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Introduction:
Rethinking the Disciplinary Confluence
of Anthropology and Literary Studies

It may well be that the disciplinary confluence of literary studies and anthropology is over—over, at least, in the way it has been understood since, as the story goes, Stephen Greenblatt came to the realization that when Clifford Geertz argued for interpreting culture as if it were a text, he opened the door to interpreting literature as if it were culture in the anthropological sense. For at the center of that confluence was a shared emphasis on and critique of the concept of culture—an emphasis shared not just between these two fields but also across the academy, as witnessed by what has come to be called “the cultural turn.” That emphasis has given way to new circumstances grouped under the agenda-setting rubric of the global and involving a process that culture often feels inadequate to describe—namely, that of circulation.¹

Though it is not often remembered, circulation had been central to the emergence of culture in the early twentieth century as the de facto conceptual apparatus with which to think through both academic and political radicalism. When the anthropologist Franz Boas and populist cultural critics like Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne began using culture to describe a relativist, pluralist position in the 1910s, circulation was clearly on their minds. For Boas, it was known as the problem of “dissemination,” a process with strong antievolutionary implications involved in tracking the movement of cultural elements across social and racial boundaries; and, for the early cultural pluralists, it involved imagining a more capacious understanding of national citizenship with which to oppose anti-immigration rhetoric that had coalesced around the notion of the “melting pot.”² However, in the classical, modernist sense in which it rose to prominence, culture was conceptualized not as a process but as a thing—complex and whole. And it was just the thing that was missing from both modern society and leftist political
critique. It was the thing that might have kept Elsie’s “pure products” from going crazy, as suggested in a roundabout way in William Carlos Williams’s period-defining poem; the thing that made coming of age in Samoa so much more sensible than doing the same in the West, according to the analysis of Margaret Mead; and the thing that could make Marxism speak to both consumption and aesthetic theory in the work of Walter Benjamin. But after the postmodernist critique of culture for being precisely that, a complex whole thing, artificially bounded in space and irrevocably tied up with essentializing ideologies of race and nationalism—and especially as a result of the elevated significance since the end of the cold war of extra-national networks that have enabled the global diffusion of trade and terrorism, both of which have challenged such principles held to be central to pluralism as cultural diversity and liberal tolerance—culture may no longer feel conceptually adequate for the task at hand. The version of cultural pluralism that had propelled the cultural turn during much of the twentieth century is hard put to encompass or make sense of the penetrating, worldwide circulation we see today—the vast and fragmenting circulation of commodities, incommensurable religious beliefs, people of vastly different economic resources, options on corporate risk and national debts, illicit weapons and occupying armies, Web content and computer codes, and infectious diseases.

And so we find ourselves in a new and undocumented place, where we might be led to wonder if the particular manifestation of inquiry marked by the disciplinary confluence of anthropology and literary studies has a future. In the recent past that confluence was itself motivated by a significant turn in the political landscape of the academy corresponding to the cultural movements of 1960s, and it had at its core the conceptual refiguration of each field’s disciplinary object in the other’s image. Literary studies reconnected with a more populist and racially inclusive social history by revitalizing the cultural contexts and constructedness of its canon; but more than that, it refigured the very idea of what literature was, such that literature was able not merely to represent cultures, but also to be representative of them—as if an object of ethnography. Similarly, anthropology came to terms with its manifest implication in colonial and cold-war policies by rethinking its claims to scientific disinterestedness and objectivity; and it, too, reconceptualized culture in terms of epistemological systems and ethnography in terms of writing—as if both its core concept and core disciplinary practice were available as objects of literary analysis. It is surely testament to the interchangeability of disciplinary objects that many began to get the sneaking suspicion that anthropology had become part of the humanities in the 1990s, or as Marshall Sahlins put it, that it had been transformed into the “working class of the Cultural Studies movement.” But now the disciplinary confluence produced around this particular configuration of the art-culture matrix has been replaced by a different kind of interdisciplinary ferment, and one might go so far as to argue that art and culture have become things that once again need to be thought apart.
A quick keyword survey can help us get a feel for the new disciplinary terrain. The American Studies Association (ASA) is one place where the disciplinary confluence had been felt quite profoundly, and, as such, offers a telling example of the shift. Although ASA annual conference titles cannot cover everything going on in the field, the consistency with which they have set a transnational and trans-hemispheric agenda since 1998 is striking: “American Studies and the Question of Empire” (1998), “American Studies in the World” (2000), “The Local and the Global” (2002), “Crossroads of Cultures” (2004), “The United States from Inside and Out: Transnational American Studies” (2006), “America Aqui: Transhemispheric Visions and Community Connections” (2007). That there has been a paradigm shift is perhaps most evident in the turn from critique of a methodology to what amounts, in effect, to a new methodology—in the turn from the critique of a concept to a new concept, from the critique of cultures to the embrace of a global American Studies.

