THE ROLE OF SOFT-LINE GOVERNMENTAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS TOWARDS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION PERIOD: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY BETWEEN THE PKK AND ETA

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Global Affairs written under the direction of Professor Carlos Seiglie and approved by Dr. Felix Martin Dr. Kusum Mundra Dr. Alvaro Rodriguez

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Role of Soft-line Governmental Policy Interventions towards Terrorist Organizations during Democratization Period:

A Comparative Case Study between the PKK and ETA

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Professor Carlos Seiglie

In Today’s world, we have been witnessed several terrorist events originating from ethnic conflicts. In order to deal with ethnic violence, countries employ various policy interventions from hard-line to soft-line. Turkey and Spain have both suffered at hands of ethnically motivated terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since 1984 and the Basque Homeland and Independence (ETA) respectively. Terrorist attacks undoubtedly occupied a significant proportion of both countries domestic and foreign political agenda. Thus, Turkey and Spain have implemented diversified policies, including hard-line, soft-line and mixed methods against the PKK and ETA.

The main purpose of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between soft-line governmental policy interventions and the responses of the terrorist organizations by specifically focusing on the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) in Turkey and ETA (Euskadi Ta Alkatasuna) in Spain during the democratization period of each country. The democratic transition periods for each state (between 1975 and
1990 for Spain, and 1995 and 2010 for Turkey) were analyzed in the study. Therefore, I attempted to seek the answer to the question ‘what is the impact of soft-line Spanish and Turkish governmental policies on the level of PKK and ETA-initiated violence?’

In order to measure the effectiveness of these policies on the level of PKK and ETA initiated violence, descriptive statistic, Negative binomial and VAR (Vector Auto Regression) analyses were deployed in this study.

Based on these analyses, I found that Spanish and Turkish soft-line policies had statistically significant and positive impacts on the level of PKK and ETA-inflicted violence during the democratization period of each country, rather than decreasing or neutral impacts. Moreover, I also found that democratization process of Spain and Turkey increased the level of violence in the short run, however, in the long run, the level of violence considerably reduced. Secondly, I examined the attack strategies of the PKK and ETA during the time period observed in this study. I found that both the PKK and ETA mainly targeted civilians rather than the military and government officials, and both terrorist organization aimed more deadly attacks against the governments by using bombing method in a small number of incidents.

Three analyses employed in this dissertation revealed that when the country continued to implement its soft-line policies targeting the ethnic grievances, and reached the status of a well-established democracy, the level of violence considerably decreased in the long run since public support for the terrorist organizations was eliminated thanks to those governmental policies.
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my lovely family and the Turkish National Police.
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MAP OF TURKEY

Source: The World Factbook Published by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

MAP OF SPAIN

Source: The World Factbook Published by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Chapter I: Introduction to the Study

Terrorism has become one of the most complicated social phenomena in the era of globalization and the 9/11 attacks may arguably have served as a turning point in the development of counter-terrorism strategies throughout the world. Although globalization has been accompanied by enhanced counter-terrorism strategies, it has simultaneously been exploited by terrorist groups for purposes of recruitment, propaganda, and financing. Furthermore, terrorists have decreased the quality of life in certain regions by committing massive and devastating terrorist attacks that create fear as an unavoidable component of these attacks and their effects on peoples’ daily lives.

There are many forms of terrorism. Ethnicity-based terrorism is one of these, and in today’s world, we frequently witness terrorist events that originate from ethnic conflicts. Millions have died or have been displaced as a result of violent ethnic conflicts. The unexpected rise of ethnic conflicts during the post-cold war period has turned scholars’ attention (C.P. Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006; Carlos Pestana Barros, 2003; Walter Enders & Sandler, 2000; Kim & Yun, 2008; Steinberg, 2008; S. Teymur & Smith, 2008; Unal, 2009) towards examining the contexts where ethnic conflict and suffering is commonly experienced. They have also focused on exploring the root causes of these ethnic conflicts, what peace building processes are needed to resolve these ongoing ethnic conflicts and what counterterrorism polices are effective to eliminate the level of violence initiated by ethnically motivated terrorist groups.

Statement of Research Problem

Current studies (i.e., Crenshaw, 1999; Eser, 2007; Mead, 2005; Netanyahu, 1995; Ünal, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011) show that in order to deal with terrorism
countries employ various policies and intervention strategies, and these policies and interventions may differ from country to country. Doubtless, these policies may differ because they may be affected by a variety of social, economic, and domestic factors, as well as the prevailing international environment. However, the most common policy used by states for fighting terrorism has been related to the use of certain deterrence-based policies (Hewitt, 1984; Netanyahu, 1995) such as military action, intensifying sanctions and punishments, increasing severity, declaring state of emergency, expelling civilians from their villages particularly in ethno-terrorism. Many governments, particularly totalitarian regimes, have enforced harsh military measures against terrorist groups, instead of focusing on the reasons which underlie the cause of any ethnic conflict in a society and employing several political measures that will prevent citizens from to intending to join terrorist organizations (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). However, the solely use of hard-line/repressive policies to curb terrorism have often deepened the problem and increased the hatred of the terrorists and their supporters toward the state (Crenshaw, 1999; Kim & Yun, 2008). In addition, such rigid policies may bring isolation, which can impair the social image of the state. Because the most crucial step in the fight against ethnic terrorism is to prevent the public support of terrorist groups (Byman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1999), meeting people’s democratic demands should be a priority if countries want to reduce ethnic conflicts and later on, ethnic violence.

A historical analysis of the processes of counter-terrorism indicates that military measures and operations (deterrence based policies) by themselves cannot produce efficient solutions to deal with especially ethnic terrorism. Here, the most important issue is to eliminate the underlying causes of ethnic conflict (Byman, 1998), which can be manipulated by terrorist groups for their own political purpose.
Therefore, some countries, such as Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK) have begun to take into account the importance of social and democratic projects in order to meet the democratic demands of various ethnic groups. This approach can decrease tensions that exist between ethnic groups in an ethnically divided society and can possibly contribute towards preventing or reducing a moderate group’s support for the radicals. While the introduction of democratic governmental regulations themselves can contribute towards solving ethnic conflicts, at the same time, they can also contribute to a country’s democratization process.

Many experimental researchers (i.e., Lijpart, 2004; Vorrath & Krebs, 2009; Windsor, 2003) in this field have demonstrated that democratic improvements and consolidation of these are of key importance in terms of finding a long term solution to ethnic conflicts and preventing public support for terrorist groups. However, analyzing the effect of such government policies on terrorist organization’s activities is of importance in understanding how terrorist groups respond to these policies during the democratization process of various countries.

In this sense, this dissertation set out to examine the relationship between soft-line governmental policy interventions that contribute to the countries’ democratization process and the responses of terrorist organizations by specifically focusing on the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey and ETA (Euskadi Ta Alkatasuna- Basque Homeland and Independence) in Spain. The democratic transition periods between 1975 and 1990 for Spain, and 1995 and 2010 for Turkey, are analyzed in the study, respectively. I specifically attempted to answer the question, what is the impact of such governmental policies on the extent of terrorist groups’ attacks by comparing the cases of the PKK and ETA during the democratic transition periods in Spain and Turkey.
One of the most important reasons for choosing these cases was that they have many similarities, such as similar histories, geographical conditions, terrorist group demands, strategies and methods, even though they have some significant differences that I will elaborate on in the ensuing chapters. Spain’s practices concerning ETA and its methods for resolving the Basque problem offer an important perspective for countries struggling with ethnic conflict, particularly for Turkey, which is in the process of democratization. Another important reason for selecting the ETA case is that Spain has been an important member country of the European Union (EU), both politically and economically. Therefore, ETA is not only Spain’s problem, but it is also the problem of the EU as its activities threaten regional security. Similarly, Turkey is also important and is politically and economically the most powerful candidate state to the EU, and the terrorist organization, PKK is thus not only Turkey’s problem, but it is also a notorious drug provider to the western countries of Europe1 (Laciner, 2008; Radu, 2006; Sahin, 2001; Steinberg, 2008; Ward & Hill, 2002). When considering these cases, it is obvious that both ETA and the PKK are not only local problems, they also have regional and international dimensions that will be examined in the literature section of the present study.

Having considered the Kurdish case, this issue undoubtedly occupies a significant proportion of Turkey’s domestic and foreign political agenda because of the protracted violence carried by the PKK that hinders the integration of the Southeast Anatolia region to the rest of the country. Since 1984, more than 30,000 people have died on both sides because of this violent conflict, and over 300 billion dollars has been spent in attempts to put an end to the problem (Feridun & Shahbaz, 1992).

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1 A report, in 1992, published by International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) states that there is a strong link between the PKK and drug smuggling; and nearly 178 Kurdish organizations were suspected of illegal drug trade involvement in 1992. In addition to that, German and Italian chief of prosecutor suggest that 80 % of the drugs seized in Europe were linked to the PKK and that money acquired through illegal drug trafficking was used to purchase arms (Fas.org, 2012).
This social problem has hobbled not only Turkey's status as a rising regional power, but has also slowed its efforts to join the European Union and to hasten its democratic improvements (Birch, 2009; Ünal, 2011). Along with the purpose of trying to solve its domestic problems including the Kurdish issues, the Turkish Government has initiated several reforms to meet the requirements of the EU especially between the 2002 to 2011 period. After the EU officially accepted Turkey as a candidate state in 1999, the Turkish government enacted nine democratic reform packages.

The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999, was also another important milestone in the fight against the PKK (Eser, 2007; Yılmaz, 2012). After Ocalan’s capture, the PKK announced a unilateral and a long cease fire that lasted until 2004. Thus, the year, 1999, was selected as a turning point for the introduction of Turkish democracy. In addition to these soft-line policies, the Turkish government enacted the “Returning Home Bill” in 2003, which aimed to reintegrate the PKK militants into the society. The Bill was perceived as an amnesty by Turkish society and was valid for a limited time period for those PKK militants who were not involved in any armed conflict.

Similarly, the Turkish government ratified the new Active Repentance Law in 2005, which is still effective, and intended for the same purpose as the Returning Home Bill. As a final intervention, the government also adopted a new approach for solving the “Kurdish Issue” and addressing the grievances of the Kurdish people in 2009. This new initiative was initially called the "Democratic Opening" and later on it was called the "Kurdish Opening" by Turkish politicians and intellectuals (Kirişçi, 2009). In this sense, this study examines the impact of these soft-line governmental
policies initiated by Turkey mentioned above on the PKK attacks (the level of violence).

In the same vein, considering the Basque problem, the issue also occupied Spain’s political and security agenda during the period between the 1960s and 2011. Although Spanish governments have succeeded in resolving the ETA problem, it was still on the Spanish governments’ agenda up until 2011. The Spanish government has won the hearts and the trust of the Basque people to a large extent by defeating ETA through the use of some new defiance/legitimacy (also called soft-line) based policies and tactics launched under its democratic system (Conversi, 2002). Therefore, Spain’s democratic history and counter-terrorism policies have shown that Spain has considerable experience in the cited area.

During the periods mentioned above, in order to solve the Basque problem and eliminate ETA attacks, the Spanish government implemented many important soft-line policies such as a democratic constitution, a social insertion program, and new democratic reforms toward the ethnic grievances.

Considering the outputs of these interventions, the Spanish Democratic Constitution of 1979 after 40 years of Franco dictatorship can be accepted as one of the most important policies, not only for solving the Basque problem, but also for solving other similar problems in Spain (Conversi, 2002). Additionally, during the period between 1983 and 1988, the “Social Insertion Program” was implemented by the Spanish government to help provide opportunities to reintegrate those ETA militants who accepted to lay down their arms. Being a member of the EU in 1986 provided a significant impetus for Spain in the transition period to become a well-established democracy (Breckinridge, 1993). With the EU membership of Spain, the French government, which had provided a safe haven for ETA militants since the
foundation of ETA, was forced by the EU countries to cooperate with the Spanish government in the fight against ETA (Babb, 2008). Hence, this study also examines the role of those policies implemented by the Spanish government on the level of violence initiated by ETA.

Although Spain’s democratization process differs somewhat from those of Turkey, it has many similar characteristics to Turkey’s ongoing democratization process in many respects. Their democratization processes and individual challenges and unique problems are discussed in detail in the literature review.

It was expected the literature would show that each of these policy interventions mentioned above has had an impact on the terrorist groups’ activities, although the scope and direction of these are unclear. Even if the main aim of these policy interventions has been to solve ethnic conflict and eliminate terrorist group’s attacks by meeting people’s democratic demands, they may have had the paradoxical effect on the number of terrorist attacks, because these democratic reforms may be perceived as a sign of weakness by the terrorist groups or these groups may think that by stepping up the number of attacks they can obtain more rights (Crenshaw, 1999; Hewitt, 1984; Wilkinson, 2011). However, these governmental policies may diminish the attacks in the long run since the more moderate group members may possibly start to reduce their support for the radical members (Crenshaw, 1999). In this context, this dissertation solely focusses on the impact of defiance (legitimacy/soft-line) based governmental policies on the level of violence initiated by ethnicity-based terrorist groups (ethno-terrorism) in particular. In the literature, there are many approaches regarding this issue and many are based on these assumptions that will be explained later.
Purpose of the Study

This study aimed to assess whether Turkish and Spanish defiance based\(^2\) (legitimacy/desistance or soft-line) governmental policies against the ethnicity-based terrorist groups had an impact on their activities during the democratization process of each country by making a comparison between the two cases. Its specific aim was to examine the impact of governmental policies (democratic initiatives and interventions) implemented by the Turkish and Spanish governments on the number of violent terrorist incidents carried by the PKK and ETA during the considered time periods.

A secondary purpose of this study was to examine the correlation between soft-line governmental interventions and attack type and target type by the PKK and ETA. By so doing, it was believed the direction of these attacks in response to interventions could be evaluated.

Thirdly, this study aimed to investigate the short-term and long-term impact of governmental policy interventions on prevailing terrorist tactics and activities. To accomplish this final purpose, I developed a procedure for combining the study data using VAR (Vector Auto Regression) analysis.

Finally, as another purpose, this study intended to make a prediction with regards to the future of the Kurdish conflict, which is an ongoing violent conflict in Turkey, based on the findings of the study.

It was believed selecting to study the Turkish and Spanish cases could help pave the way for generalizing the data to similar ongoing violent conflicts around the world. Therefore, it was expected this study might serve as an example of how to

\(^2\) Since the term of defiance is also used as legitimacy, soft-line, or desistance in the counterterrorism literature, these terms will be used interchangeable throughout the study.
evaluate other ongoing ethnic violence situations, which have similar characteristic to these cases examined in this present body of work.

