UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN IMPLEMENTING PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF COMPSTAT IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Understanding the Role of Culture and Communication in Implementing
Planned Organizational Change:
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Despite the popularity of planned change efforts, the failure rates of implementation are as high as 50 to 70 percent (Lewis & Seibold, 1998). While these efforts are affected by technical issues, the organizations’ approach to change, structure, technological capabilities, and organizational culture and communication practices are thought to play a more critical role (Lewis, 2011).

The central purpose of this dissertation is to examine the role that organizational culture and communication play in the introduction and implementation of the popular performance-based management system known as Compstat, which has been implemented by numerous police organizations in the United States over the past decade.

This study aims to provide a rich and contextual understanding of Compstat’s introduction and implementation process within one large metropolitan police
department. It focuses on planned change in terms of the role of culture and communication with a focus on meaning, context, and communication practices. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation, and documents, and analyzed using grounded theory.

The study revealed that culture and communication are inseparable parts of the introduction and implementation processes of this change initiative. The culture of this organization influenced the communication choices of change agents, the high level of resistance, and the ways in which resistance and acceptance of Compstat model were manifested over the years after its introduction. Compstat was undeniably part of the cultural evolution of the police department from reactive, unresponsive, and relatively unfocused with regard to outcomes, to an organization that is more proactive, accountable, flexible, performance-oriented, information-driven, and goal-oriented.

The study revealed that the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat in informing officers about change and in understanding and addressing sources of resistance was not taken seriously into consideration by change agents. For the most part, communication was regarded as a symbolic activity utilizing one-way, bureaucratic channels and formal language.

The recursive relationship between culture and communication was evident in the communication choices of the officers. While Compstat played a positive role in changing cultural values and enabling a new perspective and discourse in responding to crime, the change agents’ communication choices in informing officers and the culture of the organization in some respects was still traditional and bureaucratic.
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Last, and certainly not least, I would like to thank Metrocity Police Department staff for sharing their experience and providing me the opportunity to carry out this field study of Compstat.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family and beautiful country
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INTRODUCTION

Pervasive change is one of the predictable features of contemporary life, and organizations are no exception. Society’s rapidly changing conditions and needs, demographics, market demands, government regulations, pressures created by globalization, increasing competition and resource constraints, and technological developments coalesce to make change a critical issue for all types of organizations (Fairchild, 1989; Tayep, 1994). Pressure for organizations to change has increased worldwide as layoffs, mergers, and closings are becoming an increasing survival strategy (Lewis, 2011). In the case of public organizations, taxpayers and funding sources are progressively demanding higher levels of performance at lower costs, and these pressures also require organizational changes of various kinds (Tromp & Ruben, 2004). All of these factors as well as institutional and cultural pressures have led to more change attempts among organizations (Demers, 2008).

In this environment, all types of organizations have increased their efforts to identify new technologies and innovations in order to address the many emerging challenges and opportunities they face, and to become flexible and adaptable (Zorn, Page, & Cheney, 2000). Cameron and Quinn (1999) found that 69% of the U.S. firms and 75% of European firms have engaged in at least one planned change effort over the last decade. A vast and highly profitable consulting industry has emerged in an attempt to respond to the demands of organizations regarding issues such as change management, performance measurement, transformation, organizational development, and reengineering (Gallivan, 2001). The actors of this industry have suggested a number of planned organizational change initiatives such as Total Quality Management (TQM), the Balance Scorecard, Strategic Planning, and Organizational Development, all of which claim to increase the organization’s performance, profitability, accountability, effectiveness,
legitimacy, quality, and customer satisfaction (Adlam, 2002; Cullen, 1995; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). Therefore, organizational change has become a regular part of business language and organizational functioning.

The emergence and promotion of organizational change programs such as Total Quality Management, the Balance Scorecard, and Strategic Planning has also increased the popularity of research on organizational change in the last two decades. In response to these demands, scholars have focused on a variety of issues ranging from the content, context, process, and outcome of organizational change (for a review, see Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). The literature on content issues deals largely with factors such as organizational structure and performance measurement systems that comprise the targets of change efforts. Contextual research focuses primarily on forces or conditions existing in an organization’s external (i.e., governmental regulations, technological advances, and marketplace competition) and internal context (i.e., key values, organizational/individual change history, culture, and degree of specialization) that influence change efforts. Process studies address actions that take place at the external, organizational, and individual levels during implementation of an organizational change as well as the nature of employee responses to these efforts. Finally, criterion research focuses on outcomes such as survival, fidelity, uniformity, goal accomplishment, unintended consequences, and profitability (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Lewis, 2011).

As shown in the review of literature by Lewis and Seibold (1998), organizational communication scholars have also studied organizational change with a focus on the role of communication and culture during the change efforts. Across these studies, there is general agreement that organizational change is not an easy task. As suggested by Ruben (2009), “Organizations, like individuals, have habits, traditions, and histories, and all of these are
powerful forces that reinforce past and present practice, and typically impede efforts to stimulate progress and innovation” (p. 1). As such, the success of specific initiatives requires an understanding of the nature of the change process, factors that facilitate or impede change efforts, and the sources of resistance and receptivity. Further, the use of this knowledge to manage and guide the change effort is also required. Although this dissertation specifically focuses on the role of culture and communication in the change process, there is a substantial amount of research in the literature aimed at providing insights about how to increase the likelihood of success during organizational change.

Although ‘organizational change’ has become a common phrase in vocabulary of organizational leaders, it should be noted that there are numerous distinctions used to classify different forms of organizational change, namely planned/unplanned, incremental/radical, first order/second order, and material/discursive (Gallivan, 2001; Lewis, 2011). Understanding these changes is important because they vary in their scope, purpose, and implications for the organization; they thus present problems of varying degrees and require taking into account different implementation concerns and strategies (Lewis, 2011).

This dissertation specifically addresses large scale planned organizational changes, as opposed to unplanned. An unplanned change is the result of environmental or other uncontrollable forces such as an earthquake, government regulations, or change in customer needs and expectations (Lewis, 2011). Planned organizational change refers to deliberate, purposive, systemic, and complex efforts of organizational members (Tenkasi & Chesmore, 2003). Consistent with this definition, the concept of planned organizational change in this dissertation will be used to describe major change efforts of organizational members who “intentionally take actions and create interventions through a deliberate, systemic process with the goal of achieving a different state of
behavior, structure, and/or conditions” (Jian, 2007, p. 7). Other than these, planned organizational change may involve deliberate attempts to alter technologies, policies, practices, or physical characteristics of organizations, or to diffuse new values and ideas (Lewis, Richardson, & Hamel, 2003; Ruben, 2009).

Concomitant with the increasing popularity of planned organizational change initiatives, the concept of performance-based management (PBM) has played a prominent role in organizational change literature. The emphasis on performance and goal-directed activity within organizations is a common theme in a variety of contemporary organizational change models. As implied by the business motto ‘you can’t manage what you can’t measure,’ a key ingredient in the success of performance-oriented planned change initiatives is to know how well organizations and their members are functioning when compared to previous performance, desired goals, and benchmarks (peers and leading organizations), and to take corrective actions when performance fails to meet expectations (O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

Beginning in the 1980s, the movement for PBM was first developed by corporate organizations in the face of international competition (Rainey, 2003). A similar trend has spread to federal agencies due to the concerns raised by politicians, scholars, and the general public regarding the performance and effectiveness of federal organizations, especially in comparison to corporate organizations. In particular, the enactment of the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and establishment of the National Performance Review influenced a broad array of developments for federal agencies (Rainey, 2003). In this process, allocations of funding for federal agencies were made subject to the development of strategic plans and use of performance data (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). With the influence of these reforms and budget requirements in addition to increased public and government demands for accountability, lower costs, legitimacy,
and credibility, not only federal agencies but also public organizations began to develop strategic plans and adopted different kinds of systems for the measurement of their performance (Rainey, 2003). Currently, all types of organizations, including the police, are adopting different kinds of performance based management systems in order to respond to these demands.

Performance based management should not be thought of as a simple process of measuring and reporting performance, but rather as an integrated approach that involves measuring, monitoring, analyzing, and managing performance (Eckerson, 2006). In order to implement a performance-based system, data needs to be collected and used to identify the goals that an organization intends to accomplish, analyzed to determine the relative success in achieving these goals, and used to set new strategies and goals accordingly. In other words, “this new type of performance measurement system must include and be driven by an effective mechanism for management” that goes beyond simply reporting measurements (O’Connell & Straub, 2007, p. 2). Similarly, Bocci (2004) suggested that the notion of PBM requires the transformation of a simple process of measuring and reporting performance into a comprehensive performance management system within which an organization’s effectiveness can be systematically monitored, evaluated and continuously improved based on two criteria: Its progress in achieving desired goals and missions, and the knowledge the system generates to guide strategic decision making.

The Balanced Scorecard, a well-known and frequently implemented approach proposed by Kaplan and Norton in 1992, provides a good example of the PBM system. Kaplan and Norton (1996) criticized the use of performance measurement data solely for control, retrospective analysis, and record keeping. They suggested that most organizations specify the particular actions they want employees to take and then measure to determine whether the employees have,
in fact, taken those actions. This will ultimately bring about control rather than improve their performance. This traditional form has nothing to do with the overall improvement of one’s performance given that it is not linked with the organization’s goals, objectives, and strategies.

As suggested by the idea of PBM, the Balanced Scorecard approach requires reviewing and clarifying organizational goals, strategies, and missions; linking them with the measures; translating them into tangible indicators; monitoring their progress; and finally, obtaining feedback in an effort to promote and support the overall strategy and mission (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Ruben, 2004).

Other than the Balanced Scorecard, dashboards have been extensively adopted as a PBM tool by both corporate and public organizations. Dashboards identify a small set of key indicators and measures to track outcomes and check progress in the most critical areas. Dashboards allow organizations to monitor performance using key indicators much like an automobile dashboard provides quick reference to information regarding the most critical functions (Ruben, 2005a). In a more generalized explanation, dashboards are used to translate the organization’s strategy into reliable, verifiable, coherent, representative, actionable objectives; metrics of performance; and tasks customized to each group and individual in the organization. They also enable organizations to measure, monitor, and manage the key activities and processes needed to achieve their goals (Eckerson, 2006; Ruben, 2005a).

The Balanced Scorecard and dashboards are both PBM systems designed to bring continuous, timely, and relevant data collection for measurement, review information to identify the root causes of problems and eliminate them before they become out of control, and develop future projections and long-term strategic decision making based on analysis (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Regular strategy meetings and other forms of formal and informal collection used
to analyze this information are believed to play a key role in improving decisions, optimizing performance, and steering the organization in the right direction (Eckerson, 2006). Thus, the intended value of PBM systems extends beyond control, cutting costs, and measurement of performance; it encourages a multidimensional approach that combines multiple measurable indicators capturing the organization’s goals, strategies, and mission (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). At the same time, the use of PBM provides the means of communicating and reviewing strategies; increasing coordination and motivation, accountability, and comprehensive measurement; building consensus and shared perspectives on organizational strengths, weaknesses, priorities and improvement needs; gaining credibility and legitimacy; and enhancing competitiveness and cost effectiveness, continuous improvement, employee involvement, and transparency (Eckerson, 2006; Henri, 2006; Kramer, 1998; Ruben, 2004). In this sense, performance based management can be used as a tool for the assessment of any planned change efforts or as a powerful organizational change agent by itself which can transform an organization.

The Case of Compstat

Compstat (computerized/comprehensive statistics) provides a good example of a PBM system that has been used in a variety of public service settings, particularly in police organizations. In recent years, pressures for performance management have been apparent in police work in addition to other areas. Like any public organization, police agencies must also respond to external pressures and adjust their internal functioning in order to respond to changing circumstances. As previously mentioned, government regulations in the 1990s fueled an interest in performance based management and transformation of the highly criticized hierarchical, centralized, bureaucratic model and operational processes in order to increase efficiency and quality of performance in federal and public organizations (Rainey, 1983). Many police leaders
were influenced by this movement at different degrees and began to apply some of the strategies that were being successfully used in other public and corporate organizations (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). In addition, community concerns related to human rights, diversity, and the effectiveness of traditional policing strategies increased significantly beginning with the great change of the 1960s in the social and political arena of the U.S. These societal conditions and expectations placed more pressure on police organizations to change their traditional policing style, focus more on effectiveness and performance, and develop closer community relationships in order to confer legitimacy; this goes along with obtaining support for police budgets as well as public cooperation in conducting investigations (Vitale, 2005). Finally, technological innovations and computerization of police work increased the capacity of police organizations and facilitated new opportunities for measuring, analyzing, and disseminating information related to crime, criminality, and police performance. All of these changes significantly increased the responsibility and pressures placed on police leaders and organizations to respond to these emerging opportunities and challenges and focus more on performance measurements to achieve their missions; and increase their budgets, operational efficiency, and individual performance; and legitimize support (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Moore & Braga, 2003; O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

Compstat is the most recent and popular performance based management system among police organizations in the U.S. Compstat emerged in 1994 in the New York Police Department (NYPD) as a new, complex, multifaceted system (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). It was initially developed as a means to collect timely and accurate data about daily crime patterns to initiate tactics and strategies, increase the flow of information and communication among precinct commanders and departments, and ultimately increase performance and accountability
(O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Over time, “the initiative has been transformed into a more comprehensive form in its structure and promises, claiming to instigate the changes needed in police organizations and boasting the ability to reduce crime by making police organizations more responsive to management’s direction and performance indicators” (Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2005, p.189).

Compstat can be defined as a “goal-oriented strategic management process that builds upon police organizational paradigms of the past and blends them with the strategic management fundamentals of the business sector” (Walsh, 2001, p. 352). As many scholars have pointed out, although Compstat’s description emphasizes crime statistics, crime data, and communication, it includes not only these factors but also a range of management principles in its structure to respond to problems. For instance, “the use of different policing styles (i.e., real time crime analysis, targeted crime interdiction, broken windows enforcement, directed patrol), adaptive culture, structural reorganization (i.e., empowerment, managerial accountability, teamwork, geographic decentralization), and a set of innovative strategies and motivational tools are counted in as a part of Compstat” (Silverman & O’Connell, 1999, p.130). Basically, Compstat is considered a police version of the performance based management system.

A group of scholars studied the assumed link between Compstat and crime reduction (Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Weatherburn & Chilvers, 2004). After the implementation of Compstat in the NYPD, the significant reduction of crime received considerable attention from scholars in criminal justice, management, business, organizational behavior, and communication. Despite the difficulties expressed by scholars in directly linking crime reduction to Compstat (Kelling & Sousa, 2001), New York City’s crime rate clearly declined 76% from 1993 to 2009 and has had a 12% decrease during the past two years. In 2008, the city’s violent crime rate declined by 4%,
outpacing the national violent crime rate decline of 2.5%. According to the FBI’s UCR’s statistics for 2008, New York City has remained the safest large city in America over the last three years.

Another group of scholars focused on Compstat’s management aspects, including accountability, performance measurement, motivation, empowerment, information sharing, and communication. These aspects are studied to understand their impact on police organizations’ structure, performance, culture, technology, decision making, and communication (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; O’Connell & Straub, 2007; Smith & Bratton, 2001).

As briefly stated, Compstat is a complex, multifaceted, and large scale planned change that calls for reorganization of a whole or significant portion of an organization and alteration of many fundamental assumptions and practices within the organization. Within the terms of Kedia and Bhagat, (1988) Compstat is a ‘process-embodied’ and ‘person-embodied’ change initiative that brings difficulty and flexibility its design, use, and interpretation.

In this sense, Compstat can be introduced, implemented, and thus appropriated in different ways, and can bring diverse meanings and effects for various users and organizations (Orlikowski, 1992). At this point, the culture of the police organization and communication strategies through which Compstat is introduced and implemented can play a significant role in how organizational members perceive, appropriate, make sense of, and interpret this initiative which, in turn, will influence the way it was adopted, the degree of resistance and receptivity, and its ultimate success or failure. This dissertation will be the first that places culture and communication into the center of the investigation of Compstat. It is hoped that a thorough understanding of Compstat with a focus on the relationship of change, culture, and communication will be quite significant in obtaining a realistic assessment of implementing
planned change initiatives and learning how to deal effectively with the introduction and implementation of these initiatives.

**The Role of Culture and Communication in Planned Change initiatives**

Typically, planned change initiatives seek to promote cultural modifications and call for certain communication strategies through which these changes can be introduced and implemented. Given this, an understanding the role of culture and communication, and how they affect the process of introduction, implementation, and outcomes of planned change efforts appears to be increasingly vital in an environment. This need is underscored by the realization that planned change efforts rarely go precisely as planned and may lead to a total failure or unintended consequences for both organizations and individuals (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002; Jian, 2007; Lewis & Seibold, 1998; Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003). “The failure rates have been reported to be as high as 50 to 70 percent, of which only 10 percent are attributed to technical problems” (Lewis & Seibold, 1998, p. 98). Operationally, this failure rate is of great concern due to the substantial loss of time, morale, financial resources, and damage to an organization’s ultimate survival (Lewis, 2011). As stated by Miller, Johnson, and Grau (1994), there may be many factors affecting the success or failure of change efforts, namely individual inertia, existing technical capacities, organizational members’ attitudes towards change, motivation for altering behaviors, experience of earlier change initiatives, and individual demographics, but few are as critical as the following cross cutting ones: leadership, planning, assessment, communication, and culture (Ruben, 2009). This dissertation will specifically address culture and communication while acknowledging the importance of other factors.
Culture

The concept of culture is often cited in the literature due to the multidimensional role it is acknowledged to play in promoting, managing, or impeding planned organizational change efforts. The importance of an organization’s culture is significant to planned change efforts beginning. Authors suggest, for instance, that it is important for those planning change initiatives within an organization, to endeavor to determine the chief role that culture will play, to try to understand the reactions of organizational members to change efforts, and assess how effectively change agents will be in moving cultures in specific directions to achieve particular goals related to performance, quality, or customer satisfaction (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). General points of interest among scholars include topics and issues related to cultural fit, cultural resistance and barriers, possibility of cultural change, ways to change culture, and the role that leaders will play.

In this dissertation, the role that culture plays during the introduction, implementation, and evolution of change will be addressed by focusing on how Compstat was introduced and implemented, the reaction of organizational members in terms of resistance and receptivity, and its possible influence on police organization’s cultural values. In order to discuss these questions, a background of the concept of organizational culture and its relationship to planned change efforts must first be understood. Briefly, organizational culture is comprised of the values, history, language patterns, stories, norms, rules, traditions, customs, and preferred practices and processes that emerge over time (Ruben, 2009). All of these cultural characteristics are enacted through communication and shape an individual’s organizational thoughts and behaviors.

Consistent with Kurt Lewin (1947), an early pioneer of organizational psychology, who stated, “if you want to truly understand something, try to change it,” any type of planned change effort brings cultural considerations to the surface. Culturally accepted practices, interactions,
goals, and routines that have not been salient, or have been taken for granted prior to an organizational change attempt, can be a source of resistance or receptivity, or spectacles for perceiving, understanding, and interpreting change efforts which result in different reactions, effects, processes, and outcomes (Dawson, 1994; Eilam & Shamir, 2005). In other words, over time, organizational members develop cultural practices, values, and patterns through which they define what is appropriate or inappropriate, and feasible or unfeasible. In addition, they develop certain ways of handling situations wherein these accepted cultural practices and values can function as a source of receptivity and resistance to change initiatives, or as a sense-making device that can influence how change initiatives will be interpreted, reacted to, and adopted by the organizations (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). These reactions and interpretations lead to a better or worse adaptation and implementation of change initiatives with different outcomes. For example, the same change effort can be interpreted differently by members of a highly bureaucratic, authoritarian, and masculine organizational culture than members of a volunteer-based organization that privileges autonomy and low power distance. Thus, the cultural dimension of an organization raises critical issues that should be taken into account during the various phases of change. Given this theoretical framework, an understanding the role of organizational culture is the first area of interest in this dissertation.

The literature suggests that culture is particularly influential in the implementation stage of planned change initiatives such as Compstat. For purposes of this study, implementation will be defined as “the translation of any tool or technique, process, or method of doing, from knowledge to practice” (as cited in Lewis, 2011, p.193). In general, the effectiveness of implementation is measured based on the benefits that organization receives (i.e., improvements in profitability, productivity, customer service, and employee morale) as a result of the implementation and the
fidelity, uniformity, consistency, and quality of use in a given change initiative by organizational members (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Lewis, 2011). Implementation failure occurs, if a planned change initiative does not specifically provide its intended benefits and goals, or is used less frequently, consistently, or persistently than required for organizational members to realize its potential benefits (Klein & Sorra, 1996).

Implementation issues are especially vital for change agents, who must become aware of and recognize the context in which change takes place, and discover better strategies and tactics to overcome problems during implementation. Lewis (2011) classified four different models used to introduce and implement organizational change, namely ‘adaptive, programmatic, rule-bound, and autonomous’. Typically, adaptive models are characterized as being more responsive to organizational members, and changes are adapted to fit the needs and considerations of the organization as well as its members. Programmatic models focus on a plan first and then aim to change the organization without any or with very little feedback from group members. Rule-bound models refer to centrally controlled and designed organizational change efforts in which change agents or top executives play the central role. Finally, autonomous models use flexible strategies that are open to further modification and welcome feedback and involvement from members at all organizational levels during the change process.

To be discussed in-depth later, Nutt (2007) identified another set of approaches that can be used to implement a given change initiative: ‘intervention, participation, persuasion, and edict’. Similar to those suggested by Lewis (2011), these models change based on their focus of control, participation, persuasion, and adaptation. Although Nutt (2007) found that intervention and participation were the most successful approaches, it is interesting to note that they were, at the same time, the ones least commonly used. Luthans (1989) made another distinction among
implementation models with their roots derived from leadership literature, namely ‘autocratic, participative, and democratic’. Finally, after reviewing different types of models in the literature, Beyer and Trice (1982) categorized them as ‘informational approaches’ (persuasion oriented), ‘bonding approaches’ (consensus oriented), and ‘control approaches’ (control, top-down oriented). Different combinations of these approaches can be used to introduce and implement planned organizational change initiatives. Selection can be a function of the change agents’ intended goals in terms of outcomes, characteristics of the model itself, and fit of the planned change to the organization’s culture (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Lewis, 2011). The role that organizational culture plays in the selection and implementation of change efforts can be more dominant in police organizations that are known for the strong cultural features which will be analyzed in this dissertation.

Another area of interest relating to the scope of culture is the reaction to change by organizational members, exemplified by the case of Compstat. This topic is particularly important when considering the significant focus of literature on the strong resistance of police organizations toward change efforts. Although there is a general tendency to view resistance as an issue to be minimized, fixed, or overcome, this point of view has been criticized given that it will dismiss a potentially valuable source of information and valid employee concerns that can be used to improve the elements involved in a proposed change and/or the change process (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000). Scholars further argue that resistance is motivated by more than mere personal anxiety or self-interest. Rather, it might be due to legitimate and valid concerns relating to the organization’s future performance, feasibility of the change itself and the way change is implemented (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000). Regardless of the different roles that resistance and receptivity can play, it is obvious that organizational members’ reactions to
change may influence the process and outcome of these efforts in better or worse ways. Numerous researchers have noted that as change initiatives typically imply an alteration of an organization’s accepted culture, practices, goals, roles, status, and routines, they might lead to anxiety, conflict, misunderstanding, and a sense of uncertainty among organizational members about the future of the organization, their status, salaries, and comfort (Dawson, 1994; Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Whiteley, 1995). While some members may perceive this situation as an “opportunity for organizational and personal rejuvenation, evolution, improvement, and growth, others may perceive the uncertainty, conflict, and unpredictability as an organizational and personal risk as well as a threat to the future of organization and their status and self-interests” (Cochran, Bromley, & Swando, 2002, p. 510). Depending on the perception of planned change efforts, some organizational members may respond enthusiastically to the initiatives; in contrast, these efforts may create undesired responses including stress, cynicism, reduced organizational commitment, denial, and other forms of active and passive resistance (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).

Parallel to the increasing popularity of initiatives that directly target an organization’s culture, the debate regarding whether culture can be managed or changed and if so, how, has become a prominent issue among organizational scholars (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). The topic will also be addressed in this dissertation in order to establish whether Compstat, as theorized, was able to change the culture of police organization and, if so, how. As will be discussed, the proliferation of organizational culture studies beginning in the 1980s comes in part from the claim that culture is manageable as a way to increase commitment, loyalty, productivity, performance, and sometimes even profitability (Smircich & Calas, 1983). The general assumption was that planned change initiatives, namely Total Quality Management (TQM) or
Reengineering, were not enough to obtain the desired performance and enduring improvement results unless they were integrated with an overall approach to changing an organization’s culture (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). In this sense, scholars suggested that implementation of any planned change was geared more toward cultural change than any specific practices (Michela & Burke, 2000). However, the 1990s introduced a proliferation of critical and interpretive studies that challenged the direct link between culture and performance, and the use of culture as a form of value-based unobtrusive control. These traditions also drew attention to the literature’s limitations regarding cultural change, how to change or manage culture, specific strategies and tactics used to change culture, and the possible consequences (Martin, 1992). Although a range of different approaches can be found in these traditions, the idea that is more commonly supported is that cultural change in organizations, like a society’s culture, is possible yet difficult to accomplish since it breaks routine, habits, or traditions (Dilling & Moser, 2007). Therefore, an organization’s culture may evolve in response to changing organizational and environmental conditions, or it may be influenced by change agents but not exactly controlled or changed in a certain direction (Ogbonna & Harris, 2002a; 2002b; Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003). Related to these discussions, the relationship between Compstat and cultural values will be questioned in this dissertation in order to determine if this initiative changed cultural values and if so how they changed.

Communication

In addition to culture, the communicative dimension of organizational change is an emerging topic of investigation within organizational communication research (for a review, see Lewis & Seibold, 1998). Scholars have increasingly focused on the role that communication plays during the introduction and implementation of planned change initiatives. Generally,
Communication is identified as an instrument through which these changes can be introduced and implemented, and as a crucial factor in dealing with resistance and achieving organizational change. Specifically, the literature dealt with communication in terms of announcement of change programs (Smeltzer, 1991), disseminating information related to change (Lewis, 1999), reducing or managing uncertainty and conflict (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, & Callan, 2004), sense-making, persuading, soliciting, acquiring feedback (Gallivan, 2001), and framing (Fairhurst, 1993). Communication is also considered a tool for creating and sustaining a guiding vision for the organization, facilitating opportunities for participation, decreasing resistance, building a positive environment and reaction for change, and appropriating and adapting features of change (Lewis, 1999; Lewis, Schmisseur, Stephens, & Weir, 2006; Witherspoon, 1997). As shown in the studies of Fairhurst (2005), communication and framing strategies used in change efforts certainly affect the perception and interpretations of organizational members, which, in turn, affect the outcome and success of planned change efforts (Fairhurst, 2001). In short, the basic assumption of these studies is that communication is essential in creating a vision for change, making understood the need for change, minimizing resistance, and acquiring the participation, motivation, commitment, and ‘buying in’ of organizational members for planned change efforts. These, in turn, are all necessary to facilitate change and improve the likelihood of successful outcomes (Galpin, 1996; Kotter, 1996).

Consistent with this basic assumption, scholars have suggested guidance in terms of proper use of messages, channels of communication, and types of information. In these studies, the use and selection of channels (i.e., face-to-face, brochures, newspapers) to disseminate information and solicit input (Lewis, 1999; Timmerman, 2003), proper use of messages in terms of clearance, consistency, and repetition (Witherspoon, 1997), and selection and use of certain
communication strategies and styles (Lewis, 2011; Lewis et al., 2006) have been explicated for
the purpose of minimizing resistance and providing a smooth implementation of change. Similarly, Miller, Johnson, and Grau (1994) emphasized the role of quality information concerning timeliness, accuracy, and usefulness. In subsequent portions of this dissertation, some of these points will be explained in detail in terms of their influence on the success of planned change efforts.

As briefly mentioned, although there is an abundance of literature concerning the role of information and communication during planned change efforts, there is a lack of studies that suggest a theory or framework. Lewis (2007) placed the discussions regarding the communication of change into a larger framework and provided strategy dimensions that are used during the implementation of planned organizational change initiatives. These dimensions that will be discussed in detail later include (a) disseminating information/soliciting feedback, (b) one-sided/two-sided messages, (c) gain or loss frames, (d) blanket/targeted messages, and (e) discrepancy/self-efficacy. Change agents use a mix of these communication strategies based on the general implementation approaches (i.e., rule-bound, programmatic, and participatory). These approaches, in turn, are influenced by the perception of the organization’s context (i.e., culture, history of change, needs and goals in implementing change, willingness to change) and by institutional factors that shape the organizational environment of change agents (Lewis, 2007). For instance, a strictly hierarchical and centralized organization may select a rule-bound, programmatic implementation approach in which change agents focus more on disseminating information in a top-down manner in order to influence compliance rather than solicit feedback and participation. Similarly, volunteer-based advocacy organizations are more likely to take an
adaptive approach in which there is more focus on participation, feedback, and modification of change in accordance with the concerns of organizational members.

Other than these communication strategy dimensions, Lewis, Hamel, and Richardson (2001) identified six models used by change agents to implement communication through interaction with various stakeholders. They found that the perceptions of change agents concerning the need for communicative efficiency or consensus building during change efforts can be used to predict the following six models of implementation: equal dissemination, equal participation, the need to know, marketing, quid pro quo, and reactionary. As will be elaborated later, these models are selected and used depending on the context of change. Lewis et al. (2001) argued that organizational members’ preferences or cultural orientations toward participative values tend to influence a change agent’s need to recognize the importance of consensus building. On the other hand, structural and environmental circumstances that limit access to resources might influence a change agent’s insight concerning the need for efficient communication. In turn, a combination of these task dimensions may very well predict the model that will be adopted. Thus, these studies assist practitioners in understanding the possible role of communication and alternatives which can lead to a better or worse implementation of change initiatives. Keeping in mind the aforementioned communication strategy dimensions and the six models of implementation, this dissertation will focus on how information about the Compstat was communicated, and will describe which strategies, models, and channels were utilized that lead to better or worse implementation in the context of a police organization.

While it is clear that culture (i.e., a source of resistance and receptivity and a sense-making and sense-giving tool), communication (i.e., strategies to introduce and implement change), and communication channels (i.e., face to face, written) play important roles in the
dynamics of planned change, there is still much to be learned about the specific ways in which these dynamics operate. In general, the goal of this dissertation is to bring a deeper understanding by focusing on the reciprocal role of culture and communication when performance based management models such as Compstat are introduced and implemented.

**Statement of the Problem**

Currently, there are important gaps in the literature regarding the implementation and adaptation of planned organizational change that limit an in-depth understanding of the roles that culture and communication play, specifically in the case of Compstat. Although the need to recognize the role of culture, communication and selection of communication strategies has been extensively articulated in organizational change research (Brown & Starkey, 1994), these concepts are most often studied independently. Based on this assumption, this dissertation will focus on the reciprocal relationship between communication and culture and its consequence during the implementation of planned organizational change. In fact, communication scholars have described this relationship by stating that culture is constructed and enacted through communication and, once created, it influences the behavior and communication practices of organizational members (Ruben & Stewart, 2005). As such, culture emerges as a set of preferences and possibilities that inform and influence given interactions. Similarly, Brown and Starkey (1994) stated, “Culture is a product of social interaction mediated through communicative acts, and communication is a cultural artifact through which organizational actors come to understand their organization and their role within it” (p. 809). Accepted cultural values and rules, appropriate and inappropriate behaviors and communication practices are evaluated within this cultural environment.
Only after we take a stance that considers the inextricable role of culture and communication can we go beyond the prescriptive recommendations for introducing and implementing change and managing communication processes through the most effective message, media, and communication strategies responsive to the organization’s cultural features and artifacts (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).

To pursue this goal, the use of different introduction and implementation strategies (i.e., adaptive, programmatic, participative, autocratic, and democratic) need to be studied considering the influence of an organization’s culture (Lewis & Seibold, 1998). Each approach to planned change implementation implies a particular communication strategy, and as suggested by Lewis et al. (2006), a change initiative or implementation strategy that might work in some organizations does not ensure that it will work in others. The perception of the context of change influences the decisions made by change agents when they are considering the best communication strategies to employ in an effort to introduce and implement change successfully. For example, the use of a participation strategy assumes some form of discussion, negotiation, and feedback between subordinates and superiors; therefore, participation in decision making may not be relevant in an organization where the culture places a high value on command and control (Hofstede, 1980; Tayep, 1994). As such, this cultural context may influence—if not require—change agents to select a different strategy for introducing and implementing change if they are to be successful.

Similarly, an organization’s culture is a crucial and cross-cutting factor that plays an important role in the different reactions exhibited by organizational members. As Orlikowski (1992, 2000) observed, although the physical characteristics (i.e., rules and procedures structured into a model) of a planned change effort may affect to some extent how they will be appropriated
and implemented, the reaction of organizational members might differ substantially based on the interpretation of change drawn from their accepted cultural practices and values. In this sense, a strategy that represents an appropriate performance tool in one organization may not be appropriate in another that has distinct cultural features. For example, the expectation of organizational members in terms of performance and autonomy or teamwork versus individuality may vary cross-organizationally. As such, the degree of cultural fit between the organization and the components of a planned change initiative is expected to influence the organizational members’ perceptions and reactions to an initiative in a given context. This does not mean, however, that change initiatives must be consistent with an organization’s accepted culture. As previously noted, most planned change initiatives seek to promote cultural change as a prerequisite to the success of these initiatives. They suggest, however, that it is likely to be more problematic and difficult as a function of the degree of difference between the cultural values embedded in or implied by the proposed innovation on the one hand, and the organization’s culture and cultural expectations, on the other. Consequently, it is more common in the literature to refer to the negative effects of culture’s role as a source of resistance (Schein, 1992). The basic reason for these assumptions is the possibility of existing cultural features clashing and becoming embedded into the change initiative’s structure. In other words, the likelihood of resistance is higher when the extent of differences between the espoused and current cultural features is larger, and when there are strong subcultures (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, Schein, 1985). In this case, implementing change initiatives may be totally or partially resisted, or may be adapted, modified, or redefined by organizational members. In regard to police organizations, the role of culture can be more dominant and obstruct change efforts (Maanen, 1975; Manning 1977; Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Wood, 2004). Thus, in this
dissertation, an attempt will be made to provide insight into police officers’ reactions to the Compstat in the form of resistance as well as receptivity. Assuming that Compstat is modified throughout the years, reasons for this modification will be questioned with a focus on the role of culture.

Another important point to be discussed in this study is the recursive relationship between communication strategies and culture of an organization. Although scholars have provided a list of communication strategies and tactics that may be useful in implementing planned change initiatives (see Lewis, 2007; Lewis, 2011), much remains to be learned regarding the influence that an organization’s specific cultural nature has in this process (Lewis & Seibold, 1998). In other words, organizational members who represent various cultures are likely to differ in their responsiveness to communication preferences, strategies, channels, and actors in addition to the way they receive, interpret, and act on messages. Thus, there might be clear distinctions between organizations concerning the preferences for communication strategies, styles, channels, forms, and principles depending on their cultural features. More specifically, the importance placed on open, formal, informal, targeted, blanket, direct and indirect communication, participation, consensus, and the degree of face-to-face and other channels of communication may vary culturally (Hofstede, 1980). Understanding an organization’s culture might help change agents to select appropriate communication strategies, frame their messages appropriately, influence possible divergence of organizational members’ interpretations, and promote a positive understanding of change initiatives which, in turn, will minimize resistance and ease the implementation of these initiatives (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Tromp & Ruben, 2004).
In the case of Compstat, there are a number of studies that described its introduction and implementation by specifically focusing on the NYPD (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). However, these studies most frequently described this process without providing appropriate consideration to the reciprocal relationship between culture and communication and the reaction of police officers. For example, emphasis was not placed on how Compstat was introduced and implemented; in what ways the implementation strategies fit or did not fit with the organization’s culture and the reaction of police officers; how response to resistance was handled; how the initiative was communicated; and the role that culture played in the process. All of these points are particularly important in police organizations which are suggested to have a unique culture which includes certain practices, values, and beliefs unique to the occupation that fully influence, challenge, and resist change within the department and obstruct implementation of police reforms (Maanen, 1975; Manning 1977; Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Wood, 2004). This dissertation proposes to address this gap in the literature within the aforementioned assumptions.

In this dissertation, another topic of investigation will be the relationship between Compstat and organizational culture change, specifically in the values of organizational members. Previous research regarding the influence of planned change initiatives on cultural change primarily takes a structural perspective that ignores the contextual and communicative aspects. Within this dissertation, based on the assumption that cultural change is created and manifested through communication, we look at communication both as a manifestation and creator of cultural change. As suggested by Thayer (1988), the real source of change can be found in what and how people communicate with one another given that cultural distinctions are created and the potential for cultural change occurs through the alteration of communication processes and mindsets. Thus, in the communication process, it is not only the existence of a new
initiative that shapes cultural meanings and change for a given situation; it is also what an individual thinks about and does with the initiative, and how it is enacted in the communication process (Thayer, 1988). If there is a real change of cultural values and mindsets after an initiative is implemented, there must also be a change in the ways that language is used and spoken in regard to organizational practices, relationships, and policies. As put into more practical framework by Pacanowsky and Trujillo (1993), these changes can be observed in the physical and linguistic artifacts of the organization. These artifacts include addressing terms; routines of asking, greeting, turn taking; dress codes; room settings; design of communication (who talks, with whom, how); communication style (formal vs. informal, open); use of humor; labeling rules and other recurring practices; and other rituals, routines, rules and norms. Such a perspective may be more constructive as it takes a view of culture that moves beyond static, superficial analysis, and looks at the manifestation of certain values in the communication practices as well as emergent cultural values that shape the communication of organizational members in the context of organization.

In the case of Compstat, it has been asserted that Compstat had certain impacts on culture of the NYPD. In this particular organization, “there was a shift from a largely hierarchical, centralized, formalized management style with an emphasis on mistake avoidance, conformity, security, order, caution, and systematic rule application toward an adaptive culture, where the values of innovation, collaboration, creativity, flexibility, exchange of information, accountability, and problem solving became dominant” (O’Connell & Straub, 2007, p. 77). Although this cultural shift may be true for the NYPD, it is likely that implementing these kinds of initiatives does not necessarily result in their intended benefits in all police or public
organizations. Thus, there is a need to question the success or failure in each organization that implemented these types of initiatives without making assumptions as to their inherent success.

As a result, an attempt will be made in this dissertation to determine whether the Compstat changed the cultural values of an organization as intended. If there is in fact a strong perception among organizational members regarding the change of values after Compstat is implemented, then the following related question will be addressed: How? To examine this point, in addition to opinions expressed by organizational members in interviews, an analysis of communication practices employed during the Compstat meetings will be used considering Thayer’s (1988) and Pacanowsky and Trujillo’s (1993) theoretical suggestion regarding change and manifestations of change. This approach to cultural change is more aligned with an interpretive, communicative perspective that helps to bring a contextual, communicative, in-depth understanding of this process.

The Purpose of the Dissertation

This study will examine the role of culture and communication involved in the introduction and implementation of planned change efforts in general, and Compstat in particular, in addition to the implications of planned change efforts on cultural change. The first step will be to identify strategies that have been used to introduce and implement the Compstat in the Metrocity Police Department keeping in mind the various implementation strategies offered by scholars (see Beyer & Trice, 1982; Luthans, 1989; Nutt, 2007; Lewis, 2011). The second step will be to focus on organizational members’ reaction in terms of resistance and receptivity, and cultural sources of these reactions in this police department. The third step will describe current form of Compstat as it exists within Metrocity Police Department, and how Compstat’s structure and function has evolved and changed over time and its cultural sources. The fourth step proposes to
establish the relationship between Compstat and cultural change in this police department from a communicative perspective. In this step, the researcher intends to explore whether there is a cultural change after the implementation of this initiative. This is followed by identifying the ways Compstat influenced the change of cultural values and how these changes are manifested in different practices in the Metrocity Police Department.

In the communication section, the researcher will describe the ways in which Compstat has been disseminated to organizational members in Metrocity Police Department in terms of selected communication strategies and channels. In the final step, the focus will be on the selection of communication practices, strategies, and channels and its interaction with the culture of the police in this department.

**Significance of this Dissertation**

The Compstat initiative has great potential to be implemented in the future by numerous other police organizations inside and outside of the United States. For example, a police foundation survey found that one third of the police organizations in the U.S. have already adapted Compstat or similar initiatives into their structure and another one third have plans to do so (Moore, 2003; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003). Similarly, there are various popular organizational change initiatives that have been implemented or are planned to be implemented by numerous public and private organizations. For this reason, understanding the role of culture and communication during the introduction, implementation and adaptation of Compstat and other organizational interventions aimed at enhancing performance or changing culture can be quite helpful for organizations that intend to adopt these kinds of initiatives.

However, research on culture and communication -as it relates to planned change initiatives- generally focuses very little on the communication as a life process and the
relationship between communication and culture. Often humans are portrayed as passive recipients of information during the change process assuming they either accept or reject change related information. Research, in this line of thought, typically considers culture and communication as two independent concepts. Also, research is often conducted through surveys or attitude oriented methodologies that may not adequately reveal the context, nature and sequence of changes that have occurred in organizations; these methodologies may fail to provide a background that makes readers fully aware of the limitations of their practical advice (Collins, 1998; Martin, 2002).

Considering these limitations, this dissertation represents the first study designed to provide an assessment of the inextricable role of culture and communication in the case of Compstat with a communicative and interpretive perspective. In fact, a broader view of communication suggests that they all parties involved in change communication have the potential to play very active roles in sense making of and reacting to the situation and information that confront them. Within this perspective, culture is not a static concept, but constructed and enacted through communication and manifested in different forms, including communication practices which is used to refer in this study as any kind of activity (i.e. verbal and nonverbal communication, talking and listening) that involves messages (Craig, 1983). Once created, it influences the behavior and communication practices of organizational members and functions as a sense making device that can influence how communication practices will be interpreted and reacted to (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Ruben & Stewart, 2005). As such, culture emerges as a set of preferences and possibilities that inform and influence given interactions. This approach allows the researcher to provide a dynamic, contextual, reciprocal, and interactional understanding of the role that culture and communication play. This, in turn, offers practitioners a
rich explanation of the process and the opportunity to establish a good comparison between the organizations that ultimately increase the likelihood of a successful implementation of these types of initiatives (Kedia & Bhagat, 1988; Stake, 2003).

Compatible with this approach, another important aspect of this study is the use of alternative means of data collection, including in-depth interviews, documents, and observation. The use of multiple data sources, especially great amount of time spent in the organization support the above mentioned dynamic, contextual, reciprocal, and rich explanation of the research topic.

The organizational change and police management literature, including that on Compstat, approaches organizational change from a managerial perspective and disregards the perspective of officers on the ground as participants in the change process. For instance, most previous studies have approached resistance to change from a managerial perspective, offering several strategies to overcome resistance (Dantzker, 1999; More, Wegener, Vito, & Walsh, 2006). However, major changes in organizations certainly require understanding ‘resistance’ in terms of the potentially valid concerns of officers on the ground, those who are the intended adopters of organizational change efforts. In order to fill the gap in the literature, this study examined the explanations of officers on the ground by conducting interviews with officers from different ranks and positions and observing their practices within the Compstat meetings. Thus, by taking a multi-perspective approach (taking into account the points of view of change initiators and potential adopters of the change), this dissertation adds new insights about the reaction of officers to change, their expectations in the change process, and the reflection of change on the ground which has been suggested as a common problem in the police organizations.
In addition, the police department selected for this study presents unique opportunities in terms of its structure, crime problems, lengthy experience of Compstat, and organizational, geographical, and cultural closeness to the NYPD. More specifically, its large size, crime ridden environment, openness to change in its history and revision of Compstat, initiation of a number of innovative programs, reorganization of the department, and reduction in crime rates after the implementation of Compstat make this police department a good, interesting, and significant sample for this study.

Finally, it has been argued that any attempt to change one’s values, meanings, and cultural assumptions are more likely to be resisted (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 1985). Thus, rather than focusing on these aspects in change efforts, an alternative approach will be to “treat values and assumptions as epiphenomena and aim instead to reshape practices, (including communication), which is less likely to be resisted, and paradoxically more likely to shape interpretations over time” (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006, p. 311) and maximize the chances of implementing change initiatives. The focus on communication practices also increases the chances of transferring these types of initiatives into police organizations that have distinct cultures. As such, this dissertation is comprised of practical implications for any police organization that plans to adapt Compstat or other similar change efforts.

Therefore, presenting a dynamic, contextual, and interactional understanding of the role of culture and communication within the change process; presenting the perspectives of officers from different ranks and positions; using alternative data sources; and the research setting selected for this study make meaningful contributions to literature. They also provide practical knowledge for police reformers and administrators who aim to change police departments.
Research Questions

Within this background, this dissertation will aim to shed light on the following research questions:

**R Q 1:** What was the role of culture in the introduction, implementation, and evaluation of the Compstat?

- a) How was Compstat introduced and implemented in the selected study site?
- b) How was Compstat received and reacted to by organizational members?
- c) How did reactions change over time, if they changed?
- d) Was the introduction of Compstat perceived to have changed the cultural values of the organization? If so, how?

**R Q 2:** What was the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat?

- a) What communication strategies were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?
- b) What communication channels were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?
- c) What was the role of communication in the current implementation of Compstat?
- d) In what ways was the selection of communication strategies and channels related to the culture of police organizations?
In order to provide the background for this dissertation, relevant literature is reviewed in three chapters. The introduction provides a brief review of literature, followed by the statement of the problem, the purpose and significance of the dissertation, and the research questions.

The first chapter is composed of three different sections. The first section introduces the concepts of culture and communication with a focus on their historical roots, definitions, and various perspectives to understand the roles that culture and communication play in organizations. The second section presents the implementation of organizational change and the specific role that culture and communication play in this process. The third section deals with change efforts in police organizations that gave rise to Compstat in general.

In the second chapter, the literature regarding the relationship among Compstat, police culture, and communication is explained.

The third chapter on methodology describes the interpretive approach of this study, its advantages in analyzing culture and communication, the history of the research setting, data collection methods, the researcher’s experience in the data collection process, analysis of data that relies on grounded approach and the constant comparative method, and finally issues related to reliability and validity.

The findings in chapter four are represented in two separate sections. The first section deals with the first main research question of this study, about the role of culture in the introduction, implementation and evaluation of Compstat. The next section deals with the second main research question, about the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat, and the recursive relationship between communication and culture.
In the same line of thought, discussion and implication are represented in two separate sections. The first section is about culture and Compstat, and the second one is about communication and Compstat.

The final sections provide limitations of the study, future research directions, conclusion, references, and appendices.
CHAPTER I

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

IN ORGANIZATIONS

Given that this dissertation directs attention to the emerging role that culture and communication play during the implementation phase of planned organizational change efforts, specifically Compstat, a historical account is essential in better understanding contemporary discussions and emergence of communication and culture as a perspective for studying organizations. For this reason, the following section includes a brief background pertaining to organizational communication studies followed by the definition of culture and communication, their organizational roles, and various perspectives pertaining to the study of culture and communication.

Brief History of Organizational Communication Studies

Although the origin of communication studies dates back to traditional rhetoric (Redding & Tompkins, 1988; Ruben & Stewart, 2005), the modern field of organizational communication has a more recent history that can be traced back to the early nineteenth century. Initially, research was not the product of primarily communication scholars but was rather conducted by academicians within the fields of organizational psychology, organizational behavior, administrative science, and management (Redding & Tompkins, 1988). During the first half of the century, research was focused basically on communication skills, managerial effectiveness, and superior-subordinate relationships (Redding & Tompkins, 1988; Richetto, 1977). It was only after the 1950s that organizational communication, known as ‘business and industrial communication,’ emerged as a potentially autonomous discipline in its own right (Ruben & Stewart, 2005); however, the research was basically conducted by scholars from diverse fields.
In the second half of the century, studies that emerged in the field included information flow, network analysis, climate analysis, message content, and the adaptation of systems theory to organizations (Goldhaber, Porter, Yates & Lesniak, 1978; Redding & Tompkins, 1988; Richetto, 1977). During this period, the academic field of organizational communication can trace most of its conceptual roots to four sources: traditional rhetorical theory, mass communication, human relations, and management/organization theory, all of which basically had the characteristic of a pragmatic, utilitarian philosophy. Most of the studies offered prescriptive and descriptive managerial advice through “effectiveness of the individual and of the organization” (Redding & Tompkins, 1988, p. 12). This philosophy was associated with logical positivism, which strives to test theories with ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ data collected from experiments and surveys (Delia, 1987; Redding & Tompkins, 1988). As such, the focus of research during this period was more antecedent-based or outcome-based (i.e., cultural climate, effectiveness, satisfaction), and less process-based (i.e., how individuals interact to become socialized and satisfied with their organization). Although early scholars clearly emphasized the importance of process, at least in terms of better outcomes, they commonly neglected the study of communication as a process in which communication is foundational (Berlo, 1960). Until the 1980s, most studies in the field had, in fact, taken this modernist or empirical orientation.

Almost three decades ago, organizational communication scholars in attendance at the first ALTA conference posed the following question, which has initiated scholarly debate concerning the field’s characteristics: What content, methodology, and applications define the scope of the field and separate it from other related sciences and disciplines? Scholars argued that the main problem was the need for a new perspective and theory to conceptualize communication as foundation for the organizations (Bullis 2005; Putnam, 1983; Putnam &
Krone, 2006). The debate was critical in the sense that it further helped shape the identity of organizational communication as a full academic field by developing its own scholarship, applications, and theory, and distancing itself from the management school (Taylor, Flanagin, Cheney, & Seibold, 2001). Since that time, the debate has revolved around the field’s scope, different perspectives within the field, and how to conceptualize communication and organization, all of which constitute a central consideration within the literature (Bullis, 2005, Kuhn, 2005; Putnam, 1983, Putnam & Krone, 2006).

After the first ALTA conference, much of the communication field began to place far greater emphasis on interpretive and critical perspectives that essentially focus on meaning, interpretation, and power in organizations (Eisenberg, 1984; Kuhn, 2005; Putnam & Krone, 2006). This ‘interpretive turn’ greatly influenced how the field has evolved over the years since. After the introduction of this paradigm, communication has been viewed not only as a process occurring inside organizations but also as a process that creates and recreates social structures that comprise organizations (Eisenberg, 1984; Putnam, 1983, Smircich & Calas, 1987, Weick, 1995). In fact, this shift in the field was not unique or independent from the change in other disciplines, given that all are rooted in some emerging epistemological and ontological orientations regarding the nature of reality and social order that have influenced social sciences in general. The challenge to Newton’s and Galileo’s theories laid the groundwork for the reasoning of deduction/induction and universal laws (Berger, 1977; Craig, 1983), especially by Luckman’s social construction of reality notion, a symbolic interaction movement that emerged in the Chicago School of Sociology, Heidegger’s phenomenology (Taylor et al., 2001), and hermeneutics (Smircich & Calas, 1987). Goffman’s dramaturgical and social phenomenological perspective (Delia, 1987) also provided a base for interpretive and meaning oriented approaches.
In a similar way, Frankfurt’s school of critical theory and cultural studies in Europe propelled the study of power and inequality in communication and culture studies (Delia, 1987).

Based on these new approaches, the field of organizational communication and culture is divided into three main perspectives: ‘functionalistic, interpretive, and critical’. The development of these perspectives not only contributed to a flourishing field but also brought more complex and nuanced understandings of communication, culture, and other important concepts. Discussion of the differences in these perspectives represents the core for a fundamental understanding of these concepts, their role in organizations, the types of issues studied, and their methodological stance for culture and communication analysis. This debate also generates insights by providing a broader understanding from the stance of this dissertation. The following section will present a detailed review of these perspectives.

Perspectives in the Study of Culture and Communication

Functionalistic Perspective

The functionalistic perspective is associated with an objectivist stance on reality, which is viewed as an objective, a priori dimension of the world, and an external order of objects that can be uncovered, a deterministic view of human nature, and logical positivism that aims to test theories with ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ data obtained from experiments and surveys (Putnam, 1983; Delia, 1987; Redding & Tompkins, 1988). Researchers center on more validity, reliability, dependent and independent variables, sampling strategies, and generalized law-like statements for the purpose of prediction, control, and manageability across situations, experimental research designs, and use of multivariate statistics (Smircich & Calas, 1987). As such, the focus of research in this view is more antecedent-based or outcome-based and less process-based.
Functionalist tradition underlines the principles of prediction, generalizability, and causality with a concern of producing useful knowledge.

**Interpretive Perspective**

Although functionalistic research remains dominant in the field of organizational communication, the interpretive perspective has become more common in literature that investigates organizational communication and culture. As briefly discussed, the ‘interpretive turn’ of the 1980s greatly influenced how the field evolved in the following years. The emerging epistemological and ontological orientations regarding the nature of reality and social order provided a base for the interpretive perspective, which takes a subjective stance of social reality, anti-positivist epistemology, and voluntarism which, in contrast to determinism, accepts the role of human agency in the creation of meaning (Orlikowski, 1992). As opposed to dealing with prediction and control, this perspective is concerned with the processes and experiences through which people construct organizational reality and meaning (Geertz, 1973; Smircich, 1983). As suggested by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), human understanding and actions are based on “the meaning assigned to any set of events” (p.434), or in other words, the interpretation of information and any set of events. As such, it attempts to understand what is happening in a situation through a contextualizing strategy while recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations in any situation or event (Smircich & Calas, 1987). As a result, the new organizational communication scholars dealt much more with the social construction of meaning, meaning making, and constitutive approach to meaning, inter-subjective meaning, and power (Putman 1983; Axley, 1984). In fact, the interpretive perspective brought to the field new conceptualizations of communication and culture as well as a rich understanding of
organizations. In addition, it provided scholars with new directions for research and a wide range of flexibility in terms of content, application, and methodology.

**Critical Perspective**

Although typically rooted in Marxian theory, critical theory has entered the academy via a number of routes. In the field of organizational communication, the Frankfurt school and cultural studies in Europe provided its theoretical base (Delia, 1987; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). In most cases, critical theory makes its contributions known to organizations through studies of power and hegemony despite a growing interest in discourses. For critical theorists, “organizations are a struggle site in which conflicting preferences and interpretations between the members of dominant and marginalized groups is inevitable” (Alvesson, 1993, p. 134). These theorists recognize and focus on an organization’s hegemonic structure with an anti-managerial tone, power relations, ignored and silenced concerns of minorities, old and new forms of organizational control (i.e., culture, identification), harsh working conditions, and so forth (Cheney, 1995; Martin, 2002).

In this sense, critical theorists criticize the existing organizational communication research that reflects the technical interests which attempt to manipulate communication and culture in order to produce predicted effects on behalf of organizations and ignore inequalities and specific minority groups (Martin, 2002). “They challenge individuals to rethink the goals of organizational research and to move from technical interests, managerial bias, uncritical acceptance of current organizational conditions, and corporate interests by considering alternative voices as well as the social and political consequences of activities occurring in the lives of organizational members” (Deetz, 2001, p.7). Thus, consistent with their focus on a more democratic and participatory organizational life, critical scholars strive to contribute to the establishment of a democratic
workplace where informed, authentic participation, and freedom from various coercive acts are possible. For this purpose, Habermas suggested an ‘ideal speech situation’ which might be regarded as the idealistic goal of these perspectives, in which organizational members who are affected by decisions can voice their concerns freely and openly without one dominating the other in any way (Deetz, 2001). Basically, critical scholars aim to understand, critique, and educate in order to increase awareness and create more democratic, participative work environments, especially for lower-level employees and specific minority groups such as Blacks, women, and blue collar workers. However, scholars criticize this line of research for restricting their interests solely with the goal of understanding organizational contradictions within the context of larger social, economic, and political structures and increasing awareness of an organizational member’s disadvantaged position while not discussing particular actions that should be taken to reach these objectives in a given context and ignoring management’s usual concerns (Collins, 1998). Although the study in functional, structural perspective still dominates the field, the number of studies in both interpretive research and critical research increased throughout the 1990s (Martin, 2002).

**Conceptualization of Communication in Different Perspectives**

Although culture and communication have become the most frequently used workplace terms, there is certainly a wide range of definitional variations in the concept of communication, which depends primarily on the theoretical and methodological orientations in the field. The basic underlying theory that shaped the concept of communication after the 1950s was Shannon and Weaver’s theory which posited that communication is the transmission of information or sending and receiving messages (Berlo, 1960; Delia, 1987; Craig, 1999). In this theoretical orientation, scholars focus mainly on the exchange of information and treat communication as a
variable that can be manipulated to produce certain effects, namely effectiveness, coordination, or collaboration (Taylor et al., 2001). The messages sent or received are assumed to have an objective reality in which they exist independent of sender and receiver. Within the framework of this conceptualization, studies focused primarily on information flow, message content, communication skills, message channels, message fidelity to understand communication problems, nature of superior-subordinate relationships, and effectiveness of communication (Greenbaum, Hellweg & Falcione, 1988). In this approach, what is technically called ‘noise’, practically called information overload, distortion, coordination problems, communication skills and attitudes, and message content (i.e., clear versus ambiguous) result in communication problems (Berlo, 1960; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). Thus, in order to increase effectiveness in communication, clarity of messages and open communication is proposed as a practical solution to managers as well as the rationale for making structural shifts in organizations that will allow more communication among members holding different positions (Dawson, 2004; Eisenberg, 1984; Mcphee & Poole, 2001). These suggestions follow the assumption that communication problems are not the norm but rather the exception drawn from information overload, information blockage, communication skills of sender, or message content (Miller, Johnson, & Grau, 1994). Despite criticism of this model, this view of communication is still dominant in books and textbooks, and in the discussion of scholars, and practitioners (Lewis et al., 2006; Zorn, Page, & Cheney, 2000). In response to these critiques, attempts have been made by Westley and Maclean, Dance, Thayer, and Schramm to develop new models of communication in future years (Ruben & Stewart, 2005) that will complement the original model through feedback, the role of the receiver in communication, situation and relationship variables in
interpretation, the notion of two-way communication, and strategic ambiguity as another communication strategy (Axley, 1984).

In the 1960s and 1970s, systems theory provided a different conceptualization of communication in which “human communication is not a one-way process, but rather a multidirectional phenomenon with no distinguishable beginning or end” (Ruben, 2000, p. 175), “a process through which the social fabric of relationships, groups, organizations, societies, and world order and disorder is created and maintained” (Ruben, 2005b, p. 294). System theory has provided the reasoning to question simple causal relationships in the communication process and to understand the complex relationship among the constituent parts of organizations and their relationships with the social environment surrounding the organization (Weick, 1979). Systems theorists emphasize the role of interconnectedness (i.e., loosely versus tightly) and the inherent importance of the external environment and view communication as essential in relating the organization to its parts and the environment (Ruben, 1978, 2000). Although system theory makes valuable contributions by exploring the dynamic, relational, and constantly changing nature of organizations, it has been criticized for neglecting social interaction, lacking a methodological tool to analyze, and being too abstract with little applicability to actual research theory (Pacanowsky & Trujillo, 1983; Taylor et al., 2001). Weick (1979, 1995) addressed some of these concerns in his enactment, selection, and retention model, in which organizational members join in collective sense-making for selection from a number of alternatives through communication. However, systems theory in general appears to be more macro-oriented and focuses less on the communication content.

In contrast to the conceptualization of communication as information exchange, after becoming influenced by the aforementioned shifts in epistemological and ontological
orientations regarding the nature of reality and social order, scholars suggested focusing on communication as a constitutive process (Craig, 1999; Peters, 1999), in which “messages are an active part of the production of meaning, perceptions, and feelings” (Deetz, 1994, p. 573). In other words, communication is viewed as a process through which shared meanings are produced and reproduced (Craig, 1999; Putnam, 1983). Following the introduction of this new perspective, communication was viewed not only as a process occurring inside organizations but also as the process that creates and recreates social structures that make up organizations (Putnam, 1983; Eisenberg, 1984; Smircich & Calas, 1987). This can be perceived “as a meaning-centered perspective whereby meaning is not universal and fixed, but rather negotiated and situated” (Deetz, 2001, p.8). Consistent with this conceptualization, miscommunication or unintentional communication is expected, not an exception (Axley, 1984). Clarity of messages for effective communication is believed to be misleading because all meaning is viewed as fundamentally contextual and constructed by individuals. Relational variables that arise through a combination of source, receiver, or message factors and context should be considered when interpreting the message rather than the message itself (Eisenberg, 1983; Taylor 1993). Regardless of making any argument concerning effectiveness, this perspective offers to observe the process rather than the outcome to understand communication. Thus, this perspective broadens the scope of organizational communication from the study of message output, message barriers, information overload, distortion, frequency, and information flow (i.e., upward, downward, and laterally within a container organization) to the communicative processes that constitute and sustain meaning systems such as power, identification, and conflict within the organization (Berlo, 1960; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993; Putnam & Krone, 2006). Although this shift is generally reflected in the privilege of qualitative over quantitative approaches, the difference between the perspectives
should be considered more in tandem with epistemological and ontological shift (Kuhn, 2005). This view is taken in this study with a focus on the role of communication in the construction of meaning of Compstat and culture.

Although critical theory makes its role known through studies of power based on an organization’s structural and ideological aspects, there is growing interest in discourses in the field that focus on more micro-political processes, communication content, and the joined nature of power and resistance (Conrad & Hynes, 2001; Deetz, 2001). Deetz (2001) further made a distinction between ‘critical’ -macro-oriented- and ‘dialogic’ -micro-oriented- perspectives in his classification of the field. According to Taylor (1993), critical scholars criticize information oriented communication researchers for their position of assuming that messages sent or received have an objective reality. They argue that communication does not simply portray a reality which already exists, as suggested by the informational view of communication; rather communication shapes reality, which has intended and unintended consequences that both enable or constrain the possibilities of collective action and challenge the dominant system (Deetz, 1994, Mumby & Stohl, 1996). However, by viewing communication as neutral as suggested by functional scholars, communication reproduces existing meanings that benefit some groups and loses its ability to challenge dominant systems and power; while the constitutive view has the potential for producing new meaning (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). By taking a constitutive view, critical scholars aspire to explore political processes that are usually undemocratic and to support democratization and workplace participation. As gleaned from this discussion, effectiveness is considered to be a part of workplace language that reflects and serves to maintain managerial control (Zorn et al., 2000).
Communication is the essence of organizations. It is the process by which meanings, relationships, and organizations are created and perpetuated (Putnam & Krone, 2006). Communication also represents the means through which individuals in relationships, groups, organizations, and societies receive and transmit messages and create meanings to relate themselves to their environment and to one another (Ruben, 2005b). As suggested by Ruben (2005), through the communication mechanism, “joint activity is made possible, cooperation and conflict emerge and are addressed,” (p. 294) information is shared, and the system of leadership, power, identity, and culture are established and sustained within the organization. It is also employed to inform, command, instruct, influence, persuade, integrate and relate things together (Thayer, 1986; 1988). Communication can be used effectively or ineffectively to keep the organization together, to inform organizational members, to facilitate and improve relationships, to decrease coordination problems, to create a vision shared by employees, to increase participation and satisfaction, to promote organizational change, innovation and a vision, and to implement daily practices (Lewis & Seibold, 1998).

As previously stated in the conceptualization of communication, different perspectives prioritize various roles of communication in an organization. For instance, while the functionalist perspective is centered more on information exchange, system theory addresses the role of communication to relate the organization to its parts and the environment. Interpretive scholars focus on communication as a constitutive process and clarify the role of communication in terms of appropriateness, sense-making, and enactment of organizational practices (Orlikowski, 1992, 2000). For instance, Orlikowski (2000) provided different examples of “how people, as they interact with a technology in their ongoing practices, enact structures which shape their emergent
and situated use of that technology” (p. 407). Similarly, Bansler and Havn (2003) suggested that mediators play a central role in the adaptation process of technology by influencing the interpretations and interactions of users regarding how technology will be used in the organization. In this process, mediators employ communication as a sense-making tool or frame the technology in different ways. Their research shows that the same technology may be used as a broadcast medium in one organization but as a groupware system in another. Thayer (1988) pointed out the role of communication in cultural change by suggesting that through the alteration of communication processes, real change in culture can be created.

Critical scholars drew attention to the relation of power and communication by placing more emphasis on communication’s role in manipulating or dominating lower level employees and reproducing meanings which benefit some groups over others. Mumby (2001) argued that creation of meanings in the communication process is fundamentally mediated by power, leading to a struggle over meaning domination. For example, in Smith and Eisenberg’s (1987) study, the ‘family’ metaphor in times of conflict was reinterpreted differently by employees and managers, which resulted in tension. The family metaphor has been used to indicate closeness among all employees and differences from other parts for a long time. However, during the strike, the family metaphor was interpreted differently by employees and managers. While employees perceived management’s economic measures to be a threat to the family, management tried to reinterpret family by emphasizing that “family life can sometimes be hard, and families must make sacrifices if they are to survive” (Smith & Eisenberg, 1987, p. 375). This example clearly shows conflicting implications of metaphors used in an organization, which is a sign of struggle over meaning in the communication process.
Regardless of different roles given to communication, there is clearly a need to recognize communication, how it is used, and the rules, principles, content, channels, and various forms that are used within the organization in order to understand the organization itself. For instance, in their analysis of emails as a kind of genre, Yates and Orlikowski (1992) showed how the analysis of emails helps researchers to understand the structure of communication practices and thus, different organizing processes and the democratic or autocratic nature of an organization. In a similar vein, the preference for certain forms of communication, namely memos and reports; their vertical or horizontal distribution, frequency, and content provide information about an organization and its culture. Therefore, communication is more than information exchange. It plays multiple roles within organizations and helps individuals to understand those organizations. The role that communication plays during planned organizational change efforts will be explained in a separate section.

**A Brief History of Organizational Culture Studies**

As one of the main points of interest in anthropology, the study of culture dates back to the 19th century (Raymond, 1976). The concept of culture has been used by anthropologists to study ethnic or national groups through ethnographic and cross-cultural research (Louis, 1985). The roots of organizational culture as a theoretical perspective date back to the early human relations movement that originated in the 1940s; however, it was not until the early 1980s that the concept became a popular field of study in other areas, including organizational communication which had overwhelmingly adapted the system metaphor for insights into organizational life in the 1960s and 1970s. Several factors have increased the recognition and popularity of cultural metaphor in both academic and practitioners circle, especially, the increasing dominance of multinational organizations and organizational interaction (Tayep,
1994); the dissatisfaction of early studies that focused on structure, bureaucracy, and control to the exclusion of people: ‘organizations without people’ (Scott, 1998, p. 54), the dissatisfaction with the system metaphor and positivist, functional methods (Pacanowsky & Trujillo, 1983; Smircich & Calas, 1987); the emergence of Luckman’s social construction of reality, the symbolic interaction movement that emerged in the Chicago School of Sociology, Heidegger’s phenomenology (Taylor et al., 2001); the awareness of cultural differences and the success of Japan’s organizations, which is thought to be related to the culture of Japanese organizations (Tayep, 1994; Eisenberg, Goodall, & Trethewey, 2006); and finally the promotion of cultural change through consulting firms and popular publications as the core of organizational effectiveness and productivity (Peters & Waterman, 1982). In addition, in a 1980 cover story in *Business Week* entitled ‘Corporate Culture’, academic journals were littered with special issues on culture, and thus media attention to this concept increased the popularity of culture as a part of business language (Smircich, 1983). Culture has been recognized as an innovative way to investigate life in organizations, predict most organizational practices, and increase quality, effectiveness, and productivity.

Consistent with the emergence of the culture metaphor within the scope of the aforementioned economic and intellectual trends, analysis of culture has become a popular topic of investigation in organizational settings among organizational communication scholars since the 1980s (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001; Smircich & Calas, 1987). The expectation was that the focus on culture would provide a better understanding of organizations and would overcome the limitations of system metaphor, rationalism, and mechanical views of organizations. The early forms of culture research in organizations were based primarily on the belief that the efficient management of culture (i.e., building a strong culture) could provide effectiveness, improved
performance, and quality, and, in turn, a competitive advantage over other organizations (see Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Peters & Waterman, 1982). The increasing study of diverse national cultures with the purpose of successful business interactions internationally was another dominant trend during this time.

Smircich and Calas (1987) declared that this emerging trend was ‘dominant but dead’ (p. 229), meaning that this initially innovative domain of research had come to be much like most of the rest of organizational studies, dominated by managerial interests with the purpose of increasing performance and control by engineering culture, despite its capacity to challenge organizational hegemony and provide a rich understanding of organizational life without being caught in the illusion of prediction and control. Despite these early forms of culture research that remain dominant in today’s literature, the 1990s brought a proliferation of critical and interpretive studies that challenged managerial interests regarding the manipulation and control of employees and the direct link between culture and performance (Smircich & Calas, 1987; Martin, 2002). To be explained later, these new traditions created fertile ground in which the number of studies in the field of organizational culture accumulated.

**Conceptualization of Culture in Different Perspectives**

A semantic and conceptual confusion exists in defining the term ‘culture’. Given that scholars from different fields examined the study of culture, definitions can be found in numerous versions and each definition brings a different approach. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that there is no single definition and conceptualization that ensures clarity across fields, traditions, contexts, organizations, and circumstances. In this sense, scholars have proposed various definitions and approaches for the concept of culture (see Smircich, 1983).
In functionalistic tradition, culture is taken as an essential organizational variable, something an organization has that can be managed to produce certain effects, such as effectiveness, commitment, and satisfaction in the workplace (Smircich, 1983). It is common to define organizational culture in this tradition by emphasizing widely shared values and practices within any given organization (Schein, 1985). From this standpoint, organizational culture has historically been described as widely shared patterns of beliefs, norms, rituals, symbols, and stories that develop over time and function as social or normative glue that hold people together. In this perspective, culture is essential for an organization’s success in tough times and to keep employees motivated (Pettigrew, 1979; Smircich, 1983; Martin, 2002). This stance emphasizes the distinctiveness of organizations in terms of their culture. For instance, Kotter and Heskett (1992) defined organizational culture as an interdependent set of values, pattern of beliefs, and expectations that are common to an organization. Schein (1985), a prominent scholar of the field, provided a comprehensive definition of organizational culture as,

the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invested, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 9)

Specifically, the comparative and corporate cultural themes fall into the functionalist perspective, which derives from technical interests. A common conception within this perspective can be found in the field of comparative management in which culture is conceptualized as ‘national culture’ defined by Hofstede (1980) as,
the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another. When we speak of the culture of a group, a tribe, a geographical region, a national minority, or a nation, culture refers to the collective mental programming that these people have in common; the programming that is different from that of other groups, tribes, regions, minorities or majorities, or nations. (p. 43)

National cultural practices are transmitted through formal and informal means of socialization beginning from childhood and continue through adulthood. In this view, the history, economics, religion, geographical location, education, and language as well as legal and government systems influence the evolution of a specific culture and play a considerable role for national distinctiveness in the perception and reaction of people in organizations between countries (Kedia & Bhagat, 1988; Schneider, 1989; Ralston et al., 2008).

Smircich (1983) argued that the scholar in this segment views the concept of national culture as relatively coherent and stable, an independent, external variable, a background factor, or basically the country that influences the development and reinforcement of culture in an organization. This stance treats culture as if it is imported into an organization through the national, regional, and individual backgrounds and revealed in the attitudes and practices of organizational members (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Studies in this segment can take a macro focus, by examining the relationship between culture and organization structure, or a micro focus by, looking at the differences and similarities between behaviors and attitudes of organizational members across countries (Smircich, 1983). By focusing on the differences and cluster of similarities across cultures, national culture research typically aims to provide practical suggestions for international business and document the possibility of translation of management
theories, and of influence of national culture on organizational practices and communication, and its implications over organizational effectiveness (Smircich & Calas, 1987; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). This type of research certainly makes a considerable contribution for understanding cultural differences and challenges the idea that organizational theories and practices are universally applicable (Hofstede, 1980).

The other research theme that falls into the functionalist perspective is ‘corporate culture’, which is very common in management literature and popular business journals and magazines. In accordance with the corporate culture view, organizations have distinct cultural artifacts, such as rituals, stories, ceremonies, and norms that develop within the organization rather than external factors that impose on the organizations (Smircich & Calas, 1987). In such a stance, culture is taken as an internal organizational variable that can be manipulated to produce certain effects, namely effectiveness, commitment, and satisfaction (Riley, 1983; Smircich, 1983; Martin, 1992). It is more likely for definitions of culture in this tradition to emphasize widely shared, unwritten value systems and practices within any given organization. In general terms, organizational culture is defined as, “social or normative glue that holds an organization together” (Smircich, 1983, p. 344) by means of shared values and beliefs among the members. In this regard, it is important for organizational members given that, it provides a sense of identity and organizational loyalty, generates commitment, enhances social system stability, and serves as a sense-making tool that can guide and shape organizational behavior (Smircich, 1983). This perspective treats culture as a concept that can be deliberately created or imposed by leaders and managers in order to build value consensus (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). As such, leaders and founders of organizations are viewed as the main actors who are able to create or change culture. They can build a strong culture by emphasizing a set of values and norms, adapting certain
policies, rituals, and performances, and communicating vision (McDonald, 1991; Bryman, 1999).

A culture’s strength is evaluated in terms of the extent and number of values shared among the members and the extent to which it predicts the behavior of organizational members. Corporate culture literature draws attention to the culture of organizations known for their success by suggesting an explicit or implicit link between culture and effectiveness, in spite of the lack of consistent data supporting this argument. It also sets the most common understanding of culture among leaders and managers. However, these two conceptions of culture which are most often defined and studied from a functionalistic perspective, are heavily criticized for being management centric and leading to static, non-contextual interpretation by the scholars who support an interpretive and critical perspective (Gregory, 1983).

In the interpretive tradition, scholars typically emphasize the symbolic, cognitive, communicative, meaning-centered, and contextual aspects of culture. Although there are differences in the symbolic, cognitive, and communicative conceptions within this perspective, they all treat culture as a root metaphor and “tend to view culture as a lens for studying organizational culture” (Martín, 2002, p. 4). They all support the idea that “a culture is not something an organization has; a culture is something an organization is”; as such, “organizations can be understood as cultures” (Smircich, 1983, p. 387). The researcher’s role is defined as a ‘cultural interpreter’ who intends to describe and interpret the meanings related to the activities of people with the purpose of drawing the natives’ points of view (Geertz, 1973). The researcher claims credibility based on his or her presence at the organizational setting rather than based on following the conventions of the scientific research paradigm.
According to scholars who take a cognitive stance, culture is seen as a system of shared meanings, frames of reference, or a system of knowledge, rules, and beliefs that determine how the members of a culture view and describe their world and thus guide their actions (Smircich, 1983). Another common segment in this line of research focuses on the symbolic nature of the cultural forms in the workplace. That is, culture is principally seen as a pattern of symbolic discourse; a system of shared symbols and meanings (Smircich, 1983; Carbaugh, 1988). Within this perspective, any symbols, which are the material manifestations of culture, can be indicators of cultural processes. It is through these cultural patterns and ordered clusters of significant symbols that people make sense of the events surrounding them and learn acceptable perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in that context (Geertz, 1973; Goodman et al., 1999). The meaning of all symbolic construction in organizations must be interpreted and deciphered in order to be understood (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993; Smircich, 1983). As shown in Carbaugh’s study (1988), each cultural term is a part of the interrelated systems of meaning, and the meaning of cultural terms such as ‘family’ can best be understood by taking into account the interpretation of symbol systems by members of the organization. Thus, in order to understand an organization’s culture, there is a need to focus on how organizational members assign meanings, understand and interpret their organizational experiences in a given setting, and how these interpretations and understandings relate to action and cultural symbols of the wider society.

From a constitutive perspective, culture can be perceived with a meaning-centered view whereby meaning is not universal and fixed, but rather negotiated and situated (Deetz, 2001). Within this perspective, culture, in simple terms, is defined as a system constructed over time through communication (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). It regards “communication as playing a
central role in constituting or shaping organizational experience and action and focuses on questions of meaning, interpretation, sense-making, and interaction” (Gibbs, 2002, p. 48). This view pays considerable attention to the everyday practices and interactions, rituals, artifacts, and symbols as the material manifestation of culture (Pacanowsky & Trujillo, 1983). The study of organizational culture is achieved by focusing on the interpretation of meanings given to these cultural practices by organizational members. This perspective provides insights into the study of everyday practices of organizational members and about the ways in which these practices are shaped by broader social, political, and ideological meanings which interact at an organizational nexus (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). As such, it increases the opportunity for dialogue concerning organizational culture, identity, and change process.

In his notable research, Kunda (2006) brought a critical perspective to the field by defining organizational culture as a set of explicit and implicit rules and body of traditions that guides the relationship between the organization and its members; as such, culture governs what the organizational members need to know, think, and feel in order to meet the standards of membership. In a similar vein, Geertz (1973) emphasized that culture is a socially structured system of meanings “in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives” (p. 52). According to Geertz (1973), culture involves plans, recipes, and instructions; as such, it is a control mechanism for governing and ordering people’s behavior. In general, according to critical scholars, management of organizational culture is thought to improve control rather than to directly increase performance, and the notion of strong culture and identification is viewed as a form of value-based unobtrusive control which has gradually replaced simple, technical, and bureaucratic forms of control (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985; Papa, Auwal & Singhal, 1997). This new form of control adopted, especially in modern organizations, limits decision options for
organizational members in favor of organizational interest and masks the mechanism of discipline (Kunda, 2006; Zorn et al., 2000). In addition, critical scholars emphasized cultural variation within organizations in the form of subcultures, multi-cultures, and finally the tensions and paradoxes among these cultures (Alvesson, 1993; Chan, 1996).

As seen, although many different definitions of culture are employed in the literature, there seems to be a focus on values, attitudes, ways of doing things, beliefs, rules, norms, meanings, symbols, and a frame of reference that are common in an organization. Harris and Ogbonna (2002) combined many of these definitions to describe culture: “culture is commonly theorized as a pervasive, eclectic, layered and socially constructed phenomenon, which is generated through values, beliefs and assumptions but expressed through artifacts, structures and behaviors” (p. 32).

**The Role of Culture in Organizations**

Although scholars differ on the generally accepted definition of culture and how it influences organizations, most agree on the important role that culture plays in organizations. Some scholars, especially functionalists, suggested an explicit or implicit link between culture and motivation, strong identification, control, and ultimately increasing an organization’s productivity and effectiveness (Pettigrew, 1979; Martin, 2002). Some scholars view culture as a metaphor for understanding organizational life rather than a managerial tool that can be used to increase effectiveness. Culture guides the interpretation and actions of organizational members by defining appropriate and inappropriate expressions of behavior for various situations (Louis, 1985; Witherspoon, 1997; Martin, 2002). As Weick (1979; 1995) suggested, culture plays an important role in how members make sense of the organization, their evaluation of certain situations and appropriate behavior and expressions, including dress codes, working hours,
leadership practices, and emotional responses. Eisenberg and Goodall (1993) viewed organizational culture as a repertoire or tool kit of habits that help organizational members choose the right thing to do and say. Similarly, Ravasi and Schultz (2006) contended that, cultural practices and artifacts served as a context for sense-making and as a platform for sense-giving by providing organizational members with a range of cues for reinterpreting and reevaluating the defining attributes of the organization through a retrospective rationalization of the past (p. 448).

In addition, some organizational culture scholars suggested that practices, stories, artifacts, rituals, and other cultural forms are products of a shared history and interpreted by members as evidence of an organization’s distinctiveness (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Although the claim of uniqueness is open to discussion in some respects (Martin, Feldman, Hatch, & Sitkin, 1983), organizational culture may serve to communicate a collective identity and support the feeling of organizational involvement and identification (Martin, 1992; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Much research currently exists to support the idea that organizational culture is essential in understanding and managing members’ daily practices, communication, and decision making; as such, managers consciously attempt to influence the behaviors and experiences of others. As stated by Kunda (2006), different forms of culture can also serve as framing devices used by leaders or managers to influence the ways in which social reality is perceived, interpreted, and understood by the organizational members and support the official interpretations. As such, some scholars pointed out that organizational culture not only serves positive functions such as making sense of the organization, a sense of emotional involvement, and fulfilling people’s needs for guidance but also leads to closure of mind, close monitoring and control, detailed prescription,
and thus as a form of constraint on the organizational members’ own autonomy (Alvesson, 1993; Cheney, 1995).