In the 2007 ASA conference schedule, the word “culture” appeared in twenty-nine session titles, and perhaps what was most interesting was the predominance of its use in the singular—not “cultures” but simply “culture”—which indicates just this shying away from the disciplinary nexus with the anthropological. In these panel titles, “culture” generally signified a category of humanistic production. And so there were session titles containing “print culture,” “literary culture,” “vernacular culture,” and “material culture,” each once; “public culture” in two session titles; “popular culture” in three session titles; and “visual culture” in six session titles. The formulation “literature and culture” or “history and culture” appeared as the dependent clause in three session titles, and in each instance the formulation complemented a specific community that was the session’s main focus. So one got “U.S. Latino/a Literature and Culture,” “African American History and Culture,” “Early Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and Culture.” But the fact that these cultures were coupled with history or literature would seem to draw an equivalency between them. Culture was being used not to demarcate a population, but rather to indicate a category of humanistic production.

Of the twenty-nine sessions, there were only five in which culture had an anthropological bearing. In three of these five, “culture” was pluralized but referred to a pattern of discourse, not to a group. The formulation of the title was the same in all three of these. They were set up as “cultures of x”—specifically, “cultures of militarization,” “cultures of the academy,” and “cultures of re-enactment.” The point was to demarcate not groups but a system of meaning, and, frankly, it is not clear that pluralizing the word meant much more than the perpetuation of an academic trend.

Only twice out of twenty-nine possible sessions did that old bugaboo of “American culture” show up. That really says something about paradigm shift not only since the 1980s, but also from the “myth and symbol” era of American Studies. In the first one, the full title was “Aura—Trace—Destination: Home and
Homelessness as Key Imaginaries of American Culture." This one was particularly interesting because it was organized by Laura Bieger of the JFK Institut at the Freie Universität Berlin in Germany, and had two other German scholars presenting. Given the push of the ASA to form research partnerships outside of the States, it seems interesting that only from abroad might one be willing to make generalizations on the subject of “American culture.” The second panel was equally interesting, in that it posed a question about “The Amish in American Culture”—a panel organized in response to the Nickel Mines tragedy in Pennsylvania in 2006. Given that all the panelists were themselves from institutions in rural Pennsylvania, it is interesting to think through their use of the culture concept as also being, in effect, one in which outside and inside positionality were key.

At any rate, what seems clear is that the shift of the disciplinary object toward problems of a global scale has had its effect: problems issuing from the theoretical conceptualization and critique of culture in the anthropological sense are no longer setting the agenda at these meetings. And note that it is not just the ASA. The same holds for the Modern Language Association, which in 2007 had twenty-seven conference panels whose titles included the word “culture,” all of them in the singular. Of these, seven seemed to refer to an anthropological idea, including one instance of African American culture, one modern Spanish culture, one Victorian culture, one containment culture, and three German cultures. What is more, these last three on German culture, actually a three-part series sharing the same title, were interesting for coupling German culture with “political violence,” which, if you also add the “containment culture” panel, gives four out of seven instances where the anthropological concept carried a decidedly negative connotation.

As for the American Anthropological Association (AAA), it seems fair to say that their disciplinary enthusiasm for art was never quite the same as the humanists’ for culture, and yet their conference program for 2007 suggests a similar disaggregation. At last year’s AAA convention, there were seventeen instances of the word “culture” in panel titles, the vast majority featuring it in its traditional anthropological sense. Only four broke the social-scientific conceptual mode, with two instances each of “popular culture” and “material culture.” There were two panels with “art” in their title, one of which reflected the MLAs negative framing of anthropological cultures by associating art with regressive power structures: “Power in Practice: Constructing Inequalities through Art and Performance.” The Society for Humanistic Anthropology ran a few panels on “writing,” but they were entirely geared toward practice and not postmodern critique, as in “Writing Ethnography for the General Public.” There were no panels with “literature” in the title—nor, for that matter, were there any featuring “fiction,” “sculpture,” or “painting.”

