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Airpower and the Hawk/Dove Dynamic in American Politics: Post-Vietnam to Post-9/11

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Abstract

This dissertation chronicles the role of airpower as a focal point in the evolution of the hawk vs. dove dynamic in American politics. It accounts for the relationship between changes in the viability of aerial weapons technologies and the general commitment of elected officials to expand or restrict the standing and use of hard power as a foreign policy tool. By comparing and contrasting the aftermath of two main paradigms of conflict -- the post-Vietnam era and the post-9/11 era -- it shows how disagreement over the size, scope, and role of the nation’s armed forces has changed amid the introduction of airpower technologies that have in many cases been developed to mitigate the increasing level of conflict asymmetry witnessed by the transition from one strategic threat environment to the next. Accordingly, the analysis follows a basic chronology of comparative case study: first it examines the waning years of the Vietnam War through to the years following its conclusion, establishing a baseline for the character of the hawk/ dove dynamic amid a mindset of mostly conventional conflict before proceeding to the post-9/11 era, evaluating how trends in the hawk/ dove debate have shifted in an age of extreme asymmetry and non-linear battlefields. The lion’s share of the research analyzes legislative voting data on the U.S. Congress from 1964-2012 to visually chart how the hawk/ dove dynamic has fluctuated over time in terms of its intensity, primary focal point(s), and the balance of the dynamic. Seven litmus tests are identified as individual moving parts: 1) airpower policy, 2) defense spending in general, 3) (de)escalation of conflict, 4) foreign military aid, 5) WMD policy, 6) war powers/ inter-branch relations, and 7) NASA support as part of air and space power. Providing a quantitative basis for analysis, the findings are revealed along with contextual points of
interest found in the public communication of key intellectual leaders (including those in the executive branch). Taken together, the research offers a comprehensive view into the evolving debate over peace and war in an age of rapidly-advancing airpower systems used in increasingly asymmetrical conflict.
Acknowledgements

This project is the summation of nearly a decade of study and careful thought, stemming from my longstanding fascination with pro-war/anti-war debates and the ardent passions they tend to evoke from politicians and average citizens alike. Beginning undergraduate study in political science the year after 9/11, I came of age in a time of persistent conflict waged by the U.S. amid the heightened climate of controversy on college campuses surrounding the ‘War on Terror’ and the Iraq war in particular. Seeing the great interest in these issues on the faces of my own undergraduate students several years later, I set out on further study, which was never about advocating for one side or another, but rather understanding the positions of both sides. Coupled with my former interests in the mechanisms of warfare and especially the technology of aerial combat, I longed for a better understanding of the relationships between U.S. air warfare and the struggles of the politicians that govern it.

Along this intellectual journey, and far before I envisioned completing a dissertation of this length, there were many mentors who helped to shape my scholarship. They guided me through the world of academia, through the field of political science, and later, into the wider field of global affairs. To begin, I would like to acknowledge my entire dissertation committee, without which, this project would not have been possible. In his great wisdom, Dr. Norman Samuels has been indispensable in guiding my thought process and what ultimately emerged in my writing. Likewise, I am indebted to Professor Richard Langhorne, whose encyclopedic knowledge of world political history has always been inspiring. Lectures by Dr. Yale H. Ferguson and Dr. Leslie Kennedy soon after coming to Rutgers only added fuel to the fire of my fascination with global issues.
Certainly, each member of this interdisciplinary committee has played an important role in strengthening my work, coming on the heels of my Master’s thesis in 2009 on the National Security Act of 1947 under the able direction of Dr. Keesha M. Middlemass and Dr. Mara S. Sidney. More recently, Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud, and the opportunities he has extended have helped my work and my professional development in innumerable ways. All of these Rutgers faculty members share my deepest gratitude, in addition to Dr. Thomas A. Cassilly, who was the first professor to truly spark my interests in politics during undergraduate study at Montclair State University. I will never forget the graciousness they have extended to me over the years. I am also greatly appreciative of the administration at the Division of Global Affairs (DGA) for their steady hand in my progress through the program, as well as the Graduate School-Newark for the opportunity to conduct my research under the terms of a dissertation fellowship for the 2012-13 academic year. Lastly, I thank those friends and family members that have supported me along the way, including my brother, my parents, and last but not least, my grandfather Erik Arndt in Denmark.
When my brother and I built the first man-carrying flying machine we thought that we were introducing into the world an invention which would make further wars practically impossible.

— Orville Wright, June 21, 1917

Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.

— John F. Kennedy
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List of Abbreviations

ACLU – American Civil Liberties Union
ARVN – Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AWACS – Air Warning and Control System
BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China
CDM – Coalition for a Democratic Majority
CENTCOM – Central Command
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
COIN – Counterinsurgency
DCI – Director of Central Intelligence
DOD – Department of Defense
ER/MP – Extended Range/ Multi-Purpose
ESS – Evolutionary Stable Strategy
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Area
FY – Fiscal Year
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GPS – Global Positioning System
GWOT – Global War on Terrorism
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
J-UCAS – Joint Unmanned Combat Air System
LBJ – Lyndon Baines Johnson
LIC – Low Intensity Conflict
LRAD – Long Range Acoustic Device
MACV – Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIC – Military Industrial Complex
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC – National Security Council
NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board
NVA – North Vietnamese Army
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D – Research and Development
RPA – Remotely Piloted Aircraft
RVN – Republic of Vietnam
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative
SECDEF – Secretary of Defense
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
TACAIR – Tactical Airpower
UAS – Unmanned Aerial System
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCA – Unanimous Consent Agreement
UCAV – Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
VNSA – Violent Non-state Actor
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOT – War on Terror
Chapter One:  
Introduction

The contest between war hawks and peace doves is a dynamic that has emerged as an object of real fascination in the popular imagination of modern democratic society. Nearly everyone can relate to either anti-war or pro-war sentiments (sometimes both), which flow from some of the oldest and most fundamental questions surrounding humankind’s penchant for violence against fellow wo(man). Indeed, the basic dilemma over resorting to the use of force as a (democratic) society speaks to the core of a nation’s character, values, priorities, ethics, and morality, which has the tendency to motivate perhaps the most ardent passions seen in political life. Though somewhat simplistic in its binary premise -- representing a philosophical divergence of course in military policy -- the hawk/ dove debate over the extent of America’s militarism, in particular, is an evolving political phenomenon that defies easy explanation and remains murky absent a more comprehensive attempts to account for the debate, its moving parts, and their connections to real-world military affairs. It is with these central aims that the project unfolds. In particular, how does this dynamic actually work over time when involving several different issue areas, countless competing interests in representative democracy, an increasingly complex and often challenging security landscape in international affairs, and the development of ever more destructive weaponry?

Certainly, to better understand the hawk/ dove dynamic in the U.S. -- especially as it concerns the most advanced military ever assembled on the face of the Earth -- is to better grasp outcomes in military conflict from a global perspective as well. And central
to this, aerial technologies have led the way in the transformation of hard power, from
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to attack drones. But how do these concepts
intersect and how can they be effectively measured or otherwise accounted for?
Addressing this area of inquiry in the pages to come is a journey into the U.S. Congress,
as the beating heart of the hawk/ dove dynamic on any official level. According to the
seven primary litmus tests identified by this project as exhibiting the dynamic (including
support for airpower as the primary focal point), it reveals a fascinating history buried
deep within the Congress’ storied voting behavior on key issues of peace and war
between 1964 and 2012.

To start down this intellectual road, the following chapter provides an
introductory survey of the topic, including a discussion of what the hawk/ dove dynamic
actually represents, how it can be measured, and how it relates to global affairs/ real-
world events. It also sets up the structure of the rest of the project, chapter by chapter, as
a preview of how the research is presented.

**Topic Overview**

Over the course of the sophistication of human conflict, the most valuable
province in which to hold the upper hand militarily has progressed from the ground, to
the sea, to the air, and ultimately to space. From the armies of Genghis Khan conquering
previously unimaginable amounts of terrain throughout Eurasia, to British naval
dominance across the high seas linking an empire on which the sun proverbially never
set, and more recently to American technological superiority in the skies and in space, the
reins of hegemony (though never absolute) have hinged on the domination of these
spatial domains in which hard power can be exercised. Each built upon the previous one as technologies improved, furthered by the simple fact that land covers roughly 30% of the Earth’s surface, water covers some 70%, but air covers a full 100% of the globe. Indeed, all of these areas have remained important throughout the development of increasingly stronger military forces by states and empires, and ‘holding ground’ may always remain a core interest of governments. However, it is clear that the heavens have been the most prized battle space in which great military powers have strived to excel. Control the air, and one shall control the ground beneath it.

Even before the advent of heavier-than-air flight, military thinkers began salivating over the possibility of being able to deliver ordinance from the air, including by balloon, even though it proved impractical throughout the late 19th century. But with sustained, powered, and controlled flight made possible after 1903, the value of aviation used initially as a surveillance and reconnaissance tool quickly expanded to its use as a munitions delivery platform. Governments plainly realized the advantage of this new capability for their militaries, and ever since, they have moved quite resolutely to improve their air forces. If only the first military aviators -- men like Italian pilot Giulio Gavotti who in 1911 threw bombs by hand out of his rickety monoplane against Ottoman loyalists in Libya -- could have peered into the future to see Predator drones firing

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1 Though it proved unreliable and unpredictable due to weight issues and wind direction, among other things, the prospect of this technology presented enough of a concern that the practice of dropping projectiles from balloons was curtailed in the Hague IV Conventions on July 29, 1899 concerning Laws of War: Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, which stated literally that “the Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a term of five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of similar nature.” This can be found among international law archives compiled by the Avalon Project at Yale Law School. See Hague IV Conventions, July 29, 1899. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague994.asp>

Hellfire missiles piloted remotely from thousands of miles away, they would undoubtedly be mesmerized. With such advancement in aerial weapons technology over the last 100+ years, especially following the introduction of jet engines and modern rocketry (including nuclear ICBMs), the stick of American foreign policy has transitioned inexorably toward one that is swung overwhelmingly from the air. No American conflict since WWII (or any war plan in the future for that matter) could even be imagined, in strategic or tactical terms, without the role of airpower capabilities.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, American supremacy in this area has been unparalleled, becoming quite comprehensively global in scope with technology like the F-22 Raptor fighter jet, for example, which according to one of its lead test pilots, brings aviation toward a level of superiority in avionics, targeting, and maneuverability that is “… like going to Disney Land and you have the whole place to yourself.”\(^3\) These leaps forward in aerial tools of combat -- including uninhabited platforms -- have put America’s leadership in the remarkable and often tempting position of being able to launch airstrikes against virtually any precise location on the planet within a matter of hours or in some cases minutes. However, largely in reaction to this advantage enjoyed by the U.S. in the air, America’s adversaries have increasingly sought to exchange fire in different and often unconventional domains, leading to the problem of conflict asymmetry where strategic bombers with nuclear payloads -- built for a war against the Soviet Union or other state adversaries -- hold little value against individual militants in

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\(^3\) This is a quote by Raptor test pilot Major Chris Keithly as featured in “Secret Access: Superpower.” History Specials Season 1, Episode 147. A&E Television Networks for the History Channel. March 1, 2012.
plain clothes hiding out amongst civilian populations⁴ (barring the rejection of any ethical standards in the conduct of warfare).

As growing bodies of evidence suggest, many of the old rules of the game simply do not apply as it concerns the use of (air) force in this new environment, especially after the attacks of 9/11. But in a democracy with civilian oversight of the military, this is not merely a problem for uniformed members of the military/security apparatus. Ultimately, real-world outcomes in the course of America’s foray into global aerial dominance stem from the positions carved out by politicians, including for the purposes of this study -- and to the extent they are involved in such matters -- members of Congress tasked with weighing a more hawkish course against a more dovish course amid increasingly complex features of the new strategic landscape.

It is a relationship of mutual reshaping between powerful actors and changes in the nature of fighting war, which is summed up by a recent report to Congress by the Congressional Research Service:

> Today’s new technologies, including the development of precision-guided weaponry, have given rise to new methods of war fighting, thus bringing dramatic change to the operational battlefield. As will other decision makers, Members of Congress will confront significant challenges in making their choices about how to adapt to the continually evolving environment…⁵

As is often the case, new complexities can bring about greater confusion, which in turn, can breed heightened controversy when it comes to making decisions in this area,

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begging questions about how the hawk/dove dynamic may have been shaped as a result – along with how it shapes the mitigation of these complexities/challenges. No doubt inseparable from these larger issues of airpower in warfare and conflict asymmetry as an outgrowth of the proliferation of violent non-state actors challenging states for power/authority, decision-makers in Washington D.C. have had to undergo a major realignment in their understanding of the fundamental nature of how America orchestrates warfare with precision strike and other advanced capabilities. And although this study falls short of drawing direct lines of causation between the extent of conflict asymmetry and trends in opinion or policy, it is put forth here that this rather drastic restructuration in the operating assumptions of applying force in the 21st century can act as a strong push-factor, and at the very least, provides indispensable context in studying the evolution of contention between hawks and doves over time. In the opposite direction, it is clear that the intentions of the U.S. Congress (and the nation’s leadership in general) have, more than any other entity in the last several decades, shaped the course of military affairs and actual conflict around the globe.

With power in the skies having risen to a clear place of prominence in military affairs, and especially given the difficulties of adapting to extreme asymmetry with new technology after 9/11, it is no wonder that the huge attention paid to the role of America’s air assets in foreign/security policy has translated to a notable extent into controversy in the political realm. After all, this is where the development of airpower is funded (in the legislative branch) and where policy on its strategic use is primarily decided (especially within the executive branch) – issue areas not detached from the contention spawned by electoral politics. With a sense of growing importance, the level of commitment by
political leaders to the development of aerial technology, as well as the extent of its actual use against the nation’s adversaries, has become central to understanding the nature and evolution of the distinctive hawk vs. dove dynamic in American politics. Yet, curiosity looms over how asymmetry in conflict, along with the airpower technologies purported to overcome them, figures into the now perpetual debate within America’s foreign policy leadership, the balance of which dictates how aggressively new technologies are cultivated and brought to bear against opponents (real or perceived) of the U.S. around the globe.

Because asymmetry has so extensively changed the nature of how contemporary war is fought by the U.S. military after 9/11, including the aerial technologies now being relied upon to in many ways bridge the asymmetry gap (e.g., armed drones), it begs the question: have key characteristics of the hawk/ dove dynamic established in a mostly conventional paradigm of conflict during Vietnam vanished entirely in this new environment after 9/11? Or have specific elements/ trends perhaps been persistent? Most particularly, how has the course of this debate been altered amid new constraints/ opportunities confronting political leaders in the area of aerial weapons technology? This line of questioning sets up the premise of the overall comparison throughout the project between the (post)-Vietnam and post-9/11 eras.

For answers, the research seeks to tease out airpower’s role in the dynamic between generally anti-war and pro-war conglomerations in the U.S. Congress, a body where the debate between hawks and doves is the most visible and consequential. Centered on the methodological exercise of tracking Congressional vote data and applying it to the cases, the dissertation specifically aims to answer:
1) Has the hawk/dove dynamic in the post-9/11 era become more contentious or less contentious than in the post-Vietnam era? To what extent have certain issues that are nested within the hawk/dove dynamic fluctuated independently in terms of their frequency and intensity?

2) Which side seems to have been winning out over time? How has the balance varied for separate sub-issues that demonstrate the hawk/dove dynamic?

3) Do the trends involved in airpower-related issues stand apart from those witnessed by the dynamic applied more generally to other areas of contention?

4) In light of the results, what connections (if any) can be made with significant events in international affairs, especially concerning major paradigm shifts and the overall prevalence of aerial warfare in asymmetrical conflict?

**Methodological Considerations**

In answering the core research questions, the research turns to a straightforward, quantitative approach supported by certain crucial qualitative elements. To begin, it is imperative to point out that the struggle between hawks and doves is not uni-dimensional. It has evolved and given rise to certain different and specific points of contention that have dominated the dynamic, waxing and waning based on the nature of the conflict environment in which the nation has found itself. These fault lines have recurred in regards to specific policy preferences falling under the purview of seven distinct litmus tests identified by this dissertation as demonstrating the hawk/dove dynamic in clear terms. Considering them separately obtains greater insight into the mechanics of the hawk/dove dynamic because each of them operates independently according to different
sub-issue areas. They are: 1) the extent of support for all forms of airpower (the central focus of the project), 2) defense spending on everything other than airpower, 3) the active deployment of U.S. military force (e.g., escalation vs. de-escalation), 4) foreign (allied) military support, 5) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policy, 6) war powers/ inter-branch relations, and 7) support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a key aspect of the nation’s air and space power. Implicit in making these distinctions, hawkishness in one area does not automatically translate to hawkishness in another area, for example. As such, they constitute individual moving parts to the debate worthy of independent consideration.

According to these fundamental litmus tests for judging hawkishness/ dovishness that can be found in bulk voting data of the Congress, this dissertation systematically chronicles how airpower has acted -- in relation to the other categories -- as a focal point in the disagreement between the two sides over the course of the transition from a period of mostly conventional/ symmetrical conflict during and after Vietnam, to a period of highly asymmetrical/ non-linear conflict after 9/11.

This is perhaps the most important component of this work, for in order to actually track change in the standing of the hawk/ dove split as it relates to the leveraging of airpower, a coherent data set is required, which in this case centers on the U.S. Congress (to the extent that the legislative branch has oversight power and controls the power of the purse). This is designed to gauge the level of support for the furtherance of American militarism, holding apart the level of support for funding or expanding aerial weaponry for purposes of comparison. To do this, the research scours raw voting data made available by Govtrack.us, a leading organization that has pioneered the
comprehensive online accumulation of unfiltered data on Congress (a procedure at which the body itself does not excel), dating back to the founding of the United States. Making use of an initial data set of every floor vote held in both houses of Congress from 1964 up through 2012 -- no doubt a massive data set to start out with -- this became an extensive qualitative process of separating relevant floor votes from irrelevant ones, categorizing the ones to be included in the final data set according to the litmus tests, tabulating ‘yea’ and ‘nay’ vote data for each year, and then calculating key trends witnessed over time. Subsequently, numerous charts were created to help put the findings in visual terms, most of which are revealed, along with a comprehensive discussion of the entire methodological process, in chapter three. Boiled down to each floor vote with hawk/dove relevance, this data set allowed for the extrapolation of some rather interesting insights into the voting behavior of Congress, such as the level of intensity for each litmus test and trends in the balance between the two poles (more hawkish or more dovish over time). Given the comprehensive yet straightforward data organization process employed by this research, the questions posed at the outset can begin to be answered with enhanced intellectual credibility.

With the data out of the way in the first half of the project, the findings are then applied to the two general cases that serve as the primary comparison that is developed more thoroughly in the latter chapters: the post-Vietnam and post-9/11 eras. On the heels of a massive task of data entry and calculation, this is where qualitative analysis re-enters the picture. In fundamental terms, to answer whether key aspects of the hawk/dove debate have preserved any of their essential character over the transition from a mindset of fighting state adversaries with conventional means to a mindset of fighting non-state
adversaries employing non-conventional tactics, one must establish a baseline for the prior age. Only then can any comparison be done with present conditions. Accordingly, the core of this dissertation relies on the case study method and basic comparativism to analyze how the issues described have played out during the post-Vietnam and post-9/11 eras. It shows how U.S. airpower as an aspect of the hawk/dove dynamic played out in the first strategic era (during and after Vietnam) versus the contemporary strategic era (after 9/11), which provides context for grasping the evolution of these issues over successive periods of political leadership. Specifically, it ‘tests’ whether and to what extent a paradigm of asymmetry is different from the prior conventional paradigm in terms of the controversy that has arisen over the proper role of American hard power on the world stage throughout the end of the 20th century and into the 2000s. In this regard, the temporal nature of the comparative analysis is crucial due to the nature of rapid discursive change on issues of armed conflict amid ever-tumultuous international developments. In turn, the time span examined in each of the two cases is deliberate and rather meticulously chronological throughout.

These two general paradigms of conflict selected for the overall comparison are most relevant because shifts in the dominant positioning of political leaders on dilemmas of peace and war have been rather dramatic, especially after major crises of conflict, when such issues are thrust to the forefront of the debate and force clear stances out of decision-makers. This is certainly the case in the latter stages and aftermath of the Vietnam War, as well as the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under the heading of the war against terrorism.
It is clear that the intensity of the hawk/ dove dynamic depends on the difficulty of the national security question(s) being debated in political life. Tough problems, complex scenarios, and particularly confusing security environments increase the level of controversy involved. And when military action -- particularly involving the tremendous destruction aerial campaigns can bring to bear -- is highly controversial, it tends to polarize opinion. High cost in blood and treasure pushes opinions even further apart with some wishing to cut losses and others hoping to avoid the effort and funds having been expended in vain. Most often, hawk/ dove contention is negligible when questions of foreign policy and national security are comparatively more ‘easy,’ as they are thus, more unified. This is the case both in times of relative peace, where the lack of crisis or present enemies makes hawkishness less necessary, as well as in times of existential threat from a clear enemy, when doves seem few and far between (e.g., after Pearl Harbor). It is for these reasons that this dissertation pays particular attention to the sharpest controversy during the Vietnam War and its aftermath, as well as during the U.S.-led ‘war on terrorism’ launched after 9/11 (including Iraq).

The first general case on the end/ aftermath of the Vietnam conflict is especially appropriate given the watershed time period for change in this dynamic. With the establishment of a permanent anti-war movement amid new heights for American military might, the aftermath of the conflict’s end in 1975 set the stage for perpetual debate over the wisdom of American military action. The scale of the war itself, particularly in the larger context of the Cold War, naturally put military/ foreign policy front and center in the discourse and motivated great changes in opinion. Similarly, the attacks of 9/11 and the wars that followed (serving as the second case study) were
conflicts mired in similar political and social disagreement, moving minds in the process, both to the left and to the right, and opening up new grounds for contention. The post-Vietnam and post-9/11 periods can be regarded as critical paradigms of American conflict within the context of the Cold War and ‘War on Terror’ (WOT), respectively, that most boldly reveal such changes in opinion, and are therefore the main foci of the analysis. With two overall and temporally-defined cases that break the interpretive portion of the dissertation into two halves, the findings of the project are outlined with greater chronological simplicity and analytical clarity.

To be sure, comparing the post-Vietnam and post-9/11 eras may seem counterintuitive in the sense that the post-Vietnam era was relatively peaceful for American forces on any large scale (until 1991) while the years since 9/11 have been rife with the heat of near constant battle in two major theatres. Moreover, Vietnam was a nearly decade-long war and 9/11 was a single day of destruction on the U.S. homeland. Yet, in justification of the temporal focus of the case studies, both eras are said to have been ‘wakeup calls’ and influential breaks with the past that changed the nature of American conflict, how it is contemplated, how it is waged, and where it is focused. Part of this related to the corollary line of inquiry into the validity of the conventional wisdom holding that Vietnam made the U.S. more dovish vis-à-vis war weariness and 9/11 made the U.S. more hawkish vis-à-vis the desire for retribution. And although the emphasis in the first case is on the aftermath of the Vietnam War, it does consider some of the conflict itself in its latter stages because these years constitute a major contextual environment in which the hawk/ dove relationship took shape in modern history. Thus, the period of time covered from roughly 1964-1975, during escalation, peak military
footprint, and then a path of de-escalation in Indo-china, serves as a more valid comparison alongside the active period of conflict witnessed in the years since 9/11. In other words, without examining the years included during the Vietnam War, the cases might in this respect be taken as incongruent (comparing a post-conflict time period with an active conflict period).

Moreover, each case stands apart, representing a major paradigm in terms of what is perceived as America’s primary adversary: the Soviet Union and communism during the Cold War and non-state groups like al-Qaeda and radical Islamist terrorism during the global war against terrorism. To the extent, however, that the research explicitly covers 1964-2012, four basic periods actually comprise spans of time (nested within the two cases) that are analyzed with some distinction: the Vietnam War, the post-Vietnam or latter Cold War years, the post-Cold War or ‘unipolar moment’ years, and the post-9/11 years.

In the more qualitative second half of the dissertation, separate chapters tackle each of the two cases with in-depth discussions of the relationship between the data produced for that period and the qualitative insights into motivations/ rationales behind changes in focus/ policy seen in Congress. In straightforward terms, the dissertation as a whole is a basic comparison of two distinct periods of conflict designed to pin down what is similar and what is different in terms of how opinions on the utility of airpower are debated in the wake of emergent constraints on the battlefield and the development of technologies aimed at mitigating those constraints. The similarities and differences of the two main paradigms of American conflict used in this study serve as the framework for this dissertation and set up the overall conclusions presented at the end.
Running parallel to the numerical data, the true state of the hawk versus dove dynamic is ascertained more accurately by looking to actual ideas and plans communicated to the public vis-à-vis certain illuminating 1) party platforms, 2) programs, and 3) rhetoric put forth by key intellectual and party leaders. Thus, the dissertation retains important qualitative elements. A central aspect also involves literature reviews of the theoretical foundations made by other authors (tackled in the following chapter). In keeping with the central logic of the dissertation, the literature review is geared toward pinning down conflict asymmetry as a concept in global affairs, and more particularly as it operates in relation to advances made in the application of airpower. Subsequently, the two main case studies on the post-Vietnam and post-9/11 periods are centered on high-profile and readily observable examples of hawk/ dove opinion (i.e., ones that are actually communicated to the public). One by one, these metrics are analyzed in terms of how new realities of conflict in these time periods can be interpreted as having shifted stances along each of the sub-component parts of the hawk/ dove continuum (wherever relevant).

Thus, in addition to voting behavior in Congress, this dissertation conducts its analysis with data that is most readily available for study, including the speeches and official communications put forth by presidents, presidential nominees, and other party leaders in Congress with oversight responsibility, (e.g., major speeches, policy statements, campaign literature, debate performances). It also looks at the major party platforms published from 1968 to 2012, scouring them for revelations as to major

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6 To evaluate in quantitative terms alone borders on futile given that the initiation of conflict comes down to so few individual actors (even when acting on behalf of larger political constructs) and in formal terms, so few votes. The U.S. Congress has only voted to declare war five times, and in other instances of hard power being exercised, the hands-on nature of this power has been increasingly concentrated in the executive branch of government.
divisions of hard power policy. These data points are most relevant because presidential-level politics typify the rhetorical manifestations of differing approaches to foreign/military policy, and therefore, offer an insightful window into the evolving views of policy standard-bearers. Some qualitative insight into how this all operates in the executive branch is a nice parallel to the data set exclusive to the legislative branch. Moreover, each of the platforms of the two major parties published every four years comprises a sort of explicit ideological repository and the essence of the key positions of the parties as a whole on military/foreign policy. This aspect of the supplementary qualitative data includes portions of both Democratic and Republican political party platforms compiled by The American Presidency Project.7 These resources are examined for specific instances of support for or dissent against instances of military intervention that either line up with or run counter to the data produced for the time period in question. However, because presidential-level speeches and party platforms are written in sanitized and highly parsed language, this will ultimately be of limited utility. Undergirding the research in this area, key papers, speeches, and official statements of other leading figures within the two general ideological camps, especially those of fringe or insurgent candidates, will also be considered. This includes relevant op-ed pieces published in major newspapers over the period in question. Collected and organized in tandem, the totality of this data is used to compare the primary points of contention on issues of peace and war unfolding over the course of the two main cases.

Though centered on the two umbrella cases, the discussion incorporates context involving specific crises of hard power showing up as points of relevance in the data,

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7 The American Presidency Project is a digital document repository formed by John Woolley and Gerhard Peters at the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1999. See <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php>
including Gulf War I, American involvement in Kosovo, the U.S. component of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action in Libya, and to a less temporally
precise extent, continuing aerial theatres of operation over countries like Yemen and
Somalia. Within the context of the post-Vietnam and post-9/11 eras, these crises capture
the essence of the most consequential, and therefore, controversial instances of U.S. hard
power being used on the world stage, offering excellent insights into the most significant
politicking and debate that surrounds them. Thus, the case study method is central to the
project, to more concretely examine and compare the course of hawk/dove struggles
during several of the most heavily politicized conflicts.

**Theoretical Considerations**

In conjunction with the most primitive human organizations formed for security
against threats from the natural world throughout prehistory came an acceptance that
other groups of humans likewise posed potential threats. This fundamental security
paradigm, in which the formation of increasingly powerful organizations eventually leads
to conflict, has been endemic to virtually all human affairs dating back to before the
written word was even conceived of and for the first time applied to documenting warfare
between Sumer and Elam around 2,700 B.C.E.\(^8\) In the approximately 739 major wars that
have been fought since then,\(^9\) the parties involved have -- to varying degrees -- been
concerned with the justification behind the use of force. With the capacity for higher-
order reasoning and an understanding of the fundamental risks of waging war in the first


place, decision-makers have treated its initiation with careful attention, albeit often in an exclusive and closed setting. But it is not until relatively recently that democratic/pluralistic features have appeared in governance, allowing for questions of peace and war to be distinctly more public questions and central topics of general, and thereby often contentious, discourse.

As such, debating war has become subject to the same political realities as all other issues discussed in the social arena. Where before, the ideologies of various polities were monolithic (including their stance on rival powers), more distinctive groupings have formed in the last few centuries to either support or oppose the assertive use of force to achieve a given nation’s security objectives or other priorities, which in some cases are decisions made outside of the specific circumstances involved. The merits and/or pitfalls of exercising hard power have become embedded in deeper approaches to political philosophy and worldview, where the fundamental morality of militarism is called into question, not only its wisdom or viability.

In open democracies, there is indeed heated and honest debate over issues related to peace and war. American foreign policy leaders of both major parties have in particular come to spar quite frequently over how to manage such potentially destructive air capability in recent years. Although this research does not single out the partisan component of the hawk/dove dynamic for analysis, it is an inescapable and recurring theme worth consideration in the context of the rest of the project. In this vein, conventional wisdom holds that hawks (mostly Republicans) have tended to fast-track the development of aerial hard power and often also expand its use in response to security challenges abroad. By contrast, doves (mostly Democrats) have tended to limit its use,
and perhaps to a lesser extent, put the brakes on its development, as an obvious target in their opposition to what they view as bellicose militarism by the hawks.

Though certainly not always in alignment with party allegiance, the struggle between the two dominant poles of thought on the methodology of foreign-policy (i.e., preferring the use of sticks vs. carrots) has been a key component of the rather sharp disagreement that has persisted in Washington D.C. and throughout the country, even case even when the ends of foreign policy are more or less agreed upon. Especially from the Vietnam conflict forward and the establishment of a permanent anti-war movement, the dynamic has become a perennial issue. In fact, widespread political usage of the hawk and dove metaphor, itself thematically aerial, gained renewed traction out of controversy over whether and to what extent the U.S. should escalate the air campaign in Indochina leading up to the Tet Offensive in 1968.\(^\text{10}\) Used pejoratively, the label ‘dove’ was tantamount to an accusation of weakness and lack of resolve in the face of an expanding communist sphere. In the years since, the label ‘hawk’ applied to foreign policy hard-liners has been used pejoratively as a moniker of reckless militancy and uninformed jingoism in the conduct of foreign policy. Interestingly, these terms have also been used as a badge of honor by both sides as a means of touting foreign policy bona fides that align with their ideological identity, and in turn, for electoral advantage vis-à-vis political rhetoric put forth to the public.

\(^{10}\) Though the metaphor gained significant mileage in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis just as the U.S. was beginning to ramp up its presence in Vietnam, its initial use came about in the context of the War of 1812, based on the words of Congressman John Randolph of Roanoke. See for example Blacklidge, Jacob C., “John Randolph of Roanoke Predicts War: Speaker Clay Prevents Debate on Anti-War Motion,” *The Carolina Gazette*. ‘19th Century Now’ - May 29, 1812 – Posted by Dr. James L. Senefeld on June 5, 2012. <http://www.19thcenturynow.com/?p=279>
Although change in the fault lines of the hawk versus dove dynamic has been an overarching and highly consequential feature of recent U.S. political discourse, this research is merited in this area specifically to chronicle and gauge the dynamic over time, especially in light of the added context of globalization and the new realities of warfare after 9/11. How changes in U.S. approaches to the use of its colossal airpower assets fit into the global security arena -- and vice versa -- bears further scrutiny, especially as the medium to long-term durability of the U.S.-led global security umbrella (implicitly suspended by the use or the threat of using airpower) lingers in question. However, the use of American military power delivered from the air continues to be a leading vehicle for violent social and/or political change on the world stage today (e.g., Libya), such that the implications here are truly global in scope, with significant ripple effects into issues and regions other than those proximate to what is immediately in question.

All of this speaks to the significance and importance of this research. The evolution of the hawk/dove dynamic is a real peculiarity in modern politics. No other issue area seems to cause as many ‘flip-flops’ or inconsistencies by leading figures in American political life, and yet, especially with unprecedented military capability in modern times, the tone and tenor of American partisan approaches to the use of its near-plenipotentiary hard power directly holds the fate of millions around the globe in the balance between a comprehensive security platform and the receiving end of a devastating aerial attack. Researching and documenting these intricacies of American opinion in this area has wide-ranging implications for the study of conflict in the 21st century, given that airpower seems to have renewed itself as a prime avenue for conflict in the contemporary age of globalization. A more comprehensive attempt to uniquely
articulate the extent of these controversies over how to approach the management of highly lethal airpower is intrinsically worthwhile, contributing to today’s discourse surrounding how globalization has pushed the envelope of prior assumptions on how organized conflict is conducted (including who the players are), and has tested the boundaries of conventional wisdom in this area amid radical advancements in the digitization and automation of aerial weapons platforms in just the last decade.

Aiming to answer how the clash between hawks and doves has changed over time -- and articulating how exactly it happened -- undoubtedly sheds badly needed light on a whole range of other, macro corollary issues surrounding the direction of globalization, the nature of conflict an security in the contemporary age, and the viability of the U.S. to continue operating as a global hegemonic state. Ultimately, the main value of this inquiry into the hawk/ dove dynamic lies in its assessment of how it connects with real-world technological change in the tools of aerial combat as well as how the dynamic itself is shaped by the increasing prevalence of asymmetry/ non-linear warfare -- each essential symptoms of globalization that influence each other in the modern age.

**Hawks and Doves: The Dynamic Explained from the Bird’s Eye View**

At the most basic level, there remains significant confusion in the literature and especially in general discourse about how to appropriately label, classify, or otherwise measure ‘hawkishness’ or ‘dovishness,’ which begs further qualitative elaboration given the extensive, but often imprecise, use of these terms in the lexicon of today’s political chatter. Thus, particularly nebulous or slippery metaphorical language, such as ‘hawk’ and ‘dove,’ which are umbrella terms often used pejoratively, begs precision and careful
qualification before proceeding. Though they are often used, these terms are properly understood less often. This section delves into a discussion of what actually constitutes hawkishness and dovishness as they are applied for the purposes of this study. So what are hawks and doves anyway, and what specific policy characteristics do these terms speak to?

Indeed, the tension between hawkishness and dovishness is fundamental to the nature of existence and power, as an extension of the fight or flight response. Even on the individual level, people must make choices about when they decide that physical force in a given situation becomes justifiable, to defend themselves against an armed hostage taker for example, or perhaps even break up a fistfight. This dynamic is able to scale all the way up to the national and international levels, where nations and their leaders debate whether to fight back against an organized attack or even to intervene in a foreign civil war.

Analogous to the bullish/ bearish metaphor applied to investment strategy in the world of finance, the hawk/ dove dynamic itself is centered on a simple question: are you anti-war or pro-war? It is a question with timeless quality that today confronts both those in the upper echelons of power and the average voter. Recent decades have no doubt seen the question of when to use hard power coming to occupy an increasing share of the national political discourse, breathing new life into the hawk/ dove dynamic, especially in the American context in which deciding whether to support or oppose the use of this power in the name of security has become a frequent quandary for U.S. leaders.

American tactical ability to intervene abroad with militarily force (especially in smaller-scale/ ‘surgical’ air operations) became so overwhelming in the past few decades --
largely balanced only by growing international public relations accountability -- that discussions about whether the U.S. should exercise its might came up often, meaning that the hawk vs. dove dynamic came to operate as its own distinctive and highly contentious area of the national debate. Also, as security challenges across the board have become less clear-cut from the national interest perspective, the virtues and perils of swinging the ‘stick’ of U.S. foreign policy have been ever more hotly contested in an expanding ideological tug-of-war between these two poles. Now more than ever, it represents a unique political cleavage in the nation’s politics, operating as a distinct aspect of the ideological thought process.

