement their income by “fowling, hunting, and fishing.” But other economic activities were reserved for the WIC. The colonists were not permitted to practice or teach, without the WIC’s consent, any skill that might “impinge on the company’s trade.” The dye trade is
singled out especially in this regard. Moreover, only company men were allowed to work mines of “gold, silver, copper, or any other metals, as well as [of] precious stones, such as diamonds, rubies, and the like, together with pearl fishing.” Any colonist who discovered a mine would receive a one-tenth share of the profits for the first six years. The hope, obviously, was that New Netherland would eventually yield the same kinds of riches for the Dutch that Mexico and Peru had for Spain.32

The WIC also restricted access to its trade network in New Netherland. The colonists were to prevent any persons outside of the company or those it commissioned from “coming to their shores to do any trading.” It was likewise a violation of the regulations for any colonist to divulge any information to strangers in regard to trade or the general condition of the colony. All of the company’s transactions and affairs were to remain secret. To maintain peace, the colonists were to faithfully “fulfill their promises to the Indians and other neighbors.”33

Finally, the WIC promulgated regulations in regard to settlement beyond those already mentioned. The colonists, to whom the company had given land, were required to stay with their families “at the place of destination” for six years, though the commander or the company’s agents might order their removal sooner. Only after six years of continuous settlement, or by order of the company beforehand, would the colonists be permitted to “trade or sell their houses, planted fields, and cattle to some one else among the remaining colonists.” This provision meant that the allotted lands could not be alienated to someone outside of the colony. The WIC also had strict control over the colony’s agriculture. The colonists were permitted to grow only such crops as the commander and council ordered and could make no changes for private reasons. These
specific regulations regarding land ownership and farming strongly suggest that as early as 1624, the WIC envisioned planting an agriculturally based settlement colony along the Hudson. 34

Through 1624, the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber seem to have undertaken a vigorous debate on just what the requirement of settlement meant in terms of a claim of possession. Jaap Jacobs has termed the two factions that developed among the directors the “colonization faction” and the “trade faction.” The colonization faction believed that New Netherland could be profitably converted into an agricultural colony of the type historians have generally associated with the English in North America. Among the members of this faction were some who would play important roles in the development of New Netherland—Kiliaen van Rensselaer, Samuel Godijn, and Johannes de Laet. The trade faction argued that such large-scale settlement was expensive and would divert the WIC from its main task—making money through trade. This faction held that the colony on the Hudson should be nothing more than a small trading settlement that would be sufficient to assert the Dutch claim of possession and to protect the WIC’s trade. 35

For the moment, the colonization faction prevailed. On 23 September 1624, the Amsterdam Chamber resolved to send additional colonists, along with domestic farm animals and all other necessary merchandise to New Netherland. In addition, the chamber would send “a capable political director.” This meant that the colony would no longer be under the command of whichever ranking sea captain happened to be in the province. It seems that the Amsterdam Chamber was not able to act immediately on its resolution, likely because it was preoccupied over the next several months with preparing a relief expedition to the besieged Dutch forces at Bahia. But in 1625, it sent six ships to New
Netherland, including the *Orangen boom*, on which the first official director of New Netherland, Willem Verhulst, was to sail. The *Orangen boom* was a relatively small ship, just 150-tons, and nearly as soon as it left Amsterdam in January it encountered trouble. Rough conditions in the English Channel forced the captain to put into port at Plymouth where English customs agents, finding that she intended to plant a colony in English-claimed territory, seized the ship. While the captain negotiated with the English, a deadly illness broke out among the passengers and crew, killing eleven. This seems to have prompted the English to immediately release the ship, which then continued on its way to New Netherland.\(^{36}\)

The WIC gave Verhulst detailed instructions for governing and developing the colony. While religion had not heretofore been a priority, it is given first place in the instructions to Verhulst. The director was to assist the “comforter of the sick,” Sebastiaen Jansz. Krol,” in carrying out his religious duties. Krol, who was originally from Friesland, had been a velour worker before signing up in October 1623 to go as a comforter of the sick to the West Indies and New Netherland. As per his instructions from the Consistory, he was permitted to comfort and read prayers to the sick and to read the Bible and commentaries to the settlers more generally on suitable occasions. But because he was not formally a minister of the Reformed Church, he was not permitted to administer the sacraments. He initially sailed to the Americas on 25 January 1624, perhaps aboard the *Eendracht*, and spent some time in New Netherland. He returned to Amsterdam by November, at which time he asked for and received permission from the Consistory to baptize the children who had been lately born in New Netherland. Krol was therefore on hand to sail on the *Orangen boom* early the next year. In addition to
administering to the sick and baptizing children, Krol, with Verhulst’s support, was to see to it that the Indians were instructed in the Christian faith.\textsuperscript{37}

The WIC also gave Verhulst the authority to uphold justice. He was to prevent “all wanton murders,” so far as he was able. He was also ordered to send “all adulterers and adulteresses, thieves, false witnesses, and useless persons among Christians, likewise also the lazy persons who draw pay from the company” back to the Netherlands for punishment. He therefore had the authority to arrest and expel persons for transgressions, but not to try and punish them.\textsuperscript{38}

A number of families sailed on the \textit{Orangen Boom}, and Verhulst was directed to “distribute” them “over the places that [were] already occupied.” These places would now include Fort Orange, near Albany; the settlement on the Fresh (Connecticut) River; the trading post near the mouth of the Hudson, and presumably Fort Wilhelmus on the Delaware. At this early stage, it seems the WIC hoped to concentrate its effort on the Delaware, since it ordered Verhulst to “strengthen the population of the southern colony most” and to be sure the fort there was well-fortified and that its guns were given an unimpeded range of fire.\textsuperscript{39}

In an apparent contradiction of its earlier directive to distribute some of the new families among the places that had already been occupied, the WIC ordered Verhulst to settle all of the families, farmers, and cattle that sailed aboard the \textit{Orangen Boom} on High Island, some twenty-five miles up the Delaware near the present site of Trenton. Here he was to build a protective fort and also to convince the local Indians to trade only with the Dutch. In both these ways, it seems, the WIC was determined to restrict access to its trade network up the Delaware.\textsuperscript{40}
Although the WIC in 1625 seem to have expected Verhulst to reside on the Delaware, where the largest number of colonists were supposed to settle, the director was to rule over the entire colony, which stretched from the Delaware to the Connecticut River, in conjunction with a council made up of the captains of ships then present. Verhulst’s duties therefore required him to visit from time to time the North River (the Hudson) in order to take care of business there. When Verhulst was not on the Hudson, the vice-director, Thienpont, was to govern on there, in conjunction with a council made up of Daniel van Krieckenbeeck, François Fezard, Johan Lampo, and any ship captains happened to be on the Hudson at any given time. Krieckenbeeck, who was named vice-director for trade, had come to New Netherland in 1623 as the supercargo of the Mackreel, and therefore presumably had experience in the local trade and in business matters more generally. Fezard, a millwright, was a Walloon who likely came with May in 1624 and probably served on the council to represent the Walloons, who made up the bulk of the population. Lampo, interestingly, was an Englishman, who might have been useful diplomatically in relations with the English colonies to the North and South of New Netherland.  

In addition to these political duties, the directors of the WIC ordered Verhulst to continue the fact-finding that had commenced with Hudson’s voyage. He was required to survey the region the Dutch meant to possess with the commercial eye of the early modern European. This meant taking note of the kinds of products the land produced, including, particularly, timber and minerals, but also various animals and birds. As to timber, he was to seek the best and the nearest at hand, so that the company could make the most profit from it with the least expense. Elm was especially sought after for
gunrests and gun-carriages. The WIC asked him to be on the lookout for trees from which boards five-inches thick and ten- to thirteen-feet long could be cut. If this could not be done on the spot, Verhulst could ship the logs to the Netherlands to be cut there. Space aboard ship was a valuable commodity, and the WIC was concerned that none should be wasted on the return trip. In this regard, the company advised Verhulst to fill up the holds of returning ships with “all kinds of lumber,” even such as might be used for axe-handles and firewood. The production of timber, for on-the-spot building and for shipment to Europe, was deemed so important that the WIC required all officers and sailors to help cut the trees and saw the lumber. The company, though, was also interested in other forest products, such as nuts. It noted that Verhulst might send hazelnuts, if he found any, or walnut oil, if the country produced it.42

In the search for valuable minerals, Verhulst was to have the assistance of Peter Minuit. Minuit and others were “to investigate what minerals and crystals” might be found on both the North and South rivers and to take care that a thorough survey was made of all of the mountains, to the point of engaging in what archeologists call “shovel tests” at various elevations. Minuit was not to confine himself to minerals, though. He was also to be on the look out for any “dyes, drugs, gums, herbs, plants, trees, or flowers that might prove useful or valuable. Verhulst was to send any promising samples back to the Netherlands for analysis. The director was also to be sure that he and his subordinates closely questioned the Native Peoples for information as to where metals such as gold, silver, copper, iron, or lead might be found and even whether the Indians knew of any sulfur or salt mines. He was also to seek out coal for local use in the forges.
Alternatively, Verhulst could order the colonists to make charcoal, so that coal would no longer have to be supplied from Europe.43

One director’s key responsibilities, though, was to develop the fur trade in order to put the colony on a strong economic footing. For this purpose, he was to have a cabin erected for the storage of the furs, presumably at Fort Orange, to which he was to send one or more sloops during each May-to-November trading season. He was also to employ competent persons who knew how to write in order to keep accurate records. The WIC ordered Verhulst to send samples of other types of skins aside from beaver—such as deerskins—that might prove valuable on the European market. Company employees were to be careful to maintain good relations with the Indians, on whose trade networks they would have to rely in order to obtain furs and other skins. For this reason, the Dutch were only to take up lands that they could obtain through peaceful negotiation. Verhulst was warned not to get embroiled in the Native Peoples’ internecine disputes, and where possible he was to use his influence to compose them. Moreover, company employees were to determine which items the Indians most desired in trade so these could be supplied from Europe. Verhulst was also to make certain that the stock of trade goods on hand—hatchets, mattocks, knives, and other metal goods—were kept in good condition.44

The director was to determine what kinds of fish were to be found in the seas near New Netherland, as well as in the bays and rivers of the colony. He was to be on the lookout for species that could be dried and salted for sale in European markets. He was likewise to determine if there were oysterbeds that produced pearls. This, as Champlain had noted, had proved a lucrative business for the Spanish.45
In all the aforementioned ways, the WIC envisioned New Netherland as an extractive colony, the purpose of which was to ship timber, minerals, furs, and fish to European markets. But the instructions to Verhulst also demonstrate that the colony was not to be entirely dependent upon the extraction of commodities. In fact, the instructions show that the WIC’s plan was to develop New Netherland as a self-sufficient community with a mixed economy, only partly dependent upon extraction. The colony was also to include industry and agriculture.

In terms of industry, Verhulst was to survey all waterfalls and streams where mills might be erected. The WIC seems to have been most interested in sawmills. Since the colony would have an immediate need for lumber to build houses, store houses, barns, and forts, efficiency seems to have required that timber be transformed into usable lumber on the spot. For trade purposes, it would also be economically desirable to ship ready-cut boards from which the heavy waste wood had been removed. But the WIC’s instructions mention erecting other types of mills as well—presumably gristmills.46

The company directed Verhulst to find a suitable place for a shipyard, where ships, sloops, and barges could be built, repaired, and caulked. A shipyard might well be needed for the local riverine trade and also to care for ships going back and forth between the colony and the ports in Holland and Zeeland. This shipyard would also serve the larger network of the WIC, so that New Netherland, and more particularly New Amsterdam, would become a port of call for ships making the circuit from the Netherlands to the Caribbean, then up the coast of North America before turning east to Northern Europe. Some of these ships would stop first in West Africa to pick up slaves to sell in South America or in the Caribbean. In fact, most ships sailing from the Dutch
Republic to New Netherland, since the beginning of the fur trade, did not follow a direct route, but went by way of the Caribbean. This was the case, for instance, with the *Mackreel*, which sailed first to the Caribbean in company with the *Duyf* before making its way to the Hudson. As time went on, providing services for visiting ships and crews would becoming an increasingly important part of the New Netherland’s economy—one that historians have often overlooked.47

But perhaps what is most interesting about the WIC’s instructions in 1625 are the provisions the company made for farming. The instructions make it clear that the WIC had hired farmers to go to New Netherland to develop the colony’s agriculture. All of these “head farmers” would be in the employ of the company, but the instructions also indicate that the WIC expected the families it had sent over and those it would send in the future to set up private farms as well. Verhulst was to seek out tillable land and divide it among the company’s farmers and the families according to their ability to cultivate it. For the company, in particular, he was also to have barns constructed to store farm produce.48

The instructions reveal the WIC’s intention to send cattle, trees, vines, and “all sorts of seeds” in order to convert New Netherland into a neo-Europe with agriculture established, as far as practicable, on the European model. The company also expected the families it sent over to grow grain, hay, flax, and hemp, which they might sell to the WIC. In addition, Verhulst was to determine whether the grapes native to the region were suitable for producing wine or vinegar. If not, the company would send vines from Spain or the Canary Islands in order to establish viticulture.49 It is quite clear from the instructions that in 1625, at least, the WIC meant to establish a self-sustaining colony—
which perforce meant one firmly grounded in settled agriculture. This was the same
vision Champlain had for his colony at Quebec, though the WIC seems to have enjoyed
more resources for carrying it out.

In the spring, the directors of the WIC took further steps to develop the
agricultural base of the New Netherland. Wassenaer, from his perspective in Amsterdam,
noted that in April, the directors, seeing that “the country is well adapted for agriculture
and the raising of everything that is produced here . . . resolved to take advantage of the
circumstance.” To do so, they prepared “an extraordinary shipment” of 103 “head of
livestock,” including horses, cows, and bulls “for breeding and multiplying.” They also
sent a number of oxen, hogs, lambs, sheep, and poultry. Two ships of 280 tons each were
prepared for the purpose. Each animal had its own stall and an attendant to ensure safe
passage.\footnote{50}

In conjunction with the shipment of livestock, a number of “country people” were
engaged to go to America. Along with them went “all sorts of seed, ploughs and
agricultural implements” as well as “all furniture proper for the dairy.” A third ship was
sent with extra supplies of feed and water for the livestock in case the voyage lasted
longer than the usual six weeks. The \textit{Mackreel}, a “fast sailing yacht,” was also
dispatched on this expedition. It was to bring “six completely equipped families and
some single persons,” a total of forty-five new colonists. Unfortunately, a short time after
the flotilla left the Zuider Zee, the \textit{Mackreel} got into a scuffle with a Dunkirker in the
English Channel and was captured. What its final disposition was is unknown, but it
seems to have eventually escaped and made its way to New Netherland. Four prominent
investors in the WIC, on their own initiative, also dispatched the 260-ton \textit{Ruijter}, carrying
sheep and hogs and all manner of farm equipment. These were to be sold to the colonists in exchange for furs, which would have been a violation of the company’s monopoly. As it turned out, the Ruijter never made it to New Netherland. Moorish pirates captured it off the coast of Africa as it followed the usual southern route to North America.51

In April, too, the Amsterdam Chamber took the opportunity to send Verhulst “Further Instructions.” These mainly dealt with the handling of livestock and farm equipment, which again indicates that at this stage, the WIC was committed to establishing an agricultural foundation for its North-American colony. Perhaps the most interesting provision in this regard is that the farm animals sent from the Netherlands were not to be slaughtered but were to be used for breeding purposes in order to recreate in the New World the animal husbandry of the old. Only the excess yearlings and rams could be used for food. To keep tabs on how the animals fared, the directors ordered the council in New Netherland to provide a report by every ship as to the number, increase, and condition of the livestock, along with an account of how much additional pastureland was available, so that the WIC could maintain and increase the colony’s stock.52

For the purpose of “sowing and pasture,” Verhulst was to take possession of 800 to 1000 morgans of unoccupied land. The director was to see that a suitable fortification was built in close proximity to these agricultural lands in order to protect them. If no unoccupied land could be found, Verhulst was to amicably induce the Indians to transfer ownership of some of their lands to the Dutch—perhaps through purchase. Under no circumstances, though, was land to be taken by force.53

The new instructions reveal that the WIC had sent over five professional “head-farmers” to take charge of the company’s agricultural effort. This was a significant
investment in the agricultural sector of the colony. The council was to distribute the
cattle and horses to the head-farmers by lot. Each head-farmer was to receive at least
four horses and four cows selected from the best. Once the head-farmers had completed
the service to the company for which they had been contracted, they were to be permitted
to remain in New Netherland as free colonists. This right was also extended to all other
WIC employees.54

The WIC had also sent farm implements. These included carts and plows, as well
as hand tools. The company recognized that these implements would likely be in short
supply. It therefore directed the council to let the people use them in turns by lot. In
cases where a farm implement wore out or broke, the old implement would have to be
brought before the council before the company overseers would issue a new one.55

While the new instructions, like the old, seem to have emphasized livestock-
raising and general farming, the WIC asked its employees and all colonists to think about
whether there were suitable locations for other types of agribusiness and industry.
Potential enterprises included viticulture, salt-making, charcoal production, brick-
making, tobacco-growing, barrel-stave production, commercial fishing, and whatever else
might strike the colonists as useful and/or profitable.56

Indian relations are also a matter of concern in the Further Instructions. The
Amsterdam Chamber was aware that the Native Peoples in the area of New Netherland
engaged in “many wars and enmities,” and the directors once again warned Verhulst and
the settlers not to interfere in them and to maintain peace with all the Indian groups so far
as possible. Where they could, the Dutch were to resolve disputes between Indian
groups. In this way, the Further Instructions repeat the provisions of the original
instructions. But while the Amsterdam Chamber hoped the settlers could maintain amicable relations with the neighboring native groups, it also sought to maintain the military superiority of the Dutch. This is indicated in the provision in the *Further Instructions* that prohibits the colonists from teaching the Indians to ride or raise horses.\(^{57}\)

To a greater extent than the provisional regulations of 1624, the *Further Instructions* provided for the extension of a Dutch system of justice to the colony. This system, in part, would deal with Indian relations, and at this juncture, the Amsterdam Chamber took into account the likelihood that the Indians had their own system of justice, which could not be summarily disregarded. In any case in which an Indian injured a colonist or a colonist’s property, the first resort would be for the “tribe” to which the transgressor belonged to provide the punishment. The Indians would merely have to notify the Dutch that the transgressor had been appropriately punished. But in any case in which the Indians themselves failed to uphold justice, the council of New Netherland could arrest the transgressor and punish him or her according to Dutch customs.\(^{58}\)

In cases in which one of the Dutch settlers committed any wrong—whether against the Indians, fellow Dutch settlers, or a stranger—the council had full jurisdiction and was responsible for insuring that the transgressor was “punished as the circumstances of his crime require[d], in order that the Indians may see that both in civil and criminal cases we do justice without regard to persons . . .”. The instructions make it clear that while Indian forms of justice should be respected, they would only be respected to a certain extent, so that in the final analysis, the Dutch system was predominant.\(^{59}\)
The WIC authorized the province secretary—Gerrit Fongersz—who was also the new vice-director, along with two members of the council to sign and execute all “wills, marriage settlements, contracts, and other instruments upon which anyone might base a claim to title or mortgage of real estate.” These matters and the administration of justice more generally were to be carried out according to the “ordinances and customs of Holland and Zeeland and the common written law.”

To facilitate trade, the company required the colonists to employ the Amsterdam standard of weights and measures. Because most of the trade would be barter with the Native Peoples, the council was to try to persuade the Indians to conform to the Amsterdam standard. The council was also given the power to punish anyone who attempted to perpetrate a fraud by not conforming to the standard.

Land too was to be measured for the purpose of commoditizing it. The settlers were enjoined to stake off the boundaries of their house lots and to construct their houses in accordance with regulations. All houses should front the street and be flush with all the others “in order not to break up the general arrangement.” Presumably, once lots had been surveyed, they might, in accordance with the provisional orders, be sold after the original owner had abided there six years. The surveying of lots, which allowed for the transformation of land into private property—a marketable commodity—extended a European concept of land into North America. William Cronon has noted that the English commoditization of land, more than anything else, distinguished their concept of land ownership from that of the Indians. The Dutch also began to employ this concept almost from the first, and it provided them with a key ceremony of possession—one that
would not be shaken even after the English conquest of New Netherland, at least as far as private possessors were concerned.\textsuperscript{62}

To carry out its instructions and administer the colony, the Amsterdam Chamber bolstered the director’s council, adding Pieter Minuit, Joost van den Boogaert, the engineer and surveyor Cryn Fredericxsz, and the secretary and vice-director Fongersz to the existing membership. Presumably Thienpont remained vice-director for trade at Fort Orange. Any ship captains who happened to be in port would also serve on the council. This council had wide discretion in terms of administering justice, regulating the economy, and distributing land. But the Amsterdam Chamber also imposed limits on the local government, in order to maintain its own power over the colony. The council was not permitted to remit any sentence or issue pardons. These could be suggested to the company directors, but the directors had to approve them in writing. More importantly, the council could not “pass any new laws or ordinances” or “sanction any new custom” unless these ideas were sent over for the approval of the Nineteen.\textsuperscript{63}

By the end of 1625, then, it would seem that the WIC had provided a rather firm foundation for its colony in North America. About 300 colonists had been settled, including many families, which ought to have allowed the population to begin reproducing itself.\textsuperscript{64} Livestock, seeds, plants, and farm equipment were on hand, much of it under the control of professional farmers—a luxury that New France and New England did not enjoy. Carpenters under the direction of a professional engineer had begun to erect forts at key locations on the Delaware, on Noten Island, on the Connecticut River, and near the present site of Albany. The latter had proved a convenient site for trade with a number of Indian groups. The WIC, in a good faith effort to fulfill its vision for a full-
fledged agriculturally based settlement, seems to have left nothing undone that could conceivably be thought necessary to a flourishing settlement.

But by year’s end, the carefully planned colony in New Netherland was in disarray even to the point of dissolution. The company had concentrated on the construction of fortifications and warehouses so that housing for the settlers was whatever they could scratch together for themselves—“hovels and holes,” as the Rev. Jonas Michaëlius described them—and this in spite of the fact that the company had given Fredericksz, the engineer, specific and detailed instructions on how houses within the fort and on the outlying farms ought to be constructed.65

Food was also in short supply. Some of the cattle died after eating poisoned plants, others from accidents or general neglect. Many of the company farmers as well as the family farmers seem to have neglected agriculture in order to get rich quick in the fur trade. Michaëlius, who arrived in 1628, found the food supply “scanty and poor.” Butter and milk seemed particularly difficult to come by. As far as Michaëlius could see, the population had outpaced the ability of the farmers to provide. He thought ten or twelve additional farmers and more cattle ought to be sent immediately. Only pigs and sheep seemed to be thriving. Another problem for the farmers had been locating suitable farmland. Although the soil was fertile in many places, it had proved difficult to till because of the many roots that crisscrossed it. Issac de Rasière, who arrived in the colony in September 1626 as secretary to the council, found the land sufficient but the people who had been sent to work it deficient. “At times,” he noted with some exasperation, “I cannot sufficiently wonder at the lazy unconcern of many persons, both farmers and others, who are willing enough to draw their rations and pay in return for
doing almost nothing . . .” He thought farmlands could be profitably developed, but that “greater diligence” would “have to be applied than has hitherto been done, under the superintendence and management of sober, industrious persons, of whom, may God better it, there is a great lack here.”

De Rasière was referring, not just to the agricultural sector, but to the colony as a whole. When he arrived, he found Director Verhulst under arrest and the vice-director and previous secretary Gerrit Fongersz to be a vindictive “drunkard and idiot.” Moreover, Councilor Daniel van Kreickenbeeck, who seems to have been put in charge of the trading settlement at Fort Orange in place of Thienpont, had precipitated a disastrous war with the Mohawks, which nearly ruined the fur trade. Krieckenbeeck and a number of other Dutch were killed in the fighting.

The WIC had given Verhulst a formidable responsibility. He had to govern the diverse and scattered population of a frontier colony. The bulk of the population were French-speaking Walloon families, who may well have been a close-knit group and culturally indisposed to taking orders from a Dutch station director. The rest of the settlers were chiefly young, single men in the company’s employ. While they had signed on to work on behalf of the WIC, they had come to America for their own purposes and often put these purposes above the needs of the company and the colony. Something of the attitude of these workingmen can be seen in de Rasière’s comment to the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber that sawyers in the company’s employ “are a rough lot who have to be kept at work by force, and whenever your Honors are engaging sawyers or such-like men, it had better be done at so much per foot, or cord, or on shares; in that way your Honors cannot be cheated as they are in many things.”
Verhulst had somehow to organize this recalcitrant population to build housing, fortifications, warehouses, and other necessary structures from scratch. He also had to establish the agricultural sector of the colony on a firm footing, again from scratch, with very little knowledge of how to adapt European agricultural practices, plants, and livestock to American conditions. Moreover, he had to deal with a number of different Native-American groups in order to convince them to acquiesce in the Dutch settlement of their lands and to engage in trade.

Unfortunately for the WIC, Verhulst was temperamentally unfit for the enormous task of colony building. According to de Rasière, the director’s harsh and arbitrary rule pushed the already unruly population into lawlessness. Moreover, Verhulst quarreled with his own council to the point where the council deposed him, placed him under arrest, and had him tried and sentenced. When he swore he would betray the colony to the French or English, the council decided that he and his wife had to be sent back to the Netherlands and banished forever from the colony.69

Having taken so extraordinary a step as deposing the duly appointed director, the council, on its own initiative, appointed Pieter Minuit in Verhulst’s place. Minuit, who seems to have been in the colony earlier as a surveyor of mines, had come back on the ship Sea-mew, which sailed from the Texel on 9 January 1625. By the time he arrived in New Netherland, the council had already placed Verhulst under arrest. Minuit, with the able support of de Rasière, quickly set about reorganizing the colony.70

One of the first things he did was to concentrate the population at two key points—Manhattan Island and Fort Orange. The forts on the Delaware were abandoned. Minuit also moved the civilian population of Fort Orange—eight families—down to
Manhattan. To secure the fur trade, the director left a garrison of fifteen or sixteen men on the upper Hudson. The disposition of the trading post on the Connecticut River at this time remains unknown, but the fact that it goes unmentioned indicates that it too was abandoned.71

Sometime in 1626, either Minuit or Verhulst, but most likely Minuit as tradition supports, purchased Manhattan Island from the local Indians—very likely the hostile Manhattes. Oliver A. Rink believes that Minuit bought the island, for sixty florins worth of trade goods, sometime between 4 May and 26 June. In this way, the Dutch secured possession of the locus of the most important node on their North-American network. Here Minuit had a fort and an administrative hub built. In effect, this transferred the provincial capital from Noten Island, where Verhulst seems to have had his residence, to the new settlement of New Amsterdam. Previously, the Dutch seem to have used Manhattan Island chiefly to pasture their cattle, preferring to keep their dwellings on the more easily defended Noten Island.72

Minuit also instructed Fredericksz and his carpenters to build houses for the colonists. By the end of 1626, Wassenaer could report that the settlement on Manhattan Island had a stone countinghouse with a thatched roof, about which were clustered thirty rudimentary houses constructed of “the bark of trees.” François Fezard, a millwright, was in the process of constructing a large sawmill, on the top floor of which would be a meeting room that would serve as the colony’s first church. At the very least, Minuit had ensured that a majority of the population would have adequate shelter for the coming winter.73
With the help of de Rasière and Sebastian Janz. Krol, Minuit also restored amicable relations with the Mohawks. This allowed the fur trade, which was more than ever the colony’s economic lifeblood, to proceed. When de Rasière arrived at New Amsterdam, Minuit was at Fort Orange “to inquire into the disaster caused by the reckless adventure of Kreickenbeeck.” The council appointed Krol, who seems to have acquired some facility in Indian languages, to take Kreickenbeeck’s place as commissary or vice-director at Fort Orange. The Mohawks were also anxious to compose matters and sent a delegation of thirty or forty people to New Amsterdam meet de Rasière, who was to organize the fur trade for the WIC. “I showed them as much friendship as I could,” said de Rasière, “so that they begged me that when the season approached I would send them a sloop or small ship, until whose arrival they would keep the peltries, which I promised to do.” The agreement was sealed with an exchange of gifts. The Mohawk gave de Rasière ten beaver pelts, while he gave them “a fathom of duffel-cloth and a small quantity of beads, two hatchets, and a few other things.” Still, de Rasière worried that he might not be able to keep his promise because he might not have the support of the council, which was required to ply this trade. He was also unsure whether enough men would available to man a sloop. But the exchange demonstrated that both the WIC and the Mohawk had now become more or less dependent on the fur trade.74

Such was the state of the New Netherland colony at the end of 1626. Minuit’s reforms likely saved it for the time being, but the colony was much different than the one the colonization faction of the Amsterdam Chamber had envisioned. These powerful directors of the WIC had imagined a robust, self-sufficient agricultural settlement colony with population centers located at key points on the province’s three great rivers. They
had done their best in 1625 to plan, populate, and supply such a colony, but the reality came far short of their dreams. Rather than a complex network with farm-based support that could serve not just the interests of trade, but also of further settlement, what Minuit was able to salvage was a linear network along the Hudson that focused chiefly on the fur trade and to a lesser extent on the extraction of timber. The WIC’s original plan seemed to be that the extraction of resources would be just one component of a mixed economy. The colony was also supposed to enjoy a localized agribusiness. The spread of farming would allow its major port town, either on the Delaware, as originally planned, or on the Hudson, to become a gateway for further European settlement. The colony’s chief town was also envisioned as a port-of-call for Dutch ships returning to Europe after trading or making war in the Caribbean or in South or Central America.

In 1626, it was still to be seen whether the WIC would remain committed to its original vision of a self-sufficient agricultural colony or would trim its aspirations and satisfy itself with an “off-shore” trading-post arrangement. In the long-run there were advantages to realizing the grander vision. The need to supply the colony from Europe with most of the food-stuffs it would need as well as clothing and other material necessities was an expensive proposition, to which Michaëlis could attest in 1628. But the creation of a sufficient agricultural base for the colony would require a much greater short-term investment, and in 1626, it was not at all clear where the money for such an investment could be found.

In order to firmly establish their trade network in North America, the Dutch had to assert possession—at least in the eyes of other European powers—over the territory between the Delaware and Connecticut rivers. To do so, they had used, as had the French
before them, the full panoply of ceremonies of possession. These included the right of first discovery, establishing the position of the territory with the techniques of celestial navigation, map-making, naming, literary and graphic description, establishing and maintaining regular trade, issuing charters, and inscribing the territory with Dutch buildings and physical markers. But given the counterclaims of rival powers, none of these ceremonies seemed fully adequate. As early as 1623, the WIC had therefore adopted the policy, which the States General accepted, that settlement alone conferred possession. Patricia Seed has argued in one instance that, for the Dutch, “the principal mode of manifesting possession was describing,” while at another point she asserts that it was maintaining a regular trade. Certainly the Dutch, in their official reports and in promotional writing were quite efficient at describing the territories they claimed. But description, in the official Dutch records of the period, is never cited as conferring legal possession, and the WIC, by 1624, had clearly decided that maintaining a regular trade would not be sufficient to defend its claim to New Netherland. Seed also argues that “Settlement, the dominant English image of entitlement and right to rule, occupied a distinctly minor place in Dutch efforts in the New World.” She holds that the Dutch did not regard settlement “as the root of legal rights over the region” and like Merwick argues that “the purpose of populating uninhabited regions was not to claim the region, but to further trade.” Of course, such claims fly in the face of the explicitly stated policy of the West India Co. that settlement alone conferred legal possession, which amounted to an outright denial of the legal efficacy of all other ceremonies of possession.

It is also clear that the Dutch, in the period between 1623 and 1626, meant to establish something more than an “off-shore” trading-post colony. The detailed plans for
the colony and the initial effort the WIC put forward demonstrate that the directors, in contrast to Merwick’s view, meant from the outset to establish an agriculturally based settlement colony in order to establish a Dutch empire in North America. The fact that these plans did not manifest themselves as fully as the directors envisioned does not negate their intentions. The question for a later chapter will be whether the WIC changed its position in the wake of the financial problems it encountered in the late 1620s.

While the WIC’s effort in North America proved far less successful than had been hoped, elsewhere in the Atlantic the company had suffered one disaster after another. Early in 1625, the Spanish and Portuguese outfitted a combined fleet of fifty-two ships to recover Bahia. This armada reached Brazil in the early spring and immediately besieged the Dutch there. The WIC, upon receiving word of the siege, almost immediately dispatched two fleets—one under Boudewijn Hendricks and another under Andries Veron. The directors had prepared these forces in advance, having anticipated that the Iberians would make some effort to recover Bahia. They reasoned that the Dutch garrison was strong enough to hold out until the fleets arrived. Unfortunately, while the garrison in its fortification could have kept the Hispano-Portuguese force at bay until Hendricks and Veron arrived, it was under the command of the irresolute and drunken Willem Schouten, who decided to surrender on 30 April, nearly a month before the arrival of the Dutch relief expedition. Even after Hendricks and Veron arrived, they did not reckon themselves strong enough to dislodge the Iberians, and sailed away after only a perfunctory effort to engage them.76

The WIC had sent a third fleet to Africa under Jan Dirkszoon Lam in an attempt to capture the Portuguese stronghold at El Mina off the coast of Guinea. This would be
the third attempt on the part of the Dutch to capture this important trading station. El Mina was the source of slaves, who provided the bulk of the labor for the Portuguese sugar empire in Brazil. While the WIC at first had been morally opposed to the idea of using slaves, the company soon found that without them, it would be impossible to keep up sugar production at Bahia, since free persons could not be found who would endure the torturous labor of harvesting the cane or processing it in the dangerous *enginhas*, or factories. But even though Veron, after the failure at Bahia, had sailed off with eleven ships to join Lam in his August assault on El Mina, the Dutch were repulsed with heavy losses.

Hendricks, with eighteen ships under his command, had likewise tried to salvage something out of his expedition after the failure to retake Bahia. In the fall of 1625, he attempted to capture San Juan, the capital of Spanish Puerto Rico. While he did manage to take the fortress at El Morro and burn the city, he was soon after forced to retreat back to his ships when Spanish reinforcements arrived from Santo Domingo. He then cruised the Caribbean, hoping to run into the Spanish silver fleet, but again had no luck. In July 1626, the hapless Hendricks died of a fever off the coast of Cuba. His fleet then limped back to the Netherlands with little to show for the immense investment the WIC had made.

The catastrophes at Bahia and El Mina hung heavy financial losses on the WIC, bringing the company, as Rink has said, “to the brink of bankruptcy from which it never was to recover fully.” As the company’s ships made their way back to port from the Caribbean and the coast of Africa, the WIC’s stock prices plunged on the exchange, making it difficult to raise new capital. All of this, along with news of the problems in
New Netherland under Verhulst, made the WIC as a whole extremely reluctant to invest anymore money in its North-American venture. In essence, the WIC washed its hands of the colony on the Hudson and left its further development in the hands of the Amsterdam Chamber’s colonization faction.79

From the perspective of 1626, it was easier for the WIC’s directors and stockholders to see what had been lost than what had been gained. While the initial vision of the colonization faction for a self-sustaining agricultural colony had not been realized, the Dutch had established a largely extractive riverine linear colony up the Hudson for the purposes of conducting the fur trade with the Native Peoples in the interior of North America. They had begun the process of transferring specifically Dutch systems of agriculture, religious belief, and justice to the Hudson. They had also started to reinscribe the landscape with, albeit modified, but nevertheless Dutch-style houses, fortifications, buildings, and farms. The Dutch had projected military, commercial, and political power across the Atlantic and into the American hinterlands in much the same fashion as the French and for much the same reason—they wished to challenge Spanish domination of the Western Hemisphere. But the Dutch also had an additional reason for creating New Netherland in the way they did. They also hoped to challenge France’s monopoly of the lucrative North-American fur trade. It is significant for the study of networks that the West India Co. had administrative control of the colony. In spite of its initial setbacks, the WIC’s operations extended, not only from Amsterdam to New Amsterdam but also to the Caribbean, South America, and to the West Coast of Africa. This diffuse network, upon which New Amsterdam was a node, transformed the colony from a simple linear colony to something much more complex. It
was also clear that developing New Amsterdam and New Netherland more generally would not be simply a matter of a few rich merchants in Amsterdam imposing their undiluted vision on North America. Whatever the Dutch colony would become would also be conditioned by the aspirations of the colonists themselves and of the Native Peoples among whom they settled.80

1 Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 10, 24.
2 Interestingly, Phillip III died on 31 March 1621, a little more than a week before the truce ended, but not before giving the order on 29 March to renew the war. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 264.
3 As Oliver A. Rink notes, the charter was published on 7 July and backdated to 3 June. See his *Holland on the Hudson*, 60; A.J.F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswick* (Albany, N.Y.: University of the State of New York, 1908), 86-91; Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 5-6, 20-21.
5 Ibid., 91-93.
6 Ibid., 92-93, 109-12.
7 Ibid., 92-95.
8 Ibid., 94-97; Rink, *Holland on the Hudson*, 63.
10 Ibid., 96-97, 100-101.
13 Sombart’s account of the development of European trading companies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is prejudiced and oversimplified, but his particular description of the WIC seems apt. He does, however, neglect to mention that the States General established the WIC as a wartime measure. See his *The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1915), 73-76.
20 Ibid., 7.
My account follows the more detailed deposition that Trico gave to Justice of the Peace William Morris on 17 October 1688. Her early deposition of 14 February 1685 (N.S.), given before New York Gov. Thomas Dongan, suggests that she was among the settlers on the Delaware. This anomaly might be explained as a mistaken interpretation of what Trico was saying on the part of Dongan. O’Callaghan, *Documentary History*, 3:49, 50-51; Peter R. Christoph, ed., *The Dongan Papers, 1683-1688, Part 2: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Thomas Dongan* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 216-17. The inaccuracy of Trico’s depositions has been widely criticized. Van Cleef Bachman, however, makes the case that her testimony is substantially accurate. See his *Peltries or Plantations*, 82 n. 23. See also George Olin Zabriskie, “The Founding Families of New Netherland: The Rapalje-Rapelje Family, Part II,” *de Halve Maen*, 67 (April 1972): 11.

It may be that Verhulst did not sail on the *Orangen boom*, but, as Rink reports, came to New Netherland on the *Mackreel* later. Perhaps he made his way back to Amsterdam after the *Orangen boom* was delayed at Plymouth. See Rink, *Holland on the Hudson*, 81-82; Stokes, *Iconography*, 4:59-60; Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations*, 83-84, 84 n.
65 *DRNN*, 164-68; Dingman Versteeg, *Manhattan in 1628: As Described in the Recently Discovered Autograph Letter of Jonas Michaëlius Written from the Settlement on the 8th of August that Year and Now First Published* (New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1904), 69.

66 Versteeg, *Manhattan in 1628*, 64-65


68 Ibid., 207.

69 Ibid., 176, 184, 187-88.

70 Ibid., 176, 271 n. 6.


74 *DRNN* 192, 195.


80 Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations*, 3.
CHAPTER 8

THE FUR TRADE—THE DOMINANT FLOW?

In the early encounters between indigenous peoples and Europeans along the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers, each side began imagining a landscape transformed. For the Europeans this process began once the dream of a Northwest Passage collapsed. Up to that point, North America seemed to them little more than an obstacle to be overcome, one that short-circuited a connection to the Asian trade. As Frederick Jameson aptly noted so many years ago, “[Henry] Hudson gave nearly the finishing blow to the notion, discredited for many years but revived in the years just before his voyage, that there was a strait in the forties of north latitude which led through to the western sea.”1

With the failure of their initial goal of finding a way through to the Pacific, Cartier, Champlain, and Hudson all began to look at the space along the great rivers through the commercial lens of early modern Europeans. These lands, it seemed, might easily be converted to what Alfred Crosby would later term “neo-Europes.” But, in fact, there were two interconnected spatial considerations. The first was to determine what was of value that could be shipped to distant markets overseas and sold for profit. Cartier thought he might have found gold and diamonds near Quebec only to discover, once he had taken them back to Europe, that they were nothing more than quartz crystals and iron pyrites. As Peter N. Moogk noted, it was the Native Peoples who understood best what the country could offer to the Europeans, at least initially. In Chaleur Bay, the local peoples tried to entice Cartier and his men to come ashore by holding up “certaine skins upon pieces of wood.” These furs, which the indigenes produced through hunting,
would eventually become the gold and diamonds of New France and New Netherland. Champlain and Hudson certainly realized, seventy years later, the market value of furs, in as much as European fishermen had been independently engaged in fur trading along the coasts for decades. Champlain was able to report that the Native Peoples willingly traded a variety of furs—beaver, marten, lynx, and otter—for European goods. And de Laet, reporting on the voyages of Hudson and the New Netherland Co.’s captains, noted that along the Hudson River there was “a great traffick in the skins of beavers, otters, foxes, bears, minks, wild cats, and the like.”

The second consideration with spatial implications for the Europeans was whether the land could support settlement. To determine whether it could, Champlain sailed further inland until he reached lands suitable for farming. He also took note of stands of trees useful for fuel and for the construction of European-style houses. Hudson and his subordinates remarked upon the abundance of fish in the Hudson River, the wild grapes in the forests suitable for viticulture, the presence of iron, the great stands of timber for house construction, and the slate, also useful for building permanent European-style abodes. De Laet, synthesizing the reports of several Dutch captains, commented that the lands along the Hudson were perfectly suited to European settlement, by which he meant agriculture and industry. All that was wanting, he claimed, was European knowledge systems, domestic animals, and crops. According to the Dutch, the reason the land seemed so “wild” and “empty” was that the local peoples lacked the understanding to bring it under useful cultivation or to use their resources for the improvement of their way of life.
What the Europeans could not readily see was that the Native Americans along the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers had transformed the landscape to suit themselves—but in ways that were largely invisible to the Europeans. Each band had marked off territories for hunting and gardening, and, in the case of the Huron and Iroquois, for larger-scale agriculture—territories that had to be defended against interlopers. They had built villages and towns, using materials at hand. And by their own lights they had created a way of life they considered superior to that of the Europeans. As Father Pierre Biard observed in 1611, the Mi’kmaqts of Acadia “think they are better, more valiant and more ingenious than the French; and what is more difficult to believe, richer than we are.” The Native Peoples also considered themselves physically superior. The Huron, for instance, believed the eye and hair color of the French and particularly their facial and body hair, which Indian men lacked, were symbols of French racial inferiority. The Franciscan friar Gabriel Sagard noted that the Huron “have such a horror of a beard that sometimes when they try to insult us they call us Sascoinronte, that is to say, Bearded . . . moreover they think it makes people more ugly and weakens their intelligence.”

Lack of sources makes it more difficult to assess how Native Peoples imagined the landscape after significant contact with the Europeans, but some indications can be found in European accounts. Donnacona, for instance, clearly imagined himself and his town, Stadacona, as an important hub in the potential trade between the French and the Native Peoples west along the St. Lawrence. He saw his future as a middleman, connecting and controlling two trading networks. This vision never materialized largely due to French inaction in the seventy years following Cartier’s last voyage. Still, by Champlain’s time, the Indians on the north bank of the St. Lawrence certainly hoped the
future would bring French protection from their enemies to the south, as well as some alleviation of the privations they endured during the long winters. They clearly imagined and seemed to hope for a mixed Indian-European community of some sort. But the nexus of trade—specifically the fur trade—had shifted to the west of Quebec. By 1611, the most robust of the native fur trading networks connected to the French overseas trading network at Montreal.

The Native Americans on the lower Hudson, by contrast, either because of the bad behavior of the crew of the Half-Maen or because of a general lack of understanding and miscommunication between the Dutch and themselves, envisioned a fearful future if the Europeans were not driven off. Farther upriver, though, the friendly reception a local sachem gave Hudson seems to indicate that the Native Peoples there desired some kind of trade or perhaps a defensive alliance with the Europeans.

It seems fairly certain, though, that without the fur trade none of these imagined futures involving the Europeans—whether of settling unimproved “empty” land, of forming communities based on alliance, or of bitter warfare—would have materialized. But because the Native Peoples had access to furs, for which the Europeans had a vast potential market, all three possible futures were realized, at least in part. According to the traditional view, it was the opportunity for profit which the fur trade provided that prompted the Europeans to project commercial, military, and political power up the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers. Vance has remarked that in a colonial setting, “settlement takes place and populations expand in fairly direct proportion to the avenues of trade open to the colonists, unlike the situation typical of the old lands of Europe and Asia where populations and settlement reflect political ends and general health conditions.”
As a categorical statement, Vance’s declaration might be something of an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is true that trade played a key role in prompting the Europeans to create nodes of settlement and riverine networks along the St. Lawrence and Hudson, and there is little doubt that commerce and early modern capitalism played an integral part in reshaping the American landscape and with it the social and economic arrangements of people on both sides of the Atlantic. It was, after all, the special configuration of the fur trade, which seemed to require creating and sustaining a connection with Native-American trade networks in the interior of the continent, that determined the linear shape of the initial French and Dutch colonies and defined these colonies even to contemporaries. And yet, a closer look at the motivations of the colonizers suggests that the fur trade may not have been the most important determinant in the development of the New France and New Netherland.

To be sure, without the promise of some profit, it is unlikely that the Europeans would have sustained their colonies in North America. But, as Van Cleaf Bachman has pointed out, in order to realize some return on investment, the French and Dutch trading companies faced “four basic technical problems.” They had (1) to establish and maintain transatlantic communication between the metropole and the colony, “(2) to contact the Indians over as wide a territory as possible, (3) to induce them to hunt and trade furs, and (4) to sell the furs in Europe.” All four of these criteria were met in both New France and New Netherland, which allowed for the establishment of what might be deemed the dominant linear flow between these colonies and the metropolitan capitals. What may not be so well understood is just how tenuous this flow was.
In terms of New France, Champlain, who knew more than anyone about what the
country might produce by way of commercial profit, did not think furs would be
Canada’s most important commodity. In 1618, he made a report to the Chamber of
Commerce of the city of Paris in order to enlist its aid in persuading Louis XIII to support
the development of the colony. He noted that the codfishery off the Atlantic Coast of
New France would produce more than a million livres each year, far in excess of what the
extraction of furs might produce. In addition, salmon fishing in the harbors and rivers
could bring in 100,000 livres annually, as would sea-sturgeon and sea-trout fishing. Eels,
sardines, herring, and other fish from American waters could also be profitably brought
to market in Europe to the tune of another 100,000 livres. In all, then, French
commercial fishing in North America—of both the dried and fresh variety—would be
worth 1.3 million livres per year and would remain, as one scholar has said, “much more
important than the fur trade expeditions.”7

Champlain estimated that the annual worth of products from walrus and seal
hunting along with profits from whaling would run to approximately 700,000 livres per
annum. Whale bone, walrus tusks, and seal skins would produce some 500,000 livres,
while whale oil, so important for lighting in the seventeenth century, would bring in an
additional 200,000 livres.8

Forest products were also abundant in North America and could easily be brought
to market in Europe, where wood was in short supply. Champlain had seen vast forests
of “oak, elm, beech, walnut, plane, maple, birch, cedar, cypress [eastern red cedar],
chestnut, hemlock, pine, fir and other woods.” The Canadian forests would supply the
materials to construct ships, particularly ships’ masts, but could also be harvested to
make barrel staves, window frames, wainscoting, and the like. He estimated the annual value of wood from New France on the European market at 400,000 livres. Gum and wood ash would bring in another 400,000 livres, while pitch, tar, and resin might realize 100,000 per year. In all, forest products would be worth 1.3 million livres annually. Indeed, in 1612, five years before Champlain made his report to the chamber, the French government had abolished its tariff on timber from New France. Soon after, Canadian timber replaced that which had formerly been obtained in Russia and Scandinavia for the French market.\(^9\)

Champlain, who always had an eye out for fertile tracts of land, noted that the soil easily yielded grain, maize, beans, peas, and dye roots, with the implication that it might yield still more if European methods were applied. Hemp, valuable for making rope, grew naturally “without cultivation.” He estimated that dye root and hemp alone could bring 700,000 livres on the European market. Products manufactured from hemp, such as sail-cloths, cables, and rope itself would be worth a further 400,000 livres. In all, then, plant-based agriculture would bring at least 1.1 million livres in European sales. He also noted that much of the land along the St. Lawrence was suitable for raising cattle, which would produce additional revenue. He added that the Spanish had realized more than a million livres in gold each year from hides alone and implied that New France could produce at least as much.\(^10\)

Nor did Champlain neglect to mention metals and other minerals. These, which would include silver, iron, and copper, would yield a further one million livres on the European market. Moreover, he reckoned that permanent settlement would be conducive to further exploration, so that other useful minerals might well be found.\(^11\)
Lastly, Champlain reported on furs, the trade in which was “not to be scorned.” He believed that furs of all kinds, not just beaver, but also marten, fox, lynx, along with the skins of deer, moose, and buffalo could bring 400,000 livres in Europe.\textsuperscript{12} This meant, of course, that of the categories of commodities Champlain mentioned—fishing, forestry, agriculture, mining, and furs—furs, in his estimation, would realize the smallest profit.

Champlain’s presentation to the Chamber of Commerce was no doubt a sales pitch, aimed at garnering the chamber’s support and ultimately that of the king’s for establishing permanent settlements in New France. He might, therefore, have exaggerated the profits to be made from these various enterprises. But even if this were the case, he would have had no reason to deliberately underestimate the value of furs in relation to other commodities, and his estimate on what furs might bring in terms of profits was not far off, at least in years when the trade was good.

There is a certain prescience to Champlain’s report in another way as well. Over the course of time, the fur trade \textit{would} become relatively less important, particularly after the Euro-American population reached a certain level. This, of course, would require another two centuries. But for the moment, furs, and specifically beaver furs, captured the imagination of French entrepreneurs. Furs could be extracted and might realize a profit without the development of any significant settlements, which had proved expensive to found and maintain. But while the trade in furs gave both the French and Dutch colonies their economic \textit{raison d’être}—their dominant and defining flows—the network connections established for the fur trade remained relatively anemic. New France and New Netherland existed on a shoestring.
Bachman notes that furs were valuable because of a preexisting market in Europe. But this market, which increased dramatically in the sixteenth century, was largely confined to fine furs, which were a status symbol for the aristocracy and the growing class of elite merchants. The source of these furs in the early sixteenth century was Russia—though North America soon began to supply martin and fox furs in limited quantities. North-American furs only became important on the European market after 1575 when a war between Russia and Sweden disrupted the Russian supply.  

Initially, Parisian furriers were interested in otter, lynx, and marten furs from North America and did not have much use for beaver. The reason was, simply, familiarity. French furriers were used to working with otter, lynx, and marten furs from European sources. These furs were used primarily for making lined garments, and offered, as John F. Francis has noted, “warmth, comfort, and display in the traditional fashion.” They were the trappings of luxury and status.

The main peltry trade of the Native Americans, though, was in beaver skins. The Indians preferred beaver because it was waterproof, warm, and durable. The key problem for the French and Dutch trading companies was to create a new European market for beaver, which would allow the Europeans to tap into preexisting Native-American trade networks and to siphon off their most valuable commodity. As Champlain’s contemporary Marc Lescarbot noted, in Europe there was no interest in beaver pelts during Cartier’s time. Even as late as 1582, the market for beaver pelts in Paris was limited. In that year, the Parisian fur dealer Mathieu Garnier complained to his suppliers that due to an extraordinary influx of North-American beaver skins that year, he had so many beaver furs on hand already that he could not sell them. Creating a market
for the flow of these particular pelts required the reintroduction of the beaver hat, a revived fashion connected to status. Beaver hats had been in high demand up until the fifteenth century, but fell out of fashion with the depletion of the European beaver population. The discovery of a vast supply of beaver pelts from North America allowed European hatters to reintroduce the beaver hat in the late sixteenth century. As Harold A. Innis has demonstrated, the creation of this market required the development, not only of a trade network to link the preexisting Native-American network to Paris and Amsterdam, but also of technical processes for manufacturing the hats.¹⁵

Because it quickly became a status symbol, the beaver hat commanded a high price on the European market, high enough support the long-distant shipment of the pelts from North America. As Bernard Allaire has shown, from 1580 to 1620, a plain beaver hat on the Parisian market sold for about 100 sous tournois while a plain woolen felt hat sold for only about 30. In the 1650s, the price of a plain beaver hat had risen to about 300 sous tournois, compared to just 50 for a woolen felt hat. Decorated beaver hats, which were lined with fabric and trimmed with ribbons and feathers, commanded even higher prices, peaking at between 700 to 800 sous tournois in the 1620s. By contrast, decorated woolen felt hats sold for less than 75 sous tournois.¹⁶

In the 1570s and 1580s, most furs were brought back to French ports by fisherman and whalers as a secondary source of income. Basque whalers and fishermen initially played a key role in the North-American fur trade, as they returned yearly to the port towns of La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Bayonne with some furs in their cargo holds. Breton and Norman fisherman brought furs back to St. Malo, Dieppe, and Rouen, respectively. Furs that came into the ports of St. Malo and Dieppe normally transited
through Rouen on their way to the Parisian market. Calais, Dunkirk, Brest, Nantes, and Bordeaux all became points of entry for North-American furs, but once the trade was organized on a monopoly basis beginning in the late 1580s, the main ports of entry would be St. Malo, La Rochelle, and Rouen. The trade to Rouen normally passed through the Norman channel ports of Dieppe, Le Havre, and Honfleur.17

The destination for most of the furs French traders brought back to Europe was Paris, no matter where they were landed, though some other French towns also purchased furs in transit. But beginning in the 1580s, French merchants also sent Canadian otter, beaver, and marten furs to London and Amsterdam and to ports on the Baltic Sea. The Baltic trade peaked in 1603, even before the settlement of Quebec. In that year, more than 6,000 furs were traded to the Baltic. Thereafter, the trade declined precipitously to below 3,000 furs and was generally less than 1,000, except in 1612 when about 4,500 furs where shipped to the Baltic ports. This was during the brief period of free trade on the St. Lawrence. From 1624 to 1634 there was no appreciable trade in furs from France to the Baltic. This can be explained in part by the fact that the English took control of New France from 1627 to 1632. In the later years up to 1644, the French only traded significant numbers of pelts to the Baltic in 1637 and 1643, when French merchants sold 1,765 and 1,300 furs, respectively, in the Baltic markets. Allaire has hypothesized that trade to the Baltic picked up when there was a glut of furs on the Paris market or when prices in France were too low.18

Prices for beaver pelts on the French market seemed to enjoy a steady rise from 1545 until 1586 when they reached 60 sous tournois in Paris. After a slight decline between 1586 and 1593, prices again rose steadily up to 1603 when they broke above 60
sous for the first time. This was, of course, the first year of de Monts’ monopoly. After a brief decline in 1604, prices shot up again in 1608, the year of Quebec’s founding, this time to above 150 sous tournois. The period of free trade from 1610 to 1613, however, brought about a precipitous decline in price of furs on the French market. Prices fell to 60 sous tournois and did not recover until the early 1620s, when they once again reached 120 sous. The capture of Quebec, combined with the siege of La Rochelle in 1627-28 and the Thirty Years’ War, brought about a spike in prices. Beaver pelts sold for a high of 240 sous on the Parisian market in 1632, but once the French recovered Quebec, prices plunged, reaching a low of below 50 sous in 1641 before rising again to 200 sous in 1645.\(^{19}\) Such fluctuations obviously made it difficult for merchants to predict the profitability of the trade over time.