One can debate whether the disciplinary disaggregation I am describing here follows from the theoretical critique of culture and ethnography begun in the 1960s, or whether it is more properly seen as a response to our current post-
millennial crises that seem resolutely global in scope. From a historical perspective, what seems possible to say is that there were two distinct modes of interdisciplinarity in the recent past, each of which had a different effect on the as yet unresolved questions about how to refigure the disciplinary relation today.

First, there was the line that ran through Geertz to Stephen Greenblatt and new historicism, which also ended up including much of the work collected more generally under the rubric of cultural studies, where literature settled into the epistemological field of culture to emerge as an object of ethnography. But there was also a second wave beginning in the late 1980s that was oppositional in nature, focusing less on the epistemological continuity of art and culture than on the critique of culture as a concept capable of adequately describing the complexity of modern life. This second wave was intimately tied to the politics of identity, followed in literary studies on the reformulation of the canon, and ultimately led to a spirit of critique epitomized by James Clifford’s *The Predicament of Culture* and widespread discomfort with the popular rhetoric of multiculturalism. As I will suggest here, this second wave depended less on Geertz than on George Stocking’s restoration of the historical prominence of cultural pluralism in Boasian anthropology, which literary scholars came to see as being intertwined with their own recovery projects of literary work, particularly in the American field.

The anthropologist Matti Bunzl has laid out a case along these same lines for distinguishing between a first and second wave in the transformation of anthropology during the last forty years. The interdiscipline would seem to follow the same course. The first wave followed on the disciplinary crisis of the late 1960s, when anthropology had been rocked by specific revelations about its involvement in U.S. Defense Department research designed to put down revolutions in Latin America, as well as by the posthumous publication of Bronislaw Malinowski’s inflammatory fieldwork diary, which shattered the anthropological myth of the “ethnographer’s magic”—the notion of the anthropologist as a benevolently disinterested observer. Laced with racist profanity and redolent of colonialist ennui, the diary shook the field’s founding myths about representing “the native” from his point of view, with a sympathetic and yet scientifically objective eye. For Bunzl, the political reaction can be marked with works like the volume edited by Dell Hymes in 1972, *Reinventing Anthropology*, and the epistemological reaction by the publication of articles by the likes of Bob Scholte and Johannes Fabian, which reasserted “a disciplinary epistemology grounded in a submerged continental tradition.”

It would seem to make perfect sense to slot Geertz and his admirers in literary studies into this spot. However, what now seems striking about literary criticism's response to this first phase in anthropology’s transformation was its seeming indifference to this disciplinary crisis, which so clearly served as the backdrop to Geertz’s epistemological turn. In Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher’s recent account of the emergence of new historicism, Geertz is celebrated for having returned to literary study the “touch of the real,” but there is no mention of Geertz’s
role in the disciplinary maelstrom that saw anthropological positivism crumbling down around him. With new historicism there may have been an implicit critique of the manner in which, in Greenblatt and Gallagher's words, “lived life, at once raw and subtle, coarse and complex . . . had been refined out of the most sophisticated literary studies” (28). It would also seem to make sense that opening up the literary canon would bring into focus arguments like Pierre Bourdieu’s about prestige and cultural capital. However, the current assessment of new historicism’s politics tends to be in the other direction. What now seems striking about both Geertz and Greenblatt is that despite the conceptual transformations manifest in each, their preferred disciplinary objects remain unchanged—it is still all about Bali and Shakespeare. Even as the crisis in anthropology shook that discipline’s theoretical assumptions and radically transformed its political practice, literary scholars following Geertz learned to pick up anthropological models, especially the concept of culture as a system of signification, while not only remaining politically unscathed but actually pushing forward what many understood to be a radical theoretical agenda.