This runs directly counter to the notion of partisanship and ideology or otherwise contentious policymaking being said in the American context to end ‘at the water’s edge,’ implying a certain unspoken unity in the nation’s foreign/security policies. Indeed, throughout most of U.S. history, there has been a certain harmony of opinion in this area. But with the diminishing importance of the spatial/territorial component to threats as well as the governance challenges involved in guarding against such threats, this old political adage has increasingly been called into question. Where before, there was relative unanimity for the virtues of U.S. military involvement against obvious enemies when the need to fight was clear to national interest, the new features of modern warfare in an era of hyper-globalizing phenomena have made the wisdom of exercising military power a highly politicized, polarized, and often partisan affair – more likely to appear as an issue but also more nebulous in the determination of what constitutes ‘real’ or ‘net’ security gains for given political units of analysis.
Just as threats are no longer buffeted by the water’s edge as a meaningful dividing line, ideas about how best to secure against said threats are in the same way no longer normalized simply by virtue of common national identity and patriotism. This is a central headline in the globalization story as it relates to questions of security over the last several decades; globalizing trends and the complexities they entail have greatly changed the prior structural features of the security landscape reflected in older strategic studies literature. The factors involved have greatly complicated this area of policy and, somewhat unsurprisingly, the nebulous nature of threats in the 21st century is accompanied by the equally nebulous ‘answers’ to those threats vis-à-vis the possible policy options. Just as oceans are no longer seen as barriers to threats in an age of modern globalization, oceans no longer seem to contain or standardize opinion on foreign policy. Threats can less and less be seen in unitary terms, and foreign/security policies are therefore less unitary or cohesive to follow. As security concerns become increasingly de-territorialized, and less grounded *per se*, political positioning on security issues likewise becomes less grounded – unmoored from the prior norms of its discursive circle(s). This is part and parcel of the intersection of the national and global levels of abstraction, with national policymakers responding to (and in some cases trying to preempt) major changes in the global political and conflict environments.

With these emergent complexities factoring into the hawk/dove struggle and the grounds on which it is debated in these national terms, it is important to discuss some important caveats about the limitations of the hawk/dove metaphor (although it serves as a useful analytical framework for this project). For example, hawkish does *not* necessarily mean the use of force is simply seen as the first option. Likewise, dovish
certainly does not necessarily mean hard power is entirely off the table. So although not acting with the use of force serves as a kind of default position, even the dove will resort to force given certain conditions, and must not be perceived as necessarily being an unequivocal pacifist. Assuming basic agreement on the legitimacy of a given national order, hawks and doves essentially only disagree over the point at which ‘all other options have been exhausted’ and when the threshold for acting with force has been reached. It is a matter of requiring certain conditions to convince an individual that using hard power is wise and feasible. Virtually overnight, the attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance, turned staunch isolationists and those with dovish tendencies unapologetically pro-war; the desire for revenge was palpable and seen as entirely legitimate by any standard of warfare. Therefore, it could be said that doves can only truly flourish when there is a preexistent baseline environment of peace. In other words, if clear and present enemies began to attack and attempt to invade the U.S. on a consistent basis, doves from a different time period might be pro-war under such a hypothetical climate of national duress.

Thus, even though acting with hard power because of an existential threat and/ or in the name of legitimate parochial interest still constitutes the use of hard power in the affirmative, it does not mean that acting for such reasons is necessarily indicative of hawkishness per se. An act of justifiable homicide in genuine self-defense could hardly label someone a hawk -- to use the analogy of the individual -- even though they may have killed somebody to preserve their own life. Similarly, when hard power is brought to bear as the last option on the policy table and under ethically legitimate pretenses, its use can still be fundamentally dovish in its categorization. Thus, it is not the mere act of
using hard power that constitutes hawkishness; rather it is the context in which it is considered and used. Moreover, neither approach is inherently preferential in objective terms. Excessive hawkishness can indeed be reckless and breach the conditions of just war theory (both in its initiation and execution), just as excessive dovishness may be an abdication of responsibility and lead to unnecessary death and destruction, although this is far from always the case.

Furthermore, a major misconception of hawkishness, usually from the dovish perspective, is that it must always be out of financial gain (vis-à-vis the Military Industrial Complex, or MIC) or out of sheer bloodlust. However, it often advocates for the use of force out of a certain perspective on achieving justice, and a desire to create greater peace over the long term. A misconception of dovishness, usually from the hawkish perspective, is that it is never willing to use force. In fact, when certain lines are crossed, almost anyone would conceivably gravitate toward a hawkish stance. That is why this dynamic is so fungible. It entirely depends on the situation at hand. To say one is pro-war is not necessarily to say one favors the initiation of conflict merely for the sake of doing so or for some nefarious purposes. Indeed, there are numerous political considerations, both domestic and geo-strategic, that factor into a decision to be pro-war or anti-war during a given crisis. The terms dove and hawk, however, speak also to the longer-standing tendency for one to be pro or anti-war as the basis of an established worldview; as a lens through which to better interpret the wisdom of using force in the next crisis.

Going beyond when specific question of national security arises on the country’s radar screen, this shows the distinction between the dynamic in times of peace (when
ideology plays a larger role) vs. times of crisis (when specific facts and events primarily shape opinions). Here, context is everything. In times of relative peace, this question is entirely generic and speaks to the general ideological leanings of the person—a disposition that is evident in one’s level of support for defense spending, for example. On a crucial vote to authorize force or on the eve of proposed use of hard power, however (such as during President Bush’s 48 hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq), this question becomes relative to the specific proposed military action looming on the horizon. Both aspects become relevant in the data set covered in chapter three.

No matter the circumstance, there is always great complexity in what factors into dovish or hawkish policy. Isolationists and pacifists can both be dovish, but for different reasons; the former out of inward-looking parochialism and the latter out of moral aversion to violence. Then there is sheer partisan dovishness based on carefully crafted messaging in electoral politics. On the other side of things, hawkishness can exist on the basis of several reasons, many of them working in tandem as well to create hawkishness as a palpable body of thought in the discourse. Whether out of a sense of humanitarian internationalism, blunt no-holds-barred nationalism, sheer partisan gain, or even financial interests within the Military Industrial Complex, hawkishness can have several driving forces as well.

Notwithstanding, it must also be considered that hawkishness and dovishness do not always represent positions that exist merely for the sake of blindly pursuing conflict or conciliation, and manifestations of these tendencies are idealistic or self-serving less often than what might commonly be assumed. They arise most often out of honest

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11 A hawk in time of crisis reveals himself or herself to support the use of hard power to solve the problem at hand, whereas a dove would not. In times of general peace, however, hawks still reveal themselves as deeply concerned about preparation for the military to be able to successfully wage wars of the future.
assessments of what is strategically wise or even feasible in a given scenario as well as a genuine belief in the best means of accomplishing a given goal, and are thus transcendent of partisan affiliation in many respects. Hawks -- generally defined -- routinely adopt what would otherwise be dovish positions (not to use force or use less force) when its application is unfeasible, counterproductive, or simply strategically unwise. By the same token, doves -- generally defined -- also routinely adopt what would otherwise seem to be hawkish positions when the ethics and legitimacy of using force are clear and necessary to vital interests of (inter)national peace and stability. In this mix, individual Democratic and Republican leaders often break ranks from party convention. Quite clearly, hawkishness and dovishness are not blanket terms and they seldom reveal much without knowing the context of the conflict paradigm to which they are applied. An assessment of this dynamic requires a qualitative approach with plenty of context and these caveats are critical in assessing which positions are indeed fair to consider hawkish or dovish in the analysis portion of the dissertation that looks at the voting behavior of successive Congresses.

In this vein, although examples of the hawk versus dove dynamic introduce countless corollary issues, and the complexity is rife depending on the situation, it is usually very clear what the more dovish and more hawkish positions are when context is presented – manifested in Congress as an up or down vote. And to be sure, the more dovish position can in many cases be merely less hawkish, but hawkish nonetheless. That said, this is a matter of interpretation, to which any political observer can attach a different value. In other words, the threshold for what constitutes something that is hawkish or dovish can never quite be established in objective terms. That is why the
relationship between these two poles is usually binary, meaning that it slides along a continuum. Therefore, the extent of hawkishness or dovishness in a given policy preference may be nearly impossible to ascertain, but the direction traveled is clear and can be pinned down/ measured more effectively.

As was alluded to earlier, this natural split goes beyond questions of actually going to war, and is manifested in the hawk versus dove relationship insofar that doves tend to want to limit armaments and hawks tend to want more of them, which can be especially telling in times of relative peace. In the American context, both sides -- as they are predominantly but not exclusively represented by the Democratic and Republican Parties -- generally agree on possessing a strong and capable U.S. military to defend American interests, but the clashes come most often on the extent of this strength. Thus, in the political realm, this is a question of trade-offs and prioritizing certain public-policy agendas, which usually boils down to funding for weapons and other defense needs. Doves are generally more inclined to limit military spending in favor of spending on other (mostly social) programs for domestic purposes, often described as the ‘guns versus butter’ debate. They view overspending on the military as wasteful and potentially provocative in the international arena. At root, hawks carry the belief that potential enemies are more likely to accept carrots when they know stick looms in the background, and because security is sacrosanct under this view, it outweighs even the most important domestic spending programs in terms of what is viewed as national priority. In this sense, they view a strong military as a vehicle for peace and as an incentive for more successful diplomacy. Some other facets of the hawkish position include also supporting more robust foreign military aid, the tendency toward favoring executive power over legislative
oversight, and maintaining international superiority with WMDs. And short of being proponents of actual war, hawks can also advocate for precursors or steps along the path to war during specific crises, including the imposition of a no fly zone, which often constitutes a significant ratcheting up of the show of force to dissuade aggressors.

This signifies a split in the methodology of foreign policy; whether to rely more heavily on the diplomatic establishment or the military establishment to achieve certain objectives in the international domain. Thus, it does not necessarily speak to any disagreement over the desired objectives of the nation’s foreign policy. Hawks and doves, therefore, disagree primarily over means, and not always the ends involved. For example, regime change in Iraq was largely supported by the Democratic Party since after the first Gulf War, just as it was resoundingly supported by Republicans. However, after 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s failed attempts to disarm Iraq through diplomatic channels, the Republicans moved to a policy of supporting preemptive invasion of the entire country. Though many tagged along vis-à-vis the vote on a resolution on the authorization of the use of force against Iraq, many Democrats favored containment and other strategies to try and de-fang Saddam Hussein’s military forces.

Interestingly, as part of the thorny features involved in the debate, doves are most often defined in relation to the more interventionist and hard power-reliant hawks, such that they do not necessarily oppose the use of the military in blanket strategic terms. Often, they simply take a less forceful position. Of course, much of this also simply boils down to the constraints of electoral politics and simple two-party polarization, although the data set does not account specifically for the hawk/dove dynamic in partisan terms. Democrats seldom use expressions of unapologetic nationalism and the merits of hard
power to garner votes, while Republicans often do. Democrats, however, are keen to get the anti-war vote, and thus take on a more dovish nature, often speaking out against the pitfalls of militarism gone too far. Republicans appeal to the more hawkish nature present in the human spirit to achieve a greater good through armed intervention. But in any fair sense, and at least outwardly, even the self-professed dove in American politics supports a strong military and intelligence community. In reality, the American dove could be characterized as still being a hawk in form, but surely a dove in mind – implying a keen element of defensiveness in dovish foreign policy that focuses on preventing conflict through deterrence and diplomacy. But by any standard, the American hawk is a hawk in form and in practice. With these distinctions, the standing of the nation’s airpower capability and the standing of the debate over where and when to use such power are intimately related and have managed to rage into the present.

*The Hawk/Dove Debate and Airpower Technology: Nature of the Relationship*

There are certainly numerous aspects to the hawk/dove split, but this dissertation treats airpower as the main focal point and as its own unit of analysis (i.e., a separate litmus test utilized in the data set). And insofar as this fascination with airpower has developed in the political realm, it is central to understanding the debate over the merits/pitfalls of assertive interventionism between hawks and doves. Especially with the extent of U.S.’s military predominance in the air and the extensive reliance on power accumulation in this domain of warfare, this serves as the central object of study in the study.
As has been established, the term ‘hawk’ -- used to describe one’s pro-war stance generally, or in a given crisis -- is defined primarily by a low(er) threshold needed to favor the use or accumulation of military power in achieving a foreign policy objective. But beyond the inherent component of aggressiveness involved, there is also the question of capability, or the tools of combat (in this case aerial) at the military’s disposal that allow politicians to adopt a hawkish stance in the first place. To continue the analogy, a hawk in nature would not be a hawk *per se*, without its speed in flight, powerful talons, and sharp beak used to devastate its prey. Thus, the decision phase of resorting to force is greatly constrained by what can be brought to bear in the execution phase (as it stands against the size, weapons, and cunning of a given adversary). This is a basic precept of conflict that has undergirded all battlefield strategy since the dawn of organized conflict, even in most unconventional, sub-state, and individual contexts.¹² Knowing how one’s power stacks up against potentially hostile enemies plays a pivotal role in determining whether it is wise or even feasible to adopt a pro-war stance at all; whether one is best suited to *do what they can* or *suffer what they must*¹³ (lest belligerent, but weaker powers risk annihilation).

On the other side of the coin, the extent of hawkishness or dovishness present in the political leadership of the American government has an impact on the fate of these very military capabilities; whether they are better funded and more actively pursued, or perhaps best left undeveloped in lieu of other public spending priorities. If one generally

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¹² For example, in ‘bringing a knife to a gun fight,’ as the expression goes, the person with the knife can quickly become a dove. Similarly, countries without a permanent standing army like Costa Rica have few, if any, hawkish politicians -- in a scenario in which the mere *threat* of force against a potential adversary is not even credible.

believes that military action is unwise by its very nature, then there is less of a burden to support a strong and more powerful military. Those that feel that military action is indeed a legitimate policy tool naturally want to see it stronger and better prepared to act in this capacity. This boils down to support for funding for the military, and the air assets of each of its branches in particular, which aside from all the politicized ‘riders’ present in American legislative appropriations for the military, constitutes a key litmus test for gauging hawkishness/ dovishness, especially in peacetime.

As the discord over foreign policy methodology on the one hand, and the standing of hard power capacity on the other, are so interrelated in this way, it is logical to conclude that there are consequential insights yet to be fully extrapolated from the relationships between the posture of America’s military arsenals (including specific weapons systems/ innovations of airpower) and the ideological posture of the political agency exercised to control them.

Whether one favors the use of the carrot or the stick in a situation, largely comes down to the size of the stick, and the size of the stick wielded by the given opponent. Indeed this may change depending on the specific circumstances at hand, but it is precisely because of the fact that the nature and effectiveness of sticks in the military sense advance so rapidly that the level of hawkishness in the parties fluctuates so significantly. That said, hawkishness in many cases verges on an ideology, which transcends individual crises to inform one’s position on future ones.

This speaks to the distinction between the two questions of when the military should be unleashed against another power, and what the military is able to unleash at all against that opposing power. Policy -- especially policy towards the international realm --
is limited by the capacity to enforce it. Naturally, weaker military powers are unable to dictate terms in the course of international affairs when operating in the shadow of a larger power with contravening interests; hence the quest for military power as the basis of all Realpolitik and most interstate-relations throughout history. Much policy, especially that directed at the international realm falls flat without teeth to back it up.

There are lines separating opinions on the wisest means of achieving more-or-less agreed upon goals in foreign policy: either through the use of carrots, diplomacy, and soft power or the stick of the nation’s unrivaled military might. Thus, the question arises: have the introduction of new military technologies impacted the prevalence of hawkishness within Congress? Conversely, have understandings of the limitations of emergent battlefield technologies facilitated the advancement of hawkishness or dovishness in Congress?

To be sure, military weapons development has been the ultimate game of cat and mouse playing out over the centuries, quite literally from sticks and stones to pilotless attack drones firing hellfire missiles; all the result of competition between rival powers and hostile enemies. This newfound airpower, however, has the potential to make the use of force a more controversial area of policy. This is for two mutually-reinforcing reasons. First, with the relative ease of initiating an air attack against an adversary, the issue simply comes up more often. Second, when the issue of using force does come up, it is often in the context of elective, or at least non-existential, engagements. This means that the urgency for solving the problem at hand is less than absolute, which lessens popularity and support for war. In fact, in cases where warfare is entirely non-elective, and a true matter of survival, then support for the use of hard power reaches near
unanimity in society. And yet, even with these conditions that might tend to breed heightened controversy (both evident in the WOT after 9/11), a key question (and hypothesis) that this dissertation sheds light on is the extent to which transformational weapons systems like drones actually lessen controversy and pave the way for a new consensus on the stick of America’s foreign policy.

**Chapter Layout**

This chapter has surveyed the topic in introductory terms and provided a glimpse into what is to come. It outlined the topic and its significance, the research questions, the main arguments, and the basic methodologies to be employed. In addition, it covered some of the theoretical complexity found in the hawkishness/dovishness continuum and its sub-components, serving as the basis for understanding the subsequent analysis. On the heels of thorough literature review sections that cover the nature of hawk/dove opposition and the role of airpower in the asymmetrical conflict environment (comprising the bulk of chapter two), the project’s data set is revealed in general terms throughout chapter three. Entitled ‘The Hawk/Dove Dynamic: Data and Methods,’ it comprises the heart of the entire dissertation and is where the bulk of the actual numbers crunching, visualization, and comparative analysis is treated. It unpacks the data set with a comprehensive discussion of the data, how it is organized, and interpreted. It also reveals the main findings along with charts to put the information in visual terms.

With the conceptual basis for the dissertation firmly established in the opening chapters, it then continues on to the case studies. Chapter four turns to ‘Case #1: Hawks and Doves Clash over Vietnam and Beyond.’ It evaluates the data collected for the (post)
Vietnam era, showing how new and existing aerial technologies of the time became the grounds for heated debate over funding such programs, such as the B1, cruise missile, and other programs. It provides a baseline for how the dynamic played out in these years according to each of the litmus tests, including of course, the fundamental flash point over the wisdom of escalation/de-escalation central to the war. The next chapter then tackles the second study in order to have a comparison on how the litmus tests changed in the new, post-9/11 environment. It is entitled ‘Case #2: Hawks and Doves Clash after 9/11.’ With more or less the same structure as the previous chapter/case study, it examines the data collected for the years 2001-2012 and offers a glimpse into each of the litmus tests as they have risen and fallen during the WOT. Finally, chapter six is largely a recap of the key findings and a discussion of final conclusions for the whole project. It also turns an eye to the future. With this overview, the dissertation now moves on to a comprehensive, two-part literature review covering 1) the hawk/dove dynamic, operating primarily in national terms, and 2) asymmetry in armed (specifically aerial) combat, operating primarily in international/global terms.
Chapter Two:
Literature Review

Being able to locate the original contribution of a dissertation among a wider body of established research is imperative in any field. This task is made somewhat more difficult in a global affairs context, which demands knowledge in more than one discipline and often leads to making connections between what might otherwise be considered disparate concepts. As it concerns the main focal point of airpower as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, a proper review of the literature in which this topic is couched demands separate treatment of two main areas: 1) the hawk vs. dove dynamic and 2) asymmetry in armed conflict. This section examines the central theoretical issues raised by these general bodies of published work, with particular attention paid to the implications for American politics in the period in question (Vietnam-present). The following serves as a basis for understanding the subsequent logic of this project, which is greatly aided by a proper evaluation of certain intellectual output derived from key areas of prior scholarship.

Before proceeding, it is critical to point out that this dissertation considers airpower itself as more of an empirical frame for the project (as opposed to a theoretical strand) and is therefore most appropriately called upon as needed throughout the development of the text, instead of being covered in this section.\footnote{The role of airpower is partially discussed in the section on asymmetry insofar as it appears in the literature as a platform on which asymmetry can be mitigated.} A comprehensive, standalone look at airpower literature copiously produced by military institutions, and to
a lesser extent by wider academia, (including its numerous tactical and strategic facets)\textsuperscript{2} is undoubtedly a daunting task tangential to the specific research objective set forth here. Detailing how the growing prevalence of asymmetry in the application of airpower has shaped the political dynamics of the American hawk/dove contest after Vietnam -- compared to after 9/11 -- does however demand a solid grasp of the theory behind two conceptual moving parts: the nature of political contention over the use of force (e.g., in Congress) and the nature of using force in asymmetrical conflict (e.g., in the U.S.-led fight against terrorism).

The interplay pursued in this vein is integral to this project and is certainly worth reiterating here. In the face of growing asymmetry, the development of state-of-the-art airpower technologies has been tailored to keep the option of hard power ‘on the table’ for America’s decision makers insofar as they are geared toward reducing the risks of deploying airmen and women as well as keeping collateral damage to non-combatant civilians down to a ‘tolerable’ level.\textsuperscript{3} To illustrate further by counterfactual, if the U.S. had never pushed the envelope to cultivate reliably precise munitions, especially on unmanned platforms after 9/11, an over-reliance on aging fleets of Cold War-era bombers capable only of carpet-bombing wide swaths of terrain for example, would essentially render the option of using airpower off-limits politically speaking. In the fight against groups like al-Qaeda, it would be nearly impossible for political parties in power, or in the minority for that matter, to justify the level of collateral damage incurred by such

\textsuperscript{2} The huge volume of publications in this area is evidenced by, among other things, the sheer number of journals on airpower, both from within and outside of the military. See for instance Air and Space Power Journal, Airpower Journal, Air University Review, Airpower Review, International Airpower Review (formerly World Air Power Journal), and The Airpower Historian, among others.

\textsuperscript{3} As just one example of this notion expresses even before the events of 9/11, see chapter five entitled “Technology and Future Constraints on Air Operations” in Waxman, Matthew C., International Law and the Politics of Urban Air Operations. RAND, Santa Monica, CA. 2000.
weapons systems that are vastly incongruent with the nature of conflict against individual militants that live and plot amongst civilians. All this is heightened in an age of instant communications and global media that amplifies outrage, facilitates public relations disasters, and always keeps powerful entities under the microscope.

By extension, it is clear that the terms of the hawk/dove dynamic debate would be vastly different absent these new technologies that at least partially mitigate asymmetry by delivering fire from the air in smaller, smarter, and more targeted doses, thereby relegating the debate to consideration of alternative means of applying hard power and perhaps greatly altering the dynamic’s intensity and/or level of partisanship. Thus, the constraints and opportunities created by the actual terms of how war is fought in different and/or novel ways end up greatly shaping the political debate over its viability as a foreign policy tool. In other words, the tendency of political leaders to adopt hawkish stances is limited or enabled by what is possible on the military side of things, while in the opposite direction, the application of airpower to mitigate asymmetry in the field depends largely on the level of support received from the political realm (i.e., funding). This relationship constitutes the explanatory frame in which the analytical dimension of the project is presented.

But with growing asymmetry in conflict (and the technology purported to overcome it) serving as the most consequential development to arise with implications for the viability of airpower over the last few decades, determining the manner in which the hawk/dove clash has changed -- in terms of 1) its balance, 2) its intensity, and 3) its degree of partisanship -- necessarily requires more than a review of literature; it demands a look to specific data. As a basis for comparing these metrics in the (post) Vietnam era
vs. the post-9/11 era, the methodology turns to a basic quantitative task of aggregating, charting, and interpreting Congressional votes on legislation involving questions of airpower from the mid-1960s to the present. The heart of the methodology looking at voting behavior in Congress over the years seeks to clearly chart how the hawk/ dove struggle has unfolded over the years, providing a more solid basis on which to consider how qualitative changes in the nature of warfare operate alongside quantitative fate of bills voted on in Congress. And although they do not always win the day against the power of the executive branch in the realm of international affairs, aggregation of bills brought to the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate reveal the *Mens Rea*, or mental component, of Congress (and thereby the two major parties) as it develops alongside Presidential leadership. But before being able to perform this research relating the new era of air warfare in an age of asymmetry to the state of the hawk/ dove dynamic, one must understand the moving parts involved, which in this case includes a look back to what others have written on the basic divergence between those who are favorable toward the use of force and those who remain dubious.

**Part I: The Hawk/ Dove Dynamic**

The following literature review section evaluates how the hawk vs. dove dynamic has been described by prior scholars and applied to differing contexts throughout history, serving as indispensable background for how to approach a study of the U.S. Congress’ experience with the dynamic in latter decades. But whereas many of the other approaches to the hawk/ dove split in American politics have tended to hinge on certain specific
crises, the value of this study lies in its consideration of the dynamic as it has evolved over successive periods of conflict. Only then can trends be established and context involving the nature of using airpower in changing threat environments be appreciated -- factors treated in the subsequent literature review section (part II) which are inseparable from the hawk/dove dynamic if for no other reason than that virtually all U.S. conflicts since WWII have relied overwhelmingly, and indeed primarily, on airpower capability.

To be sure, airpower is seldom brought to bear by the U.S. without some degree of (usually significant and healthy) debate between those in positions of national leadership who emphasize the pros and those who emphasize the cons of doing so.

In fact, the development of dramatic metaphorical imagery such as white fluttering doves holding out carrots on the one hand, and dark scowling hawks wielding sticks on the other (no doubt the basis of many a political cartoon), is a reflection of the fundamental philosophical divide in question and a testament to its highly consequential nature. The metaphor is derived from the animal world, as so many other political metaphors have similarly emerged with quasi-zoomorphic origins, such as the Democratic donkey and the Republican elephant, the blue dog (conservative Democrat), and the rhino (or ‘rino’ as an acronym for ‘Republican in name only’). There are also other more pejorative terms such as the chicken-hawk (one that advocates war after having him or herself shirked responsibility to fight in war) as well as the ostrich, which is said to outright ignore questions of peace and war while making decisions in complete

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4 For example, this is seen in literature discussing the hawk/dove and even “owlish” positions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, such as Blight, James G., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch “The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 170-188. Fall 1987. Another example is found in a discussion of the hawk/dove split leading to peculiar (and seemingly contradictory) positioning during the air war in Desert Storm. See Spencer, Metta. “Anti-War Hawks and Pro-War Doves.” *Peace and Change*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 172-197. April 1992.
denial about legitimate security threats. But whereas the now ubiquitous donkey and
elephant gained notoriety and went mainstream through political cartoons in the late
1800’s (widely credited to Harper’s Weekly cartoonist Thomas Nast),⁵ the hawk and
dove metaphor had decidedly more political, and indeed legislative, roots. In fact, it was
borne in the American context - first documented in the run up to the War of 1812 by
journalist Jacob C. Blacklidge who on May 29, 1812, wrote:

Today in the House, the Hon. John Randolph of Roanoke predicted that by
Monday next, a Declaration of War would be forthcoming from the Chief
Executive. Any knowledge of this was denied by the War Hawks, led by
Speaker Clay and the Hon. John C. Calhoun.⁶

Noted in the report were the quotations from Virginia Congressman John Randolph,
regarded as having coined the term war hawks, who commented:

I was simply outgunned today in the House by that infernal combination
of Calhoun and Clay and 66 more willing souls who blocked my…
attempt to dissuade these young lions and hawks from a war declaration.
[Moreover,] …some two-thirds of the House so rapidly rejected… my
proposition… that it is not expedient at this time to resort to a war against
Great Britain… Not everyone is lucky enough to pick a fight with a giant
and succeed. [They] are more experienced today and have better
weapons…⁷

Regardless of his rationale in suggesting that the U.S. would likely lose another
armed confrontation with the British, Randolph’s opposition to the ‘hawks,’ many of
whom were too young to recall the horrors of fighting the British the last time around,

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⁵ This can be traced to a cartoon named “The Third Term Panic” originally published on November 7,
1974, which provided a visual commentary on the controversy over Ulysses S. Grant’s bid for a third term
as president, including images of a donkey (which had first come about in the characterization of Andrew
Jackson as a jackass in the election of 1828) and for the first time, an elephant representing the Republican
vote. See Kennedy, Robert C., Cartoon of the Day – ‘The Third Term Panic.’ HarpWeek.
<http://www.harpweek.com/09cartoon/BrowseByDateCartoon.asp?Month=November&Date=7>

⁶ See Blacklidge, Jacob C., “John Randolph of Roanoke Predicts War: Speaker Clay Prevents Debate on
Anti-War Motion.” The Carolina Gazette. ʻ19th Century Now’ - May 29, 1812 –Posted by Dr. James L.

⁷ Ibid.
was quite clearly an early example of dovishness expressed in America’s burgeoning foreign policy debate. The ornithological symbolism of the dove, which is based on this longstanding Judeo-Christian image of peace and which naturally counter-balanced the notion of a war hawk, set the stage for understanding pro-war/ pro-military vs. anti-war/ anti-military debates in these terms.

No matter the imagery, this metaphor puts its finger on a fascinating political phenomenon that operated long before being described in these particular terms. In fact, what can be described as sustained political disagreement between two generally dogmatic, closed belief systems8 (pro-war and anti-war bodies of thought remaining rigid even in the face of inconvenient facts) is a dynamic that has no doubt operated in multiple contexts and at multiple levels of abstraction throughout the history of civilization (both above and below the nation-state). This is due to the fact that the basic conundrum of fight or flight, confrontation or conciliation, is intrinsic to the human experience. Every individual must contend with the question of where to set the bar in terms of when the threshold for the justifiable use of force has been reached, as part of the inner fiber of one’s psychology of threat perception and response. This exists from being in a schoolyard fistfight all the way up to being a leader of a nation involved in a nuclear showdown. It is a spectrum with no shortage of adherents to either side: proponents of both dovishness and hawkishness that exist often times in the extreme.

In fact, research in the areas of evolutionary biology and behavioral psychology has shown that it is natural for populations to exhibit a divergence of thought taking place between those who concentrate on achieving ends through threats of force and those who

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favor conciliatory and non-threatening strategies. There are applications to both animal
and human behavior:

Fighting strategies are vital necessities within nature. The hawk strategy is
one that favors fighting an opponent over backing off. Dove strategies
entail withdrawing from an opponent rather than engaging in an attack…
[and] when there is an equilibrium between the number of hawks and
doves within a population, then that species will be able to survive and
produce in a fashion that will be beneficial for a given population.9

This has been explored under the purview of game theory as an evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) and numerous corollary lines of thought, including the ‘chicken’
game involving, among other scenarios, the brinksmanship of hawks on two opposing
sides.10 Further work in modern psychology has even emerged with more politically-
relevant implications to shown that decision makers are “…predisposed to believe their
hawkish advisors more than the doves… a bias… [that] is built into the fabric of the
human mind.”11 Whether intrinsically slanted to one side or not, this fundamental
dynamic has naturally been manifested within innumerable social and political contexts
throughout time. On one side of the spectrum, the idea of pursuing a dovish course found
in literature goes at least as far back as the notion applied to the individual of turning the
other cheek expressed in the bible. Even when faced with direct physical attack from
another person, the lesson is to not retaliate or use force in return – dovishness to the
extreme, although on the other side of things, the notion of ‘an eye for an eye’ found in

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<http://www.muskingum.edu/~psych/psycweb/history/smith.htm>

10 See Killingback, Timothy and Michael Doebeli. “Spatial Evolutionary Game Theory: Hawks and Doves
a more foundational work on the topic, see Smith, John Maynard. Evolution and Theory of Games.

the Old Testament of the bible has a decidedly different character. Here, a connection can be made on a larger political level to the later Machiavellian sentiment about the ends justifying the means found in his infamous work *The Prince*. The lesson is that if a goal is noble (i.e., maintaining the power of a prince or a kingdom), employing what would otherwise be regarded as ruthless tactics (i.e., hard power) to achieve that goal can be seen as acceptable.12

However, among some of the earliest work documenting the political development of cohesive pro-war/anti-war debates in actual representative democratic institutions can be traced as far back as Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, in which he details the rhetorical back and forth between Athenian delegations over whether and to what extent to intervene against the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League. Though not employing the explicit metaphorical imagery of hawks and doves in his writings some 400 years before the Common Era, the essential characteristic spoken to by these terms -- namely binary factionalism in the political leadership based on divided opinion on questions of peace and war -- were rather extensively alluded to by the ancient historian. He quotes the impassioned speeches of the saber-rattling war mongers at considerable length -- men who were clearly hawkish in their policy against rival Sparta. However, modern scholars are careful to note that the ‘doves’ in this Athenian context were not necessarily anti-war *per se*, but rather restrained only in their opinions on where

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12 See chapter 18 in Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*, where it is said that “In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no tribunal to which to appeal, one must consider the final result. Therefore, let a prince conquer and maintain the state, and his methods will always be judged honorable and praised by all.” (Published on Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism). <http://www.nlnrac.org/critics/machiavelli/primary-source-documents/the-prince>
and how forcefully to attack Spartan interests after war with their former ally against the Persians was already a foregone conclusion.13

It is also important to point out in this case that the pro-war/ anti-war dynamic seen in Ancient Greek legislatures took place in regards to a state of specific crisis – war between the Athenian and Peloponnesian Leagues. In later, more politically developed contexts, the dynamic has taken on a longer-standing and more ideological character, which operates even during times of peace (as it concerns preparations by a permanent national security establishment made in advance of the next potential crisis – such as accelerating funding for more and better aerial platforms). This dissertation considers both aspects, which is to say that it looks at how the dynamic operates in crisis as well as in peacetime.

In contemporary times, the dynamic has unmistakably come to operate most robustly in nations with military muscles to flex in the first place and crucially also in democracies where there is space for open debate and disagreement between cohesive political factions. Both elements (hard power capability and protected free speech/ genuine democratic debate) obviously facilitate the development of a hawk/ dove dynamic (which can either be seen as healthy for, or harmful to, national security). Thus, it has been described in terms of operating most often, though not exclusively, in the Westphalian, nation-state context. This is natural in the sense that militaries, and air forces in particular, are the chess pieces of nations. Whether to deploy such force is therefore a question that operates internal, even exclusive, to the national leadership

controlling it. And although this project focuses on the hawk/dove dynamic in American politics, literature has revealed how other nations have robust hawk/dove dynamics unique to their own security challenges as well, which are interesting to consider.

Israeli party politics in the Knesset have in particular seen a very intense hawk/dove debate due to the nation’s vibrant democratic tradition, legendary military/security apparatus, and also its constant feeling of threat (and actual attack) by neighboring states as well as terrorist groups. Therefore, it is clear that a third factor that polarizes opinion on the use of force is naturally when threats are a persistent question on the national agenda. Nations facing few threats to speak of need not have a robust debate on the wisdom of the use of force when it seems unlikely to even come up in the first place. And in this vein, the hawk/dove dynamic has ebbed and flowed in its appearance in academic discourse according to country-specific debates over potential targets of military intervention. In the American context, it has come up frequently amid the successive crises involving Cuba, (North) Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, among others – asking on a basic level: should America commit its military abroad?

The relatively incipient but limited literature published to zero in on the nature and evolution of the hawk/dove dynamic is a reflection of the fact that it flourishes (for better or worse) almost exclusively in open, liberal democratic societies that allow for free debate. Closed, authoritarian societies that quell dissent simply have no breathing room for a hawk/dove debate, at least not outside of perhaps an inner circle of top

advisors that might be sought out to avoid the flattery that follows totalitarian leaders. Thus, the list of truly politically-open nations throughout history -- that also had enough military power to allow for a hawkish political class -- is a relatively short one, limiting the number of case-studies able to have been pursued on the topic. And even in the U.S., which exhibits these two characteristics in no small measure, such issues of peace and war were said to ‘end at the water’s edge,’ at least up until the Vietnam War, making this a somewhat recent phenomenon as well. In fact, the very existence of the dynamic runs contrary to this political adage, which after only a few decades of rancorous foreign policy debate seems entirely obsolete. To be sure, the emergent disunity in U.S. foreign policy speaks to the potential for rapid evolution of the hawk/ dove dynamic and its ability to transform the political landscape of nations. No longer the province of fairly strict national unity (as it once was), hard power policy has undoubtedly taken on a distinctly partisan/ ideological character in recent decades, and certainly in today’s context, the dynamic seems ever-present, receiving significant attention from the academic world, especially in regards to Vietnam and Iraq (2003), two of America’s most contentious wars.

It should be noted however, that counter to any notion of a substantive left/ right split in this area of policy, doubts have been expressed about whether the dynamic represents genuine disagreement, or instead, reflects a shallower rhetorical split that exists more for electoral posturing. Certainly, some scholars contend that differences between the two sides in America’s foreign policy debate are only skin-deep, not

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reflective of fundamental divergences of course,\textsuperscript{16} and moreover that the split is largely only an elite, ‘inside the beltway’ phenomenon.\textsuperscript{17}

The schisms between hawks and doves are even further accentuated by the conditions created by first-past-the-post voting systems, like in the U.S., that thereby tend to also have two-party systems. Naturally, a binary political configuration is conducive to binary policy preference formation. Much of this has been described generically in terms of political polarization in the area of foreign policy, which it is suggested plays out not just on the merits of the arguments for or against foreign military involvement, but among other reasons, also for politicians to score political points.\textsuperscript{18} This has also been described more specifically in terms of partisanship,\textsuperscript{19} policy -- including on the basis of security vs. entitlement tradeoffs implicit in the ‘guns vs. butter’ debate\textsuperscript{20} -- and in terms of ideology as well.\textsuperscript{21} Among the ideological strains pursued of late, scholars have


emphasized the phenomenon of hawks clashing with doves in a heightened sense as a result of the rise of a new hawkish neo-conservatism.\textsuperscript{22}

Beyond consideration of the conditions and parallel factors involved, the literature has also considered the hawk/dove dynamic (though not always by name) in regards to other less obvious contexts. Interestingly, significant points of disagreement between hawks and doves do not just operate among public intellectuals or even partisan standard-bearers in Congress. The actual hands-on disagreements often play out most fervently within presidential administrations, even as they would otherwise be inclined to feature a harmony of opinion under the purview of winner-take-all control of the White House by one party or another. This is seen quite clearly in epic battles that have taken place between Secretaries of State and Defense, and on an institutional basis, between these respective departments.\textsuperscript{23} But because difficult questions of national security have become increasingly complex with nuclear missiles and global media attention in the mix, sharp disagreements can come out of the woodwork between various organs of government -- especially those that already display this basic divide in the methodology of foreign policy, namely the conflict between the diplomatic and military establishments.