For the French traders, France itself, in most years, provided a sufficient market for Canadian furs, but since this market already had a regular source of supply of the best beaver furs, it was not, it seems, a significant market for the Dutch. It does seem, though, that the French were concerned about the Dutch entering the market and took steps to ruin the Dutch trade. Wassenaer notes, for example, that in 1624, just as the WIC’s operations in New Netherland were getting underway, the French flooded the Amsterdam market with Canadian furs, which were “finer than had ever been seen in this country.” The French effort did not succeed, so that the Netherlands itself provided a market for some quantity of furs brought from New Netherland. England, Southern Europe, Poland, and Germany likely provided additional markets. As Bachman notes, Leipzig was the premier market for furs in Western Europe. Still, in Poland and Germany, the WIC had to compete with the Russian trade.\(^{20}\)
Once the network was in place, a market had been established in Europe, and the manufacturing problems had been solved, the beaver pelts could begin to flow. According to the *Jesuit Relations* of 1626, some 15,000 to 22,000 beaver pelts were shipped from New France each year. This seems like a significant flow, and it certainly led to the rapid depletion of the beaver population close to Quebec and Montreal. This in turn pushed the hunting grounds farther into the American hinterlands, a process that is also discernible in New Netherland. But in terms of a flow along a network—the fur trade required only one or two ships per year trading between Quebec and the various ports serving Paris. Even as late as 1632, records indicate that no more than five ships per year traded to New France—which included Acadia. This increased to eight ships on average in the 1640s and from eight to fourteen in the 1650s, though it is likely that only one or two of these ships engaged in the fur trade to Quebec. But in terms of a flow along a network—the fur trade required only one or two ships per year trading between Quebec and the various ports serving Paris. Even as late as 1632, records indicate that no more than five ships per year traded to New France—which included Acadia. This increased to eight ships on average in the 1640s and from eight to fourteen in the 1650s, though it is likely that only one or two of these ships engaged in the fur trade to Quebec.  

Because New France was located in a somewhat colder climate than New Netherland and could draw on Native-American hunters who ranged far to the north of the St. Lawrence, the French were generally able to export higher quality pelts with thicker fur than the Dutch could. This meant that French furs commanded a higher price in Europe. But in spite of the higher profit margin and greater volume of the French trade, the merchants doing business in New France did not always make a profit. De Monts found it difficult to enforce his monopoly, and the Native Americans were quick to take advantage of competition among the French in order to increase their own profits. Champlain was aware that unbridled competition was ruinous to the French and to the colony. During the period of free trade from 1610 to 1612, fur traders to New France generally operated in the red. In 1610, merchants along the St. Lawrence, as a result of
this ruinous competition, were unable to trade all of the merchandise they had brought with them from France. While they traded for some furs, they returned to France with a net loss for the season. Poutrincourt in Acadia seems to have fared better. One of the men who had come out to Port Royal with him wrote home that if he had only brought three or four laborers with him, chiefly to tend to agricultural chores, he might himself “expect to have a yearly trade in Beaver and other Skins amounting to seven or eight thousand livres.” Trade in 1611 was even worse because competition had increased both at Tadoussac and the Lachine Rapids. At Tadoussac, the Montagnais had found a means to drive up the price of fur. As Champlain explains, “they wanted to wait until several ships arrived in order to get our wares more cheaply. Thus those people are mistaken who think that by coming first they can do better business; for these Indians are too sharp and crafty.” This incident also demonstrates that, at this stage at least, it was the Native Peoples who really controlled the market. At Tadoussac and in Acadia, the French traded whatever they could for furs, not just manufactured goods, but also copper, iron, hemp, wool, and even vegetables. Along the Acadian coast, ships from La Rochelle and St. Malo may have done a good business in furs, but Poutrincourt, who was unable to pursue the trade until late in the season because his supply ship came late, found that the Indians had no furs left to give him. This meant that the fur trade in no wise provided any financial support for his colony in 1611. Direct reports from French sources for the 1612 trading season are lacking, but likely the trade had improved over the previous year. The improvement can be seen in the number of Canadian furs French merchants shipped to the Baltic, which shot up from fewer than 1,000 in 1611 to about 4,500 in 1612. 22
By 1613, Champlain, under the viceroyship of Condé, had created a trust of sorts—La Compagnie du Canada or the Rouen and St. Malo Co.—in which traders combined resources and pooled trade goods. This association of merchants, though, thought little of developing the colony, which remained small and weak throughout Champlain’s time. The merchants were mainly concerned with their own profits, which were sometimes thin because they had the expense of maintaining the good will of the royal government through offering bribes and also had to foot the bill for keeping the trade network open and secure. The latter required building and maintaining a series of forts stretching from Quebec to the Great Lakes. Nevertheless, the trust did fulfill its purpose. In 1613, trade at Lachine Rapids improved considerably over the previous two years, partly because the number of merchants was restricted to those who had licenses from Condé and partly because Champlain, who was on the scene, was able to persuade more of the western Indians to come to the barter. Still, a number of the French who traded at the rapids suffered losses when unlicensed French traders waylaid them as they made their way from Quebec to Tadoussac and robbed them of their furs.23

In the years 1615 and 1616, the fur trade in New France was particularly good. Along the Atlantic coast, where Biencourt maintained a post at Port Royal and Robert Dupont-Gravé another at St. John’s River, the trade in beaver and elk was brisk. John Smith, who cast an envious eye on this trade, believed that a single vessel could bring home six or seven thousand furs each trading season from Acadian coast alone. The coastal trading posts were outside the purview of Condé’s monopoly, but the Rouen and St. Malo Co., sometimes known as Champlain’s Company, which held the St. Lawrence monopoly during these years, also seems to have plied a profitable trade in furs in 1615
and 1616, at both Tadoussac and the Lachine Rapids. Trade seems to have remained robust in 1617 and 1619. A lack of information for 1618 makes any characterization of the trade for that year impossible, but there is every reason to assume it went on as usual.24

But in spite of these successful trading seasons, the Rouen and St. Malo Co. did little to develop the colony. Rather, the merchants, particularly some in Rouen led by Daniel Boyer, began to balk at supporting the further settlement of the country as they had agreed to do at the formation of the company. Boyer and his clique, taking advantage of Condé’s imprisonment for challenging Marie de Medici’s regency, attempted unsuccessfully in 1617 to block Champlain from continuing as lieutenant. Later, in 1619, Boyer was able to prevent Champlain and his wife from sailing to New France. The Rouen merchants, with whom Champlain met, refused to support his continued leadership of the colony even after he showed them his commission from the king. Ultimately, the king upheld Champlain’s authority, but by that time it was too late to make the trip he had planned for 1619. This incident, though, made it clear to Champlain that some new financial arrangement had to be made if the colony were to succeed.25

In October 1619, Louis XIII, now firmly in control after his mother had been removed as regent, released Condé from prison and restored him to the viceroyship, which the marquis de Thémines de Cardillac, the marshal of France, had assumed in the interim. Condé soon thereafter sold the viceroyship to his brother-in-law Henri de Montmorency. Montmorency was the admiral of France and as such could be counted on to take a greater interest in New France than had Condé, who seems to have been
chiefly concerned with his own status and with extracting money from his office. The king formally appointed Montmorency viceroy on 25 February 1620, and early the next month the new viceroy reappointed Champlain as lieutenant. Montmorency was a busy man, and to oversee the affairs of New France in the metropole, he created the new office of intendant. To this, he appointed the able courtier Jean-Jacques Dolu.²⁶

Champlain sailed back to America in the late spring and reached Tadoussac on 7 July after a difficult voyage. After a few days there, he hurried upriver to Quebec, which he found in rough shape. The few meager buildings were in disrepair and the fortifications needed attention. He reported to Dolu that under the current company, further development of the colony was hopeless. If they had not already been disposed to cancel the Rouen and St. Malo Co.’s monopoly, Montmorency and Dolu were now convinced. Charging that the company had failed to live up to its agreement to begin colonization, Montmorency transferred the monopoly to William de Caën and his nephew Emery, merchants of Rouen. The initial grant was to run for eleven years. In return, the Caëns were to pay Montmorency 1,000 crowns per year as well as Champlain’s salary of 200 crowns. They were to put ten men at Champlain’s disposal each summer, maintain six Récollet missionaries in country, and settle six families of at least three persons each during the course of the monopoly.²⁷

In 1621, the Caëns mounted their first expedition. It was a formidable one. William de Caën arrived with three ships manned by some 150 sailors. Unfortunately, he arrived too late to do much by way of the fur trade. Caën had sent word ahead to Champlain that the king had revoked the old company’s charter. Montmorency had also sent advance orders for Champlain to seize the old company’s furs and goods in the
factory at Quebec as partial payment for its failure to invest money in the settlement.

This first ship, though, had not brought out the king’s commission, so that Champlain had no proof that the old company had lost its charter. Since the old company factors were united in not giving up either their goods or the trade until he produced a new commission, Champlain had no choice but to ignore the order to seize the goods in the factory and to allow the old company to trade freely until the proper papers arrived. As it turned out, the first ship to arrive at Tadoussac for the trading season was that of Pont-Gravé, who sailed for the old company. Champlain seems to have thought the old company might resort to force in order to maintain control of the goods in the factory, and he began to put the fortifications in shape to withstand an attack, but Pont-Gravé soon assured him that he contemplated no such thing. Champlain’s longtime friend and associate had been apprised before leaving France that the old company would almost certainly loses its privileges, and he had, therefore, brought along no new provisions or stores. He was prepared merely to collect whatever the current trading season had to offer and to bring the factors and workmen of the old company back to France.28

When William de Caën finally arrived at Tadoussac, he brought with him news of the decree of the king’s council that both companies were free to trade for the year 1621. Caën, though, immediately violated this order. He commandeered Pont-Gravé’s ship, the Salamandre, at Tadoussac and directed Champlain to carry out the viceroy’s order to seize the old company’s goods. Partly through the good offices of Champlain, Caën relented and returned the Salamandre to the old company, the factors of which he allowed to trade along the river. Inexplicably, Caën himself carried on no direct trade with the Indians, but contented himself with exchanging some of the trade goods and
other supplies he had brought from France with the old company factors for some of their
furs. In this way, Caën brought home 1,700 beaver pelts in 1621, though this seems
hardly enough to cover the cost of the expedition.39

Both companies left men at Quebec to spend the winter, which signified that Caën
was open to an amalgamation. This is precisely what happened. In the spring of 1622,
the king’s council decreed that the new united company hold a monopoly of the trade
until 1635. The new company transferred five-twelfths of its capital to the shareholders
of the old in payment for the monopoly privileges the old company had lost. In this way,
the two companies were united. The united company seemed to enjoy a good business in
furs during the time it held an exclusive monopoly. Trade seems to have been especially
good in 1623 and 1624 when new Indian groups, including the Iroquois, joined the barter,
even though infighting among the various Indian nations and the very presence of the
Iroquois may have suppressed the trade a little. This uneasy peace with the Iroquois
lasted until 1627. The victories Champlain and his allies had won seem to have prompted
the Iroquois to seek peace with the French, a peace that Kriekkenbeeck’s attack in 1626
reinforced, since it prompted the Iroquois to temporarily shift their trade from the Dutch
to the French. In 1623, Biencourt in Acadia, too, enjoyed his usual round of barter for
furs during the summer before returning to France in the fall. He would not return to
Acadia again, but ceded his holdings there to his friend Charles de Saint-Étienne de la
Tour, who had already established a trading post and residence at nearby Cape Sable.30

In 1625, Montmorency transferred the viceroyship to his nephew Henry de Lévy,
le duc de Vantadour. Vantadour was a favorite of the Jesuits who would now begin to
take a leading role in New France. His accession also spelled trouble for the Protestant
William de Caën. Although the trade in Canada had been good since the Caëns had taken over the monopoly, they had trouble keeping out Basque and Rochelais interlopers, who ate into the company’s profits. The Caëns also had to deal with lawsuits over accounting emanating from their partners in the old company. In 1626, the Rouen and St. Malo associates agreed to leave the actual trade entirely to the Caëns in return for a share of the profits. For an investment of 60,000 livres each trading season, the old company associates would receive a forty-percent profit guaranteed. This was a steep profit for the Caëns to pay. A further complication arose when the new viceroy required that only a Catholic could serve as commander of the company’s trading fleet. This meant, of course, that William de Caën could no longer supervise the operations of his own company in New France. This task would have to be left to his brother-in-law Raymond de Ralde, a Catholic, under whom Émery de Caën, William’s brother, seems to have made annual voyages.31

The changes in administration seem not to have affected the fur trade very much. The trade remained good in 1626, which was a usual year. The next year, trade was exceptionally good both in Acadia and on the St. Lawrence, and the company seems to have taken in a record 22,000 pelttries. One reason for the increase may have been the withdrawal of the Iroquois from the trade after the peace Champlain had fashioned fell apart. This likely encouraged the traditional allies of the French, particularly those who feared the Iroquois, to come to trade in greater numbers.32

The Caëns, in spite of the difficulties they encountered, certainly made a handsome profit from the fur trade. The number of beaver pelts the company secured in any given year ranged from 12,000 to 22,000, though accurate figures beyond this are not
to be found. Conservatively estimated, this meant that the Caëns, in a usual trading season, likely brought in about 15,000 pelts. Each pelt could be bought from the Indians for about 30 sous in trade goods, but sold on the European market for 300 sous or 15 livres. This meant that each skin yielded a gross profit of 13.5 livres on the French market. An average year, then, would yield a profit of some 202,500 livres. William de Caën estimated that his annual expenses amounted to 46,000 livres. He also had to pay 24,000 livres to the associates of the old company each year. With these sums deducted, the Caëns still realized a tidy profit of 132,500 livres in an average year, some of which had to be paid to their partners in the new company. Little of this, however, translated into the development of a settlement colony along the St. Lawrence, though the Caëns did invest in improving, extending, and fortifying the fur-trade network.  

Time, though, had run out for the Caëns’ monopoly. The growing Roman Catholic power at court took a dim view of leaving the development of New France in the hands of a Huguenot merchant. Cardinal Richelieu, who became the leader of the king’s council in 1626, took a strong interest in overseas colonies and trade. He seems to have been strongly influenced by a memorandum that his cousin Isaac de Razilly, a knight of Malta, wrote him which emphasized the importance of overseas trade and a colonial empire to the economy of France. In order to take direct oversight of French colonial affairs, Richelieu created for himself the position of Grand Master and Superintendent General of the Navigation and Commerce of France and soon after abolished the position of Admiral of France. Razilly’s memorandum, combined with Jesuit and Récollet complaints about the Caëns’ administration of the St. Lawrence colony, led Richelieu to
revoke their monopoly and create a new trading company that he hoped would better
serve the interests of settlement.34

In 1627, at the Cardinal’s urging, the king granted a monopoly of the fur trade to
the newly created Company of New France, which would consist of one hundred
associates, each of whom would invest 3,000 livres. Only about one-third of the
associates were merchants. These were drawn from all parts of coastal France— Paris,
Rouen, Bordeaux, Dieppe, Calais, La Havre, and Libourne. The greatest number of
associates, though, were nobles of the robe or of finance, which reflected Richelieu’s
influence. As Lucien Campeau has noted, the Company of New France was chiefly “a
society of colonization and not of commerce.” For the first three years, profits were to be
reinvested in the company, and in the out years associates would only be allowed to
withdraw one-third of their yearly profits, so that, theoretically at least, there would
always be a sufficient fund available for the development of the colony. The king also
extended the territorial grant of the new company to include both the St. Lawrence and
Acadia and, beyond this, all of North America from the Arctic Sea to Florida. The grant
extended west to the Great Lakes and “beyond.” The Company of New France was given
a fifteen-year monopoly, not just of the fur trade, but of all commerce within its territorial
bounds, except fishing. At the expiration of fifteen years, the company would still enjoy
a monopoly in skins of all kinds. French colonists would be allowed to trade freely for
furs with the Native Peoples, but they were required to sell only to the company at the
fixed price of 40 sous for each pelt.35

It does not appear, however, that the company was able to raise all of its initial
subscriptions for some time. The articles of agreement allowed associates to opt out after
an initial payment of 1,000 livres, and by the beginning of 1628, twenty-nine associates had done so. The company then began an immediate campaign to recruit replacements and by 1634 was able to fill all the vacancies. Unfortunately, six of these new associates defaulted. They were replaced by ten new members as of 1641, so that the company as of that year consisted of 104 associates. According to Campeau, who has done the most detailed investigation of the finances of the company, by 1643 it had a total capital investment of 382,000 livres, which included abandoned initial deposits and additional capital that members of the nobility had granted to promote settlement and Christianization.36

With the establishment of the Company of New France, there was for the first time a real prospect that the tiny colony would now receive the support it needed to steadily develop. Up to 1627, Quebec consisted of the original compound Champlain had built, the unfinished Fort St. Louis, which Champlain had constructed in 1620 on the mountain at Quebec, the Franciscan hostel of the Récollets, and the farm of the Hébert family. The entire population numbered fewer than sixty. The fact that there were only two farms at Quebec by 1627 shows how dependent the colony still was nearly nineteen years after first settlement on support from Europe. Under the terms of its charter, the Company of New France was required to send 4,000 settlers within fifteen years and provide and maintain a priest for each new settlement town. It was also to provide each settler with provisions for three years. In 1628, the company sent out a fleet of four ships with 200 settlers, four priests, and abundant supplies. This expedition was designed to mark the beginning of a new era for New France. But the privateer David Kirke, sailing under English letters of marque, surprised and captured the French fleet off
the Ile d’Anticosti, a loss to the company of 164,720 livres—more than half the entire amount of its capitalization. The next year, Kirke captured Quebec itself, the population of which was on the verge of starvation. The loss of Quebec prevented a second fleet of four ships from the Company of New France from venturing up the St. Lawrence, which occasioned a further devastating loss of 103,976 livres. In 1630, the company fitted out yet another fleet with which it hoped to resupply its remaining possessions in Acadia. The cost to the company was another 77,092 livres, so that in three years, its losses nearly exceeded its initial capitalization. Revenues from trade in 1630 were just 7,301 livres against these devastating reverses. In all, the losses amounted to 338,488 livres, in the wake of which the company lost a lawsuit before the royal council, which cost it another 45,000 livres. To pay this, the directors were compelled to levy 450 livres against each associate.37

With the capture of Quebec, Champlain was made prisoner and taken to England. New France remained in the possession of the English until the summer 1632, when at Champlain’s behest it was returned to France. This interlude delayed any further attempt to develop the colony. In the face of these calamities, the company made no profit at all. When the English finally agreed to return Acadia and Canada to France in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (29 March 1632), the colonial infrastructure at Quebec and elsewhere was in ruins, but the fur trade networks remained intact, thanks largely to the French interpreters and traders who had protected it.38

During the negotiations over the return of Canada and Acadia to France, the Caëns and Company of New France attempted to regain some toehold in the fur trade to recoup losses. Richelieu allowed the Caëns to send a trading ship to Quebec in 1631 as a
compensation for the loss of their monopoly, which was supposed to have run until 1635. This ship, in the charge of Emery de Caën, arrived safely, but Lewis Kirke, who was now in charge at Quebec, would not allow Caën to participate in the trade, though he did permit him to off load his merchandise for storage. The Company of New France dispatched two ships. One, which was sent to resupply the La Tours at their trading posts on St. John’s River and Cape Sable, was able to successfully trade for a few furs and to bring back some fish. The other, under Capt. Charles Daniel, made it to Miscou. There Daniel had a scuffle with some Basque traders, which seems to have prevented him from doing much business. He also dispatched a pinnace to trade at Tadoussac, but the English confiscated all the furs he obtained there.39

The immediate beneficiary of the Treaty of St. Germain was the Caëns Co., which had still held Quebec when the Kirkes captured it. The treaty called for the return of all ships and property, for which William de Caën received 82,700 livres in compensation. This was far short of the 266,000 livres he claimed was due him, but to make up the difference, Richelieu conferred the fur-trade monopoly on him for the next year and gave him a ship worth 10,000 livres.40

For the Company of New France, which was virtually bankrupt, the peace, while welcome in itself, brought no immediate financial relief. A good many members of the company had had no experience in trade and had subscribed to the association chiefly to promote the Christianization of the Native Peoples. Therefore, the parent company, in November 1632, leased its monopoly to a subordinate group of the associates who were more interested in the fur trade. In return, the subordinate company agreed to pay the Company of New France a paltry 10,000 livres per year along with a one-third interest in
the trade. The subordinate company, which subscribed from its members a fund of 150,000 livres, earned 180,000 livres profit in the five years it held the lease, 60,000 of which it paid to the Company of New France. It seems that between 1630 and 1632, the parent company created a number of other subsidiary companies, as well—each with its own capitalization—to oversee the trade and the development of the various areas where the French had already established trading posts. These included: the Company of Bordeaux to support the posts on Cape Sable and St. John’s River, which the La Tours controlled; the Company of Normandy to support the settlement on Cape Breton; The Company Cheffault-Rozée to develop posts at Miscou Island, Chaleur Bay, and on the lower St. Lawrence; and the Company Razilly to support settlement at Port Royal and its environs. In the case of Quebec, though, the problem with leasing the fur trade to a subordinate company seems to have been that while the subsidiary sometimes made a profit, the parent company retained the responsibility for administering and settling the colony, and the funds the subsidiary company paid to its parent were plainly inadequate for this task.41

By the time the subsidiary company on the St. Lawrence assumed economic control, the trade had changed considerably. The opening up of trade with the Huron and western Algonkian at Lachine Rapids had shifted the focus of the fur trade from Tadoussac and made it impossible for the Montagnais to control the trade and drive up prices. Moreover, beaver and other animals had, temporarily at least, all but disappeared from the areas near Tadoussac, rendering the Montagnais and other hunting peoples destitute. They complained to the Jesuits in 1637 that “their country was being stripped of Elk and other animals, and that consequently, if the land could not furnish them a
living, they would be utterly lost.” Even further west at Trois-Rivières and among the Huron themselves, the beavers, by 1635, were being hunted out, so that the Jesuits began to plan conservation measures.42

Shifting the trade further west to Lachine Rapids may have helped the French company sustain its monopoly, but it also cut into profits. When the trade centered on Tadoussac, merchants could anchor their seagoing ships there and trade directly for furs with the merchandise on board. When the trading season ended, they loaded the furs directly onto their ships, weighed anchor, and departed for their home ports. By contrast, to trade at Lachine Rapids meant that after the seagoing ships anchored at Tadoussac, all the trade goods had to be transferred to pataches or small barques that could make the long trip to Quebec and then on to the rapids. These complications increased the time spent conducting the trade and, naturally, also the cost to the merchants.43

Further difficulties plagued the French fur trade during the 1630s. Although the barter seemed to rebound fairly well in 1633, ominously, some contention seems to have broken out between the Huron and the Ottawa-river Algonkians. The latter, hoping to secure the trade for themselves as middlemen, tried to dissuade the Huron from coming to trade directly with the French. The previous June, the Huron had murdered Etienne Brulé, whom the French considered a traitor after he had cooperated with the British. The Algonkians themselves had indiscriminately precipitated the murder of two Frenchmen, one in May and another in early July. Although Champlain was not particularly unhappy about the killing of Brulé, the Algonkian lumped his murder in with those they had committed and told the Huron that the French were displeased and might seek retribution not only against the Algonkians but the Huron as well. This tactic was
meant to keep the Hurons from descending the river to trade. Champlain, however, sent Amantacha, a Huron who had been educated and baptized in France, to convince the Huron people that it was safe to trade with the French. As a result, some 500 to 700 Huron and a good number of Algonkians and Montagnais made the trip to Quebec. But in 1634, war with the Iroquois prevented many of the Huron from coming to trade. Two years later, the Algonkians of Allumette Island, in another attempt to control the flow of trade for their own benefit, initially prohibited the Huron from passing through their territory to reach the St. Lawrence. This was their right, and the Huron, who were their allies, normally submitted to their wishes. As father Pierre Le Jeune explained, “It is strange that although the Hurons may be ten against one Islander, yet they will not pass by if a single inhabitant of the Island objects to it, so strictly do they guard the laws of the Country.” Normally, the Huron could gain passage by distributing a few presents, but in 1636, the Algonkians used the recent death of their leader as an excuse to bar them. Le Jeune, however, suspected that the Algonkians’ underlying motive was to become the middlemen between the French and the western Indian nations. In 1636, the Allumette Islanders finally relented, and the trade seemed to be carried on as usual.44

In spite of its arrangement with the first subsidiary company, by 1637, the Company of New France was once again facing bankruptcy. Its penury was due at least in part to a lawsuit that William de Caën had brought before the royal council, which in 1634 had ordered the Company of New France to pay Caën 79,000 livres for the loss of the trade under his monopoly at the time the Company of New France was formed. The parent company could not raise the money to pay this debt and in the end had to be bailed out by the subordinate company. Under these dire circumstances, upon the expiration of
the lease to the original subsidiary company in 1638, a number of associates formed a new subsidiary that would hold the fur-trade monopoly for the next four years. The associates of the new subsidiary subscribed a fund amounting to some 243,000 livres. Under this new agreement, the Company of New France incurred a loss of 70,000 livres. By 1641, its total debt stood at more than 415,796 livres. The associates had to subscribe another 103,500 livres out of their own pockets just to underwrite the annual expedition to New France in 1642. As Campeau has pointed out, any company expressly formed for trade would have declared bankruptcy at this point, but the mission of the Company of New France was imperial, not economic.45

To the dismay of both the subsidiary company and the Company of New France, trade in the early 1640s was somewhat depressed. The Iroquois, now armed with arquebuses obtained from the Dutch, stepped up their attacks on the entire French trade network. Their goals were to prohibit the Algonkians from descending the Ottawa and to prevent the French and their Indian allies from using the St. Lawrence as an avenue of exchange. Through well-planned ambushes, the Iroquois spread terror and disrupted the French trade. They brought the furs they seized in the process to Fort Orange for barter. And yet, in spite of these difficulties, the French witnessed enough of a rebound in trade so that by 1645 the Company of New France had realized a profit of 85,000 livres. Unfortunately, even this modest gain seems to have been lost through the dishonest dealings of one of the company’s directors, Jean Verdier.46

Cardinal Richelieu, the real leader of the Company for New France, died in 1642. His death compounded the colony’s difficulties. Under pressure from the Iroquois, who had gone back on the warpath, those inhabitants who now had a stake in the colony,
along with the resident Jesuits, decided that the salvation of New France depended upon the inhabitants themselves gaining control of the fur-trade monopoly. Only by this means would the money from the trade flow back to the colony. With this in mind, two Quebec colonists—Pierre Le Gardeur de Repentigny and Noël Juchereau des Chatelets—traveled to France to petition the company to lease its monopoly to the community of inhabitants. They were assisted at court by Father Charles Lalemant, who had influence with the queen.47

With bankruptcy imminent, the Company of New France was ready to unload some of its responsibility in New France. It appealed to the king, who approved the company’s lease of its fur-trade monopoly to an association of eight fur traders resident in Canada. Under the agreement of 6 March 1645, the Company of New France retained the fur-trading rights to Acadia and Miscou Island, but the trade of the St. Lawrence region to the west, beginning ten leagues from Miscou Island, was given over to the Communauté des Habitants, which consisted of all of the heads of families settled on the St. Lawrence. These were organized into three classes, each of which was entitled to a one-third interest in the monopoly. In return for the privileges of the monopoly, the Habitants had to bear the expenses of the government and pay a yearly fee of 1,000 of the best beaver pelts to the Company of New France. They also had to bring twenty new settlers to the colony each year. The agreement specified that the Company of New France still held control of the lands, from which it could create seigneuries and provide other grants. It also retained the power to select administrative officials. The new town of Ville-Marie at Montreal was included in the Habitants’ company, though its government remained, as it had been, semi-autonomous. The new company received
financial backing in the metropole from Hilaire Leclerc, a treasurer of France, who purchased all the trade goods and the provisions—some five ships’ worth—for the rejuvenation of the colony and its trade.  

In 1645, the parent company shared the trade with the Communauté des Habitants. It was a lucrative year. According to Father Jerome Lalemant, the Habitans shipped ninety-eight casks of beaver, each weighing 200 pounds. At ten livres per pound, the beaver skins alone were worth 196,000 livres. In the early fall of 1646, the Communauté benefited further from the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Mohawks, who had proven to be the most significant threat heretofore to the Huron-French trade network. The other four nations of the Iroquois remained in a relation of hostility to the French. But with the partial peace in place, the Habitans, who had the trade to themselves in 1646, shipped 168 casks of furs to France, representing more than 33,000 pounds of pelts, worth 330,000 livres. It was the best year on record to that date. 

In its first two years, the Communauté des Habitans had been a resounding success, and for the first time much of the money made in the fur trade—some 190,600 livres in 1645 alone poured back into the colony rather than into the coffers of merchants in the metropole. But after 1646, debilitating problems hampered the company’s trade and profitability. In order to protect the monopoly of the Habitans’ company, Gov. Montmagny on 6 September 1645 had prohibited individual colonists from trading furs with the Native Peoples. This order occasioned widespread protests, both from the colonists and the resident Jesuits. The chief complaint, however, seems to have been that the company’s directors were organizing the trade to enrich themselves at the expense of the commonalty. In the fall of 1646, Gov. Maisonneuve of Montreal and Robert Giffard,
a company director, traveled to Paris to discuss the company’s difficulties before the king’s council. In March of the next year, the council adopted new regulations that opened the fur trade to all inhabitants so long as they sold the furs to the Communauté des Habitants at a fixed price. The council also enacted a budget for the administration of the colony, to be paid from company receipts, and established a colonial council consisting of the governor-general, the superior of the Jesuits, and the governor of Montreal, to provide oversight of the company’s operations. The imposition of an administrative budget amounting to 49,000 livres led the Habitants to protest in turn. As a result, the king issued an edict reducing the salaries of the governor-general and the governor of Montreal as well as other administrative costs, so that the overall budget stood at 30,000 livres.50

But a more pressing problem for the French trade after 1646 was the renewal of warfare between the Iroquois and the Huron. The Mohawk officially ended their peace agreement with the French and the French-allied Indians in the fall. By early 1647, the Five Nations were ready to begin a war of extermination against the Huron—their ancient enemies—and by extension against the French. The effect on the fur trade was devastating. In 1647, the Huron were too afraid to travel downriver to trade. By early July of the following year, the Iroquois had invaded Huronia and were systematically destroying one village and town after another. By 1650, one quarter of the Huron population of some 9,000, which epidemics from 1634 to 1640 had already seriously weakened, were dead. The Iroquois had captured some two thousand Huron and allied Petuns. These had either been killed or incorporated into the Iroquois nation as slaves. Most of the rest of the Huron had scattered. In effect, the great Huron Confederacy was
no more, and New France had for the most part lost its most important Native-American allies and trading partners, though a remnant of the Hurons did continue to trade with the French after 1650.\textsuperscript{51}

In spite of the continued hostilities, the fur trade went forward in 1648, though at a slightly reduced volume. In that year, 250 Huron arrived at Quebec in such need of French hatchets and other goods that they were willing to risk ambush en route. In all, the trade brought in 250,000 livres. This included 22,400 pounds of beaver and 500 of moose. The next year, the Communauté des Habitants shipped some 20,000 pounds of pelts, which at eight livres per pound realized about 160,000 livres tournois. This marked a serious decline in the company’s trade from the high point of 1646. It was barely enough to cover expenses, which included public administration, shipping costs, rents, and debt to creditors. The debt alone amounted to about 133,000 livres. The trade for 1650, the year when the Iroquois-Huron War reached its disastrous climax, at least from the French/Huron perspective, was even worse. In order to equip and dispatch ships for the year, the Communauté had to rely on creditors, which immediately placed the company under an obligation of some 88,615 livres against the profits of the fur trade for that year. The trade, significantly reduced even from the year before, brought in only 11,135 pounds of furs, which sold for some 62,300 livres. After paying port costs, the company remained indebted to its creditors for the year 1650 alone to the tune of 28,485 livres, which had to be financed at eighteen percent interest. This debt remained unpaid for the next several years at least.\textsuperscript{52}

Continued hostilities with the Iroquois resulted in a period of reduced trade in the early 1650s. The financial difficulties of the Habitans forced the company to borrow
more than 132,106 livres at thirty percent interest from La Rochelle financiers just to bankroll the expedition for 1651. As Lucien Campeau has noted, this meant that interest alone for the year would amount to 39,630 livres. It seems that the cost of hiring two ships for at least 15,000 livres each was over and above the amount of the loan, so that the Communauté started the year with a deficit of 201,736 livres. The overall deficit may have been even greater because the record shows that two additional ships were fitted out and sent from La Rochelle. Unfortunately, the trade for the year fell far short of covering costs. Only 13,131 pounds of beaver pelts were exported, and the ships *Vierge* and *Saint-Joseph* had to sail for France before the furs from Montreal could be brought to Quebec.

Had the two ships reached France, the Communauté might have counted on a sale amounting to some 118,179 livres, but both ships were lost. Two other ships, the *Passemoy* and the *Petit Saint Jean*, did arrive back in La Rochelle. But these carried only 10,326 pounds of beaver, which did not even meet the cost of fitting out the ships. The Council of Quebec tried to repudiate the debt it owed to the La Rochelle financiers under rules governing shipwreck, claiming that the financiers had taken the risk on themselves by issuing the money at “grosse aventure” or as a bottomry loan. Nevertheless, the Rochelais were still insisting on having their claims paid as late as 1673.53

In 1652, the Iroquois—chiefly the Mohawk—turned their attention to the French, making systematic attacks on the French settlements along the St. Lawrence. Trois-Rivières, a key node on the French trade network between Montreal and Quebec, was a particular target. In light of the straitened circumstances in which the colony found itself, the new governor, Jean de Lauson, cut administrative expenses from 49,000 to 46,000 livres, even though he managed to boost his own salary by 2,000 livres. Lauson
also suspended the fee of 1,000 beaver pelts annually owed to the Company of New France and created a new monopoly, separate from the Communauté des Habitants, to organize the fur trade down the Saguenay to Tadoussac. To provide for administrative costs, the Council of Quebec imposed a punishing fifty percent tax on the value of each beaver pelt sold to the Communauté store. This became quite a hardship as prices for commodities shot up in what amounted to hyperinflation. Since the Communauté was in desperate straits financially, the new governor and Father Jerome Lalemant arranged for two merchant companies in the metropole—the Pagets and Béraudin Co. of La Rochelle and the Rozée and Guenet Co. of Rouen—to take over the fur trade on behalf of the Communauté in return for a whopping seventy-five percent of the profits. Pagets and Béraudin sent a single ship in 1652 while Rozée and Guenet sent two.54

It is unclear, just how much revenue the fur trade produced in 1652. Father Ragueneau, the superior of the Jesuits and a member of the Council of Quebec, claimed that the trade sent from Quebec amounted to only 65,000 or 66,000 livres. The monopoly at Tadoussac, from which government expenses were to be paid, may have amounted to another 40,000 livres. Campeau speculates that Ragueneau’s figure may apply to only one of the ships of Rozée and Guenet and that another might have brought in a further cargo of furs so that the total for the year might have exceeded 130,000 livres. In any event, these profits were not sufficient to meet the expenses of the colony, so that, the Communauté des Habitants, which from the first had lacked sufficient capitalization and experience in overseas trade, found itself in debt to the tune of more than 181,972 livres. By the end of the trade year, the Communauté owed more than 48,980 livres to the Rozée
company alone, to which it paid 18,631 livres in interest from the receipts on beaver furs.\textsuperscript{55}

In the plight of the Communauté des Habitans, it is possible to see the emerging world capitalist system at work. The Company of New France, which was chiefly made up of members of the nobility and clergy, had transferred the fur trade business to the Communauté so that the profits of the trade would flow back into the colony and support its development. This plan worked well for the first two years when the trade boomed, but the Communauté lacked the capitalization to withstand the decrease in profits that the Iroquois war occasioned. As a result, it had to rely on loans from merchant/financiers in France to stay afloat through the lean years. By leveraging these loans, the merchant/financiers, in classic capitalist fashion, were able to reverse the polarity of the overseas fur trade so that any profits would flow from the colony back to the metropole.

But the problem for the merchant/financiers, as well as for the indebted Communauté, at least in the short-term, was that there were no profits. By 1653, the fur trade had reached its nadir in New France. As the Jesuit Father François le Mercier reported:

Never were there more Beavers in our lakes and rivers, but never have there been fewer seen in the warehouses of the country. Before the devastation of the Hurons, a hundred canoes used to come to trade, all laden with Beaver-skins; the Algonquins brought them from all directions; and each year we had two or three hundred thousand livres’ worth. That was a fine revenue with which to satisfy all the people, and defray the heavy expenses of the country.

The Iroquois war dried up all these springs. The Beavers are left in peace and in the place of their repose; the Huron fleets no longer come down to trade; the Algonquins are depopulated; and the more distant Nations are withdrawing still farther, fearing the fire of the Iroquois. For a year, the warehouse of Montreal has not bought a single Beaver-skin from the Savages. At Three Rivers, the little revenue that has accrued has been used to fortify the place, the enemy being expected there. In the Quebec warehouse there is nothing but poverty; and so
every one has cause to be dissatisfied, there being no means to supply payment to those to whom it is due, or even to defray a part of the most necessary expenses of the country.56

There are no reliable numbers by which to judge the trade of 1653, but all the evidence, such as the foregoing, points to disaster. Presumably some furs were shipped from Tadoussac, but even there the Iroquois threat likely reduced the number of Indians willing to come to the barter. Father Le Mercier noted that the English had captured a French ship heavy-laden with beaver. This appears to have been a ship that had delayed its departure from Tadoussac until the late fall. Bowing to necessity and to the complaints of the inhabitants, the Council of Quebec reduced the tax on furs from fifty to twenty-five percent. At the end of the year, to raise the money to meet the administrative costs of the colony, the council turned over the trade at Tadoussac for a three-year period to Louis Couillard de Lespinay in return for a cash payment of about 10,000 livres. Since the Native Peoples were no longer coming to the French to trade, it was up to the French to go north and west to meet with the remnants of the Hurons, the Algonkians who lived along the Ottawa, and the peoples even farther to the west who might provide the beaver skins necessary to the French colonial economy. It was in this year that the famous *coureurs de bois* first made their appearance.57

A tenuous peace of sorts between the French and the Onondaga and Mohawks, which was hammered out in September 1653, aided the efforts of the *coureurs de bois*. They succeeded spectacularly. In June 1654, they arrived at Montreal and Trois-Rivières with a fleet of 120 Huron and Algonkian canoes filled with furs. Although precise numbers of pelts or an estimation of their value have not been found in the extant records, the haul must have been close to that of the prewar years of 1645 and 1646, and led to
general rejoicing in Montreal and Trois-Rivières. By August, there were also 25,000 livres worth of beaver pelts in the storehouse at Quebec from the Tadoussac trade. All of this and more, however, had to be put toward administrative expenses, which amounted to 26,850 livres (francs?). Some 2,000 livres of this figure had to be expended in part for presents for the Iroquois, in order to seal the peace, and in part to pay a debt to the Dutch.58

The changes in the nature of the fur trade that the destruction of Huronia and the advent of the coureurs de bois wrought prompted new regulations aimed at preventing a ruinous competition from developing among the French. In April, even before the return of the coureurs with the fur fleet, Gov. Lauson issued a regulation prohibiting anyone who did not have his permission from traveling to the Indian settlements to obtain furs. Then in June, Lauson ordered that intoxicating liquors were not to be sold to the Indians. That same month, Pierre Boucher, the interim governor of Trois-Rivières, where many of the furs were traded, fixed prices for beaver skins. For one skin, the French could trade two large axes or three small ones, or alternatively, ten large knives or twelve small ones. For five beaver skins, the French could trade a blanket, a pound of powder, or four pounds of lead. These rules were meant to forestall the inflated prices that unregulated competition encouraged.59

The state of the trade for 1655 is unknown, but likely it was not good. In spite of the boom the year before, the Communauté was still unable to pay its debts and found itself harassed by creditors in France. The financial embarrassment was such that the Council of Quebec asked the king to intercede so that the trade might proceed. The king issued a moratorium on 23 February on the payment of the debts of the Communauté,
though he later clarified that this did not absolve the Habitants from paying the rents to the Company of New France. The moratorium allowed the Communauté to organize a new shipment of trade goods for the year. Five ships departed France to bring these goods and other supplies to the colony. Two were captured and another disappeared on the high seas. As Father Le Mercier observed, “Not only have the merchants who were interested in those three Vessels incurred great loss, but the whole country has also greatly suffered through this. For, besides the provisions that were being conveyed to Monsieur the Governor and to private individuals, the succor sent by the Queen—who takes a very great interest in the preservation of New France, and in the conversion of the Savages—was completely lost.” To further the colony’s woes, the two coureurs de bois Gov. Lauson had authorized to go to the western Indians did not return that summer. The renewed attacks of the Mohawks on the French and on the Huron at Ile d’Orleans in May might also have suppressed the trade.  

The renewal of the peace with the Iroquois in September 1655 and the return of the coureurs de bois who had gone west in 1654 brought renewed hope that the fur trade could be established on a permanently lucrative basis after 1656. When the coureurs returned to Quebec in August of that year, they were accompanied by 250 Huron and Ottawa-River Algonkian in fifty fur-laden canoes. “Their arrival caused universal joy,” said the Jesuit Jean de Quen. This fleet brought in some 100,000 écus blanc worth of beaver pelts, which would be the equivalent of 300,000 livres. As a reward, Gov. Lauson gave each of the coureurs 14,000 or 15,000 livres.

But even this seeming success ended in disaster. The venial Gov. Lauson had little by little brought the fur trade under his own control through his dominating
influence within the Council of Quebec. The Communauté, whose representatives had been prohibited from attending council meetings, sent a representative to Paris to report Lauson’s shady practices to the Company of New France and to the Jesuit leadership in the metropole. The result was a decree from the king, issued in March 1656, which required the financial officer of the Company of New France to sit in on meetings of the Council of Quebec. The king also required that the monies owed to the Company of New France be paid and that the key to the storehouse of the Communauté be entrusted to an elected agent who served the interest of the Habitans. Lauson was aware that the decree was aimed at him. He therefore abruptly returned to France, making off with most of the receipts from the fur trade that year and forcing the bookkeeper at Quebec to pay him 3,000 livres for travel expenses. The Habitans quickly sent former Gov. d’Ailleboust to Paris to lay charges against Lauson before the king in council.62

D’Ailleboust with the help of Gov. Maisonneuve of Montreal and the Company of New France appealed to the king in council for a reform of the administration of the trade. The situation from the perspective of the Communauté was so dire that it tried to return the trade to the Company of New France, which balked at accepting it. In response to the complaints of D’Ailleboust and Maisonneuve, the king issued an edict, dated 7 March 1657, that put oversight of the trade into the hands of a Council of Trade, which would be composed of the governor-general, a director appointed by the Company of New France, and four members elected by the Habitans. Two of the elected councilors would represent Quebec and one each would represent Montreal and Trois-Rivières. All of the councilors would have the right to speak and vote. The Company of New France was also to have a financial agent sit in on the meetings to ensure that the annual
obligations to the government and to the Company were being met from the
Communauté’s storehouse. The twenty-five percent tax on furs was to fund these
obligations. Another part of the reform was to give the Communauté a monopoly of all
trade goods to be dispensed through its storehouses. In addition, the new council had the
right to regulate shipping from the colony. All ships had to obtain travel permits from the
council, which also had the power to set the prices of all imports and to fix the value of
currency used in the colony. The power to regulate prices was no doubt a mechanism by
which the king hoped to curb inflation.63

These reforms might have stabilized the trade and redirected the flow of profits to
support the colony, but they came too late. The peace between the French and the
Iroquois began to fray in 1657. The Mohawk had never been reconciled to the peace,
which the Onondagas had precipitated without their consent. But until 1657, they had
used the peace as an opportunity to continue their attacks on the Indian allies of the
French, who were not, in their eyes, included in the agreement. In the meantime, the
Mohawk had pursued a diplomacy within the Iroquois Confederacy aimed at breaking off
the peace altogether. By 1658, they had successfully persuaded their associates in the
confederacy to renew the war against the French directly, which had a devastating effect
on the fur trade.64

A new governor, Pierre de Voyer, viscount d’Argenson, arrived at Quebec on 11
July 1658 and soon after launched an investigation into the state of the trade. He found,
to his disappointment that in 1657 the trade had brought in only 150,000 livres worth of
furs. An additional reason for the decline in profits to half of what they were at the peak
of the trade was the drop in the price of furs on the French market. Once again the
colony was impoverished, and new loans had to be taken out to keep it afloat during the ensuing war with the Iroquois. In spite of d’Argenson’s efforts, 1658 proved to be a disaster. The Communauté received 9,000 livres from the lease of the trade at Tadoussac, some revenue from the trade at Trois-Rivières, and the meager proceeds from the few furs just nine canoes of Allumette Island Algonquin brought to Quebec. Precise figures are not available for this year, but revenues must have been well below the figure for 1657. In 1659, though, trade rebounded to some degree. In July, forty-five canoes of White Fish, Attikamega, Piskatang, and Mississauga Indians brought abundant furs to Montreal and Trois-Rivières.65

But one good year was not enough to pull the colony out of its economic difficulties. Once again the receipts from the fur trade were insufficient to pay the administrative costs of the colony and the debts of the Communauté. Governor d’Argenson concluded that the impoverishment of the colony overall and its general economic instability resulted from the inhabitants over-reliance on the make-or-break fur trade and their consequent neglect of agriculture. With bankruptcy looming, the Council of Trade in October 1659 decided to turn the fur trade over to private merchants in France. By February of the following year, the Communauté had given a Rouen company, which Toussaint Guénet headed, exclusive rights to the fur and import trade for four years. In return, the Rouen company agreed to pay the Communauté an annual fee of 10,000 livres as well as an additional 50,000 livres in lieu of the long-standing one-quarter “tax” on furs. This arrangement would ensure that the expenses of the colonial administration would be covered without resorting to further loans.66
In the short term, the Rouen company took over the trade at a fortuitous time. The *coureurs de bois* Pierre Radisson and Médard Chouart des Groseilliers conducted some sixty canoes to Montreal in August 1660. The total value of the trade amounted to 200,000 livres, which allowed the Rouen company to pay the colony what it owed and to make a profit. In early 1661, though, the Habitants, many of whom were angered by what they considered to be a sweetheart deal offered to the Rouen company, asked the royal council to annul the agreement. In the meantime, the fur trade suffered a serious reverse as the Iroquois intensified their war against the colony. In 1661, the Rouen company was only able to collect 26,930 livres of the one-quarter tax. This meant that on this alone, it was running a deficit of more than 23,000 livres. In all, the trade brought in revenues of some 87,340 livres, which left the company a deficit of 12,659 for the year. Under these circumstances, the Rouen company did not resist the revocation of its contract. This occurred by royal edict on 10 March 1662. In the meantime, the Council of Quebec granted the trade monopoly to the colonist Juchereau de Saint-Denis. To compensate the Rouen company for its loss of the monopoly, the king, in his royal edict, allowed it to collect any furs brought in up to the arrival of the first ship in 1662 and also to recoup the 100,000 livres paid to the Council of Quebec for the two years it held the monopoly. In addition, the Communauté was to pay the 12,659 livres deficit the Rouen company incurred in 1661.67

Exact figures for the fur trade for 1662 and 1663, the last two years before the royalization of the colony, have not been found. It is known, however, that the Council of Quebec, which the new governor, Pierre du Bois, baron d’Avaugour, reorganized in 1662, leased the trade to Juchereau de Saint-Denis for 45,000 livres per year. This, along
with a ten-percent import duty on merchandise, was supposed to support the administration of the colony. In 1663, the council leased the trade to a consortium of seventeen inhabitants for 50,000 livres, which together with the ten-percent duty on imports was to fund the administration. In the early 1660s, D’Avaugour and his council made two further decisions that affected the trade. The first was an ordinance of 7 October 1661 that arbitrarily increased the value of French coins used in the colony. This was, no doubt, an attempt to curb the rampant inflation that beset New France and to reverse the flow of hard money out of the colony. The second was d’Avaugour’s decision in January 1662, which the religious authorities in New France strongly opposed, to permit the colonists to trade alcohol to the Native Peoples. Alcohol was, aside from firearms, the trade good the Indians most desired, but the French had outlawed its sale to the Native Peoples since at least 1633. Nevertheless, unscrupulous traders had continued to sell it to them. For d’Avaugour the problem with the prohibition was one of simple fairness. Although the illegal sale of alcohol to the Indians was widespread, the severe punishments for violating the law fell only on the poor who did not have connections to the upper echelon of the church and government. D’Avaugour’s attempt at reform, though, could not affect the state of the fur trade very much in light of the ongoing war with the Iroquois, which no doubt suppressed the fur trade in 1662 and 1663. The governor found that the Communauté’s debts had risen to 172,000 livres by 1662. He convinced the creditors to accept the receipts of the ten-percent duty on imports over a six-year period in payment. Nonetheless, by 1666, the debt of the Communauté was still 163,000 livres.68
With its royalization in 1663, New France began a new phase in its colonial history that is beyond the scope of this study. What can be said, though, about the early developmental period from 1608 to 1663 is that the fur trade did not provide a sufficient economic basis on which to develop the sort of land-based settlement colony that Champlain and his benefactors had envisioned. In the years between the founding of New France and its royalization, hundreds of thousands of beaver pelts had been extracted from Acadia and the St. Lawrence region for sale in the metropole. No doubt, this commerce had enriched a few merchants, but more than fifty years after its founding, New France was still an underpopulated, relatively impoverished outpost of the French empire. It did not have the wherewithal to defend itself from the Iroquois and was still largely dependent on outside sources for food and other necessaries. Although it can hardly be denied that the fur trade provided the dominant flow of goods out of the colony, this extraction of a single commodity did not contribute much to colonial development. None of the trading arrangements between 1608 and 1663 created a stable or profitable company that could provide the financial wherewithal to develop a self-sustaining colony. In fact, most of the companies that held the trade monopoly ended in bankruptcy or near to it. During boom years, a fortune could be made, but the boom years were few and far between, and plying the trade in itself was an expensive proposition given the hazards of maintaining an overseas network. An argument could also be made that the fur trade actually impeded the growth of New France. As Governor d’Argenson observed, the tendency of the inhabitants to gamble all on furs led them to neglect farming, so that the agricultural base of the colony remained weak. The best that can be said of the fur trade is that the hope of making it profitable, no doubt, helped to sustain
the colony. But the fact remains that the aspirations of those who looked to the fur trade to provide the money to develop a robust colony along the St. Lawrence had not been met.  

The question remains: Did the fur trade provide any better basis for colonial development along the Hudson? Any comparison of the Dutch experience in the fur trade with that of New France yields many important differences, the chief of which would be the relationship of the Dutch with the Iroquois. But, in the main, the Dutch trade, like that of the French, proved a disappointing foundation on which to develop a colony.

The records for the early fur trade down the Hudson are exceedingly spotty. The only clear indication regarding the number of furs traded in the years prior to the establishment of the West India Co. comes from 1614, when four competing companies attempted to conduct trade in the Hudson region. Depositions taken in Amsterdam reveal that Hendrick Christiaensen brought 2,500 skins back to Amsterdam at the end of a long trading season that lasted from late 1613 to the summer of 1614, though the types of skins and their value are not determined. This seems to have been virtually the entire haul for all four companies trading to the Hudson that year. Data on the fur trade after the establishment of the WIC reveal a gradually increasing trade between 1624 and 1635. In his 1644 work, Historie ofte Iaerlijck Verhael, Johannes de Laet, one of the directors of the WIC, included the following figures for the fur trade from New Netherland between 1624 and 1635:

1624— 4,000 beavers; 700 otters
1625— 5,295 beavers; 436 otters
1626— 7,258 beavers; 857 otters
1627— 7,520 beavers; 370 otters
1628— 6,951 beavers; 734 otters
1630— 6,041 beavers, 1,085 otters
1632—13,513 beavers, 1,661 otters and other furs
1633— 8,800 beavers, 1,383 otters
1634-35—yearly average of 7,445.5 beavers, 707.5 otters

The numbers indicate a significant extraction of a valuable commodity, but in all likelihood each year’s haul represented only a single ship’s cargo. We can see, for instance, that in 1626 the ship *Arms of Amsterdam* carried nearly the whole of the year’s trade in furs—7,246 beaver skins, 853 otter skins, 81 mink skins, 36 wildcat skins, and 34 muskrat skins. The ship also carried a “considerable” amount of oak and hickory timber, as well as samples of wheat, rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, canary seed, beans, and flax, all grown in New Netherland, likely as an enticement to farmers who were needed as settlers.⁷⁰

Oliver A. Rink has estimated the WIC’s expenditures for the colonizing expeditions of 1624-25 at 100,559 florins. His estimates include f18,620 for freightage, f14,994 for insurance, f19,320 for the wages of ship’s crewman, f8,000 for dock workers’ wages, f15,000 for passage for colonists one way, f12,625 for livestock, and f14,000 for trade goods. Rink himself notes that this overall estimate is probably too low. As just one example why, he explains that he did not include in his estimate “several nonrecoverable expenditures, such as the building of houses on Manhattan Island or fort construction.”⁷¹ While some of the building materials, such as wood and stone, might have been cut or quarried in New Netherland, some likely was shipped from Amsterdam. Rink also does not include in his estimate the wages of company farmers and employees
in New Netherland nor administrative costs in Amsterdam. Nor does he include the two years’ worth of supplies the WIC promised settlers.