As observed in the discussions, although scholars change their positions on whether organizational culture is viewed as a tool to increase effectiveness and performance, as a sense-giving tool that guides actions, or as a form of unobtrusive control at the workplace, they appear to agree that culture is essential in understanding organizations and the behaviors of organizational members.

Based on this background, this study takes a symbolic, interpretive approach that regards culture as a root metaphor and as constituted or constructed by communicative practices (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). For the purpose of this dissertation, organizational culture is viewed as a beneficial concept that assists members in making sense of the organization, guiding their actions (i.e., appropriate and inappropriate things to do and say), and providing a sense of involvement in contrast to the alternate, ‘culture as a form of unobtrusive control’ or ‘culture as a tool to increase effectiveness’ paradigms.

**Forms of Culture in Organizations**

Existing studies of organizational culture tend to focus on a broad repertoire of cultural forms. These forms includes visual, verbal, and material artifacts (Schein, 1985); espoused values (beliefs and values that rationalize the behaviors of organizational members) (Schein, 1985; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006); formal practices (written policies that govern organizational structures and rules) (Kunda, 2006); informal practices (unwritten norms regarding appropriate behavior or proper decision making procedures); stories about employees (Martin et al., 1983), rituals (Kunda, 2006), organization-specific jargon and language (Maanen, 1991), humor, and
the effects of décor (Barley, 1983), dress norms (Maanen, 1991; McDonald, 1991), interior
design (Barley, 1983), and architecture (Carbaugh, 1988; Martin, 1992; Hatch, 1993).

Schein (1985) suggested a perspective in which these forms of culture are interrelated.
Accordingly, assumptions, values, and artifacts comprise three levels of culture. Assumptions are
the core of an organization’s culture which are usually taken for granted and are unconscious
elements that are not directly observable and knowable even to members of the organization
(Henri, 2006). At the middle level, there are values and norms, which represent the manifestation
of assumptions. While norms include common beliefs about appropriate and inappropriate
behaviors, values include the priorities given to certain states or outcomes. At the third level,
there are artifacts, which include the observable physical manifestations such as symbols,
language, rituals, mechanisms of decision making, and communication (Henri, 2006). Schein
(1985) regarded these artifacts as the manifestation of values.

Without making any categorization, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) underlined symbols
(i.e., words, gestures, pictures, language, jargon, hair, and dress), heroes, rituals (i.e., collective
activities, ways of greeting, ceremonies, and meetings), and values (i.e., respect, innovation,
accountability, and hierarchy) as the main forms of culture that manifest cultural differences among
organizations and nations.

In fact, researchers’ focus of interest in the interpretive perspective is also on the same
cultural forms. However, these researchers find it useful to center on the patterns of
interpretation underlying the various manifestations and processes that shape meanings rather
than focusing on a specific manifestation of culture (Martin, 1992; Smircich, 1983). In this
tradition, anything can be an expressive symbol of organizational culture from which
organizational members construct meaning and organize action (Louis, 1985). For example, the
offices of organizational members can be symbols of status through their design, space, and quality.

**Organizational Culture Perspectives**

In addition to the distinction between interpretive, functionalistic, and critical research, another important contribution came from Martin (1992), in which three dominant scholarly perspectives of organizational culture research were characterized: ‘integration, differentiation, and fragmentation’. Although this dissertation does not take these three perspectives into consideration as a framework for the analysis of culture, understanding them provides useful insight for any cultural research, including the one at hand. Since its emergence, this classification has produced an extensive body of literature in the field of organizational culture. Each perspective influences how researchers define and conceptualize culture, utilize methods for data collection and analysis, and finally present their findings (Witmer, 1997; Taylor, Irvin, & Wieland, 2006).

The integration perspective focuses on a consistent, shared understanding of culture in organizations. In integration studies, homogeneity, clarity, harmony, and a unified culture are achievable and desirable within an organization; they function as social or normative glue that holds people together, which is essential for an organization’s success in hard times and to keep employees motivated (Smircich, 1983; Martin, 2002). Integration studies search for ways to explain how managers successfully create a culture that generates commitment, motivation, strong identification, control, and ultimately increases an organization’s productivity and effectiveness (Pettigrew, 1979). It has been argued that managers have the power to make a difference and can play a central role in the transformation and creation of a unified, widely shared, homogeneous culture by articulating a clear vision, objectives, and corporate values.
Integrationists criticize others for not having a research agenda to assist practitioners in creating and controlling cultures, which is key to an organization’s success and ultimately to all organizational members. In many ways, the integration perspective is linked to the assumptions of ‘corporate culture’ phenomenon.

Differentiation studies recognize the existence of diverse values, practices, and inconsistent manifestations in organizations, and look instead at subcultures, namely lower level organizational members and minorities (i.e., blacks, women) where consensus and clarity exist. This line of study highlights the power struggle and conflict of interest between labor and management, and interpretation of managerial discourse regarding quality, excellence, and customer satisfaction as a new form of unobtrusive control that inspires lower level employees to work harder (Zorn et al., 2000). Thus, it is not surprising to observe that most differentiation studies are written from a critical perspective. Integrationist studies are criticized for being caught in the illusion of homogeneity and unitary of culture and having a managerial bias that enables and justifies inequalities and value engineering (Martin, 2002). In contrast, differentiation researchers view organizational culture as a nexus of environmental influences and sub-cultural characteristics rather than an organizational wide unitary. Consistent with this, they argue that cultural change programs cannot be easily planned and imposed by top management as suggested by integrationist researchers, but that cultural change is the product of unplanned responses to environmental pressures and long-term struggles of different subcultures within the organization that enforce and resist the change (Martin, 2002; Böke, 2008).

Finally, the fragmentation perspective emphasizes ambiguity, flux, transience, and inconsistency manifested both between and within subcultures (Martin, 1992; Whitmer, 1997; Eisenberg & Riley, 2001); this perspective criticize other studies for oversimplifying
organizational culture by narrowing it down to shared values, a strong culture, homogeneity, or conflict between groups that can be defined in terms of clear oppositions (Martin, 2002). In the fragmentation perspective, consensus is neither organization-wide nor specific to any given subculture. Consensus among individuals is transient and issue-specific, producing short-lived similarities that are quickly replaced by a different pattern of similarity (Martin, 1992; Whitmer, 1997). In fragmentation studies, ambiguity has been regarded as a central feature of organizations which is normal, inevitable, and even beneficial, and which needs to be admitted and understood (Gibbs, 2002). Fragmentation researchers criticize other studies in their stance regarding cultural change and argue that cultural change is a process of constant flux and ambiguity. “The interpretations of those changes are multiple; people don’t agree what change is intended, why, or even what exactly has changed. Change is a part of culture; it is culturally constructed and so its meaning lies in the eye of the beholder” (Martin, 2002, p. 176).

According to Martin (1992), using a single perspective produces only partial knowledge claims about an organization rather than complex and heuristic representations of organizational culture. Hence, it has been posited that multiple perspectives are necessary and desirable in order to provide a full, holistic picture of organizations, because any culture has some aspects compatible with all three perspectives (Hylmo & Buzzanell, 2002).

**Different Layers of Culture**

Scholars of organizational culture have classified different layers of culture. Individuals in a group or organization carry with them a set of cultural mindsets acquired outside the group (i.e., country, region, ethnicity, gender, and occupation) or organization (i.e., industry, organizational position) that have certain influences on the way of doing what the individual does inside the organization, team, or group. As Goodman et al. (1999) contend, the members of
each organization or cultural group are also carriers of multiple cultures and “may not use a single set of cultural assumptions. Rather, they may shift their cultural identity depending on the issue at hand, drawing from the different mindset they carry” (p. 27). Thus, organizations or groups can be thought as the potential carriers of multiple cultures.

Within this context, Goodman et al. (1999) define five layers of culture that distinguish one cultural group from another: geographically based (i.e., national, regional); social subgroups (i.e., ethnic, gender); cross organization (i.e., industry, profession, discipline); organizational; and sub-organizational culture (i.e., functional, hierarchical, project based). Each member of the organization carries a number of these layers. For example, a patrol officer in New York carries a geographically based layer to the United States national culture, the regional culture of the Northeast United States as well as a gender and hierarchical based culture. All these different layers of culture may also evolve in the organization and contribute to the development of a certain set of assumptions unique to this organization. These entire cultural layers have important implications in the perceptions and practices of organizational members that are reflected in the language, symbols, and ethnocentric beliefs; thus, it is important for scholars to understand the implication of these layers when adapting any initiative in terms of applicability, limitations, and resistance by organizational members.

The Role of Culture and Communication in Implementing Planned Change Initiatives

In this section, a theoretical perspective for organizational change and the change process will first be discussed, followed by different implementation approaches, reasons for success and failure of organizational change initiatives, and various forms of resistance and receptivity to organizational change. Then, the roles that culture and communication play during the
implementation of planned change efforts will be addressed. Finally, change in police organizations with a focus on Compstat and its theoretical background, definition, and principles and component will be discussed.

**Planned Organizational Change**

Planned change efforts involve deliberate and purposeful attempts of change agents to enhance individual development and improve organizational performance and effectiveness through the alteration of an organization’s structure, technologies, policies, processes, culture, practices, and behaviors of members (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Because the world is changing in a rapid and dramatic way, no organization can remain the same and expect to survive. Thus, the majority of corporate and public organizations engage in planned efforts in an attempt to change their overall practices, structure, culture, and technologies through strategies and techniques or package systems of change that will keep them in line with the demands of governments, public needs, new technologies, legal requirements, and other normative and cultural pressures (Collins, 1995).

In an effort to put organizational change into a theoretical framework, scholars have typically viewed institutional theory as useful given its strength to explain the change, various choices of organizations to adopt change, and the ways change is implemented into the organization. Institutional theory was developed in 1948 by Philip Selznick, a distinguished professor at the University of California, Berkeley, noted for his works on organizational theory. Consistent with system theory, institutional theory suggests that organizations are located in the environment rather than in isolation from the environment, and they take into account the interests, external constraints, and pressures from the environment (Thayer, 1968; Ruben, 1972; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993; Jones, Watson, Gardner, & Gallois, 2004). The theory argues that organizational structures and policies will develop and change over time due to shifting internal
and external conditions and pressures. The chief motive behind these change efforts is not only the rational pressures to encourage more effective performance, but also the social and cultural pressures needed to conform to conventional beliefs and thus confer legitimacy and survival (Scott, 1998; Vitale, 2005).

In an organization’s change process, institutional theorists suggest three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism explains organizational change through the existence of formal and informal pressures exerted by other organizations and cultural expectations. Political pressures that can be enforced by regulating agencies (i.e., environment protection standards, scholarship standards) are examples of coercive isomorphism (Demers, 2008). For instance, an agency can define the rules for obtaining grants or funding and can demand that organizations follow these rules and strategies in exchange for receiving grants or funding. This situation forces organizations to comply with the rules and respond to the demands which, in turn, results in change in organizations. Secondly, mimetic isomorphism refers to the tendency of organizations to adopt standard practices in the face of uncertainty (Demers, 2008). The goal ambiguity and uncertainty created by an organization’s environment creates pressure and leads an organization to imitate others. Weick and Quinn (1999) stated that organizational leaders watch one another and adopt strategies that they envision will be successful in producing greater performance and legitimacy. For this reason, popular change initiatives and management principles create pressure on organizations and are therefore accepted and quickly imitated. The rapid diffusion of popular practices during the 1980s, such as Total Quality Management, and community policing and Compstat during the 1990s, are examples of mimetic isomorphism (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003; Lewis, 2011). Finally, normative isomorphism is associated with
professionalism and comes primarily from experts and professionals within organizations. The development of education and professional networks produces pressure for organizations to conform to legitimated professional practices (Demers, 2008). In this sense, scholars have asserted that the decision to adopt a change initiative has arisen mostly from these types of pressure. Once a decision is made to adopt a change, the next step is to take the necessary steps and strategies and then put the change into practice. The process of implementation strategies are theorized and expressed by a number of scholars, and will be discussed in the following section.

Organizational Change Process

The first well-known and highly respected attempt to understand the change process was provided by Kurt Lewin in 1947, in which he argued that human behavioral changes occur in three stages: unfreezing the present level, moving to the new level, and then refreezing the new level. In this three-step model, successful change occurs by first unfreezing an old pattern of relationships; second, developing a new pattern through a change program; and third, refreezing the new pattern of relationships (Lewin, 1947). This basic model has been improved through the years following Lewin’s first introduction. For example, Rogers (1962) organized the change process into agenda setting (create a need for change), matching (feasibility testing), redefining (modification for the fit), clarifying (common understanding), and finally routinizing (incorporating change into the system). The first two processes are considered to be the ‘initiation’ stages, and the last three are ‘implementation’ stages. Similarly, Kotter (1990) developed a change phase model to be followed in order to avoid making costly mistakes during organizational change. The model includes the following phases: establish a sense of urgency, create a coalition, develop a clear vision, share the vision, empower people to clear obstacles, secure short-term wins, consolidate and keep moving, and anchor the change. Similarly, Ruben (2009) identified a stage model of change that is
considered a different form from those presented by Lewin and Kotter. In Ruben’s model, stages consist of seeing a need for change (attention), becoming involved (engagement), committing to a position (commitment), acting on one’s commitment (action), and embracing the change as a regular part of life/work (integration).

Although the names and number of stages change considerably, the points made to ensure successful planned change efforts remain very much the same. For example, Lewin (1947) suggested in his model that feeling uncomfortable with the old behavior and seeing a need for change is the key incentive in the first step. Both Kotter (1990; 1996) and Ruben (2009) pointed out the importance of a sense of urgency for change among organizational members. Although it is common to argue that the need for organizational change is abnormal, change must first be created and communicated by defining and articulating the problem. Second, the engagement and commitment of related parties must be ensured by creating a common vision, goal, and ownership of the process by empowering affiliated parties and people. The third step basically defines the actual change process. This step requires the need to identify what should be changed and specific actions that will be initiated to achieve the identified goals and standards. The final step requires efforts to get the new process accepted and practiced on the job, or; in other words, institutionalization of the results (Lewin, 1947; Kotter, 1990; 1996; Ruben, 2009). Although change is not necessarily a linear, singular process characterized as a rational series of activities and events (Dawson, 1994), these and other models help to understand the critical issues faced in the planned change process. Each stage requires a number of intentional, planned, and well-understood efforts as well as consideration of cross-cutting factors such as planning, leadership, communication, culture, and assessment (Ruben, 2009). In particular, this dissertation will address two of these factors: culture and communication.
Implementation of Planned Organizational Change

Implementation can be defined as “the translation of any tool or technique, process, or method of doing, from knowledge to practice” (as cited in Lewis, 2011, p. 193). Organizational scholars have expressed an enduring interest in the implementation of planned change efforts. A considerable number of theories and research have examined different approaches and offered insights that have been followed by change agents during an organization’s implementation phase, namely top-down, bottom-up, and whole-system participative strategies (Tenkasi & Chesmore, 2003). Decisions to determine how to implement change can affect the overall success of implementation. Therefore, understanding these strategies and selecting the ones consistent with an organization and/or change initiatives are essential.

Numerous scholars have placed implementation strategies and tactics into larger frameworks. For example, Nutt (2007) identified four implementation models: ‘intervention,’ ‘participation,’ ‘persuasion,’ and ‘edict.’ Intervention involves documenting gaps between current performance and expected performance based on benchmarking comparable organizations and then suggesting realistic ways to implement change according to how others have been able to improve. Participation, on the other hand, involves feedback from those affected by the change process and requires interested parties to reach a consensus on the meaning of change and use of certain participation mechanisms. In the third model, persuasion occurs when change agents highlight the benefits of a given change in order to influence and gain support from those who will be affected in the process. In this model, they can rely on factual statements, analysis, or their own intuition to promote the change efforts. The final model is edict in which change agents firmly control the process and make decisions regarding how to implement change with little or no feedback from organizational members.
Nutt (2007) concluded that although intervention and participation were the most successful models, they were, interestingly, the least used. Although participation and intervention models are highly recommended and extensively articulated in the literature, change agents tend to rely primarily on their own judgment unless forced to involve other parties and build a consensus. Even in these situations, participation of organizational members can stay at the symbolic level rather than an authentic one (Nutt, 2007).

In another distinction among implementation of change initiatives, Lewis (2011) developed four classifications, namely: ‘adaptive,’ ‘programmatic,’ ‘rule-bound,’ and ‘autonomous.’ The adaptive model is more responsive to organizational members, and changes are adapted to fit the needs and considerations of the organization as well as its members. In the programmatic model, very little feedback, if any, is requested from organizational group members, and plans to change are first made and then implemented. In the rule-bound model, change agents or top executives play the central role in implementing changes. Finally, in an effort to design the best use of organizational structure and change, the autonomous model uses flexible strategies that are open to further modification and includes feedback and involvement from the members of organization at all organizational levels (Lewis, 2011).

In comparing these implementation models to those proposed by Nutt (2007), Lewis (2011) stated that rule-bound/programmatic models are comparable to the edict model which is based on centralized control and decision making, whereas the participation model resembles the adaptive/autonomous models in terms of their common focus on empowerment and reinvention. According to Lewis (2011), Nutt’s persuasion model delegates the implementation process to experts and so might fit into the autonomous/programmatic model. On the other hand, Nutt’s intervention
model may fit well into the rule-bound/adaptive category, in which the implementers play the active role in promoting change.

Luthans (1989) made another distinction among implementation models with their roots taken from leadership literature, namely ‘autocratic’, ‘participative’, and ‘democratic’. Yet another classification was provided by Beyer and Trice (1982) based on literature reviews of 27 empirical studies. They identified three types of implementation approaches: ‘informational’, ‘bonding’, and ‘control’. The informational approach focuses on creating a connection between the organization and experts who take the role of sales representatives in an effort to persuade organizational members to change. In the bonding approach, implementers consider ideas suggested by interested parties and then incorporate some of them into the implementation process to gain support and acceptance. Finally, in the control approach, much like that of the rule-bound model, top executives decide what is useful and then take actions to adopt their plan.

A combination of these approaches can be used to introduce and implement planned organizational change initiatives. The selection may be a function of intended goals in terms of outcomes (i.e., uniformity, fidelity), the characteristics of the model itself, and the fit of planned change to the organization’s culture (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Lewis, 2011). For example, a new, complex technology with a number of different applications can be best implemented using autonomous/adaptive or participative approaches in which organizational members are empowered to choose the best design. However, if the main purpose of change efforts is to alter the organization’s structure and culture, the adaptive approach may not be relevant. Similarly, participative and democratic approaches may not provide the best results in an organization characterized by a high power distance and strict hierarchy. Other than these models and their
selection, there are many other factors that can affect the success or failure of the change implementation process. The following section will focus on these factors.

**Reasons for Implementation Failures and Successes**

Many studies have been conducted to understand the various factors that influence change implementation. In one such study, Cochran et al. (2002) identified the following external and internal factors that lead to negative reactions toward implementing organizational changes: financial difficulties, lack of leadership commitment, lack of employee support, organizational culture, employee resistance, or a negative attitude toward change. Ruben (2009) also developed an extensive list of factors that may negatively influence the reactions of organizational members: not seeing a need for change; regarding the change as a threat to their comfort level, self-interests, self-concepts, or self-identities; fear of changing routines and approaches that may require new knowledge and skills, fear of a change in status; lack of confidence and trust in leaders; and finally viewing the change as a threat to the organization’s future.

From another perspective, Covin and Kilmann (1990) identified factors that influence the change process both positively and negatively. On the one hand, management support and commitment, readiness for change, encouraging employee participation, good communication, and acknowledgement of a strong need for change were all perceived by respondents as positive issues that support change. On the other hand, lack of management support, forced change programs by top managers, unrealistic expectations, lack of employee participation, poor communication, and an unclear purpose were believed to impact change programs negatively. In addition to these factors, Lewis (2011) argued that the organizational structure, resources, and political power can influence change efforts. For example, an organization’s degree of bureaucracy, hierarchy, and its ability to use resources to change can influence the rate of
success or failure. Further, conflicting interests and political power exercised by related parties are likely to affect how change will be implemented as well as its successful or unsuccessful outcomes (Lewis, 2011). In an earlier study, Lewis (2007) suggested that uncertainty and resistance are perceived to be the most common reasons related to the failure of planned organizational changes.

Despite the general focus on resistance to change, there are also empirical works that focus on receptivity. According to Cochran et al. (2002), an organizational member’s receptivity is a function of the degree of perceptions to which an organization is well-prepared for such a change. Based on these results, they suggested a number of recommendations that are widely shared in the literature. These include: creating urgency for the change, clearing obstacles (uncertainty) in the system in order to overcome resistance, and preparing organizational members to be ready and willing for change through involvement, participation, and empowerment mechanisms. In another study conducted in a police organization, Cochran and colleagues (2002) found a difference between the level of receptivity to new ideas among people with different socio-demographic characteristics, namely race, gender, education, number of service years, and hierarchical position. In brief, a review of the literature reveals the following factors that influence organizational change processes and the reactions of members: uncertainty, resistance, receptivity to change, readiness to change, organizational structure, resources, politics, commitment, leadership support, trust in management, communication of change, organizational culture, training, past changes and failures, and cynicism.

Among all these factors, ‘resistance to change’ is likely to be the most recognized and researched factor in the organizational change literature, and this takes its roots from the common belief that people resist change (Dent & Goldberg, 1999). In the majority of works,
resistance is defined as a “restraining force moving in the direction of maintaining the status quo” or “forces that lead employees away from supporting changes proposed by managers” (Piderit, 2000, p. 784). Further, Argyris and Schon (1978) argued that “resistance to change is a defense mechanism produced by frustration and anxiety” (p.34).

In criticizing the loss of meaning and managerial bias in the use of this concept, Dent and Goldberg (1999) made an important distinction between resistance to change and resistance to the consequences of change by stating that people may resist loss of status, pay, and comfort in change programs that do not appear feasible. And therefore, these factors are different from resistance to change; rather, they represent resistance to the consequences of change. In the same line of thought, Piderit (2000) criticized the managerial conceptualization in which resistance is used to blame “the less powerful for the failure of change efforts, and dismiss the potentially valid and legitimate concerns and expectations of organizational members” (p.785).

Another important consideration in the use of the term was raised by Hultman (1995), who argued that although the nature and degree of resistance can be considerably different, the concept is mistakenly used to cover a range of various reactions. Considering this point, Hultman distinguished resistance as an active-resistance or passive-resistance concept. While active-resistance includes finding fault, ridiculing, and manipulating, the latter includes approving verbally but not following through or withholding information.

Regardless of the different definitions, factors, and perspectives for the concept, it would be fair to say that resistance, at different degrees, is a part of the change process. Although there are increasing number of works that draw attention to the positive role that resistance can play, for example, forcing management to rethink or reevaluate change in terms of plausible concerns raised by organizational members and an opportunity to engage and educate members (Dent &
Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000), resistance to change is typically viewed as a negative issue that makes programs very difficult or even impossible to implement (Bovey & Hede, 2001). Even well-prepared plans may suffer the risk of eventual failure due to the resistance to change or resistance to consequences of change. Considering the centrality of this issue, there is an abundance of literature regarding factors that influence resistance as well as means and methods to overcome, minimize, or manage change.

In identifying the main causes of resistance, most researchers pointed out the need for stability, a sense of reduced control, uncertainty, instability, insecurity, conflict, fear of losing power, status, and benefits (Dawson, 1994; Eilam & Shamir, 2005). Similarly, Dent and Goldberg (2000) noted that other potential causes that lead to resistance include fear of change, fear of unpleasantness, lack of trust, uncertainty, poor training, surprise, and personality conflicts. Further, Harris and Ogbonna (2002) listed a number of other different resistance factors common to members of organization. These include organizational culture and subcultures, persuasion and coercion mechanisms, an individual’s position and role in the organization, commitment to organization, history of change initiatives, and the roles of change agents. In yet another study, Harvey (1995) considered the lack of involvement, benefits, knowledge, and management support to contribute to resistance, whereas factors suggested for the success of implementation included involvement, equal information, participation, and use of certain incentives among organizational members. According to Lewis (2007), taking all of these factors into account, uncertainty was the central reason resulting in a sense of reduced control, fear, anxiety, and stress as well as one of the most commonly recognized reasons for resistance to change.
Other than these factors, how change is implemented might possibly play a critical role in the reaction of organizational members toward change (Piderit, 2000). Obviously, not all staff in all organizations are resistant to organizational change. In other words, the way in which agents treat organizational members and implement programs may have a direct influence on resistance to change. For example, when organizational members believe that they are treated fairly, they develop the desired attitudes and behaviors necessary for a successful change. On the other hand, if workplace decisions and managerial actions are perceived as being unjust or dictated, members are more likely to experience feelings of anger and resist change. Accordingly, Folger and Skarlicki (1999) claimed that through resistance to change, organizational members exercise their power to redress injustice within the existing power relationships.

Although the literature most often focused on resistance concerning particular factors, Orlikowski (1992) argued that the reactions of organizational members might differ substantially based on their interpretation of change. Further, organizational members make sense of and interpret change based on their ascribed meanings, emotional responses, and perceptions of personal gains or losses as well as their workplace experiences (Eilam & Shamir, 2005). As will be discussed later, cultural values and beliefs and communication are also essential factors that contribute to members’ perceptions of change, meanings they assign to change, related gains or losses due to change, and understanding and minimizing change.

Consequently, it is accurate to state that all of the aforementioned factors influence the degree of resistance and receptivity towards planned change efforts. Accordingly, understanding of these factors and ways in which to manage the planned organizational change process will increase the likelihood of a successful implementation of a change effort (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). Culture and communication are two important cross-cutting aspects that play a crucial role
across all stages of the change process and which will affect the degree of receptivity, resistance, 
and outcomes. The role that culture and communication play in implementing a successful planned 
change effort will each be individually examined in the following section.

**Role of Culture in Implementing Planned Change Efforts**

The role of culture in implementing planned change efforts can be considered at two 
different levels. The first and most common level is its role as a source of resistance and possibly 
receptivity, and the second level is its role as a sense-making and sense-giving tool during 
organizational change efforts. Although some positive roles can possibly be linked to culture, 
researchers addressing the role of culture during the implementation stage of change have focused 
mainly on the negative aspects in terms of cultural fit and cultural resistance. Some have argued 
that cultural fit is an important factor that should be considered in all stages, and suggested that 
change agents should consider the significance and potential tenacity of existing cultures to be 
certain that strategies are culturally sensitive (Dawson, 1994; Weber, 2000). In other words, it has 
been recommended that the values postulated by a proposed change must be consistent with the 
values and assumptions that comprise the organization’s culture, and if not, the change needs to 
be adapted to the organization’s culture (Dawson, 1994). Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) supported 
this view and further suggested that change programs which aim to increase motivation and 
performance all be culturally conditioned and call for adaptation to fit different national and 
organizational cultures. For instance, in high context and collectivist cultures, managers may 
prefer more subtle, indirect ways of gathering feedback relating to the performance of 
organizational members, given that directly discussing the subject is likely to break the group’s 
social harmony. In contrast, it is more applicable for managers in individualistic cultures to 
directly confront inadequate worker performance and conflicts between organizational members.
For this reason, Jaeger (1986) earlier stated that the organizational development model which encompasses confrontation meetings is not appropriate for collectivist cultures due to the possibility of loss of face in the sense of humiliation during times of direct confrontation concerning performance and conflicts. Similarly, change initiatives that call for empowerment, participation, and confrontation of organizational members do not fit organizations that are defined by high power distance and strong hierarchies. For example, the Management by Objectives (MBO) may not be relevant in such an organization as it assumes some form of negotiation and consultation between subordinates and superiors in addition to participation in decision making that neither party would feel comfortable doing (Hofstede, 1980; Tayep, 1994). Specifically, while low level employees may be afraid to disagree with their managers or bring up negative facts about a particular situation, expecting managers to give directions, managers may consider the negotiation with subordinates and their participation in decision making as a kind of weakness and loss of face (Newman & Nollen, 1996). As shown, the basic reason for these negative assumptions concerning the role of culture is the possibility of clash between existing cultural features and those embedded into the structure of change initiatives. Deetz, Tracy, and Simpson (2000) argued that there is increasing evidence that cultural incompatibility is the single largest cause for the failure of change efforts and emergence of problems during mergers and acquisitions. The possibility of resistance and, in turn, failure is higher when the extent of difference between the espoused and the current cultural features are larger and when there are strong subcultures (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, Schein, 1985, Witherspoon, 2005). In this case, implementation of change initiatives may be totally resisted or may be adapted, modified, or redefined by organizational members. For instance, Jian (2007) stated that “organizational members treat the promoted cultural values in a superficial and ritualistic manner instead of
embracing its intended managerial meaning. Organizational members reconstitute meaning and practice in the implementation of change and produce various forms of escape from management’s intent” (p. 8). In other cases, resistance may be shown more directly by reduced outcome, slowed pace of work, and increased absenteeism (Miller, Johnson, & Grau, 1994).

As previously noted, this does not mean that change initiatives need to be fully consistent with the accepted culture of an organization. At the outset, most planned change initiatives seek or should seek to promote a cultural change as a prerequisite to the success of these change initiatives (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). However, this suggests that it is likely to be more problematic and difficult as the degree of difference becomes larger between the organization’s culture and cultural expectations of a proposed change effort. Considering this point, the dilemma becomes whether to adapt change initiatives to the organizational culture or attempt to change the organizational culture to accommodate change initiatives. As suggested by Hofstede (1980), most of the time organizations tend to adapt change initiatives to fit the organizational and national culture. This is illustrated by Germany’s successful adaptation of the MBO model, although these efforts generally failed in France. As will be discussed in the cultural change section, the integration of an organization’s cultural values with the proposed change initiative or the right balance between the need for cultural fit and cultural change is a difficult situation that must be taken into account during change efforts that run counter to the organizational culture.

Another important factor relating to resistance that was listed in the literature is subcultures; specifically, the extent of difference between the espoused and the current cultural values of different subcultures in an organization (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002). As we noted in different layers of culture, there are likely to be multiple cultures or subcultures in an
organization as a result of difference in organizational members’ demographics, and occupational and hierarchical positions (Goodman et al., 1999). According to Gallivan (2001), these diverse cultures can hold various assumptions, values, and ideas concerning organizational change that cause them to interpret the same activities and messages in very different and even contradictory ways than other cultures or subcultures within the organization. The most recognized cultural difference is between hierarchical lines such as upper management, middle management, and lower level members of an organization. They may have radically different interpretations concerning the size, scope, and purpose of change and ways to implement change (Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2005). For example, most change efforts in police organizations can be misdirected or totally ignored by the front line officers within the limits of their discretionary power. Similarly, Harris and Ogbonna (2002) described certain situations in which front line members were not internalizing the cultural shift in the way that change agents desired. As such, they viewed particular activities such as goal setting meetings not as something important but solely symbolic events that had to be endured. As Gallivan (2001) argued, when such extreme interpretations exist within or between groups that have diverse cultural features, this may lead to resistance in accepting change initiatives. Thus, any given change initiative should account for the existence of multiple cultures and subcultures within an organization as well as variations in the reactions as to how change is to be implemented, which can be critical to its success.

Another role of culture can be conceptualized as sense-making and sense-giving. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) viewed the initiation of change efforts as sense-making for self and sense-giving for others. In other words, organizational members are not solely passive recipients of change but rather play active roles in the organizational change process. On the basis of
different meanings that members assign to alteration initiatives, they make sense of change, develop certain beliefs and ideas about change, and act accordingly (Whiteley, 1995). This is known as sense-making process and in this process they do not rely solely on objective facts and factors. Rather, they act on their interpretation of reality, rather than reality itself, which becomes the basis of their actions and behaviors. More specifically, organizational members make sense and interpret organizational change based on the existing cultural beliefs, rules, norms, symbols, and traditions and use them to understand and assign meanings to specific actions and experiences (Gallivan, 2001). Weick and Quinn (1999) highlighted the role of culture in the change process as follows:

Culture as the vehicle that preserves the know-how of adaptation is implied in this description: If we understand culture to be a stock of knowledge that has been codified into a pattern of recipes for handling situations, then very often with time and routine they become tacit and taken for granted and form the schemas which drive action. Culture, viewed as a stock of knowledge, serves as a scheme of expression that constrains what people do and a scheme of interpretation that constrains how the doing is evaluated. (p. 378)

Some scholars place more emphasis on the role of culture as a sense-giving tool used by change agents. Ravasi and Schultz (2006) suggested that leaders should understand the role of culture in informing and supporting not only sense-making actions of organizational members but also sense-giving platforms in order to affect perceptions of organizational members. In order to change organizations, organizational members must make new sense and develop new interpretations of what the organization is about. At this point, change agents can use “culture as
influential discursive resources for developing a positive perception and resolving possible divergence of interpretations about change” (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006, p. 448).

This assumption takes us to where organizational culture and communication interact as two critical change concepts. In particular, the ambiguity and uncertainty experienced at the introduction makes communication central to the construction and development of certain expectancies, labels, and beliefs about change (Zorn, 2002). That is, change efforts are open to multiple interpretations and negotiations that suggest the possibility of influencing the process in positive, negative, and neutral ways. Organizational culture provides a range of cues for how to reinterpret the change process. It also serves as resources and constraints that help change agents to create and communicate frames consistent and congruent with organizational members’ culture and influence their perceptions in a positive way (Zorn, 2002). Put differently, organizational members are likely to reject or ignore frames that they perceive as incongruent with the organization’s culture and history (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). If the manner in which change agents frame a problem does not clearly resonate with any current cultural values, this situation limits the ability of communicators to persuade and get attention and support from organizational members during the change process (Dilling & Moser, 2007). For this reason, change agents need to recognize organizational members in terms of demographics, needs, predispositions, and culture in order to understand what will invigorate them. For example, in individualistic cultures, change agents can focus on people’s self-interests as a result of change (Michaelis, 2007). Consistent with this, Weick and Quinn (1999) underline the importance of the ability of change agents to give a sense of change dynamics through managing language, reframing certain aspects of change consistent with frames and mental models of organizational members, and supporting an official interpretation of change. Therefore, it is clear that culture is
not only a source of resistance but also a platform for making and giving sense of what the change is all about.

**Culture and Organizational Change**

Regardless of its main purpose, any planned change effort must interact with the organization’s culture. Increasingly, practitioners and scholars have begun to argue that implementation of any planned change initiative is more about cultural change than about any specific practice (Michela & Burke, 2000). According to Cameron and Quinn (1999), most change programs (i.e., TQM, MBO) did not achieve the desirable level of performance because the organization’s culture remained the same. They suggested that if an organization’s only intention is to change procedures, practices, and strategies without targeting the cultural features and goals, change will remain on the surface, and organizations will quickly return to the status quo. Based on this assumption, changing the organizational culture is claimed to be a key factor in successful change efforts. However, different traditions in the literature vary considerably regarding the possibility of cultural change, how to alter or manage culture, the possible consequences, and the methodological approaches concerning how to measure or understand cultural change. Therefore, these points are important issues to be discussed in the context of this dissertation, which questions the possible influence that a change initiative could have on an organization’s cultural values.

In fact, the proliferation of organizational culture studies in the beginning of the 1980s came partly from the claim that culture is manageable in a way that increases commitment, loyalty, productivity, performance, and even sometimes profitability. As previously discussed, the dominant line of research illustrated by the works of many functionalists as well as integrationists treated culture as a concept that could be deliberately created and changed by
leaders and managers in order to build value consensus and thus increase organizational effectiveness (Bryman, 1999; Martin, 1992; McDonald, 1991). Despite the divergence of scholars on the nature and extent of control, studies in this camp (i.e., corporate culture, national culture) view culture mostly as a variable that is subject to either complete or partial control of management under certain conditions following certain approaches. The other camp takes culture as a root metaphor for understanding and analyzing organizations. Scholars in this camp either support the idea that culture is not manageable or that it can be managed or controlled only with difficulty, and that management also may lead to unintended consequences. These two camps set the background for discussing this issue (Ogbonna & Harris, 2002a, 2002b).

Early studies of organizational culture were most often in the first camp and followed the idea that the creation of a strong, unifying organizational culture could be a solution to weak performance. Organizational leaders and founders were viewed as the main actors who were able to create or change culture, and they could build a strong culture by emphasizing a set of values and norms, adapting certain policies, rituals, and performances, and communicating vision (Bryman, 1999; McDonald, 1991). This idea was promoted through consulting firms and popular publications that supported a universally appropriate, prescriptive list of cultural characteristics such as ‘customer orientation’ and ‘constant innovation’ that were applicable to all organizations (see Peters & Waterman, 1982). This literature drew attention to the culture of organizations known for their success by suggesting an explicit or implicit link between culture and effectiveness. Specifically, the attractiveness and simplicity of these solutions to poor performance increased the recognition and popularity of these publications among practitioners and thus brought about the idea that culture can be changed in accordance with these prescriptions (Ogbonna & Harris, 2002b). Despite the limited success of these efforts, Ogbonna and Wilkinson (2003)
reported widespread attempts for planned cultural intervention in the UK. Proponents of this perspective also offered a lengthy list of approaches on how to manage and change culture in order to reach desired outcomes.

Since the late 1980s, mostly scholars in the interpretive and critical camp questioned the intellectual foundations of the link between culture and performance, manageability of culture, and the idea of a strong culture characterized by widely-shared values among organizational members by pointing out cultural diversity, conflicts, and ambiguity within organizations (Smircich, 1983; Martin, 1992, 2002). One group argued that cultural values and assumptions are deeply embedded in the individuals’ subconscious, which is beyond the control of managers. At the same time, they argued that the transformation of organizations from modern to post-modern in their structure as well as greater competition, globalization, and technological innovations increased the organization’s cultural diversity and complexity. In this regard, while functional and integration studies tend to ignore the conflicts and contradictions and adopt a monolithic, integrated view of culture in which the values of top management are assumed to be widely-shared by organizational members, this is not the case in the modern and post-modern organizations (Martin, 1992). Thus, the response and interpretation of organizational members to any sort of cultural intervention cannot be controlled. It may both lead to ethical dilemmas and unintended consequences for the organizations and individuals (Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003).

Another line of research in this camp provided a more realistic view of culture change and argued that cultural control is difficult and slow, but not impossible (Hofstede, 1980). Similar to society’s culture, an organization’s culture may be influenced, although it may not be controlled completely (Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003). Rather, it may be influenced by some societal, national, and organizational conditions, including the efforts of managers to influence
certain aspects. For instance, Schein (1985) and Hofstede (1980) claimed that managers have the capacity to control the organization’s cultural artifacts, rules (i.e., promotion systems, reward systems, forms of recruitment), or practices which, in turn, may facilitate or influence change at the deeper levels of culture such as values, assumptions, and beliefs. Thus, managers must be realistic concerning the nature and extent of change that is possible considering the complex nature of organizations and deep-rooted set of values (Collins, 1998).

As suggested by Ogbonna and Harris (2002a), camps can be classified under three categories identified as ‘optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic’. Overall, whereas the optimistic camp may be too positive in perceiving that organizational culture can be easily changed, the pessimistic camp may not portray a complete explanation of the dynamics of cultural change by supporting the idea that culture cannot be changed or managed. Based on this discussion, it would be fair to say that the realistic view represents a more practical position. The realistic camp proposes that an organization’s culture may evolve in response to changing organizational and environmental conditions or it may be influenced by change agents through certain interventions; however, it cannot be controlled or changed in an exact direction (Ogbonna & Harris, 2002a, 2002b; Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003). In a number of articles, Ogbonna and Harris provided evidence for cultural change in the hospital and food industry of the UK through certain interventions.

There are two main models of culture change in the literature: ‘natural evolution’ and ‘forced revolution.’ The evolutionary model suggests that “as new organizational members are socialized, they are inculcated with the organization’s culture, which is further reinforced as dynamic interaction occurs” (Ogbonna & Harris, 2002a, p. 38). While Maanen and Barley (1985) focused on the role of changing environmental conditions as a source of organizational cultural change,
Harrison and Carroll (1991) suggested that cultural evolution is the result of inaccurate or poorly controlled transmission during the socialization processes. Although there is general agreement on the influence that natural evolution has on cultural change, cultural change is revolutionary in nature and requires a systematic intervention in order to change.

Taking the assumption that cultural change is possible through certain interventions, numerous studies focused on what kind of cultural intervention is needed, the target of these interventions, and difficulties that are likely to occur in this process. In fact, the most common suggestions can be classified as structural reorganization, which includes changing the promotion and reward systems and decreasing hierarchy and bureaucracy in order to facilitate and promote change in a certain direction (Jermier & Berkes, 1979; Collins, 1999). Other than this, the implementation of new recruitment criteria (i.e., young, educated, diverse in gender and race) and hiring new people, assessment through benchmarking or other systems, training of organizational members consistent with the new direction, and introducing new technologies that change the organization’s daily practices are considered key to successful cultural change efforts (Chan, 1996; Whiteley, 1995). Although these factors can facilitate cultural change, they are not enough if not combined with a number of different strategies. In this context, scholars suggested that managers must communicate the values and build a new vision for providing a sense of direction for change (Deetz, Tracy, & Simpson, 2000). Even Whiteley (1995) found that this notion limited, simply communicating a vision in order to persuade or motivate organizational members to accept it. She further requested participation and involvement of organizational members in general where the vision was created collectively and collaboratively. Policy documents, procedures, instructions, and meeting with different groups in the organization provide an opportunity to involve organizational members in change, and negotiate shared
values and meanings regarding expectations and new organizational values. Other than these cultural change tools, scholars also recommended the use of physical artifacts, symbols, heroes, rituals, and stories to reinforce new values and practices in the organization (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2000). In the process of change, although middle and lower level organizational members are not totally passive recipients of change, members who have the power, namely leaders, upper managers, or founders of organizations, undoubtedly play a more central role in influencing and shaping organizational culture even if they are unable to totally shape or control cultural change (Schein, 1992; Collins, 1999).

Another important point of interest in the literature related to this discussion is the target of cultural change. Here, more emphasis is placed on changing organizational members’ values as a part of cultural change. Values constitute an individual’s most stable characteristics and are the basis upon which attitudes, behaviors, and personal preferences are formed, and crucial decisions are made. In other words, lifetime choices are instilled in the basic values that individuals are taught and learn (Whiteley, 1995). Similarly, organizations also have a value system that is an essential part of the organizational culture. Although values are abstract in nature, they have an essential influence on daily practices and management decisions. As an organization’s defining characteristics, values such as, empowerment, control, accountability, innovation, flexibility, creativeness, teamwork, entrepreneurship and individualism can play a crucial role in the manner in which an organization relates to customers, competitors and internal decision making processes, daily routines and procedures, and organizational members’ relationship with one another (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Due to its critical role, it is not surprising to witness that most change efforts target altering cultural values. As a strong supporter of value change, Schein (1992) claimed that
leaders can change a culture by altering its value set with new ones and making them a part of everyday practices. Consistent with Schein’s three levels of culture, these new values will become taken for granted assumptions which represent the deepest level of culture. In the same line of thought, the most popular articles request changes in bureaucratic models that value rationality, chain of command, hierarchies of control, and impersonality of work practices with a less bureaucratic model that values creativity, flexibility, risk taking, and innovation.

Based on this discussion, it would be fair to say that it is not surprising to target cultural values as the main source of cultural change. However, the question is whether values can really be changed by organizational leaders, as stated by Schein, and if change initiatives should or should not direct their attention to values. At this point, scholars support the assumption that changing values is difficult (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). As stated by Whitley (1995), values are among the most stable and enduring characteristics of individuals and organizations, and are usually acquired during the early years of an individual’s life, especially by the family and in school. Typically, people enter their organizational life with these firmly learned values (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Similarly, organizations have strong values that are derived from their history. For example, traditional management principles, Taylorism, and bureaucracy have gained considerable value throughout the years that have rarely been questioned. As such, these factors have created a collective mental framework for the perception and interpretation of any attempt to change one’s culture. In other words, a strong cultural heritage provides a specific way of viewing and doing things that has many advantages. However, there are also blind spots that limit an organization’s ability to replace these values and structures with highly recommended ones, namely empowerment, flexibility, innovation, and risk-taking (Whiteley, 1995). In this context, some organizational scholars suggest that
any attempt to change values and cultural assumptions would more likely be met with resistance and therefore called for a focus on structure, procedures, and other daily practices, the physical artifacts (i.e., room designs, symbols), and organizational rituals. This, in turn, would affect the values of organizational members and the organization in the long run (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Similarly, Ravasi and Schultz (2006) argued that rather than focusing on cultural values and assumptions, an alternative approach would be to “treat values and assumptions as epiphenomena and aim instead to reshape practices, (including communication practices), which is less likely to be resisted, and paradoxically more likely to shape interpretations over time” (p. 311).

Another consideration is how cultural change is manifested in organizational life. In fact, the differences in the way functionalist and interpretive scholars study cultural change and the position of this dissertation have already been discussed. All forms of culture (i.e., artifacts, values, practices, stories, symbols, rituals, language, and so forth) specified in this dissertation can be studied in terms of cultural change. For instance, any type of change in the physical, linguistic, and cultural artifacts; room settings; expression of emotions, use of humor, labeling rules and other recurring practices, rituals, routines, rules and norms can be viewed as a kind of cultural change. While some scholars choose one of these cultural forms to deeply analyze, it is also plausible to take a general approach and look at changes in any of these cultural forms.

As supported in this study, communication scholars can place communication at the center of analysis and view it as both a manifestation and creator of cultural change. In the communicative perspective, culture is generally perceived as socially constructed and emergent rather than defined a priori. The relationship between culture and communication is seen as more reciprocal than causal whereas culture may influence communication but is also
constructed and enacted through communication (Martin & Nakayama, 2008). It is through the process of communication we create and enact our own sense of reality. In organizational life, members enact part of the environment they face and create their own perceptions (Weick, 1995).

Consistent with this assumption, Thayer (1988) suggested that the real change of values can be found in how people communicate with one another. In other words, if there is a real change of cultural values and mindsets after implementing a change initiative, there should be a change in their discourse, the ways of using language and speaking about organizational practices, relationships, and policies (Jian; 2007; Whiteley, 1995). As will be discussed in detail in the methodology section, this type of analysis requires a methodological stance that takes into account a more holistic, contextual, communicative, and dynamic analysis of change rather than a structural, functional analysis that considers culture and communication as two distinct variables.

**Communication and Organizational Change**

It has been well documented that communication plays a critical role in the successful implementation of any change initiative and helps people to understand and deal with the change process (Lewis & Seibold, 1998). Communication scholars have increasingly acknowledged the inextricable link between communication and the change process. However, it should also be noted that the literature, in general, that acknowledges this inextricable link between communication, communication strategies and channels, and the change process conceptualizes communication as information exchange. The review of literature in the following paragraphs needs to be evaluated within this frame.
Generally, the literature dealt with communication in terms of the announcement of change programs (Smeltzer, 1991), disseminating information, soliciting input regarding change (Lewis, 1999), reducing or managing uncertainty and conflict (Bordia et al., 2004), and sense-making, persuading, soliciting, acquiring feedback (Gallivan, 2001), and framing (Fairhurst, 1993). Communication is also viewed as a tool for creating and sustaining a guiding vision for the organization, facilitating opportunities for participation, decreasing resistance, creating a positive environment and reaction for change, and appropriating and adapting features of change (Lewis, 1999; Lewis et al., 2006; Witherspoon, 1997).

Certainly, communication strategies and communication channels used in change efforts affect the perception and interpretations of organizational members, which, in turn, affects the outcome and success of planned change efforts (Fairhurst, 2001). A number of scholars provided evidence of how communication can affect the change process and outcomes. One of the more common findings is that communication has an impact on an organizational member’s perception of the urgency of change. Stanley, Meyer and Topolnytsky (2005) indicated that distrust in the motives driving change as a result of poor communication is a quite significant source of resistance. In another study, Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) found that misunderstanding as a result of communication problems or inadequate information is one important factor resulting in resistance to change. They indicated that when levels of personnel information sharing and communications are increased, cooperation also increases, and negative employee attitudes as well as resistance to change decrease. Similarly, Armenakis and Harris (2002) identified the most important factor for failure in change attempts as the managers’ inability to persuade organization members to create a sense of urgency and obtain support for the change. They asserted that communication creates readiness and the motivation to support and institutionalize
the change. The link between communication and uncertainty is also subject to scholarly interest. Empirical works have shown that timely, credible, and trustworthy communication reduces uncertainty and anxiety regarding change. This, in turn, increases the sense of control and, willingness to participate in planned change efforts, and decreases the overall resistance of organizational members (Miller, Johnson & Grau, 1994; Bordia et al., 2004). In contrast to commonsense, whereas the quality of information matters for organizational members, the mere frequency of communication was unrelated to members’ perceptions of change and its success (Lewis, 2006).

On the other hand, studies suggest that better information dissemination, more knowledge, or more effective communication alone will not necessarily lead to desirable changes. Although it may contribute to a better understanding and awareness of a problem and the need for change, it may not be enough to minimize resistance and persuade individuals to act in new ways or alter their behaviors (Chess & Johnson, 2007). Increasing evidence points to the importance of asking for input and participation, empowerment, active listening, openness, transparency, emancipating qualities of communication, genuine dialogue and exchange of information, and a broader definition of communication as a continuous dynamic process that forms a shared understanding that moves beyond message delivery or dissemination of information (Zorn et al., 2000; Fairhurst, 2005). It is suggested that these factors are associated with increased commitment to change, taking ownership of the problem, increased accuracy in perceptions regarding the reasons for and goals of change, and decreased resistance to change (Lewis, 1999; Lewis, 2006; Chess & Johnson, 2007).

The content of communication is also critical for the success of change implementation. Specifically, the way individual frames communication can influence the perceptions of
organizational members and can minimize resistance, mobilize action, and bring about ownership and support (Fairhurst, 1993; Dilling & Moser, 2007). As previously discussed, organizational members are not passive receivers of communication but rather actively filter communication through the spectacles of existing beliefs and values, which have a strong impact on how they interpret the messages received from other members (Agyeman, Doppeh, Lym, & Hatic, 2007). Supporting this assumption, Dunwoody (2007) found that selection of congruent and local frames of reference and metaphors that are accessible to organizational members are more likely to get their attention and promote change and mobilize action. For example, the use of a concept such as ‘ozone hole’ in comparison to ‘climate change’ influenced a community’s reactions and interpretations to the same problem (Dunwoody, 2007). In the same line of thought, Gallivan (2001) argued that even members belonging to the same organization with different hierarchical levels, occupational communities, or prior socialization into specific jobs might have different experiences and mental frames which may influence the way they receive and interpret change messages. Following the findings of Dunwoody, change agents should even consider these possible differences when planning change, developing communication programs, and selecting frames.

In addition to these points, the source and channels of communication influence organizational members’ reactions to change attempts; all information channels are not equal in terms of their perceptions. It is commonly believed that face-to-face communication is more helpful and essential for major organizational and behavioral changes. While interpersonal communication serves as a better predictor of behavioral change, mediated communication can be more effective in setting the agenda, providing general information, and reaching more people with fewer resources (Dunwoody, 2007). Dilling and Moser (2007) found that organizational
members are more likely to alter their behaviors if the information is received from trusted, familiar, and informal sources. Although communication channels can be used for both disseminating information and asking for input, among other functions, Lewis (1999) found that change agents focus more on disseminating information than on soliciting input and invitations for participation. Based on these agents’ perceptions, the selection of channels for disseminating information—especially use of general information meetings—is found to be related to successful change outcomes. Other than general information meetings, small informal discussions are the most frequently used channels for disseminating information, whereas written information is the least frequently used channel of communication (Lewis, 2011). In terms of formal and informal communication, Lewis (1999) found that informal channels are utilized more for disseminating information and requesting input from organizational members. Finally, Timmerman (2003) stated that source, organization, media, message, task, receiver, and strategic factors are likely to influence the selection of communication channels that agents employ to disseminate information. According to Timmerman, change agents who adopt a programmatic approach to implementation are more likely to use official media with a one-way communication approach, whereas those who select an adaptive approach are more prone to use both formal and informal channels that are more interactive and allow agents to obtain feedback.

As briefly stated, although there is an extensive literature on the role of communication during planned change efforts, there is a lack of theory or framework. Lewis (2007; 2011) placed discussions regarding the communication of organizational planned change into a larger framework and provided communication strategy dimensions of models that are employed during the implementation phase. These dimensions include: (a) disseminating information/soliciting feedback, (b) one-sided/two sided messages, (c) gain/loss frame, (d) blanket/targeted
messages, and (e) discrepancy/self-efficacy. Change agents use a combination of these strategies based on the general implementation approaches (i.e., rule-bound, programmatic, and participatory), which, in turn, are influenced by the perception of the organization’s context (i.e., culture, history of change, needs and goals in implementing change, willingness to change) and by institutional factors that shape the organizational environment (Lewis, 2007).

The first dimension deals with the agent’s decision as whether to use communication resources in sharing information concerning change or solicit input from organizational members. While soliciting input is associated with participation, feedback, and alternative views, disseminating information is more top-down oriented and attempts to influence organizational members’ compliance, reduce uncertainty, and support official plans (Lewis, 2011).

The second dimension is more concerned with the balance between positive versus negative messages regarding change. In other words, agents can make a decision to emphasize only the positive aspects or decide to use negative as well as positive ones. In this sense, while some change agents may focus simply on arguments that support one position and ignore other positions, others may focus on both supporting and opposing arguments in order to provide a more realistic point of view (Lewis, 2007). There is little empirical evidence that has revealed which method is more effective. Rather, some empirical works show secrecy and dishonesty to be related to a failure of communication (Colvin & Kilmann, 1990). Scholars also suggest that organizational members may request any information (even negative) regarding change plans (Lewis, 2007).

The third strategic communication dimension concerns “whether the persuasive message is framed in terms of gains or losses” (Lewis, 2011). While a gain frame emphasizes the advantages of compliance, a loss frame emphasizes the disadvantages of noncompliance (Lewis,
These gains or losses can be both organizational and individual in nature. For example, a gain frame could be stated similar to the following: If you support this change, both the organization and you will earn in this process. On the other hand, a loss frame would suggest: if you do not support this change, it might lead to organizational layoffs.

The fourth communication strategy dimension relates to the change agents’ choices as to whether messages should target specific groups or individuals based on their key roles in the change process, or be more general by using a blanket strategy, wherein the same messages will be sent to all groups or individuals (Lewis, 2007). The selection of these strategies is associated with the perceived need for consensus building or availability of resources (Lewis et al., 2001).

The fifth and final dimension deals with the degree of focus on messages (discrepancy) that suggest the need to initiate change and/or messages (efficacy) that promote the idea that an organization is capable of successfully implementing the change (Lewis, 2007; 2011). Both types of messages are important for the successful implementation of change.

Besides these communication strategy dimensions, Lewis, Hamel, and Richardson (2001) identified six models of implementing communication that are employed by change agents to interact with various stakeholders. They found that the perceptions of agents in regard to the needs for communicative efficiency or consensus building during change efforts can be used to predict the following models of implementation of communication: equal dissemination (disseminating information to all members equally), equal participation (both disseminating information and soliciting input for equal participation), need to know (disseminating information to groups who must know or express a desire for the information), marketing (constructing messages specific to individuals or to groups), quid pro quo (focus on groups who have something the organization needs), and reactionary (response to an unexpected situation)
Change agents may be more willing to reach a consensus depending on the dominant values such as participation, importance of the change, and leadership styles. In certain cases, resource limitations (i.e., time, personnel, and financial) promotes a change agent’s perception of the need for communicative efficiency (Lewis, 2011).

**Change in Police Organizations and Compstat**

Compstat is the main planned change initiative that was investigated in this dissertation. Most of the studies that focus on the emergence of Compstat have limited their attention to the need for change based on the problems in New York City in 1990s. Problems such as reactive policing, lack of information sharing and accountability, and lack of timely information are important in understanding why this initiative was initiated in the NYPD in 1994. However, focusing on just the problems is not enough to provide a theoretical background for the reasons that Compstat emerged and why this initiative increased in popularity in other police organizations over the following years. As discussed widely in the organizational change section, this limited perspective ignores the institutional pressures (i.e., coercive, mimetic, normative isomorphism) for change and inescapable evolutionary change in the organizations. In addition to the ‘institutional pressures’ and ‘evolutionary change’ in organizations, ‘theoretical improvements in the history of policing’, ‘technological improvements’ that facilitated the use of computers and crime maps, and ‘the development of performance measurement systems’ provided Compstat’s theoretical background and eased the implementation of such an initiative.

For this reason, it is essential to include a background explaining why and how, in general, police organizations change and in what ways they have changed in the framework of the policing approach, technology, and use of performance measurement systems. The next part will first focus on these issues. Then, based on this framework, this part will include the local conditions in which
Compstat initially emerged, definitions, main components and principles, meetings, and finally critiques of Compstat.

**Change in Police Organizations**

Similar to any public organization, police organizations are not isolated, autonomous organizations (Chan, 1996). As previously mentioned within the framework of institutional theory, most public as well as police organizational change efforts are believed to be responses to internal and external conditions, expectations, and pressures (i.e., coercive, mimetic, normative isomorphism). Most police organizations have engaged in change efforts in an attempt to absorb critiques from outside actors including the media, politicians, scholars, and communities. In this way, they attempt to confer legitimacy and appear progressive and successful, which goes along with obtaining budget support and cooperation from the public in conducting investigations (Vitale, 2005). For instance, the rapid diffusion of community policing and problem oriented policing among police organizations in the 1980s and 1990s has been considered an effort to re-legitimate the police after the harsh criticism they faced during the 1970s and 1980s due to human rights issues, police brutality, corruption, red tape and bureaucracy, rising concerns about performance, and the efficiency of traditional policing styles (Vitale, 2005). Similarly, in an effort to explain Compstat’s popularity, Willis and colleagues (2003a) argued that innovations and change programs that are viewed as successful create undue pressures on other organizations to adopt similar practices. For example, the implementation of Compstat at a large and popular police organization like the NYPD and its perceived success increased ‘bandwagon pressure’ on other organizations, that is the fear of non-adoptive organizations that they will appear different from adopters and possibly perform more poorly if other organizations substantially benefit from this initiative (Lee & Chan, 2003).
Similarly, the trend in the United States to increase competition, accountability, empowerment, and performance augmented the demand in police organizations to adopt popular change programs as well as Compstat (Scott, 1998). This trend was reinforced through governmental mandates derived from law and financial reporting requirements, society’s cultural expectations, management books, and the common belief in the effectiveness of these tools in an organization’s functioning (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For instance, management books inspire the use and implementation of certain management principles and programs (i.e., teamwork, participatory management, empowerment, performance measurement, and TQM) by articulating their benefits and framing these concepts in a positive way (Zorn et al., 2000; Lewis, 2006). As a result, Compstat’s promises and aspects, including constant measurement, accountability, and less bureaucracy certainly fit the trends in societal, organizational, and management literature and acts as pressure on police leaders to engage in these types of change efforts.

Increasingly, police managers are becoming aware of the body of literature devoted to planned change, strategic planning, and performance measurement and are encouraged to pursue advanced degrees in administration and join professional trainings related to these topics (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). This powerful socializing force of training, professionalization, inter-organizational networks, and inter-hiring between organizations encourages police managers to follow certain standards and compels them to accept particular definitions and solutions to problems or reforms (i.e., Compstat) in order to respond to the dilemmas that organizations face (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Another form of normative isomorphism is the result of close cooperation between police organizations, the academic world, and consulting agencies. For instance, George L. Kelling, a criminal justice professor at Rutgers University who is well known for his ‘Broken Windows Theory’, was hired as a consultant by William Bratton.
During his assignment at the New York City Transit Authority, Kelling convinced the Transit Authority to adopt the broken windows model which, in turn, led to significant reduction in crime over time (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Throughout the years, comparable policing models have been replicated by various police organizations. Similarly, John Linder and Jack Maple, two strategists credited with engineering Compstat at the NYPD, were hired by the Metrocity Police Department in 1997 to set up Compstat and train the officers in the process (Ben-Ali, 1997). As such, models and practices developed by consultants have been entered and diffused into many police organizations and have created a background from which problems can be approached and solved in much the same way. Therefore, change in police organizations is, in part, a response to the combination of these factors.

Within the frame of the aforementioned theoretical background, police organizations have changed considerably in similar directions throughout the years in their performance measurement, policing style and functions, and technological infrastructure. Thus, the following section will briefly explain these changes in policing style, crime analysis and mapping, and the development of performance measurement systems in order to develop a clear understanding of their role in police organizations and how they provided a theoretical background for Compstat.

**Compstat’s Theoretical Background**

**Change in Policing Styles**

In terms of policing styles, there have been significant changes since the emergence of police organizations. Kelling and Moore (1988) classified policing into three eras. While fighting crime is common to all eras, the role and function of policing, tactics, and measurement of performance changed significantly during each era. The 1840s to the 1900s is referred to as the ‘political era’, characterized by close police-politics ties. In this era, ineffectiveness and
widespread corruption in policing, in addition to emerging trends in society, led to the ‘reform era,’ that began in the 1930s, remained the dominant form of policing during the 1950s and 1960s, and began to lose popularity in the 1970s. In the reform era, emphasis was placed on crime control, detection, arrest rates, preventive patrol using cars, and rapid response to calls for services. The police operated from their patrol cars and were reactive to criminal incidents. However, community-police relations still failed during this era. More police in patrol cars meant more distance between citizens and the police; thus, they had less time to interact with community members in solving crime problems in a positive way. During this era, the primary measurement of success was lowering the crime rate and response time (Kelling & Moore, 1988).

The United States witnessed a period of great change during the 1960s and 1970s in the social and political arena, and increased concerns related to human rights, diversity, and the effectiveness of policing. In addition, research in the field of criminal justice increased in volume, which showed that traditional methods of policing (i.e., random patrols, rapid response practices, routine criminal investigations, and traditional crime analyses) had little impact on crime or public safety (Goldstein, 2001). All of these changes influenced the mindsets, culture, diversity, and structure of policing, and brought about new tactics and thinking aimed at improving effectiveness and community relations (Palmiotto & Donahue, 1995). Thus, upon a growing dissatisfaction with the police function and recognition of the ineffectiveness of traditional policing, community oriented policing and problem oriented policing were among the most appealing alternatives presented.

Within this context and since the 1970s, a majority of police departments in the United States have tended to revise their organizational structures and practices. For example, many
began to implement new policies and programs, and to describe the activities of their departments as community policing, problem oriented policing, and broken windows policing with a focus on quality of life, crime prevention, and reduction (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). Despite the deficiencies and critiques of community policing, problem oriented policing, and broken windows policing asserted by scholars over the last years, they still remain the most common and recognized policing styles in the United States and provide a theoretical background for other policing styles and Compstat. Both community and problem oriented policing have developed the idea that police can prevent or reduce crime by adapting proactive styles. This is also the main promise of Compstat, which combines the best and most effective elements of these policing styles (Henry, 2002; Magers, 2004).

**Community policing.** During the last three decades, community policing has become a dominant frame in the United States to explain new forms of policing and has been used extensively to refer simultaneously to ambitious and ambiguous activities and policing practices (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994). Despite confusion over the theory and concept of community policing, scholars have argued that a radical change in the relationship between the police and the public is essential in all theories and philosophies that form a background for community policing.

Within this context, supporters of community policing heavily criticize a policing style that relies on oppressive and repressive police tactics. Alternately, they attach considerable importance to a management philosophy that places community support or partnerships along with crime control, prevention, and problem solving approaches at the center of policing, and aims at increasing quality of life and citizen satisfaction (Moore, 1992; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Bratton, 1997; Jiao, 1998). In order to reach the aforementioned objectives, community policing
suggests a change in police management by increasing the community’s role in defining the problems the police address, discretionary power of frontline officers, increased accountability, and decentralization. Specifically, community policing activities such as citizen advisory boards, community meetings, foot patrol, neighborhood watch, and door-to-door visits aim to increase the satisfaction of citizens with police, to encourage people to share information about offenses, offenders, and public safety problems as well as to increase the feeling that police care about the problems the citizens face (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994). Consistent with this background and these policing tactics, community policing broadens the police function, including maintenance order, absence of crime and disorder, conflict resolution, and provision of services through a problem solving approach that focuses on the causes of crime and other activities (Davies & Thomas, 2003).

However, Rosenbaum and Lurigio (1994) argued that the lack of a complete definition and theory, and the ambiguity of community policing practices as well as some deviations in practices from the existing theories led to the failure of community policing without its being fully implemented like many other police reforms. Moreover, due to the complexity of planning and implementing community policing activities and increased suspicion concerning the effectiveness of tactics such as foot patrol, neighborhood watch, and community meetings, many departments established specialized units to implement activities rather than department-wide implementation of the community policing philosophy. The degree of implementation and impact changed depending on a police organization’s structure, size, responsible district, and culture (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). In spite of the successes that have been observed on a smaller scale and the strong evidence that suggests reduced fear of crime and increased community satisfaction with police, “the longevity of these reforms, its impact on crime -mostly
in urban police departments- and its ability to become institutionalized and to change the status quo in police agencies have always been questioned by the scholars in the criminal justice field” (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994, p.303).

**Broken windows policing.** The broken windows policing approach stemmed from an idea developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling (1982). This theory simply asserts that if one of the windows of a building is broken and not repaired in a short time, other windows have the potential to also be broken. In other words, if minor offenses such as public drinking, graffiti, vandalism, littering, and begging are not checked and controlled, there will be an atmosphere in the streets or neighborhoods that encourages serious crimes by sending a signal that the community is not in control (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In such a place, if disorderly attitudes are not checked and prevented, then others will move to the site. Next, drug dealers and prostitutes will come to the place, serious crimes such as street robberies will increase, property values will decline, and respectable and law-abiding people will be replaced with less respectful individuals; eventually, disorder will invade the neighborhood. Thus, police should remove the signs of incivility from the neighborhood and prevent crime through proactive policing approaches (Peak & Glensor, 2004).

In this regard, broken windows policing focuses on quality of life offenses and advocates that disorder should be removed so that serious crimes can be prevented (Bratton, 1997; Kelling & Coles, 1998). In fact, these forms of policing have become popular since the practice in the NYPD’s use of Compstat in the 1990s under the leadership of William Bratton. As illustrated in the case of the NYPD, this policing style concentrates on disorder, street offenses, and quality of life crimes (i.e., public drinking, public urinating, graffiti, vandalism, begging, and vagrancy) with the belief that this will reduce serious criminality. Consistent with its proactive orientation
to reduce crime rather than respond to crime, the broken windows policing approach suggests
using risk assessment methods and police intensified operations on a proactive basis that is
directed to people, places, and properties (Dixon & Coffin, 1999).

**Problem oriented policing.** Another policing model that is highly emphasized in the
criminal justice literature is problem oriented policing (POP). The concept was first introduced in
a scholarly article written by Herman Goldstein in 1979. Although community policing and POP
differ in the role given to police in general and the role and priority given to citizens in crime
solving mechanisms, most police organizations that shifted their policies and programs in
accordance with community policing also adopted the problem oriented policing approach. In
other words, these two policing styles are typically implemented together. Problem oriented
policing suggests a problem-based, proactive approach by identifying the causes of crime or acts
of disorder and responding to them proactively rather than simply reacting to the harmful
consequences through an incident based, reactive approach (Eck & Spelman, 1987). As
Goldstein (1979) pointed out, police traditionally focus on centralized control, strong discipline,
and efficient use of personnel and technology rather than how they can solve community
problems. In other words, there is a focus on ‘*means*’ rather than ‘*ends*.’ As such, instead of
simply responding to single incidents and reacting to citizens’ demands for services, the main
focus of policing should be in identifying and analyzing the original causes of societal problems
rather than mere symptoms and making efforts to solve the problem by designing an appropriate
response based on the nature of the underlying conditions that, consequently, have a greater
impact on crime problems (Goldstein, 2001). In order to receive an appropriate response, POP
suggests careful analysis of data regarding crime and disorder problems, assessment of the
adequacy of response, and adapting alternatives to present responses, if needed (White, 2008).
All of these assumptions give police a broader role than only law enforcement and oblige a coordinated effort of community members, governmental agencies, business and service organizations, and media in order to solve problems.

**Technological Improvement and Crime Mapping**

The changes in technology and adaptation of crime mapping as a part of policing have also contributed to Compstat’s theory and practice. Consistent with the trends of many organizations across sectors in the United States, the development of technology over the past three decades has resulted in computerization of police organizations. This has significantly changed the means, practices, and nature of police work and management. More specifically, the capacity of new technologies to store, analyze and retrieve information has opened new opportunities for police organizations.

As a reflection of the innovations in computers and workforce computerization within the last two decades, crime mapping and analysis has become one of the main components of police work in the United States. Crime mapping helps police organizations to map, visualize, and examine the patterns and trends of crime events (Bruce, 2002). With the contribution of these technological innovations and criminal justice theories, scholars and practitioners have begun to focus more on the relationship between the place, time, and nature of crimes and offenders as means of better understanding the underlying causes of the crime problem and developing effective crime prevention programs and policies (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). For instance, by looking at the distribution of crimes geographically, analysts are able to pinpoint the spots where most crimes are committed in a specific region. These small geographical areas referred to as ‘hot spots’ that generate a high volume of crimes in a region have become the main target of agencies with a ‘hot spot policing approach’.
Crime mapping is an essential tool in identifying and visualizing hot spot areas and responding to them in a timely manner before crime gets out of control. In addition, crime mapping has been used to observe patterns and relationships of crime data at many levels, and thus improve specific policing strategies, deploy resources and programs accordingly, and evaluate the effectiveness of police tactics and crime prevention programs (Weisburd & Lum, 2005).

Crime analysis and crime mapping is an essential part of Compstat. These are employed to identify hot spots, review police performance in responding to these hot spots, and make better decisions for fighting crime, formulating strategies, crime forecasting, and geographic profiling as the NYPD did through Compstat meetings (Mencimer, 2001; Henry, 2002).

Performance Based Management Systems in Public and Police Organizations

As the 21st century approached, a shift from the industrial age to the information age has occurred (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). In the industrialization age dominated by tangible assets, organizations viewed as adequate financial measurements that mainly took investments and profitability into account. However, in the new century, the value of tangible assets account for less than 20% of an organization’s market values; this figure was 62% in 1982 and 38% in 1992 (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). In this new era, both corporate and public organizations are searching for new ways to measure performance. The sustained success and transformation of organizations has had less to do with market forces, investments, resource advantages, or management of physical assets. Intellectual capital, information, and knowledge became the main source of an organization’s competition and transformation (Collier, 2001). Clearly, strategies for creating value shifted from managing tangible assets to knowledge-based strategies that created and deployed an organization’s intangible assets. The organizations which took
advantage of these intangible assets consistently outperformed their competitors (Kaplan & Norton, 2001).

In this shifting environment, it became more evident that traditional forms of performance measurement that relied exclusively on financial and reporting measures were insufficient and ineffective. These measures, which were thought to reward short-term profitability, growth, and shareholder value rather than long-term value creation lacked the predictive ability to explain future performance and timely signals for wrongdoings; thus they did not improve the ability of organizations to determine, execute, measure, and follow up on strategies and plans effectively (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Henri, 2006). In this sense, the organizational demands for a more comprehensive and integrated measurement system increased.

As a response to these demands, in a 1996 scholarly article, Kaplan and Norton (1992) proposed an integrative framework known as the Balanced Scorecard. This approach goes beyond financial measurement, control bias, retrospective analysis, and record keeping and brings a comprehensive management system that emphasizes reviewing and clarifying organizational goals, strategies, and missions, and linking these goals and strategies not only financially but also through other tangible operational measures. These measures include:

- customer relationships (i.e., time, quality, and cost of service),
- innovative products and services,
- high-quality and responsive operating processes (i.e. cycle time, quality),
- skills and knowledge of the workforce,
- the information technology that supports the work force and links the firm to its customers and suppliers,
- and the organizational climate that encourages innovation, problem-solving, and improvement. (Kaplan & Norton, 2001, p. 88)
And finally, financial measures such as profitability, growth, and shareholder values are included in this score card in addition to other operational measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 2005). In short, scorecards call for a strategy or mission that can be translated into measurable operational and financial objectives, and show the success or failure of these measures. If there are gaps between operational performance and increased financial performance, this implies the need to reconsider the organization’s strategy, mission, and goals. As such, this approach is assumed to provide the means of monitoring, promoting, supporting the strategy, and signaling the problems in the implementation process of strategies (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). In the light of these new approaches to performance measurement, corporate organizations that adopted mostly financial measures in the 1980s began to apply different forms of comprehensive performance based management systems in the 1990s.

Performance measurement of public organizations was neither part of the literature nor practice until the 1990s. For instance, a study conducted by New York’s Management Planning and Reporting System office in the 1980s found that statistics derived from various public organizations included practically no outcome measures or results. There was no consistent or timely information that showed where money was spent and services were delivered (Smith & Bratton, 2001). This lack of focus on performance measurement was usually explained by the lack of rival agencies and competition in the public sector, the traditional, centralized, bureaucratic model that was not responsive to society’s demands, and the difficulty of measuring public goods and services (Smith & Bratton, 2001).

Similarly, “few police organizations were actually measuring their performance, and even fewer were accountable to the public” (O’Connell & Straub, 2007, p. 30). In such an environment, there was certainly a need for more entrepreneurial, competitive public organizations
as well as police organizations in order to respond to the increasing demands of the public and
government for better service quality and accountability and implementation of performance
based management systems as a useful tool to achieve these goals (Rainey, 2003). In fact, the
enactment of the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and
establishment of the National Performance Review were responses of the federal government to this
problem in federal agencies and the public sector (Rainey, 2003). Through performance
measurement and strategic planning mechanisms, these new regulations and establishments
intended to cut red tape, increase customer focus, empower managers to obtain results, and clarify
job descriptions. Allocation of funding, obtaining support for funding, and legislative initiatives
were made subject to the development of strategic plans and use of performance data (Chan, 2003;
O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Beginning in the 1990s, with the influence of these reforms and
increasing public and government demands for accountability, lower costs, legitimacy, and
credibility, not only federal agencies but public organizations as well began to develop strategic
plans and adapt different kinds of systems for performance measurement (Rainey, 2003).

Due to the increasing use of performance measurement systems in federal and public
organizations, scholars needed to search for ways to determine how to adapt these performance
based management systems used in corporate organizations to public and police organizations
(Kaplan & Norton, 2001). There were major challenges that could obstruct their adaptation into
public organizations, such as the complex set of goals and difficulties in measuring performance due
to the nature of the work, political interventions, inadequate resources, and funding. Financial
measures based on profitability were not applicable to these organizations, and public organizations
could not articulate their missions as clearly and consistently as did the corporate organizations
(Rainey, 2003). As such, there was certainly a need to adapt performance based management
systems for public organizations that would involve clear, tangible, and measurable indicators, and use these indicators to show that the organizations were effective, credible, and accountable in fulfilling their functions, missions, responsibilities, and broad organizational goals (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Within these efforts, various forms of performance based management systems were adapted and applied to public organizations consistent with their missions and functions. For instance, Ruben (2005) adapted the Baldrige framework to higher education institutions. Similarly, Kaplan and Norton (2001) suggested a modified framework of the Balance Scorecard that could be used by government and public organizations.

Within these modified frameworks, public organizations needed to clarify their chief long-term objectives that represent the overall mission of each organization. The other objectives could be arranged in order to improve the overall mission or goals. For corporate organizations, financial measures in the form of profitability and growth provided a high level purpose for their scorecards (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). For a public organization, however, this type of measure was not a relevant indicator of performance. Even other operational measures of the Balance Scorecard such as customer relationships, internal processes, learning, and growth need to be identified based on the organization’s mission. For example, customers are not consumers for police organizations, and as such, their primary focus cannot be considered customer satisfaction. The customers, for police organizations, are the citizens at large who benefit from the services and legislative agencies that provide funding for the organization. Regarding operational efficiency in public organizations, the value and benefits of services to citizens replace any type of financial measures. Consistent with this, public organizations should recognize and focus on the concerns of the community they serve. For example, police organizations can identify crime rates, perceptions of public safety, and citizen satisfaction with
police as main performance measures and indicators of success and failure. In addition, similar to corporate organizations, an organizational climate that supports change, innovation, and growth can be another important measure of success for public organizations. Finally, legitimizing the legislative support of politicians, citizens, and taxpayers in order to assure continued funding can be another important measure of performance for public and police organizations (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 2001; 2005; 2005a).

Given its underlying assumptions, therefore, many different forms of performance based management systems, including Compstat, have been applied by nonprofit, public, government, and police organizations over the last decade. These kinds of systems are essential for the improvement of performance and transformation of organizations. Today, more and more public and police organizations use performance based management systems. These systems are used for documenting past and present performance; clarifying strengths and weaknesses; establishing priorities and reinforcing a shared focus and agenda for improvement within the organization; gaining credibility and legitimacy; increasing accountability; reviewing and clarifying the organizational mission; obtaining feedback to learn and improve strategies; giving feedback to employees regarding their work; distinguishing well performing and poor performing members; and motivating employees. They are also used for providing credible, defensible, tangible information in which to base organizational and personnel decisions such as new change plans, investments, new assignments, promotions, transfers, or demotions (Kramer, 1998; Tromp & Ruben, 2004).

The development and implementation of Compstat by the NYPD in the mid-1990s is a valuable and leading example of a multi-dimensional approach to performance based management systems adapted for police organizations. As intellectual capital, information is
considered to be a key component of Compstat (Collier, 2001) which indicates the use of knowledge and information as the most valuable intangible asset of police organizations. As suggested by O’Connell and Straub (2007), “If the system is functioning optimally, the organization processes every single piece of information to generate organizational knowledge and analyzes it with a broad perspective to determine better strategies and improve performance” (p. 79). Consistent with this idea, Compstat facilitates the collection of timely and accurate information and uses it for operational and managerial purposes. It represents a radical shift in the way police organizations collect and strategically use information about performance to develop more effective, economic, and efficient strategies and to achieve greater internal accountability (Smith & Bratton, 2001). This internal accountability that is based predominantly on performance appraisal through crime statistics and the Compstat meetings where people can share their knowledge, skills, and experiences to collectively solve problems are two distinct characteristics of this initiative. As Smith and Bratton (2001) argued, “the development of the Compstat system of police management involves not only a focus on measuring outcomes but also on managing for improved outcomes” (p. 454). As will be shown in detail, the NYPD case was the first in U.S. police organizations to use statistics and regular meetings to review current crime trends, direct and monitor enforcement efforts and strategies, create a sense of accountability, and measure and compare the performance of precinct commanders in terms of crime rates and effectiveness of the strategies applied to reduce crime (Bratton, 1997; Buntin, 1999). As previously noted, Compstat places crime reduction as an over-arching objective at the top of its mission, and other operational measures are oriented toward improving such a high level objective. The use of this initiative can continuously facilitate individual competence; improve organizational capacity and flexibility, and thus transform police organizations into
knowledgeable and higher performance organizations (Maguire, 2004). In this sense, Compstat has been credited with bringing about better relations with communities, increasing the efficiency of internal processes, legitimizing organizational support, and encouraging a climate that leads to innovation and growth. The next phase of this dissertation will provide details about Compstat with a focus on the specific conditions in which this initiative emerged, its definition, main principles, components, Compstat meetings, and a critique of Compstat.

**The Emergence of Compstat**

The growing crime problem in large cities during the 1980s and early 1990s increased the amount of criticism of the effectiveness of policing styles and police organizations, especially in crime-ridden urban areas, and thus led to the increase of change expectations (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). The crime problems in New York City in the 1980s and 1990s illustrate this situation. Although there were some initiatives to change the structure and philosophy in accordance with community policing in New York City during this period of time, none reached the results sought at the beginning of 1994 (Silverman, 1999). After Rudolph Giuliani had been elected New York’s governor in 1993, owing largely to his campaign on the issues of quality of life and crime, Giuliani selected William Bratton as police commissioner of the NYPD due to his best known role in decreasing the crime rates in the subway system of New York City in previous years (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999; Steinhauer, 2006).

When William Bratton took command of the NYPD, many researchers claimed that (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000), the situation in New York City was in chaos, and people were afraid of becoming victims of crimes. Certainly, New Yorkers had a strong desire to be out of the danger and lawlessness they experienced every day that made living in the city so uncomfortable. Surveys indicated that “more than half the people who had recently left the city
did so to improve the quality of their lives and chief among the reasons they couldn’t do that in the city was crime” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 1). In addition to serious crimes, quality of life crimes and disorder had occupied the streets (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). In response to this situation, Mayor David Dinkins was able to pass the ‘Safe Streets’ legislation in 1990 that increased the size of New York’s police force to over 6,000 officers (Vitale, 2005; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005). By 1994, however, even this increase did not appear to have been of much help. The police department seemed demoralized, dysfunctional, and corrupt (Bratton & Knobler, 1998) and the centralized, bureaucratic organizational structure appeared to promote red tape rather than facilitate effective use of resources (Willis et al., 2003b). The main philosophy became “stay low and avoid trouble” (Maanen, 1975, p. 222) because the NYPD lacked a sense of the importance of its main crime control mission and was not setting goals or articulating a vision concerning what its officers could do and accomplish (Willis et al., 2003b).