**Significance of the Study**

In the literature, there are a number of studies directly or indirectly related to the Kurdish conflict or the Basque conflict. However, most of these focus on casual factors such as financial, social, and identity factors, and so on. There is comparatively less research with regard to the impact of governmental policies on the number of terrorist organization attacks. Therefore, this research attempted to extend the terrorism literature by comparing these specific cases mentioned above and by discussing the probable impacts of interventions to reduce these related terrorist activities.

In order to measure the impact of various interventions as regards numbers of terrorist activities, many empirical studies have been conducted, such as those by Landes (1978), Hewitt (1984), Sandler and Enders (2004), Enders and Sandler (1993), Cauley and Im (1988), Barros (2003), Eser (2007), Crenshaw (1999), Byman (1998), Enders and Sandler (2000), and Unal (2011). However, none of these studies are systematic empirical analyses that examine the impact of desistance based governmental policies made during a democratization period on the level of terrorist violence (violent incidents and casualties).

Apart from previous studies, another important characteristic of this present study is that it focused only on ethnicity-based terror activities by focusing on solely on the cases of the PKK and ETA. However, previous empirical studies only analyzed the effectiveness of (deterrence/defiance based) interventions on terrorism as a general concept by examining all types of terrorist organizations together, such as
Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, ETA, the Tamil Tigers, FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the PKK.

In addition, this study also intended to contribute to Turkey’s new and civil constitutional process initiated by all political parties in the Turkish Grand Assembly after the 2011 elections. When compared with the ETA Case, which is a success story of Spanish democracy, this case may provide Turkish policy makers with a novel approach for solving the ongoing violent Kurdish conflict in its territory. From this perspective, findings of this study will have an important place in Turkey’s constitution making process. Besides, it is expected that this study will offer an opportunity to policy-makers who would like to measure the costs and benefits of existing policy interventions in order to eliminate terrorist incidents, not only in Turkey, but in other countries that share a common destiny with Turkey in the fight against separatist terrorist groups.

All of motives mentioned above make this research unique to the studies on terrorism.

**Chapter’s Summary**

Chapter one has provided a brief overview of the study’s purpose, and background concerning the examination of the role of government policy interventions towards terrorist organizations.

The reminder of the dissertation consists of three parts; a literature review, a description of the methodological framework, and the results and conclusion sections. In the first part, Chapter two examines ethnic conflict and resolution theories in order to reach a better understanding of the causes, consequences, and responses to ethnic conflicts since the study focuses on two ethnicity based terrorist organizations, the PKK and ETA. I assume that the reader may not comprehensively understand the
dimensions of the cases of the PKK and ETA without touching on the topics of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution issues. Therefore, this chapter attempts to find an answer to the question of why ethnic conflict can turn into ethnic violence or terrorism, which theories suggest a method for solving this problem, and how countries can deal with ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. This chapter also provides counter-terrorism approach/theories that practically used by countries. Even though there are many factors or dimensions for solving ethnic conflicts and ethnic violence, this dissertation focuses on soft-line governmental policies and interventions in particular, which contribute to the democratization process of the countries, Spain and Turkey, and their approaches towards reducing or preventing ethnic violence.

The third chapter reviews relevant literature on the historical and socio-political background of the Kurdish conflict and the emergence of the PKK terrorist organization that helps us to understand the underlying factors of this ongoing conflict between the Turks and Kurds. This chapter also explains Turkey’s democratization process and democratic reforms that are being employed to help solve its domestic problems, which include, in particular, the Kurdish conflict.

In the same way, I examine the historical and socio-political background of the Basque conflict and the emergence of ETA terrorist organization in chapter four. Spain’s counterterrorism experience and policies against ETA are also evaluated in this chapter. Chapter five sheds light on previous terrorism studies, which have utilized a similar methodology and quantitative approach to those used in this present study.

Part II covers the methodological framework of this study, which includes the research design, the research questions and hypotheses, variables, data collection methods, data analysis processes, and limitations of the study.
Finally, this study’s findings, discussions and policy implications are presented in Part III.
PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter II: Conceptual and Theoretical Approaches to the Notion of Ethnic Conflicts

We have witnessed several ethnic conflicts within states and between states especially after the post-cold-war period, while expecting that the existing armed conflicts would diminish around the world after the end of the Cold-War (Jesse & Williams, 2011). Over the last three decades, however, it can be demonstrated that intrastate conflicts have increased considerably (Figure 2.1) and now this has become a significant plague both for domestic and international communities.

Figure 2-1: Trends in Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2008

![Trends in Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2008](image)

Source: The OECD report of Conflict, Challenges & Responses

Many states have suffered from ethnic conflicts, from Afghanistan to Ethiopia, from Yemen to Turkey (Marshall & Cole, 2008). Even though the focus of this study is on the role of governmental policies in preventing the attacks of ethnicity-based terrorist organizations, this chapter provides a significant understanding of the underlying factors that explain the emergence of ethnic conflicts by analyzing the
theoretical framework of ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict resolution. In addition to that, it is necessary to have some insight into the terminology used in the field before talking about causes of ethnic conflict. Therefore, this chapter first defines ethnicity.

**Defining Term: Ethnicity**

In general, the terms ethnicity and nationalism are used interchangeably, however there are some differences in terms of the goals of an ethnic group versus those of a nationalist group. In both cases, those goals can cause ethnic conflict, violence, and even wars, within and between states (Jesse & Williams, 2011). Moreover, while ethnicity refers to racial ancestry, nationality means one’s country of origin. Nationality can be identified as the relationship between a person and his/her state of origin, whereas ethnicity can be termed as a group of people who are united by common traditional, cultural, ritualistic, linguistic, behavioral, and religious traits (Hutchinson, 1996).

In this sense, Gilley (2004) defines ethnicity as “[a] part of person’s identity which is drawn from one or more markers like race, religion, shared history, region, social symbols or language” (p.1158). In addition to this definition, Smith (2001) defines ethnicity as having a proper name, common myths of ancestry, shared culture, shared memories, and a link to a homeland. Therefore, an ethnic group can be defined as “a group of people bound together by a belief of common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, language, and history” (Byman, 2002, p.5). A nation, by contrast, “is a socially mobilized group that wants political self-determination” (Kaufman, 2001, p. 16). Therefore, it cannot be said that all ethnic groups are nations or all nations are ethnic group. As many ethnic groups who do not want to have political autonomy, in some nations such as the U.S, many ethnic groups live peacefully together under the one flag. However, one needs to be understood
how ethnicity and the ethnic structure of human beings have taken place and how ethnic differences have turned into ethnic conflicts or more importantly to ethnic violence. The next section will mention some important theories which explain underlying factors of ethnic violence.

The Theories of Ethnicity

Primordialism

Many scholars (i.e., Jesse & Williams, 2011; Isaacs, 1975; Geertz, 1973; Smith, 1991) argue that human nature has a significant impact on the ethnic and national identity of human being. This factor is unchangeable, “fixed” or “given”. According to primordialists, when ethnic identity is compared to class or ideology, it is an especially significant form of identity (Jesse & Williams, 2011). In fact, it is really difficult to define primordialism. The academic literature mentions four different definitions of this: biological, psychological, cultural and cognitive influences.

Biological explanations discuss the fact that people build up ethnic attachments by acting on their instincts to form kin bonds. According to this view, ethnic dependence takes its people power from forces essential to the human condition (Van den Berghe, 1987).

To psychological primordialists, people use ethnic identity to reflect their deep dependence on the natal community. The fundamental assumption of this view is that individuals have a basic need to feel a sense of belonging to one group and to desire a respected and self-respecting status in society and as individuals people are satisfied only in their small groups, not in political systems or associations (Isaacs, 1975).

The culturalist approach argues that human perception of reality is shaped by human culture. In this view, the ethnic identity concept originates from differences
among groups who are culturally distinct. Primordial attachment stems from “givens” of social existence such as culture or kin connection. Besides, “the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness themselves” (Geertz, 1973, p. 259). Geerzt (1973) also suggests that the “givens” of social existence are not natural and defines its social characteristic in terms of: kin ties, custom, religion, and language.

Therefore, it is important to answer the question “how do primordial sentiments lead to ethnic conflict?”. Primordialists suggest that ethnic divisions and tensions are natural, and ethnic conflicts stem from ethnic differences (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). When ethnic identity and consciousness causes political demands for one’s own group, those ethnic differences trigger ethnic conflict. In other words, ethnic groups` interests are naturally different from other groups` interests. Therefore, ethnic groups, without discrimination or dominance, will make political demands to realize their own self-determination, and have their own self-governance or benefits (Jesse & Williams, 2011). However, even though we can see that primordialism is situated in many ethnic conflicts all over the world, some other factors such as economic competition and weak states stimulate the emergence of ethnic conflict (Jesse & Williams, 2011).

In fact, the primordialist approach has no rational component or and is not concerned with ethnic hostility and fear as the driving force in ethnic wars.

Primordialists claim that:

...humanity is naturally divided into different groups that will tend to exclude and show hostility towards others; the aggression of in-groups towards out groups is rooted in primordial… ethnic prejudices are especially important, because these prejudices motivate people to blame the other group for their own problems, to follow extremist leaders, to threaten the other group….and finally to
mobilize and fight. From this perspective, modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarities that prompts minorities to mobilize in defense of their culture and way of life. (Oztalas, 2004, p. 11)

In this approach, a nation must have a common history, culture, common myths of descent, common memories, and common symbols in order to be real nation (Smith, 1991). These features provide the conjunction and interpenetration of cultural or ethnic elements with political, territorial, economical, and educational elements that help to produce a modern nation. When we look at critics of the primordialist approach, this theory cannot clarify “the differentiation of human being in terms of ethnic origin and culture”. In another words, it is not enough to explain the creation of specific ethnic communities or the changing and disappearing of communities. Therefore, the primordialist approach fails to explain why people choose to emigrate and assimilate to other ethnicities (Smith, 1996). Moreover, although the theory assumes that identities are fixed and unchanging, it cannot explain the reasons for the various levels of conflict that occur over time, and how diverse ethnic groups can live peacefully with one another (Jesse & Williams, 2011).

In short, the primordialist approach is of importance in terms of explanations about why people feel strongly bound to their ethnic group and may follow extremist leaders who involve them in ethnic wars and violence. Moreover, it explains the reasons behind the psychological sources of ethnic identity and the driving forces of people who are motivated towards ethnic violence and ethnic solidarity. However, it is difficult to say that ethnic or inter group differences are the most significant causes of ethnic conflict.

**Constructivism**

Contrary to the primordialist approach, constructivism asserts that identities are “molded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and
center of power” (Cerulo, 1997, p. 387). The constructivist approach also claims that ethnic identity is constructed, manufactured, and socially created by elites within social system (Oztalas, 2004). People’s behaviors and speech characterize these various social categories to which they belong. Human behavior generates “membership rules, content, and valuation of social categories” and thus these social categories change over time (Jesse & Williams, 2011, p. 11).

Lake and Rothschild (1998) point out that the constructivist approach explains ethnicity as a social phenomenon and emphasizes the social origin and nature of ethnicity. More importantly, to constructivists, “political salient identity” is led by the collective consciousness (Comaroff & Stern, 1994). From the constructivist perspective, the roots of ethnic violence do not rest in human genes. On this point, ethnic symbols are of importance in terms of defending or promoting the defense of an ethnic group (Stern, 1995).

Nationalism is seen by constructivists as a function of modernization and social change (Oztalas, 2004). According to this approach, an ethnic and national consciousness emerges and ethnicity leads to conflicts in a social system in which crisis and violence are possible. When people begin to use ethnicity for political and social purposes, the masses can easily accept this. In Yugoslavia, for instance, when tensions increased between ethnic groups because of the numerical expansion of one group, demographic shifts and economic problems, conflict and violence against the political system emerged. These problems resulted in the emergence of armed militias and nationalist leaders in order to achieve their purpose, which was an ethnically pure state. To destroy the development of a multiethnic country, they used violence, and those nationalist leaders led armed militias and the masses (Jesse & Williams, 2011).
Instrumentalism

Instrumentalists see ethnicity as a tool used by groups, individual and elites in order to become larger. Ethnicity is primarily a set of symbols to use for political purposes (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In other words, in order to obtain the support of the masses, ethnicity and nationalism can be used by political elites, the intelligentsia, and intellectuals (Jesse & Williams, 2011). Thereby, they take advantage of ethnic differences to implement their political aims. Contrary to the primordialist approach, therefore, ethnicity is a political phenomenon.

In the instrumentalist approach, there is no direct effect of culture on the formation of ethnic identities. In this view, interethnic conflict does not result from ethnic group differences, it results from the manipulation of nationalist elites who exploit ethnicity for their own interests (Gagnon, 1994). In order to benefit from political gains and economic sources, ethnicity is an important motivational element that pushes elites to compete against each other.

Unlike the primordialists’ approach, cultural identity is not a fixed or given dimension of communities in this view, rather it is an element used by elites for political interests. The Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, for instance, tried to expand Serb territory in 1980s by exploiting the perception of the threats of Serbs in Krajina. Thereby, he started the war against the Croats, which resulted in the demise of Yugoslavia (Jesse & Williams, 2011). Instrumentalists criticize the primordialists’ view of claiming “defense of kin” as a rationale for their acts, because the idea of people binding based along ethnic lines, is irrational. In contrast, the scarcity of goods or resources, as a consequence of the modernization process, can be a driving force behind the formation of the ethnic group, and is deemed a rational one (Bates, 1983).
However, according to Jesse and Williams (2011), there are several points that constructivists and instrumentalists are unable to elucidate such as; “how particular ethnic communities are able to endure…why are people willing to die for their nations? Why would the masses follow the elites? What mechanism accounts for such a following?” (p. 12). In addition to that, instrumentalism and constructivism fail to explain “the potency of emotion and ethnic sentiment that emerged prior to the development of the modern nation-state and yet persists today” ll the causes for and reasons behind ethnic violence. Therefore, when(Jesse & Williams, 2011, p. 12). As mentioned above, even though all approaches –primordialist, constructivist and instrumentalist– try to explain the psychological sources of ethnic identity and why ethnic differences turn into violence, it is hard to say only one approach by itself can explain a these three theories are considered along with the modernization approach, this may permit a better understanding of the real reasons for ethnic violence.