What Bunzl describes as the second wave in the transformation of anthropology had the effect of drawing literary studies into the political turmoil. Catalyzed by the publication in 1986 of *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, this second wave redirected anthropology’s political critique at its core conceptual and methodological foundations. At stake now was both the culture concept and the writing of ethnography, epitomized for Bunzl in Lila Abu-Lughod’s polemic article arguing against future use of the culture concept, “Writing Against Culture”—an article that appeared in a volume titled *Recapturing Anthropology*, which was itself telling of the way that the anthropological had infiltrated, or, as in this volume’s estimation, been infiltrated by its interdisciplines. This second wave, initiated by theorists who were often not anthropologists at all, finally implicated the humanities alongside anthropology in a more direct fashion. Surely the ubiquity of “the culture war” and widespread academic discomfort with the popular rhetoric of multiculturalism can help us understand the draw of this critique in the humanities. The onset of smorgasbord multiculturalism, a consumerist celebration of so-called diversity, seemed to trivialize the kind of deeply scarred and thickly interwoven cultural borderlands most academic postmodernists were interested in delineating. But it also initiated a push outward against the perceived conceptual limitations of culture as a concept that could be used to make the humanities more inclusive in uncomplicated ways. The idea of adding minority authors to literary anthologies, or even starting all new anthologies around these pluralized “literatures” (for example, *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*, first published in 1997), took shape around more involved thinking about the interpenetration and interdependence of humanistic production generally. One needed to add African American literature to the canon, but more than that, one needed to understand that
American literature and culture could not have taken shape without a previously suppressed black presence. From here, a progressively and productively messy picture emerged. Cultures became complex mongrels, crisscrossed by both forced and voluntary migrations of populations, interlaced with shared and contested cultural traditions, and peppered by the diffusion of material culture well beyond national and linguistic borders. In place of “culture,” “diaspora” and “cosmopolitanism” became the new buzzwords, and circulation emerged as a kind of antidote to culture’s conceptual stasis in place and time, such that one now spoke instead of routes and flows. Under the rubric of such a reformulation, identifying writing as having an “anthropological dimension,” be it in fiction or nonfiction, became equivalent to leveling an insult, akin to saying that the work was complicit in a project of colonial and racist objectification.

It seems worth pausing for just a moment to consider how very different this line of critique was from that described in the Geertz to Greenblatt trajectory, and this to underline the fact that the disciplinary confluence between anthropology and literary studies has always been but one particular manifestation of the larger cultural turn happening both inside and outside the academy. In literature departments this particular aspect of the cultural turn was largely initiated by feminist and African American scholars, who were themselves following on the tails of the civil-rights-era reorganization and the reinvention of college campuses to reflect and promote diversity. It also received a significant boost with the emergence of postcolonial theory, itself tied quite obviously to decolonization movements. The cultural turn in literary study, that is to say, did not follow merely from theoretical concerns, but also tracked an institutional reorganization that itself reflects the political moment at large. In this respect, the prior moment is very like our own, where theoretical concerns are always taking much of their relevance from the context of current events in the world outside the ivory towers.

That said, from within the intellectual arc of the disciplinary confluence under examination here, this second wave often feels decidedly less Geertzian than Boasian, less invested in a theoretical rethinking of culture as an epistemological system than in a recuperative salvage and pluralization of cultures that had previously been overlooked. Judging from the pattern of citations to Boas, it was Stocking’s publication in 1968 of Race, Culture, and Evolution and in 1974 of an article titled “The Basic Assumptions of Boasian Anthropology” that can be put forward as providing the most accurate anthropological catalyst to this movement.

To take an example coming at the end of this first wave, one might turn to the groundbreaking work done by Eric Sundquist in To Wake the Nations (1993), a text that puts fiction and folklore to work in an attempt to imagine in ethnographic terms the previously undocumented contours and impact of nineteenth-century African American culture. While Geertz makes only the briefest of appearances in a footnote in this text, Stocking’s version of Boas is both central and widespread. In particular, Sundquist makes extensive use of Boas’s discussion of “alternating
sounds”—the idea that sound is culturally conditioned, such that different cultures might literally be tone-deaf to one another’s complexity—in elaborating not only the cultural, but also the political significance of slave speech recorded in the period’s representation of black folklore and song. This concept was one that Stocking had turned to when first making the case for Boas’s significance to the emergence of an antievolutionary, antiracist, pluralized concept of cultures. Along with a point about Boas’s argument with Smithsonian curator Otis Mason over the arrangement of museum displays, alluding to alternating sounds has become a way to shorthand the emergence of pluralist thought in American intellectual history. And the point is pure Stocking.