It was suggested that there was a need for an evolution of policing, organizational structure, and the way police perceived their jobs (Peak, 2003). In 1994, William Bratton and his team began a process of change that involved a different policing style and culture, structural reorganization, and a set of innovative policing strategies (Silverman & O’Connell, 1999). Compstat played a central role during the implementation of this change process. Until that time, like most American police departments, the NYPD focused on reacting to crime with rapid response and arrest rather than reducing and preventing crime. Officers would pace from one crime scene to another in response to radio calls, doing very little in the way of proactive policing to reduce and prevent crime (Mencimer, 2001). Even police organizations were accepting no responsibility for reducing crime based on the assumption that crime was caused by social problems that were impervious to police intervention (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton &
Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999; Mencimer, 2001). However, Bratton had supported the idea that the police could have a significant effect on crime and that crime could be reduced by using law enforcement expertise, leadership and management skills, and an inspired workforce (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Smith & Bratton, 2001).

Although there were some initiatives to reduce the crime in former periods by employing the community policing philosophy, Bratton believed that the interpretation of community policing by former chiefs was totally inappropriate for a city as large and complex as New York. He disagreed with the interpretation of community policing as a way to make ordinary citizens partners in combating crime. “Bratton wanted police-work to be done by the police: On the whole, Bratton believed reducing crime was the job of the police, not the citizenry” (Buntin, 1999, p. 10). Within this mindset, the model Bratton supported and used was the ‘broken windows’ theory of law enforcement, the idea that tolerating such minor crimes encourages serious crimes by sending a signal that the community is not in control (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In addition to broken windows policing, William Bratton benefited from the key principles of problem oriented policing. These principles proposed identifying the underlying causes of recurring problems within the community through research and the collection of relevant data and then solving them proactively with the collective efforts of different units by adapting alternative and innovative interventions, rather than responding to single incidents reactively (Eck & Spellman, 1987). Considering these points, Bratton supported a proactive policing style that collected timely and accurate information (crime statistics) and analyzed this information in order to predict crime trends as well as analyze the causes of crime to develop effective tactics and strategies.
However, when Bratton asked for information from the different departments, it became clear that the NYPD did not keep crime statistics on a daily or even a weekly basis (Silverman, 1999; O’Connell & Straub, 2007). In addition, there was a lack of communication among precinct commanders and other departments. Precinct commanders lacked the authority to customize crime control to their precincts and did not take any responsibility for monitoring their precincts (Willis et al., 2003). As a result, they had not communicated with the officers for months and were unaware of the crime rates and problems within their precincts (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Bratton believed that an organization such as the NYPD could not be effectively managed without timely and accurate information and communication among different units. In this sense, Compstat began in 1994 as a struggle to create a simple system to collect daily crime patterns and increase the flow of communication among precinct commanders and departments (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Over time, this system became an elaborate program where police officers could analyze the statistics in order to create crime maps showing important changes and emerging hot spots, and use them for operational and management purposes. Meanwhile, regular meetings began as a part of this system. In these meetings, officers discussed crime trends, questioned precinct commanders about their responses to crime, and worked out creative solutions and future strategies (Smith & Bratton, 2001). The Compstat initiative which incorporated the use of sophisticated technology, crime analysis, empowerment, and accountability for reducing crime became a phenomenon among police organizations the following year (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).

Under the leadership of Bratton, the NYPD was able to reduce crime at a remarkable rate. In 1994, for example, there was a 12% decline in New York City. “In comparison, index crimes in the country as a whole had fallen just 1.1 percent. The decline in crime in New York City
from 1993 to 1994 meant that 385 fewer people died; 13,461 fewer people were robbed; and 3,023 fewer people were assaulted” (Buntin, 1999, p. 27). The decline in crime carried on in the following years. Moreover, after Bratton’s resignation, a survey conducted by a nonprofit public policy group found that 71% of all respondents approved of Bratton’s performance, and he was credited with having lowered the crime rate.

In a similar vein, the approval rating of the NYPD had a 73% positive rating, up from just 37% in a 1992 poll (Kocieniewski, 1996). All of these results increased scholars’ attention to the case of the NYPD and the story behind its success. Among many other features, such as the policing style adapted in New York City during those years, Compstat was one of the main contributing factors that NYPD’s success was attributed to. It has been acclaimed as an innovative police management paradigm that revolutionized law enforcement management practices and renewed policing style, organizational structure, and culture, leading to impressive reductions in crime (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Smith & Bratton, 2001; Vito, et al., 2005).

As previously noted, New York City had remained the safest large city in the United States for the previous three years. From the year that Compstat began until 2009, there was a 76% decline in crime rates in New York City. In 2008 alone, New York’s violent crime rate declined by 4%, outpacing the national crime decline of 2.5% (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 2009).

Due to its success, Compstat has spread among police organizations as well as business organizations. The national publicity and scholarly interest crediting Compstat with the decline of crime rates increased its popularity and rapid diffusion among police organizations. A-Police Foundation survey found that a third of the country’s 515 largest police departments had implemented a Compstat-like program by 2000, and 26% were planning to implement one.
Compstat has been rated the most quickly diffused program, with a 90% saturation level (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, & Willis, 2004). Public organizations such as parks, recreation centers, and fire departments have adopted this initiative into their structures, and in 1996, Compstat was awarded the prestigious ‘Innovations in American Government Award’ from the Ford Foundation and the John F. Kennedy School of Government (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005). In 1998, over 150 police department representatives from foreign countries visited the NYPD for briefings in broken windows policing and Compstat. During the first ten months of 2000, another 235 representatives from police departments in the United States and abroad visited the NYPD (Harcourt, 2001). When Mayor Giuliani gave his farewell address, he dedicated a major portion of his speech to New York City’s success in reducing crime with a specific focus on Compstat. Although there are limitations of evidence provided for the Compstat’s efficiency and success, this initiative has received an unprecedented admiration from politicians, practitioners, and scholars (Weisburd et al., 2001).

**Definition of Compstat**

Compstat has been defined as a “technique for bringing state-of-the-art management principles into a single program customized for police organizations” (Smith & Bratton, 2001, p.1). As many scholars have pointed out, although Compstat’s description emphasizes crime statistics, crime data, and communication, it includes not only these factors but also a range of management principles inserted into its structure in order to respond to a police organization’s problems such as different policing styles (i.e., real time crime analysis, targeted crime interdiction, broken windows enforcement, and directed patrol), adaptive culture, structural reorganization (i.e., empowerment, managerial accountability, teamwork, and geographic
decentralization), and a set of innovative strategies and motivational tools as illustrated in the case of the NYPD (Silverman & O’Connell, 1999). As defined by Moore (2003), Compstat is a combined technical and managerial system that embeds the technical system for the collection and distribution of performance information in a broader managerial system designed to focus the organization as a whole and a subset of managers who are relied on to exercise leadership in meeting the organization faces. (p. 470)

The Compstat is commonly considered a police version of well-known organizational development initiatives including goal-oriented strategic management, management by objectives, performance based management, total quality management, and strategic planning. As stated by Walsh (2001), Compstat can be viewed as a “goal-oriented strategic management process that builds upon the police organizational paradigms of the past and blends them with the strategic management fundamentals of the business sector” (p. 352). These fundamentals include strategic planning, accountability, constant monitoring and measurement, empowerment, and innovation. In a similar vein, Vito and colleagues (2005) pointed out that “Compstat is a goal-oriented strategic management process that uses information technology, operational strategy, and managerial accountability to guide police forces” (p. 57). In another definition, O’Connell and Straub (2007) placed emphasis on a variety of clever policing strategies that were developed and implemented in accordance with the organization’s goals. According to these scholars, Compstat has become the main tool used to implement and monitor these strategies.

**Principles of Compstat**

Compstat consists of 4 principles believed to give police organizations the capacity to reduce crime by forcing them to be more responsive to management direction and performance measurement: (1) ‘*timely and accurate information*’ made available at all levels in the
organization, (2) ‘determination of the most effective tactics’ for specific problems, (3) ‘rapid, focused deployment of resources’ to implement these tactics, and (4) ‘relentless follow-up and assessment’ to learn what happened and make judgments (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Vito et al., 2005).

Information is a vital tool for effective policing. The success of Compstat certainly depended on collection of accurate and timely information regarding crime statistics and trends and the use of information for operational and management purposes. Traditionally, scholars have supported the idea that centralization of power, hierarchical structure, rigid bureaucracy, police culture, and the nature of police work make information flow and communication among different units, hierarchical lines, and ranks more difficult than other organizations. Even if there is information stored in databases, it is not used for operational and managerial purposes on a regular basis. The NYPD was not an exception, in that there was neither willingness nor an organized mechanism and cultural atmosphere for information sharing and communication across organizational lines (O’Connell & Straub, 2007; Silverman, 1999). During the history of policing in the United States, Compstat was the first point of collecting crime records on a daily basis in a shared database and developing mechanisms and culture for sharing information and best practices. Regular Compstat meetings played a central role in this process. These meetings connected all the various districts to headquarters and provided a ground for interactive, face-to-face, and horizontal communication across organizational lines, exchange of best practices and innovative strategies, and strategic modifications according to practices and tactics proven to work (O’Connell & Straub 2007). Specifically, during these meetings, crime statistics and crime maps depicting the latest crime trends in the precincts were analyzed and used for the deployment of resources to necessary locations, coordination of joint efforts, development and
revision of policing methods and tactics, and finally, assessment and monitoring of precinct commanders’ performances based on crime rates and their efforts (Buntin, 1999; Silverman, 1999). This information-based system that favored and employed computer capabilities, crime-mapping software, and crime analysis assisted police commanders in obtaining early crime alerts, producing effective strategies to fight and prevent crime, and shutting down hot spots before they got out of control (Mencimer, 2001). In this sense, Compstat represents a proactive policing style that aims to reduce crime by making information and collective planning central to responding to crime rather than running from one call for service to another (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990).

**Core Components of Compstat**

According to Willis et al. (2007), the core management principles of Compstat were identified as (a) ‘mission clarification’ by focusing on basic values and objectives, giving priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (b) ‘internal accountability’ for achieving these objectives, (c) ‘geographical organization of operational command,’ (d) ‘data-driven problem identification and assessment of the department’s problem solving efforts,’ (e) ‘organizational flexibility’ to implement the most promising strategies, and (f) ‘innovative problem solving tactics,’ learning about what works and what does not work by following through with an empirical assessment of what happened and sharing this knowledge within the organization.

**Mission Clarification**

The first component of Compstat, mission clarification, consists of management’s commitment, the core reason for the organization’s existence, and an announcement of clearly defined goals by which the organization can be assessed. Compstat assumed that police
organizations must have a clearly defined organizational mission in order to function effectively (Willis et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2007). Consistent with the idea that police could have a significant effect on crime, Compstat established a mission statement that focused on crime reduction as the main goal. Although reduction of crime was the highest priority goal for both Compstat and non-Compstat police organizations, there was a considerable difference between these organizations. It was found that 48% of police organizations that implemented Compstat announced a goal of reducing crime, whereas the rates was 23% for non-Compstat police organizations (Weisburd et al., 2003).

As illustrated in the case of Compstat in the NYPD, a clearly defined goal such as reducing crime by 10% within a year helped police organizations to function more effectively by setting a benchmark for success and encouraging police officers to a sense of shared commitment. When Bratton was appointed as the NYPD’s police commissioner, he first announced that his plan would reduce crime in New York by 40% in three years, with a 10% reduction in the first year alone (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). By stating bold goals and promoting high expectations, he stated that he risked looking bad if he did not achieve them. At the same time, he believed that articulating such audacious and bold goals was an important aspect of motivating organizational members and “lifting a low-performing organization to higher levels of accomplishment and revitalizing an organizational culture” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 11). In this way, Bratton was able to inspire multiple audiences with a vision to reduce crime and set measures or benchmarks to evaluate the department’s success. In this respect, from the beginning of Bratton’s duty, he intended to create an organization whose goal and mission was to control and reduce crime for a “safe and clean city,” not simply a response to it (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Newfield & Jacobson, 2000).
In general, the practices and strategies produced during the Compstat meetings were aimed mainly at reducing crime by clever policing tactics. Scholars argued that empowerment, accountability, relentless follow-up, and assessment through the Compstat were the chief mechanisms that made the mission effective and a highly visible element of daily operations by keeping the organization’s focus on crime reduction (Willis et al., 2003b; 2007). Thus, from the beginning, Compstat’s principle of having a clear mission and goals was accepted as one of its main components.

**Internal Accountability**

Romzek (1998) defined accountability as “a relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for performance that involves some delegation of authority to act” (p. 195). Internal accountability was one of the most articulated components of Compstat. The basic idea was to empower the precinct commanders, and then keep them accountable for their performance, which included knowing their command, being familiar with its problems, and measurably reducing the problems or showing a diligent effort to reduce them. Compstat forced police officers to take responsibility for tackling and reducing crime and imposed adverse career consequences, such as replacement from command on those who failed to comply (Willis et al., 2003a).

William Bratton changed the NYPD’s overall structure in order to put into practice such a system. He established a Compstat unit that provided weekly reports by precinct, borough, and department to compare performance changes. He gave more power, resources, and authority to precinct commanders, and they were held accountable for how they performed and how they effectively managed their human and other resources, created innovative solutions for current crime or disorder problems, accomplished measurable results in reducing these problems, and
provided accurate and timely information to top level managers (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Vitale, 2005; Vito et al., 2005). Internal accountability was mainly dependent on crime statistics which helped the executive team measure individual performance (strengths and weaknesses of managers) organizational performance in terms of crime rates, and identifying successful and failed tactics based on change in crime rates (Moore, 2003). All precinct commanders knew that they were expected to not only have knowledge of crime statistics and trends within their areas but had also taken responsibility for actions to address crime problems by developing certain tactics and strategies.

Regular meetings are a very critical part of Compstat’s accountability component. It is the place where accountability is put into practice. The precinct commanders and their staff are expected to attend the Compstat meetings fully prepared with responses to the queries related to crime rates, crime patterns, and arrests in their respective districts. Depending on the type of policing applied, minor violations and quality of life offenses could also be examined by top executives. As such, these meetings establish a system for monitoring the activities of commanders and providing a measure of performance and accountability for goal achievement. As a result, “Compstat becomes an influential managerial system that creates organizational values through managerial alignment of performance variables according to organizational mandates” (Moore, 2003, p. 470).

Punishment and rewards are used as a means to ensure internal accountability. In a study conducted by Weisburd and colleagues (2003), they found that Compstat departments were more likely than non-Compstat departments to punish precinct commanders by replacing those who did not have sufficient knowledge regarding crime rates in their districts or who failed to decrease the crime rates in their respective districts. Sixty eight percent of officers in Compstat
departments reported that their precinct commanders will be replaced if they have insufficient knowledge about crime rates in their districts, and 42% reported that their commanders will be replaced if crime rates remain at a high level or continue to increase over months. The rates are 46% and 20% respectively in non-Compstat departments. In contrast, precinct commanders who have sufficient knowledge about the crime rates in their district or decrease the crime rates in their districts are more likely to be promoted in Compstat departments (23%) compared to non-Compstat (13%) departments (Weisburd et al., 2003). Consistent with this, within the first year of Compstat’s implementation, “nearly two-thirds of the department’s precinct commanders at the NYPD were changed based on their performance. Some were promoted to more challenging positions due to their success, and some were either fired or forced to retire by the new administration” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p.5).

However, Compstat has been criticized for holding accountable only middle level managers, not those further down the chain of command, not reinforcing accountability outside the meetings, and giving frontline officers the role only to follow orders, thus centralizing command (Willis et al., 2003a; 2007).

**Geographic Organization of Operational Command**

Traditionally, police organizations have been criticized for centralization of authority, strict bureaucracy and hierarchy, and lack of information sharing between precincts and specialized units, which lead to communication and coordination problems within the organization (Weisburd et al., 2003).

In a similar vein, the NYPD had a highly centralized structure until the 1990s. Silverman (1999) pointed out that “… operational police tactics were conceived, formulated and issued from headquarters, primarily on a city-wide basis and often with very little input
from field commands” (p. 182). Precinct commanders could not crack down on crime and disorder in their geographic areas because they lacked authority and personnel; these kinds of operations were conducted by a central unit known as the Citywide Street Crime Unit (Henry, 2002; Safir & Whitman, 2003). In addition, precinct commanders did not have any communication or joint efforts with the narcotics divisions that focused on narcotic activities in their geographic areas (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). These problems were assumed to limit the ability of precinct commanders to fight crime problems in their designated geographical areas, and they needed authority and the assistance of specialized units to deal with local problems and increase the performance of geographic units (Silverman, 1999; Henry, 2002; Safir & Whitman, 2003).

In order to respond these problems, Compstat stresses the need to empower precinct commanders by increasing their share of the organization’s resources and decision making authority in their geographic units. It is assumed that specialized units -community police officers, street narcotics, patrol, juvenile, and traffic enforcement- need to be either arranged in a way to facilitate their responsiveness to the precinct commander’s needs or placed under the command of the precinct commanders. In fact, based on the aforementioned considerations, after Compstat’s implementation, Bratton gave a considerable amount of authority to New York’s 76 precinct commanders and held them accountable for their territorial responsibility (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001). Through the empowerment mechanisms, precinct commanders gained the ability to make decisions about how to use their resources to develop and implement crime fighting strategies and conduct crackdown operations in their districts based on local needs and expectations (Silverman, 1999; Willis et al., 2003a; 2007). This process also decreased the potential communication and coordination problems among different units.
Well-developed communication with respective units forced precinct commanders to successfully eliminate the problems. In short, Compstat strived to give commanders the means to conduct the initiative’s mission, which came with the responsibility and accountability of their districts. Thus, empowerment of precinct commanders with decision making authority and responsibility of their districts was an essential component of the Compstat.

**Organizational Flexibility**

During the past decade, there has been an increase of interest in organizational flexibility. This concerns the need for organizations to respond promptly to changing conditions and opportunities for both managing environmental uncertainty and enhancing organizational performance (Llorens, Molina, & Verdu, 2005). Similarly, organizational flexibility is essential for police organizations to adapt to changes in their environment and develop the capacity to mobilize resources for non-routine work demands, and thus bring a timely and effective response to incipient problems that will emerge citywide on a daily basis (Willis et al., 2003; 2003a). However, police organizations generally have a highly centralized bureaucratic structure dominated by detailed rules and regulations, excessive paperwork, and operational protocols that limit their flexibility to respond effectively and promptly to ever changing work demands (Jermier & Berkes, 1979). This was the case at the NYPD before Compstat.

In the Compstat era, however, this system changed. Henry (2002) pointed out that “the Compstat report is intended as an early warning system that alerts police managers and executives to rapidly changing conditions and allows them to deploy and re-allocate resources in response to these conditions …” (p. 250). This improved the probability of success in designing an effective human management system. Compstat promises a high performance
organization that can produce a rapid and effective response to crime problems based on timely and accurate information followed by rapid deployment of personnel and resources on the need basis (Buntin, 1999; Silverman, 1999; Vito et al., 2005). According to research results published by Weisburd et al. (2004), nearly 45% of the departments that implemented Compstat-like programs noted that Compstat provided a great deal of flexibility to their units.

In contrast to the promises of Compstat, Willis et al. (2003a, 2007) argued that there were some challenges that limited police organizations in their flexibility in terms of resource and manpower allocation on the need basis and favored equality and fairness over the allocation of resources. The first challenge was limitation of resources in the police organization. In this case, there may not have been enough personnel for the necessary allocation in different locations and units. The second challenge was certain internal and external constraints such as labor union contracts, employee rights contacts, politicians, and media as well as the operational command’s geographic organization. The geographic organization increased competition and rivalry among different precincts and reduced their willingness for them to share and shift resources and manpower “on a need basis.”

**Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment of Problem Solving Efforts**

Obtaining and using accurate and timely crime statistics to identify an organization’s problems and assessment of performance is another important innovation that Compstat brought to police organizations. Before Compstat, police managers usually made decisions based on their personal experiences and anecdotal evidence, despite the availability of crime reports and crime maps. Compstat requires the collection of daily and accurate statistics concerning the crime situation, crime patterns, and trends; management and analysis of this information for identifying problems; the development of effective problem solving mechanisms and crime
fighting tactics; and information based assessment of all these tactics and problem solving efforts (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001). Compstat’s primary data source is derived from all precincts on a daily basis and organized around seven major crimes (i.e., murder, felony, rape, robbery, and burglary, grand larceny, and grand larceny auto).

As previously mentioned, before Compstat, the NYPD did not have an up-to-date data source (Henry, 2002). Crime statistics were prepared every 6 months to send to the FBI for submission to the Uniform Crime Reporting System (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Commissioner Bratton believed that without timely and accurate information, the NYPD could not be managed effectively. Similarly, James Q. Wilson asserted that “the effectiveness of a police department is directly related to the quality of its records” (President’s Commission, 1967, p. 82). Based on this, Bratton immediately assigned personnel to determine what kinds of crime data were available, and these personnel were also responsible for creating new databases (Bratton, 1997). However, merely acquiring the data was useless unless proper crime analysis efforts accompanied the data collection. Thus, a number of crime analysts were assigned to assess the NYPD’s data.

In the Compstat process, crime analysts play an important role in collecting, organizing, and analyzing data (Baker, 2004). Crime mapping is the basic tool used for identifying crime trends, crime patterns in certain neighborhoods, and hot spots in the city. With the help of crime analysis, mid-level managers such as precinct commanders can develop solutions for crime and disorder problems and deals with hot spots before they get out of control. After these solutions are implemented, police managers can use the data to assess their results and change tactics and deployment based on what they observe (Baker, 2004). The study conducted by Weisburd et al.,
(2004) revealed that Compstat departments were significantly more successful in defining crime trends and analysis, hot spots, and crime classification based on the suspect and modus operandi.

Willis et al. (2003a, 2007) observed that in spite of the aforementioned capacity of Compstat, in three organizations they studied, police officers still relied on their personal experiences and anecdotal evidence rather than crime data and other information. Although the availability of data and regular presentation of crime data at Compstat meetings improved the speed and focus of each organization’s response to hot spots, this was not used to identify the underlying causes of crime problems and respond to them proactively as theorized in Compstat.

**Innovative Problem Solving Tactics**

One of the suggested strengths of Compstat is its support and encouragement for the use of technological tools, innovation, creative thinking, and best practices. Within this initiative, precinct commanders are expected to consider a number of alternatives in responding to crime problems and not repeatedly follow the same traditional strategies. In fact, Compstat’s mechanisms, namely crime analysis, empowerment, internal accountability, and geographical organization of operational command are expected to encourage precinct commanders to search beyond their own experiences by gaining knowledge about other organizations and research, and to think about innovative methods and approaches in handling crime and management problems that they confront in their precincts (O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

As illustrated in the case of the NYPD, regular Compstat meetings became a platform to share and spread best practices, innovative strategies, successes and failures, and thus a major vehicle for organizational learning. This situation allows different units to make modifications in their strategies according to practices and tactics that have been proven to work (Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Smith, 2001). In addition, Compstat certainly facilitated and supported the use
of technology such as computer based crime mapping and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that show the visualized results of crime density locations. These technological tools allow precinct commanders to analyze collected and stored information more effectively and increase the optimum use of resources in order to produce desired outputs (Henry & Bratton, 2003). As found in a study conducted by Weisburd et al. (2004), Compstat departments are more likely to use statistical analysis and mapping software technology to identify problems as well as utilize problem solving strategies to respond to crime than are non-Compstat departments.

As Willis et al. (2003a, 2007) suggested, although a degree of innovation was seen in the police organizations they observed, it was limited by the need for commanders to respond to crimes quickly, rather than to pursue the most effective innovative strategy possible and pressure to follow traditional law enforcement tactics that had been used before. For example, once a hot spot was identified by using crime maps and analysis, patrols were directed to the area and asked to identify suspects and keep an eye on suspicious surroundings and area saturation, and to step up traffic enforcement, increase arrests, and knock-and-talk, all of which are traditional tactics. Although these tactics might be the best police response in certain situations, this can be determined only after taking into account other possibilities.

**Compstat Meetings**

The Compstat process has two main components: the gathering and analysis of statistical data in the form of weekly ‘Compstat reports’ and ‘commander profile reports’ and ‘the Compstat meetings’. The Compstat meetings have been called to be the most visible part of the process. O’Connell and Straub (2007) described the meetings as,

an open forum in which to evaluate the success or lack of success regarding initiatives, strategies, and tactics that have been implemented. Discussions are direct and require
every participant to be familiar with specific incidents, patterns, and trends and to articulate cogent action plans. Each participant is held accountable for achieving results regardless of the unit or bureau to which he/she is assigned. The message is clear: poor performance must be corrected and good performance will be awarded. (p. 19)

These meetings can be seen as the basis of a management strategy that delegates authority, responsibility and accountability from the commissioner’s level to the commanders of the precincts (Vito et al., 2005). Crime strategy meetings are normally held on a weekly basis, and many of the discussions are based on statistical analyses contained within the weekly Compstat report. These reports contain arrests, crime patterns, crime complaints, and police responses to these issues. The meetings are typically held in large rooms in which police managers can easily display and see their results in the fight against crime on large computer screens. In its NYPD version, this room was called the ‘war room’ (Bratton, 1997), as well as a ‘great theater’ (Weisburd et al., 2004). There are no strict guidelines for the design of communication in meetings, but, as in most cases, the police commissioner begins the meeting with a welcome speech. Next, the featured commander makes a presentation regarding his or her precinct’s crime situation and crime control strategy. After the presentation, the police chief or authorized deputy police chief questions the commanders about their specific crime problems, their analyses of patterns and trends, their crime control strategies, the precinct’s quality of life conditions, current investigations, and coordination with other police units as well as suggested solutions and strategies at the precinct level (Moore, 2003). Also, commanders may discuss other issues such as budgets or staff problems, or make announcements regarding other department initiatives (Silverman, 1999).
Compstat meetings are influential as a platform for holding precinct commanders accountable for how they perform in the effort to control crime (Safir, 1997). Compstat reports and commander profile reports involve not only crime statistics but also the precinct commander’s performance on various issues: “personnel assigned, personnel absence rates, incidences of domestic violence and unfounded radio runs, radio car accidents, overtime expenditures, and summons activity” (Buntin, 1999, p. 19). All precinct commanders are aware that they will be held accountable for their results strategies adopted. Therefore, “regular Compstat meetings establish a measure of performance, accountability for achievement of the goals, and a sustainable process to ensure that the strategies have been carried out. These meetings also serve as a way to assess which strategies work and which ones do not” (Buntin, 1999, p.16). As suggested by Buntin (1999), “innovative tactics that seemed to work quickly came to light and were immediately communicated to everyone attending; just as failed tactics were quickly exposed” (p. 16). These meetings are a major vehicle for officers to communicate, share best practices and failures, and motivate one another as well as a department-wide learning and accountability experience. They force precinct commanders to develop new strategies for fighting crime that will transform the way in which crime fighting is handled (Silverman, 1999). Within knowledge management terms, these meetings can be considered as a platform for facilitating the expression of implicit knowledge to others within the organization. Communication aspects of these meetings will be specifically discussed in the following sections.

**Compstat Critique**

In some respects, both Compstat and the Compstat meetings have been criticized. Willis et al. (2007) observed three different police departments that implemented Compstat, discussed
technical/rational and institutional theories in an attempt to determine which theory was more explanatory of the implementation. The authors claimed that rather than adopting all components of Compstat into their structure, these particular police organizations modified some components and ignored others that would radically change their organization’s structure, practices, and routines. They claimed that these organizations were more influenced by the cultural features of their environments and normative external pressures than Compstat’s predicted benefits. In other words, these scholars supported the idea that police organizations may adopt Compstat in an effort to respond to pressures by appearing to be progressive and successful, and thus confer legitimacy rather than genuinely desiring to adopt Compstat. In this regard, these scholars concluded that these organizations implemented Compstat in ways that would minimize disruption to the existing policing structure and routines rather than make changes anticipated by Compstat (Willis et al., 2004, 2007). This is the reason why so many implementations may ultimately fail or deviate from the theorized Compstat form. In some cases, it strengthens highly criticized traditional hierarchical structures and turns out to be a tool used solely for the purpose of increasing the ability of top managers to control middle managers (Willis et al., 2003a).

As previously discussed, some components of Compstat are not put into practice or remain limited in practice. Even Willis and colleagues (2003a) believed that dilemmas and paradoxes exist among certain components of Compstat. For instance, accountability undermines innovative problem solving and flexibility. According to critics, the powerful effect of internal accountability, along with a lack of training in data analysis and general exclusion of frontline officers from the Compstat process, is believed to discourage the flexible reallocation of resources. These factors are also believed to lead organizations to integrate widely accepted and
traditional practices and routines for problem solving rather than to change them in innovative ways that are central to the Compstat process (Willis et al., 2003a).

Bratton supported the idea that the harsh atmosphere and tough questioning prevalent in Compstat meetings was an important part of the initiative. According to Bratton and Knobler (1998), this style creates a feeling of accountability on the side of precinct commanders and helps them to make decisions under pressure. However, some critical points are raised regarding the tough atmosphere of Compstat meetings and the burned-out members who were unable or unwilling to meet the demands of this new initiative. For instance, in the case of the NYPD, half of all precinct commanders were replaced by Bratton during the first year (Pooley, 1996). In addition, the tough atmosphere in Compstat meetings was believed to limit officers’ willingness to try new approaches to problems, talk freely about them, and focus more on tactics that had previously worked (Willis et al., 2003a).

Another critique suggested that the Compstat’s role in crime reduction was exaggerated (Levitt, 2004). A number of researchers hesitated to give credit to Compstat for reducing crime rates (Willis et al., 2003a) and emphasized that economic, demographic, and geographic factors had greater effects on the declining or reduced crime trends. Finally, Compstat and aggressive policing tactics adopted were criticized because they tended to cause violations of civil rights by not making community policing a main focus of concern (Weisburd et al., 2004) and promoting zero tolerance policing (Vito et al., 2005).

Despite its pros and cons, Compstat has become a well-known, popular, and elaborate initiative that has been adopted by many police organizations in the United States as well as a number of other countries. Naturally, with all these components and principles, Compstat influenced the culture of police organizations and communication strategies used in its
implementation. As principal points of interest in this dissertation, the following section discusses the police organizational culture and communication and the relationship between Compstat, culture, and communication.
CHAPTER II  
COMPSTAT, CULTURE, AND COMMUNICATION

Compstat, as a complex and multidimensional performance based management system, has been suggested to influence and be influenced by the culture and communication of police organizations. In this chapter, the literature regarding police organizational culture, communication, and their interaction with the Compstat will be discussed.

**Police Organizational Culture**

Researchers are typically in agreement regarding the importance that culture plays in police organizations and everyday police practices (Maanen, 1974; Chan, 1996). Any type of change effort is contingent upon how it interacts with the cultural values of police organizations (Willis et al., 2003a). In fact, when the literature regarding the relationship between Compstat and culture is examined, researchers suggest that Compstat both influenced and was influenced by the culture of police organization in which it took place (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Thus, it is essential to examine the culture of police organizations in order to understand possible points of opportunity, challenge, and resistance to change. To obtain a background of the relationship between Compstat and police organizational culture, an understanding of the history of police culture and its interaction with other change efforts is essential.

Most police organizations around the world are designed as quasi-military, rigid, centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic structures dominated by formal rules, regulations, procedures, standards, and operational protocols (Walsh & Vito, 2004). These aspects were “largely grounded by the works of Wilson, Weber’s bureaucratic organizational model, and Fayol’s administrative management theory” (Jermier & Berkes, 1979, p.3). Taking its roots from these organizational studies, the classical structure of a police organization is viewed as a strict
bureaucracy that is intended to rationalize management practices, cultivate strict and unquestioned obedience and discipline for rapid mobilization, and accomplish proper direction, coordination, and control (Jermier & Berkes, 1979; O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

The bureaucratic structure of police organizations, pre- and in-service police officer training, and the long, intense, and unique background of police work are believed to produce key aspects of practices and common values in police organizations. According to Maanen (1972), the chief organizational norms and values produced and reproduced in police organizations include conformance to authority, discipline, loyalty and dedication to the system, mistake avoidance, security, order, caution, and systematic rule application. These norms and values are believed to play a key role in advancing and being accepted within the police organization. Similarly, Jermier and Berkes (1979) highlighted the authoritarian command model internalized through the experience of police officers within the organization. Consistent with this authoritarian command model, Jermier and Berkes suggested that police officers in general express a relatively low expectancy for job autonomy and delegation of decision making; support a rigid, authoritarian command system; value routine, orderliness, and role conformity; and prefer a highly directive, masculine leadership style and highly structured work environment. Although some of the bureaucratic dysfunctions have appeared in the writings on police (Maanen, 1974), police organizations can still be best described as quasi-military, hierarchical, and bureaucratic structures. Rather than rejecting the bureaucratic model completely, arguments that question the degree of bureaucracy (i.e., more or less bureaucratic) and hierarchy and ask for incorporating more responsive management practices into the existing bureaucratic structure are thought to be more applicable for police organizations (O’Connell & Straub, 2007).
Other than these structural aspects and their implications on police culture, some scholars have highlighted the nature of police work and explained certain cultural values and practices as strategies needed to cope with the realities and difficulties of the working environment of police (Reiner, 1985; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Paoline, 2003). In this respect, Crank (2004) delineated 22 cultural themes observed in police organizations, which include: dominion, force, militarization, guns, suspicion, danger and its anticipation, unpredictability and situational uncertainty, turbulence and edge control, seduction, police morality, common sense, masculinity, solidarity, racism, outsiders, individualism, deception, deterrence, bullshit, death, and police funerals. Among these themes, ‘isolation, solidarity, suspicion, perception of danger, and authority’ are the most prominent and most extensively discussed. While some can operate favorably in certain circumstances, for the most part, they influence police organizations and their members negatively (Barker, 1999; Wall, 2002; Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 2003).

The root causes of these common values are asserted to be “danger, authority (the legitimate capacity to exercise force) and efficiency (the pressure to produce results)” (Reiner, 1985, pp. 87-88). As Skolnick (1994) emphasized, danger and authority reinforce each other and produce wide perceptions of threat, fear, stress and anxiety. On one hand, these aspects of police work have negative implications because they lead to over suspiciousness, a strong sense of solidarity and code of silence, a cynical view of the world, and officers distancing themselves from the rest of society (Maanen, 1974). On the other hand, Goldsmith (1990) highlighted the positive, functional role of these cultural values for the survival of police officers. “The bond of solidarity between officers offers its members reassurance that the other officers will pull their weight in police work, that they will defend, back up and assist their colleagues when confronted by external threats” (pp. 93-94). Similarly, Skolnick (1994) mentioned that these common values
produce a police officer’s ‘working personality’ and function as a ‘tool kit’ in order to produce an impression of order, make sense of the issue, and respond accordingly.

Other than these values, masculinity and competitiveness are other important cultural values that encompass police work and identities (Davies & Thomas, 2003). For example, police officers tend to be stereotyped in images of being tough and ‘real men,’ and perceive these identities as an attribution of being a good cop. This competitive masculinity reinforces the long hours work culture and commitment to police work. Another important aspect of police organizational culture is what Jermier and Berkes (1979) referred to as ‘discretionary paradox.’ Despite heavy control mechanisms in the form of extensive rules and standard operating procedures, quasi-military structure, centralized decision making, and lower level officers’ preferences for role clarity and authoritarian leadership, officers at the lowest level in the hierarchy still exercise discretionary power at certain degrees in which they determine the meaning of law and order.

All of these traditional assumptions of police organizational culture are believed to play a critical role in change efforts. Scholars have consistently pointed out the difficulty of changing police practices and resistance to change (Maanen, 1975; Manning 1977; Barker, 1999; Wood, 2004); the most common and popular explanation is the existence of a police culture (Davies & Thomas, 2003). As suggested by Schein (1984), an organization with a long, intense, and varied history generally has a strong and easily distinguishable culture, and such a culture is correspondingly challenging to reshape. Given its lengthy and dramatic history, the organizational police culture strongly shapes an individual officer’s characteristics, and such strong cultural practices and values often undermine change efforts as they lead to ambiguity and anxiety among police officers. Specifically, the control and command structure, discretionary
power, and cultural values such as, masculinity, conformance to authority, solidarity, discipline, mistake avoidance, security, order, caution, and systematic rule application can bring about the resistance in police organizations. For example, researchers have suggested that changing police culture requires changes at both upper level and street level practices, but the discretionary power of front line officers can obstruct or undermine planned change efforts initiated at the top (Jermier & Berkes, 1979; Chan, 1996). Front line police officers can therefore determine the meaning of these change efforts on the ground and create different mechanisms and shortcuts to cope with these change efforts in the scope of this discretionary power. As suggested by Lipsky (1980) and Maanen (1978), rather than placing espoused values, laws, and regulations directly into practice, front line officers adopt official rules to their work conditions. They can make a distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ and see change efforts as unrelated to local needs and conditions. This understanding generates new practices and routines and increases the gap between the perspectives of managers and front line officers on the actual adaptation of change initiatives.

A number of empirical studies were also conducted to examine the relationship between organizational change attempts and certain characteristics of police organizations and police officers. In a study conducted in a police department to determine the relationship of change with certain socio-demographic characteristics, Cochran et al. (2002) found that female, minority, college-educated, and less experienced officers were more open to the types of organizational change required for a shift to community policing. In addition, they found that officers who adhered most to elements of the traditional forms of culture (i.e., solidarity, authority, masculinity, danger) were least receptive to change, specifically community policing.
In another study, Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1992) pointed out difficulties in the implementation of community oriented policing given that this new policing style requested a dramatic shift from operational autonomy to reliance on the community. There were two major obstacles in this process: The first one was the centralized, rigid bureaucratic structure of police organizations, which is defensive of the status quo, and the second one involved police officers who were caught up in the image of crime fighters and viewed this new form of policing as social work as opposed to police work. In a similar vein, Goldstein (1990) suggested that the concern with problem oriented policing is the difficulty of changing the reactive; simplistic concerns of police organizations for operational efficiency (i.e., responding to incidents and 911 calls and processing cases more quickly). As mentioned previously, Goldstein supported a proactive approach rather than responding to single incidents to identify the causes of problems and focus on these problems.

In a study on the adoption of community policing, Greene (1998) discussed certain problems during the implementation of change efforts by stating, “For many years and in many places, changes sought of the police have had to adapt to the police organization and subculture, rather than the organization and subculture adapting to the change” (pp. 145-146). Therefore, any kind of change effort undergoes a metamorphosis to the traditional form of police culture and structure. Consistent with Greene’s assumptions, Chan (1996) argued that due to the strong culture, habitual nature of work, and preferences for clarity, if the existing processes and practices are not challenged relentlessly, police officers will tend to follow existing ways of accomplishing organizational tasks. Chan (1996) found that successful change efforts in police organizations require the external pressure and longtime efforts of stakeholders. Therefore, Chan (1996) introduced the notion of ‘field’ (rules of the game) in understanding the culture and conditions of
change and highlighted its role by stating that “changes in the field (i.e., formal rules, government policies) inevitably alter the way the tasks are accomplished within the police organization” (p. 120). For example, the successful fight against corruption in police organizations was a result of the relentless efforts and struggles of police managers, lawmakers, and politicians that affected the mindsets of police officers (i.e., corruption will not be tolerated) and created a sense of “the new ways things should be done around here” (p.120).

“These traditional assumptions of police organizational and occupational culture as strictly bureaucratic, monolithic, homogeneous, universal, and unchanging are becoming less and less applicable in a world that is identified by the complexity of environmental and organizational factors and the ambiguity of role identification between officers due to different kinds of policing styles and roles” (Wood, 2004, p.32). In contrast to early studies that demonstrated a more integrated view of policing and police organizations, today’s organizations are becoming ethnically and culturally diverse and more complex in their function and practices (Wood, 2004). Increasingly, scholars are acknowledging that police culture is not monolithic. Police organizations may have multiple subcultures, namely ‘management cop culture’ and ‘street cop culture’ that can create and develop their own norms, language, time horizons, and standpoints on the organization’s mission (Crank, 2004).

Besides these subcultures, particular change efforts may have altered the well-known cultural values common to police organizations. In particular, the implementation of community policing over the last three decades has changed both the occupational environment and the organizational environment, and have inevitably changed policing practices, patterns of interaction and socialization, training, roles of police, and the organizational culture of police officers (Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000). For example, officers currently tend to increase their
interactions and communication with citizens in handling crime problems. These changes are said to have an effect on the relationship between police and citizens as well as between police and their supervisors. However, this does not indicate the nonexistence of traditional forms of police culture, but reveals the need for an effort to analytically understand the content and scope of that culture within the light of new developments.

Compstat is one of these developments that must be analyzed in terms of its relation to the culture and communication of police organizations. However, as previously mentioned in this study, the literature regarding these issues either focuses primarily on the NYPD case or remains at the structural, functional level, which ignores the mutual relationship between culture and communication, contextual and communicative aspects of culture and change. For instance, the literature contains various assumptions concerning the positive role that Compstat plays on the collaboration, accountability, innovation, risk taking, and free-flow of information in police organizations. It is not clear, however, how the change of cultural values are manifested in the communication practices of police officers, the degree of change in the officer’s routine practices, and how these changes are actually accomplished considering the existing cultural values of police officers to follow orders, defer to rank, and become reluctant in pursuing innovative approaches. Similarly, it is not clear how communication strategies in the introduction of Compstat interact with the culture of police organization, how resistance and receptivity are revealed and overcome within the cultural environment of police organizations, the role of culture as a sense-making and sense-giving tool, and how communication practices are interpreted through the lens of organizational culture.

All these limitations should to be kept in mind as the literature relating to Compstat and culture is addressed in the following section.
Compstat and Police Organizational Culture

In a review of the literature regarding Compstat and culture, research can be classified in two different yet related lines. In the first line of research, police organizational culture is studied in order to understand the influence it had on the introduction of Compstat and police officers’ resistance and receptivity. In the case of the NYPD, Commissioner Bratton recognized the importance that culture played in the process of reorganization and asked consultants to perform a cultural diagnostic survey that would determine to what extent the NYPD’s cultural values and priorities matched his own and would be appropriate in the change effort (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). The first survey item was designed to determine the difference between the priorities of managers and those of front line officers on the ground. Managers valued “holding down overtime; staying out of trouble; clearing backlog of radio runs; reporting police corruption; and treating bosses with deference” rather than “reducing crime, disorder, and fear,” Bratton’s major goal (Buntin, 1999, p. 6). As Silverman (1999) pointed out, the NYPD police officers “had lost direction with no focus on crime fighting. We were there to keep the lid on and not to be an embarrassment. The main thing was ‘don’t make waves, something might go wrong.’ You were put through the wringer if you really did your job” (p. 87). In contrast, officers on the ground valued “reducing crime, disorder, and fear; making gun arrests; providing police services to people who requested them; gaining public confidence in police integrity; arresting drug dealers; correcting quality-of-life conditions; and staying out of trouble” (Buntin, 1999, p. 6). As a reflection of these cultural values, during the implementation process, Compstat encountered powerful resistance from managers who advocated the professional bureaucratic policing management model that emphasized strict dependence on written rules and regulations, centralization of the decision making process, and authority by top
level management (Henry, 2002). In contrast, Compstat stressed rapid action, flexibility for managing resources, and a decentralized decision making process. In the implementation process at the NYPD, some advocates of the professional management model were forced to retire, whereas others were transferred to less influential positions by the new administration in order to implement this innovation (Henry, 2003).

In the second line of research, the focus is on the impact of change efforts for the work, structure, and culture of police organizations. For instance, it has been claimed that Compstat had certain impacts on the police culture, and this view was supported by comparing culture in police organizations both before implementation and after implementation (O’Connell, 2002; O’Connell & Straub, 2007). It is common to suggest that after the implementation, NYPD’s largely hierarchical, centralized, formalized management that emphasized mistake avoidance, security, order, caution, systematic rule application changed in a way that stressed innovation, creativity, flexibility, information-sharing, accountability, and problem solving (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Proponents argued that static, unitary, and traditional police culture encourages uniform actions and hinders innovation but, Compstat’s components and principles created an environment where innovative problem solving was supported (Willis et al., 2004). As Bratton pointed out, “we encouraged creative thinking and backed our people up when they practiced new techniques. We freed them from old restraints, gave them responsibility, held them accountable, and were very pleased with the result” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 237). Compstat was presented as a vital component of the NYPD’s reorganization process, and regular Compstat meetings in particular were believed to provide a platform to sustain change by constant monitoring, communication, measurement, and accountability to achieve the goals. The basic idea was that “you can’t manage what you don’t measure” (O’Connell, 2002). In this regard,
Compstat enforced system thinking, benchmarking, and continuous measurement, which promoted an outcome, performance-oriented culture.

In addition, Compstat was believed to have created a learning culture with a focus on empowerment, more participation in decision making, and less hierarchical (flattened hierarchy) communication within the organization (O’Connell & Straub, 2007; Silverman, 1999). Compstat meetings were given as an example of a learning environment where best practices were shared and diffused within the organization. Some scholars emphasized the role of Compstat in the creation of a knowledge sharing culture—from having knowledge to sharing knowledge—which was limited before the implementation of Compstat (O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

Most importantly, the Compstat claimed to alter the existing mindset of officers in the organization by engendering the belief that police can reduce crime. In other words, it took vision to realize the value and potential in reduced crime statistics, and confidence and a ‘can do mentality’ to believe that the police could, in fact, do something about crime. This belief brought about the creativity, innovation for problem solving, continuous search for best practices, and general dissatisfaction with the status quo (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; O’Connell & Straub, 2007). It can be concluded that the literature regarding Compstat and culture focused on the role of police organizational culture in the perceptions and reactions of police officers to the Compstat, and secondly, structure, certain values and norms that changed after implementation, and how these values reflected the police organization’s structure.

**Communication and Police Organizations**

As already mentioned, there are many views as to the nature of communication. The functionalist perspective posits communication as an information exchange and deals with information flow, message content, communication skills, message channels, and message
fidelity to understand the problems and effectiveness of communication (Greenbaum, Hellweg, & Falcione, 1988). Systems theorists emphasized the role of interconnectedness (loose v. tight) and the inherent importance of the external environment and view communication as essential in relating the organization to its parts and the environment (Ruben, 1978, 1979, 2000). In contrast to the conceptualization of communication as information exchange, interpretive scholars view communication as a process through which shared meanings are produced and reproduced (Putnam, 1983). Within this framework, interpretive scholars focus on communication as a constitutive process and tease out its role in terms of appropriateness, framing, sense-making, and enactment of organizational practices (Orlikowski, 1992, 2000). Finally, critical scholars make the role of communication known in organizations through studies of power based on the structural and ideological aspects of organizations and studies of discourse. They argue that communication does not simply portray reality but rather shapes reality which can both enable or constrain the possibilities of collective action and challenge the dominant system (Deetz, 1994; Mumby & Stohl, 1996).

Regardless of the different roles given to communication, clearly the concept is the essence of organizations. As suggested by Ruben (2005), through the communication mechanism, “joint activity is made possible,” “cooperation and conflict emerge and are addressed” (p. 294), the culture of an organization is reinforced and/or challenged, and change is advocated or resisted. Information is shared, and the system of leadership, power, identity, and culture are established and sustained within the organization. Communication is used to inform command, instruct, influence, persuade, integrate, and relate ideas together (Thayer, 1986; 1988). It can be used to keep an organization together, to inform organizational members, to facilitate and improve relationships, to decrease coordination problems, to create a vision shared by
employees, to increase participation and satisfaction, to promote organizational change, innovation and a vision, and to implement daily practices. Thus, communication plays multiple roles within organizations and helps to make sense of the organization.

In spite of different conceptualizations and multiple roles ascribed to communication, the literature regarding communication in the police organizations view communication primarily as information exchange and focus on problems that can be eliminated through its effective use. The hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, chain of command, centralized decision making, and cultural tendency to hide information that remain in many police organizations is believed to be the major obstacle in effective communication which, in turn, leads to coordination problems, slowness, and distortion (Dantzker, 1999). Thus, in order to increase effectiveness in communication, clarity of messages, open, dynamic, timely, quality, sufficient, relevant, and productive communication, and effective listening have been proposed as practical solutions to police managers as well as the rationale for making structural shifts that will allow more and freer flow of information both horizontally and vertically among organizational members from different positions (Doerner & Dantzker, 2001; Dawson, 2004).

There are few studies in the Compstat literature on the constitutive role of communication, in other words, communication processes through which meanings, cultures, and practices are shaped, reinforced, or altered over time. The role of communication as an instrument through which Compstat was introduced and implemented, and the centrality of communication for understanding the organization, the organization’s culture, and change in the organization is also ignored in the literature. However, as suggested by Pacanowsky and Trujillo (1983), the preference for various forms of communication, the frequency, selection of certain communication channels and strategies, and content introduce a sense of regularity into the
organizational experiences and have a capacity for displaying certain aspects of the organization’s culture. In this line of thought, the claims of Compstat to bring accountability, creativity, problem solving, and flexibility can be and should be analyzed by examining the communication practices during the Compstat meetings where particular cultural values are enacted and manifested. This has not been done in the literature.

The following discussion concerning Compstat and communication should be considered within this conceptualization stance of this literature.

**Compstat and Communication**

During the Compstat process, the role of communication as an instrument for introducing change, minimizing resistance, and promoting change was mainly discussed in terms of Bratton’s leadership practices. Buntin (1999) argued that, as a good communicator, Bratton repeatedly communicated his goals and vision through different channels of communication in order to motivate and inspire organizational members. The cultural diagnostic survey that identified the values of organizational members helped Bratton to take advantage of the situation and to organize his messages accordingly during the implementation of Compstat. Bratton’s internal communication strategy was not based on traditional channels of communication, namely memos, staff bulletins, and other documents that are not read by staff. Rather, through the assistance of communication experts, Bratton prepared and communicated video messages in different locations within the NYPD (Kim & Mauborgne, 2006). Press interviews and media stories were effectively utilized in this process both as a public relations (PR) tools and as parts of an internal communication strategy. He believed that newspapers stories could have a greater impact on police behavior than any other tools of communication. He used the press to share the success of his new methods, namely Compstat, to call attention to
police officers who had done well and to challenge them to a higher standard. In this way, a clear sense of goal was communicated throughout the organization (Buntin, 1999).

Another important communication strategy adopted by Bratton to persuade, promote, and initiate change was to create a sense of urgency through first-hand experience. Rather than making the case for change simply by pointing to numbers and insisting that the organization could do more, Bratton introduced key managers directly to the problems confronting the force. For instance, to convince managers of the need for change, Bratton requested they take the subway so that they could personally witness the crime problems faced by New York City (Kim & Mauborgne, 2006). Within the framework provided by Lewis (2011), it can be said that Bratton relied most heavily on disseminating information to create discrepancy during the implementation of change within the NYPD.

Another important communication strategy followed Bratton used can be classified as ‘quid pro quo’, which refers to communicative attention given to key people who can be instrumental in supporting the change process (Lewis, Hamel, & Richardson, 2001). He certainly aimed to mobilize the commitment of key organizational members and outside actors. In this sense, Bratton developed close relationships with his many constituencies by attending meetings and giving speeches to church groups and neighborhood organizations in crime ridden areas. In this regard, he was also able to obtain support from external sources such as police unions, the public, media, and local and federal government. One example included the New York City Police Foundation that provided significant funding for the NYPD’s initial development of Compstat (Moody, 1995; Vitale, 2005).

As stated previously, concerning the role that Compstat plays on communication in police organizations, the review of the literature focused most on its positive role when
referring to the highly emphasized communication problems within police organizations. For instance, one of the main reasons for implementing Compstat at the NYPD was the lack of communication and information flow between headquarters, precincts, specialized units, and other departments. As Bratton and Knobler (1998) noted, precinct commanders had not communicated with officers for months and were even unaware of the crime rates within their precincts. In addition, precincts and specialized units in the same districts worked in isolation. “The centralization, rigid hierarchy, cultural tendencies to keep and conceal information and formalized communication mechanisms had limited the extent of information-sharing and interaction between NYPD’s different units and departments” (Silverman, 1999, p.129). Bratton believed that communication was essential for the effective coordination of crime fighting efforts and resources. For this reason, he outlined new mechanisms to open channels of communication and change the well-known behaviors of police officers to keep or hide information (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). The Compstat, specifically the regular meetings conducted in the Compstat’s framework, was one of these mechanisms.

The Compstat meetings that were conducted in large rooms with all divisions intended to be represented, including the commissioner, precinct commanders, and staff holding different levels and positions (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). The Compstat meetings are intended to provide grounds for information sharing and horizontal communication across all these organizational lines. Until these meetings were instituted, even precinct commanders at the NYPD had never be given the chance to speak directly to the commissioner. In theory, every participant was able to communicate openly with other participants, a type of communication that Bratton referred to as a ‘seamless web’ (Henry, 2002). If precinct commanders faced a resource problem during implementation of their crime solving strategy, they could speak
directly to the responsible commander and request help in solving their issues (Henry, 2003). In this way, top-down, one-way bureaucratic communication was replaced with both two-way and horizontal communication. These meetings became a forum for the exchange of knowledge and facilitated the coordination of joint efforts and problem solving: “Issues that had previously taken weeks to resolve were quickly addressed since most necessary parties were assembled in the same room” (O’Connell & Straub, 2007, p. 89). In short, it is claimed that communication and information sharing became part of the police culture in organizations.

However, critics disapproved of the tough atmosphere and harsh manner of questioning in these meetings and found them likely to produce defensive thinking, limit innovative ideas and creativity, and lead to burn-out and unmotivated organizational members (Willis et al., 2007). But, Bratton supported the idea that a harsh atmosphere and hard questioning was an important part of the Compstat in terms of creating a feeling of accountability and relentless assessment. He noted that the questioning style was necessary to ensure that commanders could handle the resources and their power appropriately (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).

The Compstat is also believed to be a useful mechanism for external communication and collaboration in that it enables the engagement, collaboration, and collective efforts of various law enforcement agencies, private business organizations, and the media in order to identify, respond to, and solve problems. Diverse law enforcement agencies including the FBI, DEA, and local agencies, such as the parole department and city probation department, were extended an invitation to attend the Compstat meetings on the need basis. The purpose was to increase communication and, thus, join in finding appropriate solutions to the city’s crime and disorder problems (Shane, 2004). In some cases, the media was also invited in an effort to develop greater awareness in the public spectrum as to how the department was managed.
Within this context, Compstat facilitates the use of information on a regular basis to increase coordination, collaboration, and development of effective strategies, and monitor the performance of different units. The regular collection and analysis of information through different mechanisms allows top executives to follow their planning and problem solving plans, prioritize and respond to gaps in these efforts, set and communicate new organizational goals accordingly, and monitor and evaluate the performance of the organization and organizational members in terms of the objectives they set. In addition, an individual’s successful practices, skills, and performance are identified and used as a form of internal benchmarking that is eventually communicated and adapted to the organization (O’Connell & Straub, 2007).

In addition to these studies that conceptualize communication through the lens of the functionalism and system theories, there are a few studies that focus specifically on the content of communication and how it contributes to the enactment of particular values inside the organization. In their analysis concerning the discourse of the Compstat meetings, Smith and Jenne (2006) argued that the meetings could be considered a system of discursive accountability that consist of very structured, highly formalized, special ways of acting, using language, and communicating. These aspects make Compstat meetings more effective and unique compared to other types of meetings. Within the definition of Yates and Orlikowski (1992), they can be identified as a special kind of genre that is a socially recognized type of communication action habitually enacted by members of the organization. Smith and Jenne (2006) referred to this process as ‘management by inquiry’ wherein an entire organizational chart that represents top executives, middle managers, and front line officers come together to discuss innovative activities and strategies to improve the performance and operation of individual units and respond to emerging conditions. The uniqueness of discourse comes from its ability and design
to foster buy in and change the practices and policies of police organizations (Smith & Jenne, 2006). When pointing out the problems, Smith and Jenne maintained that

Discursive processes are often employed by upper management when formulating agency objectives and strategies; they are generally considered to be incapable, by themselves, of directing administrative behavior down through the ranks. If structured discourse is used at all for administrative personal beneath the upper echelons, it is typically a pseudo-democratic effort to foster buy-in and defuse employee dissatisfaction, not a genuine dialogue across administrative levels to set and adjust the course of administrative action. [p. 66)] On the other hand, the success of the Compstat process is based on the belief that motives and actions are shaped primarily by interpersonal communication and agreements, tendency for people to feel bound by their promises, to give reasons for their beliefs and actions, and to accede to the better arguments and more justifiable claims of others. (pp. 68-69)

While all of these aspects create a system of accountability, similar to Smith and Jenne, O’Connell and Straub (2007) pointed out the need for authentic and honest dialogue to ensure the effectiveness of this inquiry. The communication style designed to embarrass officers rather than to reach a consensus on strategies and tactics where “administrative discourse is seen as a game of ‘gotcha’ will reinforce rather that expose and dissolve defensive thinking, and thus the communication weaknesses of performance management will be amplified rather than corrected” (Smith & Jenne, 2006, p. 74). Therefore, the style and design of communication is basically viewed as essential in terms of facilitating or hindering accountability, innovative problem solving, creativity, and respect and dignity for all participants.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Interpretive Approach

In contrast to disciplines that tend to focus more on macro, structural, and technical levels, organizational communication scholars are able to clarify the role of culture and communication with a focus on meaning, context, and communication practices (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). Consistent with this approach, this study will take an interpretive approach in analyzing the role of culture and communication in the introduction, modification, implementation, and evaluation of the Compstat initiative, and the relationship between Compstat and cultural change. Taking its foundations from a number of methodological and ontological traditions (i.e., constructivism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, critical theory, hermeneutics, semiotics, symbolic interactionism), the interpretive perspective suggests an approach in examining culture and communication. As stated by Denzin and Lincoln (2003), the interpretive research “attempts to observe, describe and interpret settings as they are” (p. 55). In this perspective, “research aims to discover the meaning events have for the individuals who experience them and interpret those meanings rather than test theories and causal relationships between variables for verification” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p.55).

Organizational activities and communication occur in a context, and meaning can only be understood by examining relationships, history, authority lines, politics, and other immediate organizational factors (Pacanowsky & Trujillo, 1983; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). For example, one’s interpretation of what constitutes culturally appropriate or inappropriate actions is a matter of how organizational members interpret the context in which they work. As such, there is certainly the need for a deeper understanding of the circumstances that affect the interpretation of
any types of actions and communication. In this regard, the interpretive perspective endeavors to delve into deeper meanings that are viewed as fundamentally contextual, negotiated, and constructed by individuals. This perspective also suggests a reciprocal relationship between culture and communication, where culture may influence communication but is also constructed and enacted through communication processes (Deetz, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Martin & Nakayama, 2008).

Based on these assumptions of the interpretive perspective, a more contextual, communicative, and dynamic analysis of culture and communication is offered in this dissertation in an attempt to understand how culture and cultural change is constructed through communication and manifested in communication practices, values, rituals, norms, and habits of members in a given organization. The overall purpose of this stance is to take an ‘emic’ perspective and provide a rich description of what is happening in an organizational setting through the interpretations of meanings that members bring to organizational activities in their communication practices.

However, studies in this line of research typically remain conceptual in nature and fail to provide specific guidelines on how to study culture and communication compatible with this stance. At this point, Pacanowsky and Trujillo (1983) suggested looking at certain cultural performances, such as rituals, stories, symbols, metaphors, ideologies, and sagas with a communicative perspective as a way to understand an organization’s communication and culture. As previously mentioned, these authors considered performances to be contextual, episodic, and interactional, and described a heuristic but not exclusive list of cultural performances in which organizational members construct reality, reveal, and make sense of culture. This list includes: performances of rituals (i.e., tasks, social, organizational), performances of passion (i.e.,
personal, collegial, and corporate stories as a way to dramatize organizational life), performances of sociality (i.e., formalized codes of behavior: courtesies, pleasantries, social abilities, privacies), performances of politics (i.e., forms and tactics of showing power, control, and influence), and performances of enculturation (i.e., learning and teaching the roles and ropes) all of which are manifested in different cultural forms (Pacanowsky & Trujillo, 1983; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993). Therefore, any researcher who intends to study and understand the communication and culture of organizations should look at these performative and symbolic functions of communication in the context of organization.

Such a perspective may be more helpful for understanding the relation between culture, communication, change, and Compstat. Rather than solely asking questions to study these concepts, it appears to be more constructive to examine how cultural features are manifested in the physical, linguistic, and cultural artifacts. These artifact include how to talk to and address peers, subordinates, and supervisors; asking; greeting; turn taking; dress codes; design of communication; communication style (formal v. informal, open); expected expression of emotions; use of humor; labeling rules; and other recurring practices, rituals, routines, rules, and norms that guide the actions of organizational members. In this view, the meeting room represents more than just a place to hold meetings, but a place that symbolizes the nature of relationships and power. The rules, rituals, and norms that were constructed by the participants of the Compstat meetings became the ‘rules of the game’ that determine what is appropriate and inappropriate and how far a person should go in that specific setting. Thus, the researcher’s role is to look at all of these processes and practices and how police officers assign meanings and understand them in the context of organizations which is then interpreted by the researcher
Based on these assumptions, this study takes an interpretive approach to the study of culture and communication in the case of Compstat.

**Case Study Approach**

“Case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of what is to be studied” such as an individual, organization, or even a nation (Stake, 2003, p. 134). Although it is compatible with any type of methodological stance, it is commonly argued that case studies are more appropriate in situations where existing knowledge is limited, and the goal is to provide in-depth, contextual, historical, and detailed information about a given organization (Abbott, 2004). Case studies enable researchers to develop an in-depth understanding of the given organizations to obtain as complete a picture as possible of practices in the organization’s context, and thus, the role that culture and communication can play in the implementation of planned change initiatives in different settings.

In light of these benefits, a case study approach was adopted in this dissertation, because this approach is more consistent with the conception of culture as a root metaphor, and provides in-depth contextual information. Thus, it allows researchers to show the holistic and meaningful characteristics of activities in a certain organizational setting (Yin, 2003). The case study can also be more appropriate for exploring situations in which the phenomenon being evaluated does not have a clear and single outcome (Yin, 2003). As discussed earlier, with its suggested components and outcomes, Compstat is a complex, multifaceted change initiative that makes a causal analysis of the model limited in terms of generating insights to the whole model. All of these aspects make case study particularly helpful for this kind of research.
Research Setting

In this dissertation, a large metro police department on the east coast of the USA was selected for an in-depth analysis of Compstat. The real name of this police department and names of individuals were not used. The police department will be referred to as Metrocity Police Department (MPD) in this study. This police department was selected due to its relevance for this research. First and foremost, the MPD has employed the Compstat initiative since its implementation in 1997, and the department was receptive to conducting interviews and having a researcher attend Compstat meetings. In addition, several factors made this police department a good and interesting sample of study: its large size, crime ridden environment, openness to change in the past and revision of Compstat, initiation of a number of innovative programs, reorganization of the department, and reduction in crime rates after the implementation of Compstat. The main site selected for the observation was that of the Compstat meetings.

According to figures on its web site, over 2,000 officers in the MPD serve a population of over a quarter million; and this population swells to over one million during the day. Metrocity is inhabited by a wide range of ethnicities, mainly African-Americans and may be classified among the larger police departments in the United States. According to the MPD’s official web site, the department is broken down into four precincts, and there is a police captain who governs each precinct. The Metrocity Police Department consists of two primary divisions and several important bureaus. The patrol division and the detective division are the largest organizational entities within the department. The patrol division, the largest, is organized into four police precincts and a tactical patrol bureau. The detective division of the police department is also divided into four components: major crimes bureau, general investigations, narcotics, and the property and evidence bureau. Other than these divisions, the bureaus of the police department
include: Records and Communications, Special Operations, Youth and Community Services, and Internal Affairs (Police Department Web Site, 2011).

In the 1980s and 1990s, as many police departments in America, the MPD changed its organizational structure and practices to one compatible with community policing. In order to push decision making down the chain of command, to provide greater access to police services, and to improve organizational flexibility, the MPD decentralized into districts or precincts. Furthermore, it fostered closer relationships with city residents and increased neighborhood contributions to crime problems through a variety of programs and tactics. These tactics included assigning patrol officers, holding regular community meetings, increasing foot patrol, and implementing Neighborhood Watch programs (Police Department Web Site, 2011).

As previously discussed in the section on the emergence of the NYPD’s Compstat initiative, despite the overall decline in crime rates that began in the early 1990s throughout U.S. cities, including Metrocity, crime, citizen satisfaction with police services, and management of police organizations still fell short of meeting community expectations. Specifically, there were serious problems in the MPD concerning police visibility, response time to incidents, police morale, racial profiling, lack of crime trend analyses, and the department’s overall management (Kleinknecht, 2000).

Under these circumstances, a veteran of the Metrocity police department, who will be referred to as John Black, was promoted to the position of police director in 1996. He began his duties by promising to make substantial changes in the organization and address its many problems (Smothers, 2002). Besides focusing on serious crimes, John Black centered his attention on quality of life crimes taken from the broken windows theory. In addition, he introduced Compstat in 1997 by hiring two strategists credited with engineering NYPD’s
Compstat initiative, John Linder and Jack Maple, to set up the initiative in the MPD by the end of 1997. Under this contract, they were expected to give training for Metrocity police officers about Compstat, examine the police culture with the aim of changing it, and try to obtain citizen support through advertising campaigns (Ben-Ali, 1997). In 2002, John Black left his job in Metrocity after his appointment to another State Police. During his six years as Metrocity police director, crime had declined more than 50% (Roberts, 2008).

In 2006, an officer who will be referred to as George Brown, deputy commissioner at a nearby police department, was appointed to this position. Within the leadership of this new police director, despite the fact that Metrocity still had a high crime rate compared to other surrounding regions, it witnessed a significant reduction in crime. Murder was down 14%. Shootings had decreased 29% and overall crime was down 24% (Police Department Web Site, 2009). The new police director initiated a number of innovative programs in a short time, including reorganizing the department’s staffing structure by sending over 150 police officers from clerical positions to city wide task forces and patrol duties. He also installed a new Records Management System (RMS) in order to reduce the time officers spend on paperwork and processing arrests and to allow them more time on the street, all of which aimed to further increase the quality of service to the citizens. In addition, he launched a Quality of Life Initiative as a multi-agency task force consisting of the police department, alcohol beverage control, fire department, health department, code enforcement, and uniform construction code officials with the purpose of reducing crime and the fear of crime occurring in the communities. There were many other initiatives, such as the increase in surveillance cameras and other technological resources, the creation of new divisions, and the creation of a community partnership program. Finally, the department’s Compstat initiative were renewed with the purpose of empowering all
precinct commanders and thus emphasizing accountability (Police Department Web Site, 2009). In short, this organization has a strong professional reputation, has received considerable publicity for being innovative, and has been operating the Compstat initiative since 1997 which has recently been renovated. In this regard, its size and history as well as availability of the Compstat for a long period of time make this site a theoretically relevant and interesting sample of study.

**Research Questions**

As discussed before, the literature on Compstat mainly focused on the case of the NYPD. There is little information for other organizations that implemented Compstat. In addition, previous studies have mostly taken a functional perspective in their conceptualization of culture and communication. As such, there is much that can learned about the role of culture and communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat in the MPD by taking a different conceptual and methodological stance. Within this context, this dissertation aims to shed light on the following research questions related to implementation of Compstat in this organization and the multidimensional role that culture and communication play in this process.

**R Q 1:** What was the role of culture in the introduction, implementation, and evaluation of the Compstat?

a) How was the Compstat introduced and implemented in the selected study site?

b) How was the Compstat received and reacted to by organizational members?

c) How did reactions change over time, if they changed?

d) Was the introduction of Compstat perceived to have changed cultural values of the organization? If so, how?
R Q 2: What was the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of the Compstat?

a) What communication strategies were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?

b) What communication channels were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?

c) What was the role of communication in the current implementation of Compstat?

d) In what ways was the selection of communication strategies and channels related to the culture of police organizations?

Data Collection

In this dissertation, the unit of analysis was the organization. Data regarding Compstat in the MPD was collected through in-depth interviews of police officers in different ranks and positions, observations of Compstat meetings, and analysis of documents.

Interviews

Interviews represent a useful method of gaining in-depth, contextual, detailed descriptions of organizational members’ accounts of their daily practices, experiences, perceptions, and interpretation of particular practices, which assist researchers in understanding the phenomenon under study (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The main goal of conducting interviews in this dissertation was to understand the rationale, philosophy, and meaning behind the practices of officers, and to gather information on several topics: The history
of Compstat, officers’ personal experiences and feelings toward this change initiative, espoused rationale for its introduction, implementation, and communication, change in officers’ ways of working, the organization’s culture, perception and reactions at the beginning, modification of Compstat over the years, and perception of success or failure regarding Compstat.

In order to check the feasibility and to improve the design of the interview instrument, three pilot interviews were conducted with officers in this organization. These pilot interviews revealed a number of potential problems. The correction of these problems increased the internal validity of interview instruments. Specifically, the officers thought some of the questions had similar meanings, gave similar responses to different questions, or misunderstood some questions. These questions were refined or removed. A number of important issues emerged during the pilot interviews such as the unusual personality of the police director who introduced Compstat in the MPD and the problems of changing the mindset of front line officers. In order to clarify these issues, a few questions were added to the interview instrument. Finally, the questions were organized in a different order and with headings to make the interview process more efficient and effective. The questions utilized during the interview process are presented in Appendix A.

The interviews were semi-structured, which provided the interviewer with an opportunity “to explore, probe, and ask questions that elucidate and illuminate that particular subject” (Patton, 1987, p. 111). In this sense, the interviews were partially directed by the officers’ responses, rather than solely those of the researcher, and reflected information that was of importance to the officers (Geertz, 1973; Murray, 1998; Barker, 1999). The idea behind this approach was to encourage officers to freely express their thoughts and talk about any aspects of their work they considered important. In this sense, as common and different concerns, cultural
manifestations, or areas of disagreement emerged among officers during the interviewing process, more specific questions that needed clarification regarding certain matters were asked. In other words, the interview questions were used to provide some structure, but there was flexibility in the way and order in which questions were asked, which made it possible to ask questions regarding the issues that came out during the interview sessions and to explore issues that were important to the officers. In addition, attending to the Compstat meetings for observation enabled the researcher to clarify certain points regarding the identities of organizational actors and the relationships among them.

The researcher conducted 26 interviews with members of the MPD. The interview process took three weeks in total. Nearly all interviews took place in participants’ offices. In some cases, participants arranged a small office where we could talk without any disturbance or noise. Interviewing in the participants’ offices was effective in making the participants feel comfortable and relaxed. The researcher started each interview by sharing a short story of his personal background and research purpose, indicating that the primary focus was on the culture and communication side of Compstat. The Informed Consent Form was given before each interview and all participants read and signed the form. Then, the researcher asked the participants for permission to audio tape the interviews. All participants agreed. Two digital recorders were used, one as a backup for any unexpected malfunctions of the other. Thus, all interviews were recorded and transcribed. These interviews ranged from 20 to 70 minutes, although the average length was about 45 minutes. The transcription of interviews generated 296 pages of double spaced, 12 point, Times New Roman raw data. Each interview generated a transcript of approximately three to ten pages. The details regarding access, the researcher’s
relationship with participants, and overall impressions will be explained in the following sections.

**Sampling strategy for interviews.** This study’s basic sampling strategy was to reach a sample of individuals from diverse groups and varied functions within the organization. Based on this stance, it was the goal to conduct interviews with officers from different positions, units, and years of experience to generate a variety of perspectives, views, and opinions. Priority was placed on conducting interviews with upper level managers (i.e., police director, police chief, and deputy chiefs), middle level managers (i.e., precinct commanders, head of different divisions), and Compstat unit members who were given more responsibilities in the introduction and implementation of this initiative.

The interviews were arranged by a contact person who was assigned by the police director to assist with the study. The contact person was the head of the Compstat Unit, serving in the rank of lieutenant. In the first meeting with the contact person, the number of potential participants, central groups, and arrangement of interviews were discussed. There was agreement in this meeting on the number of participants -approximately 30- and that these participants would be drawn from a wide range of units and ranks. An organizational chart was used to define central units, groups, and individuals. The contact person functioned as a gate keeper and facilitator; he made calls personally to officers to arrange interviews, especially at the Headquarters. Once the interviews with precinct commanders in each precinct were set, the precinct commanders organized interviews with the officers in their command.

Participation was voluntary. Although the contact person made calls to some high ranking officers -the police director, the police chief, and the deputy chief- to arrange interviews, these requests were rejected due to time considerations. The researcher attempted to reach retired
officers and the former MPD police director who introduced Compstat in the MPD. However, these attempts were not successful. Thus, this study did not fully tap the perspective of upper level managers and former employees of this Police Department. In order to get information on the perspectives of former and current upper management, newspaper articles that include statements regarding Compstat by individuals in these groups were added in the data sample of this study.

Other than this limitation, there was a representative number of officers from a wide range of ranks and units. This enabled cross-checking of information in an effort to establish different views held concerning the introduction and implementation of Compstat (Olie, 1994). When contradictory accounts were obtained from different respondents, these alternative accounts were documented and included in the findings. See Appendix B for a full description of interview participants.

In summary, the participants interviewed were at the ranks of Constable (9), Sergeant (3), Lieutenant (7), Captain (5), and Civilian (2), working under a wide range of divisions. Another important characteristic of participants was years of experience. These interview participants were classified under the more or less than 12 years’ work experience category, as the introduction of Compstat in this organization occurred in 1997. Twenty (20) out of twenty six (26) had more than 12 years experience, which allowed the interviewer to ask participants to contrast the periods before and after the implementation of Compstat. Nearly all participants had experience of Compstat meetings either in the past or present with different responsibilities. Even the ones classified under the ‘no experience’ category had visited Compstat meetings once or twice during their police academy period.
Observation

Observation was another data collection method used for this dissertation. Observation is particularly helpful in observing actual work behaviors and uses of change initiatives, generating insight into the daily routines, motivations, rules, and emotions that organizational members experience in their everyday activities, and finally, revealing contextual circumstances that help to understand particular frames of reference and the meaning and interpretation of organizational practices (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).

The main setting for observations was the Compstat meetings. The meetings, as the most visible aspect of Compstat, presented a unique context in which to examine certain practices and conversations conducted in the scope of Compstat. They also allowed to researcher to understand the culture of the organization manifested in the rules, rituals, relationships, and preferred styles of communication of officers during the meetings. The main purpose for the researcher was to understand the meanings produced in these meetings and interpret the experiences of officers regarding these Compstat meetings and Compstat in general.

The researcher was not allowed to record the meetings, but took detailed field notes during the observations or immediately thereafter. Observation field notes gained from these meetings were the main source of evidence in addition to interview statements. The observation period was over seven months. The meetings that were usually held on a weekly basis in the previous administration had changed on the need basis in the new administration. Based on this new criterion, there were eleven Compstat meetings conducted by the MPD in these seven months. The researcher attended nine out of eleven meetings. The meetings were held in a separate building within walking distance of the Headquarters. The photos and drawings that
show the design of the meeting room, the participants, and their status are presented in Appendix C.

The meetings, with one exception, were held on Thursday mornings at 9:30 a.m. Participants of the meeting were informed on Wednesday afternoon if the meeting would be held or not. The researcher got information regarding the meeting by calling the Compstat unit on Wednesday afternoons or Thursday mornings. The basic criterion to determine the need for meetings and the precincts commanders who would be questioned was the crime rates.

Normal attendance at these meetings ranged from 30 to 40 officers. As will be discussed in details, there were clear rules that defined the critical people in meetings, who would talk, about what, and the expectations of the chief and director. The meetings were led by the police director and the deputy chief of operations. While the deputy chief of operations was responsible for asking the questions, the police director joined this process frequently and also asked questions.

During the meetings, the researcher did not interact with officers in any way, but sat in the back of the room and took notes. In other words, the researcher played an ‘observer’ role in these Compstat meetings, given the very formal and structured nature of meetings. However, relying solely on observations without participating may inhibit the researcher’s ability to adequately understand the complex, lived experience of human beings (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). That is, they may lead researcher to unreasonably judge certain aspects of these meetings according to his/her own distinct cultural background and beliefs concerning organizations, or present and interpret data without providing convincing evidence to represent the experience of officers. At this point, interviews provided the researcher a space to ask questions to understand, supplement, and validate observation field notes. At the same time, the experience of meetings
before the interview process made the researcher more aware of the Compstat practices in this organization, and helped the researcher to ask more informed and detailed questions. In short, triangulation of data helped to cross check information in the data collection process.

The observation guidelines used to collect data systematically are presented in Appendix D. During the observations, the researcher paid special attention to points that can function as symbolic expressions and manifestation of cultural features: Linguistic choices; communication styles; turn taking; addressing terms; routines, rules, and norms that govern the meetings; and cultural artifacts (i.e., clothing, architecture, and so forth).

In addition to these, the researcher made observations pertaining to whom these people represent; their roles, their status and relationships; how they displayed their positions in the culture of the setting; how the roles and relationships were actually performed; how the rules and norms were enacted in this setting; regular and irregular activities; the time and place of activities; the room design; and other cultural artifacts. Parallel to the communicative focus on cultural change, observations were used in particular to provide contextual information, reveal the nature of the change of cultural values and the ways these values were enacted and manifested, and confirm or disconfirm cultural change claims expressed during the interviews. Thus, by participating in the meetings, the researcher gained better insight into the practices, rules, rituals, motivations, and feelings that members experience as they participate in meetings.

**Document Review**

Documents are critical to the function of organizations. As suggested by Lindlof and Taylor (2002), documents reveal the main function, goals and vision of an organization (i.e., mission statement, vision statement), procedures and policies used by an organization (i.e., manuals and policy documents), and the history of the organization and its activities (i.e.,
yearbooks, minutes of meetings). All of these documents can assist the researcher in gaining insight about the main beliefs, expectations, and culture of the organization.

In this dissertation, a variety of documents were analyzed based on the document review guidelines presented in Appendix E. The type of documents and their content are presented in Appendix F. These documents included the Compstat report, organization web site, the organizational chart, mission and vision statement, media articles, brochures, general orders and memos. Specifically; the Compstat report covers a wide range of documents, including crime statistics for precincts and the city, crime analysis, and crime maps prepared for upper and middle level managers before the Compstat meeting. Other than this, the contact person provided ten sets of ‘minutes of meeting’ for Compstat meetings held in 2008 and 2009. These documents include a brief summary of meetings and decisions made during the meetings, which, in turn, are good indicators of the rationale and expectation behind the meetings. Also provided were eight general orders and memos used to communicate change by upper and middle level managers in department, which is essential to understanding the content and scope of communication; two ‘precinct commander profiles’ that show the weekly activities of a precinct which are essential to seeing the points that are used to identify and evaluate performance; and finally a number of brochures, media releases, vision and mission statement, organizational chart, and crime reports.

In addition, the researcher personally found 18 media articles from a number of newspapers which cover stories regarding the implementation of Compstat in the MPD under the former and current police directors. As stated before, one of the limitations in the sampling for interviews was the lack of perspective for upper level managers. In that respect, these articles filled the gap regarding the expectancies and rationale of the police directors for the implementation of Compstat at the MPD.
Accordingly, these documents were used to triangulate, corroborate, and augment the data collected through interviews and observation. More specifically, they helped the researcher to confirm or refute the conclusions drawn on the basis of interviews and observation (Olie, 1994). They also filled any gaps regarding the organization’s culture and history, the introduction and implementation stages of Compstat, and the main considerations when implementing such an initiative.

**Role of the Researcher and Research Participants in the Data Collection Process**

Lincoln and Guba (2000) suggested the concept of ‘human as instrument’ to refer the criticality of the interaction among research topic, researcher, and research participants during the data collection process. Specifically, the role and status of the researcher and his or her relationship to the participants in the data collection process is very critical in interpretive research that includes face-to-face interactions during interviews and observations. As Lindlof and Taylor (2002) suggested, the researcher and research participants read each other as texts. Thus, age, occupation, gender, hierarchical position, nationality, ethnicity, and culture may influence the relationship; the trustworthiness, quality, and accuracy of information given by participants; and the researcher’s interpretation of findings. All these points may influence the credibility of information and reliability and validity of the findings. As such, interpretive research requires the researcher’s consideration and description of his or her relationship with research participants within the research setting, possible biases through the process of self-reflection, and how he or she will deal with these issues (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Maxwell, 2005).