As far as the theoretical side of its contextualization, the dynamic can also be discussed in the context of the literature on international relations schools of thought. It is


applicable to the divide between realism and liberal institutionalism, and although hawks
have tended to be realists and doves have tended to be liberals, this is not always the case.
Speaking to the complexity involved in the sub-component parts of the hawk/dove
continuum, realism can be hawkish as an outgrowth of its fear of anarchy and emphasis
on national power. It also focuses unapologetically on (its own) state interests and views
unilateralism favorably. However, it is also antithetical to foreign military
interventionism in the sense that the high costs in blood and treasure -- and often
nebulous security gains that accompany such commitments -- make military engagements
seem contrary to the preservation of national interest. On the other hand, liberalism tends
toward the dovish side of the spectrum insofar as it focuses on peace and cooperation,
negotiation and compromise, even while there is a clear opening for hawkishness in the
desire to prevent humanitarian crises abroad that usually require some application of
military force. Thus realists can be on either side of the hawk/dove coin. Hans
Morgenthau (in 1965) cautioned against America’s involvement in Vietnam, and “…
Zbigniew Brzezinski [maintained] that escalation is exactly what [was] needed to end the
war.”24

Even when not referring deliberately to the hawk/dove metaphor, much has
indeed been written about it at least tangentially, and it seems an undercurrent of several
other works in the areas of politics and foreign policy. In fact, nearly all advocacy in
foreign policy, representing any facet of the issue(s), contains elements which could be
plausibly associated with hawkish or dovish policy preferences. Though not addressing

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898748,00.html> For a supplement to this, see
Mearsheimer, John J., “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism.” *Open
Democracy.* May 18, 2005. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp>
the dynamic per se, numerous works certainly take on the mantle of a hawkish or dovish bent in the course of their studies. Books like Blowback by Chalmers Johnson or Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance by Noam Chomsky show the implicit dovishness in foreign policy advocacy put forth by such authors. Others like Niall Ferguson or Robert Kagan, for example, have written in general support of U.S. military engagement and its role as a stabilizing force for good in the world. Works by Kagan like Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order have implicit hawkish undertones (however extensively nuanced).

**Part II: Asymmetry in Armed Conflict**

By itself, a study of Congressional vote data to determine trends in the evolution of the hawk/dove dynamic lacks the crucial context of the conflict environment in which decisions are made in the arena of foreign policy. And without question, the main thread dominating the nature of modern conflict (especially as it concerns American involvement) is the heightening of asymmetry in conflict, which largely came about as a direct result of adversaries realizing that to fight openly against American air dominance is futile – other methods of exchanging fire were developed such as suicide terrorism. It is one thing to conclude for example, that the Congress has become more hawkish over time, but from a wider academic perspective (and certainly a global affairs perspective) it may beg the age-old question: so what? What adds color to such conclusions is precisely a parallel understanding of the changing nature of conflict itself, which certainly affects
people’s opinions on whether the use of force is wise or even feasible in the first place, both in the U.S. and internationally.  

In concert with the understanding of the hawk/dove laid out in the previous passage (part I), this section of the literature review (part II) deals with asymmetry in armed conflict, especially as it concerns the role of airpower both furthering it and reacting to it. The connection made here is deliberate: that tactical and strategic challenges/opportunities witnessed on the battlefield weigh heavily on the policy calculation of members of the U.S. Congress voting on issues related to peace and war. Specifically, and perhaps most importantly, the challenges of asymmetry and the airpower innovations like armed drones designed to overcome them weigh heavily in the decision-making process of members of Congress contemplating the use of force (namely from the air). In fact, any analysis of whether politicians and parties have become more or less hawkish would be entirely bland absent a consideration of the real-world factors shaping the feasibility of striking targets from the air.

Long before powered flight -- ever since weaker powers first went up against considerably stronger powers millennia ago, those at an inherent disadvantage on the battlefield have come up with new and imaginative ways to inflict harm against even the most colossal of armies. Elements of this dynamic have been around since the first underdogs in warfare. The essential characteristics of asymmetry date back to the earliest military theorists and are often a factor even in smaller scale conflicts -- not just between superpowers and rag-tag militant groups. It is certainly the case that conflict is only feasible for any extended period of time between two powers with vastly different

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This applies both to other nations’ internal discourse about the use of their own militaries, as well as their opinions regarding the best role for America’s armed forces in the global security environment.
military capabilities when unconventional tactics are resorted to that can circumvent the stronger power’s strengths and stave off what would otherwise be decisive defeat. This basic David vs. Goliath feature seen in much conflict throughout history, though by no means universally favorable to the smaller power, is a dynamic that has fed a relentless cat-and-mouse game by which each side embroiled in a conflict of this nature looks to gain the upper hand. Weaker powers search for new ways to strike at their more powerful enemies, and large military entities constantly seek to improve their abilities -- often in the area of superior technology -- to stay one step ahead and reduce the lethality of weaker but cunning and stealthy enemies that are often willing to launch their attacks by any means necessary. Though counterintuitive at face value, big nations can indeed lose small wars.  

Each a far cry from the U.S. military fighting Nazi Germany for example (i.e., two roughly equal, conventional armies), most of America’s conflicts after WWII have to one extent or another featured asymmetrical challenges, by simple virtue of the fact that the U.S. had become a clear superpower on the world stage, rivaled only by one other entity – the Soviet Union. It became obvious that no other adversary of the U.S. would last long if lined up in formation on the infamously open battlefield of wars past, which has continued to feed the asymmetry dynamic. Particularly after the attacks of 9/11, and the wars that followed in Afghanistan and Iraq under the rubric of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT), it has become evident that groups like al-Qaeda resort to unconventional tactics to strike the U.S. and its interests when and where it can – often soft targets that the conventional military establishment cannot protect against, per se.

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This has fueled a significant and growing body of literature on asymmetry in this conflict and the airpower used to try and overcome it, from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. 27 And although relatively little has emerged to consider the explicitly political ramifications of this new dynamic in warfare, this section briefly covers the essentials of these perspectives on asymmetry in order to set the stage for the validity of the comparative case study method pursued later in this work.

First, it is important to consider that the U.S. is a nation borne out of the asymmetrical conflict experience, which its founding fathers utilized to great avail against the British. 28 At a time when lining up formally on a battlefield was a matter of honor, early American colonialists were willing to adopt hit-and-run tactics, including sabotage, sniping, spying, and other means of deception to beat back the redcoats. However, the fundamental nature of the problem of asymmetry is by no means unique to American conflict. Although the U.S. had long grown accustomed to conventional wars against comparable national enemies (essentially up until 9/11), this is a phenomenon that has been highly problematic elsewhere around the world – often in a civil war context. Thus, even within nations, governments utilize airpower to fight against much weaker, yet determined challengers to their authority, such as what has been documented in the fight against insurgents challenging the national government in India. 29


No matter the location (arguably the entire globe in the fight against al-Qaeda) or specific grievances behind the conflict, guerilla warfare by informal, unprofessional, and poorly-equipped militants has been a challenge for governments, especially since the 1960s onwards. The infamous Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara himself penned one of the early seminal works in this area, *Guerilla War*, as a sort of how-to and lessons-learned guide to violent overthrow after his experiences alongside Fidel Castro in Cuba. It shares some similarities with Mao Tsetung’s earlier work, *On Protracted War*, which in 1938, dealt with how to fight as peasants on the weaker side of an asymmetry in China. Later considering how to fight such a conflict in urban environments -- again from the weaker side’s perspective -- Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella authored his ‘Minimanual’ of the Urban Guerilla in 1969,30 which has since inspired countless revolutionaries around the globe. These kinds of works from the left outline quite clearly how weaker powers can to rather significant avail, challenge much stronger powers in the realm of armed conflict.

Although asymmetry has also been usefully discussed in theoretical terms of the consequences of warfare being so unbalanced, it is indeed quite an empirical, real-life problem for nation-states, which has been dealt with extensively in the doctrinal approach found in counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy developed by, among others, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director General David Petraeus, in the counterinsurgency field manual.31 It is an entirely utilitarian approach to fighting asymmetrical war, though

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mostly from the ground, aimed at an audience of practitioners, which constitutes a ‘how-
to’ guide on fighting asymmetrical war from the stronger power’s side of the equation.
Others have looked in more theoretical terms to the impact of airpower on COIN.32

Without question, asymmetry has at its heart an element of inequality (reflected in the Marxist origins of many asymmetrical tactics of weaker powers). It arises out of weak political and economic power, which is needed to support large expenditures by organizations -- be they state or non-state -- to fund competent military activities. However, with considerable cunning, the poor underdog can study its enemy well and strike with the element of surprise as its advantage, and do so in ways that expose the larger power’s weaknesses and capitalize most efficiently on the weaker power’s strengths. It is a contest between military haves and have-nots; a challenging of the social order by a weaker entity as it vies for political control and challenges the legitimacy of authority in the social, economic, cultural, and political realms. And also inseparable from a solid grasp of asymmetrical warfare is an understanding of the associated concepts of unconventional tactics (e.g., suicide hijackings), low-intensity combat (e.g., the slow drip of casualties in America’s longest war in Afghanistan), and non-linear battlefields (e.g., zones of conflict without a front line, and where any place is potentially as dangerous as any other). All of these concepts seem to come as a sort of package deal in this paradigm of conflict.

As it concerns the logical structure of this dissertation, the literature that examines the role of airpower within the context of conflict asymmetry is itself considerable. This is because of the simple fact that airpower and irregular warfare are inextricably linked in

today’s environment. Over the course of recent decades, one likely would not exist nearly as extensively without the other. Especially as airpower has become the center-of-gravity for the strategic projection of American hard power, it is no wonder that the constraints imposed by this growing asymmetry – the terms of which tend to disadvantage the stronger power, have had immense implications in the realm of administering hard power from the air and how enemies react to such power. Since WWII, ships and tanks have played a smaller role in armed conflict when compared to the confidence in, and reliance on, air assets to form the tip of the spear of American military might. This means that the problem of asymmetry has primarily fallen as a burden on airpower to adapt and overcome in light of the challenges brought on by new conditions of warfare. Constraints imposed by devastatingly counter-productive instances of collateral damage to innocent civilians for instance, which are more likely to occur in asymmetrical wars on non-linear battlefields, have forced the form and function of the nation’s go-to airpower technologies to change quite significantly. This has precipitated the development of cutting-edge aerial technology, the likes of which include precision munitions systems like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and ‘uninhabited’ or unmanned kinetic strike platforms like the Predator drone. Both aim to overcome the problem of asymmetry by reducing collateral damage, and although there were indeed asymmetrical features to the war in Vietnam for example -- including some rather unconventional tactics according to modern and Western means of fighting war (like

33 See for example Peck, Allen G., “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare.” *Air & Space Power Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 10-15. Summer 2007. Also, with whole institutions recognizing the clear link, there is even an aptly-titled *Airpower and Asymmetric Warfare Research Center* as part of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies at the Israel Air Force Center Foundation.

jungle booby traps) -- considerably more lopsided strains of conflict have called these new weapons into action and become the norm for America’s leaders after 9/11.

Largely due to the modern technological advancements in the aerial tools of combat pursued more aggressively after 2001, the sheer scale of American military capability as ‘the world’s last superpower’ is literally unrivaled in all of human history and no U.S. casualties have been suffered by enemy air attack since the Korean War.\(^{35}\) But it has also been well established that the conventional and rather bulky configuration of American hard power, all the while designed to engage other state adversaries in conventional battle spaces with aircraft carriers and thermo-nuclear weapons for example, is especially ill-suited to take on the asymmetrical threat matrix posed by terrorists and other sub-state adversaries in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\(^{36}\) This basic disconnect between the form of a shadowy enemy that exploits its civilian status to launch its attacks and the core function of state actors’ security apparatuses still largely dominated by rank-and-file militaries, continues to be a central problem in geo-political affairs. Certainly, to accumulate technology of armaments in a certain area (like the air) is to in some way lock in the terms of conflict and how fire will be exchanged. But in many cases, when inferiority is openly acknowledged by a weaker power with sub-standard technology, they choose not to exchange fire in this domain. Instead, attempts are made to circumvent the advantages held by the opposition in this particular battle space, to instead exploit weaknesses in other areas and capitalize on opportunities whenever they arise.


Seen in this light, there is little question that airpower is at the crux of the development of asymmetry in conflict, and also at the crux of the response to it. The unconventional tactics adopted by weaker forces without airpower assets has been uniquely shaped by the capabilities of stronger forces that do command airpower assets. This is especially true for militant fighters in tribal regions of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, for example, who realize the threat of American airpower to their desire for a return to Taliban control. After the Mujahideen used U.S.-supplied stinger missiles to such great avail against Soviet aircraft in the 1980s (showing the importance of aerial dominance/vulnerability in the balance of the struggle), they have ramped up attacks on NATO air assets – even those simply parked on the ground. In fact, a recent surprise Taliban attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan resulted in the death of two Marines, the complete destruction of six U.S. Marine Corps fighter jets, and two others planes that were severely damaged.37

In many regards, this increasing asymmetry is itself the result of overwhelming American air dominance. Smaller forces and all would-be adversaries of the U.S. realize that the only viable strategy to go up against such a military colossus is to fight it on different terms; from hidden positions, through sabotage/terrorism, and always with the element of surprise. It is a dynamic that has risen to a striking level after 9/11. At the two extremes, the ‘war on terror’ has been a battle pitched between a half-a-trillion-dollar-per-year Pentagon capable of flying nuclear weapons at supersonic speeds at the edge of space vs. a group numbering only in the thousands, many of whom operate in

Afghanistan, which is one of the most underdeveloped nations on Earth. Given America’s inability to ‘win’ in this ‘graveyard of empires’ after over a decade, a key lesson of asymmetry, therefore, is that with the right level of determination, any organization can inflict a high degree of damage with relatively meager financial and technological means.

Indeed, new innovations in airpower have been examined from the perspective of their ability to (re)gain at least some advantage in asymmetrical settings. This is a body of literature that has taken off within military institutions after the attacks of 9/11 and the rapid understanding that newly-armed drones would become central in the fight against groups like al-Qaeda that operate in the shadows, so to speak. New technologies to precisely surveil and strike from the air have the ability to make the option of hard power more viable, although new tactics devised by weaker powers to fight more effectively in the asymmetrical context make the use of airpower to thwart them less viable.

For example, the development of various ‘smart’ weapons enables the USA and other militarily advanced countries to attack and kill individual opponents with little likelihood of suffering deaths of their own forces and avoiding extensive deaths of noncombatants. On the other hand, powerful explosives and persons willing to die in the process of killing military personnel and civilians enable even small non-state organizations to disrupt and terrorize a strong opposing side.

Recognition of these essential elements seen in the phenomenon of conflict between vastly different enemy capabilities dates back at least as far as the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, who stated in *The Art of War* that “You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. You can

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38 See Clodfelter, pp. 37-46.

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.”

This quote is timeless in its relevance, and in the present context, is something right out of the playbook of groups such as al-Qaeda and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs). The natural advantage in attacking “places that are undefended” parallels the logic behind terrorists wishing to strike ‘soft’ targets (including civilians), whereas ensuring one’s defenses by holding “positions that cannot be attacked” is precisely why Islamist extremist terrorist groups either melt in amongst civilian populations or relegate themselves to remote hideaways in rugged terrain such as the caves or burrows in the Hindu Kush mountains. The nature of this profound asymmetry has no doubt presented leaders of all governments engaged in the multivariate GWOT with perplexing challenges regarding how to effectively yet proportionately deploy their comparatively overwhelming military and intelligence might through proactive means, assuming the key strategic decision has been made to go ‘on the offense’ – even as the fundamental threat of terrorism against civilians places states inherently on a reactive defense posture.

However, the dramatic asymmetrical advantage of groups lacking any brick-and-mortar headquarters and who are willing to commit suicide to carry out attacks -- as was so vividly placed on display on 9/11 -- did not necessarily portend that the U.S. would somehow be intrinsically incapable of adaptation to the new paradigm or unable to at least partially mitigate the asymmetry that has greatly frustrated policymakers.

With U.S. funding for its armed services representing almost half of global military expenditures -- totaling nearly as much as that of all other nations on Earth

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combined\textsuperscript{41} -- the epicenter of American hard power at the Pentagon has expended over $5 trillion\textsuperscript{42} during the almost decade-long process of adaptation to the many features of asymmetry that undermine, or simply render ineffective, its conventional might.

Certainly, the new grand strategic calculus of the post-9/11 world has provided a framework for fighting smaller wars and has buttressed the rationale behind various efforts to achieve some degree of parity with unconventional adversaries. However, due to the extreme extent of the power gap between the U.S. military that mostly fights out in the open and insurgent militants who seldom display insignia other than a Kalashnikov, bridging the divide in both capability and tactics with the ultimate goal of making conflict more decisive remains an arduous task. Yet, the use of increasingly sophisticated pilotless aerial weapons systems with ‘pinpoint’ accuracy has emerged in the minds of many as the \textit{de facto} ‘best’ answer to the particular difficulty of attacking at the heart of otherwise elusive terrorist operatives coordinating attacks from the relative safe haven of remote and ‘ungoverned’ regions within the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Northwest Pakistan as well as neighboring regions.\textsuperscript{43}

In this vein, the Pentagon has been unequivocal in maintaining a clear and steadfast reliance on overwhelming U.S. air superiority in the years since 9/11, including the use of precision attack munitions to carry out the orders of the president of the United


States both tactically and strategically.\textsuperscript{44} Whereas a docked battleship has little actual force projection capability in the fight against terrorism and has instead become a colossal vulnerability, such as the U.S.S. Cole which no doubt had a giant red bulls-eye painted on it in the minds of the attackers, aviation maintains the upper hand insofar that it is one of the only arenas of militarism that terrorist groups have not been able to penetrate.\textsuperscript{45} That the World Trade Center towers and a sizeable portion of the Pentagon were reduced to rubble by aircraft that were ruthlessly commandeered and themselves turned into missiles in a suicide attack on 9/11 is an irony not lost on this analysis. But air warfare as a battle space, is a conflict domain in which actors other than nation-states (and certainly groups like al-Qaeda) tend not to be able to effectively operate.

Through these means, achieving some level of conflict parity and carving out a more viable battle space in which fire can effectively be directed against terrorists has come in the form of what has largely been consistent with former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision for transitioning to a lighter, swifter, and more agile fighting force that relies more heavily on the use of covert Special Operations forces and interoperability between military branches.\textsuperscript{46} Crafted in the context of the dissolution of

\textsuperscript{44} The ‘precision’ of guided munitions is by no means guaranteed. There have been several high-profile incidents of collateral damage and even friendly fire, as when air strikes were called in during the 2001 prison revolt in Afghanistan, in which “one of the 200kg American ‘smart’ bombs missed its target by 600 ft. killing several [northern] alliance fighters and wounding five American soldiers.” See “Fort Revolt: What Really Happened?” \textit{BBC News}. Saturday, December 1, 2001. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1681513.stm>

\textsuperscript{45} This is implied in an operational sense. There was however, a recently reported case of insurgents in Iraq hacking into a video data stream from a U.S. UAV using standard software open-source software. See BBC News. “Iraq Insurgents ‘Hack into Video Feeds from U.S. Drones.’” Thursday, December 17, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8419147.stm>

the Soviet Union, this plan was initially instituted though resisted quite fervently from within the Pentagon establishment for testing prior ‘comfort zones’ within the national security bureaucracy in the months before September 11th, but has gained steam since the attacks. In terms of weapons and tactics, it constituted a kind of scaling down and streamlining of the colossal military force posture that had previously dominated the America’s strategic mentality.

This downsizing of sorts, without any loss of operational capability, is largely congruent with these ongoing alterations to how the military conducts itself, which serve to lessen the span of asymmetry. However, this was only considered to be feasible because of recent innovations in the use of new technologies that allow for precision hard power, the essential reliance on which has been maintained throughout recent processes of great change in other areas of national security posture. This is particularly true as the delivery of many ‘smart’ munitions has become significantly easier, in many cases cheaper, and lacking any real risk to human operators. They have also become much more accurate with advanced computer guidance systems, which have literally made it possible to fly a Tomahawk missile into a target roughly the size of an average garage door. But even as such remarkable capabilities make hawkish stances seemingly more


justifiable, it is not necessarily the case that it makes them more likely to win the day in Congress or in the wider discourse, for that matter.

Inseparable from this discussion, and springing from the intersection of these two parts to the preceding literature review, there are clear implications from the standpoint of the literature on strategic studies, and more recently, global security as well. As has been alluded to, all of the advancements in the means of bringing hard power to bear, shape power relations between states and between other actors (both sub-state and supranational). The transformation of military power and the nature of security itself are seen repeatedly as a backstory in the data that is revealed in the next chapter. For now, it critical, however, to point out that as the costs of interstate war have been raised to the point of nearing obsolescence, this has seemed to give way to the prevalence of asymmetrical warfare involving the U.S. that will undoubtedly persist for years to come. This may be a case where there is simply a permanent state of warfare being conducted by the U.S. with drones and other technologies. The intensity will be lower, and yet, it may continue in perpetuity. It can be sustained for such long periods of time because the technological advancements seen since 9/11 will undoubtedly improve into the future making this permanent state of low intensity combat (LIC) almost entirely remote, and also cheaper than conflicts of years past.

Indeed, much of this verges on a discussion on the relationship between the military and security more broadly speaking. Indeed, military power used to translate more easily into security gains. Now, where enemies are diffuse and battlefield challenges are rampant, military power alone does not equal the realization of enhanced security. Thus, the security landscape, in which the military plays a role, has become
much more complex in recent years, incorporating several additional types of security and a more complex web of the referent objects of that security.

There is little question that the nature of global power is intimately tied to the standing of a given actor’s technology and weapons capabilities. By extension, the nature of fighting itself has been altered because of the lopsidedness of armaments available to belligerents, whereby U.S. forces and those of its allies have had to adapt and overcome in the post-9/11 era with new technologies (mostly in the air). This is an environment of asymmetry that has emerged in the distinct context of globalization, in which “the distinction between legitimate war and crime will continue to blur” and where “the distinction between public and private violence and security is burring” as well. Under these new terms of conflict, irregular warfare is essentially the new regular. Interstate war seems increasingly irregular, though it is assigned the label ‘conventional’ war. This reality has formed the basis of the domineering shift in the Pentagon’s psyche after 9/11. Although Iraq was an attempt to essentially impose the conventional/inter-state conflict paradigm on the problem of unconventional terrorism by non-state actors, the theatre ended up in a classic insurgency and non-conventional armed struggle.

Even with this quite radical transformation of the nature of military security on the world stage, in this case away from conventional state v. state wars, this does not mean that the course of U.S. military conflict debated in the halls of Congress simply goes away. It continues to operate, though under differing pretenses, in the latter case under the purview of the new dynamics of 21st century conflict. There has no doubt been a sea change in the nature of the strategic environment in which airpower is exercised,

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from carped bombers to drones, but because airpower has been the go-to means of using force in either scenario, it raises the question of whether and to what extent the hawk/dove dynamic has changed during the transition according to this and other litmus tests. It is to this point that the data revealed in the next chapter aims to tell the story of how the debate has changed over the course of these changes in global power and military security.
Chapter Three:

Gauging the Hawk/Dove Dynamic: Data and Methods

In the context of new developments in the global security landscape, it is clear that much interest has been generated in the changing nature of 21st century conflict amid never-before-seen technologies and new types of violent (non-state) actors. Given its central role in world affairs, much of this interest revolves around how the American military superpower navigates this emergent terrain of -- among other features of the modern battlefield -- conditions of extreme asymmetry. As with other aspects of national policy, outcomes in the ever-meandering story of America’s defense and security ultimately come down to the will of democratically-elected leaders who are tasked with steering the national ship and charting the course of history. Nothing in peace and war is ever a forgone conclusion while the avenue(s) for, and extent of, militarism emanating from government is whatever political leaders make of it.¹ But crucially, even the most powerful decision-makers (national actors) are engaged in a feedback loop with the international political sphere, making decisions to affect the security environment but which are simultaneously also shaped by the security environment. Evident in the data put forth here, this is especially true in the wake of major developments such as the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, the attacks of 9/11, and conflict in the context of the so-called Arab Spring (especially the Libya case).

To be sure, a large part of this story involves the development of new technologies to overcome the cunning of new adversaries in a perpetual game of cat-and-

mouse begun with the advent of the very first tools of combat in prehistory. And so far as these new weapons technologies are concerned, the U.S. Congress holds primary authority over the direction and intensity of programs to develop weapons systems (including airpower technologies) vis-à-vis its constitutional power of the purse, doling out approximately $718 billion for defense per annum in fiscal year 2011, which exceeds the next 13 nations’ defense outlays combined.² Herein lies the importance of looking to the hawk/ dove dynamic -- specifically in Congress -- for insights into the past (and thereby perhaps future) intentions of U.S. leadership on military, defense, and national security issues. The fate of airpower and other weapons technologies seem locked in perpetual struggle -- largely a fight over money -- between those who tend to support warfare as a go-to tool of foreign policy and those who tend to view hard power with great skepticism and reserve. Centered in the halls and on the floor of both houses of Congress, which serve as the central crucible of the hawk/ dove dynamic,³ the balance of this struggle has profound implications for the tools of the military trade, and by extension, the level of assertiveness of the U.S. military on the ever-shifting world stage.

Accordingly, this project bases its methodology on a massive data set that began with tabulated results of every single floor vote held in Congress (both the Senate and House of Representatives) from 1964 to 2012, compiled by GovTrack.us, an


³ Although the executive branch has tended to dominate issues of peace and war (at least since WWII), there are markedly fewer flash points of hawk/ dove tension due to the domination of this branch of government by one party or another and because internal division tends to stay private (and is thus difficult to quantify). By contrast, Congress has during the same period been split between the parties under divided government and must hold its opinion out in the open/ on the record. Nonetheless, presidential administrations have not been immune to hawk/ dove splits internal to their decision-making processes, as is chronicled qualitatively in subsequent chapters.
independent, private data resource.\textsuperscript{4} The data was supplemented with Library of Congress data through the THOMAS open access system\textsuperscript{5} on amendment details needed for 1990-2012.\textsuperscript{6} By means of extensive qualitative sifting and numerous quantitative calculations, the research presented in the pages to come sought to boil this massive data set down to the essence of the hawk/dove struggle in Washington D.C., going beyond what has been a meager and almost exclusively qualitative mainstream inquiry into this political phenomenon. Represented visually, the data offers a quantitative basis for a clear window into the collective mind of Congress as it has evolved over time, both confirming areas of what might be considered conventional wisdom about history and also revealing some fascinating, if not unexpected findings. Accordingly, the data itself is a story of the \textit{intent} of Congress, and not yet a foray into the more ambitious task of pinning down \textit{outcomes} and drawing connections to real world events, which is tackled in subsequent chapters.

On this basis however, the following pages cover the core of the data contained in this study, the methodology used, and the broad strokes of the findings (including numerous charts/visualizations). Later portions of this work reveal the more in-depth findings of the data in tandem with pointed historical analysis, which is broken into two main time periods acting as case-studies to be compared: the (post)-Vietnam era and the post-9/11 era.

\textsuperscript{4} Thanks to Joshua Tauberer (founder of GovTrack.us) and also Professor Keith Poole (whose data is featured) for their efforts to provide wide and open access to government information for both serious analysts and concerned citizens alike. For more about the organization, see <http://www.govtrack.us/about>

\textsuperscript{5} See <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php>

\textsuperscript{6} For the years 1990-2012, amendments listed in the GovTrack.us data, though partly dependent on THOMAS data itself, were only numbered, showing final vote counts but lacking details on the content of the amendments. The THOMAS data contained full titles/descriptions, which was cross-referenced with the GovTrack lists for each year to ensure complete coverage in the subsequent search process.
The Process: Sifting through Data

The following discusses what is, and equally important -- what is not -- included in the data. In fact, from the outset of this research project, considering what \textit{not} to include was perhaps as important as selecting what should be included, constituting the most laborious aspect to the research. Consistent criteria (qualitative criteria) for what was considered a valid data point had to be devised at the outset as a standardized process equally applied to all the data. After boiling everything down to the essential and most relevant data, then the actual quantitative portion of the methodology could continue to allow for the creation of charts and then the final analysis. In all, the process involved phases of collecting, organizing, categorizing, calculating, charting, and then interpreting the data.

To begin, it is important to consider that the data is specific to floor votes, meaning occasions where one chamber held an up or down vote on a particular measure. That means both bills, and amendments to bills, in the House and the Senate. Although overall bills carry more weight than amendments in terms of outcome, the data is aimed at measuring \textit{intent}, and therefore the study considers both on an equal footing. This inclusion of amendments stems from the fact that votes on final bills reflect extensive processes of negotiation, compromise, and horse-trading intrinsic to democratic policymaking. Although pure intent to grow or slow military power is in certain instances masked by other goals/ intentions during the often tumultuous amendment process, this is where most of the actual contention plays out with politicians ultimately going on record as to where they stand on the issues before the nation. Final bill votes represent more of a formality under this type of parliamentary maneuvering – often after the leadership of
both parties has more or less figured out how their members intend to vote in the end.

Taken alone, bills fail to capture the broader dynamics of the hawk/ dove struggle that amendments bring to the table. Thus, to only have considered final bill votes would have missed this richness in the policymaking process and, in turn, would have suffered from a lack of data to draw any broad conclusions about a relatively long span of time (1964-2012).

Accordingly, the process began with lists of every floor vote held in the Senate and House\(^7\) from 1964-2012. Of these 44,715 floor votes listed by year, a rigorous search process with 74 key terms\(^8\) was set up ranging from “air,” “aerial,” and “drone” to “defense,” “military,” “troops,” and many others in order to identify all bills (by their title and description) that in clear terms demonstrated the hawk/ dove dynamic:

\(^7\) Although a Senate vote carries more weight than a House vote (100 vs. 435), the aim of the numbers is to capture overall intent and figures are converted to percentages anyway, removing the need to weight data to compensate for the disparity in power between the lower and upper houses of Congress.

\(^8\) In no particular order, the search terms used were: air, craft, aerial, aviation, aero, plane, helicopter, pilot, flight, fly, altitude, space, missile, bomb, weapon, jet, rocket, drone, UAV, AWACS, stealth, precision, guided, kinetic, laser, vehicle, nuclear, ballistic, JDAM, munition, hardware, defense, security, military, foreign, power, combat, conflict, fight, force, attack, strike, intervene, escalate, operation, hostile, war, deploy, invasion, army, navy, marine, coast guard, naval, vessel, technology, spy, covert, CIA, research, appropriation, arms, platform, Pentagon, DOD, troop, soldier, Vietnam, Indochina, Iraq, Afghanistan, 9/11, NASA, and explosion.
Aiming for only the most relevant occasions for a floor vote, the searches therefore did not require inclusion of the full-text versions of each bill/amendment. Because most measures are in the hundreds or even the thousands of pages, and because coverage is intermittent going back almost half a century, searching the entire legislation for these terms is an exercise in futility. Many bills turn up hits on words seemingly relevant, but which are used in other (irrelevant) contexts. Thus, the titles and descriptions of the bills/amendments were the target of the search. If none of the 74 search terms turned up in the title or description of the floor vote, then they were assumed not to have material relevance to the hawk/dove dynamic. In fact, if a connection to the hawk/dove dynamic cannot be almost immediately ascertained from the title of a bill, it is unlikely that there are any such implications found inside the full text that would be plausibly demonstrated by simple up or down vote, and are in these instances often amendments of a more detailed or technical nature.
Right off the bat, virtually all domestic issue bills/amendments, for example, have no direct connection to the question of hawkishness vs. dovishness and were generally never flagged by the search terms. But to ensure maximum inclusion of what was relevant, this part of the methodology was not necessarily exclusive to the complete words used for the searches, such that a query for “air” would hit on “chairman” (which made the exclusion of irrelevant results necessary), but also on “airmen” (which would otherwise have been missed, but clearly is relevant). Thus in some instances, these terms necessitated a root-word usage in the terminology of the search process to maximize returns, such as “inva” being used to cover both “invade” and “invasion.” The rather broad net of search terms was used to ensure that no floor vote that could possibly have contained relevance to the hawk/dove dynamic was overlooked. Indeed, this resulted in much by-catch (i.e., search hits that did not demonstrate the hawk/dove dynamic), but was necessary to avoid an incomplete or sporadic data set. All irrelevant data points were dutifully left out. But to use one specific example of a bill, the following one showed up with multiple hits (‘air,’ ‘craft,’ and ‘force’) and was ultimately included in the data for obvious reasons: (91\textsuperscript{st} Congress) House Vote #16 - Mar 27, 1969; To pass H.R. 7757, to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1969 for procurement of aircraft for the armed forces, (341/21).\textsuperscript{9}

The measure is clear in its intent to grow the air assets of the armed forces. Of the 362 House members that voted in total, 341 cast their opinion in the affirmative (leaning toward the hawkish side of the spectrum) and 21 voted against the bill (leaning toward the dovish side of the spectrum). That is, for the purposes of this study, 341 hawkish votes and 21 dovish votes. Repeated for every other floor vote relevant to the hawk/dove

\textsuperscript{9} See <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/91-1969/h16>
dynamic, this constituted the basic exercise that led to the construction of the final data set. Of course, much more was required to make sense of the large amount of data beyond this step, but initially identifying relevant bills/amendments while weeding out the mass of irrelevant ones was crucial to the process.

At this stage, rough lists of potential data points were still far too large, requiring further distillation, which was done one-by-one to determine whether each bill was, or was not, germane given the research at hand. This was painstaking, but necessary to ensure that irrelevant data points did not wind up being entered into the final calculations. Some of the issues included, for example, situations where there were bills that involved airpower, but which did not equate to any identifiable divergence of course to either grow or shrink airpower. These were accordingly omitted along with all votes that may have had issue relevance, but were strictly procedural. Fortunately, most bills and amendments involving airpower are clear in their intention to limit or expand it, providing for an adequate sample size from which valid conclusions can be extrapolated.

Indeed, many bills/amendments making it through the first filter (separating relevant floor votes from cursory ones in bulk) had to be weeded out. Many votes seemed poignant at face value, but were essentially neutral or irrelevant for other reasons that can only be determined qualitatively. Some involved civil aviation, for example, which were omitted from the data – to include issues such as funds for airports, taxes on air travel, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regulations, and even cracking down on sonic booms over certain populated regions of the country. Also not included, several seemingly-relevant bills merely set forth reporting requirements, which do not demonstrate any contention in this area because the reporting done could serve to bolster
either side of the dynamic. For example, in 2005, Senate amendment 1382 to Senate bill 1042 set forth the intention “to require a report on the aircraft of the Army to perform the High-altitude Aviation Training Site of the Army National Guard.”\(^{10}\) Agreed to by unanimous consent, the bill covers airpower, but clearly does not demonstrate any discernible contention seen in the hawk/ dove dynamic. Others represent a tradeoff in decreasing one area of airpower, and increasing it in another area – with less than overt implications for the hawk/ dove dynamic, such as Senate amendment 1396 (also to amend Senate bill 1042 in 2005), which sought:

\[
\ldots \text{to authorize} \$5,500,000 \text{for military construction for the Army for the construction of a rotary wing landing pad at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and to provide an offset of} \$8,000,000 \text{by canceling a military construction project for the construction of an F-15E flight simulator facility at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.}^{11}\]

Also passed by unanimous consent, it represents a more or less equal tradeoff in the management of airpower, which is different from other votes that quite clearly and often dramatically seek to reduce or expand airpower or other aspects of the military without commensurate offsets (material or financial) to ‘neutralize’ the controversial aspects of a given proposal. Therefore, the standard used here is to identify and use only the data points that exhibit one-sided, immediately obvious, clear, and logically deducible implications for the hawk vs. dove split.

With balanced or otherwise non-controversial aims, the aforementioned amendments passed by use of the parliamentary practice of a unanimous consent agreement (UCA), which even for bills that were deemed relevant, meant that they were - - by definition -- not a source of any contention and were accordingly omitted. Floor

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\(^{10}\) See <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:sp1382:>

\(^{11}\) See <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:sp1396:>
votes that ended up unanimous (but where this was not predetermined by procedure), such as a tally of 98/0 in the Senate, were however included in the data because dissent could plausibly have been voiced if it was present. Other floor votes concerned matters that were in other ways strictly procedural in nature, such as invoking cloture, ending debate, or sending an issue to committee. These types of votes were obviously not used either, although in certain instances (mostly applicable to the airpower floor vote sub-set) motions to table more controversial bills or amendments were considered, with support for tabling or putting off a measure seen as tantamount to opposition to the bill/amendment itself. For example, doves would be expected to vote against tabling (i.e., dismissing) a dovish bill that they would want to see pass. Lastly, many measures were passed by voice vote, which naturally precluded the extrapolation of any data for such amendments. ‘When in doubt, leave it out’ is a motto in this case suggesting that it is certainly preferential to have a smaller data set than to incorporate data points which may altogether skew or simply muddy the final results.

