©2012

Ahmet Kaya

THE IMPACT OF THE EU SECURITIZATION PROCESS ON

THE BORDER SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF TURKEY

"Towards the Emergence of a Border Security Actor?"

by

Ahmet Kaya

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Global Affairs

written under the direction of

Dr. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia

and approved by

Dr. Norman Samuels

Dr. Yale Ferguson

Dr. Mercer L. Sullivan

Newark, New Jersey

October, 2012

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Impact of the EU Securitization Process on

the Border Security Framework of Turkey

Toward the Emergence of a Border Security Actor?

By

Ahmet Kaya

Dissertation Director:

Dr. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia

The capability of states to deal with illegal flows and the states' role in providing border security have undergone a dramatic transformation in the face of globalization. In order to understand this transformation, it was believed conducting a case study that includes the European Union (EU) and Turkey, would provide notable insights. Having considered the current literature, the author argues that there is little research with regard to the impact of the securitization of the EU borders on nation states and existing scholars have not discussed this current topic precisely. Therefore, the present research discussed the probable impacts of the securitization process and the changing security role of nation states in the area of border security.

In this respect, this study concentrated on addressing questions regarding "whether there has been any significant impact of the securitization process thus changing Turkey's security framework and security role". In order to measure the impact, some variables including legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions of Turkey

were selected. Changes in the chosen variables were examined over specific time periods. These time frames represented the pre-securitization period (<1999), the beginning of the securitization period (1999-2004), and the deepening of the securitization process (2005-2010) that have occurred as part of the EU accession process. In order to measure the significance of the impacts and evaluate the ultimate results, the author conducted interviews with 40 Turkish and non-Turkish professionals, experts in the field of border security, some of whom are involved in the transformation of the Turkish border security system in line with the EU requirements.

Findings obtained from the present research prove that the securitization process has had a significant impact on the evolution of the border security framework of Turkey, thus leading to a change in its security role. Having considered the evolution of the process in the *Areas of Freedom, Security and Justice,* the emergence of the new security agenda in the EU, and Turkey's accession to the EU, the author argues that border security and borders will continue to play a crucial role in contemporary world policy and politics reflecting a situation similar to that of the Westphalian period.

Keywords: securitization, border security, globalization, regionalization, the European Union, Turkey.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

encouraging me in every step of my graduation process. However, I can cite only some of them here: A. Rahmi Kirkpinar, Derin Akdeniz, Irfan Ciftci, Emirhan Darcan, Sahin Buyrukbilen, Ayhan Akbulut, Zeki Bilgin, Esref Erturk, Hakan Aydogan, Onur Murat Koprulu, Hudaverdi Balci, and Ozcan Ozkan. There are perhaps many people to thank and mention their name here but with the limits of the page I have to conclude my last acknowledgements.

Last but not least, my appreciations and respects are for my Mom and Dad, who made me "me" and had to endure my absence from home. My admirations are also for my wife, Nermin who deserves these acknowledgments because of her patience and endless love.

Dedicated to:

My grandparents, Ali Kaya, Suleyman and Zulfiye Mermer who were my first mentors.

My grandmothers, Sahinder Kaya and Nazire Mermer who passed away while I was in

the USA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

A. Tables

B. Figures

CHAPTER-I: INTRODUCTION

Most of the research on Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) has concentrated on its population size, human rights situation, retention of an Islamic identity, territorial and political border conflicts with neighboring countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, and Iraq), and its geographical proximity to countries experiencing internal disputes, as well as political and economic crises which make the EU very anxious about Turkey's membership. Turkey's permanent membership in the EU is therefore a controversial issue as the EU is torn between blocking Turkey's admission to the EU on the one hand and sustaining the current strong partnership initiatives that exist with Turkey on the other.

Remarkably, there is little research with regard to the potential impact of securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey. The same can be said about Turkey's contributions to the European peace and security framework in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), which includes border security, migration management, and police cooperation. Moreover, as an unintended consequence of the securitization process, Turkey could become a crucial border security actor. Hence, the purpose of the present study was to contribute to the current research in this field by discussing the probable impacts of securitization and the changing security role of nation states in the area of border security.

Examining the EU and Turkey in a case study was felt to provide insight specifically into the impact of regional securitization of a country's borders on transit and receiving countries. The case study approach was selected to shed light on the impact of securitization not only at a regional level, but also at the national level. The present study

discussed whether the securitization of the EU borders has profound implications for the entire Turkish national security framework or not.

With this in mind, the study questioned "whether there has been any significant impact of the securitization process, thus changing border security framework of Turkey and its security role". In order to measure this impact, some variables including legal, administrative, budgetary, and external action variables related to Turkey were examined. Changes in the chosen variables were examined through specific time intervals, between 1999 and 2005, representing the pre-securitization period (<1999), the beginning of the securitization period (1999-2004), and the process of deepening the securitization activities (2005-2010) which occurred during the EU accession process. Furthermore, in order to measure the significance of the impact and evaluate the ultimate results, the author interviewed 40 key Turkish and non-Turkish professionals, all experts in the field of border security and actively undertaking a role regarding the transformation of the Turkish border security system to comply with EU expectations.

The present research comprises two main components. In the first, the paradoxical observation the author encountered, as well as a literature review, and policy aspects with regard to the topic of the present study are addressed. In the second, the research design and methodology is articulated, and the outcome of the study concerning the impact of the securitization process is examined, followed by concluding remarks based on the key findings of the study, along with its policy implications. Considering the diverse aspects of the present research, the following conceptual framework briefly explains the scope of the dissertation, which aimed to shed light on the securitization of the EU borders and its impact on the border security framework of Turkey.

Chapter 2 provided a summary of the paradoxical insights the author examined in the context of the present research area. The literature shows that the securitization process not only generates new obstacles, but also provides new opportunities, particularly in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU. For example, securitizing the EU borders requires reconsidering Turkey's prospected membership. For example, the securitization process, which aims to protect the European identity by excluding Turkey from being a member of the EU and being separated from the economically and politically unstable Eastern neighboring countries of Turkey, can be considered as an obstacle towards Turkey's accession to the EU, on the one hand. On the other hand, with the impact of enlargement, it is clear that securitizing Turkey's borders can also produce opportunities for both the EU and Turkey. For example, Turkey can contribute to the EU peace and security framework in the domain of *Freedom, Security and Justice*. In this respect, the literature the author reviewed suggested that the securitization process could lead Turkey to become a border *security actor*.

Chapter 3 summarized the attempts to examine the conceptual and theoretical explanations of the notion of security by reviewing the existing literature. In this sense, it can be argued that the concept of security has changed as the nature of threat has changed. The concepts and contemporary paradigms presented are basically those that have developed from security concerns regarding existential, potential or perceived threats.

In this respect, the paradigms (realist, globalist and securitization) and concepts regarding border security are considered important due to the fact that they frame and form domestic and international policy and politics. Furthermore, in addition to a

discussion about this issue, this chapter provides a critical evaluation of the cited theoretical perspectives related to this topic.

Chapter 4 sought to clarify the implications of the current approaches and policy aspects of the present study. This chapter argues that the uniqueness of the research depended on addressing several issues, including policy perspectives such as the new aspects of security, border security policy, and security roles of the EU and Turkey.

This chapter thus addressed crucial aspects of the EU border security policy including its historical evolution and its changing notion. The evolution of the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)* brief indicates the extent of the impact of the securitization process within the EU. Furthermore, this chapter provides brief information on Turkey's existing border security policies, Turkey's accession to the EU, as well as policy aspects regarding the application of security actorness to the EU and Turkey.

The first part ends by addressing the linkage between the literature and the present study. The literature review discussed in the third chapter required further research with regard to understanding the impact of securitization process on nation states. In this respect, the present research aimed to extend the prevailing data by revealing the implications of the EU securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. Therefore, the second part of the study was designed to focus on the methodologically measuring the impact of the EU securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey and sought to illustrate the implications of the securitization process through interview findings and the content analysis of documents. The following information discusses the chapters of the second part of the dissertation.

Chapter 5 addressed the research questions, hypotheses, variables, and criteria which are discussed throughout the dissertation. The research questions focused on various aspects of the impact of the securitization process. The foundations of the criteria, data collection methods, data analyzing tools, and data evaluation as well as data analyzing strategies were also key dimensions of the processes used to assess the answers to the research questions.

The present study focused mostly on a qualitative methodology. However, it also benefited from a quantitative approach that was applied to better address the research questions. Therefore, in line with the research questions, a case-study approach was adopted. The qualitative methods were used including observations, interviews and archival research and were expected to contribute to the triangulation of data which aimed to measure and analyze the impact of securitization in a qualitative way.

Chapter 6 can be considered as the core chapter of the present research as it concentrated on notable impacts of the research. Furthermore, this chapter provides analytical results of the research in accordance with the findings derived from the content analysis of documents and findings obtained from interviews. These results helped the researcher to formulate probable answers for each research question as addressed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 7 ends with a summary of the key findings and policy implications obtained from the present research. In this respect, this chapter illustrates the implications of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey through interview findings and the content analysis of documents. These findings indicate that border security is still as important as it was in the Westphalian period. However, while

borders and nation states can be considered important, the nation states' role and capability in providing border security have changed dramatically within the globalization process. The present research further argues that some aspects and impact of the securitization process can lead Turkey to become a border security actor.

Within the framework of the research, both limitations and strengths of the study were clarified. As stated above, the study aims to contribute to existing security studies by discussing the impact of the securitization process on nation states' security framework. The present study may seem to be a densely theory-based one, however, it has enabled the applications of the securitization theory on an intergovernmental organization and a specific nation state. As the intended research is focusing on the securitization of the EU borders and its impacts on the border security framework of Turkey, the ability to reveal those implications of securitization supports the significance of the study.

From this point of view, the present research provides concrete results from the application of the securitization theory with chosen variables including legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions of Turkey. Policy-makers and scholars can evaluate the application of the chosen variables and predict some results. Therefore, the present study can be considered as applicable and measurable.

In addition to the strong points of the study, there are also some limitations which need to be specified within the scope of the study. For instance, *the researcher voluntarily limited his approach to the concept of security actorness within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The notion of actorness or becoming a border security actor is therefore expected to be understood solely in the domain of AFSJ.*

Broader studies that focus on global actors, international actors, regional actors or being an actor on the common foreign and security issues were excluded from the content of the study.

By contrast, becoming an actor in the *Area of Freedom Security and Justice* or border security issues has been highlighted and acknowledged within the scope of the study. Moreover, in order to prevent conceptual and terminological confusion concerning tables and figures obtained from NVivo-9 software program, an explanation of emergent categories and terminologies was made under each figure and table. By doing that, it was thought the reader would have a better understanding of the concepts used in tables and figures.

In conclusion, findings obtained from both quantitative and qualitative credentials provide evidence that the securitization process has had a significant impact on Turkey's border security framework thereby changing its security role. Having considered the evolution of the Area of Freedom Security Justice and the emergence of the new security agenda in the EU as well as Turkey's accession to the EU, the author argues that border security and borders will continue to play a crucial role in contemporary world policy and politics just as they did in the Westphalian period.

PART-A

CHAPTER-II: PARADOXICAL OBSERVATION

Turkey's permanent membership within the EU has been a very controversial issue due to the fact that Turkey is not a member, yet it has had strong ties with Europe since the end of the World War II. For example, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, which *de facto* plays a role in the European security environment.[1] Turkey is also a strategic partner of regional security organizations established within Europe. To give an example, Turkey is a member of Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) which is an international police organization facilitating and securing the rapid exchange of information among law enforcement agencies in 13 Southeast European countries.[2]

In addition, Turkey has signed a cooperation agreement with European Police Office (Europol) which is a European Union law enforcement organization that enhances cooperation among competent authorities of the EU Member States in preventing and combating serious international organized crime and terrorism.[3]

Moreover, the Customs Union between the European Union and Turkey came into effect in 1996, thereby creating the closest economic and political relationship between the EU and a non-member country.[4] In this sense, Turkey is considered to be the only candidate country that signed the Custom Union Agreement with the EU before being a member.

In sum, Turkey has closely aligned herself with the West. Turkey is a founding member of the United Nations, a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD as well as an associate member of the Western European Union. These areas of cooperation have run parallel with deepening economic and political partnerships.[5] In this respect,

one can argue that these strong initiatives have played a key role in terms of reinforcing the security system of Europe.

However these strong partnerships need to be reconsidered in the light of the issue of the admission of Turkey to the EU. Turkey's membership can be viewed as either vital or trivial due to security reasons such as immigration, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Thus, this chapter clarifies factors, which can be used as arguments against membership as well as favoring membership.

As one aspect of accession, securitization can generate anti-membership arguments. Environmental, socio-economic, and geopolitical factors, for example, facilitate the flow of refugees and immigrants. Political and economic crises in the neighboring countries of Turkey have triggered immigration flows towards Europe. For example, more than 5,000 migrants fled from Libya and Tunisia, and the majority of them tried to seek refugee status in Southern Europe-raising concerns and fears about "invasion" of the EU by immigrants.[6] This, in turn, jeopardizes the efficiency of implementation of the EU border security agenda and therefore may be used as an argument against Turkey's membership.

Yet, securitization can offer new opportunities which in turn, can contribute to Turkey's admission to the EU. Securitizing Turkey's borders can provide opportunities for both the EU and Turkey. For instance, Turkey can contribute to the EU peace and security framework in the domain of *Freedom, Security and Justice* by securing national borders, as well as by having a mutual understanding of security challenges through cooperation and collaboration activities with the EU.

Therefore, Turkey is a very interesting case not only for the EU but also for the scholars who are skeptical about its role. Therefore, it can be pointed out that the securitization and accession processes not only generate new obstacles but also provide new opportunities, particularly in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU. Nonetheless, Turkey's accession to the EU is going to be a very big challenge if EU member states are not sufficiently convinced by the opportunities and contributions of Turkey to the EU in the Area of Freedom Security Justice.

In order to provide an analytical explanation concerning the arguments regarding Turkey's membership bid for the EU, a historical overview to the EU accession will be given, then the securitization and integration processes will be discussed, and lastly Turkey's accession to the EU within the context of border security will be examined. Thus, this chapter addresses the paradoxical situation regarding how securitization matters in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU.

A. Securitization Process and Admission of Turkey to the EU

The impact of the securitization process on Turkey's admission to the EU requires taking into consideration several aspects, including obstacles and opportunities which are used as an argument for either pro-membership and anti-membership of Turkey.[7] *Considering both the Turkish and EU perspectives, this section will reveal a paradoxical observation as regards whether the securitization process enhances Turkey's admission to the EU or brings up new alternative paths apart from full-accession.*

1. Arguments against Turkey's Admission to the EU

Implementing a border security agenda which is compatible with the EU is quite challenging for Turkey. There are several obstacles, including environmental, socio-

economic, and geopolitical factors that can play a role in implementing the European border security agenda in an efficient way. In terms of environmental obstacles, 65% of Turkey's land borders are mountainous. Borderlines are not clear, especially the eastern borders that feature rugged terrain with harsh climate conditions.[8] These environmental factors have adverse impacts on maintaining security in the region. And because of these cited conditions, Turkey is failing to eliminate border porosity, which has led to cross border terror attacks, narco-trafficking, and human smuggling in the region.[9]

Apart from physical conditions, there are also political factors which raise tensions and concerns over the border security debate within Europe. Political conflicts and economic crises in Turkey's eastern neighbors provoke migration towards Europe by using Turkey as a crossing point. Accordingly, Turkey has common borders with various countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria, Greece that are enforcing very different rules regarding border security issues. This affects the implementation of readmission procedures of apprehended illegal immigrants.[10] Moreover, some countries of origin are reluctant to sign and implement readmission agreements with Turkey. In order to prevent illegal flows from the eastern region, Turkey placed a geographic limitation on the provisions of the Geneva Convention through which its obligations would be applied only to persons seeking asylum from Europe, while disavowing any obligations towards non-European refugees.

The political and economic situation of bordering countries or peripheral countries facilitate refugee and immigrant flows. Turkey is thus reluctant to sign the readmission agreement with the EU because this agreement runs the risk of turning Turkey into a buffer zone. Icduygu and Sert (2010) have asserted that the readmission

agreement between the EU and Turkey would generate the creation of a buffer zone between the immigrant-attracting European core and the emigrant-producing peripheral regions and would create a burden on periphery states such as Turkey in controlling migration.[11]

Furthermore, the resistance against signing a readmission agreement with the EU is becoming more problematic when the perspective of membership has not been clearly articulated. The EU is using the accession card as a condition, thereby urging Turkey to sign the readmission agreement.[12] By contrast, as argued by Ozcan (2010), the readmission agreement with the EU is one of the important cards that Turkey has in its hand and Turkey should follow a foreign diplomacy policy based on its own interests before making a decision on signing the agreement.[13] Signing a readmission agreement with the EU is a very controversial issue that needs to be re-considered with a system of burden sharing which may also raise concerns among the European public and further arguments against Turkey's membership.

From the perspective of the EU, the management of the EU's long and escalating external borders is considered to be a challenge and requires a substantial investment.[14] As argued by Hill (2002) and Neuwahl (2005), it would be very hard to predict if the EU would want to extend their borders to southeastward countries, including Iraq, Iran and Syria.[15] Stretching their borders to these countries would raise more concerns than being bordered with Turkey.[16] In this sense, Anderson and Bort (2001) and Tocci (2010) have argued that the EU seeks to define its borders on the basis of its interests, which prioritize a European identity, maintaining a comfort zone that is currently protected by friendly buffer states such as Turkey.[17]

As a result of these concerns, since 1999 the proclamation date of Turkey's candidacy, the EU has urged Turkey both to securitize its borders and to adjust to norms of the international refugee regime which require Turkey to allocate more resources for managing migration flows across and within its borders.[18] Specifically, the EU asks Turkey to make clear-cut institutional improvements and to devote sufficient resources for managing migration and borders.[19]

The EU documents emphasize that border management structures in Turkey are currently split between the army, gendarmerie, police, and coast guard; however, Schengen's best practices require a single professional authority that is responsible for border management.[20] While screening the negotiating chapter regarding border security, the questions of EU officials have concentrated on whether there is a single authority that has the main responsibility for border management and whether there is intra-agency cooperation on border security.[21]

2. Arguments Favoring Turkey's Admission to the EU

Through the implementation of proactive policies regarding border security, both Turkey and the EU can benefit from new opportunities. Thus, in this section, we will discuss the probable opportunities which contribute to the convergence between the security policies of Turkey and the EU.

The physical proximity of Turkey to the areas having political and economic conflicts might make its integration into the EU more problematic, thereby securing the EU's borders but would increase the burden. However, these factors might also enhance Turkey's prospects of membership. Turkey's membership might increase the EU's success in dealing with security challenges.[22] Moreover, the most powerful catalyst for

political change that deeply affects Turkey's domestic policies has always been the European Union.[23] The Europeanization process can provide an opportunity for Turkey to catch up to the international standards that distinguish asylum seekers from illegal immigrants through the means of efficient organizational structures.[24]

In terms of the security aspect, Turkey would potentially have two roles: as a security risk or a security asset. While the integration would take the EU borders to the most unstable regions in the world, this would, in turn, provide increased cooperation on third pillar issues of the European Union that are addressed under *the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*.

Turkey's contribution to the prevention of threats, such as international terrorism, organized crimes, human trafficking and illegal immigration would also increase the European security and stability in the aftermath of the membership.[25] Furthermore, Turkey's membership would reinforce the EU's Neighborhood Policy and increase the EU's likelihood of being an international security actor.[26]

In this respect, Turkey can be an asset to the EU's security by keeping the unwanted and uncontrolled movement away from the EU.[27] The enhancement of Turkey's external borders would contribute to the prevention of illegal flows towards Europe, which can also be interpreted as a contribution to the EU's peace and security.[28] Thus, the membership perspective would promote the shared interests of Turkey and the EU, and this would also help Turkey to internalize the expectations of the EU in the area of border security.[29]

B.   Turkey's Accession to the EU and Border Security

The arguments against Turkey's accession mainly concentrate on territorial and political border conflicts with Bulgaria, Armenia, Cyprus, Greece, and Iraq; Turkey's considerable population (77 million); Turkey's issues regarding human rights; the Islamic identity of Turkey, and concerns over common borders with the countries experiencing internal disputes, as well as political and economic strains.[30] All of these variables have had an impact on public opinion and political will towards the EU membership of Turkey.

Moreover, as argued by Diez (2007), the EU has some concerns and therefore questions its own enlargement by asking "Do we have responsibilities that go beyond our immediate political community? Are there different values that require different political orders? If so, where can we draw borders and how can we defend these borders in order to defend our values?" The Turkish case therefore highlights the problems of applying principles as to securing established values by de-bordering and re-bordering.[31]

In the face of popular disappointment with the European integration and uncertainties over the future of the EU project, skepticism over Turkey's role is becoming more salient and public support for Turkey's membership in the EU is becoming more challenging. Some EU leaders are offering alternative options for Turkey-EU relations as seen in French and German bids for a privileged partnership. Besides, enlargement is being exploited in member states through political elections and referenda done for the EU constitutional treaty.[32] Those, who are skeptical about the membership of Turkey, have seen Turkey as a security risk rather than a security asset due to the fact that the

Union would be bordered and neighbored with the Middle East countries. As a result, this would challenge the idea of accepting Turkey as a member of the EU.[33]

Turkey has wanted to be a nation with clear borders and a uniform identity since 1923, the year of national independence. As pointed out by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, *"there is no defense line, there is a defense of area. This area is the entire of the country"*. The same can be seen in European policies in the area of border security. European countries aim to solve global problems through creating a bordered, gated and isolationist community. According to Pierini (2010), the ambassador and head of the EU Delegation to Turkey, both the EU and Turkey have common challenges in terms of implementing the *Integrated Border Management (IBM)* which provides both open borders for trade and marketing, and secure borders to prevent cross-border crimes.[34]

As previously stated, the possible consequence of Turkey's membership in the EU is an issue of concern that would present the probability of massive migration influxes to the EU's more prosperous members.[35] Thus, Turkey's accession to the Union is rather different than other enlargements of the EU. The size of the Turkish population and territorial area are almost equal to the sum of ten Eastern European countries that enjoyed the EU membership in 2004.[36] This is a striking point that leads the EU member states to rethink Turkey's membership in terms of immigration concerns.

However, internal border controls with regard to Turkey will not be removed immediately after Turkey's accession to the Union.[37] The policies conducted by the EU indicate that there will be a long transition period of free movement in the Schengen area and the EU will have more influence over issues in the *AFSJ*, once Turkey is a member of the

EU.[38]

Additionally, the experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain in the enlargement process indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of immigration policies reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures.[39] For example, the number of Turkish nationals seeking asylum continued to decline strongly- dropping about 30%, whereas, asylum seekers coming into Turkey increased by more than 15% in 2006 compared to 2005.[40] This indicates that the disposition of asylum seekers ratio and variations have changed since 2005, when negotiations with the EU started. As the negotiation process helps to enhance democratic and social rights of a candidate country through reform packages for accessing the standards of the EU, political concerns of the Turkish asylum seekers begin to be resolved, thereby limiting the number of Turkish refugees in Europe.

In sum, securitization not only generates new obstacles but also provides some opportunities in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU. Institutional reforms, efficiency in dealing with global problems, and reaching international standards are considered to be the main opportunities. However, inefficiency in implementing border security policies, the burden of illegal immigrants on the economy, and relinquishing of basic human rights are essential obstacles playing a role, thus framing the EU politics.

From the legal and structural steps taken historically in the area of migration control and border security, it is apparent that the EU views migrants as a threat, and therefore develops its policies based on what would help to protect national identity and security. Therefore, the precautions for maintaining border security and the evolution of the *AFSJ* within the EU indicate that national concerns and interests are of utmost importance in

dealing with the side effects of the internal market. As a result of this realistic approach, member states of the EU play a key role in immigration control and are unwilling to delegate their powers to the supranational bodies, particularly in the area of border security. Their concerns are so dominant that the agenda of the Council of the European Union is being shaped by national interests which are reinforced through intergovernmental conferences.

Furthermore, finalizing the negotiating chapters conducted with the candidate countries depends on the approval of the member states. These negotiations may enable a result of becoming a member, but with many opt-outs, derogations, and transition periods due to the various concerns. Therefore, there may be a *de facto* and different kind of membership process that evolves rather than a privileged status. There seems to be no alternative path except for continuing serious, fair, and transparent negotiations with Turkey, as some member states are against the idea of conducting "privileged partnership" with Turkey.[41]

To conclude, Turkey's enlargement is going to be a very big challenge for the EU if member states are not sufficiently convinced by the opportunities of integration and contributions of Turkey for the EU's peace and security framework. Therefore, since border security is one of the core arguments used against the membership of Turkey, it is vitally important for Turkey to address this issue. Turkey's contribution to the EU's security through securitizing its borders may change these concerns and help the country to get through the main arguments that generate obstacles for its membership.

CHAPTER-III: LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Theoretical Aspects of the Notion of Security

1. The Traditional Notion of Security

The traditional notion of security has been perceived as a rational choice for achieving the external ends of states. This concept was therefore defined in a narrow way. As argued by Waltz (1959), the traditional security concerns in international anarchy were entirely related to territorial integrity or protection of interests.[42] Additionally, in line with Machiavellian thought, it was believed states should defend themselves against other states.[43] In this respect, defending national security and sovereignty are at the top of the agenda of those nation states that pursue their security interests against those of other states in the international system.

In the same vein, Clausewitz placed an emphasis on national security problems which are posited at the mainstream of the realist thought.[44] Machiavelli's thesis also focused on the security of the state by considering the fact that certain acts of the Prince (head of the state) can be justified for state security.[45] Additionally, according to Morgenthau (1978), a feeling of insecurity is the key factor or motive that forces states towards armament. Therefore, it can be claimed that there has been a feeling of insecurity at the heart of the state behavior.[46]

Additionally, it can be claimed that the traditional notion of security is directly related to the state sovereignty as well. Hobbes (1950) highlighted the importance of sovereignty by suggesting that being sovereign would prevent the *common wealth* from dissolving, turning into calamity and even worse conditions.[47] Morgenthau (1978) has also seen sovereignty as a supreme power over a certain territory.[48] According to Bull

(1977), states assert sovereignty not only over authorities within their territory and population, but also they assert independence outside their territory. In this sense, there is a boundary between internal and external sovereignty in international society.[49]

The traditional notion of security is also embedded in the notions of war and power as told by *Thucydides* in *The History of Peloponnesian War* which implies that the growth of power in one nation state forces another state into war.[50] Hobbes (1950) also emphasized the role of the military by suggesting that the army is the source of sovereignty and security.[51] Machiavelli (1950) also prioritized war, army, and armaments for the survival and security of the state by claiming that "such princes who are not having any army to defend or attack should be ashamed of it".[52]

In the same vein, Kissinger (2001) has argued that the states would resort to war under the Westphalian international system in order to solve the problem of violence.[53] Therefore, war is considered as a behavior of states which can be enforced by states or the international society in order to maintain international order and balance of power.[54]

Moreover, Waltz (1979) has argued that in an anarchical international society, states that seek to maintain security must rely on the means of power they can generate for themselves.[55] Hence, states used to be in pursuit of widening the scope of their control and strivings towards obtaining a self-sufficient structure rather than an increased dependency. In this sense, considerations of security would be subordinate to economic gain and political interest which were favored by nation states.[56] In this respect, the traditional logic of security acknowledges a fairly narrow security concept.

In sum, the traditional notion of security can be explained through the lens of a realist approach. This approach considers national security and state sovereignty solely as

a means of maintaining order in the international system. Conventionally, security relates to sovereignty and power seeking behavior of states through war making. Therefore, security is restricted to being an issue between states and it is perceived by the states as a matter of sovereignty, interest, and power. From a security point of view, *the traditional notion of security,* as a concept, used to be understood in a narrow way in the sense that some territorial connotations including the notions of security, interest, sovereignty, power, and military zones would only be attributed to this concept. However, this paradigm could shift with the involvement of a new threat environment and actors which will be discussed in the next section.

2. The Expanding Notion of Security and the Copenhagen School

Since the early 1990s, security studies have been broadened significantly and the definition of security has rapidly evolved. The concept of security is basically related to the twin questions of 'what is a threat?' and 'who or what is at risk from that threat?[57] The definition of security has also changed as the nature of threat has changed. For example, the traditional security paradigm has shifted into another paradigm, known as the *human security paradigm.* The human security paradigm encompasses several components of security such as environmental security, economic security, food security, health security, political security, community security and personal security.[58]

The nature of threat has also changed in the sense that contemporary threats to humans are now arising from man-made problems such as environmental degradation, scarcities of resources, unchecked global population growth, disparities in economic opportunities and the rise of pandemic diseases.[59] The rapid rate of population growth coupled with a lack of developmental opportunities is overcrowding the planet, and thus

adding to the enormous pressures on diminishing non-renewable resources which have cross-border impacts.[60]

The concerns over protecting the social and economic fabric of society, being an effective gatekeeper between mala fide and bona fide immigration, and maintaining economic and political order have all challenged states or states' capacity and capability which, in turn, has left states vulnerable to new categories of threat.[61] Muller (2004) has suggested that the agenda of security has broadened beyond conventional instruments that lie with the state and military and has moved toward the question of identity.[62] Considering this situation, the notion of security practices have widened significantly.

Furthermore, the distinction between internal and external security has been blurred over the course of time. Crelinsten (1998) has also seen the blurring distinction between external security and internal security as well as the traditional notion of national security as combining with societal security, where society is threatened by the "enemy" who targets the identity, culture, and cohesion of that society.[63] Lutterbeck (2005) has further claimed that the expansion of immigration controls, as a result of border security escalation has led to the convergence of the security practices between soldiering and policing.[64] Therefore, police forces responsible for securing the EU's external borders have tended to adopt a more proactive or pre-emptive and a more military-typed approach to border enforcement.[65] Moreover, the introduction of the notion of human security in the 1990s, as discussed in the UNDP Report of 1994, has indicated that security has been widened by incorporating new areas and this has contributed to further blurring the severe distinction between internal and external security.[66] The

intensification of international policing in the area of peacekeeping and crime prevention also implies the convergence of security practices, thus obscuring security distinctions.[67]

In this respect, it can be claimed that security studies have broadened significantly and the definition of security has rapidly evolved since the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War revealed a security complex where states' concerns and their security problems are intertwined.[68] Huysmans (2006) has claimed that security depends on not only the kind of threats but also the nature of the security practices resorted to.[69] Rudolph (2006) has also maintained that the ebb of external threats shifts traditional security interests into internal, societal aspects of security.[70]

There are now two main security components, state security and societal security respectively. While the traditional notion of security fails to explain what security truly represents, a new paradigm, *societal security*, has emerged. Societal security is essentially about situations when societies perceive threats regarding their identities.[71] This societal security is being challenged by immigration which is considered to be an important factor that can distort the society and the capacity of receiving countries.[72] In this respect, societal security reveals problems regarding identity. It brings identity and immigration into the security framework, and extends the security theory by including society as a unit of analysis.[73] This paradigm mainly focuses on identity and immigration that drive main perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities.[74]

In line with the tenets of the securitization theory formulated by the Copenhagen School, security is considered to be a speech act. By securitizing an act, an actor attempts to shift an issue from low politics to high politics. According to Neal (2009), securitization should not be understood simply as a speech-act, as securitization relies on

certain conditions likewise threat environment. In this sense, securitization assumes a kind of relationship between the speaker and the audience under certain conditions.[75] In the same vein, Roe (2004) has viewed securitization as a *call and response process* where an actor makes a call to address something as a security issue and then the audience must reply in an accepting manner.[76] The Copenhagen School's understanding of security is a zero-sum game of identity formation which also reveals two opposing groups.[77] Thus, securitization theory mainly bears on the distinction between friend and enemy and the security act establishes the community through the identification of the enemy.[78]

Apart from personification of threat and enemy, securitization places an emphasis on unity and identity. Munster (2009) has introduced securitization as an outcome of threat construction within a territory and as the interplay between bureaucratic framing and political negotiations.[79] Huysmans (2006) has offered securitization as a process which constitutes a political community through establishing unity and identity that are free from existential threats.[80] Likewise, Diez (2004) has claimed that securitization does help the strengthening of borders which reinforces identity.[81]

As suggested by Bigo and Guild (2005), securitization has been undertaken not only through discourses of fear management but also technologization of policing, thereby changing the concept of physical border into the construction of borders with the impact new technologies of 'policing at a distance'.[82] Diez (2004) has therefore argued that borders are closely interlinked with the securitization process as they are considered to be means or sites of preventing existential and symbolic threats thus inscribing identity.[83] Borders have such a broad meaning that they include identity and security building.[84] Border controls and identity checks are the tools used by states as a response

to the expectations of the threatened community.[85] Bigo (2005) has approached this process by using a metaphor of *ban-optican* which refers to new forms of discrimination and inequalities both internally and externally.[86]

In sum, when conceptual and theoretical explanations regarding security are examined, it can be observed that security practices have diversified and broadened significantly. These concepts and contemporary paradigms have evolved from security concerns over existential threats towards potential or perceived threats. Moreover, the explanations regarding security practices have shifted from the realist paradigm to the globalist and to the theory of securitization. Thus, the taxonomy below suggests there have been paradigmatic shifts in terms of ideas, interests and institutions that govern security issues.

Table-1: Taxonomy on Paradigmatic Assumptions Related to Security

	Realism	**Globalism**	**Securitization**
Ideas	Balance of Power Security threats	Global Threats	Friend & Enemy Personification
Interests	National Security	Global Security	Securing National Identity
Institutions	State Structures	Non-state Structures	New Techniques of Governance
State's Role	Major; State power and sovereignty matter	Minor; Non-state actors matter	Equal; State and Non-state actors involve equally.

B. Paradigmatic Approaches to the Notion of Security

1. **The Realist Approach**

As seen from the discussions in the previous section, realism is considered to be one of the most venerable theories which attempts to explain national security in conventional ways. In line with the tenets of the realist paradigm, security here is seen as an asset and the dominant goal of states is to maximize their power by acting on their interests in the international arena.[87]

Furthermore, the realist agenda is shaped by states and the concerns over high politic issues including balance of power, national security, maximizing power, and interests are the result of the state-centric approach.[88] As argued by Morgenthau (1978), states act on their interests and they regard them as the essence of power and also as a driving force for political action.[89]

Additionally, the widespread and prominent assumptions of the traditional notion of security are illustrated by the realist approach. Accordingly, the concept of security used to be perceived within the context of military, the use of force, and state-centered terms. The referent object of security is the state, which is considered to be a strategic and self-interested unit aiming to ensure its own security, individually. In line with the realist approach, the main goal of the state is to survive the sovereignty of the state and the state is considered as a unitary actor which highlights maximizing its power in order to guarantee its national security and sovereignty.[90]

In this respect, it can be claimed that the traditional notion of security is to a significant degree embedded in the old schools of thought of international relations as seen in the realist approach. From all aforementioned remarks, an emphasis can be placed

on the realist view, thus preserving national security through the means of de-territorial or re-territorial policies. However, the realist concept of security has shown deficiencies as it is merely explained by national security means designed for military threat, and it does not offer more elaborative explanations for the emerging new actors and new threat environment. In this sense, the realist assumptions with regard to security imply a narrow connotation. This narrow explanation of security has widened with the assumptions of the globalist approach which will be discussed in the next section.