In this regard, one of the important considerations in this dissertation was my occupational background as a police officer in another country, which has an effect on the
research participants as well as the researcher. First of all, the selection of a research topic such as this one was the result of a personal struggle to combine my academic background in the field of communication and occupational background as a police officer. In spite of the difficulties that I encountered to get approval for data collection, my occupational network played an essential role in getting approval, and thus gaining access to the research site and research participants.

Secondly, a researcher will be noticed as a new face when she or he in the presence of others. In that sense, the first day of my observation at the Compstat meetings and first interaction with the contact person to arrange interviews was the most uncomfortable phase of the data collection, due to in large part to my feeling of vulnerability and the possibility of being rejected. In the first meeting, I arrived just before the start of the meeting and sat on a chair in the back part of the room. All the officers were either in uniform or suits. I was the only one in casual clothes. It was clear that I was an outsider in this setting. The deputy chief of operations noticed me and sent an officer to ask what I was doing there. I introduced myself as a police captain in Turkey and a Ph.D. student at Rutgers who was conducting observation for the dissertation about Compstat with the approval of the police director. Then, the officer turned back and informed the deputy chief of my purpose for being there. The police director and the deputy chief then talked for a minute, in which I believe the police director informed the deputy chief of my purpose, and, they greeted me. This was the moment that I felt that I had been accepted at the meetings. I was not questioned about attending the meetings after that.

Another issue that has been addressed in the literature of observational studies is the influence of the researcher’s presence on the behavior of those observed. Due to the room’s size, the large number of participants at these meetings, and my position at the back of the room, my
presence did not in any way seem to influence meeting practices, which decreased the potential for non-authentic or unnatural behaviors.

In terms of the interview process, although I had some concerns at my first encounter with the contact person regarding the arrangement of interviews, the number of interviews, and the documents that could be provided, the first encounter was very relaxing and positive. He welcomed me as a colleague rather than as a researcher. During the arrangement of interviews, he introduced me as a police captain in Turkey who was doing research about Compstat rather than solely as a Ph.D. student in the US. These were the moment that various components of my identity played a positive role in terms of attention and inclusion.

During interviews, it is critical to create a comfortable atmosphere for both the researcher and the participants as that may contribute trustworthiness and credibility. These are classified as two important factors that increase the integrity of these types of studies (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I started each interview with an explanation of my personal background as a police officer; my research purpose indicating that my primary interest was on the culture and communication side of Compstat; and my personal and professional reasons for conducting this study. All of this was helpful in engaging the participants’ interest and paving the way for a meaningful and sincere interview. I also emphasized the fact that the final product might contribute to policies and techniques that will improve Compstat in this organization. In particular, my occupational background as a police officer reduced the potential barriers and eased the suspicions that researchers may expect to be directed at them from police officers. In addition, my background helped me to establish good rapport and trust during the interviews, and thus to obtain quality and trustworthy information that provided insight about what went on behind the scenes.
At the same time, being a police officer myself raises questions about potential biases in the study. On the one hand, my position as a student in the U.S. and my lengthy time away from the world of policing may help balance, to some extent, any potential occupational bias in the research. On the other hand, it would be difficult to imagine that a researcher could remain bias free in this type of study, which would apply to strictly positivist studies as well. There is an inevitable process of inclusion of some features and exclusion of others; therefore they are partial and selective (Emerson, 2001). The inclusion and exclusion of features depend to some extent on the researcher’s background, and thus choices of relevancy and irrelevancy, or what he or she views to be important and unimportant. Similarly, research participants reflect on their own experience with Compstat considering the points that are important to them. In other words, they reflect on their subjective understandings of the points that the researcher asks about. Although there are certain mechanisms how to organize and interpret data to address the validity and reliability of the findings, it would be impractical and wrong to suggest a completely nonjudgmental, objective stance for this dissertation written in an interpretive tradition. In fact, the reason to disclose the researcher’s possible biases, personal background, and relationship with participants is to make readers aware of this process and these limitations, and help them fairly judge the interpretations of the study.

The final consideration that needs to be taken into account is the difference in the nationality of the researcher and participants, which presents both challenges and opportunities. All interviewees were U.S. citizens who were born in and/or grew up with the values of the U.S. culture. Therefore, they look at the organizational practices primarily from the perspective of the U.S. culture -ethnocentrism- and assume that their patterns of thought and behavior are the most appropriate and natural (Smircich & Calas, 1987; Redding, 1994). These cultural assumptions
limit the participants to express their own culture and develop insights for alternative practices or patterns of thought for Compstat. This was also the case for the researcher, who brings his own cultural and personal background to the research setting, as this may lead to ethnocentric biases and limit my understanding of the reasoning behind certain behavioral and linguistic choices. For instance, there might be some cultural meanings and practices that are well-known by people reared in the United States but not by the researcher. However, this difference provided me with an outsider’s perspective for understanding the taken for granted cultural practices that were not directly clear and observable, and helped me to direct attention to these assumptions by questioning the participants through the interview.

Other than this, using English as a second language and the specific jargon used in the Compstat meetings made it difficult for me to understand the language in the meetings. This problem, however, was partly overcome in the long run as I attended more meetings and became more aware of the Compstat practices.

**Data Analysis**

The data obtained from the interviews, observations, and aforementioned documents were used for the analysis and interpretation of the role of culture and communication in the implementation of Compstat in this organization. The main characteristics of the analysis were contextual and communicative rather than antecedent or outcome-oriented. The research took an inductive approach to examining the present phenomenon, insofar as the “categories emerge out of the examination of the data … without firm preconceptions dictating relevance in concepts and hypotheses beforehand” (Walker, 1985, p. 58). As such, the phenomenon would appear to be most appropriately supported by a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
The grounded approach was used in this dissertation for a variety of reasons. As mentioned, it is an inductive approach that allows the researcher to develop categories that emerge from an examination of the data without any specific theoretical framework in mind. This generative approach is particularly helpful in producing accurate and useful results, provides the complexities of the organizational context for an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, and facilitates the generation of theories of process (Orlikowski, 1993). These main characteristics of grounded theory -inductive, contextual, and process oriented- “fit with the interpretive rather than positivist orientation of this research. The focus here is on developing a context-based description and explanation of the phenomenon, rather than an objective, static description expressed strictly in terms of causality” (Orlikowski, 1993, p. 311). As indicated above, the analysis of the relationship between Compstat, communication, organizational change, and culture with a contextual, dynamic, and meaning-centered approach tends to have been neglected in the Compstat literature. As such, a research approach that considers these elements is particularly appropriate for this dissertation.

The overall data analysis process can be considered in terms of two interrelated concepts: analysis and interpretation. Lindlof and Taylor (2002) defined analysis as “the process of labeling and breaking down raw data and reconstituting them into patterns, themes, concepts, and propositions. Interpretation is the process of making a construal” (pp. 210-211). In this process, both analysis and interpretation come together to clarify the meaning and make knowledge claims about the given research topic.

Specifically, the constant comparative method was used for analysis and interpretation. In fact, this method appears to be particularly useful in coding a large amount of texts, forming categories, establishing the conceptual boundaries of the categories, assigning the segments to
categories, and summarizing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). There are two concepts that need to be understood to get a better sense of this method. These are ‘coding’ and ‘categorizing’. Coding is a discovering and describing process in which the researcher labels, separates, compiles, and organizes data to relate the coding meaningfully to categories (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). “Categorization refers to the process of characterizing the meaning of a unit of data with respect to certain generic properties. It is a covering term for an array of general phenomena: concepts, constructs, and themes” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 114).

The analysis process, within the scope of the constant comparative method, can be summarized as follows. First of all, in order to prepare the data for analysis, all interview statements, field notes, and documents were logged into the computer. The Atlas-ti software that is designed for content analysis of large amounts of transcripts, field notes, and other written documents was used for the analysis and interpretation of data, and it facilitated a coherent means of coding, categorizing, analyzing, and interpreting. This software provided the flexibility and non-hierarchical coding of data compatible with the constant comparative method (Gibbs, 2002).

The analysis process involved three stages: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Open coding can be considered as a form of content analysis where the data are read, coded, and categorized into themes on the basis of ‘look-alike’ characteristics rather than predetermined categories (Orlikowski, 1993). The purpose is to “group similar events, happenings, and objects under a common heading or classification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 103). In this regard, the researcher started the analysis process by reading all interview transcripts, field notes, and documents to make sense of the data. While reading, the researcher asked in each unit: What is this about, what is being referenced here, and what is happening in
the scene (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). There was not any imposed unit for coding such as a word, line, sentence, or paragraph; rather it was determined to capture naturally occurring and meaningful thought units within the data (Gibbs, 2002). The units emerged as a word, a sentence, a paragraph, or several paragraphs. In this first phase, the researcher defined 174 emerging codes in the data. In certain units, the researcher assigned multiple codes to the same unit, which facilitated a richer description of the processes. For instance, if applicable, a unit was coded for the context, ideas, and outcome. Throughout the coding process, some codes already assigned were changed until they seemed fit based on the increased understanding of the relevance between quotations and codes. At the same time, the researcher wrote memos during the coding process considering the meanings of these coding units, which helped to identify possible categories and relationships. Within this iterative process, a total of about 141 codes were generated. A list of all codes with frequencies can be found in Appendix G. Appendix H contains sample codes and quotes. Then, these coded data were clustered to identify salient categories in the dataset. In other words, the codes found to be conceptually similar in nature or related in meaning were grouped under certain categories and quotations collected for each category. This process ended by reducing 141 codes to 14 broader categories, such as ‘Cultural change’, ‘Cultural values’, ‘Resistance to change’, ‘Tone of meetings’, ‘Performance’, ‘Policing style’, and ‘Communication Channel’. Each category included a number of codes. For instance, the category of ‘Cultural values’ included codes, such as ‘chain of command, hardworking, pride, traditional, culturally diverse, discipline, paramilitary’. See Appendix I for a list of categories created. Then, a list of categories and corresponding codes are presented in Appendix J.

The next step, axial coding, is “the process of relating categories to their subcategories and linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 142).
During axial coding, these categories were reviewed and re-sorted in order to relate them to subcategories, linkages, and relationships that have greater explanatory power to answer research questions. The purpose was to look at associations and relations in the dataset and set associated subcategories based on particular properties and dimensions to answer more specific questions (i.e., time, place, size, frequency, how, why, where, what results) about the phenomenon under study. This step has further acknowledged variations among the categories. For instance, the ‘Cultural values’ category was labeled at different subcategories. One subcategory was more generically illustrated as ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ factors, which are further categorized as ‘national’, ‘occupational’, ‘organizational’, and ‘generational.’ Each research question was addressed by relying on these categories and subcategories that are appropriate for it. During the analysis section, representative and illustrative quotations from different categories and subcategories that demonstrate the emerging pattern of consensus and conflicts on specific issues were used to organize, frame, and present the answer to research questions.

The final step is selective coding, in which core categories are selected and systematically integrated to narrate what is happening, form general explanations, generate a larger theoretical stance, and make knowledge claims about the organization studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In this last phase, the researcher analyzed the codes and categories again in order to find the core categories that pull the other categories together to form an explanatory power. These core categories, by linking them to larger corpus of literature, were used to form a general explanation that either confirms or disconfirms existing literature and to generate a theoretical framework. In this process, interpretations of the data and emerging concepts and categories were checked for representativeness by examining them across participants and using multiple sources of data. If there were contrasts and refuting evidence that led to contradictory interpretations and
confrontation of emerging explanations with possible alternative ones, they were also presented (Orlikowski, 1993). Consequently, “the ultimate task was developing categories, subcategories, and core categories based on the wide range of consensus and interpretation of these categories by the researcher” (Owen, 1984, p.278).

**Reliability and Validity**

As previously mentioned in the introduction of this section, on the one hand, this interpretive case study has certain strengths. These include providing a more in-depth, contextual, meaning-centered, historical, communicative, and dynamic analysis that enables a holistic understanding of the organization and captures the reciprocal relationship between culture, communication, change, and Compstat without imposing predetermined theories. This stance of the dissertation allows for a rich description and deep understanding of this multidimensional and complex relationship, points of view of organizational members, and the nature and context of change in the organization. In addition, it allows the researcher to collect data more flexibly in a natural setting, develop rich insights during data analysis, and go beyond the limits of existing literature to generate new theories and recognize phenomena ignored by previous researchers (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Witmer, 1997).

On the other hand, the interpretive case study approach raises concerns regarding validity and reliability, due to the lack of systematic ‘scientific’ procedures. “The absence of these procedures may lead to relativism, and, biased and judgmental views that influence the direction of the findings and conclusion of the study” (Yin, 2003, p.32). Before focusing on how to address these problems, the distinction between positivist and interpretive research should be clarified. In interpretive research, scholars either use different concepts, such as credibility, trustworthiness, transferability, confirmability, and dependability (Lincoln & Guba, 1995) instead of conventional
concepts, such as reliability and validity, or assign different meanings to these conventional concepts. For example, Witmer (1997) argued that “validity in the context of this type of research refers to scholarly consensus as the test of verisimilitude rather than the test of logical or mathematical validity” (p. 331). Similarly, Yin (2003) claimed that external validity which is related to the generalizability of a case beyond the immediate case is typically taken as statistical generalization in positivist research by ignoring the analytical generalization that is appropriate, and valid and can be strengthened by establishing replicable parameters (transferability) and using multiple case studies. Taking into consideration these points, the following paragraphs explain certain limitations and the ways this study deal with these issues. This discussion excludes the limitations regarding the sampling of interview participants and bias, as these have already been explained in the previous part of the methodology.

Regardless of the methodological orientation of a study, one of the most important things is to show how the researcher rules out specific plausible alternatives and threats to the analysis, interpretation, and conclusions (Maxwell, 2005). This is a validity issue. In this regard, scholars in the interpretive camp have suggested a number of tactics that significantly improves the validity of case study research. Yin (1994) suggested three tactics: “the use of multiple sources of evidence (i.e., triangulation); establishing a chain of evidence; and key informant review” (p. 34). Scholars have also added the need for intensive and long term involvement, providing rich data, searching for discrepant evidence and negative cases, and finally comparison between settings, groups, and existing literature to increase the validity and reliability of interpretive case study research (Maxwell, 2005).

Firstly, this study relied on triangulation of data in which interpretations of the data were derived from a number of alternative data sources (i.e., interviews, observations, and documents).
This triangulation across data provided multiple measures of the same phenomena, supplied more information on concepts, and allowed for checking data gathered from one source against other sources (Yin, 2003). In particular, the use of multiple data sources revealed the contradictions between what people say they do and what they actually do in practice (Maxwell, 2005). It also enabled the researcher to question more deeply certain points, check for the representatives of interpretations across alternative data sources, and thus discover refuting evidence that forces contradictory and rival interpretations. All of these steps increase the validity of this study (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Witmer, 1997).

In terms of external validity, it must be stated that this single case study is limited in terms of statistical generalization. It is always possible that the police organizations with its highly differentiated adaptation strategy of Compstat might have different processes, practices, and consequences that inevitably affect the findings of this dissertation. It is also reasonable to argue that the history of the organization, its size, environment, or crime trends might affect the organization’s cultural heritage, which separates it from general cultural features of police organizations (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Thus, this setting may not be truly reflective of the relations between organizational culture, communication, and change in police organizations. Either way, a single case study is always limited in terms of representativeness of other organizations even in the same region, industry, and occupation, and cannot be generalized to larger populations. Analyzing multiple organizations and checking the match of patterns between the cases would be helpful in addressing the limitations that emerge from reliance on one organization, but due to the difficulties of conducting research in different settings in terms of manageability and time, this dissertation focused on only one police organization rather than multiple organizations. However, the tentative analytical generalization is still valid, appropriate
(Yin, 1994), and helpful for organizations that are willing to understand Compstat’s implementation and the role of culture and communication in this process. In this regard, the general patterns in this specific context can be generalized to a certain degree to any organization that has adapted Compstat into its structure.

This analytical generalization can be further strengthened by establishing transferable parameters (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003). As Murray (1998) stated, “providing full contextual details should indicate the likelihood of a similar outcome if the study will be replicated under the same conditions” (p. 315). This should not be taken as a full transferability of research because the exactness of each lived experience is nonexistent and therefore not generalizable in this type of research. However, it is plausible to give insight to readers about the process of data collection, the procedure followed throughout the analysis, and the interpretation of data. In this study, a description of the self (the researcher as instrument), the research context, participants, the research-participant relationship, and the methodological steps taken to analyze and interpret the data were provided so that the study may be reproduced to some extent by other researchers without making proclamations as to how widespread the results might be (Bruening, 2004). This also enables the reader to decide how the findings may be useful in another setting (Huber & Van de Ven, 1995).

Another important issue is the assessment of reliability. “The way to assess reliability for interpretative research is different than positivist research where reliability depends on whether or not a research instrument yields the same results (replication) every time it is applied” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 25). A common approach to assess the reliability of research instrument measuring inter-coder reliability among independent coders may not be a good strategy in this study, as nobody joined the observation to have knowledge of the organization equivalent to the
researcher (Gibbs, 2002). In this study, the reliability of the research and research instruments comes from long term involvement in the field, which enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of context and alternative explanation. It is also derived from presentation of rich data that are detailed and varied enough to provide an authentic picture of what is going on in this cultural environment and participants’ experience of culture and communication in this organization (Geertz, 1973; Maxwell, 2005).

The final point considered during the writing phase of this study was to present ideas in a finely compelling narrative, addressing the issues of authenticity, plausibility, and criticality, as proposed by Brower, Abolafia, and Carr (2000). Authenticity is about the quality of the representation of the field. To give the sense of authenticity, the researcher needs to convince readers that they have been in the field and faithfully reflect the views of people in the research setting. In parallel, detailed information about the research process and procedures is presented while trying to reflect the views of organizational members. To have a plausible study, the results need to be reasonable and understandable for readers so they are able to relate the findings to their own experiences. To ensure plausibility, the researcher attempted to explain the topic while keeping in mind the need for a reasonable and understandable narrative. Finally, criticality can be fulfilled by challenging one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions and presenting the topic from a critical viewpoint. In order to fulfill these criteria, alternative explanations of organizational members within the data were presented to have a better picture of the research topic.

All in all, to increase validity and reliability, this interpretive case study approach relied on collecting detailed data through different sources, providing rich, detailed, and historically
grounded (retrospective) description of the context, conveying and analyzing data extensively, incorporating expressive language, and telling a compelling narrative to readers (Maanen, 1974).
CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

CULTURE AND COMPSTAT

This section aims to answer the first main research question about the role of culture in the introduction, implementation, and evaluation of Compstat. There are four sub-questions that compose the infrastructure of the main question. These sub-questions attempt to identify the way Compstat was introduced, the reaction of officers, modifications over the years, implementation of the Compstat in general, and finally cultural change perceived in this police organization after the implementation of the Compstat.

As mentioned in the methodology section, the best way to address these research questions is to look at the interplay between the macro and micro conditions, and how the macro conditions are reflected in the daily practices of officers by presenting rich, complex, historical descriptions with a compelling narrative. In particular, the results of the research questions regarding the introduction, reaction, and modification rely more on the personal accounts of members in interviews and documents with a retrospective perspective. This is because these questions are related mostly to the history of this change initiative in this organization and could not be observed by the researcher. The sub-question related the implementation of the Compstat was addressed by combining all means of data collection: Observation, interviews, and documents. The answer to the final sub-question of this section, cultural change, is essentially based on the personal accounts of the interviewees. However, the observation process and document analysis make it possible to check whether these claims of cultural change are put into practice, and if so, how.
Taking these points into consideration, the following first section attempts to identify the ways change was introduced and how this was influenced by the culture of this police organization. Specifically, the focus will be on the specific problems, promises of the upper echelon before Compstat, the antecedent conditions in the MPD as well as macro conditions of policing in the U.S. Then, the introduction phase of Compstat will be explained with a focus on critical actors in this process, announcement of this change initiative, and general characteristics of the introduction perceived by officers in terms of knowledge level, training, participation, communication, and culture.

**Introduction of Compstat**

Scholars have identified a range of options for introducing a change initiative in an organization (Lewis, 2011; Nutt, 2007). It is important to understand that the way a change initiative is introduced and implemented can lead to various results, some less desirable than others. In fact, the criticality of this study comes from this assumption, which draws attention to the range of options at the introduction process of a change initiative, the role of culture in the way these options are selected, communication strategies that go along with these options, and eventually the end product, which produces successful or unsuccessful results.

Any type of change is likely to start with recognizing or perceiving a problem or need in the organization and awareness of a range of options to address these problems (Rogers, 1962). Recognition of a problem or need for change is influenced by not only organizational factors, but also macro factors in which an organization operates, such as financial crisis, war, changing expectations of society, technological improvement, and popular trends in the management. All these organizational and macro level conditions are part of the change process and are likely to influence the way a new initiative is introduced and implemented. In that sense, in order to
understand the introduction phase of Compstat in the MPD in a larger context, there is a need to express the specific problems and the antecedent conditions in the MPD as well as the macro conditions of policing in the U.S. The following section aims to put the Compstat implementation in the MPD into a wider framework in a way that will help to understand the reasons for its introduction and implementation.

**The MPD before Compstat: Problems and Promises**

The history of Compstat in the MPD goes back to 1997. It refers to a time frame immediately after the resignation of NYPD police director William Bratton in 1996 and discussion of the role of Compstat in the significant reduction of crime in the NYPD. William Bratton, some colleagues and scholars were promoting and marketing aggressively the success of Compstat by inviting newspaper reporters and police chiefs from different parts of the USA to the NYPD (Newhouse News Service, 2000). In addition, there was increasing attention on the part of scholars regarding the role of Compstat in the success of the NYPD. It had become a popular change initiative in just a few years and was advertised heavily as a solution to the historically asserted managerial problems of police organizations and crime problems, especially in urban environments.

The popularity of Compstat spread rapidly across the country in the following years. The MPD, which initiated the tool in 1997, was one of the earlier adopters. A 27-year veteran of the Metrocity Police, Deputy Chief John Black, was nominated and became police director of the MPD in July of 1996 (Kleinknecht, 2000). The popularity and perceived success of Compstat in changing the NYPD in many aspects seems to overlap with the vision of the new police director at the MPD, who had promised to make substantial changes in police performance in his first 100 days (Stewart, 1996). During these years, the MPD, as one of the largest police
organizations in a similar geographical context of the NYPD, had a number of problems which were widely recognized and shared by the new police director and officers in the department. Immediately after he was assigned to this position, the police director stated that “the department is here to provide a service and we have not been doing that” (Sullivan, 1996). Referring to problems such as high crime rates, high response time, low morale of officers, corruption and scandals in the department, lack of citizen confidence and satisfaction, and resource constraints (Sullivan, 1996), he promised to hire 100 officers, and get them out of their cars and into the streets; talking to residents; increase arrests for minor crimes; improve responses to 911 calls; and institute an evaluation system that rewarded competent police officers (Stewart, 1996). He also declared on different occasions that a police department should be run like a business, considering the public and their expectations and should have a system of accountability, incentives for officers who want to work hard, and a set of goals and challenges (Smothers, 2002).

**Problems in the MPD**

In addition to the needs identified and promises made by the newly assigned MPD police director at that time, study participants identified a number of other problems in the MPD that predated Compstat and created a widely shared sense of urgency for change in the department. As one officer commented, “There were many problems, and it was certainly a necessity here.”

One of the most articulated problems among participants that made the implementation of Compstat necessary was lack of communication and information sharing. One officer asserts, “Basically, it was due to lack of communication. I think there was a disconnection at different levels.” Another officer confirms this point by saying, “There was a lack of sharing information.
Things were very specific and territorial. But, the same individual (criminal) wasn’t just locked into in a certain geographical area.”

Accountability was identified as another important problem in the MPD before Compstat. One officer emphasizes lack of accountability in the MPD as follows: “The department started Compstat twelve years ago. It was basically for accountability. The commanders wanted to keep the people accountable for high crime, dysfunction of the organization.”

Another common point expressed by officers was the lack of resources that goes along with high response time and excessive work-load. As stated by one officer, before Compstat,

The police departments’ response time was down, personnel was pretty much all time low, we were bleeding overtime. All the time, officers worked double shifts almost as a practice. We had cars that were just condemned being on the road. And the list goes on and on.

Another interrelated problem expressed by officers was the high crime rates and high response time:

I always say when I came first in 1985, I don’t think we were a very good police department, we did not respond quickly enough to calls for service. I think there was too much crime. In 1996, there were 40,000 index crime and we had 12,000 last year.

Similar to the NYPD, officers commented on the lack of timely and accurate information, crime statistics, and crime analysis, and the reactive nature of policing before Compstat. Even officers in managerial position did not have the appropriate and updated information needed to make decisions. John Black, police director at that time, illustrated this problem in a newspaper article, “I held a meeting with the deputy chiefs and asked them what the crime rate was in Metrocity. Nobody knew the answer” (Kleinknecht, 2000). One officer in the auto squad division confirms the lack of updated information, saying, “There was only a monthly report in our department which is auto squad. These reports were prepared monthly and distributed to the
police director on a monthly basis”. The lack of information went along with lack of analysis of
crime trends and reactive policing. One officer suggests that,

The department at that time really didn’t have a grasp on crime trends, crime patterns. We have a stolen car, using that as example, we have a burglary over there. And they were just sending an officer. Everything was reactive. There was no proactive policing.

The following statement of another officer illustrates what reactive policing means in the department:

Years ago, who really cared what time the burglary happened at the house? Nobody cared about that. You were more reactive. If someone broke into a home, or there was a robbery on the corner, then they would say “okay. It happened. Let’s go take the report. No one cared to follow up on that.

Another suggested problem is the lack of mission and department wide strategy before Compstat. This point is explained by one officer as follows: “Prior to 1996, I don’t know there was a concerted effort to address crime in the way that Compstat allows you to focus on crime. I don’t think that there was an organized methodology department wide before Compstat”. All these problems naturally led to lack of citizen confidence. In a referendum in October 1996, citizens in Metrocity city voted two to one that the department was doing a poor job (Sullivan, 1996).

To sum up, the main problems stated by the former police director and study participants were high crime rates, lack of communication within the department, corruption, high response time to 911 calls, reactive policing, and lack of updated information, resources, mission, strategy, and accountability. It is clear that both the police director John Black and officers who were working in the MPD at that time shared the idea that the MPD definitely needed change in these years. In particular, the police director, John Black, who had been assigned to this position with a claim to change the MPD, seems to have perceived the popular Compstat as an opportunity to
address these problems in the police organization. The following table illustrates the problems and promises in the MPD before Compstat.

Table 1 Problems and Promises in the MPD before Compstat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEMS</th>
<th>PROMISES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High crime rates</td>
<td>Hire new officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High response time (911 calls)</td>
<td>New policing approach (proactive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low morale of officer</td>
<td>More police on the streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>More arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low citizen confidence</td>
<td>Focus on quality of life crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low citizen satisfaction</td>
<td>Improve response time to 911 calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource constraints</td>
<td>Closer relationship with public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td>Institute a management system with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of accountability</td>
<td>Goal setting,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of strong mission and strategy</td>
<td>Accountability,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of updated information and statistics</td>
<td>Information sharing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive policing</td>
<td>Performance measurement,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Excessive work load</td>
<td>More incentives,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Career orientation.</td>
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Selection of Compstat

The decision for the introduction and selection of Compstat among other change initiatives cannot be explained solely by organizational problems and need for change. As envisioned in the theory of institutionalization, the reasons for most public as well as police
organizational change efforts are believed to be a response to internal and external conditions, expectations, and pressures. In particular, implementation of Compstat at a large and well-known police organization like the NYPD and its perceived success, which was reinforced by a number of practitioners and scholars, seems to have created pressures on other police organizations including the MPD, to adopt similar practices.

There are many statements that point to the institutional pressures as the police director’s motivation for selecting Compstat. For instance, one officer stated, “They did it successfully. So, a lot of people, including our director, decided to adopt it.” Similarly, another officer emphasized the role of the Compstat’s perceived success in its selection: “Director, John Black implemented this. I think he saw the success that New York City had at that time. He was looking for a way to focus us on crime. That is why; he implemented it.” One officer compared the rapid diffusion of this change initiative with Community Policing: “It was like community policing. If there is something new, something that worked, something different, it quickly diffuses. There was a time the results were being seen across the nation and it was attributed to Compstat.” The concept of ‘bandwagon effect’ is expressed by another officer to explain the diffusion of Compstat rapidly among police organizations, including the MPD:

I can’t answer for him but I can tell you what I think happened. What I noticed was the Compstat process became very popular throughout the U.S. Everybody at that point like anything else jumped on the bandwagon to see what it was about.

In short, these statements provide ample evidence that the problems in the MPD, similar to those of the NYPD before Compstat, and the legitimacy and perceived success of Compstat responding to these problems created a tendency to adopt Compstat with a hope to produce similar success.
The influence of institutional pressures was also reflected in the choice of the police director to bring Jack Maple and Jack Linder, two strategists credited as the founders of Compstat in the NYPD. These two strategists had been hired by a number of police departments before Metrocity and had had positive results. In Metrocity, a federal grant paid $343,200 Dollars to these two consultants, who came with promises to make Metrocity one of the USA’s safest cities (Newhouse News Service, 2000). Similarly, it is stated by a few officers that a number of officers were sent to the NYPD for training purposes:

He sent people from this organization to New York because New York was the first organization to utilize this. So, we had personnel from here went to New York and studied it. I think they did three or four month’s research on how New York does it.

It seems like interaction between police organizations, the academic world, and consulting agencies produced pressure for organizations to conform and adopt legitimated practices, and create a foundation from which problems can be approached and solved in much the same way.

Another important factor for the selection and implementation of Compstat seems to be the national trend in the US at the time. The trend in the United States to increase competition, accountability, empowerment, and performance augmented the demand in police organizations to adopt change programs as well as Compstat (Scott, 1998). The MPD police director in different newspapers suggested that police departments should be run like business organizations considering the customers, and their expectations, and should have a system of accountability, an evaluation system that rewards competent police officers, and a set of goals and challenges (Smothers, 2002; Stewart, 1996). All these statements clearly show that the police director was aware of the trends in the US at that time, and those trends possibly acted as pressure on him to
engage the Compstat, which fit the trends in the US in terms of constant measurement and accountability at that time.

Therefore, there were many problems in the MPD in the 1990s and Compstat was seen as a change initiative not only for addressing these problems but also for earning legitimacy by following trends and getting credit for their efforts. After a decision is made to adopt a change, the next level is to put the change into practice.

**Introduction Phase of Compstat in the MPD**

The introduction of Compstat in the NYPD is not comparable to that in the MPD. Compstat in the NYPD was basically set up to monitor the new initiatives in the department and collect accurate and current information and statistics to make informed decisions, as emphasized in the private industry. Even the founders of Compstat did not have an overall goal to reach in their minds. In other words, the progress of Compstat in the NYPD was a spontaneous, reactionary process. The main principles and components of Compstat and the content and manner of Compstat meetings evolved over time. When other police organizations decided to implement Compstat, they had a change initiative to adopt, which had been practiced and modified at the NYPD over the years. Keeping in mind this main difference, officers in the MPD emphasized a number of issues such as the main actors, the announcement of Compstat, uncertainty and anxiety, training, involvement, and hierarchical culture and authority as prominent points in the introduction phase of Compstat.

**The Role of Different Actors**

The MPD was one of the early adopters of Compstat. The primary role of the police director John Black as the decision maker for the implementation of Compstat in the MPD was pointed out by nearly all officers. A common view stated by many officers is as follows: “So, he
brought it here. It was a kind of personal choice of the director.” In addition, some officers suggested the possible role of the police chief and the mayor in this decision making process: “I can say he (police director) made the decision with the chief and the mayor of the city and implemented.” Clearly, the implementation of Compstat was a decision of the upper echelon.

Similarly, there is no question among participants of this study about the essential role of the police director in the way this change initiative was introduced. Without exception, all officers emphasized his leading role in defining how Compstat had to be introduced and implemented. In the introduction phase of Compstat, the police director was in close contact with the NYPD and consultants hired to set up Compstat in the MPD. The director had access to firsthand knowledge from the consultants about the process in the NYPD. As stated by one officer, “Two consultants were hired. I do remember Jack Maple came in to Metrocity to help John Black to implement Compstat.” Another officer pointed out the close contact of the director with the NYPD: “I don’t know how he did it. But he went to New York and he worked in New York.” In fact, the Metrocity police director was not alone in this process; there were many other police directors who had visited the NYPD to learn the Compstat. Finally, the role of culture is recognized in terms of the distinguished role of the upper echelon in police organizations in the change process. As explained by one officer, “it was related to the top. Change came from the top in police organizations.” There is widespread reference among officers to hierarchy and chain of command in the MPD in explaining the distinguished role of the upper echelon in the change process.

Thus, the police director had a distinguished position in terms of being knowledgeable about Compstat due to the pattern of specialized information flow in police organizations. Clearly, he had more information regarding Compstat than other officers in the organization. It is
evident that he had the assistance of expert knowledge in addition to his positional power in the organization.

**Announcement of Change**

After the police director’s decision, the first real attempt to inform officers about this decision and the implementation of Compstat in the MPD occurred in a conference room at police headquarters. The police director John Black, two consultants, Jack Maple and John Linder, and city business administrator Glenn Grant explained the four main principles (i.e. accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment of resources, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment) behind Compstat and how they planned to implement this change initiative in the MPD (Ben-Ali, 1997). These general information meetings, organized in two sessions, were recommended as one of the cornerstones of the introduction phase of Compstat. A number of officers stated their views regarding these meetings. One of the officers stated,

The director at that time actually did a very abnormal thing. He had two sessions with the help of professors coming from the college and he actually spoke to all commanders and all the officers. And after these two sessions, he got up there and told the department; this is where we are going and this is what we are going to be doing and this is how we are going to get there. Some commanders bought into it, some commanders wrote their retirement papers that day.

Another officer mention about the manner of these gatherings, specifically lack of input or dialogue in the meeting as follows:

It was more like this is something that we are going to do. It works. It worked for New York. This is where we need to be, because if we keep going in this way, we have nothing left. We need to do something. No one else came to the table and no one attempted the challenge.

It seems like the meetings were like a lecture in which the police director and consultants informed the officers without asking for their opinions and input. These information sessions
were followed by written information in the form of general orders and memos regarding the implementation of Compstat.

Uncertainty and Lack of Training

At this point, a critical issue stated by the study participants was the lack of training and further information in the process of introduction. In fact, the two consultant who were hired to set up the Compstat system were there with the purpose of training officers to use Compstat, examining the culture of the police department with the aim of instituting permanent changes in it, teaching officers how to communicate better both within the department and in the community, and trying to rally citizens behind crime-fighting efforts by launching an advertising campaign (Ben-Ali, 1997; Onley, 1997). However, all these objectives seem not to have been recognized widely by the officers in the MPD. Other than the meetings, most of those officers said that they were not involved any training session or similar efforts organized by the consultants. Even the officers who attended the Compstat meetings immediately after the introduction of Compstat were not involved any training session or organized communication efforts of the consultants about this change initiative. This point is made by a few officers. One of the officers criticizes the way Compstat was introduced, emphasizing the lack of training and information:

They (the consultants) came around and said you are going to be part of this process called Compstat. And this is what it is. These are the things you need to know to be prepared. It is like, one day, here we go. But, we did not have any training. You got the training, if you want something different from somebody. They spent a lot of time with the director but they never spent time with us. That was the problem. It was new all to us.

Another officer who attended the Compstat meetings during the early phases of Compstat described the knowledge gap between the director and other officers about Compstat:

In 1997, we developed Compstat. I went to the warrant squad unit in 1997 where I had my first taste of Compstat. It was sometimes good, sometimes bad. It was like he knew
where this department should be run. But, we did not know what is going on, what we should be doing to make this work. None of us know that what we should know. I think if we would have gone in New York City and had the opportunity to see how other commanders approach Compstat and how they are prepared for Compstat, I think it would have been easier on us. Because we were going in blind and he already knew how this should be run, this Compstat. We were not on the same page. One day, he said, listen I want Compstat here. I am going to ask you questions, you got to answer it. We did not know the questions he would ask us. We did not know how to be prepared.

Lack of information and uncertainty about Compstat seems to be greater at the level of constables, who did not attend even these general information meetings. As stated by one officer,

In 1997, I was a patrolman. A patrolman does not really know what Compstat was. They may have a basic understanding of it. Years ago, when I was a patrol officer when Compstat started, all I knew was my superior officers go to these meetings and get beat up.

It is possible to conclude that there was a common belief among officers that there was a lack of information and training at the introduction phase of Compstat and this made the process more difficult for them. In contrast, the director was perceived to know what Compstat was and how it should be implemented in this department. This point will be further discussed in the resistance section. Thus, considering all these problems, some officers believed that the introduction process would be run more smoothly by informing people about Compstat, plans for the future, and by providing necessary training for the implementation of it.

**Involvement**

Another point to be emphasized in the introduction phase of Compstat is the lack of involvement and soliciting input of the officers in the MPD. Nearly all officers pointed out that they were neither involved nor asked for input during the decision making process, introduction and early phases of Compstat. There are many reasons suggested for the lack of involvement in the introduction of Compstat.
The first thing that needs to be suggested is the leadership style of the police director. As stated by a number of newspaper articles, the police director believes in a need for a top-down approach for change in police organizations. In one newspaper article, he said, “there is no mistake; the change has come from the top” (Smothers, 2002). The introduction process of Compstat in the MPD was obviously top-down, as confirmed by the police director and many officers in the MPD as follows: “it was related to the top. Change came from the top”.

However, some officers suggested that it was likely that the police director had a number of high ranking officers who were involved in the decision making process, but that they themselves were not due to their position and rank at the time of introduction. As stated by one officer, “I don’t know how much input he got from the various commanders. I was just a sergeant at that time, so I really don’t know how much input he got.” Another officer describes the possibility of more involvement depending on rank and personal position in the organization as follows:

It depends what your relationship is with the various directors. Over the years, my position has changed and increased in rank. I have more input than before. It just depends on your relationship with the director. Every director is going to choose who is in his circle.

In fact, most of the officers seem to have accepted this approach by referring to the paramilitary, hierarchical cultural environment of police organizations.

Another point that seems to influence the lack of involvement was the size and nature of the change. Compstat necessitates a major change in the way an organization runs. As stated by some officers, a top-down approach along with a tough management style was necessary to accomplish such a major change initiative in the organization. One officer stated, “I don’t think that he got input from the various commanders because it was a major shift in the way we did business in the police department.” Another officer pointed out the nature of Compstat and need for a top
down commitment as follows: “Compstat is to a certain extent not bottom-up, it is a top-down system. Commitment is first made by the director.”

The next point related to the lack of involvement is the problems in the organization. Both the police director and most of the participant in the study suggested that a top-down system that goes along with strong leadership and tough style was needed in the case of the MPD to overcome problems in the organization and set up a change initiative like Compstat. By referring to a number of problems, one officer explained the need for a top down and tough style in the introduction of Compstat as follows:

Every agency is different. I go back to John Black. He is very aggressive man. This agency needed that because there was a lot of corruption. People did not want to do the jobs. They came to work to collect the pay-check. That is what they were here for. They did not serve the public. You needed someone in this agency that came in and pretty much cleaned house where there was a lot of garbage that was here. But, in order to do that he needed that style. He needed, I don’t know what kind of leadership you call it, but he was very aggressive, very loud, very intimidating.

In the following lines, the same officer explained the role of organizational culture in this process: “So every agency is different. Maybe in smaller agencies, family like organizations, maybe you don’t need that.” Another officer confirmed the problems in the organization and explained the connection between the director’s style and the way Compstat was introduced in the MPD as follows:

I said before because there was so much inefficiency, incompetence, corruption, I think it was done appropriately. Other people could say people should have been involved more or you should try to get more help, more assistance, more cooperation, but when things go so bad at some point you have to say enough is enough. This is what we are going to do to restore this.

The same point is confirmed in a newspaper article with the quote of a scholar who observed Compstat practices at Metrocity at this phase: “Metrocity’s process is more tightly run, and John Black has been incredibly hard-nosed. The department was so bad when he came in
that he had to be hard-nosed.” The style of the police director seemed to be perceived by some officers as the strong leadership needed to change the police department. This point is illustrated in the following statement of one officer: “I think that the police department really needed that kind of leader. We did not have a true leader. And that’s what we needed. And he took the department to where it needs to be.”

Concomitantly, another officer suggested two different options regarding the introduction of Compstat and explained why the police director took a tough approach in this process:

You come to an organization whether it’s a private business or a public institution and the places are a mess. You can sit there and you can say we have to correct these problems or you can say these problems will be corrected now. And I think that latter approach that we undertook to do Compstat, probably because the problems were really a mess. To do it sort of slow, easygoing is not going to work. It was painful, I was not happy with it, I was yelled at just like everybody. I just can’t see that it would work had it been casual.

The final point that was repeatedly emphasized in the interviews is the paramilitary, bureaucratic structure of police organizations. It seemed likely that bureaucratic and paramilitary culture, typical of police organizations, played a significant role in the perception of officers as a way of justifying a top-down system, a lack of involvement, and the autocratic and tough style of the police director in this process. There are a number of interviews that confirmed this point. For instance, one officer said, “We are police; we are very much military people. We tell them what to do and they do it. It is simple.” In a similar vein, a constable pointed out the power of police director considering the paramilitary structure of police organizations: “His approach was I am the boss. You are going to have this now. That’s it”. These statements should not be taken to imply that the police director did not care at all about the perception and beliefs of the people, but that the leader holds coercive and positional power to be used when needed. One officer confirmed this idea by saying,
At different levels, I think every commander wants his subordinates, followers to believe, want and to accept. But they come to a point of time where if the change is for the benefit of the department and because a few people, a few officers don’t buy into it for personal reasons, it is a military organization; you have to keep that in mind. Sometimes for the better of the department, the lesser will have to suffer.

Some officers, especially constables, mention the requirement to follow orders in police organizations even if they don’t like it. In the scope of this, an officer states,

I have to do what I am told. I am sure they know what they are doing. Otherwise, they would not implement it. We are not going to like everything that is done, you have your opinions. You might think oh boy, but that does not necessarily mean that you are not going to do it.

Similar points are expressed by many officers. All these statements prove that size of the organization, scope of the change, problems in the MPD as well as the paramilitary structure defined with chain of command, discipline, authority acceptance influenced how police director’s leadership styles was perceived and increased the level of tolerance for the lack of involvement and the director’s tough style.

**Conflicting Ideas about Introduction**

Therefore, there are basically two main points regarding the introduction of Compstat in the MPD. On one hand, some study participants and the police director highlighted the need for strong leadership, and a top-down, aggressive style to overcome the problems and resistance which emerges due to the lack of a sense of accountability, corruption, and inefficiency. The paramilitary structure and bureaucratic culture seem to increase the level of acceptance for this approach, and the lack of involvement and input. On the other hand, some officers emphasize that Compstat could have been introduced more smoothly. The tough and aggressive style of the director made the introduction process more difficult and painful. In particular, the tough manner of the police director, the uncertainty, and the lack of information and training led to resistance, which would have been less if a different approach had been selected. In fact, hesitation should be taken before
privileging one position over the other. As mentioned before, officers make sense of any type of change based on their rank and position, their personal values, and cues regarding how they would be influenced in this process.

Consequently, the overall approach in this process implies a combination of rule-bound, programmatic approach. In this approach, the police director, probably with the upper echelon, controls the change process, makes decisions regarding what is useful and how to introduce and implement Compstat without input from the middle and lower level of officers. In this process, it seems like these people have a plan in mind to be implemented, initiated and changed by a senior team quickly, but even the mid-level officers who were the most affected by Compstat were not involved in the introduction or early phases of Compstat under the leadership of the police director John Black.

However, it is hard to conclude that this approach is a standard procedure for the introduction of a change initiative. As confirmed by the officers in the MPD, there were change initiatives such as uniform change, change of equipment, and crime maps software which were different in its implementation approach than Compstat. There were different approaches in the MPD depending on scope and type of the change, antecedent conditions, and personal choices of leaders. The likelihood of different approaches is higher in the implementation of these kinds of major change initiatives in other police organizations which are likely to be different in their culture, target population, largeness, crime rates, antecedent conditions, and leaders. All these points as well as effectiveness of this model will be explained widely in the discussion section.

General characteristics of the introduction of Compstat in the MPD, reasons to explain the rationale behind these characteristics, and overall approach in this process are illustrated in the Table 2.
Table 2 Introduction Phase of Compstat

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<th>General Characteristics of the Introduction</th>
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<td>Lack of training</td>
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<td>Lack of participation\involvement</td>
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<td>Lack of dialogue and input</td>
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<td>Tough, aggressive manner</td>
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**Overall approach**

PROGRAMMATIC- RULE-BOUND APPROACH

(AUTOCRATIC- CONTROL APPROACH)

**Reaction of Officers**

The next point that will be explained is the reaction of the MPD officers to Compstat. The literature regarding the NYPD suggests that there was strong resistance to Compstat in its early phases. Similar to the NYPD, based on the analysis of data in the MPD, it is fair to say that the reactions of officers were mostly in the form of resistance rather than receptivity in the introduction and early phases of Compstat. This initiative was accepted over the years. For this reason, the focus will be on the resistance in the following section.

Of particular importance in understanding resistance in the MPD were the tone of meetings -which was commonly found to be intimidating and humiliating-, and change in the practices, work habits, and status of the middle level managers through certain mechanisms such as accountability, crime analysis and data driven decision making.
In fact, the literature on resistance generally have a managerial perspective, ignoring the perspective of lower and middle level managers, who are the most affected groups in change process. The following section of this study intends to explore the situation in the MPD without ignoring the perspective of officers from different ranks and positions.

Before explaining these points, it should also be noted that most of the participants in the study were either constables or sergeants during the introduction of Compstat in the MPD. They were affected at different degrees from this change initiative. As stated by one officer and confirmed by many others, “Initially, it affected the commanders, eventually it worked down to sergeants. Police officers are not affected by Compstat as much as senior commanders.” In that sense, it is highly plausible that officers who had responsibility in the implementation of Compstat, who were responsible for answering questions in Compstat meetings, and who were in a position to change his/her daily routines and practices have different perceptions of Compstat and thus different evaluations of the reasons for resistance and receptivity. As noted by one officer, “I am prepared for Compstat, but never been at the podium. I can give you my perspective of Compstat, but not the perspective of commanders.” In that sense, the evaluations of some participants in the study rely more on an outsider perspective, who were not affected as much as the groups who resisted or accepted Compstat. The following section regarding the reactions of the officers should be evaluated within these limitations. In addition, it should be noted that this section of the study relies more on the personal accounts of the participants, as the reactions of officers mostly goes back to early phases of Compstat.

The reaction of the MPD members is divided into several headings including introduction of Compstat, change in management (i.e. accountability, responsibility, work load), and the
Compstat meetings. In addition, the specific role of leadership, forms of resistance and how this change initiative was accepted over the years will also be explained in the following section.

**Introduction of Compstat and Reaction of Officers**

As mentioned in the previous section, defining characteristics of Compstat’s introduction were the lack of information, involvement, and training. These points led to knowledge gap between leaders and other officers, the uncertainty, and the anxiety among officers. This lack of involvement was justified and accepted by some participants in the study considering the nature of Compstat, problems in the organization, structure and culture of the MPD. Nevertheless, the lack of information and training were linked more with the resistance in the MPD. These points will be briefly explained as they were mentioned in the previous section.

**Involvement-Participation**

There was a common agreement in the MPD regarding the lack of involvement and participation in the introduction phase of Compstat. With few exceptions, most of the officers stated that this was not unusual in a police organization with the paramilitary, hierarchical culture that goes along with masculine culture and high power distance. In addition to the organizational police culture, officers mentioned the following issues as justifications for the lack of involvement: The major problems in the MPD (i.e., misbehavior of commanders, corruption, and inefficiency), the major size of the change, and the overall aim of Compstat to change the officers. Thus, many officers believed that lack of involvement was not a leading factor for officers’ resistance.

**Communication, Training and Uncertainty**

Change, especially major change, leads inevitably to a degree of uncertainty in organizations, especially when certain communication strategies are not followed to minimize it.
In the MPD, most of the officers were not aware of what was expected of them in this change process, the extent and nature of the change, and how to prepare for Compstat and Compstat meetings. The change implementers did not have a strategic communication effort to inform and train officers on these matters. As reported by a number of officers, “There was fear because of something different. We were in the dark. We did not know what to do.” Another officer summarizes the general feeling of officers in those early phases: “It was more a sense of unknown, what is going to happen, a sense of fear, how this is going to affect me.”

That is why, in contrast to the lack of involvement, most officers did not express the same level of acceptance for the lack of communication and training; they seem to believe that Compstat could have been introduced and implemented differently in terms of communication strategies and training. Further, they believe that these communication strategies and training would have resulted in a smoother transition with fewer problems understanding and adapting to Compstat.

As illustrated in the following excerpt, most of the officers expressed anger at facing intimidation and punishment for something that they had not been taught beforehand:

I just learned how to be prepared by doing it within these 12 years. If he (Joan Black) collected all the commanders and executive officers when it took place and somebody would explain how to be prepared and run it, I think the beginning would have been much better. I don’t know if he tried to shame us, but it seem like you were there [at the meetings] to be punished.

In summary, it is plausible to say that lack of communication and training were among the main reasons for the resistance while lack of involvement is suggested as less related to resistance in the MPD.
Compstat: A New World of Policing

In addition to the upper echelon’s choices in the introduction phase, there are two main points repeatedly linked to the officers’ different reaction to Compstat. The first relates to the change in management that included a new policing approach, new organizational practices, and a new management approach. It is suggested that the requirements of this change initiative, such as accountability, responsibility, information sharing, smart policing, and thus increased workload influenced the reactions of officers. The second point relates to the Compstat meetings and the tone of these meetings. Many of the participants in the study had firsthand experience of the meetings during different periods of implementation and had strong feelings about the tone. These two points will be discussed successively.

Change in Management

Compstat promotes a number of principles (i.e. timely and accurate information, determination of the most effective tactics, rapid deployment of resources, relentless follow up and assessment) and components such as mission clarification, accountability, organizational flexibility, and innovative problems solving tactics. With all those principles and components, Compstat brought a new world for the management of police organizations, requires new ways of organizing the job, and increases the responsibilities of managers. This inevitably influences the daily practices, work habits, and personal status of officers, and thus workload in the MPD. For instance, as a part of accountability, officers, especially those in managerial positions, have to collect data on a regular basis and attend meetings where they have to answer a lot of questions on regular basis on issues such as crime rates, crime trends, their response to crime, and performance indicators. They were not used to doing this before Compstat.
These new requirements as a part of Compstat did not seem to be well accepted in the MPD at first, especially by the most affected groups, such as precinct commanders and senior staff who had different practices, habits, and beliefs regarding how policing should be done. As suggested by one officer, “As far as the culture of the police department, they are not used to the accountability that Compstat demanded. There was a lot of resistance, open resistance to Compstat and the accountability the police director is demanding at that time.” This point was clarified by another officer as follows: “My opinions were that some people were not in favor of it as they were being held accountable. There were some people that did not like being questioned”. Another officer said, “There was a lot of resistance because people had never been forced or asked to explain why.” As shown, these new responsibilities were not well accepted by some middle level and senior level staff in the MPD.

Officers’ resistance and unwillingness to take more responsibility was linked specifically to the strong culture and increased workload in the Compstat era. The following statement of one officer pointed out the link between culture and resistance:

The police used to do things in a certain way and they resist any kind of change not just for the dramatic change for how they are doing business or how he wanted to do business. They just did not want responsibility.

In terms of workload, in the Compstat era, officers needed to know the crime statistics and trends in their responsible district and required them to explain what had happened and how they planned to respond in regular meetings. This situation forced officers to be prepared for the meetings and work in closer cooperation with lower ranks. The way Compstat increased the work-load can be illustrated by the following statement of one officer:

When I went to these meetings, I was responsible for answering the questions. When I come to the office on Monday, the first thing I do was what crime happened over the weekend. I start looking at the patterns of crime just because I had to talk about those crimes on Thursday. Before the day of Compstat, most Wednesday nights I would stay at
the office until 7-8 o’clock and come Thursday morning at 7 in the morning when Compstat was starting at 9 o’clock.

Another officer explains how these requirements were related to the stress and resistance of officers as follows:

I was in the detective squad in 1998. I would see my sergeant go to Compstat. When he gets out of meetings, which is Thursday, he felt a lot better. When Wednesday came again, he had to prepare for meeting again, so he was very nervous. The difference I did notice, he would come back and say what did you do with that investigation?

As shown in these statements, Compstat meant extra work, stress, and a difference in personal status and work habits for some officers. These are some of the main reasons for the resistance of some officers in the initial phase of Compstat.

**Compstat Meetings: Resistance and Receptivity**

Compstat meetings, as the most visible and important part of this change initiative, certainly influence the perception of officers, and as such the reaction and overall perception of success. The MPD held Compstat meetings every week for eight years until the last administration, which had meetings on average once a month. As stated by one officer, “We had it every week. We never missed, never, eight years straight.” Each meeting took four to five hours for the first eight years, and takes only two to three hours now. As such, the meaning of Compstat and the feelings of officers regarding Compstat were rooted to a greater extent in these meetings. Officers’ emphasis on these meetings during the interviews indicates the centrality of the meetings in the reactions of officers and the overall success of Compstat.

The reactions of officers to these meetings can be classified under two main themes. The first and larger group strongly criticizes the tone of meetings and finds that the biggest reason for their resistance. Some study participants even indicated that the meeting tone was the only reason for the resistance. The second, smaller group of officers, justifies or supports the tone of
meetings in the MPD by taking into account a number of factors in the organization. All these points will be explained successively.

**Compstat meeting and resisters.** Compstat meetings, especially the meetings in the NYPD, became the subject of newspaper articles and scholarly interest as a new and unique phenomenon in police organizations with their design, tone, and focus of interests. In particular, the tough, humiliating, and intimidating nature of meetings provided a good story for both journalists and academicians. Even the stories regarding the meetings in the NYPD were recognized by some officers in the MPD who were in close contact with the NYPD. As noted by one officer, “I heard famous war stories of commanding officers. Maybe, that would not happen that often, but that happened often enough to grow up mythical stories about the meetings”. Change implementers in the NYPD regarded it as a necessity to prepare commanders for crisis situations and to overcome resistance (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). It seems like the Metrocity police director appreciated the tough style of meetings in the NYPD and adopted it in the MPD. This manner in the meetings was also compatible with his personal style of leadership that relies on being tough and aggressive and institutional pressures to follow supported practices in the NYPD. All participants in this study, even those who supported the tone of meetings, agreed with the tough style of meetings.

Study participants’ main argument is that interrogations in Compstat meetings especially in the early phases were humiliating, hostile, and intimidating; they harmed morale and led to resistance in the department. When officers did not respond in the way expected by the director, they were intimidated, humiliated, or even transferred as a punishment in front of coworkers. As noted by one officer,
In the beginning, it was tense. It was rough. And if you did not know the answer of the question, you were degraded, you were yelled at, and you were called incompetent, amongst other words. There could be times when they tell you get off the stage.

These communication practices and attitudes in the meetings were given as the reason for the resistance by many officers: “Compstat was so intense, so hostile that people naturally resisted it.”

The tone of the meetings was even subject to newspaper stories. A newspaper, quoting a researcher who observed the Metrocity Police Department in 1997, reported that “when the commander could not justify his action or inaction, he was brought up on disciplinary charges before the session ended” (Smothers, 2002). An officer illustrated this newspaper story with a true case from the meetings in the early phases of the meetings: “You are gone tomorrow, tomorrow you won’t be over here, and you are not sergeant, lieutenant, or detective no more. Get somebody else. You are transferred.”

Officers in general suggested that the resistance was not personal reasons, but related to humiliation in front of peers and negativity in general. In other words, they suggested that their resistance to change is often based on valid concerns. One of the officers explained this point: “There was resistance because we did not know what was going on. We were humiliated in front of our peers. It was not a problem for our own sake.” Similarly, officers stated that they could not benefit from these meetings because they were always criticized rather than supported or provided with positive feedback to help them avoid the errors they were criticized for. This point may be illustrated by the following excerpts:

They were just scaring you did not do this and that. They did not provide any positive feedback, but all negative. Instead of saying, why did you not do this or that, you should say, you should do that and this. I don’t have any problem with that.
This atmosphere seems to contradict the theorized purpose of meetings in the literature, reducing crime through information sharing and analysis. One of the officers indicates how this tone actually had a negative effect of on reaching the theorized purpose of the meetings:

I don’t know if he tried to shame us, but it seemed like you were there to be punished. It was not like an exchange of ideas and how we reduce crime; it was not designed to help people foster new strategies, get ideas about people. It was more like how I can publicly humiliate you in front of your peers.

Some officers had a feeling that the police director seemed to be trying to find mistakes to embarrass and intimidate people in the meetings. This behavior was believed to create resistance among officers. As stated by one officer, “I tell you, John Black, he was rough. He embarrassed us many times. He embarrassed everybody. He would always find something you were not aware or you did not look at.” Similarly, another officer said,

I had all the answers to their questions and they come up with a question that you never thought of. It almost seemed no matter what kind of effort they put into, they found something you missed. You are being put on the spot in front of all command staff. So, it was very negative at the beginning.

When talking about their personal experience in meetings, an officer said that he was asked for the serial number of a found radio. As suggested by one officer, “It was a kind of ‘gotcha’ mentality”, which led to resistance among officers who were in a position to answer the questions. As shown clearly, officers believe that when they are recognized, it is usually for something they have done wrong in Compstat meetings, rather than for something they have done well. This perception inevitably resulted in negative feelings among officers, harmed their morale and performance, and eventually increased resistance as illustrated by the following excerpts from one officer’s interview:

Resistance came from, where if you continuously were pounded down, resistance would be to shut down. How many times can you yell at me? How many times can you blame me in front of my colleagues, superiors, subordinates, peers?.. You either yell at people and they shut down or talk to the people as human beings and get more out of it.
As shown, it is suggested that officers would contribute more if a different approach was adopted by the director.

In different periods of Compstat, it has been suggested that there was a sense that during the interrogation of officers in the Compstat meetings, some officers are punished for personal or political reasons. As explained by one officer, “It was personal. People don’t like certain people; I think it had a lot to do with it.” The lack of fairness applied by one of the police chiefs was even subject to newspaper stories (Kleinknecht, 2000). Another officer supported this view by saying,

Some of the directors and chiefs, they just used Compstat as a way to humiliate certain commanders. It was personal. It was not like this is your problem and you should be doing this.

The personal and political agenda in these meetings led to a perception of unfairness among officers and seems to have increased the negative feelings and resistance of some MPD officers in Compstat’s implementation.

One of the salient factors contributing to resistance to change in the MPD was that officers believe that they were criticized and yelled at in meetings for issues that are beyond their capacity and resources to resolve. For example, in the following statement, an officer stated that he did not have the resources needed to meet the expectations of the director:

Listen, I was in charge of the missing person unit. I can tell you how hard it is to find a missing person. There are so many missing people in this city. I had only two detectives, I needed ten detectives. It was not enough. Every time in Compstat, he would yell at me, embarrass me, what are you doing to find this one, what you are doing to find that one. I was just like, I cannot win. I knew how hard the detectives were working. He did not want to hear it.

The statement of this officer shows how officers felt when they thought that they were embarrassed for things beyond their control. Similarly, some officers suggest that you can’t
totally control crime, but they were yelled at during the meetings when there was an increase in crime. A newspaper article describes officers’ feelings as follows: “Officers are often reprimanded for crime trends beyond their control” (Kleinknecht, 2000).

In summary, the tone of the meetings certainly increased the resistance in the MPD. In particular, the humiliation and intimidation in the meetings, negativity and ‘gotcha’ mentality, personal attacks, and embarrassment of officers for things beyond their control led to strong resistance in the MPD.

**Compstat meetings and supporters.** There were also a few study participants who supported the tone of the meeting set by the police director. The main argument of these officers is that this approach was needed to overcome the resistance shown in different ways and to make it part of the culture of the organization. In other words, they stated that the tough style is needed as some officers in the meetings did not meet the requirements of Compstat and the police director. As noted by one officer, “They kind of needed to do it that way. You know it is still needed in some respect. The same information is requested every week and they don’t have the answers. It is very frustrating.” Another officer justified the disciplinary measures taken by the director as follows: “If you are not prepared, it is time to move on. If you are not doing your homework, someone has to replace you. That is the way I see it.” In parallel, the next excerpt from the interview of another officer explained that the resistance was not due to Compstat, but to people who were not willing to adopt it:

> Sometimes, people just resist. They don’t want to be held accountable. And they say this system is too hard. No, it is not the system, sometimes the people. So, you have to make a decision; system or people.
As shown earlier, a few officers believe that the tough style was a necessity in the MPD because of the officers, and especially commanders at that time, and consider the resistance of some officers as a sign of unwillingness to make the change needed for Compstat.

Another officer emphasized the problems in the MPD and suggested the need to be tough to make this change initiative work in the MPD:

The problems were really a mess. To do it sort of slow, easygoing is not going to work. It was painful, I was not happy with it, I was yelled at just like everybody. I just can’t see that it would work had it been casual.

Other than the culture and problems in the MPD, another point asserted by officers to justify the tone of meetings was the unquestioned authority of police directors in paramilitary organizations. In the case of the MPD, the police director John Black was a tough and aggressive manager and used those qualities in the introduction and implementation of Compstat. As stated by one officer, “Each police director has his own style of running Compstat and that is their personal choice.” The police director’s leadership style deserves specific attention in understanding the reaction of officers in the MPD.

**The Police Director and Tone of Meeting**

As shown, while most study participants found the manner of discussion and style of the police directors and chiefs in the meetings extreme, and believe that it led to increase of resistance, some of them justified the tone considering the problems in the organization, corrupt officers, and the culture of the police.

The police director also seemed to believe that this approach was needed to change the organization. It was apparent in the newspapers stories that the police director was aware of how his style was perceived, but had a number of arguments to justify it. As reported in one article, Metrocity Police Director John Black strongly defended his style:
I read all the time that I am tough. Well, I’m not Mary Poppins, true. But it is too one-dimensional to just see me as tough. I was put in the Metrocity job to take over a runaway agency and to have a vision (Smothers, 2002).

He suggested that this manner was needed to create a professional environment and accountability.

How do you ask people to act professionally without first creating an environment where they can do it? While the earlier practices were intimidating to commanders who had never been held accountable, a whole new generation of officers was now in place that was used to accountability (Smothers, 2002).

In the same article, he added, “People who are doing their jobs have nothing to fear.” In that sense, the police director seems to believe that the problem was related to the lack of a sense of accountability among officers and that kind of approach was needed for such a major revolutionary change and to run the agency. If a democratic, easygoing approach had been taken, officers would have sabotaged the change. In that sense, when officers did not meet the requirements of Compstat that the police director demanded at that time, the consequences were negative. These consequences included transfers to undesirable positions and assignments, disciplinary measures, and intimidation and humiliation in front of their peers in the Compstat meetings. In other words, the method selected to reinforce certain components of Compstat was not rewarding, or supporting officers, but punishing them. As explained by one officer, “A lot of transfers are coming out of it and disciplinary measures are taken” to implement Compstat. In particular, the police director’s choice to maintain Compstat and reinforce it in the MPD seems to increase resistance rather than minimize it.

To sum up, it has been suggested that officers in the MPD resist Compstat for many salient reasons. These reasons included uncertainty about new processes and procedures, fear of departing from habit and routine, loss of perceived and real power and status, increased workloads and demands, tone of the meetings, and the way the change was introduced by the
police director. Mechanisms such as communication, training, culture, and leadership style, which could be used to increase receptivity of Compstat, seem to work in the opposite way.

However, it is hard to conclude that there would not be any resistance even if these points had been taken into account in the introduction and implementation process. Compstat is certainly a large scale, revolutionary change initiative that implies significant differences in the way commanders work. This change initiative requires new ways of organizing the work, increases the accountability and responsibilities of managers and the workload; and requires new work routines. As such, depending on the position and rank, the extent of the impact on personal status and work, the level of information about Compstat, and personal values and expectancies, there would be resistance. As confirmed by many officers, the middle level managers, who are affected more than any other groups in this process, were more resistant than other groups such as low level managers and constables. However, taking into account the factors such as communication, training, tone of the meetings might minimize the resistance. The following figure illustrated the main reasons for the resistance in the MPD.
Another important point regarding the resistance is how MPD officers showed their resistance in the cultural environment of a police organization. The MPD is in many respects a traditional, hierarchical, paramilitary organization that has a masculine culture and high power distance compared to corporate agencies. It is suggested by some officers that this influences how resistance is shown and even how it can be shown. Following section illustrates these different forms of resistance.

Retirement

In the MPD, retirement seemed to be an important form of resistance in the early phases of Compstat. Interestingly enough, after the announcement of Compstat in the MPD and the new responsibilities of officers in this change initiative, some officers chose to retire even before the implementation of Compstat. As stated by one officer,
After this two session period, he [police director] got up there and told the department; this is where we are going and this is what we are going to be doing and this is how we are going to get there. Some commanders bought into it, some commanders wrote their retirements papers that day.

While explaining this situation, one officer stated, “Some of the precincts commanders’ sort of see, they did not function well in this kind of environment. People close to retirement did not care too much and retired in the early phases of Compstat.” Nevertheless, some officers stayed in the MPD for a while and expected Compstat to be abolished or waited to see how they would be affected from this new environment. However, as explained by one high ranking officer, “Once Compstat was in full effect, when became precise situation, and when you go every week to the Compstat, senior staff, especially older guys close to retirement retired from their job.” It seems like some officers, especially precinct commanders and senior officers, who were most affected, considered retirement as an option when they saw Compstat became part of the organization.

The response or approach of the police director to these retirements was interesting. As noted by one officer, “Part of methodology that is grown up with Compstat was to get rid of whole bunch of precincts commanders.” This issue was confirmed in a newspaper article where the police director said, “While the earlier practices were intimidating to commanders who had never been held accountable, a whole new generation of officers was now in place and used to accountability.” As such, the police director seems to have a mind to change the organization and enforce Compstat by changing the senior staff that was unable to meet his expectations.

Unpreparedness, Transfers, and Manipulation

The second form of resistance was shown in the meetings. As stated by one officer, “Some commanders were not preparing, not having the answers. The same questions, the same every week.” Some of them asked for transfers or transferred to undesirable assignments.
Another form of resistance was the manipulation of numbers and the misrepresentation of these numbers in the meetings. This may be illustrated in the following quote of one officer: “People tried to manipulate numbers and misrepresent it.”

**Behind the Scenes**

It is suggested by the study participants that there was more resistance and sabotage behind the scenes. It was because the cultural environment of the MPD and autocratic leadership, officers chose to stay behind the scenes to show resistance as long as they face the risk of having undesirable consequences. As explained by one officer,

They just show with their attitudes. They could not show certain word measures of resistance because they had to deal with the ramification of going against the administration. Nobody wants to do it. Nobody, at that time, wanted to do it.

The more common form of resistance was probably talking informally about Compstat. The informal critique of this change initiative among officers was stated by a number of officers and even made the subject of newspaper stories: “Some police sergeants and lieutenants privately grumble that the Compstat interrogations are humiliating and have harmed morale in the department” (Kleinknecht, 2000). In summary, officers showed resistance by retirement, unpreparedness, manipulation of the numbers, asking for transfers and gossip or try to sabotage the initiative behind the scenes (See Table 3).

**Table 3 Forms of resistance in the MPD**

| Early retirement or Retirement when Compstat became a permanent situation |
| Manipulation of crime statistics |
| Unpreparedness |
| Requesting transfers |
| Gossip and sabotage behind the scenes |
Modification of Compstat and Change of Reaction over the Years

The MPD has been implementing Compstat for nearly 14 years. During these years, the MPD has witnessed three different police directors with different managerial styles. The crime rates and crime trends in Metrocity, priorities of the public and department, and characteristics of officers in general have changed significantly. In addition, both officers and managers improved their understanding of Compstat, what is expected from them, what to expect from the officers, and points to be improved. In the case of the MPD, there is an agreement among officers that Compstat has been changed extensively over these years in many different aspects.

The change of Compstat can be classified as both evolutionary (developmental and transitional) and revolutionary (transformational) (George & Jones, 2000). As discussed later, this change initiative has evolved in the last two administrations in the MPD, but the real change of Compstat that can be classified as revolutionary was under the current administration. In the following section, the main points that were changed over these years, including the tone of the meetings and meeting arrangements, crime analysis and priorities, and technology will be presented. Then, the main reasons behind these changes will be described. Finally, based on these modifications, the transition of officers from resistance to receptivity will be explained.

Compstat Meetings: Tone and Arrangement of the Meeting

The Compstat meetings are the most visible and articulated aspect of Compstat. When study participants talked about the modification of Compstat over the years, the first thing they consider was the Compstat meetings, changes in the meeting practices and the tone of meetings. This confirms the central role of the meetings in this initiative. For this reason; the first point that will be mentioned regarding the modification of Compstat will be the tone of meetings.
Tone of Meetings

The Compstat meetings in the early phases, especially under the directorship of John Black, were suggested by many officers to be confrontational, tense, humiliating, and embarrassing. Officers seem to believe that the upper echelon had a ‘gotcha mentality’ rather than commitment to ensuring accountability and information sharing. The next police director who will be called McCain was not significantly different from John Black in terms of the tone of meeting, but he was accused by some officers of bringing personal issues to the meetings. This seemed to create a sense of unfairness among officers. In spite of the general agreement about the toughness of the meetings, it is clear from the personal statements of the study participants that the tone of meetings evolved in these years, even during the administration of John Black. As reported in a newspaper article, “As he prepares to leave Metrocity, there are signs that Mr. John Black is softening” (Smothers, 2002). The change in the police director’s style in these years was also mentioned by the officers: “I think it was more about Compstat because even John Black was still here, it was changing already. Once he got people see things he wanted to be done, he would relax a little bit.” Although there was a comparable improvement in the tone of meetings, most of the participants in the study indicated that there was not any significant difference until the last administration.

The biggest change in the tone of meetings was in the administration of current police director George Brown. It was obvious from the officers’ personal statements that he has a different perspective on the role of relationships and communication in the meetings, and how problems regarding the commanders should be handled. The meetings were described as more relaxed and friendly in the current administration. One of the officers spoke about the difference in the tone of meetings:
It was transformed a lot in the last two years since the new director came. He brought new ideas. The meetings are not as confrontational as the previous administrations. Now, people sit down, more relaxing and friendlier. It was harsh before. At that time, when people did not have the answer, they would be thrown out of Compstat. I would say it is better now.

Another officer drew attention to the change in the meetings from a different perspective and said, “It was extremely personal; there were personal attacks in the former administrations. That never happens anymore. Nobody personally attack over there. Nobody is embarrassed. They might be embarrassed professionally.”

This should not be taken to imply that officers do not have any problems in the current form of meetings. While officers believe that the meetings are still stressful and challenging, they mostly justify that stress and challenge and consider it part of the job. For instance, one officer stated the reasons for the stress in meetings as follows: “I believe that it is a little bit stressful for commanding officers. You are on the spot. Even in this friendly type, it is still stressful being up there.” Peer pressure and being on the spot to answer questions seem to be enough for stress. Similarly, another officer emphasized the different consequences when officers did not provide an appropriate response in the meetings: “There are still certain times when people feel uncomfortable when the answers of the captains are not satisfying for the police director and the deputy chief. Things get a little bit uncomfortable for captains. But, it is never personal.” The consequences of unpreparedness were stated by another officer: “They might be embarrassed professionally. Maybe, somebody feels embarrassed because the analysis is not going well, but nobody is attacked in that sense.”

This form of the meetings is intended to improve the effectiveness of Compstat in many respects. For instance, one officer spoke about the positive effect of this new environment: “Now, people are more relaxed and this situation helps to come up with solutions.” This is
confirmed by another officer as follows: “I guess people become more comfortable presenting and having the information.” The situation in the department was described by another officer: “We are now back to business for the whole department, we focus on more analysis. It is more sharing information and learning curve under the new police director.”

There are a range of reasons asserted by the officers to explain the change in the tone of meeting, including leadership style, national trends, media attention, and officers’ experience with Compstat.

The first explanation is that officers better understand the expectations of the managers. Even Police Director John Black explained the change in his manner as related to the change of officers. In a newspaper article, he said,

While the earlier practices were intimidating to commanders who had never been held accountable, a whole new generation of officers was now in place who was used to accountability and with whom the exchange of ideas was a natural thing (Smothiers, 2002).

The same point of view was supported by many officers participated in the study. The following statement of one officer illustrated this:

I think it softened a little bit just from the fact that everybody on the commanding officer’s side knows much more clearly today what is expected from them, the exact assignments of commanding officers. They know that they are going to exist in this environment; they have to play it as expected. Otherwise, it is going to be harsh.

Another officer talked about the learning process: “We learned. We learned the questions, we learned how to do analysis and what we should be doing, which made it easier on us.”

The second explanation is the administrative change and personal style of directors. The new MPD director seems to have a different style and attitude about Compstat and getting things done. For example, when an officer was asked to identify the major reasons for the change in the tone of meetings, he said,
It was related to administrative change, the new police director, he is the former deputy commissioner of another state police, and he brought his model. And, he was in that state for twenty five years. So, in the early 1990s he was there. I am sure he saw what was going on.

While explaining his manner, the same officer stated, “George Brown never raised his voice. He wants to get things done in certain way. But he knows how to talk to people and how to get it done.”

The next explanation was the national trend in the US to treat officers with respect regardless of rank and status. Some officers in Metrocity thought that it was related to the change in police organizations including the NYPD:

I think it was the trend that was going on. Other agencies as well as we learn that you cannot treat people that way. You have to treat professionals like professionals. Basically, Compstat has gone towards still accountability measures, but Compstat treats people more professional.

Interestingly, another officer links the national trend with the decreased media attention and Compstat becoming more of an internal function. In other words, he thinks that the tone of meetings was used to attract the attention of media and other police agencies, which is not the case anymore.

**Arrangement of the Meeting**

The change of the meeting was not reflected only in their tone. There were changes in the frequency, duration, and the design of the meeting room, all of which were compatible with the change in the tone of meeting. For instance, one of the officers spoke about the change in the design of the meetings as a sign of changing mindset regarding meetings: “People at Compstat used to stand up at podium. And they would give their crime analysis for their particular unit or precinct. Now, people sit down, more relaxing now.” Another officer said, “It was quite different at first; it was much less organized in the fashion the current Compstat is.”
In addition to this, meetings happened less frequently and had shorter duration in the current administration. This may be illustrated with the following statement of one officer:

In the prior administration, we had every Thursday, sometimes twice in a week. We had Compstat every week religiously. In the new administration, they don’t have Compstat as often. Why should we have it every week if crime is down. The guys are doing what they are supposed to be doing. It is not necessary to put them into that room for two-three hour meetings. That is the other thing; Compstat now is one and half to two hours. It was five or six hours in the old administration.

As shown, the design of the meeting, and their frequency and duration has been modified over the years, which is basically explained by the change in the administration.

**Crime Analysis and Priorities**

In addition to the meeting tone and arrangements, the way crimes are analyzed, the crime priorities of the department, and thus the topic of discussion in the meetings has changed over these years. In the early phases of the Compstat, there was a lot of focus on individual cases. Precinct commanders were questioned for the single cases conducted in a week in their district which was different in the current administration. As described by one officer,

Instead of looking at a 28 day period, they looked at the weekly periods. They pretty much looked at crime by crime. They were talking about the robberies, for example. They would talk about each individual robbery, the circumstances surrounding a particular crime and what they are trying to do to solve that particular crime. What it is now is, as you can see, it is much more pattern driven. Instead of discussing only specific events, they want to know about patterns, they want to know about geographic clusters, what you are doing to solve this problem instead of what you are doing that singular robbery and what that robbery. That is one main difference.

This excerpt illustrates a development in the way crime is analyzed in the MPD. In addition to the analysis, crimes and problems that were prioritized and discussed have changed over these years. As stated by one officer, “Response time is not our priority any more. George Brown focused on shootings and homicides more.”
Study participants considered the reasons for these changes in the method of crime analysis and priorities to be related to a number of factors. The first factor emphasized was that the crime rates, crime patterns, and managerial problems in the MPD were certainly different in the 1990s, and that certainly influenced the priorities of the managers and the topics of focus during the meetings. As explained by one officer,

Compstat is always being modified. Compstat changes, as the crime patterns change. Crime does not take place in the same location. You focus on certain areas and certain type of crimes at different points of time. As the crimes change, you need to come up with new strategies.

Another point mentioned to explain these changes was the decline of crime rates in Metrocity: “Crime problems are moderated significantly. We are talking 70-80 percent drops in crime.” As will be shown in the following statements of another officer, the decline of the crime rates required the police department to focus more deeply on the analysis of crimes:

So, you look at it more precisely. Right now, as the crime really declined, you need to know who was the person, history, and their links. You need to look at it deeper, more focus on patterns than you have done initially. As crime reduced so much, you look at smaller things. It was simple initially, go out and arrest people.

As stated by this officer, Compstat evolved because you cannot address an issue in the same way when the crime rate is lower, and different methods have to be implemented in terms of Compstat in order to keep that reduction in crime.

Another officer emphasizes the necessary adaptation of Compstat in accordance with the changing needs and experience of this change initiative: “You adapt to what the needs are. You see what works and what does not. Things you did measure initially, the things you thought important, you no longer think they are important.”

In the case of the MPD, the role of the current director has been very central for the change in the crime analysis and priorities. Although there was a slight modification in the
previous administrations in crime analysis and priorities, the significant modification of Compstat was under the current administration. The following excerpts from interviews illustrated both the change in crime analysis and the role of the new director in this process:

It was transformed a lot in the last two years since the new director came. He brought new ideas. Before, we just documented statistics. Now, we document why, why this change in statistics is happening, what we can do to prevent it, which is the analysis part of crime. For this purpose, we look at crime patterns, geographical trends, what time it is happening and where it is happening, and looking at description of suspects. We keep in contact with the respective investigation units and we provide information.

Another officer emphasized the central role of the police director in the determination of priorities and how this influences Compstat:

Compstat has evolved definitively over the years. I mean, each director has his personal opinion of what should be looked at and what is important as a measure. Subordinates have to adapt what they feel is important. Ultimately, it comes to the point that it depends on the measures the director considers the most important and develops a mechanism to measure that.

As shown, the director’s personal choices, and changing crime rates and patterns played a central role in the modification of the crime analysis and priorities of Compstat in Metrocity.

**Structural Change**

There were also modifications in the structure of the organization to ensure empowerment of precinct commanders in the system. In the previous administrations, the information had been collected by the Compstat unit and was used by the precincts commanders. As noted by one officer working in the Compstat unit,

The Compstat unit at that time gathered all the information. They had it all. We would tell commands you had this there. Now it has changed. The commands tell us what is going on in their precincts. We are looking at it also. This is a kind of check and balance. The commanders are telling us what is going on. It forces them to look at their issues.
This issue was stated by another officer as follows: “This director gives power to the commanding officers and lets them know what they want to do. Precincts do what they want to do.”

As shown, this system enforces a check and balance system where the crime statistics and analysis of the Compstat unit and precincts can be compared. In this system, there are crime control officers in each precinct who are responsible for taking care of collecting crime statistics in their districts and analyzing them; these are distributed to both the precinct commanders and patrolmen through roll call meetings and information boards in the precincts. This news system is intended to help the department to share information more widely, know the problems of their district, and compel commanders to take more responsibility. However, it is also criticized as the precincts don’t have adequate resources to analyze crime as the central Compstat unit does.

**Technology**

The practices of Compstat also changed along with the technological changes in crime maps, crime analysis software, data storage and sharing opportunities, and other computerized technologies. The main assumption is that technology, especially the computer has facilitated storing and sharing large amount of data in databases. Everything was paper based initially, but was transferred to computers in the following years with increased computerization of the department. As stated by one officer, “People initially brought in needles, maps, pins, stickers, markers on them. They became aware of new mapping capabilities that came with Windows 95. Map.info came out with mapping software.” Other than this, new technology helped Metrocity to use computers to enter and store crime statistics, and monitor and share crime trends in all departments. For instance, the MPD adopted a record management system that allows people to
enter information in a database and share it with other units. It allowed the Compstat department to retrieve updated information from the system and use it for reporting.