At least four different kinds of consequences have followed on the humanistic side of these waves. First, and perhaps most ironically, the interdisciplinary turn actually seems to have derailed literary criticism’s anthropological objectives, at least as those objectives are defined as the production of knowledge about cultures other than one’s own. This effect was undoubtedly initiated by Edward Said’s arguments concerning Orientalism, and it follows from Clifford and Marcus’s second-wave textual critique of “writing anthropology.” But it had also been logically implied by the literary uptake of Geertz’s reformulation of culture in terms of epistemology. Though much of the most interesting new historicist criticism focused on the distinctions between what we might call different genres of cultural texts, what Geertz made clear was that all such genres—be they cockfights or performances of Shakespeare—were fictions of one sort or another. This is what I meant before when commenting on how both fields refigured their disciplinary objects in the other’s image. Art and culture became aggregates in this system, as suggested bluntly in a line penned by Walter Benn Michaels in a richly sustained monograph on American naturalism, where he argued that “the only relation literature as such has to culture as such is that it is part of it.” Pursuing what we could think of as the Geertzian line to its logical endpoint, Michaels in effect formalized the idea that one ought not merely read culture like a book, but also read books as culture.

The problem, however, is the debilitating effect this formulation logically imposes on our ability to read books for information about other cultures. For once books are cast as just another part of a culture, they seem to lose their ability to say novel things about anything but themselves. As succinctly outlined by the literary critic Ed White, “there emerges a streamlined hermeneutic sequence moving from an initial privileging of comprehensive ethnography to a consequent clarification of European discursive systems, concluding with an acknowledgment of an indigenous presence that remains largely inaccessible.” Even books written explicitly about other cultures come to represent little if anything more than their own cultural delusions—and with one further consequence: not only does literature prove to be a bad resource for understanding different cultures, but literature departments become difficult places from which to even
broach the topic. Indeed, what we see is further disaggregation in the humanities itself, with splintering between ethnic studies programs and literature departments, or Native American Studies and American Studies. Within the current structure of the academy, the insider-outsider positions decried by postmodern theory nonetheless exert enormous practical pressure. The expansion of the canon has completely transformed the way we conceptualize literary and historical fields, and yet we have to become all but dependent on first-person accounts of cultural difference. We can only speak for ourselves.

Second, there has been a historical turn, with a number of scholars moving out from Stocking's initial studies to consider the cross-fertilization between the humanities and anthropology from a broader and more literary perspective. As a result of this work, such cross-fertilization has come to seem integral not only to the intellectual history of the disciplines but also to the conceptual history of art and culture. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the modernist period of the 1920s and 1930s, when poets and anthropologists seemed to share the same project with regard to the elucidation of authentic cultures. As pointed out by Marc Manganaro, it should come as no surprise that Edward Sapir and T. S. Eliot were publishing on similar topics in the same journal during this period, that their interests in the culture concept were driven by similar concerns about the fracturing of contemporary society, that they both found solutions in a notion of wholeness most evident in premodern cultures, and even that they deployed nearly identical metaphors when describing the vacuity of modern life—the “telephone girl” in Sapir, the “typist” in Eliot. What studies like Manganaro's have made clear is that literary studies and anthropology have had a clear and long-standing special relationship, particularly in the American context. They both emerged in the late eighteenth century out of the same German-university mold. They established themselves as disciplines in the U.S. academy at roughly the same time in the late nineteenth century during a moment of great conceptual uncertainty about national and racial identity. And they cross-fertilized each other throughout the twentieth century in a protracted debate about the meaning and appropriate analytic apparatus for conceptualizing culture.

Third, increased attention to the process of circulation has led increasingly to the understanding that art is often disarticulated from particular cultural places and times. Generally speaking, it is clear that circulation can work as an umbrella term across the disciplines, gaining prominence for defining not so much a methodology as a process taken to be central to the long history of modernity. As such, much of its generative power comes from the ease with which it reenergizes any number of cross-disciplinary interests. Circulation is key to explorations of migration, diaspora, globalization, and cosmopolitanism; to interest in the exchange of commodities and the production, thereby, of new structures of affiliation; to the effort of rethinking America in global terms; to new geographies of the novel and art, including such notions as “world Anglophone”
as a disciplinary substructure in literature; to the new prominence of networks and system theory; and to a general return in many different disciplines to comparative approaches. It also seems fair to say that accompanying the sense of urgency in attending to circulation as a matter of global political significance there is a piquant aesthetic and intellectual pleasure that comes from bringing to light its strange, seemingly indeterminate, and frequently avant-garde workings. What this move seems to offer in particular is a more flexible understanding of how art and culture move—how they circulate not just in lockstep, but, more often than not, in different geographical directions and across surprising jumps in time. As such, it becomes far from self-evident to think of something like a book as being “part of” a culture in any exclusive kind of way, for picking up a book by Jonathan Franzen in an American classroom or bookstore is certainly no less a “part of” the culture than picking up something by Chinua Achebe or J. M. Coetzee, or seeing *Beowulf* in 3-D at the local multiplex.