From the master lists of initial search hits, precisely 1,418 floor votes were ultimately identified as being directly-relevant to the hawk/dove dynamic, depending on the nature of the bill or amendment in question (3.171% of all floor votes). To be sure, this component of the research required extensive qualitative preparation before a single number could be considered, let alone being able to paint a picture of trends over time. At this juncture, it turned to the creation of certain boundary lines for which types of policy issues demonstrated the hawk/dove dynamic with their own area of significance. Without identifying separate litmus tests that specifically outline the sub-topic(s) involved, the data would be far too general (especially because points of contention under
the heading of defense issues range widely) and would lack a solid basis for any comparative analysis (at least quantitatively speaking). In this way, to have looked at airpower alone would have been lacking proper context and may have been less than sufficiently ambitious for a doctoral dissertation.

For the purposes of making important comparisons later on, this demanded the categorization of each of these floor votes according to the various litmus tests or issue categories that put the hawk/dove dynamic on display most vibrantly and distinctly. Seven categories that clearly exemplify the divergences of opinion on peace and war were settled upon, to include 1) support for airpower (the central focus of the study), 2) defense spending on everything other than airpower, 3) escalation/de-escalation of actual conflict involving U.S. military forces, 4) foreign (allied) military support, 5) WMD policy (including nuclear arms control at the international level), 6) war powers/inter-branch relations, and 7) support for NASA as a key component of the nation’s air & space power. Resting at the heart of the inquiry, a total of 402 floor votes dealt specifically with airpower technology in a hawk/dove context throughout the period in question, amounting to 28% of all the hawk/dove floor votes (a mere 0.899% of all floor votes). Defense spending at large was the most frequently recurring hawk/dove litmus test, with 547 floor votes or approximately 39% of the total relevant floor votes, while war powers in the context of inter-branch relations between the executive and legislative nodes of government came up just 35 times in the data set or just 2% of the total hawk/dove floor votes considered.
This part of the process came down to making certain judgment calls about which litmus test had the closest connection to the floor vote in question, a process which was handled with great attention and care to preserve consistency and validity in the research. Indeed, various arguments can be made for including or omitting certain votes, or for categorizing them differently, but ultimately, the criteria set up here entailed using the most relevant context to which the bill or amendment(s) could be applied. Generally speaking, in cases where a floor vote seemed to meet the criteria for more than one category, precedence was given to airpower first and then to the category of the escalation/de-escalation of U.S. military force. Other categories tended not to present similar conflicts. But because virtually every bill is unique in its aim, each categorization of the litmus tests necessarily contains at least some diversity/overlap in the issue at hand. These areas cannot be seen in vacuums, and indeed, the votes included in the data show how intertwined certain aspects of military escalation can be (not all just bullets and bombs), which speaks into the nature of modern real-world military operations.
Nonetheless, for the sake of clear delineations between litmus tests, this meant that, once lumped under a certain heading, each data point was only considered once (and never simultaneously counted under two or more litmus tests).

In sorting bills/amendments according to each of these categories, a simple color coding system was devised to allow for easier organization and comprehension of the data (as seen in the previous pie chart). Also reflected in the master data sheet compiled in Excel, black signifies airpower, green signifies defense spending, red signifies escalation/de-escalation, purple signifies foreign military support, blue signifies WMD policy/arms control, yellow signifies war powers/inter-branch relations, and orange signifies support for NASA. In the end, this allowed for a sub-issue specific view of, among other things, the intensity of each litmus test rising and falling over time as well as the trajectory of the proportion of hawkish inclinations to dovish ones.

With this logic, the following outlines each of the 7 litmus tests that comprise the moving parts of this study, why they are important, how they were identified (i.e., the criteria used), and how dovishness and hawkishness are manifested under each purview.

The Seven Litmus Tests

1) Airpower Policy - The first and most critical litmus test is the one at the heart of this project: airpower. This therefore entails any floor vote that specifically involved the enhancement of, or limitations placed on, various aspects of U.S. airpower. This is to say that this litmus test considers those bills/amendments that both involve airpower and pass for something which actually holds relevance in the dynamic between hawks and doves. Others not meeting both conditions were not included so as to minimize
insignificant aspects to, or unwanted anomalies in, the final data put together. Fortunately, nearly all airpower bills are relevant to the hawk/dove dynamic because they almost always involve the basic question of whether to expand or restrict this specific aspect of America’s hard power.

Because of the somewhat limited nature of data in this area, the term airpower is applied somewhat broadly. In terms of the technology involved, it essentially includes any and all instruments of aerial technology used for military purposes -- aircraft (propeller planes as well as jets, both fixed wing and rotor aircraft, hybrids like the Osprey, vertical takeoff platforms like the Harrier), missile technologies (air to air, air to ground, and ground to ground, including ICBMs), and of course also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-1 Predator drone. Also included were space-based laser weapons and anti-satellite weapons systems, specific bomb types/programs, and even defoliants or any other weapon of war launched from the air. Quite critically in terms of its frequency as a contentious issue, it also includes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programs, which although pertaining to the nuclear issue and being primarily defensive/non-aggressive in nature, did involve specific airpower capabilities to shoot down ICBMs in the air and provoked as much from the Soviets militarily-speaking as the ICBMs themselves. Thus, SDI (also known pejoratively as Star Wars) was one of the dominant flash points in the debate over America’s airpower capability during the Cold War, falling under the purview of airpower. Indeed, U.S.-specific missile technologies of all stripes are considered under this category, because if UAVs are obvious candidates for classification under airpower, what is an ICBM but a nuclear-tipped kamikaze drone? International efforts to reduce nuclear weaponry by international or bi-lateral means,
however, (and thus not merely focused on American arms alone) are considered under the WMD policy category. Also crucial, aircraft carriers are considered as well under this litmus test of airpower because although they are technically assets of the Navy, all branches of the military control extensive airpower assets and carriers are unquestionably indispensable to U.S. air dominance around the globe. Lastly, it also included critical military infrastructure programs important to the area of airpower such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which although primarily defensive and informational in character, held huge implications for the real-world deployment of air assets to strike locations around the world (and protect against foreign aerial attacks).

Thus, this litmus test deploys a rather wide understanding of airpower, which is done both to provide for a more comprehensive account of the issue and also to ensure that the sample size is sufficient. Although some of these examples of airpower stray from conventional notions of winged craft dropping bombs as the ideal of airpower bringing force to bear, modern conflict in this domain has come to include several corollary technologies that reinforce and multiply the more traditional notions of what airpower constitutes. With a significantly more narrow definition of airpower, very few data points would remain, missing several aspects indispensable to the modern air war battle space.12

Under the purview of these airpower-related issues, a dovish vote is counted when there is opposition to a bill that specifically sets out to expand an aspect of airpower or when there is support for a bill that specifically aims to limit it. Conversely, hawkishness is seen in votes of support for occasions where airpower is specifically proposed to be expanded or when there is opposition to floor votes that reduce or limit airpower.

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12 For a full list of every airpower-related weapons program voted in the data set, see appendix J.
2) Defense Spending - The second litmus test is the most abundant with relevant data, and perhaps the most important for purposes of comparison: defense spending. This includes any bill or amendment that deals with increases or decreases in funding for the military (all branches) as well as authorization for certain construction or reconfigurations of the military and its infrastructure at home and abroad (all of which always have financial implications). The few issues left out included things like veteran health care issues, military pay, pension plans, building of memorials, and things of that nature. The data set also omits funding for the military that is specifically earmarked for non-combat related programs such as funding for an Army food research program, which is hardly indicative of the hawk/ dove dynamic. All other general or unspecified funds appropriated were assumed to be relevant. Again, although most airpower bills also involve spending, these were considered under the airpower litmus test (which takes precedence). Thus, the defense spending litmus test includes all data that falls under appropriations for the military, excluding airpower-specific defense expenditures (which would essentially amount to counting these floor votes twice). This means, among other general costs, all non-aerial weapons systems – from spending on arms, ammunition, and armor to tanks, ships, and submarines.

The comparative element to this study is actually facilitated by accounting for defense spending on airpower separately, allowing for a critical comparison between airpower spending (as most airpower bills deal with funding) and military spending more generally applied to all defense outlays. It allows for a window into the extent to which the U.S. has leaned toward airpower over more conventional forms of exercising hard power (by land and sea). That said, this area of policy displays the most frequency in
terms of hawk/dove votes in Congress, largely due to the simple fact that most of the body’s business involves the allocation of funds (i.e., the power of the purse). The existence of more data in the one litmus test of defense spending, and much less on escalation/de-escalation, for example, is simply a reflection of the role of the legislative branch primarily as holding the power to allocate funds, leaving the ‘hands-on’ management of security matters in the international arena to the executive branch.

Because of the complexity of the Congressional budgeting process, it is crucial to point out some caveats in the consideration of which floor votes were appropriate to be considered here. The defense spending category did not consider amendments to bills that make funds available from within an existing expected budget appropriation (usually based on the previous year’s allocation). The vast majority of these types of amendments, worded such as “… to make available from the amount appropriated” are passed by unanimous consent or by voice vote anyway. Thus, the basic amount is already stipulated by the umbrella bill. The hawk/dove dynamic then operates in relation to this existing appropriation as a sort of baseline. It is a zero-marker or center point for the dynamic insofar as a cut from the previous year’s allocation under a major defense bill is the dovish position and an increase (beyond what might be automatically-indexed or inflation-connected increases) is considered the hawkish position. In these terms, a cut is a reduction in the rate of growth – while budget growth, virtually across the board, is largely a forgone conclusion. Given this prerequisite consideration, hawkishness under this issue area is quite obviously defined by votes in the affirmative when the question is whether to increase spending (over and above the previous year’s rate of growth or for entirely new programs), or opposition to measures that go the opposite direction by
reducing defense spending (often targeting specific areas/ weapons systems). Obviously, dovishness is determined to be the opposite of these scenarios. Such issues are critically important to consider in the evaluation of whether certain bills/ amendments constitute a data point to include or to ignore in the study. A poor foundation in the qualitative assessment of what data should be used in the quantitative realm will essentially skew the numbers.

3) Escalation/ De-escalation - The third litmus test is perhaps the most consequential and thereby also one of the most controversial: escalation/ de-escalation of actual combat. This question entails the decision of whether to escalate or back away from a newly-proposed combat mission or one already underway. In that regard, this litmus test is perhaps the most indicative of the hawk/ dove struggle, and captures its essence most acutely. This is because it actually involves the fundamental question of using force in real-world situations. All the other litmus tests have to do with increasing or decreasing the ability or the option to use force. Therefore, this is one of the less abundant data sub-sets among all the litmus tests because the issue simply comes up less frequently than comparatively more routine questions of defense spending, for example. This relative lack of data is also reflected by the fact that at least since WWII, the executive branch, and not the legislative branch, has taken primary control over issues of peace and war – and specifically when to commit troops. In fact, none of the instances of U.S. hard power being brought to bear in the time period in question involved a declaration of war. Most were limited engagements originated and carried out almost exclusively by the White House and the President himself. Occasions in which Congress has voted to authorize the use of force (short of declaring war), represent the same strain
of contention that might be seen in war declaration votes, but are relatively few and far between. Yet, they provide invaluable insight into what ultimately constitutes the heart of the hawk/dove dynamic. Without specific instances of contention over the question of whether to *apply* military force, many of the other aspects of the hawk/dove dynamic essentially become moot.

To provide further illustration, de-funding specific ongoing conflict is considered here to be an act of de-escalation, while prohibiting the use of funds for a proposed military intervention is also primarily de-escalatory in nature because it can effectively tie the hands of the president to carry out any policy of aggression without the money to do so. Generally, setting troop numbers and ceilings on enlisted troops, general to the overall fighting force and without specific reference to a nation or theatre of operations, constitutes a funding issue (falling under the purview of the previous litmus test). Setting troop levels in allied nations at peace that host U.S. military forces (such as Germany and Japan) falls under foreign military support, but setting troop numbers in a specific theatre of ongoing conflict such as Vietnam in the late 1960s clearly falls under this category of escalation/de-escalation. Moreover, in times of extreme war weariness, advocating the maintenance of existing force levels and funding streams amid growing calls for a complete military pullout such as was the case with Iraq in 2006 and 2007, is tantamount to escalation, at least politically speaking. Thus, each case was evaluated separately in context to either merit, or thwart, its inclusion in the data.

With this, the litmus test included any floor vote that held implications specific to the use of force (including bills that specifically de-escalated combat situations by imposing limitations and/or cutting off funding for combat-specific missions). Hawkish
positions were obviously determined by support for escalatory measures, or opposition to de-escalatory measures. Dovish positions were naturally characterized by opposition to escalation and support for de-escalation.

4) Foreign Military Support - The fourth litmus test involved another crucial element of the American hawk/dove struggle and which also holds grave implications for Global Affairs and the international security landscape: support for (allied) military forces in foreign nations. This includes any bill that specifically aims to increase or decrease funding for a specifically-designated country’s military. Because the militaries in question are allied with the U.S. (except the few instances where military support is prohibited to an adversarial foreign military, whereby the opposite conditions apply), it is clearly hawkish to vote for increases in military spending for non-U.S. militaries, many of which are trained by U.S. forces, working closely under the command of international organizations like NATO, and with unified security ambitions. It is dovish to oppose such foreign military aid, because the tactical and strategic goals of the U.S. (broadly speaking) are the same ones fostered by foreign allied militaries that help as partners to carry out America’s geo-strategic ambitions/grand strategy. A dollar going toward boots on the ground that fight for the same cause, but which wear a different flag on the uniform, is still a dollar in favor of the overall military expansionism and general mission of the (U.S.) military. This also includes the size of the U.S. military footprint in non-combat bases of operations in nations around the world (e.g., Germany, Japan, South Korea, etc.), because the U.S. presence amounts to a subsidy of those nations’ defense in exchange for bases and other American military interests.
This category certainly required significant qualitative filtering as well, such as with amendments proposing to cut off military assistance to a given nation. Sometimes this is done because due to political turnover in that nation, it is no longer an ally. And in other cases, it is done to punish or coerce states to do something, with the looming threat of the cut-off of military aid hanging over their heads. Thus, one must be careful in determining which bills actually constitute hawkish or dovish positions under this category. Cutting off military aid to the Shah of Iran before 1979 would clearly be dovish, while cutting off aid after Iran became an adversary of the U.S. following the revolution would clearly not be dovish in and of itself. Depending on the geo-political relationship evident in the intent of the bill/amendment, each was considered on the basis of its relevance and the premise of its intent. Lastly, it is important to point out that this litmus test only covers foreign military aid and not foreign assistance more generally because many of those funds are not used for defense or security.

5) WMD Policy - The fifth litmus test involves policy on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Because the ‘airpower support’ litmus test covers most of the floor votes involving U.S. ICBMs and SDI defenses (and are thus not included under this litmus test), the WMD policy data deals mostly with floor votes that involve WMD stockpile strength from the point of view of international conventions or bi-lateral treaties on collective/mutual reductions. In other cases, it deals with American chemical and biological programs and their relative strength. Hawkishness under this purview is conferred by a desire to oppose any reductions of U.S. WMD stockpiles or a blatant occasion to vote in favor of an increase in their strength. On the other hand, dovishness is seen in support for measures that reduce WMDs (domestically and
internationally) or opposition to measures that expand American WMD programs.
Interestingly, this is the one and only litmus test where doves tend to have consistently
outweighed hawks, perhaps due to the existential nature of the threat posed by WMDs
becoming more prevalent or simply falling into the wrong hands. With this said, it is
important to note that the WMD policy purview did not include bills involving SDI. Once
again, the airpower litmus test (as the main focus of this project) takes precedence. Floor
votes are only counted once and no bill was input as data for two separate categories.

6) War Powers/ Inter-branch Relations - The sixth litmus test involved specific
questions over the nature of the relationship between Congress and the executive branch
on issues of peace and war. Specifically it deals with war powers as the dominant aspect
of inter-branch relations on military/ defense issues. Because Congress has seldom
pushed for war against the wishes of the President, efforts to allow more Congressional
oversight over issues of peace and war (essentially tying the hands of hawkish presidents
or at least limiting their free rein) has almost always been dovish in its inclination. This
means that votes to limit the President’s powers and vest it back in the hands of Congress
amounts to a dovish intention (though perhaps not successful in achieving a dovish
outcome), while votes to increase Presidential powers in the area of exercising hard
power often lead to more frequent use of such force, and therefore amount to a hawkish
position. This is the most infrequent data sub-set, although its importance for outcomes in
the initiation, intensity, and duration of American conflict are not to be underestimated.

7) NASA Support - The seventh and final litmus test devised to analyze the
overall data set involves support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Specifically because of the long history of close working cooperation between the
military (the Air Force in particular) and NASA, this research considered support for NASA, its budget, and flight programs separately from airpower itself. NASA has clearly been a key element of the nation’s air and space power throughout the decades. Indeed, this area is less prone to the hawk/ dove dynamic because of its primary peaceful and scientific mission benefitting all of humankind, but due specifically to the development programs managed jointly with the Pentagon, the military/ geo-strategic importance of the space race during the Cold War, and space representing the last great frontier in physical warfare, this was included as an important and final litmus test.

**Methodological Limitations**

It is critical to point out here that the hawk vs. dove dynamic is inherently binary in its premise, which is reflected in the approach taken in this research. Although there are certainly many degrees of hawkishness and dovishness along a wide continuum (which, incidentally might differ according to various sub-issues), the ultimate positions forced out of members of Congress by specific policy questions must be of one stripe or another. The nature of voting itself – ‘yea’ or ‘nay,’ demonstrates this, and imposes an inescapable condition in evaluating this type of numerical data. One cannot quantitatively measure the differences of passion existing in individual politicians’ rationales for voting for or against a bill/ amendment because a fervent no vote counts as much as a half-hearted one. Obviously, abstentions and “present” votes were not considered in the data, which represent cases in which members are hesitant to expose themselves politically by either committing to or opposing a controversial topic on record. With that said, this
research necessarily sought out areas of contention in considering the levels of support for or against various measures that served to demonstrate hawk/dove opposition.

Aside from abstentions or votes of “present,” it is quite clear that politicians must come down on one side or another on the bills they vote for -- and for various reasons -- these votes reveal which side they are on. This all depends on the premise of the issue being voted on. For example, votes against a bill to slash defense spending were considered hawkish and votes in support of a bill to specifically increase defense spending were also considered hawkish, while the opposite votes in these scenarios were considered to be dovish. Thus, a critical component of the data analysis (at the input stage) was to determine the bill or amendment’s premise. That is, did the bill or amendment have an inherently dovish or hawkish aim? Although some bills amounted to a subtle change (reducing or enhancing airpower) and many were sensible in either direction (often attracting significant bi-partisan support), all of them represented a fundamental direction of course to either proceed with or retreat from certain aspects of the nation’s aerial arsenal. There is little neutral ground in this environment, and bills/amendments seldom exist to change nothing. They almost always serve to place more weight on the military gas pedal or on the brake. And even though some weapons programs are opposed in favor of different (perhaps even more destructive) weapons, each represented a course of action placed on record at a specific moment in time. Of course, there may be those who vote against an appropriations bill because they want even more funding for the military (and are thus hawkish in their orientation), yet it is more likely that dissenting votes for a military appropriations bill will represent dovish intentions. Nonetheless, knowing the premise of the measure in question is crucial to
identifying which votes are which, and then entering the data correctly on that basis.
Indeed, this binary characteristic inherent to research on this dynamic (at least with this particular data set) does constitute a limitation of sorts because it disallows shades of grey, but it consequently also makes the research somewhat more manageable and perhaps even easier to grasp in the interpretation phase.

Operating in this way, it matters not whether there were more floor votes with a hawkish or dovish aim, a ratio not specifically tabulated in this research. This is because it is natural that more often than not, amendments have a dovish premise because when bills are being crafted, militarism cannot be limited *per se* until such stipulations for it are already in a bill. Thus, the formulation stage is directionally hawkish in the sense that it is a process of putting things *into* a bill; that is, growing a bill, making it more expansive, and often also more ambitious or hawkish. Once a military bill is floated in draft form, then it is to be expected that most of the amendments involve limitations as opposed to expansions to what was already “hawkishly” included in the bill from its inception. If a bill were created from scratch through the amendment process alone, then it would be plausible for there to be a roughly equal number of hawkish to dovish amendments. Yet, it is inconsequential for the purposes of this research, whether there were more dovish-premise floor votes or more hawkish-premise ones. This is because even if every bill was of one strip or another, the volume of dovish and hawkish voting blocs would, in theory, be the same. Opposition to acceleration is the same as support for deceleration, and vice versa.
Visualizing the Data: Macro Revelations (1964-2012)

Up to and including this point, the majority of the work was heavily qualitative in nature, but everything that followed from there became quantifiable with each of the vote totals separated between the hawkish and dovish votes. With all of the data in numerical form -- figures, sums, and averages in Excel documents for each year -- final calculations became possible. Ultimately, everything was entered into a master data spread sheet in Excel.13 This allowed all of the final/total calculations to be set up and any number of charts to visualize and interpret the data to be created. Aggregated together, all of the data put through the sorting process proves illuminating, as the rest of this chapter lays out in some detail.

Of all the 44,715 floor votes held in both the Senate and House of Representatives, some 1,418 were found to in some way demonstrate contention involved in the hawk/dove dynamic, depending on the nature of the bill or amendment in question. This amounts to a mere 3.171% of all floor votes that appear to put this topic on display. Although a much larger percentage no doubt does also deal with military/security issues, most of these are procedural and/or non-controversial passed in many cases by unanimous consent. Thus, the roughly 3% figure is a boiled-down representation of the true amount of substantive contention in this area, set in the context of the entire purview of the Congress’ business. Nonetheless, using the relevant data that emerged in its final form, any number of calculations could be set up to answer different questions. Along the way, trends could also be determined in the direction of the overall hawk/dove debate, including whether the general trends have been toward more hawkish or less

13 The master data sheets are provided in the appendices at the end of this project.
hawkish positions. Generally speaking, the following covers some key findings (along with charts) evident in the data.

To begin, it is interesting to look at some of the overall revelations:

As a share of all floor votes held, the hawk/dove dynamic operated most forcefully during Vietnam, and then even more dramatically, in the mid-to late 1980s to coincide with the latter intensity of the Cold War. Ever since this peak seen amid the East/West battle of ideologies and their military muscles, contention has quite consistently declined until 2011, when the debate over intervention in Libya seems to have thrust hawk/dove issues back to the fore (though still not as significantly as prior conflicts).

Seen specifically in relation to airpower (as a share of relevant hawk/dove floor votes), the following suggests that airpower seems to have more or less followed the
same trajectory seen with the hawk/dove dynamic as a whole. Airpower rose as a frequently-addressed issue during escalation in Vietnam, re-emerging to its peak in the early 1980s, and then beginning to decline in the early 1990s. However, quite interestingly, airpower seemed to follow an inverse trajectory compared to all hawk/dove issues in 2011 during the debate over Libya, perhaps suggesting that although intervention itself was controversial, the means of that intervention (using airpower alone) was not as aggressively debated.

It is also interesting to point out here that 9/11 seems to have represented a lull in the contention between hawks and doves, which is also reinforced by several of the other charts to come.

Quite convincingly, these visualizations begin to confirm a certain symmetry to the hawk/dove struggle, and a sort of rhythm in the oppositional dynamics that is perhaps
to be expected of partisan politics, especially in a first-past-the-post system that breeds polarization and the two-party system configuration itself. Although the hawkish position seems to trump the dovish by a significant margin in nearly every instance, the dovishness tends to follow right along (proportionally speaking). That means that as hawkishness grew in prevalence, so did dovishness. Thus, even as the intensity of the hawk/dove dynamic rose and fell over time, the spread between the two sides remained somewhat stable. Virtually across the board, however, hawks have held the upper hand in terms of total individual votes cast by members of Congress:

![Total Individual Votes Cast - Hawkish vs. Dovish](chart.png)

This is also seen in the same chart specific to airpower alone:
This shows the balance of the dynamic for airpower, but also where the intensity has been the sharpest and the dullest. The first peak seems to emerge right out of the Tet Offensive in 1968, when U.S. leaders turned to more airpower to escalate the war. The issue rose in importance with an initial peak in 1975 when the Vietnam War drew to a close. Two more even larger peaks appear during the Reagan Administration, likely in the context of SDI and other Cold War-era technologies. The first peaked in 1982, shortly after Reagan’s inauguration, and after dying down by the end of his first term, the issue rose again quite dramatically reaching a high point in 1988. Since then, the data seems to show a general decline in both the frequency of airpower issues and the intensity of the contention involved. By 9/11 and in the years following, the issue and its contention seemed to evaporate almost completely, which had not been the case for this issue since 1968. Only in 2011 did the numbers rise significantly again to suggest a re-emergence of the significance of the hawk/dove split on airpower (yet again, the increase was much sharper for hawk/dove issues in general, and less so for airpower). In terms of which side
has had an edge, it is clear from the data that hawks have rather consistently won out over
dovish sentiment on airpower (as with most of the other litmus tests) – especially evident
in 1982 where there was a notable spread between the two sides, favoring the hawks by a
wide margin. However, doves mounted comparable votes in 1989 and held the leading
edge for only one year in 1990, which likely coincides with the fall of the Soviet Union,
sentiments of new hopes for peace, and a desire for peace dividends – an environment in
which much of the usual contention in this area dropped away.

Because American airpower has been so strong, and has won wars for the US
while limiting threats and costs, the hypothesis is that airpower is less contentious than
what might be expected due to its utilitarian value as an instrument of national power.
The data suggests that indeed, it is likely that the decrease in the number of airpower-
related bills over time (and a drop off in the spread between the two sides) suggests the
forging of some degree of consensus on such issues. Seen in different terms, airpower
policy emanating from Congress has clearly been overwhelmingly hawkish, although the
dovish position was not without significant numbers of adherents at different points in
time:
Now turning to issue intensity, category by category, interesting findings are revealed by showing results attained according to the overall number of individual votes cast (hawkish and dovish together) as well as the total occasions for a floor vote for each category. In both cases, it provides some context about when, how frequently, and how extensively contention under each litmus test reared its head. The two following charts essentially show the same set of phenomena:
Confirming initial suspicions, airpower peaked as an issue in 1988 and has more or less dropped off since then. Defense spending seems to have a bumpy trajectory, peaking quite interestingly in tandem with the Republican takeover of the House in 1994/1995. Illustrated quite clearly, amid the increase in drone and other unmanned or remote technologies, most of which were authorized under specific amendments passed by unanimous consent or by voice vote, disagreement about wider defense spending issues (on non-aerial armaments) still continued, though not quite as intensely. Escalation was debated in the waning years of the Vietnam War, before becoming less of an issue until the Iraq troop surge and then even more significantly in 2011 surrounding actions taken in Libya. Foreign military support seems to have risen as U.S. forces drew down from the Southeast Asian theatre, while WMD policy peaked along with several of the other Cold War issues in the mid to late 1980s. War powers were by far contested the most toward
the end of the Vietnam War when Congress tried to limit the extent of the militaristic presidency. NASA support peaked just two years prior to the moon landing in 1969, before retreating as a contentious issue (aside from moderate increases during the 1980s vis-à-vis the shuttle program).

Also seen in the previous chart (by number of occasions for a floor vote) it is clear that international events (and major domestic events/ shifts in the partisan balance of power) stand out very clearly on these charts, suggesting among other things, that hawk/ dove issues (and perhaps even the contention that it entails) is subject to external stimuli in the form of international events on the world stage. Crises, mostly out of the control of the Congress or even the U.S. federal government as a whole, are most often the impetus for hawk/ dove-type votes to emerge on the floor of Congress. Events such as Vietnam,
the warming of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, 9/11, and revolt in Libya seem to be highly influential in the alteration of trajectories in this data. Taken together, it certainly also shows a certain volatility in the process of hawks and doves opposing each other insofar as unexpected events in the international environment can completely alter the trajectory of this area of policymaking, in turn, confirming initial suspicions developed at the outset of this research that there are connections to be explored here (related to increases in asymmetrical/unconventional conflict in particular).

Specifically, perhaps the most surprising spike in the data rises up in 2011 during the debate over intervention in Libya. This year garnered more intensity and contention, at least in terms of escalation, than the invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and even the 2006 Iraq troop surge. Thus, concerning the period after 9/11, this data confirms a general atmosphere of unity and consensus that seems to have existed for some time, but which has been shattered by the dynamics of conflict amid the relative confusion of the Arab Spring (coupled with a strongly-Republican House after the mid-term elections of 2010 and their firm opposition to much of President Obama’s foreign policy stances). Interestingly however, many of the dovish positions came from the (libertarian strain of the Republican) right in the hopes of limiting the comparatively hawkish Obama Administration.

What was not surprising (and thereby perhaps lending credibility to the approaches taken to produce the charts), was that the visualizations conform to general understandings of history. Hawkishness was on the rise in the lead up to 1968, after which, dovishness seemed to make a comeback according to certain key indicators. The Reagan Administration’s strong desire to build up U.S. military technology -- including
ICBMs -- shows up very clearly as a large protruding spike on the charts during the 1980s (almost mirroring the missiles themselves). In terms of issue intensity in the hawk/dove dynamic, the dénouement was in 1987, toward the end of the U.S.-Soviet arms race. The post-cold war years (until 9/11) saw a retreat in both the frequency and intensity of hawk/dove contention, which coincided with the ‘unipolar’ moment, and some consensus about the wisdom of taking peace dividends after victory in the Cold War struggle. 9/11 itself shows up clear as day in the data, and does so precisely in the manner in which it might be expected. There was indeed considerably unity in 2001 and for some years after, where hawk/dove issues forged near consensus, and where few contentious questions of military/defense policy even reached the floor vote stage. This relative unanimity about the course of America’s defense posture after 9/11 continued more or less without major disruption until two key policy questions emerged to put the hawk/dove dynamic right back in the front and center of the Congress’ business: the 2006 Iraq troop surge and even more drastically, the question about U.S. involvement as part of the NATO mission to support anti-Gaddafi rebels with airpower support in Libya. In fact, the Libya question stands out as one of the most significant points of contention in this area of policy, almost as grand in statistical importance as the height of the hawk/dove debate during the latter years of the Reagan Administration’s efforts in the Cold War.

With the balance between hawks and doves represented for each litmus test, more can be gleaned from the charts:
Defense Spending - Percentages of Hawkish vs. Dovish Votes Cast

Escalation/ de-escalation - Percentages of Hawkish vs. Dovish Votes Cast
Quite fascinating, doves have tended to trump hawks in only one major category or litmus test of the seven put forth here. On the issue of WMD policy, and non-proliferation issues involving mutual reductions of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by means of both international and bi-lateral convention, the U.S. Congress has been more often dovish than hawkish. Due to the very nature of nuclear weapons and their radically destructive force, perhaps the hawk/ dove dynamic becomes muted or suppressed due to even the most hawkish of politicians realizing the extent of overkill involved with weapons capable of literally destroying the Earth as it is known:
With the least abundant data, war powers/ inter-branch relations have been a mixed bag, although important inroads toward the dovish side of the spectrum were made in the early 1970s (as the Vietnam War began to wind down) and at the end of the Cold War:
Except for a few instances, NASA support has been relatively stable, and more often than not, hawkish in its intention to continue this aspect of American space power:

**Summing Up**

This chapter has shown clear trajectories in the sub-components of the hawk/dove phenomenon from the 88th Congress to the 112th Congress -- Johnson to Obama. The value of this research goes beyond its purposes as applied to this dissertation. The data and the charts in particular will hopefully hold value for other researchers who may benefit from any number of other conclusions that may be reached from this data. The data set itself can be interpreted via numerous separate data input methods, allowing for several more comparisons and/ or charts that this project does not even set out to draw upon. In the future, this area of research could also be continued to incorporate, among other additions, additional years of data after the U.S. has drawn all forces out of Afghanistan as it has done in Iraq.
With hindsight, and with this data in hand, it seems to confirm general trends in history. Yet, with a more in-depth look at the data, many more interesting trends can be uncovered. The key here for the general aim of the dissertation, however, is to take this one crucial step forward and begin to connect the data involved with the international environment and trends identified in global affairs, to either establish linkages or cast doubt upon certain notions of how Congress’ role in international affairs (as the funding mechanism behind the world’s most advanced superpower) is shaped by trends in the defense/ security landscape that are often beyond its control (and vice versa). This leads, for example, to questions about whether the consensus on the trend towards the use of airpower over other means of exercising hard power is inaccurate or misleading – as well as whether defense spending in general has been as contentious as once thought. It is to this and other points that the rest of this dissertation now shifts its focus.
The experience in Vietnam marked a unique period in American history. Once said to end at the water’s edge,\(^1\) politics by the height of the war no longer exhibited the relative unity that had characterized much of the nation’s prior foreign and military policies. It exposed a raw nerve of division in the halls of power that reflected a bitterly divided populace, with significant internal conflict (mostly peaceful political conflict) opening up over America’s external conflict in the world abroad (ripe with life and death issues). Set against the wider backdrop of grand strategy during the decades-long clash between democracy and communism, the war constituted a watershed moment for the material emergence and tumultuous growth of the modern hawk/dove dynamic among U.S. leaders. Coinciding with the increasingly controversial escalation of American hard power being brought to bear in Vietnam, it has been noted that:

For the first two decades of the Cold War there were no identifiable consistent differences between the stances of the two parties on foreign affairs or in their credibility on these issues in the eyes of voters. Clearer differences emerged in the second half of the Cold War.\(^2\)

As this chapter shows, the data for the years in question supports such general observations, though not merely in a partisan context. Peering deeper to the actual policy mechanics of the clash between hawks and doves, it reveals clear peaks/troughs and

\(^1\) This phrase expressing the unity of American foreign policy during the early Cold War years was coined by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) amid bipartisan support for the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO. See Senate.gov <http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Featured_Bio_Vandenberg.htm>

proximate fluctuations for every metric used here to gauge the dynamic, providing a more complex picture of changing opinions/priorities involved in the tug-of-war characteristic of military policy during and after Vietnam (itself a proxy conflict in the Cold War). Along with key qualitative insights to add frame of reference beyond the numbers, it becomes evident that especially in the period after the Tet Offensive of 1968, issues pertinent to warfare/international conflict were debated in the U.S. Congress with new ferocity, often more frequently and much more contentiously. These years formed the basis of a new standard against which subsequent clashes between the two sides can be compared.

Accordingly, this chapter forming the first main case study examines the time period that includes the incipient build-up of American forces in Vietnam, the height of battle, and quite crucially for the purposes of this analysis, also the post-Vietnam era. In fact, because it began gradually with small contingents of military advisers in an assisting role before escalating to a staggering rate of as many as 500 U.S. combat fatalities per week,\textsuperscript{3} Vietnam’s role in shaping attitudes was predominately felt toward the latter stages of the war debate, and in terms of its political repercussions, perhaps most profoundly in the years following the end of American involvement in 1975. Although this entire swath of history forms the overall case #1 as it is discussed in the dissertation’s conclusion (essentially 1964-2000, which goes all the way up to the beginning of the second case study that covers the post-9/11 era), this chapter discusses them and provides visualizations of the data by dividing them into more manageable spans of time nested within this period, to include the duration of the war itself and the immediate post-war years (from 1964 to 1980) as well as the Reagan Cold War years through to and including

the immediate post-Cold War years (from 1981 to 2000). Indeed, the data for 1964 up until the eve of 9/11 represents a wide period to chart changes in opinion over successive Congresses. However, this is necessary for a comprehensive look at the complete legacy of Vietnam in this area of study, which is why the research is keen to look back as far as 1964 to grasp how the politics materialized along the course of initial escalation, serving as a sort of built-in control for the findings on the war’s aftermath.

Apparent in the data for these years, the nation’s politics had grown divided in new and more complex ways, forever changing the nature of the political discourse on issues of peace and war and each of its subcomponents. Even today, it is clear that the legacy of Vietnam continues to polarize positions on, and approaches to, foreign interventionism with hard power. In fact, it gained new visibility in the context of the Afghanistan and Iraq war debates after 9/11, based on the critique from doves that Iraq in particular threatened to become another Vietnam. The parallels made between these two periods of conflict quickly flooded the hawk/ dove debate, with New York Times articles, for example, exploring the connection in 2003: “‘quagmire,’ ‘attrition,’ ‘credibility gap,’ ‘Iraqification’ -- a listener to the debate over the situation in Iraq might think that it truly is Vietnam all over again.”4 Dovish leaders such as Senator Edward Kennedy and others tended to promote this connection as a means of hammering home the perceived folly of the continued occupation of Iraq, commenting in 2005 that the U.S. was, much like Vietnam, stuck “… in a seemingly intractable quagmire.”5 But beyond its use as an


aspect of dovish rhetoric, the comparison made between Vietnam and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is natural given their comparable scale of operations and the shared strategic goals of holding vast territory and standing up new governments. Most other interventions by U.S. forces since WWII simply have not involved the sheer scale and extent of such occupation and nation-building objectives, which is why American intervention in Grenada, for example, did not garner anything approaching the controversy surrounding, or comparisons made to Vietnam. Thus, the domineering nature of conflict in Southeast Asia during the Cold War on the one hand, and conflict in the Middle East during the ‘War on Terror’ on the other, lends credence to the overarching contrast developed throughout the dissertation between these two paradigms of American military operations.

