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Social preferences, occupational choice and labor market performance
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Isgin, Ebru. Social preferences, occupational choice and labor market performance. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T34J0CT5

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TitleSocial preferences, occupational choice and labor market performance
NameIsgin, Ebru (author); SOPHER, BARRY (chair); Killingsworth, Mark R. (internal member); Sjostrom, Tomas (internal member); Sadrieh, AbdulKarim (outside member); Rutgers University; Graduate School - New Brunswick
Date Created2013
Other Date2013-01 (degree)
SubjectEconomics, Industrial relations, Experimental economics, Communication in management
Extentx, 71 p. : ill.
DescriptionThe first essay analyzes the role of information transparency on fairness and reciprocity in long-term labor market relationships. The main finding of the second chapter is that transparency serves as an effective mechanism to both improve worker welfare and total market efficiency. Fairness, which means that an increase in the generosity of a contract offer is reciprocated by an increase in the effort level, is a prominent concern under information transparency. When workers are informed about firms' productivity levels and potential profits, firms propose higher wages that represent a more fair division of total surplus. Workers respond to generous offers with high effort levels. However, workers' response to wages is not constant and depends on the following factors. It is elevated with information transparency. That is, for given wages, workers provide more effort under full information. It also depends on whether a wage offer represents a fair share of the final surplus. The second essay analyzes the role of information transparency and communication in short-term employment relationships. The evidence shows that the level of trust and reciprocity is significantly reduced if there is no contract renewal. While information transparency was critical in long-term relationships, it does not have a substantial effect in short-term relationships. Wage offers are lower and compressed regardless of how workers are informed. On the other hand, communication enhances trust and reciprocity more significantly than any other factor that is controlled for. The third essay studies the occupational choice of agents between working for wages and becoming entrepreneurs. The main finding is that policies that improve worker's welfare also improve the terms for entrepreneurs. If the tax rates on entrepreneurs and the working wages are raised, entry into entrepreneurship slows down. This increases the average quality and consequently, the average success rate of entrepreneurs when a high wage-high tax regime is adopted. The credit market offers lower interest rates to potential entrepreneurs due to higher average success rates. On the other hand, overconfidence exists among potential entrepreneurs. The average rate of success is lower with overconfidence, which only worsens the adverse selection problem in the credit market.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
NoteIncludes vita
Noteby Ebru Isgin
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T34J0CT5
Languageeng
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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