De Laet has given the figures for the sale of beaver and otter pelts for the years 1624 to 1628. This allows a direct comparison with Rink’s estimated expenditures for the two-year period 1624-25. The value of the furs the WIC sold on the European market for those years amounted to £62,950, which, when weighed against the company’s overall expenditures, would result in a net loss of £37,609. Of course, the total value of goods the company extracted from New Netherland, which undoubtedly included some timber and perhaps other natural resources, was slightly higher than what was derived solely from the fur trade. But this undervaluation must be weighed against the additional expenditures the WIC incurred that are not included in Rink’s estimate.

After 1626, the WIC, in light of the major losses it had incurred in operations against the Portuguese, significantly reduced its support for the colonization effort in New Netherland, and accordingly its expenditures were likely reduced in proportion. At the same time, the export of beaver and otter pelts from the colony increased, so that it might be expected that the company had put itself in a better position to realize a profit after its initial start-up investment. De Laet says the gross proceeds of the pelts the WIC sold on the European market for the period of 1626-28 were £162,545, which added to the sales figures for the previous two years would total £225,495. This figure represents gross sales, however, and must be weighed against the cost of the manufactured trade goods the WIC sent to New Netherland, which de Laet says amounted to £110,895 for the same period. This would cut the WIC’s net profit from the fur trade during this five-year period to £114,600. Whether this amounted to a profit at all for the WIC is still a
question because even though the company reduced some of its costs after 1626, it could not reduce them to zero. This means that the wages of company officers, Amsterdam administration costs, the costs of shipping, etc., for four years must all be weighed against the remaining profit. Rink has noted that the furs the WIC traded for during the whole period from 1626 to 1632, which were worth about £454,000 on the European market, may not have covered expenses. In any case, whatever profit the company realized was hardly worth the effort and not in itself enough to support the colony or fund its growth.

In the late-1620s, the Dutch experienced serious setbacks in their attempts to take full advantage of the fur trade. The first of these was participating on the losing side in the war between the Mohawks and Mahicans. The Dutch had established their trading post—Fort Orange—on the upper Hudson in the territory of the Algonquin-speaking Mahicans, who seem to have immediately recognized the benefits of trade and friendship with the Dutch. The Mohawks, whose territory was just to the west, also occasionally appeared to trade at Fort Orange. But at this stage, it was the Mahicans who provided the bulk of the furs to the Dutch and had on all occasions remained friendly to Dutch interests.

In 1626, Daniel van Krieckenbeeck, the commissary at Fort Orange, in violation of the WIC’s instructions to Verhulst, allowed himself to be persuaded to join a Mahican raiding party on a Mohawk fort. Van Krieckenbeeck brought along four soldiers. Both he and his Mahican allies undoubtedly believed that the Dutch arquebuses would prove decisive in combat with the Mohawks, who had no firearms. But the Mohawks ambushed the raiding party well before it ever reached the fort and discharged such a rain of arrows that van Krieckenbeeck and three of his men, as well as a number of Mahican
warriors, were killed. The remainder fled. The Mohawks roasted and ate one of the Dutch soldiers and carried off a leg and an arm of another as a memorial of their great victory.75

The incoming administration of Pieter Minuit, who replaced Verhulst, realized that van Kriekenbeeck’s intervention portended disaster for a number of reasons. First, it jeopardized Dutch security in that it demonstrated how vulnerable the Europeans could be even with their formidable weapons. Second, it was damaging to the fur trade, especially since the easternmost territories were already experiencing a decline in the beaver population brought on by over-hunting. This meant that over time the supply of beaver would come chiefly from regions northwest of the Hudson, so that from the Native-American perspective, the Mohawks, not the Mahicans would come to control the supply. Isaac de Rasière noted that in the immediate wake of van Kriekenbeeck’s raid, the company traders at Fort Orange had received only 197 beaver and sixty otter skins. The new administration of Minuit and de Rasière moved quickly to restore relations with the Mohawk and were in some measure successful, but van Kriekenbeeck’s mistake led the Mohawk, and by extension their brothers in the Iroquois Confederacy, to harbor lingering suspicions about the Dutch. These became more problematic as the Mohawk got the better of the Mahicans in the war so that by 1629, the Mahicans had abandoned some of their lands along the Hudson. This in turn gave the Mohawk direct access to Fort Orange.76

The second check the Dutch received in the late-1620s in their effort to engage in a profitable and robust trade in furs came when their Indian trading partners began to reject Dutch trade goods and demand higher prices. At first, the Indians had seemed
ready to accept whatever trade goods the Dutch offered, likely because these represented gifts rather than actual barter and because the novelty of having European goods—including the practically useful steel knives, awls, and scissors—conferred status on the recipient. But as European goods became more common and the trade became less about showing respect and gift-giving and more about hard-bargaining, the Native-American traders became more selective in what they would accept. In 1626, de Rasière noted that the Indians would no longer accept the copper kettles the company had sent because they were too heavy to be readily transported—a key issue for the highly mobile Northern Woodlands Indians. De Rasière advised the company that the Indians most desired hatchets and duffels cloth, a heavy woolen cloth that the Indians could wear in place of deerskin. But in the 1620s, the Iroquois and the Northern Indians generally, including those allied with the French, most desired wampum, belts of which were made of beads that were in turn made from bits of the shells of the whelk and the quahog clam. These shells could only be had along the coast of Long Island and in parts of New England, which meant that the Dutch could potentially control this trade to the Iroquois and French-allied native groups. This trade in wampum was precisely what de Rasière recommended. “I shall know how to get wampum,” he assured his Amsterdam employers, “and to stock Fort Orange in such a way that the French Indians will never again come there in vain, as they have done heretofore, according to what I hear from those who were stationed there.” He hoped that before winter he could supply Fort Orange with “a thousand yards of wampum,” which he had stored at New Amsterdam.77

The WIC took de Rasière’s advice and by the late 1620s wampum beads became a key trade item by which the Dutch purchased furs from both the Mohawks and the
Mahicans. They purchased the shells from the coastal Algonkian through the exchange of European trade goods and then traded the beads at Fort Orange for furs. As Daniel Richter has noted, by the 1640s the Dutch had rationalized the production of shell beads in a typical European fashion, standardizing the techniques to produce greater output. Unfortunately for the Dutch, the improved production, along with the introduction into the fur trade of wampum from the English colonies, tended to reduce the special magic of the beads in the Indian economy—their rarity. According to Richter, the value of wampum in the fur trade fell by sixty percent between 1641 and 1658 and plunged more than 200 percent in the final years of Dutch governance. This drove up the price the Dutch had to pay for furs over time and made it much more difficult to realize a profit from the trade.78

The devaluation of wampum led to the introduction of new trade items. In the 1640s, alcohol and firearms became essential to the Dutch fur trade. The WIC officially prohibited trading these items to Native Peoples, but a robust trade in both took place beginning in the directorship Willem Kieft. That the Indians at Fort Orange could obtain these items from the Dutch in spite of the prohibition demonstrates the degree to which the upriver Indians—particularly the Iroquois—controlled the trade. If the Dutch were to get any furs at all, they had to provide the Iroquois with whatever goods they demanded, even if these goods—particularly firearms—put the entire Dutch colony in danger. Toward the end of the Dutch period, the WIC itself, under Director-General Stuyvesant, traded firearms on the upper Hudson, even while Stuyvesant prosecuted private traders for doing the same thing. The WIC really had little choice. If the company would not
exchange firearms for furs, the Indians would simply trade their furs to private merchants for smuggled weapons. But perhaps the most persistent problem from the WIC’s perspective had nothing much to do with Indian relations. This was the black market in peltries that appears to have been in operation with the connivance of some company officials from the very beginning. As de Rasière revealed in his letter of 1626, while company traders at Fort Orange had received fewer than 200 beaver skins that year, private traders had corralled more than 300. Under WIC rules, individual colonists were permitted to engage in the fur trade so long as they sold the furs to the company. In this way, the WIC hoped to retain its control of the trade, which would allow it to pay the lowest possible prices. But the black market gave individual traders another outlet and set up competition, which drove prices up. “With great trouble and many threats,” de Rasière wrote, “I have obtained for cash from the colonists at Fort Orange 305 beavers and 40 otters. I had to pay for each merchantable beaver two guilders and for a good otter two guilders and five stivers, so that the whole of the abovementioned beavers and otters amounts to 574 guilders, 15 stivers.” Even then the colonists complained that they could get three guilders per skin if they sold them directly to the directors. De Rasière did not take this threat seriously, but noted that Minuit advised him to pay two guilders and five stivers each, so that the furs would not “go to strangers.” This suggests that the colonists could sell the furs outside of the company altogether and perhaps even had an outlet to the English or French.

The losses the WIC incurred through its adventures in Brazil and West Africa, along with the troubles within New Netherland itself, led a powerful faction within the
Amsterdam Chamber to push for a severe reduction in the company’s commitments to New Netherland. This faction called for the abandonment of the costly settlement program the company had pursued up to that point and wanted to prohibit further immigration to the colony while maintaining no more than a few trading posts to carry on the fur trade. But a more powerful faction within the chamber, which Kiliaen van Rensselaer headed, was able to block this plan. Since it was obvious that the WIC itself, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, no longer had the wherewithal to settle and support colonists, van Rensselaer proposed that the company privatize the colonization effort by offering large land grants to wealthy “patroons” who would agree to send a significant number of colonists.81

The first patroonship plan, the *Freedoms and Exemptions*, adopted 10 March 1628, upheld the WIC’s fur trade monopoly, but did allow the patroons to trade along the Atlantic coast from Florida to Newfoundland for other commodities. Initially, the proponents of the plan seem to have proposed that the fur trade be opened to the patroons as well. According to van Rensselaer, opponents of this provision countered that the ultimate intention of the patroonship scheme was to “lay the expenses [for maintaining the colony] to the Company’s charge and to take the trade in furs away from it.” Van Rensselaer dismissed this charge as “pure calumny.” Although the opposition did not have the votes to prevent the adoption of the patroonship plan, it had enough clout to restrict the inducements extended to prospective patroons. This led the prospective patroons to complain that their exclusion from the fur trade made the entire patroonship plan economically untenable.82
In October the *Heren XIX* agreed to mediate the dispute between the pro-patroon and anti-patroon factions and ordered an investigation. In the meantime, the fortunes of the WIC spectacularly rebounded. In mid-November, the company received word in Amsterdam that one of its admirals, Peyt Heyn, had captured a Spanish treasure fleet on its way home from the West Indies. The rumors alone caused the company’s stock to rise precipitously on the Amsterdam exchange. The prizes—once they were brought into port—were valued at 11.5 million florins. Company stockholders received a fifty percent dividend, and after all expenses were paid, the WIC had been recapitalized to the tune of about 7 million florins. This turnabout in the company’s economic fortunes made the recalcitrant members of the Amsterdam Chamber more amenable to accepting a new plan for New Netherland, one that would open the less-than-lucrative fur trade to the patroons.83

Under the new plan, which the WIC finally adopted in 1629 (to be more fully discussed in chapter 10), the company relinquished its monopoly on all trade other than furs. As an inducement to participate in settling the colony, the WIC gave the patroons the right to trade with the Native Peoples all along the coasts of New Netherland and in adjacent areas for whatever commodities they wished, except for “beavers, otters, minks and all sorts of other peltries, which trade alone the Company reserve[d] to itself.” But the patroons were even allowed to engage in the fur trade at places where the company did not maintain an agent, so long as they brought the pelts to Manhattan and paid a five percent duty to the company. In cases where the peltries and other commodities could not be brought to Manhattan, they would still have to be unloaded and inventoried under company supervision and a fee of one guilder paid per skin. The WIC envisioned that the
patroons and their colonists might engage in the shipment of other commodities obtained, not in trade, but directly from the land and water. These included pitch, tar, potash, timber, grain, fish, salt, and limestone. The WIC required these goods to be “conveyed in the Company’s ships at the rate of eighteen guilders per last (four thousand pounds weight). Other commodities that could not be measured by lasts would be freighted at one daelder for each one hundred pounds. Wines, brandies, verjuice, and vinegar, shipped by cask, would be rated at eighteen guilders per cask. In cases where the company did not have room in its ships, the patroons could convey commodities in their own ships.  

Once the new plan had gone into effect, the fur trade seems to have rebounded from the serious decline in the number of beaver skins exported in 1629 and 1630. In 1632, de Laet recorded a total of 13,513 furs shipped from New Amsterdam. But the likelihood is, because there is no figure for 1631, that de Laet was recording two-years’ worth of trade. By 1633, though, he could record a relatively robust trade of 8,800 beaver skins, the best tally for any single year to that point if we accept the 1632 total as representing two years of trade.

It was in April 1633, though, that the Dutch endured a significant breach of their trade network up the Hudson. An English ship, the William out of London, arrived before the fort in lower Manhattan. The master of the ship, William Trevore, had on board as factor the Dutchman Jacob Eelkens, who had served as the commander at Fort Nassau on the Hudson in the days before the WIC took control of New Netherland. The WIC had dismissed him for misconduct. Trevore informed Director Wouter van Twiller that the Hudson River (which the Dutch called the Mauritius) was English territory by
right of the discovery of the Englishman Henry Hudson. The Dutch countered that the river was theirs because Hudson had sailed for the Dutch East India Co. Whatever the case, Trevore and Eelkens announced their intention to sail upriver to trade. Van Twiller, who seems to have been intoxicated much of the time, warned against this, but Trevore ignored him and headed up the Hudson in the *William* anyway. In the meantime, the indecisive van Twiller, much to the chagrin of some of the Dutch, sat in the fort drinking and dithering. Naturally, the director was reluctant to precipitate hostilities against the English. But realizing that the success of the Dutch trade and of the colony itself depended upon monopolizing control of the river, van Twiller eventually decided to send a ship after the *William*, and by this means successfully prevented the English from engaging in trade on the upper Hudson.85

The affair of the *William* was an isolated event, after which the Dutch allowed no foreign vessels to sail up the Hudson. But after 1633, other difficulties arose to impede the Dutch fur trade. Records are spotty at best, but it is evident that by 1634, the trade had slipped a bit. In that year, the Dutch, concerned that the French had made inroads on trade with the Iroquois, sent commissioners to the Mohawk and Oneida to encourage them to direct their furs back to Fort Orange. The Iroquois told the commissioners that they would require “four hands of sewant [wampum] and four hands of long cloth” for each large beaver skin. If the Dutch agreed to this price, which took into account travel expenses, the Iroquois promised to trade with “no one else.” In spite of coming to some understanding with the Mohawk and Oneida, the Dutch watched the total of beaver skins fall to below 8,000 per year for 1634 and 1635. It is notable, though, that in 1634, Massachusetts Gov. John Winthrop estimated that the Dutch shipped between nine and
ten thousand skins to Europe each year, though it is unclear whether this total included otter and other skins. In 1636, the WIC’s trade amounted to about 8,000 skins, which would be in line with the known total for 1633. Van Rensselaer estimated that the trade could produce between 60,000 and 70,000 guilders (florins) per year, which would comport with a total of fewer than ten thousand skins annually. English encroachment on the Connecticut (Fresh) River in the early 1630s also began to complicate matters for the Dutch. Prior to 1620, the Dutch may have kept a seasonal trading post on the Connecticut near present-day Hartford. In 1624, the WIC took the additional step of establishing a small settlement on the river in order to assert possession and seems to have sent additional families to this settlement the next year. But in 1626, the company ordered the withdrawal of the settlers from the Connecticut River in order to concentrate the population at New Amsterdam. From this point until 1633, the WIC seems once again to have maintained nothing more than perhaps a seasonal trading post on the Connecticut. In that year, in order to counter increasing English settlement in the area, the company constructed a formidable fortification, Fort Good Hope, near present-day Hartford. The problem for the WIC was that English settlement far outpaced that of the Dutch, and as the English began settling upriver at Windsor (1635), they began to cut off the flow of furs to Fort Good Hope. The final blow came in 1636, when the English fur trader William Pynchon set up a trading post on the Connecticut in what is now western Massachusetts. This settlement, later to become Springfield, sat well above Fort Good Hope and virtually captured a monopoly of the trade on the Connecticut. Pynchon’s settlement also had the potential to serve as a base from which the English might interdict the trade of Fort Orange itself.86
The patroonship plan of 1629 may have provided some greater stability to the fur trade during the 1630s, but it is clear that the revenues were insufficient as far as the WIC was concerned, otherwise the company would not have agreed to give up its monopoly. English encroachment on the Connecticut River also demonstrated that without a substantial influx of new settlers, the WIC might lose the fur trade on the Hudson altogether. This consideration, along with rampant smuggling, led the WIC to relinquish its monopoly over the fur trade entirely and to institute free trade. In June 1638, the Nineteen noted that it had “now become manifest to all the world that many self-seeking persons in New Netherland, flagrantly violating our good ordinances and commands by their private and clandestine trade and traffic, have acquired and diverted from the Company to their own private profit many, nay, more peltries and skins, of better condition and quality, than those that are purchased there and sent over on the Company’s own account.” The problem was so great that the merchandise which the colonists and patroons ordered from Europe for the clandestine trade with the Indians took up so much space in the holds of the company’s ships that the WIC had no room for its own trade goods. Then, too, by paying higher prices for the furs, the private traders were ruining the market for the company. The WIC, after all, required a higher profit margin because it had to pay for the colony’s administration and for employees’ salaries, as well as for supplies and fortifications, just to name a few outstanding expenses. The Nineteen’s initial response was to urge more rigorous enforcement of the company’s monopoly rights, forbidding any private trade and ordering the confiscation of the furs and merchandise of those who engaged in it.
But clamping down on smuggling would obviously militate against the Dutch government’s chief goal for the colony—settlement. It was this consideration that led the States General to precipitate a new strategy. The problem from the Dutch perspective was that New Netherland did not have sufficient population to successfully resist the English, and there was no guarantee that the English meant to stop their territorial advance at the Connecticut River Valley. In 1638, the Swedes had also set up a colony on the Delaware River under the direction of Peter Minuit, the former director of New Netherland. New Sweden was situated within Dutch-claimed territory and threatened to encroach on the fur trade down the Delaware, where the Dutch had intermittently kept a trading post. It was clear to the States General that the only way to hold on to New Netherland would be to significantly boost the population, and the only way to do that would be to make immigration from the metropole more enticing. The States, therefore, asked the West India Co. to draft a plan for populating New Netherland or risk forfeiting the colony to the government.88

In answering a series of questions put to them by the States General, WIC officials noted that in the seventeen years the company had held the fur trade monopoly, it had incurred a loss. Moreover, the company did not expect to realize a profit from the colony in the future, though its representatives believed that a better return might eventually be realized from the cultivation and export of grain. As to the fur trade, the language of the WIC representatives is dismissive. “Nothing comes from New Netherland but beaver skins, minks, and other furs.” In other words, the fur trade was not worth the trouble to the company, which was willing to give up its monopoly.89
In its proposal to the States General, the WIC agreed to open up trade to the inhabitants. The colonists would be permitted to build and maintain their own vessels and engage in all “lawful trade and barter” along the colony’s rivers and along the Atlantic coast from Florida to Newfoundland. Public servants, meanwhile, would be forbidden to engage in trade or farming so that they would not be in competition with the colonists. The proposal, which the Amsterdam Chamber drafted, noted that the new guidelines were being issued specifically to encourage “greater attention . . . to the cultivation and settlement” of New Netherland. As such, the proposed articles ordered that no one be excluded from using, for farming purposes, the waterways that the company owned.90

In September 1638, the States General rejected the WIC’s proposed plan, noting that it was “not adapted to the service and promotion of the Colonies of New Netherland.” The States proposed that some of its members meet with the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC to hammer out a more acceptable plan. The explicit goal was to adopt “such resolutions on the planting of Colonies and the stocking Cattle in New Netherland . . . as shall be found to be most for the service of this State and the advantage of the Company. It was clear that the success or failure of the fur trade was not of foremost concern to the States General. It can only be concluded from this that the States wished to develop the colony for other, likely imperial, purposes.91

In 1639, the WIC sent a new set of proposals to the States General, which made the trading rights of all parties much more explicit. The new provisions allowed “all Patroons, Colonists, and inhabitants” in New Netherland “as well as the stockholders in the Company” to trade in their own ships along the whole coast from Florida to
Newfoundland. There was no stipulation that private traders had to sell to the WIC, but the company reserved the right to charge a ten-percent duty on the cash cost (at Amsterdam prices) of all trade merchandise whether freighted in private ships or in the company’s own ships. Such merchandise had to be sent in bulk first to Manhattan for inspection. Only then could the bulk be broken for trade. The company was also entitled to a ten-percent duty on all peltries shipped back to the Netherlands. This duty was to be paid to the governor and council at New Amsterdam prior to shipment and a receipt for it was to be presented at the company storehouse in Amsterdam where all freight had to be discharged. Those caught attempting to evade the duties or who broke bulk anywhere aside from a company storehouse would forfeit their ships and goods to the company. These new provisions not only opened the trade to the inhabitants, but, in effect, allowed all independent shippers to enter the trade. Thus, as Jaap Jacobs has noted, by 1640, the WIC had given up its monopoly not only of the fur trade but also of shipping rights in New Netherland.92

The question remains: Why didn’t the WIC at this juncture simply relinquish control of the colony to the States? After all, the administrative costs of the colony still fell to the WIC, even though it had given up its trade monopoly. First, it might be observed that opening the trade to all inhabitants of the colony and to all stockholders of the company probably did not have as much effect on company revenues as might be presumed. As has been seen, in the Freedoms and Exemptions of 1629, the WIC had already opened the fur trade to the patroons and to free (land-owning) colonists of New Netherland. So the new provisions only extended trade rights to inhabitants more generally and to the company stockholders. The inhabitants who wished to were already
engaged in the fur trade through rampant smuggling, so opening a legal avenue of trade at least had the potential of increasing company revenue from the fees inhabitants would pay in order to avoid the possibility of forfeiting their goods should they be caught smuggling. Then, too, the focal point of the fur trade was Fort Orange, which the company still controlled. This is where the Iroquois, who had become the chief middlemen in the Dutch fur trade, brought their pelts. Stockholders who sent ships to engage in the trade would likely have to ply their trade elsewhere, giving the company a distinct advantage. The company was also free from having to pay duties on its own goods, which would increase its own profit margin vis-à-vis private traders. Allowing stockholders’ private vessels to range the coasts also increased the likelihood that they might capture prizes. The WIC stood to benefit from this also, since the prizes had to be registered before either the governor and council of New Netherland or the Amsterdam Chamber, after which the WIC was entitled to one-third of the value of each prize even before the state’s portion was deducted.93

If the new plan succeeded in increasing the population of New Netherland, the WIC also stood to benefit financially. New settlers, whether free colonists or simply inhabitants of the patroonships or elsewhere, would have to be connected to the metropolitan market, not just to trade furs, but for all kinds of other goods needed to maintain their identities as Europeans. Such commodities would include building materials, clothing, liquor, tools, firearms, tableware, and books. For the WIC, this meant an increase in freightage fees. In addition to the profits from freight, the company was also entitled to a five-percent duty on all goods shipped to the colony, whether on board its own ships or on private vessels. The WIC stood to benefit, too, if the majority
of the new colonists engaged in agriculture. Not only would this move the colony toward self-sufficiency, but if correctly managed, could benefit the company’s entire Atlantic trade network. Grain and cattle from New Netherland, both of which had been mentioned in the WIC’s plans, might be traded to the company’s territories in the Caribbean as well as to the English tobacco colonies. Moreover, the labor shortage in New Netherland in relation to the vast amount of arable land meant that farmers and patroons alike would have an economic incentive to purchase African slaves from the company. The WIC could profitably transport slaves from the Caribbean, or if need be, from its slave-trading station, El Mina in West Africa, which the Dutch had seized from the Portuguese in 1637. The new provisions specifically mention that the “Company shall exert itself to provide the Patroons and Colonists, on their order, with as many Blacks as possible.”

Aside from these economic considerations, the WIC likely also wanted to retain New Amsterdam as an important port on its Atlantic circuit. Ships that had made the trip from Africa to the Caribbean and to Brazil could stop at New Amsterdam to refresh and refit before re-crossing the Atlantic to Europe. WIC ships and, after 1640, the ships of private Dutch entrepreneurs could also bring enemy ships they had captured in the Americas into port in New Amsterdam to have the prizes inspected and judged.

A lack of data on the fur trade in the 1640s makes it difficult to assess the immediate results of opening the trade. Certainly, Kieft’s War from 1643 to 1645, during which the Dutch and the Algonkian peoples who surrounded New Amsterdam engaged in a bitter and deadly struggle, must have suppressed the fur trade to some degree, since many settlers for safety withdrew from outlying areas to New Amsterdam, and many
others were killed. It is notable that the records regarding the fur trade which do survive come from the post-war period. The WIC’s own records have been lost, but some information is available on the activities of private traders. For instance, 1,585 beaver pelts were shipped in 1645 aboard the *Rensselaerswijk*, which likely represented the total from Kiliaen van Rensselaer’s patroonship. In 1647, Govert Loockermans believed he would be able to ship about two thousand skins, and Willem de Key planned to ship about five thousand, so that the total of these two independent merchants would nearly equal the yearly total of the WIC prior to the opening of the trade. That same year, the ship *Prinses* was wrecked with the loss of more than 15,000 furs. Taken together, this means that the total number of furs shipped from New Netherland in 1647 was more than 22,000, tripling the number exported annually prior to 1635. In 1648, the ship *Valckenier* of the Verbrugge Co. carried 5,500 furs on its own account and 2,000 for the WIC, which means that the total number of furs shipped from New Netherland that year must have been well above 10,000.95

One result of opening the trade was the establishment, sometime after 1646, of a new settlement of fur traders on land that had been included in the grant to Kiliaen van Rensselaer. These independent traders were technically colonists of the patroon and subject to his jurisdiction. Once free trade was adopted, van Rensselaer attempted to make it impossible for independent traders to participate. His patroonship was strategically located on the upper Hudson and included the land on which the WIC kept Fort Orange. Van Rensselaer would not allow independent traders to set up shop within the boundaries of his patroonship, which made it difficult for them to conduct business with the Mohawks. He had hoped that this prohibition would limit the trade to the WIC
and his own clients. His own tenants were permitted to settle near Fort Orange and participate in the trade so long as they sold their pelts to him at a fixed price. This allowed both the tenants and van Rensselaer to profit. Van Rensselaer also seems to have provided his tenants with the merchandise with which to carry on the trade, which also guaranteed him a profit.96

But in spite of his efforts, van Rensselaer had trouble blocking independent traders from entering the field. He could not very well prevent them from using Fort Orange as a base of operations without unduly antagonizing the WIC, which had thrown open the trade to encourage settlement. He, therefore, attempted to cut off trade to Fort Orange by encouraging his tenants to settle at what became Beverwijck, slightly north of the WIC trading post. This tactic also failed. Before the period of free trade, smugglers—known as *bosch-lopers* (forest-runners)—had skirted company officials at Fort Orange and headed west along the Mohawk River to trade directly with the Mohawks in their villages. In this way, the *bosch-lopers* were able to drain off perhaps a majority of the furs before the Indians ever came to trade at Fort Orange. Independent traders simply continued to use this technique to thwart van Rensselaer’s attempts to corner the market.97

The Indians—particularly the Mohawk—used the increased competition among the Dutch to drive up the price of furs and also to encourage Dutch traders to deal in illicit goods, such as firearms and liquor that helped to intensify Native-American warfare along the St. Lawrence and to destabilize Indian society generally. Van Rensselaer, though, was chiefly concerned with the increase in the price of furs, which cut into his profits. He, therefore, came to an arrangement with the WIC in 1642 to set a
price ceiling for furs. The next year, to enforce it, he set up a fortified inspection post on Barren Island, located in the Hudson just south of Fort Orange. But these efforts were to no avail. In 1644, the WIC, finding it impossible to compete, closed its own trading post at Fort Orange. Two years later, van Rensselaer died, and his nephew, the former director Wouter van Twiller, temporarily took charge of Rensselaerswyck. His superintendent Brant van Slicthenhorst rigorously enforced the patroon’s inspection policy. He also encouraged colonists of Rensselaerswyck to settle around Fort Orange in an effort to restrict independent trade. These actions antagonized the WIC and led Director-General Stuyvesant in April 1652 to annex the Rensselaers’ settlement, which he named Beverwijck, to Fort Orange, thereby bringing it under the direct authority of the WIC.98

Stuyvesant also took steps to end the interference of the Swedes in the fur trade down the Delaware and to reassert the WIC’s jurisdiction in that area. Initially, the settlers in New Sweden, which included a number of Finns, took little interest in trade with the Native Peoples, and concentrated their efforts on farming. But under the governorship of Johan Printz from 1643 to 1654, the Swedes began to play a more active role in the fur trade down the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers. To take advantage of trade on the Delaware and keep out English and Dutch interlopers, Printz moved his seat of government from Fort Christina (Wilmington, Delaware), to Great Tinicum Island, just south of Philadelphia. Soon after his arrival, he began construction of a fort, a church, and large fortified house on Great Tinicum Island. He named the new capital Nya Gotheborg and considered it a suitable position from which he could blockade the Dutch trading post at Fort Nassau, a little farther upriver.99
From his new position, Printz was able to initiate trade with the Susquehannock (Andaste) Indians, an Iroquoian-speaking group that were in a hostile relationship with the Five Nations of the Iroquois to the north and also with the Delaware Algonkian groups who inhabited New Jersey. By 1644, Printz was able to send between 1,300 and 2,200 beaver pelts to Sweden. Two years later, he built two trading posts on the trail into the Susquehannock territory in order to keep them from bringing their furs to Fort Nassau or other Dutch trading posts. Yet, in spite of this effort, in 1647, the Swedes shipped just 2,136 furs to the homeland. The next year, Benjamin Bonnell, a trader for the New Sweden Co., sold 1,232 beaver and 63 otter skins in Sweden.

In his first attempt to reclaim the trade on the Delaware, Stuyvesant in 1651 built Fort Casimir on the west bank of the river a few miles southeast of Fort Christina at what is now New Castle. In this way, the Dutch could potentially control ingress and egress on the Delaware. Three years later, the Swedes installed a new governor, Johan Rising, who was even more aggressive than his predecessor in pursuing trade. He pushed Swedish trading posts farther west, but in the end was unable to compete successfully with English traders from Virginia, who paid higher prices. The Virginians were even able to siphon off some of the Dutch fur trade, as independent Dutch traders preferred selling to them for higher prices than they could get from the WIC. In the first year of his governorship, Rising made the bold move to seize Fort Casimir. This naturally provoked the WIC, which dispatched from Amsterdam a ship with 200 soldiers to retake not only the fort, but the entire area the Dutch claimed along the Delaware. Once this ship reached New Amsterdam, Stuyvesant, lately returned from a trip to Barbados, prepared his invasion force, which included a fleet of seven ships and 317 soldiers. With almost no
ammunition and few soldiers, it was suicidal for Rising to resist. He ended up surrendering New Sweden with only one casualty.\textsuperscript{101}

Stuyvesant’s efforts at Beverwijck and on the Delaware no doubt contributed to the increase in the fur trade in the mid-1650s, but perhaps the most important factor was the persistent and escalating warfare between the Five Nations of the Iroquois and the Huron, which took place throughout the 1640s. Once the Iroquois had essentially destroyed the Huron Confederacy in 1649, the volume of trade down Hudson increased dramatically. In 1656, for instance, 34,840 beaver skins and 300 otter skins were collected at Fort Orange alone and sent downriver to New Amsterdam. The next year, about 37,000 beaver skins were sent from Beverwijck to the capital. With the illicit trade, as well as skins collected elsewhere, it can be presumed that New Netherland exported well over 40,000 beaver skins per year to Europe. This is the highest volume recorded in either the Dutch or English period.\textsuperscript{102}

But after 1657, the Dutch experienced a decline in the trade at Fort Orange/Beverwijck. In 1659, Stuyvesant informed the WIC directors that wholesalers and retailers at Fort Orange were blaming one another for “the decline of the trade, which grows worse from year to year,” which suggests that the trade began to fall off the year previous. He noted that Indian traders had increased their demands, so that more than 100,000 guilders worth of presents had been given to them that summer. The traditional explanation for the decline is that the sources of beaver available to the Mohawk through hunting and trade and been depleted and that intertribal warfare had suppressed what trade was left. The patroon Jeremias van Rensselaer noted in 1663 that hostility among the Native Peoples allied to the French, English, and Dutch respectively, made it unsafe
for the Mohawk to travel with furs to Dutch trading posts. This view has recently been
callenged, but no other explanation has emerged.103

There was also trouble in the metropole. Prior to 1657, the price of a beaver pelt
on the Amsterdam market was more than six florins. The much larger trade in 1656 and
1657 produced a glut, so that in the latter year, the price of a beaver skin fell to six florins
even. Even at that price, traders were finding it difficult to find buyers. By the middle of
1658, the price dropped precipitously to 4.18 florins. The fall in prices meant that traders
in New Amsterdam, who were already facing the prospect of a smaller trade in the final
years of the 1650s and the early 1660s, would have to accept much lower profits per unit
for the skins they could manage to collect.104

Falling prices were not the only concern. In the late 1650s and early 1660s, the
Iroquois, the chief trading partners of the Dutch, were preoccupied with their war against
the French, which prevented them from concentrating on trade. The Dutch themselves
were busy with two wars against the Esopus Indians in what is now Ulster County, New
York. The first of these lasted from 1659 to 1660 and the second from 1663 to 1664.
While no records have come to light that provide figures for the number and value of furs
traded in New Netherland during these years, the squabbling that broke out between the
large institutionalized traders and the small traders at Fort Orange and Beverwijck
indicates that the trade was not robust and competition became keen as the number of
furs dwindled and prices on the European market declined.105

The history of the Dutch fur trade, then, much like that of the French, is not one of
unmitigated success. Like the French, the Dutch enjoyed some wildly profitable years,
but for the most part, the fur trade did not provide the hoped-for economic support for the
development of the colony, at least so long as the WIC held the monopoly. In the years of free trade, the extraction of furs from North America and their sale on the European market did seem to bring some wealth back into the colony and created some substantial individual fortunes. But overall, the fur trade alone, given its instability, does not seem to explain, in itself, the growth and development of the Dutch colony in the years following 1638.

Yet, in spite of the history of bankruptcy, debt, and failure that marks the fur trade generally, historians have nevertheless defined both New France and New Netherland from 1608-1664 from the perspective of the fur trade. Perhaps this is only natural since in terms of the extraction of resources, furs, particularly American beaver pelts, did loom largest. When seen from this perspective, these two colonial networks inevitably conform to extractive and exploitative models. And indeed, seen in isolation, the fur trade network itself, in each case, exhibits attributes of both the solar and dendritic models discussed in the introduction. But neither network falls neatly into either of these classic extractive colonial types. Each colony loosely resembled a solar system, with its solar center respectively at the urbanized jurisdictional capital of Quebec or New Amsterdam. These solar centers organized and set the rules for subsidiary market centers from which furs flowed to the solar center to be re-organized for shipment to the metropole. In the case of New France, the subsidiary markets at Montreal and Trois-Rivières fell under the economic control of the Council of Quebec, as did the trade at Tadoussac. But because Quebec was not the final port through which the furs were shipped to the metropole, the French network does not conform completely to the solar model. Furs from Montreal and Trois-Rivières were sent along the network to Quebec
where they were organized and put aboard larger vessels for shipment downriver to Tadoussac. But it was at Tadoussac that the furs were loaded aboard seagoing vessels for transport to the metropole. Tadoussac was also a market for furs brought down the Saguenay River. These were not shipped to Quebec at all, but were simply put aboard the seagoing ships at Tadoussac itself. Tadoussac still remained subsidiary to Quebec, however, because the profits of the Tadoussac trade were ultimately sent to Quebec.

Then, too, New France included an entire trading area—that from Miscou Island east—that generally operated outside of the solar authority of Quebec.

New Netherland, in terms of the fur trade, seems to have conformed somewhat more to the solar model. All of the subsidiary markets—Fort Orange, Fort Good Hope, Fort Christina, and others—seem to have sent their furs to New Amsterdam for organization and transshipment to the metropole. At least this was so as it relates to the legal trade in furs. But as has been seen, New Netherland was also known for a prodigious illegal trade in furs, and many of these were likely never brought to the solar center but were secretly loaded aboard private ships in other locations.

A classic solar system, as Carol A. Smith defines it, requires the solar center—Quebec or New Amsterdam—to enjoy “a monopoly in a closed regional system.” Both the French and the Dutch tried to effect this, but because in each case the trade was dependent upon Native-American networks that were more or less independent, a completely closed regional system proved impossible to maintain. In essence, Quebec and New Amsterdam operated within the same regional system and competed with one another, through their Native-American allies, for the same resources.
The French and Dutch networks also exhibited some of the attributes of the dendritic system. While the Native-American trading partners of these networks could not be defined as “peasants” who produced agricultural products that flowed “directly from rural areas to urban centers for shipment to the metropole, as in the classic dendritic model, it is important to note that the chief indigenous trading partners of these colonial networks were agricultural peoples, who at least in part traded the agricultural goods they produced for furs, which were then sent to the urban port centers for shipment to markets in Europe. The Native Americans did somewhat more than produce a raw material for the European market. As Matthew Dennis has pointed out, they were also responsible for the initial processing phases of the industry, which included not only hunting and trapping the beavers, but also skinning them and then preparing the pelts for the European processing phase by wearing them.107

In other ways, the French and Dutch networks conformed to the dendritic model. In general, the lower-level centers, as in the solar model, were tributary to one higher-level center—though, as has been seen, Quebec and New Amsterdam did compete with one another to some degree, which allowed Native-American producers to negotiate for higher prices than they could have in a typical dendritic system. As in the typical dendritic system, the urban centers of the European end of the trade network at least became progressively smaller with distance from the primate center (although Montreal might prove a slight exception here for reasons to be discussed later), and the higher-level centers generally controlled the lower-level centers, at least in terms of the fur trade, which helped to control prices. But perhaps the chief correlation of the French and Dutch trade networks with a dendritic model is that the economy of the producers (the Native
Peoples) was poorly served. Most of the trade goods the Indians received—with the exception of firearms and perhaps cloth—were cheaply produced and not very well distributed. The Native Americans, who operated according to a different value system from the Europeans, were not interested in developing permanent market areas or accumulating wealth. In this way, they operated partially outside of the European economic system and did not provide a significant market for more expensive European manufactures and commodities.

From a narrow, economic perspective, then, the French and Dutch fur trade networks operated chiefly as extractive systems. But the fur trade was only one facet of the colonial enterprise. The fact remains that in each case, the development of the fur trade was not the first priority of policy planners in the metropole. For the royal government in France and for the republican government of the Netherlands, the overall goal of the imperialist enterprise was to build strong agriculturally based settlement colonies, peopled chiefly with French and Dutch immigrants, respectively. The problem for the European governments was one of funding, and at first each saw the fur trade as perhaps providing the money for the work of settling the colony.

But, as it turned out, the fur trade could not be made to bear the expense of colonization to any great degree. Although a single beaver pelt could be purchased cheaply in North America and sold dearly in Europe, the margin of profit for companies holding these monopolies was still slim. For New Netherland, Bachman has estimated that the margin of profit for the WIC through exchange of merchandise was about 2.18 florins to one for the period from 1624 to 1635. This, however, does not take into account the costs of insurance and shipping or the overhead of maintaining the colony.
When these expenses are considered, Bachman estimates that the West India Co. ran a yearly deficit in the fur trade of about 2,895 florins. Given the greater volume of the trade in New France, it might be assumed that some profit accrued to the succession of companies that held the monopoly from 1603 to 1645. But even if this were so, and it generally was not, the margin of profit was never enough to effectively develop the colony. For this reason, the crown periodically revoked the monopoly charter, which invariably required the company that held it to increase French settlement and infrastructure.108

No doubt, certain individuals along the way made a handsome profit from the fur trade, but more importantly, the companies charged with colonization could rarely make a profit for more than one or two years. Before too long, under the weight of administrative costs and given the inherent uncertainties of the trade itself, they either went bankrupt or gave up the attempt to settle the country. Finally, both the Company of New France and the WIC (quasi-governmental institutions) relinquished their monopolies, essentially separating the colonization effort from the fur trade to the degree possible. In each case, as will be seen, the settlement effort proceeded more effectually after it had been separated from the fur trade.

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1 Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland, 14; Champlain, though, seems to have continued to believe a way might be found or at least he led his superiors in France to think so. See “Utilite que le sieur de Champlain dict & entend que le Roy recepeura de l’enterprise de la nouvelle france s’il plaict a Sa Majte. dy entendre,” n.d., also known as “mémoire de Champlain au roi,” Documents Concernant Samuel de Champlain—1619-1635, Bibliothèque et Archives Nationales de Québec [accessed online, 15 March 2012, http://pistard.banq.qc.ca/unite_chercheurs/recherche_simple]; Biggar, ed., Works of Champlain, 2:345.


4 For the spatial arrangement of Native Peoples and a discussion of their horticulture and construction of towns and villages, see Chapter 9; Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 25-26.

5 Vance, The Merchant’s World, 11.
8 Bachman, *Pelttries or Plantations*, 15.
12 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 55.
29 Biggar, *Early Trading Companies*, 117-19
30 Ibid., 123-24, 128-29.
Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 10-12.

Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 169-78; Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 15; Narcisse Henri Eduoard Faucher de Saint-Maurice and Jean Gervais Protaias Blanchet, eds., Collection de Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Memoires et Autres Documents Historiques Relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Quebec: ou Copies à l'Etranger Mis en Ordre et Edites sous les Auspices de la Legislature de Quebec avec Table, etc. (Quebec: Imprimerie Augustin Coté, 1883), 1:79.


Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 179.


Innis, The Fur Trade, 29.


Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:183-84.


Campeau has noted, too, that the private trade cut into the profits of the company. In 1649, soldiers and others returning to France carried with them 15,000 or 16,000 livres in furs, much of it given in payment for services rendered. Jesuit Relations, 32:97, 99, 103, 179; Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 92, 95-97.


Campeau, 120; Jesuit Relations, 40:78; 41:43; Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:206, 213; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 225.

Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, 233-34; José Antônio Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More: Iroquois Policy Toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 105-9; Jesuit Relations, 40:78; 41:43; 77; “État des ‘charges indispensables payées en castor’— détail de ce qui a été payé au gouverneur général, aux gouverneurs particuliers, aux Jésuites, aux
commis, aux Hospitalières, aux Ursulines, au chirurgien de Québec, etc.” 22 Aug. 1654, Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer COL C11A 1/fol.290-290v [accessed through www.archivescanadafrance.org, 31 Jan. 2012]. Trudel says the trade in 1654 amounted to 300,000 livres, but gives no source for this amount. He also says that the English captured the ship carrying these furs, but his citations point to the ship captured in December 1653. See his The Beginnings of New France, 225.

59 Lancot, History of Canada, 212-13; Campeau says the governor of Trois-Rivières made his regulation on prices on 20 June 1653. But this seems to come from a misreading of Lancot, from whom it is clear that Boucher made the ruling in 1654. Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 111.

60 Jesuit Relations, 41:211; Lancot, History of Canada, 1:216; Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 126, 129.


63 Trudel, Beginnings of New France, 227-28; Lancot, History of Canada, 1:222-23.

64 Lancot, History of Canada, 1:230; Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More, 105-10.


67 Ibid., 247, 255; Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 153; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 273; Jugements et Déliberations du Conseil Souverain de la Nouvelle-France (Quebec: Imprimerie a Coté et Cie., 1885), 100-104.

68 Lancot, History of Canada, 1:253, 155, 159, 262; Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 184.

69 Campeau, Les Finances Publiques, 103-4; Innis, The Fur Trade, 40.

70 See Declaration of two members of the crew of the ship ‘Nachtegael’ of skipper Thijs Volckertsz. Mossel, 23 July 1614, in Hart, Prehistory of the New Netherland Company, 86; DeLaet’s figures are quoted in Bachman, Peltries or Plantations, 94, 129-32, and amended in Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland, 198; Russell Shorto, The Island at the Center of the World, 55-56.

71 For purposes of comparison, the florin was roughly equal to the livre tournois, which the French used during much of the period under discussion. See Thomas Munk, Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598-1700 (Houndsmills, U.K.: Palgrave, 1989), 112. Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 89.

72 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 89; Bachman, Peltries or Plantations, 94.

73 Bachman, Peltries or Plantations, 94; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 90.


75 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 47; Jameson, Narratives of New Netherland, 84.

76 DRNN, 212; Trigger, “The Mohawk-Mahican War,” 279.


78 Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, 85, 96.

79 Ibid., 94; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 98-99.

80 DRNN, 215-16.

81 Van Laer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 236; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 96-97.

82 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 97-100; Van Laer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 237.

83 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 102.

84 Van Laer, ed., Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 143-47.


89 *DRCHNY*, 1:106-7.
90 Ibid., 111-12
91 Ibid., 115.
93 *DRCHNY*, 1:121.
94 Ibid., 114, 120-23.
102 Fort Orange Records for 1657 seem to indicate that 33,940 beaver skins were shipped from Fort Orange that year, but this number may not include everything. Charles T. Gehring and Janny Venema, trans. and eds., *Fort Orange Records, 1654-1679* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2009), 94-95. O’Callaghan, *History of New Netherland*, 2:310 n.; Burke, “The New Netherland Fur Trade,” 59:2; Allen W. Trelease says that about 46,000 furs were shipped from Fort Orange in each of the years 1656 and 1657. See his *Indian Affairs*, 131.
107 Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace*, 155.
108 Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations*, 128.
Northeastern Native Peoples

While Hornsby’s conception of linear colonies has some limited value in delineating the different methods Europeans employed to colonize North America, it seems much less useful for explaining why the Europeans used the methods they did, how they connected to Native-American networks, and what kinds of communities were formed through the interaction of Europeans and Native Americans. Both Vance and Bachman underscore the idea that colonies are created to establish and maintain economic relationships with indigenous peoples. The linear-colony model describes only the European-controlled portion of the economic network the Europeans and Native Americans jointly established. A network analysis, by contrast, is more inclusive. It demonstrates that the “linear colony” is one link—a dominant flow perhaps—in a much larger web that connects preexisting Native-American trade networks to European overseas networks. Such analysis allows the historian to trace the trade and cultural interactions of the Native Peoples and Europeans in the colonial setting, and it is this interaction, rather than the simple imposition of the Europeans, that defines the colonial experience. Finally, a network analysis demonstrates that in terms of the dominant flow—the fur trade—the Native Americans controlled the means and mode of production, at least in its earliest stages, and therefore exerted more economic power over
the network than did the Europeans, at least during the first half of the seventeenth century. ¹

For Native Peoples, long-distance trade was nothing new. Elaborate Native-American trade networks predated the coming of Verrazzano by hundreds of years. The most sophisticated of these in eastern North America was the riverine network that the Mississippian Peoples constructed along the Mississippi and Missouri river systems with a central urban place at Cahokia near present-day East St. Louis, Illinois. This waterborne network, which reached its highest point of development in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, organized much of the trade of the American Midwest and the South and extended somewhat more weakly north toward the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Cahokia was an urban center with a population of at least 20,000. But it was only one node on a fairly sophisticated network that included nine subsidiary urbanized centers and numerous outlying agricultural villages.²

The Mississippian network, while by no means capitalist or even protocapitalist, bears some striking resemblances to the model Christaller proposed for the modern development of central places in Europe. The larger urban centers, including Cahokia itself, drew on a broad hinterland of villages where horticultural, if not agricultural, production was highly developed and could support urban concentration, trade specialization, and social stratification. Cahokia and the other urban centers seem to have developed some artisan-based “manufacturing” (in the original sense of the word), which produced trade goods such as axe-heads, shell-bead necklaces, distinctive pottery, copper ornaments, and possibly specialized notched arrowheads. In some cases, craft goods manufactured in the urban centers required the importation of important raw materials
from a distance. Very likely, agricultural produce was also reorganized in the urban nodes for exchange.

By the end of the fourteenth century, Cahokia and its network had collapsed, leaving its people to disperse into smaller agricultural settlements. Some scholars—notably Dena Dincauze and Robert Hasenstab—have argued that the Iroquois Confederacy developed to provide security in response to both the regional power of the Mississippian society at its height and to the violence and social disorganization of its collapse. This same argument might well hold true, as Neal Salisbury suggests, for the development of the Huron Confederacy. Dincauze and Hasenstab’s supposition has been widely disputed, but there is little doubt that the Mississippian Peoples’ adoption of agriculture as the basis of their economy and also of settled urban life had an important effect throughout northeastern woodlands.

Woodlands Indians in the Northeast, where there were arable lands and a long enough growing season, adopted agriculture as early as the twelfth century. But the people who lived in the area of Iroquoia from 1200 B.C. to about 1000 A.D., were not agriculturists at all, but hunter-gatherers. They did, however, carry on an extensive long-distance trade for items used in elaborate burial rituals. This trade extended to the Atlantic Coast, from which came ceremonial shells, to the Great Lakes, from which came copper, and finally to the Adena culture of the Ohio Valley, from which came various other ritual objects. Such long-distance trade seems to have intensified after 200 A.D., but it was only after 1000 A.D. that agricultural production on a significant scale began in Iroquoia and became the foundation of the life of the people. As Daniel Richter
observes, it was at this time that the people of Iroquoia developed the “basic way of life that would still prevail . . . during the period of early contact with Europeans.”

The profound changes in the life-ways of the people of Iroquoia after 1000 A.D. indicate to some scholars—most notably Dean Snow—that Iroquois-speaking peoples first immigrated into northern New York from the south during this period. Evidence has shown that the same period during which agriculture was adopted in Iroquoia witnessed an intensification of warfare. Oddly, it also coincided with a sharp decline in long-distance trade. Scholars speculate that the continuous warfare among Iroquois-speaking groups led to the development of distinct Iroquoian languages, such as Huron, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Susquehannock.

Maize, beans, and squash (the three sisters) were the staple of Iroquoian agriculture. The cultivation of these crops was the work of women, though men, who contributed to the diet through hunting and fishing, helped to clear fields. The Iroquois and Huron farmed on a scale much greater than the simple gardening of some other Northern Woodlands Indians. Their cultivated fields sometimes radiated up to a mile out from principal towns.

Although there is still an ongoing dispute among scholars as to when Iroquoian speakers first settled in upstate New York, Ontario, and southern Quebec, it is clear that long before European contact, the Laurentian Iroquois, the Five Nations of the Iroquois, and the Huron had all adopted agriculture as the basis of their societies, producing crops for both subsistence and trade. These groups had also embraced settled town and village life, which was necessary to the cultivation of crops on the scale European visitors
witnessed. Each of these peoples created a distinct network of palisaded towns that were loosely organized politically.8

In his visit to the palisaded town of Stadacona in 1535, Cartier observed that the Laurentian Iroquois cultivated a number of crops, including maize, musk-melons, pumpkins, gourds, cucumbers, beans, and tobacco. He was even more impressed with the palisaded town of Hochelaga, which stood amid “fair, large fields full of the grain of their country.”9 These towns had disappeared by the time the French established Quebec, but early visitors to the Huron found their network of towns and villages even more impressive than those Cartier had described.