*The Aerial Component*

Crucial in this discussion, both Vietnam and the wars launched by the U.S. after 9/11 were/ are periods of conflicts in which issues concerning airpower have figured prominently. Each in their own way, these two cases share a common thread of notable political controversy over the proper standing/ application of this power, but vary greatly in terms of the nature of the technology involved in each case. This points to the key factor being examined: differences in the nature and capabilities of waging air warfare that vary quite extensively between the two eras – from conventional airpower doctrine carried out with ‘dumb’ bombs to highly asymmetrical conflict being fought with increased reliance on technology, including surgical ‘smart’ bombs and UAVs, which
offer surveillance, kinetic strike, and real-time battle damage assessment capabilities in a single package.

To be sure, the main temporal qualifier of case #1 on the (post)-Vietnam era is important not only given its enormous role in shaping debates over American military force generally speaking, but also for the specific and more novel extent to which airpower as an aspect of the use of force arose in this period as a standalone object of the debate. In fact, with the rise in importance of the aerial battle space seen in global conflict after WWII, the standing of airpower technology emerged as perhaps the main focal point the Vietnam debate, including primary arguments over whether it should be more aggressively utilized against targets in North Vietnam/ the wider region, and later on, whether it should be more aggressively developed after the war in preparation for future conflicts. After years of debating how assertive the U.S. should be in applying the use of force from the air during the war, this disagreement shifted markedly after 1975 to more frequent and pressing questions over the fate of the technology that makes air dominance or superiority possible, such as intercontinental ballistic missile technology (including missile defense), the strategic bomber fleet (B-1, and later, the B-2), and other programs. After the infamous last chopper flight from the U.S. embassy in Saigon with a line of people clinging to it for dear life as it ascended from the building’s rooftop, the focus naturally moved away from a debate on the level of airpower applied against clear and present enemies toward a concern over the standing of airpower in preparation for the next likely military confrontation(s).

With the gravity that leading developments in the conduct of air warfare entail for the hawk/ dove debate at large, the case of Vietnam in this chapter reveals a multitude of
interesting changes over time, but taken as a whole, sets the stage for understanding change in the litmus tests after 9/11 that are tackled in the next chapter. On this basis, the following paragraphs have the primary goal of analyzing how the development of various aspects of aerial technology were construed by political leaders in order to establish a baseline for this aspect of the hawk/ dove dynamic amid a mindset of mostly conventional/ symmetrical conflicts and threats. It serves as the dissertation’s control for comparison to be made with the nature of the dynamic as it has transitioned to the post-9/11 paradigm of asymmetry/ non-linear battlefields (though one not entirely devoid of the value of conventional armaments against potential state adversaries of the future).

The data for this chapter on the (post)-Vietnam era is presented chronologically, running alongside supporting historical consideration of consecutive stages of presidential leadership, freeing the data from the analytical limitation of considering Congress alone, as none of these issues operate in a vacuum exclusive to a single node of government. Especially because military operations are increasingly inseparable from the overall politics involved (both national and international), the research considers the extent to which U.S. presidents have, along with their allies in Congress, extensively shaped military and specifically airpower-related rhetoric and policy from the latter Johnson years onwards. Although less analysis is devoted to the years between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 given its relative retreat in terms of hawk/ dove contention (a glaring feature of the data in its own right), emphasis is placed on specific, ongoing arguments over airpower put out for public consumption in the midst of conflict, which give color, so to speak, to the most significant changes seen in the data. In qualitative terms, this includes open discourse in public life and notably also certain policy
sentiments expressed in the pages of the two major party platforms written every four years to coincide with the presidential election cycle.

In these and other sources, it is clear that political and intellectual leaders of the time came to clash rather specifically on the record, in print, and on the airwaves over issues involving airpower, which had come to operate as a key subcomponent of the overall hawk/dove divergence and, in turn, occupy a growing share of the overall debate at critical junctures of history. The data on Congress vis-à-vis the voting behavior of elected representatives reflects this quite clearly, showing how widely opinion varied in this area at key moments and during crucial events. Grasping how the nature of these debates over aerial weapons technologies unfolded in the context of the history provides valuable insight into their perceived place/viability in the external conflict environment during and after Vietnam.

In the context of the major weapons systems at stake during the Cold War arms race, hawks stood up in firm support of establishing/expanding programs to fortify U.S. military/atomic/airpower predominance. They also tended to be quick to favor their actual use against America’s declared enemies. Doves, who felt that more arms were counterproductive to the ultimate aims of lessening the likelihood and destructive power of conflict -- especially nuclear weapons technologies -- called for more restraint and negotiated reductions in arms while also trying to limit perceived excesses of the conventional military. They also opposed the liberal (i.e., generous) use of force, railing against what they saw in American policy as an attitude of shooting first and asking questions later. Indeed, both sides in this general area of controversy stressed that their approach, to either expand or restrict various (aerial) weapons programs in particular, was
designed with the ultimate goal of peace at heart. Much of the desire for building-up arms and combat technology inherent to the hawkish position, for example, is predicated on the notion that with an overwhelming force, potential adversaries may be dissuaded altogether from choosing the path of conflict, in turn, leading to greater peace (i.e., the notions of deterrence and peace through strength).

In this discussion, it is especially important to consider that the contention being evaluated, as it has waxed and waned according to each of the litmus tests, is seen as relevant in the context of internal events and changes in the global military landscape. By themselves, the data points are interesting in an American politics context, but lack connection to parallel changes in the wider world. In this vein, it is crucial that the airpower litmus test is accounted for as a separate variable in the data, given that sophistication in the area of weapons technology is a leading (often dramatically transformational) element of change in how war is fought. In addition to allowing for the comparison of support for airpower against defense spending the other aspects of military might (as well as each of the other litmus tests), this facilitates separate consideration of the relationship between U.S. airpower and its place in the changing nature of strategic and international military affairs now increasingly globalized (with asymmetry as a central feature). It is with these prerequisites that the following pages drill down to the nature of the hawk/ doves clash over airpower as part of the larger dynamic surrounding the Vietnam War, and how it may connect to changes seen in the landscape of aerial/ often asymmetrical conflict around the world – especially given America’s leading military role in it.

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6 This, by extension, also features a certain Machiavellian ends vs. means aspect to the debate.
From a domestic U.S. political vantage point, a certain conventional wisdom has coalesced around the notion that Democrats have trended toward the dovish side of the spectrum, while Republicans have by and large done the opposite – especially since the end of Vietnam. There is a sense that:

Democrats push primacy with a human face, dressed up in the rhetoric of multilateralism, and they use military power with much hesitancy and handwringing. Republicans push primacy ‘in your face’, with unapologetic unilateralism, and they swagger brazenly.7

Although this quote goes on to suggest that the somewhat superficial tone of political rhetoric in this area has varied much more than the actual policies that support and further U.S. primacy, the analysis put forth here reveals that the hawk/ dove dynamic is certainly not clear-cut and does indeed feature genuine splits over how important the military (and its air assets in particular) figures into this position of primacy. Especially by the latter stages of the Vietnam War, the hawk/ dove dynamic came to operate in tone and on substance within the context of several sub-issues and at multiple levels of abstraction, with airpower issues standing front and center. In many cases, the difficulty of the strategic and military challenges faced at this time defied the oft-applied partisan label of the debate, exhibiting not insignificant intraparty conflict over the heavy-handedness of American airpower that also existed between various nodes of the U.S. government, and even within some organs of government (each considered below). All this had a profound impact on both the quantity and quality of American war making abroad. And although the data itself does not consider partisan affiliation as its own frame in which to base these calculations, it is certainly not something which can be ignored as a general current of the politics involved, if only a natural observation in the

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7 Betts, p. 2.
process of conducting this research. The true extent to which partisanship is an accurate indicator of hawk/dove politics, however, may very well open up an area in which this research can be expanded or continued in the future.

Nonetheless, in any manner U.S. leaders were affiliated, the ghosts of America’s darkest days in Vietnam continued to loom over the nation as a Cold War geo-political climate persisted well past 1975. Doves had interpreted Vietnam as a teachable moment in the high costs and strategic foolishness of major land wars against indigenous adversaries in difficult terrain. It was to be a lesson learned, and a critical lens through which to hammer home the lack of wisdom of future military interventions. To most hawks with lingering resentment over what a more unrestricted unleashing of American hard power (e.g., aerial bombardment of Hanoi) could have done to change the outcome in Vietnam, adopting a renewed position of peace through strength in the face of a still threatening communist sphere became a post-war rite of passage and psychological means of avenging what had gone wrong in Vietnam. To be sure, most hawks did not view the failure to succeed in one military scenario as a tarnishing of the theoretical vision of the value of military intervention used as a legitimate extension of foreign-policy. But how exactly did these strains of policy disagreement play out in Congress? And what does the data for 1964-2000 suggest about the interplay of American military policy and the nature of (air-based) military conflict on the world stage?

**A Closer Look at the Data**

The following data takes a closer look at the intricacies of shifts in the policy dynamics displayed by Congress in the areas of airpower support, defense spending,
escalation/de-escalation, foreign military aid, WMD policy, war powers/inter-branch relations, and NASA support. Structurally, the charts provided are reproductions of those found in the previous chapter, but zero in on narrower and more specific ranges of time. Charting the data according to smaller windows of time allows for more particular analysis in terms of key fluctuations that show up in concert with notable events/changes in the international conflict environment.

It allows for a more precise look at fluctuations in the numbers for this time period, both during the actual battle(s) as well as the years from 1975 to 1980 -- after the war’s conclusion -- showing the initial political aftershocks borne out in the immediate post-Vietnam era. To at least carry the story forward without gaps in the data, later sections detail the findings as they are shown for the years 1981 to 2000 (a period itself shaped by lingering ripple effects of Vietnam), essentially charting the decades before and after the end of the Cold War and leading to the next case study.

To begin with, even a cursory look at the intensity of each litmus test from 1964 to the end of the war in 1975 (and to the years shortly thereafter) shows an unmistakable rise in how frequently hawk/dove floor votes came up in Congress during the war. Moreover, it can be seen that the level of contention -- that is, the disparity between ‘yea’ votes and ‘nay’ votes -- also showed a steep rise in accordance with the path of the escalating American force presence. However, what seems somewhat striking, though perhaps not surprising given a proper understanding of history, is that much of this incipient contention rose significantly after the Tet Offensive of 1968. Up until that period (despite a spike in contention over defense spending in 1966 when casualties began to balloon), there is a sense from the charts that the hawk/dove dynamic was
somewhat in its infancy, lacking the bitter division that it would later come to characterize in many of the more trying periods of American foreign/military policy. By both measures of issue intensity, that is the total number of individual member votes cast as well as the total number of occasions for a floor vote, intensity more or less escalated right along with the level of American military involvement emerging from the early 1960s towards de-escalation in the early 1970s:
Although the data does not extend prior to 1964, it is fair to conclude from the numbers, and from a qualitative appreciation of history, that the years following 1968 were essentially unprecedented in terms of the extent of the multifaceted hawk/dove debate. After an initial peak in defense spending issues in 1966, the following three years showed that all of the litmus tests were muted or even non-existent as contentious issues. War powers/inter-branch relations did not emerge until 1970, when Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) was already out of office. Yet, in 1968 and especially in 1969 (when the impact of Tet and the reaction to it was more fully-realized and addressed in Congress) many of the issues on the table reached new peaks as the war became more controversial.
Much of this serves to illustrate and reinforce initial suspicions about how these issues played out in these years, but more compelling findings lie in the details.

With a certain influx around 1971, when virtually every litmus test came up more frequently (in hawk/dove terms) than the year before, this was the Congress in which the war -- and military issues -- were most contentiously debated. In the years thereafter, many of the numbers go up even further, as many military issues needed readdressing, reassessing, and recalibration after one of America’s most difficult wars. In terms of the particular litmus tests, defense spending shows this most obviously. From 1970 to 1980, the frequency of hawk/dove floor votes on defense spending bills/amendments essentially never dropped below where it had been since 1968. Of particular note, it reached a high point for these years in 1978, three years removed from the last American boot on the ground in Vietnam. Though it declined somewhat from that point into the 1980s, this peak in the data shows the increased tensions over the debate on taking ‘peace dividends’ vs. preparing for the next war that might linger just past the horizon.

In the area of escalation/de-escalation, the line follows the history involved in virtual lock-step. Again, things rose sharply after 1968 as the nation faced the difficult question of whether to meet the Tet Offensive with greater force or accept it as the harbinger of defeat and pull forces out. As is to be expected, the issue virtually disappears from the charts from 1975 to 1980, when the U.S. had definitively pulled out of the theatre of war. But running almost with an inverse relationship, the litmus test on foreign military aid began to rise rather sharply in the years after 1975, just as the escalation/de-escalation litmus test (involving the use of American forces) declined. It is as if one served to replace the other; as American boots were pulled out, Congress turned much of
this attention to standing up replacement (pro-democratic) forces instead. Issues concerning war powers/ inter-branch relations between Congress and the presidency, quite interestingly, were flat for most of this period with the notable exception of the years 1972-73. In the waning years of the Vietnam War, this shows a clear attempt at the re-calibration of power between the branches, especially in the context of what was seen as extensive powers of the LBJ and Nixon presidencies in sending young Americans into harm’s way. The Watergate scandal no doubt added to the environment in which Congress sought to regain a bit of slack on the reigns of oversight involved in the nation’s governance, including its war policies. But by 1974 the issue had again faded. WMD policy was not of great significance in the data set for these years, especially when compared to the next sub-set of the data showing what occurred in the 1980s. NASA support was likewise somewhat seldom contested ground, although somewhat interestingly, some contention over the fate of NASA is reflected in the data for the year 1970, immediately after the space agency’s crowning achievement that was the moon landing in 1969.

It is notable here that in virtually every instance, there seems to be somewhat of a lag time (of about one year) between when major events in the real world take place, and the commensurate frequency of bills/amendments hatched to address those events or related events in the given issue area. In addition to this example concerning NASA support, several key floor votes after 1968 (many in 1969) show that there was sharp reaction to the trauma of an especially deadly, theatre-wide incursion of pro-Communist forces hoping to thwart the U.S. from its aims in the region. As just one key example, this may indicate (and indeed confirm) that whereas the executive branch is involved in the
hands-on management of military affairs and foreign policy in the midst of crisis, Congress is considerably more reactionary, debating issues with more distance, perspective, and with longer-term visions of how to improve.

In general terms of Congress’ entire agenda, hawk/ dove issues naturally emerged in concert with the ongoing escalation of the war:

As a share of the overall battle over military issues, hawk/ dove issues clearly figured most prominently during the war, and less so after 1975. In fact, by 1976 it had essentially receded to pre-1946 levels of around 3%, suggesting with little surprise that military policy is debated more contentiously and more frequently in terms of its actual use and while it is actually being brought to bear. Reaching a high point in 1971 as America debated unleashing far greater airpower assets against more targets in North Vietnam and even some cross-border regions (often covertly), contested military policy
issues reached almost 7 percent of all hawk/dove votes. To be sure, this is still a relatively small share of the overall business conducted by Congress, but the fluctuations themselves are often more telling than the proportions involved.

Exclusive to the floor votes with hawk/dove relevance, and considering all of the litmus tests aggregated together, hawks tended to edge out doves for all of these years:

More total contentious votes (that is, either hawkish or dovish) seemed to emerge from Congress year after year. This suggests a general increase in the level of disagreement on military issues, but it is most interesting to consider the years when the spread between hawkish and dovish voting fluctuated. Dovishness as an overt sentiment in Congress was few and far between until a very slight uptick that can be seen from 1968 to 1969. From there, dovishness rose steadily in frequency, although it was consistently matched or even outpaced by hawkish voting behavior. In the earlier stages of the war itself, hawkishness followed a rather sharp trajectory of increase until 1966
before retreating into 1968 during Tet. From there, hawkishness rose more or less in a saw-tooth pattern until taking a steep increase toward the latter years of the war as stalwart pro-war votes in Congress attempted to save the war from the clutches of defeat. After the war’s end, there remained significant contention, and indeed significant hawkish sentiment, which culminated in the year 1978 when hawkishness had reached its height for the years 1964-1980. This corresponds precisely with the sharp increase in intensity of the defense spending litmus test, suggesting that hawkish intent beat out dovish intent in the post-war debate over peace dividends. That said, this says less about the actual outcomes involved because it is often the case that one side or the other racks up ‘points’ in the data by voting down repeated attempts by the minority to amend certain bills. Nonetheless, it is clear that hawkishness, as a representation of the general positioning of successive Congresses, appeared to win the day more often than dovishness.

Concerning the most critical litmus test on support for airpower, the data is also insightful, and sets the stage for the following qualitative, historical discussion of the politics of the war and the aerial technologies that shaped success/failure in combat (and by extension, opinions about the war). From a low point in 1967, issue intensity in this area peaked in 1975, before declining steadily again (though remaining a significant, and by then permanent, proportion of the debate). This follows along very closely with the history involved, which is seen in the following analytical discussions. Just as airpower became more destructive and more heavily relied upon, its rise as a key issue in Congress followed accordingly.
In this and the other areas examined, it is evident that Congress was often quite bitterly divided on how forcefully to support the military in the context of this conflict environment, when as will also become clear in the pages to come, precision strike capability (though not insignificant) was primitive by today’s standards. In fact, there is a clear correlation, though perhaps no easy causation to be established, between the emergence of greater aerial warfare capability and the evolution of contention between hawks and doves. And yet, it seems most evident that international events related to the geo-strategic positioning of the U.S. and its military deployment(s) around the world tend to shape the numbers more than any other factor. This means that when American policy and the forces it sends into action enter difficult times where security is highest on the nation’s list of priorities, the frequency of hawk/dove debate in Congress naturally goes up. Confirming much of what might be expected in terms of the general political climate over the years, certain major fluctuations are seen around the height of the Vietnam War, after the war in 1975, during President Reagan’s military build-up in the 80s, and after the fall of Soviet Communism in the early 90s. In many other cases, there are obvious (though not always direct) parallels to events internal to U.S. politics that show up in the data as well.

In either case, the larger line of inquiry here is about what lies behind these changes seen in the data. Of course, this is a difficult task that is by no means definitive. Although clear, methodologically viable changes in the hawk/dove dynamic in Congress can be ascertained with some degree of precision, it is altogether more difficult -- if not impossible -- to pin down the motivation behind the intent expressed through voting behavior. It is more that the creation of the data set is insightful in buttressing the
qualitative discussion of shifts in the course of events, rather than the other way around. Thus, the data itself is not designed to ‘prove’ causation. In this sense, these are the weaknesses/limitations of this research. For instance, there is no way to know how much one factor might have weighed against another in affecting the numbers. The numbers may have been shaped more by international events than by domestic factors more exclusive to the U.S. political process. Notwithstanding this obstacle, the following serves to buttress the data specific to the airpower litmus test.

Before proceeding, it is useful to point out that once again, the following charts mirror the exact data presented in chapter 3, although each of them are ‘zoomed in’ to the specific period in question. This shows rather clearly that international events rank quite prominently in the connection to fluctuations seen in the share of airpower issues present in the hawk/dove debate:
As a share of all floor votes relevant to the hawk/dove dynamic, airpower fluctuated rather significantly, if not sporadically. Part of this is due to the limited nature sample size of the data set. Some years yielded zero airpower-relevant floor votes (and thus no data for that year), while others exhibited just a few. This is because airpower is rare enough as an issue generally speaking, keeping in mind that several airpower issues fall under the purview of Congress and its legislation but do so in a non-controversial manner. Although not evident merely by looking at the final data, a zero value (e.g., number of contentious floor votes involving airpower) does not mean that no such issues came up; quite the contrary. It could be that a high number of airpower issues were dealt with, but were passed unanimously or by unanimous consent agreements.

Nonetheless, most years were quite active in this area. From more than a quarter of the hawk/dove floor votes in 1964, this dropped off very significantly in the years 1965-67, before being reignited in concert with the Tet Offensive of 1968, when airpower skyrocketed up to nearly 35% percent of all hawk/dove floor votes in 1968 and 1969. From there, it dropped back down for several years before being revived again in the post-war debate over technology, capabilities, and readiness in advance of future conflicts. By the end of the decade, airpower rose again sharply forecasting increased contention in this area well into the 1980s (shown in later sections).

Specific to the balance between hawks and doves on airpower issues, hawks retained a considerable and consistent lead over doves, as had been the case when applied to all of the litmus tests considered together. Only in the lull of 1966 and 1967 did hawkishness fail to show a significant lead over dovishness. And even as dovishness in this area rose after 1968, hawkishness maintained a lead, so to speak, by growing
proportional to the growth seen in dovishness. This is to be expected as the share of the votes in one direction or another tends not to be affected by increases in the total amount of voting done on these issues. As both lines rise in tandem, this means that the overall frequency of hawk/dove votes is fluctuating, although most of the dynamic for these years is relative insofar as the changes run parallel, meaning that the percentages for hawk to dove votes remained more or less the same.

Worthy of note, as will be expanded further in subsequent sections, a certain high-point for these years came in 1975, when both hawkish and dovish sentiments on airpower reached new heights. This corresponds to a general incline in the importance of airpower as the war dragged on, after which, the data shows a relative stabilization (though at a new elevated baseline of sorts), in the years after the war:

In this representation, it is again obvious that hawkishness tended to beat out dovishness on airpower issues:
Innovations of Airpower Technology in Vietnam

From the data, it is clear that airpower was of greater and greater concern as the war went on. Especially as it became obvious that boots on the ground were essentially insufficient to win, America’s leaders turned to airpower for answers. Hawks generally wished to use greater airpower against more targets, while doves often leaned toward the opposite side, with many favoring an immediate, complete, and unconditional pullout of all U.S. forces. Thus, the debate on Vietnam swirled largely over whether and to what extent airpower should be used against specific targets on the ground in Vietnam. But before proceeding to the politics, it is imperative to consider the extent of actual technology being launched from the air, which in turn, adds context to such political conflict.

Despite the high degree of military hardship experienced in Vietnam, one undeniable advantage in America’s tactical ability on the ground came, incidentally, from new capabilities in the air. The infamous ‘Huey’ helicopter made its primetime debut in the thousands, allowing for an unprecedented ease of mobility around the theater of
operations, in areas where fixed wing aircraft were simply unable to land. Things like napalm, other new defoliants, and the infamous ‘daisy-cutter’ conventional bomb were able to clear vast areas of jungle for subsequent operational clarity. Methods of providing close air support to ground troops were vital to the military effort, such as in the defense of American positions at Khe Sanh by the joint branch efforts of Operation Niagara, constituting one of the most concentrated instances of aerial bombardment in the history of warfare. And quite notably, laser-guided precision munitions allowed for a new degree of accuracy in targeting, which had in previous major conflicts been relegated to military pipe dreams and the fancies of science fiction. Used to significant avail toward the end of the war against the ‘Dragon’s Jaw’ bridge at Than Hoa, so-called “smart” bombs proved to be a game changer. They were finally able to knock out the structure in 1972, which had stood after 871 failed air missions with some 300 conventional “dumb” bombs dropped on it (or at least inaccurately near it) since 1965 and which had led to the downing of 11 U.S. planes.

These and other advents in technology allowed the gap between constraints on the battlefield and the desire for military victory to be narrowed. But such advancements in tactical air power (TACAIR) were, however, unable to decisively conclude the war, exposing a clear limitation of the use of air assets. Even after dropping more bombs than in all of World War II, the United States was unable to entirely cripple a dug-in and

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8 Among the most concentrated application of airpower ever expended, almost “… 100,000 tons of ordnance had been expended during almost 25,000 sorties by marine, navy, and air force aircraft between January 8 and April 8.” See pp. 181 in Morrocco, John. Thunder from Above, Air War, 1941-1968. Boston Publishing Company. Boston, MA. 1984.


10 Gelb.
highly determined pro-communist force. As it increased in desperation, the bombing campaign swirled in controversy, both within the political debate as well as within military circles, setting the stage for continued discontent in the context of how to approach future conflict both strategically and tactically. It also compelled great change in the direction of airpower technology development itself, as far as attempts to mitigate the problems associated with non-linear battlefields and growing conflict asymmetry.

**The Conundrum of Aerial Escalation**

Despite great controversy over the use of napalm/other incendiaries and international efforts after the war to ban their use, debates involving TACAIR were, however, not always the sharpest divisions in the hawk/dove dynamic in the United States. At the time, the harshest political contention came on the bigger questions surrounding America’s strategic involvement in and of itself; whether to step up with overwhelming force or simply pull out altogether. Central to this was the debate over the unleashing of America’s newfangled airpower technology and expanding the entire bombing campaign to include major targets in North Vietnam and perhaps even the wider region (including with the use of tactical nuclear weapons advocated by the most extreme body of thought within hawkish political ranks such as by the infamous Curtis Lemay).

As one author had noted:

> …the bombing itself became a salient political issue as pressures to begin negotiations increased. While American right-wing and governmental leaders kept insisting on major concessions for stopping the bombing, doves argued that it should be stopped only in return for Hanoi’s promise

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to begin talks. Whether and on what terms to stop the bombing emerged as the most symbolic political issue of the war in 1967 and 1968.  

After the Tet offensive in 1968, airpower looked to some like an increasingly attractive substitute to striking back with more ground forces. To others it was an increasingly foolhardy, immoral, and even illegal attempt to salvage something out of quagmire. The Johnson Administration’s answer to this question is a fascinating look into the operation of the hawk/ dove dynamic in empirical terms.

**Rolling Thunder: A Dove Fighting a Hawk’s War?**

In the latter half of his administration, President Johnson’s approach to leveraging airpower against North Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder, offers some insight into how quandaries involved in the use of airpower played out and were debated within the administration and the military itself. Much of the opinions and disagreements within the executive branch (where policy in this area is dominated) were mirrored in the positions of senior party leaders in Congress (including future presidential hopefuls) – on various sides of the multi-faceted coin that was opinion on how iron-fisted to execute the air war.

Indeed, given its limited mission beginning in 1965 with numerous classes of targets that were off limits, “Rolling Thunder was one of the most constrained military campaigns in history.”  

Moreover, “both Hanoi and Haiphong were spared by prohibitively restrictive zones that buffered the cities. Airfields were off limits, as were

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12 Gelb.

many industrial plants as well as targets that were within the China buffer zone.”¹⁴ Even though it constituted a huge show of force, and even led to the loss of no fewer than 900 aircraft,¹⁵ the effort fell far short of what the true extent of America’s strategic airpower assets could have brought to bear. In fact, the operation had originally been designed only as:

…an interdiction campaign… [and] as a limited campaign to avoid widening the war… [The] United States made it clear that it had no intention… to destroy the Hanoi regime, compel the North Vietnamese people to adopt another form of government, nor devastate North Vietnam. Nuclear weapons would not be used; targets in populated areas would not be attacked. Tactical rather than strategic assets would be used in the attacks to emphasize the limited nature of the campaign. Otherwise lawful targets, such as political offices responsible for the direction of the war, would not be attacked.¹⁶

Naturally, there was fear over escalation of the wider war, or even a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union if too many Soviet advisors embedded with North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces were killed in the bombing of North of Vietnam.

…the constraints which domestic politics imposed on the air war against the North were aimed at minimizing civilian casualties and the loss of pilots. This meant avoiding key population centers and other highly defended areas. Such constraints were reinforced by diplomatic judgments which sought to minimize the risk of confrontation with China and Russia.¹⁷

In this circumstance, as the war continued LBJ and those around him remained committed to the idea of:


¹⁵ See History.com’s “This Day in History” for February 17, 1966 entitled “Taylor Testifies on Operation Rolling Thunder.” <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/taylor-testifies-on-operation-rolling-thunder>

¹⁶ Parks.

¹⁷ Gelb.
…using airpower as part of a carrot and stick approach, inconsistent with airpower doctrine. They believed that we could use bombing raids as a show of resolve and punish the insurgents in South Vietnam. Military advisors, drawing upon history and experience, advocated stifling communism by defeating the enemy [period].

This meant that more hawkish elements within the Pentagon wanted to stop fighting ‘with one hand tied behind their back,’ which many felt was the key to ending the war more quickly and resolutely.

All this tension existed amid what ended up as Johnson’s strategy of gradualism – slowly ratcheting up aerial bombardment of the North to affect more favorable political outcomes in negotiations, which:

…fit the assumption of hawkishness… but [did] more than that as well. On the surface, the strategy was directed toward the right wing. As the war went on, gradualism did become the functional equivalent of escalation. And escalation, in turn, was supposed to meet not only the increasing military needs in the field, but appease the hawks at home as well. Yet, the right wing was not satisfied.

At the same time, “The Left and the liberals were the only ones who would openly press for withdrawal, for ‘losing.’ The Right would be unhappy, disgruntled, but they would never press the case for withdrawal to the public.” Throughout the early to mid-phase of the war, gradual escalation was a way to avoid overly upsetting doves, while showing to the hawks that military involvement was increasing day by day.

However, “Lyndon Johnson… would continue with middle-course actions in Vietnam,

18 Ellsworth.
19 Gelb.
20 Ibid.
playing off Left and Right against one another at home. This strategy satisfied neither hawks nor doves; nor did it face down the North Vietnamese.”

Aside from growing calls from whole-hearted doves to see a complete and immediate drawdown of U.S. forces, the internal tug and pull on this question of bombing escalation exposed a division between preexisting Air Force doctrine which rested on the leeway to bring overwhelming force to bear against the heart of an adversary’s industrial ability to make war, and the Johnson/ McNamara strategy of gradual escalation and limited targeting of major centers of activity in North Vietnam. The hawks basically wanted to use the carpet-bombing tactics that had won WWII – essentially a push to ‘go big’ in order to ‘get out’ sooner. The dovish tendencies of those who at least believed in the basic virtue of the mission to repel communism in Vietnam and who backed Johnson’s gradualist approach, felt that an incremental ratcheting up of airpower would reap diplomatic benefits at the negotiation table.

With this set of circumstances, President Johnson and other key players of the time are clear cases for the need to separate hawkishness/ dovishness in the decision phase of the use of force vs. the execution phase. LBJ was no doubt a hawk in the decision phase of deciding to considerably escalate the U.S. role in Vietnam after the USS Maddox incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, but was arguably somewhat of a dove in the execution phase - at least in comparison to those that wanted to use a far heavier hand against the North. Even after the intrinsic hawkishness of intervention was a forgone conclusion (by virtue of the war being initiated over time) hawks and doves were split on how aggressively to proceed in the prosecution of the war. Others on the opposite side, such as Republican Congressman Tim Lee Carter (no relation to the president) were more

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21 Ibid.
or less the opposite, being against the war, but advocating for much stronger escalation in order to bring about a quicker and more decisive end to the conflict – as an extension of the philosophy that half-hearted combat actually prolongs human suffering. Despite unabashedly advocating for withdrawal from Vietnam, Congressman Carter insofar as he:

...never wavered in his support of the troops fighting there. He voted against efforts to cut off funds for the war and in 1972 backed the saturation bombing of North Vietnamese cities as a way of saving American lives. 22

Thus, quite interestingly, the hawk/dove dynamic does not necessarily demand consistency. In other words, one can be hawkish on one specific aspect of a foreign policy question while remaining dovish on another. Particularly on peace and war, clear understandings of the hawk/dove dynamic are complicated by the complexity of the issues involved, and this allows for seemingly counterintuitive (though only at face value) policy preferences. In fact, there are four basic categories that can be identified according to this logic: 1) Those like George McGovern who opposed escalation and supported an immediate pullout - the true thoroughbred doves, 2) those like LBJ who supported the war but advocated a very limited and graduated application of airpower - the ‘dovish hawks,’ 3) those like Congressman Carter who opposed the war but favored more aggressive bombing to save American lives - a rather small contingent of ‘hawkish doves,’ and 4) those like Curtis Lemay who supported the war and advocated for a far more devastating strategic bombing campaign from the air (including perhaps with

tactical nuclear arms) – the thoroughbred hawks. To be sure, all of this complexity could never fit neatly into the boxes of the two parties, and there were indeed partisan ‘crossovers’ – individual politicians who buffeted the party trade winds to claim strong opinions for or against the war regardless of the partisan consequences. Congressman Carter, a Republican from Kentucky who might have otherwise been inclined to support the war with deference to the Commander-in-chief, exemplified this rather bluntly when following a Congressional trip to Vietnam, he infamously “…told President Lyndon Johnson to his face, ‘No, Mr. President, we are not winning the war.’”

Even as each of these sub-components of the hawk/ dove dynamic operated simultaneously, Rolling Thunder also revealed other tensions -- institutional tensions -- between the military and the Democratic Party, as well as the military and civilian control in general. These are indeed extensions of the hawk/ dove dynamic that bridge to areas outside the immediate partisan political world. As an extension of the liberal democratic view that excessive concentration of military power is a threat to the practice democracy, Democratic presidents have historically exhibited some tension in relations with the military. This is evident in President Johnson’s preference for civilian military advisors in greater civilian staffing in the Pentagon. “President Johnson’s basic discomfort with the military caused him to rely less on military advice than any U.S. President since Woodrow Wilson.”

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24 Associated Press News Archive.

25 Parks.
produce a potential list of viable Vietcong targets in the North, the Air Force was more or less shot down by LBJ and his civilian advisors.

White House disapproval of the 94-target list revealed areas of fundamental disagreement between the Johnson administration and the military. While the JCS saw the war as a single conflict integrated militarily, geographically, psychologically, and socially, the administration viewed Rolling Thunder as... a campaign of coercion, a subtle diplomatic orchestration of signals and incentives, of carrots and sticks, of the velvet glove of diplomacy backed by the mailed fist of air power.26

This strained relations within government nodes responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy and complicated the overall effort. To be sure, “the rift between the administration and military leaders created an environment that was not conducive to establishing a dialogue…”27

Indeed, there were clear political considerations involved in all this. It rings true that “military policy was not made in a vacuum; public opposition to the war, Johnson’s domestic agenda, and international political considerations, as well as the situation on the ground in the RVN, would always be significant… in the formulation of strategy.”28 It was clear that “Vietnam — ‘that bitch of a war,’ in [LBJ’s] words — drained money from ‘the woman I loved,’ The Great Society. Committed to a program of guns and butter without raising taxes or calling up the reserves, he fought the war accordingly.”29 While

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26 Ibid.
27 Ellsworth.
29 Parks.
trying in vain resolve the war, the “...highest priority remained the President’s domestic agenda.”

This begins to show that, most often applied to partisan politics, the hawk/ dove dynamic is quite plainly, not exclusively political. In fact, it is a near universal conundrum that all life on Earth is confronted with in some form, as the cognitive manifestation of the fight or flight response in humans. To the extent that politics soaks into nearly all aspects of life experience (including military affairs that are at least thought to be less overtly political, except if “by other means”), it is evident that hawk/ dove tensions bleed clearly into the military realm as well. Throughout history, military advisors have always grappled with whether to advocate for heavy-handedness or restraint (depending on an array of factors). But the difficulty of the Vietnam question for U.S. leadership in particularly revealed the notable extent to which the hawk/ dove dynamic was rampant even within the White House and within the Department of Defense itself. One perhaps counterintuitive example of the dovishness seen from within the military was emphatically stated by Marine General David Monroe Shoup in a speech in 1966 where he stated:

I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody, dollar-crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own... [Not one] crammed down their throats by Americans.

As Colonel John K. Ellsworth outlines in his assessment of strategic implications of airpower doctrine during Operation Rolling Thunder, opinion -- though perhaps not this extreme -- varied rather widely even within the upper echelons of American power.

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30 Ellsworth.

31 This is quoted in the lecture on “Hawks as Doves: Military Dissent in Vietnam and Iraq” by Robert Buzzanco delivered at the University of Tennessee, September 21, 2006.
The following key players in the inner circle of the war effort exhibited clear, even irreconcilable differences in preference for how forcefully (if at all) to unleash airpower against targets in North Vietnam:

- Ambassador Maxwell Taylor – favored strikes to help morale/relations of South Vietnam
- U.S. Pacific Command/ JCS/ MACV – advocated all-out escalation
- Robert McNamara (SECDEF) – proposed graduated response
- Walter Rostow (Chief Policy Planning Council) – advised continued pressure showing US resolve
- Dean Rusk (Secretary of State) – agreed with SECDEF on graduated response
- George Ball (Undersecretary of State) – disagreed with everyone: cut and run32

Of course, the military itself has significant leeway over how heavy-handed to deliver hard power in the area of tactics in the head of action on the battlefield. The realm of strategy however, and the grand strategy of a nation, falls to the political world, because “… in a democracy politicians determine the why and what of conflict.”33 The Air Force and the aerial assets of the other branches had to operate within the political will exercised from the White House, and in the case of LBJ, sometimes his personal selection of targets based on scale models of the battlefield setup in the White House.

As an aside, this diversity of opinion outlined here sheds light on why it is no wonder that hawks and doves, no matter their role in government, clash most acutely under difficult military circumstances - when the going gets tough, so to speak. Great difficulty in battle makes dovishness all the more appealing to many in accordance with general war fatigue, and to many others, makes a greater dose of hawkishness seem like the best option in order to ultimately prevail and prevent prior blood from having been

32 Ellsworth.
33 Ibid.
shed in vain. It tends to polarize opinion throughout the debate, and causes countless individual ‘flip-flops’ in policy and opinion.