2. The Globalist Approach

The traditional threat environment has shifted from the national level to the global sphere where severe inequality gaps between the North and South, core and periphery, east and west are increasingly evident, thereby incorporating new threats that defy national boundaries, national security and sovereignty. In this sense, the traditional notion of security and the state sovereignty have been challenged by the emergence of non-state actors, international human rights regime, and cross-border crimes.

The traditional notion of security has not only widened but has also deepened as it has incorporated new security aspects and objects.[91] For instance, the new threat environment has led to the emergence of security interdependency and an inclusion of new aspects of security such as human security, global security, and societal security, and new objects including security of nations, an international system and a supranational system which have become prominent themes of contemporary world politics. Considering this changing international system, globalists (Sassen 1996, Naim 2002) have claimed that state sovereignty and security have eroded with the impact of globalization.[92]

The globalists therefore argue that the state has undergone a great transformation in the face of new global threats. Both national security and sovereignty have been challenged with the emergence of new threats.[93] Naim (2002) has analyzed how illegal flows of drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money are the main threats that defy national security and sovereignty.[94] Furthermore, non-state actors, for example, have begun to play an increasing role in the international sphere, and sometimes interfere with states' domestic activities. Thus, one of the core globalist assumptions is that one must first understand the global context where states and other entities (individual, bureaucratic, societal structures) are interacting with each other likewise generating common behaviors.[95]

Since the nature of threats has changed, the traditional notion of security cannot produce solutions for global threats. The globalists therefore claim that the state is incompetent in dealing with new global threats in a 'borderless world'. Accordingly, the referent object of security is not only states but also other actors, including individuals, firms, and trans-national advocacy groups. In this respect, the globalist approach highlights the importance of non-state actors and offers global solutions to global problems.

3. The Constructivist Approach

As discussed in the previous sections, the realist approach has been challenged by cross-border threats which dramatically increased in the contemporary globalization period and defied national security and sovereignty. In addition, states are incapable of dealing with this new threat environment as argued by globalists. Therefore, there is a need to develop new techniques of government which can deal with cross-border threats

in an efficient way. Accordingly, the new techniques of government attempt to overcome cited shortcomings of realism and globalism, thus bringing them together and producing a new paradigmatic framework named *constructivism*.

Considering the tenets of constructivism, Karns and Mingst (2004) have placed emphasis on shared beliefs, norms and rules which have begun to shape the behavior of states. Thus, shared expectations, norms, and institutions play a crucial role in affecting behavior of states. [96] In the same vein, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have emphasized the importance of norms that undertake significant functions as they contribute legitimacy and acceptance to the international state system.[97]

As argued by some other constructivists, the rule-governed cooperation can lead actors to change their beliefs on "who they are" and "how they relate to the rest of the international system". Through cooperation and collaboration, states and non-state actors may develop more collective identities. Accordingly, constructivists not only highlight the effects of norms but also emphasize the roles of non-state actors and international organizations in the creation and evolution of norms.[98] However, Alexander Wendt, a leading constructivist, has further claimed that states are considered as key units and their behaviors are shaped by shared norms, beliefs and acts of collective identities.[99]

Security norms and collective identities have become increasingly crucial in the international system and states are being affected by these norms and collective identities.[100] In this respect, security practices can also be understood through the lens of the constructivist approach. Some assumptions of both the realism and globalism approaches can be found in the constructivist approach. Therefore, the emergence of new

security governance in Europe can be explained not only by the constructivist approach, but also European integration theories which will be discussed in the next section.

C. European Integration Theories

Having examined paradigmatic approaches to the notion of security, we will briefly explain the main integration theories focusing on the establishment of the European Union (EU). These theories help us to understand the establishment of the EU, Euro-governance system, and the development of the EU policies such as security practices. Thus, in this section, the main integration theories including federalism, functionalism, transactionalism, neo-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism will be addressed as follows.

1. Federalism

Federalism is considered to be one of the dominant integration theories that attempt to explain the political integration and the building of Europe. Thus, Burgess (2004) has argued that federal principles including the voluntary union of states and peoples, the constitution that binds members of the union, and building the union from the bottom upwards can generalize political integration.[101]

Considering the evolution of European integration from the European Economic Community to the European Union, as argued by some federalists (Spinelli, 1941 and Monnet, 1950)[102], the Treaty of the EU, the concept of EU citizenship, and the enlargement process indicate some federalist features which can contribute to the establishment of the political union.[103]

2. Functionalism

The functionalist approach is essentially engaged with the function of system, thereby highlighting the importance of common interests and needs of states. Functionalism has contributed to the promotion of collective governance and acceptance of principles of the international system.[104]

Functionalists thus argue that fulfilling the common need of the technocratic management of economic and social policies would trigger the emergence of regional institutions or the formation of international agencies.[105] As stated in the famous book of David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, increasing cooperation between countries in functional areas would diminish the probable outbreak of war and a working peace system would therefore prevail.[106]

3. Transactionalism

Transactionalism, a theory developed by Karl Deutsch, emphasizes the importance of political communities and a sense of identity that can promote the European integration process. Therefore, the increased interaction between peoples and countries would contribute to an increased sense of mutual responsiveness.[107]

In this sense, Deutschian security community can only be established by the increasing social interaction and communication which, in turn, would ensure the formation of norms and values. Thus, the transactionalist approach argues that states in the security community cannot pose a threat to each other.[108]

4. Neo-functionalism

As another influential integration theory, neo-functionalism concentrates on unintended or unexpected consequences of previous integration theories, named

"spillover".[109] Some neo-functionalists (Haas, 1958)[110] have revisited the concept of the spill-over effect by adding new aspects of spill-over such as technical/functional spill-over, political spill-over, and geographical spill-over which can all promote the integration process.[111] Additionally, the spill-over effect refers to the creation of supranational governance as an outcome of integrated functional sectors. In this sense, the neo-functionalist approach argues that the actual integration can be achieved only after fulfilling certain prerequisites such as reaching integration on functional sectors.[112]

Furthermore, the neo-functionalist approach argues that regional integration is inherently a contentious process and political integration can be ensured by the spill-over effect of the economic and social integration.[113] It can be claimed that the neo-functionalist approach contributes to the creation of security communities through the cooperation on uncontroversial sectors which, in turn, leads a spill-over effect, thus facilitating cooperation on controversial issues. Therefore, the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, especially the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community can be offered as a practical example of the neo-functionalist approach.

5. Intergovernmentalism

The intergovernmentalist approach places an emphasis on the central role of nation states. Hoffman (1964)[114], an integovernmentalist scholar, has also argued that the spill-over effect should comply with the interests of nation states.[115] In this sense, intergovernmentalism refers to the supremacy of nation states in the integration process over supranational actors.[116]

Considering the tenets of intergovernmentalism, states are still regarded as unitary actors in terms of shaping high politics such as defense, security and foreign policy.

Therefore, European integration process cannot be meaningful without the impact of nation states. For instance, member states are still playing a crucial role in terms of framing "Justice and Home Affairs" (Third Pillar) and "Common Foreign and Security" (Second Pillar) policy areas which were consolidated by the Treaty of the European Union.

D. Border Controls, Sovereignty and Security

Borders can be described as a line separating the land territory or maritime zones of one state from another. In this sense, border security can be described as a nationally focused system underlying the sovereignty of each state. Border control also refers to a state's regulation of the entry of persons into its territory, in the exercise of its sovereignty.[117] There are competing ideas on the role of borders. On the one hand, borders serve as the protection of identities, welfare state, political values, and diversities. On the other hand, borders are becoming more obsolete and porous and their meaning has changed over time.[118] Thus, the attributed meaning of border has changed with the impact of increasing people movements all around the globe.

Recent changes in the volume, direction, composition, and types of global human mobility indicate that international migratory flows have profound consequences for the main actors of migration (the sending state, the receiving state, and migrants) and for the politics of international migration regimes.[119] Population flows have continuously increased. Today, approximately 3% of people on the globe – or approximately 195 million in 2005– are migrants; up from around 2.6% or about 77 million in 1960.[120] The figures on international migration cover laborers, students, and professionals from all

around world. Furthermore, according to the United Nations figures of 2008, there are 15.2 million refugees worldwide.[121]

These aforementioned figures raise concerns about the ability or capability of states to control migration. More precisely, the global economy, the emergence of conflicts, political changes in the state, civil wars, colonization, decolonization, and the willingness of people to promote migration all raise the issue of a government's inability to control borders. Weiner (1992-1993) has claimed that high population movements have made exit-entry rules inevitable and the security-stability framework of states has been affected by these flows.[122] The inability of the states to control migration flows has therefore raised some concerns about the effectiveness of border security. Since the global nature of threats defies national sovereignty and national security, all states and individuals are now at the center of these global problems.

Current theoretical perspectives on border security are commonly based on the assumption that the definition of both security and threat has changed dramatically over recent years. While, in traditional period, threats defying national security used to matter and within the Cold War period they were more related to communism and fascism, new threats are now linked to illegal flows of drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money.[123] As the threat environment has changed, the domestic notion of security has also changed into the concept of global security. In this respect, the unit of analysis, including actors, factors, and conditions as a concept will help us to understand how security paradigms are created and how they explain the issues regarding border security.

1. The Globalist Paradigm

With the end of the Cold War period, a new security environment emerged in the modern and conventional international system. The traditional notion of security does not properly address the threats which have emerged globally, however. Furthermore, border structures of states are weaker than before as the deregulation of capital, service, trade and the movements of people within the economic phenomena of globalization have facilitated illegal flows of money, guns and people, which menace national security, as well.[124] In particular, free movements of capital, service, trade and people for the creation of internal markets have all impaired border structures and protective measures. Consequently, this has facilitated illegal flows that can threaten national security.

In this respect, immigration and border security policies are also deeply embedded in the question of state sovereignty and the interstate system. It is no longer sufficient to simply assert that the sovereign role of the state in framing immigration policy is to design and implement border regulations. It is also necessary to examine the transformation of the state as it is affected by migration flows.[125] In the context of global governance, Sassen (1996) has claimed that immigration issues have reduced the autonomy of the state. Immigration and border security policies are now being shaped by forces and actors ranging from economic globalization to international agreements on human rights and supranational regulations including international, regional and non-state actors.[126]

Therefore, intergovernmental organizations and supranational actors help nation states in framing border security policies to deal with global problems. For example, the European Commission has a special right to take initiatives regarding external border

control, visa policy, and free movement within the Schengen area. Since 1999, the Directorate General for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the EU Commission has been managing issues regarding border security, migration management and police cooperation.[127]

2. The Realist Paradigm

In line with the tenets of *the realist approach,* states are the most powerful actors in the international system. As suggested by Morgenthau (1978), nation states are ultimate points of contemporary foreign policy.[128] Hobbes bolstered the idea that states (he referred to Leviathan) have been the providers of order and that they facilitate ending of anarchy in the international system. In the same vein, according to Grotius, there should be laws and rules accepted by states to eliminate any anarchy in the international system.[129] In this respect, as argued by Allison (1971), national security is admitted as a strategic goal and eliminating anarchy can be considered as a rational choice of nation states.[130]

In accordance with the tenets of the *realist paradigm*, the importance of defending or controlling borders stems from national sovereignty and national security concerns. It can be suggested that borders are situated not only at the internal but also at the external limits of power of a sovereign state. Thus, border security is highlighted under the Westphalian system where national security and sovereignty are defined through borders.[131] In this sense, the borders are considered to be a defining feature of the modern international society and the role of borders is at the center of the security community.[132] In line with the realist logic of security, personification of enemy and

elimination of existential threats are necessary steps for securing socio-political order of a community.[133]

Furthermore, it can be claimed that states are still primary actors in terms of providing border security and the state has its own rules for deciding who enters, who participates in the general will, and who can become part of the nation as citizens. To be more precise, nation states distinguish citizens from others by trying to control entries through frontiers.[134] As maintained by Joopke (1999), state sovereignty does refer to the entry and stay of foreigners and sovereignty ensures a bounded territory and populace.[135] Therefore, citizenship, apart from its legal status, is an identity which relies on and strengthens shared values and understandings and a common culture in a territorial area.[136]

Furthermore, *the realist approach* prioritizes national sovereignty and national security concerns and focuses on defending and controlling borders. In this context, states are the crucial actors in shaping border security policies. The structures and policies formed in accordance with the realist paradigm can be observed within EU affairs. For example, member states are, to a significant degree, retaining their power over border security policies. The Council of Ministers which is essentially formed by the member states has been a leading institution in shaping and framing the EU border security policies since the 70s.[137]

In sum, maximizing power, realizing interests, and maintaining national security form the pivotal aspects of the realist paradigm. However, there is also a need to focus more on state's behavior in terms of explaining what exactly is being secured and what security is actually for.[138] These concerns over a state's behavior and its capacity to

maintain security have prompted the emergence of new structures which will be discussed in the next section.

3. Emergence of the New Security Governance

In line with the given realist assumptions, the capacity of the state is at the center of framing security policies. Rudolph (2006) has argued that good governance in the global age depends on the capability of states to maintain security and order both externally and internally.[139] Therefore, new techniques of government are becoming increasingly global and transnational in order to deal with the challenges that states face.[140] In this respect, new security governance can be a model for emerging concerns over the ultimate goal of providing security.

The realist perspective has been challenged by the emerging new actors in the international society and those actors have begun to play a role in the area of security. The state sovereignty has also been defined by immigration which refers to the admission and exclusion of non-members to a state.[141] In addition, realist explanations of state behavior do not consider identity issues regarding security.[142] Waever and others (1993), who add the *societal security* concept into security literature, have asserted that security is a result of the interplay between the vulnerabilities of the unit and threats that it faces.[143] In the same vein, Huysmans (2006) has also referred to deepening security concept by introducing non-state units such as individuals, humanity and society in the security communities.[144]

By contrast, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), who question the actorness of the state in the field of immigration policy, have claimed that various actors have been incorporated at different levels in responding to changing global and migration pressures.

Thus, national governments may delegate their authority to agents such as mayors, private companies and international actors, who are more capable and likely to meet policy goals.[145] However, this delegation of authority does not lead to a limited sovereignty: the state remains in charge of defining the policy and politics of immigration while non-state actors (at the international, supranational or intra-national level) are in charge of implementing them. Joopke (1999) has also argued that sovereignty seems to be challenged by intergovernmental and supranational actors, but in fact they have facilitated the trend against nation states and make nation states more effective.[146] As argued by Rudolph (2006), current social models or structures reflect state interests including interests related to immigration and border policy.[147]

Furthermore, Diez (2004) has claimed that the subversion of borders inside a state has led to the erection of borders outside a state which provides the establishment of supranational security frameworks.[148] In the same vein, Munster (2009) has also argued that the disappearance of borders has triggered the emergence of a distinct European threat environment and this has given rise to institutionalized immigration as a security issue.[149] In this respect, rising international regimes, the expansion of new security sectors, and emergence of non-state actors have contributed to the emergence of a new form of security governance.[150]

E. Critical Evaluation of Theoretical Perspectives

1. Who is in charge? The Realist, Globalist, or New Security Governance?

Theoretical approaches to the border security practices mainly include three main schools of thought of international relations, such as the realist, globalist and new

security governance. Initially, the tenets of the realist paradigm on border security will be discussed. The globalist and new security governance approaches, which will provide some insights to the changing notion of border security practices over time, will be elaborated upon here.

a. Realist Approach

Conventional approaches to the notion of border security are found in the old schools of international relations. In line with the tenets of the *realist paradigm*, defending or controlling borders has been highlighted as this inherently refers to concerns over national sovereignty and security. Some territorial discourses including security interests, sovereignty, power, and military zones used to be attributed to the traditional notion of security, thus explaining the concept of security in a narrow way.

In accordance with the realist paradigm, maximizing power, acting on interests, and maintaining national security are prioritized by nation states which use these instruments against other states, thereby creating deterrence in the international system. However, the traditional notion of security has been challenged by the threats which have emerged globally. Therefore, the realist paradigm cannot address these threats in a sufficient way and the globalist approach which addresses the reasons of drawbacks will be discussed in the next section.

b. Globalist Approach

A new threat and security environment has emerged with the impact of globalization process. The deregulation of capital, service, trade and particularly the free movements of people within the economic phenomena of globalization has triggered illegal flows, as well as other problems. Conventional state structures are therefore

incompetent in efforts to overcome the illegal flow of money, guns and people which undermines national security and sovereignty. In this sense, the *globalist approach* sees the state as being exposed to transformations in the face of new global threats. In addition, the emergence of non-state actors, international regimes and cross-border crimes have all contributed to the transformation of state structures and practices with regard to border security.

In this respect, current studies are only emphasizing the lessening role of borders in the globalized world. In addition, the existing literature argues that the actual meaning of border has changed and the notion of border security has undergone a great transformation. However, this does not mean that borders have completely disappeared from the world policy and politics and their significance has dwindled over the course of time. Meanwhile, new kinds of interpretations have been acquired as to the border security discourses and practices. Therefore, it can be claimed that borders are still considered as the sovereignty tool of nation states.

c. New Security Governance

Considering the cited theoretical explanations, from the realistic point of view, state sovereignty is vital in terms of shaping and framing border security policies. It is obvious that the disappearance of borders within the context of global economy has triggered the emergence of a vague threat environment. Thus, dealing with this kind of threat environment in an efficient way has been one of the crucial tasks of governments. However, both the realist and globalist approaches fail to clearly explain state behavior in terms of maintaining security. In this respect, new security governance has emerged as a model to assist states in their goals of achieving or providing security. Therefore, the

securitization of borders can be considered as a means of reaffirming state sovereignty and security.

Furthermore, the perception of the notion of the term border has also changed. New meanings of this term as related to the concept of border, include mental borders, biometric borders, and soft-hard borders. Therefore, it may be wrong to assert that borders are obsolete solely because of globalization. The rise of international regimes and non-state actors, the escalation of borders, and the blurring distinction between internal and external security have all contributed to the emergence of new security governance and securitization processes.

2. Theories of the European Integration

The European integration theories are slightly different from the grand schools of thought of international relations (IR), such as *realism, globalism and constructivism* which have been discussed in previous sections. The reason behind the difference is that European integration theories are merely focusing on functions of the EU bodies and the evolution of the EU policies while IR theories are explaining issues referring to world polity, policy and politics. In this respect, theories of the European integration retain narrow and regional features as compared to the IR theories which hold general explanations and comprehensive patterns. There are several grand theories of European integration, including *federalism, transactionalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism,* and *liberal intergovernmentalism,* which will be discussed below.

As one of the influential theories of European integration, *federalism* is considered to be more applicable to the Euro-governance than other approaches. *Federalism* places emphasis on inter-institutional power sharing in a compound polity,

democratic arrangements, flexible interpretation of sovereignty, constitutionalism, and unity in diversity.[151] As for another integration theory, *transactionalism,* this theory sees integration as a process of acquiring a sense of security by the community, which can be achieved through the processes of mutual transactions, cultural flows, and collective consciousness.[152]

Furthermore, *functionalism* essentially refers to the considerations of finding opportunities and promises in working arrangements as a way of establishing an international community.[153] In this sense, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community can be best described with the *functionalist* approach. However, the *functionalist* theory has lacked the ability to address the emergence of other new policy areas and structures and other paradigms such as *neofunctionalism* and *intergovernmentalism* that have begun to play a role in addressing the cited limitations.[154]

Accordingly, the *neo-functionalist* approach argues that there is a spill-over effect of an action which in turn creates further actions and conditions towards achieving a policy goal. In line with the tenets of *neofunctionalism*, sovereign nation states delegate their powers to supranational institutions as a result of further integration on some policy areas. However, the *neofunctionalist* theory has had some drawbacks in explaining the retardation of integration in some policy areas such as border security and this limitation has led to the emergence of the *intergovernmentalist* approach.[155]

The *intergovernmentalist* approach sees the EU integration as a result of converging interests of nation states.[156] From this point of view, both *intergovernmentalists* and *liberal intergovernmentalists* see states as unitary actors. However, with a slight difference, *liberal intergovernmentalists* further claim that

integration is driven not only by security and geopolitical interests, but also by the economic interests of nation states.[157]

In this context, the evolution of the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice* indicates that third pillar issues including immigration, border control and visa policies have emerged as an unintended consequence of internal market goals and these policies have been reinforced with the impact of the securitization process. Furthermore, the securitization process has also evolved from the old structures of security practices to the means of the new European security governance. Therefore, there has been a shift or spill-over from Trevi to Frontex, from terrorism to other policy areas including border security, immigration and visas, and from a state-centric notion to the concept of *intergovernmentalist* and *supranationalist* nature.[158] Both the spill-over effect of the internal market and evolution of the new security governance in the EU suggest that the neo-functionalist theory is more applicable than other grand theories of integration while explaining the securitization process.

In this respect, the intergovernmental features of the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice* also indicate that shaping security policies is still seen within the competence of nation states and their decisions are of utmost importance in order to take further actions. In this sense, the question of why nation states have reservations on security issues can be better addressed with the *intergovernmentalist* approach. Therefore, both theoretical approaches *(neofunctionalist* and *intergovernmentalist)* should be considered hand in hand when explaining the new security governance and evolution of the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.*

CHAPTER-IV: POLICY ASPECTS REGARDING BORDER SECURITY

A.   Policy Aspects of Security: Impact on Border Security

This section will primarily address crucial aspects of the EU border security policy including its historical evolution and its changing notion. First, evolution of the European border security policies in an historical context will be examined. Second, the new meaning of border security will be discussed. Third, new practices and technologies regarding border security will be explained.

1.   New Meaning of the Term Border and Border Security

The actual meaning of border has recently been diversified and has undergone great transformations in our contemporary world. However, physical borders do still matter in daily practices, and some symbolic meanings have also been attributed to the concept of border security. Here, in this section, the factors that have played a role in changing the notion of border concept will be discussed.

 With the end of the Cold War new international borders were drawn and therefore the political map of Europe changed extensively. Anderson and Bort (2001) have suggested that the collapse of Communism resulted in 20,000 kilometers of new international frontiers through the enlargements of the European Union and NATO.[159] Berg and van Houtum (2003) have argued that the meaning of border varies in accordance with strategic interests, conventions, social relations and situations and they see the concept of a border as a dynamic and repetitive process that can be encountered in daily life.[160] From these aspects, it can be claimed that borders retain diverse and continuously changing characteristics and functions.

According to Hassner (2002), borders have a vague and an intricate nature in the sense that the distinction between inside and outside, friend and enemy, immigrant and citizen in relation to borders tends to be very complex. Furthermore, borders tend to be very different in scope and rigidity in accordance with issue areas such as economics and security.[161] Neuwahl (2005) has argued that there are two kinds of borders - soft borders and hard borders - and this differentiation can represent not only physical but also symbolic functions, thereby signifying a relationship of exclusion or proximity.[162]

In the same vein, Huysmans (1995) has explained the function of borders in terms of its impact on territorial exclusion which separates the natives from foreigners.[163] Jukarainen (1999) has approached the border concept in terms of its changing role while constructing identity and he gives border spatial and symbolic meanings besides its physical role.[164] Likewise, Langer (1999), who refers to the importance of border impact studies, has suggested that borders begin to include whole society and signify this society more clearly than any other reality.[165]

Hence, the securitization process has played a crucial role in re-conceptualizing borders, as well. The securitization process places a border between friend and enemy in the sense that the community or identity is being established by a "security act" that identifies the enemy.[166] In this respect, border controls are of utmost importance in terms of identifying an enemy. This would strengthen cultural division between natives and immigrants.[167] Migdal (2004) has claimed that the meaning of a border has been broadened with social formations and symbolic dimensions which contributed to the creation of mental maps and spatial logics, thus dividing citizens from alien territory, the included from excluded, and the familiar from the other.[168]

Moreover, the link between identity and borders has been gaining attention across the EU. The geographical borders of the EU represent an essential point separating and defining 'us' and 'them' from a cultural perspective.[169] The borders therefore symbolize not only the preservation of state sovereignty but also the protection of national identity.

Additionally, de-territorialization and the creation of new buffer zones -as seen in refugee camps outside the EU territory[170]- implies a change in the notion of the border security concept. With the impact of the enlargement process, some of the new member states have shifted from transit to destination countries in terms of receiving immigration. The new periphery of the European Union now borders troubled regions such as the Balkans and Caucasus.

Furthermore, a new emphasis has been placed on the idea that stability within the European Union can be assured if and when both stability and security are maintained in its proximity area.[171] In this sense, the enlargement process has had an impact on adopting de-territorial policies, thereby creating new border escalations. The logic of border escalation therefore requires taking into account how state practices shape and interact with illegal border crossings.

Likewise, Andreas (2000) has drawn attention to the sharp expansion of immigration control efforts in recent years.[172] As argued by Laitinen (2003) new dynamics such as media, scientific communities, and global firms have all contributed to the creation of new codes, spaces, times and powers which, in turn, affect the construction of security borders. Thus, the blurring distinction between internal and external security has been a paramount factor in de-territorializing and re-territorializing, thus constructing new security communities.[173]

Furthermore, the meaning of borders has undergone changes with the adoption of the Schengen acquis. The Schengen acquis have brought up a new interpretation of border security by identifying two key concepts such as internal and external borders. The external borders are considered to be the land and sea borders of the Member States and their airports and seaports, to which the provisions of the European Community law on the crossing of external borders by persons apply. Internal borders (where passport controls are not conducted) are those crossed by any individual arriving from another Schengen Member State.[174] The candidate countries have to accept and apply the Schengen acquis on external border controls as a condition for full membership before entering the EU. This has sometimes caused these countries to strengthen entry requirements for third tier citizens.

Another interpretation of border is embedded in the definition of interception at high seas. According to the definition of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), interception refers to measures applied by states outside their national boundaries which prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of people without the necessary immigration documentation from crossing the borders by land, sea or air. However, Papastavridis (2009, 2011) has criticized this definition as it does not consider the distinction between persons freely in search of a better future and persons severely exploited should be taken into consideration while enforcing interception.[175] In any case, interception on the high seas reinforces usual border practices of nation states, thereby broadening the notion of border concept.

In sum, the usual meaning of border has changed over time with the impact of several factors including the end of the Cold War, globalization, and securitization

process. All these factors have played significant roles in de-territorializing and re-territorializing. New symbolic meanings have been attributed to the border concept, thus aiming to construct social formations. In this sense, borders continue to serve a physical role for maintaining security as well as a symbolic role for preserving identity.

2. Reaffirmation of the Border Security

The border security policy of the European Union has evolved in response to the emergence of new threats, the proliferation of actors, successive enlargements and the different needs of policy areas.[176] As argued by Monar (2005), the *'Justice and Home Affairs'* or *'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'* (AFSJ) is crucial for three reasons. First, security and justice touch upon essential functions and privileged areas of the modern nation-state. Second, security and justice involve essential functions which matter for European citizens. And third, the area is one of the major areas of 'growth' of EU action.[177]

The evolution of the EU security agenda over time is extremely interesting. There has been progress since the 1970s in making *Justice and Home Affairs* issues more institutionalized and more '*communatarized'* in a sense that some supranational arrangements have been observed. Thus, this process can be examined by distinguishing between the pre-Maastricht Treaty period and the post-Maastricht Treaty period.

a. Pre-Maastricht Treaty Period

(i) Securitization Process and TREVI

Since the 1970s, concerns over immigration have been raised due to the fact that all EU actions or policies have shifted from a permissive approach to a more restrictive one. Huysmans (2000) has claimed that the Europeanization of immigration policy has

directly securitized migration by integrating migration policy into an internal security framework and indirectly it has sustained the securitization process.[178] However, the evolution of *Justice and Home Affairs* issues started with the emergence of the TREVI group which stands for *Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence* and continued with the premises of the Single European Act, Schengen Acquis, and the EU treaties.

The TREVI group was set up in 1976 by the 12 European Community (EC) states after a Council of Ministers meeting in Rome in December 1975. TREVI aimed to counter terrorism and to coordinate policing in the EC. TREVI was considered to be an intergovernmental structure outside of the framework of the Community.[179] The TREVI group had five working groups and among them, TREVI 3, besides its other tasks, dealt with immigration control at borders until the TREVI 92 working group took over in 1989.[180]

From the 1970s, the Member States of the European Community experienced the need to strengthen their cooperation in order to prevent the threat of terrorism. However, in the 1980s, the TREVI Group's scope was extended to illegal immigration and the fight against organized crime. Accordingly, the TREVI Groups had set the foundations for a *Justice Home Affairs* policy, particularly in the area of counter-terrorism, police cooperation, the fight against international, crime, and the abolition of borders continued.[181]

The *Single European Act*, another crucial step, further contributed to the securitization process. The *Single European Act*, which was adopted in 1986, created a single European market. Accordingly, the European Community decided to remove

border controls and create an environment for a 'single market' by the free movement of goods, capital, service and people.[182] More specifically, Article 8 of the European Economic Community Treaty indicates that the establishment of an internal market depends on removing internal border controls. Therefore, the Single European Act defines an internal market as an area without internal frontiers. Huysmans (2000) has argued that there was a spillover effect of internal markets, which consequently led to the emergence of immigration and border policies in the EU.[183] In this sense, migration was initially perceived as an economic oriented activity, which was then securitized by the policies of the EU member states, thereby focusing on enhancing external borders and border security. Therefore, it can be claimed that the *Single European Act* created a spillover effect and internal market goals led to the emergence of security policies.[184]

(ii)   Securitization Process and the Schengen Acquis

The Schengen Acquis is considered to represent the inception of securitization policies. As a result of implementing the provisions of Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985, approximately 400 million Europeans can now travel from the Arctic Circle in Norway to Portugal without showing a passport. The signatory states to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border and common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controls. In this sense, Schengen is considered to be a response to the elimination of internal borders. Furthermore, Schengen Acquis has been incorporated into the European Union legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.[185]

The Schengen Acquis and the other measures taken by the EU institutions within the scope of this acquis are regarded as binding and they must be fully accepted by all

candidate states for accession.[186] In line with Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol, all new and future EU Member States must lift controls of the internal borders of the Schengen area to satisfy the requirements for EU accession. Unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland that enjoyed the EU membership earlier and had opt-outs from implementation of the Schengen, candidate countries have to allow Schengen rules regarding securing borders. In line with the impacts of the EU policies in this area, candidate countries have had to review their institutional and legal infrastructures which include adopting a range of actions, passing new regulations and establishing new administrative structures.

Since the 1990s, the entire border security concept has come under the scope of the European Community Law in several ways, including the Schengen Agreements, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. The idea of free movement of persons has led the EU to take common actions on issues regarding immigration controls. In that sense, the *Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)* policies of the EU address the need for a common approach on border controls. In sum, it can be inferred from pre-Maastricht Treaty Period developments that there has been a growth of intergovernmental cooperation and this cooperation has focused more on the security field as seen in the structural formations of Trevi and Schengen.[187]

b. Post-Maastricht Treaty Period

(i) Securitization Process and Maastricht Treaty

Significant developments occurred in the Post-Maastricht Period which reinforced the importance of border security and fuelled securitization. These developments were realized through the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, provided concrete measures in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This treaty established a pillar structure in which issues related to border security and migration related issues were considered under the *third pillar*. The Maastricht Treaty, specifically *Title Six*, listed some exclusive provisions on governing the crossings of external borders of the EU and exercising controls.[188] Therefore, the third pillar can serve as evidence of the institutionalization of internal security issues.

(ii) Securitization Process and Amsterdam Treaty

The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999) made some improvements to the pillar structure. For instance, some aspects of the third pillar including visa, migration and asylum are transferred to the first pillar which led to the communatarization of cited aspects of the third pillar, thus changing decision making procedures. Another important improvement regarding border security issues is that the Schengen Acquis has been integrated into the EU framework by the Schengen Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty.[189]

(iii)   Securitization Process and Treaties of Nice and Lisbon

The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, did not dramatically amend the provisions of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar. However, certain first pillar issues (including visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters) were switched to a "qualified majority" form of voting.[190]

Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009 after the ratification process by each Member State. According to the Treaty, "the European Union shall offer its citizens an Area of Freedom, Security

and Justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured including appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime".[191]

To conclude the present section, there has been a continuous development in the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.* At the beginning of the process, the pre-Maastricht arrangements retained inter-governmental features. By contrast, in the post-Maastricht Treaty period, there was a trend toward *"communautarization"* which implies both an increasing role of the EU institutions in decision-making and the use of traditional legal instruments of the European Community, such as directives and regulations.[192] Yet, states remain in charge in the AFSJ when it comes to deal with border security. Therefore, this explains the unique nature of the EU in terms of defining agenda, decision-making process, and implementation. In this respect, it can be claimed that these developments regarding the AFSJ reflect the evolution of the new EU security agenda as well as the reaffirmation of border security.

3. New Practices and New Technologies

a. New Practices

The securitization process in Europe took place before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. New security practices were gradually implemented during the 1980s and 1990s. Security issues as illustrated by the new European security agenda have framed the EU's summit conclusions, programs and action plans. The European legal and institutional frameworks are now built upon reinforcing external borders to prevent illegal flows from crossing borders. In accordance with the objectives and means of the EU's summits, programs and action plans, it can be claimed that legal and institutional practices have been shaped

accordingly, thereby prioritizing border security. Thus, the legal, structural and policy aspects of these new practices will be elaborated on as follows.