**Modernization**

The historical processes of industrialization pushed many social scientists to think that modernization would cause the emergence of integrated and complex societies throughout the world (Magiya, 2012; Newman, 1991a). Rapid economic development, increased migration from rural areas to cities, and a growing body of educated people make states and societies more culturally homogenous.

The Marxist approach expected that this process of modernization would result in the victory of the proletariat. They also believed that ethnic nationalism along with social manifestations of class domination would eventually disappear at the end of the modernization process. Thus, Marxist theory saw the role of ethnicity in politics as a temporary phenomenon to be terminated by the process of modernization (Newman, 1991b).
Modernization theory predicted that ethnic solidarity would decrease because of social development. Moreover, the supporters of modernization theory thought that people in culturally homogenous societies would have integrated their ethnic identity with national identity in the short run (Benedict, 1962). They also predicted that with these growing economic and political interactions among people and incredibly increased communication networks there would be a loss of the significance of people’s primordial ethnic identities in the society (Oztalas, 2004). In other words, modernization is the most important factor causing people to assimilate by diminishing their ethnic identities. However, historical events and ongoing ethnic conflicts throughout the world demonstrate that the modernization theory has failed in its predictions concerning ethnic and national identity.

On the other hand, another view on modernization is that social fragmentation and state transformation resulting from the modernization process trigger ethnic conflicts. This approach claims that modernization culminates in escalating demands and increasing competition among people in the field of economics and social life. That makes people more aggressive towards each other than ever before (Jesse & Williams, 2011). Therefore ethnic conflicts may readily emerge.

In particular, after the World War II, we witnessed many examples of ethnicity and its durability and its devastating characteristics are still alive in the domestic politics of many states. Furthermore, ethnic violence, terrorism, and war has not only occurred in developing/ or modernizing societies, but also in developed western countries over last three decades. Catalans and Basques in Spain, Flemish people in Belgium, Bretons in France, and Irish people in the UK are good example of resistance to assimilation (Novak, 1971). Karl Deutsch, who conceived of the idea of social mobilization, suggests that the level of mobilization in the political system
pushes states to assimilate ethnic groups during modernization processes. Thus, these processes result in political fragmentation and the rise of ethnic conflicts (Deutsch, 2006). However, the growing integration between societies may motivate ethnic groups to resist homogenizing state’s political system and mobilize them to build their own nation by expressing their displeasure with the existing developments (Anderson, 2006).

In light of the discussions of modernization, it can be concluded that assimilation as stated by supporters of the modernization approach is not unavoidable at the end of modernization. On the other hand, the modernization process does not always increase ethnic conflicts in domestic politics even though ethnic consciousness rises within the society. Despite the fact that an individual’s awareness may increase rapidly in terms of both their own identities and others, this does not mean that this awareness will always stimulate alienation among groups. Countries that have multi ethnic structures can be used as good examples; many of them show that ethnic differences and awareness do not always compete with national solidarity, or cause ethnic violence and separatism. In some societies, “[ethnic] groups may prefer to stay only as an ethnic group without demanding a separate political entity…only if the modernization process brings an ethnically conscious group with ethnic grievances, the result can be ethnic conflict” (Oztalas, 2004, p. 25). As a result, while many ethnically plural societies have benefited from the blessings of modernization and have lived peacefully for several years, others have been challenged with protracted conflicts. Thus, some states see the multiethnic structure as a form of richness for their societies, for others it is a source of conflict.

In sum, in terms of ethnic identity formation, as mentioned above, all these theories and approaches have made significant contributions to explaining ethnic
identity even though they have failed in some aspect of their explanations. For instance, in the 1960s, the primordialist approach was used in order to explain “the origin and strength of ethnic attachments” (Eller & Coughlan, 1993, p.1). But further events demonstrated that the emphasis had shifted from primordialism to constructivism and instrumentalism. Contrary to the primordialist approach, both instrumentalism and constructivism point out the ethnic attachments` cause can vary under different circumstances over time. On the other hand, constructivist and instrumentalist approaches ignore the effectiveness of ethnic ties.

Even though all critics discussing these major theories show neither theory alone provides a sufficient explanation for ethnicity, all elements of ethnicity mentioned by these approaches cannot be ignored. In this sense, it can be said that all explanations of these four approaches may be correct case by case, but inadequate alone.

**The Theories of Ethnic Conflict Resolution**

Ethnic conflicts are a serious menace. Apart from the current conflicts ranging from those in the Middle East to Kashmir and from Sri Lanka to Darfur they are constantly threatening to break out in many places around the world. Many of these conflicts are using excessive violence as a tool against unarmed civilians to reach their political aims. However, local, regional, and international efforts have been insufficient in terms of resolving ethnic conflicts (S. Teymur & Smith, 2008; Unal, 2009). In fact, resolving ethnic conflict depends on the timing, capacity, determination, and techniques that should be followed. In this respect, many scholars (i.e., Cordell & Wolff, 2010; Kaufman, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996; Lijphart, 1969, 2004; Schneckener, 2002; Wolff, 2010) focus on ethnic conflict resolutions in order to build a peaceful world. The resolution theories of ethnic conflict try to seek a means of
understanding how to establish sustainable institutional solutions in the case of ethnic conflict. To manage and resolve ethnic conflicts, of course, there are many approaches. This section examines the most prominent ones; suppression, power sharing, state building, and separation. However, it cannot be ignored that each resolution theory of ethnic conflict is not a universally applicable solution in every country because each country may individually have distinct ethnic characteristics. Currently, resolution theories are hotly debated among scholars (Kaufmann, 1996; Lijphart, 1969, 1977, 2002; Schneckener, 2002; Wolff, 2010). However, this section shall not devote much space to a critique of all those approaches. Instead it briefly mentions the ethnic conflict resolution theories by touching on a few of these in the discussions below.

**Suppression**

In today’s world, suppression that includes genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation, and control regimes are unacceptable solutions to solving terrorism. Many ethnic wars have ended up with a victory for one side only, which has resulted in the suppression of the other side. “The military victory of one side can reliably end ethnic wars, but such victories are often followed by mass killing or other severe repression” (Kaufman, 2006, p. 201). Regarding this approach, Kaufmann (1996) points out that any “remission of violence may be only temporary, as the defeated group usually rebels again at any opportunity. Even the fact that certain conquerors, such as the English in Scotland or the Dutch in Friesland, eventually permitted genuine political assimilation after decades of suppression, does not recommended this as a remedy for endangered people today” (pp. 151-152).

This method is generally used by antidemocratic or totalitarian regimes in a “deterrence” concept (Cauley & Im, 1988; Walter Enders & Sandler, 1993; Landes,
to provide stable solutions for dealing with ethnic violence. The Franco dictatorship in Spain, for example, used the repression policy as a tool to defeat ETA (Euskadi Ta Alkartasuna- Basque Homeland and Independence). However, this suppression attempt did not succeed. Similarly, in Turkey, this method was used by the Turkish governments until the end of the 1995 in order to solve the Kurdish conflict and terminate the PKK attacks. Contrary to the expected outcomes, this counterterrorism policy of Turkey increased the hatred against the state among Kurdish people (Ünal, 2011).

**Power Sharing / Consociationalism**

One of the best developed solutions for ethnic conflict resolution was power sharing, later called “consociational democracy” by Lijphart (1969), who is a prominent advocator of this approach. In this approach, ethnicity can be manipulated to some extent; however, it is not as freely changeable as the constructivists would suggest.

In general, power sharing is defined as a situation where two or more ethno-national groups have rights to jointly govern the common polity, and derive decisions in consensus (Lijphart, 2002). Apart from the term applied to describe this form of consociational democracy, this approach is also called, consensus democracy, proportional democracy, or corporatism (Lijphart, 1969). In this approach, one single group cannot make a decision on significant matters without the consent of the other (Schneckener, 2002). Political power and other resources such as status, security and economic power can be shared among groups at the same level. The main goal of power sharing is governmental and democratic stability, the survival of the arrangements and the protection against violence.
In a broader context, Schneckener (2002) claims that “the term consensus democracy applies to each polity where the main parties de facto rule together, be it a national or a multinational environment. Consociationalism would be a specific form of consensus democracy, linked to ethnically segmented societies or, rather, to multinational polities” (p. 204).

According to Lijphart (1977), there are four characteristics of any power-sharing system; a “grand coalition government, proportional representation, minority veto rights, and segmented autonomy” (p. 23). It can be seen that these characteristics of power sharing occur in all classical examples of consociationalism, such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Fiji, and Malaysia. Some of these examples having succeeded, and others having failed (Wolff, 2010).

In addition, Schneckener adds an arbitration role to the power sharing structure. He claims that when conflicts break out among segmented groups, some measures should be taken by a defined settlement mechanism. Such measures consist of “informal meetings among the group leaders, ombudspersons, formalized mediation committees, independent commissions or special arbitration courts in which all sides are represented” (p. 205).

Even though there are many advocates of power sharing, some scholars such as Roeder & Rothchild, 2005, Wolff, 2010 see this approach as a short term transitional mechanism rather than a long term one because of security and equality concerns, particularly among weaker groups. They address the fact that power sharing can entice groups to participate in state institutions in the short run, rather than fight against those institutions. According to this group, even if power sharing does not offer stable governance in the long term, it can provide the parties a means by which to end violence (Cordell & Wolff, 2010).
However, Kaufmann (1996) criticizes the power sharing approach by claiming that even though power sharing can prevent and dampen potential ethnic conflicts, it cannot provide for peace “under the condition of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilization that are likely to motivate intervention” (p. 155). In addition to that, Kaufmann (1996) suggests that power sharing cannot resolve ethnic conflicts. The main reason is that, as he contends, it is inherently voluntary. This is because power sharing entails a conscious decision by elites to avoid ethnic strife. He points out that “under conditions of hyper-nationalist mobilization and real security threats, group leaders are unlikely to be respective to compromise, and even if they are, they cannot act without being discredited and replaced by harder-line rivals” (p. 156).

**State-Building**

Some scholars (i.e., Helman & Ratner 1992; Paris and Sisk 2009; Fukuyama, 2004) on state-building agree upon the fact that some important state functions such as the running of the state’s institutions. Paris and Sisk (2009) state that these functions consist of “the provision of security, the rule of law including an effective constitution building as well as police and justice system, basic services and the ability to formulate and implement budget plans” (p. 15). Fukuyama (2004) argues that the enactment of laws, a minimum of bureaucracy, the preventing of corruption, and the provision of transparency, and accountability in these institutions are important components of these functions.

In this context, Helman and Ratner’s view is of importance. They argue that when states in which governments and institutions become unstable, and when economic failures and internal violence becomes dangerous for citizens and begin to threaten neighboring states, international “conservatorship” may intervene in order to administer governmental functions until the country can remedy itself. Once stability
is achieved, international powers or institutions may support or urge the country to conduct free and fair elections as soon as possible (Helman & Ratner 1992). The main aim of this approach is to prevent violent conflicts among ethnic groups by rebuilding state functions as soon as possible. Even though a failed state’s invitation is an important first step in attempts to end extreme violence within a country, the international community can directly intervene in the country without an invitation.

In this sense, Kaufmann criticizes that “Even if conservatorship could rapidly, effectively, and cheaply stop an ethnic civil war, rebuild institutions, and ensure free elections, nothing would be gained unless the electoral outcome protected all parties' interests and safety; that is, power-sharing would still be necessary. Thus, in serious ethnic conflicts, conservatorship would only be a more expensive way to reach the same impasse” (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 158).

The international community’s intervention in the event of a failed state is currently a controversial issue. Some criticize such as Kaufman (1996), Belloni, (2007) the idea of international intervention for state-building because it does not bring along any long term solution. Even if this approach may provide a temporary remedy for rapidly rising ethnic conflicts, it is difficult to ensure permanent peace between ethnic groups. This is because an ethnic war may reemerge when the intervening countries or institutions leave the warring country.

**Separation / Partition**

As one of most prominent supporters of the separation approach, Kaufmann (1996) argues that separation is the only option for preventing intense violence and for providing long term peace. He suggests that when ethnic groups mobilize for violence, mutual security threats commonly hinder demobilization and de-escalation of any prevailing hypernationalist discourse. Concerning this view, as long as there is
a security dilemma\(^3\) between the ethnic groups in a country, it is unlikely can ensure long term peace. Thus, he says separation is an inevitable option. However, Tullberg & Tullberg (1997) mention some disadvantages of this approach. They state;

A great drawback of the separatist concept is that it rarely advances a viable solution to the problem it addresses. The dissatisfied minority ceases to be a minority in the new state, yet new minorities arise, showing that the essential dilemma has been resolved only in the eyes of extreme optimists. When it comes to carving regions out of the old state, separatism always has high hopes. However, since the secessionist movement will strive to incorporate as many of its supporters as possible, few from the old minority group are likely to end up on the wrong side of a new border, but many from the old majority group probably will. This is especially likely because majority groups frequently migrate into a minority's historical homeland, and historical borders play a key role when a new state is formed. (p. 3).

Many groups currently prefer to use the separation approach instead of self-determination and partition model. One of the most important causes of deadlocks that occur with this approach is to suggest separation as only one option to resolving conflicts. Whereas the IRA case in the UK and the ETA case in Spain shows that there are some other resolution options without independency, in these cases, people may become integrated with each other unless they demand a separate territory or state.

As can be seen from these theories briefly discussed above, the feasibility of any solution depends on variety of factors including domestic, international, social, cultural, economic etc. However, it cannot be ignored that these factors exist at different levels of analysis. To ensure a sustainable peace, the most significant factor is the extent of any local commitment. Without a definite commitment of regional actors for ending ongoing conflict and any peace process, it is unlikely one can achieve sustainable solutions for any regionalized conflict such as those in the south Caucasus, the African Great Lake Region or the Western Balkans. Therefore, it is

\(^3\) This is one of the important concepts asserting that strengths and weaknesses in national security can be provocative to other nations in the realist tradition of international relations theory. However, Barry Posen (1993), in his article, examines this concept by applying on the ethnic groups. (see more details The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict by Posen, 1993)
important to consider different factors at the local, state, regional and international levels of analysis in order to achieve sustainable peace.

Apart from these discussions mentioned above, to provide long term solutions and eliminate ongoing violent conflicts, many countries have employed a variety of policies ranging in scope from deterrence based (hard-line) to defiance based (legitimacy/soft-line/desistance) policies. The following section discusses these policies in the framework of counter-terrorism by focusing specifically on ethnicity based terrorism.

