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Social preferences, occupational choice and labor market performance
Descriptive
TitleInfo
Title
Social preferences, occupational choice and labor market performance
Name
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Isgin
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Ebru
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1983-
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Ebru Isgin
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author
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BARRY SOPHER
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chair
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Killingsworth
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Mark R.
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Mark R. Killingsworth
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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(type = family)
Sjostrom
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Tomas
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Tomas Sjostrom
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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Sadrieh
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AbdulKarim
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AbdulKarim Sadrieh
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Advisory Committee
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outside member
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Rutgers University
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degree grantor
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Graduate School - New Brunswick
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school
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Text
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theses
OriginInfo
DateCreated
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2013
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2013-01
Place
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xx
Language
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(type = code)
eng
Abstract
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The first essay analyzes the role of information transparency on fairness and reciprocity in long-term labor market relationships. The main finding of the second chapter is that transparency serves as an effective mechanism to both improve worker welfare and total market efficiency. Fairness, which means that an increase in the generosity of a contract offer is reciprocated by an increase in the effort level, is a prominent concern under information transparency. When workers are informed about firms' productivity levels and potential profits, firms propose higher wages that represent a more fair division of total surplus. Workers respond to generous offers with high effort levels. However, workers' response to wages is not constant and depends on the following factors. It is elevated with information transparency. That is, for given wages, workers provide more effort under full information. It also depends on whether a wage offer represents a fair share of the final surplus. The second essay analyzes the role of information transparency and communication in short-term employment relationships. The evidence shows that the level of trust and reciprocity is significantly reduced if there is no contract renewal. While information transparency was critical in long-term relationships, it does not have a substantial effect in short-term relationships. Wage offers are lower and compressed regardless of how workers are informed. On the other hand, communication enhances trust and reciprocity more significantly than any other factor that is controlled for. The third essay studies the occupational choice of agents between working for wages and becoming entrepreneurs. The main finding is that policies that improve worker's welfare also improve the terms for entrepreneurs. If the tax rates on entrepreneurs and the working wages are raised, entry into entrepreneurship slows down. This increases the average quality and consequently, the average success rate of entrepreneurs when a high wage-high tax regime is adopted. The credit market offers lower interest rates to potential entrepreneurs due to higher average success rates. On the other hand, overconfidence exists among potential entrepreneurs. The average rate of success is lower with overconfidence, which only worsens the adverse selection problem in the credit market.
Subject
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Topic
Economics
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Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD_4478
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electronic resource
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Extent
x, 71 p. : ill.
Note
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Ph.D.
Note
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Includes bibliographical references
Note
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Includes vita
Note
(type = statement of responsibility)
by Ebru Isgin
Subject
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Industrial relations
Subject
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Experimental economics
Subject
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Communication in management
Identifier
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http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.1/rucore10001600001.ETD.000067791
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Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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rucore19991600001
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doi:10.7282/T34J0CT5
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ETD doctoral
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Rights
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The author owns the copyright to this work.
RightsHolder
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Name
FamilyName
Isgin
GivenName
Ebru
Role
Copyright Holder
RightsEvent
Type
Permission or license
DateTime
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2013-01-04 23:56:13
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Name
Ebru Isgin
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Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. Graduate School - New Brunswick
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License
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Author Agreement License
Detail
I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
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Embargo
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2015-08-06
DateTime
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2016-08-31
Detail
Access to this PDF has been restricted at the author's request. It will be publicly available after August 31, 2016.
Copyright
Status
Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
Reason
Permission or license
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windows xp
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