(i) New Legal Practices

The Tampere Council in 1999 emphasized the need for consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organize it and commit related international crimes. Accordingly, the European Council stressed the importance of the effective control of the Union's future external borders by specialized trained professionals.[193] Since the Tampere Summit, the management of the external borders has been one of the cornerstones of the progressive establishment of the European Union as an *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.*[194]

However, the Council meetings which took place after 9/11 focused on border security measures. For example, the 2001 Laeken Council emphasized the importance of more effective control of external borders.[195] The 2002 Seville European Council highlighted the significance of integrated management of external borders.[196] The 2003 Thessaloniki European Council addressed issues regarding common policy on illegal immigration, external borders, the return of illegal migrants and cooperation with third countries.[197] Finally, the 2009 Brussels European Council adopted an internal security strategy which aims at strengthening border management among other security issues.[198]

Five years after the European Council's meeting in Tampere, the European Council adopted a new multi-annual program to be known as the Hague Program.[199] The Hague Program, adopted at the European Council of November 4-5th, 2004, set out ten priorities on strengthening the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice* for the next five years. One of the highlighted priorities of the Hague Program was concerned with

developing an integrated management process for the Union's external borders. Giving additional tasks to FRONTEX, the European External Border Agency, and the creation of an effective visa policy, and securing identity and travel documents through biometric identifiers are underlined under this priority.[200]

Additionally, strengthening security in the EU is one of key orientations of the Hague Program. The abolition of internal border controls, the further gradual establishment of the integrated management system for external borders and the strengthening of controls and surveillance of the external borders of the Union are the important issues that the Council emphasized within the Hague Program.[201] After significant progress were achieved in line with the priorities of Tampere and the Hague Program, the European Council adopted this new multi-annual program termed the Stockholm Program for the period 2010-2014 in order to meet future challenges.[202]

The Stockholm Program, adopted in 2009, dealt with increasing cross-border challenges. In this respect, an internal security strategy has been adopted within the *Action Plan Implementing Stockholm Program*. This strategy involves a coordinated approach to border management.[203] Accordingly, some specific actions on integrated management of the external borders and responsible EU institutions have been identified in the period of 2010-2014.[204] For example, the European Council can ask the Commission to propose measures to make border checks more efficient in order to prevent human trafficking, in particular the trafficking of children.[205]

Furthermore, the Stockholm Program highlights facilitating legal access to the territory of the Member States and taking measures to counteract illegal immigration should be taken hand in hand. The Program also emphasizes the strengthening of border

controls should not prevent access to protection systems by those persons entitled to benefit from them, especially vulnerable people and groups.[206]

The aforementioned developments within the new European security agenda demonstrate that the border security issues have been prioritized and there has been some progress in the evolution of new security practices. In order to achieve this new security agenda, the EU has created new instruments and adopted new policies. Thus, the next sub-section will focus on new structural practices.

(ii) New Administrative Practices

The Europeanization of border security policy is another process linked to institutionalized practices. As a result of this process, member states are now coming together to tackle problems that have emerged globally. Member states have to adopt measures, in line with the European acquis, and to focus on strengthening their external borders. A new implication of enhanced border security in the EU has been that the distinction between internal and external security has been blurred. In the same vein, Lutterbeck (2005) claims that police forces responsible for securing the EU's external borders have tended to adopt a more proactive or pre-emptive and a more military-type approach to border enforcement.[207]

In this respect, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, which is also known as Frontex, was established in Warsaw by a Council Regulation in 2004.[208] As a key institution of the EU, Frontex aims to secure external borders by coordinating and enhancing border security through ensuring the coordination of Member States' operational cooperation.

One particular reason for the creation of Frontex was to integrate national border security systems of Member States against all kind of threats that could happen at or through the external borders of the European Union. Therefore, Frontex was considered to be a body of the EU having legal personality as well as operational and budgetary autonomy and governed by the management board which is composed of one representative of each Member State and two representatives of the Commission.[209]

In order to guarantee the full autonomy and independence of the agency, Frontex was granted an autonomous budget whose revenues come essentially from contributions from the Community. As seen in Table-2, Frontex's budget has increased over the course of time and it was approximately 88 Million Euro in 2010.[210] This suggests that there is political determination directed towards investing substantial amounts in order to ensure border security.

Table-2: Frontex's Budget

Year	Euro
2006	19,166,300
2007	42,150,300
2008	70,432,000
2009	83,250,000
2010	87,917,000

Source: Frontex-2010

(iii) New Policy Practices

New policy practices regarding border security include readmission agreements, negative visa regime and carrier sanctions. All these policy instruments help states to control flows through borders. Readmission agreements are considered to be one of the effective measures in dealing with illegal migration as they urge sending countries to take serious actions against those involved in illegal immigration. Readmission agreements

define the obligation for a country to readmit its citizens and specify the conditions under which countries are obliged to readmit citizens of third countries who have passed through their territory.[211]

The negative visa regime of the EU has some implications for border security policies, as well. In accordance with the EU's negative visa list of countries, citizens of those countries require a visa to enter the territory of the EU member states.[212] Thus, this policy measure is expected to contribute to the state's efficiency when dealing with border controls.

Additionally, carrier sanctions are considered to be another example of new practices which have some implications for maintaining border security. The EU member states are obliged to implement these sanctions in line with the Schengen Acquis.[213] Melis (2001) has argued that measures regarding carrier liability indicate a shift in the management of border security. Apart from public institutions, private sectors have been in charged with border controls through implementing measures of carrier responsibilities.[214] Besides carrier sanctions, introduction of liaison officers and establishing camps which provide a buffer zone between inside and outside are other new policy areas that states resort to while implementing border security practices.[215]

b. New Technologies

While patrolling across the borders has been losing its significance, new technologies produced by security industries have been increasingly used in the area of border security. According to Munster (2009), the border controls are now focusing on targeting risky spaces, risky populations and risky activities.[216] Likewise, Bigo (2007) has suggested that there are three main forms of these new technologies. For instance,

they are created for 'tracing flows', 'individualizing the body with biometric identifiers', and 'monitoring the future course of actions by profiling next events'.[217] In this respect, *Schengen Information System, Visa Information System, Eurodac,* and *The European Border Surveillance System* are all concrete forms of new technologies that will be discussed under this sub-section.

Schengen Information System (SIS) is an information-exchange system that allows competent judicial, border, consular, customs, and police authorities of Member States to obtain and share "alerts" on certain categories of people or objects crossing their external borders. The Articles 92–119 of the 1990 Schengen Convention provides for the establishment, operation and use of the SIS. The current SIS has become operational since March 1995, when the Schengen Convention was first fully put into force.[218]

Countries may issue alerts on third-country nationals if they have refused entry or deported them in the past. Data on people are restricted to a limited number of fields, including full names and possible aliases; specific objective physical characteristics not subject to change (excluding race); date and place of birth; sex; nationality; whether persons concerned are armed or violent; the reason for the alert; and the action to be taken. SIS contains approximately 10 million data items, 10 percent of which are alerts on people.

SIS II, the later version of SIS, will contain additional data categories, such as photographs and fingerprints. As the current SIS has been in operation since 1995, work is in progress on a new system with enhanced functionalities and based on new technology. This new system (SIS II) is currently undergoing extensive tests in cooperation with Member States.[219]

The Eurodac system which was established by a Council Regulation of December 11, 2000 enables Member States to identify asylum applicants and persons who have been apprehended while unlawfully crossing an external frontier of the Community. [220] By comparing fingerprints, Member States can determine whether an asylum applicant or a foreign national found illegally present within a Member State has previously claimed asylum in another Member State, or whether an asylum applicant entered the Union territory unlawfully.[221]

The Visa Information System (VIS) which was adopted by a Council Decision in 2004 provides Schengen Member States storing and exchanging data, including a facial photograph and fingerprints on third-country nationals from non-visa-waiver countries who are applying for a Schengen visa or national visas. VIS is known to be the largest 10-fingerprint database in the world and is capable of storing data for up to 70 million individuals. Its establishment purpose is to help consular and immigration officers in administering better common visa policy, combating fraud and visa shopping, and conducting identity checks at external points of entry.[222]

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) is going to be a complementary system to VIS and SIS systems. Accordingly, the Commission Communication of February 13, 2008 has examined the creation of the EUROSUR. This Communication offers Member States a roadmap for gradually developing such a "system of systems" over the coming years. In line with this Communication, the Commission has figured out a three-phase common technical framework for establishing EUROSUR which is going to support the Member States in their efforts to reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering the European Union.[223] The EUROSUR, which

focuses on the southern and eastern external borders of the EU, aims to reduce the number of illegal immigrants and increase internal security of the EU.[224]

In sum, since the 70s, there has been an evolution within the *Area of Freedom Security and Justice* treaty which includes border security, migration management and police cooperation. As illustrated by Figure-1, these issues have become more institutionalized and begun to retain more supranational features. In addition, new practices including objectives and instruments regarding the new European security agenda have been prioritized by the EU through the means of Summit conclusions (Tampere Sevilla Laeken Summits), programs (the Hague, Stockholm Programs), policies (the European Neighborhood Policy, and enlargement policy) and action plans (European Security Strategy).

Figure-1: The Pillar Structure and Process Regarding the AFSJ

B. The Border Security Policy of Turkey

Throughout history, Turkey has been affected by diverse forms of migratory movements and refugee flows. Traditionally, Turkey has been known as a country of emigration. Large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to Western European countries in early the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the economic recession in Western Europe in the 1970s, large-scale Turkish emigration flows to Europe started as a result of the agreements signed by the Turkey and European governments. This emigration continued until recent times through using several means including family reunification and the asylum track.[225]

However, Turkey's status of migration has shifted from a sending country to a transit and a receiving country since the 1980s. This is due to illegal flows including drugs, refugees and illegal immigrants from neighboring countries heading towards Europe. As a result of Turkey's proximity to unstable countries, illegal immigrants or refugees prefer to travel to Turkey which also offers a way to get to Europe where they can find better standards to live. Thus, in this section, the current situation of border security and the impact of the EU securitization process on Turkey's border security structure will be scrutinized.

1. The Current Situation of Border Security in Turkey

In order to map out the Turkey's border security policy, there is a need to address the securitization of migration process in Turkey. Historically, the flows of refugees, asylum seekers, and transit immigrants into Turkey have drastically increased since the early 1980s.[226] Mass influxes of Kurdish refugees, amounting to almost half a million people, came from northern Iraq in 1988 and 1991. Approximately 20,000 Bosnians were

granted temporary asylum in Turkey during the conflicts between 1992 and 1995 in the former Yugoslavia. In addition to these, in 1998 and 1999, roughly 17,000 Kosovans escaped to Turkey and enjoyed protection from the ethnic conflict in their homeland.[227]

Furthermore, Turkey is at the crossroad of illegal flows from its economically and politically unstable Eastern neighboring countries trying to cross Turkey towards Europe. The location of Turkey as a transit zone between the West and the East as well as the insecure environment such as wars, conflicts, and economic recessions of neighboring countries have all contributed to international migration.[228] During the period 2000-2007, over half a million illegal migrants were apprehended in Turkey.[229] Accordingly, the number of refugees in Turkey has dramatically increased since 2006. As of December 2009, the number of refugees in Turkey amounted to nearly eleven thousand.[230]

In this respect, as shown in Figure-2, Turkey has become a country of transit to the European Union (EU) for illegal immigrants, asylum seekers as well as drug traffickers from origin countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. Having considered all these migratory incidents, it can be claimed that Turkey's status of migration has shifted from a sending country to a transit and receiving country.

Figure-2: The Map Showing Borders with Neighboring Countries and Illegal Flows

As previously mentioned, Turkey is located at a geostrategic point where Europe and Asia meet. The land borders of Turkey are 2,949 kilometers and its coastline is 8,333 kilometers in total. Turkey has two European and six Non-European countries along its land borderline. The land border to the northeast with Georgia is 276 kilometers long; to the east with Armenia is 328 kilometers long and that with Azerbaijan is 18 kilometers long. The land border to the southeast with Iran is 560 kilometers long; to the south with Iraq is 384 kilometers long, and that with Syria is 911 kilometer long. Turkey's borders on the European continent consist of a 203-kilometer frontier with Greece and a 269-kilometer border with Bulgaria.[231]

The western land borders with Greece have been identified by the Meriç River. This river and its immediate hinterland separate Greece and Turkey and also form part of the Bulgarian-Greek border.[232] The western territorial sea border with Greece is of utmost importance because of its proximity to the European Union borders. For instance, Samos, a Greek island in the Aegean Sea, is very close to Turkey, and is only about 1 km away.[233]

The eastern borders of Turkey do not include a specific borderline either. However, some geographical forms define the border in natural ways. For instance, the Turkish-Iranian border passes through the peaks of the mountains which separate Lake Van and Lake Urmia basins. The Turkish-Iraqi border is formed by a high mountain range. Accordingly, the Turkish-Syrian border is so long that it causes difficulties and inefficiencies in controlling the border.[234] Moreover, Turkey has 129 border gates, including sea, railway, air, and land border gates.[235]

In Turkey, responsibilities regarding border security are classified in two categories. One is related to the protection and surveillance of borderlines where army staffs including General Command of Land Forces, General Command of Gendarmerie and Coast Guard of Command are responsible. The other is about the check and control of the passengers and goods at border gates where the police and custom officers are in charge.[236]

So far, the historical and current situations of Turkey have been explained in terms of border security issues. As this historical background suggests, Turkey is familiar with the issues related to flows of immigrants, refugee and other illegal cross-border activities. Thus, Turkey's geostrategic and geopolitical positions are at the crossroads of

the countries that have experienced or have been experiencing political and economic strains which trigger illegal flows.

Illegal flows have occurred within the geographical proximity area of Turkey especially towards Europe. Furthermore, the EU accession process has been playing a considerable role in terms of shaping Turkey's domestic policies, particularly, in the area of border security. Therefore, it would be useful to focus on the securitization of border security policies in Turkey by virtue of the EU accession process.

2. A Historical Overview to the EU Accession Process

Turkey has been party to official relations with the European Union since 1963, the date of the Ankara Association Agreement with European Economic Community. Turkey has also been acknowledged as a candidate country since 1999, the date of the Helsinki Summit. In order to be a member of the EU, Turkey started negotiations with the EU in October 2005, based on the Council Conclusions of December 17, 2004. The aim of the negotiations was accession.[237] In this negotiating process, issues with regard to the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* which include border and immigration policies of the EU have been highlighted and prioritized.[238]

Moreover, a special section has been arranged for border security issues under the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)*. Due to the negotiation process, Turkey has to align its border policies to the EU acquis. In this context, harmonization of domestic laws on *AFSJ* requires new and dynamic policies, which would help greatly in shaping the national border security policies within the perspective of the European Union. In this sense, these policies are now being shaped by not only national efforts but also the initiatives of the European Union. Accordingly, the EU has urged Turkey to redesign and improve its border

security policies.

The alignment of Turkey's border security policy and relevant practices in line with the EU *'acquis'* can be considered as one of the conditions for Turkey's accession to the EU. The official strategy papers (Accession Partnership Papers, National Programs, and Progress Reports) that define Turkey-EU relations prioritize border security measures. For instance, in accordance with pre-accession requirements, Turkey must harmonize its legislation in certain areas identified in the 'Accession Partnership Paper' adopted by the EU in 2008.[239]

In line with the provisions of the Accession Partnership Paper, Turkey is asked to take measures in various areas. Among them, border security has been addressed as a key issue. Thus, in the Accession Partnership Paper, Turkey has been expected to continue its efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration and increase its capacity to combat illegal migration in line with international standards. Furthermore, Turkey has been asked to implement the National Action Plan and prepare a precise road map on integrated border management. As an important administrative step, establishing a new border law enforcement authority has also been highlighted within the 2008 Accession Partnership Paper.[240]

After the approval of the 2008 Accession Partnership by the EU, the Turkish Government announced its own National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis on December 31, 2008. In the National Program, there is a set of provisions that contributes to the accession process. Through the National Program, Turkey sets its own agenda in line with the priorities of Accession Partnership Paper. In this sense, border security has been prioritized thereby addressing some institutional and legal actions in the short and long terms. For instance, Turkey has pledged to pass the Law on Establishment of Border Security Unit

under the Ministry of Interior in the period of 2010-2011. In order to establish this unit, Turkey needs to carry out organizational, administrative and infrastructural actions within the period of 2009 and 2013.[241]

Accordingly, the EU Commission assesses the annual progress of the candidate countries in the area of negotiation chapters and addresses some recommendations by means of the Progress Reports, which have been released by the Commission since 1998. For example, in line with the 2010 Progress Report, Turkey has been recommended to take necessary action on issues related to border security. Having assessed the developments of 2009 and 2010 in the area of border security, the Commission asked Turkey to enhance its institutional capacity by establishing a new border security agency in order to manage migration controls in an efficient way. In addition, efficiently using databases and risk analysis at the borders as well as deploying more professional staff that can use technical instruments at border crossing points have been addressed as key issues that necessitate further attention by Turkey.[242]

All the mentioned issues are closely related to implementing the provisions and measures in line with major policy papers of the EU and Turkey. Beside these strategy papers, there are secondary actions which have been taken in order to meet the requirements of the EU in the area of border security. For instance, in order to coordinate individual efforts for the protection of the external borders of the EU, Turkey set up a 'Task Force for Asylum, Migration and Protection of External Borders' in 2002. As a result of studies of the Task Force, "The Strategy Paper for the Protection of External Borders" was issued in April 14, 2003.

Furthermore, based on the strategy paper, Turkey started the implementation of a

twinning project titled as "Support for The Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy" on 19 July 2004 in cooperation with the French-UK Consortium, which produced an action plan towards the Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy in March 27, 2006. Thus, the Action Plan aims to prepare the institutional and legislative regulations for the protection of the borders by a civil, non-military, and professional agency.[243]

Accordingly, as an output of another twinning project, which started in 2005 with the participation of Hungary and Spain consortium, a common manual regarding border security checks was produced in 2007. The aim of the manual is to ensure that existing institutions that are responsible for border security issues perform their tasks (their daily work or methods) in accordance with the EU standards.[244]

With the impact of the EU policies, Turkey has had to review its current institutional and legal infrastructures regarding the expectations of the EU in the area of border security. Therefore, the securitization process performed by the EU has shifted Turkey's domestic policies towards a European perspective by adopting a range of actions, including passing new regulations and establishing a new unit. The main purpose of this policy change is to provide cooperative solutions for emerging global problems within the context of border security.

C. The Notion of Border Security Actor and Its Applications

1. The Notion of Border Security Actor

Traditionally, international actorness has been perceived by parameters such as a strong economy, military capacity, and strong diplomatic/political supremacy and

presence. Accordingly, it has been acknowledged that the strength of this actorness is affiliated with higher scores on these parameters.[245] Therefore, it can be claimed that the notion of actorness varies in accordance with the area and the scope of interests.

Thus, states were perceived to be the primary actors in the international society and were at the center of the realist thought. However, the nature and role of the state has now changed, thereby resulting in the emergence of new authority structures and new forms of governance.[246] In this respect, in the contemporary globalization period, new actors have begun to occupy the political space, thus diversifying the aspects of actorness.

As the notion of actorness is a very controversial issue, there is no common definition of actorness. Nevertheless, there are some notable definitions or descriptions of some scholars with regard to the notion of actorness. For instance, Larsen (2002), who attempts to define actorness by referring to the constructivist paradigm, has argued that the actorness of the polity is a result of its members, surroundings and social actions.[247] While describing the international actorness within the notion of security, Waever (2000) also claimed that identification of actorness requires including a level of analysis that studies different segments (individual, bureaucracy, state or a collective identity) and recognizing who will be responsible for which problems. In this respect, identifying an actor is not a simple thing as it covers some complexities such as defining a problematic area and dealing with that area in an efficient way.[248] Hill (2007) has suggested that being an international actor necessitates considerable resources of all kinds over a sustained time.[249]

In the same vein, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) formulated some criteria for assessing the actor capacity of the EU in the area of environmental policy. These criteria are recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion, which are crucial for a polity while accomplishing its policy goals as well as assessing actor capacity. [250] Bretherton and Vogler (2006) also specified three criteria for the assessment of becoming an actor, respectively naming as *opportunity, presence, and capability*.[251] In this respect, actorness can be defined as status of a polity that can formulate and act upon its policy objectives.[252]

Nevertheless defining the concept of being an actor has been a very contentious issue, most of the scholars have agreed on the idea that becoming an actor related to a polity or other forms of governmental structures is simply about that polity or governmental structure's capability and capacity in fulfilling policy objectives during the course of time. *Having acknowledged Bretherton and Vogler's actorness definition, it can be argued that becoming a border security actor, as documented in the present study, is related to capability and capacity of a polity or governmental structure in accomplishing policy objectives during the course of time.* Thus, in the next section, the application of actorness to the EU within the realm of security will be examined.

2. Application of the Notion of Border Security Actor to the EU

The application of the notion of actorness to the EU can be considered unique when compared with other similar applications. The uniqueness of the EU actorness matters due to the fact that the EU's concentration is on nonmilitary means to secure its objectives which are based on law, cooperation, and diplomacy.[253] Chaban (2006) has argued that the actorness of the EU depends on its positive role and policies appreciated

by countries outside the EU and international organizations which, in turn, will increase the legitimacy of the EU and reinforce the international actorness capacity of the EU.[254] According to Larsen (2002), as a reflection of its interests, the dominant discourse that the EU conveys to its members indicates or implies the actorness of the EU.[255]

Security actorness of the EU within the scope of the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,* which includes border security, immigration, and police cooperation, dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the securitization process has also evolved dramatically, thereby contributing to the EU to become a security actor.[256] Therefore, as addressed in previous sections, new practices including new objectives, instruments and technologies regarding the new European security agenda have been acknowledged by the EU.

In the same vein, the European legal and institutional frameworks are emphasizing the reinforcement of external borders to prevent illegal flows from crossing borders. Therefore, within the area of security, the application of actorness to the EU requires considering some parameters. As suggested by Larsen (2002) Europe can only be an international actor as long as it has a considerable capacity to achieve specific goals (such as "safe borders" and secure environment) within the EU territory, as well as convincing external actors to subscribe to (and implement) EU's priorities.[257] *The scope of EU actorness therefore involves internal actors (EU member states), the relationship between EU institutions and EU member states, and external actors (such as non EU member states and international organizations).*

In terms of policy initiatives, the EU actorness involves being able to set the agenda in Council meetings, implementing a European Security Strategy and European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP), making agreements with regard to the AFSJ, deploying the Frontex agency to the external borders of the EU. Likewise, the enlargement policy of the EU can be regarded as a key parameter as it contributes to the reinforcement of security actorness of the EU.[258]

In this respect, in order to analyze the security actorness of the EU within the scope of the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice*, there is a need to shed light on the internal factors within the EU, which affect policy-shaping process. For instance, the Council of Ministers, which reflects member states' interests, has been a dominant institution in shaping and framing the EU border security policies. Therefore, member states retain a significant degree of control over border security policies.

Yet, the making of a joint EU border security policy with respect to legally binding regulations on Member States has been on the agenda since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.[259] Border security issues have shifted from national interests into a supranational regime with the incorporation of Schengen regime into the first pillar. Therefore, there has been a change from cooperation to further integration.[260]

In order to provide an efficient means of integration, the EU asks member states as well as candidate and neighboring countries to take actions on prioritized areas including immigration control and border security. As suggested by Zaiotti (2007), a 'gated community syndrome' which is an outcome of conflicts between openness and closure, friendships and enmities, has affected the EU wholly and has had important repercussions in terms of relations with its neighbors.[261]

It is obvious that bordering with some countries will produce not only challenges but also opportunities. Therefore, the *European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)*, which was adopted

by the Thessalonica European Council in 2003, represents a comprehensive and progressive approach to dealing with the implications of enlargement so as to overcome the challenges and opportunities that Europe's new neighbors face.[262]

The European Security Strategy Paper also emphasizes the importance of the ENP which seeks to contribute further to joint prosperity and security. *The European Security Strategy Paper* highlights the importance of the neighborhood policy by ensuring that European interests will be protected by well-governed countries that have borders with Europe. While the integration of acceding states increases European security, this geographic enlargement brings the EU closer to troubled areas. [263]

Therefore, some of the *ENP*'s provisions require the EU's neighbors to tighten controls not only at their outer borders, but also at their borders with the EU. This obligation bolsters the idea that the threats are coming through neighbors' borders.[264] While the *ENP* is Schengenized, the EU's neighbors would temporarily accept its harsh conditions in the hope that, during the course of the time, the EU's position on membership will soften as it did with enlargement in 1990s. Therefore, the prospect of accession might soften the countries' reluctance to accept the Schengenized *ENP*.[265]

Furthermore, external dimension of border security should be taken into consideration. One external dimension is about to cooperate with third countries which, to some extent, helps to limit migration pressures. The other external dimension is that new member states are excluded from the opt-out choice to the Schengen acquis which obliges candidate countries to have the capacity to implement the Schengen regime before entering the Union.

Additionally, cooperation with the third countries, known as the external dimension

of the *JHA* policies, can also be considered within the *ENP*. Thus, cooperation on border control, readmission agreements, and combating illegal migration is treated as largely subordinate to the central strategy of reducing migratory pressures.[266] In this sense, cooperation has comprised a combination of both types of approaches: the externalization of control tools and prevention.

Furthermore, the European Commission has taken a preventive approach since the Amsterdam Treaty. As argued by Boswell (2003), in the absence of a preventive agenda or a leading role of the Commission in implementing the agenda, the strategy would shift back into an emphasis on migration control and border security.[267] Therefore, illegal flows through borders have led states to cooperate which, in turn, have led further integration at regional level. As nation states cannot deal with illegal flows effectively, regional actors have emerged which are based on shared goals and converged interests.[268]

Moreover, the existing literature regarding the EU's security actorness focuses more on *Common Foreign and Security Policy* areas (second pillar issues) where initial structures and policies are being shaped in accordance with military means and defense objectives.[269] Considering the EU efforts on the securitization of the borders, there have been some repercussions on the neighboring countries which have also led the EU to become a regional security actor.

Considering the initiatives of the ENP and negotiations with candidate countries, the actorness of the EU within the scope of *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* can be argued. With this occasion, as a neighboring and negotiating country of the EU, Turkey is emerging as a salient security component which can contribute to the EU within the *Area*

of Freedom, Security and Justice.[270] Hence, if undertaken, the security role will, in turn, transform Turkey into a border security actor which will be discussed in the next section.

3. Application of the Notion of Border Security Actor to Turkey

There is a mandatory relationship between the EU and Turkey which dates back to the 1960s. Furthermore, the Schengen Acquis requires candidate countries such as Turkey to adopt border security measures before being a member of the EU. Therefore, the impact of the EU securitization can lead Turkey to be a regional security actor which we may call an unintended consequence of the securitization process.

With the impact of the securitization of the EU borders and accession process, the Turkey's national security framework has been affected by the policies of the European Union. The national security framework of Turkey has been influenced by the impact of the EU policies in the domain of AFSJ, as documented in this study. This tends to support the idea that the EU has the capacity to export its own security agenda outside of its borders. In order to measure the impact of the securitization and security actorness of the EU, the present research will examine how Turkey is dealing with key issues, such as border security, human smuggling, and drug trafficking.

More to the point, this critical evaluation of the Turkish national security framework raises a crucial question the author intends to address: *Does the evolution of Turkey's border security framework provide Turkey with the capability of being a security actor, not only within the parameters defined by the EU but also according to its own agenda?*

Conclusion for Part-A: The Linkage between the Literature and the Present Study

Since the 1990s, security studies have entered into a new era where the notion of security and the concept of threat have changed dramatically. As documented by the literature review, the questions of who is the enemy and who is at the risk from the enemy have been determining parameters in term of expanding notion of security. As discussed earlier by scholars (Lutterbeck 2005 and Crelinsten 1998), blurring the distinction between internal and external security, the emergence of societal security, and the escalation of border security have led to the expansion of the notion of security.

The ultimate role of the state in shaping security policies is challenged by the emergence of a new threat environment where transnational crimes and illegal flows defy national sovereignty and security. In these circumstances, conventional means and tools are incompetent in dealing with new threats that emerged on the global stage and therefore, state capacity has to be reconsidered in the context of global security. In this respect, contemporary methods (new technologies, new practices, and new policies) and non-state actors have been unitary mechanisms that emerged as a response to the new threat environment.

Having considered the new threat environment and new security era, one can claim that states and the methods states traditionally used have undergone a great deal of transformation in efforts aimed at counteracting transnational crimes, including people smuggling, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. In the context of dealing with illegal flows, establishing intergovernmental structures and security norms are an example of the transformation of traditional structures and methods in the EU. Therefore, a state's supremacy over shaping and framing border security is secured by adopting a global

perspective where states and non-state actors interact with each other, generating common border security policies. Thus, in the area of border security, new techniques of governance increasingly involve global and transnational dimensions to deal efficiently with illegal flows that defy national sovereignty and security.

The realist view emphasizes restricting immigration and preserving national identity through de-territorial or re-territorial policies. Borders still matter in world policy and politics. However, perceptions and practices with regard to borders have been transformed. States do not have the capacity to deal with immigration pressures on their own. Tightening security measures at borders only changes the route illegal immigration take from one country to another. This is referred to as the 'rechanneling effect'. Therefore, the realist approach is challenged by cross-border crimes, which have dramatically increased in the contemporary globalization period. Furthermore, various actors, norms, new practices, and new technologies are involved in securing borders in response to changing global migration trends. In this respect, there is a need to develop new techniques of government, which deal with cross-border threats in an efficient way.

New security governance strategies can provide capacity to states and can help them to achieve their policy goals pertaining to border security. Securitization of borders as a motive for new security governance strategies will enable states to fulfill their domestic goals in the area of border security, on one hand. On the other hand, through the securitization process non-state actors will find a way to deal with illegal flows as well as getting assistance for their individual efforts. From this point of view, borders can be regarded as a key component of the securitization process which can be used by

supranational actors or intergovernmental organizations who aim to impact the security policies of nation states.

Thus, the securitization process has generated a blurring of the distinction between internal and external security, a changing notion of borders, and a series of new attributed meanings to the border security as well as the emergence of border security norms and respective structures which all have led to the creation of new security governance. The evolution of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has proven that the impact of the securitization process in the EU context is significant.

However, the current literature is lacking as there has not been sufficient research on the impact of the securitization process on nation states' security framework. In this respect, as a case study, Turkey and the EU were chosen in order to examine whether there has been any significant impact of the securitization process thus changing the security role of Turkey in the area of border security. One point we need to clarify is that there has been a paradoxical situation with regard to the impact of the EU securitization process. The dilemma between admitting and excluding Turkey as a result of the securitization process creates a paradox in the context of Turkey-EU relations. On the one hand, illegal flows from Turkey's neighboring countries will place at risk the implementation of the EU security agenda thereby causing arguments against Turkey's membership. On the other hand, the securitization process will contribute to the EU peace and security framework with the individual efforts of Turkey in securing Turkey's external borders thus facilitating Turkey's accession to the EU. From this point of view, the securitization process creates a paradox in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU.

In this respect, Turkey's accession to the EU is a very controversial issue unless members of the EU are not convinced by Turkey's contribution to the EU in the area of border security. With the impact of the EU securitization process which will have some repercussions for Turkey's legal, administrative, budgetary and external actions, Turkey's capability in dealing with illegal flows will have increased thus leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

It is therefore useful to address the concept of becoming an actor in the context of border security. As discussed by some scholars (Larsen 2002, Hill 2007, and Waever 2000) becoming an actor depends on having considerable resources, being able to create actions, being responsible for the problems as well as capabilities and fulfilling policy goals. In this sense, the EU is an actor as it can set the agenda in Council meetings, implement neighborhood policies with neighboring countries, sign agreements on AFSJ issues, and deploy the Frontex agency to secure the external borders of the EU. By doing that, the EU is becoming an actor in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.

In sum, the securitization process has had a significant impact on the evolution of the AFSJ and emergence of the new security governance in the EU thus changing its security role. However, the current literature requires more focus with regard to the impact of the securitization process on nation states' security framework. Thus, in the next section, whether there has been any significant impact of the securitization process on the Turkish border security system, particularly in the area of border security will be examined and the casual outcomes of this impact that has produced a change in Turkey's security role will be discussed.

PART-B

In this section, in accordance with the adopted research design and methodology, the impact of the securitization process on the Turkish border security system (particularly in the area of border security) and Turkey's changing security role as a causal outcome of the securitization process will be examined.

CHAPTER-V: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A. Research Design

1. The Goal of the Study

Securitization contributes to the reaffirmation of state sovereignty and also functions as a way to control borders. Therefore, securitization reinforces the pursuit of national interests in the area of border security. Throughout the research, the author focused on the security aspect of illegal flows including people smuggling and drug trafficking as well as border protection through the lens of securitization. In this respect, one of the key objectives of the present study was to determine the impact of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey and Turkey's changing security role with the impact of the securitization process.

Having clarified the goal of the study, the present research sought to discuss various aspects of the securitization process including the impact, change, and evaluation process, in the context of EU-Turkey relations. Thus, the research questions were designed to shed light on these aspects. In this respect, based on the theoretical framework of the study, the dissertation addressed the following questions, and tested several hypotheses with chosen variables and criteria.

2. Research Questions, Hypotheses, Variables and Criteria

The present research aimed to determine the impact of the securitization process in the context of EU-Turkey relations and primarily addressed the following questions. These questions are grouped in 4 categories. Hypotheses, variables, and criteria were also generated for each research question.

RQ-1: What is the impact of the securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey? Is the impact of the securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey significant?

H-1: The interactions and official relations between the EU and Turkey date back to the early 1960s. Historically, there have been continuous implications of the securitization process since the 1990s. For example, the impact of the securitization process can be seen in the legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions of nation states in the area of border security. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the RQ-1 was that there have been profound implications of the securitization of the EU borders on Turkey. That is, the researcher hypothesized there would be a strong relationship between the securitization and accession process because that generates considerable impacts in the domain of border security framework of Turkey.

Variables: Border security framework (the current state of legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border security) and the securitization process.

Criteria:

    a. Legal actions in the pre-securitization and post-securitization processes.

    b. Administrative actions in the pre-securitization and post-securitization processes.

    c. Budgetary actions in the pre-securitization and post-securitization processes.

d. External actions in the pre-securitization and post-securitization processes.

e. Opinions obtained from experts.

f. Observations regarding border security implementations.

RQ-2: Has securitization lead Turkey to become *a border security actor*?

H-2: The hypothesis regarding the RQ-2 was that securitization has led Turkey to become a border security actor.

Variables: Capability to ensure border security and being a border security actor.

Criteria:

a. Number of legal actions at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

b. Number of administrative actions at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

c. Number of budgetary actions at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

d. Number of external actions at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

e. Number of projects funded by the EU at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

f. Number of apprehensions on illegal flows at the beginning and during the deepening of the securitization process.

RQ-3: Is the current status of border security in Turkey sufficiently in line with the EU regulations? To what degree does securitization contribute to Turkey's admission to the EU?

H-3: With regard to the third research question, the researcher postulated that the current status of border security in Turkey would not be sufficiently in line with the idea of *acquis communautaire,* which requires harmonizing the domestic legal framework in line with regulations of the EU, and with its directives, decisions, and framework decisions. Yet, securitization may contribute, to a considerable extent, to Turkey's admission to the EU.