**Governmental Policies towards Ethnicity Based Terrorism**

In the current literature, deterrence and defiance theories commonly try to explain the relationship between governmental policies and political violence in the context of counter-terrorism. In this section, I first briefly discuss deterrence based governmental policy, and then I examine defiance based governmental policies in detail since the main focus of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between defiance based governmental policy interventions and terrorist attacks. Second, I touch on some theoretical assumptions as part of discussing the reduction of ethnic based violence within the democratization context.

**Deterrence (Hardline / Repressive) Based Governmental Policy**

The global history of counter-terrorism in different parts of the world demonstrates that many counterterrorism policies can be categorized under the umbrella of deterrence based (hardline) policies. The premise underlying deterrence based policies is most commonly explained using the rational choice principle. The core construct of the rational choice theory, principle of “utility”, argues that individuals strive to achieve their own self-benefits (Cauley & Im, 1988; Dugan,
Thus, in the terrorism context, individuals carry out an active cost benefit analysis and consider the probability of success before launching an attack against civilians or a state (Walter Enders & Sandler, 1993; Ünal, 2011). Therefore, governments can employ some forms of deterrence based policy to either raise the cost or diminish the benefits of terrorism. This policy approach commonly includes “raising the certainty and severity of the punishment and apprehension by imposing heavier sanctions, increasing logistical complexity for terrorist attacks by tightening security measures in the potential targets….., increasing threat of injury and death by conducting military operations” (Unal, 2009, pp. 54–55).

In the present cases of the PKK and ETA, both the Turkish and Spanish governments have preferred to apply deterrence based policies over some periods under certain conditions. These policies have included establishing collective punishment, eliminating leadership cadres, putting pressure on terrorism supporting countries, incapacitating terrorists, disintegrating the terrorist group and proclaiming a state of emergency, which was mostly evident in the PKK case (Ünal, 2011). However, the effectiveness of deterrence based policies on terrorist attacks is highly controversial among scholars (i.e., Cauley & Im, 1988; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 1993, 2000; Eser, 2007; Hewitt, 1984; Landes, 1978; Ünal, 2011). While some (e.g., Dugan et al., 2005; W. Enders & Sandler, 2002; Mead, 2005) found that hardline governmental policies are more effective in curbing terrorism, others (i.e., Byman, 1998, 2002; Crenshaw, 1999; Hewitt, 1984; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006; Wilkinson, 2011) suggest that those policies had the effect of increasing the violent incidents, rather than decreasing these. I elaborate upon the findings of these studies in Chapter V. Advocates of deterrence based polices such as Mead (2004) and
Netanyahu (1995), suggest that hardline policies are indispensable ways of curbing terrorism since these policies prevent political benefits that terrorists want to reach via terrorism.

In summary, some authors such as Mead (2005) and Netanyahu (1995), emphasize that repressive policies are the only way to eliminate violent incidents both in the short run and long run. Even though studies on the effectiveness of hardline policies have produced inconstant results, protracted violent conflicts show that these policies may have a counterproductive impact in the long run as seen in the IRA, ETA, PKK cases. This unintended outcome of the repressive based counterterrorism perspective generally results from the use of these conventional countermeasures in the realm of ethnicity based terrorist groups. In Byman’s words (1998) “Conventional countermeasures may engender broader support for an insurgency or separatist [terrorists] even when they hamstring or defeat a specific terrorist group” (p. 149).

**Defiance (legitimacy/soft-line/desistance) Based Governmental Policies**

In light of discussions of the effectiveness of deterrence based policies, here, I evaluate the impact of defiance (soft-line) based governmental policies on ethnicity-based terrorism, in particular. Defiance theory (also known as Legitimacy Theory or soft-line approach) propounds that if governmental policy interventions are perceived as legitimate and fair by terrorists and an ethnically divided society, these policies will be effective in reducing violent incidents, especially in a long run (Lum et al., 2006; Sherman, 1993; Ünal, 2011).

Some scholars (Crenshaw, 1995; Wilkinson, 2011) contend that applying hardline counterterrorism policies such as the intensity of sanctions, increasing the severity and the threat of violence, particularly in ethnicity based terrorism situations, may result in the creation of mythologies of martyrdom, thus strengthening group
solidarity, and increasing public support for the militants, as well as invoking revenge. Thus, these measures applied on the basis of deterrence based policies may be perceived by the society as unfair and illegitimate (Ünal, 2011). Moreover, such hardline policies may increase hostilities against the government in the eyes of sympathizers or supporters of terrorists (Crenshaw, 1999). Therefore, the notion of defiance based policies is more helpful if it focuses on decreasing public support towards the militants in order to eliminate terrorist attacks (Crenshaw, 1999).

In this sense, the defiance theory suggests that public opinion is the key factor in counterterrorism because terrorists groups (particularly ethnic based groups) seek support and recognition from moderate societal members people for their ideological or political goals (Crenshaw, 1999; Kim & Yun, 2008; Ünal, 2011). Therefore, especially in the case of ethnic based terrorism, Crenshaw (1995, 1996) stresses that gaining public support and sentiment is the most important element in enhancing the expected impacts of governmental policies aimed at eliminating violent attacks. Repressive policies initiated in response to terrorist attacks can impair the government’s legitimacy and hence lessen the psychological and physical support for terrorists, particularly within radical groups (Ünal, 2011).

In the context of defiance and desistance based governmental policies, governments may initiate democratic, social, and political reforms in order to cut off public support for terrorists/militants or to implement some policy interventions such as an amnesty law, ceasefire, or set of negotiations to reduce the level of violence. According to Byman (1998), because ethnic terrorist organizations enjoy the psychological and physical support of the radicals or sympathizers, the implementation of democratic reforms or policies is a crucial component for promoting psychological disintegration between militants and sympathizers. Gaining
the moderates` support is another important step in any anti-terrorism policy aimed at reducing ethnic violence. For this purpose, governments can unilaterally initiate certain reforms towards moderate groups and their sympathizers (Hewitt, 1984; Ünal, 2011), and offer them protection and give them more voice in decision making in order to win their hearts (Byman, 1998). In addition, Wilkinson (1999, 2001) emphasized that using democratic processes to reduce ethnic violence, rather than military forces might help to reduce the underlying social grievances within the population. In this context, Unal (2011) proposed that “governments must respond to social and political grievances that lead to a violent conflict before it turns at all” (p.78).

Since the concept of democratic and social reforms is very broad, in this dissertation, I explain the specific reforms towards the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and Basque conflict in Spain and provide information concerning these two conflicts, in detail, in subsequent chapters, respectively. In the light of discussions of Legitimacy Theory (Defiance) mentioned above, the following section specifically focuses on the soft-line governmental policies initiated toward the grievances that produced ethnic and violent conflicts during democratization periods.

**Democratization Process and Ethnic Terrorism**

The spread of democracy in the world after the demise of the Soviet Union has been accompanied by the rise in the number of ethnic violence. This has led some to observe that ethnic hostilities are an important factor that can prevent democratic improvement of the state. However, others consider that democratization is likely to mitigate ethnic tensions in the short term and ethnic violence in the long term, even if those conditions are likely to exacerbate ethnic violence in the short run (Nevers, 1993).
The following theoretical assumptions have led to the development of the research questions of the present study.

According to Lijphart’s theory, consociational systems prevent conflict better than other systems between ethnic groups “by ensuring that even small groups have a say in the decisions that affect them, consociational systems better manage to allay small groups’ fears” (Vorrath & Krebs, 2009, p. 5). She also suggests that consociational systems provide good opportunities for channeling participation in the political structure (Lijphart, 2004). The literature points out that one of the important motivating forces encouraging ethnic groups towards violence is the lack of any future perspective. From this point of view, the democratization process and especially democratic reforms for improving democratic standards are important tools in a country struggling with violent and non-violent ethnic conflicts in order to ensure all ethnic groups’ participation in the system.

In this context Hewitt (1984) supports Lijphart’s (2004) argument by stating that if violence occurs because of popular grievances, those grievances must be cured by implementing reforms in order to diminish the violence. Because it is expected that these reforms made by government can win the hearts of the terrorists’ supporters in the population, the extent of the terrorist violence experienced currently may decline in the long term. The expected impact of these reforms on the presence of violence is complex nature since the democratic reforms are directed at supporters, not at the terrorists. Therefore, Hewitt concluded that introducing relevant reforms to solve social grievances will remove the tools and means that cause the public to support terrorists in the long run (Hewitt, 1984). The historical process of the cases of IRA and ETA confirms his findings. In both cases, even though the Spanish and British
governments implemented significant reforms, terrorist attacks still remained a considerable problem for some considerable period (Hewitt, 1984; Ünal, 2011).

According to Vorrath and Krebs (2009), a democracy is one defined as having more accountability, legitimate and transparent government than an undemocratic one. Thus, the underlying “assumption is that outbreak of violent conflict or war becomes less likely” (p. 6).

Furthermore, another important concept underpinning democratic institutions and procedures is to provide for the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and to enable parties to participate in policymaking (Windsor, 2003) that helps to eliminate existing conflict in a country. Windsor (2003) also asserts that one of the main sources of current terrorist activities in the world particularly in the Middle East is the lack of democratic capability of these countries. Therefore, most regimes in the region cannot respond effectively to the social and economic demands of their people. As a result of this unsatisfied situation some extremist groups can be easily mobilized by leaders in order to get their deserved rights via violence.

Contrary to this argument, Mansfield and Snyder contend that democratization increases ethnic violence in the ethnically divided society. State weakness and absent institutions facilitate the increasing risk of violent action (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). In other worlds, in a mid-level democracy, therefore, there is a higher probability of civil war. However, in their statistical analysis, their finding was only associated with countries “experiencing incomplete transitions from autocracy toward democracy and whose political institutions are weak” (Vorrath & Krebs, 2009, p. 6).

Even though a number other studies confirm Mansfield and Snyder’s findings by identifying a direct link between changes resulting from democratization and violent ethnic conflict, those findings do not fit for those countries enjoying well-
established democracies. When considering the Basque case in Spain and the Irish case in the UK, democratic reforms regarding human rights, social welfare, cultural or religious rights have made a significant contribution to the resolution of these violent conflicts (Hewitt, 1984; Wilkinson, 2011). For instance, as a result of Spain’s counter terrorism policy, which was accompanied by its democratization process, ETA recently announced a permanent ceasefire and in the process to laid down their weapons. This is because the Spanish State met almost all the democratic demands of the Basque people, which were used as a propaganda tool by ETA to obtain the physical, physiological and economical support of the Basque people for a long time. Therefore, ETA lost the Basque region’s support over time.

Indeed many scholars agree upon the fact that even though the absence of democracy cannot directly explain the causes of terrorism or ethnic violence, the lack of democracy has played an important role in creating the conditions for the emergence of extremist movements in the world (Windsor, 2003). Nevertheless, historical processes of ethnic terrorism demonstrate that dictators or authoritarian regimes can create an environment in which extremist ethnic groups can thrive (Windsor, 2003).

Additionally, the establishment of advanced democracies in the political, sociological and economic system provides a barrier to the recruitment of extremist groups in many respects (Windsor, 2003). It can be argued that increasing democratic reforms that provide free and fair elections in which people can change political structure, provide a better governance structure that can respond more easily to people’s economic and social needs, as well as the rule of law in which people feel themselves more secure. It also influences civil society, which plays a key role in checking political power, while weak states are more vulnerable to terrorist networks.
within their borders, such as Afghanistan. They also provide more sustainable opportunities for economic and social development, which provides people wealthier life. More importantly, democracy ensures certain ideals such as “tolerance, compromise, respect for individual rights, equality of opportunity and equal status under law” are in place (Windsor, 2003, p. 47).

Apart from these arguments mentioned above, some scholars (i.e., Crenshaw, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Rustow, 1970) argue that even though the democratization process increases ethnic violence and provides a window of opportunity to intensify ethnic grievances in the short run, it may lead to permanent peace in the long run since moderate groups’ support to the radicals will be diminished. One of the important reasons explaining the increasing violence often seen during transitions may be the desire of the terrorist group to obstruct the democratic reforms enacted to mitigate ethnic conflict within the state (Crenshaw, 1999; Ünal, 2011). The group may perceive these democratic reforms as sign of weakness, or the group may assume that by stepping up the number of attacks it can obtain more right from the central government. Moreover, the group may think that political arguments used by the terrorist group to justify its attack will vanish as an outcome of democratic reforms that meet the ethnic community’s demands (Crenshaw, 1999; Wilkinson, 2011).

The report of the National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism in the US, which was presented on 29 June 2011, emphasized the crucial role of democratization in mitigating terrorist threats and conflicts within a country. To eliminate possible terrorist threats and conflicts that can turn into violent conflicts, the US encourages regional governments in South Asia and Middle East to promote and respect human rights, civil liberties, and civil rights as the most important tool of democratization process (Whitehouse, 2011). By doing so, the US aims to dismantle the public support
for extremists and terrorist groups. The report reflects the US`s national counter-terrorism strategy and stresses that a country’s government stability and democratic improvements have an important impact on preventing terrorist activities at the national, regional and even international level. Furthermore, chaotic and unsettled political situations have challenged the security environment of these countries. This has stimulated the emergence or reemergence of violent conflicts in certain countries (Whitehouse, 2011).

As a result, all of these characteristics of an established democracy play a crucial role in the eliminating of ethnic violence among the groups in the long run. As mentioned above, all arguments demonstrate that there is strong relationship between democratic improvements and ethnic conflict movements. Therefore, even if some scholars such as Mansfield and Snyder contend that democratic reforms increase ethnic violence in authoritarian regimes, the most recent cases of IRA in England and ETA in Spain indicate that the democratic development of a country has a significant impact on the diminishing of ethnic tension between groups in the long run. From this perspective, this study assesses these assumptions by making a comparison between Spain and Turkey cases. In order to understand the underlying factors of ethnic conflict in Turkey and Spain, the next two chapters provide historical information including the causes of the Kurdish and Basque conflicts, the emergence of the PKK and ETA, and the policy interventions and counterterrorism methods of both countries.
Chapter III: The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey

The Historical Background of the Kurdish Conflict

The Turkish and Kurdish people have been living together for centuries. During the Ottoman rule, they were considered members of the same social community in the system. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, they have maintained their status as equal citizens of the state. However, despite this shared history, since the 19th century Turkey has faced contentious relationships between the Turks and Kurds, which has given rise to a protracted social conflict, called the “Kurdish Conflict” or “Kurdish Issue”.