Finally, driven in large measure by the challenges posed by current events, there has been a push to figure humanistic interaction on grounds other than that of cultural pluralism. One sees this to some extent in the historical return to Kant, in the search for normative systems of value on which to base claims as to what is right or wrong, and in renewed interest in theorizing religion and secularization. In response to these pressures, humanist arguments with pluralism have begun to be sifted through fields like psychology, sociology, philosophy, and political theory instead of through cultural anthropology, and increasingly through the conceptual apparatus of ideology instead of culture. The desire to rediscover the grounds on which to evaluate belief systems—especially those that might otherwise have fallen out of bounds in strictly pluralistic accounts of multiculturalism—were already present before 2001, but they came to seem particularly obvious after Osama bin Laden was linked with the Taliban. That situation provided an extreme version of a test case for pluralism, of which there have since been many others ranging from the infamous Danish cartoons to debates about whether the French government was right to prohibit Muslim girls from wearing head scarves to school. The test, of course, was just how much pluralism could tolerate. The answers have moved in curious directions. One even suggests that a return to a kind of normative version of human diversity may actually fortify the paradigmatic prominence of pluralism, even if it is far from clear that this version of pluralism would be one that would similarly fortify the disciplinary confluence of anthropology and literary studies. For example, Samuel Huntington’s widely discussed notion of a “clash of civilizations,” which explicitly suggests a normative analytic framework, nonetheless reads like a strong version of pluralism with little or no acknowledgment of the postmodernist critique.

On a theoretical level, what follows from all four of these moves is a series of questions about not just the nature but the very existence of culture in the pluralist sense. For one could take the critique of culture from the perspective of
global interconnectivity, as described by the attention to circulation, and argue that culture is not only an inadequate tool with which to describe the complex heterogeneity of the global situation, but that cultures in the pluralist sense simply do not exist anymore, if they ever did. Perhaps if there are no firm borders, there are no cultures, either. We face a similar problem in moving out from the search for normative grounds. One could argue that different cultures exist and that we need to find the grounds upon which to objectively discuss their relative merits. But one could just as easily suggest that the possibility of rational discussion precludes the existence of cultures, or, conversely, that the existence of a plurality of cultures precludes the possibility of rational discussions across them.

What should be clear is that the answer to these questions is no less tangential to the future direction of literary studies than to anthropology, for they significantly determine how we define our disciplinary object. If literature is understood to be a part of culture, reading literature is obviously going to point us to something like cultural studies; however, if we are to say that culture no longer exists as we knew it, then not only will our understanding of contemporary literature change, but so too will our relations to literature from other places and other times.

The essays in this volume all take up issues raised by the changing circumstances of disciplinary paradigms and agendas. In both Eleanor Kaufman’s lively account of theoretical abstraction cum joyful desire in Claude Lévi-Strauss and Gilles Deleuze, and in Richard van Oort’s contentious argument about how the aesthetic ought best be understood as a kind of originary anthropological category, the historical imperative to read the disciplines side by side returns to the fore. But they do so with a twist. For in both pieces, anthropology serves for the authors as an invitation to return to theory, not to what Greenblatt had identified as “the touch of the real.” Kaufman’s article takes us for a romp along the thin line dividing formalism, structuralism, and poststructuralism, and in so doing draws our attention back to conceptual categories through which the humanities have registered their long-standing fondness for the inhuman. In her reading, anthropology may have served as a device meant to recall theoretical abstraction back to the concrete realm of human life and interaction, and yet as manifested reluctantly in Lévi-Strauss and exultantly in Deleuze, what one finds instead is an anthroplogy of the inhuman (of the structure, the series, or the repetition) that leads to “the affirmation of joy in landing upon the structure itself.” In this register, what distinguishes structuralism from poststructuralism is the degree to which the human desire for the inhuman in theory is embraced. Like other essays in this issue, this conceptual affirmation revitalizes a genealogical line of affiliation between the disciplines that is different from the one that had led through Geertz, which might be taken in broad terms as a sign of the new conceptual alignments.