Further extremes of hawkishness existed yet. Speculation over the idea of using nuclear bombs against Vietnam, which was not entirely off the table in some corners of the hawkish mindset, had risen to the surface of the debate. There were indications in the press about the Republican nominee for President in 1964, Barry Goldwater, who had made a statement that was criticized for seeming to have advocated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. This contributed to perceptions of an extreme potential Goldwater Administration that might even be reckless in the conduct of foreign policy. Moreover, Air Force General Curtis Lemay, infamous leader of the firebombing campaigns against Imperial Japan during WWII, eventually ended up transitioning to the political world as the vise-presidential nominee for the American Independent Party ticket alongside George Wallace in 1968. During the race he floated the idea of using nuclear bombs, coupled with saturation bombing techniques he had pioneered in WWII, to bomb the North Vietnamese “…back into the Stone Ages.” Although both Goldwater and Lemay had walked back their comments in the press to some extent, their comments offered glimpses into how far the hawkishness had gained traction in this period. In addition, recently declassified documents show that the idea of nuking Vietnam and Laos was on the table and seriously debated within the military, and to a lesser extent, within public political discourse. That said, Goldwater and Lemay (as a vice-presidential


35 Narvaez.

nominee) both lost their bids for the nation’s highest offices by considerable margins; the latter wider than the former.

In the end however, having exposed himself to attacks from both the left and the right, Johnson was greatly weakened politically, especially after Tet in 1968. More and more, “…conservatives and military officials began to attack Johnson for his tentative approach to Vietnam, for not activating reserves, for not conducting operations north of the seventeenth parallel, for not giving the military the resources it needed to win…”37 From the other side, through-and-through doves attacked Johnson for having become mired in the conflict to begin with. Thus, intra-party debate among Democrats was rampant. “A large part of the dynamic operating within the Democratic Party hinged on the question, ‘Could the U.S. build a Great Society and stave off communism at the same time?’”38 Proposing better (drastically more dovish) solutions to this conundrum, Democratic Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy flanked Johnson on the left in their run to contest the nomination of a sitting President in the race for president. With some 42% of the vote, Eugene McCarthy won the New Hampshire primary and on March 31st 1968, Johnson opted not to accept his party’s nomination for president,39 paving the way for Richard Nixon to win the office, pledging to bring the war to a successful resolution.

37 Buzzanco, pp. 28-29.
38 Ellsworth.
**The 1968 Presidential Race**

With LBJ out of the race, 1968 featured a race between Johnson’s vice president Hubert Humphrey, who had backed the policy of gradual but limited escalation (and was therefore tarnished in the minds of many more dovish candidates) vs. former vice president under Eisenhower, Richard Nixon. Central to the differences of opinion within the Democratic Party (the precise disarray on which Nixon was able to capitalize electorally), was the fascinating example of Humphrey’s own evolution on Vietnam policy, which revealed an embattled tug of war between dovish and hawkish tendencies:

Humphrey was the vice president in an administration that was dropping bombs on Vietnam. After Viet Cong attacks in February 1965 led the Johnson Administration to plan a retaliatory bombing campaign against North Vietnam, Humphrey weighed in verbally and with a memo urging delay and recommending a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The president was angered by the dissent from his vice president, from whom he expected unquestioning fealty, and Humphrey was frozen out of subsequent inner circle discussions about the war. His banishment lasted nearly a year. It ended when Johnson calculated that Humphrey could be useful to him in countering mounting liberal criticisms of the war—and when Humphrey got on board with the policy and became an enthusiastic advocate for it.  

This difficulty in Humphrey’s mind, and among Democratic rank and file arose out of the fact that “liberals had to be anti-Communist and Vietnam was the test.”

Indeed, for Humphrey, he had “…absorbed the Manichean view of the emerging Cold War in the 1940s, in which the United States was the defender of freedom against global communist aggression.”

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41 Ibid.

The test was no doubt a difficult one which had resulted in the splintering of the Democratic Party, a reality which Johnson had to take primary responsibility for. Delighting initially mistrustful liberals with his progressive domestic policies in 1964-1965, Lyndon Johnson subsequently fractured the liberal coalition in the Democratic Party by escalating the war in Vietnam. On one side of the new divide were the president’s loyalists, dubbed by the press as Vietnam “hawks,” with Humphrey now preeminent among them. On the other side were the growing ranks of Vietnam “doves.”

Indeed, this period of flux would have great consequence on the future as the dynamic between these two groupings persisted:

Humphrey and Jackson allies were at the forefront in the creation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM). Humphrey and Jackson became honorary co-chairs of the new organization, while their top aides, Max Kampelman for Humphrey and Ben Wattenberg for Jackson, actively ran it. Through CDM—and the Committee on the Present Danger that it helped to spawn a few years later—a number of prominent Cold War liberals began their transition to neoconservatism. Some remained Democrats, while others, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, became Reagan Republicans.

Amid this disarray which had already reached a fever pitch by 1968, the outcome of the election was decisive in favor of Nixon, who had himself pledged to end the war in Vietnam (though not without a healthy dose of airpower). After losing to John F. Kennedy in 1960 and to Pat Brown in the 1962 California Gubernatorial race, this was quite a remarkable political turnaround for Nixon who went on to make extensive use of America’s airpower assets as is discussed below.

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43 Bell and Stanley, p. 100.

President Nixon, Operation Linebacker, and Wider Indochina

Despite having been elected on a platform of ending the war in Vietnam, which he ultimately did, President Nixon made serious attempts to conclude the war as quickly as possible by actually stepping up the use of military power in Vietnam – especially the use of airpower. While drawing down ground troops soon after taking office in 1969, he increased the use of bombing and other operations conducted from the air. In the midst of campaign season and his run for re-election, Nixon greatly stepped up bombings against the North with Operation Linebacker, and after winning in a landslide over the dovish George McGovern, green-lit Operation Linebacker II (known as the Christmas bombings). This was the next great push to use airpower to devastate and overwhelm the enemy. Nixon also widened the theatre of operations to include what were at the time, mostly covert bombing missions over Cambodia and Laos, which have come to light over the years. Yet, this happened as ground forces were being drawn down, showing a clear preference for the use of airpower that is perhaps more risky from a geo-political standpoint, but less risky for U.S. forces. The partisan dynamics of these events are seen in an analysis of the presidential race of 1972 when airpower issues were still on the increase according to the data.

The 1972 Presidential Race: A Window into Dovishness?

By the election season in 1972, the end of the war was quickly becoming a foregone conclusion. And although American military commitments remained in support of the pro-democratic Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces in the South for another three years, the primaries in each party -- and the general election race itself --
were in some ways, the first post-Vietnam election. Dueling visions of the wisdom of the intervention and what it meant for future engagements were brought forth to the American public. This constituted quite a wide berth between the two parties’ approaches to peace and war in this time period, a split between hawks and doves that took its toll on the state of unity in the nation’s foreign policy as well as the general seemliness of American politics. In fact:

The Vietnam War temporarily wrecked the Cold War consensus. Before the crackup, Democrats Truman, Kennedy and Johnson were not suspected of weakness anywhere near as much as were later candidates McGovern, Carter, Mondale and Dukakis.45

The ‘silent majority’s’ appetite for law and order policies (at home and abroad) were to some extent an expression of hawkishness in the preservation of American interests, launching Nixon to a huge win that fall. This is where a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of the hawk/ dove split between the parties becomes insightful. Among the most relevant points in the foreign policy section of the 1972 Democratic platform, emphasis is placed on what a new Democratic Administration under McGovern would do, including to:

…end American participation in the war in Southeast Asia; re-establish control over military activities and reduce military spending, where consistent with national security… neither playing world policeman… [and] return to Congress, and to the people, a meaningful role in decisions on peace and war.46

Then turning to its own section devoted to Vietnam, which still drained American blood and treasure, the platform asserts:

45 Betts.

...if the war is not ended before the next Democratic Administration takes office, we pledge, as the first order of business, an immediate and complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Indo-China. All U.S. military action in Southeast Asia will cease. After the end of U.S. direct combat participation, military aid to the Saigon Government, and elsewhere in Indo-China, will be terminated... The U.S. will no longer seek to determine the political future of the nations of Indo-China.47

But beyond this, and more specific to the aims of a dovish perspective, much of this involves back and forth in the so-called blame game:

The task now is still to end the war, not to decide who is to blame for it. The Democratic Party must share the responsibility for this tragic war. But, elected with a secret plan to end this war, Nixon's plan is still secret, and we—and the Vietnamese—have had four more years of fighting and death.48

Moving on through the document, an analysis reveals how dovish policies are usually cloaked in proactive statements designed to rebuke criticisms of being perceived as ‘weak.’ Continuing, the platform is careful to say that “disengagement from this terrible war will not be a ‘defeat’ for America. It will not imply any weakness in America's will or ability to protect its vital interests from attack.”49

In the section on military policy, the Democratic platform turns to a discussion on strength to, once again alleviate any concerns of being too weak, saying bluntly that:

Military strength remains an essential element of a responsible international policy. America must have the strength required for effective deterrence. But military defense cannot be treated in isolation from other vital national concerns. Spending for military purposes is greater by far than federal spending for education, housing, environmental protection, unemployment insurance or welfare. Unneeded dollars for the military at once add to the tax burden and pre-empt funds from programs of direct and immediate benefit to our people. Moreover, too much that is now

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.
spent on defense not only adds nothing to our strength but makes us less secure by stimulating other countries to respond.\(^{50}\)

This shows the dovish preference for butter in the guns vs. butter debate, which has huge implications for the balance of the hawk/dove dynamic. Doves harbor an intrinsic preference for parochial interests – often domestic spending on social programs. An emphasis is not on any lack of need for spending on the military, but rather a concern that there is excessive waste in this area. The Democrats claimed that “needless projects continue and grow, despite evidence of waste, military ineffectiveness and even affirmative danger to real security.”\(^{51}\) Moreover, they wished to:

…stress simplicity and effectiveness in new weapons and stop goldplating and duplication which threatens to spawn a new succession of costly military white elephants; avoid commitment to new weapons unless and until it becomes clear that they are needed; Reject calls to use the SALT agreement as an excuse for wasteful and dangerous acceleration of our military spending; Reduce overseas bases and forces.\(^{52}\)

For better or for worse, all this amounted to a significant reduction in the pace at which the U.S. expanded its military capability (including airpower technology), which more hawkish thinking was inclined to reject, even as hawkish sentiments on airpower remained strong through 1975.

Dovishness is clearly found in the belief that greater oversight and democratic constraints on the holders of power is preferential and may even limit the outbreak of hostilities (i.e., the litmus test on war powers/inter-branch relations). This is manifested quite strongly on the issue of power relations between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. Indeed, doves, and Democrats generally speaking have

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
after Vietnam, favored a clear rebalancing of power over foreign affairs (and the use of force specifically) back to the Congress. The Democratic platform in this election cycle stated that:

The needed fundamental reordering of U.S. foreign and military policy calls for changes in the structure of decision-making, as well as in particular policies. This means: Greater sharing with Congress of real decisions on issues of war and peace, and providing Congress with the information and resources needed for a more responsible role... Ending the present drastic overbalance in favor of military opinion by redefining the range of agencies and points of view with a proper claim to be heard on foreign and military policies; Subjecting the military budget to effective civilian control and supervision; Establishing effective executive control and legislative oversight of the intelligence agencies.53

Indeed, most of these issues speak to the litmus test on war powers/ inter-branch relations, the balancing of which is dovish when granting more power to the legislative branch over the executive branch and civilians over military officials.

**Spending on Aerial Technology during the End and after the War**

By 1973, the Case-Church Amendment passed Congress, which put the brakes on any further military operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. After this, America’s war was essentially over, although efforts remained to continue assisting South Vietnamese forces with some military support (i.e., war materials) and humanitarian assistance. In the years after U.S. involvement ended completely in 1975, hawkishness quite literally had less terrain on which to operate. This is seen quite clearly in the data: there was a relative decline in the intensity of most of the litmus tests (airpower considerably so) after 1975 while defense spending clashes began to increase. The war was over, and the question of escalation was largely moot after the last troops left the

53 Ibid.
country, but the dynamic between hawks and doves does not merely melt away following the cessation of hostilities. It transitioned into one that contested the extent of strength for the next crisis or war, and in many ways, it took on new life in the political and intellectual realms. The heat of battle is filled with tough questions surrounding how far (if at all) to pursue the application of airpower, and it demands answers in the immediacy of the situation. The years after wars end provide a chance for certain ‘lessons’ to emerge from the conflict – lessons on the strategic wisdom of the intervention digested in the political realm as well as lessons on the tactical use of weapons technology in real-life practice over many years. As these lessons, which are usually obvious in their tendency toward hawkishness or dovishness – are pushed into mainstream narratives in the discourse, new ground for contention is opened up. To be sure, hawks and doves learned different lessons from Vietnam and hawkishness remained strong through the Carter years.

Much of this post-bellum disagreement is manifested in battles over funding of the latest and greatest weapons technologies – most often aerial technologies. Naturally, in times of relative peace, doves wanted ‘peace dividends’ but the hawkish mentality would still push for aggressive expansion of aerial platforms, armaments, and munitions in preparation for what else might confront the U.S. down the line. There were naturally those who prefer their foot on the gas pedal to expand the strength of the military, and then there are those who resist it with their foot on the brake. To a significant extent, much of the characterization of a hawk is comprised not only of his/ her support for specific military engagements, but perhaps even to a greater degree, in the level of support for funding of new and existing weapons development programs. In this period,
the arms race inherent to the continuing Cold War -- involving both nuclear and non-nuclear technologies -- continued with the Soviet Union alongside the tactical lessons learned from hands-on use of technology over about a decade in Vietnam. This makes the form of new airpower technologies adapt to the function needed for the next war.

Naturally, part of an anti-war position includes a desire to downsize the military and decrease its lethality as a matter of prioritization in funding social programs. In particular, these years reveal how hawks are particularly averse to the notion of peace dividends. In many cases, this boils down to the level of concern over the purported dark side of the military industrial complex. Doves generally believe the conditions created by the MIC are dangerous, reckless, even all out evil. Hawks, on the other hand, generally believe that the MIC is a net positive for the nation, its arsenal of democracy, and the economy as well. But the politics do not end there, given that:

Indeed, presidential politics for about six decades has turned defense spending into a test of presidential manhood -- how much you want to spend on the military is shorthand for how much you love America and how ‘strong’ you're willing to be in defense of it.54

Loyal to the dovish ideal, even before the war ended George McGovern in 1972 proposed “… a 37 percent haircut for the military and got pilloried for it by Richard Nixon.”55

Data for the Reagan Cold War Years

Although things had seemed to cool down during the Carter years (an avid dove by any standard), hawk/ dove passions came alive again and reached unprecedented (and since unrivaled) proportions of contention over military policy during the Reagan

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55 Ibid.
presidency before calming down significantly during the 1990s. Without question, the Reagan years signaled a new approach to policy in the Cold War,\textsuperscript{56} at the center of which was a military buildup and backlash against ‘Vietnam syndrome,’ which is no doubt reflected very clearly in the data as an accelerant in the fire of hawk/dove dynamics. This undoubtedly persisted in the context of the latter stages of the Cold War, after Vietnam had been removed as a day-by-day source of disagreement. In the 1980s and well into the 1990s, there are several striking fluctuations that are of great significance in the data, serving as a sort of median case study (though still in the post-Vietnam period):

By both measures of issue intensity, most of the litmus tests saw an increase in frequency in the late 1980s. Quite remarkably, though once again not surprisingly, contention in virtually any category dropped off extensively in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, from around 1989 until 2000, most hawk/dove issues receded to a new plateau of low levels of contention, even as defense spending spiked as an issue in 1995, coinciding with the historic Republican takeover of the House of Representatives and the subsequent budget battles waged between the parties. Also quite significant, airpower issues began dropping off the radar screen from 1988 on as seen in the previous charts. In fact, the entire hawk/dove debate declined relatively speaking, and quite remarkably, as a share of Congress’ entire agenda from the high point in
for the entire data set (1964-present) of just under 7% in 1988 until being revived in the post-9/11 era:

This trend of the easing of hawk/dove tensions is seen also with the declining share of airpower floor votes in particular, as a share of all hawk/dove votes. From a high point of some 50% of all hawk/dove issues in 1982, the share of airpower-relevant data declined consistently until 2000:
And in terms of the balance between the two sides on airpower issues, it is clear that the Reagan years into the post-Cold War years showed a much narrower spread between the two. This means essentially that dovishness managed to catch up to a certain extent to hawkishness (though seldom outstripping it). This is different from the charts produced for the prior years (1964-1980) in which hawks maintained a notable lead over doves almost the entire time. That said, after the height of this contention around 1987, doves did appear to have the edge in 1989 and 1990 (likely on the euphoria of the fall of the Berlin Wall and indications that the Soviet Union was beginning to falter):
At no point in this period did doves gain a significant edge over hawks. However, both in 1982 and in 1988, there was a statistically significant spread between the two sides, in this case favoring the hawks. In fact, 1982 is an interesting year for the data, as the only time in which hawkishness gained significant ground and dovishness lost significant ground.

Applied to all the litmus tests, the trends are roughly similar:
Although the preceding charts represent time not formally treated in the case #1 on (post)-Vietnam, the data cannot be ignored and is crucial in telling the entire story of the hawk/ dove debate since 1964 without any major gaps. Further qualitative insights into how the fluctuations in the data relate to crucial events may also be another area in which this research can be followed or expanded in the future.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the Vietnam era was tumultuous for the hawk/ dove dynamic, and for the airpower litmus test in particular. The first analytical frame that includes all of the issues comprising the hawk/ dove debate shows that the aftermath of the war in many cases showed even more contention, specifically in the context of the latter stages of the Cold War under President Reagan, in which a new arms race and the increased defense spending that follows from it became increasing objects of
disagreement for the nation’s leadership. Hawk/ dove issues had become a staple in Congress and throughout the nation.

There is much subtlety reflected in the data. With the importance of international events that are constantly refining the position of the U.S. war machine, there is constant adaptive pressure for political leaders not just to change from an absolutist position pro to anti-war (or vice versa), but also in the subtle degree of enthusiasm in one direction or another. This data accounts for some of those sometimes minute pressures and differences over time because of the sheer volume of votes pumped through the formulas. And yet, most of the findings remain general. Notable changes seen in the data relate most closely to the largest geo-political developments to take hold in the international environment. This means that when the entire conflict paradigm changes, it has profound effects on the standing of hawk/ dove politics within the U.S. – its Congress or otherwise.

In terms of the primary analytical frame that considers airpower technology alone as a key fault line in the hawk/ dove debate, and to the extent it can be dissected with the data presented, it is clear that Vietnam was a foundational period. It was in the midst of the Vietnam War that strategists, of both the civilian and military stripe, began to learn the lessons of fighting war on a nonlinear battlefield, meaning that there is no clear front line and danger to military personnel is more or less consistent throughout the theater, which is itself interspersed with civilian populations. These increased difficulties are reflected in the contention seen in the civilian politics of elected leaders in Congress as tensions are produced by the disconnect between the billed capability of aerial weapons and how they perform in real wars. Evident with the Rolling Thunder (1965 to 1968) and Linebacker (1972) campaigns, which were themselves fraught with politics at all levels, a
constant level of attention -- both hawkish and dovish -- was paid to airpower as a sort of
new normal. Interestingly, however, these two campaigns did not stand out in the data as
periods of increased disagreement, as might be expected. In fact, these aerial bombing
campaigns (far and away conventional ‘dumb’ bomb strategy) were accompanied by a
certain depression of the frequency of airpower issues voted on in Congress, likely
because they are less the subjects of votes and more the subjects of executive branch
control and strategy carried out internally by the Department of Defense (DOD). In the
years after the heat of battle, Congress pays new attention to, and votes more frequently
on, issues shaping lessons learned and how military policy charts its course into the
future.

Although the post 9/11 paradigm, and resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
exhibit asymmetrical characteristics in far more dramatic fashion as is seen in the next
chapter (case #2), the transition to nonconventional and increasingly lopsided warfare
was gradual. Vietnam did indeed show the burgeoning developments seen more
frequently in the next case, including the beginnings of precision targeting and the overall
problem of non-linear conflict. But quite crucially, it should be cautioned that advances
in aerial weaponry have both compelled this asymmetry (because lesser adversaries
simply cannot sustain parity in the conventional mode of conflict) and mitigated
asymmetry (as a result of state-of-the-art surveillance and precision strike capabilities).
This is true for both paradigms. And although having the first case begins to offer
insights into the larger connections between American politics and the nature/ direction
of global conflict often waged asymmetrically with this now critical in-air component,
the comparisons made possible by the next chapter open up a more extensive and rather
compelling set of conclusions. It is to this topic that the dissertation now proceeds: case #2 on the post-9/11 era.
Chapter Five:
Case #2: Hawks and Doves Clash after 9/11

Virtually overnight, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 forced nothing less than a wholesale paradigm change on the U.S. military apparatus from top to bottom. In fact, practitioners involved at all levels in the mission to secure the U.S. and its interests were compelled to undergo a major recalibration in terms of the thinking on, and approaches to, the form of the enemies at hand and the nature of the threats they pose. No longer exclusive to the realm of nation-states, the U.S. security posture had to guard more actively against non-state actors capable of inflicting enormous national harm. Al-Qaeda in particular came to dominate the mindset on what constituted America’s primary adversary, shifting away from the lingering Cold War sentiments about conventional and/or nuclear conflict toward a protracted struggle against individual militants operating in some of the most remote regions of the globe (as well as within the very societies they are intent on attacking). This change in paradigm (i.e., the so-called ‘war on terror’) sets the stage for the second major case study in this analysis.

After 9/11 and the resulting U.S. military actions in multiple foreign theatres over more than a decade, it is clear that airpower in particular has re-asserted itself as a primary means by which this type of conflict is waged, especially under a scenario of extreme asymmetry. Similar to Vietnam, leaders in the years after 2001 turned to airpower for answers to the nation’s conflict/security actions abroad (used on its own or in support of ground action). There have been similar hopes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the skies above other nations to apply the latest advances in airpower to produce dominance in battle, and more specifically, to overcome the asymmetrical constraints
imposed by smaller forces turning weaknesses into strengths through unconventional tactics. With the often revolutionary technologies alluded to throughout this dissertation and developed further in the pages to come, the post-9/11 case presents a unique time frame with unique and rather telling results. It is in this new environment that this chapter charts the hawk/dove dynamic for the years since 9/11 in order to shed light on how this era differs from the one that was defined by the Vietnam War and fueled by Cold War tensions.

In as much as people around the entire globe reeled from 9/11, groping for answers and for appropriate responses (sometimes involving advocacy of force), the U.S. Congress was tasked with adapting in legislative terms to the new security paradigm. Besides the macro questions of national course largely tethered to presidential leadership in foreign policy, the handling of military policy and the myriad details involved in its management fall with great consequence to Congress. This ‘detail’ found in policy governing the military -- shaping its look, its feel, and its power -- falls to the floor of both houses of Congress, where it often becomes subject to hawk/dove tensions. This struggle is captured by the data for these years, showing that each of the litmus tests involved in military policymaking are connected to the meandering course of international affairs and particular changes to the nature of fighting war in the new domain.

Paramount in Congress’ response to the evolution of extreme conflict asymmetry, the development and application of cutting-edge aerial technologies is fraught with difficult questions confronting voters and their elected leaders:

The proliferation of precision strike creates potential issues for Congress. These issues include whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is
properly taking adversary precision strike weapons into account in its own plans and programs, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify proposed DOD programs for responding to those weapons.¹

Such challenges are no doubt subject to hawk/dove politics and are reflected in the military/foreign policy to come out of the body since 9/11, with several interesting findings for the years 2001-2012.

With the data displayed in this chapter bringing the story right up to the present day, it becomes clear that there are both striking similarities and also notable differences between the (post)-Vietnam and post-9/11 cases. For each litmus test, there are individual conclusions to draw, and the data points for airpower issues alone are likewise quite insightful. As with the previous chapter, charts for the years in question are examined in opening sections. They are similarly followed by supporting analysis on the aerial technologies involved and the qualitative insights gleaned from key aspects of the political history at hand, including an analysis of both change and continuity in this area from the Bush years to the Obama years. With both case studies -- post-Vietnam and post-9/11 -- firmly established in terms of the data and the parallel historical analysis, a greater picture emerges as the case comparison becomes clearer, setting up the overall conclusions to come in the next and final chapter. But first, the data for the final years in question is evaluated in greater detail.

**A Closer Look at the Data (2001-2012)**

Concerning the hawk/dove dynamic in aggregate terms, contention operated at a comparatively low level after 9/11. During Vietnam and into the Reagan Cold War years,

hawk/dove contention was seen in an average of around 4% of all floor votes in Congress. This metric reached extremely low proportions by 2001, when hardly more than 1% of floor votes were relevant in this context:

Only during the debate surrounding Libya in 2011 did hawk/dove contention re-emerge at significant levels, which had not been seen previously since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that the spike for 2002, though technically data in the year after the attacks, does indeed reflect the re-emergence of peace and war issues in the reaction to 9/11. Coming in September (late in the Congress’ term), the attacks were no doubt responded to with an increase in legislative action, much of which however, came and was manifest as hawk/dove contention in 2002 when war was underway and rumors of war were at the forefront of the national debate. This included many of the debates surrounding whether to Invade Iraq, which took place in large measure the year before it occurred. Indeed, when the attention paid to military/foreign policy issues (in accordance
with its urgency) go up, there is naturally greater potential for relevant data points for the given year(s), although the amount of contention is not inherently tied to the volume of war issues being handled. And yet, the lull in the data for 2001 does indeed show that even though the discussion on military issues was ever-present, there was indeed some period of unity reflected in the data (certainly as it concerned the invasion of Afghanistan, which was hardly contested by any sizable dovish contingent). In fact, Representative Barbara Lee (D-California) was the only vote in Congress against the bill to authorize the use of force after 9/11, which led to the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.²

As a whole, the data for these years shows that as with the previous case on (post)-Vietnam, voting in Congress essentially follows the ebb and flow of history and momentous events on the world stage. The most significant events in history that are relevant to military policy seem to be reflected in the data for issue intensity with a fair degree of precision. But what may seem most surprising in this respect at first glance is that Iraq was much less relevant in hawk/dove terms than the 2011 debate over intervention in Libya turned out to be. Even though the data boils down to a simple attempt to capture the frequency of contention that actually makes it all the way to the floor of Congress -- suggesting that hawk/dove contention by no means operates extensively inside the body or inside government in general -- this chart shows that recent events have been extremely significant:

The most recent data for 2011-2012 suggests new life being injected into hawk/dove-style politics (for better or for worse), after some period of relative ‘back-burner’ status. This is because, speaking overall, the intensity of each litmus test had been relatively low since the dissolution of the Soviet Union – a feature which had seemed to carry through for the most part to the years after 9/11. In addition to issue intensity ascertained by the total number of individual votes cast, the trends are mirrored simply by intensity as a function of the total number of occasions for a floor vote in both houses:
Interestingly, and quite predictably, the escalation/de-escalation litmus test is a signifier of the contentiousness of conflict being proposed or already underway, capturing debate on the actual application of lethal force. Seen very clearly in the data, this issue area spiked in 2002, 2007, and to an even greater extent, in 2011. The spikes are also found in the first graph for hawk/dove issues calculated overall. These periods of influx undoubtedly correspond to three defining events in American conflict since 9/11: the invasion of Iraq, the Iraq troop ‘surge,’ and U.S. participation in the Libya intervention. Interestingly, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 did not register as significant in the data, confirming the nature of national unity on the issue of removing the Taliban from power, which had supported and harbored leaders of al-Qaeda. These connections highlight the intimate relationship between international events (beyond the scope of any single actor) and American politics (with its collosal power to shape events), both engaged in state of mutual causation.
It is fascinating, however, that in each of these historical scenarios, the spike in contention over whether to escalate the use of force virtually melted away the following year, suggesting that once troops are already committed, hawks and doves naturally pivot to disagreement expressed over other issues that are related to the military and warfare. Perhaps even more interesting, this litmus test showed the most fluctuation and volatility out of any of the litmus tests for any single 2-year span (i.e., from one year to the next). In this regard, the single largest spike or anomaly occurred in just the last few years of the entire nearly-half century long data set. This is in large part due to the nature of the escalation/de-escalation litmus test. Whereas the others are constant and pressing issues for Congress’ attention, there are years for which the question of escalation is moot – when there is no active military engagement or any such action being proposed. Thus, when it appears, it does so because it comes up as a matter of utmost urgency, and usually spikes as it had at the height of the controversy during the Vietnam War before retreating as rapidly as it appeared (usually by the next year when the engagement is already decided upon). That said, there is a compelling similarity in the data, at least as it concerns a connection between the specific debates over the Vietnam and Iraq wars, insofar as much of the contention over escalation does not come at the outset of such large wars that involve significant land and air forces. Most of the contention comes, in fact, after the war has dragged on with mounting operational difficulties, leading to the pressing issue of whether to continue the fight. This is a key similarity seen in the two cases to draw a parallel between the early 1970s ‘bomb Hanoi’ Vietnam debate and the 2006-7 ‘surge’ debate in Iraq. In that sense, the escalation litmus test is much more active -- in both case studies -- in the direction of de-escalation, rather than during the course of
the initial escalation, holding true for both gradual force application in Vietnam and
‘shock and awe’-style immediate force application against Iraq in 2003.

Whereas airpower came up more frequently than any of the other litmus tests on a
rather consistent basis throughout the 1980s (mostly attributable to the split over missile
defense bills/ amendments), this was not the case for any year in the post-9/11 data set. In
recent years, defense spending as a whole (not including airpower) has regained the top
slot in terms of the issue area on which hawks and doves have clashed most frequently.
Overall, it could even be said that airpower issues themselves have seldom been the
source of much contention in the years after 9/11, suggesting somewhat of an emerging
consensus on the viability of drone technology in particular, a sense that is also garnered
from the subsequent discussion of policy continuity bridging the otherwise wide cavern
between the Bush and subsequent Obama campaign rhetoric on military affairs.
Nonetheless, a small spike in intensity is seen for 2002 (not long after 9/11) when the
U.S. was still carving out or designating ‘best practices’ for applying military power
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. To be sure, this does not mean that the
issue of airpower came up fewer times in Congress; it means that contentious floor votes
on airpower came up less frequently. In reality, airpower was often on the agenda of
Congress, but was usually not the subject of significant hawk/ dove tensions, and in many
cases, airpower-related bills and amendments were passed unanimously (far and away in
the direction of expanding capabilities, which is to say hawkish).

Fluctuations in the remaining litmus tests are worth noting as well. Defense
spending -- often a proxy for the wisdom of intervention in the first place -- is seen as
spiking in 2003, as the U.S. debated and ultimately went ahead with the invasion of Iraq.
The general hump in this litmus test from 2005 to 2009 follows a trajectory of increase as the war raged on amid attempts to ‘de-fund’ the war and a trajectory of decrease toward the end of the decade as the situation calmed down and troop numbers fell. Otherwise operating with less urgency for some time, the issue came alive again in 2011 amid the Libya intervention, and notably also new budget battles, including proposed military cuts at stake under so-called ‘sequestration.’

The foreign military support litmus test also followed a course of what might be expected, spiking quite clearly in 2005 as part of the push to ‘stand up Iraqi forces’ as American forces begin to ‘stand down.’ Debate on foreign military aid also spiked in 2011, when significant splits emerged over whether the U.S. should actively support revolutionary groups during the ‘Arab Spring’ (in Libya and elsewhere) that were pushing to overthrow oppressive (though often pro-American) regimes.

An otherwise flat-lined course of war powers issues/ inter-branch relations was revived -- however subtly -- in 2007 (when other litmus tests spiked as well) during the debate over the ‘surge’ in Iraq. Again in 2011, the balance of war powers between Congress and the presidency became contested ground amid debates over American involvement in the NATO mission in Libya, but was routinely less active than other litmus tests. This infrequency, however, is counterbalanced by the fact that such issues tend to be extremely consequential in tilting the balance of war powers in one direction or another.

As far as the last metric on NASA support, space power remains so far beyond the realm of strategic involvement on the part of sub-state groups like al-Qaeda that NASA’s involvement in the development of post-9/11 aerial technologies (some with military
applications) has been negligible compared to its role during the Cold War, when the militarization of space was of real concern as an area in which the Soviet Union *could* compete. Therefore, its frequency in terms of appearing in the hawk/dove debate has been limited to a select few bills/amendments, mostly concerning basic funding for the agency. It is of least significance throughout the entire data set, including in the years after 9/11.

As trends have been established for each of the litmus tests, the balance between hawkish and dovish poles (according to all of the litmus tests melded together) has shown a continuing stable lead for the former over the latter:

![Graph showing the balance between hawkish and dovish votes from 2001 to 2012.](image)

Just as with the (post)-Vietnam era, the post-9/11 case suggests a certain careful balance -- almost a harmony -- existing in the relationship between hawkish and dovish voting. Both lines share a common trajectory because as the volume of floor votes fluctuate, the balance between the two sides is not necessarily affected, and the proportions often remain the same. However, there are insights in the subtlety of changes
to this balance, which can be seen in the data. This is where a basic understanding and acceptance of the partisan dimension of hawk/dove relations comes into play in the analysis, because however inconspicuous at first glance, changes in the balance of power between the two major parties can indeed be found in the previous chart. Although hawks kept the lead throughout, the years for which one side or another made headway coincide unmistakably with years in which the majority changed hands from one party to the other in the U.S. House of Representatives. The gains made by doves in 2007 (after Democrats took control of the House in the midterm elections of 2006) and the gains made by hawks in 2011 (after Republicans took control of the House in the midterm elections of 2010) bear this out. This would tend to support the notion (often accepted as conventional wisdom, however oversimplified) that Republicans are hawkish and Democrats are dovish *par excellence*.

Looking specifically at airpower in the data, much more rises to the surface:
Very strikingly, the airpower issue as a share of all hawk/dove contention tends to drop off rather precipitously each time that actual conflict comes to the forefront. This is very interesting, if perhaps counterintuitive, in that when war is afoot, the primary means at America’s disposal to carry out war policy is through the use of aerial technology. And yet, major dips in airpower coincide with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the troop surge in 2007, and even more dramatically, the Libya intervention as part of NATO in 2011.

Whereas airpower tended to spike in unison with the other litmus tests in times of conflict, 2011 was somewhat unique in this regard because even as defense spending as a whole became grounds for especially heated debate, airpower was not of much significance in this equation. This is largely due to the fact that even the more hawkish proponents of an active and aggressive role for the U.S. military in the NATO mission to protect civilians and aide in the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi did not advocate for a significant ground troop presence – if any at all. It was clear that American airpower was in many cases more than adequate to carry out the mission, especially considering that it was merely needed to act in support of an already belligerent, highly-motivated, and indigenous ground force committed to regime change. All this, again, suggests that because airpower is the most effective instrument of national hard power, it is seldom contested when conflict is afoot.

Concerning the balance between hawks and doves on airpower alone, there are several points worthy of observation:
With relevant data appearing in 2002, hawks stood up for airpower expansion with north of 60% of the representation in the voting record (in binary terms). In 2002, when revenge for 9/11 remained in policy circles vis-à-vis support for extensive bombing campaigns and even further ground action throughout the Middle East, dovish opposition was unpopular and took a back seat. This meant that hawkishness was pervasive in both parties. However, by the following year (and until hawkishness in this area regained a foothold in the debate over the Iraq troop surge), dovish airpower policy made real
headway. Again in 2007-08, dovishness made somewhat of a comeback, before again falling to a wave of hawkish airpower sentiments since 2009, when as will later become clear, the Democratic Party came to be identified with a comparable level of public expression of support for airpower – and drone usage in particular. Nonetheless, the charts show in an overall sense that when conflict is underway and at the forefront of the debate, airpower -- as America’s preferred hard power tool -- tends to be supported and expanded more than it is called into question or restricted.

It will be interesting to continue following these developments into the future, especially for the airpower litmus test in the years to come. On the heels of the relatively sharp increase in issue intensity of airpower from 2011 to 2012, it begs the question: will these trends press on into 2013 and beyond? Especially, as debate grows over the legal, moral, and ethical limitations of drone usage against U.S. citizens abroad (and perhaps domestically), further study will be required to untangle the complicated relationship between the political nature of governance and the revolutionary capabilities of aerial technology.