Variables: The EU accession process and Turkey's efforts on border security.

Criteria:

      a. Legal actions on border security.

      b. Administrative actions on border security.

      c. Discourses of official reports.

      d. Opinions of experts.

RQ-4: Does the evolution of Turkey's border security framework provide Turkey with the capability of being a border security actor, not only within the parameters defined by the EU but also in accordance with its own agenda?

H-4: By referring to the RQ-4, the researcher postulated that the evolution of Turkey's border security framework has provided Turkey with the capability of being a border security actor not only within the parameters defined by the EU, but also in accordance with its own security agenda.

Variables: The EU parameters and Turkey's parameters for defining border security policy.

Criteria:

    a. Opinions of experts.

b. Discourses of official reports.

c. Policy-based actions.

3. Defining Criteria

The research criteria were considered to be part of the evaluation process, and aimed to measure the impact of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. The criteria, designed to address the research questions, were embedded in the European Neighborhood Policy, Action Plans, the programs of the EU, as well as progress reports and accession partnership papers, which have been prepared for Turkey by the EU. In those documents, the EU has prioritized border security and has asked candidate countries to increase their capability for enhancing border security as a requirement for membership. Expectations and measures for enhancing capability were also considered as criteria for addressing the key question. Thus, it was felt that positive measures for ensuring the capability and capability in the area of border security demonstrated that Turkey would go through a process that makes it a significant border security actor in a Europe-wide security system. The criteria regarding securitization were embedded in the European Union Progress Reports, ENP policy papers as well as in the Schengen Catalogue.

a. **Foundations of the Criteria Regarding Research Design**

(i) **Policy Papers for the EU Member States**

In the Hague Program, adopted in 2005, the EU prioritized some measures for establishing a border management system which were expected to be adopted by member states. Among them there were legislative actions (adoption of Handbook for Border Guards and coherent approach and harmonized solutions in the EU on biometric

identifiers and data) and administrative actions (including the establishment of an External Borders Fund and the establishment of an integrated management system for external borders).[271]

As part of the Stockholm Program, adopted in 2010, the European Council invited the Council and the Commission to support enhancing capacity in third countries so that they could control their external borders in an efficient way.[272] The "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union" adopted in 2010, suggests that the integrated border-management mechanism must be reinforced. In this respect, dialogue and cooperation with third countries of origin and with transit countries are also essential for enhancing border-control capability.[273]

Moreover, within the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism which aims to establish an evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen Acquis, the EU Commission put forth specific areas which could be covered for purposes of evaluation. These areas included: the strategic, organizational and functional structure of border services; risk analysis, intelligence and data flow management; readmission, expulsion and illegal immigration, including carrier's liability; provisions for carrying out checks at border crossing points; infrastructure of border crossing points; technical issues meaning technical availability at the external borders for border control; numbers and training of border guards; surveillance systems at borders; and existing forms of cooperation with neighboring third countries.[274] A member states' capacity to fulfill the requirements of the Schengen Acquis would be evaluated in accordance with the cited criteria.

Lastly, within the scope of the Schengen Catalogue, administrative actions (such as establishing a border security unit and standardizing border crossing points),

legislative actions for ensuring border security, (such as constant monitoring mechanisms), removal and readmission procedures, and cooperation with third countries were identified as best practices for establishing an integrated border management system.[275] Therefore, candidate countries needed to take these practices into account if they wished to be part of Europe-wide border security system.

(ii) Policy Papers for the Candidate Countries (Turkey)

The Commission of the EU assesses the annual progress of Turkey through Progress Reports which have been released since 1998. In line with the 2011 Progress Report, Turkey has been asked to take legislative and administrative actions related to border security. The Commission has asked Turkey to enhance its institutional capability by establishing a new border security agency in order to manage migration controls in an efficient way. In addition, it was asked o use the databases and risk analysis processes at the borders and to deploy more competent staff that could use technical instruments at border crossing points as key issues that need further attention. Furthermore, the number of apprehended illegal immigrants, deportees, and seized drugs as well as initiated EU projects and readmission agreements have been highlighted as progressive steps towards increasing the capability in the area of border security.[276]

In another policy paper prepared for Turkey's accession, the provisions of the Accession Partnership Paper required Turkey to take measures in various other related areas. Among them, border security was addressed as a key issue. Thus, in the Accession Partnership Paper, Turkey was expected to continue its efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration and to increase its capability to combat illegal migration in line with international standards. In addition, Turkey was asked to

implement the National Action Plan and prepare a precise road map to reach integrated border management. As an important administrative step, establishing a new border law enforcement authority was also highlighted within the 2008 Accession Partnership Paper.[277]

(iii) Strategy Papers for the Non-Members (Georgia and Ukraine)

The European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper adopted in 2004, bolstered the idea that the Action Plans regarding integrated border management should include measures to improve the efficiency of border management, such as supporting the creation of professional non-military border guards and their training as well as measures for securing travel documents.[278] For instance, in line with the ENP strategy paper, the EU asked Georgia and Ukraine to fulfill measures with regard to integrated border management strategy. In particular, the EU asked countries to adopt legal and administrative measures as well as readmission and removal procedures for ensuring border security.[279]

(iv) Interview Responses

Responses from the Turkish and non-Turkish interviewees who were experts in the field of border security and undertaking the transformation of the border security system of Turkey in line with the EU expectations, reflect the general points with regard to research questions. Since the study aimed to address the impact of the securitization process, the selective coding method led the researcher to conduct a process of analytical inductions and to deduce emergent categories which included themes concentrated on legal, administrative, policy-based, and external actions in the area of border security. These categories allowed the researcher to analyze the impact of the securitization

process. Furthermore, on the basis of the findings obtained from interview responses, attributes necessary to become a border security actor were embedded in these categories. Therefore, these emergent categories served as criteria for addressing the research questions.

b. The Emergence of the Criteria

To conclude, all strategy papers, prepared for the EU Member States, candidate countries, and non-EU countries, have made border security a key issue and have prioritized enhancing a country's capability and capacity to ensure border security through legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions. Therefore, these measures designed to increase capability in fulfilling border security policy objectives can be used as a criterion for measuring the impact of the securitization process. These criteria also specify the significance of the impact of securitization by documenting the increasing number of legal, administrative, policy-based, and external actions that have occurred in the area of border security. The more actions taken to enhance the border security system the more these define the strength of the securitization.

Furthermore, emergent categories obtained from interview responses were consistent with the criteria obtained from policy papers prepared for the EU member states, candidate countries, and non-EU member states. Thus, the emergent categories also concentrated on legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions which will be clarified in the next section.

Moreover, chosen criteria were compatible with the criteria model developed by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) for measuring the parameters of becoming an actor. The adopted criteria also allowed the researcher to investigate the impact of the securitization

process on the border security framework of Turkey successfully.

B.   Research Methodology

The concept of research design, as suggested by Yin (2003), is one that provides a logical plan for getting from "here" to "there". Yin describes "here" as an initial set of questions and "there" as set of conclusions regarding these questions.[280] Considering the present research questions and the associated variables and defined criteria led to the belief that a qualitative methodology would be a better choice for assessing the impacts of securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey. The following arguments further support the importance of adopting a qualitative methodology.

Within the present research, a case study approach was adopted in order to better understand the particular impact of the securitization process on nation states. Yin (2003) describes the case study approach as an empirical inquiry format that tries to examine the probable application of a contemporary phenomenon in real life, particularly when the precincts between phenomena and the context in which they occur are not obvious. [281] A single case study is a good design for testing a theory with clear-cut propositions through the use of various measurement methods and tools.[282]

In this case study, the author chose the EU and Turkey as a case to study in order to investigate the impact of the EU securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. In this respect, this case study aimed to understand the nation states' role (Turkey's role) within the globalization process, while simultaneously shaping its border security policy with the impact of securitization policies of a regional

security actor, the European Union. Therefore, this study primarily concentrated on whether there has been any *impact* of border security policies of the EU on the border security framework of Turkey

Using a case study approach allowed the researcher to become acquainted with real life cases such as organizational processes and international relations. The unique strength of a case study is that it can reveal logical points through diverse evidences including, documents, archives, interviews, and observations.[283] Likewise, the author of the present research became involved in the process and gathered data by conducting a number of interviews and capturing observations. These initial interviews and observations provided the author notable insights and perspectives that were used to develop further analytical arguments.

Using qualitative research tools, firstly, the researcher made observations by visiting research sites regarding border security practices. Secondly, the researcher performed semi-structured interviews with the individuals who were active in the border security reform process in Turkey (interview questions are presented under Appendix-2). Thirdly, the researcher reviewed the pertinent documentation such as reports, official decrees, laws and regulations as an archival research. In brief, these qualitative methods including observations, interviews and archival research not only contribute to the triangulation of data, but also to the evaluation of the impact of securitization.[284]

Additionally, other methods were useful and complementary in terms of confirming the evidence or findings from the qualitative analysis done within the dissertation.[285] The secondary data was obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Interior

and from the EU's official survey tools such as Eurobarometer and Eurostat and was used to analyze the impact of the process by means of quantitative methodology.

In this respect, the methodologies adopted within the dissertation shed light on the research questions, and contribute as a measure as to whether there has been any change or impact of a regional policy action on a nation state, thus changing its security framework, role or status. The next section discusses the adopted methodology in a detailed manner.

1. Data Collection Methods

a. Observation

Yin (2003) argues that observational evidence, as a source of data, is also helpful in providing additional information about the topic being investigated.[286] In order to analyze whether there has been any impact of the EU border security policy on the Turkish national security framework, 5 main research sites (Van, Hatay, Ankara, Istanbul, and Edirne provinces) provided a sample area, situated in the east (Van), south (Hatay), mid (Ankara) and west (Istanbul and Edirne), as shown by Figure-3. These cities were deemed of crucial importance in terms of observing and measuring the probable impacts of the EU border security policies and for analyzing border security reform initiatives in Turkey. As one of the qualitative tools, observations also helped the researcher to observe differences between the official papers and the actual practices (implementation) with regard to the border security.

Figure-3: The Map of Turkey Showing the Provincial Observation Sites

b. Interviews

Interviews, as argued by Weiss (1998), are a valuable source of information in qualitative evaluations. Interviews used in the present research were structured and guided by the research questions. They were also designed as open-ended questions, thus enabling the researcher to code and create categories.[287] Responses of the interviewees therefore reflect general points with regard to research questions. Since the study sought to address the impact of the securitization process, the semi-structured interview were developed to create a flexible environment and explore opinions and experiences regarding the impact of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey.

The researcher selected a purposive analytical sample that consisted of officials, academics, and experts engaged with border security issues, not only in the field, but also at the policy-making level. By doing that, the representativeness of the sample was assured. As such, one can see that the target group was chosen with purposive techniques. Border security experts selected for qualitative interviewing were chosen purposively for an important theoretical reason: to discover the probable impacts of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey and to determine whether there has been any significant impact that changes Turkey's security role.

Weiss (1998) also argue s that purposive sampling is a useful method in the evaluation process of a program or intervention.[288] This technique allowed the researcher to obtain a diversity of expert opinions and experiences in the area of border security. Thus, Ryan and Bernard (2000) suggest that grounded researchers aim to understand people's experiences as exactly and accurately as possible due to the fact that they seek to identify categories and concepts emerging from experiences and opinions within the texts.[289]

There were 40 interviewees including Turkish and non-Turkish respondents (governors, sub-governors, police, custom officials, experts, and academics) engaged with border security practices and border security reform in the chosen research sites (Van, Hatay, Ankara, Istanbul, and Edirne provinces of Turkey) as well as experts and policymakers from international organizations (the European Commission, the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, the United Nations Refugee Agency, and the International Organization for Migration). Their responses were written on scratch papers, digitally recorded and made adaptable for use in NVivo-9, a software program.

The researcher's interview strategy was to build trust and establish rapport before starting the interviews through social activities, and to explain the intention for doing research by means of a notification letter and to also obtain their consent for doing the interviews.

Participants were assured that their names, personal information and answers as to the interviews would remain confidential, and would not be disclosed to anyone. Joining the interview and participating in the research was up to the participant. The study data was kept confidential, as participants' identifiable information was coded. For example, the responses of a captain, which were linked to a file, were coded with a number.

The research records included some information regarding job title, years of experience and organizational position both within and outside of Turkey. The investigator kept this information confidential by limiting individuals' access to the research data and keeping them locked in a secure location at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University in Newark campus.

c. Archival Research

Archival research, as suggested by Yin (2003), can be utilized in combination with other qualitative data methods thereby contributing to the construction of a case study.[290] Thus, in the present study, the focus of archival research was on issues such as border security discourses related to establishing treaties, regulations, directives, and framework decisions of the European Union as well as equivalent legal instruments in Turkey. The contents of cited official papers were examined during the process of this archival research. The author also used retrospective data contained in the drug reports of national and international institutions (UNODC, Units of the Turkish National Police;

Department of Organized Crime and Department of Foreigners) as well as information noted on EU projects and legal regulations obtained from the Ministry of Interior, the Border Management Bureau and the Department for European Union Affairs and International Relations. This method also shed light on the differences between discourses of the official papers and actual practices with regard to the topic of border security.

2. Data Analyzing Tools

a. Coding

Ryan and Bernard (2000) emphasize the importance of coding in enabling the researcher to make judgments about the meanings of complex blocks of texts thus fostering an effective analytical reduction process.[291] Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) define coding as a process of tagging texts or other qualitative data to generate a series of categories or variables.[292] In the same vein, Weiss (1998) suggests that the initial goal of coding is to develop descriptive categories.[293] Grbich (2007) also argues that the process including coding, formulating of categories, and jotting down memos is highly important in terms of generating theory. As defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), a category can serve as a conceptual element in the process of generating theory.[294] Thus, the present researcher also used a selective coding method which helped with the process of analytical induction that was applied to help develop emergent categories.

b. Clustering

Clustering, as defined by Weiss (1998), is the procedure of putting and grouping similar things together.[295] As Ryan and Bernard (2000) have highlighted, the utmost value here was placed on word counts in terms of exploring patterns of ideas from field

notes to the responses to open-ended questions.[296] Thus, in the present study, the investigator also benefited from using a clustering method in order to examine the strength of the similarities between emergent categories as calculated by the NVivo-9 software program.

c. Constant Comparative Method-Analytical Induction

The author used a constant comparison method and did this by coding a category and comparing it with other categories coded for other groups, as suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967).[297] Revealing uniformities and diversities as well as using more concepts to address differences in the data is a key element of constant comparison method.[298] Common patterns and processes which led to emergent categories were described. Provisional hypotheses however, continued to hold even after the analytical induction process was completed. Analytical induction, as explained by Ryan and Bernard (2000), is a qualitative method which enhances the causal elucidation of phenomena from closely examined cases.[299] Glaser and Strauss (1967) have suggested that analytical induction is considered as one of the qualitative approaches concerned with generating and proving an integrated, limited, precise, universally applicable theory.[300]

In the present study, categorizing and comparing codes in accordance with group responses (here, Turkish and Non-Turkish interviewees) was adopted systematically, as well. From this point of view, the constant comparison method and the analytical induction process helped the researcher to generate a theory with regard to the impact of the securitization process on Turkey's border security framework.

3. Analytical Evaluation Strategy

Evaluation is an important component of qualitative research. Creswell (1994) claims that a qualitative researcher is concerned with process rather than outcomes or products.[301] Weiss (1998), while addressing the evaluation process, emphasized the importance of programs where goals are structured to make changes in a whole network of agencies and larger systems.[302] Thus, the securitization process can be viewed as an intervention or program that has a significant impact on the Turkish border security system and that can also be perceived as the impact of a program over a larger unit. Likewise, the securitization process tends to impact a nation states' security framework as seen in the case of Turkey-EU nexus.

The securitization process aims to change the current border security system with notable impacts. In this context, the securitization process was measured through chosen variables or inputs including legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions thus increasing Turkey's capability in the area of border security. In order to evaluate the impact of securitization, the author benefited from conducting a preliminary interrupted time series analysis and employed a logic model.

a. Time Series Analysis

Time series analysis is a measuring method which can contribute to the evaluation of the present research. Weiss (1998) argues that a time series design is about a sequence of measurements on key criteria at periodical intervals before the program starts and going on measurements after beginning and ending the program.[303] Campbell (1969) suggests that the impact of the reform can be measured through a pretest-posttest design.[304]

In this sense, the sequence of the impact in accordance with a reform or any intervention in specific time periods provides a comparison base for an analytical impact-assessment. Likewise, the impact of the EU securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey started with the EU accession process of Turkey. Therefore, the two time interventions that are of utmost importance are 1999 and 2005. The securitization process can be assessed as a significant intervention which can be applied to larger units thus causing notable impacts. As seen in the EU-Turkey case, the securitization process is the main variable that can transform the Turkish national security system with notable impacts. The time series method allowed the author to carry out a counterfactual analysis with regard to the impact of the securitization process.

b. Logic Model

The logic model, as argued by Yin (2003), aims to specify the intricate chain of events that arise over time. The events are laid out in repeated cause-effect patterns. In accordance with Joseph Wholey's program logic model, the intervention could produce immediate, intermediate, and ultimate outcomes[305] Weiss (1998) calls this process a theory of change and uses a causal approach, which includes describing the desired effects to support this argument.[306] According to Remler and Van Ryzin (2011), a logic model aims to describe how interventions lead to desired outcomes.[307] The author also developed a logic model, which was intended to evaluate the impact of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. A logic model was used to provide a measure and indicator that was used to monitor the implementation of the securitization process.

4. Data Analyzing Process

The data analysis process was the most challenging part of the research as responses of 40 interviewees were transcribed from scratch papers and processed in a software program called NVivo-9 which requires technical skills to use it. After coding all the interview notes including roughly 80 pages of handwritten notes, the researcher reached the analytical results used for the present research.

As regards analyzing the data from the interviews, first, the investigator rewrote the interview responses digitally (through Microsoft word program) from scratch papers to make them usable for the NVivo-9 software program (QSR International, 2012). This program is specialized in classifying, sorting and arranging information; examining relationships in the data; and combining analysis through linking, shaping, searching, and modeling.[308]

The researcher initially examined the data in a preliminary way. Then, he categorized the data in accordance with the interviewees' nationalities. After completing the preliminary coding of the data the investigator attained emergent categories and then recoded these categories in order to provide for reliability and validity of the data results. To do so, the data was retested or recoded in order to prevent any possible biases from occurring over the course of the study. To improve the reader's understanding, the researcher made use of visualizations of the emergent categories in accordance with their coding frequency. The coding and visualization of emergent categories verified the qualitative analysis was based on a systematic data reduction process.

The researcher also made use of cluster analyses which provided him with an opportunity to examine the strengths of similarities between emergent categories in

accordance with "Pearson Correlation Coefficient" as calculated in the NVivo-9. Furthermore, as suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Ryan and Bernard (2000), the constant comparative method and open coding of interview notes facilitated the research design process and helped the investigator reach a grounded analysis with regard to the scope of the study.[309] These methods further helped the researcher to detect common characteristics among the interview responses and to reach conclusive results.

Thus, in this case study, data analyzing process initially began with the data induction process from interviews through open-coding, followed by the emergence of categories, the clustering of categories, and the writing of memos which is referred to as a "brainstorming approach to analyzing the data".[310] Glaser and Strauss (1967) have further pointed out that the theory generation process starts with coded data, categories, and memos.[311] As understood from the chosen analytical methods, including interviews, observation and archival research, the data was triangulated from different resources. In this respect, one can claim that this analytic journey started from a rudimentary level and ended up with a grounded theory thanks to its constant comparative method, coded data, time series analysis, and logic model.

In this respect, the researcher witnessed some intermediary impacts or sequences of intermediate impacts with reference to the securitization process. Therefore, emphasis was placed on the logic model throughout the research. In this sense, the question of "what steps have been taken for measuring change or impact?" was addressed.[312] Accordingly, the *testing logic model* approach helped the investigator to analyze the qualitative data in an efficient way.

Furthermore, all aforementioned qualitative data gathering methods, including interviews, observations and archival research all contributed to the triangulation of the data and provided the researcher with an opportunity to reach concrete results that addressed the research questions. In line with the adopted qualitative methodological tools, the generalized findings helped the researcher effectively analyze the impacts of the securitization of the European Union borders on the border security framework of Turkey. After analyzing the data through following the given processes and analytical tools, the researcher obtained some notable findings which will be addressed in the subsequent sections.

5. Validity, Transferability & Reliability

a. Validity

Constructing validity, as suggested by Weiss (1998), is concerned with establishing the causal relationship between program inputs and observed outcomes.[313] According to Remler and Van Ryzin (2011), validity stands for how well the measure actually represents the variable the researcher aims to measure.[314] As understood from the logic model designed for the impact of securitization process, the author found a causal relationship between the prevailing inputs and the emerging outcomes.

Since the securitization process focuses on increasing the capability to deal with illegal flows, the criteria designed for measuring this capability in this study were embedded in the official papers and legal documents of the EU. Similar measures were used to address the current research questions. For example, these included the legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions required to increase the capability to deal with illegal border flows, thereby facilitating the securitization process.

Furthermore, since there is a logical relationship between the required actions and increasing capability, for example, a country that has efficient institutions, legal infrastructure, external networks and budget will be more capable of fulfilling its policy objectives than one with inefficient institutions, and these actions can serve as a measure for evaluating the level of a state's capability in the area of border security. Therefore, the chosen criteria in the present study were those related to assessing the degree of capability. This in turn, supported Weiss's (1998) argument that, "the criteria in a study should measure what the researcher aims to measure".[315]

Accordingly, the criteria used presently to analyze the interview responses were deemed valid because they generated emergent categories compatible with inputs obtained from official reports. As well, there was a logical relationship between the chosen criteria and the emergent categories derived from the selective and open-coding process. The logic model input values which were generated in line with the content analysis of the reports were compatible with the emergent categories created in accordance with the code frequency of the interview responses.

Moreover, as suggested by Creswell (1994), the triangulation of the data which included interviews, observations and archival research as well the clarification of researcher bias supports the internal validity of the study.[316] That is, since the data used in the present study was triangulated by using various research tools such as interviews, observation and archival research, the present study was also deemed internally valid.

In addition, the researcher tried to prevent bias by developing a purposive sampling method, thus diversifying the interviewee sample so that they were drawn from

various vocations and constituted different nationalities. By doing that, it is highly possible institutional and national biases were successfully eliminated.

b. Transferability

In order to maintain transferability of any research findings, Yin (2003) argues that a theory must be tested by reproducing findings in a second setting where the theory has signified that the same results should occur.[317] In this respect, it can be claimed that the securitization theory has been tested in the EU and has shown an evolution as regards the legal and structural framework within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In terms of a subsequent application of the securitization theory on nation states, as a second case, similar results were observed as regards the emergence of legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions and their relationship to the impact of the securitization process.

At the regional level, and in the context of the impact of the securitization process, the EU has become a key actor within the domain of the Area of Freedom Security Justice. Looking at the EU experience one can see that the securitization process has had a significant impact on EU legal, institutional, international and policy actions, thus transforming it into an AFSJ actor. For instance, the evolution of the AFSJ, the emergence of the AFSJ agenda through enlargement and neighborhood policies, and the creation of Frontex are the main indicators of the EU being an AFSJ actor. Therefore, the securitization process has seemed to have an impact on the EU, thereby changing its security role and creating an AFSJ actor role for this union at a macro level. The same securitization process impacts the border security framework of Turkey, thus changing its security role and leading it to become a border security actor at the micro level. Hence,

having considered the applicable features and similar causal outcomes of securitization it can be argued that the present research is transferable.

In addition, the findings of this present study can also be extended to other cases, and can be easily transferred due to the detailed findings. Suggestions from the study can be applied more broadly than the studied cases and can reinforce the proposed theory.[318] Thus, the primary strategy adopted in this research was to ensure transferability, referred to as the provision of rich, substantial, and exhaustive descriptions. In this way, anyone interested in transferability can find an analytical framework for analyzing and comparing their research findings.

c. Reliability

Reliability is concerned with minimizing the errors and biases in a study.[319] In the same vein, Weiss (1998) argues that reliability is concentrated on the idea that repeated efforts to measure the same phenomenon will produce the same results. In order to ensure the research is reliable, the researcher initially constructed emergent categories through the careful coding of the data and then recoded those categories. To do so, the researcher retested or recoded the data in order to prevent any possible bias over the course of the study.

Accordingly, inter-coder reliability, which is also an important issue in coding and content analysis, was achieved through the recoding process and by maintaining the consistency with which codes were applied to the texts.[320] Therefore, inter-coder reliability was ensured by carrying out a cluster analysis of nodes (coded categories) in accordance with Pearson Correlation Coefficient provided by the NVivo-9, thus aiming to measure the strength of the similarities between emergent categories.

Furthermore, in order to maintain reliability of the data obtained from the interviews, the interviews were extended to Turkish as well as non-Turkish experts dealing with border security issues. The researcher prevented bias through a purposive sampling method thus diversifying the interviewee range and making sure it included various vocations and different nationalities. By doing that, to a considerable extent, possible institutional and national biases were eliminated.

Moreover, the translation process before the interview was a crucial issue for the present research. Two bilingual researchers (who are fluent both in English and Turkish), Dr. Oguzhan Omer Demir and Dr. Arif Koktas, also experts on border security issues, assisted the investigator to overcome terminological or conceptual confusions. There were two stages for the translation process before the interview. First, the researcher translated the interview questions and consent form from English to Turkish. Second, once these documents were translated, each person mentioned above translated each other's translation back to English. To increase the accuracy and reliability of the translation of the interview documents, final amendments to the Turkish language were made after an overall discussion.

6. Strengths and Limitations of the Research

a.   Strengths of the Research

The availability of the data with regard to measuring the impact of the securitization can be addressed as one of the strengths of the study. Thus, the data were embedded in legal documents, institutional resources, and policy papers of the EU and Turkey. In addition to written resources, observable research sites (border provinces of Turkey such as Hatay, Van, and Edirne) provided good yardsticks for measurement.

Responses from key informants who have worked on the transformation of the Turkish border security system to meet EU expectations also provided notable measurement resources.

Accordingly, the researcher established networks during a two-month internship in the Turkish Ministry of Interior which provided him the opportunity to make observations. During this time, the investigator established rapport with the key officials from various institutions dealing with border security issues. With this opportunity, the researcher was able to build trust with the interviewees.

Furthermore, while interviewing, the researcher did not resort to recording the voices of the interviewees which might threaten the efficiency of interviews due to security concerns and therefore he used scratch notes and reminder notes in the sense that he could remember the details of the interviews later used for in-depth analysis.

Therefore, the availability of the data, the researcher's expertise on EU affairs and border security issues, as well as his ability to network official and non-official information chains is a major strength of the study.

b. Limitations of the research

In addition to the strong points of the study, there were also some limitations which led the researcher to specify the scope of the dissertation. Confidentiality over security was perhaps one of the important limitations of the research when interviewing security officials. This limitation was particularly sensitive when some border security issues had impact on the willingness of participants to divulge information.

Thus, some respondents were suspicious about some interview questions and subsequently were reluctant to answer these questions. The investigator addressed these

possible limitations by providing a consent form that explained the goal of the research. Interviewees were assured that they would remain anonymous and the limitation was overcome by coding techniques that protected the responder. Privacy was further assured by interviewing others in occupational categories including independent experts, academics and foreigner project staffs who have no influential hierarchal structures and relations to contend with.

The other limitation was related to the making observations of on inner border security practices. The researcher had limited access to forbidden military zones, and the inner sides of the borders to see border security practices precisely. Therefore, for security reasons borders present a difficult setting for a researcher.

CHAPTER-VI: IMPACTS OF POLICY ASPECTS REGARDING BORDER

SECURITY

A. Diverse Impacts of the EU Securitization Process on the Border Security

Framework of Turkey

Recent changes in the volume, direction, composition, and types of global human mobility have triggered international migratory flows to and from Turkey, thereby producing profound consequences for individuals, states, and the politics of supranational regimes.[321] Nation states must deal with an increasing number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants in their territorial area. This section therefore addresses the impact of the EU border security policies on Turkey's policy and politics, notably on its border security framework, which will reveal some legislative and institutional changes that have occurred, as well as the effects of these on Turkey's security role at the international and regional level.

The impact of the EU securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey started with the EU accession process of Turkey. Therefore, two time interventions of crucial importance respectively were 1999 and 2005. The reason for choosing these time interventions is that the year 1999 is the date of proclaimed EU candidacy and the beginning of the first securitization period. The year 2005 is when official negotiations with the EU began and marks the beginning of the subsequent securitization period.

In this section, the nature and extent of change in the chosen variables within the specific time interventions and time periods mentioned will be examined. Considering the figures under chosen variables, it can be claimed that there has been a significant impact

of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. This impact is concentrated on Turkey's legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions.

1. Legal Impacts

Legal impacts include the enacted Laws, Amended Laws, Regulations, Decrees, Directives, Circulars, Action Plans and Strategy Papers as a result of the impact of the EU securitization process. In this respect, Turkey has passed a set of legal regulations according to the requirements laid out in the official strategic papers of the EU. As shown in Figure-4, the number of legal actions before the securitization process (<1999) was limited to a total number of 16. Yet, there was a significant increase in the number of legal actions in the course of time from 20 between 1999 and 2004, to 38 between 2005 and 2010. It is therefore apparent that the number of legal actions has increased significantly with the introduction of the securitization process.

Figure-4: Number of Legal Actions (Laws, Amended Laws, Regulations, Decrees, Directives, Circulars, Action Plans and Strategy Papers)

Source: The Turkish Prime Ministry and Ministry of Interior

Examples of enacted laws and regulations include the "United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Additional Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air" signed on March 18, 2003. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the "Law on Work Permits for Aliens" was enacted on March 27, 2003. This law was designed to ensure better management and control over the process of issuing work permits[322] In addition, the Turkish Citizenship Law was amended on June 4, 2003. This amendment aims to prevent marriages of convenience needed for obtaining citizenship and settling in Turkey, which is a method generally utilized by human smugglers and traffickers.[323]

The Road Transportation Regulation, which became effective in 2004, has some provisions as regards the carrier's responsibility related to illegal immigration, as well. According to this regulation, a vehicle used for migrant smuggling will be seized and the transportation permit will be suspended for 3 years. The Turkish Penal Code was amended on June 1, 2005. According to the amendment, migrant smugglers will be sentenced from 3 to 8 years of imprisonment and will incur judicial fines. The penalty increases by half, if the perpetrators commit the crime by acting as part of an organization. The Code also includes other coercive sanctions against legal entities involved in immigrant smuggling, such as the confiscation of assets.[324]

Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior issued a circular in January 2005. Its aim was to ensure the effective protection of borders through the cooperation and coordination of the police, gendarmerie, and coast guard forces.[325] In order to facilitate the fight against illegal immigration, Turkish passports with biometric security features were introduced in June 2010.[326] Article 79 of the Turkish Penal Code was re-amended in

July 2010, increasing the penalties for those involved in immigrant smuggling. Moreover, a ministerial circular was issued in March 2010 in order to complete legal procedures for irregular immigrants in removal centers.[327] A Prime Ministerial Decree was issued in May 2010 establishing a coordination board for Integrated Border Management (IBM), which creates an official mechanism at decision-making levels to screen progress towards IBM.[328]

2. Administrative Impacts

Administrative impacts refer to institutions, departments, coordination boards, centers, bureaus, and task forces established as a result of the EU securitization process. There has been some structural and institutional progress in the area of border security. For instance, under the Ministry of Interior, a coordination board was established in May 2010. The board's aim was to address measures for fighting irregular immigration, enhancing inter-institutional coordination, and monitoring operational activities.

Furthermore, as illustrated by Figure-5, the administrative actions (established institutions, departments, coordination boards, centers, bureaus, and task forces) before the securitization process (<1999) were not as noticeable as the administrative actions during the post securitization periods (1999-2004 and 2005-2010). For example, the number of administrative actions before the securitization process (<1999) was restricted to 1. However, the number of administrative actions increased from 5 between 1999 and 2004, to 10 between 2005 and 2010. Therefore, it can be claimed that there has been a significant increase in the number of administrative actions as a result of the securitization process.

Figure-5: Number of Administrative Actions

Source: The Turkish Ministry of Interior

To give an example of the increasing number of administrative actions, removal centers emerged as a salient figure and these are constructed for temporarily hosting of illegal immigrants. As of August 2010, the current capacity of removal centers hosting irregular immigrants stood at 2,875. Four additional removal centers with the capacity of 4,100 persons are under construction.[329] As demonstrated in Figure-6, the number of constructed removal centers ranged from 2 in 2005, to 5 in 2008, and was 8 in 2010. It is therefore apparent that there has been an increase in the number of removal centers over the course of time.

Figure-6: Number of Removal Centers

Source: The Turkish National Police

3. External Impacts

External impacts refer to the signing and implementing of bilateral or multilateral agreements in the area of border security and international project activities that come with the EU securitization process. Thus, the magnitude and variety of the challenges necessitate an integrated approach to the border security issue that tightly links cooperation with neighboring countries and regional organizations, including joint efforts with countries of origin and transit countries.[330] Considering these challenges and the emergence of global threats, Turkey has become part of the international society and has taken a collaborative stance since 1951.

In order to provide an arena for efficient cooperation, there are some international actors operating in Turkey on immigration issues. Among them, the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, the International Catholic Migration Commission, the International Labor Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are the most prominent

ones.[331] The UNHCR, despite not having formal status in Turkey, is virtually the sole authority capable of carrying out and managing asylum procedures, as Turkey maintains the geographical limitations on the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol.[332]

With the impact of the EU accession process, Turkey has also signed and ratified many international agreements, conventions, covenants and protocols regarding border security and migration management. For instance, Turkey signed the 2000 Palermo Convention, known as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and it's Additional Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air in 2003.

Moreover, as illustrated by Figure-7, the number of bilateral international agreements and protocols with countries increased dramatically over time from 41 between 1993-1998, to 46 during 1999-2004, and to 49 during 2005-2010. It is therefore apparent that the number of bilateral international agreements and protocols with countries has escalated with the introduction of the securitization process.

Figure-7: Number of International Agreements and Protocols with Countries

Source: The Turkish National Police

Furthermore, Turkey has signed bilateral agreements with countries of origin. As illustrated by Figure-8, the number of bilateral international agreements and protocols with countries of origin increased dramatically over time from 10 between 1993-1998, to 14 between 1999 and 2004, and to 32 during 2005-2010. Therefore, as a result of the securitization process, there has been a significant increase in the number of bilateral security cooperation agreements and protocols with countries of origin.