Van Oort’s piece pushes for a more polemical end—namely, the recuperation of a particular notion of the humanities with which to contravene what he takes
to be the encroaching influence of the biological sciences. What makes it interesting, in my opinion, is the attention it draws to what we might think of as another possibility for interdisciplinary redefinition. In an age of the human genome project, what literary theorists and cultural anthropologists have to say on what they take to be their traditional areas of expertise could easily be overshadowed by newsworthy discoveries in the same areas by the sciences. It seems clear, for example, that the standard move of defining race as a “social construct” will need a certain amount of retooling, given the ability of geneticists to accurately pinpoint what they call “self-identified race and ethnicity.”23 Van Oort’s line of response is to restage what he takes to be the original disciplinary split between the hard sciences and the humanities. He suggests that while scientific fields like evolutionary psychology, cognitive linguistics, and primatology look to explain the intrinsic structure of the world defined as objects separable from the human subject, the humanities ought to take as their focus the symbolic constructions exemplified by theoretical criticism. Divesting anthropology of at least one of its four fields in a curious gambit at the opening of the article about chimpanzees not using culture (they may learn to use tools, but they lack the self-referentiality to understand such tool use in symbolic terms), van Oort casts the object of humanistic criticism as the “anthropological” construction of human thought manifest in the study of language and aesthetics. To some extent, this elevation of the symbolic construction is not altogether unlike what Kaufman describes when writing on the joy of abstraction in Lévi-Strauss and Deleuze, though van Oort gives such abstraction a very different valuation by insisting that it is not inhuman but the very essence human. And yet a larger point might simply be that if the disciplinary confluence of literary studies and anthropology seems to have unraveled because of the postmodern critique of the culture concept and the new global agenda, then pressures from other disciplines may actually make it likely for the disciplines to find common cause elsewhere.

Michael Elliott’s essay takes up the problem of circulation most directly, and this through a discussion of temporality in both the novel and ethnographic nonfiction. Circulation in this instance has to do more with time than geography—with the movement of texts over time and, more specifically, with the movement of different rhetorical modes of representation defined by their temporality within particular texts. In doing so, he returns to one of the foundational epistemological critiques of anthropology, Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other (1983), in order to think through the relationship between writing and cultures in rather different terms. He brings to ethnographic fiction and nonfiction a literary critic’s eye for competing temporal schemes in a single work. Eliot’s examples range from Frederick Douglass’s attempt to describe his mother by way of referencing an image of the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II that had appeared in James Cowles Prichard’s Natural History of Man (1843), to Lewis Henry Morgan’s account of the supposedly timeless religious practices of the Iroquois that
nonetheless features the image of George Washington “in the solitary enjoyment of [his] . . . celestial residence prepared by the Great Spirit.” In such examples one sees what James Clifford had termed the “ethnographic present”—the classic modernist mode of writing about other cultures in a timeless present tense, as if they were permanently living in a moment just before contact—juxtaposed against a more linear, historical mode of writing time. Or to put it somewhat differently, what one sees is the circulation within individual texts of different genres having unique temporal modalities. Eliott considers what he finds in the heterogeneous and conflicting temporalities of the fiction and ethnography to be actually a “residue of coevalness,” and not merely what Fabian would have recognized as its denial. His point, however, is not so much to contravene Fabian as to flag how curious a thing it is to pin down ethnographic meaning in texts that are themselves moving through space and time. Prichard’s “natural history” of Egypt feels quite different when mobilized by Douglass; and this kind of mobilization seems endemic to the material culture of writing once unhinged from its historical point of production.

The final essay in this series, Vincent Pecora’s important analysis of the shift in the conceptualization of culture that has corresponded to the end of the cold war and the global assertion of religious fundamentalism, has significant implications not only for the disciplinary confluence discussed throughout this volume, but also for the very viability of culture as an analytic paradigm. Whereas the general tendency may be to think that we are now somehow “beyond” culture—either theoretically by way of the need to purge our conceptual apparatus of its essentialist biases, or practically by way of reckoning with a globalized world in which the extent and penetration of connections between peoples makes the notion of distinct cultures an anachronism—Pecora actually draws us back to the idea that we are only now fully coming to terms with what it would mean to take culture in its pluralistic sense seriously. His argument, passing again through Geertz but beginning more fundamentally with Emile Durkheim, suggests that what characterized the prominence of the culture concept in the twentieth century was the notion that we were all playing a theatrical part in the symbolic organization of our everyday lives, that our group life was literally a social drama. But in the post–cold war environment defined for the worse by 9/11, there has been a very clear move made by certain theorists to redefine culture not as theater but as belief. Looking in particular at recent work by Talal Asad, Gauri Viswanathan, and Akeel Bilgrami, Pecora notes how religious belief has come to be understood as having an intellectual substance and significance that is woven into the very fabric of cultures without theatrical irony or symbolic double meaning. It is as if, with the West actually rendered precarious by other cultures for the first time since the end of the cold war, we may have become prone to understanding pluralism in fundamentally literal ways, without “the touch of the literary.” If Pecora is right, then another way of thinking about what
has happened to the disciplinary confluence of anthropology and literary studies is in terms of the disaggregation of their disciplinary objects. Whereas the disciplinary confluence previously had taken shape around the formulation of art and culture as parts of a common epistemological field, the disciplines’ new global agenda now appears to have found a great deal of analytic purchase in ascribing to each of these things different tasks and values.