Huronia encompassed approximately 800 square miles, which extended between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe, an area just to the north of the western tip of Lake Ontario. Horticulture, at least maize, had been introduced to this area sometime before 500 A.D., earlier than in Iroquoia. Father Gabriel Sagard, who toured Huronia in the early 1620s, found it to be divided into several districts, each with its own “chief” or leader. In all, there were between eighteen and twenty-five towns and villages, which accommodated a total population of between 18,000 and 40,000. Recent archeology suggests that in 1633, well after the contact period, the population was about 21,200. Strong wooden palisades with galleries and watchtowers surrounded the principal towns. Champlain, who visited Huronia in 1615, noted that one of these towns, Carhagouha, which was not even the largest, was enclosed in a formidable triple wooden palisade some thirty-five feet in height. He visited five of the principal towns, all of which had similar defenses. The largest town was Cahiagué, which Champlain said had some “two hundred fairly large lodges.” If Champlain’s report is accurate, it would mean that
Cahiagué, while similar to the Hochelaga of Cartier’s time in terms of the construction of its palisade, was about four times as large, and had a population of between 4,000 and 6,000. This would make Cahiagué equivalent to a small town in Christaller’s categorization of the urban centers created during the industrialization of Germany. But it was much larger in terms of population than all of New France in 1663. Bruce G. Trigger, though, believes the Hurons’ largest towns likely reached a population of no more than 2,000.10

Champlain found that settled agriculture was the basis for Huronia’s somewhat urbanized society. He noted that the “whole region” was “a well-cleared country where they plant much Indian corn, which comes up very well, as do also squashes and sunflowers.” Father Sagard was careful to note that the Hurons did not live by farming alone, but also by fishing and hunting. Nevertheless, recognizing that agriculture provided an important foundation for Huron society, he took pains to describe how they practiced it. Clearing the land, Sagard observed, was “very troublesome for them, since they have no proper tools.” Indeed, for Native Americans, the lack of draft animals and iron tools made farming labor-intensive. Men cleared the lands by cutting down the trees and burning the stumps, which were only removed over the course of time. Once this heavy work was accomplished, agriculture became the concern of women. Women prepared the soil, sowed, tended, and harvested the crops, and prepared the food for storage. Maize was the staple of life in Huronia, along with the traditional squash and beans, but by the time Sagard visited, the Hurons were beginning to incorporate some European crops into their gardens, notably peas.11
The Iroquois likewise lived in settled towns and villages, many of which were surrounded by defensive palisades similar to those of the Huron and Laurentian Iroquois. Some of these towns boasted a population of more than two thousand, which would make them equivalent to a country town in Christaller’s scheme. It is worth noting that these Iroquois nodes were also larger than Quebec during the entire period under discussion in this study and larger than New Amsterdam until just before the English takeover in 1664. Because of the constant warfare between the Iroquois Confederacy and other Native-American groups, the Iroquois tended to establish their towns on defensible hilltops some distance away from rivers and creeks that their enemies might use as avenues of invasion. By the seventeenth century, the Iroquois had ten or eleven towns, each with at least one satellite village. As Daniel Richter has noted, so far as modern scholarship has established, the Mohawk had three or four towns and a number of villages just to the south of the Mohawk River and not too far from the Dutch trading post at Fort Orange. The largest of these was Tenotoge, located where Caroga Creek once ran into the Mohawk River. Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, who traveled through the Mohawk and Oneida countries in 1634-1635, noted that this village had fifty-five houses, each about one-hundred-feet in length. Although he visited in the winter, he found the houses in the town “full of grain and beans” and observed additional storehouses of grain across the creek. The Oneidas, just to the west of the Mohawks, had perhaps one town and one village. Van den Bogaert observed that the Oneida town, or “castle,” as he termed it, was larger than Tenotoge and more elaborately constructed. Some 767 “steps” in circumference, it was located on a high hill and was doubly palisaded. Inside the enclosure were sixty-six houses, which had wooden gables decorated with paintings of
animals. The gates of the town were also decorated with large wooden sculptures of men, which were adorned with the scalps of enemies. Here van den Bogaert found that some of the houses were stocked with sixty or seventy dried salmon, another staple of Iroquois existence. The Onondagas, just south of the Oneidas, had one town and one village, and the Cayugas, situated just to the west, had at least three towns between the Owasco and Cayuga lakes. Finally, just west of the Cayugas were the Senecas with two towns and two villages. The Five Nations of the Iroquois, then, were spread out between the Hudson River on the east and the Genesee River on the west.12

The Huron and the Five-Nations Iroquois, who would become the chief Native-American trading partners of the French and Dutch, respectively, spoke languages belonging the Iroquoian language group, as did the Susquehannocks, with whom the Swedes and Dutch sometimes traded. The Petuns were also an Iroquoian group related to the Hurons. But most of the other Native Peoples with whom the French and Dutch interacted spoke one of the many forms of the Algonkian language. These would include the Montagnais, the Mi’kmaqs, the Etchemin, the Abenaki, the Mahican, the Indian groups who lived on Long Island and in and around Manhattan, and the various New Jersey-based bands that would later coalesce as the Lenape. Although the languages these groups spoke likely descended from a common root language, they were not necessarily mutually understandable.13

Like the Hurons and the Iroquois, the Algonkins were agricultural peoples, who raised corn, beans, and squash. But the Algonkians generally pursued agriculture on a smaller scale than the Huron and Iroquois and did not often build palisaded towns, but instead tended to reside in smaller-scale villages. The Huron, Five-Nations Iroquois, and
the various Algonkian groups all employed hunting, fishing, gathering, and trade, as well as agriculture, in order to provide food and clothing for themselves and items for reciprocal trade. But the Iroquoian speakers tended to emphasize agriculture a bit more.\textsuperscript{14}

While nearly all of the Native Peoples with whom the French and the Dutch interacted pursued agriculture as part of their subsistence, as well as for the purposes of trade, the Montagnais, or Innu, as they called themselves, and the Mi’kmaqs were important exceptions. The Montagnais inhabited lands along the southern portion of the Saguenay River and controlled the trade at Tadoussac. As Maurice Trudel has noted, the French used the term “Montagnais” to refer to all of the people who lived along the north bank of the St. Lawrence River from Sept Iles to Trois-Rivières. These groups included the Betsiamites, Naskapis, Papinachois, Chekoutimis, and the Canadiens. The Canadiens, who lived between Tadoussac and Quebec, were the Montagnais with whom the French were most familiar. They maintained a fortified town near Tadoussac as well as a winter fishing and hunting camp closer to Quebec. The Canadien Montagnais did not engage in much, if any, gardening. The reason is readily apparent. Their chief area of residence near Tadoussac was, as Champlain described it, “the most disagreeable and barren in the whole country.” It also suffered from a very short growing season. Although some of the Canadien Montagnais traveled southwest to the environs of Quebec, where the land was arable and the climate less severe, they only did so to fish. They would not make any permanent settlement near Quebec for fear of the Iroquois. For the Montagnais, this meant that when the hunting season was bad, they would find themselves starving and destitute.\textsuperscript{15}
The Mi’kmaq on the Acadian Coast likewise engaged in horticulture only to a minimal degree and for much the same reason as the Montagnais. The coastal region they inhabited was rocky and not very well suited to agriculture. Acadia also had short growing season. It was for this reason that Champlain finally abandoned any attempt to establish a colony in the maritime region and sought more arable lands and a better climate with a longer growing season farther inland. The Mi’kmaq survived chiefly by hunting and fishing.16

Spatial Arrangement of Native Peoples Before European Contact

The spatial arrangement of the Native Peoples of Northeastern North America prior to European contact cannot be ignored in any discussion of the development of colonial networks. The merchant companies that began the initial settlement of the French and Dutch colonies were interested chiefly in the extraction of goods from which a profit might be made on the European market. When no substantial amounts of gold, silver, or other precious metals or gems were found, these companies turned to the fur trade. With few Europeans in the initial settlements, the French and Dutch had to depend upon Native Peoples to collect the furs and also to do some of the initial processing. This entailed skinning the animals, curing the skins, and then wearing the beaver skins with the fur to the inside for one season. These “worn” skins commanded a higher price because in the process of wearing them, the stiff outer hairs of the fur fell off and the natural oils from human skin helped to soften the inner hair, making the pelts suitable for use in hat-making. Fresh skins commanded a lower price because the hatter would have
to treat the fur to remove the outer hair and soften the inner. In order to make the fur trade work, the Europeans, as has been seen, had to intersect with preexisting Native-American trade networks and begin to direct the flow of trade from them into the European networks. This, of course, depended upon the preexisting spatial arrangement of the Native Peoples.\textsuperscript{17}

But creating a fur trade network that included Native Peoples was only one consideration that influenced the development of New France and New Netherland. The French and Dutch also had to develop nodes of settlement and trade that they could protect from other European powers and also from potential Native enemies. This meant that the French and the Dutch had to select locations that both intersected with the Native Peoples but could also be defended from them and from other Europeans.

A further spatial consideration in locating the colonial nodes that helped to determine the development of the Euro-Indian trade networks was the availability of arable land accessible by water. Both the French and the Dutch hoped to establish self-supporting agricultural settlements. For this, they required access to arable land. But because the Europeans, as much as the Native Peoples, and perhaps more, were dependent upon water-based transportation and communication systems, these lands had to be located in coastal regions or along navigable river systems. Arable land also had to be acquired without unduly antagonizing the Native Peoples to whom it belonged. This meant that the Europeans had to settle either in uninhabited areas, in places where the Native Peoples wished to create relationships with Europeans and were, therefore, willing to cede some of their lands, or where the Native Peoples were simply too weak militarily to contest the appropriation of their lands.
But perhaps the key determinant in the placement of the French and Dutch colonial networks was the aspirations of Native Peoples towards the Europeans. Native Peoples, within the terms of their own ideas of exchange, hoped to trade for European goods, in part, because they found such goods useful, but also because they found such goods to be exotic—and, as such, a mark of status. The Indian peoples with whom the Europeans traded directly inevitably desired to control their end of the trade—as middlemen—between the Europeans and other Native groups who were farther removed from the nodes where Native and European traders exchanged goods. Because Native Peoples generally increased their overall political power through gift-giving rather than through hoarding material wealth, access to exotic goods was a key to increasing power within the Native-American world. To achieve this, Native Peoples had to maintain a working relationship with the Europeans while also controlling access to their own trade networks in the same way the Europeans kept competitors from breaching theirs.18

Another important determinant in how and where colonial networks developed was the desire of the Native Peoples to enlist Europeans as allies against their traditional enemies. Champlain, for instance, time and again, had to promise to assist the Montagnais, Ottawa-River Algonkians, and the Hurons in their wars against the Iroquois. As the Iroquois found themselves increasingly on the defensive, they, in turn, turned to the Dutch for aid. By 1630, the Iroquois had made themselves the key trading partners of the Dutch, and, as such, could use their economic leverage to wrest firearms from them. Direct access to firearms gave the Iroquois a decided edge against their Native-American enemies north of the St. Lawrence.19 It might be noted here that the approach of the French and the Dutch in their alliances with Native Peoples differed significantly. The
French participated directly in warfare with their allies, while the Dutch—at least after the Kriekenbeek episode—generally only supplied weapons.

The spatial arrangement of Native Peoples among whom the French settled and with whom they were aligned can be briefly summarized along a line from east to west. Their chief allies and trading partners in Acadia were the Mi’kmaq, sometimes called the Souriquois, who traded furs at the French posts at Port Royal and Miscou. While the Mi’kmaq remained firm friends of the French who settled among them, the French settlements and trading posts at Miscou, Port Royal, and at St. John’s in New Brunswick were exposed to seagoing vessels of European competitors and therefore vulnerable to attack. As has been seen, Samuel Argyll in 1613 led a force that virtually wiped out the French settlements in Acadia. Although the French later rebuilt and resettled the area, Acadia, along with Quebec, fell to the English again in 1629. Acadia became a largely Scottish colony for the next three years, after which, Charles I handed it back to France in the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye. From the late 1630s to 1650, Acadia witnessed what some historians have called a civil war between competing French governors, and finally in 1654, the English reconquered it altogether and did not return it to French possession until 1667, well after the French royalization of the St. Lawrence colony. The turmoil in Acadia during the early seventeenth century seriously compromised the fur trade there with the Mi’kmaq and other coastal indigenes.20

In the Gulf of Maine, on the coast between the St. John’s and Kennebec rivers, were the Etchemin, largely a hunting, fishing, and gathering people, who were sometimes in conflict with the Mi’kmaq and Montagnais. Champlain met with the leaders of several bands of the Etchemin at a tabagie on the Penobscot River in 1604. There has been much
scholarly debate about the ethnicity of the Etchemins, who spoke an Algonkian language similar to the Abenaki. This debate centers chiefly on whether the Etchemin were culturally distinct from the Eastern Abenaki. Recent scholarship has shown, however, that the French considered the Etchemin a distinct group. Champlain hoped to draw them into an alliance and to conclude a peace among the Etchemin, the Eastern Abenaki, and their enemies—not only the Mi’kmaq, but also the Canadien branch of the Montagnais. But the Mi’kmaq, who wished to become the middlemen between the French and other Indian groups of the region, were cool to the idea. Maine soon fell under the control of the English as Champlain shifted his attention to the upper St. Lawrence.21

South along the coast were the Eastern Abenaki, an Algonkian-speaking group who were the enemies of the Mi’kmaq. The Eastern Abenaki were a horticultural people who chiefly traded with the English settlements to the south, but occasionally made an appearance among the French. In 1637, a handful of Eastern Abenaki warriors appeared at Quebec to enlist the aid of the Montagnais in their wars. The Montagnais, however, were suspicious that the Abenaki planned to capture some of the northern fur trade and divert it to the English. Gov. Montmagny, seeing the danger to the French trade, threatened to close the company store to the Montagnais, essentially cutting off their food supply, until they had persuaded the Abenaki to return to their own country. Finding no one willing to aid them at Quebec, the Abenaki moved on to Trois-Rivières, where the garrison commander, on Montmagny’s orders, detained them and had their possessions searched. He found no indication that they intended to trade, but confiscated their arquebuses and sent them home. In 1640, about twenty Abenaki appeared at the Christian Indian town of Sillery near Quebec, this time more ominously with an
Englishman who intended to explore north up the Saguenay River—a key avenue of the French fur trade. Montmagny would not allow the Englishman to come to Quebec, but did not try to prevent him from going up the Saguenay. As it turned out, an illness broke out among the Abenaki guides, and the Englishman put himself under the protection of the French, who sent him back to Europe from Tadoussac.22

As has already been seen, the chief allies and trading partners of the French inhabited areas on the north bank of the St. Lawrence River. These were the Montagnais, who concentrated near Tadoussac, the Ottawa-River Algonkians, who controlled the trade on the Ottawa River from their village on Allumette Island, and the Huron, who lived to the north of Lake Ontario. With the disappearance of the Laurentian Iroquois of Cartier’s time, the French were able to build their first significant settlements—at Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal—in an area that had largely become a no man’s land between the Montagnais to the east, the Ottawa-River Algonkians to the west and their longtime enemies, the Iroquois, just south of the St. Lawrence.23

In this way, the center of French settlement was located among Indian allies and trading partners on the north bank of the St. Lawrence. The Montagnais, Ottawa-River Algonkian, and Huron, far from resisting the French presence, welcomed it. The French did not initially, at least, take up lands that directly impinged on the homelands of their Native-American allies, but located themselves in a danger zone, providing a buffer for their allies and trading partners against their enemies south of the river. In essence, the French had been enlisted on one side in an ongoing war, even though this was not Champlain’s original intention. He had hoped to engineer a peace between the Iroquois and the Native Peoples north of the river. But he was only able to achieve this
temporarily. Any peace the French attempted to make with the Iroquois always antagonized the Montagnais, Algonkians, and the Huron, among whom the French lived and on whom they depended for trade.24

South of the St. Lawrence and just to the west of Maine and Massachusetts was a Native People who were essentially intermediaries between the French and Dutch colonies. These were the Western Abenaki, who spoke an Algonkian dialect distinct from the Eastern Abenaki, to whom they were otherwise related. The Sokokis, the southernmost band of the Western Abenaki, were allies of the Mahicans, who were initially the chief trading partners of the Dutch on the upper Hudson. Through this alliance, the Western Abernaki became connected to the Dutch trade network on the Hudson, but also somewhat more directly on the Connecticut River, along which the Sokokis lived. By contrast, the northernmost of the West Abenaki groups, the Missiquois, were located at the northeastern end of Lake Champlain, fairly close to Montreal. Because the Mohawk sometimes menaced them, they tended to gravitate northward toward the French trade network.25

The Iroquois—particularly the Mohawk—must also be accounted as intermediary between the Dutch and the French. To the north, Mohawk territory bordered the St. Lawrence. But to the southeast, Mohawk tribal lands were located in close proximity to the Dutch trading post at Fort Orange on the Hudson. Although the nations of the Iroquois Confederacy were most often at war with the French and were themselves, through the entire period under discussion, aligned chiefly with the Dutch, they did, when it was in their interest, make peace with the French and trade with them. The Iroquois also served as a buffer between the French and Dutch colonies and over
time became the chief middlemen in the fur trade because of their geographic position. The bargaining power of the Iroquois can readily be seen, for example, in van den Bogaert’s journal. The chief reason van den Bogaert’s three-man commission traveled through the Mohawk and Oneida countries in 1634 and 1635 was to shore up flagging trade relations. Part of the problem from the Dutch perspective was that “French Indians” had come among the Mohawk and Oneida to make peace and trade furs. The Iroquois were taking advantage of this offer in order to get better prices and quite possibly to put pressure on the Dutch to pay higher prices, too. The Dutch were particularly fearful that the French might establish a trading post in Iroquoia.26

The Native People who dealt chiefly or exclusively with the Dutch immediately after the WIC took control of New Netherland were the Algonkian-speaking Mahicans, whose territory initially straddled the upper Hudson and included the area where Fort Orange was located. Mahican lands extended east to the Connecticut River and north into Vermont, where they may have shared hunting grounds with the Western Abenaki, who were among their most important trading partners.27

To the southeast of the Mahicans, on Manhattan Island and Long Island and in New Jersey and the surrounding region, were numerous bands of Algonkian speakers. The location of these Algonkian groups accounted for perhaps the key difference between the French and Dutch colonial networks. Quebec, the chief center of the French colonial population, small as it was during the first half of the seventeenth century, was located in an area where the Native Peoples were only sparsely settled. As has been seen, the Native groups near Quebec were allied with the French for protection against the Iroquois Confederacy. The Huron, the main allies and fur-trading partners of the French, were
settled to the west of Montreal. The French colonial population, therefore, with small settlements at Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal, was located amid Indian allies, though it was also in close proximity to the Iroquois, who claimed the area around Montreal as their territory. The French, because of a general distrust of even their closest allies among the Native Peoples, generally held to a policy of prohibiting the sale of firearms to them with the important exception of those who had converted to Christianity. In times of danger, the French preferred sending their own troops. These French policies, which were meant to keep the most potent military technologies under French control, would eventually put their Huron and Algonkian allies at a distinct disadvantage in the ongoing regional wars of the seventeenth century.28

The spatial arrangements of the Dutch vis-à-vis the Native Peoples was quite different. The main center of Dutch population was in and around New Amsterdam, more than 100 miles south of their chief allies and fur trading partners, the Mohawk, who inhabited the area just west of Orange (Albany). The native bands immediately surrounding New Amsterdam to the north in what later became Westchester County, to the east on Long Island, and to the south in New Jersey, were Algonkian-speakers, who were either oppressed tributaries or bitter enemies of the Mohawk. Although the official policy of the Dutch West India Co. was to prohibit the sale of firearms to the Indians as potentially dangerous to the Dutch population, the spatial arrangement of Native and European settlement and the Iroquois control of the means of production of furs encouraged the sale of weapons, lead, and powder to the Iroquois, but not to the Algonkians. The sale of such weapons to the Mohawk became a pro-forma part of the Dutch trade after 1639.29
The arming of the Iroquois had two important effects. First, it allowed the Iroquois Confederacy to destroy the largely unarmed Huron. Second, it significantly increased tensions between the Dutch and the Algonkian groups closer to New Amsterdam. Displeasure with the Dutch sale of firearms to their traditional enemies almost certainly contributed to the virulence of the Algonkian assault on the Dutch settlements in New Jersey, Long Island, and Manhattan during Kieft’s War from 1643-1645, when eleven or twelve Algonkian bands united and nearly destroyed the Dutch colony.30

The sale of firearms to the Mohawks was not, however, the only issue that increased tensions between the Dutch and their nearest Indian neighbors. The sheer proximity of peoples who were so culturally different also led to problems. The Dutch, who because of their relatively sparse population could not spare the labor to look after their farm animals as they would in Europe, allowed their pigs, goats, and sometimes their cattle to roam free. The animals sometimes wandered into the gardens of the neighboring Indians and wreaked havoc on their crops. The Indians, who had no domesticated animals aside from dogs, responded by simply shooting the farm animals as they would wild animals. Since the Indians depended on their crops to survive the winter and the Dutch depended upon their expensive imported domestic animals for part of their subsistence, these differences in agri-cultural practices led to significant tensions and provided the backdrop for Kieft’s war.31

Further difficulties arose when the Director Kieft attempted to lay the local Algonkian peoples under a contribution as payment for Dutch protection. Specifically, Kieft hoped to have the Algonkians pay what can only be described as a tax in maize,
which would, of course, supplement the sometimes meager food supplies of the Dutch colony. Naturally, the Native Peoples balked at this. But Kieft sent company agents to seize the corn anyway. In 1639, the Dutch sea captain and future patroon David de Vries witnessed WIC agents commandeering the corn from the Tappan Indians, an Algonkian group whose territory straddled the Hudson near the Palisades. One of the Tappans told De Vries that the newly arrived Kieft was “a very mean fellow to come to live in this country without being invited by them, and now wished to compel them to give him their corn for nothing.” The levy meant a significant hardship for the Tappans, who did not grow enough corn to lay by a significant surplus.32

In spite of frequent hostilities with the Algonkian tribes situated around New Amsterdam, the Dutch colony was in part dependent upon them for part of its supply of maize. In addition, the Algonkian groups on Long Island collected the sewan shells so valuable to Native Peoples for making wampum. Because the Dutch had access to these shells and the French did not, they were sometimes able to divert some portion of the French fur trade to Orange. The geographic distribution of the Native Peoples in New Netherland thus involved the Dutch colony in two distinct Native-American networks—the Iroquois and Algonkian—that were often at odds. The French colony, by contrast, connected to Native-American networks that were more or less cooperative even though it was made up of many distinct groups.33
Native-American Trade Networks and the Flow of Disease

Perhaps one of the strongest indicators of the existence of pre-contact trade networks among Native Peoples is the rapid spread of European disease through the Native-American world prior to any European settlement. These diseases spread through the indigenous trade networks. Although we do not think of it as defining, in terms of its effect on native populations, disease very likely ought to be accounted the dominant flow. This flow was largely, though perhaps not exclusively, one way—from Europe to North America. In his ground-breaking 1975 study, Francis Jennings concluded that soon after European contact, the Native-American populations declined by approximately ninety percent. To corroborate his findings, Jennings cited, among other observations, the testimony the New Netherland Indians provided to Adriaen van der Donck, which is preserved in his famous book A Description of New Netherlands. “The Indians also affirm,” says van der Donck,

that before the arrival of the Christians, and before the small pox broke out amongst them, they were ten times as numerous as they now are, and that their population had been melted down by this disease, whereof nine-tenths of them have died.

It is somewhat difficult to interpret this passage. Jennings uses it to confirm his idea that much of the decline in native population occurred prior to European settlement from simple contact between Native Americans and European explorers and fishermen. Alfred W. Crosby, relying on information from Bruce G. Trigger’s study, suggests that the major decline in native population may have occurred in the 1630s when smallpox spread from New England through New Netherland and New France. Others, too, have
suggested that van der Donck, who wrote his description in the late 1640s, is referring to
the outbreak of smallpox in the 1630s. Aside from van der Donck, few Dutch sources
refer to a devastating epidemic among the Iroquois in the 1630s, though van den Bogaert,
who visited the Mohawk in 1634, mentions that an outbreak of smallpox occurred that
year at the palisaded town of Onekahoncka, which carried off “many Indians.”
Nevertheless, smallpox seems to have sharply reduced the native population on Long
Island in 1660, and a further outbreak in 1690 had nearly catastrophic consequences for
the Iroquois.\textsuperscript{34}

While a dearth of sources makes it difficult to trace the effects of disease on the
Iroquois during the early part of the seventeenth century, it is certain that European
diseases were the overriding cause of the rapid decline of the Huron in the 1630s. The
Jesuit Father Jean de Brebeuf, in explaining the rather poor treatment the missionaries
received at the hands of the Huron in 1635, wrote:

\begin{quote}
I attribute, nevertheless, all these extraordinary difficulties to the sickness among
our Savages. I know not at what price our French and the Montagnais [Indians]
will have become rid of it. All these poor people have been much inconvenienced
by it, particularly during the Autumn, as much in their fishing as in their
harvesting. Many crops are lying beneath the snow; a large number of persons
are dead; there are still some who have not recovered. The sickness began with a
violent fever, which was followed by a sort of measles or smallpox, different,
however, from that common in France, accompanied in several cases by blindness
for some days, or by dimness of sight, and terminated at length by diarrhea which
has carried off many and is still bringing some to the grave.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Trigger notes that, whether it was the measles or the smallpox, the disease spread from
Quebec to Huronia. A further epidemic, this time definitely smallpox, struck Huronia in
1639 and lasted until 1640. Trigger estimates that this series of epidemics killed half the
Huron population. Jennings says disease and warfare combined to reduce the Huron
population from about 32,000 to just 10,000 in a period of ten years, though he may have exaggerated the original population to some degree. The reduction of future manpower through the death of a majority of the Huron children, observes Trigger, may have been decisive in their defeat at the hands of the Iroquois. The fact that the Iroquois emerged stronger at the beginning of the 1640s suggests that smallpox did not afflict them as powerfully in the 1630s as it did the Huron. This tends to support Jennings’ interpretation that the winnowing of the Iroquois, to which van der Donck refers, occurred prior to European settlement.36

But beyond its effect on the Native Americans and their trade networks, disease also had a direct effect on the urbanized nodes the Europeans were trying to develop. As Philip Benedict has noted, “the basic demographic characteristic of early modern cities [was] their inability to reproduce themselves in this era of high mortality.” Urban growth in Europe in the seventeenth century was dependent to a large degree on the movement of people from the countryside to the towns and cities, which was in turn chiefly dependent upon increased commercialization and the diversification of industry. If this basic demographic was characteristic of European cities, it was even more characteristic of the urban nodes the Europeans were trying to establish in North America. Europeans brought their diseases with them, but also became susceptible to new illnesses brought on by the alien environment they were entering.37
Native Americans had engaged in the fur trade for centuries prior to European contact. Northern groups, which relied chiefly on hunting and gathering, traded furs to the more southerly tribes in return for agricultural products—maize, beans, and squash—that could sustain them during the long winters. In essence, the Europeans simply tapped into preexisting trade networks in North America in much the same way as they tapped into a preexisting trade in slaves in West Africa. The key advantage of the Europeans was their ability to navigate the open seas and link to distant, one might say “global,” markets. The Native-American fur trade and the West-African slave trade were essentially regional in nature until the arrival of the Europeans. European ships, then, became the link between local producers of certain commodities and a much larger world market. The European connection, in essence, drew the Native Peoples of North America and Africa into an emerging capitalist world system, which was largely controlled by the Europeans, though they did not necessarily control the production of all of the commodities traded throughout the Atlantic world. As Phyllis Deane has noted, one of the key elements in creating a capitalist-industrial system is the “specialization of economic activity directed towards production for national and international markets rather than for family or parochial use.” Prior to the establishment of the link to European trade networks, the Native-American fur trade was chiefly a parochial affair. The creation of the new trans-Atlantic network, however, caused the Native Peoples to reorient the trade to a new international market and to reorganize themselves for greater and greater production of furs.\textsuperscript{38}
On the Acadian and Maine coasts, the Mi’kmaq and the Etchemins had been trading furs with Europeans—Portuguese, Basque, French, and English—from at least the time of Cartier. This trade was so well-established by the early seventeenth century that a group of Native-American middlemen, whom the English called the Tarrentines, had grown up along the coast. The Tarrentines, most of whom may have been Mi’kmaq, spoke what Bruce J. Bourque has called “an Indian-Basque pidgin—a trade language that developed around the Gulf of St. Lawrence during the mid-sixteenth century. They had also picked up a few words of other European languages as well. The Tarrentines were a hybridized people, who used European shallops, chiefly of Basque design, to sail along the coasts and collect furs. They then sailed out to meet European vessels in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to trade what they had collected. The hybridization of the Tarrentines leads one to wonder whether some of them might not have been the off-spring of European fisherman and Native women in much the same way as the Luso-Africans of the West African coast, who served as middlemen in the slave trade.39

The coastal Indians seem to have acquired most of the furs they traded to the Europeans from further inland along longstanding indigenous trade networks. The Etchemin leader Besabes, for instance, seems to have had connections through alliance and trade into the interior as far as Lac Megantic in present-day Quebec Province. There is no reason to think that these trade networks sprung up only to serve the European fur trade. While traffic in furs increased precipitously after European contact, the likelihood is that Native Peoples simply capitalized on existing trade relationships and extended them to their advantage. Prior to French settlement in Acadia, Besabes’ people collected the furs from their own trade networks and traded them to the Tarrentines in the spring,
who then brought them out to European ships. Once the French began to settle Acadia, though, the Tarrentines seemed to disappear, having outlived their usefulness.40

Since the most efficient means of transportation for the Eastern Woodlands Indians was along the lake, stream, and river systems, the first trading posts, or nodes, linking European and Native-American traders were located at the intersections of rivers, streams, and lakes. In New France, a very early trading post was set up, as has been detailed, at Tadoussac, where the Saguenay River flows from the north into the St. Lawrence. Champlain bypassed Tadoussac, where French fishermen and Spanish and Basque interlopers came to trade with the Indians, in part, because it was difficult to defend and did not provide a suitable location from which to enforce the de Monts monopoly. Tadoussac was about 100 miles east of Quebec, easily accessible to seagoing ships, at a place where the river was too wide for a fort on the bank to prevent ships from passing upriver. Quebec, where the river narrows, by contrast, was ideally suited for Champlain to prevent all but agents of the monopoly from trading with the Native Peoples west along the river. Access to the European fur market intensified hunting to the point where the beaver population of the eastern region, drained by the Saguenay, was quickly depleted, though it never died out altogether during the period under discussion here. From his position at Quebec, Champlain, then, had even better control of the fur trade overall once the more easterly trade began to fade. He established a trading post still farther west at Trois-Rivières, where the St. Maurice River flows from the north into the St. Lawrence. Later, as the stock of beaver was progressively depleted, the trade shifted even farther west to Montreal, where the Ottawa River flows from the northwest into the St. Lawrence.41
The most important Indian networks with which the French intersected, thus, were north and west of the St. Lawrence. The Montagnais, the chief trading partners of the French at Tadoussac, jealously guarded their trade network, which extended west up the Saguenay to Lac Saint Jean and then north along the Ashuapmushuan, Mistassini, and Peribonca rivers that empty into that lake from the north. In this region, the rivers were lined by the lodges of Cree-speaking peoples, the cousins of the Montagnais. The Montagnais, as middlemen, traded French goods to the Northern Cree for furs—some of which the Cree seem to have obtained through hunting. But according to Champlain, the Cree also received some quantity of furs in trade from Native Peoples who lived even farther north. The furs from this northerly region, close to the Arctic Circle, were among the finest and most valuable in the world.42

The French settlement at Trois-Rivières intersected with the trade network of the Attikamek People, whom the French called the Attikamègue or White Fish Indians, who lived in the St. Maurice River Valley to the north. They were near cousins of the Cree and Montagnais and like them lived chiefly by hunting, fishing, and gathering. They only became important trading partners of the French in the late 1630s. When hunting was bad in the winter, this group, a rather small population of perhaps 550 who lived in villages spaced some distance from one another, suffered through periods of starvation.43

The most important trade network with which the French intersected was ranged along the Ottawa River and its tributaries. The Allumette Island Algonkians controlled access to the lower Ottawa, which empties into the St. Lawrence at Montreal, and they were extremely balky about anyone—French or Indian—passing their island in the Ottawa and thereby breaching their control of this network. The Allumette Islanders
traded European goods northwest along the Ottawa to the Nipissings and other northerly situated groups and received furs, which they then exchanged with the French at Montreal and Quebec.\textsuperscript{44}

But the chief trade relationship for the French from 1608 until at least 1649 was with the Huron, who traveled with their furs down the Ottawa River to trade at Montreal. During peaceful times they would travel even further east down the St. Lawrence to trade the bulk of their furs at Quebec. By the time of European contact, the Huron seem to have gotten much of their meat, fish, copper, and animal skins in trade from Algonkian-speaking hunter-gatherers located to the north—along the shores of Georgian Bay and Lake Nipissing. In return, the Huron likely exchanged chiefly cornmeal, but also fishing nets. Some trade items came from farther afield, such as tobacco, which the Huron obtained from the Petun and Neutrals, and wampum shells, which they received in trade from the Susquehannocks. How robust this trade was prior to the introduction of the European fur trade is a matter of much scholarly debate, but there is little doubt that the Iroquoian groups, which would form the Huron Confederacy, engaged in this mutually beneficial trade and had established trade networks to the north prior to the contact period. The Huron Confederacy itself was a rather late phenomenon, and only seems to have begun to form in the middle of the sixteenth century, perhaps, as Bruce Trigger suggests, as a way for the Hurons to marshal sufficient military power to protect their northern trade routes from outsiders, such as the Tionnontaté, who lived just to the southwest.\textsuperscript{45}

For the Huron, the advent of European trade goods seems to have been one factor, at least, in the creation of this higher level of social and political organization. The
original two “nations” of the Huron league—the Attignawantan and the Attigneenongnahac—only admitted the Arendarhonon to the confederacy circa 1590 and incorporated the Tahontaenrat about 1610, two years after the first settlement of Quebec. It is also clear that trade along established networks to the north and to the Neutrals and Petuns to the southwest considerably intensified with the introduction of European trade goods and the establishment of formal trading arrangements between the Huron and the French. The Huron do not seem to have participated much in hunting or trapping for furs themselves, but instead relied upon their agricultural surplus to obtain them in trade.46

The chief avenue of trade for the Dutch was, of course, the Hudson River, but initially their trade network also included the Delaware and the Connecticut rivers. As has been seen, the Dutch normally maintained at least seasonal trading posts on the Delaware and Connecticut, but the collection of furs along these river systems normally did not amount to much, and English interlopers (and also Swedish in the case of the Delaware) often compromised the Dutch trade networks on them. The Hudson, then, was the main artery of trade for the Dutch, who maintained a post near what is now Albany in order to control trade on the river.47

The lands of the Mahicans, with whom the Dutch initially traded, sat astride the upper Hudson River and allowed them to control a lengthy avenue of trade that stretched from the upper Hudson through Lake George and Lake Champlain and then down the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence. Francis Jennings has dubbed this network of rivers, lakes, and streams “the Mahican Channel,” since it was this group which basically controlled it until 1630. It was by means of their control of the channel that the Mahicans
collected furs from the north, even from regions technically under French control, and brought them south to the barter at Fort Nassau and, after 1624, at Fort Orange.\textsuperscript{48}

Although the Mahicans were the chief trading partners of the Dutch on the Hudson, the Mohawk who lived just to the west of Fort Orange also participated in the trade, and after 1630 would supersede the Mahicans as most-favored trading partners of the Dutch. In time, the Iroquois as a whole, and the Mohawk in particular, would become arguably the key Native brokers in the fur trade. This is something of an irony, since prior to European settlement, as Daniel Richter has noted, they “had no need for, and evidently no tradition of, large-scale trading relationships with other peoples or even before the fifteenth century, other Iroquois.” The lands the Iroquois inhabited in upstate New York were sufficiently fertile to provide a surfeit of corn, squash, and beans, and fish and game were sufficiently abundant to provide for all of the Iroquois’ everyday needs. What little trade the Iroquois did engage in prior to European contact was to obtain exotica meant to meet spiritual or symbolic needs. They traded with the Wenros and Neutrals to the west for copper and other minerals from the Great Lakes region and with the Mahicans to the east to obtain the special wampum shell beads from Long Island.\textsuperscript{49}

The Iroquois did have a special need to obtain European goods once these became available, at first likely because—as exotic goods—they held spiritual power, but later because European trade goods such as awls, needles, and scissors had practical uses, and finally, after 1639, because firearms gave the Iroquois a decided advantage militarily against their Native-American enemies and made them far less vulnerable to the French.
As early as 1616, Captain Cornelis Hendricksen reported trading with both the Mahicans and the Mohawk on the upper Hudson. This situation seems to have continued until about 1623, when the relationship between the Mohawks and Mahicans began to change in a way that was not unrelated to the trade connections the French had made with native trade networks north and west of the St. Lawrence.50

In order to protect the small settlement at Quebec, which was key to defending the St. Lawrence trade network, Champlain figured that he must maintain friendly relations with the Native Peoples immediately surrounding his compound. This, of course, put him squarely at odds with the traditional enemies of the Canadian tribes—the Iroquois, who had formed their powerful confederacy around the time Champlain founded Quebec. As has been seen, in 1609, the Huron, Ottawa-River Algonkian, and Montagnais allies enlisted Champlain’s aid in their ongoing war with the Iroquois, essentially drafting the French into the preexisting spatial and political arrangement of the Native Peoples.51

Faced with this new alliance, the Mohawks desperately needed to find a European ally of their own. Champlain believed that even though the Iroquois could field some 3,000 warriors, it would take no more than 120 well-armed French to completely secure New France and its trade network along the St. Lawrence, such was the superiority of European firepower. Of course, as George M. Wrong has pointed out, Champlain never had the luxury of so many troops. It is for this reason that the establishment of New Netherland complicated the defense of the St. Lawrence fur trade. The Dutch would eventually provide the Iroquois with European weapons, which would more than even the playing field between the Iroquois and their French, Huron, and Algonkian enemies.52
A key event in the development of the Dutch-Iroquois alliance was the 
aforementioned Mohawk-Mahican War, which lasted from 1624 to 1628. Although the 
primary Dutch trading post at Fort Orange fell within established Mahican territory, the 
Mohawks and the Mahicans initially seem to have maintained friendly relations. Prior to 
1624, the Mohawks traveled through Mahican lands without any difficulty in order to 
trade on the upper Hudson. But by the early 1620s, the Mohawks, and by extension the 
peoples of the Iroquois Confederacy, found themselves in a difficult position. Champlain 
had managed to cement the alliance of their enemies north of the St. Lawrence and had 
demonstrated his willingness to participate directly in warfare with them. His success in 
1609 and 1610 and even his failure in 1615 to take an Oneida/Onondaga fort had proved 
the efficacy of French weapons. By 1610, in combat with the French and their Indian 
allies, the Mohawk alone had lost between 150 and 250 warriors, amounting to some ten 
or twenty percent of their manpower. Iroquois’ problems were compounded in 1615 
because their enemies had reached out to make common cause with the Susquehannocks 
to the south of Iroquoia. Even though the Susquehannocks failed to keep their promise 
and join in the siege of the Oneida/Onondaga fort, the possibility that they might 
participate in future wars must have been sobering for the Iroquois.53

But for the Mohawk, enlisting a European ally would not be easy. The Dutch 
seemed to offer the best prospect, but relations with New Netherland were problematic. 
Although the Mohawk, at least, had begun to trade with them, the Dutch were not likely 
to become, at this stage, a military ally. Unlike the French, the Dutch did not normally 
participate directly in Native-American wars, nor would they trade firearms to the 
Iroquois at this time. Firearms seem to have been introduced into the fur trade by illegal
Rochelais traders in the early 1620s who sold a few matchlocks to the Montagnais. The English continued this practice during their brief occupation of Quebec from 1629 to 1630. The Dutch, however, did not begin to trade firearms until the advent of free trade in 1639, and even then this trade was illegal, though often winked at.\textsuperscript{54}

The Iroquois’ position was still more desperate because they had not yet achieved most-favored trading status with New Netherland. In 1623, the Mahicans remained the chief trading partners of the Dutch. All of these factors—the menacing French alliance with the Huron, Algonkian, Montagnais, and potentially the Susquehannock, the Dutch unwillingness to trade firearms, and the Dutch-Mahican trade relationship—lay in the background of the Mohawk-Mahican War. But the trigger was the Dutch attempt to use the Mahicans to siphon off some of the French trade to newly established Fort Orange. Essentially, the Dutch plan seems to have been to trade wampum beads, which they could easily obtain from Indian groups on Long Island, to the Mahican, who would carry them north to the St. Lawrence where they could be exchanged for furs that would otherwise go to the French. The problem for the Mohawk, who rightly viewed trade as a precursor to alliance, was that the Dutch scheme promised to encircle the Mohawk with enemies on all sides—the Huron, Ottawa-River Algonkian, Montagnais, French to the north, the Susquehannock to the southwest, the Dutch and their Algonkian neighbors, including the heretofore neutral Mahican, to the southeast and east.\textsuperscript{55}

The Mohawk response was a reasonable one, and highly successful. In 1622, they began peace overtures to the French. Champlain, of course, was only too ready to draw the Mohawk and potentially all of the Iroquois into his overall scheme to bring peace to the region, which would in turn facilitate French settlement and trade. His Indian allies,
however, proved much more wary, and rightly suspected that the Mohawks’ desire for peace was only a tactic of the moment. Nevertheless, Champlain concluded a formal peace with the Mohawk in 1624. Having secured their northern flank, the Mohawk were then in a position to attack the Mahicans in order gain more secure access to the Dutch trade. The Mohawk reasoned that if they were successful, they, and not the Mahican, might be able to become the middlemen in the fur trade between the Dutch and the Indians north of the St. Lawrence.56

Once hostilities broke out, the Dutch naturally, if mistakenly, attempted to assist their chief trading partners at the time—the Mahicans. The Mahicans did manage to invade Mohawk territory and destroy a fortified town fairly close to Fort Orange. But by 1628, the Mohawks had gained the upper hand, and though the Mahicans did not immediately give up their claims to the lands along both sides of the Hudson, their population was driven into the Connecticut River Valley. In the meantime, the Mohawks had gained undisputed access to the lands on the west bank of the Hudson and had made themselves the indispensable partners of the Dutch in the fur trade. This partnership, in spite of many ups and downs, would last without any real disruption for the next thirty-six years.57

With their relationship with the Dutch cemented, the Mohawk and eventually the nations of Iroquois Confederacy as a whole could turn their attention to the situation north of the St. Lawrence. The English conquest of Quebec seems to have disrupted the peace the Iroquois had formally concluded with Champlain. By 1634, they were once again launching sporadic attacks on the French trade network. While these attacks were annoying and disruptive, they could not overcome the threat to the Iroquois that the
French alliance with the Huron and Algonkian posed. But in the late 1630s, two events changed in favor of the Iroquois. The first was the aforementioned series of epidemic diseases—measles, influenza, scarlet fever, and smallpox—that swept through Huronia from 1634 to 1640. These serial epidemics significantly reduced Huron military effectiveness. The second was the willingness of the Dutch to trade firearms to the Mohawk after the WIC instituted free trade. By 1641, the Mohawk had at least 36 arquebuses. Within two years they had some 300 and, by 1644, about a hundred more.58

The decline of the Huron population and Mohawk access to firearms put the Iroquois, generally, and the Mohawk, in particular, in a position to approach the French about a formal arrangement for peace and trade. In 1641, the Mohawk broached the subject of such a peace with Gov. Montmagny. The Mohawks’ terms are telling. They would agree to peace with the French themselves but not with the Indian allies of the French. In return, they would require the French to offer trading rights and presents of firearms. From the Mohawk perspective, such a peace would have achieved several goals. It would have separated the French and their Indian allies, so that the Mohawk (and perhaps the Iroquois in total) could proceed to attack their Indian enemies, in particular the weakened Huron, without fear of French intervention. It would also have provided the Mohawk with another source of advanced weaponry. But, perhaps most importantly, it would have given the Mohawk access to two markets for furs—the Dutch and the French—which would have allowed them to negotiate higher prices. Montmagny, perceiving that the Mohawks’ intention was likely the destruction of the French allies, refused peace on these terms.59
As José António Brandão has noted, the rejection of their peace overture and the construction of both Fort Richelieu at the mouth of the Richelieu River in 1641 and the fortified settlement at Montreal the next year led the Iroquois to believe that the French were invariably hostile. In response, they stepped up their attacks on New France. In August 1642, three hundred Iroquois attacked Fort Richelieu, and though the French repulsed them, the assault served notice that there would be no peace for the French. Then, in June 1643, thirty Iroquois raided Ville-Marie, killing three settlers and carrying off two others. The Iroquois, though, were not able to dislodge the French from these posts, which controlled key positions on the fur trade routes. Then, too, in spite of these direct attacks on the French, the chief targets of the Iroquois remained the Huron and other French-aligned Native groups.  

The Iroquois attacks in the early 1640s seem to have unnerved the French, who in 1645 made peace overtures to the Mohawks. The Mohawks saw their opportunity. They were only too delighted to make peace with the French, at least in the short-run, so long as it was on their terms. This time they found the French willing to agree to make a separate peace that excluded the Hurons and Algonkians. Only Christian Indians were covered in the agreement. This meant that the Mohawk, with the support of the other members of the confederacy, could concentrate their efforts on destroying the Huron Confederacy and incorporating the survivors into their own towns and villages without any interference from the French.  

As it turned out, the peace was short-lived. By late 1646, the Mohawk had resumed their war against the French, too. The ostensible trigger for the renewed hostilities was a disease that had broken out among the Mohawks soon after a visit from
the Jesuit Father Isaac Jogues. According to Father Jerome Lalemant, Huron captives, who had seen devastating diseases sweep through Huronia, convinced the Mohawk that French priests cast spells through their prayers to bring deadly diseases and bad luck to the Native Peoples. As Lalemant explained in his relation of 1647:

they accused Father Isaac Jogues, on his first journey after the conclusion of the peace, of having concealed some spells in a small chest, or little box, that he left with his host as pledge of his return. The Father seeing them disturbed, took that box, opened it before them, and showed them and left with them everything that was in it. Sickness having fallen upon their bodies after his departure, as we have learned from the Savage prisoners who have escaped, and the worms having perhaps damaged their corn, as the letter of the Dutch testifies,—these poor blind creatures have believed that the Father left the Demon among them, and that all our discourses and all our instructions aimed only to exterminate them. These are the reasons for which they have resumed the war.62

While Father Lalemant blamed the superstitions of the Mohawk—who much like the French invested inanimate objects with supernatural power—Brandão points to other, more rational considerations. It seems that Father Jogues had also begun to make overtures directly to the Onondagas to have them join in the peace. He gave gifts to some Onondagas who were visiting the Mohawks and told them they should expect the French to visit as a prelude to peace talks. This direct approach, says Brandão, likely angered the Mohawk, who believed that the French should only approach the other Iroquois nations through them. Whatever the reasons, the Mohawks murdered Jogues in October 1646 and renewed their attacks on the French as well as on the Algonkian and the Huron.63

In spite of the renewal of hostilities against the French, the Iroquois still concentrated their attacks against the towns of the Huron Confederacy, destroying them one by one, as has been discussed in the preceding chapter. By 1649, the Huron
Confederacy was no more, and the French-Native-American trade network, of which the Huron had been the lynchpin, was seriously compromised. It is important to mention in this connection that it was the Iroquois and not the French or the Dutch who brought about the destruction of the Huron as a unified group and that this eventuality was the denouement of a longstanding antagonism between the Iroquois and the Huron that predated European settlement. Nonetheless, the Europeans helped to bring about the circumstances that allowed the Iroquois to destroy Huronia, kill many Hurons, and incorporate most of the survivors into the Iroquois population. European diseases struck both the Iroquois and the Huron, but their effect seems to have been more devastating to the Huron, so that the Iroquois by 1641 had gained a significant advantage. Bruce Trigger, who has cast some doubt on this traditional interpretation, has argued that since disease afflicted both peoples in the 1630s, it is reasonable to assume that it afflicted the Huron and Iroquois equally. But this does not account for the Iroquois’ ability to launch a devastating assault on Huronia beginning in the early 1640s. Trigger attributes this to the Iroquois having obtained firearms. It is certainly the case that while both peoples had managed to gain access to European arms, the Dutch supplied the Iroquois much more liberally. But firearms would do little good without men to carry them, and the Iroquois seem to have been able to bring a significant number of men into the field, while the Huron seem to have been powerless to defend themselves. It is also instructive that the Iroquois seemed to have had more trouble vanquishing the Eries, a people armed only with clubs and bows and arrows.

After 1649, the Iroquois turned their attention to exterminating the French colony, which the Mohawk, at least, had determined was invariably hostile to them. But in 1653,
just as the Iroquois seemed to have the French on the ropes, a “miracle” happened. At least that is how it seemed to the French. “At last we have peace,” Father Le Mercier jubilantly reported to his superiors in October, noting further that it was “the Iroquois that have made the peace. Or, rather, let us say with truth that it is God; for this stroke is so sudden, so unexpected, these tendencies in Barbarian minds so surprising, that, it must be admitted, a genius more exalted than that of man has guided his work.” Indeed, as Le Mercier explained, one day there was “mutual killing, butchering, pillaging, and burning” and the next, “presents [were being] exchanged and visits paid on both sides, after the manner of friends.” He was aware that some among the French doubted the intentions of the Iroquois and had declared that they were “making peace only in order to betray us to better advantage in a fresh war.” But Father Le Mercier dismissed this, preferring to see the peace as God’s handiwork. “If the Iroquois have some design, God also has his,” he said. “I am sure that it will be admitted that the event I am going to describe was not brought about purely by chance.”

Chance, as Father Le Mercier had divined, had very little to do with the Iroquois peace overture. In fact, the Iroquois as a whole were divided on what approach to take in regard to the French. The Mohawk, as they had been since 1641, remained hostile and preferred a continuation of the war. It was the Onondagas, alone at first, who proposed peace, and they were not prompted to do so by chance nor by God, but by design. Le Mercier’s unwillingness to attribute rational motives to “Barbarians” seems to have blinded him to idea that the Iroquois sought a purposeful peace. The Onondaga, along with the Seneca and Oneida, had become embroiled in a new war—this time with the Eries, or the Cat People, as they were sometimes called, who lived just south of Lake Erie
in what is now Ohio. The incident that prompted the war was the Eries’ murder of an Onondaga chief in retaliation for the Senecas’ murder of some thirty Erie emissaries. But the western Iroquois had other reasons, quite apart from revenge, to make war against the Eries. The Eries had taken in refugee Hurons, which could not have pleased the Iroquois, who had made war on the Huron in part to incorporate the surviving population into the Iroquois Confederacy as a means of replacing population lost to war and disease. The Erie also inhabited prize hunting grounds. If the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga could drive them out, these hunting grounds would then be open to the Iroquois Confederacy. But to defeat the Erie would be no easy task. They could put 2,000 warriors in the field. To be sure of winning, the Onondaga and Seneca required firearms, but just at this time the Dutch decided that they would only trade these weapons to the Mohawk and not to the other four nations of the Iroquois Confederacy.\textsuperscript{67}

The Mohawk were considerably miffed that the Onondaga, at this most inopportune moment, would make a separate peace with the French. That the Onondaga would do so without observing the Confederacy protocol that any approach to the French be made through the Mohawk as the keepers of the eastern door added to the irritation the Mohawks must have felt. But the Mohawk, who at one point thought their disagreement with the Onondaga might result in a war between them, decided to make the best of the situation and use the peace to carry off several hundred Huron refugees who were technically under the protection of the French. The French did nothing to save these non-Christian Hurons, likely because they did not wish to jeopardize the much-longed-for peace.\textsuperscript{68}
In the meantime, the French, at the invitation of the Onondaga, established a settlement and mission in Onondaga territory. The western Iroquois seem also to have acquired French firearms that helped to turn the odds in their favor in the Erie war. By 1657, the Erie had been driven out of their homeland and their population killed, dispersed, or incorporated into Iroquois villages. With this task accomplished, there was no real reason to preserve the peace with the French, particularly since, in itself, it threatened to pull the Iroquois Confederacy apart.\textsuperscript{69}

As has been seen in chapter 8, though a faction of the western Iroquois wished to continue the peace with the French, the Mohawks were set against it, and as the most powerful of the Five Nations, by 1658, they had prevailed in the Iroquois councils. Once again, the Iroquois began a systematic assault on the French colony. But for the timely warning of a friendly Onondaga chief, the first victims would have been the settlers at the small trading post and mission in Onondaga country. Throughout the next two years, the Iroquois stepped up their attacks on the French trade network, at one point in 1660 sending an army of some 700 Mohawks and Onondagas against French positions. By the next year, opinion in the Iroquois Confederacy was split, some preferring to renew the peace with New France, while the Mohawk and many Onondaga and Oneida opted to continue the war. Their goal seems to have been to drive out the French altogether. Had the French sufficient troops, they might have defeated the Iroquois and secured their settlements, but Gov. D’Argenson could field only about a hundred men. Meanwhile, the Iroquois could muster at least seven times that number. The situation was so dire that Father Le Jeune wrote to the king that without royal intervention “faithless tribes will rob your crown of one of its jewels” and New France might have to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{70}
The hostility of the Mohawks toward New France was unabated up until at least 1666, but circumstances led to a lull in Iroquois’ attacks in 1662. Two years before, the Seneca had met defeat at the hands of the Susquehannock, and by 1661 epidemic disease was sweeping through the western Iroquois. The Mohawk were also encountering difficulties with the Abenaki and Mahicans to the east, which would lead to war in 1663 and 1664. During this time, some factions of the Iroquois approached the French about a renewal of the peace, but others, chiefly the Mohawks, kept up sporadic attacks, much to the terror of the colonists. Montreal was a particular target. By 1662, the colonists there, having been unable to plant their fields for two years, were suffering significant food shortages.71

Yet, in spite of the difficulties the Iroquois suffered in the early 1660s, they had by this time—largely through war—radically altered the pattern of Native-American trade that had prevailed at the onset of European settlement. With their defeat of the Mahicans in the 1620s, they had emerged as the most-favored trading partners of the Dutch and by 1640 had used their economic leverage to wrest a significant number of firearms from this relationship. Their access to these weapons, in much greater numbers than the Huron and other French-allied Indians enjoyed, allowed the Iroquois to destroy their chief competitors in the fur trade—the Huron Confederacy—and to seriously compromise even the French-controlled trade network down the St. Lawrence. If the French hoped to maintain both their extractive fur-trading network and their colony in North America against the still hostile Iroquois, more settlers and trained troops were necessary, but these could only come in any significant numbers through the direct intervention of the king.
Then, too, in spite of the problems brought on by disease and near-constant warfare, the Iroquois had succeeded in making themselves the ultimate middlemen in the fur trade. Their lands—which remained intact and under their control—stood between the French and Dutch regional networks. This meant that once the French demonstrated their willingness to defend and expand their colony, the Iroquois could benefit from bargaining for better prices between two competing systems.

*The Role of the Native Peoples in the Global Trade Network*

Without the work of Native Peoples in hunting, trapping, and skinning beavers, and in preparing those skins by the tens of thousands each year for the European market, there would have been no overseas fur trade. In this way, the fur trade was dependent upon the special expertise of Native Peoples and upon their trade networks. But to better understand the role of Native Peoples in the colonial economy and their relationship to the emerging world economic system, two further questions must be addressed. The first is: To what degree did Native Peoples abandon their traditional labors aimed at subsistence or supplying goods for local and regional trade in order to supply the metropolitan market with a profitable commodity—namely beaver pelts? In extractive networks, the labor regime of the typical capitalist colonial system requires the colonized population to largely abandon their traditional economic pursuits in order to direct full-time attention to supplying the metropolitan market. As a result, the population becomes almost entirely dependent upon the metropole to meet its subsistence needs. Even if the indigenous people purchase local foodstuffs, in the typical capitalist colonial
arrangement, the money to do so is supplied from the metropole in wages for native labor. The second question is: To what degree did the Native Peoples provide a market for the products of the metropole? The success of colonies, particularly in the emerging world system, depended not only on the ability of the metropolitan economy to extract valuable commodities from the colony, but also on its ability over time to develop a colonial market for its own, chiefly manufactured, goods.

There is no doubt that the intersection of Native-American and European networks in the fur trade brought significant change to the Indians who traded with New France and New Netherland. Disease, which traveled the trade routes, devastated Native populations and intensified the so-called “mourning wars” aimed at replacing lost population. Firearms, which Native Peoples demanded in order to gain a tactical edge in warfare and to defend themselves (at least in the case of the Iroquois) from Europeans, made warfare much more deadly and in turn increased the need for further “mourning wars.” And the quest for beaver pelts to trade for firearms and other European goods led to intensified friction between traditional enemies.