The Kurdish issue occupies a significant proportion of Turkey’s domestic and foreign political agenda primarily as a result of ongoing PKK violence. Since 1984, more than 30,000 people have died on both sides, and over $300 billion have been spent to find a solution to the issue (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). This chapter examines the historical and sociopolitical background of the Kurdish conflict from the Ottoman era until now.

Ottoman Era

Before exploring the causes of the Kurdish issue, it is important to understand two important concepts in the Ottoman ruling system: “Umma” and the “Millet System”. In Islamic religious culture, ethnicity is inconsequential. The concept of “Umma”, or the brotherhood of all Muslims, excludes any reference related to ethnic origin as a factor of social or political organization by stating that people are equal as Muslims and their ethnicity is not important (Soysal, 1999).

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4 Kurdish conflict is also known as Kurdish Issue or Kurdish Question; therefore these terms will be used interchangeable throughout the study.
Secondly, under the Ottoman Empire, administrative laws were based on Islamic rules. Therefore, nationalities were also defined in terms of religious affiliations rather than ethnicity. According to this “Millet System”, subjects of the sultan were divided into two different communities as Muslims and non-Muslims (Cornell, 2001; Ergil, 2000). While non-Muslims were considered minorities, and were governed under a quasi-Autonomous mechanism with respect to acknowledged rights as defined by Islamic rules, neither Turks nor Kurds were considered as “millet”, and none of them gained minority rights because they were considered to be part of the Muslim community (Cornell, 2001). During the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman sultans had provided significant autonomy to local Kurdish leaders who demonstrated loyalty to the state (Ergil, 2000).

This structural situation in the Ottoman Empire did not create tension until the late 19th century, when the concept of “nationalism” arose in the world arena. As Barkey and Fuller (1998) write:

By the nineteenth century, new factors induced gradual political change in the relationship between the Kurds and the Ottoman administration: increased imperial intervention in the Kurdish regions, levies for troops, and warfare between Russia, Iran and the Ottoman Empire that touched Kurdish areas increased challenges to the privileges of Kurdish overlords and a broader pattern rebellion against Turkish rule throughout the empire.

In the same vein, the demands of certain insurgents who represented marginalized minorities to become an independent state, and with British support, Sheikh Ubeydullah initiated an uprising against the Ottoman Sultan (Kendal, 1993), which is generally considered a sign of the beginning of the Kurdish issue. Recognizing the ongoing Kurdish uprising as a serious threat, Sultan the 2nd Abdulhamid quelled this uprising and exiled Sheikh Ubeydullah (Özoğlu, 2004).
The Republic of Turkey

At the beginning of the creation of the new republic, Ataturk and other founder elites, along with their military staff and bureaucrats, aimed at creating a modern and secular state that refused to follow the dynastic and religious affiliations of the Ottoman state structure (Ergil, 2000b) and aimed to unite different ethnic minorities under a common Turkish identity (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997).

In fact, at the end of World War I, ‘winning’ states undermined the Ottoman Empire for the first time by signing the Sevres Treaty at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1920, where they promised the Kurds their own state. However, Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, altered this condition in the Treaty of Lausanne by arguing against the European powers and aimed to create an independent Turkey (Fuller, 1993). Thus, Kurds lost their hope for an independent state on the occasion of the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923. However, the governance of modern Turkey was established by the ruling elite as a secular, Western, progressive, and centralist form of governance. After the establishment of the new Republic, a strong emphasis on “secular” values created tension among the Kurds, simply because of their cultural characteristics.  

This new political approach pushed Turkey’s ruling republican elite to forgo its faith in multiculturalism. Moreover, after 1925, Turkey’s new ruling elite identified Turkish identity as a form of “Turkishness” not as an entity of the “people

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5 Socio-cultural structure of the Kurdish society induced tension against new “secular” values which is stated by Laciner & Bal (2004) as :

“Another most important factor in Kurdish society is Islam. Alongside the tribal ties are strong religious loyalties, especially to the sheikhs, aghas, and local leaders of religious brotherhoods. Although, the Kurds are known as a highly religious people this characteristic is comparatively recent, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century, when two religious Muslim orders, the Qadiris and the Naqshbandis, began to spread rapidly throughout Kurdistan.... This situation provided the sheikhs of the two religious orders with an opportunity that far exceeded religious guidance, allowing them to enter the political sphere”. (p.482)
of Turkey” (Ergil, 2000b). This is because the government at that time started to implement an aggressive policy towards Kurds as well as other minorities. As a result of those policies the Turkish government prohibited the use of the Kurdish language in schools, radio broadcasting, and Kurdish publications (Icduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). All those restrictions were necessitated by the constitution and related laws. This is the one of the most important underlying problems that drove the Kurdish conflict. Since the Kurdish people had had their own rich history, language, and customs for 11th centuries even though they had no own state, they wanted to maintain their identity.

Between 1925 and 1938, Kurds thus engaged in several rebellions against the state authority with different success rates (Hannum, 1996, pp. 185, 186). Sheikh Said, who was both a religious and tribal leader, conducted the most important rebellions of this period. His widespread support among the peasantry and religious leadership made him a strong foe of the new Turkish Republic (Olson, 1991). Said launched his rebellion in March 1925. At first, he captured control of a large part of the eastern Anatolian territory. Then, a relatively large army was sent to suppress the rebellion. The suppression was successful and Said was defeated. Ultimately, he and his army leaders were executed (Entessar, 2009; Jwaideh, 2006)

Ergil (2000b) suggests two main reasons affected the development of the Kurdish uprisings after 1930s; first was the legal system and the administrative system. The central government disregarded basic freedoms, rule of law, social justice, pluralism, and accountability to provide security throughout the country. Second, “every agitation in the east resulted in the deportation of Kurdish groups from their ancestral lands in southeastern Turkey and resettlement western provinces” (p. 125). Additionally, economic problems and the subsistence hardships in the east and
southeastern part of Turkey were other important factors provoking Kurdish unrest, especially after 1950.

These uprisings and their severity led to a great fear among the ruling elite. As Lake and Rothschild (1998) stated, collective fears of the future are one of the main causes of ethnic conflicts. Similarly, in the context of the Kurds, accepting ethnic diversity was seen as a serious threat to the unity of the new republic on its way to modernization.

Having such fears, the Turkish leadership transformed their identity formation concept into an “ethnic form” which was inspired by the French notion of the nationalism. Thus, Harris (1977) says:

To assure that further Kurdish revolts would not occur, Ankara imposed stricter administrative controls over eastern Turkey than in the rest of the country. A consistent effort was made to disarm the tribes, and gendarmes were stationed throughout this area. Some Kurdish tribes and especially their leaders were removed from the troubled region. At the same time, the Kurds suffered severe cultural disabilities. The use of Kurdish as a written language, or as a tongue on the radio and television, was sternly prohibited. (p.112)

In the late 1960s, as stated by Eriksen (2001), the effects of modernization began to change the dynamics of the conflicts, and with this, the Kurdish issue. After the military coup of 1960 a new constitution was introduced, “which has been hailed as the most liberal constitution that Turkey has had so far” (Kirişçi, 1998).

However, this relatively democratic environmental situation did not last long. After the 1971 military intervention “The ban on advocating Marxism-Leninism and propagating ideas deemed threatening to the indivisibility of Turkey and Turkish identity provided the basis on which the Constitutional Court shut down the Turkish Workers Party” (Kirişçi, 1998, p. 241). This military intervention and its effects on policies toward these leftist groups eventually forced them to go underground and radicalize (Kirişçi, 1998). The 1982 Turkish constitution that was amended immediately after the 1980 military coup indicates that legal regulations play an
important role in impacting identities within the country. After the 1980 coup, the military administration (1980-1983) again banned the Kurdish language and changed the names of Kurdish towns and villages into Turkish names. Beside this, Kurdish families were forced to give Turkish names to their children.

Therefore, a new generation of Kurds emerged who were frustrated with the silence of the Kurdish leadership, and were exposed to revolutionary ideas that gave the Kurdish independence movement a radical nationalist and socialist agenda. One of these students was Abdullah Öcalan, a devoted leftist who eventually became the leader of the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), or the Kurdish Workers' Party (Imset, 1992). In this political climate, Abdullah Öcalan, became a “prototype” for many radicalized Kurds.

The Emergence of the PKK

In order to understand the emergence of the PKK, it is important to understand the political situation of those times. In the 1970s, many left and right-wing terrorist organizations developed in Turkey because of socio-economic problems such as a weak economy, and a high rate inflation especially among the young generation who were unhappy to live under "the imperialist system" (Mango, 2005a). In addition to that, Marxists and Leninist wings stimulated young people who wanted to undertake a socialist revolution against the government by using violence. As a result of these challenging conditions, the PKK first appeared in the 1970s “as a primarily leftist, radical, student group; however, over the years, it extended its base of support into many other countries besides Turkey” (Samih Teymur & Smith, 2008, p. 18).

In 1970, Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK and one of seven children of an extremely poor Kurdish family, attended the activities of the Revolutionary Youth Movement (Devrimci Genclik Haraketi), which was an extremist left wing
group. In 1973, the National Liberation Army was established by Ocalan and his friends who were students in the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University (Cakar, Cengiz, & Tombul, 2011). The aim of this student movement was to create an independent Kurdish state in the Anatolia region (Button, 1995). By the year 1978, the PKK was formally established by Abdullah Ocalan as a separatist terrorist organization with 23 of his friends, including some Turks, in Diyarbakir and it was based on Marxist ideology (Kutschera, 1999).

To date, the PKK has organized eight congresses. The most important of which, the second congress, took place in Damascus, Syria, in 1982, and then the PKK decided to begin a violent armed movement against the Turkish state in order to create an independent Kurdish state (Cakar et al., 2011). The first terror attack carried out by the PKK occurred in 1984, killing more than a dozen people during the year.

When analyzing the PKK’s violent acts, even though Turkish army and police seemed to be the main target of the PKK, many unarmed civilians were killed because of their attacks in city centers. Interestingly, the majority of these killings were Kurdish civilians. According to Turkey’s official report, not including the police and army casualties, 5687 civilians were killed and 4274 civilians were wounded because of the PKK’s attacks between 1984 and 2009 (Ankara Papers, 2004). This is one of the important reasons why the PKK was listed as a terrorist organization by the US and the Council of the European Union. Furthermore, the PKK was regarded as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world when comparing its acts with the ETA case in Spain, where 343 civilians were killed, and the IRA case in the UK, where 1855 civilians were killed (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

In terms of attack strategies, kidnapping, assassination, bombing cars, suicide bombing, armed assaults, and attacking civilians (against both Turkish and Kurdish
people) and officials including teachers, health officers, police and military forces have been used by the PKK (Roth & Sever, 2007). According to some scholars (Cakar et al., 2011), the use of violence by the PKK can be explained by three reasons as follows:

1-Attacking the public to illustrate its power to provide wide public support for the organization and to show the weakness of the government;
2- Attack the business community to create the dispute about government policy, to provide money for the organization, and to increase the business expenses stemming from investing large amounts of money to security;
3- Attacking government workers in southeast Turkey to increase an ethnic and nationalist awareness in the Kurdish community. (p. 12).

On the other hand, during that time several pro-Kurdish political parties were established. However, the first party (HADEP- People’s Democracy Party), which gained seats in the National Grand Assembly was also banned by the Supreme Court due to the fact they spoke in the Kurdish language at the oath-taking ceremony. Several other political attempts shared the same destiny.⁶

Moreover, these were followed by policies that were mainly focused on military solutions, including the application of different laws under the declared “state of emergency” which was effective between 1987 and 2002 in the eastern and the southeastern part of the country, and forced relocations due to security concerns. However, these counter measures brought some restrictions not only for the Kurdish people, but also for the Turks in the region. As a result of this, the situation created dissatisfaction among the Kurds, and facilitated the PKK’s manipulation of the Kurdish people (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Ünal, 2011).

In this regard, the Turkish government had a strong fear of being torn apart that had arisen since the very beginning of the conflict. On the one hand, the PKK claimed that the biased, monolithic, and discriminative policies of the Turkish...
government created great suffering for the Kurdish people. The Kurdish citizens said that the existence of structural violence mechanisms created poor life standards. The Turkish citizens, on the other hand, had a strong feeling of insecurity because of the attacks and separatist claims of the PKK.

**The Capture of the PKK Leader**

Due to military and police forces’ operations in both city centers and mountainous areas, the PKK suffered severe setbacks during 1998. In addition to that, there was the increasing pressure of the Turkish government on Syria and a threat of war unless the country cut its support for the PKK militants, which forced the Assad regime to expel Ocalan, the PKK leader, from Syria territory used by the PKK members as a safe haven till 1999. First, Ocalan attempted to obtain asylum in countries, Russia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. However, even though he was not successful in his attempts, he was invited by the Italian leftists to Italy, but this did not last long. During this period, the PKK intensified its attacks of random killing and suicide bombings to protest the pressure being implemented by Turkish state to capture its leader. Due to strong pressure from Turkey and USA, Ocalan had been forced to leave Italy. And he was finally captured by the Turkish Special Forces on February 16, 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya (Cornell, 2011; Eser, 2007; Sahin, 2001).

The capture of the PKK leader is one of the most important milestones in Turkey’s ongoing fight against the PKK. After his capture, Ocalan called PKK militants to seek a peaceful solution of the Kurdish Problem. Then, The PKK declared a unilateral and permanent ceasefire, which ended with renewed PKK violence in 2004. It was the longest ceasefire which lasted almost 5 years by the PKK in its history. During this period, the PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) based on its new strategy in order to persuade
international community that it is now a legal political organization (Ekici, 2006; Eser, 2007). However, the PKK’s ongoing violence which started in 2004 has clearly showed it is insincere in seeking a peaceful solution to Kurdish issue. As a harvest of its strategy, the long ceasefire period was used by the PKK leadership to recruit new members and obtain more financial and logistic support from its domestic (Nationalist Kurdish sympathizers) and international alliances.

**Financial Resources of the PKK**

When we look at the financial resources of the PKK, we realize that they use many methods including drug trafficking, human smuggling, kidnapping, money laundering and revolutionary taxes to support their activities.