**Precision Strike, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and the New Era of Warfare**

With the data now firmly established for the entire temporal range of this dissertation’s analysis, it is important to consider the unique aspects of aerial technology to come about in the post-9/11 years. Central to this discussion are precision strike capabilities by all means of conveyance; land, sea, and air-based systems have each entered the world of surgical targeting. But most often, this has focused on unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or so-called drones fitted with lethal armaments.
In the same way generals are always fighting the last war, the development of new tools of combat are always trying to predict the tactical needs of the next war. In this regard, it is clear that the U.S. has vested much in the development of UAV technology (even before 9/11) and precision munitions (since Vietnam) to in a way circumvent the problem of conflict asymmetry, which is seen as the domineering operational constraint of current and future warfare. It was already growing problem in Vietnam with no front line, deficient insignia, and enemy forces setting booby traps from the safety of underground tunnel networks, for example. These imbalances in the exchanging of lethal force have become even more dramatic since 2001. But where tanks and ground troops are too costly and impractical to fight in these terms, a drone can hover above, providing similar lethal force presence at low cost and with no risk to one’s forces. Especially in an age of de-territorialized (i.e., non-linear), low-intensity conflict, constant vigilance becomes a priority because the time (and place) of an enemy incursion is even more of an unknown – a vigilance that an unmanned drone hovering for hours or days at a time can certainly provide. And yet, the U.S. has made sure to maintain the upper hand in the air across the board.

In terms of more conventional force, the U.S. holds a position of near impunity in the air, and at least for now, enjoys what could be considered a position of hegemony in the skies vis-à-vis its leading aircraft. For example, the 5th generation aircraft F-22A Raptor is said to ensure U.S. air (fighter) superiority for the next 40 years.3 Thus, fighter

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aviation and other aspects of U.S. air warfare capability represent an aspect of the
American security apparatus that has widened the hard power gap within potential
interstate (conventional) battle spaces. It has also, through the use of new technologies,
served to partly bridge the asymmetry characteristic of GWOT operations, in turn, re-
leveraging the ‘stick’ of U.S. foreign policy in the current intrinsically-constrained
fighting domain. However, it is primarily a discussion of the latter phenomenon that is
the focus of this analysis, as it pertains to ‘uninhabited’ or unmanned aircraft. There
have indeed been other battles over aerial weapons development, including ethical
questions over the use of cluster bombs and developmental questions about the nuclear
bunker buster program. Yet, the fascination seems to lie with drones and the tremendous
tactical and strategic advantages they hold. It is a fascination reflected in the public eye,
the media, as well as Congress and the military. And although the data does not reveal
major fluctuations attributable to drone advancement in particular, its absence from the
data is perhaps equally revealing – reinforcing the idea that there may be a potential
convergence of opinion on the use of drones.

Much of the preoccupation with this area of technology exists for natural reasons,
although the use of UAVs is not without its own sets of controversies. Launching hard
power from the air is often cheaper, more effective, and less of a risk to personnel, but
somehow less discriminate than ground forces that (in theory) only target combatants.

The problem with turning to airpower as an answer to the concerns of cost in blood and

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4 In addition to the F-22 Raptor, other new aircraft such as the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey continue to
revolutionize the U.S. air fleet in conventional capacities.

5 The terms ‘uninhabited’ or ‘pilotless’ are often preferred to ‘unmanned’ because of their gender
neutrality, even though people were never meant to live in (i.e., ‘inhabit’) aircraft in the first place and
drones are often piloted (in part) via remote control, sometimes from thousands of miles away. The
imprecision of the terminology suggests the relative infancy of this area of technology, similar to
automobiles being referred to as ‘horseless carriages.’
treasure of a nation’s war effort, is that bombs are far more destructive than a soldier with an M-16 but they blow up friendlies and non-combatants just as surely as an enemy combatant. Therefore, collateral damage becomes grounds for more opposition and international criticism to build against the overall war effort in question. Thus, the trend has been to attempt to make munitions dropped from the air more accurate. Such advancements have made bombs both more deadly (where they land), but also less deadly (because of where they do not land). They are more deadly in the sense that they can ‘lock on’ to the intended target and all but ensure a kill. However, with this accuracy, comes the ability to avoid hitting what is to be spared from destruction. Thus, the technological form follows the function that is needed. The demands of the battlefield of today are always reflected in the designs of the weapons of tomorrow in terms of what the improvements are called for by warriors. It makes things less risky for personnel to deploy, with changing technological forms following the ever-changing functions needed on the battlefield. Since 9/11, this meant a re-affirmation of military technology, robotics, automation, advanced imaging, communications, and accurate kinetic strike.

Beyond merely being accurate, which is a criteria that a stealth bomber with a crew of two operators can no doubt satisfy, the concept of removing the human operator from flight missions altogether adds another set of tactical and strategic advantages. Yet, the concept is not a new one and the so-called ‘drone’ as an aerial vehicle is not anything particularly novel.6 In fact, ever since the earliest military kites and balloons, UAS of various stripes have long been used in military and law enforcement applications to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) – essentially having an ‘eye-

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in-the sky’ to maintain the situational awareness of ground forces. However, the relatively recent advent of marrying such aircraft with deadly precision attack munitions\(^7\) has not only begun to revolutionize this area of conflict, it has more specifically, allowed U.S. forces to reclaim a significant tactical advantage in remote areas by devising this more symmetrical weapons system – symmetrical because attack drones can operate closer to, and have a greater impact on, suspected terrorist operatives moving in small groups throughout rugged terrain.

Remotely-operated aerial vehicles such as the MQ-1 Predator and its much larger cousin -- the MQ-9 Reaper -- are capable of firing AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles and other precision munitions, which has transformed modern conflict, giving a distinct advantage to U.S. strategists in contemporary affairs.\(^8\) This has arguably opened the door to ‘push-button’ warfare, although most UASs operate in conjunction with soldiers in theatre to provide close air support for operations by actual boots on the ground. However, the implications of this and related developments will undoubtedly be adopted into other contexts and in future wars between a wide array of actors, including conventional ones. In a world of advanced robotics being proliferated more generally (ground, sea, and air),\(^9\) conflict has entered a novel era in which at least for the time being, “… robotic vehicles will allow modern conventional armies to minimize the


\(^9\) For instance, there have been other notable breakthroughs in robotics which increasingly find themselves on the actual battlefield (loosely defined), such as the Packbot, a small autonomous rover used for searching caves and the Talon, which is an IED disposal platform. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) are in use as well. See Tierney and North.
advantages guerilla opponents gain by their increased willingness to sacrifice their lives in order to inflict casualties on the enemy.”  

Specifically as it pertains to U.S.-led GWOT operations, the MQ-1 Predator, built by U.S. aeronautical defense contracting firm General Atomics, has carved out an increasing role alongside several of its system components and similar aircraft like Global Hawk. First made operational in the Balkans in 1995, the Predator drone, which has received the most attention in popular discourse (perhaps due to its catchy name) was originally used for gathering battlefield reconnaissance and performing surveillance with various vehicle-mounted cameras/ sensors, proving to be quite a versatile platform. In fact, it is precisely this versatility that has made the Pentagon so interested in unmanned systems, allowing for the fusion of a low-cost-to-operate system with precision deadly force, and “in 2009, for the first time, the U.S. Air Force trained more ‘pilots’ for unmanned aircraft than for manned fighters and bombers.” The escalation of these lighter, cheaper, and more versatile aerial vehicles in operation today are a far cry from the planes developed during prior industrial races between states to develop the largest, fastest, stealthiest, planes with a higher payload capacity -- aircraft sometimes even far

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11 Schwing.

12 Ibid.

13 Levinson.
exceeding their weight in gold when considering enormous research and development costs.  

Rather, the UAVs of today are designed for smaller-scale wars and lower-intensity combat, such as the Raven, which is not designed to attack, but is small enough to launch by hand. Such craft do not even have to be equipped with defensive or even evasive capabilities because air warfare is simply not a battle space contested by groups like al-Qaeda. They are specifically used for tracking, targeting, and striking relatively small and non-fixed targets – usually groups of suspected terrorist or even individual operatives. That is why these now-deadly platforms are considerably more advantageous than the use of the ‘smart bombs’ -- Global Positioning System (GPS) or laser-guided -- which for example, allowed for ‘shock and awe’ in Iraq in 2003 and have for decades been launched through conventional platforms (i.e., long range bombers or from sea-based platforms).  

Unmanned (or uninhabited) aerial vehicles are especially beneficial in that they do not endanger the life of a pilot, they are relatively inexpensive to deploy, and can circle over a single area for up to 24 hours, streaming near-real time footage (with as little as a 1.2 second delay) to virtually any location on the ground. Furthermore, the operational software in these vehicles often eliminates the need for troops on the ground.


15 Tierney and North.

16 Though precise, the ‘shock and awe’ campaign was based on fixed and predetermined targets that were attacked with cruise missiles launched from naval carriers and conventional bombers, not from unmanned platforms.

to laze targets, call in GPS coordinates, or pre-program them to fixed targets. In fact, the versatility of UAVs in a sense makes them transcendent technologies insofar that they can be equipped with nearly any kind of technological device used for simply surveying an area to the opposite extreme of administering death from above – as well as a wide range of other surveillance and deterrence mechanisms including but not limited to thermal imaging and night vision cameras, lasers, communications gear, long range acoustic devices (LRADs), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) payloads. With this cross-fertilization of technology, operators can watch, follow, target, and if necessary, attack all in one package with these machines sometimes referred to as ‘hunter-killers.’ And because of advances in satellite communications, many of the military-controlled Predator attack drones flying above Afghanistan and Pakistan are for example controlled by human operators sitting in an air-conditioned work-station at Creech Air Force Base not far from Las Vegas, Nevada.18

An analysis of the last two Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reports from 2006 and 2010, which are key indicators of the U.S.’s grand national security strategy, reveals some interesting things about the DOD’s disposition toward this new area of technology. However, these reports are limited in their ability to discuss methods of operation and are notoriously vague in accordance with the trend toward the ‘covertization’ of warfare. Nonetheless, it is striking that although the now ubiquitous acronym ‘UAV’ is mentioned 6 times in the 2006 QDR, it is not mentioned a single instance in the 2010 QDR. That is because the acronym has been replaced by ‘unmanned aerial system’ or UAS, which is a term not even found in the 2006 report at all. This speaks to the extent to which the aerial platform increasingly is seen as constituting only

18 Schwing, p. 9.
one piece in the larger puzzle of related technologies and support networks that work in
harmony with such aircraft as part of a wider system of intelligence. Furthermore, it is
interesting that there are a total of 18 mentions of the word ‘unmanned’ in the 2006 QDR
and just 15 in the 2010 QDR. Of course, this is not necessarily suggestive of the
qualitative importance placed on the use of UAVs, but it does at least raise interesting
questions regarding whether the DOD has somewhat de-emphasized their use amid
growing controversy that surrounds them (in a document otherwise completely sanitized
of political overtones). Nonetheless, the 2010 QDR states forthrightly that:

…in FY 2010, the Department made a commitment to grow to a capacity
of 50 sustained orbits of Predator/Reaper by FY 2011. The Air Force is on
track to achieve this goal and will continue to expand the force to 65 orbits
by FY 2015. The Army is expanding all classes of UASs, including the
accelerated production of the Predator-class Extended Range Multi-
Purpose (ER/MP) UAS.19

This will no doubt have vast implications for the unmanning of warfare and the
potentials seem almost limitless, with the Defense Department planning to spend $16
billion on UAV technology by 2013.20 And by the year 2025, the DOD estimates that “…
approximately 45% of the future long-range strike force will be unmanned. The capacity
for joint air forces to conduct global conventional strikes against time-sensitive targets
will also be increased.”21 By extension, there is a desire to:

<http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF>

20 Tierney and North.

…restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.22

Though not without technical difficulties, this area of radically-advanced technology has constituted a new landscape of warfare that has emerged more or less since the CIA and the Pentagon began weaponizing UASs shortly after 9/11. To be sure, these aircraft have carried an increasing share of the burden of war under virtually any strategic environment, having achieved several high-profile kills, including Mohammed Atef, Baitullah Mehsud, Hakeemullah Mehsud (later reported to have survived the U.S. drone strike against him),23 and Osama Bin Laden’s own son (one of several).24

As the U.S. pursued a ‘surge’ of troops into Afghanistan, more unmanned platforms had been placed in the theatre to supplement and multiply the efforts of ground troops. But unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) have also been argued to have the ability of compensating for drawing down numbers of ground troops, such as with the proposed force trajectory in Afghanistan for 2013 and beyond. There is little question that this capability to fight war and keep a very firm security policy while staying at arm’s length (something which has never really been possible before) serves to defuse come of the contention over issues of peace and war which would otherwise entail more fundamental divergences of course and more difficult questions of national engagement.

At root, the technology will allow American forces and the NATO coalition to limit any

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22 Ibid.
real or perceived vacuum of power that would inevitably result from a significant pullout of troops, a notion advocated by George Will in 2009.25

Aside from the obvious strategic advantages of UASs in the field of combat, it is perhaps another matter in terms of geo-politics and the public diplomacy of the U.S., to which drone strikes have simultaneously become a political liability. The two phenomena -- benefits for achieving military objectives in the short term and detriments to American public diplomacy in the long term -- are not mutually exclusive. However, many would certainly argue that the questionable use of increasing UAV power constitutes a colossal blow to the U.S. in terms of its prestige and amounts to a loss of American global political capital. In other words, what the U.S. may gain in terms of hard power leveraging it more than pays for through the loss of soft power or the ability to engender ‘compellance.’26 Others oppose the use of attack drones more specifically on grounds that they are immoral, unethical, or even illegal.27 Direct, violent blowback is naturally of great concern as well.

It is quite clear that new echelons of media scrutiny and the kinds of public diplomacy crises that result from excessive collateral damage have made the use of surgical precision of American air strike capability around the world increasingly tenuous. Even the 1.2 seconds it takes to strike from 8,000 miles away makes it difficult


26 Different from conventional descriptions of hard and soft power, Thomas Schelling established this notion of ‘compellance’ to describe how the U.S. has a high amount of destructive power, but that it is not easily translated into compelling people to accept or abide by U.S. foreign policy. For a more thorough discussion, see Kaldor, Mary. “American Power: From ‘Compellance’ to Cosmopolitanism?” International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 1-22. 2003.

to be as accurate as would be ideal, given that a situational environment can change quite significantly in an instant. But decreases in the length of the sensor-to-shooter cycle, and the perception that UAVs are all but hyper-competent, places more pressure on decision-makers to avoid collateral damage or faulty targeting. Mistakes can no longer be as easily blamed on mechanical error or technological insufficiencies, conditions which essentially absolved Allied powers during WWII of wrongdoing when civilian cities were carpet-bombed almost completely indiscriminately.

Media reporting on incidents like the baby milk factory that was bombed by the U.S. in Iraq in 1991 or more recently, a wedding party that had been mistakenly targeted in Afghanistan with over 30 deaths including children28 have done incalculable damage to U.S. prestige and credibility. In fact, such attacks are often reported in Pakistan and throughout the Muslim world with far higher casualty totals than the reality,29 and inflame untold hatred against the U.S. and the West. And with instant communications, these ripple effects can be felt within hours. On January 15, 2006, protests erupted and turned violent in Karachi following a strike on a remote village in Pakistan.30 It is fairly certain that such outrage is also directed at the Pakistani government that in many cases shares intelligence quite closely on targets, locations, and other contexts, while publicly condemning the attacks.


With such complexity in the global politics involved, these weapons systems have no doubt presented American policymakers -- especially in Congress -- with new opportunities, but also with new constraints in the setting of military/foreign policy that is ultimately responsible for the proliferation of the use of UAS. This is where both domestic American as well as global politics enters the picture. The increased use of UAS is seen by U.S. national security policymakers as an attractive tool because it creates an image of being strong on security and does so while limiting the number of troops put in harm’s way. But data on the scale, frequency, and location of U.S. air attacks not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also into other ‘lawless’ regions of Yemen and Somalia suggests increasing boldness, and thereby a greater assumption of risk of blowback, on the part of top-level military leaders and national security policymakers who have consciously escalated this aspect of waging war over the last several years (albeit amid attempts to limit civilian casualties).

Yet, it remains unclear the extent to which there are direct political losses for the American position in the GWOT and more generally on the world stage. Of course, an analysis of the tension between the use of hard power and blowback (i.e., a study of whether the U.S.-led WOT is killing more terrorists than it creates) would be the holy grail of conflict analysis in this century, but is impossible to attain because of the complexity of the factors motivating armed resistance over many years.31 In that sense, blowback is often accumulative and is often felt gradually over extended periods of time, making it exceedingly difficult to quantify. In fact, the key interesting feature of blowback is its incipient nature. There is literally no way of knowing for sure or

accurately measuring residual hatred across a population and how that will be manifested as attacks against U.S. interests in future battles or conflicts.

But in the question of blowback following collateral damage, there is the issue of shades of innocence (or guilt) that accompany those who are in the proximity of key terrorist figures. This has philosophical roots in questioning the murky division and often overlapping dividing line between ‘belligerent’ and ‘innocent bystander.’ Intelligence reports on high-level targets seldom contain any comprehensive knowledge on the extent to which family members, friends, or other associates may be funding, training, or otherwise assisting suspected militants. Thus, it does in fact come down to a philosophical judgment call. Naturally, those who sympathize with the ones killed as well as liberal human rights consciousness more generally would both tend to lean toward giving the benefit of the doubt to the victim, whereas supporters of the basic outline for a struggle of global civilized society against mass-casualty terrorism as a tactic (whether having roots in Islamic extremism or not) would tend to be able to justify such collateral deaths more readily. But with less intensity of conflict, exponentially more voluminous media coverage, and a comparatively acute aversion to U.S. casualties, the battlefield constraints of the post-9/11 conflict terrain are considerable.

Also, this technology has become ensconced in a certain mythological notion of hyper-capable governments through futuristic technologies, reminiscent of a kind of impersonal, technological ‘Big Brother’ governance from above. It has even been translated into perceptions of all out cowardice. Thus, there is an immense, largely under-recognized qualitative element to human casualties. It is not just the number of deaths that provokes outrage in the form of protest, uncooperativeness, and support for or a
direct hand in violent resistance (which comprise the bulk of palpable blowback). It is often a question of precisely how individuals are killed. Throughout the Muslim world, outrage over collateral deaths has arguably been disproportionate their true impact, compared to other conventional operations that tend to be far more deadly. In fact, solely in a theoretical vacuum of military objectives, covert action (often employing UAVs) is often more effective, and less lethal than conventional operations that are more susceptible to the fog of war. In fact, “… there is no reason to hold that UAS cause more collateral damage than bombing or even attacks with Special Forces or regular ones.”

Rife speculation about the future use of UAVs in a variety of applications has emerged as a kind of ‘hot-button’ issue, which is to say that the level of fascination many seem to have with such technologies likely exceeds their consequentiality on the battlefield up until now. Similarly, there are wide-ranging reports on the extent of collateral damage, making it difficult to pin down how effectual UASs have actually been. However, an in-depth study by terrorism expert Peter Bergen states that:

…reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan from 2004 to the present have killed between 830 and 1,210 individuals, of whom around 550 to 850 were described as militants in reliable press accounts, about two-thirds of the total on average. Thus, the true civilian fatality rate… is approximately 32 percent.

Such numbers are no doubt critical to military commanders, but from an academic standpoint, the relevance of this area of study derives from the tremendous social ripple effects that reverberate throughout the world following attacks that cause civilian

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33 Bergen and Tiedemann.
casualties—even if civilian deaths are assumed to be on the lower end of the scale.\textsuperscript{34} And although many analyses harp on the transformational character of the UAV specifically for battlefield operations or how they are undesirable due to blowback, little has been published about the extent to which they transform political dimensions of national security decision-making by shortening the time from target acquisition to destruction (and narrowing this window) such that proper political oversight becomes limited. Thus, a certain degree of trust and confidence must be allocated to those conducting the remotely-operated attacks, which all speaks to the value of a heightened intelligence role in this area of GWOT operations that have received presidential authorization for the DOD as well as the CIA, which operates its own drone strike program,\textsuperscript{35} to conduct what amounts to terrorist hunt-and-kill missions.

\section*{Re-Leveraging the ‘Stick’ of American Foreign Policy}

Although drones are not without their ethical quandaries, and dovish wings in both parties (libertarian Republicans and civil-libertarian Democrats) have expressed grave concern over collateral damage and other ethical reservations, a running theme in the following pages concerns the extent to which consensus is being forged on the drone question to -- in effect -- use hard power in a somewhat soft and perhaps smarter way. With radical advancements in drone and other technologies, the U.S. under the Bush Administration and now the Obama Administration has pushed to re-leverage the stick of foreign policy and use drones as an instrumental tool in the ongoing struggle against

\textsuperscript{34} Casualty reporting varies widely, as some “… commentators have suggested that the civilian death rate from the drone attacks in Pakistan is 98 percent, while one study claims it is only 10 percent.” The actual civilian casualty rate is more likely around 32%. See Bergen and Tiedemann.

\textsuperscript{35} Meyer.
violent Islamic terrorism. This represents an area of policy continuity, which is reflected in the data (given the muted nature of hawk/dove contention on airpower after 9/11, compared with prior decades). Given that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are by definition not interested in moving toward the use of conventional military conflict that abides by international legal standards of the rules of war, the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq had essentially attempted to impose the conventional realist/nation-state paradigm onto the complex threat(s) at hand and divert fire onto ‘hard’ (military) targets, even as the Islamist extremist call to global jihad that had precipitated 9/11 continues its quest to carry out mass-casualty terrorism against civilian populations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as ‘soft’ targets in cities throughout much of the rest of the world. Though largely perpetuating asymmetry, the interventions in these two theatres, the toppling of the Taliban and Baath Party regimes, and subsequent occupations have partly been justified by some as a ‘magnet’ for global terrorists, whereby jihadists were essentially prodded into using direct conventional violence (albeit in unconventional ways such as through the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) against military vehicles and personnel – the argument being that it is better to fight terrorism offensively with the use of hard power abroad than defensively with law enforcement approaches on the homeland. This constituted a deliberate conflation of state and non-state paradigms and converged the civilian and combatant spheres. However, bridging the stark divide between the nature of hard power agency in the world today -- and the tactics used in its


37 This was a fundamental argument put forth by the Bush Administration. But in reality, the U.S. and other members of the coalition it assembled in the years after 9/11 have employed both means of dealing with terrorism – war and law. The argument of policy having to reflect one or the other on an exclusive basis is arguably a false dichotomy.
name -- has involved other non-strategic aspects related to radical innovations in UAV technology, which have presented states engaged with varying degrees of resolve in the GWOT with opportunities to actually reclaim some degree of tactical advantage, even within the overwhelmingly asymmetrical context. In effect, UASs have provided a mechanism by which U.S. forces can operate on the (lower) level of terrorist operatives.

With this capability, the military has begun to close the gap of asymmetry. However, this is only possible because of recent innovations in the use of new technologies, particularly as the delivery of ‘smart’ munitions has become cheaper, easier, and lacking any real risk to human operators. They have also become much more accurate with advanced computer guidance systems, which have made it possible to send munitions on to targets without harming people or property just yards away.

Within the realm of international conflict, the political leaders, decision-makers, and military strategists of individual states are fundamentally constrained by the hardware, technology, and resources at their disposal. Just as the inability to legitimately use hard power within the confines of a particular conflict equates to a loss of that power in the real world, re-gaining applicability of power is tantamount to an increase of it. Whereas the use of IEDs has made U.S. and Coalition troops operating in Afghanistan and Iraq ‘sitting ducks,’ UAS have reclaimed tactical advantages and have instead made terrorist operatives/insurgent militants into ‘sitting ducks.’ Militant activities are now readily seen on video screens and can be attacked almost immediately, greatly altering the battlefield psyche of militants who have grown increasingly paranoid and alter their

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38 The MQ-1 Predator costs a modest $4 million, while the MQ-9 Reaper comes in at approximately $11.4 million. See Tierney and North.
patterns of activity to elude UAS.\textsuperscript{39} After all, in the borderlands region of Afghanistan and Pakistan “the drones, which make a buzzing noise, are nicknamed \textit{machay} (“wasps”) by the Pashtun natives, and can sometimes be seen and heard, depending on weather conditions.”\textsuperscript{40}

Transitioning the existing tools of the military trade to meet the problem of global terrorism and further exploit the weaknesses of relatively unsophisticated terrorist groups has in many respects, merely been a process of retrofitting and tweaking the natural strategic advantage that the U.S. air fleet already enjoys in the skies above many regions throughout the Middle East. This has largely been the case for the U.S. and several of its NATO allies, which have moved toward downsizing and specializing air fleets but have also been unwilling to abandon their conventional military might in order to bridge the asymmetrical divide, including their air forces, because they are cognizant that traditional power plays on the world stage remain viable under a realist paradigm. Certainly, adding to their arsenals and adopting new innovations in technology that allow conventional military assets to comport more accurately with the nature of the threat of militants that form a kind of global insurgency has been underway even before 9/11. Such is precisely the case with UAVs which actually have quite a long history but have more recently come to fill this void of ‘ungoverned’ tribal areas such as in South Waziristan where ‘carrots’ are largely off the table. And whereas the drones in a colony of bees are typically stingless, the drones of the modern American military feature plenty of ‘stick,’

\textsuperscript{39} It has even been reported that key militants “…sleep outside under trees to avoid being targeted… [and] Taliban militants regularly execute suspected ‘spies’ in Waziristan accused of providing information to the United States…” See Bergen and Tiedemann, p. 5.

which most leaders in Washington tend to agree has been re-leveraged quite effectively to at least in part, mitigate conflict asymmetry.

In this vein, there is much to explore regarding the continuation of U.S. air power predominance in the 21st century and its implications for the construct of ‘grand national security strategy’ in the GWOT, particularly as it pertains to the recent escalation of the use of deadly UAVs under the Obama Administration, which as a form of extrajudicial execution, “… represents a radically new and geographically unbounded use of state-sanctioned lethal force.”41 In discussing how this area of military innovation has somewhat lessened the extreme asymmetry of battle,42 this topic also demands an explanation of the increasing importance of real-time intelligence and interagency cooperation as well as the contrasting political realities of what are widely reported as successful attacks on the one hand, and virulent ‘blowback’ against the U.S. and its interests on the other. And in exploring these complex issues that clearly have several political, strategic, moral, ethical, and legal dimensions, there is a false tendency toward believing that somehow asymmetry is exclusively an advantage for the non-state/terrorist organization in every respect. Quite the contrary, this section puts forth the argument that within this landscape, remote-operated precision air power has displayed the increasing feasibility of American forces utilizing its own sort of unconventional tactics against an unconventional enemy. To be sure, UAVs are becoming increasingly conventional within

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41 Ibid.

42 There is a distinction between the use of attack drones against covert terrorists and somewhat more overt militants in the U.S. military theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq. Armed UAVs still retain a significant limitation/conventional element in that they are markedly less effective and/or altogether impractical against ‘sleeper cells’ already blended into civilian populations, plotting to attack cities in the West or in other highly-populated areas around the world.
the branches of the Armed Forces and the CIA, perhaps even outstripping manned aerial assets in the near future.

**Presidential Transition and the Swing of the Pendulum?: From Bush to Obama**

For all the negative public relations over collateral damage, the American senior leadership at the Defense Department has accepted the value of this instrument of power and their civilian counterparts have largely been willing to incur the political fallout of seeing the drone programs through. As this is the case, it is an area of hard power that requires adequate oversight (both executive and legislative), such that covert strike operations do not stray from the intent of lawmakers or undermine the position of diplomats to negotiate with foreign powers on terrorism or other issues. And although Congress has wrestled with the issue in its own right, more light can be shed in the data for 2001-2012 alongside an elaboration of the presidential politics witnessed in the transition from President Bush to President Obama.

Similar to how LBJ (and President Kennedy before him) got the U.S. into Vietnam, and the opposite party was elected in part to end the war but ended up carrying out escalation in some respects, the Republicans lost power to the other side (President Obama) which had advocated dovish sentiments but turned out to be rather hawkish with respect to drone usage in particular. This reveals the many shades of hawkishness and dovishness, which do not always adhere to the binary continuum outlined in the opening of this dissertation. In fact, it has become apparent that the Obama years are fast becoming characterized by the rather liberal application of hard power, and for lack of a better term, a somewhat hawkish presidency. Yet, the hawkishness is itself subject to
qualification insofar that President Obama has advocated a lessening of major Iraq-style ground action, while at the same time supporting the increase in aerial activities (and Special Forces activities).

Nonetheless, continuing on the heels of the Bush Administration and holding over several key members of the national security team such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander David Petraeus, the very noticeable increase in the reliance on UAV power under the Obama Administration\textsuperscript{43} has allowed for criticism from the left in questioning his pacifist bona fides. On the other side, even some notable right-of-center commentators who might otherwise tend to be much more hawkish have suggested that the U.S. and its NATO allies should have begun to pull troops out of Afghanistan much earlier and instead play a more limited regional security role with emphasis placed on UAVs replacing boots on the ground in a combat role.\textsuperscript{44}

Even as the data for this chapter seems to show no notable fluctuation in the changing of the guard from the Bush to Obama Administrations, the ‘surge’ in Afghanistan, the increased use of UAV attack drones in aerial theatres abroad (Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, etc.), the Libya operation as part of NATO alliance, and the unilateral operation Neptune Spear to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan are each events indicative of fundamentally hawkish inclinations. Although the Obama Administration came to power cloaked in the rhetoric of dovishness, military policy (insofar as it is shaped by both the executive and legislative branches) has maintained a track of general hawkishness and relatively low levels of contention from dovish wings in either party.

\textsuperscript{43} Bergen and Tiedemann.

\textsuperscript{44} Will.
Beyond the mere fact that people in power tend to want to exercise that power, there seems to be some interesting dynamics at work on the other side of the coin as well. As a case in point, most of the dovish votes against a key force authorization bill on Libya in the U.S. House (one of several similar floor votes) came from Republicans, again confirming the partisan ‘pull’ on hawk/ dove dynamics:

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H.J. Res. 68 (June 24, 2011 - 112th Congress) authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya.  

This certainly runs contrary to what might have been imagined in the mid-2000s, when clear dividing lines existed between hawks and doves – often grouped quite closely to party. The hawkishness of the Bush Administration was mirrored in the Republican Party ranks and its platform, while the Democratic opposition was largely defined by its dovish policy ideals. What might otherwise seem like a crossing of the wires in the hawkish/ dovish debate on airpower may in reality be more of a convergence of opinion on the increasing obsolescence of ground action. Insofar as there may be this growing consensus on the problems associated with large-scale invasions (and largely lessons learned from the experience in Iraq), there is growing recognition of the value of aerial hard power over other means of using force. Moreover, there may be an associated

45 From the Govtrack.gov data set. See <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2011/h493>
acceptance in the dovish school of thought in American foreign policy that if force must be used, at least it can be carried out in an informed, direct, and limited basis.

There understandably remains heated passion on both sides of the debate for or against the use of UAVs and related issues. If anything, there appears to be more complexity insofar as the libertarian wing of the Republican Party, often the younger leaders associated with Tea Party politics, tend to be somewhat less susceptible to the arguments for interventionism. Yet, it is not unfounded to conclude that at least in terms of airpower usage, the pendulum of party politics and polarization inherent to hawk/dove dynamics has swung to the right in recent years and essentially stayed there, even under Democratic leadership. In other words, the move toward hawkishness (and thereby less contention) in aerial power has seemed to transcend both administrations, and perhaps has more of a national than a partisan character with real staying power.

**Conclusion**

Although the case is ‘young’ and still unfolding, this chapter has shown that hawk/dove politics in the post-9/11 have thus far been tame by the standards set in the Vietnam years and during the Reagan Cold War years. And yet, the last two years have begun to show the re-emergence of this type of contention, especially in the area of defense spending given that fiscal policy – including cuts to the military - has become crucial to the austerity debate in most nations. Unless this marks the beginning of a new baseline for contention in the years ahead, it is likely that with even more historical hindsight, the post-9/11 case will be seen for the relative unity seen throughout the ‘WOT.’ In that sense, it seems as though the media narrative about the extent of political
divisions in the nation’s war-making activities have outstripped the reality, at least as far as it concerns contentious voting in Congress.

To be sure, the unity that followed immediately after 9/11 was materially reflected in the business of the institution insofar as its handling of military policies that tended to show a low level of issue intensity. And to the extent there was any leaning to one side or the other, it is evident that this move toward a relative consensus on hard power issues occurred in the hawkish direction. Although both periods were characterized by great violence, the post-9/11 data shows more unity, but perhaps more volatility in the potential for fluctuation. The fact that the data jumped so significantly in 2011 over a very limited role for U.S. forces in a multinational effort shows the pull of partisan politics. And yet, airpower seems to have at least some level of immunity against the partisan contention that hangs over routine defense funding bills, for example. These and other conclusions are no doubt subject to change and bear further study, especially given the complexity involved and the inevitability of new trends in the years to follow.

With both cases now established in the data and its analysis, this dissertation now proceeds to the concluding chapter, reaching more general conclusions in analyzing the comparison of the two case studies. It provides a recap of the main findings and a discussion of their relevance in a broader global affairs context.
Chapter Six:  
Further Conclusions and a Look to the Future

This dissertation has shown that the U.S. Congress has undergone a series of shifts in the nature of the debate on peace and war according to major changes in the strategic conflict paradigm. Though not always leading to definitive results, the preponderance of the research suggests that airpower has been critical in this story as battles over technology and their use on the battlefield raged during critical junctures in American foreign policy. Varying in their degree of importance, each of the litmus tests for the assertiveness of foreign/military policy have similarly been accounted for in terms of the intensity of legislative contention they exhibit with time (along with the public debate that surrounds it). On the heels of both case studies now established, this final chapter offers some conclusions in terms of the perspective gained from the comparative method applied in the examination of similarities and differences seen with the (post)-Vietnam and (post)-9/11 eras. It proceeds with a discussion of conclusions falling under two main headings reflected in the literature review: that which can be said in general terms for the Congressional data on the hawk/dove dynamic, and secondly, conclusions on the wider role of airpower technology in the evolving (and increasingly asymmetrical) global conflict environment. The very last section turns to some informed brainstorming on how things may unfold into the future, both empirically and in terms of continuing this area of research.
Comparing Cases: Hawks and Doves over the Long Run

The comparative method employed here is useful in its simplicity. Having two cases to compare and contrast facilitates a whole range of conclusions that can flow from such an analysis. This relatively straightforward approach is a counterbalance to the inherent complexity of the issues being considered. However, the degree of complexity found in the nature of America’s security predicament and subsequent use of force after 9/11, is precisely what makes comprehensive study of the hawk/ dove dynamic both before and after this paradigm shift so worthwhile. In a sense, the years surrounding Vietnam could be seen as a control for the set of quite radical changes that have been seen after 9/11 (mostly straying from conventional features of conflict) and which have been tested here with the most significant implications for understanding current affairs in this area.

Each of the seven litmus tests moved according to an interplay of several causes/ facilitators unique to each of the cases, but over the nearly half century that the data covers, it is interesting that at no point since 1966 did hawks hold a greater lead over doves in Congress. But even as national security hawks have produced and maintained a stronger presence of opinion than doves nearly throughout the entire data set, dovish sentiments have carved out a sizeable and permanent place in modern political discussions concerning war and peace issues, especially as it concerns the basic suspicion of what is viewed as the overzealous nature of American military action.

Seen in no uncertain terms, there was somewhat of an unexpected result in that the contention seen in the charts peaked, virtually across the board, somewhere in between the main conflict periods receiving the focus of the comparative analysis.
Although the 1980s fall under the post-Vietnam purview, they were years characterized by a since unrivaled interplay of the heightened potential for conflict and the radical advancement of aerial technology. The data showing the overall summit in the data around 1986 supports the notion of placing the Reagan Cold War years in somewhat of a special category. At no other point in the last 60 or so years was there such a gap between the level of actual engagement by U.S. military force (relatively low) and the level of contention over military affairs (very high). This is an interesting finding because it suggests that the sharpest debate comes not over existing conflict or short-term problems, but rather how to handle and prepare for the next (as yet unknown) war(s) as a longer-term strategic problem. In other words, airpower and most of the other litmus tests were more a point of dispute during periods of relative peace, when the specter of future conflict did however loom large. Indeed, this fits with Congress’ role as a longer-term oversight body, seldom involved in day-to-day handling of foreign/military affairs and the Reagan Cold War years show quite clearly that all of the litmus tests -- not the least of which airpower support -- spiked quite significantly and in relative unison during the height of militarization and ‘nuclearization’ of space in the tit-for-tat between U.S. and Soviet ICBM technology programs (both offensive and defensive).

In periods of significant military engagement (involving all elements of hard power), as was the case in Vietnam and then in both Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, there was a clear difference between the two case studies in the degree to which airpower policy was contested in hawk/dove terms. This is to say that Vietnam and the years that followed were indeed much more controversial than post-9/11 conflict (at least in Congress), especially as it concerns the airpower litmus test. In fact, the reliance on (and
use of) airpower shares an inverse relationship with the amount of contention involved, meaning that when consensus begins to build around an aspect of national security strategy, it ends up being utilized more often precisely because it becomes an object of contention less often. Thus, although airpower has been utilized as an ever growing share of the U.S. hard power apparatus, this has not meant that controversy has necessarily followed; quite the contrary. The move toward a greater reliance on airpower has not occurred in spite of the controversy, it has occurred largely because the controversy itself has produced some harmony of opinion over years of debating the role of airpower and settling on it as a preferential means of using force when taking hard power action has been decided upon. However, as the conditions of conflict continue to change faster than ever, the basis on which this process of controversy, opinion-forming, and norm generation takes place may continue to become complicated – even for what later paragraphs in this conclusion describe as a certain movement towards consensus on airpower having pride of place in American grand strategy.