There is certainly more technology involved in different steps of the Compstat. It is clear that technology facilitated or eased the use of crime mapping, and recording, and transmitting information. The meetings are the main places where these technological tools are presented (i.e. crime maps, big screens) and used, and that may have increased the perception of the effectiveness of the meetings. It is true that organizations start using technology at different degrees regardless of their management aspects. At the same time, Compstat reinforced Metrocity’s adaptation of technology as a way of making the system easier.

Thus, Compstat was modified extensively in these twelve years in terms of the tone of the meetings, the gotcha mentality, and the method of crime analysis, crime priorities, and topics of discussion, technological infrastructure, frequency, duration, and meeting design. The main reasons for the modification was change of administrations, increased knowledge of officers about Compstat and expectancies of the upper echelon, decreased media attention, national trends, change of crime rates and priorities, and technological improvements. For all these reasons, nearly all study participants in the MPD believed that the current form of Compstat is better, more effective, and more professional than the way it was implemented before. All these points are illustrated in a comparable manner in Table 4.

Table 4 Modification of Compstat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODIFICATION OF COMPSTAT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early form</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotcha mentality / Negativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Confrontational | Less confrontational
---|---
Humiliation /Embarrassment | More friendly and relaxing
Stressful and challenging | Still stressful and challenging
Focus on single cases | Focus more on crime patterns rather than cases
Centralized crime analysis (Compstat unit) | Analysis of crime in each precincts
Frequency (weekly) | Frequency (once in three weeks on average)
Duration (3 hours or more) | Duration (2 hours)
Technology (paper based) | Technology (Computerization)

**REASONS FOR THE MODIFICATION**

Leadership style
Change of administrations
Change of crime rates and priorities
Decreased media attention and incorporation of Compstat as an internal initiative
National trends (that suggest softening the tone of the meetings and respecting to colleagues)
Technological improvements
Increased knowledge regarding Compstat (learning by doing)
Increased knowledge regarding the expectancies of the upper echelon

**Central Aspects of Compstat**

In spite of a range of modifications of Compstat over the years, there were some aspects of the initiative that remained the same. For instance, one officer spoke about the concept that remained the same in all these years: “The concept is still the same; gathering information, acting on that information, and you have to assess what you did.” Specifically, the four main principles
of the Compstat described by scholars, collection of accurate and timely information, rapid deployment of resources, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment, are still the main idea of Compstat. One officer noted that, “Basically, it is the same process. You look at the crime, looking at productivity, try to get officers understand what their function is.” Again, accountability was the key word in describing Compstat from the beginning. As explained by another officer, “It has always been an accountability measure. The commanders should have the answers, should know what is going on in their precincts. You should show that your fingers on the polls.”

Although the tone of meetings, the design and arrangements of meetings, and crime analysis and priorities have changed over these years, the main figures and purpose of meetings has remained the same. As explained by one officer, “The police director and police chief would be there. There is always a figure that asks most of the questions and you still need to answer the questions”. As shown, regardless of the change, there are certain aspects which have remained central to defining and understanding this change initiative.

Acceptance over the Years

The final point to make about the resistance was how it was managed or overcome in the MPD. It is obvious from the interviews and observation of current practices that the degree of resistance decreased overtime in the MPD. Today, Compstat seems to be very well accepted among officers. The question is how is this change initiative which once resisted heavily accepted now?

As mentioned, the first method used by the police director at that time to overcome the resistance of active resisters was either to compel them to retire or to transfer them to undesirable positions. The police director was willing to use this mechanism to open space for new officers:
“He never did with those people. With those people who resist it, he never did. He moved them to another place. He let new people come in that shared the same vision.” This situation created a sense of acceptance among officers who were willing to stay in the organization and advance in career. As stated by one officer,

They had to change. Here, people lost their commands, they are transferred, and things like that. People need to know that if he cannot do his job, there is another guy behind him who is willing to take your seat.

As shown, the police director used transfers and retirement as a threat for active resisters. In this process, the younger officers who did not display as much resistance as older officers came up through the system and had more responsibility in the organization, which inevitably increased the level of acceptance.

The second reason is officers’ perception that Compstat would be permanent situation in the MPD. That made Compstat work differently than other change initiatives. This point can be illustrated with the following statement of one officer:

Like any other things, it was criticized by some, sometimes openly sometimes behind closed doors. Again, the persistence was different. People had the expectation that they would walk away then come back in six months. When they were persistent and continue the evolvement, it became inevitable. Everybody knew that this is an environment you are going to be living; there would be a Compstat meeting every week. So, that persistence sort of sent a signal, but it took a while. It took, I would say the first year. After that, it really made people think that this is for real and these guys are not going to go away. They have been successful now. So that is going to double up. If we hope to go back, that is not going to happen.

As such, officers either decided to leave the organization or accept Compstat as a part of the organization, which eventually created a sense of obligation among officers.

Next, commanders learnt what was expected in the sense of ‘learning by doing’ and got used to certain mechanisms of Compstat. This situation decreased the need for a tough style; and this was especially evident in the meetings, which was the main reason asserted by the officers
for the resistance. As illustrated in newspaper articles, the police director seems to share this point of view and was willing to change his approach along with the change of officers: “The process had been altered so that it was no longer a third-degree session with them under the lights and would be more collegial” (Roberts, 2008). Explaining this situation, the police director suggested that there is a new generation of officers who are career minded, and used to accountability and information sharing. Some officers confirmed that he was softening the tone in his last year of directorship. As a result, this decreased the tension displayed in the meetings. While the meetings were still tough, the extent of the toughness decreased in the long run and received a positive response from officers.

However, the real change of the meetings in terms of the tone occurred in the last administration. The current police director has a different attitude in Compstat meetings than the two former police directors. The following statement of one officer shows how his personal reaction to Compstat changed over the years and the role of current director in this process:

If you interviewed me early 90s, I would have a different perspective on Compstat. But, now, I am part of the process so long, And, I believe George Brown is great. It was not designed to humiliate people; it was designed to help people foster new strategies, get ideas about people.

As shown, there are a group of officers who suggest that intimidation, humiliation, and negativity in the meetings were the reason for the resistance and that the change in the tone contributed to the acceptance of Compstat. It should also be noted that there were some officers, including Police Director John Black, who supported the idea that the rough tone of meetings was needed to overcome resistance and increase the level of acceptance. Even if it might have been true for the initial steps of Compstat, none of the study participants thinks that that manner is still needed in the MPD.
Thus, all these factors as well as perceived success of the Compstat initiative seem to contribute the acceptance of Compstat in the MPD over the years. After officers go through the shock of the early phases, learned what was expected from them, and experienced some modifications in the tone of the meetings, the level of acceptance certainly increased in the MPD. In particular, the current administration and the attitudes of the current police director seem to contribute the acceptance of Compstat. In addition, the decline in the crime rates, the perceived contribution and success of the Compstat in this decline increased the positive perception of the initiative. In that sense, although there are some ups and downs, the case in the MPD seems a linear process in which the level of acceptance has increased over the years. The Figure 2 shows the process of accepting Compstat over these years.

Figure 2 Acceptance of Compstat
Current Implementation of Compstat

The previous sections basically relied on study participants’ personal accounts as they related to the history and progress of Compstat over the years. The questions regarding the current implementation of Compstat initiative and change of cultural values will be answered using multiple data sources, including observation, documents, and interviews, all of which reflect the perspectives of officers from different ranks and positions.

This section of study will have two main sections. The first section will focus on the structural accounts of Compstat in the MPD based mostly on the formal, written documents. Specifically, it will address the responsible units and people in the implementation of Compstat, their positions, duties, and responsibilities, and documents used in the implementation of Compstat. The second section will focus on the main principles and components of Compstat asserted by study participants, how these principles and components are enacted in the meetings, and the limitations and opportunities in the practice of each principle and component. The meeting itself will be explained in cultural change section.

Compstat in the MPD: Definition, Duties, and Documents

Compstat has been implementing in the MPD for 14 years. It has certainly become an important part of the organizational practices with its requirements for data collection, analysis of data, performance measurement, and the Compstat meetings. Most study participants seemed to have an in-depth knowledge of Compstat, its principles and components, and its influence on the management and policing practices of the organization. As mentioned, Compstat has been modified in many respects in these years, particularly within the new administration. The duties and responsibilities of the different units and officers in the current form of Compstat are well
documented in the MPD and distributed widely to different units in the form of general orders and memos. These documents show the structural design of Compstat, the responsibilities of different units in this initiative, and how Compstat is perceived by the upper echelon. These documents also reflect certain kinds of organizational rationality and reinforce a managerial perspective regarding how Compstat should be perceived. In that sense, the following sections will use mainly these documents to explain the duties and responsibilities of different units and officers in the implementation of Compstat. Interviews and observation that specifically address the duties and responsibilities of different units will also be used to clarify certain matters.

Definition of Compstat

The first thing that needs to be mentioned is the official definition of Compstat, which shows how this change initiative is perceived by the upper echelon. In a 2008 general order of the Police Director George Brown regarding the implementation of Compstat, it is defined as a “multilayered, dynamic, crime reduction tool based on the SARA Principle. The SARA principle utilizes procedures in order to Scan the problem, Analyze the information garnered, React with the appropriate resources and then Assess the results.” This definition highlights the fact that Compstat is seen primarily as a crime reduction tool that basically relies on the SARA principle as a policing approach. The SARA principle seems to be a close equivalent of the four principles of Compstat: ‘Accurate and timely intelligence; effective tactics; rapid deployment; relentless follow up and assessment’. Rather than using the SARA principles, most of the participants in the study referred to these four steps of crime reduction as well as accountability and information sharing to describe Compstat in the MPD. For instance, the police director pointed out these principles in a Compstat meeting while defining Compstat: “The idea is we know what is going on, we know what is happening. Then, we create a plan and monitor the results. These are the
phases officers should be going through.” These four principles are displayed in a frame on the wall in the Compstat meeting room entitled, “Four Steps for Crime Reduction.” This official general order, the frame on the wall, and the interviews of officers suggested that these principles are widely recognized MPD officers. In addition, these principles suggest a proactive policing approach that covers not only responding to committed crimes but also taking measures to prevent crime. These principles will be specifically mentioned after explaining the duties and responsibilities of different units.

**Duties and Responsibilities of Different Units**

Compstat implies a new mentality for the management of police organizations. In this system, nearly all units have direct or indirect duties and responsibilities. However, it is clear that the most critical unit in this initiative is the Compstat unit, followed by the Precincts, Narcotics, Gang and other operational bureaus.

**Compstat unit.** The Compstat unit is certainly the most important unit for the implementation of Compstat in the MPD. The duties and responsibilities of Compstat unit can be represented best by referring to the mission statement:

The mission of the Compstat unit is to provide accurate and timely information to the command staff of the Metrocity Police Department for the purpose of directing department resources to drive reductions in crime and quality of life problems.

The overall purpose is illustrated in the following vision statement. This statement shows the priority of measurement, performance, and responsiveness of the department to crime trends and citizen complaints:

The Compstat unit will bring value to the department and community by providing a mechanism to accurately measure the results of the department’s response to crime trends and citizen complaints and to inspire confidence that results are real and verified.
The Compstat unit has two main divisions under a commander: Analysis and Reporting, and Quality Assurance. The Analysis and Reporting division is mainly responsible for the collection and analysis of data for the preparation of the Compstat report. Specifically, the unit has two functions, and the primary one is analysis. This includes the time and place of incidents, suspect and victim information, and the patterns that show similarities between incidents. The Compstat package, which includes all the information for a 28 day period and a weekly Executive Summary report, is presented to headquarters, basically the police director and deputy chiefs. The second function of this division is reporting, in which technical infrastructure is provided to put data into the system and use it for crime mapping. As a part of this function, this unit ensures that data entry into the Compstat database is accurate. This unit is also responsible for maintaining and providing the infrastructure for the Compstat meetings. A number of officers from the Compstat unit attend the Compstat meetings regularly to organize and manage computers, crime mapping, and the meeting room.

The Quality Assurance division under Compstat is responsible for the quality of crime reports and investigations in detective units and patrol. These crime reports are reviewed to ensure that they are properly completed and proper investigative techniques and field investigations are used. As stated by one officer under Compstat,

We do quality control. I randomly go to detective units and check if the investigations are in standards. We have certain standards. There is general order regarding detectives’ performance standards. The investigations should be submitted in a certain period of time and it should include certain reports. I go randomly and take five and check if they are in standards.

To summarize, the Compstat unit basically makes sure that collected information is entered in the system correctly, uses this information to analyze crime, presents this analysis to the upper
echelon, provides infrastructure for the meetings, and does quality control for the investigations of the detectives.

In addition to these formal duties and responsibilities, the Compstat unit is in contact with the officers in precincts and operational units, and helps them to prepare the Compstat package for their districts. As stated by the Compstat commander,

My primary end user is higher ranking officers in command, but also often times other people in the agency too; secondarily they use the information as well. Often times, they come to my unit. We basically prepare for the upper echelons, but we have an open door policy for everybody.

As explained, all these things make the Compstat unit central for the implementation of Compstat in the MPD.

**Precincts.** The precincts, precinct commanders, and staff are also essential in this system. As understood from the general order regarding the implementation of Compstat, data collection starts with crime reports that are prepared after each crime by patrol officers and detectives. These officers in the precincts are asked to enter crime reports into this system immediately. These reports are read and classified by the operational supervisors in each precinct in accordance with the principles asserted in different regulations. The crime control officers in each precinct use these crime reports in the database to organize crime statistics, analyze crime, and maintain a geographical crime map for 28 days that is updated weekly. Crime control officers also update some documents daily, such as the ‘Daily Crime Bulletins’ and some documents on the need basis, such as: wanted posters, crime maps, and crime statistics and analysis that are displayed on crime information boards in precincts. A photo that shows the crime information center in a precinct is presented in Appendix K. In addition to these boards, daily roll call meetings conducted by operational supervisor before each shift are another important platform to distribute this updated information to the front line officers.
In addition, the operational supervisors, specifically crime control officers in the precincts, assist the commanding officers in preparing a general overview of the precinct’s crime for the 28-day period, identifying crime trends and patterns, developing a strategy to address the crimes, and implementing a plan for deployment. Commanding officers are supposed to have and present all this information in the meetings. Compstat meetings play a central role in following up on and assessing all the duties, responsibilities, and information. As discussed and illustrated in the following sections, precinct commanders are the main target of Compstat, and they are questioned in the meetings in terms of their level of information about problems in their district and their plans to respond to these problems.

Operational units. Other than precincts, units such as Central Narcotics, Gang, and Crime Scene Investigation are responsible for analyzing crime in their units and coordinating their response efforts with the precincts. In the MPD, each precinct commander has their own narcotics staff, and these commanders are responsible for coordination of efforts with the central narcotics. For instance, in a meeting, the deputy chief asked the precinct commander, “Did you talk about it with the narcotics unit? Then, how did that conversation turn out? Did you get any narcotics enforcement? That will help your burglary problem.” Or, as illustrated in the following excerpt from a conversation between the deputy chief and the head of central narcotics; the head of central narcotics can be questioned on a narcotics related crime in the meetings in terms of the number of search warrants, arrests, and joint operations with the precinct commanders: “I want something coordinated between Central Narcotics and precinct narcotics.” Similarly, the crime scene unit is responsible for responding crime scenes in terms of fingerprints, DNA analysis, and the extent of information sharing with the precinct commanders. In short, the heads of these units
were questioned at different degrees in the meetings. They needed to present their information in the meetings and coordinate joint efforts with precincts to respond crime.

**Other units.** In addition to these units, there are a range of units in the MPD which don’t have any documented duties and responsibilities for Compstat implementation such as, Professional Standards, Policy and Finance, Community Policing, and Traffic. However, they are still part of Compstat to different degrees. At the very least, the police director wants the head of these units to be represented in the Compstat meetings. Their presence in the meetings indicates that the police director sees Compstat as an organization wide approach. On one hand, as observed in the meetings, the representatives of these units were rarely or never questioned, put in hot spot, or asked to join the discussion in the meetings during the 6 month observation period. On the other hand, there are some cases where one can observe the possible role of these units in the implementation of the Compstat. For instance, the interview statements of one officer show the role of different units in Compstat:

You bring people from all departments. I mean you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that have a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done because you would say the commanding officers from the second precinct needs cars, can you supply him with the replacements for the four cars? He would say I can get three. So, get the three or two. It was by having and hearing in which a lot of different players that would be given the authority to act and the meeting by itself generated inputs from highest authority to act.

In certain cases, the plans made to respond to crime may require the support of these units. For instance, in one meeting, the police director stated, “The community meetings are an important part of this initiative. At least, a captain should attend all these community meetings. We also contact certain residence associations that are really central on the case locations. That is a big deal for us. X, do you want to jump in [community policing unit]?” There are a few cases observed in the meetings that demonstrate you understand why these units are represented in the
meetings and their role in this change initiative. However, their support and participation seems to stay limited in the case of the MPD.

**Documents.** There are certain documents produced as part of Compstat. The most essential document is the Compstat Package. This package is prepared weekly by the Compstat unit and presented to the police director and the deputy chiefs every Wednesday, the day before possible Compstat meetings. This package includes crime statistics for seven major crimes in four precincts in the MPD, crime analysis (i.e., where, when, how), crime trends, and crime maps. Every precinct commander and head of other unit brings his/her own district’s Compstat Package and uses it to answer the questions during the meetings.

As a part of this package, there are also Precinct Commander Profiles. These profiles show the overall performance of the commanders responsible for a precinct or unit. A copy of this profile is presented in the Appendix L. These profiles include the names, positions and ranks of people in managerial position in these commands. Other than this, there are complaints against personnel; average response time coded in terms of emergency; numbers of arrests, field interrogations, and quality of life summonses; and precinct overtime and its monetary equivalent divided further based on overtime spent in court, arrests, and etc. These documents show the points that are essential for each command’s performance and compare it previous periods. If the period presented is a year, then the current year is compared to previous year. If it is monthly, then, it is compared to the same month in the previous year.

These profiles are an important part of Compstat. Although these indicators are not discussed one by one in the meetings, it is likely one or two will come up. For instance, when there is an increase in a particular crime in a geographical sector, then the number of arrest summonses in this sector may come into play and be questioned by the chief. As stated by many
officers, the crime trends and these indicators provide a base to evaluate performance. Another important thing is that some of these indicators are prioritized depending on current problems. For instance, response time was not discussed in any meetings, which shows either satisfaction with the performance or indicates the priorities of the department. If narcotics crime will be discussed, then it is likely to talk about the number of search warrants for narcotics crime.

Another document is the Daily Crime Report. In fact, these documents are not printed out, but put into the database by the officers to be used for analysis. These documents basically include the detective assigned, crime type, date, location as sector and open address, victims, actors, case status, weapon, items taken, warrant status, ballistic evidence, vehicle, and synopsis of the case. Depending on the crime type and availability of information, each point is filled out by the detective assigned to the case. The availability of daily crime reports shows the tendency of keeping timely information and putting it into the database in a timely manner. The record management system that was modified in the current administration provides an infrastructure to enter information and access the database from different locations.

Booklets prepared by the Crime Intelligence Bureau are another type of document used in this process. These booklets are created to help officers familiarize themselves with wanted persons. The booklet includes photos of key actors known to be in certain areas. Finally, as mentioned, crime control officers in each precinct are responsible for preparing daily crime bulletins, wanted posters, crime patterns, trends, and maps for their districts to be presented at the crime information center. All these documents show the importance of information being widely recorded and distributed in terms of Compstat.
Compstat Principles and Components

There are four principles (data collection, strategizing, deployment, and assessment) and six components (accountability, mission clarification, innovation and creativity, geographical organization of the operational command, data driven problem identification, and flexibility) that are widely used to explain Compstat in the literature. Some scholars also suggest adding ‘external communication’ as the seventh component of this change initiative. In parallel to the grounded approach, while this study does not take any of these principles and components as givens for Compstat in the MPD, analysis of the data shows that these principles and some of these components do provide a helpful framework for explaining and understanding Compstat implementation in the MPD. In other words, the data analysis process compelled me to frame and use most of these principles and components as they have explanatory power for the implementation of Compstat in the MPD.

The following section will focus on the principles and components to explain the current implementation of the Compstat. By its very design, an organization that implements Compstat must gather information on crime, determine crime trends, strategically respond to these trends, and assess the results by corresponding benchmarks collected along weekly, monthly (i.e., offenses in the month of April compared to last April) and yearly metrics (i.e., arrests this year compared to last year).

The data analysis points out a similar cycle for the MPD, which consists of data collection, strategizing, deployment, and assessment. Within this cycle, the first step, collection of timely and accurate information, is intended to be the basis of the initiative, and this inevitably interacts with the following steps. More specifically, without having timely and accurate information, none of the following principles can be put into practice. For this reason, the first
point discussed to understand the current implementation of Compstat in the MPD will be the role of information in general, how it is collected, its use for different purposes, and the limitations in collecting and using this information.

**Compstat Principles in the MPD**

**Collection of accurate and timely information.** In the Compstat era, policing relies on information much more than before. Some officers even call the type of policing *information (intelligence) led policing*. Officers, especially commanding officers, need to know what is going on in their precincts or units; it might be anything from crime rates or, analysis of crimes to more specific information depending on crime type. As stated many times in meetings and interviews, ‘*not having available information*’ is unacceptable in the Compstat era. Timely and accurate information collected using different mechanisms needs to be used to identify problems, analyze crimes, find patterns, and then determine appropriate tactics and plans to respond to crime, deploy resources accordingly, and finally measure the performance of the organization and commanders in terms of the crime plans and tactics. This aspect of Compstat was widely recognized and cited by officers during the interviews and meetings as well as in documents. For instance, the director spoke many times about the central role of accurate and timely information in the meetings:

The first thing is accurate and timely intelligence. You got to know what is going on and when it happened; time of the day, day of the week. You need to figure out the time of burglaries. We need to narrow the time. Then, we create a plan, do enforcement accordingly, and monitor the results. These are the phases those officers should be going through.

The same issue was confirmed by another officer as follows: “The most important thing is gathering information. Then, you have to act on that information and assess what you did. Specifically, you make sure that officers understand what their role in the organization is and
make sure that you deploy them accordingly.” These statements show the central role of information and how it interacts with the following principles.

In Compstat, the first step is data collection. There are a number of units and officers responsible for the collection of information on a regular basis and using this information to analyze crime patterns and trends. For instance, a patrol officer is responsible for writing crime reports and entering them to the record management system on a daily basis. A supervisor needs to check this report and classify it for crime analysis purposes. Officers in the Compstat unit, precincts, and other central divisions are responsible for using this information to analyze crime, find crime patterns, and disseminate this information upward and downward throughout the organization using different channels such as information boards, roll call meetings, booklets, and daily crime bulletins. The Compstat unit conducts the crime analysis and sends it primarily to the upper echelons. The crime control officers in the precincts do the same for the precinct commanders. At the same time, these crime control officers display the crime analysis, patterns and trends to front line officers in precincts using roll call meetings or crime information centers, which are basically notice boards.

As explained briefly, after the information regarding crimes is collected and entered into databases, the second step is analyzing these crimes and finding crime patterns. The crime rates and analysis of crimes, crime trends, and patterns compose of a big part of the Compstat package, which is extensively discussed in the Compstat meetings. In particular, the increase in certain types of crime is taken into account in these meetings with the intention of understanding the reasons behind this increase and possible steps to be taken to prevent or reduce it. In fact, the main assumption behind the strong focus on the analysis of crimes and patterns is to understand the
phenomena and produce the data driven, smart policing tactics and strategies needed to reduce crime.

The analysis of crime incorporates the time and place of incidents, suspect and victim information, and the patterns that show similarities of incidents. A photo taken during the Compstat meeting to show some form of crime analysis is presented in Appendix L. A analysis is conducted over 28 day periods in the MPD. One officer gave an example of what the crime analysis includes for robbery as follows:

Compstat analysis is done for 28 days. For instance, we have 17 robberies from week 28 to week 31. This month last year, we had 22, far more. So, it is down 23 percent. We have 17 robberies, 17 victims, 37 suspects; five with gun, two with knife, and ten with strong arm; so we break down crime into patterns. We also break it down as outdoors, indoors, in terms of sectors, in terms of time; the busiest day, the busiest time. We do this analysis each week, each month, and each year. Then, we break it down.

The idea is to find a pattern in terms of time, region, or weapon and use it to respond to the crime in a smart way.

During the meetings, the police director and the deputy chief ask questions to commanding officers about the crime analysis and patterns to get a sense of what is happening in each precinct. The following questions illustrated this point in the meetings:

Tell me about section 214, do you have any patterns? ; 31 burglaries, did you do an analysis of burglary? How many patterns did you identify? ; Let’s talk about the analysis of robberies in section 215? ; What is going on at X Street? Did you identify any patterns there?

Although the range of answers to these questions depends on type of crime, they are likely to get a response as follows: “212 is the busiest sector; 20 of 38 with handgun. It is cell phones and cash oriented. There is an increase on Fridays. Friday 4-12 is the busiest time.” After this kind of break down, commanding officers look at and present similarities in terms of suspect (i.e., race, age, body type), location (i.e., 5 robberies in a five block distance), time frame (i.e.,
Friday from 8 to 12, 5 crimes; early morning robberies), type of robbery (i.e., indoor, outdoor), motive (i.e., cash, cell phone, and navigators), victims (i.e., female), type of weapon (i.e., silver gun), and cars (i.e., Cadillac). As confirmed by many officers, this kind of crime analysis and patterns is essential to figuring out when and why crimes happen, determining main crime trends quickly, and thus determining the most effective tactics to respond to crime and deploy resources appropriately.

A number of officers referred to the problems in the first phase, which consists of collection of information on a daily basis. In terms of entering data into the system in timely manner, study participants did not report any problems. However, as observed in a Compstat meeting, a few precinct commanders complained about the lack of information and cohesion in these crime reports prepared by the patrols and detectives. One commander said, “They think that their job is just to write a report and click it. They do not understand the consequences of their actions and inactions. I explain why he needs to improve this report, but he just gives the same damn thing.” It seems like the reports of patrols and detectives are far from meeting the expectations of the managers. The quality or inferiority of information in these reports influences the effectiveness of the successive steps of Compstat. Specifically, the quality of crime analysis and crime patterns depends on the quality of these crime reports. For instance, the deputy chief asked a precinct commander in a meeting, “Why isn’t the phone number listed on the cases?” In another meeting, the police director questioned precinct commanders about the accuracy of the reports in terms of the exact time of weekend burglaries. In another meeting, the deputy chief spoke about an arrest report and asked an officer, “There is a tattoo on his neck. Why did not you put the tattoo on his arrest report?” Following this statement, the deputy chief talked about the importance of these kinds of details in identifying crime patterns (i.e., suspect pattern, time and
place), which may lead to the arrest of a person who committed several crimes. As illustrated, these are still problems systemizing the crime reports in the MPD.

In fact, there is a great deal of discussion in the literature and media articles about the accuracy of crime reports, and the downgrading or manipulation of crime statistics in the Compstat era. For instance, a recent New York Times article reported the results of a survey of retired NYPD personnel which strongly implies that police reporting of crime statistics in New York City has been skewed for years to make their results look better, and to protect themselves from abuse at Compstat meetings, where their results were discussed (February 17, 2010). This issue was not specifically questioned in this study as it was not part of the research questions. At the same time, there was not any statement about this issue made during interviews or observed in meetings. That is why; this issue was not mentioned in this section of the study. In addition, the problems regarding communication, information sharing, and coordination of joint efforts will be discussed in other section.

**Determination of the most effective tactics.** The next principle of Compstat is determination of the most effective tactics. In theory, the information that is collected and stored in the databases is analyzed to see the crime rates, crime trends, and crime patterns, which should be the basis for the determination of the most effective tactics and plans to respond to crime in a proactive manner. This principle of Compstat as well as new, proactive policing approaches (i.e., broken windows policing; problem oriented policing) that provide a theoretical background for the determination of the most effective police tactics are widely recognized among officers and stated many times during the interviews. For instance, a commander stated, “I believe Compstat was implemented very much to bring the commanders together to identify and talk about similarities regarding crime that affect each precinct and come up with strategic, proactive ways
for attacking problems.” In this change initiative, as stated by the following commander, any plan, initiative, or tactic needs to rely on analysis of crimes and crime patterns, not just on personal experience of commanders or anecdotal evidence:

Years ago, who really cared what time the burglary happened at the house? Nobody cared about that. You were more reactive. We are more proactive, now. If someone broke into a home, or there was a robbery on the corner, then they would say “Okay. It happened. Let’s go take the report”. No one cared to get a plan and follow up on that. Where they did it, was it a Spanish guy, if he had a silver gun, what time of the day; we did not look at things like that before Compstat.

This kind of crime analysis provides a basis for targeted law enforcement. For instance, the following statement of an officer explains the link between Compstat and targeted enforcement as an effective approach to responding to crime:

Like the patrol officer, for instance, you have to make him feel like instead of patrolling in all the city aimlessly, which takes time and make them less efficient, you have to show them how Compstat and crime analysis can help them going to certain location at certain time to find a particular crime. He may, without Compstat, aimlessly patrol in his sector wondering, like, where he should be. Especially, it is helpful for the new guys, where the crime is, in which sector. Without Compstat, you put the guy out there. It is going to take a while before he finds out where the crime is. But we tell the new officers where the crime is. This is what you are going to find out.

In the implementation of this principle, the Compstat meetings have a central role. These meetings bring people together and provide space to talk about strategies and plans to respond to crime and to be held accountable for the plans in front of peers and the upper echelon. It is regularly observed in the meetings that the questions regarding crime statistics, analysis, and patterns are followed by the questions of the police director and deputy chief regarding the response plan and activities conducted in the scope of this plan. For instance, after questioning the crime analysis and crime patterns in a precinct (i.e., what is your analysis for burglary? what is your analysis for sector 212?), the deputy chief regularly asked commanders questions like,

What was the plan? What did you do? What is your net team doing about this? What is the plan for this weekend? What is the narcotics plan right now? Do you have plans in the
long run to solve this problem? Do you have plans for the next step if you handle the problem in this region? What are we concentrating on?

Commanders mostly gave a number of plans and activities as a response to these questions, such as patrol presence and deployment of more personnel in hot spots, joint efforts of different units, surveillance, increased visibility by patrolling during the busiest sectors and time, early morning enforcement, and vehicle stops. Then, the deputy chief usually followed with questions to understand in what ways these response plans match the analysis of the crime, how they help to solve the crime problem and the activities conducted as a part of these plans.

In fact, this is the time when most commanders were strongly criticized by the upper echelon. They were either criticized for the plan itself or the number of activities as a part of this plan. For instance, in one meeting, the police director criticized the commander for the plan he suggested:

Presence is great. But, it is not the solution. The solution is putting handcuffs on people and then putting the presence over there. We want to stop crime. We can stop it by putting on handcuffs. We suppress it when it is occurring and where it is occurring. Then, you have to have some plan to regress it. Has anybody heard about early morning narcotics enforcement as the solution to burglary? Narcotics enforcement is the easiest way to reduce the crime. What we want to be doing is getting intelligence, arrest people related to narcotics. Okay. Let’s start doing these guys.

Then, the director stated that part of the problem is lack of analysis, which needs to be the basis for the plan:

If you don’t have the analysis, then you cannot set up or put together an intelligent plan. It sounds like you are not on the right track. You want to do enforcement without knowing because you don’t have the data to back you up.

As shown, the director may criticize these plans in terms of the lack of analysis or inefficiency in solving certain types of crime. As explained by an officer, there are also certain times where the analysis and plan match each other and help commanders to solve the crime problem:
From where I see, most of the time commanders do a good job responding based on the analysis they come up with. For example, a couple of weeks ago, there were robbery problems in the second or third precincts. Their analysis was these were night time robberies. There were a group of guys in a car. They drive up to somebody. One of the guys gets out of car and takes some of the money and jumps back in. So, based on that instead of focusing quality of life and FIS, I remember they started doing traffic stops in the area they are likely to be around. As these guys are carrying a gun, they don’t feel comfortable stopping the car.

Sometimes, the police director or deputy chief expressed satisfaction with the plan and productivity and thanked the commanders. But, more often, they expressed displeasure for the plans and productivity and ask these commanders to come up with a more comprehensive plan. These kinds of things were recorded by a police officer in the form of ‘minutes of meetings’ and handed over to the upper echelon to follow up on the process. An example of this document is presented in Appendix N. The content analysis of 10 sets of minutes of meetings shows that, the upper echelon orders commanders to prepare a more comprehensive plan nearly in all meetings. For instance, there are statements in these documents such as, “Captain A shall put together a plan utilizing motor vehicle stops to address robberies.” and “Captain A shall coordinate with Captain B and develop a plan to address a number of areas. Plan shall be submitted to the Deputy Chief by 4 pm October 16.” These documents as well as the statements of the upper echelon in the meetings show that the upper echelon were mostly not satisfied with commander’s plans, tactics, and strategies, and set up a procedure to compel them to come up with more comprehensive plans and follow up about the results.

Another important point regarding the determination of the most effective tactics was the questions in the Compstat meetings about activities that need to be part of the plan. For instance, if vehicle stops in hot spots are part of the tactic suggested by commanders, they are likely to be asked the number of vehicle stops and their consequences. As stated by one officer,
If shootings are up in your precincts, you should be prepared not only to address that but also what you have done, what your men have done, what you plan to do, and you need the numbers, the activities to show, to prove that you have done that.

In parallel to this statement of officer, the upper echelon asks specific numbers to check the degree of implementation of the plan and performance of the officers. For instance, the deputy chief spoke about the activities implemented as part of a plan in one meeting: “What kind of activities do you have? How many burglary warrants did you prepare? How many burglary arrests did you have?” Depending on the numbers, the police director and deputy chief either expressed satisfaction for the productivity rates or wanted commanders to increase the numbers. As another example, the deputy chief said in a meeting, “Field investigations need to be increased in the sector 418.” and “Anti-crimes had no productivity at shooting locations last night.” Similarly, the police director repeatedly criticized commanders in the meetings for the decrease in the number of arrests compared to last year, despite the increase in the crime rates. The final point, the degree of creativity and innovation of the plans and tactics will be discussed in another section.

As shown, in the case of the MPD, Compstat reinforces the need for commanders to take responsibility for their district by familiarizing themselves with the problems and making plans to respond to them. At the same time, the commanders are compelled to be more proactive, think about crime plans, and follow the latest trends in policing. However, there are a number of problems in the adaptation of this principle, such as lack of compatibility between crime analysis/patterns and crime plans suggested by commanders, the degree of effectiveness of plans for certain crime types, the number of activities conducted as a part of each plan, and the range of innovation and creativity.

The root cause of these problems seem to be cultural habits that reinforce traditional tactics, and strategies, avoid risk taking, and lack of appreciation or credence given to the idea that timely and accurate data should give way to effective tactics and strategies targeting specific crime
patterns. More specifically, officers seemed to appreciate collection of timely and accurate information, use it to determine problematic areas, and deploy resources in that area, but fall short of having an intelligent, comprehensive, flexible, targeted and data driven tactics and strategies. As observed in many meetings, the range of the plans and strategies suggested were very limited, traditional (i.e., increasing presence and visibility), and far from meeting the expectations regarding how these plans and tactics are linked to the crime analysis and patterns.

**Deployment of resources.** Another principle of Compstat is rapid deployment of resources. In theory, crime was analyzed and the analysis was used for the determination of the most effective tactics, which is followed by rapid and appropriate deployment of personnel and other resources according to the tactic and strategies. In other words, the resources are deployed to endorse the tactics and strategies.

In the MPD, It seemed like officers were more in tune with the principle of rapid deployment of personnel and resources based on patterns and analysis than with the link between crime analysis and determination of effective tactics. Officers often commented on the role of Compstat as being geographically driven and fluid in their deployment. They especially appreciated the contribution of this change initiative for bringing promptness and flexibility in the deployment of resources, and reinforcing the coordination of deployment between precincts and special units such as Narcotics and Gang. For instance, one commander stated how Compstat contributes to the coordination of efforts and resources to respond to crime:

> For me as the commander of the third precincts, I have to communicate with the narcotics division for deployment in high narcotic areas. Gang squad, I have to coordinate my efforts with them, we have to communicate with each other to address my gang problems. I think this is happening under Compstat.

The upper echelon wants to make sure that commanders deploy their resources to endorse their plans and strategies and coordinate their resources in the implementation of the plans. There
are a number of examples of how this is happening in the meetings. It was common to hear questions from the upper echelon such as, “How many cops did you deploy in that sector? Did you put up more patrols there? Did you talk to the supervisor who is in charge of that unit to coordinate your manpower?”

Another point that needs to be mentioned was the link between crime analysis and deployment of resources to hot spots. Commanders wanted their officers to concentrate on hot spots and to ensure that officers know what to look for and synchronize their efforts. Most of the officers in the MPD said that their analysis of crime affects where they deploy resources. In particular, commanders sent their officers to the place that is called problematic areas or hot spots. For instance, one commander explained that,

Compstat has really changed the way of policing in general. The analysis of crime affects the way we deploy officers and where you deploy them. If you already know what these problems and where, a patrol car can be directed accordingly.

In addition, the analysis of crime allowed officers to see the latest trends before it is too late, and use their resources accordingly. As observed in one meeting, the director explained the priorities of the department as robbery, burglary, and shootings. The following statement of the director in the meeting shows how these priorities are linked the resource management: “The biggest crime we have an issue right now is robberies. We are putting fifteen more people on robbery squad.” There were some other examples from meetings that show how their analysis allows deployment of resources accordingly. In one meeting, an officer mentioned the increase in the number of theft of GPS units from car and the need for posters to warn people about this. Other than the meetings, the crime information that is displayed at crime control centers is assumed to let officers focus on certain locations. Crime control officers in each precinct regularly update and post posters of wanted people in crime control centers. These posters
provide pictures and locations where each person committed a crime which, in turn, gives patrols and detectives a target and location to focus on.

Another point mentioned in interviews was the Compstat’s contribution to the rapid deployment of resources by decreasing bureaucratic barriers. Compstat, especially Compstat meetings, where all critical people in the department gather in one room, allows for a less cumbersome and more rapid allocation of resources in problematic areas. For instance, one commander stated,

You bring people from all departments. I mean, you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that has a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something to respond to the increased number of crimes, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done.

However, there are certain problems in the adaptation of this principle in the MPD. The most common problem mentioned by officers was resource constraints. Many officers commented that the MPD has limited resources. Even if they have plans, it is not possible to carry them out, as people and funding are limited. For instance, a commander said, “In some cases where there is a high concentration, like in narcotics areas, drug bazaars, things like that, precinct commanders just did not have the resources to handle it.” Another limitation was the extent of coordination among different units in deploying resources synchronically. There were many examples from the meetings where the police director and deputy chief expressed dissatisfaction with the coordination and asked commanders to meet after the Compstat meeting to coordinate their efforts. There are statements in minutes of meeting such as, “Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs in case of emergency.” There are more examples of these kinds of statements that illustrate the lack of coordination between different units in the MPD.
Relentless follow up and assessment. The most defining principle of Compstat is relentless follow up and assessment. Most of the change initiatives, even the best ones in theory, fail as there is not any strong follow up mechanism that create a sense of obligation among organizational members to adopt a change initiative. In contrast to other initiatives, Compstat in the MPD has certain aspects that allow the upper echelon to monitor officers on a regular basis if they are doing their job in terms of crime analysis, crime plans, and resource deployment. In addition, this change initiative requires the involvement of the higher level in the process. Thus, it creates feedback loops at a higher level, whereas they existed at the lower level only before.

The form and content of the Compstat meetings in the MPD have a key role in this process. As mentioned before, these meetings have been held on a weekly basis for eight straight years with the participation of the upper echelon in the MPD, until the last administration. In the new administration, the meetings are conducted once or twice a month. Either way, the commanders in the MPD know that there will be a meeting next week or in two weeks in which they will be questioned on a number of topics, including the problems from the previous meetings. The following statement of one officer illustrated how this mechanism works in the MPD: “You put them hot seat. Commanding officers say that I am going to address this particular issue in my command, when they come back I bet they do.” If these commanders do not address the problems in their command, as stated by the same officer, this is likely to get a question as follows in the meetings: “Hey commander, talk to me about the issue you said you are going to address last Compstat. Then, you are going to make sure that you address that issue before going there.” This system forces commanders to consider if there is something to be done or, updated before the next meeting where they will be put in the hot spot. In addition, some officers in the MPD pointed out that this relentless follow up is needed especially in larger
organizations. As stated by one officer, “Here, you may not see a patrolman for months. That is why you need relentless follow-up.” As shown, these gatherings provide a platform to follow up on problems and initiatives in such a big organization on a regular basis, which is very critical for the success of the other components and principles of Compstat.

The second aspect of the meetings is the participation of the upper echelon and their involvement in the decision making process. Commanders know that there will be a guy from a higher level in the meetings to question them in front of their peers and subordinates, and evaluate their performance, which inevitably influences their career in the department. For instance, a commander in the department stated,

Compstat increased the feedback loop in the department and it also did at a very much higher level. When the chief of department sits in these meetings, he is brought into that system. So, decisions that were made at Compstat meetings are his. It is not like I told my subordinate to go and deal with the problem in which there is not any follow up or checking. So, this constant, relentless follow up was the other key to making things work.

As will be discussed later, the end product of this process was that commanders faced increased competition among themselves; they become part of the feedback loop, and became focused on their command all the time.

Assessment is another important aspect of this principle. The Compstat unit prepares Compstat package on a weekly basis to present information about all precincts and units to the upper echelon. Similarly, crime control officers in each precinct prepare a Compstat package just for their commanders. Compstat packages basically have two interlocked parts which provide a base for the assessment of performance. One part is about crime rates, crime analysis, and patterns (i.e., time, place, victim, and suspect) for each crime type. The crime statistics that are presented compared to those of the previous year are the most important indicator for the
assessment of commanding officers. Commanding officers are questioned on any increase, and its causes, and asked for their plan to respond to it.

The precincts commander profile is another important part of the Compstat package. As shown in Appendix L, this one page overview shows the overall performance of the commander who is responsible for each precinct. It includes information regarding the names, positions and ranks of people in managerial positions, complaints against personnel, average response time, sick time, and precinct overtime and its monetary equivalent. In addition, there is an overview of number of arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, and search warrants for all crimes. These numbers (i.e., arrests, field investigations, search warrants, vehicle stops, cases closed or open) are also prepared for each crime type, such as robbery, narcotics, and burglary in sections that are designed to give specific information for each crime type.

All these numbers are indicators that are used to gain an overview of the activity of each precinct. Commanders are held responsible for the activity in their precincts. These written documents allowed the upper echelon to check these numbers relentlessly and take necessary measures to control crime. They questioned commanders on these numbers in the Compstat meetings or other settings. It was clearly observed in the meetings that the most important indicator was crime rates. If crime is down in a precinct, a decrease in productivity is understandable. However, if crime is up, but productivity is down, then this is a bad indicator. In such a case, it is thought that either someone is not doing something or they are not where they are supposed to be.

This takes us to another important point regarding the numbers, which is compatibility of productivity numbers with the place and time of crimes. The police director or deputy chief criticized commanders for low productivity at crime ridden locations and times. For instance, the
deputy chief said, “Anti-crimes had no productivity at shooting locations last night. Commanders need to prioritize based on the rates of violence in sectors.” Similarly, an officer explained,

I have to make certain amount of tickets; I have to make certain amount of arrests; it is not like that. I don’t think it makes them work hard. It is more about where focus should be. In other words, if there is a problem over here, you just spend your time over there.

However, there were certain problems in the practice of this principle. First of all, while some indicators were prioritized depending on the current problems, some indicators such as response time, and sick time were not discussed in any of the meetings, which results in the ignorance of these indicators by the officers. Other than this, some officers stated that some ranked officers come to these meetings unprepared all the time, but they still stay in their positions. This perception may undermine the purpose behind the principle of relentless follow up and assessment.

Another limitation was the frequency of meetings. In this new administration, these meetings were conducted once or twice a month by taking in to account the increase of crime rates. When there was a decrease in crime rates, meetings were more likely to be postponed. As such, the main content of meetings was the increase of crime rates and solutions for this, which created a perception that only negative things were taken into account and discussed. It is possible to have meetings just to understand the reasons for the decrease of crime rates and the story behind the success of commanders. Finally, the police director of the MPD usually gave a speech at the end of meetings and supported the idea that police organizations can make a difference in crime rates, as illustrated in the case of the MPD. In this environment, commanders should take responsibility for both the increase and decrease in crime rates in their precincts. However, it is strongly suggested by many academicians that social and economic factors may also influence crime rates as much as the performance of a police organization. Many of the
commanders seem to partly share this assumption, but they are compelled to take responsibility for any kind of increase in crime rates. This point seems to create a paradox for some officers in the MPD, where they avoid expressing their thoughts on this issue clearly.

Based on these findings, the Table 5 illustrated these four principles, their contribution, and limitations in the practice.

Table 5 Compstat Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTION</th>
<th>LIMITATIONS</th>
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| **COLLECTION OF ACCURATE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE** | Daily and accurate information collected by alternative sources (Check and Balance)  
Analysis of crime on a regular basis  
Analysis of crime trends  
Basis for other principles  
Data driven, smart, timely response to crime  
Production and exhibition of a wide range of documents  
**Information-led Policing** | Not entering crime reports into system in a timely manner  
Inferiority of crime reports  
Inferiority or inadequacy of crime analysis and crime patterns  
Overdose of information / Difficulty digesting all information |}

| DETE MinタイミングATION OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE TACTICS | Effective, data driven, smart tactic and plans in responding to crime  
Proactive manner in responding to crime  
Targeted law enforcement | Degree of effectiveness of plans  
Lack of compatibility between police tactics and crime analysis  
Inadequate number of activities conducted as a part of police tactics (productivity rates)  
Need for more comprehensive plans  
Lack of coordination putting the plans into practice  
Cultural values that reinforce traditional tactics and plans  
Degree of creativity and innovation of plans |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES</th>
<th>Resource constraints</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid and appropriate deployment of resources (based on the patterns and analysis)</td>
<td>Extent of coordination among different units in deploying resources synchronically</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being geographically driven and fluid in the deployment</td>
<td>Cultural values to follow bureaucracy in deploying resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexibility and decreased bureaucratic barriers to deploy resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for coordination among different units</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>RELENTLESS FOLLOW UP AND ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>Ignorance of certain performance indicators</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission clarification (crime reduction)</td>
<td>Lack of career planning based on performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a sense of obligation (regular meetings)</td>
<td>Focus solely on the increase of crime rates that brings negativity into discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor officer performance and department on a regular basis</td>
<td>Ignorance of social, economic factors in the increase or decrease of crime rates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create a sense of accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide a platform to follow up on problems and new initiatives</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase competition and career orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase performance measurement capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help to see the compatibility between crime plans and productivity numbers</td>
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**Compstat Components**

It is clear from the interviews, observation, and documents that components of Compstat cited in the literature provide a helpful framework for discussing the implementation of this change initiative in the MPD. This should not be understood that the MPD has adopted all components in the literature. On one hand, there are certainly some components such as accountability, mission clarification, and innovative policing tactics that were heavily emphasized by officers in the MPD. On the other hand, other components of Compstat in the
literature, such as geographical organization of command, data driven problem identification and assessment, and organizational flexibility were clearly less emphasized. However, this does not mean that all these components were not adopted in the MPD. Despite some of these components were not emphasized directly by officers and certain limitations in practice, they still have an explanatory power to explain Compstat implementation in the MPD. Thus, this study uses the same components as the literature, which also enables to connect this study to the body of literature that heavily uses these components.

**Accountability.** The literature on Compstat attaches considerable importance to this component of Compstat. In keeping with this, accountability along with information sharing is the most common words used to describe Compstat in the MPD. In fact, the main point behind this component is that officers should be held accountable for whether they know their command and what they are doing in their command. This component were put into practice in the MPD basically by putting commanders on the hot spot in the Compstat meetings and questioning them about crime in their districts. The following statement of one officer clearly shows how this component works:

> I believe that Compstat is basically for accountability, holding people accountable, putting them in the spot light, putting them in front of peers, asking what they are doing to solve problems, and holding them more accountable for personal integrity, personal communication, and effectiveness. That is what Compstat is.

As stated, the critical part of the accountability component is putting commanders on the hot spot in the meetings to make sure that they are doing their work properly. Commanders feel obliged to answer the questions of the upper echelon in these meetings avoid being humiliated in front of the upper echelon, peers, and subordinates, and to show their performance, and possibly to be promoted. The relentless follow up principle in particular completes the accountability mechanism as commanding officers are held accountable relentlessly in these meetings.
In fact, most of the officers in the MPD support the main idea behind accountability. For instance, one commanding officer stated,

As a commander, I believe that you should be questioned for your actions and be accountable. You have to be accountable as a commander. You have to be accountable as an officer; you have to be accountable as a supervisor. You have to know your areas. You have to know your people. You have to know your players and officers. You have to know who your players are.

This mechanism seems to be very effective in terms of forcing commanders to take more responsibility for crime problems and solutions in their district. The following statements of one officer confirmed this point as follows:

I think we needed it. That is number one. I think it was a good idea. When I was patrol, I would rarely see the captain. What we saw was the assignment lieutenant. He basically scheduled officers for work. I don’t think that precincts were paying much attention to the crime that was going on within their precincts because I have never seen any special thing done proactively to stop the burglary problem. I don’t think they were aware of what was going on in their precincts. They did not write a report daily as we do right now. I think when we started Compstat, the precinct captains become more accountable. They open their eyes to see I have a burglary problem here; I have a robbery problem in this part of the city.

As shown, it is clear that this mechanism required commanding officers to take more responsibility, to consider the problems in his/her district and possible solutions, to communicate more with other units, and to get feedback from the lower level as a part of preparation for the Compstat meeting.

There are a number of issues that were stated as a part of accountability. The first thing was empowerment of commanding officers, which should go along with accountability. In other words, before holding commanders accountable for their action and inactions, the upper echelon should provide resources and delegate more decision making to them for deploying resources, and adopting crime tactics and strategies in their district. In the MPD, while some officers stated that the police director empowered commanding officers, other officers found the level of
empowerment and delegation limited compared to the NYPD. In fact, observation of the meetings confirmed that the police director and deputy chief frequently criticized commanding officers for their decisions regarding crime plans and deployment, and make final decisions in these meetings. An officer explained the end product of this manner as follows: “I think in order to encourage people to make a decision; you have to give them the ability to make them. If you don’t, you grow up a culture eventually that won’t make decisions.” Similarly, another officer talked about general situation in the MPD in terms of empowerment as follows: “Commanding officers do not have a lot of power and a lot of authority.” It is fair to say that most of the officers believe that they were held accountable and kept responsible for any problems in their district or unit while they did not have enough authority and power to make decisions. The observation of the process confirms this is a valid concern for the MPD and creates dissatisfaction and the paradox of responsibility without power.

The second point that is commonly stated by the director is the need to hold the lower level accountable for their actions. In the meetings, the police director constantly mentioned the fact that commanding officers should hold officers in their command accountable, as he did commanding officers in the Compstat meetings. For instance, the director spoke about this point in a meeting as follows: “Listen, this is how it is going to be done. Everybody does their parts. Talk to your lieutenant and sergeants and hold them accountable for their actions.” He stated that he has meetings with his staff regularly and suggested commanding officers do the same to keep their staff accountable. However, the level of accountability of the lower level seems to be limited compared to that of middle level managers. As stated by a commander, he makes regular meetings to keep his staff accountable while this is not true for each commander. Compstat in the
MPD did not have any defined mechanism to ensure this point. It seems like some commanders keep doing what they are used to doing and neglect putting this into practice.

The final point is the manner of questioning. As mentioned, the tone of the meetings changed in a positive way in this new administration. However, instead of accountability, it is still like an interrogation in which the upper echelon questions the middle level managers. As suggested by one officer, there is a need for open communication where “officers at least ask one or two questions as to how he (chief/director) can do better and how he is going to help him do his job better.” As will be discussed later, this design of Compstat discourages officers from asking question, communication openly, and improving their practices.

**Mission clarification.** The other component of Compstat is mission clarification. This component points out the need for emphasizing the core reason of the organization’s existence and announcing clearly defined measurable goals and benchmark for success. These are intended to help police organizations to function more effectively and instilling in police officers a sense of shared commitment. It was clear from the statements of officers and observation of meetings that the MPD was adept at implementing the mission clarification component of Compstat. For instance, the following excerpt of one officer shows that Compstat played a positive role in terms of instilling a shared commitment and purpose among officers in the MPD: “It has improved our organization because we have a direction. We have a vision. We have a direct course. Before we had Compstat, we wouldn’t know what is going on.”

Consistent with the idea that police could have a significant effect on crime, most of the police organizations that have adopted Compstat as well as the MPD focused on crime reduction as the main goal. As observed in the Compstat meetings, commanding officers were basically questioned about crime statistics, which were compared with those of previous years and
periods. The upper echelon wanted commanding officers to improve upon what they had previously done. These crime statistics and other performance measures (i.e., arrests, warrants, and response time) set a measurable indicator for the performance of commanding officers. The following comment of the police director illustrated these points: “We are at the end of first quarter. This year most types of crime decreased significantly. That is pretty damn good. The shooting rate is a little bit lower on average than we had last year.” In such an environment, it seems like officers at different levels of the MPD have been bought into the fundamental crime fighting and crime reduction mission of Compstat. For instance, one officer stated that,

   Compstat brought more structure to this job. We are also more goal-oriented, just as private companies. We have goals and objectives now, which are reducing crime. Compstat is the driven force behind our very purpose. Compstat played a definite role.

   Other than the crime rates, Compstat allows the upper echelon to prioritize certain crime types and assignments. Many police officers stated that response time was a big problem in the MPD before Compstat. As mentioned by a number of officers, when the Compstat process started, the director focused constantly on response time, and reduced it to less than 5 minutes for certain crimes. Information about average response time was still presented in the Precinct Commander Profile, but it was never discussed in the meetings in the last six months as it was not evaluated as a priority of the department any more. The current director in the MPD put more emphasize on certain crime types and questioned commanders mostly for these prioritized crime types. For instance, in a meeting, the director said,

   Hey guys, here are the priorities again: The first thing is shooting. It is the most important. We want to increase robbery squads and really focus on shootings. The second thing is robberies. We need to talk about how many shootings are related to narcotics. The fact is that robbery is leading to shootings. The next priority on the scale is burglary. We had to prioritize. Priorities are very simply shootings, robberies, and burglary.
As illustrated, the director regularly gave messages regarding the priorities of the MPD. Even if he did not directly state these priorities in each meeting, he questioned commanding officers about these crime types, which created a sense of priorities and goals both for the director and officers in general. The following statement of one officer shows how this mechanism influenced the practices of officers in the MPD:

Compstat has brought a part that we prioritize what we do instead of just doing everything. If we have problems with quality of life issues with people drinking on corners, instead of writing parking tickets at that time we can do it later, going back to quality of life issues. So, that is where Compstat helps to change the officer’s perspective instead of being so general.

As shown, Compstat allowed the upper echelon to set department wide measurable goals which were used to assess officers, prioritize goals, and instill in officers a sense of shared commitment. However, it is not clear the degree of shared commitment among front line officers, their perception of organizational goals and objectives, and the reflection of these goals into the daily practice of these officers.

**Innovative problem solving tactics.** The other component of Compstat is innovative problem solving tactics. It is suggested that Compstat supports the use of technological tools (i.e., crime maps, statistical analyses) and use of innovative or best practices that go beyond officers’ own experience. The situation in the MPD shows that this component of Compstat has been adopted in a limited manner. There are certainly a number of examples observed in the meetings and expressed in the personal accounts of officers regarding how Compstat in the MPD supported innovative, smart problem solving, and sharing of best practices. For instance, in one meeting, the police director assigned a person to talk about how to check pawn shops accurately. In another meeting, an officer talked about new ways to find stolen mobile phones. This person was asked to contact mobile phone companies and share the possibilities with other staff in the
organization. It may not be wrong to conclude that some officers saw these meetings as an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge and capacity in front of the peers and the upper echelon.

In addition to this first-hand observation, a number of officers gave examples of innovative problem solving in the MPD in these approximately 12 years of the Compstat process. The following example given by an officer shows how Compstat can provide a basis for innovation and smart policing tactics:

There is always a better way of policing. People should be open-minded about it. People come together and focus on a problem, you are surprised. One of the former administrations did something which was great, we had sixty people in this room and we had an issue. I think it was rape. There was a rapist. Everybody said what they did. The director asked what else we can do. We did everything. No, there should be something else we can do. He did not have the answer. Then, he told people that “Today is Thursday. By Monday morning, three o clock, I want everyone in this room. Go back to your office and type something for me.” He had sixty reports. He read all of them. He came with 25 additional ideas on Monday how to address that problem.

This statement clearly shows that Compstat can play a positive role for innovation through bringing people together to talk, brainstorm to identify problems and come up with alternative ideas to solve the problems.

Another point regarding the link between Compstat and innovative problem solving is the contribution of Compstat to the use new technologies and databases. It was observed in the MPD that information technologies play a central role in the implementation of Compstat. As stated by one officer, the need for accurate and timely information and information sharing in Compstat compelled the MPD to adopt technology quickly and use these technological tools for smart and innovative policing:

So, the Compstat unit has essentially built up their own reporting system instead of the old system. Reports were created at least three months behind and often almost six. The preliminary statistics were a month old. So, they wanted preliminary statistics to be
available weekly. They wanted the mapping staff to be available at least in the meetings very quickly.

In addition, it is also stated by a few officers that the MPD adopted a record management system that allowed officers to enter information into a database and share it with other units. This system allowed the Compstat department to retrieve updated information from the system and use it for reporting. As shown, the Compstat process seems to force the MPD to adapt technology, specifically computers, databases, crime mapping, GPS systems, and statistical analysis in order to ease the implementation of Compstat and smart policing approaches.

The final point made by officers to show the link between innovative problem solving and Compstat was the heavy reliance on crime analysis as a tool to identify problems and alternative solutions. As stated by many officers, analysis of crime data enabled officers to identify hot spots, profile criminals in a region, and improve tactics or alternative solutions accordingly. For instance, one officer said,

There was a robbery problem in the second or third precinct. Their analysis was these were night time robberies. There were a group of guys in a car. They drive up to somebody. One of the guys gets out of car and takes some of the money and jumps back in. So, based on that, instead of focusing quality of life and FIS, I remember they started doing traffic stops in the area they are likely to be around. As these guys carrying a gun, they don’t feel comfortable stopping the car.

Another officer spoke about the contribution of Compstat to the coordination and collaboration of forces and the sharing of best practices as an example of an innovation.

As we go through our process of looking at our information, talking with other officers in these meetings, identifying problems and problematic areas that possibly exceed my borders, you sometimes combine forces with another city or another district. Or, you get help from other people around that table. So, is it innovative, is it a new thinking. I don’t know, but because this process is in place, it challenges us to try to do better and use all the resources that are available to us rather than just sit and do whatever we do and not worry about arrest.
As shown in the paragraph above, it is clear that most of the tactics suggested by the commanders as innovative ways to respond to crime are traditional, such as patrol presence, increased visibility, traffic stops in hot spots, early morning enforcement, and increasing the number of summonses, search warrants, and arrests. Once a hot spot was identified by using crime maps and analysis, patrols were directed to the area and asked to identify suspects, keep an eye on suspicious surroundings and area saturation, step up traffic enforcement, increase arrests, and utilize knock-and talk, all of which are traditional tactics.

It seems like the real contribution of Compstat in the MPD is not its support for innovative tactics, but the use of the right tactics at the right time and place by analyzing crime and emerging crime patterns. In fact, commanding officers in the MPD seemed to become adept at collecting crime information, presenting this information in a comparable manner, and making analyses that basically focus on the time and place of crime incidents. However, these commanding officers exhibited little appreciation for evaluating the meaning of this data or patterns beyond time and place. This certainly limited the level of innovation in the MPD.

Other than the limitations at the level of analyzing and evaluating data, it is stated that the early forms of the Compstat meetings played a negative role in improving this component of Compstat in the MPD. For instance, one officer said,

I don’t know because director George Brown says all the time, what do you guys think. However, most of the time, he does not get any responses. Again, it is probably the reflection of how people are used to Compstat being done over the years. People did not speak up pretty much. You would afraid of opening your mouth. To me, it is partly the same because some people just don’t say things as they are afraid of what might come out of their mouth. In the old Compstat they were so used to being told what to do.

In fact, the observation of the meetings confirms the statement of this officer. Even, in the current form of the meetings, when the police director asked contribution of officers at the end of
meetings, the common answer is, “No sir”. In fact, the following statement of an officer shows how early forms of meetings influenced the current form of meetings:

My personal experience is that I answer the question believing the reasonable answer, but they did not believe the right answer. So, they cut me off and put me out. Compstat cannot be that. You have to bring the ideas of everybody together. I am not saying accepted as value, but you should listen to him because as a person what he says can generate a good idea for a good strategy.

Some officers explained the limitation of this component in the MPD by referring to human nature and the arrangements of meetings as limiting innovation. Consider the following comments of one officer, “As far as people, human nature is the same pretty much all over the place. I think for the most part people tend not to volunteer too much information. Sometimes, people don’t offer their opinions because they don’t want extra work.” Another officer pointed out pressure in these meetings:

When you speak in a meeting, it might be criticized or looked at by the other people as trying to get too close to the boss. Or you might think is he going to make fun of it? Is he going to transfer me? So, when you sit in a room with your peers, there are a lot of people, a lot of pressure. Sometimes, people just don’t say things in open meetings, but in a one on one meeting, he would be more proactive.

In addition, the design of communication in meetings as question-answer form rather than open platform seems to limit officers getting involved in the discussion.

Therefore, it seems like the design of meeting (i.e., number of participants, meeting room, peer pressure), design of communication (i.e., question-answer form), history of police organization (i.e., early forms of meetings: intimidation and humiliation), cultural values and personal attitudes of officers in the organization (i.e., avoid extra work, defensive culture), and organizational constraints in terms of resources restrict officers in expressing and sharing information freely, and as a result, limit innovation in problem solving and policing tactics in the MPD.
By referring to these points, some officers suggested organizing the meeting differently in terms of number and communication design. As shown in the following statement of one officer, “Instead of saying, second precinct what you are doing about your robberies. It can be something like let’s talk about robberies now?” So, the meeting becomes more problem driven instead of being personnel driven. Another officer explained the need to accept all ideas as valuable ones which may generate an idea for a good strategy. As stated at the beginning of the section about this component, Compstat certainly plays a positive role in increasing innovation and smart policing tactics compared to the period prior, while the level of innovation and sharing best practices is beyond the theorized capacity of the initiative.

**Geographical organization of operational command.** This component of Compstat stresses that police departments need to empower precinct commanders by increasing their share of resources and their decision making authority in their geographical units. It criticizes centralization of authority, strict bureaucracy and hierarchy, and lack of information sharing between precincts and specialized units.

In terms of empowerment, there has been progress in the MPD after the implementation of Compstat. Structurally, the narcotics teams, gang units, and other specialized units have a number of officers that work under the command of the precinct commanders. These officers increased precinct commanders’ capacity to respond to different crime types by taking into account the problems and needs of his/her precincts, increasing communication, and enabling them to conduct independent operations from central units. For instance, one officer said,

Precinct commanders became metaphorically a quarter-back. He is the guy who is on the scene, responsible for that command. A few hundred officers are assigned precincts. Even though detectives are reporting different chain of command, they start to work closely.
Observation of meetings confirms that precinct commanders can make decisions regarding where, when, and for what purpose to assign these officers and the number of officers in order to implement their plan. However, their decisions and plans for using these officers were regularly criticized by the upper echelon. In many cases, the upper echelon made changes to these decisions and plans. In fact, considering these meetings and other settings in the department, some officers in the MPD stated that the level of empowerment in using resources and making decision still remains limited or at a symbolic level.

Another reflection of this component can be observed in the way territorial divisions are perceived by commanding officers. As stated by many officers, before Compstat, commanding officers did not have any communication or joint efforts with the other precincts or the narcotics divisions. They did not even know about or take any responsibility for crimes that happened in other precincts. Nevertheless, the implementation of Compstat changed this manner by bringing commanders together regularly under a unified structure and compelling them to coordinate their efforts. This change is explained by one officer as follows:

The difference is in communication. Prior to this Compstat, there was not a lot of communication across precincts. Things were very specific and territorial. We had different segments of the department only worrying about their specific community. It was not taken into consideration that someone else’s problems in another community would also affect their part, too. So, we were very territorial and there was not a lot of communication.

In terms of the upper echelon compelling commanders to have joint efforts, the following excerpts from the minutes of meetings are enlightening: “Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs at emergency.”

Finally, in the Compstat era, each district divided into smaller geographical divisions called ‘sectors’. These small divisions facilitated commanding officers’ to define geographically smaller hot spots, and assignment of front line officers to these sectors, which thus enabled them
to develop a more targeted enforcement. The following excerpts from minutes of meeting show how sectors enabled the upper echelon to have a more targeted enforcement: “A detailed plan to address crime in 212 sectors near shooting area; it must be submitted to the deputy chief by tomorrow.” As briefly explained, Compstat increased the capacity of precinct commanders to respond to crime and the level of information sharing and coordination, whereas the level of empowerment for using resources and making decision remained limited. This situation conflicts with the central idea of Compstat, which is empowering commanders and holding them accountable for how they use this power.

Data driven problem identification and assessment of problem solving efforts. This component basically assumes that police organizations need to obtain and use accurate and timely crime statistics to identify the organization’s problems and assess commanders’ performance instead of relying on personal experience and/or anecdotal evidence. As mentioned in other components, the MPD has mechanisms to collect timely and accurate crime information through databases, which are used to analyze crime and emerging crime trends to identify problems and make rational and smart decisions on crime reduction strategies. It is clear that the MPD officers believe that Compstat contributed to the identification of problems and the implementation of organization wide, systematic, efficient crime reduction strategies, which are assessed relentlessly through Compstat meetings. For instance, one officer commented,

Prior to 1996, I don’t know that there was a concerted effort to address crime in the way that Compstat allows you to focus on crime. I don’t think that there was an organized methodology department wide. But, Compstat helped us to understand the problem and pushed a method to everybody. And everybody had used the same tools to focus on crime. They were measured and judged on whether they were successful. So, Compstat is generally a very positive thing for the department.

Another officer pointed out that Compstat contributes to the identification of problems as follows: “The idea of Compstat was really to bring attention to what crime problems were out
here. It was about discovery and correction of the problems.” As mentioned, the availability of timely and accurate data and crime analysis allowed officers to discover crime trends and, crime problems in their districts before it is too late and come up with strategies to address these problems.

The observation of the meetings in the MPD shows that these officers’ statements are certainly true if the concept of problem is used to mean identification of any increase in crime, hot spots, and crime classification based on the suspect and modus operandi. However, this level of analysis is far from identifying underlying causes of crime problems. The decisions are made on the basis of this limited analysis which certainly influences the tactics and strategies in responding to crime proactively as theorized in Compstat.

Additionally, the director of the MPD seemed to rely on his own experience, especially to advice on crime reduction strategies. Referring to his experience in the NYPD, he gave examples of how certain tactics and strategies in the NYPD worked with certain crime types and suggests using these. In addition, most of the decisions for the crime fighting strategies were traditional, and it is hard to see how these strategies were linked to the analysis of crime and crime trends, except for focusing on hot spots. In short, although the availability of data and regular presentation of crime data at Compstat meetings improved the level of data driven problem identification and decision making, there is still a tendency to rely on personal experiences and anecdotal evidence and to use traditional strategies.

In terms of assessment of problem solving efforts, the Compstat meetings provide a platform to talk about problem solving efforts and their effectiveness in reducing crime. The main criterion for the assessment of problem solving efforts, specifically police tactics and strategies was crime rates. If there was a decrease in crime rates, the problem solving strategy
was believed effective or vice versa. Also, as stated by many officers, the strategies which were proven to work or effective distributed immediately in the Compstat meetings. In spite of the number of criteria to assess problem solving efforts was limited, taking into account that crime reduction was common goal of police organizations, this situation in the MPD seems to be rational.

**Organizational flexibility.** The other component of Compstat in the literature is organizational flexibility. Police organizations need to respond promptly to changing conditions and opportunities, and non-routine work demands that will emerge citywide on a daily basis. This component addresses the fact that the centralized bureaucratic structure dominated by detailed rules and regulations, excessive paperwork, and operational protocols limit flexibility of organizations in responding effectively and promptly to ever changing work demands (Jermier & Berkes, 1979).

In the case of the MPD, it is stated many times that commanding officers need to know crime trends and problems in their district by collecting and analyzing data on a regular basis, which enables them to see rapidly changing conditions, specifically emerging hot spots, and to deploy and re-allocate resources in these areas. For instance, one officer commented about Compstat’s contribution to the MPD’s ability to adapt to changing conditions:

> It helps us to conduct our jobs every day. In a city like Metrocity, it is so busy and changes so rapidly that if we did not have this model, we would be anywhere. We would not adapt to these changing conditions.

Another officer pointed out how Compstat increased the speed and focus of the organization’s response to hot spots: “It is about knowing where your problems are on a daily basis and using your resources to address those problems before it is too late.”
Observation of the meetings confirms that crime analysis and crime mapping enabled commanding officers to see problematic areas quickly and compelled them to direct more resources to these areas promptly. This is because these commanding officers were questioned on the problems in their district and on their response. Most of the time, commanding officers expressed the need to allocate more resources (i.e., increase patrol, increase number of officers) as a part of the tactics and strategies used to respond to problems. Similarly, the police director talks about the priorities of the department and the need to manage resources accordingly.

Another positive function of these meetings in terms of flexibility of the organization is the participation of officers from different units and the upper echelon. As explained by one officer, this platform helped things get done:

You bring people from all departments. I mean, you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that has a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done promptly.

However, officers also mentioned some challenges that limited the MPD in flexibility in terms of resource and manpower allocation on a need basis. The first challenge was lack of resources that limit allocation of resources rapidly on the need basis. Many officers pointed out that lack of resources limited their capacity to allocate resources as they wish. The second challenge was attitudes of police managers, who tend to follow routine procedures instead of changing resource allocation on the need basis.

The Table 6 illustrates the implementation of Compstat components in the MPD. It specifically shows the contribution of each component and limitations stated by the study participants, observed by the researcher, and reflected in documents.
Table 6 Compstat Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTION</th>
<th>LIMITATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCOUNTABILITY</td>
<td>Requirement to take more responsibility</td>
<td>The degree of empowerment (the paradox of responsibility without enough power)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Requirement to consider and learn the problems in his/her command and possible solutions</td>
<td>The degree of holding accountable lower level officers (in precincts and other units)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>More communication with other units and precincts</td>
<td>Manner of questioning that discourage free flow of ideas, honest and sincere dialogue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>More communication with his/her staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISSION CLARIFICATION</td>
<td>Increase the focus on crime fighting and crime reduction</td>
<td>The degree of reflection of department wide goals and objectives in the daily practices of front line officers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bring department wide goals, objectives, and vision</td>
<td>The degree of shared commitment among frontline officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase shared commitment</td>
<td>The degree of dissemination of goals, objectives, and commitment to the front line officers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prioritize certain crime types and assignments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS</td>
<td>Increase innovative and smart problem solving</td>
<td>Tendency to follow traditional tactics and strategies and resource constraints</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increase the degree of sharing best practices</td>
<td>The level of analysis and evaluation of data</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of crime analysis and patterns to identify problems and alternative solutions</td>
<td>Early forms of the Compstat meetings that discouraged free talk</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human nature to avoid extra work</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defensive culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication design (peer pressure, question-answer form)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND</td>
<td>Increase the capacity and independency of precincts to respond different crime types</td>
<td>Level of empowerment to make decision and allocate resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase communication and coordination between different units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geographical analysis of crime that helps to define problematic areas and use targeted enforcement</td>
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| DATA DRIVEN PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT PROBLEM SOLVING EFFORTS | Level of crime analysis that is far from identifying underlying causes of crime problems

- Relentless assessment of crime problems, initiatives through the Compstat meetings

- Cultural tendency to rely on personal experience and anecdotal evidence |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY</td>
<td>Tendency to follow routine procedures for budgeting and resource allocation instead of allocating resources on an as needed basis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the speed of response to problematic areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid and appropriate use of resources based on changing crime trends and conditions</td>
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<td>The Compstat meetings that help to get things done in a timely manner</td>
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### Cultural Change and Compstat

It is clear from the literature that one of the main claims of Compstat is cultural change. By referring to the case of the cultural change in the NYPD after the implementation of Compstat, this change initiative is said to bring about cultural change in police organizations. This has historically been believed to be very difficult due to the habits, unwritten rules, traditions, and strong values through which officers identify themselves and make sense of organizational actions. This main assumption is supported strongly in literature on police culture, and results in increased focus among scholars on whether and how Compstat leads to cultural change? The following section mainly questions this point based on the case of Compstat in the MPD.

Considering this research question, the following section focuses first on the culture of the MPD described by the participants in the study. Then, the different factors that are suggested to lead cultural change in the MPD will be explained. Finally, the interaction between cultural
change and Compstat is explained in two sections: change in policing approach and change in the management of police organization.

The findings of this study regarding the interaction between cultural change and Compstat basically relied on officer perception of change after the implementation of Compstat. Observation of the Compstat meetings and documents enable the researcher to check and confirm the personal accounts of officers regarding the change of cultural values as well as how and in what ways these cultural values are enacted and manifested in different cultural forms including organizational habits, rules, norms, setting, and communication practices, etc.

**An Overview: Culture of the MPD**

Before focusing on the change of culture in the MPD, it is necessary to understand how officers describe the culture and cultural change in the MPD in the last decade. The focus will be, then on the role of Compstat in this process.

The MPD is a very large police department serving the largest population in a culturally diverse, very cosmopolitan, and business oriented city:

The people from this city are coming from everywhere around this city. That’s for the business. Predominantly, at this time, you have more Hispanic than before. There are also many African-Americans. Melting pot of everything you can imagine. Black, Hispanic, you name it. I find this city is unique. It’s got its own way. It’s got its own cultural make up. It is just its own place.

This cultural diversity was also observed in the interviews. There were many officers from different ethnic origins. In terms of crime, Metrocity has a very high crime rate compared to other surrounding regions, despite the fact that it has witnessed a significant reduction in crime in the last fifteen years.

Within this police organization, the most common concepts used to describe the organization and organizational culture are *large, busy, culturally diverse, traditional,*
paramilitary, chain of command, resource constraints, the best, pride, dedicative, and hardworking. Nearly all officers said that the MPD is the largest and the busiest police department in the state. Some of them compare the MPD with the NYPD in terms of crime situation, being busy, and diversity of the population they are serving, whereas others compare the MPD with small police departments to explain the difference in the policing approach and culture. For instance, one officer stated that,

This is a city in comparison to a town. Policing in big cities like Metrocity is different. We deal with major crimes. We got homicides. On average, let’s say once a week, we have a homicide. We deal with major crimes. We got homicides. On average, let’s say once a week, we have a homicide. We always get a homicide. Three homicides happen in five years in a town. As such, our understanding and way of policing is totally different. In a small town, I imagine it is more family oriented. Police will know all the individuals in the area. In a place like Metrocity, people come to work and they leave.

Another officer emphasizes reflection of this difference in policing practices as follows: “We are different from small departments. They look at inspection, stickers, and teenagers driving cars. They don’t have a gun pointed at them. In this city, you may never know. There are shootings on a daily basis.” As shown, this crime situation and characteristics of the Metrocity are believed to play a definite role in the policing approach that goes along with different practices and culture.

In spite of this crime situation, some officers suggested that policing in the MPD has changed with the increased popularity of new policing approaches such as community policing. Officers in the MPD seemed to have influenced like many other police organizations in the US. For instance, one officer stated,

Officers have changed. They are not as tough and harsh as before. They are more community oriented. We have become more community oriented. Years ago, you were the police. They were civilian. They don’t talk to us to police. Now, it is more community related. Community gets more involved with the police.
By referring to being busy, another point repeated by many officers was the need for working hard under resource constraints. One officer illustrated this point as follows:

We are the busiest city in this state; certain parts of city are very violent. Officers go from assignment to assignment on a daily basis. I think they are overwhelmed there times because there is so much going on in Metrocity, whether it is crime related or nonsense. There are a lot of calls for services. They are all hardworking people. They work harder than the NYPD.

In general, most of the officers in the MPD seemed to believe that Metrocity is a tough and busy place to work as a police officer due to types of crime, crime rates, and resource constraints. In addition, the idea of the need to work hard with limited resources was presented as a sign of the greatness of officers.

The other aspects of the MPD repeated frequently during the interviews were hierarchy, paramilitary, and chain of command, which went along with the discipline rules. Many officers suggested that hierarchy, chain of command, and discipline were inevitable parts of police organizations, not only in the MPD but also in any other police department. The following interview excerpts illustrated this point: “A police department is a police department. A policeman is a policemen whether in Metrocity or in another country. We are just like other police organizations; hierarchy, and chain of command.” Observation of the meetings, specifically, addressing terms, turn taking, and communication practices clearly show that hierarchy was a prominent aspect of the MPD. In fact, this paramilitary structure and chain of command need to go along with discipline rules. The police director regularly emphasized discipline problems in the MPD:

The next level in the evaluation of the city and in this agency has to be organizational discipline. Folks, I am telling you, if we don’t fix organizational discipline, we become a dinosaur. It has to become part of organizational culture.
As stated, the police director attaches considerable importance to organizational discipline and the idea that it should be part of the culture. At the same time, it was observed during a discussion in a Compstat meeting that most of the mid-level and high level officers supported the view that discipline is needed to manage police organizations. Most of these officers seemed to support the idea that discipline problems should be taken care of by talking, persuasion, and training. However, if these do not work, as illustrated in the following statement; then the first thing they mentioned was the need for adopting discipline regulations by referring to the paramilitary aspect of police organizations: “It is organizational discipline. You just do everything you can, if the guys do not do what their supervisor says you have to create a trial.” Similarly, lower level officers seemed to internalize the need for hierarchy and discipline to govern police organizations. For instance, as a response to a question regarding the manner of police director in Compstat, one constable stated, “It is a military organization. You will do what you are told. That’s it. You have to keep that in mind.” In short, police officers from different ranks and positions seemed to believe the need for hierarchy, and paramilitary structure goes along with the need for discipline.

It should also be noted that these aspects seemed to be perceived differently nowadays than in previous years in terms of power distance and openness to low level input. The following statements of one officer illustrated this point: “When I first came to this job, you would rarely see the precinct captain. You see them a lot now. I see them every day. It has changed a lot.” In interviews, officers in rank generally stated that they are more open to the input of lower level officers in their daily practices compared to the past. In addition, it is common to refer the closeness and respect among police officers.
Another important point in understanding the culture of the MPD is the beliefs of officers regarding how a police director should be. Compatible with the tendency of officers for chain of command, hierarchy, and discipline, nearly all officers mentioned their expectation for a police director to be hard driven, decisive, confident, and strong in order to be successful in managing the organization and implementing change initiatives like Compstat. This may be illustrated by the following statement, in which an officer says, “I think it should be strong, confident, someone who can verbally communicate, and team worker.”

In addition, many officers seem to believe it is difficult to change anything in the MPD. Specifically, some officers emphasize the traditional aspect of the MPD. They refer to hierarchical structure, habits, values, and cultural heritage that makes difficult to change the culture including discipline rules. For instance, one officer stated,

It is very traditional. When you come into this police agency, for the most part, you obviously adapt or adopt the culture of the police agency. To change that culture is very difficult. It is one of the most difficult things to change in this agency. If you don’t agree with the culture of the police agency, we have thirteen hundred officers, four or five hundred non-sworn personnel, for the most part; the culture in this agency is very traditional. They don’t like change. We have our symbols; we have our emblems, statutes.

Concomitantly, a number of officers confirm the idea that change is difficult in the MPD due to traditions and habits that have been constructed over the years and for personal reasons. One officer explains this point as follows: “The guys like me, we don’t like change. Let’s stick this way and keep this way. We don’t want something different. Most people don’t like change”. There are many other interview statements that address officers’ fear of change for personal reasons. Even, the police director expresses the difficulty of changing the culture in the MPD in a meeting as follows: “I don’t understand. Thirty two months later, we are talking about the same stuff, the same stuff. We got to accept that this is not the way it is going to be from now on and
we talk about that.” As shown, one of the central aspects of the MPD is a common belief about the difficulty of changing things in the MPD, which makes it more critical to understand the process of change after Compstat. All these issues regarding the culture of the MPD is illustrated in the following figure.