But in spite of the devastating changes that produced what some historians have called a “holocaust” for the Native Peoples, the way most Hurons, Iroquois, and Algonkians lived their daily lives did not change very much after European contact and settlement. Native Peoples did not become full-time workers in the beaver pelt industry. Prior to European settlement, the woodlands Indians of the Northeast had hunted game for meat and skins during the fall and winter months, and this seasonal custom did not change as a result of the fur trade. The more agriculturally based Indian groups traded for furs with hunter/gatherer groups prior to European contact, just as they
did afterward. The sole difference was that once Native trade networks connected to European overseas networks, Indian hunters and traders sought out furs on a much larger scale and generally, though not exclusively, concentrated on hunting or trading for beaver skins to supply European market demand.

Native Americans also did not become dependent for their subsistence on European supplies of food or clothing directly nor for the money to purchase these commodities locally. The Montagnais might prove to be the exception to this rule. Champlain sometimes found them on the verge of starvation and took pains to provide for them out of his own stores, but it seems that even prior to European contact, periods of starvation had not been uncommon for the Montagnais, who had developed no significant agriculture. The most important trading partners of the French and the Dutch—the Huron and Iroquois and most of the Algonkian groups that circled New Amsterdam—did not give up agriculture in order to pursue the fur trade. The fact is that while these important Native-American groups remained self-sufficient, the Europeans depended on Europe still for their own foodstuffs and clothing. The evidence that this is so can be readily seen from the many complaints of government officials and others in both New France and New Netherland that too many of the colonists neglected agriculture in order to pursue the fur trade. It can also be seen in Commander Kieft’s attempt to impose a “tax” on the Algonkians near New Amsterdam payable in maize. The Iroquois, who came to dominate the fur trade by the end of the period addressed here, continued to maintain their traditional agricultural life-ways well after 1664. Governor-General Denonville of New France, upon invading Seneca territory in 1687, made note of the extensive fields of corn under cultivation and claimed to have burned
hundreds of thousand of bushels of Seneca maize. From this, it can be inferred that the Native Peoples in no wise became full-time exploited laborers who had become dependent on the developing world economic system for their survival or subsistence, as one might expect to occur in a typical extractive network. 73

Nor did the Native Peoples become a significant and growing market for European manufactured goods. William de Caën, who held the French fur trade monopoly in the 1630s, estimated that his overall yearly expenses, which included shipping, labor, warehousing, insurance, and trade goods, were about 46,000 livres, only a small fraction of which must have gone to purchase trade goods. Oliver Rink has estimated that in the mid-1620s, the Dutch spent only about 14,000 florins for the goods they traded to the Indians over a two-year period. In return, they could expect to bring to market about 5,000 beaver pelts each year. Naturally, the expenditure on trade goods would increase along with the number of pelts shipped from New France and New Amsterdam and also as the Native Peoples began to learn the value of the goods for which they traded. Firearms and duffels cloth, for instance, were more expensive commodities than trinkets, needles, and knives. 74

And yet, though the quantity and quality of the goods the Europeans traded increased, it must be admitted, that by any standard, the Native Peoples did not represent a significant market for European manufactured goods. For the Europeans, the increase in the number and value of the European goods traded simply meant lower profits. This was because the Native Peoples did not trade in a cash economy—especially after wampum had lost the better part of its value. For colonies to work successfully and be integrated into the emerging world market, commodities have to be shipped from the
colony to the metropole in return for cash payments or credits. The colonists then have to spend a significant part of what they earn to purchase goods from the metropole. In this way merchant/financiers in the metropole stand to make a double profit. The colony, though, might also benefit from increasing material wealth.

The Native Peoples did not provide a market for European goods in this way. Because they operated under a different value system, they had little need for overseas credits or cash to purchase enough goods to increase their material wealth. In fact, the Native Peoples had no tradition of developing their individual material wealth. They traded only for what was of practical use or served spiritual or gift-giving purposes. In Native-American culture, giving wealth away had a far greater value than stockpiling it in order to gain leverage in the market. Because they lacked interest in material development, the Native Peoples did not create the kind of institutions that would have integrated them into the metropolitan market. They developed no banks or stores of their own. Their villages and towns did not even have dedicated market areas. At best, they relied on periodic markets at set times of the year to trade furs and other goods.

Beyond an interest in acquiring firearms, ammunition, cloth, alcohol, and some iron tools, the Native Peoples did not have much interest in European goods. They also do not seem to have become dependent in any important way on European commodities with the exception of firearms and ammunition. Once these were introduced to the trade, Native Peoples needed to acquire them or perish at the hands of enemies who had them. But the Indians’ demand for firearms and a few other manufactured items was not robust enough to make of them a significant market for goods from the metropole. Worse still, from the perspective of the emerging capitalist system, the Native Peoples did not
provide an expanding market. As a result of the influx of European disease and the introduction of firearms, Indian populations were precipitously declining during the seventeenth century. Successful colonization, which requires the colony to become a market, and preferably a growing market, for goods from the metropole, would eventually necessitate the replacement of the native population with settlers from Europe who held the same materialistic values as merchants in the metropole, whose numbers could expand over time through immigration and natural increase, and who were susceptible to the idea of “new needs.” Whether consciously or not, to develop a successful colony in North America, the metropolitan power had to convert its territorial holding into what Philip Curtin has called a “true colony,” where “the natives [are] few and the alien immigrants are many.” As it turns out, the Dutch were much more successful than the French in accomplishing this by 1663.

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1 Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 2-4. If the Native Americans had been dependent upon European trade goods, as Innis asserts, this might have given the Europeans considerable leverage over the trade, but Richard White has demonstrated fairly convincingly that such dependency occurred only at the end of the seventeenth century as the result of a long process. Nonetheless, the decisiveness of European firearms in the Iroquois-Huron War suggests a certain need for European weapons for survival. See Innis, *The Fur Trade*, 17-18 and White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics, 1650-1815* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 95-96.


21 Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759" *Ethnohistory*, 36 (Summer 1989): 262, 264, 273-74. According to Bourque, the Native Peoples later designated as "Canibas" or "Maliseet" were descendants of the Etchemin. For Champlain’s meeting with the Etchemin, see Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, 1:292-97.


23 Trudel, *The Beginnings of New France*, 140-44.

24 Fischer, *Champlain’s Dream*, 382-83; Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, 95-96.


31 Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, 64.


35 Kenton, ed., Jesuit Relations, 104.


40 Ibid., 35, 41.


46 Tooker, An Ethnography of the Huron, 11; Trigger, Natives and Newcomers, 157-58.

47 See chapter 8.

48 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 30-32.

49 Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, 28-29.

50 Ibid., 52; DRCHNY, 1:14.

51 Wrong, The Rise and Fall of New France, 1:175-89.

52 Ibid., 176.

53 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 280, 328-33.


56 Ibid., 279.

57 Ibid.


59 Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More, 95-96.

60 The settlement of Montreal was particularly galling since it was located on land the Iroquois claimed. Ibid., 98-101; Lanctot, History of Canada, 1:178.

61 Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More, 102.

62 Jesuit Relations, 30:227-29.

63 Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More, 102-3; Jesuit Relations, 29:57

64 Brandão, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More, 103-4; Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic, 2:629-38.

66 Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, 103-5.

67 Parkman, *France and England in North America*, 1:706-8; 706 n. 2; Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers*, 273; Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, 105-6


CHAPTER 10

FLOWS OF PEOPLE

To some extent, the number and kinds of people who immigrated to New France and New Netherland depended upon how policymakers in the metropole envisioned the development of these colonies, as well as upon which policymakers had the most power at a given time to carry out their designs. In the period from 1608 to 1663, there was in the case of both the French and the Dutch a difference of opinion among those most interested in the colonial enterprise as to whether these colonies should be chiefly trading posts organized to extract valuable commodities or more robust settlement colonies with a largely European population. If they were to be merely extractive trading-post colonies, then the likelihood would be that immigration and settlement would be minimal, territorial requirements would be limited, and foodstuffs and other material necessities would largely be met through importation from the metropole. But, if the goal was to develop self-sufficient agricultural settlement colonies, then more settlers would have to be sent and more land would have to be brought under the direct control of the Europeans. How policymakers defined these colonies and the resources they brought to bear would also determine to a great degree, but not entirely, the types of people that would be sent. Trading-post colonies would require a few resident traders, skilled in making bargains with the Native Peoples, perhaps some soldiers to protect the trade, and perhaps some workman skilled in building fortifications and storehouses and in repairing ships. Settlement colonies, though, would require a much larger and diverse population,
the aim of which would be to become largely self-sufficient appendages of European empire.

Soon after the establishment of the trade networks on the St. Lawrence and the Hudson, the policymakers most closely associated with the French and Dutch colonial enterprises in North America seemed unsure as to just what kind of colonies to build. From the time of Francis I, certainly, it had been French policy that settlement alone conveyed legal possession of territories in the New World. This had not changed in the time of Henry IV, who seemed committed, at least in theory, to creating a French empire in North America that might rival that of Spain in the south. The problem was that Henry’s ambitions for a New World empire were not as important as his ambitions for a unified, defensible kingdom at home. His key advisor, Sully, who had charge of the royal purse, was not disposed to spend any money on overseas adventures, particularly on the expensive proposition of supporting settlement colonies in North America at a time when every penny was needed to fund urban redevelopment, canal construction, and the military establishment in France. The king, therefore, turned over the development of his colonies to nobles, such as de Monts, who shared his vision of empire in the New World. But de Monts did not have the money on his own to fund much by way of settlement, and when he took on business partners, they were chiefly interested in turning a profit. Champlain was undoubtedly committed to developing an agricultural settlement colony at Quebec. In fact, he had chosen the site with that idea in mind. But the building of such a colony was not entirely or even chiefly dependent on what he wanted. When Champlain returned home after tenuously establishing a foothold at Quebec, he was not
sure how his king and his employer wished to proceed or even whether they meant to maintain the colony at all.

In any event, the whole settlement scheme lost its chief patron at court when Henry IV was assassinated in 1610, just two years after Champlain had made an establishment at Quebec. The subsequent companies that Champlain was able to cobble together under the titular leadership of Soissons, Condé, and Montmorency received their funding from merchant groups in Rouen and St. Malo. The merchants were interested in making a profit, and while they funded Champlain’s explorations, they generally worked to get around stipulations that required them to promote expensive settlement. As a result, in the years between 1608 and 1614, the permanent population of Quebec never rose above thirty. At its first establishment, the colony had just twenty-eight inhabitants, chiefly workmen. There had been no clergy and no women. Of these twenty-eight, no more than thirteen survived the winter. There seems to have been no appreciable increase in the French population over the next five years, so that the permanent settlement on the St. Lawrence remained in the neighborhood of fifteen men stationed at Quebec and a handful—Etienne Brulé, Nicolas Marsolet, and Nicolas de Vigneau—who had been parceled out among the Native Peoples in order to learn their languages and customs and gain geographical intelligence.¹

As might be expected, during the period of free trade on the St. Lawrence, Champlain was able to accomplish nothing toward encouraging a more robust settlement. By 1614, the English had wiped out the Acadian colonies of Poutrincourt and Madame de Guerchville, so that the French hold on the coastal territories consisted in nothing more than a few sparsely populated trading posts. Quebec, the only significant French
settlement, had a permanent population of fewer than twenty. But by 1615, with a new company in place that held a monopoly of the St. Lawrence trade under the prince de Condé, Champlain was able to take the first small but highly significant step toward creating a stronger French presence at Quebec. In the spring of that year, he sailed for the St. Lawrence with a fleet of three ships. On board were four Récidet friars—Fathers Denis Jamet, Jean Dolbeau, and Joseph Le Caron, and Brother Pacifique du Plessis—who were to establish a seminary at Quebec and investigate the possibilities of converting the native population to Roman Catholicism. The new Rouen and St. Malo Co. had agreed to provide for their support until such time as the seminary was in operation.2

In terms of sheer numbers, four new settlers seem hardly worth mentioning, but for New France, the introduction of the Récidets was a significant and perhaps critical step. In effect, Champlain had established a wholly new network, one which intersected with the network of the merchant traders between Rouen, St. Malo, and Quebec, but was independent of it. The Récidet presence at Quebec placed the settlement within the worldwide network of the Roman Catholic Church, so that it was now connected to the French Récidet Province at St. Denis and beyond, at least tenuously, to the Holy See at Rome. The Récidet presence also provided a new connection to the French court, which heretofore had not given much heed to North-American trade, but did have some interest in promoting Roman Catholicism in the New World. In essence, the Récidets opened up new avenues of support for the fledging colony on the St. Lawrence.3

After a year in Canada, the Récidets met together in Quebec to consider the best way to proceed with the Christianization of the Native Peoples. They invited Champlain and six other “well-meaning” and knowledgeable persons to participate in their
deliberations. The group concluded that only by living among the French could the Native Peoples be “civilized,” which, from the perspective of the Récollets, was a prerequisite to religious conversion. By “civilized,” Champlain and the Récollets meant “sedentary,” or agricultural, and living according to French custom, as well as according to settled law and government. This would require large-scale French settlement of the countryside. For the Récollets, Christianization was synonymous with Roman Catholicization, so that Huguenots and other Protestants would not be permitted to immigrate to New France.4

The design of Champlain and the Récollets could not be carried out without further financial and logistical support from France. To enlist this aid, Champlain and two of the Récollets—Jamet (who had served as commissary or leader of the mission to Canada) and Le Caron—sailed for France on 20 July 1616 with the intention of lobbying for “all necessary help.” Champlain and the Récollets made their pitch to the associated merchants of the company in a meeting at Paris, but made little headway. As the Récollet Father Chrestien Le Clercq later observed, “These gentlemen, after many conferences, promised much, but without effect; very zealous for their trade, they cared little to deserve God’s blessing by contributing to the interests of his glory.” Part of the problem was that events in France had made it an unpropitious time for raising support for the colonial effort. Condé, the viceroy, had helped to foment a civil war against Marie de Medici. On her order, he had been arrested on 1 September 1616 and thrown into the Bastille and would not be released until October 1619. In the meantime, the Marie de Medici had appointed the Marquis de Thémines in his place. Thémines then reappointed Champlain as lieutenant. But in spite of the king’s confirmation of the appointment on
17 January 1617, the merchant associates of the company attempted to use the political turmoil surrounding Condé’s arrest to rid themselves of Champlain, whose settlement and missionary schemes would only add to their costs. In the end, the effort to block Champlain’s return to Quebec, which Daniel Boyer of the Rouen associates led, was unsuccessful, but it pointed to a deep disagreement between Champlain and the Récollets on the one hand and a significant number of the merchants on the other over the direction and purpose of the St. Lawrence colony.\(^5\)

During the turmoil over who would gain the viceroyship, some members of the government, it seems, complained that the Rouen and St. Malo Co. had not made sufficient headway in developing the colony. It was rumored in official circles that the company was likely to lose the monopoly if, in Champlain’s words, it did not have “some additional buildings set up, and some families sent out to put the land in cultivation.” According to Champlain, de Monts, who was still a member of the company, drafted a plan that would have committed the associates to send “more men for maintaining their hold on the country, munitions of war, and provisions required for two years, while waiting for the land to yield its crops.” But this plan, too, “went up in smoke,” though Champlain says he does not know precisely why. As it was, the merchants, though they had previously promised to maintain six Récollet missionaries in Canada, only agreed to send two in 1617. Le Caron went back, this time as commissary, accompanied by Father Paul Huet. Jamet stayed in France to organize support.\(^6\)

In spite of resistance from the company, Champlain himself took another significant step in 1617 when he induced the Paris apothecary Louis Hébert to come to Quebec with his wife, three children, and his brother-in-law to set up the first working
farm in the settlement. It had always been Champlain’s ambition to establish a year-round agricultural colony. The fertile fields nearby were one of the chief reasons he had chosen Quebec for settlement in the first place, and the reason he had selected Trois-Rivières and Montreal for subsequent settlement nodes was because they were at the intersection of natural trade routes but also had fertile lands adjoining them. His early efforts to establish gardens around the Habitation at Quebec, though, had proven less successful than he had hoped because the workmen and traders who wintered there neglected to tend the gardens once Champlain left the country.

Rather than seeing the value of becoming self-sufficient, the early settlers preferred to ply the fur trade and rely on the yearly resupply ships from France for their sustenance. Naturally, sending a year’s worth of food and other supplies from France to Quebec was an expensive proposition for the Rouen and St. Malo Co., so it did make sense, even from the merchants’ perspective, to establish at least some agricultural base for the colony. Hébert might seem, at first blush, like an unlikely choice for the first farmer at Quebec, but given his versatility and his willingness to transport his whole family, the company’s decision to hire him does not seem so odd. Since an apothecary made many, if not most, medicines by hand from plants likely grown in his own garden, Hébert would have been familiar with horticulture, if not large-scale agriculture. Moreover, he could investigate the medicinal use of indigenous North-American plants and assess their market value. He could also prepare on-the-spot remedies, such as they were, for the colonists. Finally, Hébert’s previous experience in North America would prove a decided advantage. He had been one of the company in Acadia in 1604 and was at Port Royal from 1606 to 1607 and again from 1610 to 1613.
Hébert was to be an employee of the company, which initially agreed to grant him a large tract of land and a substantial salary. But after he had sold his property in Paris, the company reneged on its promises, forcing him to accept much less upon his immigration. The Rouen and St. Malo Co. hired him for two years at 300 livres per annum and granted him about half the acreage originally promised. He, his wife, and one servant were to care for the sick, assist with the fur trade, and do any other tasks the company might require. In the meantime, he had to pay twenty percent interest to the company for double the money and land he had actually been granted (as per the original contract). He was only permitted to work on the farm in his spare time, and all the furs he collected and everything the farm produced could only be sold to the company. Eventually, Champlain would help the family acquire more land, so that the Héberts, the first family to build and inhabit a private residence at Quebec, became substantial landowners. Under the company rules, once Hébert had fulfilled his two-year commitment, he was still obliged to sell his produce only to the company and would no longer be allowed to engage in the fur trade. As Maurice Trudel has noted, the Rouen and St. Malo Co.’s treatment of the Héberts demonstrates that the associated merchants “were anything but anxious to have colonists.” The episode made both Champlain and the Récollets painfully aware, if they were not before, that there would be no appreciable development of the colony so long as the Rouen and St. Malo merchants controlled the purse strings.9

Upon his return to France, Champlain made his most forceful appeal yet for the creation of an agricultural settlement colony along the St. Lawrence. This included his assessment, given to the Chamber of Commerce, of the value of commodities to be
extracted from the region, which has been discussed in chapter 8. In articles addressed to the king, which were first submitted to the Chamber of Commerce, Champlain noted that by greater effort and support, his majesty could gain credit for establishing “the Christian faith among an infinite number of souls” in North America. The Native Peoples, Champlain claimed, were only too willing to submit to Roman Catholicism and presumably by doing so would become subjects of the king of France, who would then be master of their lands, which stretched some eighteen hundred leagues along the great river. The king would also make a handsome cash profit from the customs duties on commodities shipped from the St. Lawrence. Champlain also held out hope that he would find a passage to China and that the king could profit even more by the duties he could attach to goods pouring into France from Asia.10

But the key to securing both glory and riches was to more firmly establish French control of the St. Lawrence River Valley, and this required, according to Champlain, a commitment to settlement. Perhaps harkening back to the splendors he had seen at Mexico City, Champlain urged the king to establish a town on the St. Lawrence on the site of Quebec—a key node on this developing network. He proposed the name Ludovica for the town in honor of the king and envisioned it to be as large as St. Denis, which in 1618 had a population of perhaps 3,500 souls. At the town center, said Champlain, the French should build a grand Church of the Redeemer “as a memorial and commemoration of the good it shall please God to do” for the Indians who would be converted. Near the church he envisioned a monastery for fifteen Récollets. Two large forts, each with five bastions, should be built nearby on either side of the river “in order to bar completely the passage of said river, as being the entrance and the gateway of the
said country.” To begin settlement he proposed sending 300 families, consisting of four persons each, as well as 300 men at arms, who would also provide the labor for building up the colony. In this way, the colony would have an immediate infusion of 1,513 colonists. Champlain also proposed building a garrisoned fort on a commanding spot at Tadoussac in order to control this node on the seaborne network to Europe. Without this more robust settlement of the countryside, Champlain warned, the English and the Dutch, who had already established themselves in North America, would likely drive the French out, as the English had already done to Poutrincourt and the Jesuits in Acadia.11

Within fifteen years of such a settlement being made and with only the commitment of monies the king would gain from the tariffs on commodities transported from the St. Lawrence, Champlain believed four towns could be established along the great river. These urban nodes would so firmly anchor the network “that no human force need be feared,” either by the French colonial population or the Native Peoples “tributary to His Majesty.” Champlain estimated that the transportation of colonists, supplies, and “in considerable numbers all sorts of domestic animals that we have in France, which are not found in the said country” would cost 15,000 livres annually “for three consecutive years only.”12

Champlain was not the only one advocating greater attention to the colonization effort in New France.13 In 1618, Lescarbot brought out a new edition of his Histoire de la Nouvelle-France. In his dedicatory letter to Louis XIII, he claimed that it was “zeal for the glory of God, and desire to increase their own possessions” that prompted kings to make conquests and “extend their rule beyond the Ocean.” He then gently chided the king for not making a greater effort in developing New France, noting that “after having
discovered the country we remain content therewith, and the French name has fallen into contempt.” Lescarbot contrasted the feeble effort of the French with that of “the Spaniard, aforetime feeble, [who] through our carelessness has made himself powerful East and West alike, without our having had the honourable ambition to precede him but merely to second him.” He admonished the king to hold firm in the face of those at court who stood against the colonial effort. “Sire,” Lescarbot pleaded, “you will not lack good captains on the spot, if it please you to aid and sustain them, and to grant office to those only who will dwell in the country.”

Biencourt also wrote to the city authorities of Paris urging them to organize greater support for colonization. In a letter from Port Royal dated 1 September 1618, he made note of the effort he and his late father had made to secure Acadia for France. But, he warned, in light of the growing English colonies in Virginia and Bermuda, he could not on his own sustain the colony. Biencourt reminded the authorities that the English had already driven out the Jesuits, captured French ships and their crews, and burned the French habitations along the Acadian coast. “It is necessary,” he continued, “to forestall the designs of the English,” and “to see to it that this country will be, on the contrary, inhabited by the French.” Biencourt thought that two or three strong forts could keep the North-American fisheries open to the French, and that the metropolitan authorities should see to it that one or two ships were sent each year with supplies on which free passage would be given to anyone who wished to come. Funds should be provided them for food and other necessaries. He noted that the Native Peoples of Acadia were well-disposed to baptism, that the land there was good to work, and that game and fish were plentiful.
“Would you suffer,” he asked finally, “that for so little the French name would be disgraced by all the land?”

These appeals, especially Champlain’s, had some effect in eliciting promises at least. On 12 March 1618, Louis XIII wrote to the Rouen and St. Malo Co. expressing his displeasure at the lack of progress in settling the country, which his informants (namely Champlain) had attributed to “bad management in the establishment of families and workmen that have been taken to the settlement at Quebec and other places in New France.” The king rather sternly warned

that it is our pleasure that you assist, in so far as you conveniently can, the Sieur de Champlain with the things requisite and necessary for executing the commands he has received from us to choose tried and faithful men for employment in exploring, inhabiting, clearing, cultivating and planting this land, and to carry on all work he shall judge necessary for establishing the colonies we wish to found in the said country.

Although the king made it clear that the work of exploration and settlement should be organized so that it did not hinder the company’s “factors, clerks, and agents in the matter of the fur-trade,” his message was unequivocal. He supported the establishment of an agriculturally based settlement colony on the St. Lawrence.

Champlain succeeded by year’s end in eliciting from the company a promise to invest in the immediate settlement of the countryside. He had convinced the associated merchants that they might lose the monopoly if they did not make a stronger effort to abide by the terms of their agreement with the king. The plan committed the merchants to send out eighty settlers in the next year. Among them would be a leader, three more “Récollet fathers, clerks, officers, craftsmen, and field laborers.” The company was also
to supply bedding and clothes, arms, farm tools, iron and steel, tiles for roofing, bricks for building ovens and chimneys, millstones, and kitchen equipment, as well as two yearling bulls, heifers, sheep, and “all kinds of grain.” But once again this commitment proved to be no more than a promise, perhaps made to mollify the king, and to forestall merchants from Brittany, La Rochelle, and St. Jean de Luz, who had made proposals to the king’s council for taking over the trade. Champlain, in part, blamed the Huguenot partners, who were not enthusiastic about furthering the Catholic religion in New France. Naturally, these complaints to the king incurred some resentment from some of the merchant associates. It will be recalled that Champlain had planned to bring his wife to Canada in 1619. But when the company’s ship sailed that spring, he was not aboard. In defiance of the king, the Boyer-led associates had replaced Champlain as the commander at Quebec with his old friend Pont-Gravé. Champlain produced the aforementioned letter from the king affirming his reappointment as lieutenant, but the merchants ignored it. On 18 July, Champlain was able to secure an edict from the royal council upholding his lieutenancy and his rights as commander of the colonial effort in New France, but by that time it was too late to make his annual trip.19

The transfer of the monopoly to the Caën company in 1620 led to a doubling of the population at Quebec in 1621, since factors and workmen from both the old Rouen and St. Malo Co. and the new company wintered at the settlement. Because the companies eventually united, it must be assumed that while some of the personnel at Quebec were withdrawn, the amalgamation may have led to a slight increase in the permanent population. The Caëns did make some effort to build up the colony and make it a bit more self-sufficient. Cap Tourmente, for instance, produced hay in abundance—
two thousand bales in 1623 alone—which Champlain arranged to have sent by water to Quebec to feed the livestock there. William de Caën decided that a better course would be to develop a livestock farm at the cape so that the colony could be provided with sufficient meat from this local source. The habitation he had built there was to accommodate the herdsmen. Caën also built another habitation on Miscou Island, which was to serve as a trading post, though it seems to have been occupied only sporadically.  

In spite of the improvements under the Caëns, the European settlement of New France was painfully weak. By the time Cardinal Richelieu created the Company of New France in 1627 for the express purpose of reenergizing settlement, New France in its entirety had only about one hundred permanent French inhabitants. Under threat from the English, the French held little more than a trading post in Acadia. Biencourt had died in 1623, and his family turned over the Port Royal settlement to Charles de la Tour. By the end of 1627, the Miscou Island habitation seems to have been abandoned. Tadoussac now had one fortified European-style house, but this was used only during the trading season. Fewer than ten people lived at the habitation at Cap Tourmente. Quebec itself, the only French settlement of any size, had a population of just seventy-two. Up until 1627, then, in spite of the ambitions of Champlain and the hopes of the crown, New France was little more than an extractive colony.

New Netherland followed a similar but not identical course. From 1609 to the establishment of the WIC in 1621, the Dutch made no concerted attempt to settle the territory they claimed between the Delaware and Connecticut rivers. As had the French king, the Dutch republican government left the territory in the hands of a series of trading companies, which established no more than trading posts. It was only with the creation
of the WIC that settlement began in earnest. Unlike the French companies that controlled New France between 1608 and 1627, which were strictly private enterprises, the WIC was a public-private concern closely tied to the Dutch government. For at least the first three years, the WIC was committed to establishing a full-fledged agriculturally based settlement. But the disasters the WIC suffered at Bahia and El Mina in 1625 led the directors to reconsider pouring further resources into New Netherland. In fact, the *Heren XIX* seemed ready to give up the colony altogether, noting that challenges from the French in particular to Dutch possession of New Netherland had led to reprisals from which the company had “suffered, of late years, notorious damage.” In their report to the States General, the Nineteen complained that the climate of New Netherland had proven colder than anticipated so that the colonists had difficulty providing themselves with more than “a scanty means of livelihood.” The only benefit the WIC had garnered from the colony had come from the fur trade, which had proved “right advantageous.” But even this brought in only 50,000 guilders a year. Although the *Heren XIX* did not say so directly, the implication of their report was clear. The fur trade, though it provided some profit to the company, was not lucrative enough to pay for the further development of a self-sufficient settlement colony. The directors, in a none-too-subtle way, were asking the States General to abandon the settlement policy in favor of an off-shore style trading-post colony. Subsequent events, however, would demonstrate that the States General was not ready to give up on its original vision for New Netherland.22

One of the most vexing problems for both New France and New Netherland was finding “suitable” settlers in sufficient numbers. In the case of New France, the colony had such a bad reputation as a dangerous and lawless place that even the most
impoveryished peasants refused to sign indentures to settle along the St. Lawrence. Marcel Trudel notes that the French population of the entire valley of the St. Lawrence numbered only 107 persons in 1627, when the Company of New France took charge of the colony. Champlain had personally recruited the Récollet friars and the Hébert family and had done his best to encourage settlement, but by 1629 when the English captured Quebec, the provincial capital still had only about 50 inhabitants, chiefly sailors, soldiers, and workmen in the employ of the Company of New France.23

Up until 1627, New France had been under the control of merchant companies that had very little interest in developing the colony beyond a sparsely settled extractive network. But the Company of New France was different in its composition and purpose. As Lucien Campeau has noted, Cardinal Richelieu established the new company chiefly to promote settlement and Christianization. The company’s interest in trade was purely a secondary consideration, so that for the first time, the administration of the colony was in the hands of highly placed officials dedicated to colonial development. One of the first things Richelieu decided once France had regained the colony in 1632 was to replace the Récollet fathers with the Jesuits. From this point until 1657, the Jesuits would be in control of the religious effort in New France and would begin the construction of a new and vigorous network aimed at converting the Native Population and ensuring that the colony remained Roman Catholic.24

With the recovery of New France from the English, the Company of New France could begin its settlement in earnest. In 1633, it sent three ships under Champlain’s command to retake its possessions in North America. On board was a contingent of royal soldiers, in case there should be trouble; four Jesuits; and a number workmen and
artisans, who could rebuild the colony’s infrastructure. There was also one married woman and two girls. Of the 197 persons who sailed to New France that year, some 150 had promised to winter over, but it is unclear how many became permanent settlers.25

Over the next few years, families began to settle in New France in unprecedented numbers. Four ships bearing some 200 settlers arrived in 1634, and six ships with some 300 settlers came the next year. By the end of 1636, the number of colonists along the St. Lawrence had grown from 77 to 400. A further 1,000 immigrants came over the next four years, and, in all, from 1640 to 1659, some 3,500 immigrants made their way to the colony. Many, though, found the conditions harsh or had come only as temporary employees of the company and did not stay. By 1641, there were still only about 200 permanent settlers. There had been, though, a marked increase in the number of women in the colony. As of 1636, there were at least sixty-five, which meant that the colony was moving toward the day when it could “reproduce” itself.26

The new settlers who arrived in the 1630s included the Giffards, the Juchereaus, and the Repentignys, who would play leading roles in the colony after the death of Champlain. These men brought new talents that would diversify the colony to some degree. Robert Giffard was an apothecary and surgeon, and Noël Juchereau des Chatelets was a lawyer. Among those who came in 1634 were Jean Bourdon, an engineer, and Jean Le Sueur, the first secular priest to set foot in the St. Lawrence settlements since Cartier’s time.27

In spite of these efforts, the Company of New France fell far short of its 1627 mandate to settle 4,000 people within fifteen years. It therefore shifted some of the burden of colonization onto private individual “seigneurs,” who would be given extensive
tracts of land along the St. Lawrence in return for settling workmen. A total of 115 seigneurships were granted between 1623 and 1663, but the population of the St. Lawrence colony still grew only gradually. Because French workmen were exceedingly loath to settle in New France, the seigneurs had to pay high premiums to indentured servants to get them to immigrate. The costs included passage, pay (far above what common laborers received in France), land, and sometimes free passage to return to France. Free laborers were promised all of these things plus three years’ worth of supplies. Under these circumstances, the seigneurs who did attempt to comply with their obligations normally sent no more than forty or so settlers, most of whom were défricheurs (land-clearers) or plowman. Many of these returned to France once their contracts were up, having used the opportunity solely to amass a little capital.

According to one estimate—the best available—by 1645 New France still had only 300 inhabitants. Over the next thirteen years, the Company of New France made a greater effort to settle the country, so that the Jesuit Paul Ragueneau could report that the population had grown to some 1,700 inhabitants by 1658. But five years later, the European population of the St. Lawrence colony was, according to Trudel, still only about 3,035, well below what the Dutch had accomplished in New Netherland by the same date. Some 1,976 persons lived in the Quebec region, 462 at Trois-Rivières, and 597 at Montreal. By percentage, this meant that 65.1 percent of the population was concentrated in or near Quebec, 15.2 percent at Trois-Rivières, and 19.7 percent at Montreal. 28

Although it tended to be concentrated around the towns of Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal, the population in 1663 was largely rural. Trudel has identified
1,188 persons who lived in rural districts full-time and a further 851 who resided at least part of the year in the countryside. Only 996 lived full-time in the town centers. This means that 39.2 percent of the French along the St. Lawrence lived in rural areas, while 32.8 percent were fully urban. Another 28 percent were “de type mixte.” Trudel’s calculations give some sense of the size of these towns. The largest, Quebec, had a permanent population of 550, followed by Montreal with 259 and Trois-Rivières with 187 residents, respectively. In the newer settlements areas—Montreal and Trois-Rivières—the concentration of the population in the towns—43.4 and 40.5 percent, respectively, was much higher than at Quebec, where only 27.8 percent of the regional population was urban. Naturally, the population of the towns fluctuated, perhaps seasonally, so that at certain times of the year, the number of those dwelling in Quebec might swell to nearly a thousand, while Montreal and Trois-Rivières might each exceed 350 residents.29

As might be expected of a frontier colonial settlement, the population of New France in 1663 was young, averaging 20.6 years—22.2 years old for men and 18.2 years old for women (that is, of the 2,689 persons for whom adequate records exist to assign an age). As was typical under colonial conditions elsewhere, a preponderance of the population was male—62.9 percent. The presence of a significant number of women of child-bearing age is critical for the success of any settlement colony, and while only a little more than one-third of the population was female, the proportion of women from the metropole was sufficient in 1663 so that the French population had begun to reproduce itself. Trudel found that a little more than a third of the French population of
Canada—38.7 percent—had been born in New France. There were 1,030 first-generation and 145 second generation Canadians in 1663.30

The immigrant population was overwhelmingly French. Of the 1,253 persons identified as immigrants, 1,246 were born in France. Of the others, one was born at sea, two were Walloons (Belgian or French-speaking Dutch), and there was one each from Switzerland, England, Ireland, and Scotland. Normandy contributed the most to the settlement of the country, accounting for 282 persons, followed by Aunis with 204, and Perche with 142. Significantly, Paris contributed 90 settlers, while Champlain’s home region of Saintonge on the Atlantic coast of France sent just 65.31

There was also a métis population among the French. Children of mixed Indian-French parentage began appearing almost simultaneously with the first French settlements. Robert Gravé, the son of Champlain’s associate François du Pont-Gravé and an original settler of Acadia, had taken a Native-American wife, as had Charles de la Tour, the governor of Acadia during much of the first-half of the seventeenth century. Champlain’s interpreter Nicolas Marsolet had also taken a Native-American wife. There were three mixed-marriage couples at Quebec in 1663 and one at Trois-Rivières. In one of the marriages at Quebec, the wife, Madeleine-Euphrosine Nicollet, was herself a métisse. Two of the couples at Quebec, including Jean Leblanc and Madeleine-Euphrosine Nicollet, had produced off-spring, as had the family at Trois-Rivières, so that there were six métis children living at Quebec and three at Trois-Rivières. Including Mme. Leblanc, then, Trudel has been able to identify ten métis among the French population along the St. Lawrence in 1663.32 Naturally, given the long association of the French with the Huron, Algonkian, and Montagnais populations on the St. Lawrence,
there were a number of métis who lived among the Native Peoples and had adopted their lifeways. Undoubtedly, there were also métis among both the French and Native populations in Acadia.

In terms of social composition, New France largely reproduced the three estates—the clergy, nobility, and commonalty—of Old France. The clergy made up 2.5 percent of the population while the resident nobles accounted for 3.2 percent. The overwhelming majority of the people of Canada—94.3 percent—belonged to the third-estate or common class. These Trudel has divided into the bourgeois and working classes. The bourgeois include merchants, large-scale landowners of the common class, professionals, master artisans, and government officials who were not nobles. Ordinary laborers, sailors, servants, farmers, and workers in master artisan shops made up the lowest division of the third estate. The bourgeois constituted 26.3 percent of the population, while the common working class composed 68 percent. Significantly, there was no appreciable slave population.

In his demographic study of 1663 Canada, Trudel was able to determine with some assurance the professions or occupations of 680 men, or a little more than half of the total male population of working age. He divided these into five major categories: churchmen, public officials, merchants, tradesmen, and servants. The overwhelming majority were tradesmen, numbering 465. Next were servants, numbering 89, followed by merchants, 45; government officials, 33, and finally churchmen, 37. Trudel also identified 41 churchwomen, which would bring the total of those in the ranks of religious workers to 78. As Trudel himself remarks, “It astonishes us that in a colony that is said to have an economy based on the fur trade that so few persons identified their principal
occupation as commerce.” Of course, the explanation is that almost all of the colonists, including the clergy and government officials, engaged part-time in the fur trade, sometimes illicitly.

A key indication as to whether New France had made the transition from a purely extractive network to a self-sufficient agricultural colony is the percentage of the population that pursued agriculture as a primary occupation. From the first, Champlain had cleared land and insisted that gardens be kept at the habitation at Quebec, but these proved to be less successful than he had hoped because the inhabitants were neglectful in his absence. As has been seen, Louis Hébert set up the first working farm at Cap Tourmente near Quebec soon after his arrival in 1617. Hébert’s extended family planted several acres with wheat, rye, corn, and oats and cultivated grape vines and apple trees. Champlain, who visited the Hébert farm in 1618, also noted that “cabbages, radishes, lettuces, purslain, sorrel, parsely” along with “squash, cucumbers, melons, peas, beans, and other vegetables,” were all under cultivation and growing as well as they did in France. The Récollets also maintained a garden for their own use and raised pigs and poultry, and when the Jesuits settled at Quebec in 1625, they also cleared more than ten acres for agricultural purposes. By 1626, there was a small herd of cattle at Quebec, which was soon sent out to Cap Tourmente under the care of six herdsmen. This was the meager state of the agricultural base of the colony in 1627, when the Kirkes descended on the colony and destroyed the farm at Cap Tourmente and laid waste to most of the infrastructure at Quebec.

By 1663, though, the agricultural base of the St. Lawrence colony had been considerably expanded. Of the 680 male colonists of marriageable age whose
occupations are known, 97 or about 14.3 percent worked on the land in some agricultural capacity. Of these, only 19 were farmers, who could be divided into independent farmers and tenant farmers. In all, there were 17 independent farmers—nine at Quebec, seven at Trois-Rivières, and just one at Montreal. Both of the tenant farmers were at Quebec. If the percentage of farmers among those of known occupation were to be extended to the population at large, this would show that there were perhaps 130 farmers in all of New France. It is far from certain, however, that such a supposition is justified. What can be shown, however, is that in seventeenth-century terms, the agricultural sector does not appear to have been adequate to supply the needs of the colonial population. As has been seen, only 39.2 percent of the population lived in rural areas full time with another 28 percent living part time in the countryside. Even by the most liberal estimate, this means that the rural population of New France could not have amounted to more that 67.2 percent of the population. In France itself, even as late as 1700, after considerable urbanization had taken place, the rural population amounted to some 83.9 percent of the overall population.36

By 1663, then, New France had not become the thriving, robust settlement colony that Champlain, Henry IV, and Richelieu had envisioned. In part, this was because the St. Lawrence colony was a dangerous place to live. No doubt, the ongoing wars with the Iroquois in the 1650s and early 1660s stunted the growth of New France, and as J.M.S. Careless has observed, until the Iroquois problem was solved, the colony could not be expected to prosper. From 1661 to 1663, the civil and religious leaders of New France implored the king and court to offer direct support to the colony. Gov. Davaugour, for instance, in 1661, asked the Prince de Condé, the son of the former viceroy, to arrange to
send three hundred soldiers to end the Iroquois menace and 1,200 settlers to ensure that
the colony could become self-sufficient and defend itself from outsiders. Obviously,
Davaugour’s report was meant for the king. By the next year, Louis XIV began to heed
these calls for help. Ultimately, he would decide to royalize New France outright in 1663
and pour in the troops and resources needed to stabilize the colony for the next one
hundred years.37

New Netherland had similar problems finding settlers but for slightly different
reasons. In the early seventeenth century, the Netherlands was the leading commercial
power in Europe and enjoyed a bustling economy and a high level of prosperity. Dutch
citizens were unlikely to give up the good life in Europe for a risky existence in a
sparsely inhabited colony on the fringe of the Dutch seaborne empire.38 Aside from
establishing a few trading posts, the early trading companies did nothing to settle the
Dutch-claimed territory between the Delaware and Connecticut rivers. It was only after
the establishment of the West India Co. that any real effort at settlement began. The WIC
was a powerful commercial and military organization with wide powers and jurisdiction,
in some ways analogous to the Company of New France. It had for instance, close ties to
the government and was given the power to administer overseas domains. But in some
ways the WIC was better circumstanced to develop commercial colonies. The majority
of the members of the Company of New France were nobles and clergymen who seem
not to have been experienced in overseas trade, whereas the members of the WIC were all
merchants, who knew how to conduct business by sea across the globe. The WIC was
also far better capitalized.
It will be recalled that by 1624, the WIC had raised the financing to begin its
development of New Netherland. In that year it sent between eight and eighteen Walloon
families who were to settle at different locales meant to secure possession of the Dutch-
claimed territory. The very fact that the Dutch chose to settle families at the first
opportunity demonstrates a marked difference from what the French were able to achieve
under the early monopolies. In March 1625, the WIC sent an additional thirty Walloon
families, augmenting this number still further later in the year. The company was also
careful to send a number of professional farmers, whom the WIC employed directly. In
all, there were already about 300 settlers in New Netherland by the end of 1625, just a
year after the WIC took over the administration of the colony. This compares very
favorably with the French effort. New France only reached this level of population, as
has been seen, in 1634. And though the French colony reached something of a peak of
400 settlers two years later, by 1645, the population had declined once again to about
300.39

But though the WIC’s settlement of New Netherland started auspiciously, more
needed to be done to ensure the security and success of the colony. The Dutch Reformed
minister Jonas Michaëlius, who arrived in 1628, noted that the colony did not produce
enough food and suggested that the company send cattle and ten or twelve more farmers.
He also thought the Dutch should confiscate the fertile lands the Mahicans had
abandoned after losing their war against the Mohawks, saying that this would be justified
since the Mahicans had acted treacherously and murdered a number of Dutch colonists.
The only problem, according to Michaëlius, was that there were too few settlers to take
up this land. The directors of the WIC might have agreed with Michaëlius, but after the
expensive and disastrous attempts to capture Bahia and El Mina, the company did not have the financial wherewithal to follow up on the colonization program begun in 1624. The directors as a whole more or less abandoned New Netherland, leaving its administration in the hands of the Amsterdam Chamber. But support for building an agricultural settlement colony was no longer strong even within the Amsterdam Chamber. Only a small, though powerful, faction still believed in the settlement program. It was this faction, which Kiliaen van Rensselaer headed, that pushed through the patroonship plan, which aimed to save the colonization program overall.40

As has been seen, under this program, which was only fully enacted in 1629, the WIC offered “patroonships,” essentially landed manors, to wealthy individuals who agreed to send settlers. The Freedoms and Exemptions of 1629 required each patroon to settle fifty colonists of working age on his lands within four years of assuming ownership. In return, the WIC would grant “patroonships,” each of which would extend for four leagues along one side of a river or, alternatively, for two leagues on both sides of a river. The patroons were also given political and legal authority within the boundaries of their lands on the model of the traditional manor lord.41

At least five directors of the WIC applied for and were granted patroonships in 1629, which promised a renewed commitment to the settlement program. These were Van Rensselaer himself, Samuel Godijn, Samuel Blommaert, Michael Pauw, and Albert Burgh. But this new effort began to falter almost immediately. Burgh pulled out because of financial difficulties. Blommaert lacked the gumption to continue with the plan in the face of opposition at home. Indians attacked and destroyed Godijn’s settlement on the Delaware almost as soon as it was established, and Michael Pauw, who attempted to
establish “Pavonia” in what became New Jersey, sold the patroonship back to the WIC in 1635 for 26,000 florins, having failed to send even one settler from Europe.42

By 1635, the only fully functioning patroonship was that of Van Rensselaer on the upper Hudson. Van Rensselaer, at great expense to himself, was able to settle a sizable group of farmers and skilled tradesmen on his lands and to provide Rensselaerswyck with all the support and organization it needed to survive. The population fluctuated between 200 and 300 persons. Since records exist for some 174 persons who immigrated to Rensselaerswyck between 1630 and 1644, it is possible, as Oliver Rink has shown, to determine the gender, family, and occupational status of those who settled within the patroonship.43

By far, most of the immigrants—102—were single men, most of whom were under the age of twenty-five. There were only two single women. There were sixteen families, fifteen of which included a wife. This meant that while the sample was overwhelmingly male and single, Rensselaerswyck did have some capacity for reproducing its population. Many of the families arrived with one or more children. The largest family had nine. Since families tended to remain in the colony, this meant, also, that Rensselaerswyck was beginning to establish what Rink elsewhere has described as “a stable core.”44

Van Rensselaer’s goal was to establish an agricultural settlement colony, which aimed at self-sufficiency in the short term but for commercial viability in the long term. In 1638, he wrote to his manager, Jacob Albersw Planck, that the laborers he sent over should be distributed among the farmers on the patroonship and that his colonists should be prevented from focusing their attention on the fur trade. “My principal object is
directed toward farming and things connected with it.” Van Rensselaer reminded Planck. The occupations of those who settled at Rensselaerswyck generally reflected the patroon’s attitude. Of the 102 settlers for whom an occupation is known, eleven were farmers. There were also five farm servants, ten farm hands, ten farm laborers, one farm boy, and one a farmer’s apprentice. This means that thirty-eight men of the 102, or about 37 percent, were engaged in agriculture. Rink thinks that some or perhaps all of those listed as servants (19) and laborers (7) might also have been engaged in farming. If even half of these worked in agriculture (a fair estimate), then precisely half of those whose occupations are known worked the land. This would mean that the percentage of those engaged in agriculture at Rensselaerswyck, at least, was much higher than in New France as a whole. It also mirrors what might be found in the Netherlands in the 1620s where approximately 51.1 percent of the population was rural. Not all of the rural dwellers in the homeland were engaged directly in farming, so Rensselaerswyck’s agricultural base was somewhat stronger vis-à-vis what might be found in the Netherlands itself. It should be noted, however, that, at least in terms of cereal production, the Dutch Republic was far from self-sufficient.45

But while Van Rensselaer concentrated on developing agriculture, he did not neglect other necessities. Some fourteen percent of the known settlers at his patroonship were in the building trades. Immigrants also included four shoemakers, four tailors, a blacksmith, baker, weaver, wagoner, brewer, surgeon, and minister. Van Rensselaer also maintained an administrative staff, which included the schout or manager and usually an assistant. There is also a clerk listed among the immigrants for 1630 to 1644.46
Rink seems to think that the occupational make-up of the immigrants to Rensselaerswyck during this period mirrored that for the colony as a whole for 1630 to 1644, since both Rensselaerswyck and New Netherland itself were “largely unsettled wildernesses” that required similar kinds of settlers. But what kinds of immigrants the colony required and what sort it was able to attract are two widely disparate things. The WIC, moreover, does not seem to have manifested the same kind of support for agriculture as did Van Rensselaer. In one way, though, it seems the immigration to Rensselaerswyck and New Netherland as a whole was alike, and that is in terms of ethnic diversity. Of the 174 immigrants recorded in the passenger lists for Rensselaerswyck, twenty were foreigners. Of these, ten came from Germany, six from Norway, and one each from Sweden, Denmark, France, and England.47 This demonstrates that Rensselaerswyck alone was much more diverse than New France, which by 1663 had just three foreigners resident in a population more than ten times as large.

Van Rensselaer’s patroonship, however, had its difficulties. It apparently never turned a profit for the patroon, and it was only his impassioned desire to make it and, by extension, New Netherland succeed that kept it from going under during his lifetime. Once Kiliaen van Rensselaer died in 1643, conditions at the patroonship declined precipitously. His oldest son, Johannes, who took charge of the family’s business affairs, reportedly took no interest in New Netherland or the patroonship. It was the younger sons, Jan Baptiste and Jeremias, who recognized that the Van Rensselaer holdings along the Hudson were valuable and interceded to save them and the patroonship after 1651.48

According to Rink, the period from 1628 to 1645 witnessed a substantial increase in the population of New Netherland, from fewer than 500 to approximately 2,500. It is
difficult, though, to see just how and when this five-fold expansion occurred. Certainly, Van Rensselaer’s activities brought 200 to 300 new settlers to the colony in these years, which may have increased the overall population to about 800. Perhaps there was other substantial immigration into the colony during the early 1630s, though this is undocumented. Whatever the case, by 1638, the States General had become concerned, not about the rapid expansion of the population of New Netherland, but rather about depopulation. In its 26 April resolution of that year urging the colonizion of New Netherland, the States noted that it had received “information that the population of New Netherland does not only not increase as it ought, but even that the population which had been commenced is decreasing, and appears to be neglected by the West India Company, so that the inhabitants of foreign princes and potentates, are endeavoring to incorporate New Netherland, and if not seasonably attended to, will at once entirely overrun it.”49 To rectify this problem, the States essentially forced the WIC to open the fur trade to all inhabitants and to appoint a new director, Willem Kieft, who, it was hoped, would bring greater stability to the colony.

In 1640, the WIC also issued a revised Freedoms and Exemptions that aimed to revive the patroonship plan. The next year, under the provisions of this document, the Utrecht nobleman Godard van Reede with his partner, Cornelis Melyn, attempted to establish a patroonship on Staten Island, near where the sea captain David de Vries had already begun to establish a plantation. In the meantime, Meyndert Meyndertsz. van Keeren began planting a colony at Achter Kol, near the Hackensack River in New Jersey.50
Unfortunately, these ambitious plans came to naught after Kieft precipitated a war with the Algonkian groups that lived in the areas surrounding Manhattan Island and in New Jersey. During Kieft’s War, which lasted from 1641 to 1645, the Algonkians laid waste to the farms outside of New Amsterdam and besieged the Dutch towns on Long Island. They destroyed de Vries’s plantation, as well as van Reede and van Keeren’s patroonships. The Indians also laid waste to the remnants of Michael Pauw’s patroonship in New Jersey, though the town of Bergen (Jersey City) survived. No doubt some settlers did arrive during the war years, most notably English from New England, but the disastrous war with the Algonkians in the 1640s set back the advance of settlement. Quite a few Dutch were killed and most of the surviving population was forced to seek asylum in New Amsterdam itself. It is unlikely, then, that the population increased very much between 1641 and 1645.51

The nineteenth-century historian E.B. O’Callaghan estimated that in 1643, the year Kieft’s War began in earnest, New Netherland had a population of about 3,000, some 2,500 of whom were located in New Amsterdam itself. He then notes that by the end of the war, in 1646, the population had declined precipitously to only about 1,000, with the outlying areas left in devastation. While the latter figure may be, as O’Callaghan admits, a little low, it does reflect the kind of decline that would have triggered a response from the States General. Ellis Raesly, writing in the 1940, suggests that the figure O’Callaghan gives for 1646 represented only the population of New Amsterdam, not of the outlying regions. He says that when Stuyvesant took over as director-general in 1647, New Amsterdam had a population of about 1,000 with the outlying areas of New Netherland contributing perhaps a thousand more.52
The differences among historians in estimating the population reflect the scarcity of available data. Nevertheless, it seems that there was some significant growth in the overall population in the early 1630s, some of which took place at Rensselaerswyck, but much of which seems to have been concentrated in New Amsterdam itself. During Kieft’s War the population of New Amsterdam was swollen with refugees, but this did not reflect, necessarily, an increase of the total population of New Netherland, but rather the evacuation of the countryside. Some of the evacuees may have remained in the city as late as 1646 while they rebuilt their country estates. Others may have stayed permanently. Some of the increased population of New Amsterdam even during the war was, however, both new and temporary. The WIC had sent soldiers in the emergency, and some recent immigrants, who had planned to settle outside of the capital, found it too dangerous to reside on the lands prepared for them. These would have included forty-one settlers who had come with Cornelis Melyn to settle Van Reede’s patroonship on Staten Island and a number of English settlers, largely from Salem, Massachusetts, who had come under the leadership of Lady Deborah Moody, to establish a town under Dutch jurisdiction on Long Island.53

It does seem, though, that the population of New Netherland expanded rather rapidly as soon as the war was over. While Rink admits that this is so, he says there are no details in the records to aid the historian. He found among the notarial records in the Netherlands that thirty-six of the fifty-three ships which sailed to New Netherland between 1644 and 1657 carried some immigrants, which suggests “a large influx.” But aside from the suggestion that more families began to immigrate, the notarial records, says Rink, reveal “virtually nothing about the immigrants of this period.”54 Rink, though,
by concentrating on the notarial records of ship departures from Dutch ports, does not take into account the rapid development of towns following Kieft’s War, much of it spurred by English immigration from New England.