Figure-8: Number of Agreements and Protocols with Countries of Origin.

Source: The Turkish National Police

Readmission agreements are also considered an effective measure in terms of providing border security. These agreements urge sending countries to take serious actions against those involved in illegal immigration. In this respect, readmission agreements define the obligation for a country to readmit its citizens and specify the conditions under which countries are obliged to readmit citizens of third countries who have passed through their territory.[333] Both Turkey and the EU have adopted signed readmission agreements with sending countries as a priority. So far, Turkey has signed

readmission agreements with Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Pakistan, Ukraine and Greece to fight illegal migration.[334]

Furthermore, Turkey is negotiating a working agreement with Frontex, a European Border Security Agency aimed at enhancing operational cooperation on preventing irregular migration and combating cross-border crime at Turkey's borders with the EU.[335] Frontex is currently involved with security measures along the Turkish borders. For instance, Frontex recently conducted a joint operation with Greece at the Greece-Turkey border in 2010. European Union border teams (Frontex guards) deployed in Greece to perform patrol tasks arrested 115 illegal immigrants at the northeastern land border with Turkey.[336]

Moreover, the introduction of the EU projects to the Turkish border security system started with the proclamation of Turkey's candidacy and official negotiations with the EU in 2005. The number of EU projects has increased over time as a result of the securitization process. Thus, Figure-9 demonstrates the dramatic increase of the EU projects in the area of border security. As shown in Figure-9, there were no project activities before the securitization process (<1999). Yet, there was a significant increase in the number of projects over the course of time from 7 between 1999 and 2004, to 16 in the period of 2005-2010. Therefore, it can be claimed that the securitization process within these respective periods has further caused a significant growth in the number of project activities.

Figure-9: Number of the EU financed projects

4. Budgetary Impacts

There have been budgetary impacts of the securitization process. Budgetary impacts include the allocated budget for projects funded by the EU and the costs associated with the deportation of illegal immigrants. As shown by Figure-10, there was no allocated budget for the EU projects before the securitization process (<1999) as there were no project activities over that period. Yet, there was a significant increase in the amount of the allocated budget for EU projects over the course of time from 9 million Euros between 1999 and 2004 to 181 million Euros between 2005 and 2010. Therefore, it can be claimed that with the impact of the securitization process, the amount of the allocated budget for project activities experienced an increase over these respective periods.

Figure-10: Allocated Budget within the EU Projects (Euro)

Source: The Turkish Ministry of Interior

Furthermore, with the impact of the securitization process, Turkey's financial efforts for deporting illegal immigrants also experienced growth during this period. As illustrated by Figure-11, there was a significant growth in the amount of expenditures for deporting illegal immigrants from 3.3 million dollar ($) between 1999 and 2004 to 16 million dollar ($) during 2005-2010. In this respect, the amount of expenditures for the deportation of illegal immigrants increased within securitization periods (1999-2004 and 2005-2010).

Figure-11: Expended Amount for the Deportation of Illegal Immigrants

Source: The Turkish National Police

5. Results of the Impact Regarding Illegal Flows

Having considered the legal, administrative, external and budgetary actions as a result of the impact of the securitization process, there is also a need to address the results of the impact with regard to illegal flows. Here, two dynamics, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, are important. In the context of struggling against illegal flows, the securitization process has produced unique results which need to be analyzed in accordance with the nature of illegal flows.

The number of apprehended irregular migrants in Turkey declined from 65,737 in 2008 to 34,345 in 2009. The irregular migration flows through the Greek and Bulgarian land borders dropped by 40% in 2009 when compared to the year 2008. Irregular border crossings from the sea located between Greece and Turkey also decreased by 16%.[337]

Having used illegal immigration as a key variable, the targeted sample for this variable consisted of 19 countries of origin (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan,

Bangladesh, Burma, Fas, Georgia Iraq, Iran, Moldova, Mauritania, Pakistan, Palestine, Romania, Russia, Somali, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine) and the number of apprehended illegal immigrants from those countries in a 16-year period time was 5,000 or over 5,000. As illustrated by Figure-12, the number of apprehended illegal immigrants fluctuates over time. For example, the number of apprehended illegal immigrants was around 146,000 between 1995 and 1999. Then, this number increased to 387,000 during 2000-2004 and decreased by 273,000 during 2005-2009. Therefore, it is apparent that the trend before securitization tracks at comparatively lower rates, then the impact of the securitization has caused a sudden increase followed by a decrease in the number of apprehended illegal immigrants.

Figure-12: The Number of Apprehended Illegal Immigrants (in thousands)

Source: The Turkish National Police

However, whether there has been any impact of the securitization process on the fluctuation of these figures needs further assessment. In order to approach this issue in an

analytical manner, we have to keep in mind the rechanneling or redistribution effect -a trend explained by the fact that the decrease in the number of illegal flows while crossing a specific route will cause an increase of illegal flows for another route. Cornelius (2005) explains similar fluctuations for the apprehension on the US south-west border in 1970-2004 through a similar redistribution effect, in addition to greater resources and more efficient performance by border patrol agents in the field.[338] In the same vein, Turkey's experience has also shown a sharp increase followed by a dramatic fall because of effective border security measures since 2002 with the impact of the securitization process.

Figure-13: The Number of Apprehended Illegal Immigrants-Yearly (in thousands)

Source: The Turkish National Police

As previously mentioned, Turkey has been exposed to illegal flows from its economically and politically unstable neighboring countries. Hence, Turkish

policymakers consider border security as a national security issue and illegal crossings over the borders are regarded as a violation of the Turkish criminal law.[339] The deterrent measures in the 1999 Law on Fighting Organized Crime and the penal code enacted in 2004 and 2005 resulted in a significant increase in the efficiency of agents in the field. Thus, the figures (Figure-14 and Figure-15) demonstrate the impact of those deterrent measures on the country's ability to fight against drug trafficking. As illustrated by Figure-14, the amount of heroin seized was around 15 tons over the period 1993-1998. Then, this amount increased from 22 tons between 1999 and 2004 to 54 tons during the 2005-2010 time period. Therefore, with the impact of the securitization process, there has been an increase in the amount of seized drugs as well as in the number of imprisoned perpetrators because of drug offences.

Figure-14: The amount of seized heroin (tons)

Source: The Turkish National Police

Figure-15: The Number of Imprisoned Perpetrators for Drug Offences (in thousands)

Source: The Turkish Ministry of Justice

Having addressed the findings from archival research with regard to the impact of the securitization process, this study will compare and contrast these findings with the analytical work obtained from interview findings in the following sections. To do this, the author tested the significance of the adopted time series analysis to convey the trends in the securitization process with the analytical results from the interviews.

6. The Significance of the Impact

The significance of the impact was measured through findings obtained from the interview responses. The size of the rectangles was shaped in accordance with the numbers of coding categories, thus showing the frequency of the coded categories. As illustrated by Figure-16, in line with the frequency of the coded categories, the impact of the securitization process was linked with the EU accession process, EU projects, administrative and legal actions as well as implementation and raising awareness of border security. Having examined the figure's (Figure-16) content, it can be concluded that the securitization of the EU borders has had noticeable impacts on the border security

framework of Turkey by changing the previous legal and administrative framework, and

by raising awareness, and increasing the number of border security projects.

Figure-16: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the Impact of the Securitization
Process

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.
***Figure-16 terminology regarding emergent categories:**
Significant-TI: The impact of securitization is seen as significant by Turkish Interviewees.
Significant-NTI: The impact of securitization is seen as significant by Non-Turkish Interviewees.
Not Significant-TI: The impact of securitization is not seen as significant by Turkish Interviewees.
Not Significant-NTI: The impact of securitization is not seen as significant by Non-Turkish Interviewees.
EU Accession Process: Process in which candidate countries aim to be a member of the EU.
Projects: Project activities conducted with regard to the border security.
Administrative: Institutions, departments, coordination boards, centers, bureaus, and task forces
established with regard to border security.
Legal: Laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars enacted on border security.
Awareness: Awareness regarding the integrated border management concept (IBM).
Outputs: Observable results of the securitization process.
Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

As demonstrated by Figure-16, both groups (Turkish and Non-Turkish

interviewees) emphasized the importance of the EU projects and the EU accession

process in changing Turkey's legal and administrative framework. As argued by TS-7aca-

3, "...the EU projects concerning border security help Turkey to institutionalize existing

border security units". Furthermore, YS-4Exp-1 suggested, "… the EU twinning projects

influence harmonization efforts of national institutions in adopting the norms of the EU".

TS-7aca-3 further claimed, "…The EU norms require reforming the border security structure of Turkey. Institutional reforms should have been completed by 2012".

In the same vein, YS-1EU-2 also pointed out "…Turkey is committed to being a member of the EU. Therefore, Turkey has to align its border structures considering the requirements of the Schengen acquis. Any development should be in line with the EU acqui". YS-4Exp-2 exemplified this requirement with the idea that "…the EU pushes Turkey to adopt non militarized or civilian border security agency which is a necessity of the Schengen best practices".

There have been considerable administrative impacts, as well. As summarized by TS-7aca-1, "…there has been a process towards institutionalization since 2001". YS-4Exp-3 also agreed with TS-7aca-1 by stating that"…. this impact has led the development of the current border security system of Turkey". To give an example of administrative impacts, YS-1EU-1 argued that "…border stations and control points have been modernized and "…biometric passports have been used." as clarified by YS-1EU-2. Furthermore, in TS-4MI-1's remarks on administrative actions, "…coordination board has been in effect with a Prime Ministry Decree in order to align the Schengen Acquis and administrative responsibility of sub-governors with regard to border security raised. This can be considered as a step toward civilian oversight of border security practices in Turkey". Thus, TS-6GS-1 also pointed out "…the EU asks Turkey to establish a civil professional unit in line with the road map and national program.

There are also legal impacts of the securitization process. TS-3TP-3 claimed, "…The EU has been progressive in terms of enacting or drafting legal regulations". As argued by YS-1EU-2, "…border management bureau in the Ministry of Interior is in

charged with drafting laws and regulations in order to meet the expectations of the EU in the area of border security." Thus, TS-4MI-2 exemplified the fact that ".... readmission agreements can be considered as the observable impacts of the EU policies".

Reactions to the implementation of adopted measures could also be observed from the responses of the interviewees. According to YS-4Exp-4, the introduction of biometric passports could be considered one of these impacts. Accordingly, TS-3TP-3 indicated the efficiency of adopted measures by claiming "…at operational level, there has been 350% decrease in the number of illegal immigrants within the borders but there has been an increase of illegal immigrants while crossing the border which can be assessed as an impact of the EU policies". YS-4Exp-6 highlighted the importance of joint operations on apprehending illegal immigrants crossing borders. Furthermore, TS-8prexpt-2 suggested that ".... Turkey is cleaning landmines at its borders through the financial support of the EU" thus aiming to secure its borders.

Moreover, NVivo-9 provided a similarity index between each pair of items using the similarity metric that had been selected. The proximity to the value 1 indicates the strength of the similarity between the coded items.[340] The author also used Pearson Correlation Coefficient as calculated in NVivo-9 in order to measure the strength of the similarities between nodes (containers of coded categories).

Table-3 indicates the strength of the correlation between emergent categories with regard to types of the impact. In this sense, there is a strong correlation between both group's attitudes towards the EU projects and EU accession. Furthermore, the EU accession and projects, which are regularly referred to by Turkish respondents, are also strongly correlated with a high level of awareness, which suggests that the EU accession

process and EU projects are an effective means of raising awareness with regard to the new border security concept. Thus, the Turkish respondents commonly used the *Integrated Border Management* (IBM) concept. Non-Turkish interviewees also confirmed the benefits of the new approach with regard to the border security concept.

Therefore, the discourse with regard to border security has changed from traditional terms towards the concepts of retaining professional and being loyal to civilian principles, as well as transparency and accountability. Transparency can be described as the opening of public institutions to other institutions and organizations to which they are required to reveal the costs and nature of their services[341] By definition, accountability is the ability to call public officials requiring that they be answerable for their policies, actions and use of funds[342]

Furthermore, the EU accession process and its related projects have raised awareness of the IBM concept among Turkish officials. Moreover, Table-3 illustrates a strong correlation between the EU projects and the EU accession process. The author further suggests that both groups have emphasized the importance of EU projects in terms of accelerating the EU accession process.

Table-3: The Strength of Similarities between Categories* on Diverse Impacts of the Securitization Process

Node A	Node B	Pearson correlation coefficient
NTI\projects	TI\Projects	0.787635
TI\EU accession	TI\Awareness	0.648362
NTI\EU accession	TI\EU accession	0.645726
TI\Projects	TI\Awareness	0.517297
TI\Projects	TI\EU accession	0.489433
NTI\Outputs	NTI\institutional	0.45383
NTI\projects	TI\EU accession	0.442501
TI\Legal	TI\Institutional	0.432111
NTI\institutional	TI\Institutional	0.416039
NTI\EU accession	NTI\projects	0.400707

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.

*Table-3 terminology regarding emergent categories:
NTI\projects: Coded project activities in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\projects: Coded project activities in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
TI\EU accession: Coded issues related to the EU accession process in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
TI\awareness: Coded awareness on IBM concept in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\Outputs: Coded observable results of the EU securitization process in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\institutional: Coded administrative actions on border security in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\legal: Coded legal actions on border security in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
TI\institutional: Coded administrative actions on border security in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\EU accession: Coded issues related to the EU accession process in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
Node A and Node B: Containers of coded categories according to responses of each group (Turkish and Non-Turkish Interviewees).

Concluding Remarks

Since the 1999, there have been continuous impacts of the securitization process. Legal, administrative, external implications in the area of border security can be given as an example of the impact of securitization. Findings from the interviews indicated that the impact of the securitization process has also been shown to be significant by most of the respondents. Having clarified the types of the impact and reviewed the frequency of references made by interviewees, it can be argued that the overall impact of the securitization process has led to the emergence of significant results.

In sum, it can be asserted that with the impact of the EU accession process, the traditional border security policy of Turkey has shifted from "a nation state level" to a supranational or international platform. As a result, Turkey's border security framework has undergone dramatic transformations. Therefore, in this section, various aspects of the EU accession process and the diverse impacts of the securitization process have been examined. In the next section, the nexus between the securitization process and the EU accession process will be clarified.

B. The Securitization Process and EU Accession Process Nexus

The nexus between the securitization process and the EU accession can be easily observed in the case of Turkey-EU relations. The contribution of the EU securitization process to Turkey's EU membership process is embedded in the diverse impacts of the securitization process which were addressed in the previous sections.

Turkey has accepted that the securitization process is tightly coupled with the EU accession process. Since 1999, the date of proclaimed EU candidacy date, Turkey has enacted laws, established units, and has adopted new policy measures in line with the expectations of the EU in the area of border security. Furthermore, since 2005, the start date for official negotiations with the EU, the frequency of legal and administrative actions taken by Turkey in the area of border security has increased dramatically.

Thus, EU-Turkey relations are now in a serious situation that might end with rejection unless necessary actions are taken. The EU prioritized actions on border security and as a negotiating country, Turkey must align its border security system to

meet the requirements of the EU in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as documented in official reports.

As understood from the identified issues, border security is interlinked with the securitization process and with Turkey's accession process. Therefore, the EU, as a regional and international actor, has had a significant impact on domestic policies in Turkey, from the perspective of Turkey's pending EU membership process. In order to meet the requirements of the EU, Turkey has also outlined some legal, administrative and external actions to facilitate the EU accession process.

Turkey's migration status has changed from a sending country to an immigrant transit and immigrant receiving country. Changing patterns of migration have also affected the traditional policy discourses of Turkey, which until recently focused more on the "nation-state level" and national security. Managing immigration in today's world is a very challenging issue in terms of its impact on state's capacity.[343] Therefore, the EU accession process has been a crucial factor that currently alters or will alter the Turkish conventional border security and immigration policies.

As illustrated by Figure-17, interview findings have also proven the significance of the nexus between of the EU accession process and the securitization process as well as border security policies. Thus, in accordance with the respective size of the rectangles, both groups have highlighted the importance of the securitization and prioritized border security policies because they contribute to Turkey's admission to the EU and also serve as a way to enhance the EU security framework.

Figure-17: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the Nexus between the Securitization Process and the EU Accession.

Nodes compared by number of items coded

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.
*Figure-17 terminology regarding emergent categories:
Significant-TI: In the context of the EU accession, the securitization process seen as significant by Turkish Interviewees.
Significant-NTI: In the context of the EU accession, the securitization process seen as significant by Non-Turkish Interviewees.
Insignificant-TI: In the context of the EU accession, the securitization process is not seen as significant by Turkish Interviewees.
B-Security matters-TR: Border security and the securitization process are important for Turkey and Turkey prioritizes them.
B-Security matters-EU: Border security and the securitization process are important for the EU and the EU prioritizes them.
Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

Table-4 also provides evidence that responses from both groups regarding the degree of contribution are strongly similar. In line with the Pearson Correlation Coefficient results regarding the strength of the similarities between coded categories, it can be argued that both the EU and Turkey will benefit from securitized border policies to a significant degree, because they do not challenge their individual interests. With the impact of securitized borders, Turkey may have facilitated its accession process for becoming a member of the EU and the EU may have a more secure environment and a

significant reduction in illegal flows as a result of the more efficient border security policies in Turkey.

Table-4: The Strength of Similarities between Categories* on the Importance of the Securitization Process for Parties

Node A	Node B	Pearson correlation coefficient
NTI\B-security matters-TR	TI\B-security matters- TR	0.733549
TI\B-security matters- EU	TI\B-security matters- TR	0.648347
NTI\B-security matters-EU	TI\B-security matters- TR	0.625578
NTI\B-security matters-EU	TI\B-security matters- EU	0.568237
NTI\B-security matters-TR	TI\B-security matters- EU	0.565976
NTI\B-security matters-EU	NTI\B-security matters-TR	0.496384

*Table-4 terminology regarding emergent categories:
NTI\B-security matters-TR: "Border security and the securitization process are important for Turkey" is coded in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\B-security matters-TR: "Border security and the securitization process are important for Turkey" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\B-security matters-EU: "Border security and the securitization process are important for the EU" is coded in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\B-security matters-EU: "Border security and the securitization process are important for the EU" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
Node A and Node B: Containers of coded categories according to responses of each group (Turkish and Non-Turkish Interviewees).

Accordingly, Turkey is currently facing challenges in immigration and asylum policies. Icduygu (2010) has explained the situation in terms of a *country's position*. He describes a hegemonic setting, where policy priorities and questions are defined and formulated by "migrant-receiving core countries," and then presented and inserted into the agendas of the "migrant-sending peripheries".[344] Securitization therefore seems to dominate the Turkey-EU irregular migration debate.

The EU has asked Turkey to pass laws, sign international agreements, and establish institutions to protect its external borders in an efficient way. Therefore, Turkey has begun to focus on the protection of external borders with the impact of the EU accession process. For instance, Turkey has started to negotiate the readmission

agreements with other countries of origin including Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM (the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)*, Georgia, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Russia and Uzbekistan.[345]

The EU has asked Turkey to enact legal instruments in the area of border security. In the National Program, which is being prepared for the adoption of the EU acquis, Turkey has prioritized enacting some laws within the membership perspective. For instance, in the period of 2009-2010, law on the establishment of an asylum and immigration unit, asylum law, law on foreigners, law on establishment of a border security unit, legislation for harmonizing the Turkish visa sticker with the EU Schengen visa sticker, and law on amending the passport regulation were expected to be enacted, in line with the EU acquis.[346]

Given the importance of EU membership, Turkey has also outlined some administrative actions. For example, establishing a new border security agency has been prioritized in the National Programs that aim for EU accession. In this respect, Turkey has also pledged to carry out organizational, administrative and infrastructural actions to establish a Border Security Unit within the period of 2009 and 2013.[347] According to *Today's Zaman,* a Turkish daily newspaper, the Ministry of the Interior completed a draft bill establishing a Border Control Agency in 2010. According to the draft, 70,000 officers from the gendarmerie and coast guard commands and the Turkish National Police will serve under the Border Control Agency. The restructuring will cost 3.7 billion Euros, and 60 percent of the cost will be financed by European Union projects.[348]

Moreover, the establishment of reception and accommodation centers for asylum seekers and refugees, a training academy on asylum related issues, and information

systems for the country of origin as well as issues related to asylum have been prioritized in the National Program.[349] A National Schengen Information System (N-SIS), legal and technical bases of SIS II, an asylum appeals evaluation board, a fingerprint database for effective application of the Dublin Convention, and a reception system for asylum seekers and refugees will be established in Turkey, with a full-membership perspective.[350]

Having examined the official reports which define EU-Turkey relations such as *Accession Partnership Papers, Regular Reports, and National Program*, the author focused on the interview findings related to Turkey's membership perspectives and its efforts in the area of border security.

As demonstrated in Figure-18, most of the interviewees agreed with the idea that the current situation of border security in Turkey is not sufficiently in line with the EU *acquis communautaire* and needs to be harmonized. There are several reasons for that, and most of the reasons focus on the lack of administrative, professional, and legal infrastructures, as illustrated by the respective size of rectangles.

Figure-18: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the State of the EU Accession Process

Nodes compared by number of items coded

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.

*Figure-18 terminology regarding emergent categories:

No harmony-TI: Turkish Interviewees see Turkey's border security framework as not in harmony with the EU acquis

No harmony-NTI: Non-Turkish Interviewees see Turkey's border security framework as not being in harmony with the EU acquis

Administrative: Turkey should establish a single and professional border security unit. Turkey should consider the IBM model which prioritizes intra-agency, inter-agency and international cooperation.

Professional: Professionals should be responsible for dealing with border security issues. Temporary measures such as usage of conscripts should be given up.

Legal: Turkey should enact laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars in the area of border security.

EU is vague: The EU is not very clear about its expectations from Turkey in the area of border security.

Borders: Turkey's borders are difficult to patrol due to their rugged mountainous terrain and climatic reasons.

Policy: Turkey's border security policy should consider adopting risk management tools, signing readmission agreements, and prioritizing the EU accession process.

Visa: Turkey's visa regime should be in line with the EU visa policy.

Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

There is evidence that a lack of efficient, professional and civilian structures is commonly seen as problems in the Turkish border security system. Thus, TS-7aca-3 pointed out "…the EU expects Turkey to establish a single professional, civilian authority in order to maintain border security". In the same vein, YS-4Exp-6 suggested

that "…one institution should be responsible for controlling borders and this institution should be civilian in accordance with the Schengen Catalog. This catalog should be perceived as a bible".

The second most commonly noted reason was more related to the lack of professional structures. When the concept of the professional is articulated, it is understood in terms of being an expert on border security, being proficient in the use of technologies, being transparent to citizens and accountable to authorities. Being loyal to ethical values as well as human dignity is also important when performing border security duties.[351]

In this sense, TS-4MI-3 claimed that "…the current system is not professional because of the fact that conscripts are being used and specializing on border security is lacking". TS-2LF-2, who was an army officer gave a fair explanation stating that "…it is the military concept that challenges the EU expectations. Similar explanations can be observed in the responses of non-Turkish respondents. For instance, YS-4Exp-9 claimed that "…border controls are reactive rather than proactive" and YS-4Exp-5 also suggested that "there is a failure of coordination and there should be a civilian, professional body responsible for border security issues. However, the military is reluctant to delegate its power".

The third prevalent reason explaining the disharmony with the EU regulations was the issue of prevailing legal deficiencies. For instance, as argued by TS-3TP-6, the current border security system is not in line with Schengen Border Code and Catalog. YS-1EU-2 also suggested "…the Schengen acquis covers many areas including visa,

readmission procedures and securing borders however the Turkish legal and administrative structures are fragmented".

There were also other reasons which were related to rigid border structures, Turkey's visa regime which challenges the EU common visa policy, and border security perceived as a secondary issue. However, these reasons were not commonly seen as previously addressed issues explaining Turkey's drawbacks in the area of border security.

Concluding Remarks:

Considering all impacts addressed previously, there was a strong relationship between the securitization and accession processes, and this appears to have created various and considerable impacts in the domain of the national security framework of Turkey. However, it is recognized that the securitization process may also contribute, to a considerable extent, to Turkey's admission to the EU.

However, the current situation of border security in Turkey is not sufficiently in line with the *acquis communautaire,* which requires harmonizing the domestic legal framework according to the requested EU regulations, directives, decisions, and framework decisions as well as establishing new units and adopting a civilian approach to border security (i.e., one which prioritizes being professional, accountable, and transparent while performing border security duties).

C. Toward the Emergence of Border Security Actor?

On the basis of the aforementioned discussions concerning the criteria for being a border security actor, the author concentrated on the capability and capacity of Turkey to accomplish policy objectives in the area of border security. In this respect, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) have come up with some criteria which can be used for the measurement of being an actor, such as *recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion*. Recognition refers to the acceptance of and interaction with other polities. Recognition is merely a construct detailing the frequency and number of these contacts. The second criterion, authority, stands for the legal competence in a given policy area. Thirdly, autonomy is concerned with institutional uniqueness, distinctiveness, and independence, which are considered components of autonomy; and autonomy occurs when that polity is distinct from other polities as well as independent of them. Lastly, cohesion happens when all stakeholders have reached a level of agreement on a policy measure.[352]

Considering Jupille and Caporaso's arguments regarding the criteria to become an actor, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have determined that there are three categories for the measurement of an actor, as illustrated by Table-5. They argue that *opportunity, presence, and capability* matter when assessing whether a polity is an actor or not.[353] According to Bretherton and Vogler (2006), opportunity is concerned with the external environment of ideas and events, which enables parties to take action or to remain in active. Accordingly, presence is related to the ability pf the parties to exert influence beyond one's borders, to take action externally, and to frame the perceptions, expectations and behaviors of others. Lastly, capability refers to the ability to formulate

effective policies and the availability of convenient policy instruments such as the political, economic and military means.

Table-5: The Criteria for Being an Actor in Accordance with Scholars' Models

Jupille and Caporaso's Actor Model-1998	*Recognition* (Interaction with other polities)	*Authority* (Legal competence)	*Autonomy* (Institutional independence)	*Cohesion* (Level of agreement on a policy issue)
Bretherton and Vogler's Actor Model-2006	*Opportunity* (External environment leading actions)	*Presence* (Ability to influence externally)	*Capability* (Ability to frame and implement policies)	

However, even though there are different criteria, developed by different scholars, it is clear that being an actor requires the capability for fulfilling policy objectives. Therefore, having the capability to perform in the area of legal, administrative and external affairs will contribute to the increased likelihood of a polity becoming an actor in that policy area.

For Turkey, becoming a border security actor is also related to increasing its capability in the area of border security. According to Bretherton and Vogler's criteria model (opportunity, presence, and capability), the political environment in which Turkey is situated plays a key role notably in taking external actions and in being capable of dealing with illegal flows. Thus, as discussed in previous chapters, with the end of the Cold War, traditional state structures have been exposed to the impacts of illegal flows and have been incompetent in dealing with them. Turkey has also found itself in a newly threatening environment where illegal flows are increasingly challenging its control of its territory. Turkey's proximity to politically and economically unstable countries of origin

has led it to take the initiative in dealing with illegal flows. Therefore, it can be claimed that the new threat in the environment that Turkey has to face has provided an *opportunity*, as defined by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), as the first criterion for being actor. Accordingly, as addressed in the EU Regular Reports prepared for Turkey, the securitization process requires adopting and implementing *Integrated Border Management* (IBM) principles which are related to intra-agency, inter-agency, and inter-state cooperation as well as coordination. With the impact of the securitization process, Turkey has entered into a process which enables interaction and the creation of networks with countries of origin in order to maintain border security.

As previously discussed, *presence*, the second criterion of being an actor, is related to the consequences of external actions. From this point of view, the securitization process has increased the number of bilateral agreements with the countries of origin dramatically. Therefore, in response to the new threats in the environment, including illegal flows, the intensity of Turkey's *presence* in the international arena has increased over time. For instance, an increasing number of readmission agreements and security cooperation agreements with the countries of origin indicate Turkey's increasing *presence* in the area of border security thus leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

Furthermore, *capability* (the third criterion of Bretherton and Vogler's criteria model) refers to being capable of fulfilling policy objectives. Thus, with the impact of the securitization process, Turkey's capability in the area of border security has increased over time. Enacting laws, establishing new units and structures, and increasing budgets with regard to dealing with illegal flows and enhancing border security measures have all

raised the capability and capacity of Turkey in the area of border security which in turn, increases the likelihood of its being seen as a border security actor.

Therefore, it can be claimed that Bretherton and Vogler's actor model is appropriate for evaluating Turkey as a border security actor. However, there is a need to elaborate this argument with the findings obtained from interviews. Findings excerpted from the archival research have been tested and compared with the interview findings.

As discussed in previous sections, securitization has significant impacts on the Turkish national security framework particularly in the context of the border security area. Furthermore, in accordance with key respondents' remarks, securitization has led Turkey to become a key border security actor in the region. In this section, the author hence focuses on how securitization is leading Turkey to become a border security actor through the lenses of Turkish and non-Turkish interviewees.

Figure-19: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the State of Being a Border Security Actor

Nodes compared by number of items coded

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.

*Figure-19 terminology regarding emergent categories:

Yes How-TI: According to Turkish Interviewees, the securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

Yes How-NTI: According to Non-Turkish Interviewees, the securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

No Why-TI: According to Turkish Interviewees, the securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

No Why-NTI: According to Non-Turkish Interviewees, the securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

Contributing to the EU: The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by contributing to the EU security framework.

Managing flows: The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by dealing with illegal flows.

Increasing capability: The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by increasing its capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions.

Geopolitical structure: The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor due its geopolitical importance.

IBM: The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by establishing Integrated Border Management mechanism which aims to ensure intra-agency, inter-agency and inter-state coordination and cooperation.

TR policies: The securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor due to Turkey's border security and visa policies.

TR inefficient: Securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor due to Turkey's inefficiency in the area of border security.

EU efficient: The securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor because the EU is already an actor in the area of border security.

Perception: The securitization process is not leading Turkey to become a border security actor due to perceptions regarding the EU's policies.

Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

As illustrated in Figure-19, the respective size of the rectangles indicates the proportion of coded references. The number of references made by interviewees who do not believe that Turkey is becoming a border security actor (despite the impact of securitization process) is lower than the number of references made by interviewees who identify Turkey as a border security actor. Having considered references made by key informants, it can be argued that the securitization process has led Turkey to be a border security actor.

If Turkey is becoming a border security actor then a subsequent question is how Turkey needs to evolve in order to remain and grow as a border security actor. Respondents have come up with new ideas regarding the evolution of the Turkish border security system and the drive toward being a border security actor. Thus, each interview group concentrated on similar points. For example, being able to contribute to the EU security system, dealing with illegal flows, increasing capability, and exporting Integrated Border Management model to neighboring countries were considered as the main parameters of being a border security actor.

Referring to managing flows, TS-3TP-3 claimed that "…. the number of tourist entering Turkey has increased from 6 million to 30 million since the last decade which indicates Turkey's increasing importance. Therefore this process will securitize Turkey's borders, leading Turkey to take some initiatives such as signing visa and readmission agreements, preventing illegal flows and promoting legal immigration, which in turn, will lead Turkey to be a border security actor".

In the same vein, YS-3IM-1 suggested that "...making Integrated Border Management tools, which are intra-agency, inter-agency and international cooperation,

sustainable can lead Turkey to be border security actor in the region thereby preventing illegal flows, regulating legal flows and contributing the EU's peace and security framework".

In this respect, contributing to the EU security framework emerges as a variable that can be considered as one of the components of being a border security actor. For instance, TS-4MI-1 pointed out that "…the EU prioritizes enhancing Turkey's borders and securitization process will lead Turkey to undertake the role of securing EU's external borders". In YS-4Exp-2's remarks, it was noted that "…secured borders means stability in the region and Turkey will increase the confidence level at neighboring countries which will, in turn, contribute to the EU security framework" because "Turkey will be a heaven at the center of the hell", as highlighted by TS-2Gen.

Accordingly, YS-4Exp-6 emphasized that "…if neighboring countries have secured borders, Turkey will not be exposed to criminality so as the EU. The recent refugee crisis caused by Syria proves the significance of Turkey in the area of border security. The EU will not give up Turkey in order to ensure its borders as secured".

As another emergent category, increasing the capability in the area of border security was considered to be a key component for the emergence of a border security actor. Thus, TS-2CG-2 emphasized that "…being a border security actor depends on the capability in controlling borders" and "…securitization process will increase the capability of Turkey in preventing illegal flows" as argued by TS-7aca-1. In the same vein YS-4Exp-1 suggested that "…a new border security system will have been created and this will increase the capability level of the national security in preventing illegal flows".

Dealing with the main arguments related to the state of border security actor, there are some other explanations provided for the emergence of a border security actor. For example, TS-3TP-2 pointed out "…retaining rigid geographic features, being close to unstable countries are showing Turkey's exception. Things have been done and will be done within these conditions will be in any case a model for other countries". Thus, YS-4Exp-3 also claimed that "…. Turkey's experiences on the transformation of the traditional border security system to a system which prioritizes professionalism, law enforcement concept, and cooperation and coordination mechanisms can be a lesson for the inner region". As argued by13TS-3TP-5, "…if Turkey can handle this transformation process from military structures into a civilian structure and export the IBM model to its neighbors, being able to do this will lead Turkey to become a border security actor".

When we look at the values of nodes (coded references) provided by Pearson Correlation Coefficient (Table-6), there is strength of similarities between the emergent categories such as contributing EU, managing flows, increasing capability, and geopolitical structure. As illustrated by Table-6 indicating the strength of similarities between respective categories, the ideas that "contributing to the EU security" and "being able to manage illegal flows" are strongly correlated in the sense that Turkey can be a border security actor through generalizing these ideas. Furthermore, there is a strong set of similarities between "managing flows" and "increasing capability" which, in turn, can facilitate the process toward being a border security actor.

In this respect, increasing capability is of crucial importance in terms of managing flows and contributing to the EU security framework and in contributing to the emergence of a border security actor. Moreover, the geopolitical structure of Turkey is

important for the EU and this needs to be considered in the context of becoming a border

security actor, as well.