Figure 3 Culture of the MPD

Change in Cultural Values

Compstat has been in place for more than twelve years in the MPD. Through these years, not only this change initiative, but also policing approaches, officers’ understanding of police work, society, and the technology that supports policing have changed extensively, all of which have something to do with the culture of police organizations in general. Illustrated in the statements of officers, it would be wrong to assume that the change in the cultural values of officers since the introduction of Compstat can be fully explained by referring to this change initiative. Officers specifically mentioned the role of technology, leadership, generational
differences, and years of experience, and environmental change in these years, all of which certainly changed the culture of the MPD. For instance, many officers mentioned the great role of information communication technologies (ICTs) in the change in policing approach, policing practices, habits of officers, and the capacity of police investigations as well as the Compstat itself. Some officers emphasized the role of generational differences in priorities, education level, economic expectations, work habits, perception of hierarchy and discipline while discussing the change of police culture. Similarly, some officers pointed out the change of attitudes and understanding during their occupational life as a result of increased experience and maturity. A number of officers mentioned the role of different leaders, not only in the change of culture in the MPD, but also in the successful implementation of Compstat throughout these years. Finally, a few officers talked about the role of different policing approaches developed in the academic world (i.e., problem oriented policing, community policing, broken windows policing), which, in turn, changed the culture of police including the MPD. All these factors reciprocally changed the culture of the MPD. A model of cultural change that shows all these points is presented in the figure below.
This is not to say that officers were not able to identify the role of Compstat in this process. Among all these issues to be considered, as will be mentioned later, it is clearly and strongly evidenced in the statements of officers, and displayed to some extent in their organizational practices that *this initiative changed the culture of the MPD*. In response to the question of whether Compstat has changed the culture of the MPD over these years, nearly all officers replied in a supportive manner, with statements such as, “Absolutely, yes. I think we would be lost today without it”, and; “Overall, I think it was necessary and it has been a success. It became culture. It changed culture. We are doing better than we did. If we did not have Compstat, we wouldn’t be as successful as we are today.” Another officer implied that it took years to make Compstat part of the culture in the MPD: “When the department adopted Compstat first, it was something very new, it was never experienced. Compstat is part of our culture now. So, now, it is our background.” There are many other examples that illustrate that
the officers really believe in the positive role of Compstat in changing this organization and its culture.

It is possible to explain officers’ strongly supported belief regarding cultural change in the MPD after Compstat with reference to different perspectives and categories. As this study puts cultural values at the center of understanding cultural change, the main focus will be values and the values in practice that have changed as a result of Compstat.

The interviews are one basic source of information regarding the change of values, as these interviews reflect perceptions, cognitions, emotions, and interpretation of officers in regard to organizational events. Specifically, the interviews reflect information that officers deem important regarding how and in what ways this change initiative changed their thinking, and thus culture of this organization. Based on these interviews, it seems more reasonable to categorize and present cultural change under two main headings: ‘policing approach’ and ‘management of police organization’. In order to support these categories, this part of the study relies extensively on quotations to convey the authentic and representative remarks of MPD officers regarding the change of cultural values after Compstat over these years.

In addition, in line with the contextual and communicative approach of this study, the meetings, with their rituals, rules, relationships, communication practices and discourse, and organizational artifacts, all of which are visible, tangible, and audible result of activities grounded in values are another source of information used to explain cultural change. Observation of meetings and documents are the main source of data at this level.

Documents and observation of the meetings within this framework 1) enable confirmation or disconfirmation of officers’ statement regarding the change in the values and the values in practice; 2) contextualize the explanations of the officers; and 3) show how these
perceived changes of cultural values are manifested in communication practices and rules, rituals, norms, and daily practices of the officers in the MPD.

**Change in Policing Approach**

It is clear from the interviews, documents and observation that the values of officers regarding how policing should be, specifically the role of information gathering, information sharing, crime analysis, crime statistics, crime tactics in policing, and police-public relations, has changed undeniably in the last decade. Among other explanations, officers strongly emphasized the role of Compstat in this period. Compstat brings a new perspective for policing in which police officers creates new interpretations of how policing should be done, and how police officers should behave. Specifically, officers pointed out the role of Compstat in terms of having a proactive approach in policing that goes along with a ‘can do’ mentality; the centrality of information and crime statistics; the focus on crime analysis instead of reliance on just anecdotal evidence and experience; adaptation of different policing approaches and tactics based on scientific analysis; and a closer relationship with the public. The following statement of an officer regarding the MPD’s policing approach “I cannot consider any other way of doing this job” shows that the current policing approach has become the culture of this police organization. In fact, the statements of officers, observation of meetings, and analyses of documents absolutely confirm the change in the values of officers in terms of policing approach. Specifically, the discourse of the meetings and artifacts in the form of crime maps, computers, and booklets prove that the new mentality has been put into practice, though there are certain limitations. Based on this main assumption, the following paragraphs will focus on the change in policing approach in the MPD in terms of proactive policing, information orientation, crime analysis, the use of academic approaches, and police-public relations after the implementation of Compstat.
Proactive policing. The first and foremost contribution of Compstat in the MPD is about the proactive approach in policing that goes along with ‘can do’ mentality. Looking for the underlying causes of crime traditionally has not been something that police saw as their function. Their job was traditionally to respond crimes after they had been committed, and they measured success by the portion of crimes that were solved with arrests and conviction. As confirmed by one officer, “When I came in, the meaning of policing was catching bad guys.” Another officer indicated the change in policing approach over these years as follows:

Years ago, who really cared what time the burglary happened at the house? Nobody cared about that. You were reactive. If someone broke into a home, or there was a robbery on the corner, then they would say, Okay. It happened. Let’s go take the report. No one cared to follow up on that. Where they did it, was it a Spanish guy, if he had a silver gun, what time of the day; we did not look at things like that before Compstat. Compstat has allowed us to consider accurate and timely intelligence, affective tactics, rapid deployment and relentless follow up. Before Compstat, we did not analyze crime.

This is not to say that police do not care to investigate, solve crimes and arrest criminals. Most of the officers stated that the main function of police organizations as well as the MPD is investigating and solving crimes, and arresting people. These are mostly referred to as ‘putting handcuffs on criminals’ or ‘fighting crime’. The police director said many times in the Compstat meetings, “Solution is putting handcuff on these burglars. We have to put handcuffs on people. We can stop it by putting on handcuffs.” As such, catching criminals was and will be an important part of policing and police culture. The difference is in the understanding of the policing approach, specifically, that police can prevent criminals from committing crime using initiatives like Compstat, but if they cannot prevent, there is always a better way to catch them. And, Compstat is certainly helpful not only in reducing crime, but also in investigating cases and catching criminals.
We should keep in mind that a proactive approach does not ignore the traditional function of policing. However, it suggests that police should consider not only catching criminals, but also preventing crime before it is committed. As already stated in mission clarification component of Compstat, this initiative, with all its principles and components, presume that police could have a significant effect on crime by taking a proactive rather than a reactive approach. The police director is a strong supporter of this mentality and highlights this mentality in his speeches during the meetings. For instance, in one meeting, he stated, “Every crime can be prevented. Our goal is to prevent every crime. It is impossible, but we can prevent it in any way.” In another meeting, he refused the idea that the economic crisis in the USA will increase crime rates by implying the central role of police in any decrease or increase of crime rates. This mentality is critical for the success of this initiative. If officers at different ranks don’t believe that police, specifically proactive policing approaches, can reduce crime, the entire initiative could be seen as worthless.

In the MPD, nearly all participants in the study think that police organizations can reduce crime, and Compstat, which reinforces a proactive approach, is very supportive and helpful in this process. In response to a question regarding the effect of Compstat on crime, one officer directly linked the decrease of crime rates with Compstat as follows:

Compstat is generally a very positive thing for the department. I always say when I came first in 1985; I don’t think we were a very good police department. We did not respond quickly enough to the calls for service. I think there was too much crime. In 1996, the crime index was 40,000 and we had 12,000 last year. So, in the last 13 years, we reduced crime significantly. The Compstat process is a very big part of that.

In fact, the constant decrease of crime after Compstat over these years supported the idea that police can reduce crime, and the Compstat initiative supports this.
In addition to the statements of officers in the MPD, some other issues confirm the acceptance of the idea that police can make a difference: Communication practices in the meetings; the large number of documents produced regularly that focus on crime rates; crime analysis; and response plans on reducing crime. As will be mentioned largely in the section on Compstat meeting, the main discourse of meetings was crime rates, crime analysis, and patterns that should lead to smart crime reduction plans and tactics. The police director held precinct commanders or heads of different units directly responsible for any increase in crime rates, and this was demonstrated in the police director’s questions in the meetings. For instance, it is common to hear, “Why there is an increase in burglary? What is your analysis of the increase in crime? What is your solution? What is your plan to respond?” All officers in these meetings come up with a plan to respond to any increase in crime rather than giving an excuse such as economic crisis or social conditions. All these examples show that most officers in the MPD seem to believe in the positive role of Compstat in reducing crime. This reciprocally strengthens the role of police and the police organization in reducing crime.

This is not to say that officers do not accept the possible influence of economic conditions, social, and cultural improvements on the level of crime and changing crime trends. For instance, one officer mentioned the role of social and economic conditions on crime rates; another one emphasized the balance between human rights and security, yet another pointed out the resource capacity to explain the limits of the reduction in crime. However, officers in general believe that police organizations can certainly play a role in crime trends. Otherwise, all activities of Compstat and the relentless discussion in Compstat meetings about crime levels, crime trends, and policing tactics to reduce crime would be perceived as useless and ridiculous.
Information orientation. Another important point regarding policing approach is the central role of information in the Compstat era. Nearly all study participants accepted the criticality of having accurate and daily information. It is also suggested that the Compstat process led them to understand and accept the importance of having accurate and daily information, and using it for analysis to increase the effectiveness of both the policing approach and management of the organization. In this new environment, a large amount of information is gathered daily and analyzed in the Compstat process by officers who seem to internalize the value of information gathering and analysis. As stated by one officer, “Information gathering is the most important step of Compstat which is used for policing purposes.” It is clearly observed that information is a big part of this change initiative. There are crime information centers in every precinct that are used to display crime analysis, hot spots, crime trends, bulletins, and wanted criminals. In the same way, Compstat meetings clearly demonstrate the information orientation of this initiative in which information is presented in the form of crime maps, crime analysis, and crime patterns. Compstat packages cover large amounts of information. In short, having accurate and daily information can be considered part of the culture in the MPD, which can be called “information having culture”.

In spite of the large amount of information produced daily in the MPD as a part of Compstat, there are certain problems that need to be noted. One officer pointed out the problems in the quality of incident reports, which are the starting point of information gathering. Another officer mentioned the problems of digesting all this information and using it for operational purposes.

It is clear that the degree of benefit from this information is tied to the level of sharing this information and using it for operational purposes. Nearly all officers seemed to believe in the
benefit of sharing this information among different units and ranks. Most of the officers acknowledged Compstat’s contribution on this issue. As stated by one officer, “I believe Compstat has a very large, significant effect on the department as a whole because you share information with other units, identify crimes patterns, get prepared to attack crime in your city.”

As stated in previous sections, Compstat meetings provide a platform to present and share information. Officers in the MPD clearly benefit from this platform. A large amount of information in the form of crime analysis and crime patterns is presented in these meetings by commanders. Similarly, each precinct uses roll call meetings and crime information centers to share information regarding their district.

The problems regarding information sharing rooted in the hierarchical, divisional structure of police organizations and historically suggested cultural barriers to sharing information seem to have been overcome to a large extent in the Compstat era. The mechanisms of Compstat (i.e., Compstat meetings, crime information centers, roll call meetings, Compstat packages, record management systems) inevitably support information sharing at different levels. Also, all these mechanisms seem to have been accepted and internalized by officers after the implementation of Compstat. This is not to say that there is not any problem regarding information sharing. As already discussed, there are problems related to the quality of information sharing, hierarchical pressures to express information freely, and integrating this information into resource deployment and police tactics on the ground.

**Analysis orientation.** One of the biggest contributions of Compstat to the MPD is its focus on crime analysis, crime statistics, crime patterns, implementation of a plan, and deployment of resources accordingly. In other words, Compstat brings a new approach for policing to the MPD where crime analysis, rather than anecdotal evidence and personal beliefs, is
essential to responding to crime. As illustrated in a number of personal statements of officers, all these points are well accepted by officers as an inevitable part of policing. For instance, one officer illustrated the change of work habits and mentality by referring to the role of Compstat as follows:

    It is changing for the better. As I said, when I first started in the early 1990s, we would come to work and go out on a job. I would go to burglary two days later. With Compstat, since we are looking at time of the day, day of the week, and other variables, response time, it has changed the mentality of the officers. They started thinking these things.

    Another officer emphasized the fact that crime analysis became part of policing approach after Compstat: “The Compstat process works. It breaks down when crime happened? Who is committing the crime? Geographical area of where the crime is being committed. It gives you all the tools you didn’t have before to try to do something.” Another officer explains the change of policing with a focus on crime analysis: “Compstat has really changed the way of policing in general. The analysis of crime affects the way we deploy officers.” These principles affect the way officers work in the streets where real change should occur:

    I think it has changed the perspective of patrol officers. Now, patrol officers instead of doing everything, they are doing more specific activities based on what their precinct commander tells them, which is being brought out in Compstat. It is a trickle-down effect. Certain problems are being identified in Compstat, precinct commanders come back and tell them, and here are the problems we want to eradicate, get rid of, and minimize. There are the ones that need to be solved right away, prioritized. So Compstat has brought a part that we prioritize what we do instead of just doing everything. If we have problems with quality of life issues with people drinking on corners, instead of writing parking tickets at that time, we can do it later, going back to quality of life issues. So, that is where Compstat helps to change the officers’ perspective instead of being so general.

    All these statements clearly show how Compstat works and changes the way frontline officers’ work. Another good example would be crime statistics, which are used extensively to determine the most effective tactics and strategies: “Because of crime statistics, we have
intelligence led policing, looking at gangs, looking at guns, looking at narcotics. It has changed strategies implemented which are all part of Compstat”.

In fact, the Compstat not only produces crime statistics, but also statistics on officers’ activities in the form of number of arrests, search warrants, tickets, car stops, and response time. All these numbers are used both to measure performance of officers and to verify the extent of implementation a plan suggested in the Compstat meetings. As such, Compstat puts into practice a number of measurable indicators. These indicators create a sense of control, measurement, competition, and accountability which, in turn, compels officers to take into account all these things in contrast to the period before Compstat.

The best way to understand and illustrate all these things is to look at Compstat meetings. As stated by one officer, “The way of communication and discussing the crime has changed with Compstat.” The language of meetings and the various terms that officers use truly demonstrate new ways of doing policing. In these meetings, the officers are quite likely to refer to daily information, crime analysis and patterns, effective tactics, and accountability. The statements in the meeting show the new face of policing in the MPD. This may be illustrated by the following conversation between the deputy chief (DC) and precinct commanders (PC):

DC: Do you have any other day high? How many of them occurred from Friday to Monday? PC: There are 58 burglaries and 16 of them on Monday. DC: For how many of those did you narrow down the time frame?

DC: What kind of activities do you have? PC: Quality of life activities are going on (gives certain numbers). 3) DC: What is the plan for this weekend? PC: We put more supplements, more cars, and more supervision on the field. DC: It is ok. But, come up with a more comprehensive plan.

As stated in the beginning of this section, there were also discussions about investigations, number of arrests, and possible plans or tactics to increase arrests. The following quotes from the meetings illustrated these points:
DC: Is there progress for ongoing jobs? Detective: We have seven arrests.

DC: What are we doing so far to investigate them? There are four burglaries in the same area (angrily). Detective: We have an ID, but victim does not cooperate with us. It is juveniles. We know it is them, but the victims does not cooperate and give us ID, we can’t get warrants for these individuals. D.C: Did these groups of juveniles do the other jobs, too?

This is not to say that there is not any problem in putting all these values into practice. Precinct commanders and heads of different units are criticized many times in these meetings in terms of the level of analysis, actions plans, productivity numbers, and level of change on the streets. For instance, the police director expressed his dissatisfaction in a meeting as follows:

This is not about the meeting, this is about the process that we go through to reduce crime. Ok. If you don’t have this stuff in your hand X, if you don’t have the analysis, then you cannot set the plan and put together an intelligent action plan. It sounds like you are not on the right track. You want to do enforcement without knowing because you don’t have the data to back you up. …… X, this is how you need to do analysis regarding burglaries.

There are a number of other examples in which both the police director and deputy chief criticized officers strongly due to their analysis, patterns they suggested, plans and tactics, and productivity numbers (i.e., arrests, warrants, vehicle stops, quality of life summonses).

All these problems do not mean that officers did not internalize or accept the benefits of all these new issues in policing. There is a plausible gap between what they intend to do and what is accomplished. In other words, there is a greater ‘change in philosophy’ than ‘change in practice’, but it is clear that there is a change in terms of the values of officers regarding the job of policing.

Academic approaches in policing. Compstat seems to help police officers to consider more academic and scientific approaches in policing. While problem oriented policing is the most basic assumption, academically developed policing approaches such as broken windows policing, problem oriented policing, and hot spot policing are used electively based on the
information collected and analyzed within the scope of Compstat. The following statement of one officer shows how Compstat enabled the adoption of different policing approaches and tactics accordingly: “The Compstat process changes the role of patrol officers because now when we determine problematic areas, captains are directing them to these areas and asking them get quality of life summonses, check FIS, and stuff like that.” The statements of the deputy chief in a meeting illustrated the focus on a different policing approach: “So, what is the narcotics plan right now? What are we concentrating on? Where are our hot spots in narcotics?” In another meeting, a precinct commander talked about the role of community meetings as a part of an initiative: “The community meetings are an important part of this initiative. At least, a captain responded all these community meetings. That is a big deal for us. We always plug the community in. We also tried to put a uniform presence at the locations”.

As shown, rather than imposing one way of policing, Compstat is perceived as a tool to adopt different approaches based on the analysis of crime. While one officer emphasizes hot spot policing with a focus on crime ridden areas, or broken windows policing with a focus on quality of life crimes, another officer points out the need for community meetings, all of which are based on the analysis of crime. In short, in terms of policing, Compstat implies a change from selective approach to eclectic approach based on numbers, statistics, and patterns.

**Police public relations.** Another important point to be mentioned is the possible role of Compstat on police-public relations. There is a common belief among officers that the police are not as tough and harsh as before, and there is more community involvement in policing. Most of the officers seem to believe that Compstat does not have a primary role in this change. However, there are few officers who linked this change to some extent with Compstat. For instance, one officer drew attention to changing police public relations in the Compstat era:
I think it has changed. The mentality when I first came here, we had to go out there and break everybody’s head, everybody is enemy, shake everybody upside down until you get what you want if you are looking for a bad guy. There are different methods to do it and it works. Compstat definitely works.

In short, it is hard to conclude that Compstat supported the change in police public relations. Nevertheless, the statements of officers make us take into account the possible role of Compstat in this change process.

In summary, Compstat was related to the officers’ change of values on how policing should be. Regardless of some problems putting all these new values in practice, officers in general have a sense of appropriateness and acceptance of proactive policing, information sharing, crime analysis, and academic approaches for policing, and closer relationship with public which were not accepted or adopted before. In other words, before Compstat, officers did not care about crime reduction, time and location of crimes, crime patterns, information sharing within or among units, or using different policing approaches. Today, nearly all officers in the MPD accept that all these issues are inevitable aspect of their policing approach, which can be thought as an indicator of change in culture. The following figure illustrates the change in policing approach in the MPD.
Change in the Management of the Police Organization

Another important point is the change in the values of officers regarding the way the police organization is managed, and the role of Compstat in leading to differences in management. It is clear from the statements of officers, observation of meetings, and documents that the MPD has changed extensively in terms of management after the implementation of Compstat. Change in the management in the MPD can be categorized as accountability that goes along with responsibility, flexibility, performance orientation and follow up mechanisms, bureaucracy, and control.

Accountability. The most foregrounding change in the management is accountability. Nearly all study participants referred to accountability to both describe Compstat and explain change in the MPD in terms of management. For instance, one officer stated, “I think the biggest thing that Compstat brings is accountability, and maybe gives more sense of urgency.” Another
officer confirmed the fact that accountability came into play after Compstat: “I think when we started Compstat, the precincts captain become more accountable.”

Compstat is intended to bring about accountability and responsibility to reduce crime. In particular, the role that was expected from middle managers changed considerably in the Compstat process. As stated by many officers, the basic idea behind accountability is to keep officers accountable for their performance, which includes knowing their command, and problems in their command, and showing an intelligent, attentive effort responding to these problems. The following interview excerpt of one officer illustrates the idea behind Compstat: “They keep commanding officers accountable. He gives commanding officers all the power and they do what they want to do. Now, you are going to be accountable for your actions. What you do about it, what you are going to do about it.”

In fact, accountability is basically put into practice in the Compstat meetings. Officers, specifically precinct commanders’ and heads of different units were questioned to check if they know their problems and have a plan to respond to these problems. These people know that they are supposed to experience these meetings and will be put on hot spot to answer a number of questions regarding their problems and plans. If an officer initiates a strategy, he or she is likely to be questioned in the next meeting about this initiative, and might be humiliated, intimidated, or sometimes rewarded, all of which have possible consequences for their career.

This simple but effective mechanism is supposed to bring a whole new way of doing business in the MPD. A few officers mentioned the change of work habits among commanders after the start of Compstat. The following excerpts from interviews of two different officers illustrate how and why Compstat changed the habits and increased the responsibility, accessibility, and availability of commanders:
When I was patrol, I would rarely see the captain. What we saw was the assignment Lieutenant. He basically scheduled officers for work. He was the one who was in contact with us. I don’t think that precincts were paying much attention to the crime that was going on within their precincts because I have never seen any special details done proactive to stop the burglary problem even in midnight shifts. I don’t think they were aware of what was going on in their precincts. They did not write a report daily as we do right now.

Prior to Compstat, commanding officers were hardly seen. He came to work, officers did not know him, had not seen him, just saw the name. But now, because you have Compstat and that commanders are being held accountable and he has to work through other people, he has to make himself more available. They would come two hours and you would not see them more. Now, with Compstat, hey, you got to be held accountable every day so they spend all the hours. They go to community meetings, meet with officers.

As clearly shown in these statements, commanders have to worry about problems in their area, know their officers, and consider analysis based tactics and strategies to respond to these problems quickly and appropriately. These were not pressing issues for them before Compstat. Accountability comes along with more work hours and close scrutiny of daily problems in their districts. One critical indicator of this change from the perspective of lower level police officers is the increasing availability and accessibility of middle level managers. Before Compstat, patrol officers and detectives would hardly see precinct commanders. This system seems to be internalized in the MPD as shown in the following statement of a police captain, who experienced accountability first hand:

Now, we are the first was here and last ones leaving. Listen, we are more in touch with the precincts in every way. We are just doing our job even if Compstat never existed. I wouldn’t work any other way. We review the crimes daily. It was not forcing us to do that but it was a part of our culture now.

In fact, there are a number of problems in making accountability an organization wide value in the MPD. As explained before, while mid-level officers such as precinct commanders and heads of different units are held accountable for their actions, there is a lack of accountability both at the lower level and upper level. In the meetings, the police director
constantly pointed out that commanding officers should keep accountable to the lower level officers in their command, as he does commanding officers in the Compstat meetings. For instance, in one meeting, the police director spoke about this point as follows: “Talk to your lieutenant and sergeants and hold them accountable for their actions.” He stated that he has meetings with his staff regularly and suggested commanding officers do the same to hold their staff accountable. Some commanders stated that they go back to their command and talk to officers to pass along the information and ask their activities. A few others stated that they bring one or two officers to these meetings to pass on the information and make them understand the process: “Once they see how people are held accountable and answer the questions, their behavior changes. Once they see how intensive it was and they see why sometimes the supervisor makes me do the jobs in a certain way.” Another police captain stated that he is reluctant to bring his staff to these meetings due to the possibility of humiliation in front of them. Also, none of the commanders mentioned a specific mechanism of Compstat to hold their officers accountable. In short, the level of accountability of the lower level seems to be limited compared to that of middle level managers.

As stated in the section on current implementation, another problem seems to be the level of authority and power among commanding officers. In other words, before holding commanders accountable for their action and inactions, the upper echelon should provide resources and delegate more decision making to the commanders for the deployment of resources and adaptation of crime tactics and strategies in their district. In the MPD, while some officers report that the police director empowers commanding officers, some officers find the level of empowerment and delegation limited. In fact, observation of the meetings confirmed that the police director and deputy chief frequently criticized commanding officers for their decisions
regarding crime plans and deployment, and make final decisions in these meetings. One officer described the end product of this approach as follows: “I think in order to encourage people to make decisions; you have to give them the ability to make them. If you don’t, you grow up a culture that eventually won’t make decisions.” Similarly, another officer talked about the general situation in the MPD in terms of empowerment as follows: “Commanding officers do not have a lot of power and a lot of authority.” It is fair to say that most of the officers believe that they are held accountable and kept responsible for any problem in their district or unit, while they do not have enough authority or power to make decisions. Observation of the process confirms this is a valid concern for the MPD and creates dissatisfaction and the paradox of responsibility without power.

**Flexibility.** Flexibility is another important change in the management of this police organization. It is used to mean rapid and appropriate response to ever changing conditions in the environment. Police organizations have historically been criticized for not responding to changing conditions in a timely manner because of their bureaucratic nature.

Nearly all officers suggested that Compstat functions as an early alarm system in terms of changes in crime trends, emerging hot spots, and problematic locations which, in turn, enable the police organization, at least theoretically, to adapt to these ever changing conditions. Time and time again, officers commented on the role of Compstat as being geographically driven and fluid in their deployment. In the MPD, flexibility is observed in terms of rapid and appropriate deployment of resources and implementation of appropriate plans and tactics in responding crime in a timely manner using accurate and daily information. The following statements of officers show how flexibility is put into practice in the MPD: “As you see in Compstat, we do all crime related analysis to suggest areas of the city in which we have a problem and target zones.
Then, let’s put more resources in this location. Talk to the supervisor who is in charge of that unit.” The next statement clarifies the role of Compstat in the management of resources more strategically in contrast to bureaucratic and static use of resources regardless of changing problems:

Let’s look at the way we utilize the resources, material resources and human resources. Because of Compstat we decided that we may be spending the money in the wrong places. Instead of saying we don’t have enough cops out there and we need to spend more money to hire cops, get more police cars and spend more money on technology. Compstat brings out all your problems and then you with money or some administrative things, you can figure out how you are going to utilize just plain resources better or more effective.

It is clearly observed in the meetings that depending on crime trends, commanders are asked what they do in terms of deployment of resources. For instance, it is common to hear questions such as, “How many cops did you deploy in that sector?” In summary, it is clear that officers appreciate the contribution of Compstat for bringing promptness and flexibility to the deployment of resources.

In addition to the flexibility in terms of deployment of resources, it is clear that Compstat to some extent enables the adoption of appropriate tactics to respond to the problems. The following statement of one officer illustrates flexibility in terms of tactics the MPD adopts:

Compstat has brought a part that we prioritize what we do instead of just doing everything. If we have problems with quality of life issues with people drinking on corners, instead of writing parking tickets at that time, we can do it later, going back to quality of life issues. So, that is where Compstat helps to change the officers’ perspective instead of being so general.

Similarly, another commander pointed out how Compstat enabled the changing of priorities and implementation of a plan based on changing trends:

Okay, what is the major problem in the city that the department has to confront? Let’s say auto theft, street crime, juvenile issues, and drugs. Compstat helps us to identify those problems and write up sort of a plan that is including what the department had done in the past, were they acceptable and effective or not, and what new initiatives we might be
taking to do something about it. Compstat helps them to closely monitor those initiatives, those specific initiatives.

However, it should be noted that there were problems in terms of the link between analysis and putting appropriate plans into practice. More specifically, officers implement a plan in a timely manner, but the plans they suggest seem to be a way from meeting the expectations of the upper echelon. As observed in meetings, the police director criticized officers for their plans and asked for the link between their analysis and suggested plans, and how these plans help them to solve problems. For instance, in one meeting, the police director stated, “Presence is great, but it is not a solution.” There are a large number of examples of dissatisfaction regarding the plans and tactics officers suggest in these meetings. In short, it seems like officers were more in tune with the principle of rapid and appropriate deployment of personnel and resources based on patterns and analysis than in making the link between crime analysis and determination of appropriate tactics.

Performance orientation. It is clear that performance based management became an inevitable part of police management in the MPD after the implementation of Compstat. Two basic mechanisms in Compstat, tangible indicators and follow up, changed the evaluation of success and failure in the management, which, in turn, brought competition and careerism in the management of the MPD.

The most basic and foregrounding measure of success and failure was crime rates. Crime statistics were prepared on weekly and monthly bases for seven index crimes. All these crimes were presented in a comparable manner to those from the same time period in the last year. A big part of the Compstat package used in the meetings included these statistics about crime rates, which were used to make further analysis in the form of crime trends, crime locations, time, and patterns. In fact, centrality of crime rates was confirmed by a large number of officers in the
MPD as illustrated with the following statement: “Ultimately, the most important measure is the amount of crime we have. That is the ultimate measure of what we are doing.” Commanding officers are questioned for the increase and, its causes, and asked for their plan to respond to it on regular bases in the meetings.

In fact, the uniqueness of Compstat is not the focus on crime rates, but the use of a number of other indicators called productivity numbers. As shown in precinct commander profile in Appendix L, this one page overview shows nearly all measures of productivity in a precinct. These include number of arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, search warrants, tickets, vehicle stops, cases closed or open, and complaints against personnel, average response time, sick time, and precinct overtime and its monetary equivalent. Statistics (i.e., arrests, field investigations, search warrants, vehicle stops, cases closed or open) are also prepared for each crime type such as robbery, narcotics, and burglary in sections that are designed to give specific information on those crimes. All these numbers are indicators that are used to see the activity of each precinct. Commanders are kept responsible for the activity in their precincts. These written documents allow the upper echelon to check these numbers relentlessly and take necessary measures. They question commanders on these numbers in the Compstat meetings or other settings. The following quotation of a commander brought together all measures used in the MPD:

This is a time analysis report which indicated how quickly our units get to calls for service. It is broken down by the type of call for service. We prioritize our calls anywhere from code 2 up to code 8. Code 8 is the most urgent and code 2 is the least urgent. We dispatch the units based on the need. I prioritize assignment and make sure that somebody gets there. We set goals to make sure that we have a quick response. We usually do not discuss sick time, absenteeism at Compstat, but it is something important to running the command. We look at officer sick time; we have a sick policy that takes measures for officers that take much sick time, which can result in from a verbal warming up to termination if they continue to abuse it. As far as the Compstat process is concerned, we look at crimes. Performance indicators would be number of arrests officers
make, field interrogations in which officers stop somebody and question them about what is going on in the area, summonses, motor vehicle summonses, moving summonses, and parking summonses, and we have something quality of life summonses to address lesser types of crimes in the city. But it is important for us to address quality of life problems we have in the neighborhoods. If people get summonses, people have to go to court. It could be anything, littering.

Observation of meetings showed that these measures were questioned by the upper echelon on a regular basis. This is not to say that all these measures are questioned one by one. As observed in six months, there is a focus on number of arrests, field interrogations, vehicle stops, search warrants, and quality of life summonses. It is common to hear questions such as, “How many burglary arrests did you have? What kind of activities do you have?” This does not mean that other indicators were not taken into account in the MPD. As stated by one officer, depending on the emerging problems, some other indicators can also be questioned. In addition, some of these indicators were sent to the police director separately:

We have overtime, sick time, and productivity. We get most of that information from human resources. We make a comparison if sick time is up or down, overtime is up or down. Then, we report it to the police director. And, so he would know and take whatever necessary measures.

This long list of indicators shows the focus of Compstat on performance measurement, which was not the case in the MPD before Compstat. The following interview excerpt illustrates this fact: “This is all stuff that we did not do before Compstat. We did it just kind of like, if we got around to it, not very largely, a matter of fact.”

Another important aspect of Compstat regarding performance measurement is the need for compatibility of productivity numbers with crime rates and crime analysis. The following statement of one officer clarified this point as follows:

If crime is down in a precinct, the decrease in productivity is understandable. However, if crime is up, but productivity is down, then it is a bad indicator. In such a case, it is thought that either someone is not doing something or they are not where they are supposed to be.
As mentioned, any increase or decrease in productivity numbers is evaluated along with crime rates. Compstat even goes further and checks for the compatibility between productivity numbers and crime analysis (i.e., time, location). In other words, any of these productivity measures need to be conducted based on analysis of crime. The following statements of two officers showed how this was adapted in the MPD:

If you have high accidents, you expect more motor vehicle summonses. If you have a lot of robberies in a sector, they expect people to be field inquiries in those locations, motor vehicle stops. They want to see you are addressing the problems in a proper way.

I have to write certain amount of tickets; I have to make a certain amount of arrests; it is not like that. I don’t think it makes them work hard. It is more about where focus should be. In other words, if there is a problem over here, you just spend your time over there.

There are times in the meetings that you can observe how this connection was questioned. For instance, the following dialogue between the police director and precinct commander in a meeting illustrated this: “What are you planning to do for 212? Right now, we focus on 212 commercial burglaries. What kind of activities do you have in 212?” On the same line of thought, the deputy chief criticized a commander as follows: “Anti-crimes had no productivity at shooting locations last night. Commanders need to prioritize based on the rates of violence in sectors.” In fact, this system, with all these indicators, implies a new world for the management of police organizations.

Not only having these performance tools but also following up on those indicators systematically is a key factor for the success of Compstat in the MPD. As already stated, most of the change initiatives, even the best ones in theory fail as there are not any strong follow up mechanisms that create a sense of obligation among officers to adopt it. In contrast to other initiatives, Compstat in the MPD has certain aspects that allow the upper echelon to monitor officers on a regular basis to determine if they are doing their job based on these performance
tools. The Compstat meetings which have been conducted in the MPD for the last ten years create a sense of obligation to consider all these performance tools. The commanders in the MPD know that there will be a meeting the following week or in two weeks in which they will be questioned on a number of things, including the problems that came up in the previous meetings. The following statement of one officer shows how this follow up mechanism works in the MPD: “You put them (commanders) in the hot seat. Commanding officers say that I am going to address this particular issue in my command, when they come back, I bet they do.” It was clearly observed in the meetings that Compstat functions to monitor the initiatives and plans in the MPD. The police director’s question, “What did you do about this initiative?” demonstrates how this follow up is put into practice. Additionally, the upper echelon’s participation to these meetings brings supervisor control in the system. Commanders know that Compstat can be a good platform if you want to be promoted. From the management point of view, this initiative makes officers work hard and functions as a platform for career oriented officers in the MPD. As such, it brings competition and supports a career oriented system in the MPD, which was not the case before Compstat, as confirmed by a number of officers.

To summarize, with all components and principles, Compstat can be considered more than a performance measurement tool; it is a functional and effective performance based management system. The inclusion of all these measures, use of all these measures based on analysis, and the follow up mechanism make Compstat an indispensable initiative for the MPD. Nearly all study participants seemed to internalize performance measurement as a new value that should be used in policing. In short, the MPD seemed to institutionalize an outcome oriented culture that goes along with competition and careerism.
Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a never changing topic of discussion in the management literature, and police organizations have historically been criticized in terms of the bureaucratic nature of police work that leads to paperwork, ineffectiveness, communication problems, and unresponsiveness to changing conditions. For this reason, it is critical to understand the relationship between Compstat and bureaucracy. In fact, the points that were mentioned as a part of change in the values such as information orientation, accountability, flexibility, and performance orientation all have something to do with bureaucracy. Taking into account all these points, the nature of relationship between bureaucracy and Compstat will be evaluated in the next section.

In spite of certain limitations observed in practice, the situation in the MPD shows that Compstat certainly makes this organization more effective on different levels. It was noted that the focus of Compstat to the accurate and daily information that is collected, analyzed, and shared at certain levels to determine and put into practice the most effective tactics and strategies helped the police organization to respond to the changing outside conditions immediately and intelligently. Similarly, the focus on crime analysis using accurate and timely information helped officers to see emerging trends and problematic areas before it is too late, and enables commanders to deploy resources and adopt police tactics and strategies quickly and appropriately. In other words, the MPD seems to be flexible in terms of deployment of resources and adopting appropriate police tactics and initiatives. As such, both information orientation and flexibility contributed to the MPD in terms of effectiveness and responsiveness to changing conditions.

In addition to the information orientation and flexibility, both accountability and performance measurement make the management of the organization more effective in many
ways. As explained before, accountability and performance orientation increased the responsibility of officers, compelled them to deal with problems more closely, and brought competition and careerism into the system. In short, all these new values that come with Compstat contributed to the MPD to decrease bureaucratic problems.

Another highly articulated problem in the literature is the hierarchical structure of police organizations that leads to lack of communication within and with different units and unresponsiveness to environmental changes. In fact, the Compstat meetings that were held regularly with the participation of the upper echelon as well as officers from different ranks and units were intended to decrease these problems. This point was captured nicely in the following statement of an officer:

You bring people from all departments. I mean you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that has a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done, because you would say, commanding officers from the 27th precinct needs cars, can you supply him with the replacements for the four cars? He would say, I can get three. So, get the three or two. It was by having and hearing in which a lot of different players that would be given the authority to act and the meeting generated inputs from highest authority to act. Let’s resolve this problem and do everything we can do to make sure that this precinct commander can be successful.

These regular Compstat meetings with its form and content decreased problems related to communication and increased responsiveness to the changing conditions in the MPD. Following statement of an officer clearly illustrated the contribution of Compstat to the communication:

Compstat made us talk because if I have a narcotic problem here, I tried to handle the narcotic problem by myself rather than calling the expert from central narcotics, and listen I got a problem here. We would handle it by ourselves. Even, narcotics they were territorial. I cannot tell you what we are doing. It was like big secret. Compstat process definitely made us talk more. We call everybody when we have a problem. We would not see each other and talk before which I think is great.

As observed in six months, the meetings clearly made officers talk about their crime problems, management problems, and solutions to the problems, and enabled them to coordinate
efforts with other units. The following questions of the deputy chief captured the contribution of Compstat to the coordination problems among different units: “How many times in these 28 days did a narcotic lieutenant come to your office in the second precinct? Did you have a conversation about your burglary problem in top priority narcotics locations?” These statements and dialogues in the meetings confirm the contribution of Compstat to decreasing communication problems. In short, all these points seem to help the MPD to overcome the problems rooted in bureaucracy and hierarchy.

It should be strictly clarified that the interaction of Compstat and the hierarchical, bureaucratic structure is a complex one. In fact, all the above mentioned points seems to make the MPD more flexible, and more responsive to crime trends and outside conditions, and to decrease communication problems. However, this is not to say that Compstat completely ignores and change bureaucratic structure and hierarchy. Rather, this initiative seems to be injected into the system without changing the other components of bureaucratic structure in the MPD. For instance, most of the officers accepted the necessity of the hierarchical (paramilitary) structure, chain of command, and the top-down decision making and authority norms in the MPD by comparing police with military organizations. The authority of leaders is never questioned. The following interview excerpt illustrated this common value among officers: “We are police; we are very much military people. We told them what to do and they do it.” This is not to say that officers do not discuss anything with the ranked officers. It is stated a few times that the communication channels between constables and ranked officers are more open compared to past, and ranked officers attach more importance to the ideas of lower level officers. It should be evaluated as a reflection of the concept of chain of command in police organizations. In short,
the success of Compstat in terms of responding to the bureaucratic problems and changing values
in the organization should be evaluated within this framework.

Other than this point, the Compstat initiative itself had its limitations and bureaucracy. For instance, there were not any signs of decreased paperwork in the MPD. An officer even suggested that Compstat itself increased paperwork in the MPD. The following statements show how:

Our goal is go paperless. Right now it is not working. As far as Compstat goes, every time people ask for more stuff and more information, which eventually increases paperwork and bureaucracy. Every time there are so many criteria they ask for. There was so much information we need to break it down. At one point, it was too much. It went up to fifty pages for shootings and robbery and we needed to take it down and simplify it.

In fact, this excerpt clearly illustrated the problems based on the overload of information that is difficult to digest. Just the amount of information in Compstat package that is produced weekly is enough to understand the scope of the problem on this issue.

Another problem in terms of bureaucracy is the gap between upper, mid and street level officers. In fact, there were different views in terms of passing information to the street level officers and helping them follow through on the plans and tactics devised in meetings. This is a highly critical point because all plans and tactics should be reflected on the street level, where the real fight with crime occurs. Even though the police director asked commanders to bring their constables to these meetings to make them understand the reasoning behind the tactics and strategies in the MPD and keep them accountable for their actions, it was observed in the meetings that there were only a few constables participating in these meetings. Commanders were reluctant to bring street level officers to these meetings for a number of reasons. Similarly, it is not clear if these officers were held accountable for their actions by their commanders. At this point, there are some other mechanisms in the MPD to pass information to the street level
officers such as roll call meetings and, crime information boards that are available in each precinct. However, it is not clear to what extent street level officers benefitted from these mechanisms that were put into practice with Compstat. As stated by a commander, the role of ranked officers is critical in passing information and holding street level officers accountable for their actions on the streets. The following statements captured this problem in the MPD:

One of the things we try to do and probably we can improve on is getting information out to our police officers a little bit better. We put programs to make it happen, but it depends on the sergeants and line supervisors, and mid managers. If they are not good at what they do, if they are not taking significant interest on what is going on around them, then, they don’t give the police officers information that they need to be better at what they do. To me, Compstat is all about getting information to the officer in the field so he can be more productive and we can reuse. That is the bottom-line to me. I am a captain; I don’t go out and fight crime every day. I know all about what is going on in my precincts, but that does not help the officers who are sitting in a police car at midnight tour, if I don’t give the information that I knew.

The statement of this officer clearly shows the problem in the MPD and the criticality of this problem for the success of Compstat. There is not a well-organized and effective mechanism in Compstat to overcome this problem. In fact, some ranked officers expected that officers behave differently by explaining how:

Expectations from the managers cross down to the patrol level. The Compstat process in Compstat meetings does not directly impact what patrol officers do because they are not being there and they are not being told. After a meeting it is a drip down effect that leads to them probably behaving differently because of that.

In short, the data from this study suggests that street level officers struggled to follow through on the plans and tactics devised and communicated downward by upper- and middle-level supervisors.

However, this is not to say that there is not any change on the street level. As wisely captured by a commander, even if they were not aware of all process and implications of Compstat on their daily routines, Compstat certainly influenced their work on the street level:
They are not involved in the Compstat process itself, but they are involved in this fighting crime. They don’t even know what is going on, they don’t have a bigger sense of the organization yet, and a lot of them are relatively new. They don’t develop plans for the work. They come there, put in their time and go home. They may not even realize why they are doing certain jobs, but it is also part of Compstat. To them, they are fighting crime. You put them in an area and they fight crime. What do you want me to do; record check people, arrest people, and give more summonses. They do that because that is for what they are paid to. To them, it is not Compstat, it is police work.

As shown, even if there were problems sharing information and tactics devised in Compstat meetings, there was a real reflection of Compstat on the street level.

The last point to be mentioned is the nature of relationship between Compstat and the bureaucratic nature of police organizations that force low responsibility, low opportunity, and avoid risk taking. On this level, Compstat seemed to encourage officers, especially mid-level officers, to take more responsibility. As explained in the section on accountability, officers needed to know their areas and problems, and have a plan to respond these problems, all of which encouraged them to take more responsibility and work more closely with other units and his/her own staff. However, there was not any evidence to show that they take more risks. In contrast, most officers tend to rely on more traditional tactics and strategies especially in responding crimes on the street level. This point was explained in detail under the section on innovative problem solving component of the Compstat.

On one hand, Compstat seems not to change the structural aspects of the bureaucracy or, hierarchy, but make it more flexible, more responsive, more responsible, and better in communication. On the other hand, there are still some problems in terms of decreasing paperwork, increasing risk taking and innovation, and passing on information and police tactics to the street level.
**Control orientation.** This study points out that Compstat can also be considered a new form of control in the police organizations. From the critical perspective, Compstat, with these components and principles, is a strong tool to monitor the organization and officers and have a sense of control over what is going on in the organization. The idea of accountability, performance measurement, and follow up mechanisms injected into the system clearly enabled the upper echelon to monitor more closely activities of officers, especially mid-level officers, who were held responsible for any problems in their units and precincts. From the beginning, this initiative had the goal of monitoring officers. In response to a question regarding the implementation of Compstat in the MPD, an officer responded, “He (police director John Black) puts out these initiatives and first things he wants to do is he wants to make sure that people are actually doing well, working towards these goals, he wants to monitor it”.

There are a number of principles, rules, and policies that are strongly enforced in the practices of officers. Within this cultural environment, a new form of competitive culture is integrated into this hierarchical culture. In this competitive culture, competition, a sense of achievement in the meetings, and reward based promotion were emphasized to achieve productivity and efficiency, which, in turn, increased **obtrusive** control in the system.

Consequently, it is clear that the MPD has changed extensively in terms of management after the implementation of Compstat. The new cultural values related to how police organization should be managed seemed to have been accepted, internalized, and put into practice at different degrees. Compstat certainly brought accountability that reinforces responsibility to reduce to crime. There was more flexibility in terms of rapid and appropriate deployment of resources and implementation of appropriate plans and tactics to respond to crime. Performance measurement system with tangible indicators and follow up seemed to change the evaluation of success and
failure in the management, which, in turn, brought competition and careerism in the management of this police organization. In terms of bureaucracy, Compstat seemed not to change structural aspects of the bureaucracy and hierarchy, but made it more flexible, more responsive, more responsible, and better in communication. There were still some problems in terms of decreasing paperwork, increasing risk taking and innovation, and passing information and police tactics to the street level. Finally, it is possible to say that Compstat enabled to control more closely activities of officers by the upper echelon and brought an unobtrusive control system with its focus on accountability, careerism, and competition. The following figure shows the interaction of Compstat and cultural change in the management of this police organization.

Figure 6 Compstat and change in the management
Summary

While answering the question about the role of culture in the introduction, modification, and current implementation of Compstat and cultural change, this section first focused on the reasons for Compstat’s implementation in the MPD. This is evaluated as a part of the introduction process, as it has certain implications for the implementation strategies. It was obvious that the MPD had a range of widely shared problems, such as high crime rates, high response time, low morale of officers, corruption, communication problems, reactive policing, lack of citizen satisfaction, lack of accountability, and resource constraints before Compstat. These problems, the new police director who was assigned to this position with promises to change the MPD, the popularity of this change initiative in the USA based on its perceived success in the NYPD, and institutional pressures led to the selection of Compstat in the MPD. The police director, mayor, and possibly the upper echelon in the MPD are the most critical people in the selection and decision making process of Compstat.

Introduction of Compstat

Among the critical influences in the introduction phase of Compstat were the hiring of two consultants to introduce and train officers for the implementation of this change initiative, and two general information meetings, which were conducted with the participation of these consultants, the police director, and mid-level ranked officers. It was understood from the interviews that there was not any organized communication strategy except for these two meetings where the police director announced the change formally. The general perception of officers, including the ones who attended the first Compstat meetings in these early phases of Compstat can be described using terms such as uncertainty, lack of training, lack of information, knowledge gap between upper echelon and other officers, and lack of involvement and feedback.
The implementation strategy can be described as top-down and autocratic. The manner in the introduction shows a programmatic, rule-bound approach that goes along with a tough, threatening management style used to gain officers compliance for Compstat. The police director, probably with the upper echelon, controlled process, and made decisions regarding what was needed from their perspectives and, introduced Compstat without input from the middle and lower level of officers.

While all officers generally agreed with this characterization of the introduction phase, some officers justified this approach by referring to major problems in the MPD, the need for a major change, the hierarchical, paramilitary structure of the MPD, and corrupt and incompetent officers who categorically disagree with change. These officers justified this strategy by pointing out that a gradual, democratic approach would be sabotaged by officers who benefit from inefficiency, corruption, and incompetency in the MPD. The police director, at that time, seemed to be supportive of this point of view. Specifically, these officers and the police director highlighted the need for strong leadership, and a top-down, aggressive style to overcome the problems and resistance due to the lack of a sense of accountability, corruption problems, and inefficiency in the organization.

However, some officers emphasized that Compstat could have been introduced more smoothly. The tough and aggressive style of the police director in that process made the introduction process more difficult. In particular, the tough manner of the police director, the uncertainty, and lack of training led to resistance which would have been less if a different approach had been selected. These officers emphasized the need for more information and training for such a major change, and the need to make distinction between officers who were opposed to change and the ones who are opposed to the way this change initiative was introduced.
Reactions of Officers

There was a range of reactions to the implementation of Compstat, but resistance was a prominent reaction of many officers, even if for different reasons. In terms of the introduction phase, some officers emphasized that lack of training and information about this initiative created a sense of unknown and a sense of fear in the early phases of Compstat. This, in turn, increased the level of resistance, even among officers who supported the need for change and promises of this change initiative, and who justified the lack of officer involvement. Similarly, the other salient factors which increased resistance were the increased workload, lack of tolerance for mistakes, the transfers to undesirable positions and assignments, and disciplinary measures taken for officers who did not meet the requirements of Compstat. In addition to these points, the tone of the Compstat meetings had a primary role in officers’ resistance. Officers emphasized that humiliation in front of peers, intimidation, ‘gotcha’ mentality, and negativity harmed the morale of officers and led to resistance in the department.

In addition, it was stated that there were a number of officers who resisted this change initiative as they feared losing personal gain and status. It was suggested that the requirements of Compstat, such as accountability, responsibility, information sharing, and smart policing influenced the reaction of some officers. Basically, the officers who resisted the model were those used to a reactive policing style, and not used to being held accountable for their actions or taking responsibility for their districts. These officers had a fear of departing from habit and routine, and of loss of power and status.

Resistances was shown by officers in the form of retirement, unpreparedness, manipulation of numbers, and sabotaging Compstat behind the scenes as they did not want to
deal with the ramification of going against the administration. In the long run, the initiative seems to be well accepted among officers for reasons explained in the following section.

**Modification of Compstat and the Change of Reactions over Time**

This initiative was clearly modified over these 14 years. It was generally stated that management style of the three different police directors, changing crime rates and crime trends, changing priorities of the public and department, characteristics of the officers (i.e., new generation with new cultural values) and an improved understanding of Compstat among officers were the main reasons behind the modification of this change initiative.

Compstat has evolved in the last two administrations in the MPD, but real change of it that can be classified as revolutionary was under the current administration. This change initiative was basically modified in terms of the tone of meetings, which became friendlier and more relaxed. In addition, the frequency and duration of meetings, and topic and manner of discussion has changed over these years. There were also modifications regarding the structure of Compstat and Compstat unit, and technological infrastructure of the initiative (i.e., crime maps, crime analysis software, information storage and retrieval).

After officers go through the shock of the early phases, the level of acceptance certainly increased in the MPD. It was due to a new generation of officers, persistence of management, increased learning of this change initiative and expectations of the upper echelon, and positive change in the tone of meetings over the years.

**Current Implementation of Compstat**

The current form of Compstat in the MPD is well organized and very structured. There are a number of units that are more critical for the implementation of Compstat than others. The Compstat unit, precincts, and operational units such as Narcotics and Gang with different roles
and responsibilities, seemed to have a more primary role in the implementation of this change initiative.

A wide range of documents are produced at regular intervals. The Compstat package, which was used in the Compstat meetings by the upper echelon and commanders, includes crime statistics, crime analysis, crime patterns and maps, and precinct commander profiles that cover anything about a precinct (i.e., complaints against personnel, average response time, number of arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, summonses, and precinct overtime). There are also daily crime bulletins, wanted posters, and handouts about crime statistics and patterns, which are distributed among front line officers and displayed at crime information centers in each precinct.

There are four principles and six components that are widely used to explain Compstat in the literature. In parallel to the grounded approach, while this study does not take any of these principles and components as givens for Compstat in the MPD, the analysis of the data shows that these principles and some of these components provide a helpful framework for explaining and understanding Compstat implementation in the MPD.

The interview statements, observation of the Compstat meetings, and analysis of documents indicated that the following principles seem to be internalized and put into practice, though there are certain limitations in practice: Collecting timely and accurate information using different mechanisms; identifying problems and analyzing crime, finding patterns, and then determining appropriate tactics and plans to respond to crime; deploying resources accordingly; and finally measuring the performance of the organization and commanders in terms of the crime plans and tactics.
In terms of the components of Compstat, there were certainly some components such as accountability, mission clarification, and innovative policing tactics that were more strongly emphasized by officers in the MPD. Other components of Compstat, such as geographical organization of command, data driven problem identification and assessment, and organizational flexibility were clearly less emphasized. Among all these components, accountability was the most emphasized, along with information sharing.

There were a number of limitations to putting into practice these principles and components, and organizational culture seems to play a primary role at this point by discouraging free, innovative, and open communication in the meetings, reinforcing traditional and habitual tactics and strategies, and prioritizing hierarchy and authority in the MPD. In addition to culture, personal attitudes, resource constraints, management style, and structural problems were emphasized among the reasons for the limitations in practice.

**Cultural Change**

This section of this study starts with an overview of the culture of the MPD. The culture of the MPD is described as large, busy, culturally diverse, traditional, paramilitary, chain of command, resource constraints, the best, pride, dedicated, resistant to change, and hardworking.

In terms of cultural change, it was obviously stated by officers that not only Compstat but also technology, leadership, generational differences, amount of experience, emerging policing approaches, and environmental change in these years certainly changed the culture of the MPD. Among all these issues to be considered, it was clearly and strongly evidenced in the statements of officers, and displayed to some extent in the practices, that this change initiative changed the culture of the MPD. Officers were able to identify prominent and unique role of Compstat in this change process.
The cultural change in the MPD after the implementation of Compstat can be categorized and presented under two main headings: ‘policing approach’ and ‘management of the police organization’. In terms of policing approach, the interviews, documents, and observation of the meetings provide ample evidence of the change in officers’ values regarding how policing should be, specifically the role of information gathering, information sharing, crime analysis, crime statistics, crime tactics in policing, and police-public relations in the last decade. A proactive policing approach that goes along with a ‘can do’ mentality, centrality of information gathering and sharing, the focus on crime statistics, analysis, and crime patterns in their fight against crime, and elective use of academically developed policing approaches (i.e., broken windows, problem oriented, and hot spot policing) seemed to be prominent values in the MPD after the implementation of Compstat. It should also be noted that officers had a new understanding of policing, but kept the basic purpose of policing, which is investigating crimes and catching criminal. This was represented with two terms; fighting crime and catching bad guys.

Similarly, it was suggested that the values of police officers regarding the way police organization is and should be managed changed extensively after the implementation of Compstat. Specifically, the accountability that goes along with increased responsibility, flexibility in the deployment of resources, flexibility in terms of police tactics and strategies, and the increased understanding of the criticality of performance measurement in the management of police organizations seemed to become dominant values among officers in the MPD. Performance orientation in terms of measurement of crime rates, productivity numbers (i.e., arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, search warrants, tickets, vehicle stops, cases closed or open, complaints against personnel, average response time, sick time, precinct
overtime) in each precinct, and a follow up system in the meetings to check all these productivity numbers were believed to be the key factors in the success of the initiative in the MPD.

The interrelation between Compstat and the bureaucratic nature of the MPD is a complicated one. On one hand, Compstat seemed not to change the structural aspects of the bureaucracy (i.e., chain of command, top-down system), or hierarchy, but made it more flexible, more responsive, and better in communication. On the other hand, there were still some problems in terms of decreasing paperwork, increasing risk taking and innovation, and passing information and police tactics to the street level.

This study also pointed out that Compstat can also be considered a new form of control in the police organizations. From critical perspective, Compstat, with all components and principles, functioned as a strong tool to monitor organization and officers. The idea of accountability, careerism, competition, and performance measurement injected to the system clearly enabled the upper echelon to monitor more closely officers’ actions and created an unobtrusive control mechanism among officers.

**Communication and Compstat**

*(Research Question 2)*

In this section of study, the focus will be on the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat, and the connection between culture and communication. In the first part, it is intended to look at the communication strategies and channels during the introduction and modification of Compstat. Specifically, the focus will be on communication strategies and, channels that were used to introduce and modify Compstat. Then, the second part will be about the role of communication in the current implementation of Compstat. Finally, the third part will explain how the selection of communication strategies and channels, and
communication practices in the Compstat meetings are related to the culture of this organization. In this part, the focus will be on the Compstat meeting, which is essential to understanding the connection between culture and communication.

**Communication Strategies and Channels**

As discussed before, there are different approaches that identify communication and its implications within organizations. One of these approaches regard communication as tool to introduce change initiatives in the organization and as a crucial factor in dealing with resistance and achieving organizational change. Taken this approach into consideration, the focus here will be on how communication strategies and channels were used in the introduction and during the modification of Compstat over the years.

**Communication Strategies and Channels during the Introduction Phase**

Before any change effort is introduced, it is seen as essential to provide justifications for why change is needed. This subsequently creates readiness for change, and increases the likelihood of change acceptance and possible success. It is widely accepted in the literature that communication plays a critical role in creating and sustaining the need for change in organizations and change acceptance. For this reason, it is necessary to look at whether and how communication was used for this purpose in the MPD.

Although the reasons given were different, there was a common agreement among officers that the MPD had serious problems before Compstat in terms of high crime rates, corruption, response time, policing approach, communication, and community relations, and thus, the MPD definitely needed change in these years. The following statement of one officer illustrated this common agreement on the need for change: “I think we needed it. That is number one.” Another officer confirmed this point as follows: “I don’t know what the crime rate is, but it
was a necessity here.” More importantly, the police director, who had been assigned to this position in 1996 with a claim to change the MPD, clearly accepted these common problems in the MPD, which was illustrated in a newspaper article dated 2000: “It’s like Prudential holding meetings and not talking about insurance, John Black said. I held a meeting with the deputy chiefs and asked them what the crime rate was in Metrocity. Nobody knew the answer (Kleinknecht, 2000).” The approach of John Black to these commonly accepted problems was reflected in another newspaper article as follows:

Promising to make substantial changes in his first 100 days, he said he would hire 100 officers, get officers out of their cars and into the streets, talking to residents, and increase arrests for minor crimes like driving violations and small illegal drug sales. He also said he would improve responses to 911 calls and institute an evaluation system that rewards competent police officers (Stewart, 1996).

In spite of common agreement among officers and the upper echelon for the need for change, this is not to say that everybody was eager to change in this organization. As stated by a few officers, corruption, misbehavior, incompetency, and negligence of work was common among officers, especially among ranked officers who benefited from this inefficient system.

The following statement of one officer illustrated this point:

Because corruption is widespread, misconduct was widespread; they were not willing for any change. He decided he did not want to talk to these people. This was his idea, because he needed to do that, because there was so much corruption that he did not think that he was going to get people to buy into it anyway.

The newspaper stories which reflect the perspective of John Black confirmed this point as follows: “How do you ask people to act professionally without first creating an environment where they can do it? Mr. John Black asked rhetorically” (Smothers, 2002).

Within these conditions, the general approach of the police director was not to persuade all officers and get people to buy into change using a communication strategy to create and sustain the need for change and inform officers about the change process. The statement of
officers and newspaper stories confirmed the fact that the police director had no intention of adopting a communication strategy to inform officers or solicit feedback as to whether change was needed and Compstat was appropriate for the MPD or not. This approach was justified not only by the police director but also by some officers, who referred to the major problems in the MPD. Some of these officers also pointed out the level of difference between the current practices of the organization and the proposed change to explain the necessity of this approach.

After the selection of this initiative, the first formal procedure to announce the change and inform officers about this initiative was two general information meetings organized by the two consultants. As illustrated by a number of newspaper articles, the Metrocity City Council hired two former New York police officials, John Linder and Jack Maple, to provide management training, specifically to train Metrocity officers to use Compstat, examine the culture of the police department with the aim of instituting permanent changes, and try to rally citizens behind crime-fighting efforts by launching an advertising campaign. This point was reflected in an interview as follows:

The director at that time actually did a very abnormal thing. He had two sessions with the help of professors coming from the college and he actually spoke to all commanders. And after this two session period, he got up there and told the department; this is where we are going and this is what we are going to be doing and this is how we are going to get there. Some commanders bought into it, some commanders wrote their retirements papers that day.

The following statement of another officer gave information about the communication strategy used in these meetings:

It was more like, this is something that we are going to do. It works. It worked for New York. This is where we need to be, because if we keep going in this way, we have nothing left. We need to do something. No one else came to the table, no one attempted the challenge, and nobody cared.
It is evident from the newspaper articles and interview statements that these two meetings were organized to announce the change, the need for change, and give basic information related to it. There is not any specific information as to whether consultants and the police director asked for input and questions. Communication was basically a one way lecture in these two general information meetings. The statements of officers pointed out that the police director did not intend to persuade all officers, minimize resistance, or acquire participation, increase motivation and commitment, or the buy in of all officers. Rather, the communication strategy seemed to be a hard approach reflected in interviews statements of two officers as follows: “This is where we are going and this is what we are going to be doing and this is how we are going to get there.” and “It was more like this is something that we are going to do. It works. It worked for New York. This is where we need to be.” As shown in these statements, the police director believed in the benefit of this initiative regardless of what other officers in the organization think. Interestingly enough, some officers claimed that this approach of the police director was part of a strategy to eliminate or replace some commanders in the MPD, rather than to involve them, as reflected in the following statement of one officer:

Part of the methodology that goes along with Compstat was to get rid of whole bunch of precincts commanders. There would be a large number of changes anyway. But, this situation allowed the police director to say sort of turning the whole process and making things dramatically different.

In terms of the number and position of participants in these general order meetings, it is understood that there was not any organization wide effort to involve all officers to this change process. These two meetings were conducted with the participation of middle and high level officers. Officers who were not influenced directly by this initiative were not involved in these meetings. Some officers who were constables or sergeants at that time indicated that they did not have even basic information about the change process. At the same time, some officers stated
that they thought the initiative influenced the middle level managers, and did not have any interest in asking for more information. The following statement clearly explained this common perception among officers in this period:

In 1997, I was a patrolman. Patrolmen did not really know what Compstat was. Years ago, when I was a patrol officer when Compstat started, all I knew was my superior officers go to these meetings and get beat up. That is all I knew, a patrolman knew. I think it has changed now. Patrolmen know there is a meeting and their commanders are held accountable for the crime issues.

Although newspaper stories mentioned the training of officers by consultants in the MPD before the implementation of Compstat, there was not any other organized attempt to train or inform officers other than these two general information meetings conducted by the consultants. Even, the officers who attended the first Compstat meeting stated that they were not involved in any other training, nor did they hear of any other person who involved any training other than these two meetings. This point was stated by one officer who attended the first Compstat meeting: “I never had any formal training about Compstat. I don’t know if anybody has. Maybe, they have. It is more on the job training.” In fact, the concept of on the job training was a common point stated by officers. Nearly all officers suggested that they learned Compstat by doing. This point will be explained in later parts of this study.

In addition to these meetings, another formal procedure to inform officers in these early phases of the initiative was written orders. As confirmed by many officers, there were general orders and some memos regarding how to implement this initiative. As illustrated in a number of situations, a general order goes from the top down, and it must be signed to acknowledge its receipt and compliance, and signed order must be forwarded to the police director before a certain date.
Thus, there were two different communication channels reported by the officers in the introduction phase of Compstat. The first one was these two general information meetings organized by the MPD in a formal, face to face, and one way communication approach. The second was general orders, which were the formal and written form of communication used in this phase of the initiative.

In addition to these formal channels, there were also a good deal of informal communication about Compstat and its consequences. As stated by participants in the study, officers communicated about this initiative informally based on the first cues provided in the general information meetings and the well-known case of the NYPD. “We read newspaper stories about the case of the NYPD. When John Black decided to implement it, like any other things, it was criticized by some, sometimes openly sometimes behind the doors.”

Taking into account this background, the communication strategy dimension (Lewis, 2007) during the introduction phase will be explained below. First, the communication strategy aimed at disseminating information in a top down orientation without a strong effort to reduce uncertainty and gain support for the change. The police director and consultants seemed to focus more on the positive aspects and benefits of the initiative for the organization. The interviews and statements of the police director in the newspaper articles indicated that there was a focus on loss frame, which emphasizes the disadvantages of noncompliance. In other words, the police director used a hard strategy in which he used direct assertive requests for compliance as well as threats and aggression to achieve objectives in his mind. It is also clear that the communication strategy targeted more specific groups, namely mid-level officers as they were considered the key for the success of the initiative. Finally, the police director gave the message that the MPD undeniably needs change and is capable of successfully implementing this change. In terms of
the models suggested by Lewis, Hamel, and Richardson (2001), it is possible to say that the communication strategy in these early phases of the initiative targeted more mid-level officers who need to know at least the basic aspects of the initiative.

The end product of this process was inadequate information, and a high level of anxiety and uncertainty among officers, even among those who had attended the Compstat meetings immediately after the introduction of Compstat. Officers’ expectations of training and more knowledge to decrease uncertainty about the initiative were clearly not taken into consideration. It would not be wrong to conclude that there was not any organized communication effort or strategy to announce the change, inform officers to reduce uncertainty and resistance, solicit feedback, persuade them, and appropriating and adopting features of the initiative to the needs of the MPD. As the initiative was not truly understood or adopted, the extent of resistance increased. In other words, officers made sense of the initiative based on the cues that were available to them, rather than its overall implications, purposes and benefits which, in turn, increased the level of resistance. This process is illustrated in the Table 7.

Table 7 Communication Strategies and Channels during the Introduction

| Communication Strategies and Channels during the Introduction Phase of Compstat |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| **Formal Channels**                      | **Informal Channels**                       |
| General information meetings             | General orders and memos                   |
| Oral, formal, face to face, one way      | Written, top-down, formal, bureaucratic language |
|                                          | Oral, Informal, face to face               |
On one hand, it would be wrong to assume that better information dissemination, more knowledge, or more effective communication alone would have led to support for Compstat among all officers. Although it may have contributed to a better understanding and awareness of the goals of the initiative, and its implication for the organization, even more collaborative communication strategies would likely not have been effective in persuading all officers to accept the change. This is because; some ranked officers were against the reasons and goals of change due to their personal habits and loss of status. Both the police director and some officers believe that if the police director had had intention of building consensus, or if this initiative had been implemented gradually, it would have run the risk of being sabotaged by internal politics, structures, and culture.

On the other hand, some officers suggest that they were not opposed to the reasons and goals of the change, but they did not have any information about the initiative or, what was
expected from them, which made the process painful. This is reflected in the following statement of one officer:

In 1997, we developed Compstat. I went to the warrant squad unit in 1997, where I had my first taste of Compstat. It was sometimes good, sometimes bad. It was like he knew where this department should be run. But, we did not know what is going on, what we should be doing to make this work. None of us know that what we should know. We were not on the same page and it was not our fault. He did not ease this process. If they came around, listen, you are going to be part of this process called Compstat. And this is what it is. These are the things you need to know to be prepared. We would run more smoothly. But they [the consultants] never talked to us about it. It is like, one day, here we go. They said here is the new process and this is how we are going to direct each command. But, we did not have any training. You got the training, if you want something different from somebody. They spent a lot of time with the director but they never spent time with us. That was the problem. It was all new to us.

It is clearly understood that there were some officers who would have been more supportive of Compstat, if the upper echelon had asked for input and participation, trained them, and communicated broadly and honestly about the ramifications, implementation, and benefits of the initiative for the organization and for individuals. The following statement of one officer reflects the expectations of officers in this phase: “He should involve more people; talk to people, and inform people. This is our job to fight crime and we can do it collectively by using Compstat. Basically, we need to talk about the benefits of Compstat with people.”

**Communication Strategies and Channels during the Later Phases of Compstat**

Communication strategies of the kind discussed in the literature are most often used to when a new initiative is being put into practice. However, as observed in the implementation of Compstat in the MPD, and possibly in many other cases, when an initiative is introduced, it is modified over time due to changing conditions, priorities, and administrations. As such, change communication should be evaluated as an ongoing process based on the needs of the organization. Taking into account this point, this part of study will focus on the use of change
communication in the later phases of Compstat to introduce change and modifications of the initiative itself.

As already mentioned, the initiative was modified in many respects over the years. There was even a slight change of the initiative, specifically in the tone of meetings under the directorship of John Black. The successor of John Black slightly changed the design of meetings. We have little evidence of whether these directors used any particular communication strategy to inform officers about the change of the initiative, and the reasoning behind it. However, it is likely that some written orders were used to inform officers of the new procedures and to correct some problems in the implementation of the initiative. For instance, there is a special order called the Safe Corridor School Initiative; dated 2006 and issued by the Office of the Chief of Police, in which Crime Analysts were ordered to add information about this initiative as a new segment of the Compstat book. In addition, the Compstat meetings were likely to be used as a platform to convey new procedures and expectations in these years.

In fact, the Compstat meetings are essential to understanding change communication in the later phases of the initiative. These meetings clearly functioned as a tool to communicate about the implementation of the initiative, learn the initiative, and decrease the level of uncertainty. It is clear that the perception of modification of the initiative was rooted mainly in these meetings where the police director and the upper echelon managed the tone, priorities, questions, and expectations. In other words, officers constructed meanings and a new sense of initiative itself based on the behaviors and communication practices of the upper echelon in these meetings. The observation of the Compstat meetings provides evidence that the police director George Brown effectively used this platform to convey his expectations and train officers on this initiative. There are many examples from these meetings to illustrate how these meetings
functioned in this way. The following speech of the police director in a meeting illustrates how these meetings were used to train officers and share information regarding the expectations and new procedures:

We are talking about this for two years, right? We need accurate and timely intelligence. The first thing you need to know is what is happening. That is not a big analysis, time of the day; day of the week. Burglaries are figure out when it is occurring. People leave for work at 7 o’clock in the morning and return back at 6 o’clock at night when burglaries take place. You got to know when it is happening to arrange your enforcement…. We are going to investigation, how many people actually stole it for drug related reasons? Then, you are going to care about narcotics enforcement.

There were many other examples in which the police director talked about the function of Compstat, the problems to be corrected, his expectations and new procedures. This kind of communication practice inevitably brought a new understanding of Compstat, the internalization of Compstat practices, and encouraged officers to change the parts of their work that the police director has criticized.

From the perspective of officers, these meetings functioned as a real learning platform. Their highly structured and routine practices have led to a better understanding of the initiative over the years. As stated by a lot of officers, this was learning by doing. For instance, one officer said,

When I first came in, there was a lot of learning process. It was go over the process during the years. We learned. We learned the questions and what we should be doing which made it easier on us. The point we are at now is better.

Another officer pointed out the need for practice to learn how the process works: “People need to see how it works, see it in action. Unless you see it, you can’t get it, even if you read books about it. Books are great, but practical experience is where you learn.” It is clear that these meetings functioned as a learning platform for officers. As such, practice of the initiative increased the level of understanding and helped officers to change some aspects of Compstat.
In addition to these meetings, there were a number of written orders, which indicated the use of documents to communicate about this change initiative and change in the implementation. Most officers stated that written documents such as memos and orders are the most common form of communication for change not only for this initiative but also for every kinds of change in the MPD. For instance, one officer said, “Ninety percent of everything is in written order.” Another officer confirmed this point, adding that information also comes in a top-down manner: “For any types of change, there are normally memorandums handed down. Information is always flowing from up to down. That is all I can say.” Although it depends on the change, it was stated that these orders and memoranda were distributed to all related units and officers, and related parties should confirm that it has been read. The following statement pointed out this fact as follows: “The police director sends a memorandum, distributes it to all the commands, it comes down the chain of command. We just sign it to show that it was read by us. We can get a copy of the memo.” Another officer explained the difference between general orders, memorandums, and memos as follows:

A general order is basically about, you shall do and you will do. And if you don’t do, you are in trouble. A director’s memorandum is a kind of the same thing. It is something like a quick message you want to get out. A memorandum could be, you have a problem with burglaries between four and midnight; we need to direct someone there. A general order is forever. A memorandum could be something temporary. A memo can be director’s memo, Compstat’s memo, or second precincts’ memo. In other words, memos can be written by different units.

All these types of documents were used to inform officers about the initiative, modifications, and new expectations. A number of general orders, memorandums, and memos confirm this fact. The documents showed that the department attaches great importance to creating follow up mechanisms to make sure that everybody is aware of the new policies and new rules that are put into place. The mechanisms used for this purpose includes read and sign
requirements, dates given for the completion of each procedure, and progress reports required to be submitted to responsible person.

Another important tool used for change communication is Roll Call Training. Both the statements of officers and analysis of documents confirmed the critical role of roll calls as a form of training and a communication strategy. There are a number of documents in which the need for roll calls is highlighted: “The order shall be subject to Roll Call Training for a period of three weeks.” Depending on the type of change, the current administration thinks of these gatherings as important opportunities to train and explain new policies and change. There were many interview statements that confirmed the role of roll calls in any major change, including Compstat. The following example illustrated this point: “Once the command gets the new policy, the policy is introduced in roll call for a certain period of time, like two weeks, to make sure that each person is aware of it.” This is not to say that every change is subject to roll call training, as illustrated in the following statement of an officer:

It depends on the type of change, the need for training associated with the change. If it is a minor change, then it is handled more through memorandum, instructions that come from the chain of command. If it is a significant change, we have had specific training or roll calls.

In addition to the meetings, written documents, and roll calls, officers talked about the use of organization emails and small group discussions to communicate change in practices. Although there are not any examples of these emails, as stated by one officer, these emails were used like written orders. In contract to written orders, however, which are received by all officers, only ranked officers were allowed to receive an organizational email. The following statement explained the use of emails in the MPD: “Police officers and detectives don’t have email. If you have an administrative capacity within the city of Metrocity, you have an email. When there is an order, you are supposed to read your email twice a day.”
Finally, small group discussions and communication in informal settings are other forms of change communication. As stated by one ranked officer, they instructed officers in their command based on the discussion in the Compstat meetings: “Basically, when my Lieutenant attends Compstat, he comes back and gives us feedback. And in a small office setting, there might be more one to one instructions.” Another officer talked about meetings in each command: “We have also meetings and communicate within each other.” Not surprisingly, new procedures are heard and discussed through informal channels, as explained in the following statement: “We also come together with the member of the unit and discuss informally and speak to each other.”

In summary, in terms of communication channels, it is understood that there were a number of different communication channels used to communicate modification of the initiative over these years. The first and foremost channel was the Compstat meetings which is a formal and face to face setting used as a platform to train officers, discuss new practices, and enable officers to learn what is expected from them. Written documents such as general orders, memorandums, and memos were the most articulated form of communication of change in any practices, including Compstat. These written documents were very strict and formal in manner and written in a well-organized manner. The extent of different channels was not measured in this study, but officers considered written documents the most common communication channel used to communicate change in the MPD. Roll call meetings organized in different forms seemed to be another important formal and face to face platform used to communicate major changes and also change in daily crime trends and policing. It was also clear that emails were becoming part of change communication. Like any other organizations, small meetings or informal channels were used to communicate change in the MPD.
In terms of the use of communication to inform officers about modification of the initiative, it is possible to say that communication strategies used in later phases were not totally different from those used in the early phases. There was more emphasis on disseminating information in a top-down manner. The communication mostly targeted groups that were the most critical for the implementation of Compstat. Differently, the level of knowledge about Compstat was totally different as officers learned by doing what was expected from them which decreased the level of uncertainty regarding Compstat. In addition, it was not necessary to convey messages regarding the need for change and self-efficacy as the initiative had been in use for a certain period of time. Thus, regardless of the different communication strategies used over these years, it was clear that change communication played an essential role both in the introduction and modification of the initiative in the MPD (See Table 8).

Table 8 Communication Strategies and Channels during the Later Phases

| Communication Strategies and Channels during the Later Phases of the Compstat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compstat Meetings | General Orders and Memos | Roll Calls | Emails | Small Group Discussions |
| Oral, Formal, Face to face | Written, formal, top down, bureaucratic language | Oral, Formal, Face to face | Written, Informal/Formal, Ranked officers | Oral, Informal, Face to face |
| Communicate about the new practices of Compstat | Most common form of change communication | Used as a part of training and conveying messages from Compstat meetings and daily crime trends | Used only by ranked officers for administrative issues | Informal gatherings in smaller units to discuss Compstat and any other issue |
| Officers learn by doing | Used in a top down manner and bureaucratic language | | | |
Compstat and Communication

As discussed to some extent in the current implementation section, communication is a vital aspect of Compstat from the beginning. Without repeating the points in the current implementation, this section of the study will focus on the role of communication in the current implementation of the initiative.

It is possible to say that communication is used to mean different things in the interviews. Communication, as a concept, is basically used to mean a tool to disseminate information, the sharing of best practices, the coordination and collaboration among different units to respond to crime.

The role of communication goes beyond information exchange, coordination, and collaboration. Officers make sense of Compstat and produce new meanings of Compstat through the communication practices. In other words, communication is used to construct new meanings -communication as construction-. In addition, communication practices are key for understanding the culture of any organization, thus, they can be evaluated as a manifestation of culture and values in the MPD. Although officers do not refer directly to these functions of communication, they are particularly important to understand the communication process and Compstat in the MPD.

Based on these directly and indirectly referred meanings of Communication, the following section will describe the conceptualization of Communication as:

1) Information exchange and information sharing
2) Coordination, collaboration or joint efforts.
3) Communication - as- construction
4) Communication as manifestation of culture and values
Communication as Information Exchange

The notion of information sharing and communication were used interchangeably by study participants. Communication, in the sense of better information sharing, was stated as one of the most important contributions of Compstat to this police organization. In parallel to the literature, information sharing along with accountability has been the most cited reason for the implementation of Compstat in the MPD. Nearly all officers reported that Compstat enabled the MPD not only to collect daily and accurate information, but also to share this information with other officers and units.

It is evident that Compstat allowed different sections, different commands, and different units to come together under a unified structure, without any structural barriers, and share information. Most of the study participants saw Compstat primarily as a tool to share information both within and between units. For instance, one officer noted,

I think it is mostly about information sharing. What you are doing to control and prevent crime in your area. The most important thing is getting information out there and sharing with other parts of the department. It is also about communication. Sometimes, whereas you may speak to your supervisor a lot, you don’t speak to someone else in another department. Compstat gives you that kind of forum where you can just share information.

On the same line of thought, officers advocated that Compstat contributed better information sharing among precincts and special units like narcotics and gang. As stated by many officers, before Compstat, commanding officers did not have any communication with the other precincts or narcotics divisions. They did not take any responsibility for crimes that happened in other precincts. However, the implementation of Compstat changed this manner by bringing commanders together regularly under a unified structure and compelling them to coordinate their efforts. This manner brought a unified, organization wide perspective to the fight against crime. This change was expressed by one officer as follows:
The difference is in communication. Prior to this Compstat, there was not a lot of communication across precincts. Things were very specific and territorial. We had different segment of the department only worrying about their specific community. It was not taken into consideration that someone else’s problems in another community would also affect their part, too. So, we were very territorial and there was not a lot of communication.

Another officer pointed out that the role of Compstat goes beyond information sharing as follows:

The role that Compstat plays, it brings people together to brain-storm to identify problems, brainstorm to come up with the best alternative we can to solve the problem. Because you may find out, you may have alternatives, thorough talking, brain storming, we may have a better idea.

Many study participants referred to the large size of the MPD and the greater number of people through whom information must pass while explaining the function and inevitability of Compstat in the MPD. For instance, one commander spoke about disseminating and sharing information without any barriers in the Compstat meetings:

It becomes constant sharing of information across the border. And there is no secret that there was no barrier between either chief, director and with that commander. This was open forum. You as a commander of the third precincts would get this information and you knew what was going on in the department, across the department, across finance, across vehicles, across computers, across detention. You knew what was going on in the department.

This point was repeatedly asserted as ‘being on the same page’, and ‘open communication’ by the officers. The critical point to be emphasized is this open forum of communication decreases the likelihood that communication will be transformed or distorted between ranks and units. It is clear that the degree of benefit of this platform is tied to the level of sharing this information and its use for analysis and operational purposes. Most of the study participants supported the contribution of Compstat to this issue. As reported by one officer, “I believe Compstat has a very large, significant effect on the department as a whole because you
share information with other units, identify crimes patterns, get prepared to attack crime in your city.”