Town development, particularly on Long Island, began to take shape prior to Kieft’s War, as the WIC began to purchase parcels of land from the local Algonkians. There was some sporadic settlement of Long Island—chiefly isolated farmsteads—prior to the war, and the Dutch began to settle the village of Nieuw Amersfoort (Flatlands) as early as 1636. Some settlement had begun at Breukelen, as well, in 1642 or 1643, and Lady Moody and her followers from Salem started to carve out a new village at Gravesend in 1643, a process Kieft’s War interrupted. Algonkians from outside of Long Island attacked Gravesend later in the year, and by the end of 1643, the settlers had taken refuge either at New Amsterdam or in the village of Nieuw Amersfoort, which provided better defense.55

Kieft’s War, then, seems to have been an interruption in the process of town development on Long Island and elsewhere. Once the war was concluded, the process resumed at a rapid pace. Gravesend received a charter in 1645 and became an operating town by 1646. Breukelen, of which Gravesend would eventually become part, had been settled to some degree before 1643, but it was only after the war, in 1646, that the town had filled in enough to elect its own magistrates. As early as 1639, the WIC had purchased land from the local Algonkians to establish the town of Flushing, though Kieft did not issue a patent for this parcel—to sixteen English colonists—until 1645. Some of these colonists, it seems, had been living for some time in Holland before immigrating. Some minor settlement may have begun at Middleburgh or Newtown in 1642, but there
was no permanent settlement until 1652, when English families from New England took up residence. Although German, French, and Dutch families took up lands in outlying areas of the town, Newtown remained largely English. Settlement, chiefly Dutch, began at Flatbush in 1651, and the town received its charter the next year. Meanwhile, Nieuw Utrecht, also chiefly Dutch, was settled in 1657 and received a charter in 1662. Substantial Dutch settlement began at Bushwick in 1660, though there may have some activity there previously. English townsmen from Hempstead, which had been settled in 1644, began to develop and settle Rusdorp (Jamaica) in 1656, which demonstrates that the original towns on Long Island could no longer meet the land requirements for their population and had begun to funnel surplus resources and people into the building of new villages. The first generation of towns after New Amsterdam and Fort Orange was now spawning a new generation of nascent urban centers.56

Gravesend provides an example of the size of these towns on first settlement. It was originally established by twenty-two patentees. By the end of 1646, twenty-six persons had taken lots in the town. Most of the initial settlers were of English background and came from either Salem or Lynn, Massachusetts. At least one, Nicholas Stillwell, was from Virginia, and another, George Baxter, was Director Kieft’s English secretary. Many of the twenty-six were married men with children. William Bowne, for instance, arrived in Salem with his wife and at least four, if not five, children. John Tilton came with a wife and two children, and Richard Stout and his wife, Penelope, brought their two young children. Lady Moody herself brought no family to settle at Gravesend, but likely had servants. At the very least, the town had thirty-five inhabitants when first settled and likely many more. These young families soon began producing offspring, so that the
town’s population witnessed steady growth after first settlement. Gravesend may be representative of the average size of the Long Island towns upon first settlement, but some were considerably larger. In Hempstead, for instance, sixty-six heads of families became freeholders of the town in 1647 upon the first division of land.57

New towns and settlements also sprung up outside of Long Island. Dutch began to settle in significant numbers along the Hudson in the area south of Rensselaerswyck as early as 1652, and by 1661, they received a patent for the town of Wiltwyck (Kingston). But one of the most important towns outside of Long Island was Schenectady, which some twenty families initially settled in 1662 under the leadership of Kiliean van Rensselaer’s grand-nephew Arent van Curler. This settlement in the Mohawk Valley extended Dutch fur-trading operations and settlement north and west of Fort Orange and Beverwijck. It was planted on 128 acres of land in Mohawk territory and indeed had been purchased from the Mohawk.58

Although the Long Island towns were chiefly English or Dutch, they were not exclusively so. Fourteen Frenchmen were among the initial settlers of Bushwick, and there were a few French among the settlers of New Utrecht, as well. The French colonists were mainly Huguenots, who had first migrated to the Dutch Republic in order to escape the increasing persecution of Protestants in France under Louis XIV. The French Protestant immigration to New Netherland after 1656 was quite substantial. Some 156 French Waldenses came to New Amsterdam in 1656 alone, arriving safely after the Long Island Algonkians helped to rescue them from a shipwreck off Fire Island. Huguenots, along with Walloons, settled the village of Nieuw Haarlem on Manhattan
Island in 1658, and some of the Waldenses eventually took up lands along the Delaware. The proliferation of towns on Long Island and elsewhere demonstrates that after Kieft’s War, New Amsterdam had ceased to be a simple organizational and administrative node on a predominantly extractive network, but had now also become a gateway town. Although it retained its role as an extractive node in a dendritic/solar system—organizing furs and timber chiefly for shipment to the Netherlands—it had expanded its role in organizing and administering incoming flows, not only of goods, but also of people. Whether they arrived aboard ship from Amsterdam or migrated overland from New England, the people who came to make their homes in New Netherland had to move through New Amsterdam in order to gain legal rights and protection for the lands on which they settled. Afterward, they remained dependent on New Amsterdam to some degree for the legal protection of their property, persons, and civil rights, and also, perhaps to a larger degree, for the provisions and goods they required, many of which flowed to and through New Amsterdam from the Netherlands.

While none of these new “towns” reached the level even of a country town, which requires a population above 2,000 in Christaller’s classification, the new concentrated settlements exhibited a particularly American characteristic, which can also be observed in the typical settlement of New England towns. In Europe, as Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees have explained, towns emerged during the Middle Ages in regions that began to produce an agricultural surplus, which then needed to be marketed and which could be exchanged either directly or through a cash nexus for the services and goods the towns could provide. As the farms in rural areas developed and prospered and the
population expanded, country towns began to spring up to serve the countryside as
distribution centers, small towns emerged to distribute goods to the country towns,
medium-size towns cropped up to serve the smaller towns, and finally cities developed to
manufacture necessary goods for distribution to the medium-sized towns and provide
services for the entire distribution system. But in the American experience, as it appears
in New England and later in New Netherland, the process is precisely the opposite. The
towns, generally speaking, are established first and serve as a mechanism to bring the
countryside into cultivation. In New Amsterdam, for instance, which served as an
administrative and organizational hub, the directors helped to organize the towns by
providing charters to certify land ownership and confer local governing rights on the
inhabitants. These rights normally included parceling out the arable lands surrounding
the town to prospective farmers. In this way, New Amsterdam by the 1640s began to
operate as a prototypical gateway city, helping to organize the countryside and make the
landscape accessible to the emerging global market. As a gateway, New Amsterdam
organized the inflow of capital and people from Europe and elsewhere, albeit on a much
smaller scale but in much the same way Chicago did for the American Midwest two
centuries later.60

It is important to note, too, that while some of the new towns—Beverwijck and
Schenectady—emerged chiefly as extensions of the linear fur-trade network, most were
only tangentially involved in the fur trade. This was particularly true of the towns on
Long Island. While individuals traded for a pelt now and again with the local
Algonkians, the business of the Long Island towns was chiefly agricultural and
commercial. Gravesend, for instance, concentrated on growing tobacco for the European market and raising livestock for sale in the regional market.\textsuperscript{61}

The rapid creation of towns after 1645 marks a distinct difference between New Netherland and New France prior to 1663-64. Nothing of the sort occurred in New France. After the founding of Quebec, only two new French settlements of any consequence had been established on the St. Lawrence by 1663. Champlain had founded Trois-Rivières in 1634 to protect and extend the fur trade route along the river, and the Société de Notre Dame in Paris had founded Ville-Marie or Montreal in 1642 as a mission settlement to help convert the Native Peoples to Catholicism. The settlement at Montreal was situated at an important meeting place for the fur trade, so, in effect, it also extended the fur trade network further up the St. Lawrence. In this way, by 1663, the French had really established little more than an extractive linear network. Quebec, in contrast to New Amsterdam, never made the transition from a node on an essentially extractive network to a gateway that served to organize and settle the countryside during the period under discussion here, though it had begun to develop some of the characteristics of a gateway in other respects, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Even while the process of town creation was taking place in New Netherland, immigrants began to arrive, not only from the English colonies and Europe, but also from farther afield, to create subcommunities or nodes within nodes in New Amsterdam itself. In the fall of 1654, twenty-three Jewish men, women, and children arrived at New Amsterdam on a French ship that had come from Recife, Brazil. These Jewish families were mainly the descendants of Sephardic Jews who had first taken refuge in Amsterdam after being driven out of Portugal in the late sixteenth century. They had removed to
Brazil after the Dutch had taken it over, likely to be situated once again among
Portuguese speakers. But in January 1654, they found themselves unwelcome in Brazil
when the Portuguese once again recovered the colony. They were not exactly welcome
in New Amsterdam either. Stuyvesant and his council, with the support of the Dutch
Reformed ministers in the colony, petitioned the directors of the WIC to reject the request
of the Jews to settle in New Netherland. The directors, though, saw things otherwise,
noting that “reason and fairness” dictated that the Jews be allowed to stay and engage in
trade. Part of the “reason” may have been that the Jews owed the WIC money, which
they would only be able to pay if they were allowed to engage in trade.62

The West India Co. was in itself a diffuse network that drew settlers to New
Netherland from all over the Atlantic world. The Jewish immigration from Brazil was
just one result of New Amsterdam’s position as an important node within the WIC’s
Atlantic network. The WIC was quite different in this regard from the Company of New
France, which constituted a specific, linear network between Quebec and Paris. The
WIC had considerably enlarged its network and increased its trade when it used its
military power to seize Brazil in 1630 and Angola in 1641. Essentially, New
Amsterdam, after 1641 was a node on a trading network that connected Africa, South
America, Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, and the Netherlands. Stuyvesant, as the first director-
general, was made the governor, not only of New Netherland, but also of the Netherlands
Antilles, which the Dutch had taken from Spain in 1634. This widespread diffuse
network meant that New Amsterdam participated in the constant circulation of goods,
people, and ideas around the Atlantic. Quebec, by contrast, had a thin lifeline back to
France, and even this was closed off much of the year when the St. Lawrence froze.63
With its monopoly of the Atlantic Trade, the backing of the States General, and nearly eighty ships and thousands of sailors and soldiers, the WIC was a formidable organization. New Amsterdam became a busy seaport with a fairly robust trade beyond the fur trade to Europe. Rather early on, African slaves were brought in from Angola and later from Dahomey to serve as agricultural labor and construction workers. Some slaves were also brought from Brazil and from Curacao, which became what Jaap Jacobs has termed “a transit post” in the Dutch slave trade. This trade sharply increased the African population of New Netherland, both slave and free. Jacobs estimates that the total African population of New Netherland in 1664 was close to 500, 290 of whom had recently arrived aboard the slave ship *Gideon*. Graham Russell Hodges gives a much higher estimate. He says that by the time of the English conquest there were 800 persons of African descent in New Netherland, 375 of whom lived in New Amsterdam. The Dutch slave system was relatively open to manumission, which led to the establishment of a robust free African population in New Amsterdam. Hodges notes that by the late 1640s, at least thirty persons of African descent were independent landowners on Manhattan Island, many of whom owned lots in the capital. This free community was likely increased when African sailors in the employ of the WIC decided to stay in New Amsterdam after their service was up.64

The WIC also took some direct action in the 1650s to maintain the integrity of the colony’s borders and to increase the population at one strategic point—the Delaware. After Stuyvesant succeeded in capturing New Sweden and bringing the lower Delaware region back under the company’s dominion, the City of Amsterdam applied for a patent to establish what amounted to a corporate patroonship there—named New Amstel.
Populating the lower Delaware, it was thought, might forestall English encroachment and could prevent the Swedes from retaking the area. In December 1656, the City of Amsterdam dispatched 112 colonists to its new patroonship on the southwest bank of the river. Some of the new settlers were to serve as the garrison for Fort Casimir. Their ship, the *Prins Maurits*, upon arriving off Long Island in March 1657, ran aground, though the passengers and cargo were rescued. After finally establishing themselves on the Delaware, the colonists suffered through a difficult winter chiefly owing to a lack of supplies. Then in the summer of 1658 a deadly epidemic struck, which nearly wiped out the whole colony. Many of the survivors left after promised supplies failed to materialize in the summer of 1659. Nevertheless, New Amstel survived once the City of Amsterdam renewed its commitment to the settlement program in the early 1660s.65

Although the WIC is generally seen as failing to develop New Netherland and had shown itself unable to do so on its own, the colony’s connection to the company’s overseas operations was not without significance. New Amsterdam’s participation in the Atlantic network of the WIC, not only increased and diversified the population of New Netherland, it also diversified the economy. New Amsterdam imported salt, dyewood, and perhaps horses from Curaçao, pork, beef, and wheat from New England, and liquor, wine, vinegar, cloths of various kinds, kettles, pepper, cinnamon, currants, hats, stockings, gloves, shoes, soap, lead, nails, lime, tools, firearms, steel, books, paper, kettles, ribbons, thread, furniture, and hard currency from Europe. Exports included flour, fish, meat, peas, and beans to Brazil and Angola, tobacco to Europe, and timber to the Caribbean and Virginia.66
This diverse economy, with connections to many places throughout the Atlantic World brought with it a new and diverse immigrant population to provide necessary services. For instance, businesses soon developed in New Amsterdam to support the shipping trade. The WIC sent ships’ carpenters to New Netherland to provide on-the-spot repairs, and local inhabitants produced and sold ships’ cordage. Elva Kathleen Lyon, in her survey of New Netherland occupations, has noted that there were some 113 carpenters in the colony, some of whom undoubtedly served the shipping trade. There were at least five sailmakers and two ropemakers. New Amsterdam also had a shipwright, who seems to have built boats for local use and repaired larger seagoing ships.67

Houses of entertainment for visiting sailors proliferated, often in private homes. Many householders opened grog shops, and prostitution was common. In the 1640s, New Amsterdam already had about thirty-five taphouses. Many of these were not formal businesses, but merely a room set up in a private house where sailors or neighbors might come to drink. Stuyvesant attempted to regulate these businesses, declaring that if he did not, more than a quarter of the town would be given over to selling alcohol. He had an ordinance passed which stipulated that new drinking establishments could open only with the permission of the director and council. Brewing and distilling businesses soon emerged to supply the taprooms and taverns and the illicit trade in alcohol to the Native Peoples. They also provided beer and spirits to the ships that came into port to resupply. Lyon has identified forty-six brewers, two distillers, and six bottlers among the population of New Netherland.68
The continual arrival of ships from various parts of the Atlantic brought to New Amsterdam WIC soldiers on their way home from Curaçao or Brazil and others on their way to these posts. The WIC also tried to maintain about a hundred soldiers in New Netherland itself to be stationed not only in New Amsterdam, but also at the outlying forts on the upper Hudson and on the lower Delaware. Sailors recruited from all over the Atlantic world circulated through New Amsterdam, and some decided to stay. The WIC also made a concerted effort to recruit settlers from the Netherlands and had some success after the publication in 1655 of Adriaen van der Donck’s glowing description of the colony. Because the WIC was concerned to some degree with establishing agriculture in New Netherland so that the colony would become self-sustaining and have a large enough population for self-defense, it encouraged the soldiers it sent to take up farming and encouraged the purchase of slaves for the purpose of agriculture.69

From 1657 until the English conquest, direct immigration from the Netherlands also seems to have increased. The notarial records from this period list at least thirty ships that carried immigrants to New Amsterdam. These records show that 1,032 persons emigrated from ports in the fatherland to New Netherland. Tellingly, 167 families immigrated, a key to stabilizing the population. There were also at least 253 women among the immigrants, which boded well for the colony’s ability to reproduce its population. Of these, 192 were married and sixty-one single. Forty-seven of the new colonists were farmers by occupation, which also boosted New Netherland’s self-sustainability. At least forty-five were soldiers in the employ of the WIC. Not all of the immigrants in this period were from the Netherlands, though. A full 134 are listed as foreigners.70
There is no question that with its increased access to people because of its participation in overlapping diffuse networks, New Netherland was able to significantly increase its population after 1646. But without a census, determining the total population with any precision at any point in the colony’s history is not possible. As Oliver Rink has noted, population estimates for 1655 range from 2,000 to 3,500. By 1664, the total population exceeded 9,000 and may have reached as high as 10,000. This population included many Germans, Swedes, Finns, Jews, Africans, French, French-speaking Walloons, and as many as 2,000 English. By any estimate, though, the Dutch colony had far outstripped New France in attracting colonists.71

But the advantages New Netherland gained as a result of participating in a diffuse network came with a cost, at least to the Dutch goal of building a North-American colony for the purposes of empire and trade. Much of the population was not Dutch in culture, language, religion, or politics, and therefore manifested little loyalty to the States General and even less to the Dutch West India Co. Moreover, the WIC itself tended to neglect New Netherland. Its main business until 1648 was raiding Spanish shipping and slave trading. This neglect would eventually lead to the loss of New Netherland.72

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14 Marc Lescarbot, History of New France, 1:3-4.

15 Faucher de Saint-Maurice and Blanchet, Collection de Manuscrit, 1:57-59.


17 Ibid., 364-65.

18 Ibid., 365.

19 Ibid., 349-66; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 128.


22 DRCHNY, 1:39-40.

23 Marcel Trudel, La Population du Canada en 1663 (Montreal: Fides, 1973), 1; Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 88-89.


25 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 445.

26 Ibid., 466-67; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 187.


28 Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 93-94; Marcel Trudel, La Population, 1, 11-12; Marcel Trudel, The Seigneurial Regime (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 1976), 7, 13-14.

29 Trudel, La Population, 21-22.

30 Ibid., 149-50.

31 Ibid., 29-30, 35, 149-50.

32 Ibid., 27-28.

33 Ibid., 153-54.

34 Ibid., 113, 152.


37 Careless, Canada, 47; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 278-79.

38 Jacobs, New Netherland, 46-47.

39 See chapter 6; also see Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 91; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 466; Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 191.

40 Versteeg, Manhattan in 1628, 64-67; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 91-93, 97.

41 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 104-5.


43 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 146-47, 146 n. 4.

44 Ibid., 146-47, 149.

45 Smith, Religion and Trade, 151; Van Laer, ed., Van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 411-12; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 144-51; D.B. Grigg, Population Growth and Agrarian Change, 151, 156.


47 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 146, 155.

48 Ibid., 195-200

49 Ibid., 144, 158; Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland, 64; DRCHNY, 1:105.

Ibid., 164-65, 230.

CHAPTER 11
FLOWS OF IDEAS

*Religious Ideas*

A comprehensive study of the flow of ideas to New France or New Netherland could easily run to several volumes and might include an almost unlimited number of categories. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to limit the discussion to those ideas that directly affected the development and growth of these respective colonies and resulted in significant differences between them. Aside from commercial ideas, which have already been extensively discussed in chapter 8, two categories of ideas that seem most germane to how the French and Dutch constructed their colonies are religious and political ideas.

Religious ideas must be accounted among the most significant of the flows from Europe to New France and New Netherland. Each nation had an official state religion—Roman Catholicism in the case of the French and the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church in the case of the Netherlands—and each nation put forth some effort to extend the state religion into North America, not only for the purposes of organizing its own settlers, but also to convert the Native-American population to Christianity. But there were significant differences in the way the French and Dutch applied religious ideas, as well as in how forcefully they chose to apply them.

It is next to impossible in any study of European history in the seventeenth century to separate religion and politics. In order to understand the flow of religious
ideas and institutions from France and the Netherlands to North America, some understanding of how the French and Dutch differed in terms of politics and religion is required. In the seventeenth century, Roman Catholicism was a bulwark of political authoritarianism. This is why the English Parliament was so determined to oppose any attempt to reintroduce Roman Catholicism into England. It is also why an autocrat like Louis XIV was so vehement in his defense of the Catholic Church. His right to rule without significant political restrictions on his authority rested on the power the one true God vested in him, which only the one true church—in this case the Roman Catholic Church—could certify. Under such circumstances, the king could not allow any deviation from or competition with the state church, nor could he allow any kind of religious toleration without undermining his own political position.

One would certainly be reluctant to argue that seventeenth-century Protestantism was democratic, but certain Protestant denominations—the Puritans and other Calvinists, including the Dutch—believed that the only true church was a voluntary association. By definition, this implied a certain openness to choice and therefore some opposition to absolutist or authoritarian regimes. Resistance to absolutism led the Protestant English and Dutch to move toward semi-representative systems of government and in the case of the Dutch, at least, to a policy of limited religious toleration or liberty of conscience.

Dutch religious toleration, in its seventeenth-century context, was a far cry from the kind of modern religious freedom guaranteed under the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Dutch generally were willing to concede liberty of conscience, which merely meant that no one could be forced to a confession of faith, such as membership in the Reformed Church required. There was, however, a state church, and this church was
the only one that the state officially recognized and supported. Its *predikanten*, or ministers, were paid by the state out of public funds, and it was the only church or denomination that the state legally permitted to worship publicly. This meant that while other denominations were tolerated, they could not lawfully erect public buildings where worship took place or otherwise gather publicly to conduct ceremonies. Dissenters were not forced to belong to the Dutch Reformed Church—which in Calvinist doctrine could only be a true church if it were a voluntary association—but they could only worship in private spaces and should not draw too much attention to themselves.¹

The religious and political differences between the metropolitan powers shaped the way religious ideas and institutions flowed from Europe to North America. But though New France eventually adopted a restrictive policy and New Netherland, in the final analysis, was more tolerant of religious dissent, such a general characterization of the position of each is misleading. During the period of early colonization, state policy toward religion in both France and the Dutch Republic was dynamic and evolving, and this dynamism is reflected in the policies each of the metropolitan powers adopted to govern colonial development. Then, too, evolving circumstances within New France and New Netherland played an important role in shaping how religious ideas and institutions flowed to the colonies.

The French government eventually restricted immigration to New France to Roman Catholic subjects of the French crown, but the first attempts to establish French colonies in the Americas were of a different character altogether. The colonization efforts under Henry II, in Brazil in 1555 and in South Carolina in 1562, aimed at establishing “safe havens” for Protestant subjects of the king. Henry IV, under whom the
French began their first successful colonization of North America, had been a Protestant until he was essentially forced to convert to Roman Catholicism to legitimize his accession to the French throne. He generally pursued a policy of religious toleration, at least of Protestants, and put up no obstacles toward Protestant immigration to French colonies in North America. It was Henry who, after all, had famously issued the Edict of Nantes in 1589, which granted the Huguenots liberty of conscience and even went so far as to allow them to worship publicly in their own churches in places—such as La Rochelle—where they were in the majority. The Edict also granted Protestants full civil rights. Two years afterward, when the Protestant Pierre Chauvin attempted to plant a colony at Tadoussac under the king’s patent, it was likely, in part, aimed at once again establishing a safe haven for Huguenots in the New World. Following Chauvin’s failure, Henry IV conferred the trade monopoly for Acadia and the St. Lawrence on Sieur de Monts, who was also a Protestant. It will be recalled that in his initial attempt to plant a settlement at St. Croix in 1604, de Monts brought along two Roman Catholic priests and a Protestant minister, which demonstrates that during this phase of the colonization effort, the king saw both Huguenots and their clergy as acceptable settlers. It was under de Monts’ authority, too, that Champlain succeeded in establishing the first permanent French settlement in North America.  

French efforts to establish themselves in the New World thus began in a spirit of toleration, at least for French Protestants. But events began to move in a different direction with the assassination of Henry IV in 1610. Marie de Medici, the queen regent for her son during his minority, was much less disposed to tolerate Protestants at court, much less to actively seek their advice. She promptly dismissed de Monts, and the
colonization effort on the St. Lawrence lost its most important advocate in the corridors of power. This, however, did not lessen Protestant influence in New France. Many of the most important merchants who did business in North America were Huguenots from Rouen and La Rochelle.  

The relative toleration of Protestant involvement in New France after Henry IV’s death may have less to do with the state of religious affairs in France than it did with the neglect of religion in the early French colonial enterprise. Although French charters governing trade and settlement in the Americas always emphasized converting the Native Peoples to the one true church, almost nothing was done toward achieving this goal from Cartier’s time up until 1615. In that year, it will be remembered, Champlain, a devout Roman Catholic who had long been in the employ of the Protestant de Monts, persuaded the Récollet Franciscans to establish their hostel and farm at Quebec. Up to this point, French assertions that their chief object in North America was the benevolent one of converting the Indians seems to have been little more than a hollow justification of their intention to exert sovereignty over the territories and people of Canada and the Maritime region. Even Champlain’s overtures to the Récollets seems to have been more for the purposes of enlisting Roman Catholic support for the colony than it was for the conversion of the Native Peoples, per se, though there is no doubt that Champlain himself believed that the Christianization of the Indians was the first step in Frenchifying them. Champlain had begun to court the support of the Roman Catholic establishment in Paris as early as 1610, but with little success, until 1614, when Louis Hoüel, Louis XIII’s secretary, urged him to approach the Récollets.
Enlisting the Récollets connected Champlain to a whole new network of financial support for Quebec. Hoüel, who later became a member of the Company of New France, promised to contribute himself and to find additional sources of support from his contacts at court. Champlain spoke with Hoüel in Brouage, where the later was the controller general of the vast salt works. Afterward, Champlain, in the company of two Récollet friars from Saintonge, traveled to Paris to seek authority for the mission from the Papal Nuncio Roberto Ubaldini, who was visiting France. After Ubaldini said he lacked the proper authority, Champlain approached the French cardinals who were then in Paris for the gathering of the Estates General. The cardinals gave their blessing and contributed 1,500 livres to support the mission.5

The Protestant merchants of Rouen were not so enthusiastic about transporting the Récollets to Quebec. But Champlain was able to arrange a meeting between the merchants and the Récollets, after which the merchant investors promised to do all they could to assist the missionaries and to convey six Récollets each year to New France free of charge. Within a month of arriving at Quebec, the Récollet Father Denis Jamet on 24 June 1615 conducted the mass ever held in the settlement. This was performed on the bank of the Rivière des Prairies. The next month, the Récollets held the first mass at Quebec. They also wasted little time in beginning their mission among the Indians. Father Joseph Le Caron went to Huronia without waiting for Champlain to accompany him and celebrated mass there on 12 August in a hastily constructed chapel at the village of Carahagouha, the first such service ever to be held in the Huron country. Meanwhile Father Jean Dolbeau worked at Tadoussac among the Montagnais, and Brother Pacifique
Duplessis did the same among the Indians at Trois-Rivières. As thin as the Récollet network was at this point, it overlay, precisely, the French fur trade network.6

After a year at work in the colony and among the Native Peoples, the Récollets, as recounted in the previous chapter, held a meeting at Quebec to assess how best to proceed. Clearly, they did not have enough missionaries in the field to succeed in so prodigious a task as converting the tens of thousands of Native Peoples spread over so vast a territory. Champlain and the Récollets agreed that in order to convert the Indians en masse there would have to be a much greater settlement of French Catholics along the St. Lawrence, from whom the Native Peoples could learn to become “civilized,” a prerequisite, in their view, for accepting the Catholic faith. Huguenots, who set a bad example in this regard, should, therefore, be banned from settlement and from the trade. The Récollets also agreed that they should establish a seminary for the better education of both the French settlers and the Native Peoples, and that, overall, more missionaries would have to be recruited.7

Two of the Récollets decided to return to France with Champlain to garner support for their plan. As a result of their lobbying, the Récollets in March 1618 received official recognition of their mission from the Papal Nuncio. They also eventually persuaded the viceroy, Condé, to provide 500 crowns to build their seminary. But in terms of convincing the court or the church to back large-scale settlement or even to send many more Récollet missionaries, they were not able to realize their plan. The reality was that the Récollets lacked sufficient clout in Paris and Rome to obtain such support.8

After 1616, the Récollet mission flagged. They never had more than four missionaries in Canada at any one time and maintained no mission among the powerful
Hurons from 1616 to 1622. By the fall of 1624, there were only three Récollets in New France—two at the convent in Quebec and one in Huronia. Very few Indians had been converted, and there was little prospect for the future. When Father Le Caron proposed enlisting “new evangelical workmen,” the new viceroy, Henry de Lévy, duc de Vantadour, himself a devout Catholic, suggested the Jesuits, who had, perhaps not coincidentally, lobbied the duc to accept the viceroyship. As a result, three Jesuit priests arrived in Quebec in June 1625. The introduction of the Jesuits meant that the days of the Récollets in New France were numbered.9

By 1626, the Récollet lobbying effort to ban the Huguenots from New France began to bear fruit. As early as 1622, the superior of the order of the Province of St. Denis asked the king to prohibit Protestants from living or trading in New France. This was a direct attack on William de Caën, the Protestant merchant who then held the monopoly for the fur trade on the St. Lawrence. The council of state, however, was not swayed and upheld Caën’s monopoly. But with the accession of Vantadour to the viceroyship, the Récollets, now with the support of the powerful Jesuits, redoubled their efforts. Le Caron, in a pamphlet published in Paris in 1626, noted that the “intention of the king and his council to plant the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Religion” in New France could hardly be achieved so long as the person “who is chosen to accomplish all this is of the pretended reformed religion.” The lobbying effort had its effect, and Cardinal Richelieu ordered that the trade fleet henceforth be commanded by a Catholic. This, in effect, banned the head of the company holding the monopoly from commanding the fleet and was, essentially, the first step in banning Protestants from New France entirely.10
The next year, Richelieu took the further step of forming the Company of New France, the express purpose of which was “the establishment of a colony of natural French Catholics” in North America. The royal edict that brought the company into existence affirmed elsewhere that the associates should “people the said Colony with Natural French Catholics.” While the edict did not explicitly ban Huguenots from immigrating to New France, it was clear they were not welcome and would not be permitted to openly practice their religion there, in spite of the fact that the Edict of Nantes was still in force. As Gustave Lanctot has astutely noted, Louis XIII issued the edict establishing the Company of New France from the military camp from which he was directing the successful siege of La Rochelle, the seat of the Huguenot rebellion against his rule. Although merchants from La Rochelle had played a key role to this point in the fur trade to New France, it was unlikely, under the circumstances, that the king would willingly permit them to control any part of his dominions overseas in the future.11

In spite of these restrictions, some Huguenots did come to Quebec as workmen, but only because no one bothered to inquire too closely into their background. They were, however, under no circumstances permitted to practice their religion. About two hundred Huguenots who remained in the colony are known to have converted to Catholicism. None but Catholics could serve in any public office, as a notary or as midwife, and those who did serve in these capacities had to be vouched for by a priest. Many of the conversions took place in order to circumvent these restrictions. But though a significant number of Huguenots made their way to New France in spite of these obstacles, many more might have come had these restrictions not existed. Instead, they immigrated to the
English colonies or to New Netherland to live among co-religionists. In short, the proscription of liberty of conscience in New France inhibited population growth.\textsuperscript{12}

In their analysis of the edict establishing the Company of New France, historians have uniformly emphasized the document’s anti-Protestant tenor. What has gone unrecognized is the restriction of foreign immigration to New France. The edict is adamant that only “natural French” subjects were to settle in the colony. Huguenots, who were French, could get around the prohibition against their coming to New France by simply refraining from practicing their particular brand of Christianity. It would have been much more difficult for foreigners to overcome the obstacles to their settlement, and in this regard, the proscription was much more effective. As late as 1663, there were only seven residents among the immigrants who were born outside of France. This marks one of the fundamental differences between New France and New Netherland. The population of New France was essentially all within one national network.\textsuperscript{13}

The Récollets and the Jesuits worked together in New France from 1625 until the Kirkes conquered Quebec. The goal of the Récollets was to “civilize” and Christianize the Native Peoples, a process historians have called “Frenchification.” Indeed, this had been Champlain’s goal all along. He had wished to assimilate the Indians—who would “acquire a French heart and spirit”—into a new French society in North America. The Récollets came to accept this view, largely because they did not think the Native Peoples, particularly the hunter-gatherer groups such as the Montagnais and many Algonkians, could be Christianized unless they had first been Frenchified. Unfortunately, the Récollets, who had much more experience with the Indians along the St. Lawrence, were
not convinced of the seriousness of the Jesuits in this regard. They worried that the Jesuits were more concerned with their “own temporal interests.”

Nevertheless, it would be the Jesuits who took control of the Christianization effort once New France was restored to the crown in 1632. Richelieu had initially considered turning the mission over to the Capuchins. But Jean Lauson, the president of the Company of New France and future governor-general, persuaded him that the Jesuits would be a better choice. The Jesuits, after all, were well-financed and well-connected. They were renowned for evangelical zeal and had experience all over the world in missionary work, including in North America. They had briefly established a mission in Acadia in 1611, which Samuel Argall and English from Virginia had swept away. Richelieu gave the Jesuits sole control of the missionary effort in New France, and the Récollets were barred from returning.

Although both the Récollet Franciscans and later the Jesuits made systematic efforts to convert the Native Peoples to Catholicism, their success was limited mainly to those who were directly engaged with the French in trade. With limited resources and personnel, the missionaries attempted first to assimilate and convert Indian children, but were never able to attract more than a handful as students. Indeed, most of these left before completing their studies. The most pressing need was to convert and assimilate the large Huron population, which already lived in a style closer to the French than did the Montagnais or Algonkian. But in general, as Bruce G. Trigger has pointed out, the Huron saw little need to alter their way of life or belief system since it was the French who needed them rather than the reverse. The Huron tolerated Jesuit missionaries for the sake of maintaining good relations with the French government at Quebec, though in
times of difficulty, the relationship between the Huron and the Jesuits could become hostile. A notable example of this occurred during the smallpox epidemics of the late 1630s when the Huron accused the Jesuits of sickening them through witchcraft. Only after the epidemics passed did the Jesuits begin to make inroads among the Huron and their Indian trading partners. The breakthrough came in 1642 and 1643 when three top chiefs and many of their people accepted baptism. Trigger notes the importance of trade in the process of conversion. “It is significant . . .,” he notes, “that in 1648, when about 10 percent of the population was Christian, half of the Indians in the Huron [fur-trading] fleet were either converts or in the process of being converted.”

Once the Jesuits took charge, they initially adopted the Récollets’ method of attempting to Christianize the Indian population through the youth. The idea was to bring willing young boys to their seminary outside of Quebec. But the Indian youth rebelled against the rigors of Jesuit education, and few Indian parents were willing to allow the French to educate their children. After touring among the Native Peoples from 1633 to 1634, Father Paul Le Jeune, the superior of the Jesuits in New France, came to think that the only workable method of conversion was to isolate willing Native families both from their “pagan” kin and from the pernicious influence of the French trading community. Drawing on the successful Jesuit model of the reducciones from Mexico and Paraguay, Le Jeune decided to set up a réserve, or Christian Indian settlement near Quebec. For this purpose, he received a donation of 32,000 livres from Brulart de Sillery, a prominent member of the Company of the Holy Sacrament, a secret society in France that promoted Catholic charities and missions and aimed to clean up abuses in the monastic system. This donation allowed Le Jeune in 1637 to set up the first réserve—eventually named
Sillery after its benefactor. Initially, the Jesuits were able to settle only two Indian families, but by 1645 some 167 Christianized Indians were living at the settlement. A similar *réserve* was soon set up at Trois-Rivières.\(^{17}\)

In 1639, three Ursuline nuns arrived in Quebec and took over the instruction of Indian girls there. They also opened a small hospice at Sillery to attend to the native population there. Three nuns from the Congrégation des Hospitalières de la Miséricorde de Jésus arrived together with the Ursulines and attended to the sick at Sillery from 1640 to 1645. The Jesuit fathers were overjoyed to have this help in the Christianization effort, but the nuns soon gave up attempting to educate and care for the Native Peoples, finding it difficult, if not fruitless, work. The Ursulines retired to Quebec where they opened a school for French children, and in 1646, the Hospitalières opened the Hôtel Dieu, also in Quebec, where they chiefly served ill and infirm French settlers.\(^{18}\)

By one estimate, the Jesuits were able to “convert” more than 10,000 Indians between 1632 and 1672, but just what this means is unclear. It is a formidable number, but it likely only reflects the number of baptisms, and baptism and true conversion are two different things. Although many of the Indians who came to live at Sillery and the other *réserves* did become devoted Christians, many others seemed to have accepted baptism merely to maintain good relations with the French or to gain access to alcohol. For the most part, as Cornelius J. Jaenen has noted, the Catholic missionary “remained an enigma” to the Native Peoples. Although the Indians well understood the concept of spirituality, it is not clear that a majority even of the baptized had much interest in a specifically Christian notion of spirituality.\(^{19}\)
Certainly, the French never achieved the kind of large-scale Christianization and Frenchification that Champlain originally envisioned, the sort which would have allowed the full assimilation of the Native Peoples into a new French society along the St. Lawrence, so that they might easily accept, in the words of the viceroy Montmorency, “submission to the authority and domination of the crown of France.” In part, this was because the Native Peoples, by and large, were not willing to give up their own identities. They wished to remain Huron, Algonkian, Mi’kmaq, or Montagnais, even though their interaction with the French inevitably transformed those identities. But another important reason why assimilation failed is that by 1649 disease and the Iroquois had combined to destroy the Huron Confederacy, which was the main focus of the French missionary effort. Tellingly, the remnants of the once mighty Huron league, which gathered at Ile d’Orléans, preferred to be incorporated into the Iroquois rather than accept conversion and assimilation with the French.

But while French missionaries did not enjoy overwhelming success, the sincere effort the Roman Catholic Church made to convert the Native Peoples in New France did prove to be an important support to the French colony itself. The missionaries who came built institutions and carved out new areas of settlement that, in effect, created a second French network along the St. Lawrence. The Jesuits for instance took over the missions of the Récollets at Tadoussac and Trois-Rivières, maintained a headquarters near Quebec, and established the French-Indian town at Sillery. They also maintained missions among the Huron and other native peoples. The Ursulines, likewise, maintained a convent and school in Quebec, where the Hospitalières also opened and maintained the Hôtel Dieu.
One of the most important achievements of the Roman Catholic network in New France was the establishment of Ville-Marie at Montreal in 1642. Champlain had long promised the Huron and the Ottawa-River Algonkians that he would establish a French settlement and military post at Montreal in order to provide protection from the Iroquois, but nothing more than a periodic trade fair had been established there during his lifetime. Although a succession of fur-trading companies had long used the site as a rendezvous for barter with the Indians, they had no interest in developing a permanent settlement there. It was instead the religious organization known as the Society of Notre-Dame that undertook the settlement of Montreal. The Society was the brainchild of Jérôme de la Dauversière and the Abbé Jacques Olier, who each in his own way was inspired to aid in the Christianization effort in North America. La Dauversière, a former tax collector in Anjou, had become a friend of the Jesuit Father Massé, who had done service in Acadia. Olier was a graduate of the Sorbonne and a leader of the religious revival then taking shape in France. He was soon to take over the notoriously corrupt parish of St. Sulpice as curé, where he would work a remarkable transformation. La Dauversière, after taking communion one morning in 1632, was suddenly inspired to found a hospital at Montreal. Olier, in similar fashion, was inspired to do something to convert the Native Peoples of New France. A friend in common introduced them in 1639, and in the next year they founded the Society of Notre-Dame as a means of realizing their goals.

The Company of New France granted most of the Island of Montreal to the Society along with a seigneury two by six leagues in extent on the north bank of the St. Lawrence, some twelve kilometers east of the island. Father Charles Lalemant helped to secure effective leaders for the colony, including Paul Chomedey de Maisonneuve, a
young soldier who would serve as governor, and Jeanne Mance, a woman of 35 years of age who agreed to serve as a housekeeper and nurse. The Society of Notre-Dame raised 75,000 livres from its members for the colonization effort, and Madame de Bullion, gave Mance a further 12,000 to establish a hospital.24

Such strong support and leadership allowed the Society to mount a formidable initial expedition. Maisonneuve with forty colonists landed at Quebec in August 1641, ready to begin the work of developing the colony at Montreal. It was, however, in many ways an inauspicious time to begin such an enterprise. Beginning in June, the Iroquois had stepped up their attacks on the French and their Indian allies. Montreal was especially vulnerable to these incursions, having been something of a no man’s land during hostilities since at least the 1610s. Gov. Montmagny tried to convince Maisonneuve to establish his colony in greater security on the Ile d’Orleans, close to Quebec. But Maisonneuve was undeterred. In October, in company with Montmagny and the Jesuit Father Barthélemy Vimont, he visited Montreal and formally took possession.25

But the founding of the settlement would have to wait until the spring. Maisonneuve and his colonists spent the winter preparing at Sillery. They returned to Montreal on 17 May, established themselves in a little palisaded community of tents, named Ville-Marie, and began constructing better accommodations. Twelve additional colonists arrived from France during the late summer. Some fifty-five settlers spent the first winter at Ville-Marie, which was free from the usual sicknesses that most first-time settlements endured. The next year, Maisonneuve learned that the king himself had agreed to fund the construction of a fort and had also donated a 500-ton ship to the
The Society itself had raised a further 12,000 livres for the construction of the hospital, which was endowed with 2,000 livres per annum. Such an outpouring of resources demonstrates that ostensibly religious establishments were capable of generating broader support among the French nobility than purely imperial ones.

In 1644, the Montrealers brought in their first harvest of wheat, and a detachment of soldiers arrived to provide better security. But during the late 1640s, the little town failed to develop much further. The frequent hostile forays of the Mohawks during the late 1640s made Ville-Marie a dangerous place to live, and during hostilities, it was difficult to send supplies from Quebec. Moreover, after the initial burst of enthusiasm for the enterprise, the benefactors in France began to lose interest, and financial support for Ville-Marie declined. Nevertheless, the establishment of Montreal at the important confluence of the Ottawa and St. Lawrence rivers was a notable and important achievement. And despite many attempts, the Iroquois were never able to dislodge the French from Montreal. It became, in essence, a bulwark of New France, one that likely would not have materialized when it did, but for the initial fervor of its Roman Catholic supporters.

During a temporary truce with the Iroquois, Maisonneuve returned to France to find additional settlers. Madame de Bullion donated another 20,000 livres to aid in this effort, and the Society of Notre-Dame contributed 32,000 more. But Maisonneuve, even with the help of La Dauversière, had trouble finding volunteers to go to the beleaguered little settlement on the St. Lawrence. Although he returned to Quebec in September 1653 with 105 new settlers, most of them were contract workers who could only be induced to come to New France by the most favorable terms. The Society had to offer five-year
contracts, pay for board, bedding, and lodging in addition to wages for the full-term of the contract, and offer free passage back to France at the end of five years. Most of the recruits were much-needed farmers, but there were also a number of tradesmen—bakers, shoemakers, carpenters, masons, locksmiths, and nailmakers—who would help to make the colony self-sufficient and diversify the local economy. There were also a number of soldiers—some of whom were Huguenots—and twelve marriageable young women under the watchful eye of Marguerite Bourgeoys, a 33-year-old woman from Troyes who had decided to come to Montreal to educate the youth of the settlement. The self-serving Gov. Lauson tried to convince the new recruits to remain in Quebec and refused to provide boats to carry them to Montreal, but Maisonneuve, in late October, managed nonetheless to bring his reinforcements upriver to Ville-Marie.28

In 1657, the religious establishment in Montreal was bolstered again, partly out of competition between Montreal and Quebec, as well as between the Sulpicians and Jesuits. Maisonneuve and the Society of Notre-Dame hoped to achieve religious and political autonomy, but the mission in Montreal was in the hands of the Jesuits, who were headquartered at Quebec and politically aligned with the governor there, Lauson. The Society of Notre-Dame, therefore, lobbied the Company of New France about establishing a bishopric in Canada. The company was not receptive to this idea, but once the subject came up, the Jesuits concluded that they were in danger of losing control of the Montreal mission to the Sulpicians. In response, they lobbied Lauson to grant them a parcel of land on the south bank of the St. Lawrence just opposite Ville-Marie where they might establish a competing mission.29
In the meantime, Maisonneuve was busy constructing a religious establishment in Ville-Marie that was independent of the Jesuits. He convinced La Dauversière to send Hospitalières from his home town of La Flèche to take over the hospital and prevailed upon Abbé Olier to send Sulpician brothers to set up a seminary. The Society of Notre-Dame also stepped up its effort to secure a bishop for Montreal, taking their case this time to a meeting of French clergy held in Paris on 10 January 1657. The associates of the society managed to secure the support of the Bishop of Vence for their nominee, the Abbé Gabriel de Thubière de Léry-Queylus, who in addition to his devotion to the church, had access to a large disposable fortune. The Jesuits soon got wind of the intentions of the Montreal associates and using their superior entré to the king and his court, proposed their own candidate for bishop, the Abbé François de Laval de Montigny. The effort to establish a bishopric for New France became even more confusing when the Archbishop of Rouen, who claimed religious authority over New France because he had long given authorization to independent clergy sailing to North America from Dieppe or Rouen, interceded in the process and tried to claim jurisdiction over the colony. In the end, though, it was the Jesuits who had the king’s ear, and the queen’s for that matter. Louis XIV, as early as 26 January, applied to the pope to create a new bishopric in New France and to appoint Laval bishop. In the meantime, the Archbishop of Rouen named Queylus, who had already gone to Montreal as grand vicar and canonical judge. With this new supposed authority, Queylus assumed overall jurisdiction in New France, even in Quebec, and promptly prohibited the Jesuits from continuing parish duties except within their own chapel.30
It was the Jesuits, though, who were to have the last word. The pope finally named Laval bishop in bulls issued from Rome in June 1657. The Archbishop of Rouen, though, still managed to hold up Laval’s consecration by raising technicalities, but on 8 December 1658 the consecration ceremony finally took place in Paris. Still, it was more than a year before Laval arrived in the colony to take up his duties, with letters from the king stating that the Archbishop of Rouen could not exercise further authority in New France without authorization from the pope. Queylus, confronted with the king’s order, took ship for France in the fall of 1659. Although he and the archbishop would continue to create difficulties, the episcopal see in New France, with Laval in the bishop’s chair, was firmly established under the direct authority of both the king and the pope.31

The establishment of a robust Roman Catholic network in New France was a signal achievement, one that the Dutch Reformed Church did not come close to matching in New Netherland. Through its religious network, the French colony gained support from devout members of the nobility and well-connected clergy in the metropole, as well as from the king and to some degree from the pope. Such support, it might be argued, was critical to the survival of the French colony. As J.M.S. Careless has argued, “when the state and business enterprise had largely failed the colony, it was the Roman Catholic Church that stepped in, that supplied enthusiasm, stimulated some settlement, at least, and left an enduring mark on the character of New France.”32 Indeed, the Jesuits took control and brought considerable resources to the colony in the immediate aftermath of the English conquest, a time when New France was at its nadir. And, in spite of internal competition and disagreement, it was the vast Roman Catholic network that marshaled
people and resources to sustain the colony and even to extend the colonial network to
Montreal at a time when the Iroquois seriously threatened the colony’s existence.

The establishment of Montreal is the most visible indication that Quebec, at least
in a minor way, had begun the transformation from a simple extractive primate node to a
gateway center—one that had begun to facilitate the creation of new nodes on the
religious network that extended to the colony from the metropole. The fact that the
impetus to settle Montreal did not come from Quebec itself or even from the largely
Jesuit network in which Quebec participated at the time tends to obscure the provincial
capital’s role in facilitating the development of Montreal, as does the competition the two
towns engaged in to ultimately control the religious network of New France. And yet, it
is clear that had Quebec not existed, there would have been no Montreal. It was, after all,
the information that flowed from Quebec that inspired La Dauversière and Olier to
organized the resources needed to settle Montreal and, once they did, all of the people
and resources needed to establish Ville-Marie had to flow first to Quebec and to be
reorganized there before proceeding west to Montreal. But there is also more subtle
evidence that the Roman Catholic Church was beginning to use Quebec as a gateway
through which to pour resources into New France and organize the countryside—not for
an economic purpose, but rather for a religious and imperialistic one. In Quebec itself, by
1663, the most numerous and imposing structures outside of the fortifications, were
religious institutions—the Hôtel Dieu, the Jesuit seminary, the Ursuline convent, the
Bishop’s palace, the province church, and other chapels. Even the Récollets had
reappeared, and with the establishment of the Episcopal see, Quebec again reasserted
control over the whole religious network, including Montreal.
And yet, the strong intervention of the church in colonial development came at a cost to the colony. The influence of the Catholic Church in New France, particularly at a time of growing repression of dissent in France itself, meant that no other denominations of Christianity would be tolerated in the colony. On the one hand, by pursuing a policy of religious intolerance, the French were able to achieve a measure of religious and cultural cohesion that was absent from New Netherland. On the other hand, religious restrictions made it much more difficult for New France to attract permanent settlers. The French subjects who were most likely to seek asylum in New France were the Huguenots, who could only come sub rosa. Others who might have made New France home—disgruntled New Englanders who had had enough of Puritan repression in Massachusetts or New Haven, Germans escaping the seventeenth-century wars of religion, or English Calvinists fleeing repression and economic troubles under Charles I—were simply not welcome.

By sharp contrast, the culture practice of the Dutch allowed religious toleration of a kind and provided asylum for religious dissenters, making New Netherland a magnet for dissenters from all over the Atlantic world. Such openness to religious diversity, and to diversity generally, helped to populate and enrich the colony. As George L. Smith has observed, the liberty of conscience that developed in New Netherland mirrored that which could be found in Amsterdam, the city that had played the leading role in administering the colony. His argument is that while the state-supported Dutch Reformed Church was no more tolerant of dissent than any other state church in Europe, it simply did not have the power within the Dutch Republic to suppress dissent.33
The Dutch Reformed Church had provided the inspiration and organization to sustain the Dutch Revolt against Spain that won the independence of the seven provinces of the Netherlands. In so doing, the church won for itself recognition as the state church of the newly born Dutch Republic. The Reformed Church, like the Puritan Church of Massachusetts, was Calvinist and followed John Calvin’s vision for a temporal society through which the mystical body of the eternal church could express itself. In Calvin’s ideal society, the church and state cooperated with one another, and the state should be led by the faithful elect, who were members of the church. But the government was not to be a theocracy. In other words, the ministry could only advise the magistrates. Clergy, who should concern themselves with spiritual matters, could not themselves be magistrates. In Calvin’s vision, then, while there was no room to tolerate dissent from Calvinistic orthodoxy, there was some separation between church and state.34

While the Dutch Reformed Church was, like the congregational churches of Puritan Massachusetts and Separatist Plymouth, a Calvinist Church, it was more highly structured than the English churches. The Puritans and Separatists interpreted the Calvinistic notion that the only true church was a voluntary association of true believers to mean that the state could not organize the church, appoint ministers, or require membership. It also meant that the local congregation, which voluntarily came together to sign a covenant to create the church, was essentially independent of all outside influence. While neighboring churches and ministers could advise and admonish, the local congregation did not have to accept their advice. It also had the right to call its own minister and to make and enforce its own rules.35
By contrast, the Dutch church was Presbyterian in structure. The local church was led by a consistory, which included the minister and the elders of the church. The consistory was subordinate to the classis, which was essentially a body formed by a group of neighboring churches that provided guidance and uniformity. The classis was subordinate to the provincial synod in whichever province it happened to be located, and there was a general synod that enacted rules for the Dutch Reformed Church throughout the United Provinces. The first national synod held at Dordrecht in 1578 enacted rules for the calling of ministers. The local consistory was to call the minister with the approval of the classis. The candidate was then to be “presented” to the civil magistrates, who had the right to raise concerns or objections. Once this process was completed, the final decision was left to the consistory and the classis acting together. Although a second national synod of 1581 confirmed this method of choosing ministers, the local magistrates of a number of towns and finally the States General itself never accepted it. The politicians wanted a greater role in choosing the ministers, largely because the civil government paid them. As a result, the state and church in the Dutch Republic never came to an agreement on a method of legally calling predikanten or ministers to their pulpits. This fact, in itself, demonstrates that state support for the church’s control even of ecclesiastical matters was limited.

The Reformed Church looked to the state for help in enforcing religious orthodoxy and in this regard did have some success in influencing the law. According to Calvinist theology, the state had a duty to defend the true church from all heresy and schism. This meant that all public religious dissent from the approved doctrine of the true church had to be made illegal. The church prevailed on the States General and the
provincial states to enact laws forbidding public worship in all but the Reformed Church. As Smith has observed, the church by 1660 had essentially “either obliterated or severely restricted the freedom of religion of all other religions within the United Provinces.” But this was nothing more than a “paper” victory. The States General and the states of the provinces left enforcement in the hands of local magistrates, and, as Smith demonstrates, the local governments, more often than not, were simply unwilling to enforce the law.37

Amsterdam is Smith’s prime example. Although most of the town magistrates were members of the Reformed Church, they were also merchants. As such, they valued trade above the state church’s desire to suppress all dissent. Intolerance was simply bad for business, especially for overseas trade, on which the Dutch depended. Trade required, as the merchant Cornelis Pietersz. Hooft, noted, “familiar amiability among men.” Persecution of the co-religionists of trading partners could hardly aid in developing strong business connections. Hooft, who served on the Amsterdam city council and was elected burgomeester twelve times, was in a position to know. His family firm, which dealt in grain, oil, and fish, had business dealings in Portugal, Italy, Norway, and France, as well as in the Baltic port of Danzig. Hooft’s view, even regarding Roman Catholics, was that they should remain free of persecution so long as they did not practice their religion openly.38

But for all practical purposes, toleration of dissent in the Netherlands and especially in Amsterdam extended well beyond even what Hooft would allow. Jews, Catholics, Lutherans, English Separatists, even Anabaptists and Quakers, all sought asylum in the Netherlands. By 1642, Amsterdam had a Jewish school and two public synagogues, even though such places of worship were legally prohibited. Roman
Catholics practiced their faith in extensive *schuilkerken* (hidden churches) that everyone knew about. Even the Remonstrants, whom the orthodox considered to be apostates from the Reformed Church, opened a *schuilkerk*.\(^{39}\)

Smith’s thesis is that the religious toleration that developed in New Netherland was merely the transference of Amsterdam’s cultural tradition of legal prohibition and *de facto* tolerance of dissent. Amsterdam, after all, played by far the greatest role in the guidance and the development of the colony. Merchants from the city held the most directorships on the governing board of the WIC, and the *Heren XIX* had given the Amsterdam Chamber direct authority to govern New Netherland. The WIC was, after all, says Smith, chiefly a merchant-directed commercial company. It was, therefore, even more disposed than the Amsterdam magistrates to put business first.\(^{40}\) No doubt, Smith is partly right. The first mention of religion in New Netherland among the WIC’s documents adopts precisely the attitude of Hooft. The Provisional Regulations of 1624 state that the colonists of New Netherland:

> shall within their territory practice no other form of divine worship than that of the Reformed religion as at present practiced here in this country and thus by their Christian life and conduct seek to draw the Indians and other blind people to the knowledge of God and His Word, without however persecuting any one on account of his faith, but leaving to every one the freedom of his conscience. But if any one among them or within their jurisdiction should wantonly revile or blaspheme the name of God or of our Saviour Jesus Christ, he shall according to the circumstances be punished by the Commander and his Council.\(^{41}\)

Thus, the Dutch Reformed Church was officially established in the colony as the sole publicly recognized church. But at the same time, no one would be forced to attend the church and no one would be persecuted or lose privileges for privately holding
religious views at variance with those of the Reformed Church so long as those views were not deemed blasphemous. This is a classic example of liberty of conscience extended to the settlers of New Netherland, and it demonstrates that from the outset, the WIC was willing to welcome in New Netherland the kind of diversity found in seventeenth-century Amsterdam. This policy also meant that there was no serious religious obstacle in the way of dissenters, many of whom would be fleeing religious persecution of one kind or another, from making a new home in New Netherland, even though many of these settlers would not be ideal citizens from the point of view of the Reformed Church.