Table-6: The Strength of Similarities Between Categories* on Turkey's Status of Border Security Actor

Node A	Node B	Pearson correlation coefficient
TI\contributing EU	NTI\contributing EU	0.823187
NTI\managing flows	NTI\contributing EU	0.769598
TI\managing flows	NTI\managing flows	0.768168
TI\managing flows	TI\increasing capability	0.766863
TI\increasing capability	NTI\managing flows	0.707965
NTI\managing flows	NTI\increasing capability	0.696612
NTI\increasing capability	NTI\contributing EU	0.685406
TI\increasing capability	NTI\increasing capability	0.650144
TI\geopolitical structure	TI\contributing EU	0.641846
TI\contributing EU	NTI\managing flows	0.637291

*

Table-6 terminology regarding emergent categories:
NTI\contributing EU: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by contributing to the EU security framework" is coded in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\contributing EU: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by contributing to the EU security framework" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
TI\managing flows: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by dealing with illegal flows" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\managing flows: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by dealing with illegal flows" is coded in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
NTI\increasing capability: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by increasing its capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions" is coded in accordance with responses of Non-Turkish Interviewees.
TI\increasing capability: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor by increasing its capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
TI\geopolitical structure: "The securitization process is leading Turkey to become a border security actor due its geopolitical importance" is coded in accordance with responses of Turkish Interviewees.
Node A and Node B: Containers of coded categories according to responses of each group (Turkish and Non-Turkish Interviewees).

Concluding Remarks

Having considered the content analysis with regard to governmental documents

and official papers and findings obtained from the interviews, it can be argued that being

a border security actor depends on some key variables such as being in a challenging

geopolitical environment, being able to contribute to regional security framework, and increasing the capability in managing flows. The criteria within Bretherton and Vogler's Actor model, which include *opportunity, presence, and capability*, are also compatible with those of the emergent countries. For example, first, the challenging geopolitical environment in which Turkey is situated provides Turkey an *opportunity* to increase influence beyond its borders. Second, by contributing to the regional security framework, Turkey ensures its *presence* in the international arena by taking external actions. Third, increasing capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border security will also contribute to Turkey's *capability* of being a border security actor.

Therefore, there is a logical relationship between the variables of archival research and the emergent categories excerpted from interview findings. On the basis of the emerging logical relationship, the author argues that the securitization process increases the likelihood of becoming a border security actor. These emergent categories and variables have further led the researcher to develop a logic model with regard to being a border security actor. The logic model and its contents will be discussed in the key findings section.

D. Who Sets the Agenda: The EU or Turkey?

The EU accession process requires Turkey to take actions with regard to border security before being a member of the EU. As discussed earlier, the securitization process has had a great influence over the Turkish border security system through numerous legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border security. Therefore, it can be claimed that the EU has the capability to influence factors beyond its borders by disseminating its own security agenda.

However, the critical evaluation of the Turkish border security system raises a key issue that needs further assessment: Does the evolution of Turkey's border security framework provide Turkey with the capability of becoming a security actor, not only within the parameters defined by the EU but also according to its own agenda?

The expectations of the EU in the area of border security have been discussed in the previous sections. Thus, as documented in this study, Turkey's current asylum, migration, and border regime have been essentially affected by the EU policies. In addition, Turkey's agenda needs to be addressed respectively. There are four key areas in the context of Turkey's agenda such as signing a readmission agreement with the EU, Turkey's asylum regime, its visa regime, and its terrorism policy.

1. Signing Readmission Agreement with the EU

Signing a readmission agreement with the EU is a controversial issue in the context of EU-Turkey relations. Even though the EU is insisting on signing the readmission agreement with the EU, Turkey is resisting this request due to the fact that signing such an agreement with the EU will turn Turkey into a buffer zone.[354] According to an *Assessment Report* prepared in 2011, some drawbacks with regard to signing the

readmission agreement with the EU have been emphasized. Burden sharing and visa facilitation emerge as the main drawbacks towards signing the agreement. Therefore, it has been emphasized within the report that the readmission agreement should be carried out in parallel with ensuring visa exemption for Turkish citizens and sharing the burden of illegal immigrants as a possible outcome of readmission agreement.[355]

Accordingly, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, has pointed out that Turkey will sign the readmission agreement with the EU, only when Turkey receives the same visa facilitation granted to other countries by the EU.[356] Therefore, negotiations regarding the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU are still continuing with an opt-out option for Turkey.

2. Turkey's Asylum Policy

Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographic limitation- its obligations would be applied only to persons seeking asylum from Europe, disregarding obligations towards non-European refugees.[357] Turkey has had to change this policy regarding the geographic limitation on the Geneva Convention in accordance with the EU requirements. The proposal on lifting the geographical limitation over the provisions of the Geneva Convention is supposed to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2012.[358] Therefore, the idea of "Fortress Europe" and relevant policies in order to realize this idea by the EU may result in transforming Turkey into a buffer zone.

The EU has asked Turkey both to conform fully to the norms of the international refugee regime and to securitize immigration through enhanced external borders. However, this kind of policy approach adopted by the EU is considered to be very costly as it necessitates more resources and puts a heavy burden on the Turkish economy. For

example, Turkey has been providing temporary solutions for Syrian asylum seekers amounting to around 24,000 cases[359] and this requires establishing efficient infrastructures in order to provide refugee status to those asylum seekers coming from non-European countries. For this reason, Turkish policymakers often tend to promote policies that would lead to burden sharing.[360] Therefore, the demands of the EU with regard to lifting the geographical limitation for asylum seekers from non-European countries will remain a key issue for Turkey.[361]

3. Turkey's Visa Policy

Visa agreements with third countries can be acknowledged as another aspect of the securitization process and also have some implications for the Turkish border security system. The EU has been challenged by Turkey's recent visa policies particularly on liberating visas or ensuring visa exemptions for some countries that are on the negative visa list of the EU. This indicates Turkey's national agenda still matters in shaping and framing border security policies.

Turkey and Albania, for example, agreed to introduce a visa exemption and lift entrance fees reciprocally.[362] Turkey agreed on visa exemptions with Libya and Jordan in December 2009, Lebanon in January 2010, and Russia in May 2010. Similar agreements were also signed with Syria in 2009, with Serbia in July 2010, with Georgia in 2011, and with the Ukraine in 2012. However, except for Serbia, all of these countries are in the EU's negative visa list of countries whose citizens require a visa to enter the territory of the EU member states.[363] From these recent visa policies of Turkey, it can be argued that Turkey is still prioritizing its own national agenda that might cause some repercussions such as the retardation of the EU accession process.

Furthermore, because of visa agreements with respective countries, Turkey might experience new flows especially from the countries that have historical and cultural ties with Turkey. For example, the state of emergency in Syria as well as the visa exemption recognized to Syrian citizens has contributed to the influx of immigrants and refugees to Turkey. Therefore, recent developments in the visa regime indicate that Turkey will experience a new era as to border security issues in the near future.

4. Turkey's Terrorism Policy

Terrorism, another prioritized issue for Turkey, is of crucial importance in terms of framing and shaping border security policies. For example, the establishment of the future border guard unit will not be realized in a short-term period. It will take a time to establish an integrated border management system. In the draft law on the establishment of the border guard organization, a transition period and geographical priorities have been defined in accordance with Turkey's priorities.[364] For example, the components of the future border guard unit will be established first at the western borders where terrorist activities are rarely seen, then these will be transferred to the eastern borders and consequently to the south-eastern borders where terrorist activities are widespread.

There are several reasons behind the transition from a military structure to the future border guard unit structure. First, the main goal of establishing this new border guard unit is to deal with illegal flows rather than terrorism. Second, the army and military means are extensively being used to fight against terrorism at the southeastern borders. Third, there are reservations by the authorities that suggest it will take a time for the future border guard unit to be professional in dealing with terrorism in the inner

region. Therefore, it can be argued that terrorism will have an impact on the transformation of the border security system for some time.

Furthermore, the contemporary strategies with regard to fighting against terrorism do include measures on limiting resources of terrorist organizations.[365] However, Turkey's existing policy on respective policy area is concentrating on temporary measures such as using manpower, combatting terrorists, and reactive actions rather than providing rooted solutions. In this respect, border security is of highest importance in terms of limiting the financial resources of the PKK, a terrorist organization, which is mostly active and gaining profits from drug trafficking, human trafficking, and human smuggling at the eastern and southeastern borders.[366] Therefore, dealing with illegal flows should be prioritized by adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism.

5. The Significance of Turkey's Parameters in Setting the Border Security Agenda

Considering the key dimensions of the previous sections, it is apparent that Turkey's parameters have been shaped by its own interests with regard to the border security. First, the geopolitical hinterland in which Turkey is situated is another parameter that needs to be considered when explaining the evolution of the Turkish border security agenda. As discussed before, the number of apprehended illegal immigrants and the amount of seized drugs has proven the significance Turkey. Despite geographic structures, rugged terrain, and climatic drawbacks which impact the efficiency of border controls, Turkey emerges as the only country that can contribute to the EU security framework. This *opportunity*, in accordance with Bretherton and

Vogler's actor model, has also led the development of the Turkish border security system thus contributing to Turkey's actorness in the area of border security.

Second, Turkey's reluctance in signing the readmission agreement with the EU is a result of a probable financial burden over its economy. Reacting against signing the readmission agreement with the EU and asking for visa exemptions for Turkish citizens in return for signing the agreement can be considered as prioritizing national border security agenda. As previously discussed, Turkey tends to sign readmission agreements with the countries of origin as well as neighboring countries rather than receiving countries. This reminds us that *presence*, one of the criteria of being an actor refers to being influential externally, as defined by Bretherton and Vogler (2006).

Third, Turkey's capability in dealing with asylum seekers is another parameter, which matters in setting the agenda in the area of border security. The Syrian crisis, for example, has proven the importance of Turkey for the EU security framework. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the Turkish authorities have managed the crisis effectively and efficiently.[367] The EU Parliament has also praised Turkey's efforts with regard to dealing with the Syrian asylum seekers.[368] Therefore, it can be argued that dealing with around 25,000 Syrian asylum seekers requires increasing capacity and *capability*, which is the second criterion of Bretherton and Vogler's actor model and Turkey has met this criterion within the Syrian case.

In sum, the challenging geographical structure of Turkey, Turkey's handling of asylum issues as seen in the Syrian case, and playing the visa exemption card in exchange for signing the readmission agreement with the EU indicates that Turkey's parameters

also matter in fuelling the evolution of Turkey's border security framework which can provide Turkey with the capability of becoming a border security actor.

6. How Do Interview Findings Describe the Significance of Existing Parameters?

Having considered Turkey's own agenda with regard to border security, it is difficult to assert that Turkey's priorities in the area of border security have disappeared. The EU influence in that area has not entirely weighed over Turkey's policies. Therefore, setting an agenda is still the preserve of national authorities and it is shaped, to a significant extent, by national preferences and interests. However, the EU has considerable influence on the border security policies of Turkey.

It is therefore important to measure the respective impact of these opposite trends by taking the opinions of experts from the field who are dealing with the transformation of the Turkish border security system in line with the expectations of the EU. Thus, interview findings in the present study aimed to shed light on the evolution of the Turkish border security system.

As illustrated by Figure-20, the number of references made by interviewees who believe that EU parameters play a role in evolving the border security framework of Turkey is higher than the number of references made by interviewees who identify Turkey's parameters matter. Therefore, it can be argued that both groups (Turkish and Non-Turkish interviewees) have highlighted the importance of the EU parameters in fuelling the evolution of Turkey's border security framework.

Furthermore, in accordance with the respective size of rectangles demonstrated by Figure-20, the EU parameters including administrative actions, legal actions, EU affairs,

EU projects activities, and observable results of the securitization process play a role in

evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Figure-20: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the Status of Parameters Playing Role in Setting Agenda.

Nodes compared by number of items coded

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From the NVivo-9 Program.

*Figure-20 terminology regarding emergent categories:

EU parameters-TI: According to Turkish Interviewees, EU parameters matter in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

EU parameters-NTI: According to Non-Turkish Interviewees, EU parameters matter in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Turkey's parameters-NTI: According to Non-Turkish Interviewees, Turkey's parameters matter in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Turkey's parameters-TI: According to Turkish Interviewees, Turkey's parameters matter in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Projects: EU projects play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Administrative: Administrative actions (institutions, departments, coordination boards, centers, bureaus, and task forces) with the impact of the EU accession process play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

EU affairs: Relations with the EU play a key role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Legal: Legal actions (laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars) with the impact of the EU accession process play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Operational: Observable results of the EU securitization process play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Perception: Misperceptions with regard to the EU's policies lead Turkey to enhance its own border security framework by itself.

Progress: Lack of progress regarding Turkey's accession to the EU leads Turkey to enhance its own border security framework by itself.

Visa: Turkey's visa policies are independent and play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Asylum: Turkey's asylum policies are independent and play a role in evolving Turkey's border security framework.

Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

As previously discussed, the development of the Turkish border security system can also be attributed to the impact of the securitization process. The diverse impacts of the EU securitization process, such as legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions can increase Turkey's capability with a view to becoming a border security actor. In this context, EU parameters can be considered as significant as they can contribute to the development of the Turkish border security system thereby leading Turkey to become a border security actor.

As argued by YS-4Exp-3, "…this impact has led to the development of the current border security system of Turkey". While explaining the motive behind the evolution of the Turkish border security system, TS-4MI-3 emphasized the fact that, "…as a candidate country, Turkey has to align its legal and administrative framework in line with the EU acquis".

As illustrated by Figure-20, the size of the EU parameters is larger than that of Turkey's parameters based on the number of items coded. However, Turkey's parameters or its own agenda cannot be underestimated. Thus, as claimed by YS-2HCR, Turkey's own agenda is contradictory to the EU's agenda in the sense that "…border security and asylum issues are not at the political agenda and they are not prioritized as desired".

In the same vein, TS-2LF-1 argued that "…the impact is mainly concentrating on Bulgarian and Greece borders. However, there hasn't been sufficient impact on eastern borders of Turkey". YS-3IM-1 elaborated on this issue by stating " …there hasn't been any institutional and civilian approach to border security issues, yet".

Moreover, YS-3IM-2 suggested, "…Turkey is opening its borders to the countries which are on the negative list of the EU". TS-3TP-2 has also pointed out that, "…. the

visa regime of Turkey is not in line with the EU. The visa agreements with Iran, and Syria are challenging the negative visa list policy of the EU". Nonetheless, as emphasized by YS-4Exp-6, "…Turkey's efforts in the Syrian refugee crises in 2011 have served both Turkey's and EU's interests".

Concluding Remarks

Both Turkey's own agenda and the EU's parameters matter in terms of shaping and framing national border security policy. However, the frequency of coded categories and the number of references made by each group indicate that the EU parameters outweigh the Turkish agenda in fuelling the development of the national border security policy.

Having considered those remarks, it can be argued that the evolution of Turkey's border security framework provides Turkey with the capability of becoming a border security actor, not only within the parameters defined by the EU but also according to its own agenda.

CHAPTER-VII: CONCLUSION

The conclusion section of the present research includes two sections, findings and implications. Referring to Yin's (2003) fact formula, the author has concentrated on a conceptual framework which consists of findings obtained from archival research and interviews. Thus, these findings have helped the researcher to explore the facts regarding the impact of the securitization process on the border security framework of Turkey. In order to clarify this, in this section, the author will focus on key findings from the archival research and interviews as well as policy implications of the present research.

A. Key Findings

1. Findings Obtained from Archival Research

Various data sets are used in this research in order to measure the impact of the securitization. The focus of the data, which has been observed in the present study, is about the status and trend of the data sets used and examined during selected periods and the comparison of selected variables with respect across these periods. However, in the raw data, there is a comparability problem due to the significant difference in data ranges of the variables. For example, for administrative and legal actions numbers have been provided and for budgetary actions money units have been used. In order to deal with this problem, existing data ranges need to be transformed into comparable levels without disturbing the original data trend, which can be done through normalizing the data with respect to a reference.

Therefore, in this research, the average of variables is picked as the reference of normalization and each value is normalized accordingly. By using this quantitative

transformation method, comparability of the data sets has been ensured. Another explanatory level with regard to the data has been added which also enabled the reader to see *"how much the variable increased with respect to its own average value across the securitization periods".*

Figure-21: Normalized Values Showing the Status of Actions Dealing with Border Security Across Pre and Post Securitization Periods

In this respect, Figure-21 indicates the status of actions dealing with border security during the pre- and post-securitization periods in accordance with the average value of each variable. The variables used in Figure-21 are domestic legal actions, domestic administrative actions, international agreements with countries in general, international agreements with countries of origin, the EU projects, allocated budget through EU projects, expenditures spent for the deportation of illegal immigrants, and seized heroin. The variations regarding these variables have been examined across time

using an interrupted time series analysis. Thus, 1999 and 2005 were considered as time interventions. These chosen time ranges represent a 6-year period which allows the reader to see the status of actions before the securitization process as well as their status after beginning and deepening securitization processes.

Therefore, in accordance with the average of each variable illustrated in Figure-21, the status of all actions dealing with border security during the pre- and post-securitization periods can be explained as follows: First, the value of legal actions in the pre-securitization period (<1999) was 0.64. This value increased from 0.81 during the first securitization period (1999-2004) to 1.54 during the second securitization period (2005-2010). Second, the value of administrative actions before the securitization process was restricted to 0.18. However, the value of administrative actions increased from 0.93 during the first securitization period, to 1.87 in the second securitization period.

Third, the value of international agreements with countries in the pre-securitization period increased from 0.90, to 1.01 during the first securitization period, and to 1.08 during the second securitization period. Fourth, the value of international agreements with countries of origin in the pre-securitization period was 0.53. This value experienced an increase from 0.75 during the first securitization period, to 1.71 during the second securitization period. Fifth, the value of EU financed projects was 0 (zero) during the pre-securitization process. Yet, the value of EU financed projects experienced a growth from 0.91 during the first securitization period, to 2.08 during the second securitization period.

Sixth, the value of the allocated budget through EU financed projects was 0 (zero) during the pre-securitization process. However, the value of the allocated budget through

EU financed projects increased from 0.14 during the first securitization period to 2.85 during the second securitization period. Seventh, the value of expenditures for the deportation of illegal immigrants was 0 (zero) during the pre-securitization process. Yet, the value of expenditures for the deportation of illegal immigrants grew from 0.51 during the first securitization period, to 2.48 during the second securitization period.

Ninth, the value of apprehended illegal immigrants during the pre-securitization process was 0.54. Then, this value increased to 1.43 during the first securitization period and decreased by 1.01 during the second securitization period. Last, the value of the heroin seizures was 0.49 during the pre-securitization period. However, this value rose from 0.73 during the first securitization period to 1.77 during the second securitization period.

Having considered all the values regarding the status of actions in respective periods, it can be argued that the actions with regard to the border security seem to be comparatively weak during the pre-securitization period. Legal actions, administrative actions, external actions (international agreements) as well as the number of apprehended illegal immigrants and the amount of seized drugs range at lower levels in accordance with the average reference point. Moreover, some actions including EU project activities and budgetary actions (allocated budget through EU projects and the amount of expenditures for the deportation of illegal immigrants) were absent.

During the first securitization period (1999-2004), there were more actions compared to the pre-securitization period. Legal actions, administrative actions, external actions (international agreements with countries in general and countries of origin), the number of apprehended illegal immigrants, and the amount of seized heroin increased

dramatically. Furthermore, the EU projects and budgetary actions (allocated budget through EU projects and the amount of expenditures for the deportation of illegal immigrants) began to appear during this period.

During the second securitization period (2005-2010), all addressed actions that saw a significant increase except those dealing with apprehended illegal immigrants. However, as illustrated by Figure-10, there have been some fluctuations with regard to the number of apprehended illegal immigrants from one securitization period to another. In order to understand the probable reasons behind these fluctuations, other possible explanations for the decreasing numbers of apprehended illegal immigrants need to be mentioned.

These fluctuations of the seized illegal immigrants over the securitization periods can be explained, for example, by the rechanneling or redistribution effect, as suggested by Cornelius (2005). Because of the securitization process, the deterrent legal actions and effective measures with regard to fighting against illegal immigration have changed the route of illegal immigrants and pushed them to use other ways of entering Turkey in order to achieve their goals. Since there is a sample of 19 countries of origin within the present study, illegal immigrants from those countries might have used other possible strategies to head for Europe. Therefore, when illegal immigrants or human smugglers come across problems that jeopardize their goals with respect to entering a country illegally; they might prefer other routes in their proximity areas.

Another explanation for the decreasing numbers of apprehended illegal immigrants (as previously shown by Figure-12 and Figure-13) might relate to the de-securitized policies facilitating or promoting legal immigration from the countries of

origin. As illustrated by Figure-22, the number of people entering Turkey from countries of origin increased over time while the number of apprehended illegal immigrants decreased, as demonstrated by Figure-12 and Figure-13. However, these explanations require more focus which can be assessed under another research topic discussing the impacts of de-securitization process.

Figure-22: The Number of People Entering Turkey from Countries of Origin (in million)

Source: The Turkish National Police

Moreover, as illustrated by Figure-14, there has been an increase in the amount of seized heroin. The difference between the number of apprehended illegal immigrants and the amount of seized heroin results from the sample size and the lack of routes other than Turkey. When taking the route of illegal flows, the emerging sample for drug supplying country is only one country, Afghanistan, however, the chosen sample for the illegal immigrants consists of 19 countries of origin. Furthermore, human smugglers and illegal immigrants can use other routes to achieve their goals. However, drug traffickers, as

compared to human smugglers, are lacking the adequacy of alternatives and need to transit through Turkey.

Therefore, the impact of securitization is not as salient in the case of dealing with illegal immigration as other factors might impact on the decreasing numbers of apprehended illegal immigrants. In this respect, the impact of the securitization process can be observed in the case of dealing with heroin flows. With the impact of the securitization process, the amount of seized heroin has increased dramatically over time.

Furthermore, when the magnitude of international agreements is evaluated within each securitization period, the status of international agreements concluded with countries of origin over the international agreements with other countries seems higher. Therefore, it can be argued that the securitization process has pushed Turkey to sign more international agreements with countries of origin than the one with other countries.

Having assessed the content of Figure-21 indicating the status of actions dealing with border security during pre- and post-securitization periods in accordance with the average value of each variable, the trend of overall actions needs to be clarified, as well. The scale has been kept same as illustrated by Figure-21. However, Figure-23 has concentrated on the trend of the overall securitization process.

Thus, as illustrated by Figure-23, the trend line of actions dealing with border security during the pre- and post-securitization periods shows a linear trend and has experienced an increase over time. In accordance with the demonstrated trend in Figure-23, it can be argued that there is a strong linear association between the securitization process and the actions (legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions as well as

EU project activities) related to Turkey's increasing capability in the area of border security.

Figure-23: Normalized Values Showing the Trend of Actions Dealing with Border Security in Accordance With Pre- and Post-Securitization Periods

Therefore, the emergence of a significant association has encouraged the researcher to develop a logic model showing the casual process toward being a border security actor. Thus, in the next section, merging the findings of archival research with the findings of interviews will contribute to the development of the logic model.

2. Findings Obtained from Interviews

In order to address the key findings of the interviews, common concerns on the current border security system of Turkey need to be articulated. As demonstrated in Figure-24, these concerns have been evaluated under the main emergent categories of the

study obtained from interview responses such as administrative, professional, policy,

borders, and legal responses.

Figure-24: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the Current Problems Regarding Turkey's Border Security Framework

Nodes compared by number of items coded

*Figure-24 terminology regarding emergent categories:
Current problems-TI: The common problems addressed by Turkish Interviewees.
Current problems-NTI: The common problems addressed by Non-Turkish Interviewees.
Administrative: Problems relate to establishing a single and professional border security unit and adopting IBM model which prioritizes intra-agency, inter-agency and international cooperation.
Professional: Problems relate to the lack of professional structures regarding border security. This includes lacking transparency and accountability while performing border security duties as well as resorting to temporary military means such as the usage of conscripts for securing borders rather than basing on law enforcement structures.
Policy: Problems relate to the lack of policy-based measures such as adopting risk management tools, signing readmission agreements with countries of origin, and prioritizing the EU accession process.
Borders: Problems relate to the state of Turkey's borders and geographical insufficiencies such as rugged, mountainous terrain and undesired climatic conditions.
Legal: Problems relate to lacking laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars in the area of border security.
Nodes: Containers of coded categories

To be more specific, as emphasized by YS-4Exp-4 and YS-2HCR, "…Turkey is

situated in a very important geographic zone where it has long borders with unstable

countries and therefore Turkey is at the crossroads of illegal flows". YS-4Exp-5 further

claimed that "…airports are modern and western borders are more secure. However the

eastern borders are not as secure as western borders". That's why "a transit country

cannot be free from the disease and criminality", argued YS-4Exp-4. Thus, the borders of Turkey are being perceived as "problematic: east" and "non-problematic: west". For instance, YS-3IM-1 claimed that "the eastern borders of Turkey are subjected to terrorist attacks and westerns borders are being exposed to illegal immigration".

Accordingly, most of the Turkish interviewees perceived the current state of border structures in Turkey as non-professional. One of the main proposed reasons behind this perception is that the current system is shaped and formed by militarist discourses including military threats, defending or attacking mindsets rather than acknowledging border security as a law enforcement issue. They see the current border system as lacking an integrated approach, cooperation and coordination mechanisms as well as professional structures. For example, TS-4MI-2 argued, "there are 40 personnel in a border station. 37 of 40 personnel are conscripts. Most of them are performing their duties temporarily. There is no cooperation and coordination as well as data exchange".

YS-1EU-2 further stated that "…the security situation at the eastern borders as a result of terrorist activities make army's role stronger. The mindset is defending or protecting borders rather than managing them. Even though Greece and Bulgaria are NATO members and they are supposed to be allies of Turkey, Turkey is still making its army ready at its western borders where Greece and Bulgaria neighbor".

Having said that, according to those interviewed there have been mainly administrative, professional, and policy-based concerns. In YS-3IM-1's words, "…border management requires new techniques of governance and a joint approach". In this respect, Turkey should take the advantage of the securitization process by reconsidering its administrative, legal, and policy-based structures.

In accordance with Figure-25, both Turkish and non-Turkish interviewees highlighted the importance of taking administrative actions to increase the capability for dealing with illegal flows. To do so, there is a need to establish a single authority and a coordination mechanism in order to prevent the bureaucratic muddle which the current system is criticized for.

Figure-25: The Size of Coded Categories* Showing the Recommendations for the Problems of Turkey's Border Security Framework

*Figure-25 terminology regarding emergent categories:
Recommendations-TI: The common recommendations provided by Turkish Interviewees for the problems of Turkey's border security framework.
Recommendations-NTI: The common recommendations provided by Non-Turkish Interviewees for the problems of Turkey's border security framework.
Administrative: Recommendations focusing on establishing a single and professional border security unit and adopting IBM model which prioritizes intra-agency, inter-agency and international cooperation.
Professional: Recommendations focusing on professional structures regarding border security. This includes being loyal to transparency and accountability while performing border security duties as well as resorting to permanent means such as basing on law enforcement structures.
Legal: Recommendations focusing on enacting laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars in the area of border security.
Policy: Recommendations focusing on policy-based solutions such as adopting risk management tools, signing readmission agreements with countries of origin, and prioritizing the EU accession process.
Nodes: Containers of coded categories.

In this respect, the new authority regarding border security should be based on law enforcement. This requires adopting civilian, transparency, and accountability principles while managing borders and dealing with illegal flows, as discussed in the previous chapter. In this sense, the traditional approach as to the border security should be replaced by a civilian approach and the focus should be on the development of the integrated border management (IBM) systems that also meets the expectations of the EU in the area of border security.

Furthermore, following a transformation process for the creation of a new border security authority is of vital importance due to the unique characteristic features of each border structure. For instance, as suggested by TS-4MI-1, "…the transition should start from western borders to eastern borders where illegal flows and terrorism are commonly taking place". Particularly, the transition to the future authority should follow a border line beginning with the Bulgarian and Greek borders and then it should move to the Georgian, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi borders.

Policy-based solutions are also necessary for enhancing the capability of Turkey in the area of border security. This type of solution is one that concentrates on adopting risk analysis tools, using advance technologies, human oriented management, and specialized training courses in the area of border security. As addressed by TS-2LF-2, "…new technologies should be used and risk management strategies should be adopted in accordance with rigid geographic structure of eastern borders". In TS-2LF-1's terms; "…we should focus on new technologies with regard to securing borders. For instance, we should take advantage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), thermal cameras, and land surveillance systems".

As another aspect of recommendations, legal actions are considered to be a supplementary component of increasing capability in the area of border security. Thus, TS-8prexpt-1 emphasized the importance of standardization of border security measures. In this respect, TS-7aca-2 pointed out that "…the expected constitutional reforms should take the reformation of the current border security system. The role of the military should be regulated in line with the EU acqui". In the same vein, TS-7 aca-2 underlined that "…the civilian concept regarding border security should be prevailed". TS-2LF-1 also valued the importance of professional structures by suggesting that being an expert and specialized in borders will contribute to the enhancement of the border security system in Turkey.

3. The Development of the Logic Model on the Impact of the Securitization Process

Having addressed the key concerns and key recommendations with regard to the development of the new border security system as well as the status and the trend of the securitization process, it can be argued that the securitization process has brought the current border security system onto the agenda of policy-makers and allowed them to see where the current system is and where it should be. As previously discussed, the external environment and problems regarding the current border security system of Turkey can create an opportunity thus leading Turkey to be a border security actor. This kind of approach reminds us of Bretherton and Vogler's (2006) model of becoming actor which includes the criteria of *opportunity, presence, and capability*.

According to the content analysis of documents, it can be argued that actions dealing with border security, such as legal, administrative, budgetary and external actions were observable during the pre- and post-securitization processes. Interview findings

have also shown that the stated actions dealing with border security have been considered as significant in accordance with the number of coded references.

Therefore, the combined implications of the interviews, observations and the content analysis of documents have led the author to develop a logic model. Figure-26 shows the logic model concerning the causal outcomes of the securitization process toward the emergence of a border security actor. The input values used in Figure-26 have been excerpted from both interviews and the content analysis of documents. Furthermore, these values are consistent with the criteria of the actor model developed by Bretherton and Vogler (2006).

The logic model (Figure-26) was developed so that the evaluation with regard to impact of the securitization process could be made with a logical framework. In this respect, the first research question, "What is the impact of the securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey?" was formulated. Inputs (administrative actions, legal actions, external actions, budgetary actions and project activities) were defined respectively in order to address the given question. As argued by Weiss (1998), inputs are the parameters designed for testing the implementation of a program.[369] Here, in this study, program was referred to as the securitization process. Therefore, inputs provided by the logic model served as a tool for examining how the securitization process is being implemented.

In considering the inputs designed for measuring the impact of the securitization process, it is evident that the securitization process has produced significant results (logic model refers outputs) such as increasing number of administrative, legal, and external actions as well as mounting allocated budget through EU financed projects and

expenditures for the deportation of the illegal immigrants. That the securitization process causes significant results has been proven by the interview findings.

The outputs provided by the logic model have led the researcher to address the subsequent research question which concerns "to what degree does securitization contribute to Turkey's admission to the EU?" As a result of the securitization process, taking actions (logic model refers input values) in the area of border security will facilitate the process regarding Turkey's accession to the EU (the logic model has referred this within intermediary outcomes). Henceforth, Turkey will likely meet the provisions of the EU as a requirement of full-membership.

This is because becoming an actor with respect to a policy area depends on the capability of that polity (state or non-state actors) in fulfilling respective policy objectives. Thus, the third research question relates to "Does securitization lead Turkey to become a border security actor?" In this respect, it is believed the securitization process will increase the capability of Turkey in the area of border security through its legal, administrative, and external actions. Furthermore, integrated border management (IBM), a contemporary approach to border security issues and an outcome of the securitization process, must become an enhanced capability to be able to do this both internally and externally. Therefore, as illustrated by the logic model, the securitization process will generate immediate and intermediary outcomes which will in turn, lead Turkey to become a border security actor in a Europe-wide security system if it can increase its capability in the area of border security.

In line with the logical relationship between immediate, intermediary and ultimate outcomes, the author argues that the logic model for the present research is functional due

to the fact that outputs and immediate outcomes are generating intermediate outcomes and intermediate outcomes are contributing to the achievement of ultimate outcome. For example, raising awareness as to the IBM concept, enacting legal regulations, and establishing new institutions with regard to border security will all enhance the capability of Turkey in the area of border security which will, in turn, increase Turkey's likelihood of becoming a border security actor. The present interview findings also produced similar results.

However, for the moment, becoming a border security actor is under construction due to concerns stated under findings of interviews and archival research which concentrate on necessary administrative and legal actions and highlight the importance of civilian approach through ensuring transparency and accountability over border security issues. The present logic model therefore marks these concerns in red letters.

In sum, in accordance with the logic model, the realization of the securitization process with relevant actions (inputs) can be measured by outputs. Actions regarding the implementation of the securitization process have produced some causal outcomes thus leading Turkey to become a border security actor in a Europe-wide security system. Therefore, the logic model used in the present study seems to be functional as it provides applicable and measurable inputs, outputs and causal outcomes.

FIGURE-26: THE LOGIC MODEL ON THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS

INPUTS

Legal Actions

Administrative actions

External Actions

Projects

Budget

OUTPUTS

Number of legal actions

Number of administrative actions

Number of international agreements

Number of projects

The amount of allocated budget and expenditures

CASUAL OUTCOMES

IMMEDIATE OUTCOME

Border security concept has changed

Awareness has been raised

INTERMEDIARY OUTCOMES

New legal regulations have been adopted

New institutions have been established.

Border security implementations have changed.

Benchmarks have been met for the EU accession.

ULTIMATE OUTCOME

Capability in ensuring border security has increased.

IMPACT

Turkey has become a significant border security actor in a Europe-wide security system.

B. Implications

1. Policy Implications

The European Union has experienced an evolution of border security policy since the 1970s. Historically, there has been continuous development in the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)*, which also includes border security issues. Furthermore, this process has led the EU to become an actor on the AFSJ.

Accordingly, there are some indicators of being an actor in the cited area. For example, being able to set the agenda with regard to the AFSJ in Council meetings, being able to implement goals of the European Security Strategy and European Neighborhood Policy, making agreements, influencing national security policies through its enlargement strategy, and deploying the Frontex agency to the external borders of the EU can be regarded as indicators of EU actorness on the AFSJ. Therefore, at the macro level the securitization process has caused a significant evolution in structure thus leading the EU to become an actor on the cited area. However, at micro level, the current literature requires more focus on the implications of the securitization process. Since the 1990s, there have been continuous reports concerning the impacts of the securitization process. For example, the legal, administrative, and external implications in the area of border security emerge as an example of the diverse impacts of the securitization process. Therefore, it can be argued that the overall impact of the securitization process has led to the emergence of significant results.