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Notes

I would like to thank Matti Bunzl and Marc Manganaro for reading an earlier version of this essay.


4. Consider the volume edited by Richard G. Fox and Barbara J. King, *Anthropology beyond Culture* (New York: Berg, 2002), and especially the article therein by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Adieu, Culture: A New Duty Arises.” Robert Brightman has pro-


6. The genealogy of cultural studies, of course, is distinct from that of Geertz/Greenblatt, and it may actually signal a fault that the disciplinary confluence of literature and anthropology has come to be figured so heavily through Geertz as opposed to, say, E. P. Thompson or Raymond Williams. It nonetheless seems to be the case that the disciplinary object as described by Geertz holds for much work carried on in the tradition of the Birmingham school. For more on the relationship between cultural studies and anthropology, see Richard Handler, “Raymond Williams, George Stocking, and Fin-de-Siècle U.S. Anthropology,” *Cultural Anthropology* 13, no. 4 (1998): 447–63.


9. For example, see assessments in this issue by Richard van Oort, Vincent Pecora, and Susan Hegeman.

10. For an influential review from which to gauge the tenor of these arguments, see Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism; or, Why Liberals Are Incapable of Thinking about Hate Speech,” *Critical Inquiry* 23 (Winter 1997): 378–83.


14. On the reception of Stocking’s version of Boasian anthropology, see Evans, “Where Was Boas during the Renaissance in Harlem?”


18. To see this bifurcation, White suggests comparing the different approaches of two recent compilations: *New World Encounters*, edited by Greenblatt, and *American Encounters*, edited by Peter Mancall and James Merrell. Or one might consider how very far Alan Trachtenberg’s recent book, *Shades of Hiawatha: Staging Indians, Making Americans, 1880–1930* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), is from anything that you might have seen coming out on a similar subject from a Native American Studies program. Arnold Krupat’s reflection on this problem when introducing his term “ethnocriticism” remains cogent and worth considering in this regard:

   But inasmuch as the conceptual categories necessary to ethnocriticism—culture, history, imperialism, anthropology, literature, interdisciplinarity, even the frontier—are Western categories, the objection may be raised that ethnocriticism is itself no more than yet another form of imperialism, this time of a discursive and epistemological kind, and one which, by its very foundation in these categories cannot help but falsify the lived experience and worldview of any nonwestern people, translating, in Eric Cheyfitz’s broad understanding of the term, “their” incoherent jabber into an eloquence of use only to ourselves. It seems to me that at the ultimate horizon, this objection is true, or at least unanswerable.


telling of this shift, because “culture” does not even appear in the index. The journal *Genre* 38, no. 3 (2005), also ran a special issue on this topic titled “Circulating America.” For anthropological versions of this same kind of attention, see, for example, Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar and Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Technologies of Public Forms: Circulation, Transfiguration, Recognition,” *Public Culture* 15, no. 3 (2003): 385–97.


23. Francis Collins, the director of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), has written that although “‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are terms without generally agreed-upon definitions . . . Increasing scientific evidence . . . indicates that genetic variation can be used to make a reasonably accurate prediction of geographic origins of an individual, at least if that individual’s grandparents all came from the same part of the world. As those ancestral origins in many cases have a correlation, albeit often imprecise, with self-identified race or ethnicity, it is not strictly true that race or ethnicity has no biological connection.” In Collins, “What We Do and Don’t Know about ‘Race,’ ‘Ethnicity,’ Genetics and Health at the Dawn of the Genome Era,” *Nature Genetics Supplement* 36, no. 11 (November 2004): S13–S15. See also Hua Tang et al., “Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in Case-Control Association Studies,” *American Journal of Human Genetics* 76 (2005): 268–75.