But paper privileges and the practical realities of colonization are two very different things. The WIC, whose priorities lay elsewhere until at least 1652, had difficulty finding “appropriate” settlers, i.e., who were both Dutch by ethnicity and Reformed by religion. Even the very first substantial settlement was by French-speaking, though Reformed Protestant Walloons. In 1633, the directors of the WIC, in a petition to the States General, explained why it was so difficult to form Dutch colonies overseas. This was “not so much for want of population, with which our provinces swarm, as because all those who will labor in any way here [the Netherlands], can easily obtain support, and, therefore, are disinclined to go far from home on an uncertainty.”42

Because Dutch citizens were unwilling to settle in New Netherland, the WIC recruited settlers, not only from among the Walloons, but also from among the Germans, Swedes, and Finns—most of whom were Lutherans. Even so, the colony only grew slowly and even seems to have suffered a decline in population during Van Twiller’s administration and at least part of Kieft’s. Keift’s War seems to have had a particularly
devastating effect. As early as 1638, the States General was complaining to the Heren XIX that “the population in New Netherland does not only not increase as it ought, but even that the population which had been commenced is decreasing.” This was one of the problems Kieft was sent to correct. But he soon led the colony into an ill-advised war with the Algonkian people surrounding New Amsterdam, which in the short-term at least led to a further decline in the population, both European and Indian.\textsuperscript{43}

Smith credits Pieter Stuyvesant, certainly the most capable of all of the directors of New Netherland, with rescuing the colony, restoring order, and beginning the surge in population that marked the colony’s last years.\textsuperscript{44} Stuyvesant deserves credit, no doubt, but the services Kieft rendered after the restoration of peace with the Algonkians in 1645 are almost invariably overlooked. It was Kieft, more than anyone else, who opened up New Netherland as an asylum for religious dissenters in a practical sense. Once the war was over, he was faced with the immediate problem of repopulating the countryside, and the quickest way to do so was to attract English settlement from Massachusetts, which in the 1640s and for the better part of the next four decades afterward was utterly intolerant of any dissent from the orthodox Puritan Congregational Church.

Kieft had begun the process of encouraging English settlement even before the war. As early as 1639, he began to buy up parcels of land from the Algonkians on Long Island and elsewhere. Among the first to take advantage of Kieft’s openness to religious and ethnic diversity was the Baptist John Throckmorton. Throckmorton, who came from a Puritan background, first settled in Salem, Massachusetts, where he was admitted freeman in 1631. He seems to have been a follower of Roger Williams, with whom he had first come to America. Once the Massachusetts General Court banished Williams for
his Antinomian views, Throckmorton followed him to Rhode Island, becoming a landowner in Providence. At some point following his initial emigration from England, Throckmorton had become a Baptist, and though he had left Massachusetts of his own free will, the Rev. Hugh Peters, pastor of the Salem church, excommunicated him in absentia in 1639 for holding Baptist views.45

In 1643, Throckmorton petitioned Director Kieft to allow the settlement of thirty-five English families “within three miles of New Amsterdam.” In July of that year, Kieft granted these English settlers land previously known as Vredeland, which Throckmorton would rename “Throg’s Neck” after himself. No sooner had settlement begun when Kieft’s War erupted. Algonkians warriors overran Throg’s Neck, killing eighteen English, including the Antinomian Anne Hutchinson, whom Massachusetts authorities had also banished. Throckmorton himself survived and seems to have returned to Throg’s Neck at the conclusion of the war.46

Throg’s Neck was just one of the English dissenter towns established under Kieft. It will be recalled that the war also interrupted the settlement of Gravesend, where Kieft had granted lands to Lady Moody and several associates, most of whom were Baptists. In addition, the Rev. Francis Doughty and some of his followers from Rhode Island settled at Newtown just before the war. The Dutch seemed to have believed him to be a Presbyterian, which made him acceptable to the Reformed Church. After the war, Doughty settled in Flushing, where he was the minister of the public church. In 1647, the Dutch government in New Amsterdam even ordered the Flushing townsmen to pay Doughty a salary, which the townsmen refused, perhaps because so many Baptist dissenters had already settled in Flushing.47
By the time Stuyvesant arrived in 1647, the religious diversity of New Netherland was already well-established. Stuyvesant was a committed Calvinist and adherent of the Reformed Church, and for the first time, the diminutive Reformed establishment in the colony, consisting of the dominies Johannes Megapolensis and Samuel Drisius, co-pastors of the Reformed Church of New Amsterdam, had a director-general who would support them. Until Stuyvesant took charge of the colony, the WIC commanders had been universally at odds with the church leadership. The first predikant the WIC sent to the colony, Jonas Michaëlius, who arrived in 1628, soon fell afoul of Director Minuit. Although he formally established the consistory of New Netherland, Michaëlius was able to accomplish little else aside from charging Minuit, whom he had appointed an elder of the consistory, with sexual licentiousness, lying, and defrauding the WIC. Michaëlius left New Netherland in 1632.48

His successors had no better fortune in gaining the support of the colony commanders. Wouter van Twiller was actively hostile to the Rev. Everardus Bogardus, who served as the dominie of New Amsterdam from 1633 to 1647, and Kieft, who was in outright opposition to church officials in the colony, refused even to attend services and is said to have organized loud military drills just outside the church doors while Bogardus was preaching. Stuyvesant, though, as a loyal adherent of the Dutch Reformed faith, sought to strengthen the church as best he could, even going so far as to attempt to suppress the practice of all other denominations within New Netherland.49 But the reality was that there was little the new governor could do to enforce more rigid conformity without unduly antagonizing the population and making it more difficult for the colony to attract settlers.
Stuyvesant’s first test came in 1653 when Lutherans on Manhattan requested permission to form a congregation and call a minister for public worship. The Lutherans had made an attempt in 1649 to have the Amsterdam Consistory of the Lutheran Church send a minister, but the consistory decided not to tempt fate at that time. Since this early petition remained essentially an internal document of the Lutheran Church, it did not pose any difficulty for Stuyvesant or the Dutch Reformed Church in New Netherland. But as Oliver Rink points out, the 1653 petition put the director-general in a difficult spot. If he denied the request, he would alarm the many dissenters in New Netherland and perhaps discourage further immigration to the colony. If he granted it, he would raise the ire of Megapolensis and Drisius, who were already lobbying against the Lutherans. The co-pastors wrote the Classis of Amsterdam that allowing the Lutherans to organize a public church would “tend to the injury of our church” and encourage other dissenting sects to take up residence in New Netherland. They urged the classis to use its influence with the States of Holland and the WIC to reject the petition. In terms of New Netherland becoming a haven for religious dissenters of all kinds, the proverbial cat was already out of the bag, however much Megapolensis and Drisius ignored it in their correspondence with the classis. But, from Stuyvesant’s point of view, to grant the petition might encourage the Baptists and other even more unorthodox groups already residing in New Netherland to file similar petitions. Granting the Lutherans’ wish would also violate his oath to uphold the Reformed Church as the only denomination sanctioned to hold public services.50

Given the predicament he faced, Stuyvesant simply kicked the matter upstairs to the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber, who were not pleased to have it dropped in
their laps. The directors decided “to absolutely deny” the Lutherans’ request, but they also warned Stuyvesant “not to receive any similar petitions, but rather to turn them off in the most civil and least offensive way, and to employ all possible but moderate means in order to induce them to listen and finally join the Reformed Church.” For the WIC, which was trying to recruit settlers, publicly denying such petitions was bad publicity and bad for business. Then, too, by 1650 there were at least four directors of the Amsterdam Chamber who were themselves Lutherans or at least sympathized with them enough to be financial contributors to the Lutheran Church in Amsterdam.51

In February 1656, Stuyvesant issued an ordinance that prohibited any and all public and private conventicles and meetings that were not usual, authorized, and held in accordance with the practices of the Reformed Church. The penalties for violating the ordinance were severe. Any preacher, reader, or chorister in such a meeting would be subject to a fine of 100 Flemish pounds, while other attendees could be fined twenty-five Flemish pounds. Stuyvesant and the council explicitly noted that while they did not “intend to force the consciences of any, to the prejudice of formerly given patents,” the only non-conformist gatherings that would be permitted were “Family Prayers and divine services within the family.” It was clear that Stuyvesant did not want to encourage or permit the establishment of schuilkerken in New Netherland.52

Although the ordinance was not aimed specifically at the Lutherans, it could well be employed against them. Stuyvesant seems to have imprisoned a number of Lutherans immediately following its promulgation. Tjerck Claeszoon at Beverwijck was arrested on the very day the ordinance was issued for preaching at a Lutheran meeting, though his
arrest and subsequent fine of six guilders may have been imposed under preexisting regulations.53

The Lutheran Consistory soon got word of both the restrictive ordinance and the arrests and quietly approached the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC, the directors of which were not pleased. “We would . . . . have been better pleased,” they wrote Stuyvesant, “if you had not published the placat against the Lutherans, a copy of which you sent us, and committed them to prison, for it has always been our intention, to treat them quietly and leniently. Hereafter, you will therefore not publish such or similar placats without our knowledge, but you must pass it over quietly and let them have free religious exercises in their houses.” But while the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber were signaling to Stuyvesant that they were prepared to allow the Lutherans private religious conventicles, they were at the same time signaling to the Classis of the Reformed Church in Amsterdam that there were limits to how far they would go. The Amsterdam Chamber notified the Classis that it would not permit the Lutherans public worship.54

The Lutheran Consistory seemed to think, however, that the WIC directors might be on the verge of taking another step and bringing the practical acceptance of Lutheranism in New Netherland into conformity with what had already been achieved in Amsterdam. Although the law prohibited public worship to the Lutherans, in practice it had been allowed through the “connivance” of the city magistracy ever since 1588, the year the Lutheran Church had been formally established in Amsterdam. The Lutheran Consistory seems to have sent word to their brethren in New Netherland that the directors of the WIC would soon allow full toleration. In response, the Lutherans in New
Netherland once again petitioned Stuyvesant, notifying him that Lutheran Consistory of Amsterdam had obtained from the WIC “a resolution and decree that the doctrines of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession should be tolerated in the West Indies and New Netherland under their jurisdiction, in the same manner as in the Fatherland under its praiseworthy government.”

In what amounted to a test case, the Amsterdam Consistory of the Lutheran Church sent over an approved minister, Johannes Ernestus Goetwater, who arrived in New Amsterdam in July 1657. At the urging of Megapolensis and Drisius, the burgomeesters and schepens of New Amsterdam called Goetwater before them to state his business. He said that he had come as minister to the Lutherans and that papers from the WIC authorizing him to do so were en route by the next ship. The burgomeesters and schepens warned Goetwater that, until such papers were in hand, he was not to preach to any public or private meetings or to attempt to present his papers from the Lutheran Consistory to his congregation. When no papers from the WIC arrived on the next ship, Stuyvesant and his council on 4 September ordered Goetwater to depart on the ship Waag, which was even then ready to sail. Goetwater ignored this directive in order to await the outcome of a petition the Lutherans had sent to Stuyvesant asking him to rescind the deportation, since up to this point the minister had not acted contrary to the original orders of the burgomeesters and schepens. Goetwater himself wrote the director-general on 15 October to note that he had not violated the burgomeesters’ prohibition on preaching, had committed no crime, and had a right to stay in the colony as a private student. He also pleaded that to be forced to leave so precipitously would seriously
derange his private affairs. Stuyvesant, however, remained adamant and on 16 October ordered Goetwater to leave on one of the ships then “ready to sail.”

In the face of Stuyvesant’s unbending attitude, the Lutherans spirited Goetwater away into the countryside and “supported him at the rate of six guilders a week.” Lutherans in attendance at the Reformed Church services in New Amsterdam even went so far as to take up a collection among themselves for his support. This prompted Megapolensis and Drisius to demand that the fiscal immediately arrest and deport the Lutheran minister. But Stuyvesant did not act until Goetwater began to hold meetings and preach. This was the last straw. In the spring of 1659, the director-general had Goetwater arrested and deported to Holland on the first ship out. While this controversy dragged on, the Reformed Church in New Amsterdam, albeit reluctantly and at the insistence of the directors of the WIC, slightly altered its baptismal formula to make it more amenable to the Lutherans. Once Goetwater was out of the way, most of the Lutherans gave up the idea of having a public church of their own, at least as long as Stuyvesant was in power, and returned to the Reformed Church. So ended the attempt of the Lutherans to have their church practices accepted, at least by connivance, as the Dutch termed their strictly extra-legal form of toleration. The whole episode shows only that in terms of religious tolerance, New Amsterdam was much less advanced than old.

Oddly enough, even while Stuyvesant was doing his best to keep the Lutherans along the Hudson from calling a pastor or initiating public worship, on the Delaware he put religious scruples aside in order to maintain the territorial integrity of New Netherland. The formal articles of capitulation that concluded Stuyvesant’s reconquest of New Sweden in 1655 gave those Swedes and Finns who wished to remain in the colony
“the liberty of the Augspurgh [Lutheran] Confession & a Person to instruct them in it.”

Under this provision, Stuyvesant permitted the Swedes to maintain one Lutheran minister, Lars Karlsson Lock, who held services in the log-cabin Lutheran Church the Swedes had first consecrated on Tinicum Island in 1646. Lock continued as pastor well past the 1664 English conquest of New Netherland.58

A second test case for Stuyvesant came in autumn 1654 with the arrival of the contingent of Jews from Brazil. Although a small number of Jewish merchants had already come to New Amsterdam from the Netherlands, the new arrivals portended the creation of a permanent and sizable Jewish community. Stuyvesant, Megapolensis, Drisius, and other influential Dutch settlers regarded any significant Jewish settlement as a threat to the colony. They tried to expel the Jews, but WIC officials in Amsterdam refused to allow this on humanitarian terms.59

The company did, however, allow Stuyvesant to impose special restrictions on the kinds of occupations and trade the Jews could pursue. For instance, the WIC’s initial ruling barred the Jews from being “employed in any public service.” This allowed Stuyvesant to enact a special ordinance that barred them from militia service in spite of their willingness to serve and imposed a special tax on them in lieu of service. Although the WIC specifically allowed the Jews to pursue the wholesale trade throughout province, including at Fort Orange and on the Delaware, they were not permitted to have “open retail shops,” though they might operate private shops. In 1657, Stuyvesant attempted to circumvent the WIC’s ruling by enacting an ordinance that permitted only open public shops and allowed only those who had obtained legal citizenship to operate them. Since the burgomeesters and schepens refused citizenship to the Jews, this effectively barred
them from all shopkeeping in New Amsterdam. Asser Levy, Salvador D’Andrada, Jacob da Cohun Hendricus, Abraham de Lucena, and Joseph D’Acosta, on behalf of their “Nation,” appealed this decision to Stuyvesant and his council. Remarkably, the director-general relented, and ordered the burgomeesters to admit the petitioners to citizenship, which eventually allowed them to keep open shops. Why he did so is unclear, though Smith thinks it was to avoid further clashes with the WIC directors.60

As one might expect, the predikanten of the Dutch Reformed Church of New Netherland were fully as much opposed to the establishment of a Jewish community in the province as Stuyvesant. In 1655, Megapolensis reported to the Classis that since the arrival of the refugees from Brazil, each ship from Holland had brought some further number of impoverished Jews, who had become a financial burden on the town. In his estimation, the Jews added nothing of value and were a disruptive influence. The shrillness of his denunciation is telling. “These people have no other God than the unrighteous Mammon,” he wrote, “and no other aim than to get possession of christian property, and to win all other merchants by drawing all trade to towards themselves. Therefore we request your Reverences to obtain from the Lords-Directors, that these godless rascals, who are of no benefit to the country, but look at everything for their own profit, may be sent away from here.”61

It is difficult to see how the impoverished refugees Megapolensis described earlier in his letter could acquire the property of Christians and draw all trade to themselves. Moreover, in spite of his claim that the Jews were “godless,” Megapolensis’s chief fear seemed to be that they might build a synagogue in New Amsterdam as they had in the fatherland. In May 1656, the Classis wrote back that they
would “employ all diligence” to prevent the Jews in New Netherland from building a synagogue dedicated to their “blasphemous religion.” The directors of the Amsterdam Chamber saw no reason to allow the Jews to enjoy public worship, but they did recognize the right of the Jews to “exercise in all quietness their religion within their houses, for which end they must without doubt endeavor to build their houses close together in a convenient place on one or the other side of New Amsterdam—at their own choice—as they have done here.” Within a few years, with the understanding that the Jews would be a permanent part of the community, the law in New Amsterdam began to take some limited cognizance of Jewish religious practices. For instance, in 1658, when defendant Jacob Barsimon failed to appear before the court, “no default was entered against him, as he was summoned on his Sabbath,” and in the following year, an ordinance for licensing butchers exempted the Jews from having to slaughter hogs.62

In spite of the many restrictions with which Stuyvesant hedged it, the promise of liberty of conscience prompted many religious dissenters from the Puritan regimes in Massachusetts and Connecticut to seek asylum in New Netherland as well. The English posed a greater threat to the religious unity of the Dutch colony than did either the Lutherans or the Jews because they brought with them considerable religious diversity and came in great numbers. Among the migrants were Antinomians, Baptists, Seekers, Quakers, and even some Anglicans from Virginia who sought economic advantages. The English also tended to settle in separate towns. In this way, English enclaves sprung up at Throg’s Neck and Pelham Bay in the Bronx, and full-fledged towns appeared on Long Island. English towns at the eastern end of Long Island, such as Easthampton, under the protection of New Haven and Connecticut, refused to recognize Dutch
authority at all, though the Dutch claimed the area as part of New Netherland. Hartford, in Connecticut itself, also fell into this category. The English population in New Netherland grew so rapidly and steadily, that Kieft and Stuyvesant each retained an English secretary as part of his official family.  

Although all of the various dissenting religious groups and foreign ethnicities participated in religious and cultural networks that were hardly under the control of the Dutch authorities, the English networks posed a real danger to Dutch control of the colony. In part, this was because they maintained connections through trade and family to the English colonies in North America and the Caribbean and back to England itself. This proved to be a significant threat because after Cromwell took control of the English government, hostilities broke out between England and the Dutch Republic. At the behest of New Haven officials, who were convinced that the Dutch were arming the Indians in the Connecticut Valley against them, Cromwell dispatched a small fleet with orders to seize New Netherland. In the meantime, New Haven and Connecticut began raising troops. There was also some minor agitation among the English towns on Long Island for an open revolt against Dutch authority. But it was tiny Rhode Island that took the most aggressive step. Authorities there raised an expeditionary force that seized Fort Good Hope, which the Dutch had previously abandoned.

The English fleet arrived in Boston in June 1654 with 200 troops aboard. Although Massachusetts had officially taken no part in the agitation against New Netherland, about 300 Bay Colony men had volunteered to take up arms against the Dutch. With the contributions of the other New England colonies, the English would be able to ship 833 troops to New Netherland. But before the English could fully prepare
the assault forces to sail from Boston, word arrived from London that Cromwell had signed a peace with the Dutch. The attack on New Netherland, which Stuyvesant was ill-prepared to withstand, was called off this time.\textsuperscript{65}

Although the state of war was not continual, England and the Netherlands were generally at odds up until the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Under the circumstances, the WIC became highly suspicious of the loyalty of the English citizens of New Netherland, with good reason as would later become evident. Still, in the emergency of 1653-1654, the fact that almost none of the English under Dutch jurisdiction took heed of the incendiary calls for a revolt seems to have heartened Stuyvesant.\textsuperscript{66} The directors of the Amsterdam Chamber were not, however, as sanguine as the director-general about the loyalty of the English. They warned the Stuyvesant to be wary:

because the people of Hempstead and Flushing have actually not only not prevented the raising of Parliament’s flag by some English freebooter, but also permitted it to be done; an example, which induces us not to trust to any of that nation residing under our jurisdiction. Their immigrating and having favors granted to them must therefore be restricted henceforth, that we may not nourish serpents in our bosom, who finally might devour our hearts.\textsuperscript{67}

Stuyvesant’s suspicions were more fully aroused by the number of dissenting sects among the English, which made it impossible for the Dutch to attain the kind of religious and cultural cohesion enjoyed in New France. The Puritans and Separatists who settled in New Netherland presented little problem since they, too, were Calvinists, but the Reformed Consistory of New Amsterdam would only allow public support of English ministers who adhered to Presbyterian church order. One of these was the aforementioned Rev. Francis Doughty, who was allowed to preach publicly at Flushing
and was supposed to be paid a salary from a voluntary collection among the townspeople. The WIC had paid the salaries of the earliest Reformed ministers in New Netherland. But once a number of towns had sprung up, it was customary for the WIC to pay half of the local minister’s salary, the other half to be paid by voluntary subscription. If the townspeople failed to raise enough money voluntarily, the WIC could impose a tax and did so in the case of Doughty, though the townsmen still refused to pay it. These difficulties led Doughty to move to Virginia in 1648.68

The Rev. Richard Denton, who had been educated at Oxford, brought an English congregation to settle at Hempstead. Denton had first attempted to establish his ministry in Connecticut at Wethersfield and later at Stamford, but the Puritan authorities disapproved of his too-Presbyterian views. Such views, however, were perfectly amenable to the Reformed Church, which welcomed Denton to the ranks of the publicly authorized ministry in New Netherland. Megapolensis and Drisius considered him to be “sound in faith, of a friendly disposition, and beloved by all.” Denton formally established a Presbyterian Church at Hempstead in 1644 and, with the approval of the Reformed Consistory of New Amsterdam, supervised the construction of a church building, which was finished in 1647. But like Doughty, Denton found that the townspeople were unwilling to provide an adequate salary. Facing bankruptcy, he first went to Virginia to try his fortune there, returned briefly to New Netherland, and then in 1659 went back to England.69

The Harvard-educated Zachariah Walker was also Presbyterian enough to pass muster with the consistory. He came to Jamaica, Long Island, in 1662 or 1663, only a short time before the English conquest. In March 1663, the town assigned Walker and
his heirs a house and home lot in addition to a salary to be paid in wheat and Indian corn.

In August, the town meeting agreed to build a church, where Walker served as minister throughout the remainder of the Dutch period.70

On occasion, Megapolensis and Drisius were willing to accept Independent ministers, who, while Calvinist, did not accept the Presbyterian idea of church organization. The Independent minister John Moore, for instance, who preached at Newtown and Hempstead, received the approval of the New Amsterdam consistory. The Rev. John Fordham, who took over the ministry in Hempstead after Denton’s departure, also seems to have been an Independent who received the approval of the Reformed Church. In 1662, Stuyvesant and the province council authorized the magistrates of Hempstead to proceed legally against any of the inhabitants who refused to contribute to Fordham’s salary.71

While the Reformed Church in New Netherland actively sought English ministers of a Calvinist stripe to serve the English towns, they were in no wise ready to accept Baptists. In the American colonies, Anabaptism emerged in Massachusetts as a disagreement within the Puritan Church over whether it was advisable to baptize the infant children of church members. The Baptists opposed christening anyone who had not reached adulthood, claiming that the baptism of children was a recipe for allowing the unregenerate to become voting members of the church. Early in their history, they also opposed the establishment of a university-educated clergy and emphasized lay preaching instead. In other respects, however, Baptists were indistinguishable from Puritan Congregationalists.72
English Baptists had established themselves in some numbers in Gravesend and Flushing and initially seem to have posed little problem to the government. The only incident in which the Dutch government took action against the Baptists occurred at Flushing. In 1656, William Hallett, the schout of Flushing, held a conventicle at his house, at which the Baptist William Wickendam, who had, according to the official account, “no ecclesiastical or secular authority,” preached and administered the sacraments. Stuyvesant had both Hallett and Wickendam arrested. Hallett was stripped of his office, fined fifty Flemish pounds, and banished from the province. Wickendam was fined one hundred Flemish pounds and also banished. Both were to be incarcerated until they paid the fines. But after Stuyvesant learned that Wickendam was only a Rhode Island cobbler with a wife and children and had no means to pay his fine, he remitted it and satisfied himself with sending Wickendam out of the colony.73

Of all the denominations that settled in New Netherland, the Quakers were the least welcome of all. The Quakers first made their appearance known in New Amsterdam in August 1657, when a mysterious ship flying no identifying flags appeared in the harbor. On board were Quakers from London, who had recently been expelled from Boston. The shipmaster came ashore for an interview with Stuyvesant and stood before the director-general in true Quaker fashion “with his hat firm on his head, as if a goat.” Stuyvesant must have ordered him away because the ship abruptly departed the next day for parts unknown—though Megapolensis and Drisius suspected Rhode Island, which the predikanten considered the “receptacle of all sorts of riff-raff people.”74

The ship did not depart, however, with all of its company, but “left behind two strong young women,” namely Dorothy Waugh and Mary Wetherhead. According to
Megapolensis and Drisius, “these began to quake and go into a frenzy, and cry out loudly in the middle of the street, that men should repent, for the day of judgment was at hand.” The citizens of New Amsterdam, who were to this point thoroughly unfamiliar with Quakers, did not understand what was happening and began to “run to and fro, while one cried ‘Fire.’” In a short time, the Quaker women were arrested and committed to jail, where they continued their antics. In short order, Waugh and Wetherhead were “sent away.”

Three other Quakers made their way to Long Island, where one, Robert Hodgson, began to preach in the English towns. He was duly arrested in Hempstead and brought under guard to New Amsterdam to face charges. Hodgson appeared before a magistrate who gave him the choice of paying a fine of one hundred guilders or working “at the wheelbarrow two years with the Negroes.” Apparently, this meant working alongside WIC slaves on the fortifications. Hodgson refused to do either and received a severe whipping on the bare back, along with a promise that it would be repeated in two or three days “if he should refuse labor.” Hodgson’s plight, which according to Quaker sources including a number of whippings that brought him close to death, piqued public sympathy. Stuyvesant soon received an anonymous letter urging him to release Hodgson and send him away, “as his labor is hardly worth the cost.” The director-general seems to have recognized the wisdom of this course and dispatched Hodgson to Rhode Island.

Ridding New Netherland of Waugh, Wetherhead, and Hodgson was difficult enough, but driving Quakerism out of the province altogether was, as Stuyvesant shortly discovered, impossible. Quakerism soon spread through all of the English towns on Long Island. To stem the tide, Stuyvesant promulgated an ordinance subjecting anyone
who harbored a Quaker overnight in his or her house to a fine of fifty Flemish pounds. Any ship that brought a Quaker to the colony was subject to confiscation. Copies of the ordinance were sent to all of the towns with orders that it be published and enforced.⁷⁷

Most of the towns accepted the new ordinance quietly, but Flushing submitted a lengthy written protest, its famous remonstrance of 27 December 1657, which thirty-one townsmen signed. To accept the ordinance, said the Flushing men, would amount to an infringement of their rights under the patent Kieft had granted them in the name of the States General. The patent likely included a guaranteed, such as appears in the patent to Gravesend, given about the same time, that allowed the inhabitants “the free libertie of conscience according to the costume and manner of Holland, without molestation or disturbance from any Madgistrate or Madgistrates or any other Ecclesiasticall Minister that may p’tend jurisdiction over them.”⁷⁸ The Flushing men took the occasion to defend, with some eloquence, the right of liberty of conscience:

> for our part wee cannot condemn them [the Quakers] in this case, neither can wee stretch out our hands against them to punish, banish or persecute them, for out of Christ, God is a consuming fire, and it is a fearful thing to fall into the handes of the living God; we desire therefore in this case not to judge least wee be judged, neither to Condem least wee bee Condemed, but rather let every man stand and fall to his own.⁷⁹

Moreover, they argued that both the law of God and of the State of Holland required toleration:

> The law of love, peace and libertie in the states extending to Jews, Turks, and Egyptians, as they are considered the sonnes of Adam, which is the glory of the outward State of Holland; so love, peace and libertie extending to all in Christ Jesus, Condemns hatred, warre and bondage; and because our Savior saith it is impossible but that offense will come, but woe be unto him by whom they Commeth, our desire is not to offend one of his little ones in whatsoever form,
name or title hee appeares in, whether Presbyterian, Independent, Baptist or Quaker; but shall be glad to see anything of God in any of them: desireing to doe unto all men as wee desire all men should doe unto us, which is the true law of Church and State; for our Saviour saith this is the Law and the Prophets; Therefore if any of these said persons come in love unto us, wee cannot in Conscience lay violent hands upon them, but give them free Egresse into our Towne and howses as God shall perswade our Consciences; and in this we are true subjects both of the Church and State; for wee are bounde by the law of God and man to do good unto all men, and evill to no man; and this is according to the Pattent and Charter of our Towne . . .

Thus, the most ringing endorsement and defense of religious toleration in New Netherland came from the English, who based their legal right to it on a patent Kieft had issued to them.

Stuyvesant’s response was typical of the gruff old warrior. He promptly arrested two Flushing magistrates—Edward Farrington and William Noble—along with the town clerk, Edward Hart, and the schout, Tobias Feake. Farrington, Noble, and Hart laid the blame on Feake. Hart said it was Feake who prompted him to pen the document. Farrington and Noble said they thought they were only signing a petition to ask Stuyvesant to grant a liberty. All three confessed their errors and received pardon. Feake also eventually admitted his error and promised better behavior in the future. He was nevertheless found guilty of being the “instigator in the conception of a seditious, mutinous and detestable letter of defiance.” He was removed from office and given a choice of accepting either banishment from New Netherland or payment of a 200-florin fine.

But in spite of Stuyvesant’s best efforts, the Quaker “heresy” spread throughout the English towns on Long Island, and he was forced to make a number of arrests, including that of John Tilton, the clerk of Gravesend, on the charge that he had “lodged a
Quakeress in his house.” Tilton pleaded that the incident occurred while he was away and received a small fine. But he was later arrested twice more for attending Quaker meetings with his wife. He received a sentence of banishment both times. On the first occasion, Stuyvesant seems to have remitted the sentence. But when Tilton was arrested again in 1662, the banishment was enforced, and he went to live at Oyster Bay under English jurisdiction and only returned to Gravesend in 1664 after the conquest.  

But the real cause celebre for the Quakers was the arrest of John Bowne of Flushing. In August 1662, Stuyvesant received word from the magistrates of Jamaica that Quakers were holding meetings each Sunday at Bowne’s house. Stuyvesant immediately dispatched the deputy schout of New Netherland, Resolved Waldron, to arrest Bowne and ordered all of the magistrates and inhabitants of the English towns to assist in apprehending anyone who had attended a prohibited meeting. Waldron arrested Bowne, who promptly refused to accompany him to New Amsterdam because the deputy schout had no warrant. Waldron, though, managed to bring Bowne to the capital the next day. At his trial, Bowne was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine of twenty-five Flemish pounds and court costs. This he refused to do, and Stuyvesant committed him to prison from September until 14 December. In all that time, the director-general had no luck convincing Bowne to accept his guilt and punishment, so that the provincial council, “for the welfare of the community and to crush, as far as it is possible,” the “abominable sect” of Quakers, banished Bowne, not just from New Netherland, but from North America, ordering him to be sent to Holland on the next available ship. This was the Vos, which sailed on 8 January. In the meantime, Bowne was kept in prison.
When Bowne arrived in Amsterdam, he used the occasion to appear in person before the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber. Although the directors had Stuyvesant’s written account of Bowne’s transgressions, they were sympathetic to Bowne, who was by all accounts a sober and well-to-do citizen of Flushing. The fact that Goovert Loockermans and Cornelius Steenwyck, two prominent Dutch merchants, had assisted Bowne during his trial and incarceration, likely helped his cause. After hearing Bowne out, the directors wrote to Stuyvesant that though they too wished the Quakers and “other sectarians” would stay out of New Netherland, it was not good policy to persecute them. “We doubt very much,” the directors cautioned,

whether we can proceed against them rigorously without diminishing the population and stopping immigration, which must be favored at a so tender stage of the country’s existence. You may therefore shut your eyes, at least not force people’s consciences, but allow every one to have his own belief, as long as he behaves quietly and legally, gives no offence to his neighbors and does not oppose the government. As the government of this city has always practiced this maxim of moderation and consequently has often had a considerable influx of people, we do not doubt, that your Province too would be benefited by it.

Tolerance, even when extended solely by “connivance,” led to the growth of the population and to diversity, which the directors of the WIC recognized as a positive benefit.84

Thus admonished, Stuyvesant gave up his rigorous program of rooting out sectarians who did not conform to Dutch Reformed theology.85 The examples given above, though, show that such toleration as New Netherland extended amounted to no more than liberty of conscience, and even this would have been stamped out had Stuyvesant and the Reformed establishment in the colony had their way. Although the
overall policy of the States General and the WIC had been to allow liberty of conscience in the colony, it was Kieft and the patents he issued to the English towns that really opened the door to dissenters and gave them some legal standing. The directors of the Amsterdam Chamber, however, also played a significant role in limiting Stuyvesant’s ability to proceed against those he deemed in any way unorthodox. The directors seem to have taken this course in order to maintain immigration to New Netherland, a task which the States General had given them.

New Netherland, as the foregoing demonstrates, was not really a place that allowed religious freedom, particularly under Stuyvesant’s administration. It extended only a grudging toleration. The public practice of religion was generally restricted to the Dutch Reformed Church and English Calvinists who, in the main, also conformed to the practices of the Reformed Church. New Netherland was tolerant only in relation to other colonies, such as New France and Massachusetts Bay, which did not, theoretically at least, allow even liberty of conscience. Such limited toleration, though, was enough to attract dissenters to New Netherland from all of the neighboring colonies and from several European states as well. The Lutherans, Jews, Baptists, and Quakers were hardly the only dissenters. There were also Roman Catholics, Mennonites, and Waldenses, as well as Seekers and other sectarians. Such religious diversity proved to be one of the signal differences between New Netherland and New France.86

Although the Classis of the Dutch Reformed Church in Amsterdam had formally directed its officials in New Netherland to convert the native population to its particular brand of Christianity, little headway was made. In part, this was due to the weakness of the church establishment in the colony. Until the appointment of the Dominie Michaëlius
in 1628, there was no approved *predikant* of the Dutch Reformed Church in New Netherland. The church establishment was limited to two lay comforters of the sick, Bastiaen Krol and Jan Huyck. Michaëlius, who had a falling out with Director Minuit, left New Netherland after only four years without accomplishing much more than establishing the consistory. His successor, Everardus Bogardus, lasted from 1633 to 1647, during which time he found himself at odds with Director Kieft. He was joined by a second Reformed minister, Johannes Megapolensis in 1642. Kiliaen van Rensselaer sent out Megapolensis to minister to the colonists on his patroonship. Once Bogardus left in 1647, Megapolensis left Rensselaerswyck and became the head of the consistory of New Amsterdam.87

By 1660, though, the Reformed ministry had made some progress. In all, there were six approved ministers in the colony by then. Megapolensis and Drisius were co-pastors of the church at New Amsterdam. Gideon Schaats was the minister at Fort Orange. Johannes Polhemius, who had come from Brazil, served at Midwout and Nieuw Amersfort. Hermanus Blom was pastor at Esopus, while Henricus Selyns served Brooklyn. The Reformed establishment also included a number of comforters of the sick and several schoolmasters, but it was nowhere near as well-represented in the community as was the Roman Catholic establishment in New France. And none of these clergy were full-time missionaries to the Indians such as could be found in New France. They were all busy with their own pastorates among the European settlers.88

Upon arriving in the colony, Michaëlius, who had previously served in Brazil and at El Mina in West Africa, saw “little possibility” of bringing the Native Peoples “to the true knowledge of God through Christ.” “As to the natives of this country,” he wrote, “I
find them entirely savage and wild, strangers to all decency, yea, uncivil and stupid as
garden poles, proficient in all wickedness and godlessness; devilish men, who serve
nobody but the devil.” He thought any attempt to convert adults fruitless, but that there
might be some slight hope of making Christians out of the children, so long as they could
be separated from their parents. “For without this,” wrote Michaëlius, “they would
forthwith be as much accustomed as their parents to heathenish tricks and deviltries.”
But he maintained little hope of wresting the children from their parents, who had “a
strong affection for their children, and are very loth to part with them.”

Michaëlius reported, too, that language might prove an insuperable barrier to
conversion. He found the Indian languages “entirely peculiar.” Although enough of it
might be learned to facilitate trade when accompanied by making signs with the fingers,
he thought on the whole it was “a made-up childish language” that could not be used to
convey religious ideas. For this, the children would have to learn Dutch. Nevertheless,
Michaëlius expressed some intention of learning Algonkian before he left New
Netherland for good in 1632.

Bogardus left no record at all about his activities among the native population.
Jaap Jacobs, who puts the best possible face on the Dutch evangelization effort, says that
Bogardus “in all probability” made some attempt to instruct the Indians in the doctrines
of the Christian faith. But he admits that “no sign of any success can be found” and that,
while the names of slaves appear in the baptismal records, there are no Indian names to
be found there during Bogardus’s pastorate.

Any real effort at Christianization began with the arrival of Megapolensis as the
pastor of the church at Rensselaerswyck. Since he was situated in an area on the upper
Hudson near the Dutch trading post, he had a greater opportunity to interact with the Mohawks. Megapolensis made some attempt to learn their language, but did not understand it thoroughly. He did learn enough about them, though, to write a “Short Sketch of the Mohawk Indians,” which was published in Amsterdam in 1651. Like Michaëlius before him, Megapolensis found the Indians “stupid” and added that the “women are exceedingly addicted to whoring.” He also gave an explicit account of the cannibalism the Mohawks practiced, though he noted that unlike the Christian Europeans, the Mohawk “do not—at least, they very seldom—kill people, unless it may be in a great passion or a hand-to-hand fight.”

Although Megapolensis was not afraid to mingle with the Mohawks and often had some of them stay at his house overnight, he did not have much success in convincing them to accept Christianity. In fact, unlike the French, the Dutch ministers did not usually travel to Indian villages and certainly established no missions among the Indians. Megapolensis and his successors at Fort Orange and Beverwijck merely attempted to instruct the Native Peoples who came to them. For their part, the Mohawk, who had no need to convert to maintain trade relations with the Dutch, were largely resistant to Christianity. “When we pray,” Megapolensis reported, “they laugh at us. Some of them despise it entirely; and some, when we tell them what we do when we pray, stand astonished.”

Jacobs essentially argues that the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church made a good faith effort to convert the Native Peoples but found the conditions for this kind of work insurmountable. He does not, however, provide any evidence to support this conclusion other than to refer to the statements in the WIC’s regulations and instructions
that the Native Peoples should be instructed in Christianity. He ignores the fact that the claim of Christianizing the Indians, which appears in these documents, was merely a justification European powers used among themselves for taking possession of territories in the New World. A survey of the extant correspondence of the Reformed Church relating to New Netherland, by contrast, will uncover very little mention of the Indians at all. The overwhelming concern of the predikanten in the colony was rather with the suppression of dissent, the corruption of the civil authorities, and the disposition of the ministers’ own salaries. The truth is that there was very little missionary effort toward the indigenes, so that in the late 1640s, Adriaen van der Donck could report that he knew of only one Native American in the colony who had converted to Christianity. The predikanten themselves readily admitted their failure. In a 1654 letter to the Classis of Amsterdam, Megapolensis and Drisius wrote:

"you make mention in your letter, that you have gathered from our letters that the knowledge of the Gospel is making great progress among the Indians here. Speaking with all deference, we do not know or think that we have furnished any such intelligence in our letters. We greatly wish indeed, that such were the state of things among the Indians, but as yet, there is little appearance of it."

Political Ideas

Because of the great differences between the metropolitan governments of France and the Dutch Republic, one might expect that their respective colonies in North America would be quite different in political structure and in the general ideas that underlay the authority of the provincial governments. Although France and the Dutch Republic both
began exploration and settlement of North America during a time of state-building at home, the kinds of states that emerged in the metropole were quite different. In France, the monarchy under Francis I and later Henry IV strained to unify the different regions and peoples of their kingdom into a single comprehensive state. At the same time, the Dutch people, with much less historical tradition to build upon and very little in the way of a unifying culture, cobbled together a loosely structured national polity in the crucible of a revolution against their Spanish masters. The colonial enterprises of both metropolitan governments, against this backdrop, can be seen as an extension of state-building. The greatest European power—Spain—had developed a global empire, and policymakers believed that it behooved peoples who sought national identity to do the same.

During the early colonial development of New France, the metropolitan government under Louis XIII and Louis XIV was moving toward the absolute monarchy for which the French would provide the model. Although it was never quite absolute, the French monarchy was far more centralized than the Dutch government, which had no monarch at all. The Dutch Republic was a federation of provinces in which the real political power lay with wealthy merchants in the commercial cities and towns. Although political power theoretically flowed from the central government, the States General was, to quote Thomas J. Condon, “more an assemblage of provincial ambassadors than of national legislators.” In reality, the States General only acted on the initiative of the powerful city merchants. “The initiative, therefore,” Condon notes, “had to come from the outside.”
Quebec was founded under the authority of a one-year commission and fur-trade monopoly from Henry IV to sieur de Monts, who retained the title of lieutenant-general of New France. Thus political and legal authority flowed from the king to his lieutenant-general, who was to exercise governmental power in the new settlement on the St. Lawrence. The lieutenant-general reported directly to the king and had, essentially, vice-regal powers, even though he did not have the title of viceroy. De Monts, who remained in France, chose Champlain to lead the expedition of exploration and settlement. For this purpose, Champlain was styled “commander” and had legal and administrative authority over the men involved in his expeditions.97

From 1608 to 1610, Champlain governed Quebec, first as a commander with authority under the king through de Monts and afterward, it seems, somewhat more tenuously, as an official of the de Monts’ company. After 1610 and the assassination of Henry IV, de Monts, it will be recalled, lost his standing at court, and Champlain had to cast about to find an alternative means of providing both governmental authority and financing for the little settlement at Quebec. In 1612, he persuaded the comte de Soissons, a prince of the blood, to request an appointment as viceroy of New France. In this, Soissons succeeded and appointed Champlain to serve as his lieutenant in Canada. Although Soissons died almost as soon as these arrangements were made, a precedent had been set. From 1612 to 1635, political and legal authority would pass from the king through his viceroy, who invariably chose Champlain as his lieutenant. None of the viceroys ever came to New France, so that Champlain was the on-the-spot representative of the metropolitan government and sole governing authority.98
One of the more important innovations in the political structure of New France took place in 1620, when the viceroy, Montmorency, established the position of intendant, which after 1663 would become an important royal post in New France. At this stage, the intendant was essentially an intermediary between the viceroy in the metropole and his lieutenant in New France. The position of intendant obviated the need for Champlain himself to continually shuttle back and forth between North America and Europe. The intendant’s job was essentially to convey the orders of the viceroy to his lieutenant and ensure that the lieutenant was faithfully carrying them out.99

The early political and legal history of New Netherland is much less structured. The Dutch initially based their claims to New Netherland on the 1609 voyage of Henry Hudson, who sailed as a captain in the employ of the East India Co. Any legal claim to the territory, it would seem, belonged to the VOC. But the VOC had no interest in following up on Hudson’s initial “discovery,” nor did the States General, as the national political authority of the Dutch Republic, show any interest in the region Hudson had visited. From 1609 to 1614, the region that would become New Netherland was under no governmental authority whatsoever. Whatever authority the Dutch exercised was merely that of the ship captains of private companies trading to the area. In 1614, the States General finally involved itself, but only to issue a three-year trade monopoly to the New Netherland Co. at the behest of competing trade interests.100

Significant changes in the political history of both New France and New Netherland, respectively, came with the establishment of the Company of New France and the WIC. Although each company received a trade monopoly for its respective region from the sovereign power in the metropole, these companies were far more than
simple trading concerns. The Company of New France, which was chiefly a settlement company, would hold authority in New France from 1627 until the royalization of the colony in 1663. The WIC, which was a political, commercial, and military concern, would exercise dominion over New Netherland from 1621 until the English takeover in 1664.

Cardinal Richelieu, who formed the Company of New France, assumed the role, but not the title, of viceroy under the king. As the self-styled Grand Master and Superintendent General of the Navigation and Commerce of France, he combined the role of viceroy with that of the more traditional admiral of France, a position he abolished. The English conquest of New France complicated Richelieu’s reorganizational plans, but once the French recovered the colony, he sent Champlain back in 1633 as lieutenant, this time of the whole territory under French dominion. But upon hearing of Champlain’s failing health and desire to retire, Richelieu and the Company of New France appointed his successor, Charles Huault de Montmagny, on 15 January 1636. As it turned out, Champlain had already died at Quebec on 25 December, but this news had not reached Paris before appointment of Montmagny, who was given the more elevated title of “Governor.” A knight of Malta and a former naval officer in the Mediterranean fleet, Montmagny arrived at Quebec in June 1636 with full military and civilian power. He also had the services of a lieutenant, a secretary, a clerk, and an attorney to aid with administration. The Native Peoples called him “Ononthio,” or “great mountain,” a name which they applied to all subsequent governors.101

The king’s approval of the creation of the Communauté des Habitans on 6 March 1645 through agreement with the Company of New France brought about significant
changes in the political structure of New France. The Company of New France was to retain full governmental authority, including the power to appoint the governor and other officials and the right to issue land patents. The Communauté received the fur trade monopoly west of Miscou Island. It also assumed the responsibility of paying the salaries of the clergy and all government officials and soldiers. The Communauté also controlled the colony’s budget.¹⁰²

Concerns among the rank and file of the Communauté that a clique of well-placed and wealthy habitants was organizing the trade to benefit itself at the expense of the rest of the colony led the king in council to place the business affairs of the Communauté under government supervision. Oddly enough, the reforms the crown instituted over the next few years allowed for greater and greater public participation in the government of New France at a time when Louis XIV was moving in the direction of absolutism in the metropole. On 27 March 1647, the queen-regent and the royal council, in the name of the king, issued a new regulation that established the Council of Quebec, which was to consist of the governor, the superior of the Jesuits, and the governor of Montreal. This council had the right to examine the accounts of the Communauté and the power to appoint the general of the fur-trade fleet, as well as all other officials involved in the trade, including a secretary/notary public. It could promulgate all necessary regulations for the fur trade and other commercial activity and controlled the budget for the colony as a whole. Within this framework, the governor retained power for himself in all military and civil affairs and in time of emergency could act on his own in commercial matters as well.¹⁰³
The new regulation also provided for the election of a syndic, or town representative, from each of the three principal towns—Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal. The syndics, along with the general of the fleet when he was in country, could sit-in on the meetings of the provincial council. They could voice their opinions, but could not vote. But the regulation, overall, added a popular voice to government proceedings, as well as the first elections by ballot in New France.104

On 5 March 1648, the royal council issued a new arrêt significantly altering the make-up of the Council of Quebec. Henceforth it would consist of the governor-general, the superior of the Jesuits, any former governor who resided in the province, and two habitans, who were to be elected for three-year terms by the members of the council and the syndics of Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal. If no former governor resided in the colony, the council and syndics could elect a third habitant. At the establishment of the new council, the queen-regent and royal council chose three habitans, since there was no former governor resident at the time. These were François de Chavigny, Jean-Paul Godefroy, and Robert Giffard, all residents of Quebec. The first elections would be held in 1651. All five members of the council had a right to take part in the discussions and vote. The governors of Montreal and Trois-Rivières, who were dropped from the council, retained the right to attend meetings and could join in the council debates but had no vote. The new regulation added a true representative element to the colonial government, though the governor-general remained preeminent in civil and military matters.105

The king made further changes to the council in response to irregularities under Gov. Lauson. Lauson, the former intendant, had been the hand-picked gubernatorial candidate of the Jesuits. Once installed as governor, he relied on the support of the
superior of the Jesuits, Father Paul Ragueneau, to control the Council of Quebec and, through it, the fur trade to the profit of himself and a coterie of friends. The Habitants sent Simon Denis, syndic of Quebec, to Paris to complain to the Company of New France that Lauson had essentially shut them out from the management of the trade and was defrauding both the Communauté and the Company by trading outside of the public warehouses. The associates of the company, after hearing Denis’s report, appealed to the Louis XIV, who issued a decree on 15 March 1656 which stipulated that a key to the warehouse should forthwith be given to an elected agent of the Habitants so that the Communauté could monitor the trade. The king also ruled that the financial officer of the Company of New France should attend meetings of the council, examine the contents of the Communauté’s storehouse, and be allowed to examine all accounts of the trade. The king also discharged the superior of the Jesuits from the council.106

The following year, the king issued a decree creating a new council of trade at Quebec, which was composed of the governor-general, a director to be named by the Company of New France, two councilors to be elected by the Communauté des Habitants of Quebec, and one each from the towns of Trois-Rivières and Montreal. The new council was to oversee all aspects of the fur trade and regulate all shipping and trade, both within the colony and between the colony and France. It was also to supervise the provincial budget and could impose taxes. Moreover, the council had the authority to enforce its own regulations and to pass sentence on offenders. The governor, however, seems to have retained the power to override the decisions of the council.107

In the case of New Netherland, governmental authority flowed from the States General to the WIC and thence to the director and his council in the colony. Until the
appointment of Stuyvesant as director-general in 1646, the director was the highest official in New Netherland. New Netherland was a company colony and the director was the leader of company operations. Many of the colonists were company employees, and even the free colonists, such as the Walloons who came in 1624, were under the authority of the director and council because they came as a result of a contract with the WIC and held their lands through agreement with the WIC.

Willem Verhulst, the first director, was sent over with instructions that served as a constitution for the government of New Netherland. Political and legal authority was vested in the director and a council, which was to consist of the vice-director, the undercommissary for trade, and two settlers, in this case, both Walloons. Within a year, the WIC expanded the council to include four additional company employees as well as the captains of any company ships that happened to be in port. The director was not supposed to act on his own authority but only with the concurrence of a majority of the council. The early provincial council could issue ordinances, but they would not take effect until they had been approved by the Heren XIX, the governing body of the WIC. Later, for practical reasons, the ordinances of the director and council would go into effect immediately, though provisionally, until they had received the approval of the WIC’s directors.

Little is known of the make-up of the council until the administration of Willem Kieft, who arrived in New Amsterdam in 1638. Kieft contrived to rule as a virtual dictator over the colony through his manipulation of the council. Under the instructions of the WIC, the director was to rule only through consultation with his council, and he could not act against the majority vote of the council. To circumvent this check on his
authority, Kieft limited the council to the province secretary, the fiscal, and one private citizen, Dr. Johannes La Montagne. The secretary and fiscal were both employees of the WIC and subordinate to the director, and La Montagne was hardly an independent voice because he was heavily indebted to the WIC. Kieft had organized the council as a proverbial rubber stamp.\(^{110}\)

It is an irony, then, that it was Kieft, the most dictatorial perhaps of all the directors of New Netherland, who opened up the colony, not just to greater liberty of conscience, but also to greater popular participation in government. He did so in two ways: First, by granting to English settlers town patents that permitted the creation of participatory municipal governments and, second, by creating a provincial advisory committee in an attempt to build public support for his war against the Algonkians. Eventually, these two strains of popular participation in government would coalesce in Stuyvesant’s time to work something of a miniature revolution in New Amsterdam.

Most of the English settlers who came to New Netherland were religious dissenters of one sort of another from New England. Others came to New Amsterdam to seek better farms or economic opportunities. But no matter what the motivation for coming to New Netherland, the New Englanders brought with them ideas about how to structure local political institutions. These New Englanders, at Flushing, Hempstead, and Gravesend, transplanted into New Netherland the custom of the New England town meeting and likely would not have willingly settled in Dutch territory had they not been given some guarantee of local political control of their own affairs.

