DescriptionMy dissertation examines organizational misconduct through a process framework. I examine how individual and organizational decision processes interact to increase the potential for organizational misconduct. Individuals apply a quasi-rational assessment and initiate misconduct where the benefits of this behavior sufficiently outweigh the costs. They also utilize frames to structure their decision making. At times an ethical frame is inactive which leads to an amoral decision process that increases the probability of misconduct. Conflict management processes at the organizational level feedback on these individual decision processes to increase the probability of misconduct. Within organizational decision making, conflict must be managed. Organizations specifically limit affective conflict since it highlights value differences and personality conflicts. Ethical confrontation is a form of conflict that leads to affective conflict. As a result, ethical confrontation is disfavored and a norm of ethical conflict avoidance develops. This norm increases misconduct by lowering the subjective costs that quasi-rational decision makers perceive and through limiting ethical awareness. Decision precedents represent an additional conflict management process. Precedents permit organizations to avoid revisiting decisions and focus analysis on whether the precedent applies. This further limits the availability of an ethical frame and grows increasingly problematic as precedents are extended to new contexts. The amoral process that results increases the probability that organizational misconduct will occur. In light of these individual and organizational processes, expertise and high status also increase the probability of organizational misconduct. These attributes independently reduce the perceived costs of misconduct, enhance the power of the avoidance norm, and impact precedent use to increase the probability that misconduct will occur. I test my theory through both a computer simulation and an econometric study. In the simulation I demonstrate significant differences in the levels of misconduct consistent with my predictions. The econometric model also provides strong support for the hypothesis that status is associated with increased levels of misconduct. Finally, I examine the possible impact of partial observability within my econometric data. Using two alternate specifications (detection controlled estimation and triangulation), I demonstrate several consistent findings across these models. This reduces concerns that observability creates bias within my base model.