When talking about the positive role of Compstat in terms of information exchange, nearly all officers cited the Compstat meetings. In other words, these meetings were suggested to be the most critical and ritualistic occasions for information sharing and bonding. Nearly all examples regarding information exchange given were from these meetings. The following statement of one officer illustrated the common point of view of officers regarding Compstat meetings:

In terms of its function, people come together to share information. Probably it is one of the most important factors of Compstat. Commanders, investigative units, a whole host of people come there. So, people can talk about their problems. “Listen up, we have a problem here, what do you think you can do to help me?” Without these meetings, we would not bring everyone in this room. Everyone is hearing the problems of other precinct commanders. They can say, you know what I have the same issue. Okay. You come together and discuss it. And give me a plan of action for how you are going to address this issue.

As stated in interviews, Compstat meetings provided a platform to present and share information. Officers in the MPD clearly benefited from this platform. A large amount of information in the form of crime analysis and, crime patterns was presented in these meetings by commanders. Commanders were also required to explain how they deployed their resources and their plan to respond to emerging crime problems in the presence of other officers.

The observation of the meetings confirmed the critical role of these meetings in terms of information exchange. Every moment of these meetings can be evaluated in terms of information sharing, correcting problems in timely manner, and sharing best practices. For instance, during a discussion of wanted criminals, it was understood that there was a problem of updating and disseminating of wanted posters. With the order of the police director, one captain took responsibility for putting together packages for wanted individuals, to be disseminated to all
precincts. Similarly, in one meeting, commanding officers talked about how to accurately check pawn shops. The following statement of one ranked officer shows how these meetings helped to get things done:

You bring people from all departments. I mean, you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that has a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done. Let’s resolve this problem and do everything we can do to make sure that this precinct commander can be successful.

As shown, the Compstat meetings brought together mostly middle and upper level officers from different units and enabled them to talk and hear what was going on in other units. This, in turn, enabled them to make a comparison, benefit from the experience of other units, and solve problems in a timely manner. In addition to the Compstat meetings, the regular roll call meetings and crime information centers in each precinct, where crime maps, wanted people, and crime statistics were displayed urged information sharing within each precinct.

This is not to say that there were no problems regarding information sharing. Although Compstat was said to be a good tool to gather, use, and share information, and coordinate joint efforts, the effectiveness of the initiative was heavily dependent on certain mechanisms that ensure effective use of this information and two-way communication flowing upward and downward throughout the organization. However, there were a range of problems and limitations in the collection, use, and sharing of information that were reported by the study participants and observed in the meetings. These limitations were thought to be related to personal wrongdoings, cultural habits, resource constraints, organizational size, and managerial style.

**Limitations in information exchange.** One of the most cited problem is the gap between upper, mid and street level officers. A number of managers expressed the critical role of getting information out and helping front line officers to understand what is expected from them and the
implications of Compstat for their daily practices. This is highly critical point because all plans and tactics should be reflected on the street level, where the real fight with crime occurs. For instance, a commander spoke about why this is important:

   To me, Compstat is all about getting information to the officer in the field so he can be more productive and we can reduce crime. That is the bottom-line to me. I am a captain; I don’t go out and fight crime every day. I know all about what is going on in my precincts, but that does not help the officers who are sitting in a police car at midnight tour, if I don’t get the information out that I know. So, we need to explain to the cops in the field why we need to do certain things. It is all communication.

   In fact, there are certain mechanisms in the MPD to inform frontline officers about these issues, such as crime control centers and roll call meetings. A commander confirmed the use of these mechanisms for this purpose:

   We do have methods in place now, like putting crime maps and bulletins out, putting crime information out for the officers. We also use roll calls getting information out. We put out information about burglars, burglaries of this week, the 28 day period of Compstat. So, they know that there are patterns out there, crime patterns, and they know what is going on, what to look for.

   As shown, these mechanisms provided a base from which to disseminate information to front line officers who are doing the job on the ground. However, it was not clear to what extent street level officers benefitted from these mechanisms that were put into practice with Compstat.

   The data gathered in this study pointed out that there was still a lack of information among front line officers regarding their responsibilities in this process and implications of Compstat for their daily practices. It was stated that the meaning and implications of the information analyzed were lost between the upper managers and front line officers. Consider the following comment provided by a commander who regularly attended Compstat meetings:

   One of the things we try to do and probably we can improve on is getting information out to our police officers a little bit better. But it depends on the sergeants and line supervisors, and mid managers. If they are not good at what they do, if they are not taking significant interest in what is going on around them, then, they don’t give the police officers information that they need to be better at what they do.
As shown, to be useful, supervisors at different ranks need to make sure that the information was swiftly disseminated upward and downward throughout the organization, and make sure that they were aware of what was expected from them, specifically, the underlying patterns in the data, and the logic behind the strategies and deployment efforts.

In the same line of thought, in the Compstat meetings, the police director repeatedly asked commanding officers to get briefings and tell officers in their units how and what is supposed to be done based on the crime analysis and patterns. As already stated, the extent of information sharing depended on the ability of ranked officer in a unit. Another suggestion of some commanders to overcome this problem was to bring the front line officers to the meetings at different times, to show how Compstat works and why commanders ask for certain things. For instance, one commander said, “You have to make them understand what we need, even by taking some of them to Compstat. They will see how the process works and they will get it.” However, as confirmed by the observation of the meetings, this was not a common practice in the MPD. Nearly all participants of these meetings were ranked officers. While explaining the reason for this, one ranked officer noted that, “In fact, the director asked us to bring people. But, I guess we did not want to bring them to Compstat where we were yelled at. We don’t want them see we are yelled at in the meetings. I believe we should do that. That was our fault.”

However, this is not to say that there was not any change on the street level. As wisely captured by a commander, even if they were not aware of all process and implications of Compstat on their daily routines and the true spirit behind this initiative, Compstat certainly influenced their work on the street level:

They are not involved in the Compstat process itself, but they are involved in this fighting crime. They don’t even know what is going on, they don’t have a bigger sense of the organization yet, and a lot of them are relatively new. They don’t develop plans for the
work. They come there, put their time in and go home. They may not even realize why they are doing certain jobs, but it is also part of Compstat. To them, they are fighting crime. You put them in an area and they fight crime. What do you want me to do; record check people, arrest people, give more summonses, and give more summonses. They do that because that is for what they are paid to. To them, it is not Compstat, it is police work.

As shown, even if there were problems passing information and tactics devised in Compstat meetings, there was a real reflection of Compstat on the street level.

In addition to limitations in the information flow, specifically to the lower level officers, the extent of information sharing seemed to have been limited even during the meetings. There were problems with the quality of information sharing, hierarchical and cultural pressures to explain information freely, and adopting this information to resource deployment and police tactics on the ground. Officers did not benefit extensively from this platform, physical togetherness, and being in front of an authority that enable them to talk and possibly solve their problems immediately. The communication skills of officers, the climate of the relationship and setting, the history of these meetings, and differences in values, norms, and attitudes of the people play a role in the level and quality of information sharing. The police director and deputy chief asked questions and commanders responded to them in a way that they think the upper managers expected of them and share their information and problems in a limited manner. As reported in the following statement, officers were not comfortable enough to discuss their problems freely for several reasons:

People become exclusive. They don’t really want to say what their issues are. They talk about the analysis of crime in terms of time of day, day of week because it is just basic human nature to know I do enough. Is that enough for that person who is asking me the questions? Is that going to satisfy him? If he is not satisfied, he is going to make me work on it. Is he going to make fun of it? Is he going to transfer me? So, when you sit in a room with your peers, there are a lot of people, a lot of pressure. People really don’t want to share their information. Don’t say it because everyone is aware of the issue, they have no other choice. But, if there is something that they can keep to themselves without saying it in open form, I think they will. That is probably one of the negatives of
Compstat, because fear of embarrassment, fear of being ridiculed, fear of giving me more work. Wait a minute, I work ten hours in a day, if I knew about this issue, I have to work 12 hours a day. So, whoever says that people are 100 percent open, I don’t think so. The percentage of openness I don’t know. I speak on behalf of myself. I am on a different side of the table now.

Another officer referred to the early forms of meetings, where intimidation was a common issue to explain the lack of information sharing.

As extensively discussed in other sections, it seemed several factors restricted officers in terms of expressing and sharing information freely in the MPD: The design of meetings (i.e., number of participants, meeting room), the design of communication (i.e., question-answer form), the history of police organization (i.e., early forms of meetings: intimidation and humiliation), the cultural values and personal attitudes of officers in organization (i.e. avoiding extra work, defensive culture), and organizational constraints in terms of resources.

Another problem was that Compstat injected a heavy dose of information regarding crime rates, trends, and patters that have implications for the daily routines of frontline officers. To be useful, this information should be thoroughly reviewed and digested at different levels of the organization. However, this is a difficult task, especially in such a big organization where there are a range of officers with varying commitments to the job. As explained by a commander,

If you work in a big organization, people have varying commitments to the job. There are some people who care about what they do, fully committed. There are some others to get the pay check. The difficult part is to make sure that even the least interested police officers know exactly what is going on in their commands. It depends on how much effort they put in reading the information and reviewing it. We give the information to our commanders, lieutenants, and sergeant every week, when the Compstat package is prepared. They can get that information and review it. They should have the big picture; at least they should have the knowledge of what is happening on their shift so they can better direct the personnel.

It seems reasonable to suggest that some officers would struggle to digest and respond to this amount of data that is produced on a daily basis.
To summarize, in spite of certain limitations, the problems regarding information sharing rooted in the hierarchical, divisional structure of police organizations, and the historically suggested cultural barriers to sharing information seemed to be overcome to a large extent in the Compstat era. The mechanism of Compstat (i.e., Compstat meetings, crime information centers, roll call meetings, Compstat packages, record management systems) inevitably supported information sharing at different levels. And, all these mechanisms seemed to be accepted and internalized by officers for some time after the implementation of the initiative. The basic mechanism used for information sharing, their function, and limitations are shown in the following table.

Table 9 Communication as Information Exchange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISMS USED FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compstat Meetings / Roll calls / Crime Information Centers / Written documents /Informal Discussions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FUNCTION**

- Collecting different units under a unified structure
- Sharing information between precincts, different units, special units without any barriers
- Urging different units to coordinate their effort
- Correcting problems in a timely manner
- Brainstorming, sharing best practices, getting things done in timely manner
- Sharing daily crime trends and priorities, getting a proactive policing style
- The notion of open communication and being on the same page

**LIMITATIONS**

- The level of disseminating information to frontline officers
- The level of understanding Compstat and the implications of Compstat for daily practices
- The extent and quality of information sharing in the meetings
- The extent of change on the daily practices of frontline officers
- Hierarchical and cultural pressures to explain information freely in meetings
- Adopting information to resource deployment and police tactics on the ground
- History of police organizatin (intimidation and humiliation in the early meetings)
- Communication design (question-answer form) / Difficulties in digesting a great deal of information
Communication as Coordination and Collaboration

The notion of communication was commonly used by officers to mean coordination of efforts both with the other units and external organizations. Most of the officers appreciated the contribution of this initiative for bringing promptness and flexibility to the deployment of the resources, and reinforcing coordination of efforts and deployment between precincts and special units such as narcotics and gang. For instance, one commander explained how Compstat contributed to the coordination of efforts and resources for responding to crime:

For me as the commander of the third precincts, I have to communicate with the narcotics division for deployment in high narcotics areas. Gang squad, I have to coordinate my efforts with them, we have to communicate with each other to address my gang problems. I think this is happening in Compstat.

Coordination was also said to be essential for the effective use of resources. The upper echelon wanted to make sure that commanders deploy their resources to endorse their plans and strategies, and coordinate their resources in the implementation of the plans. There were a number of examples of how this was happening in the meetings. It was common to hear questions from the upper echelon such as, “How many cops did you deploy in that sector? Did you put more patrol up there? Did you talk to the supervisor who is in charge of that unit to coordinate your manpower?”

In parallel to the information sharing, Compstat meetings were critical for coordination efforts in the MPD. There was ample evidence in the Compstat meetings regarding the contribution of these meetings to the coordination among different units. In particular, the police director and deputy chief reinforced the coordination of efforts across different units through these meetings. The police director stated several times in the meetings that most crimes such as robbery, burglary, and theft from cars are narcotic related and require joint efforts of precincts, the
narcotics teams of precincts, and central narcotics. For instance, while speaking to a precinct commander in a meeting, the police director stated,

We need to investigate how many people actually stole it for drug related reasons? Then, you are going to care about narcotics enforcement. X (name), I ask you what your narcotics team is doing about this. Do you do any early morning enforcement at heroin locations with narcotics officers? Those are burglar bros.

He, then, stated what should be done as follows: “Hey guys, we need smart policing, working close and coordination between narcotics and patrol, coordination between patrol and detectives.” Similarly, the deputy chief asked the following questions to precinct commanders in different meetings to reinforce communication and coordination of efforts: “How many times have narcotics lieutenants come to your office? How many times in these 28 days has the lieutenant come to your office in the second precincts? Did you have a conversation about your burglary problems in top priority narcotics locations?” As illustrated, if there was a problem in the coordination efforts, the upper echelon wanted these commanding officers to come together and put together a plan within a certain time frame to address these types of crimes. As shown, Compstat, and specifically the Compstat meetings, have been used as a platform to see if crimes are related and reinforce coordination of efforts.

Another important contribution of the Compstat meetings regarding coordination was the availability of officers from all departments. As mentioned in a number of interviews, the availability of different units as well as the upper echelon in these meetings made it possible to resolve problems and get things done in coordination.

Compstat meetings were also used to coordinate crime fighting efforts with other organizations, such as courts, the municipality, parole office, etc. There were a number of statements that show this function of Compstat in the MPD. Consider the following comment provided by a ranked officer who regularly attends Compstat meetings:
Compstat meetings were usually attempted, particularly at the beginning, to bring people from the attorney’s office, probation. So, if there were anything those agencies can do to help them to solve problems by fostering some specific prosecutions, they were brought in to this process. It was helpful.

Another officer confirmed this point as follows: “Metrocity police department does a lot of good things. We work in collaboration with the FBI, Fire Department, and Police Ballistic. It provides more communication between other agencies and us.”

External communication or coordination with external agencies can be best represented by the participation of the deputy mayor in these meetings. It was observed that the deputy mayor was a regular attendee of these meetings and few examples show his role in these meetings. For instance, the deputy mayor once talked about the changing regulations (i.e., closing hours) of bars, night clubs, and discos and their implications for security problems. There was also another meeting which was conducted with the participation of a few officers from the parole office. A parole officer informed police officers in this meeting about the new police-parole relationship (i.e., weekly strategy meetings, data sharing, joint street operations, executions of search warrants, joint visits made to parolees) to solve parolees’ problems and to join efforts to fight crime. In spite of certain examples of coordination and collaboration with other agencies, it is possible to say that the regular attendees of these meetings were mostly police, except for the deputy mayor. The attendance of other agencies such as parole or the housing office was exceptions, which indicates the limitations of this function of Compstat.

In addition, there were certainly a number of problems mentioned by officers and observed in the meetings in terms of coordination. One limitation was the extent of coordination among different units to deploy resources synchronically. There were many examples from the meetings where the police director and deputy chief expressed displeasure with the coordination and asked commanders to meet after Compstat meeting to coordinate their efforts. There were
statements in minutes of meetings such as, “Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs at emergency.” There were more examples of these kinds of statements that prove lack of coordination between different units in the MPD. The following table illustrates the contribution and limitations of Compstat to the coordination and collaboration process within the MPD.

Table 10 Communication as coordination and collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms Used for Coordination and Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compstat Meetings / Minutes of meetings / Follow-up Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUNCTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bringing promptness and flexibility to the deployment of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reinforcing coordination and deployment between precincts and special units such as Narcotics, Gang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective use of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The presence of different units in one room enables resolving problems and getting things done in coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External communication or coordination with external agencies (the municipality, parole department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The extent of coordination among different precincts and units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The extent of coordination between police department and external agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communication as Construction

As noted, communication was mostly conceptualized by study participants as information exchange or as a means of facilitating the coordination of actions and joint effort. However, to scholars in the field, communication is more than information exchange or coordination. It is an ongoing process through which new meanings and new practices are constructed. The culture of this organization, the meaning of Compstat, and resistance and receptivity is constructed and manifested through communication.
The officers make sense of Compstat through communication in formal and informal settings. They talk about Compstat in their units with their colleagues, with their friends, all of which contributes to the construction of the meaning of Compstat. Officers are humiliated or intimidated in meetings through communication and show their resistance or receptivity through communication. Accountability is constructed and manifested in and by communication. The police directors promote change and their expectation through communication, which, in turn, influences the meaning of Compstat for the officers and their perception of success and/or failure.

Within this theoretical background, it is possible to give many examples from the interview statements and communication practices in the meetings of how communication plays a role in the construction of meaning about the Compstat initiative and its introduction.

The interview statements of officers show how communication influenced the construction of the meaning about Compstat. The two general information meetings held to introduce the Compstat, and the communication strategies of the police director in these meeting clearly gave cues of a new police organization and the type of officers needed in this new environment. Officers made sense of Compstat first based on these two meetings and constructed a meaning for Compstat. The decision of some officers to retire was based on their perception of Compstat that was developed after communication practices of the police director in these meetings.

The Compstat meetings play a significant role in the construction of Compstat principles and components and perception of people regarding the meaning of Compstat. The negative attitudes of some officers in the early phases of Compstat were derived from the police director’s preferred style of communication in the meetings. Officers provided many examples of humiliation and, intimidation at these meetings, such as being told “get off the stage; you are
transferred now”, all of which influenced how officers perceive this initiative. In contrast to early forms, officers express more positive feelings about Compstat taking into account the changing communication style of the police director. There are many other examples that show how communication influences officers’ perception in the long run.

Thus, communication is an ongoing process through which new meanings of Compstat are constructed and reconstructed. Officers made new sense of Compstat in the moments of communication. The times they were rewarded or intimidated contributed to the construction process. In the case of the MPD, the police directors seemed to play a privileged role in terms of reconstruction of meanings of Compstat. Officers relentlessly pointed out the communication style and strategies of the police directors while emphasizing the meaning of Compstat for them.

To summarize, communication is a very important part of Compstat from the beginning. Communication problems were one of the main reasons used to explain the need for a change effort in the MPD. Similarly, officers referred to communication and accountability more than anything else to explain to the contribution of Compstat to the MPD. As shown in this section, the interaction of communication and Compstat in terms of information exchange, information sharing, coordination, collaboration, construction of new meanings, and manifestation of culture and cultural values in the MPD was undeniable. The next section points out the last function of communication as manifestation of culture and cultural values in the MPD with a focus on the Compstat meanings.

**Communication and Culture**

It was widely explained that communication plays a critical role in Compstat at different levels. Specifically, the Compstat meeting, where communication practices of this initiative become more visible, clearly shows the dominant aspects of the culture in the MPD. Taking this
into account, the first part of this section will focus on the communication practices in these meetings in terms of understanding the cultural values in the MPD.

In addition, the selection of communication channels and communication strategies used in the introduction and modification of Compstat is another important point that certainly gives cues regarding the dominant cultural values in the MPD. As such, the second part of this section will focus on the change communication and its relations to the culture of the MPD.

**Communication as Manifestation of Culture**

Communication is not only information exchange or construction process but also a tool to manifest ideas, beliefs, and, values. The language and jargon, humor, and physical arrangements of the office space, turn taking patterns, reporting mechanisms, and tone of voice can be evaluated as manifestations of culture and beliefs. This is critical for this study which suggests a link between culture and communication.

The data in this study shows that the Compstat meetings are the most visible part of the initiative where culture is both constructed and manifested. The preferred styles of communication in these meetings (i.e., verbal, nonverbal), language, jargon, addressing terms, physical arrangement of meeting room, the number and rank of participants, and the sequencing of disclosures, and processes such as greetings and asking questions show the culture of the organization and culture of the gathering that define the rules of meetings. The observable aspects of the interaction (i.e., timing, location) tell us great deal about the relationship among the participants. For this reason, these regular gatherings with their certain practices deserve specific attention in this study, which aims to understand the connection of culture and communication in the context of Compstat.
Communication in Compstat meetings and culture. The first thing that needs to be mentioned is the special room design for the meetings. The meeting setting not only reflects the critical people in the sense of where they sit, how they talk, and the culture of the organization, but also the ways certain values are enacted in the organization. In the MPD, the room is designed in a way to increase the quality of communication practices and the idea of accountability, show power distance, and provide an image of the technology oriented nature of Compstat.

There was a conference center called the communication center that is walking distance from the police headquarters. As shown in the following picture, there is a big room that was regularly used for these meetings in this center. The meetings were held on Thursdays promptly at 9am. Officers wore either a uniform or suit depending on their unit, which represents the formality and seriousness of these meetings. Officers mostly came about 15 minutes before the meetings. The time gap between their arrival and start of the meeting functioned as a ritualistic occasion for sharing informal information and bonding. The meeting started officially after the police director came to this room. When the police director entered, everybody stood up and sat only after he asked them to. Officers sat around a big oval table, which was placed in the middle of this room. As shown in the Photo 1, the chief, deputy chiefs, precinct commanders, and heads of other divisions sat in the first row while their staff sat in the second row. Precinct commanders and heads of divisions sat on the long left and right sides of the first row, which is reserved by the Compstat unit staff with name tags (i.e. second precinct commander; head of narcotics division) on the table. The short side was reserved for the police director and deputy chiefs, while the chairs in the front part of picture were for the units and precincts that would be questioned during the meetings. Officers’ place at the table was reserved basically according to
their position in the organization. Deputy Chiefs sat next to the police director in bigger seats compared to the other commanders, as a way of expressing power distance in this organization. On the part of the wall not visible in the picture, there were two big screens displaying crime statistics/crime analysis and crime maps simultaneously. Officers came with big files called Compstat package, in which they had all the information needed for the meeting. The design of the room enabled the police director and deputy chief to see all the officers during questioning.

Photo 1 Compstat room

The meetings were held in a ritualistic manner in terms of greeting, asking, turn taking, topic, manner, and participants. There were clear rules that define the critical people in meetings, who talk, about what, and the expectations of the chief and director. The police director regularly opens the meeting and gives the floor to the deputy chief for questioning. The deputy chief starts mostly “welcome” and calls a precinct commander by saying, “Yes, we start Compstat, second precinct.” The related precinct commander and one or two staff from this precinct go to the seats opposite the director for questioning, which is basically known as the ‘hot spot’. In each meeting, usually two different precincts were invited to the podium, where officers were expected to answer questions regarding their units or precincts in front of their peers. This room design,
specifically the use of the podium, has a symbolic meaning that supports the accountability mechanism.

The central discourse of meetings was devoted to how crime can be reduced either by prevention, deterrence (i.e., quality of life summonses, visibility, presence, tickets), or investigating and solving crimes committed and arresting people. The police director and deputy chief had different roles in the meetings. The deputy chief’s role was to ask questions in order to check commanders’ information about the problems in their precinct, hold them accountable, and check their performance. The deputy chief regularly started questioning with a number of expected questions (i.e., what are the activities in your region; what is your analysis; what causes this; what are you doing about it; what else) regarding crime statistics, analysis, deployment of resources, and the response of officers for the problem. In other words, the deputy chief followed the concept of the four principles of Compstat in his questions. He asked questions one after another which gives the impression that he has a strong background to perform his role in this scene. The byproduct of this questioning was basically accountability, information sharing, and performance measurement. At the same time, these meetings function as an occasion for evaluating the administrative and leadership skills of commanders.

The police director mostly stayed silent in this question-answer practice and came into play if he needed further clarification, or found the answers inadequate, or to finalize the meeting with a general evaluation. In particular, the times when a commander did not provide enough information, or satisfying information about the problems in his/her region, crime analysis and patterns, and possible police tactics for the crime problems, the police director expresses his displeasure by saying, for instance, “this is not good; this is not a solution for this problem”, “this is not enough”, “Hey T… listen to me, we have been talking about this for two years. It is not
okay……”, “It is ok. But, come up with more comprehensive plan.” After this, he mostly explained the reason for his displeasure and what he has in his mind. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear comments such as,

Presence is great, but not a solution to this problem. You should put handcuffs on these people. Early morning operations with the narcotics division are needed to solve this problem. Hi guys, you should make analysis of crime time and place carefully in order to make a good decision for the police response. You should have pictures of the suspects. You guys listen! Quality of lives, quality of lives, quality of lives; they have to feel uncomfortable carrying a gun.

The police director used this platform to share his experience in policing by referring to what he has done in the NYPD, which is likely to increase the legitimacy of his suggestions.

The closure of the meetings was conducted by the police director by focusing on general problems, followed by a visionary and motivational speech. The issues mentioned in this final part of the meeting confirm that the police director constructs and reconstructs his leadership and managerial skills in front of all commanders and a wide range of participants. The police director frequently focused on the issues of leadership, personal expectations and priorities of the department, policies of the organization, new procedures initiated by his upper echelon, cultural and organizational change, motivation, and the success or failure of the organization. The following excerpt from the end of a meeting illustrated a typical closure speech of the police director:

Shootings are down. That is remarkable. I attended a 200 person work shop. We got the attention of other departments. Take a deep breath and look at the unbelievable. It is really hard to keep it going. The successes we have are remarkable. Success needs to be institutionalized. Concentrate on what you do. We need smart policing, working closely, coordination between narcotics and patrol, coordination between patrol and detectives. You did a remarkable job.
In another meeting, the police director emphasized firstly the problems in crime analysis, organizational discipline, and the difficulties in changing organizational culture, and closed the meeting with the following inspirational speech.

Listen folks; ….. You did a phenomenal job. You can do better. You can do better by listening to what you are told to do. Listen, I am going to screw up. Management is about numbers, leadership is about vision, letting people see themselves in this agency. Caroline you did a great job. That is the type of thing we are waiting for. Today, she went to the podium to represent her precinct and she did a great job. Listen, great job, keep up the good work. Take care you folks and stay safe. Thank you everybody.

In an exceptional meeting, the police director postponed the meeting in its fifth minute due to problems in the answers of a commander. He said, “Stop, stop, stop, go home, study your lessons, and come back tomorrow. Okay.” The speeches of the police director in these meetings show that managerial discourse on leadership, organizational and cultural change, and motivation served as a powerful rhetorical resource for the police director in communicating certain ideas. He referred to these concepts frequently and tried to adopt the popular ideas of management in this organization.

In short, the police director used these meetings both for motivation and critiques of some commanders. There were some questions unanswered throughout the questioning process, which was criticized, but at the same time there were moments of motivation, support, and reward. Although the extent of these was comparably less than that of criticism, this manner shows a change in the tone of meetings compared to the early forms of Compstat meeting.

Another presenting property of these meetings was the way communication was organized; it both influences and is influenced by the relationships among participants (i.e., social status, power of participants) as well as the culture of the police (i.e., hierarchy, rank). It was clear that there were some conventional rules that defined the preferred communication practices. Officers, institutionally, seemed to be aware of the range of choices open to them. In
particular, the deputy chief and police director had the primary role of starting the conversation, changing the subject, selecting the speaker, defining the tone of meeting, and finishing the conversation. The following excerpts show the power of the police director to start and finish the conversation. For instance, the police director could interrupt other officers and start speaking with expressions like “Listen; listen folks; guys.” Officers would wait a little bit to make sure that the police director finished his speech. Other officers started speaking with expressions like “sir, chief.” These words were good indicators of power distance among participants. Similarly, the police director and deputy chief had the power to change the topic of conversation as illustrated in the following excerpts: “Second precinct. I want to talk about robbery” and “Now, Let’s talk about burglary.” Other participants including precinct commanders, and heads of different divisions usually spoke when they were asked a question. It was a rare situation for them to ask a question to the deputy chief or police director. Even in these cases, the question was for clarification of the question that has been asked of them: “Sir, do you mean burglary in sector 212?” In many cases, precinct commanders at the podium needed to answer these questions, where as the heads of narcotics and gang units joined this interaction depending on the topic.

All communication practices, the way turn taking was organized and timing, and the lack of overlap clearly showed that the current form of these meetings were very structured. In fact, this strictly enforced question-answer form seemed to limit the extent of information sharing, organizational learning, and innovation as most of the officers in the room remain as passive listeners rather than active listeners or contributors. In addition, the culture of the police organization characterized by hierarchy, bureaucracy, and power distance seemed to discourage taking responsibility and risk taking. The culture of the police organization, early forms of the
meetings, peer pressure, and fear of embarrassment seemed to play a significant role in this communication practice. A ranked officer clarified this limitation as follows:

I don’t know because director George Brown says all the time, what do you guys think. However, most of the time, he does not get any responses. I don’t think that everybody has an opinion. Some people might have a comment. It is just police culture. Again, it is probably a reflection of how Compstat is used to being done over the years. People did not speak up pretty much. There is also a lot of pressure in that room, fear of embarrassment, fear of being ridiculed, and fear of giving me more work, fear of transfer.

The observation of meetings showed that the meetings were organized with well-defined and predictable questions and predictable answers that lack creativity and innovation. There were few moments that surprised the participants in the room. As such, it is plausible to say that the communication in these meetings was a way from being in the form of brainstorming. This is not to say all these discussions were useless, but to point out the possibility of improving the meeting design, communication, and creating a feeling of relaxation in terms of the topic of discussion and range of answers. The following interview excerpts from one officer illustrated the problems on these issues and possible solutions:

In order to overcome this problem, you can organize the meeting differently. Instead of saying, second precinct what are you doing about your robberies, it can be something like, let’s talk about robberies now. Instead of being personnel driven, it can be problem driven. That might be helpful for people to talk more freely.

In addition, the communication patterns in these meetings, addressing terms confirmed the formality of the discourse and the power distance among participants. While ranked officers started answering the questions of the upper echelon with “Sir”, the police director addressed officers in the room by saying “Listen, folks, guys”, hey guys” or with the names of officers. These addressing terms clearly show the power difference and chain of command among participants.
The language used, especially word choices in these meetings, also reflected occupational and relational codes and provided a basis to talk on the same level and standardized interpretations of the talk. Historically, police officers use acronyms, numbers, and jargon on the radio to maintain a short talk and prevent other people from understanding it. This cultural and communicational background enabled police officers to adopt this occupation specific language in the meetings. The use of this language in the meetings was illustrated by the use of the following acronyms, jargon, and numbers for crime locations, sectors, and crime types: “positive, negative, sector 212; FIs (Field Inquiries).” All these concepts were widely used in these meetings and helped officers to talk on the same level and clearly manifested a shared system of symbols and meanings performed in their speech.

The discourse of the meetings shows that officers consider crime patterns, statistics, digital maps, and talk about these things more than before. There were a range of concepts that manifest the new ways of doing the job and the new world of policing. In particular, the common use of concepts such as, “crime analysis and patterns, computers, crime maps, daily information, effective tactics, and accountability” show the new face of policing. There was a press conference before a Compstat meeting about the police–parole office relationship. This press conference was a great example of the change in the language of policing, which was also the sign of the change in the mind and understanding of police officers. New terms used included being proactive and intelligence led, forging partnerships, sharing information with different agencies, and participating joint efforts. It is understood that the way police organizations discuss crime changed with the contribution of Compstat.

To summarize, the basic character of communication was question-answer and feedback. The most common forms of transactions was information giving, greeting, criticizing,
questioning, complaining, threatening, warning, requesting, and making announcements. Communication practices in these meetings were clearly restricted by the organizational culture. At the same time, it is necessary to say that these preferred communication practices in the meetings were not independent from wider cultural values and rules that define the relationships and communication styles in the department. More specifically, it is possible to say that there is interdependence between the current form of meetings and the wider cultural rules that define the organization, the occupation of police, and the USA. Within this cultural knowledge, participants know who will talk, when, when to stop talking, addressing terms, what is appropriate and inappropriate, the arrangement of turn taking, and also questioning, how to question, and how to warning. For instance, the following quote of the police director after strong criticism of commander shows how different cultural levels function in the meetings: “Don’t take it personal, it is business.” As stated by another officer, “the boss shouts at you in a meeting, but tomorrow you can still be friends in the USA.” As shown, there is a general understanding to differentiate personal life and business in the culture of the USA, and this is reflected in the Compstat meetings of the MPD.

In fact, these kinds of gatherings for accountability, performance measurement, information sharing, and motivation of the officers are not unusual for an organization in many ways, but, as explained, the manner and tone of questioning, power distance, the use of language, technological infrastructure, and the well thought out and strictly defined rules and norms of these meetings make them unique, and possibly successful. For instance, an officer explained this difference as follows “Even in the corporate world, if you are not giving what is expected, I am pretty sure someone will be thrown off the stage as well. Maybe, in different ways, but everyone will be.” In the case of the MPD, the manner of questioning was strict, abusive, and
humiliating, while it was transformed into a friendlier manner over the years. In contrast to early forms of the meetings, these officers stayed seated during questioning which was perceived by many as a sign of reduced tension over the years. While some officers explained this transformation as basically the personal style of the police director, some of them put more focus on the inevitable change of manner due to officer’s reaction and demoralization. Regardless of the reason for the change in this manner, the level of tolerance for this tough manner seem to be higher in police organizations, where the relationships are basically defined by rank, status, hierarchy, power distance, and masculinity.

Thus, these regular gatherings with their well defined norms and communication patterns show high power distance, masculinity, and individuality as well as a focus on the ranked system, status, and avoiding risk taking. In addition to these traditional values, accountability, information sharing, and flexibility seem to be emerging values in this organization.

The issues discussed in this part will be illustrated in the following table. The table shows the main points in the meetings and their cultural meanings.

Table 11 Culture, Communication and Compstat Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules of the Meeting</th>
<th>Culture, Communication and Compstat Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularity in day and time</td>
<td>Promptness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress code: Uniforms/ Suits</td>
<td>Formality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing up when the police director comes to the meeting room</td>
<td>Paramilitary Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritualistic manner of meetings in terms of time, duration, topics of discussion, greeting, turn taking.</td>
<td>Chain of command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure speech of the police director</td>
<td>Power distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular participants</td>
<td>Norms and Habits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room Design</td>
<td>The technological infrastructure: Projectors, Crime Maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The size of chairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sitting position in the room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Discourse of the Meetings</strong></td>
<td>Reducing crime / Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigating and solving crimes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arresting people</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crime statistics, Analysis of crime, Crime patters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Plans and tactics for responding to crime</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communication Design / Practices</strong></td>
<td>Question-Answer Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regularity in turn taking rules</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tone of voice</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Body language</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The primary role of upper echelon to start, finish conversation and change of topic of discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Address terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Word Choices</strong></td>
<td>Use of occupational codes: Positive, negative, sector</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relational Codes</td>
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<td>Jargon</td>
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<td>Use of numbers</td>
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**Change Communication and Culture**

Similar to the previous section, the literature suggests that the selection of certain communication channels and communication strategies provides information about an organization, and its structure and culture. Based on the section regarding communication...
strategies and channels, it is possible to say that the dominant cultural aspects of the MPD are reflected heavily in the selection of communication strategies and channels used in the introduction and modification of the Compstat.

It was explained in the previous section that regardless of communication channels used in the MPD, communication was used in a top-down manner to disseminate information about Compstat and to influence officers’ compliance. The channels to give feedback or participation were limited. The following quotations from interviews illustrated clearly different aspects of change communication used in the introduction of Compstat. The first example emphasized the role of the chain of command in the change communication as follows: “We have a chain of command. What is expected from the number one guy is transferred to the number two guy. He should be able to follow that information. So, it is all about chain of command.” Another officer confirmed this point by adding the lack of feedback in this process: “We make changes and we make policies that trickle down to the patrol. He has to do it. But, it is never explained why he has to do it. We never ask for feedback about it.” As shown, there is more focus on the dissemination of information than on soliciting input in this organization characterized by hierarchy, chain of command, and directive and masculine leadership expectation.

This is not to say that there is not any exchange of ideas, participation to the decision making mechanisms, or feedback in the MPD. As illustrated in the following example, each director has his own circle where there is more exchange of ideas and feedback: “Mostly the police director gives specific instructions and expects us to follow them. It usually goes through the ranks. There is more feedback higher up.” This statement shows the hierarchical nature of police organizations and its reflection on communication strategies.
Another important point to be mentioned is the focus on the paramilitary structure, orders, and the unquestioned authority of the upper echelon. This point was evidenced clearly in the following statement: “It is first done by orders. They give you details of what they want. What is going to be implemented and how it is going to be tracked. This is a paramilitary, we do it with orders. Usually, orders have done by orders.” Another officer confirmed this aspect of change communication by giving an example from a written document as follows: “It is called exactly what it is. It is an order. It is not a request, advice, not a request for participation. It tells you what you shall do. This shall be the way we conduct Compstat. Put in to effect immediately.” It is clear from these interviews that the paramilitary structure, chain of command, and hierarchy of the MPD that envisions direction and leadership from the top-down was reflected in the communication strategies used in the introduction and the modification of Compstat.

Not surprisingly, many officers seemed to accept this paramilitary, hierarchical structure that goes along with masculine culture and high power distance, in which officers in lower ranks are required to accept the top down change communication initiated by the upper echelon. The first excerpt from the interview of a ranked officer shows the perspective of officers in managerial positions: “We are police; we are very much military people. We told them what to do and they do it. It is simple.” The following statement of a constable shows the acceptance of this attitude by the lower level: “This is a paramilitary organization. I have to do what I am told.” Most of the low level officers emphasized masculine culture and high power distance in police organizations, and that it is shaped in the hierarchical, paramilitary structure which justifies the top down manner, and lack of participation and feedback of low level officers in the change communication process.
Another important point is the implications of the rank system in the change communication process. As illustrated in the following examples, the MPD makes clear distinctions between ranked officers and constables. For instance, the first two meetings in the introduction of Compstat aimed at mid-level officers. Similarly, the main groups of officers participating in the Compstat meetings are ranked officers. Organizational emails were given only to ranked officers.

The selection of this communication strategy was believed to be associated with the chain of command and need for support of specific groups rather than of all officers. As mentioned in the following statement, ranked officers were more likely to be involved in the change communication process, in terms of being able to influence frontline officers on the streets, the police director and upper echelon: “I mean, it depends what your relationship is with the various directors. Over the years, my position has changed and increased in rank. I have more input than others. It just depends on what your relationship with the director is. Every director is going to choose who is in his circle is.” The reason for this attitude was given in another statement: “You know often times they want to keep the power among the superior ranks.”

Another important approach for the focus on ranked officers rather than the entire agency was explained by the resources and size of the organization. This point was highlighted in the following statement of one officer: “Now, there is something written. I can’t physically go and talk every single officer. We use orders, memos, and officers speaking about it.”

The final point stated to explain the involvement of only a number of ranked officers was related to effectiveness. In other words, some officers emphasized the structural circumstances, specifically the resources and size of the organization, that influence the upper echelon’s insight
concerning the need for efficient communication and how change should be communicated. This point was illustrated in the following example:

If you are used to informing everybody regarding every change in this department, you never get anything done. That is why you have the superiors. They implement, they have a couple of officers to ask what you think. You can’t ask everybody because everybody has an opinion, who does not like this or like that. You will never finish. In the case of Compstat, they did not ask my opinion.

However, when officers talked about change in uniforms, software, or anything other than Compstat, it should be noted that different mechanisms were used. Specifically, officers identified that the scope and content of change certainly influenced the selection of communication strategies and communication channels, which was not necessarily like the case of Compstat. For instance, one officer talked about a current change process which clearly indicated a different mechanism used for the introduction of change:

Currently, we are making a change in the disciplinary process. The bosses from different commands have a meeting with the director’s office to discuss how these changes should take place. It depends on what it is because some of the changes they have to meet with the union because it may involve the contract, like changing the uniform. So, it depends on what the situation is.

The difference was explained in terms of the scope of change, major or minor, and the nature and complexity of the change. The following statements emphasized this point,

It depends on the type of change. If it is a minor change, then it is handled more through memorandum and there are instructions that come from the chain of command. If it is a significant change, we have had specific training. So, it depends on the complexity and nature of the change.

On the same line of thought, one officer talked about his primary role in the selection of mapping software. All these statement showed that bottom up change is possible. Some officers can present an idea to the upper level which comes from their expert power, positional power, or power that come from their exposure to the problems on the ground.
Selection of communication channels and the language in these channels are other important points to be mentioned. The focus on written documents and use of formal, strict language and orders reflect the traditional nature and hierarchical culture of this organization. An officer pointed out this aspect of the MPD: “It has been that being such a paramilitary organization being guided by orders, general orders, and personal orders. Did it work? Sure, it worked. But, there is no room to encourage free thinking and creative thinking”.

Thus, on one hand, the masculine culture, high power distance, and focus on authority shaped the strictly hierarchical, paramilitary structure of the MPD; this was reflected in a rule-bound, programmatic implementation approach, in which the upper echelon focused more on disseminating information in a top-down manner in order to influence compliance rather than solicit feedback and participation. The modification of Compstat was done in accordance with the concerns of the police directors rather than officers in the MPD. In a similar vein, the preference for certain forms of communication, namely memos and orders, and their content, indicated the traditional nature of this organization.

However, there is a room for bottom up change depending on the scope, nature, and the complexity of change. In terms of Compstat, it is certainly evaluated differently than other forms of change. As the main purpose of Compstat is to alter the organization’s structure and, culture, and replace some corrupt officers, participative and democratic approaches and communication strategies are believed not to provide the best results in an organization characterized by a high power distance and strict hierarchy.

The connection between change communication and culture will be illustrated in the following table.
Table 12 Change Communication and Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Communication and Culture</th>
<th>Introduction of Compstat</th>
<th>Change Communication</th>
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<td></td>
<td>One way / Top-down</td>
<td>Written order and memos (formal, strict, and bureaucratic language)</td>
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<td>Disseminate information</td>
<td>Top down-One way</td>
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<td>Channels to give feedback or participation limited</td>
<td>Disseminate Information</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Influence officers’ compliance by threats and intimidation</td>
<td>Targeting especially ranked officers (email for ranked officers / meetings aiming ranked officer)</td>
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<td>Targeting ranked officers</td>
<td>Acceptance of higher authority</td>
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<td>Chain of command</td>
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<td>Unquestioned Authority</td>
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<td>Ranked system and Discipline</td>
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<td>Hierarchy / Paramilitary</td>
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**Summary**

In this section of this study, the focus was on the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat, communication strategies and communication channels that were used to introduce and implement this initiative, the role of communication in the current implementation of Compstat, and how communication design, word choices, preferred communication practices in the Compstat meetings and the selection of communication strategies and channels were related to the culture of this organization.

**Communication Strategies and Channels**

Among many other points, communication is essential to introducing change initiatives in the organization, providing justifications for why change is needed, and dealing with resistance, and achieving organizational change. The most critical cases in the introduction of Compstat in the
MPD were two general information meetings. These meetings, which were organized with the contribution of two consultants, were the first formal procedure announcing change and informing officers about this initiative in the MPD. These meetings were supported with written general orders regarding the implementation of Compstat. The communication strategy in these early phases of the initiative was to disseminate information in a top down manner, without any serious effort to reduce uncertainty, persuade officers, or win their support. Rather, there was an authoritarian strategy in which the police director used direct assertive requests for compliance, as well as threats and aggression to achieve objectives in his mind. The end product of this process was inadequate information, and a high level of anxiety and uncertainty among officers, even among the ones who had attended the Compstat meetings immediately after the implementation of the initiative. Most of these problems were overcome to some extent in the later phases as officers learned by doing what was expected from them in the meetings.

There are two main points that define this process. On one hand, some officers believed that it would be wrong to assume that better information dissemination, more knowledge, or more effective communication alone would lead to support for Compstat among some officers. Although it might contribute to a better understanding and awareness of the goals of the initiative and its implication for the organization, it was not expected to persuade some officers to alter their behaviors, as they were against the reasons and goals of change due to their personal habits and loss of status. On the other hand, some officers suggested that they were not against the reasons and goals of change, but they did not have any information about the initiative, what was expected from them, which made the process painful for them.

The initiative was modified extensively over these 14 years. These modifications were communicated at a greater extent in written documents such as memos, and general orders,
which were disseminated in a chain of command. These written documents were very strict, bureaucratic, and formal in manner and were written in a well-organized manner. In addition, Compstat meetings, which take place in a formal and face to face setting, were used as a platform to communicate about the implementation and modification of the initiative, share information and decisions, train officers, discuss new practices. Thus, these meetings enabled officers to learn what was expected from them, and decreased the level of uncertainty. Roll call meetings seemed to be another important formal and face to face platform that played a primary role in communicating changes in practice and also changes in daily crime trends and policing. Finally, it was also clear that emails were becoming a part of change communication. Similar to any other organization, small meetings or informal channels were used to communicate change in the MPD.

**Communication and Current Implementation:**

When officers talked about the role of communication in the current implementation of the initiative, they basically referred to information sharing, coordination, collaboration, and joint efforts. Although officers did not refer directly, the role of communication to construct new meaning and as manifestation of cultural values was evident in the current form of Compstat.

Communication, in the sense of better information sharing, was stated as one of the most important contributions of Compstat to this police organization. It was stated many times in the interviews that Compstat allowed not only the collection and use of information, but also created a platform to share this information, especially in the Compstat meetings. Many study participants referred to the large size of the MPD and the greater number of people through whom information must pass when explaining the function and inevitability of Compstat in the MPD. The observation of the meetings confirmed the critical role of these meetings in terms of
information exchange. Every moment of these meetings can be evaluated in terms of information sharing, addressing problems in a timely manner, and sharing best practices.

In spite of its contribution to information sharing, the data gathered in this study suggested that there were still problems to disseminate information to front line officers and to make them understand their responsibilities in this process and implications of Compstat for their daily practices. In addition, the extent of information sharing seemed to be limited even during the meetings. It seemed like a number of factors influenced the quality of information sharing and restricted in expressing and sharing information freely: The design of meeting (i.e., number of participants, meeting room), the design of communication (i.e., question-answer form), the history of police organization (i.e., early forms of meetings: intimidation and humiliation), and the cultural values and personal attitudes of officers in organization (i.e., avoid extra work, defensive culture), and organizational constraints in terms of the resources.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the problems regarding information sharing rooted in the hierarchical, divisional structure of this police organization and historically suggested cultural barriers to sharing information seemed to have been overcome to a large extent in the Compstat era. The mechanism of Compstat (i.e., Compstat meetings, crime information centers, roll call meetings, Compstat packages, record management systems) inevitably supported information sharing at different levels.

Communication is also essential to coordinating efforts both with the other units and external organizations. Most of the officers appreciated the contribution of the initiative to bringing promptness and flexibility in the deployment of resources, and reinforcing the coordination of efforts and deployment between precincts and special units such as Narcotics and Gang. In addition to the coordination of efforts among different precincts and units in the MPD,
Compstat, specifically the Compstat meetings, were used to some extent to coordinate crime fighting efforts with other organizations, such as attorneys, the municipality, etc.

Although officers did not talk about directly the role of communication as construction process, it is clear that the role of communication in Compstat is more than information exchange or coordination, but it is an ongoing process through which new meanings and new practices are constructed. The culture of this organization, the meaning of Compstat, resistance and receptivity were constructed and manifested through communication. The police directors employed communication as a sense-making tool or frame Compstat in different ways, which influenced the interpretation of change and reaction of officers. In the case of the MPD, the police directors played a privileged role in terms of reconstruction of meanings about Compstat. Officers relentlessly pointed out the communication style and strategies of the police directors while emphasizing the meaning of Compstat for them.

**Communication and Culture**

Communication is not only a construction process but also a tool to manifest ideas, beliefs, values, and culture. The language and jargon, humor, physical arrangements of the office space, turn taking patterns, reporting mechanisms, and tone of voice can be evaluated as manifestation of culture and beliefs. In addition, the preferred styles of communication in the Compstat meetings (i.e., verbal, nonverbal), language, jargon, addressing terms, design of the meeting room, the number and rank of participants, the sequencing of disclosures, and process such as greeting, asking question show the culture of the organization and culture of the gathering that define the rules of meetings.

The analysis of all these points provided ample evidence that these regular gatherings with their well defined norms and communication patterns show high power distance,
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and individuality, as well as the focus on the ranked system, status, and the avoidance of risk taking. In addition to these traditional values, the analysis of data indicated that accountability, information sharing, and flexibility seemed to be emerging values in this organization.

The selection of communication channels and communication strategies to introduce change was another important point that certainly gave cues regarding the dominant cultural values in the MPD. Many officers seemed to accept the paramilitary, hierarchical structure that goes along with masculine culture and high power distance, in which officers in lower ranks are required to accept the top down change communication initiated by the upper echelon. The focus on written documents and use of formal, strict language, and orders pointed out the traditional nature and hierarchical culture of this organization. The masculine culture, high power distance, and focus on authority shaped in a strictly hierarchical, paramilitary structure of the MPD was reflected in a rule-bound, programmatic implementation approach, in which the upper echelon focused more on disseminating information in a top-down manner in order to influence compliance rather than solicit feedback and participation. In a similar vein, the preference of certain forms of communication, namely memos and orders, and their content indicated the traditional nature of this organization.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
CULTURE AND COMPSTAT

The first main question of this study is: *What is the role of culture in the introduction, implementation, and evaluation of Compstat?* In this section of the study, the main findings for this research question and its four sub-questions will be discussed with a focus on organizational culture, along with its implications for police organizations attempting to implement Compstat or a similar change initiative.

Based on the sub-questions, the focus will be on the role of culture;

1) In the selection and introduction of Compstat
2) In the reaction of officers to Compstat
3) In the current implementation of Compstat
4) The connection between cultural change and Compstat

Then, a general framework regarding the role of culture in Compstat implementation will be presented. Finally, the focus will be on the practical implications of organizational culture for police organizations attempting to implement such change initiatives. The discussion of these points relied basically on interview statements, observation of the meetings, and documents, all of which are then interpreted by the researcher.

**Introduction of Compstat**

RQ 1- a) How was Compstat introduced and implemented in the selected study side?

This sub-question will be discussed in two subheadings: The selection of Compstat and the introduction of Compstat. The selection process of Compstat has certain implications for the
way of introducing Compstat. For this reason, it will be discussed as part of the introduction process. The current implementation of Compstat will be discussed in another section.

**Selection of Compstat**

The process by which Compstat was selected for the MPD provides valuable examples of institutional theory and interaction of organizational change initiatives with the culture of an organization. Organizations work in an environment. In contrast to countries with one, national, centralized police organization, there are many independent police organizations in the USA that in some sense, compete with each other. As envisioned in the theory of institutionalization, innovations and change programs that are viewed as successful create substantial pressures on other organizations to adopt similar practices. In the case of Compstat, more than 400 police executives from nearly 100 law enforcement agencies in the USA attended an NYPD-sponsored Compstat conference in 1997 (Newhouse News Service, 2000). In the years that followed, testimonials and endorsements were widely published as government reports or in policing journals. In particular, the implementation of Compstat at a large, well-known, and prestigious police organization like the NYPD and its perceived success increased ‘bandwagon pressure’ on other police organizations. This pressure implies that non-adoptive organizations fear appearing different from adopters, and possibly performing at a lower level, if other organizations substantially benefit from this initiative (Lee & Chan, 2003).

The data provided evidence of institutional pressures on the selection of Compstat in the MPD. The MPD inevitably interacts and competes with other police organizations, and is influenced by the overall trend and success in the NYPD attributed to Compstat. More specifically, the following factors influenced the selection of Compstat in an environment where numerous numbers of alternative initiatives exist: a) The heavily advertised success of the
initiative in the NYPD; b) The popularity of the initiative in the academic world; c) The political and public support behind this initiative (i.e., accountability, empowerment, performance measurement); d) The geographical closeness and resulting interaction of NYPD and MPD officers; e) Similarities of problems between two organizations before adopting Compstat (i.e., high crime rates, communication problems, corruption, lack of citizen and officer satisfaction); and finally f) Cultural and structural similarities between these organizations. Considering all these factors, Compstat provided an inevitable opportunity for the MPD and the MPD police director, who had been assigned to this position with promises to make substantial changes.

In fact, the role of institutional pressures on the selection and implementation of Compstat had already been stated in the literature. Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2007) analyzed three police departments which adopted Compstat. They found that relative to technical and rational considerations to improve effectiveness, institutional pressures to appear progressive and successful were more dominant reason to adopt these kinds of initiatives. This study confirms the point suggested by these scholars.

From the culture perspective, the selection, implementation, and diffusion of Compstat over these years in the police organizations including the MPD show cultural harmony between Compstat and police organizations. Even, the various fire departments, which are culturally closer to police organizations than to any other organization and were intended to implement this initiative, could not exhibit the same level of success. In fact, the notion of cultural harmony implies the fact that Compstat can be adopted without changing traditional values of police such as strict hierarchy, paramilitary structure, and chain of command. Despite the change of certain values such as reactive policing style, unresponsiveness to the changing conditions, and lack of accountability and information sharing, these traditional values seemed to remain as an important
part of the cultural identification of the MPD. This was the case in the MPD and some other Compstat-adopted police organizations (O’Connell, 2002). Otherwise, the tough nature of Compstat and the focus on numbers for the measurement of performance would not be tolerated.

The cultural and structural similarities between the NYPD and the MPD asserted in the interviews were another point emphasized to explain both the reason for the selection of this initiative and the success of the initiative over these years. Specifically, the cosmopolitan nature of these two organizations in terms of their officers, citizens, high population density and crime rates, policing approach, crime types, size, and focus on traditional values (i.e., paramilitary, hierarchy, history, respect, discipline) are hypothesized to make these two organizations culturally comparable, in contrast to a small police organization without these characteristics. Thus, cultural and structural similarities were another important point to be considered in the selection of Compstat in the MPD.

In addition to all these institutional, cultural, and structural conditions, the change of the police director in the MPD was another point of considerable importance in terms of the timing of the decision to implement this change initiative in the MPD. Leaders, as the visible face of the organization, tend to follow the trends in the environment. In this line of thought, the police director of the MPD who had been assigned this position with promises to make substantial changes in the MPD saw this politically and publicly supported, technologically sophisticated and dramatic initiative as a powerful mechanism to support his promises, appear progressive and successful by following the trends, and earn legitimacy and credit for his plans, programs, and policies in the MPD.
Given these circumstances, it was not unexpected that the decision was made to implement this initiative in the MPD. There were likely to have been similar considerations in the other police organizations which implemented Compstat in the following years.

**Introduction of Compstat**

There are a range of options asserted by scholars regarding the way a change initiative is introduced in an organization (Nutt, 2007). In particular, the introduction phase of a change initiative is critical for its overall success and failure in the organization. This assumption is highly critical for an initiative like Compstat, which is a major change possibly with major consequences for the organization. In parallel to the concept of ‘interpretive flexibility’ theorized by Orlikowski (2000), the concept of ‘Compstat as a tool’ used by many officers imply different ways of introducing and implementing this initiative, with different consequences. In that sense, the role of culture and communication, and inevitably change agents become more significant in the introduction of highly flexible change initiatives like Compstat. Based on this, it is important to understand the communication choices of change agents, culture, and how they interact in the introduction of performance management tools such as Compstat.

The most central practice for the introduction of Compstat in the MPD was two general information meetings organized with the participation of the upper echelon, mid-level managers, and two consultants with experience of Compstat implementation in the NYPD. Although there was not any in-depth information about the extent and nature of the relationship between the police director and these two consultants, they were clearly in closer contact with the upper echelon than the officers in general. The communication strategy in these meetings was to disseminate information and ask for officers’ voluntarily or involuntarily acceptance of this process. As confirmed by many officers, the main message was, “If we keep going in this way,
we have nothing left. We need to do something. And, this is what we are going to do. This is where we are going and this is how we are going to get there. It works. It worked for New York.” The components of this message were, a) we need to change b) it is in our best interest, c) it is appropriate for us d) we need to be persistent e) this is what you need to do. These main messages created the perception that the police director had already decided what was useful and needed, and determined to take action to ensure this initiative was adopted. Within the implementation tactics literature, this manner implies a mixture of rule-bound, programmatic approach (Lewis, 2011), or a control approach noted by Beyer and Trice (1982), and what is identified as an autocratic leadership style by Likert (as cited in Nutt, 2007).

Compatible with these approaches, change agents in the MPD focused more on disseminating information in a top-down manner and dictated how this initiative had to be implemented without asking for input or participation. There was centralized control and decision making in this process. In the process of introduction, the use of positional power of the police director was part of the process to push resisters toward plan acceptance and to replace some officers. There were many examples given by officers of direct assertive requests for compliance or manipulative threats and aggression.

There were many different reasons for this approach at this early phase of the initiative. The most prominent factor was police culture. In the case of the MPD, there was no sign that the input, reaction, and feedback of the officers were sought during the introduction and implementation of the initiative. The culture of the MPD defined with traditional police values played a definite role in this choice of the police director. The culture of the MPD places a high value on strict hierarchy, command and control, authority, discipline, high power distance, and masculine culture. Consistent with these traditional cultural values, officers expressed a
relatively low level expectancy for autonomy, involvement to change process and delegation of decision making, and preferred mostly a highly directive, strong leadership style. These cultural values specified the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate practices. All these values increased the justification of programmatic-rule bound approaches.

The tough manner of the police director in the Compstat meetings was also related to the culture of the police in the MPD. Tough talk and directive questioning as a part of police culture was reflected in the practices of the upper echelon. Even if these manners were not welcomed by some officers, the level of tolerance for intimidation, toughness, and humiliation was likely to be higher in police organizations, including the MPD, than in other types of organizations.

The culture should be considered not only at the organizational, professional level, but also at the national level. For instance, the national culture of the USA makes it possible to distinguish business and personal relationships, and confrontational arguments in meetings. The discussions in business setting are basically not transferred to personal relationships. As stated by the MPD police director in a meeting, “this is business, do not take it personal”. As such, the national culture certainly enabled the confrontations and tough talk in the meeting. In short, this organization characterized by a high power distance, masculinity, and strict hierarchy influenced the change agents’ and officers’ insight concerning the relevant implementation approach for the introduction of Compstat.

Organizational problems were another point to be considered in terms of the choices of the change agents. The case of the MPD indicated that officers were aware of the common problems in the organization. Regardless of the rank and position, it was evident that nearly all officers in the MPD were aware of the problems in every component of the organization, including policing approach, communication, corruption, citizen satisfaction, officer satisfaction,
and crime rates. The problems that were shared by many officers provided an opportunity for a change initiative. The director saw Compstat as an opportunity to control the organization, and to change the inefficient officers and practices in a certain way. The major problems in the MPD, traditional culture of the MPD, the police director’s personal style of leadership as well as his agenda to replace some officers triggered an autocratic approach in the early phases of the initiative.

National trends are another issue. Organizations look at broad trends and forces. Specifically, the case of the NYPD with its overwhelming influence on other police organizations created a sense of how Compstat should be introduced and implemented. The newspaper stories and articles that describe the version of Compstat meetings in the NYPD with terms like ‘war room’ and ‘big theater’ created an expectation that a tough manner was needed to make the initiative work.

The scope of change is another overwhelmingly emphasized point in terms of the choices of change agents. Compstat was evaluated as a major change without exception, which clearly influenced the beliefs of both the upper echelon and officers in general. Officers had different perspectives depending on the type and scope of change. An autocratic style of leadership, communication efficiency rather than consensus building, and a programmatic approach was found more effective by many in guiding the change process for an initiative like Compstat due to the fact that some officers would have sabotaged the process.

The primary role of the leaders as the framer of the change is evident. Leaders play a critical role in communicating and reinforcing a particular frame, which affects how others think about these kinds of initiatives and the nature of the challenge it presents. The role of the leader is important in every organization, but it becomes more critical in paramilitary and high
reliability organizations with unquestioned power of leader. It becomes even more critical in such a highly flexible change initiatives. In the case of the MPD, the leadership style of the police director seemed to lead to certain strategic choices in the introduction of Compstat, which, in turn, influenced the acceptance or resistance, and the degree of success of the change. The police director, as the main character in the introduction phase, described on his own as tough and hardnosed, and reflected his personal style in the case of Compstat. He seemed to rely on the power related to his position.

On one hand, officers in general seemed to expect and justify a strong leader with self-confidence, and a tough, top-down style in which the change process was initiated from the top. Concomitantly, this programmatic, rule-bound approach, characterized with top-down communication, lack of involvement and feedback was justified even perceived as needed. These officers emphasized the need for change, the culture of the police organization (i.e., strict hierarchy, paramilitary structure, control, conformance to authority, discipline), the scope of change, and some corrupt and inefficient officers to justify their point of view. Not only the police director but also more than half of the officers supported the idea that a participative, or democratic approach would not work in the MPD.

On the other hand, some officers did not perceive humiliation and intimidation practices of the police director as a component of strong leadership or as appropriate behavior that lead to desired outcomes. Similarly, the lack of information, training, and the tough manner that turned into humiliation and, in some cases, intimidation was perceived as a problem by nearly all officers. It was posited that this approach created uncertainty, a sense of unknown, and demoralization in the meetings, all of which decreased the legitimacy of the actions of the police director. Even the officers who saw change as necessary and attainable, and supported a change
like Compstat became opponents of this initiative. Thus, it is possible to conclude that there is not reason for not informing and giving training to the officers, or for humiliating and intimidating them in the meetings. Strong leadership and persistence, however, were certainly needed in this process.

**Reaction of Officers**

RQ-1 b) How was Compstat received and reacted to by organizational members?

The case of the MPD is a valuable example of the reaction of officers as it reflects managerial and lower level perspective, and resistance and receptivity. Specifically, the way Compstat was introduced, change in the management practices, the climate and tone of the Compstat meetings, personal attitudes and cultural values certainly influenced the reaction of officers in the MPD.

It was evident that the prominent reaction was resistance at first. There were certainly different groups that changed in their reaction and the level of their reaction. Firstly, there were certainly a number of officers who resisted Compstat as it required a change of culturally accepted habits, routines, roles, status, and practices. In particular, the commanders who had autonomy, who benefitted from inefficiency, and who managed their units and precincts without responsibility and accountability resisted this initiative. They were partly aware of what would change and its possible implications in their work in terms of autonomy, efficiency, responsibility, and accountability. Officers in these groups and a number of traditional officers resisted the initiative due to uncertainty of new processes and outcomes, and fear of possible consequences of the initiative on their status. These fears related to losing control and power, distrust to the new administration, increased workloads and demands; departing from habit and routine; and becoming non-adaptive in this new environment. The case of the NYPD, which was
very close geographically and heavily covered in the newspapers, was likely to influence their expectations.

However, there were certainly officers who were in favor of an initiative like Compstat and were ready to change their habits and practices. Officers in this group resisted more the way the initiative was introduced, the lack of communication, and poor training that fed the feeling of uncertainty, sense of unknown, and fear in the introduction phase. The level of resistance increased with the intimidation and humiliation in the early forms of the meetings. Specifically, officers felt that they were questioned, intimidated, or humiliated about something on which they did not have enough information or background.

There were also a few officers who seemed to accept the way the initiative was introduced and the later phases of the initiative. Officers in these groups mainly mentioned serious problems in the organization, the paramilitary structure, chain of command, strong leadership, and unquestioned power of leaders in police organizations. The main assumption of officers in this group was that a tough and autocratic manner was needed to make the initiative work, to overcome serious problems and resistance in an organization like the MPD, and to prevent resisters from sabotaging this initiative. The tough manner in the meetings and the lack of officer involvement in the process was said to be consistent with the culture of police organizations in general. These officers have also suggested that this kind of process enabled the upper echelon to be aware of and replace incompetent and inefficient officers with other, career oriented officers who can compete in this new environment. The police director was in tune with this perspective, which suggests a tough and autocratic manner to make the initiative work.

In fact, the meetings were the most central and visible practice of Compstat, which came with a consequence more in the form of resistance. Not only in the early phases, but also in the
following phases, it was the meetings that influenced the acceptance and resistance of MPD officers. This was not unexpected, as officers come together regularly for these meetings. Officers made sense and constructed the meaning of Compstat based mainly on these meetings. When humiliation and intimidation, in contrast to accountability and information sharing, became the prominent feeling among officers, resistance became an inescapable consequence of the initiative. In addition, there was a time period in which officers felt the meetings, specifically the questioning style were not fair. It has been generally thought that officers were criticized or rewarded in the meetings not for their performance but for their personal relationships with the upper echelon. These managerial actions and perceptions of injustice increased the feeling of anger and resistance to this initiative.

Although officers in each group referred to police culture to explain their respective positions and reactions, they differed in their interpretation of culture and thus in their reactions. For instance, it would seem that some officers resisted this initiative because they were reluctant to change culturally accepted habits, routines, roles, status, and practices. At the same time, the study suggested that their resistance was motivated by personal anxiety and self-interest. Other officers were more willing to change their habits and practices and be part of this change initiative. However, for some individuals in this group, the way Compstat was introduced, communication strategies, and the tone of meetings led them to resist this initiative. According to them, the extent of information and training provided by higher managers was limited. This led to uncertainty, anxiety, conflict, misunderstanding, and thus resistance among these officers. Finally, while the third group accepted the lack of communication strategies and participation, poor training, and tough tone of the meetings, they justified this approach by referring to strict hierarchy, authority, major problems, and need for change in the MPD. While these reactions
were more distinguishable at first, the lines between these different reactions blurred in the long run and become more interconnected.

**Transition from Resistance to Receptivity**

RQ 1-c) How have reactions changed over time, if they have?

This sub-question will be discussed in two subheadings: Modification of Compstat and the transition from resistance to receptivity. Modification of Compstat was added to this sub-question as it was essential in the transition of officers in the MPD.

**Modification of Compstat**

Compstat was modified extensively throughout the years. The modification process was evolutionary until the last administration. The following factors contributed to the evolution of the initiative and decreased the tension in the meetings: a) Officers’ increased knowledge and experience of the initiative; b) their better understanding of the expectations of the upper echelon; c) improvements in information technology and crime analysis tools; d) change of crime problems and density; e) change of the problems in hand; the need for adaptation to outside trends in the implementation of Compstat; f) a new generation of officers with new values. There were also some reflections of the personal style of each police director on the evolution of Compstat.

However, there was revolutionary change in Compstat in the last administration, which was described by some officers as the pre-post George Brown period. The structure of the meetings, in terms of duration and regularity, crime analysis style, topics of discussion, and the tone of meetings changed extensively in the last administration. The last administration, particularly the police director, conveyed his expectations and showed his personal leadership style in the meetings. Each administration over these years has called this initiative as Compstat,
may have had the same goals in mind, however, the practices and expectations were quite
different, which definitely changed the reaction of officers and meaning of Compstat for the
officers. Overall, the current form of Compstat in the MPD was widely accepted among the
officers over the years, which will be discussed now.

**Transition from Resistance to Receptivity**

Another important aspect of this study is to provide a perspective on the transition from
resistance to receptivity over the years. Although there are some ups and downs, the case in the
MPD seems a linear process in which the level of acceptance has increased over the years. It was
evident in the interviews that most of the officers accepted the initiative and believed in its
benefits in their personal and organizational improvement. A number of factors influenced the
acceptance of the initiative over these years.

The most prominent reason was the persistence of the upper echelon. More clearly, the
expectations of the abolishment or failure of Compstat initiative in the early phases triggered
resistance at first. However, the perception of the success of the initiative, persistence in the
implementation of the initiative, and the weekly gatherings led officers to think that this initiative
would be part of this organization for a long time, and served as an impetus for officers to be part
of this new environment for success in their career. In addition, the regular gatherings in the form
of Compstat meetings increased the upper echelon’s level of control and follow up mechanisms.
Officers had to accept the initiative and put into practice the expectations of the upper echelon to
avoid criticism in the meetings and to get promotions in the long run.

This point reminds the assumptions of Chan (1996) regarding the change efforts in police
organizations. Chan (1996) argued that due to the strong culture, habitual nature of work, and
preferences for clarity, if the existing processes and practices are not challenged relentlessly,
police officers will tend to follow existing ways of accomplishing organizational tasks. Chan found that successful change efforts in police organizations require the external pressure and longtime efforts of stakeholders. As illustrated in this case, external pressures for accountability, crime analysis and the relentless efforts and struggles of the police directors affected the mindsets of police officers and created a sense of obligation. In this environment, new routines and values were accepted and internalized over these years and became the culture of the MPD.

Another reason was that people learned what was expected in the sense of ‘learning by doing’. This decreased the tension displayed especially in the meetings between the middle managers and upper level. Officers became aware of what was expected of them. In short, several factors contributed to the transition of resistance to receptivity and positive perception of the initiative: the change of the tough manner in the meetings; increased knowledge about Compstat and expectations of the upper echelon; becoming used to the practices; change of crime analysis; and finally the leadership style of the current police director and its reflection in the meetings.

On a different level, this transition was comparable to the four stages of reaction to change; shock, defensive retreat, acknowledgment, and adaptation and change (Jick & Peiperl, 2003). Compstat, which envisioned a major change in officers’ practices created a perception of shock at first and led officers to refrain from engaging in new practices and to oppose the initiative. However, the persistence of the upper echelon, a fear of being non-adaptive, learning by doing, and the follow up mechanisms in the system moved officers into the acknowledgement stage, which was characterized by a mourning of the past as well as an increased capacity for adopting Compstat. Finally, officers developed a comfort with change and its practices.
The points discussed in this heading give an idea about the overall process. However, it is important to be aware of the subtleties of the acceptance-resistance dynamic. For instance, there were some officers who supported the Compstat initiative from the day it was announced by the police director. There were some officers who criticized and resisted some aspects of the model, but supported certain aspects. Some of these critiques were based on valid concerns of officers or can be evaluated as a part of sense-making process. As suggested by Gioia and Thomas (1996), organizational members need to engage in sense making in order to achieve a cognitive reorientation, and possibly accept or reject change. Even the last version of Compstat was criticized by many officers. However, these critiques were more related with the personnel wrong doings in Compstat or some aspects of Compstat that could be improved. Nobody seemed to criticize the model as a whole or ignore its contribution to the MPD. On another level, it is likely that some officers who seemed to support the Compstat on the surface level, had not thoroughly integrated the framework in their thinking. In that sense, officers' reactions can be seen as occurring along a continuum, marked by strong and immediate support on one end and strong and enduring resistance on the other. Most of the officers can be situated along this continuum rather than being situated on one end.

It is also important to understand that officers' reaction varied over time. Many indicated that they felt apathy or anxiety about the change initiative at first, but often came to accept and support the changes over time. This point indicates the fact that resistance is a normal step in the process of adapting to change. Change agents need to expect and allow for a reasonable time period for organizational members to understand and digest a change, and whenever possible use communication strategies to shorten the time period.
Implementation of Compstat

In this section, current form of Compstat will be discussed. The current form of Compstat in the MPD was highly structured. In line with the recent movement toward performance-based police management, Compstat in the MPD relied on targeted goals and objectives that went beyond retrospective analysis and record keeping. Not surprisingly, the main goal was to reduce crime, which was regularly compared to the same time period in the previous years. Commanders always competed with the figures from the previous year and with other commanders. In that sense, clearly defined organizational goals, strategies, and missions were linked with the measures, which had been translated into tangible indicators. These measures were monitored regularly in the Compstat meetings.

There were a core set of management principles built around comprehensive crime analysis techniques and coordinated and collaborative problem-solving (Dabney, 2010). A culture of information sharing and accountability guided the short and long term planning and operations of the MPD. The meetings, with their well defined rules and practices, provided a basis for information sharing, accountability, and assessment of the overall success of the plans in fulfilling the goals. Thus, the overall purpose of Compstat in the MPD resembles a strategic planning system in which organizations define their priorities, missions, and directions and translate them into clear plans that will be measured by standard measures, and evaluated and followed up with through accountability. In this system, all precinct commanders were aware that they were held accountable for the results that they obtained and the problem solving strategies that they adopted. Therefore, regular Compstat meetings established a measure of performance, accountability for goal achievement, and a sustainable process to ensure that the
strategies have been carried out. These meetings also served as a way to assess which strategies work and which do not (Buntin, 1999).

In terms of the components of Compstat, it was evident that officers at all levels of the organization bought into the fundamental crime fighting mission of Compstat. Similarly, accountability was enhanced among mid-level officers. However, there was not any clearly defined system to hold front line officers accountable and reinforce accountability outside the meetings. These officers were given the role to follow orders without making them understand the mindset behind these orders.

The organization was clearly more sensitive and flexible in following emerging problems and responding to them by assigning personnel and resources in a timely manner. “Officers commented on and appreciated Compstat for its geographic command structure and emphasis on geographically driven and fluid in the deployment, which allowed for a less cumbersome and more prompt response to criminal activities” (Dabney, 2010, p.43). The availability of data and regular presentation of it at Compstat meetings improved the speed and response to hot spots.

Turning to the issues of a data-driven approach, each unit became expert at compiling complex data that captured offending, arrest numbers, and many other figures. However, less progress was made in evaluating the meaning of this data and coming up with creative and innovative problem solving and police tactics. This data was not used to identify the underlying causes of crime problems and respond to them smartly and proactively. Rather, officers relied more on personal experience, anecdotal evidence, and traditional police tactics and strategies. Even if officers came up with innovative or wise plans and strategies in the meetings, “the spirit of these plans often got lost between the Compstat meeting and the front line officers, who thought as though there was no strategic vision guiding their daily activities” (Dabney, 2010,
In addition, the need to respond to crimes quickly undermined the need to pursue the most effective innovative strategies, and led to follow traditional tactics and strategies.

The role of culture was evident in the better or worse implementation of this initiative. On one hand, enforced roles, rules, regulations, and structured communication practices, including language codes (i.e., technical and occupational codes) enabled officers to perform their roles, provided a basis for talking on the same level and making standard interpretation of organizational practices. The practices in Compstat meetings provided ample evidence for strictly defined role, rules, norms, and standard interpretation of organizational practices. It also gave officers a sense of predictability, stability, formality, and conformity, which are prized values in this and other police organizations. Within this structured environment, officers made decisions easily for what was appropriate and inappropriate in each situation and what was expected by the upper echelon.

On the other hand, the ritualistic nature of Compstat practices and culture specified boundary conditions and limited the ability to see alternatives and problems in the current implementation. First of all, information was shared in a ritualistic manner that did not go beyond the strictly defined borders. The crime statistics and crime patterns stayed descriptive rather than inferential. The perceived work environment in the MPD, specifically hierarchical control, perception of authority, communication design, feeling of peer pressure and managerial pressure, and fear of humiliation and extra work, influenced the level of risk taking, innovation, and creativity and limited the range of information sharing and meaningful dialogue. Within this cultural environment, a meaningful dialogue did not take place which was highly critical for change, development, and organizational learning.
Another important cultural boundary was the perception of the reward structure and motivation. Officers posited that when they were recognized usually for something they had done wrong in Compstat meetings, rather than for something they had done well. This common perception decreased the comfort level, which, in turn, created a defensive culture and decreased the level of information sharing and innovation.

There is also a need to put organizational culture in the context of the larger society, and its effect on individuals and what they take into the organization. In other words, national culture has to be taken into account as it certainly mediates organizational and police culture. National culture, defined in terms of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and short term orientation, influenced officers’ expectation about autonomy, leadership style, and superior and subordinate relations. As stated by Hofstede (1980), individualism, competition, performance orientation, expert power, and equality are prized values in the United States. The extent of their consistency with the components and principles of Compstat certainly influenced the applicability, limitations, and resistance of the officers to this change initiative. In other words, the national culture of the USA as well as police culture functioned as both enabling and restrictive factors for the better implementation of the Compstat.

For instance, the masculine culture of the USA as well as of police organizations fed officers’ expectation about the primary role of the upper echelon in the process. Short term orientation was reflected in the upper echelon’s focus on short term crime rates and results. However, this cultural value also compelled officers to rely on more traditional tactics and strategies in contrast to risk taking and creative tactics. Finally, individualism played a positive role as it increased the level of tolerance for tough talk and face to face criticism. Cultural acceptance of conflict and competition in organizational life and the individualistic nature of the
United States enabled managers to directly confront with poor employee performance and conflicts, which was essential for the success of Compstat (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Officers did not take critiques in the meetings personally. As stated by the police director, “this is business, do not take it personal.”

Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) referred to countries like the United States as performance societies in which earnings, achievement, recognition, advancement, and challenge are rewarded values. In line with these characteristics, the meetings are considered to be places where people assert themselves and show how competent they are. Conflicts tend to be resolved with competition in which the best man is supposed to win, contrary to Scandinavian countries where compromise and negotiation are the preferred methods of resolving conflicts (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Within this context, the harsh atmosphere of Compstat meetings was tolerated and found to be motivating to some extent in terms of showing their competency, which would not be the case in a feminine or collectivist culture. As shown, this initiative is applicable, at least to some degree, to the national cultural features of the United States.

**Cultural Change**

RQ 1-d) Has the introduction of Compstat perceived to have changed the cultural values of the organization? If so, how?

One of the main assumptions of Compstat is cultural change in police organizations. This point is highly important as changing police departments is viewed as a difficult task and police culture is cited as the primary impediment in the literature (Chan, 1997). As explained in findings, technological change (i.e., computerization of work), generational differences (i.e., education level, economic expectations, new priorities), change of officers’ understanding of police work, change of society, leadership, diffusion of new ideas about management, and new
policing approaches (i.e., community policing, problem oriented policing) developed in the academic world have all contributed to the cultural change in the MPD. In addition to these factors, the role of Compstat on culture was clearly defined and accepted by the officers. There was an unexceptional agreement regarding the influence of Compstat on the cultural change in the MPD in terms of ‘policing approach’ and ‘management of police organization’.

Specifically, the most emphasized change was related to the policing approach of the MPD. Compstat brought a new perspective, mindset for policing in which officers created new interpretations of how policing should be done, and how officers should behave.

Firstly, Compstat was hypothesized to reinforce a proactive approach in policing that went along with a ‘can do’ mentality. Looking for the underlying causes of crime traditionally has not been something that police saw as their function. Their job was traditionally to respond to crimes after they had been committed, and they measured success by the portion of crimes that were solved with arrests and convictions. The main difference after Compstat was in officers’ understanding that police can reduce crime using initiatives like Compstat. Communication practices in the meetings, the large number of documents produced regularly that focus on crime rates and crime analysis, and response plans on reducing crime confirmed the fact that police officers believe that the police could, in fact, do something about crime.

Secondly, current and accurate information in the form of statistics, crime analysis, and patterns became essential in policing instead of solely anecdotal evidence and experience. In spite of certain limitations, information having and sharing became the culture of the police organization. It was evident that Compstat meetings became the central place for sharing information and bonding. The upper echelon and officers from different units and ranks came together on a regular basis to talk about problems and possible solutions, which creates less
hierarchical communication within the organization. There was much more focus on crime analysis, crime statistics, and crime patterns, which were essential to determining crime patterns, crime tactics and deploying resources accordingly. In addition, the display of information at crime information centers, roll calls before each shift, and production and distribution of a great amount of documents became habitual practices, which contributed the centrality of having, sharing, and using information for managerial and operational purposes. The way of discussing crime and evaluating the performance of a precinct, unit, or a commander certainly changed with Compstat.

Finally, Compstat seemed to help police officers to consider more academic and scientific approaches in policing. Different policing approaches were used electively based on the information collected and analyzed within the scope of Compstat. In short, officers in general had a sense of appropriateness and acceptance of proactive policing that went along with a ‘can do’ mentality. In addition, information having and sharing, the focus on crime analysis and performance measurement, and openness to academic or scientific approaches in policing can be seen as new policing values that emerged in Compstat era.

Another main change in values was witnessed in the management practices of the MPD. The most prominent value change in terms of management was accountability. Compstat was intended to bring about accountability and responsibility for reducing crime, which, in turn, changed officers’ work habits. The basic idea behind accountability was to hold officers accountable for their performance, which included knowing their command, problems in their command, and showing an intelligent, attentive effort in responding to these problems. All these points were questioned in the Compstat meetings. This simple but effective mechanism was
mainly put into practice in the meetings and brought a whole new way of doing business with increased responsibility, accessibility, and availability of commanders.

Secondly, Compstat was believed to support flexibility which was used to mean rapid and appropriate response to ever changing conditions in the environment. Compstat functioned as an early alarm system in terms of change in crime trends, emerging hot spots, and problematic locations. This, in turn, enabled police organization, at least theoretically, to deploy resources and implement appropriate tactics to respond to crime in a timely manner.

Thirdly, performance orientation became an inevitable part of police management. Two basic mechanisms in Compstat, tangible indicators and follow up, changed the evaluation of success and failure in the management. The MPD officers seemed to institutionalize an outcome oriented culture that went along with competition and careerism.