Over the course of such complex politicking and since the beginning of the time period covered by this study, there seems to have been a major break or shift in the nature of world conflict insofar as the U.S. military posture is affected, occurring roughly every 10 to 15 years: the Vietnam War, to the post-Vietnam or latter Cold War years, to the post-Cold War or ‘unipolar moment’ years, and then on to the post-9/11 years. One question going forward, is whether the Arab Spring in 2011 and the events surrounding it represent a new turning point for the course of American conflict and the hawk/ dove debate that shapes its course. The spike in the data reflecting the debate over intervention
in Libya in 2011 certainly suggests that the current decade may be one of significant fluidity, even as certain features of hawkishness and dovishness seem to persist.

Along each of these major mile-markers, the heart of the hawk/dove dynamic has been revealed, itself rife with certain paradoxes within both sides that are seen from the beginning of the data to its end. These speak to deeper and longer-standing features that were not themselves altered by the constraints/opportunities presented by either of the case studies. Conservatism, for example, is wary of foreign intervention and entangling alliances, yet holds a no-compromise position for the strength of America and the preservation of its interests. Along with the accelerated globalization of the post-World War II era, domestic strength and security is increasingly dependent on links to other nations around the globe, making foreign intervention and entangling alliances all the more likely to emerge as a means of preserve American interests and national strength.

On the other hand, the dynamic can bode in either direction on the liberal side of American politics, revealing what could also be considered a contravening policy aim. Liberalism preaches peace and pacifism, but is willing to intervene when certain conditions are met; namely multinational cooperation, clearly-defined objectives, and a passing of the ‘last resort’ rule of thumb. It is a body of thought seemingly not wary of becoming involved politically and linked to the fate of other nations, yet one that seems somewhat less willing to use force to protect and sustain the formation of its critical relationships.

In addition to any contradictions, the split itself is difficult enough to negotiate. Although a long period of history has been considered, hawks remain convinced that American security has an undeniable foreign component and is therefore something that
can only be achieved if ‘you go out there and get it.’ They act according to the time-honored, though seemingly counterintuitive notion held in the Latin adage ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum,’ meaning ‘if you wish for peace, prepare for war.’ On the operational side of this same coin, the Powell Doctrine, for example (named after Colin Powell), argues for the use of overwhelming (ground) force when acting so as to undermine the enemy’s willingness to fight and therefore mitigate the total loss of life produced by armed conflict. Though it may be hawkish at heart, it is dovish in its ends.

Self-described doves, on the other hand, remain firm in their allegiance to the notion that force should remain a last resort, and should itself never be used as a ‘coercive’ tool of foreign policy. They employ more of a wait-and-see approach (i.e., reactive), in the sense that they tend to view security in defensive terms, seldom achieved by proactive (i.e., preemptive) interventionist means. However, they tend to at times prefer the use of hard power on a limited basis on mostly humanitarian grounds. And yet, dovishness is always relative to the level of hawkishness present, meaning that dovish positions are often not defined by the opposite extreme of unvarnished opposition to military action and preparedness; but rather by a simple and thoughtful desire to act as a limiter of the extent of militarism.

Then there is another interesting split within dovish ranks - between those who have held firm to pacifist dogma, and those who feel that technocracy can be applied to the national security realm in order to make bad wars into good wars, and turn those that were unsupportable into those that are worth placing faith in. In fact the natural inclination of a liberal in the American context is to support liberal military engagement, vis-à-vis nearly a hundred years of predominantly Democratic Party wars in the
American Century. The rise of significant clusters of anti-war ideologues is a relatively recent advent in American politics, coming largely as a reaction to the difficulties of the Vietnam experience.

On the right, hawks often support hard power in all its forms on more traditional, realist grounds – rationalizing things in terms of perceived national interest, personal identity of nationalism, or perhaps even outright xenophobia. Part of hawkishness comes, however, in the tendency to go beyond the war only as a last resort rule of thumb – not necessarily because of simple bloodthirstiness, but because the ends begin to justify the means in a strategic assessment of threats, given overwhelming American conventional military superiority and its very real capacity to stamp out the world’s worst abusers of human rights and international order.

In a philosophical sense, these kinds of issues are at root, irreconcilable and will likely never be resolved until the very blueprint of Western democratic organization is fundamentally altered. This is a major aspect of continuity between the two case studies. And yet this perpetual tug of war (about the issue of war in the modern world) has profound implications in political and human terms, both domestic and global. For example, greater hawkish pressures in Congress and within the populace feed into the MIC, with not insignificant economic ramifications. A stronger hawkish presence within the discourse around the time of the Rwandan Genocide may have led to the insertion of U.S. military forces to intervene in defense of those being slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands – many in the most brutal of ways. On the other hand, hawkishness without balance can lead to excessive and/or unnecessary bloodshed. The balance between hawkishness and dovishness in practice is a delicate one, which does not readily lend
itself to easy answers in terms of which approach is more effective, legitimate, or even moral. With hindsight, excessive hawkishness can seem unwise, even reckless as in the popular disaffection with the Iraq invasion, as is the case with excessive dovishness which can be seen as weak, dangerous, or even shirking from responsibility as was much of the criticism of Neville Chamberlain’s purported appeasement of Hitler and the Nazi threat. There are instances of perceived success and folly on both side of the coin.

Much of this, therefore, boils down to an offensive/defensive divide between the policy poles. Although both may be equally concerned with the security of the nation, they part in how to achieve this. Hawks see the world, much as realists do, as an anarchical world where threats pervade. Especially because of globalization, these potential threats (both state and non-state alike) hold the potential to disrupt America’s security and stability gravely.

Stepping back a bit further, it is clear that the overall split between hawks and doves is about more than any single factor. It is undoubtedly tethered to the ground-level politics involved in electoral democracy, including parochial (monetary) interest of individual politicians, but it is also a dialectic process in which society struggles genuinely to find the best answers to problems of national security, which are often answered in the details of foreign and military policy. The development of highly particularized imagery such as fluttering doves offering carrots versus scowling hawks wielding sticks -- no doubt the basis of many a political cartoon -- is a reflection of the fundamental philosophical divide in question and its highly consequential nature for societies at large. This binary structure to the debate is itself a source of some contention, for on the one hand, heightened contention in these areas can be seen as healthy to
democracy because it shows vibrancy in debate, especially on the most consequential issues of peace and war that require deliberation to produce preferential solutions. But on the other hand, too much contention can paralyze the system and decisions on issues as important as going to war are argued to be best left to the clearest of cases in which there is something approaching unanimity.

This is certainly relevant in general, as well as legislative terms. Indeed, insofar as all of the data is focused, it speaks to the state of such opinions in the Congress, although supporting evidence from the historical record makes it clear that the hawk/dove dynamic exists beyond the scope of Congress’ role in government. The executive branch and its deliberative process of crisis decision-making when issues come before the National Security Council (NSC) for example, is very much pointed at weighing and balancing more hawkish vs. more dovish policy options depending on the level of threat, the reliability of intelligence, and the logistical feasibility of intervening – all happening in a much more demanding compressed time environment. The dynamic exists as well within the Department of State and the military itself (themselves representing dovish and hawkish wings, respectively, of the carrying out of foreign policy). There are always genuine differences of opinion over how to stern to behave in the conduct of diplomacy and how forcefully to act in terms of war planning. This research has only begun to scratch the surface on the hawk/dove dynamic in these other areas and discusses them only insofar as they are needed to broaden the otherwise limited focus on the Congress.

Thus, it is important to consider that the primary unit of analysis is limited -- especially so in the modern era. Many decades ago, when engaging in warfare necessarily meant sending large land armies overseas, there was simply more time for Congress to be
intimately involved. But with the pace of national security crises unfolding in a
globalized world, as well as the speed of airpower delivery that can be done on a
pinpointed and very limited basis, American warfare has been much more often, almost
exclusively under the province of the White House. To the extent that Congress has less
pull on questions of peace and war, this is mitigated by the fact that they are key partners
in the President’s ability to lead, and thus, there is somewhat of an alignment between the
branches. Also, the deference paid to the executive branch in this area makes it all the
more likely that the level of hawkishness in one branch will tend to mirror the other.¹

Therefore, it is obvious that because the use of airpower in tactical sense is time
sensitive, such as when President Clinton launched tomahawk missiles against the Bin
Laden training camps in Afghanistan in 1997, these decisions fall most often to those in
the executive branch of government (the people with their hands on the problem), and are
thus difficult to gauge from an analysis of Congress. The speed at which air strikes can be
authorized and carried out makes oversight, and certainly and hands-on involvement,
decidedly more cumbersome if not altogether unfeasible. This is part of the reason that
the exercise of U.S. hard power has moved away from the legislative branch towards the
executive branch. In fact, the power of the president over matters of national security in
general, has grown unmistakably compared to that of legislators who, beyond voting on
bills and amendments, only have generally outlined oversight roles depending on their
committee assignments. However, the longer-standing characteristics of hawkishness and

¹ The foreign policy complex has become defined by the executive branch carving out more areas of
control over external affairs, for every bit that Congress relinquished. Especially after WWII, the U.S.
Congress “increasingly… took a back seat to the person of the president, who commanded general
deferece as the embodiment of the nation in a semipermanent state of war.” See pp. 140 in Hunt, Michael
H., The American Ascendancy: How The United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance, The
dovishness are revealed with some precision by the litmus test of support for spending on aerial research, development, and actual hardware appropriated for the military. This is appropriate given Congress’ power of the purse role in the American system, and the incipient rise of the standing of the executive branch on matters of national security, foreign, and, military affairs. It represents a split, or division of labor, between Congress’ cultivation of airpower and the executive branch’s exercising of it. At both stages, however, the hawk/ dove split rears its head.

**Major Developments in Technology and the Aerial Battle Space**

Along with the remarkable advancements seen in aerial technological advancement over the last 100+ years, issues surrounding airpower have received wide-ranging attention from military strategists, academics, politicians, and indeed from popular culture. Humankind’s fascination with the air, in both the furtherance of war and in the conduct of peace, seems to know few bounds, even as flight -- both human and remote operated -- has become routine:

America’s fixation with air power after WWII was a passing phenomenon, and its recurrence seems hard to imagine. The key ingredient in the cultural recipe leading to faith in air power—a society so fascinated with the sudden reality of human flight as to ascribe messianic properties to the airplane… will never come again.  

And yet, it is interestingly the *removal* of the human operator from mechanized flight and the conduct of air warfare that has served to re-inject a renewed fascination into aviation, though perhaps not to the level present when Lindberg flew across the Atlantic Ocean. But to those tasked with the preservation of America’s defenses, there

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has indeed been a sea change, especially given that now the U.S. trains and graduates more Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) aviators than conventional ones (i.e., fighter and bomber pilots). Leaders have recognized that precision strike and the other array of advantages provided to militaries by the operation of UAS provide a huge strategic advantage of being able to penetrate behind enemy lines (insofar as that means anywhere on a non-linear battlefield). It is a sort of blitzkrieg, or lightning war, for the 21st century in which the objective is seldom to take a whole nation, but rather to take specific militants out of the fight, so to speak – a notion once thought unimaginable little more than a generation or two ago.

As a running theme, this dissertation has shown that the technology itself continues to be a significant vehicle for the contention seen between hawks and doves and is fundamental to the perpetuation of the dynamic. In fact, schisms of this kind over technology are age old. Since the very first criticisms of the Industrial Revolution appeared in romanticism and its artistic, literary, and intellectual themes, pacifist schools of thought have risen to express apprehension over the mechanization of death vis-à-vis advancements in military technology that did indeed turn the 20th century into somewhat of an assembly line of death (despite its unprecedented societal advancements). These anti-war opinions on the basis of an aversion to the technology itself, sharing much with more recent neo-luddism, hold that progress in these areas is inherently destructive to humankind and that nothing good can come of tools that are solely designed to increase lethality. But vastly opposed to those who believe in the inherent evil of technological innovation (particularly in the area of military arms), men like Alfred Nobel and Edward

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Teller pioneered each their own caliber of explosives (dynamite and the hydrogen bomb, respectively) in the hopes that the extent of destruction wrought by these would actually limit the likelihood and ultimate extent of human suffering in war – especially when held in the ‘right’ and most responsible hands. Similarly, theories of realpolitik and realism hold that the accumulation of power is not only natural, but it is fundamental to the characteristic of what states do, and that therefore, advancements in military technology are not inherently evil. If used in accordance with the ethics of warfare, they are mechanisms of the legitimate pursuit of security in an environment where comparable actors do the same. Under this view, tools of war are not necessarily malicious to the human species; it is a question of the intent of the user when it comes to the tools of combat. This is the basis of the justification for strategies of peace through strength, and which is undergirded by the theory of deterrence, as it is understood in the conventional nation-state meaning of the term.

To be sure, there are always radical extremes of both tendencies – the so-called ‘Unabomber,’ Ted Kazynski’s anti-technology campaign as outlined in his infamous manifesto following a string of terrorist bombings over decades comes down hard, for instance, against virtually all technologies. On the other extreme, many military leaders had advocated for the use of nuclear bombs in the Korean War, and later in the Vietnam War, even as a global taboo emerged around the use of nuclear weapons seen in the clear distinction between conventional and nuclear arms.4

4 In Korea, “US general Mark Clark, who... [became] UN commander in May 1952... was himself waiting for the opportunity to present to Eisenhower his strategy, known as Oplan 8-52... The US 8th Army would advance 90 or so kilometres [sic] to the narrow waist of Korea. There would be amphibious landings, air and sea attacks on China, a blockade and the attacks would include the use of nuclear bombs.” See Forbes, Cameron. “Korean War Faced Atomic-Bomb Conclusion.” The Australian. December 24, 2010. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/korean-war-faced-atomic-bomb-conclusion/story-e6frg6z6-1225975201581>
Far from either such extreme, and settling with the majority of opinion somewhere in the center or right of center, the drone debate in particular has been unique and leads to a set of conclusions about the state of such technology in the U.S.’s attempts to combat terrorism after 9/11. It is interesting that for these past several years, the U.S. has not been fighting an air war *per se*, with any air-to-air combat to speak of. Rather, it has been fighting what was always fundamentally a ground war, but conducted from the air in a new kind of battle space that features the tricky interspersion of belligerents and non-combatants in urban landscapes. Thus, the proliferation of unmanned military hardware in particular, has the power to transform the use of hard power and thereby, the landscape of global politics, which is still largely predicated on the use of force or the threat thereof. In particular, the current trajectory of the funding, development, and operationalization of UAS may offer a temporary lead for the U.S. and other advanced industrialized nations in the West, although other states such as China are of course expanding their capabilities in this area as well, after having reverse-engineered U.S. Firebee reconnaissance drones downed as far back as the Vietnam War.5

A new kind of arms race has certainly ensued, as the U.S. is certainly not the only nation to take a lead on drone technology, but generally, non-state actors have not entered into this arena. This is likely because of the cost prohibitive nature of UAS, which require sophisticated networks of individuals to launch, operate, and then maintain such craft. Thus, these aircraft remain primarily a state-controlled enterprise. And although UAV manufacturing has been dominated by private firms, ones that contract with the Pentagon to develop specific systems for the American military of course require Congressional

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approval to sell them abroad to states that are unwilling or unable to organically develop their own UAS and would prefer to secure them through direct acquisition. However, as time proceeds, it will become more and more likely that these kinds of remote-operated spy planes will ‘trickle down’ in to the hands of sub-state organizations such as drug cartels, which have employed increasingly brazen means of transporting narcotics, including the use of unmanned submarines. It is of particular note that:

…as global research and development (R&D) investment increases, it is proving increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive advantage across the entire spectrum of defense technologies.

However, the significant support for UAS by Congress demonstrates the continued resilience and adaptability of the American security agencies as well as the high-end technology sector rooted mostly in U.S. corporations to take the lead in new technological advancements. The funding and private contracting to countless private sector weapons development remains healthy and adaptive to new challenges, as one of the most dynamic sectors of the still-thriving MIC. What the Chinese for example take away from this is not fear over the fact that the U.S. is capable of striking a few terrorist operatives here and there. It is the larger picture of the American ingenuity and

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industriousness, and its ability to meet new challenges vis-à-vis defense companies like QuinettiQ and iRobot are at the cutting edge or robotics technologies.⁹

**A New Consensus on U.S. Interventionism?**

Whereas the basic ideas and motivations behind the hawkish/dovish poles, and their manifestation within the business of Congress, have remained largely unchanged, the methods of intervention and the challenges of doing so have changed given the backing of Congress and the industriousness of leading defense firms. This technological component in and of itself leaves the hawk/dove dynamic in a fundamentally different place today than when it began to emerge in earnest in the mid to late 1960s. Although the fundamental questions of how extensively to maintain the American colossus remain subject to significant disagreement (i.e., defense spending), the use of airpower in particular (over other means of force delivery and perhaps even before other options are exhausted) seems to be carving out a less contested space in the debate, and indeed in actual policy.

Echoing in eternity, the bombing of Dresden during WWII, for example, was a lesson in the horror of unmitigated death from above, with some 3,900 tons of high-explosive munitions and incendiaries dropped on mostly civilian populations during a massive four-part carpet-bombing raid.¹⁰ The main changes seen since then have been transformational along two parallel, yet seemingly counter-intuitive tracks. This area of weapons development has become less lethal while also becoming more lethal. This is

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possible in the sense that the killing potential pound-for-pound is unquestionably tilted in favor of an armed drone with precision strike capability over a B-52 dropping dumb bombs. On the other hand, the very precision that makes it more lethal to those intended for the crosshairs, it becomes far less lethal to non-combatants and innocent bystanders.

But one thing remains unaltered in both the conventional and the asymmetrical paradigm: the latest aerial technologies form the tip of the spear of American force whenever the use of hard power becomes a foregone conclusion.

Especially with the advancements that have been made, new technologies may be forging a sort of new consensus on foreign policy insofar that the cost to exert force in this way is less than other conventional arms being used. Interestingly, aerial technologies have been developed toward the delivery of more precise munitions, to in many cases, specifically assuage criticism from the left arguing that collateral damage is too great to justify using hard power in the first place. Otherwise inclined to merely deliver the most devastating bombardment possible, the extremes of a hawkish compulsion is attenuated in this way. Thus, especially in the modern environment, the sophistication of America’s air power has made it easier to be a hawk in the sense that limited action against an enemy with aerial attack holds down the cost of going to war and circumvents many of the unpopular aspects of initiating conflict in a democracy. In electoral terms, this means less worry over war weariness on the part of the public, few personal sacrifices in people’s daily routines, and little journalism coverage of casualties/horrors of combat. Depending on the opponent in question, one can support the use of force by the U.S. on an assumption of few people in uniform being placed in harm’s way, and an intrinsic distance between the conflict and the homeland.
Any warming to hawkishness is enhanced when the force in question is already underway and also when it is of a more limited nature. Therefore, the changes seen in the advancements of aerial platforms toward smaller and more capable packages in use against an ongoing extremist militant threat from the likes of al-Qaeda have worked toward a certain consensus of hawkishness on airpower. In many other cases, it simply bypasses the hawk/dove dynamic with the hawkish route (i.e., consensus). Procedurally, 1996 for example saw increase in number of voice votes on airpower, meaning less contention. Unanimous consent agreements increased in this area in 2000, and in 2001, no fewer than 30 extra amendments on airpower came to the floor of Congress (that would otherwise have made into the data set), all without any substantive contention (either voice vote or UCA). In 2002, the only real airpower contention was over arming pilots on civilian flights and deleting funding for missile silos. And in October of 2005, for example, Senate amendment 1882 to H.R. 2863, which set out “to increase, with an offset, amounts available for the procurement of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles” was agreed to in the Senate by unanimous consent.11

That said, it is difficult to trace these changes according to specific changes in the technology of aerial warfare because such developments can have countervailing outcomes. For example, if certain technologies are proven to work and be uniquely deadly, this may lead to a hawkish tendency on the basis that it allows for the U.S. military to carry out its duties more efficiently, but it may also foster a dovesh tendecy on the basis that the technology is too destructive or perhaps indiscriminate in administering death from above. The surveillance and precision targeting features of the

11 See Library of Congress data through the THOMAS system at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d109:45.:./temp/~bdkmC0::>
latest drones tend to assuage the latter concern, but the debate is still not free from those who oppose these new technologies – on both sides of the political spectrum. Civil libertarians, mostly in the left, tend to agree with the libertarians on the right that fear drones and the power they hold over people (even the nation’s enemies), are simply too extensive and threaten to spiral out of control, perhaps even in the wrong hands someday. Others from a tactician’s perspective simply oppose them on the basis of their impersonality; the idea that it is hard to win hearts and minds simply from robots in the air.

To be sure, the technology allows an opening for doves to take on a hawkish tone because it is so much less intrusive in the application of hard power. Many who might otherwise carry the dovish mantle are actually voting hawkish because it is limited in nature, and may in their opinion actually serve to lessen casualties on both sides. Thus, it is the quality of the hawkishness that is of concern, not merely its quantity. Not all means of intervention are created equal. American leaders seem to have coalesced around a belief in the ability of drones to deliver foreign policy ends more effectively as a beneficial option than what hawkish policies used to entail – greater ground force and larger commitments.

Thus, the debate may have shifted to a point where dovish tendency has embraced the limited stick of unmanned airpower and precision strike capability as a means of excusing the need for larger, more conventional aspects of U.S. air superiority to continue to guard against such challenges by potential state adversaries in the future. What doves like about the direction of the war against terrorism is that it provides an excuse to transition to a lighter, cheaper, and more mobile force – one that is ultimately less lethal
in a conventional sense, because it does not need to be large and bulky in order to fight low intensity conflict. As undesirable as it is compared to an ideal of world peace, the low loss of life inherent in LIC (compared to great purges of human life in the world wars for example) satisfies dovish concerns over bringing down the average loss of life in international conflict. The advances in technology themselves, allow for this thinking to operate more extensively, where doves seem like hawks especially when conflict can be conducted remotely.

Despite the clear zones of disagreement seen throughout the data presented in previous chapters, there is a school of thought suggesting that differences between hawkish and dovish poles are hardly skin-deep. Thus, one interpretation is to conclude that overall, the dynamic is really only about the contesting of relatively minor details and is ultimately just tweaking around the edges. Beyond the relative consensus about the leadership role for the U.S. (including its assertive military) to ‘police the world,’ many aspects of military policy are not even contested in any significant way by doves. Defense funds, for example, are essentially ‘main-lined’ because things like operation and maintenance costs do not start from zero in the budget. In fact, ‘zero’ becomes measured in relation to the projected rate of increase from the previous year. To stray from this perpetually inclined trajectory becomes the starting point in the discussion. However, as this data shows, individual programs for weapons systems are singled out to be funded/ de-funded. This could be considered the upper echelon of the defense budgeting process, where Congress exerts its control over its special projects to foster the highest-end (non-classified) weapons systems in the world. And yet, some of the clashes
do have a significant impact on the fate of specific systems that translate into real-world tactical advantages/disadvantages for troops deployed in future conflicts.

These clashes, however, tend to have less impact on the overarching trajectory of American military prowess. As it pertains to the Obama Administration’s somewhat ‘surprising’ hawkishness explored in chapter five, which is indicative of the general consensus formed around the more hawkish tone for American global leadership:

Obama accepts the ideology of national security completely… [which] is not a statement about Obama’s flexibility or lack of it, except to say that he is constrained by the assumptions that govern how the political class understands the world and America’s place in it. The belated recognition by neoconservatives that Obama accepts this ideology was inevitable. They feign surprise mainly because it is useful to maintain the fiction that there are meaningful, large differences between the parties on major policies and they have an incentive to perpetuate the idea that they are better adherents of this ideology than those farther to the left. Likewise, there is a strong incentive on the left to emphasize small differences with neoconservatives over means and tactics.12

This embrace of relatively hawkish positioning -- especially concerning the use of armed drones -- by the Democratic Party (at least in rhetoric and within the executive branch) seems to tell a story of significantly less daylight between the two sides in partisan terms, which is mirrored as well in hawk/dove terms by the data set. Either hawk/dove contention was superficial all along, or there has indeed been a certain convergence of opinion – or both. To be sure, the combination of both factors has led to a similar place, although the data itself seems to suggest that the formation of some degree of consensus (i.e., policy convergence) through a long and event-filled process has been the more significant factor. Splits between hawks and doves were, and continue to be real – not just perceived phenomena, even as they may have come less frequently in the post-

That said, the complexity involved in these issues may be a push-factor in increasing the intensity of the dynamic while the precision of the munitions themselves may very well have the effect of facilitating the ‘easy’ and therefore more adventurous use of force. Indeed, before the relative ease and efficiency of launching hard power from the air, engaging in military conflict required huge efforts in terms of finances, manpower, industrial capacity, and centralized resource management. Accordingly, such undertakings were most often reserved for those conflicts that were distinctly part of the national interest, and thereby less controversial. “Easier wars” – that is, wars that can be launched with limited engagement are more likely to occur, though the overall lethality may be less.

Of course there is an emerging literature on the ethics of remote operated warfare where the argument is made that greater precision and capability to kill makes it more tempting to use such robotic weapons systems and therefore likely that casualties will rise.\(^\text{13}\) Certainly, there are “… fears that when countries no longer fear losing soldiers' lives in combat thanks to the ability to wage war with unmanned vehicles, they may prove more willing to initiate conflict.”\(^\text{14}\) However, the particularly strong American aversion to casualties following the experience in Vietnam (and put on display during the pullout of U.S. troops from Somalia in 1993) has made the use of UAVs an enticing


policy option to U.S. leaders. Such ease in the carrying out of force has always served to make some leaders more hawkish because they are that much more assured in victory. However, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the ease of calling in airstrikes has made politicians more hawkish.

Nonetheless, the case has been made both for and against the use of precision strike capability; on one side as a reaction to the abuse of terrorists’ civilian status to attack innocent men, women, and children, and on the other side, an aversion to the killing of innocents as a byproduct of targeting the guilty. Even though these decisions are made carefully with legal counsel from afar, and are funneled through the careful checks and balances of the chain of command, it brings the ultimate extent of law (i.e., a death sentence) to places that are all but completely lawless. And this ‘extrajudicial execution’ even of American citizens abroad such as Anwar al-Awlaki signifies a continuation (and indeed an escalation) of hawkish policies under President Obama, despite rhetoric to the contrary by the administration and by many of its most loyal supporters.

**Going Forward: Change as a Constant in the Use of Aerial Power**

The debate over how hard and how often the stick of American foreign policy should be swung, in addition to how large it should be in peacetime, will always be a pressing issue so long as critical national security challenges face the country. Notwithstanding all of the changes seen in the adaptation of American forces to the concept of asymmetry and the lighter, more technologically-driven aspects of fighting such conflict, there remains significant reservations (especially within hawkish ranks)
about strategic overcompensation. “If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one.”\(^{15}\) Especially with the rise of other major state powers (e.g., the so-called BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China in particular), the debate may at least in part swing back to a discussion of military preparedness in conventional terms against other state adversaries in potential (symmetrical) wars of the future. Hawks have specifically retained an element of not jumping too quickly to abandon the concern for conventional military strength as a deterrent and bulwark against potential state-adversaries of the future.

That said, UAVs have the potential to have at least as much impact in conventional wars as they do in present-day asymmetrical ones. Therefore, this is less of a debate about whether the new asymmetrical paradigm should be embraced in the sense that UAV technology presents itself as a clear, largely bi-partisan, component of American strategy in combating militant extremists after 9/11. It is much more a question of whether elements of the old, conventional paradigm remain relevant and how new technologies fit into whatever rules of the game remain intact. The left, which has largely moved to accept the need for drone strikes and the like vis-à-vis President Obama’s evidently hawkish policy in this area, tends to view nuclear missile/ defense technology for example as antiquated and no longer needed, or at least significantly less relevant, to provide for longer-term U.S. and international security. Though clear in embracing new technological advances in the area of UAVS and the like, the right, has maintained an emphasis on need for maintaining conventional/ nuclear predominance as

well, in the face of lingering state adversaries such as North Korea, a regressive Russia, and perhaps even a not-long-off nuclear-armed Iran. Hawks of many stripes have been reluctant to place all the eggs of military armaments in this one basket of an exclusively asymmetrical paradigm. In the end however, the right has tended to embrace both paradigms and kept the throttle on funding for both types of technology – both the cutting-edge remote strike capabilities as well as the older, more conventional, and far more powerful nuclear ICBMs.

Also part of this area of discussion is the fact that although hawks advocate for the development and use of drone and other aerial technologies at least as forcefully as any dove in a position of leadership, they have after 9/11 also stressed the need for ground campaigns (as well as basic realist concerns over maintaining a strong conventional military to guard against current and future state adversaries). This turned into support for counterinsurgency strategy, accompanied by surges of ground forces, to ‘win’ the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – a strategy to which doves in the Democratic Party in particular were largely opposed.

In the end, however, it may simply be concluded that air operations tend to be less contentious and ground operations tend to be more contentious, no matter the affiliation or ideational allegiance of individual leaders. By extension, the cases showed that the Vietnam War (a more or less symmetrical conflict with vast commitments in blood and treasure) tended to stir up more hawk/dove discontent than what has been the case for post-9/11 conflict (largely asymmetrical conflict with a lower level of commitments in
blood and treasure). This is borne out by a comparison of the costs of American warfare during these two eras.16

Thus, in the near(er) term, much debate will continue to center on drones and the ethical questions that surround their use (including in domestic law enforcement capacities). There has already been a sort of fraying of the usual dynamic here, offering further evidence of the trans-partisan nature of hawk/ dove politics. Republicans such as Ron Wyden and Rand Paul in the Senate may have more in common with the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) position on drones, then with the older hawks his own party such as John McCain (highlighting the fine line/ periodic overlap between libertarians on the right and civil libertarians on the left). In fact, more and more conservative politicians have recently begun to express grave reservations about drones -- both the technologies and the policies/ guidelines that govern their use -- especially as it concerns domestic use.17 But even as much debate swirls over the basic question over the ethics of their use, many more questions will surround the need for governance in this area when the decision to use them is reached (as it already so often has, often without much governance due to its novel status as an issue). By extension, what will be interesting to see in the coming years, is how -- amid future cuts to defense -- this prioritization weighing between conventional and aerial/ remote armaments plays out.

16 Although the U.S. has spent well over $1 trillion on warfare since 9/11 (compared to $738 billion for the Vietnam War in fiscal year 2011 adjusted dollars), Vietnam was far more of a commitment – financially, and certainly in terms of the loss of human life – when the figures are considered as a percentage of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) during the year of the war’s peak. In these terms, Vietnam amounted to 2.3% of the nation’s wealth while all post-9/11 operations (including Afghanistan, Iraq, and other actions) have amounted to just 1.2% of the nation’s wealth. See Daggett, Stephen. “Costs of Major U.S. Wars.” Congressional Research Service. June 29, 2010. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf>

Even with the move toward wide acceptance of the legitimate role of armed drone in 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare, further revolutions will likely be applied to the UAS platform to even further assuage the concerns of opponents of such technologies. This may very well come to include less-than lethal deterrence mechanisms such as LRADs for physical deterrence, blinding laser systems to debilitate combatants, non-lethal projectiles, and/ or perhaps even drones that may one day swoop down and capture, instead of kill, individual combatants. This might allow for militants to be taken out of the fight and subsequently screened for intelligence while avoiding the escalation inherent to the use of lethal force. This will begin to blur the lines between military and law enforcement applications of UAV technologies, bringing still more ethical questions as yet unresolved to the fore. Such advances in the technology have, and will continue therefore, to be subject to the hawk/ dove dynamic. It may also continue to thrust questions of how heavy-handed to apply force down to the tactical level, whereby individual units are tasked with deciding grave questions of how forcefully to apply airpower, as with the dilemma of whether to strike in a small village where winning hearts and minds is the goal. This speaks to the personalization of warfare seen in the targeting of individual militants tracked with surveillance drones -- often with facial recognition or other biometric identifiers -- to then go through a stage of quasi-judicial review by military or CIA lawyers, before green-lighting a subsequent lethal strike.

In terms of this specific area of research going forward, there would certainly be much value in continuing this into the future (both for its own sake and to offer a greater period of time in the post-9/11 case on which to make further conclusions). Other similar and related approaches could also be taken to re-configure the data according to different
means of classification. For instance, another worthy method would have been to look only at defense spending, and then slice up litmus tests according to each area of armed force (e.g., airpower, naval power, land power, and perhaps nuclear arms and cyber capability, etc.). Indeed, this would be even more specific to airpower, with each other area of the use of force acting as a control for the extent of the reliance on air assets over others, which could be pinned down more effectively with this data configuration.

To be sure, this area of research and analysis is far from complete or definitive. The sheer extent of the complexities involved lends itself to significant further exploration of these issues lying beyond the scope of this dissertation. That said, the data has at a minimum established connections between the nature of air warfare technology available to the U.S. during the Vietnam War (namely the limitations of the ‘dumb’ bombardment strategy), and the contention seen in the political realm over airpower and other issues of military concern. This connection bears further scrutiny, especially as the conflict environment continues to evolve and airpower technology continues in its sophistication; how wrong indeed Orville Wright’s expectation that aircraft would one day lead to the obsolescence of war.
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## Appendix A - Full Data Set

### DATA

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Appendix J - Airpower Weapons Systems Voted on in Data Set*

*As they are referred to in drafted legislation and which fall under the airpower litmus test. More/other weapons systems are specified in the full-text versions of these bills/amendments. This chronological list reflects aerial weapons systems developed over the years specifically mentioned in the title of the bill/amendment as the subject of a floor vote. Note that some systems/programs are the subject of such votes on more than one occasion within the data set.

- Nike X antiballistic missile system
- Surface to air missiles known as Hawk, Nike-Hercules, and Bomarc
- Bomber defense system known as Sage
- The Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA)
- Nuclear aircraft carrier designated CVAN-69
- C-5A cargo aircraft
- Anti-ballistic missile system known as the Safeguard System
- The proposed international fighter aircraft
- F-14 airplane
- Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missile system
- The B-1 manned bomber
- CVN-70 nuclear attack aircraft carrier
- The SAM-D Missile
- A-10 close air support aircraft
- CVN-70 nuclear aircraft carrier
- Navy submarine launch cruise missile program
- A-10 aircraft
- A-7D aircraft
- F-18 Navy air combat fighter
- Enforcer aircraft
- Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
- Long range cruise missile
- Minuteman III
- F-111 fighter/ bomber
- Non-nuclear Lance missiles
- CVN-71 nuclear aircraft carrier
- Marine Corps advanced Harrier V/STOL aircraft
- Grumman Gulfstream II aircraft for Marine Corpse
- Wide-Bodied Cruise missile carrier
- MX missile
- CVN Nimitz Class aircraft carrier
- F/A-18 Naval fighter/ attack aircraft
- Aircraft carrier Saratoga (life extension program)
- FB-III program
- Airborne space-based laser program
- MX/MPS system
- Stealth bomber program
- B1-B bomber aircraft
- KC-10A tanker/ cargo aircraft
- B-707 aircraft
- KC-135 aircraft
- A-7K aircraft
- F-16 aircraft
- AGM-65D Maverick missile
- Trident II missile
- Axe anti-airbase missile
- Pershing II missile
- C-5 aircraft
- Light aircraft carriers of the type 45 class
- FFG-7 guided missile frigate program
- Division air defense gun (DIVAD)
- Antisatellite systems
- Strategic defense initiative
- Division air defense system
- Air Force space system survivability program
- Trident II D-5 missile
- T-46 trainer aircraft
- Bigeye binary chemical bomb program
- F-15 aircraft
- Bigeye nerve gas bomb
- Minuteman II
- Rail-based mode for MX missile
- Trident I missile
- Missile defense system to guard against accidental launches
- Kinetic-kill vehicle tested as one element of SDI
- C-17 aircraft
- Midgetman ICBM
- Ground-based anti-satellite weapon
- FSX aircraft
- SRAM-T missile
- Multiple-launch rocket system
- B-2 advanced technology bomber program
- Kinetic energy ASAT program
- Theatre Missile Defense Initiative
- Joint Tactical Missile Defense program
- Short-range attack missile tactical (SRAM T) program
- D-5 Trident II missile
- Air Force ground-wave emergency network (GWEN) program
- Kinetic energy antisatellite (KE-ASAT) program
- Ballistic Missile Defense Organization single-stage rocket technology and single-stage-to-orbit program
- Milstar satellites
- CVN-76 aircraft carrier
- B-2 Bomber Industrial Base program
- Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ)
- Kiowa Warrior light scout helicopters
- ASAT Antisatellite weapon program
- TOW 2B
- Hellfire II missile
- CBU-87
- Space-based interceptors or space-based direct-energy weapons
- F/A-18C/D fighters
- Air National Guard KC-135 aircraft
- F/A-18E/F aircraft
- Conventional Trident Modification program
- Predator drones
- F-22A fighter aircraft
- F-119 engines
- AARGM Counter Air Defense Future Capabilities
- UH-1Y/AH-1Z rotary wing aircraft
- Joint strike fighter program
- Joint strike fighter’s alternative engine program
- Navy and Air Force V-22 Osprey aircraft
- Ground-based midcourse missile defense system
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