Kieft, who was anxious to promote settlement at almost any cost, particularly after his disastrous war, bent to the wishes of the English. The earliest of these extant
town patents, which Kieft issued for Newtown in 1642, allowed the patentees no more than the right to a court that could decide, without appeal, civil and criminal cases that did not exceed fifty florins. The townsmen could also nominate a slate of magistrates, though the final choice was left to the director. The 1644 patent for Hempstead included the right to establish a local court, but adds the further right “to erect a body politic and civil,” which would allow the “magistrates and free inhabitants to make civil ordinances among themselves.” The patent Kieft issued to Gravesend in 1645, likewise, permitted the patentees, their associates, and heirs “to erect a body politic and civill combination amongst themselves, as free men of this Province & of the Towne of Gravesend & to make such civill ordinances as the Major part of yœ Inhabitants ffree of the Town shall thinke fitting for theyr quiet & peaceable subsisting.” The patent also conferred on the freemen of Gravesend the right to nominate three men, who subject to the director’s approval, would sit as magistrates on the municipal court. The court could determine, without appeal, cases of debt and trespass that did not exceed fifty guilders. The court could also attach and seize the goods of offenders for payment of fines. The town could also elect its own schout, or sheriff, subject to the approval of the director.111

Naturally, given their right to town government, the English inhabitants organized themselves according to the ideas with which they were most familiar—the town meeting. The fact that the Dutch towns were not allowed to have their own courts or make their own ordinances until later is evidence that the idea for municipal self-government was brought into New Netherland from New England and that the New Englanders would not settle within Dutch jurisdiction without some guarantee of local
self-government. The first Dutch town to be authorized to have its own court was Breukelen in 1646, but others did not attain such rights until 1654.¹¹²

The English towns in the late 1640s enjoyed a measure of self-government, then, that was unavailable to the Dutch settlers even in New Amsterdam. In the provincial capital, the director ruled as an authoritarian with a handpicked council to rubberstamp his decisions. But it was again Kieft, ironically, who set in motion changes that would eventually bring a new, more participatory municipal government to New Amsterdam itself. To marshal public support for his war on the Algonkians, who were harboring the murderer of a Dutchman, Kieft in 1641 allowed the commonalty of the colony to elect twelve representatives—the Twelve Men—to serve as an advisory body. Kieft thought that he could manipulate the Twelve Men into rubberstamping his war plan and drumming up public support for it, but his assumptions were incorrect, at least initially. The advisory board had much more experience in dealing with the Native Peoples than Kieft, and they put him off, saying that any attack on the Indians should wait until a more opportune moment. Kieft reconvened the Twelve Men in January 1642, in the hopes that they would now support his plan. But before they responded to the director’s request, they petitioned him to expand the council and make it more representative. They then advised Kieft to proceed with his war. The director had no intention of allowing greater participation in the council, and having gotten what he wanted from the Twelve Men, he dismissed them. He then launched a surprise night assault on peaceful Indians who were camped outside at Pavonia. This ill-advised sneak attack united at least eleven Algonkian bands against the Dutch. During the summer of 1643, the Algonkians began to
systematically reduce outlying farms to ashes and kill any colonists who did not seek asylum in New Amsterdam itself.\textsuperscript{113}

In September, Kieft called the commonality together once again. Forty-six burghers of New Amsterdam convened and elected a board—the Eight Men—to advise the director and council. The Eight Men henceforth attended the meetings of the director and council and also took on some executive functions, such as the recruitment of troops. The council resolved that any five of the eight men would constitute a quorum and that the director and council would be guided by whatever these select men decided. On 15 September, with seven of the eight men voting, it was “resolved to commence war against the Indians.” Then, in October, with just three of the Eight Men present, the council resolved to attack the Waesquesgeek band.\textsuperscript{114}

In addition to their wartime activities, the Eight Men also took it upon themselves to correspond with the Amsterdam Chamber and the Heren XIX to appeal for aid in the war. Eventually, dissatisfied with the treatment they received from Kieft, they also petitioned the WIC directors for a more representative government, which would include elected delegates from the towns. One of these letters, to the Amsterdam Chamber, was basically an indictment of Kieft’s wartime leadership. Such agitation on the part of the Eight Men eventually led the WIC, under pressure from the States General, to remove Kieft from the directorship and send Stuyvesant in his stead.\textsuperscript{115}

Stuyvesant considered the correspondence of the Eight Men with the Amsterdam Chamber, particularly their criticisms of Kieft, to be disloyal to the government, and he was not about to permit himself to fall victim to a similar campaign. One of his first acts upon arriving in New Amsterdam was to disband the Eight Men and prosecute two of its
leading members, Jochem Pietersz. Kuyter and Cornelis Melyn, on various charges, including libeling former Director Kieft in a letter to the directors of the WIC. But while he took these steps to repress political dissent, Stuyvesant was aware that he could not be seen as restoring the authoritarian regime of Kieft without antagonizing the people at large. He therefore established his own advisory board of the Nine Men, who were to help raise money among the commonalty to repair the fort on Manhattan Island. The commonalty were permitted to nominate eighteen men by vote, from whom the director-general and council would select nine to serve. Stuyvesant made it clear that the Nine Men were to have no independent authority. They could not meet on their own and could only convene at the behest of the director-general and council.\textsuperscript{116}

Stuyvesant may have thought he had nipped any popular agitation for a more representative government in the bud, but the movement Kieft had begun toward popular participation in the government with his establishment of the Twelve Men took on a life of its own. Cornelis Melyn, who had received a sentence of banishment for his activities while a member of the Eight Men, returned to the Netherlands and began to lobby the States General to curb what he described as the abuses of Stuyvesant’s government. At the same time, Adriaen van der Donck, the former attorney at Rensselaerswyck and also one of the Eight Men, penned his famous \textit{Remonstrance} to the States General, asking for the establishment of a representative municipal government for New Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{117}

While Russell Shorto has claimed that the agitation for representative government in New Amsterdam was wholly of Dutch origin, it likely would not have arisen at all had it not been for the inflow of political ideas from New England. The New Englanders, even those dissidents who sought asylum and opportunity under Dutch jurisdiction, seem
to have required some form of local self-government before they would agree to take up lands and build towns. No other explanation has emerged to explain why Kieft granted free inhabitants of each of the English towns the right to “erect a bodye pollitique and civill” and make their own ordinances. There is no doubt that the New England tradition of the town meeting influenced the Eight Men and the commonalty of New Amsterdam as they persisted in their effort to achieve some kind of a representative government for New Amsterdam. In their October 1649 petition to the States General for a redress of grievances, the commonalty of New Netherland, led by Van der Donck, asked that a “suitable municipal government” be established in New Amsterdam “somewhat resembling the laudable Government of our Fatherland.” But in footnotes to “Additional Observations” on the petition, the petitioners made clear their debt to the example of New England. They noted that a “suitable municipal government” would be one that allowed “those interested in the country [to] also attend to its government and keep a watchful eye over it, without its being intrusted to a set of hairbrained people, such as the Company flings thither, but to such as obtain in New England.” In a further note, the petitioners explained the system of government in New England, in which “each town, no matter how small, hath its own court and jurisdiction, also a voice in the Capital, and elects its own officers.” Moreover, observed the petitioners, the “Governor and Deputy are chosen annually by the entire province.”

By 1650, the States General was open to some change in the administration of New Netherland and advised that the province council should henceforth consist of the director, the vice-director, one councilor chosen by agreement of the States General and the WIC, and two councilors chosen from among four men nominated by a vote of the
patroons and burghers of New Netherland. The plan also called for a civil government for
New Amsterdam, which would be under the control of the town’s burgomeesters and
schepens. The WIC, however, put up stiff resistance to this plan, which compromised
company control of its own provincial capital. As a result, the plan was shelved for a
number of years. Eventually, though, the WIC permitted the burgomeesters and
schepens to form an elective municipal government for New Amsterdam, which began in
embryo with the establishment of a court of justice in 1653. In after years, the
burgomeesters and schepens slowly expanded their power to take over more and more
responsibility, which included issuing ordinances and administering city services.119

Ironically, the English towns on Long Island initially supported Stuyvesant and
the West India Co. against the popular party. Although they had achieved local home
rule themselves, they apparently did not wish it for New Amsterdam or for the colony as
a whole, at least not in 1650 and 1653 when they found themselves harassed by the local
Indians, who had received arms and ammunition in illicit trade with the Dutch. Although
they wrote to the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber for aid, the magistrates of
Gravesend, for instance, were careful to note that even while they desired the directors
intercede to halt the illicit sale of weapons to the Indians and to provide the English
settlers with gunpowder and lead, they did not blame Stuyvesant for their problems.
From their perspective, the best course would be in “maintaining and upholding our
present Governor against all malignant persons, our superiors in Holland paying no
attention to the reports of dissatisfied persons.”120

But when nothing had been done by 1653 to satisfy their needs, the leaders of the
English towns on Long Island held a meeting at Flushing to determine a course of action.
This in itself was dangerous because England and the Dutch Republic were at war at the time, and Stuyvesant was understandably worried about the possible disaffection of the English towns. He agreed to allow the towns to meet at City Hall in New Amsterdam to discuss their problems on condition that two members of the provincial council could attend. The English magistrates agreed to this, but became understandably agitated when Stuyvesant sent Cornelis van Werckhoven, who was known to be antagonistic to the interests of the English townsmen. To cool things down perhaps, Stuyvesant agreed to convene a *landdag*, or assembly of the representatives of all of the towns, which met on 10 December. Eight towns sent delegates. In all there were ten Dutch delegates and nine English. 121 George Baxter of Gravesend, who had formerly been Stuyvesant’s English secretary, penned a lengthy protest which signaled that the English towns now supported a change in the provincial government to allow for greater representation of the citizenry of all the towns:

’Tis contrary to the first intentions and genuine principles of every well regulated government, that one or more men should arrogate to themselves the exclusive power to dispose, at will, of the life and property of any individual, and this, by virtue or under pretense of a law or order he, or they, might enact, without the consent, knowledge or election of the whole Body, or its agents or representatives. Hence the enactment, except as aforesaid, of new Laws or orders affecting the Commonalty, or the Inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed to the granted Freedoms of the Dutch Government, and odious to every freeborn man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a free state on newly settled lands, which might require new laws and orders, not transcending, but resembling as near as possible, those of Netherland. We humbly submit that ’tis one of our privileges that our consent or that of our representatives is necessarily required in the enactment of such laws and orders.122

The message was clear: New Netherland had outgrown the government of the West India Co. It had become a society of its own with its own interests. Stuyvesant apparently
thought otherwise. He simply disbanded the landdag and did not convene another until 1663 when it was apparent that he needed to rally the people to resist an English invasion.\textsuperscript{123}

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the agitation of the commonalty for some form of representative municipal government for New Amsterdam and for New Netherland as a whole is what it says about the growth of both the city and the province itself. By the late 1640s, New Amsterdam was really no longer just a company town filled with company employees and transient WIC sailors and soldiers. The “commonalty” had begun to see the town, and the province too for that matter, as independent entities with their own political and economic aspirations. This is why the commonalty coupled its 1649 plea for a more popular form of government with a call for economic rights—to be exempt from duties on tobacco, which New Netherland exported, and to be allowed to export and sell “grain, timber, and all other wares and merchandise the produce of the Country, every way and every where your High Mightinesses have allies and have granted to the Netherlanders the privilege of trade and resort.”\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bertrand van Ruymbeke has challenged the idea that the French colonization efforts in the 1550s and 1560s were an effort to provide a safe haven for Huguenots. He says there is nothing in the contemporary record to support this. It is unlikely, though, that the crown would explicitly express such a purpose in any public document. But even prior to the issuance of the Edict of Nantes, let alone after its revocation, French Protestants were certainly aware that they might need safe havens should the government impose an inquisition against them. Why else would the Edict of Nantes have been necessary in 1589? See Van Ruymbeke’s “The Walloon and Huguenot Elements in New Netherland and Seventeenth-Century New York: Identity, History, and Memory” in \textit{Revisiting New Netherland: Perspectives on Early Dutch America}, ed. Joyce D. Goodfriend (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 47. Buissere, \textit{Henry IV}, 44-45, 70; On Protestant involvement in early French colonial enterprises, see Chapter 4.
\item Fischer, \textit{Champlain’s Dream}, 313, 317.
\end{enumerate}
15 Ibid., 266-67, 275.
20 Ibid., 265.
28 Most of the recruits were from Burgundy and Anjou. Lancot, *History of Canada*, 1:211-12.
29 Ibid., 224.
32 Careless, *Canada*, 41
37 Ibid., 37, 39, 70-72.
41 DRNN, 1-2.
42 DRCVNY, 1:65
43 Ibid., 106.
44 Smith, *Religion and Trade*, 179.
50 According the Jaap Jacobs, there were about 150 Lutheran families in New Netherland by 1653. See his New Netherland, 298-99; Ecclesiastical Records, 1:317-18; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 230-31; Smith, Religion and Trade, 192.
52 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:343-44.
53 Ibid., 352; Jacobs, New Netherland, 297.
54 Jacobs, New Netherland, 301; Ecclesiastical Records, 1:352.
56 Jacobs, New Netherland, 302-303; Ecclesiastical Records, 1:405-8.
57 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:428-31; 433, 440-41; 449; 475, 477, 486.
60 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:352; Jacobs, New Netherland, 378; Smith, Religion and Trade, 217-18
61 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:335
62 Ibid., 335, 349, 352; Smith, Religion and Trade, 218.
63 Smith, Religion and Trade, 221, 227; Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland,116; Cooper, A Dangerous Woman, 102.
66 The call for an English revolt came from Capt. John Underhill, the schout of Flushing, who had been forced out of Massachusetts for religious dissent and sexual transgressions. Underhill had served as a successful commander of Dutch forces during Kieft’s war. In a bid, perhaps, to return to the good graces of the New England authorities, he served as something of an agent provoca teur during the war scare of the 1650s, exhorting the English on Long Island to rebel against the Dutch government and raising the flag of Parliament in Flushing. He later fled to Rhode Island and led that colony’s troops in the seizure of Fort Good Hope. Thompson, History of Long Island, 3:644-46; Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland, 120; Fiske, The Dutch and Quaker Colonies, 1:264-65.
67 DRCHNY, 14:216.
68 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:410; Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland, 229; Thompson, History of Long Island, 3:9.
69 Thompson, History of Long Island, 2:497-99; Ecclesiastical Records, 1:410.
71 Ecclesiastical Records, 1:397, 523; Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland, 230; Thompson, History of Long Island, 2:500.


Ibid., 399-400.


Ecclesiastical Records, 1:410. Frederick J. Zwierlein’s account of the Hodgson episode is much more detailed than that of the predikanten in Ecclesiastical Records. If Zwierlein is to be believed, Hodgson’s punishment was far more severe than the Dutch ministers were willing to admit. But since Zwierlein’s object is to emphasize the cruelty of Dutch persecution, his account cannot be accepted at face value, especially since it traces back through O’Callaghan to Quaker sources that may have exaggerated the incident for propaganda purposes. Smith essentially repeats the story from Zwierlein. See Zwierlein’s Religion in New Netherland (Rochester, N.Y., John P. Smith, 1910), 215-19; O’Callaghan, History of New Netherland, 2:347-50; Smith, Religion and Trade, 221-23.

Smith, Religion and Trade, 224


Ecclesiastical Records, 1:412.

Ibid., 413.


DRCHNY, 14:490-91; Stillwell, Genealogical and Historical Miscellany, 5:133.

Ecclesiastical Records, 1:527; DRCHNY, 14:515; Smith, Religion and Trade, 230.


Smith, Religion and Trade, 230.

Ecclesiastical Records, 1:335, 354.

Ibid., 46; Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 149-52; Smith, Religion and Trade, 167, 172 n. 37.

Ecclesiastical Records, 1:488-89.

Versteeg, Manhattan in 1628, 72; Ecclesiastical Records, 1:56, 60, 68.


Jacobs, New Netherland, 320.


Van der Donck, Description of New Netherland, 104.

Ecclesiastical Records, 1:326.


See chapter 5 and also Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 610-4.

Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 367-68.

See chapter 6.


Québec (Province), *Nouvelle-France, Documents Historiques,* 1:105-7; Lanctot, *History of Canada,* 1:221-23.


*Jacobs,* *New Netherland,* 98-99.


*Jacobs,* *New Netherland,* 153; For an example of how the town meeting administered municipal affairs, see Gravesend Town Records, microfilm reel 62, pp. 19-25, Municipal Archives of the City of New York.


*Jacobs,* *New Netherland,* 145-46.

Shorto, *Island in the Center of the World,* 220, 244-45, 257-58, 263, 305, 315-16; O’Callaghan and Morgan, *Documentary History,* 1:630; *DRCHNY,* 1:260, 266.


*DRCHNY,* 2:153-54.


*DRCHNY,* 1:551.

*Jacobs,* *New Netherland,* 165-67

*DRCHNY,* 1:267-68.
CONCLUSION

THE DIFFUSE AND SPECIFIC NETWORKS OF NEW AMSTERDAM AND QUEBEC

In his 1970 book *The Merchant’s World*, James E. Vance quoted with approval Adam Smith’s observation that the purpose of colonies is to expand the market for manufactured goods flowing from the metropole. Smith is very likely correct, but the process of creating a “successful” colony seems to be a bit more complicated. Colonies are established, in essence, to create new networks, and every colony exists within a network or a matrix of networks consisting of “nodes”—normally villages, towns, and cities—and the flows between them. For a seventeenth-century colonial network to have been successfully integrated into the emerging world economic system, at least from the point of view of the metropolitan power, the defining, dominant flow between the metropole and the colony had to be four-fold: 1) trade goods or some other form of capital had to flow from the metropole to the colony to be exchanged for some form of commodity sufficiently valuable to overcome the high overhead required for its transportation over a long distance; 2) the commodity produced in the colony then had to flow to the metropole where it was sold outright or used as raw material for manufactured goods, which were then sold at a higher price; 3) the colonized peoples had use the greater part of the capital they accumulated through trade to purchase manufactured products from the metropole; and 4) the manufactured “central” goods finally had to flow
back into the colony. In other words, the colonized peoples must be both producers (of raw materials) and consumers (of manufactured products from the metropole).

On the surface it would seem that the Native-American trading partners in the fur trade were both *producers* of raw materials (furs) and *consumers* of European manufactures (kettles, knives, awls, cloth, firearms, and liquor). But a slightly deeper analysis reveals that the Native Peoples were really only producers. While the items the Europeans gave them in exchange for furs were in essence wages for their labor, no part of these wages seems to have been saved or accumulated for the purchase of more central goods from the metropole. In this way, the Native Peoples did not provide a market for European products, at least not in the way Smith conceived such a market. As producers, but not consumers, Native Americans, through their special knowledge of beaver trapping, were also able to exert control over the dominant flow of trade between the colonies and the metropole—a significant weakness from the European point of view. Moreover, if capitalism, even of the seventeenth-century variety, requires an expanding market, the Native Peoples were not able to provide it. The significant flow of disease from the metropole, the intensification of warfare resulting from the introduction of firearms, and the depletion of game resulting from the fur trade combined to systematically reduce native populations.

In North America, at least, light-footprint, extractive, linear colonies, such as Hornsby has described, were weak and essentially failed, not only because they were not able to develop a self-sufficient agricultural base, but also because they did not develop a strong and expanding consumer market for European goods. In the end, to succeed, both New France and New Netherland had to be converted to territorial colonies, which in the
long term required the replacement of Native-American society with a European consumer society. In essence, connecting to the emerging world market in the way they did spelled doom for most Native Americans, even though they were initially able to control the colonial fur-trade that linked them to that market.  

Scholars such as Innis, Careless, Seed, Condon, and Merwick have argued that French and Dutch colonialism in North America significantly differed from that of the English because it was based on trade with the Native Americans and not on settlement. The implication is that French and Dutch colonialism was not predicated upon imperialist desires to exert sovereignty over the Native Peoples and their lands or to allow large-scale European settlement that would eventually dispossess the Indians of their traditional territories. To make their case, Innis, Careless, and Merwick have generally emphasized the intentions of merchants, who invariably wished to extract as much wealth from the colonies as they could, while incurring as little cost in the process. The point of view of most merchants, with the exception of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, extended only to the short-term. They saw settlement as an expensive proposition that cut sharply into profits. But there were influential policymakers in both France and the Dutch Republic who saw no inevitable conflict between settlement and trade. They reasoned that trade, in the long-term, was dependent upon creating settlement colonies and that in light of the competition from other European states, there was no other way aside from settlement to hold on to territory in the Americas. The intention of the French government and of the most influential members of the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC to create agriculturally based settlement colonies (or territorial colonies) was present from the first and is amply expressed in the contemporaneous documents. It can then be said that the intention of
the French and Dutch in creating colonies in North America was not significantly different from that of the English. It was only their success in realizing this intention that differed. By 1663, New France and New Netherland had populations of 3,035 and about 10,000 respectively. By contrast, English North-America had a population of about 80,000.

These disparities in population were not due to cultural differences, as scholars such as Patricia Seed and Donna Merwick have suggested, but rather to variations in the internal economic and political conditions of each of the three European nations. While elites in the metropole might support colonial enterprises for the glory of exploring new lands, converting the Native Peoples to Christianity, and enriching their coffers, it is usually desperation that motivates ordinary people to become colonists. Religious and political repression, combined with population growth and economic distress, particularly in the manufacturing sector, along with the relative freedom to establish quasi-independent colonies in North America, gave impetus to the large-scale immigration of the English in the seventeenth century. By contrast, the Dutch and French had difficulty finding settlers. For the Dutch, a prosperous economy and relative religious toleration at home inhibited immigration to New Netherland. And though France, particularly after 1640, suffered, as Peter Moogk has noted, “unemployment, severe famines, oppressive taxation, and social conflict,” this was not a sufficient catalyst to drive mass immigration to New France. In part, this was because of the not-altogether-accurate reputation of the French colony as a place of exile, where criminals and vagrants were sent to eke out a life of misery. Certainly, the rather severe winter climate of the St. Lawrence region and the difficulties with the Iroquois did nothing to disabuse the French public on this score. The
fact remains, though, that most of the French who went to the St. Lawrence after 1632, when the colonization effort began in earnest, were male contract laborers. Tough economic conditions at home often drove these men to accept work in the colony. But their intention more often than not was to return to France after they had made a little money, and many did. That French officials were not able to convince families to immigrate to any great degree retarded the development of a self-sufficient territorial colony on the St. Lawrence. Religious restrictions also impeded this effort. After 1627, when Richelieu assumed leadership of the colonization effort, Huguenots were forbidden to settle in New France. This meant, of course, that the population with the most interest in establishing and settling the colony was prohibited from doing so. It might be added here that the Huguenots, in spite of this prohibition, took the lead in organizing and profiting from trade to the St. Lawrence. More importantly, Richelieu also discouraged all but “natural French” subjects from settling in the colony, which meant that New France could not increase its population through immigration from other European countries or from migration from other North-American colonies. All of these difficulties and policies made it more difficult for France to populate its territories in Acadia and along the St. Lawrence. Nevertheless, it was not in intention that the French imperialists differed from the English but only in execution. The same can be said for the Dutch.

Since World War II, post-colonial theorists have offered a withering critique that has defined colonialism and all of its manifestations and vestiges as immoral. This view, in many ways well-argued and justified, has almost utterly shifted the perspective of scholars of the colonial period during the last twenty-five years or so. From the
American Revolution up to the end of World War II and, in many cases, up until at least the 1970s, American historians generally portrayed the colonial period as a “heroic” era when predominantly English colonists made the perilous journey to the New World and carved out of the “wilderness” new societies that were freer, more equal, and more tolerant than could be found in the Old World. In this story, which is implacably progressive, the only anti-colonial note of any consequence comes with the American Revolution itself, when the work of building a new and presumably better Republican society in the Americas has reached sufficient maturity for the colonists to break their ties with the old, corrupt, socially stratified, monarchical society of Great Britain. But even in this Revolutionary narrative, colonialism at least has the virtue of creating a more progressive “American” society.

The plight of Native Americans and enslaved Africans is never entirely absent from the more thoughtful traditional colonial histories, even those dating back to the early nineteenth century, but it is usually treated as an unfortunate anomaly in the larger story of progress. In these “heroic” narratives, the problem of African-American slavery normally looms larger than the sub-story of the Native Peoples because slaves are incorporated within colonial European society, and their position in that society contradicts in so dramatic a fashion the overriding theme of liberty. The Native Americans, by contrast, are portrayed, even in the more sympathetic accounts, as having brought their misfortunes upon themselves by becoming obstacles to progress. The fact that Native Americans are, in the main, seen as outside of colonial society altogether and alien to it, made it easier for traditional historians to portray them in this fashion.
Post-colonial theory has helped to rectify the deficiencies and glaring exaggerations in the traditional “heroic” history. Instead, of simply acknowledging the effect of colonialism on Native Peoples as an unfortunate sidebar to an otherwise positive narrative, post-colonialist scholars have attempted to incorporate the point of view of Native Peoples into the history, making it central to a new narrative. This, of course, has been a necessary corrective. But all theories can be taken to an extreme, which tends to limit their usefulness, and post-colonialism has been no exception. While it has been useful to study and understand the deleterious effects of colonialism, there is a tendency in studies that adopt the post-colonialist critique to view “colonialism” in the abstract as a monolithic historical force. Such an over-generalized view makes it more difficult to see the complexities inherent in any colonial enterprise. It also tends to define colonialism and all its effects and manifestations—even indoor plumbing and literacy—as morally wrong or “evil,” ignoring the fact that, in many respects, the tools by which colonized peoples have fought the oppression of the colonizers came to them by way of the colonial enterprise itself.6

Once one adopts the premise that colonialism is a monolithic historical force that is universally evil, the conclusion inevitably follows that those who are the most successful colonizers must be, however paradoxical this might appear given the general theory, the most reprehensible. This “standpoint” post-colonialism tends to ignore the intentions of the colonizers and focuses on the overall result. The scholarship that has developed along these lines, in terms of North-American colonization, tends to class the English as the worst, followed in order by the Dutch and the French. In many of these accounts, the English are even unfavorably compared to the Spanish—at least after the
period of the conquests of Mexico and Peru. The Spanish, after all, didn’t send many colonists to the New World. This classification of the relative immorality of European colonizations dovetails nicely with current prejudices within academic circles against Europeans generally, but particularly against the English and Anglo-Americans. This prejudice can most readily be seen by the fact that it is still permissible within scholarship to “essentialize” the English and Anglo-Americans.

Such thinking has produced any number of studies since the 1990s, in which Native Peoples are portrayed as invariably right and Europeans invariably wrong in every aspect of human endeavor—socially, economically, politically, and morally—Jill Lepore’s *In the Name of War* and Stephen Greenblatt’s *Marvelous Possessions* provide notable examples. But while such perfectionism and stark oppositions emanate from quite a few recent studies, they never did exist in reality. To persuade otherwise thoughtful people to accept an idea so alien to their own experience, contemporary scholarship has adopted its own version of the long-discredited theory of the “noble savage.” These studies invest the Europeans with the moral responsibility of seeing the wickedness of their own ways while completely absolving the Native Peoples. The result, contrary to the intention of many of these scholars, is to “privilege” the Europeans with critical rational insight somehow unavailable to Native Peoples. Part of the problem lies in ascribing morality or its lack to abstract groupings of people, rather than to individuals, who are really the only true moral actors.

One wonders, though, whether assessing the relative immorality of various types of European colonialism based on the long-term results alone constitutes good history. Or to cast the question in another way: Is it fair to place the blame on the first English
colonists or even on Columbus, for that matter, for all the bad stuff that happened subsequently? The first Pilgrims who came ashore in the Wampanoag country in 1620 could not have predicted that King Philip’s War would erupt in the 1670s, let alone that the overall result of colonization writ large over the next 250 years was to be the virtual disappearance of Native Peoples from the eastern seaboard of what would eventually become the United States. Nor could Samuel de Champlain, let alone the destitute contract laborer who came to Quebec in the 1630s, know that French and Indian cooperation in the international fur trade would result in the destruction of the Huron people through the intensification of warfare and the spread of European disease.

Until recently, thinking people were apt to believe, with justification, that Aristotle took a great leap forward when he proposed that culpability had to take intention into account. In other words, it was the intention of the actor, not the result of the action that determined whether an action was vicious, criminal, or immoral, rather than simply accidental, unfortunate, or perhaps at worst naïve or stupid. Aristotle’s emphasis on intention moved the idea of justice out of the realm of \textit{lex talionis}, providing a more reasonable basis on which to establish culpability than the emotional state of the victim and the desire for revenge.\footnote{7}

Unfortunately, in many post-World War II histories, the overall intentions of the metropolitan governments as well as the individual intentions of the colonists have been overlooked in order to tailor the history to whatever argument the historian wished to make. Harold A. Innis and Thomas J. Condon, for instance, focus only on the intentions of the merchants, who chiefly sought to make a profit through exploiting extractive colonial networks in New France and New Netherland, respectively. Certainly, it was not
the intention of these commercially minded merchants to build full-scale territorial settlement colonies in North America. But this narrow focus on economic history ignores the stated intention of the French and Dutch governments to people their colonies in North America with loyal European subjects. Condon even goes so far as to argue that the States General was too weak to have any significant influence over colonial policy, which allowed the economic interests of the merchants who directed the WIC full sway in New Netherland. But the fact is that when the merchants in charge of the WIC, for economic reasons, wanted to give up on New Netherland altogether, it was the States General that not only ordered them to retain the colony but forced them to give up their fur-trade monopoly and concentrate on increasing settlement.

Settlement was also the goal of French policymakers. From the time of Henry IV, if not before, it was always the stated policy of the French government and its officials in New France to create an agriculturally based settlement colony in the St. Lawrence region—one, by the way, that would “Frenchify” and incorporate within it allied Native Peoples. The various merchant companies that were supposed to implement this policy invariably failed, largely because it was not in their interest or in accord with their short-term intentions to do so. But this does not mean that the French government gave up on carrying out its overall design to create a settlement, or territorial, colony. Richelieu, the king’s first minister, created the Company of New France in 1627 to do just that, and when this effort also fell short of its goals, the king himself royalized the colony and poured in more resources to effect it.

The narrow economic perspective of Innis and Condon also largely ignores the intentions of the individual colonists. Condon, for instance, in order to make his
argument that the Dutch had no intention to establish a settlement colony, continually emphasizes the point that many of the people the WIC sent to New Netherland were contract workers who had no interest in permanently settling in the colony. He even tries to assert that the Walloon families, which the WIC sent over in 1624 and 1625, were essentially contract employees, which is not exactly true. But while the WIC’s effort to settle the countryside, particularly in the early going, might have been stronger, there were those who, from the outset, came to New Netherland to stay and make a new life for themselves. Most of these colonists came with their families and made up the “stable core” of the colony. These true colonists took up lands, built homes, and continually called upon authorities in the metropole to send more settlers. The documentary records of New France are similarly replete with letters and petitions from those who saw themselves as permanent colonists imploring officials in France to send more settlers. It was the intention, then, of the “stable core” of colonists in both New France and New Netherland that these colonies become, not just linear commercial networks or trade outposts, but territorial settlement colonies.

By the same token, a narrow focus on cultural history has also allowed scholars such as Merwick and Seed to ignore the larger concerns and intentions of policymakers in the metropole. Merwick argues that the Dutch were simply not culturally disposed to create settlement colonies and only had an interest in establishing “along shore” trading stations that did not dispossess the Native Peoples of their lands. To make this argument, she sets up a false analogy between the practices of the Dutch East India Co. and the WIC. The Dutch East India Company, she notes, made no attempt to settle regions in Asia, but merely set up off-shore posts to carry on trade. Since the VOC provided the
model for the West India Co., it only stands to reason, she argues, that the WIC, too, adopted the similar polices and practices, which were firmly rooted in Dutch culture. Up until 1638, at least, says Merwick, the Dutch had no intention of establishing an agriculturally based territorial colony in New Netherland, but only a light-footprint trading colony. Unfortunately, her argument ignores the very different circumstances the VOC and the WIC faced. Asia was much more densely populated than North America, and the societies the VOC encountered there were in a position to successfully resist any significant Dutch settlement of their territory. The territories in which Dutch settlement took place in North America, while by no means empty wildernesses, were much more sparsely settled, and the Algonkians among whom the Dutch lived were not well-enough organized socially and politically to withstand European settlement over the course of time. In this regard, it is germane to point out, that the better-organized Iroquois did not allow Dutch settlements in their territory until the founding of Schenectady and seem to have done so only in 1662 for their own purposes.

In Ceremonies of Possession, Patricia Seed also focuses on the cultural practices of various European nations as they carved out colonies in the New World. She argues that each imperialist nation employed different methods to assert possession, methods which were so culturally distinct that they were unintelligible to people from other nations. The French, for instance, took possession by erecting crosses and holding ceremonies in which the Native Peoples were encouraged to participate. The Dutch relied on pictorial representations and literary descriptions of the places they meant to possess and emphasized their right to possession through maintaining a regular trade with
those places. In Seed’s account, it was only the English who employed settlement to assert possession, with all of the ill effects it had on native communities.\textsuperscript{10}

But Seed’s study, while demonstrating that different European powers may have emphasized one ceremony over another, ignores the fact that, for the most part, they all used the full panoply of ceremonies of possession, including erecting markers of one sort or another, establishing the position of territories through celestial navigation, map-making, renaming, issuing legal documents and pronunciamentos, providing literary and graphic descriptions, creating continuous trade relations, and so on. Moreover, in a larger sense, none of these ceremonies seems to have mattered very much. They were merely the signs and symbols of possession. The metropolitan governments of the imperialist powers well understood this and realized early in the colonization process that the only practical way of possessing territory in the Americas was to occupy it. This is why both the French and the Dutch, taking account of the legal and diplomatic circumstances under which they interacted with other European powers, explicitly asserted that the only legally valid method of asserting possession of territory in the New World was settlement. But by focusing so narrowly on cultural history, Merwick and Seed ignore this political and practical reality, which the imperialist powers themselves could only do at their peril.

Given the explicit intention of the French and Dutch to create agriculturally based settlement colonies in North America, it is pertinent to ask: How well did they succeed? Superficially, this question is easy to answer. One need only look at the population figures for each colony to discover that the Dutch had better success than the French. This observation, in itself, demonstrates the value of a comparative study of New France
and New Netherland. Because they invariably compare the settlement of New
Netherland to the English colonies, most historians judge the Dutch colonial effort a
failure. But in comparison with New France during the same period, the Dutch colony
seems much more successful.

And yet, while it is easy to see the relative success of the Dutch colonization
effort vis-à-vis the French, the reasons for it are not so readily apparent. An analysis of
the fur trade provides no answers. Furs, specifically beaver furs, constituted by far the
largest flow of commodities from each colonial network to the metropole, and it was the
plan of the metropolitan governments to use the profits of this trade to fund settlement.
But in each case this became impossible, largely because the fur trade was not profitable
enough to support the administration of these start-up colonies, let alone pay for their
further development. Although the French extracted more value in furs from their
network than did the Dutch, the French fur trade companies went bankrupt one by one,
and even the WIC saw so little prospect of using the fur trade to effect settlement that it
ended up surrendering the monopoly.

Nor can it be said that New Netherland’s greater success in attracting settlers is
attributable to greater solicitude on the part of the WIC than of the Company of New
France for “peopling” the countryside. It might well be argued that the Company of New
France, which had no other purpose aside from supporting settlement, made the better
effort. The WIC, which had a much fuller plate of responsibilities, tended to neglect New
Netherland, at least until after the peace settlement with Spain in 1648 and the subsequent
loss in the mid-1650s of Brazil and El Mina.
In terms of the fur trade, there was not much difference in how New France and New Netherland operated. Furs flowed out in great numbers and minor trade goods flowed in. The key differences between New France and New Netherland relate, not to the flow of furs, but rather to the relative openness of the two colonies to flows of ideas and people. During the course of the early seventeenth century, the French network became progressively more closed to the inflow of people and ideas, while the Dutch network became progressively more open to a diversity of interests. The relative openness of the Dutch network led, in time, to the creation of a series of new networks, all of which connected to one another at New Amsterdam. By contrast, New France developed only one significant network outside of the fur trade—that of the Roman Catholic Church, which was first controlled by the Récollets and later by the Jesuits. This network, which paralleled and later extended the fur trade network to Montreal, was no doubt vital to sustaining New France, particularly in troubled times. It also helped to transform Quebec, which became, not just a simple primate center on an extractive network, but a gateway center that facilitated the flow of religious ideas and institutions into the St. Lawrence region and by so doing helped to produce a few new nodes—notably Montreal and a number of missions to the allied Indians. But this developmental function soon became stunted because of restrictions inherent in the type of religious network Quebec served. Jesuit control ultimately meant that the French network was legally closed to all but Roman Catholics. More importantly, after 1627, the network—as per Cardinal Richelieu’s instructions—also became closed to all but natural French subjects.
By contrast, New Netherland was relatively open to religious and ethnic diversity. Although dissenters could not build churches or conduct public services, they could settle in the province with all the rights of citizens. They were not compelled to attend services at the state church and, with the exception of the Jews, could also hold public office without converting to the state church, as was required in New France. In these ways, New Netherland welcomed foreigners to the point that perhaps a majority of the population by 1663 was not “Dutch” at all by ethnicity or culture. The overall result was the creation in New Netherland of sub-communities, each of which had its own network connections. The Jewish community in New Amsterdam, for example, established trade connections with Jews, not only in Amsterdam, but also on the Dutch island of Curaçao in the Caribbean, where there was a sizable Sephardic settlement. After the reconquest of New Sweden, the Jews of New Amsterdam also began to trade with the Swedes and Finns on the Delaware. It might be noted, too, that the Swedes and Finns, most of whom were farmers, had their own connections. They sold grain and livestock to Maryland and Virginia tobacco planters and also maintained connections to their homeland, so that in the 1660s more Swedes and Finns arrived in the colony from Europe.

But it was the English who, outside of the Dutch themselves, provided the most extensive network connections to New Netherland. As early as the 1620s, the Dutch were re-exporting manufactures—chiefly linens and ceramics—to Plymouth Colony. It only stands to reason that Plymouth and New Amsterdam should have entered into amicable trade relations, since many of the Plymouth colonists had lived for several years in Leiden. One of the most important figures in developing trade connections between
the Dutch and English was Isaac Allerton. Allerton came to Plymouth aboard the
\textit{Mayflower} in 1620 and served as assistant to the governor and business agent for the
colony from 1621 to 1631. He made numerous trips to London to take care of
Plymouth’s official business and to buy provisions for the colony. He also purchased
goods on his own account in order to carry on trade with the Indians. By the early 1630s,
though, Allerton’s questionable trade practices began to make him unpopular in
Plymouth, and he moved to Marblehead, Massachusetts. He is first known to have come
to New Amsterdam to sell corn in 1639, but by the 1640s, he had taken up residence in
the town and was named one of the Eight Men. Allerton’s chief talent, though, was in
organizing trade, not only between New Amsterdam and the New England colonies, but
also between New Amsterdam and New Sweden, as well as between New Amsterdam
and the Dutch and English colonies in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{13}

The connections between New Netherland and the English colonies, though,
extended well beyond those of Allerton. The Dutch traded sugar and linen to Virginia in
exchange for tobacco, some of which they resold in New England, and some of which
they exported to Amsterdam. Massachusetts Gov. John Winthrop also noted that the
Bostonians traded with the Dutch for such diverse items as sheep, brass, linen, sugar, and
liquor. The New Netherlanders had especially good trade relations with Rhode Island by
dint of the fact that many of the English colonists who came from Massachusetts to settle
in New Netherland filtered through that colony—including John Throckmorton and John
Underhill—who were intermediaries in the trade.\textsuperscript{14}

Jewish, Scandinavian, and English networks were only a few of the more visible
trade and cultural connections that radiated out of New Netherland. It only stands to
reason that the French and Germans had their own connections back to their homelands and elsewhere. The Africans, too, free and slave, had, as Graham Russell Hodges has shown, their own internal network of culture and trade, which perhaps also connected through sailors of African descent to the larger Atlantic World. Then, too, the various religious denominations—Congregationalists, Lutherans, Mennonites, Baptists, and even Quakers—seem to have participated in networks of information, and likely of commerce, too, with co-religionists outside of New Netherland and often across the Atlantic.

But undoubtedly the most important network in which New Netherland participated was that of the WIC itself, and the very fact that the WIC was so different from the Company of New France begins to explain the very different ways in which the French and Dutch colonies developed. Unlike the Company of New France, which constituted a specific network that connected Paris to the St. Lawrence through Rouen and the French channel ports, the WIC constituted a diffuse network that connected nodes of trade and administration throughout the Atlantic World. The WIC’s network linked New Amsterdam to Amsterdam, of course, but also connected to nodes in West Africa, Brazil, Guiana, and the Lesser Antilles. As a diffuse network, the WIC significantly increased the traffic in and out of the port of New Amsterdam, making the town a much busier hub of commerce and information than Quebec could hope to be as a node on the specific network of the Company of New France.

The complex, overlapping networks in which New Amsterdam was a node provided greater economic opportunities for New Netherlanders than were available to the inhabitants of New France. While a good many New Netherlanders opted to concentrate on the fur trade, particularly after the WIC opened it to all comers in 1639,
others found alternative ways of participating in the economy. While both New France and New Netherland made strides in increasing their agricultural bases, New Netherland far outstripped the French colony, in spite of the fact that agricultural workers made up a larger percentage of the total population in New France. Farmers in New Netherland not only supplied the regional market during the late 1640s and 1650s, but began to export farm produce to the West Indies, South America, and Africa, as well as to the English colonies and to Europe. The colony’s agricultural output was such that it went beyond providing subsistence to the farm communities themselves but also created enough surplus to meet the needs of the colony’s internal market and for export. New France never reached this level of production, and even if it had, it did not have connections to such a wide range of markets.

The extensive overseas network of the WIC, which allowed for a much greater circulation of people, goods, and ideas through the port of New Amsterdam than Quebec ever enjoyed, also provided economic opportunities outside of either agriculture or the fur trade. Carpenters, sail makers, rope makers, shipwrights, and other port workers catered to the needs of ships visiting New Amsterdam, while the many grog shops and houses of prostitution provided entertainment for visiting sailors and soldiers. A number of merchants made their fortunes in brewing, including Olaf van Cortlandt and Govert Loockermans. In short, New Amsterdam developed a port economy beyond the fur trade that was far more extensive than what could be achieved at Quebec, which was located some 800 miles inland on a very specific network.

The openness to diversity and the multitude of networks in which it participated set New Amsterdam apart from Quebec and over time allowed the Dutch colony to attract
a greater population. As a diffuse network, the WIC on its own contributed to the
diversity of the population of New Netherland, and each new sub-community established
new networks, each of which connected to the others at New Amsterdam. Eventually,
the relative openness of the Dutch colony and its participation in a complex of networks
led to a fundamental shift in how the WIC went about attracting people to New
Netherland. This shift allowed the Dutch colony to far outstrip New France in terms of
population by 1663.

Prior to 1639 or so, there was hardly any difference in how the French and Dutch
went about the business of “peopling” their colonies. In each case, the company that held
the fur trade monopoly recruited settlers in the metropole and by contract agreed to
transport them to the colony and provide them with provisions for a certain period of
time. This proved to be a costly proposition and did not result in any significant growth
of the colonial population. After the failure of these initial efforts, the Company of New
France and the WIC each adopted the idea of turning the settlement effort over to private
“lords of the manor,” the seigneurs and patroons, who in exchange for extensive land
grants would agree to transport and provision a certain number of colonists. With the
exception of Van Rensselaer’s patroonship, these efforts also failed to significantly boost
population. The patroons and seigneurs, like the merchant companies, tried to recruit
settlers in the metropole among people who had little interest in or motivation for
immigrating to North America as permanent settlers. As a result, the patroons and
seigneurs had to pay exorbitant salaries and agree to provide extensive provisions for the
colonists they were able to recruit, and in many cases these colonists had little inclination
to remain in the colony once their contracts were up.
The effort on the part of the monopoly companies and the patroons and seigneurs to dragoon people into settling in North America did not achieve very much. The French never moved beyond this method, at least up through 1663, with predictable results. Prior to 1663, New France never advanced much beyond a linear, extractive network. For New Netherland, it was Kieft, aided by the WIC’s decision to give up its fur trade monopoly in 1639, who hit upon a new way of attracting settlers, one that was far less expensive and far more successful. This was to allow people to come on their own initiative and for their own reasons. He did this by simply offering land patents to groups of settlers—largely English but also some French and Dutch—who wished to create little town-based communities of their own. This simple expedient resulted in a population boom during the last two decades of Dutch rule, which, in turn, transformed the New Netherland into a true territorial settlement colony.

Kieft’s innovation also transformed the provincial capital into something more than a simple node on a largely extractive solar/dendritic network that was responsible for organizing the outflow of beaver furs and distributing, in a rather inefficient way, European trade goods to the Native Peoples. In Kieft’s time, New Amsterdam began to take on the characteristics of a gateway center that facilitated the rapid creation of new urbanized nodes in its immediate hinterlands. With the legal sanction of authorities in New Amsterdam, at least sixteen new towns sprang up in New Netherland over the next two decades. Quebec, by contrast, never made this transition, which resulted in stark differences in the development of the two colonies and their provincial capitals.

The St. Lawrence colony did branch out to establish and maintain settlements and religious missions at Tadoussac to the east of Quebec and at Three-Rivières and Montreal
to the west. The French also managed to establish some minor posts and settlements elsewhere. But all of these nodes, and even Quebec itself, remained relatively small until the crown took direct control of the colony in 1663. By 1660 Quebec included a small government compound, the fort on the heights started in Champlain’s time, an Ursuline monastery, a Jesuit college, the Hôtel Dieu of the Hospitalières, a church, several chapels, the Communauté storehouse, a few private homes, and perhaps a mill or two—little more. Even three years after royalization and an influx of troops and settlers, Quebec had achieved a population of just 547.16

In stark contrast, New Amsterdam was a rather large town. By 1664, it included Fort Amsterdam with its barracks of WIC soldiers, a large church, the director-general and secretary’s offices, a statehouse, WIC storehouses, and the facilities of private merchant companies, a city tavern, numerous taphouses, a windmill, several breweries, a number of retail shops, and literally hundreds of private homes and businesses—some of them built of stone. The population was such that a visitor might identify specific neighborhoods organized by ethnicity. There was, for instance, a free black district. Although New Englanders had significantly encroached on Dutch territory, taking control of the Connecticut River, Stuyvesant was able to retake the trading post on the Delaware from the Swedes and to strengthen the WIC’s control of the upper Hudson. Among the numerous small towns were Beverwijck near Orange, Bergen south of the Hudson, Nieuw Amersfort, Gravesend, Hempstead, Middleburgh, Throg’s Neck, Newtown, Wiltwyck, Rusdorp, Breukelen, and Flushing in what was to become New York. There was also the large agriculturally based patroonship at Rensselaerswyck on the Hudson and New Amstel on the Delaware.17
If the purpose of a colony is to provide a market for manufactured goods from the metropole, as Adam Smith noted, how well did New France and New Netherland meet this purpose? Certainly neither the French nor Dutch succeeded in converting the Native population into a profitable market for manufactured goods. But unlike New France, New Netherland had become a largely self-sufficient agriculturally based colony by the 1650s, and its population provided a profitable market—albeit a relatively small one—for manufactures from Europe. These were distributed chiefly through New Amsterdam, which in this regard performed the traditional role of a central place. The provisions trade developed as an adjunct to the fur trade, and the great merchant companies from Amsterdam that came to dominate the fur trade after 1640 found a profitable business in supplying the colonial market with shoes, clothing, books, silverware, home furnishings, and all manner of other such products. The colonists were able to pay for them with surplus from raising livestock, tobacco, and wheat, as well as with furs. This market for manufactures had developed in New Netherland to such a degree that the English townsman of Gravesend petitioned the WIC for permission to charter their own ship to bring provisions and settlers to the colony.18

Oliver Rink has claimed that the control four great Amsterdam merchant houses (the Verbrugge Co., the Van Rensselaer Co., the Wolff Co., and the Hoornbeek Co.) exerted over the trade network between Amsterdam and the colony prevented New Amsterdam from developing an independent merchant community of its own. In his view the Amsterdam companies drained off the capital that might otherwise have financed the development of a “viable, colony-based merchant community.” In terms of the control of shipping between Amsterdam and New Amsterdam, he is probably right.
But because Rink’s perspective is from the metropole, he seems not to have recognized that an independent commercial community did develop in New Netherland, in part, through cooperation with the great Amsterdam houses. Among the wealthy merchants of New Amsterdam were:

- Olaf van Cortlandt, who made his money in brewing and in the distribution of provisions that he obtained in part from his brother-in-law Jeremias van Rensselaer. At his death in 1674, he was the third richest man in the province of New York.

- Govert Loockermans, van Cortlandt’s brother-in-law, who became one of the wealthiest independent merchants in New Amsterdam by plying the Indian trade from New England to Virginia in his own ship. Van Cortlandt and Loockermans both initially came to New Amsterdam as employees of the WIC, and Loockermans worked for a time for the Verbrugge Co. before striking out on his own. He and Isaac Allerton were joint owners of the trading bark *Hope*.

- Jan and Jeremias van Rensselaer, who moved to Rensselaerswyck after the death of their father, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, and took control of the family trading company and patroonship. The immigration of two of the Rensselaers to Rensselaerswyck meant that the leadership of one of the most important of the Amsterdam companies had relocated to New Netherland, a fact that would allow the Van Rensselaer Co. to continue the trade between New York and Amsterdam once the English took control of the colony without being subject to the onerous duties and fees the English imposed on foreign traders.
• Cornelis van Steenwyck, who was associated with Loockermans in trade to the West Indies. Steenwyck made most of his money in shipping and in mercantile trade and was so well-circumstanced that on at least one occasion he loaned money to WIC officials in New Amsterdam.

• Philip Pieterse Schuyler, the son of an Amsterdam baker, who came to Beverwijck in the early 1650s to engage in the fur trade. Schuyler soon became one of the principal traders of the town. Like Van Cortlandt and Loockermans, he invested his money in real estate both in the countryside and in New Amsterdam.\(^{19}\)

Many of these merchants survived and thrived after the English seized New Netherland. In the meantime, all of the great Amsterdam concerns, with the exception of the Van Rensselaers Co., collapsed. This fact, in itself, attests to the relative independence of the New Netherland merchant community.\(^{20}\)

In terms of diversifying the economy, building population, inscribing the landscape, creating a self-sufficient agricultural colony and providing a market for manufactures—all initial goals of the colonizers—New Netherland far outstripped New France in the period before 1663 and even after. In spite of all of the complaints of the States General, the WIC directors, and the colonists themselves, New Netherland was a success as a colony, a fact that the complaints and controversies encapsulated in the documentary evidence tends to obscure. Even in its own time, this success was hard to see because contemporaries, like so many generations of historians afterward, generally measured New Netherland’s progress against that of the English colonies. But on its own terms and in relation to New France, New Netherland did succeed. As a community, it
had become a place with its own reasons for existing and its own aspirations for the future.

New Netherland did not, however, ultimately survive as a Dutch colony. Within a few years of its transformation from a primate node on an extractive network to a gateway center, New Amsterdam fell to the English along with the entire province. New Netherland would henceforth be a dominion of the duke of York and, after 1685, a royal province in the English empire. France, meanwhile, managed to hold on to its colony along the St. Lawrence for another hundred years, which allowed the French to leave a much more discernible mark on North America than did the Dutch. The reasons the English seized New Netherland when they did and left New France alone can be traced to European politics in the second half of the seventeenth century. From the 1650s through the 1670s, the relationship between England and Dutch Republic was generally hostile, giving the English a motivation to seize Dutch overseas possessions. The relatively friendly relationship between the Stuart kings and Louis XIV, meanwhile, meant that French colonies were safe from English attack. Of course, this relationship abruptly changed in 1689 when the Dutch prince William of Orange, the enemy of the Sun King, assumed the throne of England. Still, in spite of the ongoing wars between Britain and France after 1689, France was able to hold on to Quebec until 1763. Even then it took a tremendous effort and an all-out assault on the French provincial capital before the British were able to seize it. New Netherland, by contrast, with a population just under 10,000, fell to a small fleet of four English ships and 400 troops. Stuyvesant, who initially wanted to fight, ended up marching out of the Fort and surrendering without firing a shot. How could this be so?
The answer again lies in political decisions made in the metropole. Although by 1660 New Netherland had made more headway than New France in transforming itself into a territorial colony and a true market for European goods, the turning point in the fate of each colony came with a decision by the metropolitan government about whether or not it should take direct control. In 1662, Louis XIV decided that the French government should takeover the fur-trade monopoly, and the next year, he royalized New France outright. In short order, the crown sent hundreds of soldiers to end the Iroquois menace. It began investing money in the colony to build infrastructure, and it also recruited settlers, reorganized the seigneurships, and sent out a royal governor, who reported directly to the crown. Crown control meant, too, that the colony was to be exclusively French and Roman Catholic, maintaining the social, political, and religious cohesion New France had enjoyed since at least 1632.21

For New Netherland, as Russell Shorto has pointed out, the turning point came in 1652, when the States General decided not to assume direct control. Adriaen van der Donck and his associates nearly persuaded the Dutch government to take this step, but the outbreak of war between the Netherlands and England prevented it. In short, the trouble was the diffuse network on which New Netherland was a node. While this network helped New Netherland begin the process of transformation from a linear to a territorial colony and allowed it to boost its population, it also made it vulnerable. Because the WIC was both a trading company and a military arm of the States General, once hostilities broke out, the Dutch government had to rely on the company to prosecute the war. It could not, therefore, in any way challenge the WIC’s commercial interests, including those in New Amsterdam. This and its own administrative weakness
precluded the States General from taking direct control of New Netherland in the 1650s and in a sense sealed the colony’s fate. The States General and the WIC diverted resources from New Netherland to other parts of the network to protect what both saw as more important interests. In the end, the WIC lost control of both Angola and Brazil, which led to the company’s sharp economic decline and eventual bankruptcy. After 1652, the WIC could not afford to invest much in New Netherland, nor could the metropolitan government afford to challenge the WIC’s control of the colony. Moreover, while the promise of liberty of conscience and municipal self-government created a diffuse network that increased New Netherland’s population, it did so at the expense of social, religious, and political cohesion. Much of the population was not loyal to the Dutch government or to the WIC, so that when the English fleet came to call, there were few citizens willing to defend Dutch sovereignty.22

1 Vance, *The Merchant’s World*, 69
2 Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 2-4
3 Condon argues that the Dutch had no intention to create a settlement or territorial colony until 1639 when the WIC gave up the fur trade monopoly and allowed free trade. Merwick sees the turn to settlement occurring as a result of Kieft’s War. See Condon, *New York Beginnings*, 140-41, 143 and Merwick, *The Shame and the Sorrow*, 202-6; also Stephen J. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 2-4 and Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*, 11-12.
4 This is not to say that there was no opposition to the settlement plans among high officials in the metropole. Sully, for instance, among the key officials of Henry IV, was dead set against establishing French colonies in the New World. In the case of New Netherland, the Heren XIX essentially washed their hands of any further involvement with the settlement of New Netherland after 1625, so that the colonization program fell to the New Netherland Commission, as it has been called, a subcommittee of the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC. The commission, on which Kiliaen van Rensselaer was the key member, never lost site of the settlement mission.
6 Perhaps the seminal work in the development of post-colonial theory is Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), which was deeply critical of Enlightenment ideas. Said argued essentially that Enlightenment thought was little more than an intellectual rationalization for the West’s domination of non-Westerners. While many writers have taken up the cudgels where Said left off, he himself moderated his view in later years. In *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), Said recognized that Enlightenment ideas were of use, even for non-Westerners.
Thomas J. Condon writes that the non-Dutch population of New Netherland ranged between twenty and forty percent. But it was probably much higher. The English population of the province was about 2,000 by 1664, which would on its own account for more than 20 percent of the total population. There were also between 500 and 800 people of African descent and about 150 Lutheran families, some whom may have been Dutch, but most of whom were likely German, Swedish, and Finnish. Condon, *New York Beginnings*, 177; Rink, *Holland on the Hudson*, 166-67; Jacobs, *New Netherland*, 298-99; Hodges, *Root & Branch*, 31.


Arent Isaacs, Cornelis Melyn, William Coddington, William Brenton, Jeremy Clarke, and Richard Smith were among the merchants prominent in trade between New Amsterdam and Rhode Island. Smith maintained houses in Rhode Island and New Amsterdam. Wilcoxen, *Dutch Trade and Ceramics*, 40-41; Koot, *Empire at the Periphery*, 42, 44.


Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, 1:274-75; 384.


Rink, *Holland on the Hudson*, 183, 196, 210; *DRCHNY*, 2:155


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