Concerning this point, Sever and Roth’s (2011) study provides an important contribution to the literature in terms of showing a strong relationship between transnational organized crime and the PKK. They claim that “the PKK involved in different types of transnational organized crime to finance its activities, while drug trafficking predominates over human smuggling/trafficking, extortion and firearms trafficking among others” (p. 152). In 2009, they suggested the PKK’s estimated annual income from criminal activities was $10 million. Similarly, Sahin (2001) indicated that illicit drug trafficking constituted a large portion of the overall income of the PKK as a result of its operations across the globe. Due to Turkey’s geographical location as a major transit route from Southwest Asia and Middle East to Europe, a considerable amount of heroin is trafficked by the PKK through Turkey en route to western European markets (Sahin, 2001).

According to KOM’s (Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime in Turkey) 2009 Annual Report, there are increasing numbers of PKK members who have been arrested for drug-related crimes over the past two decades. This report says
that 807 PKK members were arrested by both the Turkish Police and Gendarmerie in 359 drug cultivation, production, trafficking and distribution cases between 1984 and 2009 (Table 3.1).

**Table 3-1: PKK related drug seizures 1984-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Drugs</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Liters</th>
<th>Kilogram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish/marihuana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22,729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acetic anhydride</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26,190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium gum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>337,412</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium carbonate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug lab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to that, the U.S. State Department’s 2007 Country Report and NATO terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit Report emphasized that “the PKK is involved in illegal economic operations such as smuggling, tax evasion, and other forms of organized crime, including drug and counterfeit money trafficking as well as illegal foreign currency exchanges. These report also stated that PKK members apply coercion in collecting funds” (Onay, 2008, p. 1).

As a result of the PKK’s strong involvement in transnational crime activities, in 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department announced it would freeze the account activities of three leaders, Murat Karayilan, Zubeyir Aydar, and Ali Riza Altun, of the PKK owing to the fact that the PKK was using the funds for drug smuggling (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2009). In fact, the existence of Kurdish immigrants in Europe and the structure of the PKK ensured a fertile environment for the PKK, especially for drug trafficking. Turkey’s geographic location situated between the
Asian and Europe continents also facilitated other forms of transnational organized crime activities such as illegal immigration, human smuggling and smuggling of goods by the PKK (Sever & Roth, 2011).

Additionally, similarly to ETA, the PKK has been gathering “revolutionary taxes” from the Kurdish people both in Turkey and Europe to finance its activities within the territory of Turkey. Most recently, The Turkish Finance Ministry announced that they found evidence suggesting that “$15.5 million was transferred to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) by municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in audits carried out during operations involving the KCK7 (Union of Communities in Kurdistan), which is the parallel state structure of the PKK in cities against Turkish state, an umbrella political organization that includes the PKK” (World Bulletin, 2011). Current police operations have supported these explanations; more than 2000 of the PKK members have been taken into custody and nearly 900 among them have been arrested by Turkish courts.

**Global Dimensions of the PKK**

Many violent ethnic conflicts witnessed throughout the world demonstrate that no terrorist organization can live without international support or linkages (Martin, 2012) such as training, logistic and financial aid. Some of these supports might be directly provided by states, and some can be provided by other separatist or terrorist organizations (Martin, 2012).

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7 Koma Civaken Kurdistan (Union of Communities in Kurdistan), is a Kurdish organization founded by Ocalan to carry out democratic confederalism. To achieve this end, members of KCK have established an illegal state structure parallel to the Turkish state within the Turkish territory. As a result of later investigations and indictments, for example, prosecutors have claimed that the KCK is the umbrella organization above the PKK and has its own judicial system. KCK militants illegally trial local mayors who do not serve towards KCK’s ideology and goals, and businessmen who do not accept to pay revolutionary taxes. Another aim of the KCK is to create acts of mass violence in society by deploying children, teenagers and women. In order to create an atmosphere of violence in the streets, the latter fight with police forces in protests and sabotage public property and transportation with Molotov cocktails. Yilmaz (2012) states that “the KCK was depicted as an organization which has established a de-facto Kurdistan state in some pilot-cities in Turkey’s south east region”.
As indicated in the Map, in consequence of the regional distribution of the Kurdish people, the PKK has especially used Iraq, Syria, Russia, Greece, and Iran’s territories as safe havens since its establishment. There have been several training sites and hidden camps operated by the PKK within Iraq and in Syrian territory. Ocalan was living in Damascus until his arrest in 1999. During that time, Syria provided not only protection for PKK’s leaders and members, but military assistance and training. Before Ocalan’s capture, this situation brought the two countries close to a war. As a result of the Turkish state’s pressure on the Assad regime, Syria deported the PKK leader in 1999. Syria used the PKK as a political tool against Turkey until 1999. However, they left the PKK alone because of the Turkish military threat (Ankara Papers, 2004). It is now clear that even though the Syrian regime accepted a proposal to coordinate with the Turkish state in the fight with the PKK, after March 15th 2011 when the Syrian civil war broken out, the Assad Regime has just begun to provide PKK militants with an area of movement (although this is not at the same
level as it was in 1980's and 1990's) and an opportunity to set up new camps once again in Syrian territory such as in the district of Resulyan on the Turkish border. The main reason for the Syrian regime’s policy change regarding the PKK is Turkey’s stance in supporting the opposition parties (free Syrian Army) in Syria in its ongoing civil war against the Assad Administration (Orhan, 2012). Concerning this point, Laciner (2006) noted that 35% of the executive PKK militants were from Syria, Iraq, Armenian and Iran. Besides Syria, nearly all PKK attacks have been carried out by terrorists who came from northern Iraq. The Autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, which has run northern Iraq since the US invaded Iraq in 2003, has overseen PKK activities in their territory especially in the Qandil Mountains.

According to Turkish officials, the estimated number of PKK militants who are capable of attacking the Turkish army and civilians are 5000 troops, with 3,500 who live freely in nearly 15 camps in Northern Iraq (See the map 2) (Laciner, 2006).

Map 3-2: PKK camps in Iraq and Iran

Source: Aksiyon (Weekly journal in Turkey), and Turkish Daily Sabah

It can thus be said that two main factors that have contributed to the survival of the PKK; are strong international support and its involvement in transnational organized crimes, which have a significant impact on the financing of its operations.
In fact there are several different reasons, it can be argued, why certain countries support the PKK. For instance, while the support of Syria for the PKK stemmed from their unhappiness over the water dispute and grievances regarding claims related to the Turkish province of Antakya (which is a border city of Turkey with Syria), the support of Iran and Russia may stemmed from the increasing influence of Turkey in the Middle East, Turkic republics in central Asia, and the Caucasus. Greece and Greek Cyprus for example, used the PKK card against the Turkish state to implement their expansionist policy in the Aegean Sea and to guarantee the future status of Cyprus. For instance, when Ocalan was captured in Kenya, Africa, he was found in a Greek Embassy and was carrying a passport from South Cyprus (Ankara Papers, 2004).

Additionally, many PKK members have enjoyed the indirect patronage provided by some European countries over the past two decades. Onay (2008) contends that this has occurred even though most European states have also officially recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York:

“The PKK has enjoyed safe conduct in some European countries for quite some time. Today, these nations are beginning to understand the global effects of terrorism and the need for international cooperation, and are accordingly taking steps to ban or restrict PKK activities. For instance, as reported by the Turkish daily Sabah, the British Foreign Office acknowledged in January 2008 that the PKK and its affiliate organizations had been active in Britain and other European countries since 2001. As a result, Britain announced that foreign terrorist organizations would not be allowed to exploit the territories of the United Kingdom to fundraise anymore”. (p. 2).

It should be noted that even if many Western governments declared that the PKK is one of the world’s bloodiest terrorist organizations, the PKK has still succeeded in receiving considerable support from the West (Ankara Papers, 2004) by allowing PKK members to establish associations which organize the Kurdish community in western Europe in accordance with the PKK’s political strategy, and
media (TV, Radio), for example in Denmark, where these are used as a propaganda tool by the organization.

**Turkey’s Counter-Terrorism Policies and Actions towards the PKK**

In Turkey, especially after the 1970s, more than 100 left and right wing terrorist organizations were formed throughout the country including groups such as the DHKPC, MLKP, TKP, Turkish Hezbollah, Al-Qaida, TIT, and the PKK and so on (Eser, 2007). Therefore, the Turkish state faced a serious situation and needed to counteract the formation of those terrorist groups. This was despite the fact that some of these terrorist organizations such as the DHKPC, TKP, Turkish Hezbollah and Al-Qaida had been terminated by the Turkish police force. From this perspective, it can be said that the Turkish state has developed a great deal of counterterrorism experience.

Apart from those terrorist groups, however, the attacks and effectiveness of the PKK are still continuing because of its domestic and international support and the failures of the counterterrorism policies of the Turkish government (Ünal, 2011). The PKK still has an important influence nationally on the Kurdish people who live not only in the East or Southeastern part of Turkey, but also in Syria, Iran, and Iraq in order to use these countries as sites for attacking the Turkish people and Turkish states or cities.

Generally speaking, Turkey’s response to terrorism has been based on a no-reconciliation and no-negotiation approach (Alkan, 2003). The main objective underlining this approach is that the state wants to avoid showing its impotency in the fight with terrorist. In regards to this view, if it maintains its stability in its fight against terrorism, the terrorism issue can be overcome in the long run. For this reason, Turkey’s response to the PKK violence has consisted largely of military measures,
rather than other social-economic and reconciliation policies (Ünal, 2011). In order to implement its repressive based counterterrorism policy, Turkey has employed several forces such as their regular military, gendarme and special operational police teams both in rural and urban era in southeastern Anatolia (Cakar et al., 2011).

When we look at the historical process of Turkey’s counterterrorism policy, we realize that its efforts have changed from being a hard-line one to a soft line one over time depending upon the extent of the PKK attacks. In this respect, the Turkish governments’ counter terrorism approach is similar to that of Spain’s approach to ETA. This is because Spanish governments, including even Franco, implemented both repression (hard-line) and reconciliation policies (soft-line) by responding to ETA tactics, of “action, repression, action”\(^8\). The PKK has used the same tactics of “action, repression, action”, as ETA since its inception. However, the Turkish state has realized that this creates a vicious circle of discord between the state and separatist terrorist organizations, and gave up the repression policy after the mid-1990s. Both ETA and the PKK have used this tactic described above against the state in order to obtain public support. This is because the states repression policies in the affected regions can cause public dissatisfaction, and terrorist groups have exploited the state’s failures towards reconciliation by implementing practices such as unlawful detentions and trial processes that made people feel a sense of mutiny against the Spanish state. These negative developments in the conflict zones increased the popularity of ETA among the Basque people, and similarly the PKK among the Kurdish people (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010). Mango (2005) suggests that Turkey followed a strategy, which involved evacuating villages to prevent the logistic support they provided to the PKK and protected the locals living in those places.

\(^8\) This strategy can be explained as the concept that was a “cycle in which every action would be followed by state repression which would, in turn, encourage a larger revolutionary action, restarting the cycle at a higher level at each stage” (Diego Muro, 2004)
However, most important, “this strategy manipulated by the PKK as if Turkey was engaging in discrimination against the Kurds by the forcing them to live another place” (Cakar et al., 2011, p. 15).

After 2001, Turkey began to enact democratic reforms to meet the EU demands and to stimulate its membership negotiations with the EU. This democratization process also brought about a change in the Turkish state’s counterterrorism policies. Until the present time, Turkey has fought against the PKK within its territory and northern Iraq on the one hand; and had started indirect negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan, on the other (Çandar, 2011). However, no reconciliation has yet been reached because of his irretrievable demands. In addition to that, the PKK disrupted its temporary cease-fire, and increased its attacks against both civilians and officials not only in the local areas, but also in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Mersin, Adana, and as a result the Turkish government put an end to this indirect peace negotiation process with the PKK. Among the Turkish government policies for combating terrorism there have mainly been criticisms from two camps. While the first group argues that the Turkish government perceived the Kurdish Issue as simply a security issue, the other stated that:

...although it was necessary to have some degree of security measures, their implementation had to be considered very carefully in order to avoid public dissatisfaction and abuse of civil liberties. They argue however, that as in any other democratic country where public life and order are threatened by terrorists, it was inevitable that the government would take security measures that would impact on civil liberties. (Ankara Papers, 2004, p. 58)

To sum up, Turkey’s 30-years counterterrorism experience has clearly shown that the military options used to solve the PKK problem do not work on their own. Therefore, Turkey has begun to use a mixed model counterterrorism policy, which means that both hard-line and soft-line responses have been applied together since 2010. In this respect, the Erdogan government announced its new strategy regarding
with the Kurdish Question by saying that “negotiation with politicians (pro-Kurdish parties), fighting with terrorist”. This was meant that it closed the process of negotiations with representatives of the PKK. While the Turkish government is carrying out democratic and social reforms to meet the demands of minorities and particularly the Kurdish people, on the one hand; the military in rural and police forces in cities are fighting against the ongoing PKK attacks, and are increasingly operating against KCK and PKK militants in cities to prevent prospective attacks of the PKK on the other.

However, even though the Turkish government announced its new no-negotiation approach with terrorists in 2012, current developments (that occurred only six months after Erdogan`s statement noted above) show that the Erdogan government has recently started to negotiate with Ocalan, the PKK leader, who has been imprisoned in a Turkish prison in Imrali since 1999, once more, in order to convince the PKK to lay down its weapons. This current process may differ from those conducted previously in many respects. First, the majority of Turkey’s political parties, media leaders, academicians, NGOs, and citizens, all support this new negotiation process with Ocalan in order to provide a solution for sustainable peace in Turkey. Second, to this end, all units of states have ensured there will be a consensus on this continuing historical process. Third, some pro-Kurdish party lawmakers have been included in the negotiations with Ocalan.

Therefore, this current process enhances hopes for solving the protracted conflict for some, even though fears remain the same for those who know that “the PKK had sabotaged the government’s previous talks, namely the Habur and Oslo processes, and this had given rise to the impression that the terrorist organization
lacked a central and well-established hierarchy” (Kenes, 2013, p. 1). Only time will show whether this new process is deemed to succeed or fail.

**Democratization Process in Turkey**

In 1945, as the first step towards democracy, Turkey held free elections with multi parties, and then began to design its structure in accordance with democratic requirements. Even though these processes were disrupted by the military coup series in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1997 “post-modern coup”

9, Turkey underwent a strong democratic process. However, when considered “some essential components of a true process of democratization such as the recognition of ethnic/religious identities, the autonomous representation of economic interest and other forces of civil society” (Ulusoy, 2010, p. 50), it can be said that Turkey’s transition to a “the true democracy” is still continuing.