As seen in the given figures, which focus on 1999 and 2005 as time related interventions, it can be asserted that with the impact of the EU securitization process, the traditional border security policy of Turkey has shifted from a nation state notion to a supranational or international one. As a result, the author argues that the Turkish national

security framework has undergone dramatic transformations with the impact of the EU securitization process thus increasing Turkey's capability in the area of border security through acknowledged legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions.

Having considered the impacts generated by the securitization process, the present research suggests that there is a strong relationship between securitization and accession processes, thus creating various considerable impacts in the domain of the national security framework of Turkey. These impacts concentrate on harmonization of domestic legislation, administrative structures, policy, and international affairs in line with the EU requirements. In this respect, the securitization process may contribute, to a considerable degree, to Turkey's admission to the EU.

However, the current state of border security framework of Turkey is not sufficiently in line with the *acquis communautaire,* which requires harmonizing the domestic legal framework according to the EU regulations, directives, decisions, and framework decisions as well as establishing new units and adopting civilian approach (which prioritizes being professional, accountable, and transparent while performing border security duties) as to the border security.

In order for an efficient and functional integration process, the EU has asked Turkey to take action and prioritize issues related to border security. Therefore, the impact of the EU's expectations in the field of border security has encouraged Turkey to review its institutional and legal infrastructures in the field of national security. This review within the context of border security will also facilitate Turkey's accession to the EU.

However, there are several factors including environmental, socio-economic, political

and geopolitical factors that facilitate refugee and immigrant flows as well as cross-border crime, and jeopardize the implementation of the EU border security agenda in a significant way. This, in turn, affects Turkey's accession to the EU. For example, signing a readmission agreement with the EU, lifting the geographical limitation from the provisions of Geneva Convention, and establishing a single professional unit related to border security, are all considered to be main factors which can be used as arguments against the membership of Turkey.

Nonetheless, the securitization process generates some notable results that can be beneficial both for the EU and Turkey. These opportunities contribute to the EU security and peace framework, increasing its capability in managing illegal flows, and helping it to adopt the IBM concept which emphasizes the importance of institutional and international cooperation and coordination mechanisms in the area of border security, and also enhances the *presence* of Turkey in the international arena, thereby promoting border security. Therefore, the given opportunities generated by the regional securitization process may both securitize the policies of other nation states and lead them to be border security actors, as seen in the case of the EU-Turkey nexus.

In this respect, being a border security actor relies on several key variables. First, the challenging geopolitical environment in which Turkey is situated provides Turkey with an *opportunity* to increase its influence beyond its borders. Second, by contributing to the EU security framework, managing flows, and taking external actions, Turkey ensures its *presence* in the international arena. Third, its enhancing capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border security will also increase Turkey's *capability* to become a border security actor.

Having considered the tenets of the transformationalist thought as defined by Held et al. (1999), the state's role should not be overestimated or even underestimated in the contemporary globalization period as there is still a mixture of old and new practices.[370] Likewise, it can be argued that states do not disappear completely, particularly in the area of border security, as argued by the present research. However, its applications have changed dramatically through the use of advanced technologies, thus increasing its interactions with other states and intergovernmental organizations, and increasing the number of legal, administrative, external actions, which all imply that state's actions in the area of border security are experiencing a dramatic transformation.

For example, as suggested by the present research, both Turkey's own agenda and the EU's parameters matter in fuelling the development of the national border security policy. Therefore, the author argues that the evolution of Turkey's border security framework has provided Turkey with the capability of being a border security actor, not only within the parameters defined by the EU, but also according to its own agenda.

To conclude, border security is still as important as it was in the Westphalian period. However, the nation states' role and capability in providing security have changed dramatically within the globalization process. Considering the evolution of the '*Area of Freedom Security, and Justice'* treaty within the EU, and its impact, securitization generates not only obstacles, but also opportunities for Turkey's accession to the EU. Thus, the present research suggests that emerging impacts of the securitization process will increase the likelihood of Turkey to become a border security actor. In this respect, the present research extends the current literature by revealing the significant impacts of the regional securitization process on national security framework as seen in the case of the EU and

Turkey.

2. Future Research Implications

As discussed earlier, the impact of the securitization process on the EU and Turkey has been the main focus of this study. This study also considered some future research implications. For example, while examining the overall impact of the securitization process, the fluctuations in the number of apprehended illegal immigrants raised an issue that requires further inquiry. Thus, the observed emerging fluctuation might be related to the impacts of de-securitization policies of nation states. Having considered the fluctuations in the numbers of apprehended illegal immigrants, the next step may be related to the impact of de-securitizing the border security policies of regional actors and national states.

Accordingly, in the present research the impact of the securitization process was examined in the context of border security area. The main focus of the present study was on dealing with illegal flows and was restricted to the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*. Therefore, the subsequent research may be carried out on the impact of the securitization process on other policy areas such as terrorism and the Common Foreign and Security policies (CFSP) of regional actors and nation states.

Furthermore, the unit of analysis in the present research was the EU, as a regional actor, and Turkey, as a nation state. There was an association of the membership processes between these units. Hence, with respect to further research considerations, the scope of the present study can be extended to other units. The impact of the securitization process can be also examined for those units that have no direct association with either the membership process or any other association.

Moreover, the present research highlights the importance of transferability, as clarified in the *Research Design and Methodology Chapter*. The adopted methods and strategies designed for measuring the impact of the securitization process on nation states can also provide notable insights for future researchers who would like to use them for examining different units and diverse policy areas.

REFERENCES

A.Bibliography

1.Books
- Allison, G. (1971). *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Boston: Little, Brown.
- Andreas, P. (2000). *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-Anderson, M., & Den Boer, M. (Eds.). (1994). *Policing across National Boundaries*. Pinter Publications.
- Anderson, M., & Bort E. (2001). *The Frontiers of the European Union*. Palgrave
- Anderson, M., & Apap, J. (2002). *Police and Justice Co-Operation and the New European Borders*. Boston.
- Apap, J. (Ed.). (2004). *Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Batara, A.G. and Sukadis, B. (2007). *Border Management Reform in Transition Democracies,* DCAF&LESPERSSI.
- Bayramoglu A., & Insel, A. (2010). *Almanac Turkey 2006-2008 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight.* Istanbul, Tesev Publications.
- Berg E., & Houtum, H. v. (Eds.). (2003). *Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bigo, D., & Guild, E. (Eds.). (2005). *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe.* Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Bommes M., & Geddes A. (Eds.). (2000). *Immigration and welfare: challenging the borders of the welfare state*. Routledge.
- Bretherton, C. and Vogler J. (2006). *The European Union as a Global Actor*, Routledge: London and New York.
- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, Second Edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press.
- Carr, F., & Massey, A. (1999). *Public Policy in the New Europe*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Chryssochoou, D. N. (2009). *Theorizing European Integration*. Routledge
- Corbin, J. M. and Strauss, A. L. (2008). *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory,* SAGE Publications.
- Craig, P. (1996). *European Community Law (Text, Cases, Materia*. Oxford University Press.
- Cram, L., Desmond, D., & Neill, N. (Eds.). (1999). *Developments in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Creswell, W. J. (1994). *Research Design Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Sage Publications.
- DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.). (2005). *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*. Ashgate.

- Dinan, D. (Ed.). (2000). *Encyclopedia of the European Union*. Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Eskelinen, H., Liikanen, I., & Oksa, J. (Eds). (1999). *Curtains of Iron and Gold Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Information*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Esther, B., & Stefan F. (Eds.). (2005). *The Strategic Implications of EU Enlargement*. Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

- Ferguson, Y. H., & Jones, B. R.J. (Eds.). (2002). *Political Space, Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Ferguson, Y. H., & Mansbach, R. W. (2004). *Remapping Global Politics, History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge University Press.

- Geddes, A. (2008). *Immigration and European integration: Beyond Fortress Europe*. Manchester University Press.

- Glaser B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *Generating Theory" and "The Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Analysis, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine.

- Goren, N. & Nachmani, A. (Eds.). (2007). *The Importance of Being European, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

- Grbich, C. (2007). *Qualitative Data Analysis*, Sage Publications: London.

- Guzzini, S. & Jung, D. (Eds.). (2004). *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*. London: Routledge.

- Hampson, F.O., & et al. (2002). *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.

-Harrison, R. (1974). *Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration*. London: Allen & Unwin.

-Haas, E.B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

- Held, D. and et.al. (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Hix, S. (1999). *The Political System of the European Union*. Macmillan.

- Hobbes, T. (1950). *Leviathan*. New York: Dutton Press.

- Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.

- Icduygu, A. (2000). *The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows in Turkey*. UNESCO.

- Icduygu, A. & Sert, D. (2010). *Irregular Migration at Two Borders:The Turkish-EU and Mexican-U.S. Cases*. German Marshall Fund Paper Series.

- Joopke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation State.* Oxford University Press.

- Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K.A. (2004). *International organizations: The politics and processes of global governance.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Kelstrup, M., & Williams, M.C. (Eds.). (2000). *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*. London: Routledge.

- Kissinger, H. (2001). *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*. New York: Touchstone.

- Leech, J. (Ed.). 2002. *Whole and Free: Nato, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations.* London Federal Trust.

- Lodge, J. (Ed.). (2007). *Are You Who You Say You Are? The EU and Biometric Borders*. WLP.

- Machiavelli, N. (1950). *The Prince and The Discourses*. Modern Library College Editions.
- Maurizio, F. (2005). *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-McCormick, J. (2002). *Understanding the European Union: A concise introduction*. New   York: Palgrave.
- Melis, B. (2001). *Negotiating Europe's Immigration Frontiers.* Brill Academic Publications.
- Migdal, J. S. (Ed.). (2004). *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miles, R., & Thänhardt, D. (Eds.). (1995). *Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. London: Pinter.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1978). *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Munster, R. V. (2009). *Securitizing Immigration.* Palgrave Macmillan
- Nye, J. S. (1968). *International Regionalism.* Boston: Little Brown and Company.
- Occhipinti, J. D. (2003). *The Politics of EU Police Cooperation, Toward a European FBI?.* London: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Oudenaren, J. V. (2000). *Uniting Europe, European Integration and the Post Cold War World.* London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Remler, K. D. and Van Ryzin, G. G. (2011). *Research Methods in Practice, Strategies for Description and Causation*, SAGE Publications.
- Rhodes, E. (1998). *International Relations Introductory Readings*. Kendall/Hunt Publishing.
- Rudolph, C. (2006). *National Security and Immigration.* Stanford University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1996). *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization.* New York Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1998). *Globalization And Its Discontents.* New York: New Press
- Smith, M. A., & Timmins, G. (Eds.). (2001). *Uncertain Europe, Building a New European Security Order?.* London: Routledge.
- Smith, K. (2003). *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Polity Press
- Tocci, N. (Ed.). (2007). *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations.* Rome: Instituto d'Affari Internazionali.
- Ugur, M. (1999). *The European Union and Turkey, An Anchor Credibility Dilemma.* Ashgate Publication.
- Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1998). *International Relations Theory.* Prentice Hall.
- Waever, O., Buzan, B., & Kelstrup, M. (1993). *Identity, Immigration and New Security Agenda in Europe.* London: Pinter.
- Waltz, K. N. (1959). *Man, The State and War, A Theoretical Analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press,
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.
- Weiss, C. H. (1998). *Evaluation: methods for studying programs and policies.* New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Weiss, C. H. (1995). *Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families, In New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts.* Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute.
- Wiener, A., & Diez, T. (Eds.). (2004). *European Integration Theory.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). *Applications of Case Study Research.* Sage Publications.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* Sage Publications.
- Zielanko, J. (Ed.). (2002). *Europe Unbound.* London: Routledge

2. Articles
- Aksoy, Murat. (2010). The Gendarmerie. in Bayramoglu A., & Insel, A. (2010). *Almanac Turkey 2006-2008 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight* (pp. 172-187). Istanbul: Tesev Publications.
- Anderson, M. (2004). The Transformation of Border Controls. In Apap, J. (Ed.). (2004). *Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement* (pp. 172-187). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Andoura, S. (2005). EU's Capacity to Absorb Turkey. Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf.
- Andrijasevic, R. (2010). Deported: The Right to Asylum at EU's External Border of Italy and Libya, IOM, *International Migration*, Vol. 48 (1), pp.148-174.
- Aydin, M. & Esen, A. T. (2007). Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice: A Concluding View from Turkey. In Tocci, N. (Ed.). *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations.* Rome: Instituto d'Affari Internazionali. Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf.
- Baç, M. M. (2004). Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Institutional and Security Challenges, *Perceptions*, pp. 29-43.
- Baker, Estella., & Harding, C. (2009). From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the third pillar. *European Law Review*. 34:1. pp. 25-54
- Berg, E. & Houtum, H. V. (2003). Prologue: A Border is not a Border. In Berg E., & Houtum, H. van (Eds.). *Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices* (pp.1-10). Aldershot : Ashgate.
- Bigo, D. (2005). Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?. In Bigo, D., & Guild, E. (Eds.). *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe* (pp. 49-99). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bigo, D. (2007). Mobility Controls and New Technologies. In Lodge, J. (Ed.). *Are You Who You Say You Are? The EU and Biometric Borders* (pp.9-14). WLP.
- Bigo, D., & Guild E. (2005). Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies. In Bigo, D., & Guild, E. (Eds.). *Frontier Controls* (pp.233-264).
- Bilgin, P. (2005). Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of Globalisation, *European Journal of Political Research,* pp. 175-201.
- Boswell, C. (2003). The 'External dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy. *International Affairs*, 79.3, pp.619-638.

- Bunyan Tony (Ed.) (1997). *Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union From Trevi to Maastricht Volume 1 (1976-1993). Statewatch.*

- Bunyan Tony, (1993). Trevi, Europol and the European state. In Farrel, M., *Statewatching the new Europe.*

- Burgess, M., (2004). Federalism. In Wiener, A., & Diez, T. (Eds.). *European Integration Theory* (pp. 25-43). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Campbell, D. (1969). "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist*, pp. 409-429.

- Ceccorulli, M. (2009). Migration as a security threat: internal and external dynamics in the European Union. *Forum on the Problems of Peace and War*. Florence: GARNET Working Paper No: 65/09.

- Cerrah, I. (2006). Police, in TESEV, *Almanac Turkey 2005 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, Tesev Publications.

- Ceyhan, A. (1999). Migrants as a Threat: A Comparative Analysis of Securitarian Discourse – France and the United States. In Gray, V. (Ed.). *A European Dilemma - Immigration, Citizenship and Identity in Western Europe*, pp. 1-31, Oxford: Bergham Books.

-Chaban, N., Elgstrom, O., & Holland, M. (2006). The EU as Others See It. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 245-266.

- Collyer, M., (2006). Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities. *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 11, n°2, pp. 255-270.

- Cornelius, A.W. (2004). Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.*

- Çomak, H. (2008). How Will Turkey's EU Membership Effect Peace and Security in the World and in Europe?, pp. 1-14. Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.bilgesam.org.

- Cram, L., et al., (1999). Reconciling Theory and Practice. In Cram, L. et al. (Eds.). *Developments in the European Union.* London: Macmillan Press.

- Crelinsten, R. (1998). The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Volume 44, Number 1, pp. 389-413.

- Diez, T. (2007). Expanding Europe: The Ethics of EU-Turkey Relations. *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 21.4, pp. 415-422.

- Diez, T. (2004). The Subversion of Borders. In Guzzini, S. & Jung, D. (Eds.). *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research* (pp.128-140). London: Routledge.

- Douglas-Scott, S. (2004). The rule of law in the European Union - putting the security into the area of freedom, security and justice. *European Law Review*, 29:2, pp. 219-242.

- Editorial Comments (2005). Turkey Quest for Membership of the EU. *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp. 1561-1566.

- Erzan, R., Kuzuba, U., & Yildiz, N. (2006). Immigration Scenarios: Turkey–EU. *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7 No. 1, March, pp. 33-44.

- Faist, T. (2002). Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After September 11th 2001. *International Migration Review*, 36 (1), pp. 7-14.

- Fell, M. (2006). Is Human Security our Main Concern in the 21st Century?. *Journal of Security Sector Management*. Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 1-11.

- Ferguson, Y. H., & Mansbach, R. W. (2002). Remapping Political Space: Issues and Nonissues in Global Politics in the Twentieth Century. In Ferguson, Y. H. & Jones, B. R.J. (Eds.). *Political Space, Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World* (pp. 87-111). New York: State University of New York Press.

- Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norms Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 887-917.

- Guild E. (2003). International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001. *European Foreign Affairs Review.*

- Guiraudon, V., & Lahav, G. (2000). A Reappraisal if the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control. *Comparative Political Studies,* vol. 33, n°2, pp. 163-195.

- Guzzini, S. and Jung D. (2004). Copenhagen Peace Research. In Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research.*

- Hassner, P. (2002). Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands? A New Type of Border for a New Type of Entity. In Zielonka, J. *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union* (pp. 38-50). London: Routledge.

- Henrik L. (2002). The EU: A Global Military Actor?. *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, No. 3.

- Higgott, R., & Reich, S. (1998). Globalisation and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and Taxonomy. Working Paper No. 1, *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation*. Warwick University.

- Hill, C. (2002). The geopolitical implications of enlargement. In Zielonka, J. (Ed.) *Europe unbound: enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union* (pp. 95-116). London: Routledge.

-Hill, C. (2007). The Future of the EU as a Global Actor. In Foradori, P. *Managing a MultiLevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs* (pp. 3-20). Landham: Lexington Books.

- Hoffman, S. (1964). "The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 3.

- Hoffman, S. (1982). Reflections on the Nation State in Western Europe Today. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21 No. 1.

- Huysmans, Jef. (1995). Migrants As a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues. In Miles, R., & Thänhardt, D. (Eds.). *Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (pp. 53-72). London: Pinter.

- Huysmans, J. (2000). "The EU and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 38, n°5.

- Icduygu, A., & Keyman, F. (2000). Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey. *Global Governance*, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 383-398.

- Joenniemi, P. (2004). A Deutschian Security Community?. In Guzzini, S. & Jung, D. (Eds.). *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research* (pp. 143-153). London: Routledge.

- Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Immigrant Integration Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, Volume 59, Number 2, pp. 243-273.

- Jukarainen, P. (1999). Borders Change- So Do Space, Identity, and Community. In Eskelinen, H., Liikanen, I., & Oksa, J. (Eds). *Curtains of Iron and Gold Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Information* (pp. 57-72). Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Jupille Joseph and Caporaso J.A. (1998). States, Agency, and Rules: the European Union in Global Environmental Politics, in Carolyn Rhodes, *The European Union in the World Community* (pp. 213-230), Lynne Rienner Publishers: London

- Keser, H. (2006). Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy in the Light of the Central and Eastern European Experience. *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol.5 No.3, pp-115-130.

- King, M. (1994). Policing Refugees and Asylum Seekers in 'Greater Europe': Towards a Reconceptualization of Control. In Anderson, M., & Den Boer, M. (Eds.). *Policing across National Boundaries* (pp.69-84), Pinter Publications.

- Kirchner, E., & Sperling, J. (2002). The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. pp.423-452.

- Kirisci, K. (2004). Reconciling refugee protection with efforts to combat irregular migration: The case of Turkey and the European Union. *Global Migration Perspectives*, pp-1-14. Retrieved Nowember 15, 2010 from http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%20No%2011.pdf.

- Kirisci, K. (2007). Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration. *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.91–97.

- Kiziltan, B. (2009). Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK. *Small Wars Foundation*. Retrieved September 20, 2011 from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/262-kiziltan.pdf

- Kruse, I. The EU's Policy on Readmission of Illegal Migrants. pp. 1-41, Retrieved September 20, 2011 from http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kruse.Imke.pdf.

- Lahav, G., & Messina, A. M. (2005). The Limits of a European Immigration Policy: Elite Opinion and Agendas within the European Parliament. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, No 4, pp. 851-875.

- Laitinen, K. (2003). Post Cold War Security Borders: A Conceptual Approach. In Berg E., & Houtum, H. v. (Eds.). *Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices* (pp. 13-35). Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Langer, J. (1999). Towards a Conceptualization of Border: The Central European Experience. In Eskelinen, H., Liikanen, I., & Oksa, J. (Eds.). *Curtains of Iron and Gold Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Information* (pp. 25-42), Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Larsen, H. (2002). The EU: A Global Military Actor?. *Cooperation and Conflict*. Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 283-302.

- Lutterbeck, D. (2005). Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe. *European Security*, Vol. 14, N.2, pp. 231-253.

- Migdal, J. S. (2004). Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints. In Migdal, J. S. (Ed.). *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (pp. 3-26), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Miliband, D. (2007). Turkey is vital to Europe's future. Retrieved November 11, 2010 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/.
- Mitrany, D. (1968). The Prospect of Integration. In Nye, J. S. *International Regionalism: Readings* (pp. 43-74), Boston: Little Brown.
- Monar, J. (2005). Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?. *European Constitutional Law Review*, pp. 226-246.
- Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 31, No. 4, pp. 473-524
- Muller, B. (2004). Disqualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and Identity Management. *Citizenship Studies*, Volume: 8, Number: 3, pp. 279-294.
- Munster V. R. (2005). Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror. Political Science Publications, *Syddansk Universitet*, pp. 1-20.
- Naim, M. (2002). The Five Wars of Globalization. *Foreign Policy*, pp. 29-37.
- Narbone, L. (2007). Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations:A View from Brussels. In Tocci, N. (Ed.). *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations* (pp. 84-92). Rome: Instituto d'Affari Internazionali. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf.
- Neal, A.N. (2009). Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex. *JCMS*, Volume: 47, Number: 2, pp. 333–356.
- Neuwahl, N. (2005). What Borders for Which Europe. In DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.) *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe* (pp. 23-43), Ashgate.
- Omolesky, M. (2007). The Turkey Question: The EU and the Concept of Borders. Retrieved Nowember 15, 2010 from http://www.brusselsjournal.com.
- Ousterhout, R. and Bakirtzis, C. (2010). The Byzantine Monuments of the Evros/Meric River Valley. A book review by Heath Lowry, Retrieved December 5, 2010 from http://www.cornucopia.net/aboutevr.html.
- Ozcan, M. (2010). Readmission Agreement: In Exchange for What. Retrieved December 12, 2010 from http://www.turkishweekly.net.
- Papastavridis, E. (2009). Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis Under International Law. *Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce*, Vol. 36 Issue: 2, p. 145-229.
- Papastavridis, E. (2010). Fortress Europe' and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law?. *Nordic Journal of International Law*, Vol. 79, Issue: 1, p. 75-111.
- Pollak, J., & Slominski, P. (2009). Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU's External Borders. *West European Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 904-924
- Roe, P. (2004). Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization. *Security Dialogue,* Volume: 35, No: 3, pp. 279–294.
- Ryan, G. W. and Bernard, H. R. (2000). Data Management and AnalysisMethods. In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd Edition, Sage Publications.
-Schmitter, P. C. (2004). Neo-Neo-Functionalism. In Diez, T., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). *European Integration Theory* (pp. 45-74), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Sirkeci, I. (2007). Human Insecurity and Streams of Conflict for a Re-conceptualization of International Migration. *Population Review*, Volume 46, Number 2, pp. 32-50.
- Smith, M. A., & Timmins, G. (2001). Coming of Age as a Security Actor. In Smith, M. A., & Timmins, G. (Eds.). *Uncertain Europe, Building a New European Security Order?* (pp. 79-95), London: Routledge.
- Tarifa, F. & Adams, B. (2007). Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 18:1, pp. 52-74.
- Tibi Bassam, (2007). Euro-Islam as a Concept for the Integration of Muslims in Europe. In Goren, N. & Nachmani, A. (Eds.) *The Importance of Being European, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East* (pp. 280-283), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
- Tocci, N. (2007). Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations. In Tocci, N. (Ed.). *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations* (pp. 7-32), Rome: Instituto d'Affari Internazionali. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf.
- Tsakatika, M. (2007). Governance vs. politics: the European Union's constitutive democratic deficit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14:6, pp.867-885.
- Waever, O. (2000). The EU as a Security Actor. In Kelstrup, M., & Williams, M.C. (Eds.). *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community (*pp. *250-294*), London: Routledge.
- Weiner, M. (1992/93). Security, Stability and International Migration. *International Security*, 17 (3), pp. 91-126.
- Wessels, W. (2002). The EU as a Global Actor: Concepts and Realities. In Leech, J. (Ed.). *Whole and Free: Nato, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations* (pp. 141-163), London: Federal Trust.
- Yavuz, E. (2010). Turkey to establish civilian border control, immigration agencies. *Today's Zaman*. Retrieved November 11, 2010 from http://www.todayszaman.com.
- Zaiotti, R. (2007). Of Friends and Fences: Europe's Neighbourhood Policy and the Gated Community Syndrome. *European Integration*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 143-162.

3. Other Resources
- Frontex. Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://www.frontex.europa.eu.
- House of Lords European Union Committee. (2007). *Schengen Information System II (SIS II), Report with Evidence.*
- International Organization for Migration. (2004). *Glossary on Migration.*
- International Organization for Migration. (2008). *World Migration*.
- International Organization for Migration. (2008). *Migration in Turkey: A Country Profile.*
- International Organization for Migration. (2009). *Migration Initiatives.*
- International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO). (2010). *Turkish Weekly*. Retrieved December 23, 2010 from http://www.turkishweekly.net.
- Migration Policy Institute. (2007). *Europe's Disappearing Internal Borders.* no.20.
- OECD. (2008). *International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI.*
-Ors, H. (2011).*What are the lessons that can be learned from Turkey's transnational operational police cooperation experiences.* Doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.

-Retrieved April 21, 2012 from http://www.caritaseuropa.org/code/EN/abou.asp?Page=1156

- Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://europa.eu

- Retrieved December 5, 2010 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

- Retrieved Nowember 15, 2010 from http://www.turkishconsulategeneral.us

- Retrieved December 5, 2010 from http://www.in2greece.com

- Retrieved December 5, 2010 from http://www.turksite.eu

- Retrieved Nowember 15, 2010 from http://syb.icisleri.gov.tr.

- Retrieved October 20, 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu

- Retrieved March10, 2012 from http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx.

- Retrieved February 11, 2012 from http://help-nv9-en.qsrinternational.com

- Retrieved April 25, 2012 from http://web.worldbank.org

- Retrieved March 29, 2012 from http://www.neurope.eu/article/davutoglu-urges-visa-liberalisation-turkey

- Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.todayszaman.com

- Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-16884-34-ya-tampon-bolge-ya-sinir-degisikligi.html

- Retrieved Nowember 11, 2010 from http://www.earthtimes.org.

- Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/.

-Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.egm.gov.tr/daire.interpoleng.asp.

-Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-customs-union-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa.

- The Commission of the European Communities. (2010). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme on Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens*. COM(2010) 171.

- The Commission of the European Communities. (2006). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, Reinforcing the management of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders*. COM(2006) 733.

- The Commission of the EU. (2004). *Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession.*

- The Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Communication from the Commission on the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper.*

- The Commission of the EU. (2010). *Turkey 2010 Progress Report.* SEC(2010) 1327.

- The Commission of the EU. (2011). *Turkey 2011 Progress Report.*

- The Commission of the EU. (2010). *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011*. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/strategy_paper_2010_en.pdf.

- The Commission of the EU. (2004). *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective, Working Document.*

-Council Regulation. (2004). *Official Journal of the European Union*, No: 2007/2004.

- The Council of the European Union. (1999). *Tamper Council Decisions, Article 25.* Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

- The Council of the European Union. (2001). *Laeken Council Decisions, Article 42.* Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

- The Council of the European Union. (2002). *Seville Council Decisions, Article 31 and 32.* Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

-The Council of the European Union. (2002). *EU Schengen Catalogue.*

- The Council of the European Union. (2003). Thessaloniki Council Decisions, Article 12. Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

- The Council of the European Union. (2009). *Brussels Council Decisions, Article 29.* Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

-The Council of the European Union. (2005). *Accession Negotiations with Turkey: General EU Position.*

- The Council of the European Union. (2008). *Council Decision of 18 February 2008.* (2008/157/EC).

- The Council of the European Union. (2005). *Living in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.*

- The Council of the European Union. (2005). *Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union.*

- The Council of the European Union. (2009). *The Stockholm Programme.*

- The Council of the European Union. (2010). *The Internal Security Strategy Paper.*

-The Council of the European Union. (2001). Regulation on Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt from That Requirement, (EC) No 539/2001, 15 March 2001, p. 8. Retrieved April 26, 2012 from
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:081:0001:0007:EN:PDF

- The Council of Europe. (2010). *Parliamentary Assembly Report on Readmission agreements: a mechanism for returning irregular migrants.*

- The EU. (September 22, 2000). *Official Journal of the EU.*

- The EU. (February 26, 2008). *Official Journal of the EU.*

- The EU. (November 2, 2004). Council Regulation. *Official Journal of the EU.*

- The EU. (2003). *European Security Strategy.*

- The European Parliament. (2012). *Resolution on the Situation in Syria,* 16 February 2012. Retrieved April 26, 2012 from
 http://www.iccnow.org/documents/EP_RES_2012_2543_EN.pdf

- The Secretariat General for EU Affairs. (2009). *National Program of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis.*

- The Secretariat General for EU Affairs Justice. (2006). *Freedom and Security Bilateral Screening with Turkey Replies to Issues and Questions Posed to the Turkish Authorities by the European Commission.* Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.abgs.gov.tr/.

- The Turkish Ministry of Interior & UNHCR. (2005). *Asylum and Migration Legislation.*

- The Turkish Ministry of Interior. (2006). *National Action Plan towards the Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy.*

- The Turkish Ministry of Interior. (2007). *Common Manual of Checks at the EU External Borders.*

- The Turkish Ministry of Interior, CFCU and B&S Europe. (2011). *Technical Assistance for Impact Assessment Study of a Possible Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement in Turkey.*

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2009). *2008 Global Trends.*

- The UN Refugee Agency. (2010). *Facts and Figures.*

- The United Nations Development Programme. (2009). *Human Development Report.*

- Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL). (2007). *Notions of Security Shifting Concepts and Perspectives.*
 Retrieved April 19, 2011 from http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu

- The United Nation Development Program. (1994). *Human Development Report Chapter-2: New Dimensions of Human Security,* Oxford University Press.

- The United Nations. (1999). *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*, Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm

-The University of Birmingham Centre for the Study of Global Ethics. (2010). *Ethics of Border Security.*

- Zaman Gazetesi, *Suriyeliler icin Dunyaya Ornek Kamp Yeri*, 13 April 2012.

B. Appendixes

Appendix-1: The Chapter Outline of the Dissertation

The outline of the chapters, which will also be discussed throughout the dissertation, provides an overview to the reader with regard to the research area. The following conceptual framework, in seven chapters, includes a brief explanation about the intended research area which focuses on the impacts of securitization of the EU borders on the border security framework of Turkey with a case-study approach.

Chapter-I: Introduction

1. The trend of increasing population flows raises concerns about the capacity of states to control migration.

2. Regional securitization policies will securitize other nation states, thereby leading to the creation of a border security actor as seen in the case of EU-Turkey nexus.

3. Borders have been a crucial symbol of national sovereignty and security not only in the past but also in contemporary era.

PART-A

Chapter-II: Paradoxical Observation

1. Turkey's membership is considered as a controversial issue due to the fact that Turkey is not member but a strong partner of Europe since the end of the Second World War.

2. The securitization process not only generates new obstacles but also provides new opportunities, particularly in terms of Turkey's admission to the EU.

Chapter-III: Literature Review

1. The notion of security can be explained by paradigmatic approaches, including globalist, realist and new security governance.

2. The traditional notion of security used to be an issue between states and be perceived by the states as a matter of sovereignty, interest, and power which are the core assumptions of the realist paradigm.

3. The supremacy of nation states over the security issues has been challenged by the emergence of new threat environment and new actors as argued by the globalists.

4. The traditional notion of security has incorporated new dynamics such as culture and identity, thus expanding the notion of security within the scope of securitization theory.

5. European integration theories are considered as another aspect of security studies which aim to elaborate the notion of security within the Euro-governance.

6. A critical evaluation on theoretical perspectives as well as the impact of securitization and who is in charge of border security has been made.

Chapter-IV: Policy Aspects Regarding Border Security

1. The actual meaning of border has been diversified and has undergone a great transformation in our contemporary world.

2. The objectives and instruments of the new European security agenda include new practices and technologies in order to enhance border controls.

3. Developments regarding the *Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice* reflect the evolution of the new EU security agenda as well as the reaffirmation of border security.

4. Implications of the literature review require further research on the impact of securitization process on nation states.

PART-B

Chapter-V: Research Design and Methodology

1. Research questions, hypotheses, variables, and criteria consider various aspects of the securitization process.

1. In line with the addressed research questions, a case-study approach has been adopted.

2. The qualitative methods including observations, interviews and archival research are expected to contribute to the triangulation of data which will be used for measuring and analyzing the impact of securitization process in a qualitative way.

Chapter-VI: Impacts of Policy Aspects Regarding Border Security

1. The EU securitization process impacts Turkey's legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions.

2. There is a significant nexus between the EU accession process and the securitization process.

3. The actions (legal, administrative, budgetary, and external actions) generated by the securitization process can lead Turkey to become a border security actor.

4. Both Turkey's and the EU parameters matter in fuelling the development of the Turkish border security system. They can also increase the likelihood of Turkey becoming a border security actor.

Chapter-VII: Conclusion

1. Considering the evolution of the *'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'* within the EU and its impact, securitization generates not only obstacles but also opportunities for Turkey's accession to the EU.

2. Securitization increases the likelihood of Turkey to become a border security actor.

3. Border security is still as important as it was in the Westphalian period. However, the nation states' role and capability in providing border security have changed dramatically within the globalization process.

REFERENCES

   A. Bibliography

   B. Appendixes

     Appendix-1: The Chapter Outline of the Dissertation

     Appendix-2: Interview Questions

     Endnotes

     Curriculum Vitae

Appendix-2: Interview Questions

Subject:…….

Date: ……….

Research Title: The Securitization of the European Union Borders and Its Impacts on the Turkish national security framework

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1- Considering border security, could you describe what the current situation of Turkey is?

2- Is there any impact of the EU border security policies on the Turkish national security framework? If yes, could you describe what kind of impacts did occur?

3- Is the current situation of border security in Turkey sufficiently in line with EU regulations?

4- What kind of drawbacks or insufficiencies did you face with regard to border security?

5-How would you describe the reasons of those problems?

6- What would you recommend to solve those problems?

7-Which area did you see problematic within the border security; raising awareness, lack of policy instruments, political will, institutional reactions or other?

8-If you were allowed to shift the current situation what kinds of things would you do first?

9- To what degree the EU border security policies contribute to Turkey's admission to the EU?

10- Could you say the EU border security policies lead Turkey to be a border security actor?