Fourthly, Compstat has become a new form of control. The idea of accountability, performance measurement, and follow up mechanisms injected into the system clearly enabled the upper echelon to monitor more closely the processes, practices, and other actions of officers. The meetings, which created a sense of competition, also brought an unobtrusive form of control over officers (Kunda, 2002).

Finally, it is essential to understand the relationship between Compstat and bureaucracy. In spite of certain limitations observed in practice, the situation showed that Compstat certainly made this organization more effective on different levels. Both information orientation and flexibility contributed to effectiveness and responsiveness to the changing conditions. The Compstat meetings that were held regularly with the participation of the upper echelon as well as officers from different ranks and units decreased the communication barriers among different ranks and units and helped to get things done. However, this is not to say that Compstat
completely ignored or changed bureaucratic structure and hierarchy. This study showed that the hierarchical structure was not totally different, but the relations behind these lines were blurred, less strict, and more complex that brought more openness to the feedback, transparency, responsiveness to the ever changing conditions, and problem solving.

In short, accountability and responsibility, flexibility, performance measurement that leads to careerism and competition, control, and a more responsive and effective hierarchical structure can be seen as new management values that emerged in Compstat era.

There were problems to putting these emergent values into practice. However, this is not to say that officers did not see, internalize or accept the benefits these new issues in policing and management. There was a plausible gap between what they intend to do and what is accomplished. In other words, there is a greater ‘change in philosophy’ than ‘change in practice’, but it was clear that there was substantial movement in the intended directions.

As suggested by Thayer (1988), the real change of values can be found in what and how people communicate with one another given that cultural distinctions are created and the potential for cultural change occurs through the alteration of communication processes and mindsets. The tacit knowledge regarding communication patterns and practices illustrate values that changed in this process. It was evident in the MPD that there was a change in the discourse of officers, in the way of using language and speaking about organizational practices, policies, and relationships. Crime analysis, crime maps, hot spots, patterns, proactive policing, accountability, and smart tactics certainly became part of policing discourse. The use of these terms shows the new values in practice. For instance, the language used in the Compstat meetings posited improvement in information sharing and new face of policing. The visual implications of this new language can be observed in the meetings in terms of crime statistics,
crime maps, and graphics of crime analysis that symbolize the new aspects of policing and management in the MPD.

It has been suggested in the case of the NYPD that there are some values such as innovation, creativity, risk taking, and empowerment that became part of culture after Compstat implementation. In the case of the MPD, although a degree of innovation and creativity was seen, it was limited by the need for commanders to respond to crimes quickly, pressure to follow traditional tactics and strategies, defensive culture, and the structural design of communication in the meetings. Similarly, delegation of authority to precincts and different units was limited as the police directors were willing to keep power centralized. In short, these values were not in practice as much as others. For this reason, it is hard to call them part of culture in the MPD.

It is possible to conclude that Compstat is a powerful tool to change certain cultural values in police organizations. The change agents, specifically the police directors in the MPD, structural design of Compstat, communication strategies of the police directors played a central role in the adaptation of this change initiative by influencing the interpretations of officers regarding how Compstat would be used in the MPD. This, in turn, affected the values changed and the degree of change in the MPD.

**Theoretical Implications**

**Culture and Organizational Change**

Organizational culture appears to play a significant role in every phase of this change initiative. Officers perceive and make sense of change at first through the lens of organizational culture. It works as a system of frames of reference, or a system of tacit rules and norms that
determine acceptable perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and practices for various situations (Smircich, 1983).

Although officers differed in their explanation of the appropriate ways of introducing Compstat, their reaction and ways of showing that reaction, and outcome of this initiative, nearly all officers referred to organizational police culture to clarify their point of view. For instance, there was widespread reference among officers to strict hierarchy and chain of command in the MPD in explaining the distinguished role of the upper echelon in the change process and top-down, and tough approach. Some officers justified or even saw as needed this top-down, aggressive, and tough approach by referring to certain cultural values such as, strict bureaucracy, conformance to authority, discipline, rigidity, an authoritarian command system, and preference for the highly directive, masculine leadership style. Among other personal and organizational reasons, the resistance of officers was explained by referring to culturally accepted practices, routines, and goals that have not been salient or have been taken for granted prior to this change initiative. The role of culture was also evident in the better or worse implementation of this initiative. In particular, organizational culture served positive functions such as making sense of particular practices, and a sense of predictability, stability, formality, and conformity, but also led to closure of mind and failure to see alternatives and problems in the current implementation. All these points were widely explained and discussed in the research questions section and discussions. This brief summary is enough to show primary role of organizational culture in the change process. There are a number of theoretical implications of this on the interaction of culture and organizational change.

Police officers tend to describe culture with well known, traditional characteristics of police organizations. They seem to internalize the strict bureaucracy, conformance to authority,
discipline, competition, masculinity, and security that encompass police work and identities. Consistent with this authoritarian command model, police officers in general express a relatively low expectancy for job autonomy and delegation of decision making, and prefer the highly directive, masculine leadership style and highly structured work environment (Jermier & Berkes, 1979).

These traditional values have the primary role of sense making tool during organizational change efforts. More specifically, officers make sense and interpret change based on existing cultural beliefs, rules, norms, symbols, and traditions, and use these tools to understand and assign meanings to specific actions and experiences (Gallivan, 2001). The change agents take into account the existing culture to decide what is appropriate in various situations. Police officers refer to these values to explain their choices for particular behaviors. Although officers in general supported these cultural values in the MPD, their reactions differed substantially based on the interpretation of the meaning of these values. For instance, while some officers justified every practice of the police director in the change process, other officers criticized the intimidation, and lack of participation and communication in the introduction of Compstat. They suggested that these manners have nothing to do with these values of the police organizations.

This study does not intend to explore the reasons for different interpretation of change among officers. The literature points to the possibility of different subcultures in police organizations to explain the different interpretations of the purpose of change and ways to implement change. Although the methodological design of this study does not provide enough evidence to prove the existence of these subcultures, there is more evidence that officers make sense of any type of change based on their rank and position, their personal and cultural values, and cues regarding how they will be influenced in this process.
Another important point in understanding the interaction of culture and organizational change is different layers of culture. As Goodman et al. (1999) contend, the members of each organization or cultural group are also carriers of multiple cultures and “may not use a single set of cultural assumptions. Rather, they may shift their cultural identity depending on the issue at hand, drawing from the different mindset they carry” (p. 27). In this case, the national culture of the USA, police culture, and other environmental influences (i.e., social, political, and ideological) interact at an organizational nexus and influence on the way of doing what officers do inside the organization. The open role of police and national culture in this process and possible role of other layers of culture (i.e., country, region, ethnicity, and gender) needs to be evaluated within this framework.

Another common point of view is the role of culture as a source of resistance and possibly receptivity in the change process. In fact, culturally accepted practices, interactions, and routines that have not been salient or have been taken for granted prior to this change attempt were sources of resistance in this case. In addition, uncertainty, fear of losing status and power, and intimidation and humiliation in the Compstat practices increased the level of resistance in the MPD. The interaction of organizational change and resistance needs to be evaluated as part of the sense making process because the degree of resistance depends on how officers make sense of a change based on cues provided them.

**Cultural Change**

The change of cultural values can be explained at two levels. At the first level, the assumptions of Chan (1996) have an explanatory power for this change. As suggested by Chan (1996), due to the strong culture, habitual nature of work, and preferences for clarity, if the existing processes and practices are not challenged relentlessly, police officers will tend to follow
existing ways of accomplishing organizational tasks. Chan (1996) found that successful change
efforts in police organizations require the external pressure and longtime efforts of stakeholders.
The case of the MPD illustrates the relentless efforts and struggles of the upper echelon to change
the mindsets of police officers. The tough strategies to gain compliance, the persistence of
Compstat, follow up strategies in regular Compstat meetings, and the focus on performance
measurement in transfers and promotion created a sense of obligation among officers in this
organization. All these practices affected the mindsets of police officers (i.e., inefficient practices
will not be tolerated) and created a sense of the new ways things should be done.

The other way to understand and explain all these changes is to look at external pressures,
in particular, the interplay between the macro and micro conditions. Change in outside
conditions, public administration trends, new technology, competition among police
organizations, and new trends in policing (i.e., broken windows policing, community policing,
problem oriented policing), interact with the needs of organization and the vision of the change
agents and reinforce to create new policing approaches and management practices. In this
process, Compstat functions as a carrier of environmental changes (i.e., technology, performance
based management, competition), a number of cultural identifications (i.e., national,
organizational, occupational), and characteristics of the organization (i.e., hierarchy, authority,
chain of command). The change agents who follow and interpret larger social, political, and
occupational networks, and the characteristics of the organization use this initiative or similar
initiatives to make new practices and strategies work in the organization in order to adopt these
trends and to be seen progressive.

In this process, Compstat is not just a carrier of change outside the organization. The
change of culture is constituted through the interaction of officers especially in the meetings,
which is informed by larger social, national, occupational, political, and managerial factors. Based on Gidden’s theory of structuration, it is possible to say that the constellation of all these factors as well as the rules and regulations of Compstat worked as a structure. They define the range of options available to the officers, but this is not a static process. All these factors are being shaped by as well as shaping the communicative interaction of officers. Within this process, the police director is the most critical person directing the communicative interaction in the meetings.

**Implications For Practice**

There are many lessons to be learned from the case of the MPD. The problems and possible solutions of these problems suggested in this study are based on this specific case. Firstly, in contrast to the literature that suggests using democratic or participatory approaches for the implementation of a change initiative, it is wrong to assume that democratic or participatory approaches work in every organization in every case. The greater the problems in the organization, the greater the difference between the current practices of an organization and the proposed practices, the less likely democratic approaches are to work in an organization.

Along a similar line of thought, the commonly proposed ideas for participation in the change process need to be reconsidered based on the level of organizational problems, scope of change, and culture of an organization. As a reflection of traditional values of police organizations, officers expect the change process to be initiated from the top and by a strong leader who drives a vision for change and knows what to do. The practitioners need to be aware of cultural values of officers and arrange the degree, rank, and position of participation accordingly.
There were some points to be criticized in terms of the rapidity and tough manner (i.e., intimidation, humiliation) of the police director in the case of the MPD. However, this approach helped the change agents to overcome inertia and avoid the risk of being sabotaged by internal politics, culture, and the organizational history and status quo. If change agents in the MPD compromised this approach with a carefully considered communication strategy, change agenda, and training, undoubtedly, the process of implementation would be smoother, mitigate resistance, and take more support from officers.

In terms of reaction, this case is a great example that shows the source of resistance, the type of resisters, and the transition from resistance to receptivity. There are many points that are likely to help practitioners during a change process. First, as suggested in the literature (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000), the concepts of resistance to change and resistance to the consequences of change need to be differentiated. In this line of thought, different policies and practices should be put into practice based on different considerations of each group. In particular, the expectations of the groups who do not resist the change itself but resist the way the change was introduced, unfairness, intimidation, or any other reasonable issue, should be considered seriously. There were reasonable expectations of officers in terms of having more information and training to adopt this new environment. An effective communication strategy that informs officers about the reasons for change and their responsibilities in this process and training would absolutely mitigate the level of resistance among those officers who do not resist the change itself. This is not likely to be different in another organization. Specifically, timely and adequate information about changes taking place in the organization and legitimizing change by providing justification for why the change is taking place through different communication
strategies will certainly increase not only the likelihood of change acceptance, but also the speed and extent of that acceptance.

However, this is not to say that there would not be any resisters if the above mentioned issues are taken into account. As illustrated in the case of the MPD, officers who benefit from the wrong-doing and inefficiency in the organization, who avoid the new responsibilities and new practices, perceive a threat to their work habits, and fear losing personal power and status are likely to resist a change initiative regardless of the way a change initiative is introduced and implemented. The critical issue is to differentiate these groups and take into account reasonable and possibly valuable expectations and demands of officers. Officers also criticized heavily lack of communication and training in the early phases of Compstat. Training as to how to function within a new environment and creative reward structures for career oriented officers seems to foster motivation and adherence to the new initiatives and practices.

Another important issue is the perception of fairness during organizational change. Officers felt unfairness in the questioning part of the Compstat meetings in certain periods. If processes, practices, decisions, and managerial actions are perceived as not being fair, it certainly influences desired outcomes and acceptance of the initiative. Needless to say, the perception of unfairness during the change process should be considered seriously by change agents, as it will lead to resistance.

Compstat meetings are held with the participation of a number of ranked officers in the MPD. Involvement of different officers in the change process, specifically in the Compstat meetings in the case of the Compstat, at least would increase the level of understanding and information regarding what was expected and why. Organizational members at all levels of an organization affected by change should be involved in certain practices at certain degrees, based
on their position, rank, and changing responsibilities associated with the change initiative. Involvement will generate support for change and success of the change modalities. This was particularly important for the case of Compstat, and it is likely to be important for most change initiatives that need to be reflected on the ground. The lack of involvement and awareness of how change initiatives influence or should influence the daily practices may lead to the lack of change in the particular behavior and daily practices. Given this point, each organization needs to consider involving its members in certain mechanisms to make them aware of new initiatives and their role in this initiative. As such, the goals and strategies formulated in Compstat meetings would be better reflected on the ground rather than diluted or diverted as they make their way down to the street level.

Leadership style certainly influences the interpretation of organizational change, which, in turn, influences outcomes of change (i.e., organizational performance, resistance, receptivity and job satisfaction). The leader’s role as a sense maker is critical in the early periods of any initiative. In particular, the ambiguity and uncertainty experienced at the introduction makes communication strategies of leaders central to the construction and development of certain expectancies, labels, and beliefs about change (Zorn, 2002). At this phase, leaders can use culture and communication as influential discursive resources in informing and developing a positive perception of change for organizational members, who are looking to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty to make sense of change. They also serve as resources and constraints that help change agents to create and communicate frames consistent and congruent with organizational members’ culture and influence their perceptions in a positive way (Zorn, 2002). If the manner in which change agents frame a problem does not clearly resonate with any current cultural values, this situation limits the ability of communicators to persuade and get attention and support from
organizational members during the change process (Dilling & Moser, 2007). A leadership style that takes into account these points and coaches officers in the adoption of the new procedures and practices increases the level of change acceptance and other positive outcomes.

In terms of modification, it is fair to say that modification of the initiative over the years, the change of officers’ perception at different phases, and finally increased acceptance of the initiative in the current administration highlight the fact that flexibility and adaptation of change initiatives to environmental contingencies is needed to succeed and to avoid overburdening officers. The important thing in this process is to keep the spirit of the initiative.

In terms of current implementation, the Compstat was clearly very helpful in the improvement of the MPD. However, a close scrutiny of the practices shows that there is room for improvement. There are certain points to be improved in accountability and information sharing. The level of innovation and creativity is more problematic than accountability and information sharing. Clearly, MPD is concerned more with hierarchy, formality, rules, procedures, and punishment in the form of humiliation. The sense of fear and the control function is more dominant than flexibility. There is a common understanding described as ‘you never win in Compstat’. Within this cultural environment, it is hard to expect creativity or innovative information sharing.

Another problem in Compstat is the ignorance of problems that are beyond the control of officers. While Compstat reinforces a ‘can do’ mentality and increases accountability and responsibility of officers, it is necessary to consider possibility of social, economic, or other problems in the increase of crime rates. In some cases, the upper echelon ignored the larger problems by holding officers responsible for any increase of crime rates. This might be disappointing for officers who try to influence crime even though they don’t have the capacity to
do so. This point should be considered in order to avoid officer burn out as a result of questioning for any increase in crime rates or emerging problems. In this sense, organizational members should be evaluated for things that are in their capacity.

In terms of cultural change, the contribution of Compstat in the MPD is undeniable. However, there are a number of problems that limit the capacity of Compstat to change the culture and increase the degree of success. As suggested before, a meaningful, honest, and authentic dialogue in the meetings is essential to getting different perspectives and revising the current cultural values that limit practices. In the same line of thought, authenticity in the decision making process and empowerment of mid-level officers who are held responsible for any problem in the precincts are two interrelated points to be improved to support a climate for cultural change. First, mid-level officers should be empowered to decide on appropriate tactics and strategies in their precincts. Similarly, risk taking need to be encouraged. Officers should have a sense of authentic participation in the decision making process, as this will encourage them to take more responsibility and risk taking in their practices.

In fact, the real change of culture occurs or should occur in the field, which is the main problem in Compstat. There are problems conveying the new values and new approaches to the front line officers. Sergeants are directly responsible for conveying the new perspectives and crime tactics to these officers through roll calls before each shift. However, even if these sergeants participate in Compstat meetings, their participation is more on a symbolic level and increases their alienation to the process. As such, it is hard to expect them to be a bridge between mid-level officers and front line officers, and to help front line officers to understand the justifications for their actions in the field and the contribution of Compstat to this process. Thus,
sergeants need to be invited to these meetings not as observers, but as real actors who know the problems in the field first hand.

Meaningful dialogue, authenticity, empowerment, and participation are critical concepts for cultural and thus organizational change. Only if these officers become part of the initiative or feel that they are the part of the initiative, their framework of understanding and interpretation of organizational events and crime cases are likely to shift. This process will compel them to reconsider their current identity and way of current thinking. As suggested by Gioia and Thomas (1996), these officers need to engage in sense making in order to achieve a cognitive reorientation. This is only possible by helping them to understand the Compstat, justifications of the initiative, and their role in this process.

**Discussion and Implications II**

**Communication and Compstat**

The second main question of this study is: *What is the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat?* In this section of the study, the main findings for this research question and its four sub-questions will be discussed with a focus on communication strategies, communication channels, communication and current implementation, and the relationship of culture and communication along with their implications for police organizations attempting to implement Compstat or a similar change initiative.

Based on the sub-questions, the focus will be on the role of communication;

1) In the introduction and modification of Compstat

2) In the current implementation of Compstat

3) The connection of culture and communication
Communication is a critical component of Compstat and plays various roles from the beginning. Many officers posited that communication problems in the MPD were one of the main reasons for the implementation of the initiative. Communication strategies carried out by the upper echelon in the introduction phase and communication practices in the meetings were suggested to increase resistance. The implementation of this initiative was believed to help solve communication problems. Even the problems in the current form of the initiative are related to communication. Thus, understanding the role of communication in this process is critical for the success of these kinds of initiatives. Based on this assumption, the following section discusses the role of communication in the introduction, in the implementation of Compstat and the reciprocal relationship between culture and communication, followed by the implications of these points for organizations that are intended to implement Compstat or Compstat like initiatives.

**Communication Strategies and Communication Channels**

**RQ 2- a)** What communication strategies were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?

**RQ 2- b)** What communication channels were used to introduce and implement Compstat? Were they viewed as effective by leaders and members of the organization?

The use of communication strategies and channels will be discussed under the same heading. The discussion of these points will be divided in two based on the use of communication strategies and channels in the introduction and later phases of Compstat.

**Communication Strategies and Channels in the Introduction of Compstat**

One of the main points questioned in this study is the use communication strategies and channels in the introduction and later phases of Compstat. The most defining action in the
introduction of Compstat was two general information meetings organized with the contribution of two consultants. The other communication channel was written orders which were perceived less important than these meetings. These meetings and written orders can be categorized as the only formal communication practices in the introduction phase of the initiative. The upper echelon, specifically the police director, announced change in these meetings and gave his main messages concerning the need, scope, and content of change, his expectancies, goals, and vision. The way communication was framed in these meetings can be illustrated as follows: We need to change -discrepancy-; we have the capability to change -self-efficacy-; this (Compstat) is what we need -appropriateness-, and this is what you have to do-obligation-. The details of these messages are presented in Figure 7. The police director repeated these messages in these two meetings and in newspaper stories, in which he asked officers to be part of this new environment or leave. The nature of communication in these general information meetings was top-down and directive. There was not any known effort to solicit officers’ input and persuade them.

Written documents were also used extensively to communicate change. Some officers even stated that written documents such as memos and orders were the most common form of communication for change not only for this initiative but also for every kind of change. These written documents were used in this process with a top-down and directive approach. The language of these documents reflects the bureaucratic nature of this organization. These written orders goes from the top down, and it must be signed to acknowledge its receipt and compliance, and signed order must be forwarded to the police director before a certain date.

It is very likely that Compstat meetings were also used in these phases for disseminating information and talking about Compstat itself. However, the early forms of meetings were perceived and remembered to include humiliation, intimidation, and a ‘gotcha’ mentality rather
than information sharing, accountability, or crime analysis. This main perception was thought to harm the morale and motivation of officers, and the effectiveness of the initiative, which, in turn, increased resistance.

Taking into account this background, the communication strategy dimension of Lewis (2007) during the introduction phase will be explained below. First, the communication strategy aimed at disseminating information in a top down orientation without a strong effort to reduce uncertainty and gain support for the change. The police director and consultants seemed to focus more on the positive aspects and benefits of the initiative for the organization. The interviews and statements of the police director in the newspaper articles indicated that there was a focus on loss frame, which emphasizes the disadvantages of noncompliance. In other words, the police director used a hard strategy in which he used direct assertive requests for compliance as well as threats and aggression to achieve objectives in his mind. It is also clear that the communication strategy targeted more specific groups, namely mid-level officers as they were considered the key for the success of the initiative. Finally, the police director gave the message that the MPD undeniably needs change and is capable of successfully implementing this change. In terms of the models suggested by Lewis, Hamel, and Richardson et al. (2001), it is possible to say that the communication strategy in these early phases of the initiative targeted more mid-level officers who need to know at least the basic aspects of the initiative. In other words, change agents prioritized communication efficiency compared to consensus building, and focused specifically on the most critical group -mid-level officers- in this change initiative.

From the perspective of officers, there was not any well planned communication strategy to inform or persuade officers, involve them in process of implementation, or mitigate their resistance. In parallel to the rule bound, programmatic approach used as an implementation
tactic, change agents used one-way communication approach with a purpose of disseminating information. The concerns and expectations of the officers to get more information about the initiative, specifically, its justifications and purpose, the officers’ role in the new initiative was not taken into account by the upper echelon. The end product of this process was inadequate information, and a high level of anxiety and uncertainty among officers, even among those who had attended the Compstat meetings immediately after the introduction of Compstat. Officers’ expectations of training and more knowledge to decrease uncertainty about the initiative were clearly not taken into consideration. As the initiative was not truly understood or adopted, the extent of resistance increased.

From the upper echelon’s perspective, the general communication strategy was not to persuade all officers, or to create and sustain the need for change and inform officers about the change process. Rather, the police director saw this initiative as a tool that enabled the upper echelon to distinguish competent officers from incompetent officers. The police director presented the autocratic nature of communication strategies in the introduction phase and the tough nature of early meetings as necessary. As reflected in the newspaper stories, the main problem in the introduction phase and early form of meetings was not lack of information, or intimidation and humiliation, but serious problems in the MPD and a generation of officers who were not used to accountability and information sharing. Communication strategies were part of the strategy to change some officers within the MPD. Participative and democratic approaches would not work in an organization like the MPD known for its serious problems and corrupt officers. Thus, according to the upper echelon, there was a communication strategy in the MPD, but this was completely different than the strategies suggested in the literature.
It is clear that officers in different rank and positions differ radically in the interpretation of communication strategies and introduction of Compstat. On one hand, the intolerance and autocratic approach taken in the communication practices in the introduction phase and in the meetings is understandable. If the main purpose of change efforts is to alter the organization’s structure, culture, and some officers, as exemplified in the MPD, participative and democratic approaches and communication strategies may not provide the best results. Even, in an organization, which was characterized by a high power distance and strict hierarchy, these democratic and participative approaches may lead to undesired results. In other words, it would be wrong to assume that better information dissemination, more knowledge, or more effective communication alone would have led to support for Compstat among all officers. Although it may have contributed to a better understanding and awareness of the goals of the initiative, and its implication for the organization, even more collaborative communication strategies would likely not have been effective in persuading all officers to accept the change.

On the other hand, it was obvious in the interviews that there were some officers who were willing to understand the initiative, its justifications and purpose, their role in this initiative, and what they have to do to be part of this new environment. The above-mentioned communication strategy led to a lack of information and unnecessary dilemma for these officers. These officers expected to have the tools and means to know what was expected from them and how to do it. This was a clear problem in this phase, which increased resistance in the MPD.

It has been suggested in the literature that change agents use a combination of communication strategies based on the general implementation approaches (i.e., rule-bound, programmatic, and participatory), which, in turn, are influenced by the perception of the organization’s context (i.e., culture, history of change, needs and goals in implementing change,
willingness to change) and by institutional factors that shape the organizational environment (Lewis, 2007). In addition to these points confirmed in this study, it was evident that the selection of certain communication strategies can be explained by the concerns of change agents for effectiveness and appropriateness.

The MPD is a large organization in which face to face communication to inform a change was inapplicable. General information meetings and written documents were perceived as more effective methods of reaching a high number of officers in the MPD. In terms of appropriateness, it is plausible to say that the upper echelon was not especially concerned with persuading officers using face to face communication, which was undeniably more effective in influencing officers. Rather, the main purpose was to announce the change and give basic information about the initiative. From this perspective, these communication strategies were both appropriate and effective, though not for officers who were expecting more involvement in, more information about, and training about the initiative.

**Communication Strategies and Channels in the Modification of Compstat**

Communication in terms of change communication was not limited to the introduction and early meetings. After an initiative is introduced, it is modified over time due to changing conditions, priorities, and administrations. All these changes need to be communicated in the organization. As such, change communication should be evaluated as an ongoing process based on the needs of the organization.

Compstat was modified extensively over all these years. Specially, Compstat meetings, in this process, functioned as a place to talk about not only crime but also the initiative itself. It was a formal, face to face setting used to train officers and discuss new practices. The upper echelon used this main platform to convey its expectations and problems in the implementation of the
initiative. From the perspective of officers, these meetings functioned as a real learning platform. Officers in each meeting constructed new meanings of the initiative. Through the practices praised or criticized repeatedly by the upper echelon, officers created new codes and frames to define what is appropriate and inappropriate, and what was expected from them.

Similarly, written documents, as the most traditional form of communication for informing officers, were used extensively in relation to the new practices and procedures of Compstat. There were a number of orders and general orders distributed in keeping with the chain of command to share new practices, new regulations, and rules in the implementation of the initiative.

In contrast to introduction, officers pointed out the use of different channels used in the change process, including the modification of Compstat. In particular, roll call meetings organized in different forms seemed to be another important formal and face to face platform used to communicate major changes and also changes in daily crime trends and policing. As stated in written documents, some forms of change are subject to roll call training in the MPD. Although officers pointed out the use small group discussions, emails, and informal channels in change process, there was little reference to these communicational channels in interviews and written documents.

It is possible to say that communication strategies used in later phases were not totally different from those used in the early phases. There was more emphasis on disseminating information in a top-down manner. The communication mostly targeted groups that were the most critical for the implementation of Compstat. Differently, the level of knowledge about Compstat was totally different as officers learned by doing what was expected from them which decreased the level of uncertainty regarding Compstat. In addition, it was not necessary to
convey messages regarding the need for change and self-efficacy as the initiative had been in use for a certain period of time.

**Communication and Current Implementation**

RQ 2- c) What is the role of communication in the current implementation of Compstat?

The role of communication in the current form can be categorized in different ways: communication as information exchange, communication as coordination and collaboration, communication as construction, and communication as manifestation of culture.

Regardless of how communication is perceived, Compstat was said to help the MPD to overcome communication problems. Without exception, Compstat was intended to provide an opportunity to bring together different units and precincts to talk about their problems, to share information and best practices, and to coordinate their efforts and resources. Not only Compstat meetings but also roll calls conducted before each shift in each precinct became inseparable parts of this initiative. In addition, the distribution of crime maps and statistics to officers on duty, and the display of crime analysis and patterns on crime information centers in each precinct supported this system. As such, Compstat clearly implemented new procedures and introduced new communication links in and between different units and precincts. This initiative was even called as a form of information-led policing. This system was said to bring a unified, organization wide perspective to the fight against crime.

In addition, information technologies (i.e., computers, crime maps, GPS systems) played a central role in the implementation of Compstat, the improvement of communication, and the transformation of policing in general. They allowed organizations to operate across time and space through flexible and decentralized structures. In particular, information technologies were argued to play a central role in enabling coordination of people and tasks, and the information
sharing aspect of Compstat. In that sense, technological improvements, computers, and crime mapping were believed to play a key role as the visible face of the initiative, and also increased its magnetism. These technologies were central as they send a message about the new ways policing should be done. Compstat as well as all these technological improvements also enabled the improvement of a new discourse among police officers in the fight against crime. Crime statistics, pro-activity, follow up, coordination, roll calls, hot spots, targeted enforcement, crime prevention, and sharing best practices became central in this new discourse.

The most emphasized meaning of communication in the implementation of the initiative was information exchange. Despite criticism of this conceptualization, this view of communication still dominates books, textbooks, scholars, and practitioners as illustrated in this case. Officers in the MPD perceived communication basically as information exchange. The meetings, roll calls, and all types of written documents were suggested to be part of information exchange and information sharing. Compstat brought together all units and upper echelon together under a unified structure without any barrier to talk and share information about their precincts and problems. This structure was certainly helpful in this large organization, where there were many officers through whom information must pass. This point was repeatedly asserted as ‘being on the same page’, and ‘open communication’. The critical point to be emphasized is this open forum of communication decreased the likelihood that communication will be transformed or distorted between ranks and units.

In addition to information exchange, coordination and collaboration were two additional points that was used to define the role of communication in the implementation of the initiative. It was believed that the Compstat initiative, with its principals and practices, increased the level of coordination and collaboration. The focus on bringing in different units and asking relentlessly
for joint efforts reinforced coordination and collaboration in this organization. In particular, the availability of different units as well as upper echelon in these meetings made it possible to resolve problems and get things done in coordination. If there was a problem in the coordination efforts, the upper echelon wanted related units come together after the meeting and put together a plan within a certain time frame. Coordination and collaboration was also essential for deployment of resources to endorse these plans and strategies. There were also examples of coordination with external agencies, such as courts, the municipality, and parole office. All these points were believed to bring promptness, flexibility, and effectiveness in the deployment of resources, responding to crime and get things done timely and appropriately.

Although it was not stated directly by officers, the role of communication-as-construction is essential to understanding the process in the MPD and in other organizations. The role communication plays in change process is beyond information exchange and coordination. Communication plays a definite role in constructing new realities, interpretations, new meanings of the initiative, and new practices. This is important because members of an organization act on their interpretation of reality rather than reality itself, and that becomes the basis of their actions and behaviors (Gallivan, 2001)

In particular, the ambiguity and uncertainty experienced at the introduction makes communication central to the construction and development of certain expectancies, labels, and beliefs about change (Zorn, 2002). That is, change efforts are open to multiple interpretations and negotiations that suggest the possibility of influencing the process in positive, negative, and neutral ways. For instance, the communication strategies and how Compstat was framed through these strategies certainly influenced the interpretation of this change initiative, and thus the support of officers. Officers who perceived frames incongruent with the organization’s culture
rejected or ignored them, and resisted this initiative. Some officers perceived this situation as an opportunity for organizational and personal rejuvenation; other perceived it as a threat to their status and self-interests. Similarly, the communication choices of the current police director in the Compstat meetings certainly changed how Compstat was interpreted and the degree of acceptance. In that sense, communication played a central role in the implementation of change initiatives by influencing the interpretations and interactions of officers.

The police directors had the primary role in the construction of new meanings. They employed communication as a sense-making tool or to frame Compstat in different ways. In particular, the communication practices of the directors were an active part of the production of meaning, perceptions, and feelings. Their communication choices reinforced a particular frame, which affected how officers thought about this initiative, the nature of the challenge it presented, and reflections of the initiative on the ground. This explanation shows the central role of communication as construction of meaning, and how this conceptualization is related to practice, effective implementation, and leadership, all of which will be discussed in the practical implications section.

The role of communication was also evident as manifestation of culture. Based on the assumption that cultural change is created and manifested through communication, we look at communication both as a manifestation and creator of cultural change. This point will also be discussed in the culture and communication section. Regardless of how communication was perceived, it was evident that Compstat meetings played a central role in communication. They are the place where officers basically shared information, talked with each other, coordinated their efforts for joint operations and tactics, learned the initiative itself, and constructed new meanings of Compstat as well.
The contribution of Compstat to communication was evident, but this is not to say that there were not any problems in practice. There were a range of problems and limitations in the collection, use, sharing of information, and coordination that were reported by the study participants and observed in the meetings. As discussed below, these limitations were thought to be related to personal wrongdoings, cultural habits, resource constraints, organizational size, and managerial style.

**Communication Problems**

The problems in the current form were also related to communication. More specifically, the problems in the dissemination of information throughout the organization, the extent of creativity and innovation in crime tactics, and information sharing problems were all related to communication.

The information produced, put into documents in terms of Compstat, and talked about in the Compstat meetings must be swiftly disseminated upward and downward throughout the organization. As suggested in the article of Dabney (2010) and confirmed in this study, “to be useful, the underlying patterns in the data, the logic behind the strategies and deployment efforts, and the assessment must be thoroughly digested at all levels of the organization. This sort of design is heavily dependent on efficient and effective lines of two-way communication flowing upward and downward throughout the organization” (p.27). The data in this study suggested that the downward moving strategic messages often got lost between the Compstat meeting and the ground-level deployment. Even if front line officers put into practice some of the strategies and tactics, they were a ways from understanding the logic behind the strategies and deployment efforts. The possible strategies for overcoming this problem by bringing front line officers to the meetings in a specific order, or providing the active contribution of field supervisors to the
meetings as they were in a situation to convey the messages from the ground up in the organization did not work as expected for many reasons, including communication and police culture. For instance, mid-level commanders were not willing to bring the front line officers to the meetings as they did not want to be interrogated in front of their subordinates. It is problematic to expect these street level supervisors to convey the strategic messages or inspire front line officers in the roll call meetings, which were key for the success of the initiative. However, this is not to say that there was not any change on the street level. Even if front line officers were not aware of all process and implications of Compstat on their daily routines and the true spirit behind this initiative, Compstat certainly influenced their work on the street level by the assignments directed to them.

Similarly, Compstat injected a heavy dose of information regarding crime rates, trends, and patterns that have implications for the daily routines of frontline officers. To be useful, this information should be thoroughly reviewed and digested at different levels of the organization (Dabney, 2010). For this reason, two-ways of communication and systematic communication strategies were needed to convey all the strategies and tactics and ensure that officers internalize them. However, there was not any regulation or systematic effort to do this other than personal initiatives of each commander.

In addition to limitations in the information flow, specifically to the lower level officers, the extent of information sharing seemed to have been limited even during the meetings. There were problems with the quality of information sharing, hierarchical and cultural pressures to explain information freely, and adopting this information to resource deployment and police tactics on the ground. Officers did not benefit extensively from this platform, physical togetherness, and being in front of an authority that enable them to talk and possibly solve their
problems immediately. The communication skills of officers, the climate of the relationship and setting, the history of these meetings, and differences in values, norms, and attitudes of the people play a role in the level and quality of information sharing. The police director and deputy chief asked questions and commanders responded to them in a way that they think the upper managers expected of them and share their information and problems in a limited manner. Officers were not comfortable enough to discuss their problems freely for several reasons: The design of meetings (i.e., number of participants, meeting room), the design of communication (i.e., question-answer form), the history of police organization (i.e., early forms of meetings: intimidation and humiliation), the cultural values and personal attitudes of officers in organization (i.e. avoiding extra work, defensive culture), and organizational constraints in terms of resources.

There were also limitations in the extent of coordination among different units to deploy resources synchronically. There were many examples from the meetings where the police director and deputy chief expressed displeasure with the coordination and asked commanders to meet after Compstat meeting to coordinate their efforts. There were statements in minutes of meetings such as, “Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs at emergency.” There were more examples of these kinds of statements that prove lack of coordination between different units in the MPD.

Another important communication related problem was the ritualistic nature of communication practices in the meetings. Through communicating with others in the organization, officers learn to accept the values and norms of the meetings and construct a self-identity that is appropriate to the rules they play by. In other words, communication leads to convergence in the invisible rules and practices and enables the development of patterned ways
of communicating, each with their own meanings. In this setting, it was evident that routines became a big part of organizational activity and the same type of information was produced and shared in the meetings. The problem was how these structured patterns of communication and these invisible rules and regulations contribute to a climate of innovation, creativity, and real participation. The data in this study suggested that it was rare to see creativity, innovation, or real participation of officers in the meetings. It seemed like there was a comfort zone between middle level and upper level officers in terms of information shared in the meetings. Specifically, officers tried to stay within a range of options accepted by the upper echelon. Many officers stated that they sometimes say what was expected rather than what was needed as they want to avoid extra work, taking risks, and criticism or humiliation in front of their peers and the upper echelon. The upper echelon intervened when the information level and responding strategies were perceived to be inadequate. On one hand, this situation inevitably brought ritualism to the communication practices and decreased the quality of information as well as creativity and innovation in Compstat. On the other hand, it decreased uncertainty and brought practicality and effectiveness into the communication practices.

**Culture and Communication**

RQ 2- d) In what ways is the selection of communication strategies and channels related to the culture of police organizations?

The culture and communication link can be understood at two levels. Communication strategies and practices not only influence the organization’s culture but are also influenced by the culture.

It is possible to look at communication strategies and communication practices as symbols of organizational culture. The data in this study shows that the Compstat meetings are
the most visible part of the initiative where culture is both constructed and manifested. The
preferred styles of communication in these meetings (i.e., verbal, nonverbal), language, jargon,
addressing terms, physical arrangement of meeting room, the number and rank of participants,
and the sequencing of disclosures, and processes such as greetings and asking questions show the
culture of the organization and culture of the gathering that define the rules of meetings. The
observable aspects of the interaction (i.e., timing, location) tell us a great deal about the
relationship among the participants.

The use of addressing terms, the primary role of the upper echelon in changing subject,
selecting speakers, defining the tone of meetings, and finishing the conversation confirmed the
high power distance, formality, masculinity, competition, and strict bureaucratic culture of this
organization. The discourse of the meetings showed that officers consider crime patterns,
statistics, digital maps, and talk about these things more than before. There were a range of
concepts that manifest the new ways of doing the job and the new world of policing. In
particular, the common use of concepts such as, ‘crime analysis and patterns, computers, crime
maps, daily information, effective tactics, and accountability’ show the new face of policing and
emerging cultural values in Compstat era. There was a heavy focus on written documents in this
organization. They were distributed from top to ground. The language was very bureaucratic in
these documents. The distribution, their frequency, and their content were in tune with the
traditional, bureaucratic, quasi-military aspects of this organization.

On the other level, it was evident that the selection and perception of communication
strategies in the introduction and communication practices in the meetings were shaped by
organizational culture which can be best described as a strict bureaucracy hierarchy that cultivates
conformance to authority, discipline, control, mistake avoidance, and security. Consistent with
this authoritarian command model, police officers in general expressed a relatively low expectancy for autonomy and delegation of decision making; support rigid, authoritarian command system; value routine, orderliness, role conformity; and prefer the highly directive, masculine leadership style and highly structured, masculine, competitive work environment.

In this cultural environment, it was not unexpected to select a rule-bound, programmatic implementation approach, in which change agents focused more on disseminating information in a top-down manner in order to influence compliance rather than solicit feedback and participation. This is what happened in the MPD. The upper echelon selected a tough communication strategy through direct assertive requests for compliance, or mediated through manipulative threats to gain compliance.

Some officers justified this top-down manner, tough communication strategies and meetings by referring to the culture of the MPD in addition to many other points. However, some officers clearly made a distinction between the selection of communication strategies and the culture of the organization. In other words, even if they supported a rigid, authoritarian command system, the highly directive, masculine leadership style and quasi-military, hierarchical control, and bureaucracy, they criticized the lack of information, and the humiliation and intimidation in the communication practices.

Similarly, the forms of resistance and current implementation of Compstat was influenced by organizational culture. For instance, officers who did not want to deal with the ramification of going against the administration openly in the early phases, showed their reaction either by attitudes, retirement or talking behind the scenes rather than talking openly. In the meetings, masculinity and competitiveness were important cultural values that encompass the strict question-answer style and high level of formality in the meetings. In short, it was evident
that organizational culture influenced officers in the MPD in their responsiveness to communication strategies and channels.

The communication problems in the current form were also related to the culture of the police. As discussed before, middle level officers were not willing to bring front line officers to Compstat meetings as they did not want to be humiliated in front of their subordinates in an organization characterized by hierarchy and chain of command. Similarly, the strict design of the meetings, perception of an authoritarian environment, and strictly defined roles and rules limited the range of information sharing and innovation. Other than this, the communication skills of individuals, the climate of the relationship and setting, and the differences in officers’ values, norms, and attitudes played a definite role in the level and quality of information sharing.

In addition, the lack of creativity and innovation in the crime tactics and strategies were rooted partly in the culture of the organization, which reinforced aversion to free thinking, risk taking, brainstorming, and sincere and open dialogue. There were some officers who stated that some of the limitations in the range of information sharing and innovation in current meetings were due to both cultural aspects of the police organization and the early implementation of the initiative that discouraged open and free talking. In general, the limitations on brainstorming and even information sharing were explained in the scope of meeting design (i.e., number of participants), cultural history of this specific organization (i.e., early meetings and tough style), and general cultural beliefs and personal attitudes in the organizations (i.e., desire to avoid extra work, defensive culture). Culture also played a positive role in the implementation of Compstat. Culture enabled talking on the same level, a common interpretation of communication practices, and higher tolerance for tough talk in the meetings.
Implications for Practice

The case of the MPD shows the primary role of communication in the change process. Based on the problems in the introduction and other phases of Compstat, it is fair to say that change agent must pay attention to communication processes and strategies when guiding change.

In the case of the MPD, communication strategies in the introduction and communication practices in the Compstat meeting certainly increased the level of resistance. Officers enacted the initiative differently based on how it was introduced. In this sense, in order to distinguish organizational members who resist the change from those who just resist the way the change initiative is introduced, change agents need to ensure that effective communication strategies characterized as transparent, honest, consistent, and continuous are used to inform organizational members about the reasons for change, and its implications for the organization and for officers. Otherwise, organizational members who are willing to be part of the change and likely to support the change can instead become resisters. In other words, change agents can contribute to the occurrence of resistance through communication itself.

It is hard to justify intimidation or humiliation even in police organizations. There should be clear lines between being tough and using intimidation or humiliation. If this manner is considered part of a strategy to influence and control officers, there are always better or more respectful methods than intimidation or humiliation. For instance, a reward system might accompany the system of punishments.

As specified by Mansell and Silverstone (1996), communication is an object of design and communication can become a tool for creating communication products such as entertainment, justice, contacts, plans, and information. In that sense, communication design is
particularly important in developing procedures or formats to alter forms of interactivity and communication.

Firstly, this design, -structure and setting- of communication often influence the contribution of other participants to the process, climate of real participation, innovation, and organizational learning. It was observed in the Compstat meetings that the same group of people talked and talked again. In particular, line level supervisors (sergeants) who were critical to conveying messages to the front line officers seemed to be alienated in the meetings. The number of participants, their seating position and the room design, and the manner of questions could be redesigned to increase the contribution of all officers. In this sense, the number of participants and their role in these kinds of gatherings need to be redefined; and their active contributions also need to be encouraged to spur brain storming and promote a learning environment. This new forms of design, which are intended to encourage interaction, can be tested and refined to achieve the desired goals.

Secondly, the idea of putting officers in the ‘hot spot’, asking questions using interrogation-like style, and using humiliating and intimidating practices should be reconsidered. This mechanism brings a defensive response, in which officers tend to justify any increase of crime rates or other problems. For this reason, instead of putting a commander in the ‘hot spot’ and asking about the robbery problem in his/her district, more may be gained by approaching the robbery problem as a general topic and encouraging open discussion of that problem by all participants at a meeting.

At this point, the upper echelon’s role is also critical in making organizational members feel comfortable expressing their opinion freely without any kind of retribution. If fear of wrong-doing and humiliation, mistrust, and hierarchical control can be kept at a reasonable level, the
trust and comfort levels will certainly increase which is key for building a genuine dialogue instead of talking considering the expectations of upper echelon. As stated by Boleno and Gantt (2009), a meaningful dialogue permits individuals to revise the way they see something and allows for the relational development required for organizational learning, creativity, and innovation. Rewards structures and supportive climates will certainly support an organizational learning environment.

Culture is an important concept to be used in the change process. In particular, the ambiguity and uncertainty experienced in the introduction makes communication central to the construction and development of certain expectancies, labels, and beliefs about change (Zorn, 2002). By using culture as an influential discourse resource (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006), communication might be used for creating meaningful explanations of new claims, and convergence of interpretations about the change initiatives. If change agents define symbols and frames consistent and congruent with organizational members’ culture, these frames can be used to define change, develop a positive perception, and guide the interpretations of organizational members. If the manner in which change agents frame a problem does not clearly resonate with any current cultural values, this situation limits the ability of communicators to persuade and get attention and support from organizational members during the change process (Dilling & Moser, 2007).

This point implies the primary role of change agents as mediators of change. They employ communication as a sense making tool or frame change in different ways. Understanding an organization’s culture might help change agents to select appropriate communication strategies and frame their messages appropriately. For example, in individualistic cultures,
change agents can focus on self-interest as a result of change. This manner can certainly minimize resistance and ease the implementation of these kinds of initiatives.

Limitations of the Study

As acknowledged in the methodology section, the interpretive study has certain strengths and weakness that should be taken into consideration. On one hand, this interpretive case study has strengths, such as providing a more in-depth, contextual, meaning-centered, historical, communicative, and dynamic analysis that enables a holistic understanding of the organization and captures the reciprocal relationship between culture, communication, change, and Compstat without imposing predetermined theories. This stance of the dissertation allows for a rich description and deep understanding of this multidimensional and complex relationship, points of view of organizational members, and the nature and context of change in the organization. In addition, it also allows the researcher more flexible data collection in a natural setting, the ability to develop rich insights during data analysis, and the possibility to go beyond the limits of existing literature to generate new theories and recognize phenomena ignored by previous researchers (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). On the other hand, the interpretive case study approach raises certain limitations because of not having systematic ‘scientific’ procedures that lead to relativism, and biased and judgmental views that influence the direction of the findings and conclusion of the study, and generalizing findings to other settings or context (Yin, 2003).

In the reliability and validity section, the limitations of the interpretive case study approach and the ways to address these limitations were explained in detail. Briefly, the first point emphasized was the use of multiple source of evidence (triangulation), including interview, observation, and a variety of documents. Triangulation of data is essential to rule out specific plausible alternatives and threats to the analysis, interpretation, and conclusions (Maxwell, 2005).
This triangulation across data provides multiple measures of the same phenomena, supplies more information on concepts, and allows for checking data gathered from one source against other sources (Yin, 2003). For instance, observation of the Compstat meetings enabled checking and confirming or disconfirming the claims of cultural change asserted in the interviews. As such, observation enabled the researcher to identify the contradictions between what study participants say they do and what they actually do in practice. Similarly, the interview questions enabled the researcher to ask questions about the practices observed in the meetings, clarify them, and, thus, decreased the possibility of ethnocentric biases as a foreigner in the interpretation of findings.

The second point widely discussed in methodology section is establishing a chain of evidence. This study tried to establish a chain of evidence by providing rich data, searching for discrepant evidence, and presenting ideas in a finely compelling narrative, addressing the issues of authenticity, plausibility, and criticality, as proposed by Brower, Abolafia, and Carr (2000).

In terms of reliability, the way to assess reliability in interpretative research is different than positivist research, where reliability depends on whether or not a research instrument yields the same results (replication) every time it is applied (Maxwell, 2005). In this study, the reliability of the research came from involvement in the field for seven months, which enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of context and alternative explanation. It was also derived from presentation of rich data that were detailed and varied enough to provide an authentic picture of what was going on in this cultural environment and participants’ experience of culture and communication in this organization (Geertz, 1973; Maxwell, 2005).

In addition to the points addressed in the reliability and validity section, there were some other limitations in the data collection process, analysis, and interpretation that need to be
considered and addressed as much as possible. All these limitations will be explained successively.

Perhaps the most important limitation is the analysis of one organization at a certain period of time. This is about the generalizability of this study's findings for other police agencies. The decentralized structure of the U.S. police departments increases the degree of concern for the representativeness of this simple. It must be stated that this single case study has limitations in terms of statistical generalization. It is always possible that police organizations, with their highly differentiated adaptation strategy of Compstat or similar change initiatives might have different processes, practices, and consequences that would inevitably affect the findings of any study. It is also reasonable to argue that the history of the organization, its size (i.e., small versus large), environment (i.e., urban versus rural), or crime trends might affect the organization’s cultural heritage, which separates it from the general cultural features of police organizations (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Thus, this setting may not be truly reflective of the relations between organizational culture, communication, and change in other police organizations. Either way, a single case study is always limited in terms of representativeness of other organizations even in the same region, industry, and occupation, and cannot be generalized to larger populations. However, the tentative analytical generalization is still valid, appropriate (Yin, 1994), and helpful for organizations that are willing to understand Compstat’s implementation and the role of culture and communication in this process. In this regard, the general patterns in this specific context can be generalized to a certain degree to any organization that has adopted Compstat into its structure.

Secondly, a similar limitation relates to the representativeness of study participants in this organization. As already discussed in the sampling strategy part of the methodology section, the
goal of this study was to conduct interviews with officers from different positions, units, and years of experience to generate a variety of perspectives, views, and opinions. In particular, the perspectives of former and current management, and former officers could improve this study, as they are freer to express their thoughts than current officers. However, this study did not fully tap the perspectives of upper level managers, former directors, and officers of this Police Department. In order to get information on the perspectives of former and current upper management, newspaper articles that included statements regarding Compstat by individuals in these groups were added in the data sample of this study. Other than this limitation, there were representative numbers of officers (twenty six officers) from a wide range of ranks and units. This enabled cross-checking of information in an effort to establish different views held concerning the introduction and implementation of Compstat (Olie, 1994), and helped to be heard the potentially valid concerns of officers on the ground, those who were generally disregarded in the change process.

Another limitation of this study is the long time interval between Compstat implementation in 1997 and the interview and observation process in 2009. Participants of the study were expected to have difficulty remembering the situation in the MPD before Compstat, specific communication strategies in the introduction, implementation strategies, and reactions of officers. This is particularly important for this study as these historical accounts were not observed by the researcher and basically relied on interview statements of participants. However, the interview process emerged such that participants were able to give in-depth information about the history of Compstat in the MPD. The repetition of the same points by different participants confirmed the trustworthiness of information and common perception of what
participant deemed important in this process. Even if it is likely that some points were not stated by any of the participants, this shows the perception of insignificance.

Fourthly, the content of this study poses another limitation. The researcher asked questions about Compstat implementation, which inevitably brought into discussion the different approaches of the different police directors. It is not uncommon for participants to be suspicious of the researcher and reluctant to talk about these issues honestly and sincerely. The best way to overcome this limitation is to assure the confidentiality of participants’ answers and establish rapport with the participants. For this purpose, any personal or sensitive information that could disclose the identity of participants was not used in this study.

In addition, due to the sensitivity of study, it was critical to create a comfortable atmosphere for both the researcher and the participants, which may contribute trustworthiness and credibility. The researcher’s background in policing was helpful in getting approval for access, observing and interpreting certain practices, probing nuances by engaging the participant’s interests, and paving the way for meaningful and candid interviews. In particular, this background lightened potential barriers, helped to establish good rapport and trust with the participants, and thus, eased any highly articulated suspicious characteristics of police officers during the interviews. This closeness made it possible to obtain quality and trustworthy information that provided insights into what happened behind the scenes.

The next, the nature of the relationship between the researcher and study participants during the data collection process (i.e., interviews, observation) has to be addressed due to possible influence on the authenticity and quality of data collected through interviews and observation. Specifically, the literature of observational studies point out the influence of the researcher’s presence on the behavior of those observed. Due to the meeting room’s size, the
large number of participants at these meetings, and the position of the researcher at the back of the room, the presence of the researcher did not in any way seem to influence meeting practices, which decrease the potential for non-authentic or unnatural behaviors.

Finally, as acknowledged, the researcher’s occupational background as a police officer can be seen as strength, but it is also likely to raise concerns about potential biases in the study and the interpretation of findings. On the one hand, the position of the researcher as a student in the U.S. and the extent of time away from the world of policing may help balance, to some extent, any potential occupational bias in the research. On the other hand, it would be difficult to imagine that a researcher could remain bias free in this type of study, which would apply to strictly positivist studies as well. There is an inevitable process of inclusion of some features and exclusion of others; therefore they are partial and selective (Emerson, 2001). The inclusion and exclusion of features depend to some extent on the researcher’s background, and thus choices of relevancy and irrelevancy, or what he or she views to be important and unimportant. Similarly, research participants reflect on their own experience with Compstat considering the points that are important to them. In other words, they reflect on their subjective understandings of the points that the researcher asks about. Although there are certain mechanisms for organizing and interpreting data to address the validity and reliability of the findings, it would be impractical and wrong to suggest a completely nonjudgmental, objective stance for this dissertation written in an interpretive tradition. In fact, the reason to disclose the researcher’s possible biases, personal background, and relationship with participants is to make readers aware of this process and these limitations, and help them fairly judge the interpretations of the study.
Future Research Directions

As stated in the limitations section, this study has focused on one organization at a certain period of time, which brings limitations in terms of statistical generalization. Analyzing multiple organizations and checking the match of patterns between the cases would be helpful in addressing the limitations that emerge from reliance on one organization. For this reason, this kind of study needs to be replicated in other police organizations to further investigate the regional, environmental, and organizational differences in officers’ perception of organizational change.

Another point to be improved in this study was the number and representativeness of study participants. Since the late 1980s, scholars have questioned the idea of a strong culture characterized by widely-shared values among organizational members by pointing out cultural diversity, conflicts, and ambiguity within organizations (Smircich, 1983; Martin, 1992, 2002). In this line of thought, scholars are acknowledging that police culture is not monolithic. Police organizations may have multiple subcultures, for instance, ‘management cop culture’ and ‘street cop culture’ that can create and develop their own norms, language, time horizons, and standpoints on the organization’s mission (Crank, 2004). They may have radically different interpretations concerning the change process and ways to implement change. For that reason, in order to understand the existence or nonexistence of the different subcultures in the organization in terms of their perception of organizational change, this study should be conducted with a greater number of officers from different ranks and position. In addition, this study did not fully tap the perspective of former and current top management and former officers. Future research should include more of the perspectives of officers in these camps.
The researcher observed only six months of the Compstat meetings more than 10 years after Compstat implementation. The time period before/after Compstat implementation was not observed by the researcher. In that sense, future research should use longitudinal research and multiple source of evidence to compare the cultural change in depth before and after the implementation of Compstat and fully understand the role of culture and communication in different phases.

The main setting for observation in this study was the Compstat meetings. Future research should include the observation of patrols on the ground. This is a highly critical point because all plans and tactics derived from Compstat should be reflected on the street level, where the real fight with crime occurs. This observation would be quite helpful to make sense of the success or failure of Compstat and its implications for daily practices in any police organization.

This study focused on one major change and the role of culture and communication in this process. There was ample evidence in the MPD to show different strategies adopted in the implementation of other change initiatives. For this reason, future research should extend to the comparison of different change implementation in one organization. This kind of research would contribute to understanding the interaction of culture, communication, and organizational change efforts when the nature, scope, and content of change are different than Compstat.

There may be many factors affecting the success or failure of change efforts, but few are as critical as the following cross cutting factors: leadership, planning, assessment, communication, and culture (Ruben, 2009). This study specifically addressed culture and communication while recognizing the importance of other factors. In particular, the primary role of police directors with different personalities was evident in this study. For this reason, future
research should include the other cross cutting factors to understand fully the implementation of Compstat.

This study elaborated the different role that culture and communication play in the change process. In contrast to certain studies and managerial literature that focus solely on communication as information transmission, this study focused on the role of communication in coordination and collaboration of different efforts, construction of different meanings, and manifestation of culture. This view pays considerable attention to the everyday practices and interactions, artifacts, and rituals in an organization. This stance made it possible to provide a more in-depth, contextual, meaning-centered, communicative, and dynamic analysis that enables a holistic understanding of the organization in the change process. For this reason, this kind of study needs to be conducted in other organizations to further investigate and capture the different roles that culture and communication play in the change process.

Conclusion

Society’s rapidly changing conditions and needs, demographics, market demands, government regulations, pressures created by globalization, increasing competition and resource constraints, and technological developments coalesce to make change a critical issue for all types of organizations. In this environment, all types of organizations have increased their efforts to identify new technologies, innovations, and change programs in order to address the many emerging challenges and opportunities they face, and to become flexible and adaptable (Zorn, Page, & Cheney, 2000).

Compstat is one of these change initiatives that has been adopted by numerous organizations in the last decade to address the emerging challenges and opportunities. The success of Compstat and specific initiatives like Compstat certainly requires an understanding of
the nature of the change process, factors that facilitate or impede change efforts, and the sources of resistance and receptivity. Culture and communication are two cross cutting factors, essential to understanding the nature of the change process, and to managing and guiding the change.

For this reason, this study analyzed the role of culture and communication in the implementation of Compstat in a specific police organization. In particular, the selection of this specific change initiative, the implementation approaches, the resistance and receptivity of officers, the selection and use of communication strategies and channels, and change in the organization were articulated by focusing on culture and communication.

The findings point to the important role of culture in making sense of change initiatives, defining the appropriate and inappropriate implementation approaches, and selecting appropriate communication strategies and channels. The study provides a perspective for understanding how officers perceive change, the sources of resistance and receptivity, and the reason for failure and success of change efforts.

The importance of communication in terms of informing officers, managing their perception, constructing positive interpretation, mitigating resistance, understanding culture, and changing organization have also been identified, as well as the need for improving design of communication. The role of communication as construction of new meanings and manifestation of culture that goes beyond communication as information transmission has also been identified in this study. In particular, change agents employ communication as a sense-making tool or frame the change efforts in different ways, which is central to the construction and development of certain interpretations about change.
All in all, culture and communication are two indispensable part of the change process. Change agents should be aware of their implications that can either facilitate or impede change efforts, and manage and guide change process accordingly.
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Appendix A

Interview Questions

1- Will you please provide a description of your current rank and responsibilities in this organization?
   How long have you been with this organization? In this position?
   What were your previous assignments?
   Have you had any responsibility in the implementation of the Compstat either in the past or present?

RQ-1. What is the role of culture in the introduction, implementation, and evaluation of Compstat?

A) How was it introduced and implemented?

2- What was the organization like before adapting this initiative? Was it different in any ways, and if so, how? In terms of communication, decision making methods and processes, and general functioning of organization?

3- In your opinion, what were the reasons for implementing Compstat in this police organization? What were its goals?

4- Can you tell me about early stages of the implementation?
   Do you know who introduced this initiative to this organization? How was it introduced?
   Were you asked to provide feedback pertaining to your opinion of Compstat’s implementation? Do you know if other personnel, individuals, or groups outside the police organization were asked to offer suggestions?
   How did they go about implementing this initiative? Seminars? Training? Focus Groups? Pilot study or period?
Who selected the initial set of performance indicators to be used?

5- What role did the police director play in introducing and implementing the Compstat?

6- In your opinion, did the organization encounter any problems with implementation?

B) What was the reaction of the organizational members?

7- How did members of your organization react when they first learned that Compstat would be implemented? In other words, was it well accepted, or was there any resistance? Do you know who championed the initiative? Who were those opposed to the initiative or questioned it openly or behind the scenes?

   How did you become aware of their criticism?

8- What was your own reaction to Compstat?

   How did you initially feel about its implementation? What did you know about Compstat at that time?

9- Have your feelings changed over the years?

10- What strategies or tactics were used to overcome or manage any problems associated with the reactions and adaptation of this initiative?

C) How has its use changed over time?

11- Has this initiative been modified or changed since its initial adoption by your department? If so, in what ways?

12- What were the reasons behind these changes or modifications?

   In your opinion, did they accomplish what they were intended to?

   Do you know what role the new director played in this change process?

   Did he ask your opinion on this change?
D) Has the introduction of Compstat changed the organization’s cultural values? If so, how?

13- What are the most defining characteristics of this organization?

In your own words, can you describe its culture?

14- Which words or adjectives would you use to best describe Compstat and Compstat meetings?

15- Has Compstat changed your way of thinking and beliefs concerning your occupation and this organization? If so, please describe how?

16- In your opinion, to what degree has it changed the way you work? The way you think about your work? How?

Have officers in general changed their daily practices after the adaptation of this initiative?

What about the ranking offices and managers?

17- So, would you say that Compstat has changed this department? If so, exactly what has changed? How did this change come about? What proof is there to suggest such a change?

18- Can you describe what kind of performance indicators are used in Compstat?

In general, how has Compstat influenced performance measurement of this organization?

19- Have you attended the Compstat meetings? If so, what was your role?

Who attends these meetings? What is their role?

20- What function or functions do the Compstat meetings play in the initiative?

In your opinion, are they effective? Why or why not?

21- What do members of the organization say during these meetings? Do they speak openly?
22- Do you have any memorable experiences? Can you give me an example of one positive and negative experience?

23- Based on the years of experience on the implementation of this initiative;

What is your overall view of Compstat?

In your opinion, has it positively or negatively impacted your organization? How so?

Looking back, do you have any criticism concerning the way in which Compstat was introduced into your organization?

R-Q 2. What is the role of communication in the introduction and implementation of Compstat?

A) - B) What communication strategies and channels were used to introduce and implement Compstat?

24- How does your organization typically communicate a change in policy, practice, or procedure? (e.g., purchase of new equipment or vehicles)?

25- What communication channels (i.e., memos, emails) are used to convey information about these changes?

Where do you normally get information about important changes in the organization?

What role does informal communication play?

26- Specifically, how did you acquire information about Compstat over the years? From whom? What channels were used?

27- Do you have any written document that gives information about changes in general and Compstat specifically?

If so, what kind of information does the document contain? Can you provide me with a copy?
28- Looking back, do you believe that the approaches used to communicate Compstat to members of the organization were effective? If so, how? Please explain?

C) In what ways is the selection of communication strategies and channels related to the culture of police organizations?

29- Who makes decisions about organizational changes? What steps do implementers take to put these changes into practice?

30- Were you and other members of organization asked for their input regarding the change process?

   If so, was this done formally or informally? Have you shared your personal opinions? If so, when? Was your opinion taken into account?

31- Looking back, was there any attempt on the part of implementers to persuade you and other groups to support the implementation of Compstat? Any other change initiatives?

32- If you were asked to advise other departments that would be undertaking Compstat, what recommendations would you make about its communication and overall acceptance?

33- Do you have any final comments?

   Thank you for your participation.
Appendix B

Characteristics of Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Interviews</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS Specialist (Civilian)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Analysts (Civilian)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 12 Years</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 12 Years</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compstat Unit</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Administration (Director’s Office)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Administration (Deputy Chief’s Office)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precincts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Detective Bureau</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position in the Precincts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander or Executive Commander</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Control Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Compstat Meeting Experience**

| Yes | 23 |
| No  | 3  |

**Type of Compstat Meeting Experience**

| Technical Responsibilities | 6  |
| Representative of a Unit or Precinct | 11 |
| Supportive Staff for Representatives | 6 |
| Visitor in the Past            | 3  |
Appendix C

Meeting Room Photos
## Appendix D

### Observation Guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation Units</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Reason for the Observation</th>
<th>My own reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Meeting actors</td>
<td>Rank, position</td>
<td>Understanding context of this meeting and its role in Compstat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Word Choices</td>
<td>Expression of fear, expression of disagreement, confidence, expression of politeness</td>
<td>Dominant values and expression of these values in all these categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key Words</td>
<td>Analysis, Coordination, Patterns, Performance</td>
<td>Validating cultural change claims stated in interviews</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Address terms</td>
<td>Sir, Guys, Mr., Mrs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Physical Artifacts</td>
<td>Dress codes, seating position, uniforms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Rituals, routines, governing rules</td>
<td>Who starts the meeting? What do they talk? When do they start? What time? Duration? Repeated Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Content of communication</td>
<td>Giving information, questioning, harmonizing, listening, dominating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Turn taking patterns</td>
<td>Who talks? How long? In what order?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9) Communication Strategy Dimension</td>
<td>Disseminating information, soliciting input, discrepancy focus, efficacy focus, gain or loss frames, targeted or blanket messages. Autocratic, participative, Open, defensive, innovative, predictable, clear, formal, informal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Values</td>
<td>Masculine, innovative, flexible, problem solving, control, information sharing</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix E

**Document Review Guidelines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis of Documents / Units of Analysis</th>
<th>Examples of Documents</th>
<th>Purpose of Document Review</th>
<th>My Own Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inductive and contextual, Open/Axial/Selective Coding that relies on coding of keywords and lines to establish themes.</td>
<td>Compstat reports (i.e., crime statistics, crime analysis commander profile and performance reports) Minutes of Compstat meetings Publicly available brochures and other documents Web site information (Mission and Vision Statement) Examples of memos, reports, and policy document</td>
<td>Gain information about history, structure, policies, and culture of organization and determine the similarities and differences between the organization’s past/present culture</td>
<td>To triangulate, corroborate, and complement the data collected through interviews and observations</td>
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</table>

The identification of these themes are related to each other and a theory.
# Appendix F

## Table of Documents Reviewed (Interviews and field notes are not included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Content</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
<th>Volume of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compstat Package</td>
<td>Crime statistics, Crime analysis, Crime maps for each precincts and city wide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300 Pages total</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Minutes of Compstat Meeting</td>
<td>Summary of Meetings and Decisions Made during the Meetings</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>General Order and Memos</td>
<td>Information regarding the implementation of Compstat and new policies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25 Pages total</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper Articles</td>
<td>Information regarding Compstat implementation and thoughts of former and current police director’s about Compstat</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50 Pages total</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Web Site Information</td>
<td>Organizational information, brochures, mission and vision statements</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precinct Commander Profile</td>
<td>Performance and productivity figures for precincts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30 Pages total</td>
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Appendix G

List of Codes with Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th># of Occurrences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural change: Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone of meetings (Friendly/hostile, intimidation,</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>embarrassment, relaxing, humiliation, peer pressure)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing (Lack)</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime analysis</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training (Lack)</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Success (of the model)</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance (evaluation, standards)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership style</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance indicators (crime rates, sick time,</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absenteeism, arrest, warrants)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication channels (boards, email, memos, phone,</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bulletins)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology (Database, Computers)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow up</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource allocation</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values: chain of command</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rates/statistics</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values: small/large organization</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime patterns</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policing style: proactive/reactive</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural change: community orientation</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involvement (Lack)</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management style</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information orientation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural change: Information orientation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural change: Technology</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot spot policing</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making (Informed, top-down)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field inquiries/investigations</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
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<td>Productivity</td>
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<td>Formal/Informal communication</td>
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<td>Responsibility</td>
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<td>Quality of life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geographical analysis</td>
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<td>Crime response</td>
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<td>Priorities</td>
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<td>Roll calls</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Information flow (top down/bottom up)</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Cultural values: paramilitary</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
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<td>Response time</td>
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<td>Crime mapping</td>
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<td>Professionalism</td>
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<td>Crime reduction/prevention</td>
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<td>Preparation</td>
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<td>Deployment of officers</td>
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<td>Cultural change: policing style (proactive)</td>
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<td>Empowerment</td>
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<td>Change implementation (programmed/edict etc.)</td>
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<td>Forms of resistance (manipulation, retirement)</td>
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<td>Institutional influences</td>
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<td>Participation (lack)</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Stress, Burn out</td>
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<td>Cultural change: Institutionalization</td>
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<td>Crime trends</td>
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<td>Order</td>
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<td>Cultural change: generations</td>
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<td>Open, honest, free dialogue</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Cultural values: clean, sharp, busy</td>
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<td>Positional differences (hierarchy)</td>
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<td>Problem identification</td>
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<td>Reward</td>
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<td>Collaboration</td>
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<td>Police tactics (visibility, presence, traffic stops)</td>
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<td>Compstat as a tool</td>
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<td>Police culture</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Disciplinary measures (transfers, replacement)</td>
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<td>National culture</td>
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<td>Uncertainty</td>
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<td>Learning by doing</td>
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<td>Habits</td>
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<td>Cultural values: hardworking</td>
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<td>Strong</td>
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<td>(Shared) Vision, Goal</td>
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<td>Check and balance</td>
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<td>Cultural values: traditional</td>
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<td>Implementation problems</td>
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<td>Motivation</td>
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<td>Work overload</td>
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<td>Mission clarification</td>
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<td>Crime fight</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Communication channels: FfF/Mediated, oral/written</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural values: respect</td>
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<td>Organizational change (top-down/ bottom up)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal politics</td>
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<td>Sense of urgency</td>
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<td>Modification</td>
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<td>Punishment</td>
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<td>Adaptation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open/closed communication</td>
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<td>Cultural change: policing style</td>
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<td>Support</td>
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<td>Problem-oriented policing</td>
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<td>Triple effect</td>
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<td>Organizational structure</td>
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<td>Joint operations</td>
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<td>External communication</td>
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<td>Information-based approach/Information-led policing</td>
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<td>Questioning style- Hard/Soft</td>
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<td>Personal problems</td>
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<td>Awareness</td>
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<td>Gotcha mentality</td>
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<td>Cultural values: power distance</td>
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<td>Overcoming resistance</td>
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<td>Cultural value: uniqueness</td>
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<td>Timely and Accurate information</td>
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<td>Flexibility (Lack)</td>
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<td>Replacement</td>
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<td>Community oriented policing</td>
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<td>Cultural change-mission clarification</td>
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<td>Coaching</td>
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<td>Defensive thinking</td>
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<td>Cultural value: pride</td>
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<td>Cultural values: culturally diverse</td>
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<td>Brain storming</td>
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<td>Persuasion</td>
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<td>Cultural values: dedicative</td>
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<td>Cultural values: discipline</td>
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## Appendix H

### Sample Codes and Quotations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Sample Quotes (Interviews and Compstat meetings)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination; Order coordination</td>
<td>Director: Coordinate the activities, you are not listening me, get things done. It is a good thing you guys talk, coordinate what is happening there (Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention</td>
<td>Director: Every crime can be prevented. Our goal is to prevent every crime. It is impossible, but we can prevent it in any way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information orientation Planning</td>
<td>Folks, you got to pay attention; you need to know crime activities; have a plan; implement that plan. (Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime analysis Crime patterns, Hot spots Information sharing</td>
<td>I came here a year and half ago. I analyze everything from robbery and shootings. I look for patterns. I look for trouble areas. I do a report every week. Then, it is brought up to Compstat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values: resource constraints Cultural values: hardworking</td>
<td>What I noticed in MPD we do a great job working with the little we have as far as resources, equipment They are hard workers. They work harder than New York City Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning by doing; Training Crime patterns</td>
<td>I learned experienced with this. I did not have any training. Being in robbery squad and homicide squad and knowing the trends and how things go on, I kind of know what to look for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Input; Decision making Respect</td>
<td>We still have ranks. They come here and might ask for your input but to them they make their own decisions. When you express an opinion, they are pretty understandable. But you still show them respect because they are your superior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing Problem solving Proactive policing</td>
<td>As such, Compstat provides a common ground to talk about how we can attack a problem when we have a problem and we can foresee a problem before happening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication channel: Written Orders Training; Paramilitary</td>
<td>It is first done by orders. They give you details of what they want. What is going to be implemented and how it is going to be tracked. If there is training issue, they give you training about it. This is a paramilitary, we do it with orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime analysis Crime patterns</td>
<td>There were robbery problems in the second or third precincts. Their analysis was these were night time robberies. There were a group of guys in a car. They drive up to somebody. One of the guys gets out of car and takes some of the money and jumps back in. So, based on that instead of focusing quality of life and FIS, I remember they started doing traffic stops in the area they are likely to be around.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police tactics Police tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rates Gotcha mentality Modification; Tone of meeting Stress</td>
<td>In a bad week, you are talking about 30 robberies or something like that for a specific precinct. It was a kind of gotcha mentality. By the way, related to this, the second difference which was just the tone. Compstat is still uncomfortable. There are still certain times when answers of the captains are not satisfying police director and deputy chief and things get a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Little bit uncomfortable for captains. But, it is never personal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police culture</td>
<td>It is just police culture. Again, it is probably the reflection of how Compstat is used to being done over the years. People did not speak up pretty much. I am not sure maybe it is left partly from that time. In order to overcome this problem, you can organize the meeting differently. Instead of being personnel driven, it can be problem driven. That might be helpful for people to talk more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest, free talk</td>
<td>It should not. We have a chain of command. What is expected from number one guy is transferred to number two guy. He should know what is expected. He should be able to follow that information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compstat meeting: Communication design</td>
<td>So, if you didn’t have a component like this existing in the police department, you would not know what these problems would be. So, if you already know what these problems are, twenty percent of time in a patrol car can be directed accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free talk</td>
<td>I can surely say that it is stressful position to be because not only are you being asked tough questions, you need to know what the answers are, and everyone is looking at you. It is a tough position to be in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain of command</td>
<td>We look at crime patterns, geographical trends, what time it is happening and where it is happening, and looking at description of suspects. We keep in contact with the respected investigation units and we provide information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information flow: Top-down</td>
<td>It is more about keeping commanders accountable. Also you want to make sure whatever proactive policing they are doing and they are doing it properly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem identification</td>
<td>The police used to doing things in a certain way and they resist any kind of change. They just did not want responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted enforcement</td>
<td>It was mostly negative because a lot of transfers coming out of it, disciplinary measures are taken. So it was mostly negative. I could say the exchange was a little bit hostile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource deployment</td>
<td>I think it was just part of the culture in general. As the time changes, the officers are coming out changes. Technology is changing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress</td>
<td>Everybody, captains, control officers, deputy chiefs, directors are looking at the numbers on these books even if they do not talk. If there are negative numbers, then they bring them to Compstat or they might just call the precincts captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning style: tough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information orientation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Crime patterns</td>
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<td>Geographical analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information sharing/Coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proactive policing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control, Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police culture: Habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change; responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disciplinary measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone of meeting: Hostile</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural change: Generations and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow up</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I

List of Categories Created

Cultural Change
Cultural Values
Need for change
Resistance to change
Overcoming resistance/Acceptance
Communication channels
Tone of meeting
Introduction of change
Implementation problems
Performance
Policing style
Modification
Management style
Compstat meetings
**Appendix J**

**List of Categories and Corresponding Codes (selected)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Corresponding Codes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for change</td>
<td>Lack of accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of information sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policing style (reactive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Values</td>
<td>Chain of command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hardworking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uniqueness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culturally diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Busy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large/Cosmopolite</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of change</td>
<td>Sense of urgency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal politics</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chain of command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lack of participation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of involvement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Input</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>Leadership style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fear of change  
Tone of meetings  
Lack of training  
Fairness  
Punishment  
Reward  
Disciplinary measures  
Habits/Routines  
Work overload  
Gotcha mentality  
Questioning style  
Stress, Burn out  
Uncertainty  
Manipulation, retirement,  
Unpreparedness

**Overcoming resistance/Acceptance**

Disciplinary measures  
Leadership style  
Follow up  
Control  
Roll calls  
Learning by doing  
Responsibility  
Success of the initiative  
Crime rates  
Modification  
Power  
Competition  
Support

**Modification**

Persuasion  
Learning by doing  
Leadership style  
Tone of meetings  
Support  
Adaptation  
Follow up  
Control  
Competition  
Education  
Replacement  
Motivation  
Technology

**Cultural Change**

Accountability  
Information orientation
Community orientation
Technology
Mission clarification
Institutionalization
Generations
Policing style (proactive)
Competitive
Informed decision making
Performance orientation

Tone of meeting
Friendly
Hostile
Intimidation
Humiliation
Embarrassment
Peer pressure
Free, open, honest dialogue
Open communication
Information sharing
Best practices
Innovation

Performance
Follow up
Control
Crime rates
Crime reduction
Crime patterns
Geographical clusters
Competition
Best practices
Brain storming
Awareness
Gotcha mentality
Work overload
Punishment/reward
Response time
Warrants, arrests, sick time

Policing style
Crime analysis
Performance standards
Crime rates/statistics
Crime patterns
Hot spot policing
Information-led policing
Community oriented policing
Quality of life crimes
Information orientation
Proactive/reactive policing
Crime mapping
Technology
Roll calls
Priorities
Mission clarification
Innovation
Police tactics
Police culture
Coordination/Collaboration
Joint efforts

Compstat meetings

Information sharing
Cooperation
Bureaucracy
Responsibility
Defensive thinking
Brain storming
Increased communication
Tone of meetings
Best practices
Timely and accurate information
Coordination/collaboration
Geographical analysis
Competition
Awareness
Crime rates/statistics
Crime reduction/prevention
Crime patterns
Questioning style
Free, honest dialogue
Triple effect
Leadership style
Mission clarification
National culture
Performance/productivity
Roll calls
Follow up
Feedback

Implementation problems

Lack of accountability
Lack of information sharing
Flexibility
Crime analysis
Police tactics
Innovation
Control
Empowerment
Planning
Coordination/collaboration
Information overload
Defensive thinking

Management style

Job description
Accountability
Performance standards
Follow up
Resource allocation
Decision making
Responsibility
Feedback
Priorities
Deployment of officers
Flexibility
Effectiveness
Control
Order
Punishment/reward
Shared vision, goals
Check and balance
Problem solving
Decentralization
Empowerment
Bureaucracy

Communication channels

Information sharing
Coordination
Collaboration
Chain of command
Face to face/mediated
Formal/Informal
Open
Written/oral
Memos/email/orders
Effectiveness
Order
External communication
Triple effect
Appendix K

Photos of Crime Information Center in a Precinct
Appendix L

Precinct Commander Profile

### 2nd Precinct

**Date Submitted:** 8/4/2009

**Rank:** Captain

**Years in Rank:** 3 Years

**Date Assigned C.O.:** December 1, 2008

**Date of Promotion:** December 29, 2005

**Executive Officer:**

- **Rank:** Captain
- **Years in Rank:** 3 Years
- **Date of Promotion:**

**Assignment Officer:**

- **Rank:** Lieutenant
- **Years in Rank:** 3 Years
- **Date of Promotion:**

**Integrity Control Officer:**

- **Rank:** Lieutenant
- **Years in Rank:** 3 Years
- **Date of Promotion:** April 17, 2006

**Operations Officer:**

- **Rank:** NONE
- **Years in Rank:**
- **Date of Promotion:**

---

The following statistical data is for the week ending: 8/2/2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct Personnel</th>
<th>IOP</th>
<th>Avg. Response Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Arrests:**

- **2009:** 112
- **2008:** 144
- **% Change:** -22.22%

**Domestic Viol Incidents:**

- **2009:** 17
- **2008:** 0
- **% Change:** #DIV/0!

**Field Interrogations:**

- **2009:** 209
- **2008:** 205
- **% Change:** 0.62%

**Quality of Life Summons:**

- **2009:** 395
- **2008:** 206
- **% Change:** 91.75%

**Summons:**

- **2009:** 810
- **2008:** 805
- **% Change:** 0.62%

**Precinct Overtime:**

- **Current Week:** $4,347.87, $84,36, $4,634.94, $4,634.94
- **YTD:** $88,857.57, $12,253.07, $252,758.79
- **Total:** $8,966.87, $353,869.43

Unable to obtain the number of D.V. incidents for 2008 from SARA.
Appendix M

Photo of Crime Analysis and Crime Maps Used in a Compstat Meeting
Appendix N

Minutes of Compstat Meeting

COMPSTAT
5/14/09

• Capt. requests Squad bosses are placed on a 5/2/ schedule.

• F.I.'s conducted in 212 sector to address robberies shall be reviewed to determine if persons queried have a CCH, which may involve robbery.

• Lt. shall review the robbery case at 513 Broadway to determine if it is related to past robberies committed by juveniles.

• Lt. shall review case where suspect was arrested for shooting with off-duty officer to determine if he is responsible for other robberies in the area.

• Individuals arrested for Home Invasion/Incident with off-duty officer, shall be checked, presumably responsible for other robbery incidents.

• Major Crimes Unit should be reviewing all robbery jobs in 2nd, 4th & 5th to determine if any match up with description of gun, where may have a ballistic match.

• Han: /Cln shall be a lookout - may be target of retaliation. Criminal Intelligence shall put together a package for the 4-12 units beginning tonight.

• Capt. I. shall put together stats on shot spotter jobs. This information shall become part of the Commander Profile for Surveillance Room.

• Anti-Crime Units shall concentrate on “quality arrests”