Historical and political events in Turkey show that military tutelage is the main obstacle in its transition to true democracy. Turkey’s current constitution as with the previous one created by the military administration in 1980 is one of the most important pieces of evidence for this argument. For this reason, even if Turkey’s freely elected governments such as Turgut Ozal tried to realize some important democratic reforms to solve the Kurdish question, the military tutelage did not allow these regulations (Yilmaz, 2012). That is because the elites of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) advocated that these democratic reforms would cause the partition of the country and nation state (Kardas, 2009). Not only the military tutelage but also the

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9 “The Islamist Refah or Welfare Party polled the most votes in the 1995 national election and came to power in July 1996 as head of a coalition government. Some Refah actions provoked the military, which labeled what it called “reactionism” or fundamentalism one of the two main threats to the state. (The other is separatism.) On February 28, 1997, the military-dominated National Security Council (MGK) issued a series of recommendations or ultimatums to the government on actions needed to protect secularism. The military succeeded in forcing the Refah-led government from power later that year and Refah was banned in 1998, but it was succeeded by the Fazilet or Virtue Party”. (Global Security, 2010, p.1).
bureaucratic elites who were strongly tied with the Kemalism ideology have played a crucial role in Turkey’s political life. All political parties even current governments have complained about those bureaucratic elites by blaming them for slowing the implementation process of democratic reforms (Heper, 2001). The military and bureaucratic elites’ resistance against the transition to any real democracy and their power in the realm of domestic politics caused political instability in the country has provided an important clue as to why the Kurdish question has not been solved to date. Regarding this point, Ulusoy (2010) argues that:

“Over the past three decades, the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast of the country has further constituted and consolidated a basis for the military’s involvement in politics. In addition to the extraordinary powers granted through the emergency rule (OHAL) declared in the major provinces of the region, the army continuously prioritized the “military solution” to the Kurdish problem, and narrowed the space for political maneuver” (p.52).

When examining the democratization process of Turkey, three important turning points have stood out: the recognition of Turkey as an official candidate state to the EU in 1999; the 2002 National Elections, presidency election in 2007, and the “Ergenekon” probe\textsuperscript{10} in 2007.

\textit{The Europe Union (EU), as a Pushing Power}

In the international context, the EU has played a significant role in the political, administrative and economic restructuring of Turkey especially in the post 1980s era when it started negotiations with the EC (European Community), which

\textsuperscript{10} “The Ergenekon operation started with the investigation of 27 hand grenades found in a house in Istanbul, in 2007. Then the investigation widened and transformed into an operation to crackdown on the ‘Ergenekon Terror Organization’, which allegedly aimed at paving the way for a military coup against the government. More than 100 people were taken into custody in the seven waves of the operation, while 86 of them were arrested” (Hurriyet DailyNews, 2011), including retired commanders, generals, bureaucrats, professors and journalists. In later operations, Turkish Police found more than thousands illegally hidden and buried bombs, heavy weapons, snipers, mine that were ready to use for the organization’s political aim. The organization is seriously alleged by the public prosecutors with making the environment ready for military coups by conducting the events that would cause unrest among the people. Ergenekon also is alleged with connected many sub-illegal organizations such as Italian Gladio. That’s why it is called illegally an organization of the \textit{deep state or covert action} in Turkey.
later became the EU. The EU’s candidacy process stimulated the Turkish government to carry out democratic reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. From this point of view, the EU’s recognition of Turkey as an official candidate state for membership had a significant impact on its domestic policies. Thanks to the driving force of the EU, Turkey issued nine democratic reform packages, which led to serious constitutional changes and challenged the basic principles of the Republican regime (Ulusoy, 2010).

When we look at the details of these reform packages, we can see that there are several regulations that were intended to eliminate the Kurdish conflict such as the legalizing of the Kurdish language in public, allowing official and private Kurdish TV and radio broadcasting, Kurdish language courses, and releasing from prison four former deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), including Leyla Zana (Dagi, 2006).

The European Commission finally recognized these reforms as meeting the Copenhagen political criteria in its 2004 progress report on Turkey. The Commission report noted that Turkey has “sufficiently fulfilled” the political criteria. Since then the commission “has recommended the council to open ‘accession negotiations’ and the European Council meeting in Brussels on December 17 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on October 2005” (Dagi, 2006, p. 100). Regarding this point, Ulusoy (2010) indicated that the initiation of the EU accession negotiations further intensified the clashes within the Turkish elites.

The Role of the Erdogan Government

The 2002 election provided another turning point in the process of Turkish democratization. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections with enough votes to form a single party government. The AKP’s
increasing popularity throughout the country brought them three successive victories in the national elections, which were held in 2002, 2007, 2011. The reasons for this may be that there were economic, democratic, and social improvements or a lack of any alternative political party that could produce better policies than the AKP.

Interestingly, after the 2002 election, even though the AKP had Islamist roots, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan firstly carried out a wide-ranging visit to EU countries. In fact, this visit consisted of two important messages both domestically and internationally: showing domestically he would challenge military and bureaucratic elites by making democratic reforms; internationally his government’s willingness to become a member of the EU. Second, these visits both domestically and internationally provided a signal that he would not establish an Islamic state by replacing the prevailing secular democratic state with this alternate state. In order to show Erdogan’s willingness for democratic reforms, Dagi states that Prime Minister Erdogan declared that “his government would complete the work necessary and make the Copenhagen criteria as Ankara’s own criteria” (Dagi, 2006, p. 99).

Apart from the international leverage provided by the EU, the recent Erdogan government’s willingness to improve Turkish democracy and the weakening power of the TAF as regards the political system in the country has increased the hopes that this will bring about the resolution of the Kurdish question.

However, even if Prime Minister Erdogan insists on the initiative and the Copenhagen criteria, the recent developments related to the Kurdish conflict demonstrate that democratic reforms have started to slow down. This might be the result of the decreasing popularity of the EU among Turks because of disputes of the EU countries between themselves about Turkey’s participation, the existence of the
status quo within the state institution, and the resistance of the opposition parties to the “Kurdish Opening” project.

The Democratic Initiative towards the Kurdish Question

At the end of the 2009, the Erdogan government declared that they had launched the initiative popularly known as the “Democratic Opening”. However, the democratic opening was later labeled the “Kurdish Opening”. According to Ulusoy (2010), this can be explained by two situations arising from interlinked domestic and international factors; first, the AKP’s new strategy, which involved incorporating the Kurds by focusing their religious roots and offering them economic carrots, and the normalization of the political and economic situation in the southeast that increased the expectation for solving the Kurdish Issue. Admittedly, this process would require the government’s response to Kurdish demands concerning cultural rights, freedom of expression, and governance. Second, international conjecture provided a great opportunity for the AKP to initiate such a difficult process of political transformation. The EU fully supported this democratic initiative, and the positive international environment and the US’ declaration of a withdrawal from Iraq created an opportunity for the government to solve the Kurdish Question.

According to Barkey, the “Kurdish Opening” is a very serious effort by the government in terms of showing its changing mentality on the Kurdish Issue, whether or not it will succeed. He points out that this effort is also the most coherent and comprehensive attempt ever made in Turkey (Barkey, 2009).

In fact, before the 2009 local election, Erdogan provided the first signal for the “Kurdish Opening” by identifying with the Kurdish identity in Diyarbakir. Accepting this Kurdish identity by the state was perceived as a large threat against the nation
state. Thus, Erdogan’s step was of great importance for solving the Kurdish conflict at the first level.

What is the Kurdish Opening?

From a broader perspective, it can be said that “The Kurdish Opening is intended to be a comprehensive, multi-tiered policy approach to resolving problem between the Turkish government and Turkey’s Kurdish population” (Kirişçi, 2009). However, the expected outcome underlying the Kurdish opening was to force the PKK to lay down its arms.

According to Kirisci (2009), the Erdogan government planned to begin by taking several “confidence building measures”, the kinds of measures that politically do not cost much, and do not require major legal amendments. Symbolically, the first leg of the initiative was to allow Kurdish imams to preach in the Kurdish language in mosques and officially change “the Turkish name of some Kurdish cities back to Kurdish names. The second phase of the opening will likely involve granting amnesty to PKK militants. The final and most difficult phase will comprise a constitutional amendment redefining Turkish citizenship to be a less ethnically based one and allowing Kurdish language classes to be taught in schools” (Kirişçi, 2009). When considering the dimensions of the problem, we encounter a domestic political structure which is a big obstacle for the government even though the international community stands behind the initiative.

However, a few questions regarding the “Kurdish opening” remain to be answered: What will constitute the stages of this process, how will these reforms succeed in resolving the conflict and how will these reforms or initiatives convince the PKK to lay down its weapons?
First, when we look at the following list, we can evaluate the level of these democratic reforms in the short run. Some of these reforms are completed, while others are in progress. All these reforms not only originated from the “Kurdish Opening,” but also from the nine democratic packages created by Turkish state to meet Copenhagen criteria.

- Allowed free speaking and singing in the Kurdish language everywhere in the country.
- Allowed the opening of private Kurdish language courses and some universities began to offer Kurdish courses as an elective.
- Allowed TV and radio broadcasting in Kurdish. Here, more importantly, TRT6, which broadcasts 24 hours a day in the Kurdish language was established by the Turkish government as an official TV station.
- Four former deputies from the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) were released from prison.
- They released kids¹¹ less than 18 years of age who committed crimes by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails against the security forces in unlawful demonstrations.
- They allowed 34 PKK members who wanted to benefit from the Turkish state’s amnesty which was already in place and who were not involved in any armed attacks into the country from Iraq. However, this attempt backfired owing to the fact that “they delivered fiery speeches in support of terrorist group. The party members said they had returned to Turkey not to take advantage of the AKP's amnesty, but rather to represent the PKK. The group added that they had no remorse for their past

¹¹ These kids also commonly abused by the KCK to riot in cities as a part of its strategy.
actions, including violence, and made political demands on the Turkish government” (Cagaptay, 2009, p. 1).

In addition to these efforts, the Erdogan government has planned to implement medium and long term steps in accordance with the Kurdish Opening. New economic packages and employment projects were to be implemented in regions where the Kurdish population was dense in the mid-term. The most important fact was that constitutional amendments regarding regulated citizenship would be made in the long run by addressing the cultural diversity of the country. “Long-term plans also include the strengthening of local administrations, the encouraging of investments in the east and southeast” (Bozkurt, 2009, p. 2).

Second, it is clear that domestic factors have played a major role in the “Kurdish Opening”. Right after the declaration of the initiative, criticisms against the AKP by the opposition parties, the CHP (Republican Public Party), and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), broke out by those who claimed the initiative would lead Turkey towards separation. Moreover, the pro-Kurdish party the DTP (Democratic Toplum Partisi- Democratic Public Party) requested the government talk with Abdullah Ocalan by claiming that without Ocalan the goal of the Kurdish Opening would fail. However, Erdogan rejected the DTP’s suggestion for a “Kurdish opening” by saying “we have never bargained with the terrorist and separatist, and will never do. None of the honorable government of this country has sat to table with accused” (Turkish Weekly, 2009).

Domestic debates and the short experience of the Kurdish opening confirm that “the democratization process is very fragile and could easily be sabotaged. The sabotage could come from inside the regime as well as from opposition and terrorist organizations” (Ulusoy, 2010, p. 65).
The PKK`s terrorist attack in Tokat, a city which is in northern part of Turkey, that occurred on December 7, 2009, was the first of several serious crisis that affected the Kurdish opening process. In this attack, seven soldiers died and three were wounded (Hurriyet, 2009). The government saw this terrorist attack as an open provocation that aimed to prevent and sabotage the initiative. People protested against this deadly attack throughout the country. Zibak (2009) points out that the PKK`s aim “was to block the peace process because it sees its survival in danger because of the democratic steps taken thus far” (p. 1).

Soon after the PKK`s sabotage of the democratic opening, a second crisis emerged that resulted in the Supreme Court closing the pro-Kurdish party, DTP`s because of its alleged links with the PKK (Hurriyet, 2009). Even though the DTP was carrying out PKK-led politics, the court decision resulted in disturbances among nationalist Kurds who were supporting the opening. A few months later, all the independent congressmen of the DTP except those two who were banned from politics, established a new party, the BDP (Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi - The Peace and Democracy Party).

One may said that increasing PKK attacks, opposition parties` resistance, pro-Kurdish Party`s, (now the BDP), impractical suggestions and demands, increasing tension between Turks and Kurds because of the attacks, and the unclear intent of the initiative stopped the Turkish government`s favorable attempt until the new civil constitution that all political parties agreed to work on a compromise after the 2011 election, and started to work together for this purpose.
Third, it should not be ignored that the initiative has had an important impact on Kurdish people in the region. The recent results of polls\(^\text{12}\) conducted by private research companies, SETA and POLLMARK, have confirmed this thesis. However, even though the Turkish Government has accelerated its democratic reforms since 2004, during this term, the PKK has gradually escalated its violence against the civilian and armed forces. Now a majority of the nationalist Kurdish people have begun to condemn the PKK\'s attacks against civilians, in particular. There was clear evidence of this when the people in Sirnak, located in the southeastern Anatolia region, hit the demonstrators supporting the PKK with bats by claiming that “we don’t want see those people on streets, want the peace” in 2011 (Sabah, 2011).

As it seen in Figure 3-1, banning political parties create negative effect on the Kurds and increase their support to the pro-Kurdish parties even though those political parties have a direct relation with the PKK.

**Figure 3-1**: Election Result of Pro-Kurdish Parties (HADEP-DTP and BDP)

The increasing PKK attacks before each important event in Turkish political life such as referendums for democratic and constitution reforms, elections, and

\(^{12}\) The poll of “Public Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey” was conducted by SETA & POLLMARK in 2010 especially to measure how Turkish and Kurdish people perceive democratic reforms and Kurdish Initiative. One of the important findings of this survey is that the people who identify themselves as Kurd strongly support current democratic reforms and “Kurdish Opening” initiated by the Turkish government (see the report [http://www.setadc.org/reports/281-research-report-public-perception-of-the-kurdish-question-in-turkeyq-by-seta-a-pollmark](http://www.setadc.org/reports/281-research-report-public-perception-of-the-kurdish-question-in-turkeyq-by-seta-a-pollmark) for more details).
democratic initiatives have clearly shown that the PKK benefits from the deadlocks of the Kurdish question, and abuses the Kurds’ demands for its political aims, but it does not want to lose its power in the region including Syria, Iran, and Iraq. When considered that the PKK is an important player in the world scene especially in Europe in terms of drug trafficking, which INTERPOL’s records also confirm, the effectiveness of this initiative by the PKK can be better understood. In addition to this argument, increasing attacks of the PKK during the period when the Turkish state began to implement several democratic reforms in order to solve the Kurdish conflict can be seen as an artful strategy of the PKK that will provide them more time to gain more benefits at the negotiating table (Dagi, 2013).
Chapter IV: The Basque Conflict in Spain

This chapter examines Spain’s practices concerning ETA and its methods for attempting to solve the Basque problem that offers an important perspective to countries struggling with ethnic conflict.