ENDNOTES

[1] Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's changing security discourses: The Challenge of Globalization", *European Journal of Political Research*, 2005, p. 184.

[2] Huseyin Ors, <u>What are the lessons that can be learned from Turkey's transnational operational police cooperation experiences,</u> A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2011, p. 51.

[3] Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.egm.gov.tr/daire.interpoleng.asp.

[4] The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-customs-union-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa.

[5] The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-customs-union-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa.

[6] Retrieved April 21, 2012 from http://www.caritas-europa.org/code/EN/abou.asp?Page=1156

[7] Nanette Neuwahl, "What Borders for Which Europe?", in Joan DeBardeleben (ed.), <u>Soft or Hard Borders?,</u> 2005, p. 28

[8] "Screening Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security, Country Session: Turkey", 13 – 15 February 2006.

[9] Berfu Kiziltan, "Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK", *Small Wars Foundation*, 2009, p. 2.

[10] "Turkish Military's Perspective on Regional Security and Border Control", Transcript of talk by Fevzi Barutcu, Head of International Planning and Operations, Turkish General Staff, December 06, 2000. Retrieved December 14, 2010 from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/001206_baru.pdf.

[11] Ahmet Icduygu and Deniz Sert, <u>Irregular Migration at Two Borders:The Turkish-EU and Mexican-U.S. Cases,</u> 2010, p. 10.

[12] Imke Kruse, "The EU's Policy on Readmission of Illegal Migrants", p. 35. Retrieved December 14, 2010 from http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kruse.Imke.pdf.

[13] Mehmet Ozcan, "Readmission Agreement: In Exchange for What", 24 March 2010. Retrieved December 14, 2010 from http://www.turkishweekly.net.

[14] The Commission of the European Communities, "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", Brussels, 6.10.2004, p. 5.

[15] Cristopher Hill, "The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement", in Jan Zielonka, <u>Europe Unbound,</u> 2002, p. 110.

[16] Thomas Diez, "Expanding Europe: The Ethics of EU-Turkey Relations", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 21.4, Winter 2007, p. 421.

[17] Nathalie Tocci, "Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations", in Nathalie Tocci (Ed.), <u>Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations,</u> Roma, 2007, p. 21, Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf. Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, <u>The Frontiers of the European Union,</u> 2001, p. 173.

[18] Icduygu and Sert, op. cit., p. 10.

[19] The European Commission, <u>Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011</u>, Brussels, 9 November 2010, p. 68. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/strategy_paper_2010_en.pdf.

[20] The Commission of the European Communities, <u>Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective,</u> Brussels, 6.10.2004, p. 42.

[21] Justice, Freedom and Security Bilateral Screening with Turkey Replies to Issues and Questions Posed to the Turkish Authorities by the European Commission, 13-15 February 2006, Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.abgs.gov.tr/.

[22] Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Institutional and Security Challenges", *Perceptions*, Autumn 2004, p. 37.

[23] ibid., p. 43.

[24] Hasan Keser, "Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy in the Light of the Central and Eastern European Experience", *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol.5 No.3 Spring 2006, p. 130.

[25] Hasret Çomak, "How Will Turkey's EU Membership Effect Peace and Security in the World and in Europe?", 01 April 2008, Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.bilgesam.org.

[26] Baç, op. cit., p. 42.

[27] Kemal Kirisci, "Reconciling refugee protection with efforts to combat irregular migration: The case of Turkey and the European Union", *Global Migration Perspectives*, 2004, p. 13. Retrieved November 15, 2010 from
http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%20No%2011.pdf.

[28] Turkish Military's Perspective on Regional Security and Border Control, Transcript of talk by Fevzi Barutcu, Head of International Planning and Operations, Turkish General Staff, December 06, 2000. Retrieved December 14, 2010 from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/001206_baru.pdf.

[29] David Miliband, "Turkey is vital to Europe's future", 5 Sep 2007, Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/.

[30] Matthew Omolesky, "The Turkey Question: The EU and the Concept of Borders", 17 January 2007, Retrieved November 15, 2010 from http://www.brusselsjournal.com.

[31] Diez, op. cit., 2007, p. 415.

[32] Luigi Narbone, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Brussels", in Nathalie Tocci (Ed.), <u>Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations</u>, Roma, 2007, p.88, Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf.

[33] Mustafa Aydin and Asli Toksabay Esen, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice: A Concluding View from Turkey", in Nathalie Tocci (Ed.), <u>Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations</u>, Roma, 2007, p. 133, Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf.

[34] Speech of Ambassador Marc Pierini on Integrated Border Management Twinning Project, 3 June 2010. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.avrupa.info.tr.

[35] International Organization for Migration (IOM), <u>Migration in Turkey: A Country Profile</u>, 2008, p. 12.

[36] Fatos Tarifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In", *Mediterranean Quarterly*,18:1, pp. 52-74, Winter 2007, p. 66.

[37] The Commission of the European Communities, <u>Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective</u>, Working Document, Brussels, 6.10.2004.

[38] Sami Andoura, "EU's Capacity to Absorb Turkey", 21/12/2005, p. 5. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf.

[39] Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzuba and Nilufer Yildiz, "Immigration Scenarios: Turkey–EU", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 33-44, March 2006, p. 43.

[40] OECD, <u>International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI</u>, 2008, p. 284.

[41] Diez, op. cit., 2007, p. 422.

[42] Kenneth N. Waltz, <u>Man, the State and War, A Theoretical Analysis,</u> 1959, p. 238.

[43] Niccolo Machiavelli, <u>The Prince and The Discourses,</u> 1950, p. 78.

[44] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, <u>International Relations Theory,</u> 1998, p. 62.

[45] ibid., p. 59.

[46] Hans J. Morgenthau, <u>Politics Among Nations,</u> 1978, p. 417.

[47] Thomas Hobbes<u>, Leviathan,</u> 1950, p. 288.

[48] Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 315.

[49] Hedley Bull, <u>The Anarchical Society,</u> 1977, p. 8.

[50] Waltz, op. cit, p. 159.

[51] Hobbes, op. cit, p. 150.

[52] Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 175

[53] Henry Kissinger, <u>Does America Need a Foreign Policy?,</u> 2001, p. 237.

[54] Bull, op. cit., p. 188.

[55] Kenneth N. Waltz, <u>Theory of International Politics,</u> 1979, p. 111.

[56] ibid., p. 107.

[57] Michael Collyer, "Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 11, n°2, July 2006, p. 258.

[58] The United Nation Development Program, <u>Human Development Report 1994</u> (Oxford University Press, 1994), Ch. 2,"New Dimensions of Human Security," p. 24-25.

[59] Fen Osler Hampson et al., <u>Madness in the Multitude</u>, Chapter 1-3, p. 28.

[60] The United Nation Development Program, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[61] Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence", *European Foreign Affairs Review,* Winter 2002, p. 423-450.

[62] Benjamin Muller, "Disqualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and Identity Management", *Citizenship Studies,* Volume: 8, Number: 3, September 2004, p. 282.

[63] Ronald d. Crelinsten, "The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies", *Australian Journal of Politics and History,* Volume 44, Number 1, 1998, p. 408.

[64] Derek Lutterbeck, "Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe", *European Security*, Vol. 14, N.2, June 2005, p. 248-249.

[65] ibid., p. 234-235.

[66] Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, 2006, p. Xi.

[67] ibid., p. 29.

[68] Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Morten Kelstrup, Identity, Immigration and New Security Agenda in Europe, 1993, p. 6.

[69] Huysmans, op.cit., p. 16.

[70] Cristopher Rudolph, National Security and Immigration, 2006, p. 30.

[71] Waever and et al., op. cit., p. 23.

[72] ibid., p. 162.

[73] ibid., p. 186.

[74] ibid., p. 5.

[75] Andrew N. Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex", *JCMS*, Volume: 47 Number: 2, 2009, p. 336.

[76] Paul Roe, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization", *Security Dialogue*, Volume: 35, No: 3, September 2004, p. 281.

[77] Rens van Munster, Securitizing Immigration, 2009, p. 8.

[78] Rens van Munster, "Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror", *Political Science Publications,* Syddansk Universitet, 2005, p. 3.

[79] Munster, op. cit., p. 5.

[80] Huysmans, op.cit., p. 47.

[81] Thomas Diez, "The Subversion of Borders", in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (ed.), Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, 2004, p. 137.

[82] Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, "Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies", in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (ed.), Frontier Controls, 2005, p. 234.

[83] Diez, op.cit., 2004, p. 135.

[84] Pertti Joenniemi, "A Deutschian Security Community?," in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (ed.), Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, 2004, p. 151.

[85] Munster, op. cit., p. 41.

[86] Didier Bigo, "Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control", in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (ed.), Frontier Controls, 2005, p. 86.

[87] Edward Rhodes, International Relations Introductory Readings, 1998, p. 134.

[88] Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit., p. 85.

[89] Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 8.

[90] Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), Notions of Security Shifting Concepts and Perspectives, 15 February 2007, p. 25, retrieved on 4/19/2011 from the official website of the European research project; http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu

[91] ibid., p. 32.

[92] Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, New York Columbia University Press, 1996. Moisés Naim, "The Five Wars of Globalization", *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2002, p. 29.

[93] Richard Higgott and Simon Reich, "Globalisation and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and Taxonomy", *Working Paper* No. 1, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, June 1998, p. 2.

[94] Naim, op. cit., p. 29.

[95] Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit., p. 342.

[96] M.P. Karns and K.A Mingst, International Organizations, 2004, p. 50-51.

[97] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norms Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organization*, Vol. 52 No. 4 (1998) p. 906.

[98] Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit., p. 217-218.

[99] ibid., p. 429.

[100] Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), op. cit., p. 30,

[101] Michael Burgess, "Federalism", in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory, 2004, p. 30.

[102] Altiero Spinelli, & Ernesto Rossi, Ventotene Manifesto, 1941.
Jean Monnet, Schuman Plan, 1950.; Monnet has written the text of the Schuman Declaration which aimed to create the European Coal and Steel Community.

[103] Desmond Dinan (ed.), Encyclopedia of the European Union, 2000, p. 233.

[104] Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), op. cit., p. 28,

[105] Dinan op. cit., p. 279.

[106] Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan, and Neill Nugent, "Reconciling Theory and Practice", in Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan, and Neill Nugent (ed.), Developments in the European Union, 1999, p. 8.

[107] ibid., p. 9.

[108] Dinan, op. cit., p. 279.

[109] ibid., p. 279.

[110] Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958

[111] Cram, Dinan, and Nugent, op. cit., p. 10.

[112] Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), op. cit., p. 29,

[113] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Neo-Neofunctionalism", in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory, 2004, p. 46.

[114] Stanley Hoffman, "The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 3, 1964; Stanley Hoffman, "Reflections on the Nation State in Western Europe Today", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21 No. 1, 1982.

[115] Cram, Dinan, and Nugent, op. cit., p. 11.

[116] Dinan, op. cit., p. 297.

[117] International Organization for Migration, Glossary on Migration, 2004, p.10.

[118] Diez, op. cit., 2004, p. 132.

[119] Ahmet Icduygu and Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey". *Global Governance*, Jul-Sep. 2000, Vol. 6, Issue 3.

[120] The United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2009, p. 146.

[121] The UN Refugee Agency, 2008 Global Trends, 16 June 2009, p. 2.

[122] Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability and International Migration", *International Security,* 17 (3), 1992/93, p. 125.

[123] Naim, op. cit., p. 29.

[124] ibid, p. 29.

[125] Saskia Sassen, Globalization And Its Discontents,1998, p. 6.

[126] Sassen, op. cit., 1996.

[127]Retrieved February 25, 2010 from
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/fsj_freetravel_intro_en.htm.

[128] Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 9.

[129] Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit., p. 40-41.

[130] Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1971, p. 33.

[131] Mike Fell, "Is Human Security our Main Concern in the 21st Century?", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 2006, p. 1.

[132] Diez, op. cit., 2004, p. 128-129.

[133] Munster, op. cit., p. 10.

[134] Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes, Immigration and Welfare, 2000, p. 1.

[135] Christian Joopke, Immigration and the Nation State, 1999, p. 5.

[136] ibid., p. 7

[137] Estella Baker and Christopher Harding, "From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the third pillar", *European Law Review*, 2009, 34:1, p. 29.

[138] Rudolph, op. cit., p. 23.

[139] ibid., p. 10.

[140] Huysmans, op. cit., p. 42.

[141] Joopke, op. cit., p. 9

[142] Rudolph, op. cit., p. 25.

[143] Waever, and et al., op. cit., p. 24.

[144] Huysmans, op. cit., p. 34.

[145] Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav "A Reappraisal if the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2000, p. 190.

[146] Joopke, op. cit., p. 278.

[147] Rudolph, op. cit., p. 203.

[148] Diez, op. cit., 2004, p. 138.

[149] Munster, op. cit., p. 16.

[150] Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, "Copenhagen Peace Research", in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, 2004, p. 1.

[151] Fergus Carr and Andrew Massey, Public Policy in the New Europe, 1999, p. 7.

[152] Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration, 2009, p. 25.

[153] David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration", in Joseph S. Nye, International Regionalism, 1968, p. 63.

[154] Reginald Harrison, Europe in Question, 1974, p. 31.

[155] Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 1999, p. 14.

[156] Andrew Moravcsik, <u>The Choice for Europe</u>, 1998, p. 22.

[157] Andrew Moravcsik, "Prefernces and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 31, No. 4, 1993, p. 474.

[158] John D. Occhipinti, <u>The Politics of EU Police Cooperation, Toward a European FBI?,</u> 2003, p. 42.

[159] Anderson and Bort, op. cit., p. 2.

[160] Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum, "Prologue: A Border is not a Border", in Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum (ed.), <u>Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices</u>, 2003, p.2.

[161] Pierre Hassner, "Fixed Borders or Moving Borderland", in Jan Zielanko (ed.), <u>Europe Unbound</u>, 2002, p. 43.

[162] Neuwahl, op. cit., p. 32.

[163] Jef Huysmans, "Migrants As a Security Problem: Dangers of 'Securitizing' Societal Issues", in Miles (R.), Thänhardt (D.) (eds.), <u>Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion</u>, London, Pinter, 1995, p. 62.

[164] Pirjo Jukarainen, "Borders Change- So Do Space, Identity, and Community", in Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen and Jukka Oksa (ed.), <u>Curtains of Iron and Gold Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Information</u>, 1999, p. 41.

[165] Josef Langer, "Towards a Conceptualization of Border: The Central European Experience", in Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen and Jukka Oksa (ed.), <u>Curtains of Iron and Gold Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Information</u>, 1999, p. 41.

[166] Munster, op. cit., 2005, p. 3.

[167] Thomas Faist, "Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After September 11th 2001", *International Migration Review*, 36 (1), 2002, p. 13.

[168] Joel S. Migdal, "Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints", in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), <u>Boundaries and Belongings</u>, 2004, p. 7.

[169] Nathalie Tocci, op. cit., p. 21.

[170] For instance, Libya has been chosen as a place where refugee applications are finalized. Rutvica Andrijasevic, "Deported: The Right to Asylum at EU's External Border of Italy and Libya", IOM, *International Migration*, Vol. 48 (1) 2010, p. 159.

[171] Michela Ceccorulli, "Migration as a security threat: internal and external dynamics in the European Union", Forum on the Problems of Peace and War, Florence, *GARNET Working Paper,* No: 65/09, April 2009, p. 12.

[172] Peter Andreas, <u>Border Games</u>, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 9.

[173] Kari Laitinen, "Post Cold War Security Borders: A Conceptual Approach", in Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum (ed.), <u>Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices</u>, 2003, p. 25.

[174] Migration Policy Institute, <u>Europe's Disappearing Internal Borders</u>, no.20, December 2007, p. 1.

[175] Efthymios Papastavridis, "Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis Under International Law", *Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce*, Vol. 36 Issue 2, Spring2009, p. 148.

Efthymios Papastavridis, "Fortress Europe and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law?", *Nordic Journal of International Law,* Vol. 79 Issue 1, 2010, p. 111.

[176] Myrto Tsakatika, "Governance vs. politics: the European Union's constitutive democratic deficit", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14:6 September 2007, p. 868-869.

[177] Jorg Monar, "Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty.What Added Value for the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'?", *European Constitutional Law Review*, 2005, p. 226-27.

[178] Jef Huysmans, "The EU and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 38, n°5, December 2000, p. 770.

[179] Tony Bunyan (ed.), Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union From Trevi to Maastricht Volume 1 (1976-1993), Statewatch, 1997, p. 9.

[180] Tony Bunyan, "Trevi, Europol and the European state", in Statewatching the new Europe, 1993, p. 3.

[181] The Council of the European Union, Living in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2005, p. 7.

[182] Paul Craig, European Community Law (Text, Cases, Material), Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 20-21. Article 8 of the EEC Treaty indicates that establishment of internal market depends on removing internal border controls. Single European Act defines internal market as an area without internal frontiers and refers Article 8a of EEC Treaty.

[183] Huysmans, op. cit., 2000, p. 753.

[184] Ayse Ceyhan, "Migrants as a Threat: A Comparative Analysis of Securitarian Discourse – France and the United States", in Gray (V.) (ed.), A European Dilemma - Immigration, Citizenship and Identity in Western Europe, Bergham Books, Oxford, 1999, p. 4.

[185] Retrieved Fecruary 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[186] Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.9.2000, p. 202.

[187] Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration, 2008, p. 86.

[188] Maastricht Treaty, "Title VI: Provisions On Cooperation in The Fields Of Justice And Home", Article K.1, 1993.

[189] Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[190] The Council of the European Union, Living in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2005, p. 11.

[191] Lisbon Treaty, "Article 2 and Article 62". Retrieved February 25 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[192] Retrieved April 21, 2012 from
www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/conferences/guiraudon.doc

[193] "1999 Tamper Council Decisions, Article 25". Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[194] "Communication From The Commission to the Council, Reinforcing the management of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders", Brussels, 30.11.2006, COM(2006) 733, p. 2.

[195] "2001 Laeken Council Decisions, Article 42". Retrieved February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[196] "2002 Seville Council Decisions, Article 31 and 32". Retrieved on February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[197] "2003 Thessaloniki Council Decisions, Article 12". Retrieved on February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[198] "2009 Brussels Council Decisions, Article 29". Retrieved on February 25, 2010 from www.europa.eu.int.

[199] "Presidency Conclusions, Annex I". Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, p. 12.

[200] Retrieved Nowember 20, 2010 from
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights

[201] "Presidency Conclusions, Annex I", Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, p. 23.

[202] Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Program, Brussels, 2 December 2009, p. 2.

[203] "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme on Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens", Brussels, COM(2010) 171, 2010, p. 5.

[204] ibid., p. 44-45.

[205] The Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme, Brussels, 2 December 2009, p. 46.

[206] ibid., p. 55.

[207] Lutterbeck, op. cit., p. 234-235.

[208] "Council Regulation No 2007/2004", *Official Journal of the European Union*, 25.11.2004.

[209] Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://www.frontex.europa.eu.

[210] ibid.

[211] The Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Report on Readmission agreements: a mechanism for returning irregular migrants, 16 March 2010, p. 1.

[212] The Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, 2010, p. 83.

[213] Mike King, "Policing Refugees and Asylum Seekers in 'Greater Europe': Towards a Reconceptualization of Control", in Malcom Anderson and Monica Den Boer, Policing Across National Boundaries, 1994, p. 82

[214] Barbara Melis, Negotiating Europe's Immigration Frontiers, 2001, p. 178.

[215] Munster, op. cit., p. 101.

[216] ibid., p. 99.

[217] Didier Bigo, "Mobility Controls and New Technologies", in Juliet Lodge (ed.), Are You Who You Say You Are? The EU and Biometric Borders, 2007, p. 11.

[218] House of Lords European Union Committee, Schengen Information System II (SIS II), Report with Evidence, 2 March 2007, p. 11.

[219] Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/

[220] Retrieved February 25, 2010 from
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/

[221] Retrieved February 25, 2010 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/

[222] Migration Policy Institute, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

[223]Retrieved February 25, 2010 from
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/

[224] Retrieved November 27, 2010 from http://europa.eu/rapid/

[225] Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 91–97, March 2007, p. 91.

[226] Ahmet Icduygu and Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey". *Global Governance*, 10752846, Jul-Sep. 2000, Vol. 6, Issue 3.

[227] Kirisci, op.cit., p. 94.

[228] Ibrahim Sirkeci, "Human Insecurity and Streams of Conflict for a Re-conceptualization of International Migration", *Population Review*, Volume 46, Number 2, pp. 32-50, 2007, p. 42.

[229] Retrieved on December 5, 2010 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

[230] The UNHCR, Facts and Figures, UNHCR Office in Turkey, 2010, p. 12.

[231] Retrieved on November 15, 2010 from
http://www.turkishconsulategeneral.us/abtturkey/cypr/geog.shtml.

[232] Robert Ousterhout and Charalambos Bakirtzis, "The Byzantine Monuments of the Evros/Meric River Valley", A book review by Heath Lowry, Retrieved on December 5, 2010 from http://www.cornucopia.net/aboutevr.html.

[233]Retrieved on December 5, 2010 from
http://www.in2greece.com/english/places/summer/islands/samos.htm.

[234] Retrieved on December 5, 2010 from http://www.turksite.eu/cografya/turkiyenin-kom-ulari-ve-cografi-sinirilari.html.

[235] Retrieved on November 15, 2010 from http://syb.icisleri.gov.tr.

[236] The Turkish Ministry of Interior, National Action Plan towards the Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy, 27 March 2006, p. 20.

[237] Editorial Comments, "Turkey Quest for Membership of the EU", *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 42, No. 6, December 2005, p. 1562.

[238] The Council of The European Union, Accession Negotiations with Turkey: General EU Position, 12 October 2005

[239] Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 91–97, March 2007, p. 96.

[240] The Council of The European Union, "Council Decision of 18 February 2008 (2008/157/EC)", *Official Journal of the European Union,* 02.26.2008, p. 51.

[241] The Secretariat General for EU Affairs, National Program of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, 2009, p. 275.

[242] The Commission of The European Communities, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, SEC(2010) 1327, 2010, p. 83.

[243] The Turkish Ministry of Interior, National Action Plan towards the Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy, 2006, p. 7.

[244] The Turkish Ministry of Interior, Common Manual of Checks at the EU External Borders, 2007, p. 5.

[245] Larsen Henrik, "The EU: A Global Military Actor?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, No. 3, September 2002, p. 283-284.

[246] Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, <u>Remapping Global Politics, History's Revenge and Future Shock</u>, 2004, p. 110.

[247] Larsen, op. cit., p. 287

[248] Waever, Ole. "The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections From a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Order." in Kelstrup, Morten and Michael C. Williams. <u>International Relations Theory and European Integration: Power, Security, and Community.</u> Routledge, New York, NY., 2000, p. 277-278.

[249] Hill, Christopher. "The Future of the EU as a Global Actor." in Foradori, Paolo. <u>Managing a MultiLevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs</u>. Lexington Books. Landham, 2007, p. 12.

[250] Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, "States, Agency, and Rules: the European Union in Global Environmental Politics", in Carolyn Rhodes, <u>The European Union in the World Community</u>, Lynne Rienner Publishers: London, 1998, pp. 213-230, p. 214-220.

[251] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, <u>The European Union as a Global Actor</u>, Routledge: London and New York, 2006, p. 24-33.

[252] ibid., p. 35.

[253] Karen Smith, <u>European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World</u>, Polity Press, 2003, p.15

[254] Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgstrom, and Martin Holland, "The EU as Others See It.", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2006. p. 12

[255] Larsen, op. cit., p.288

[256] Waever, op. cit., p. 250-294.

[257] Larsen, op. cit., p. 294

[258] Hill, op. cit., p.14

[259] Christian Joppke, "Transformation of Immigrant Integration", *World Politics*, January 2007, p. 247.

[260] Gallya Lahav and Anthony M.Messina, "The Limits of a European Immigration Policy: Elite Opinion and Agendas within the European Parliament", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, No 4, 2005, p. 851-875.

[261] Ruben Zaiotti, "Of Friends and Fences: Europe's Neighborhood Policy and the Gated Community Syndrome", *European Integration*, Vol. 29, No. 2May 2007, p. 147.

[262] ibid., p. 147.

[263] "European Security Strategy", 12 December 2003 Brussels, p. 8.

[264] Zaiotti, op. cit., p. 149.

[265] ibid., p. 158.

[266] Christina Boswell, "The 'External dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy", *International Affairs*,79.3, 2003, p. 636.

[267] ibid., p. 638.

[268] Chien-Yi Lu, <u>Harmonization of Migration Policies in the European Union-A State-Centric or Institutionalist Explanation?,</u> Dissertation Thesis, the University of Texas, 1998, p.v. Retrieved February 2, 2011 from http://proquest.umi.com.

Matthew James Fouse, <u>The Politics of European Union Immigration and Asylum Policy Coordination</u>, Dissertation Thesis, Princeton University, 2005, p.14. Retrieved February 2, 2011 from http://proquest.umi.com.

Ruben Zaiotti, <u>Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of Europe's Frontiers</u>, Dissertation Thesis, University of Toronto, 2008, p.11. Retrieved February 2, 2011 from http://proquest.umi.com.

[269] Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, "Coming of Age as a Security Actor", in Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins (ed.), <u>Uncertain Europe, Building a New European Security Order?</u>, 2001, p. 79-95.

John Van Oudenaren, <u>Uniting Europe, European Integration and the Post Cold War World</u>, 2000, p. 273-312.

John McCormick, <u>Understanding the European Union</u>, 2002, p. 200-204.

Wolfgang Wessels, "The EU as a Global Actor: Concepts and Realities", in John Leech (ed.), <u>Whole and Free</u>, 2002, p. 141-161.

Waever, op. cit., p. 250-294.

[270] Bary Buzan and Ole Waever, <u>Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security</u>, 2003, p. 393.

[271] The Council of the European Union, "Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union", *Official Journal of the European Union,* 8.12.2005.

[272] The Council of the European Union, "The Stockholm Programme, an Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens", *Official Journal of the European Union,* 2010.

[273] The Council of the European Union, <u>The Internal Security Strategy Paper</u>, 2010.

[274] The Commission of European Communities, "Regulation Proposal, the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis", Article-4, 2009.

[275] The Council of the European Union, <u>EU Schengen Catalogue</u>, 2002, p. 18-55.

[276] The European Commission, <u>Turkey 2011 Progress Report</u>, 2011, p. 88-95.

[277] The Council of The European Union, "Council Decision of 18 February 2008 (2008/157/EC)", *Official Journal of the European Union,* 02.26.2008, p. 51.

[278] The Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission on the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", 2004, p. 16-17.

[279] Retrieved on October 20, 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

[280] Robert K. Yin, <u>Case Study Research Design and Methods</u>, Sage Publications: London&New Delhi, 2003, p. 20.

[281] ibid., p. 13.

[282] ibid., p. 40.

[283] ibid., p. 2-8.

[284] Carol H. Weiss, "Chapter 11: Qualitative Methods", in Carol H. Weiss, <u>Evaluation</u>, 2nd Edition. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Simon and Shuster, 1998, p. 273.

[285] Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, <u>Generating Theory and The Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Analysis, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research</u>, Chicago: Aldine, 1967, p. 21-43, 101-115.

[286] Yin, op.cit., p. 93.

[287] Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation, Prentice-Hall: USA, 1998, p. 153-154.

[288] ibid., p. 164.

[289] Gery Ryan, W. and H. Russell Bernard, "Data Management and AnalysisMethods," In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. <u>Handbook of Qualitative Research</u>, 2nd Edition. Sage Publications, 2000, p. 782

[290] Yin, op.cit., p. 89.

[291] Ryan, op.cit., p. 780.

[292] Dahlia K. Remler and Gregg G. Van Ryzin, <u>Research Methods in Practice, Strategies for Description and Causation</u>, SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 76.

[293] Weiss, op.cit., p. 168.

[294] Glaser and Strauss, op.cit., p. 36

[295] Weiss, op.cit., p. 286.

[296] Ryan, op.cit., p. 776.

[297] Glaser and Strauss, op.cit., p. 106

[298] ibid., p. 114

[299] Ryan, op.cit., p. 786.

[300] Glaser and Strauss, op.cit., p. 104

[301] John W. Creswell, <u>Research Design Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches</u>, Sage Publications, 1994, p.145.

[302] Weiss, op.cit., p. 122.

[303] Weiss, op.cit., p. 196.

[304] Donald Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," American Psychologist 24: 409-429. 1969, p.5

[305] Yin, op.cit., p. 127.

[306] Weiss, op.cit., p. 129.

[307] Remler and Van Ryzin, op.cit., p. 39.

[308] Retrieved on 3/10/2012 from http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx.

[309] Juliet M. Corbin and, Strauss. Anselm L. <u>Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory,</u> SAGE Publications, 2008, p.160. Gery W. Ryan, and Bernard H. Russell, "Data Management and Analysis Methods," In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. <u>Handbook of Qualitative Research</u> Sage Publications, 2000, pp. 769-802.

[310]Carol Grbich, <u>Qualitative Data Analysis</u>, Sage Publications: London, 2007, p. 71

[311] Glaser and Strauss, op.cit., p. 113.

[312] Carol H. Weiss, <u>Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families, In New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts,</u> Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute, 1995, p. 73.

[313] Weiss, op.cit., p. 185.

[314] Remler and Van Ryzin, op.cit., p. 106.

[315] Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation, Prentice-Hall: USA, 1998, p. 144.

[316] Creswell, op.cit., p.167-168.

[317] Yin, op.cit., p. 37.

[318] ibid., p. 37.

[319] ibid., p. 37.

[320] Remler and Van Ryzin, op.cit., p. 78.

[321] Icduygu and Keyman, op. cit., p. 389.

[322] International Organization for Migration (IOM), <u>World Migration</u>, 2008, p. 44.

[323] The Turkish Ministry of Interior and UNHCR Turkey, <u>Asylum and Migration Legislation,</u> 2005, p. 28.

[324] Retrieved December 12, 2010 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

[325] Murat Aksoy, "The Gendarmerie", in Ali Bayramoglu and Ahmet Insel, <u>Almanac Turkey 2006-2008 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight</u>, Tesev Publications, Istanbul, 2010, p. 186.

[326] ibid., p. 83.

[327] The Commission of the European Communities, <u>Turkey 2010 Progress Report</u>, 2010, p. 80.

[328] ibid., p. 83.

[329] The Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p. 81.

[330] International Organization for Migration (IOM), <u>Migration Initiatives</u>, 2009.

[331] International Organization for Migration (IOM), op. cit., 2008, p. 51.

[332] The Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., 2010, p. 83.

[333] The Council of Europe, <u>Parliamentary Assembly Report on Readmission agreements: a mechanism for returning irregular migrants,</u> 16 March 2010, p. 1.

[334] Retrieved December 09, 2010 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

[335] The Commission of the European Communities, <u>Turkey 2011 Progress Report</u>, 2011, p. 93.

[336] Retrieved Nowember 11, 2010 from http://www.earthtimes.org.

[337] The Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., 2010, p. 82.

[338] Wayne A. Cornelius, "Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2005, p. 783.

[339] Icduygu and Sert, op. cit., p. 8.

[340] Retrieved February 11, 2012 from http://help-nv9-en.qsrinternational.com

[341] Aditya Batara G. and Beni Sukadis, Border Management Reform in Transition Democracies, DCAF&LESPERSSI, 2007, p.41. Ibrahim Cerrah, Police, in Almanac Turkey 2005 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, Tesev Publications, 2006, p. 92.

[342] Retrieved April 25, 2012 from http://web.worldbank.org

[343] Icduygu and Keyman, *op. cit.,* p. 395.

[344] Icduygu and Sert, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[345] The Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., 2010, p. 82.

[346] The Secretariat General for EU Affairs, <u>National Program of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis</u>, 2009, p. 258-274.

[347] ibid., p. 275.

[348] Ercan Yavuz, "Turkey to establish civilian border control, immigration agencies", *Today's Zaman*, Ankara, 13 January 2010. Retrieved November 11, 2010 from http://www.todayszaman.com.

[349] The Secretariat General for EU Affairs, op. cit., p. 264-266.

[350] ibid., p. 254-270.

[351] The University of Birmingham Centre for the Study of Global Ethics, Ethics of Border Security, 2010.

[352] Jupille and Caporaso, op.cit., p. 213-230, p. 214-220.

[353] Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit., p. 24-33.

[354] Icduygu and Sert, op.cit., p. 10.

[355] The Turkish Ministry of Interior, CFCU and B&S Europe, "Technical Assistance for Impact Assessment Study of a Possible Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement in Turkey", 2011, p.64.

[356] Retrieved March 29, 2012 from http://www.neurope.eu/article/davutoglu-urges-visa-liberalisation-turkey

[357] Ahmet Icduygu, The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows in Turkey, UNESCO, 2000, p. 360.

[358] The Turkish Ministry of Interior and UNHCR Turkey, Asylum and Migration Legislation, 2005, p. 50.

[359] Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.todayszaman.com

[360] Icduygu and Sert, op. cit., p. 10.

[361] Keser, op. cit., p. 129.

[362] International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO), "Turkish Weekly". Retrieved December 23, 2010 from http://www.turkishweekly.net.

[363] The EU Council, "Regulation on Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt from That Requirement", (EC) No 539/2001, 15 March 2001, p. 8. Retrieved April 26, 2012 from
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:081:0001:0007:EN:PDF

[364] The Turkish Ministry of Interior, Draft Law on Border Guard Organization, 2011.

[365] The United Nations, "International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism", 1999.
Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm

[366] Retrieved April 26, 2012 from http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-16884-34-ya-tampon-bolge-ya-sinir-degisikligi.html

[367] "Suriyeliler icin Dunyaya Ornek Kamp Yeri", Zaman Gazetesi, 13 April 2012.

[368] European Parliament "Resolution on the situation in Syria", (2012/2543(RSP)), 16 February 2012. Retrieved April 26, 2012 from
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/EP_RES_2012_2543_EN.pdf

[369] Weiss, op.cit., p. 132.

[370] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

CURRICULAM VITAE

Ahmet Kaya

1980	Born in Erzurum, Turkey
1990-1993	Attended Ankara Alparslan Secondary School
1993-1997	Attended Ankara Police College
1997-2001	Attended the Turkish National Police Academy
2001	Earned BA degree
2001-2003	Joined the Turkish National Police, Ankara Police Department
2003-2009	Worked under the Ministry of Interior, Department for International and EU Affairs
2005	Earned master degree from Ankara University
2006	Awarded a scholarship on International Politics and Policy Program at Keele University-UK
2008	Completed Administrative Officers Program at the University of Louisville-USA
2009-2012	Attended Division of Global Affairs Doctoral Program at Rutgers University-USA
2012	Earned PhD degree in Global Affairs