Politically and economically, Spain has been an important member country of the European Union (EU). Therefore, ETA is not only Spain’s problem, but it is also the problem of the EU since it threatens regional security. In this respect, the ETA case is of significance in terms of serving as an example to other countries such as Turkey, Georgia, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan dealing with ethnic conflicts.

Brief History of the Basque Question and ETA

About the Basque “Country”

The Basque Country which had a population around 2.1 million in 2008 is located in the northeast of Spain. The Basque Region is also a very wealthy area compared with other regions of Spain, and the Region is constituted by three provinces, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava covers 11,475 square kilometers (Cokmez, 2008).

In fact, nationalists claim the Basque region to be comprised of seven provinces. Four of these are part of Spain (Southern Basque Country), and the other three are in French territory (Northern Basque Country) (C.P. Barros et al., 2006). Approximately 300,000 Basque people have lived in France (Irvin, 1999). Thus, many Basque insurgences can easily find support from their sympathizers within the area of France’s border (see in the Map 4-2).

The Basque people have lived in that region since ancient times, and their language, Euskera, is an important part of their heritage in explaining their origin and longevity (C.P. Barros et al., 2006). Their sense of freedom and independence, and
their Catholic religion directed their history. One of the most important characteristics of the Basque country is they have a history of autonomy. The Basque people were autonomous before the 17th century; the period called the “fueros”, where local privileges and exemptions were provided by the Spanish King. As a result of the centralization of the Spanish state and the Carlist Wars, the autonomous Basque region was abolished at the end of the 19th century until the 1930s (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

**MAP 4-3: Basque Region in Spain**

![Map of Basque Region in Spain](http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/eta.cfm)

*Source: [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/eta.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/eta.cfm)*

**Political Structure of the Basque Region**

The Basque inhabitants felt a deepening hatred against the Spanish state because the Spanish state deprived the Basque people of their privileges and exemptions, which they had had for many centuries. Here, the racist structure of Basque people should not be ignored. Thus, it was one of the most important foundations of Basque nationalism (Cokmez, 2008). According to Arana, who was the founder of Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), the basis of Basque nationalism was the protection of the Basque race (Coverdale, 1979). In fact, Basques had a peaceful relationship with the Spanish crown up until the middle of the
19th century (Gardeazabal, 2011). The origin of Basque nationalism can be summarized as a movement with the aim of protecting the Basque race and isolating them from the Spaniards (Cokmez, 2008).

In the spread of Basque Nationalism, the role of middle class clergy cannot be ignored, as the Basques were extremely religious people. Indeed Basque nationalism was supported by people who lived in rural areas in the Basque region. Bourgeoisie and wealthy people who connected economically to the central government of Spain were not interested in Basque nationalism (Cokmez, 2008). Therefore, those rich people in the Basque region would later be kidnapped by ETA as means of financial resources.

In the early 1930s, the Spanish state again gave autonomy to the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia. However, this new spring was interrupted because of the civil war between rightist (nationalist, religious and anti-communist) and leftist people (secular, republican, communist) in Spain during 1936-1939. In 1939, the Spanish Civil War ended with the victory of General Franco. Franco governed the whole country by means of a dictatorship for 40 years until his death in 1975 (Cokmez, 2008). Franco’s dictatorship was accompanied by a regime that fought against democracy and communism. During Franco’s term of office, the leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), a historically important party, and the largest and oldest nationalistic party of the Basque region of Spain, fled to Paris and London. The PNV’s power in the Basque region lessened over time because western countries supported the Franco regime as a result of his repressive efforts against anti-communist acts within Spain. In fact, the PNV’s ideology had shifted from a democratic and humanist discourse to a Marxist-Leninist nationalistic one (Grugel, 1990). Franco’s regime and its increasing repression it placed on the
Basque people along with the inefficiency of the PNV appeared to have accelerated the birth of ETA. The following section explains the emergence of ETA and its goals and strategies from its birth until the present time.

The Emergence of ETA

The Franco regime especially repressed the Basque people both during and after the Spanish Civil War and revoked the Basque’s autonomy. As a result of this, the Basques began to demand a higher level of self-governance. During this period, everything related to the Basque language, culture and identity was banned by General Franco (Gardeazabal, 2011). Thus, the Basque people considered that the Franco regime “was trying to root them out as a people and turn their homeland into an industrial wasteland” (Shepard, 2002, p.56) The Basque people`s nationalistic ideology had been changing substantially due to the fact that the situation in the region had become unbearable.

The terrorist organization ETA, was founded by a group of dissident students who were not happy with the PNV`s nonviolence policies. Before establishing ETA, they formed a Journal called “EKIN” to revitalize the Basque language and culture among the younger generation. In fact, in the early stages of the development of EKIN, they associated with the PNV. A couple of years later, they began to disagree with PNV ideology on some important issues, “the role of Basque language and the relation of the Basque country with Spanish state” (Pukos, 2006, p.20). After the separation of these ideas on key issues, those radical students who initiated the discussion founded ETA on July 31, 1959. The initials ETA chosen as their symbol was an acronym for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom in Basque language (Shepard, 2002).
Goals, Ideology, and Strategies of the ETA

ETA was born in order to respond to the repressions and hostilities directed by the Franco regime against the Basque people. In the beginning, ETA’s goal was to revitalize the Basque culture and language in the context of a nationalist approach and this was supported by Arana who was the first leader of the PNV, and who aimed to protect everything belonging to the Basque people by struggling with the Spanish State (Irvin, 1999). In the 1960s, ETA’s fundamental ideology was based on the revitalization of the Basque language. The motto of ETA was that ‘if the Basque language can live, the Basque Country will live’. Moreover, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2001) claimed that the foundation of ETA aimed to establish an independent Basque state in 1959. During this period, there were three fundamental ideological groups within ETA; the first group highlighted the rights of the working-class, the second supported national guerilla tactics, the last adopted a strategy to support the Basque culture based on ethnicity without violence. However, the second group’s ideology, and violent national-guerilla tactics, dominated the other groups over time. Indeed ETA’s new strategy was affected by some successful guerilla movements in Cuba, Venezuela, and Algeria over the same period (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010). As a result, the ideological structure of ETA can be summarized as a combination of traditional Basque nationalism, revolutionary socialism, and anti-colonialism (Muro, 2004).

ETA’s violence strategy was first embedded in a theoretical perspective, but later these theoretical strategies began to turn into an armed struggle over time because of increasing repression and violence by Franco. During this period, the use of excess military force and severe repression, and unlawful detentions and trial processes made people feel a sense of mutiny against the Spanish state, on one hand;
and these negative developments increased the popularity of ETA among the Basque people, on the other hand (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

When we look at the historical events of ETA, we realize that its strategy had been changing according to the conditions at the time and acts of the Spanish state. During Franco’s term in office, ETA’s fundamental strategy was “action-repression-action” which is used today by many ethnic terrorist groups. The PKK is one of them as mentioned earlier. Muro (2004) explains this strategy as the concept that was a “cycle in which every action would be followed by state repression which would, in turn, encourage a larger revolutionary action, restarting the cycle at a higher level at each stage” (p.1).

As a result of its violent strategy of “action-repression-action”, ETA carried out its first military action in 1961, but that was an unsuccessful attempt to derail a train carrying veterans who were travelling to celebrate their victory (the 25th anniversary of the Spanish Civil War) over Sen Sebastian (Barros et al., 2006). Franco responded shortly after to this unsuccessful act of the ETA; many ETA members were arrested, tortured and forced into exile (Irvin, 1999). Even though the ETA militants failed at their attempt, they succeeded in increasing ETA’s prestige in the eyes of the Basque people. In order to respond with violence to Franco’s intense and brutal repression, the Executive Committee (EC) formed by ETA began to recruit new members in 1961. At the end of this process between 1961 and 1964, “ETA found itself constantly having to change and adapt to the damage that Franco’s security forces inflicted upon its organizational structure. Moreover, ETA found itself constantly trying to address the key questions involving the nature of the struggle for liberation and how best to mobilize support for their armed struggle” (Pukos, 2006, p. 21).
At the end of the 1960s, ETA began to assassinate and kidnap famous members of the military and police force of the Spanish State. In 1968, a popular ETA activist was killed by the Guardia Civil (Spanish rural police forces). To respond to the killing, ETA assassinated an inspector of the national police and a member of the Guardia Civil. Then, the Franco regime repressed the situation by putting the entire Basque region under a siege acted. “Thousands were jailed, tortured, and exiled, culminating in the 1970 Burgos trial and imprisonment of over a dozen ETA leaders” (Barros et al., 2006, p.402).

ETA’s strategy of “action-repression-action”, was successful until the 1980s, and over this period ETA increased its capacity and operational power, and gained public sympathy within the Basque people at the same time (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

The 1973 assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero was one of the most notorious attacks carried out by ETA in Madrid. When considered at that time, Luis Carrero was a favorite and likely successor of the Franco regime. Kern describes this attack in his article by saying that “Carrero Blanco was killed when an explosion catapulted his car into the air and over the roof of a Madrid church where he had just attended mass. The vehicle landed on the second-floor balcony of a building on the other side of the church” (Kern, 2009, p.1). Therefore, this attack was of importance for ETA in order to show its ability to act anywhere in Spain, even in Madrid.

ETA had acted against specific targets until the death of Franco. After Franco, ETA changed its policy, and began to attack the Spanish government without targeting anyone specific. However, it can be said that ETA avoided attacking civilians until the 1980s owing to the fact that they did not want to lose their
legitimacy in the international arena and among the Basque people (Barros et al., 2006). The fundamental goal of the attacks and violence carried out by ETA was to force the Spanish government to the negotiation table, thus ETA would be able to obtain more concessions, which they wanted to have, from the government.

After the capture of many foremost leaders of ETA during the period of 1978-1985, the organization embarked on a new attack strategy, this was called as “spreading the pain to society” (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010). According to this strategy, everyone should share the pain like ETA`s militants and convicts suffered. Before 1985, while ETA`s primary targets were the Spanish military and police forces, they extended their target group by including journalists, academicians, judges, political leader, and anyone voicing criticism against ETA after 1985 (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

The violence by ETA reached a peak between 1978 and 1986 as the bloodiest years. For example, ETA`s single deadliest attack took place in June 1887, 21 people were killed and 45 were wounded by a car bomb placed in the parking lot of a supermarket in Barcelona (Kern, 2009).

“Kale Borroco” (street fighting) based on guerilla tactics was also one of the famous strategies of ETA after 1990s. The aim of this strategy was to create acts of mass violence in society by using youth organizations connected with ETA. Their acts involved fighting with police forces in street demonstrations and sabotaging public transportations with Molotov cocktails to create an atmosphere of violence in the streets (Barros et al., 2006).

Even though ETA had announced a temporary or permanent cease fires at times, they did not refrain from using violence against people or officials in order to meet their political demands mentioned above. Since the year 2000, ETA has
launched attacks in touristic areas of the country. Their new target’s purpose has been to disrupt the tourism economy of Spain, which constitutes 5.5% of the country’s economy. As a result, in August 2001, a car bomb exploded in the Madrid Barajas Airport’s underground parking lot (Shepard, 2002). After this time, it was clear that ETA was a threat not only for the Spanish people, but also for the foreigner who came to Spain as tourist.

Another important point is that ETA’s violent acts increased in vague and transition periods of Spain. In fact, one may say that one of the main reasons behind ETA’s increasing violence was the fear of losing ground against the governments’ reprisal acts against ETA. Over that period, ETA’s members thought that the only option was violence in order to maintain their existence (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010). ETA killed both officials and civilians and a total of 839 people have died since its foundation.

Nevertheless, ETA has sometimes proclaimed a “permanent cease fire” in order to push the Spanish government to the negotiation table as a part of their strategy. However, historical events show ETA lost trust in the eyes of Spanish governments. For, they launched attacks several times against civilians and the Spanish state while they were in the negotiation process even though they had announced a “permanent cease fire” (Perkoski & Chenoweth, 2010).

For instance, eight months after ETA announced a “permanent cease fire” in 2006; they bombed the Madrid international airport and killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. Then, the Zapatero government declared that the peace process would be suspended until all ETA members laid down their arms (Kern, 2009). The airport bombing demonstrated that even though ETA was weaker than before, they were still able to attack targets in Spain. In fact, “during the 1968-1997 period, ETA’s activity
measured as number of deaths per inhabitant was 37 times larger in the Basque country than in the rest of Spain” (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2001, p. 4).

**Profile of ETA Militants**

In the early years of ETA, it was formed mainly by the middle class young intellectuals and by labor related organizations. In fact, although these intellectuals would be needed to lead the organization in the future, laborers that come from the rural areas would constitute the most important resource for the organization. During the 1960s, the essential elements comprising the Basque militants came from schools or Catholic churches. The banning of the Basque language even within churches played a significant role among religious people as regards influencing their participation in ETA (Alexander, Swetnam, & Levine, 2001).

When examining the member profile of ETA in terms of ideology, in the early years, ETA militants clearly had a leftist view. However, they now utilize a neo-fascist discourse. The average militants’ age has gradually increased from the past till today. While 92% of the militants were under 20 ages 30 years ago, 60% of them are now under 20 year of age (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

In this sense, Shepart suggests that there are 200 active ETA members and almost 2000 in their support network (Shepard, 2002). The following table (Table 4.1) explains the steps that describe the process of becoming a militant member of ETA (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).
Table 4-1: The Participation Process to ETA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STEPS</th>
<th>PROCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Creation of Basque consciousness</td>
<td>To create Basque consciousness by means of discussion groups and seminars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Helping the armed struggle</td>
<td>To help the armed struggle by providing information and material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active participation in attacks</td>
<td>Actively participate in armed and bombing attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financial Sources

The essential financial resources of ETA are obtained from bank robberies, “revolutionary taxes” which is the forced payment taken from Basque businessman, extortion and kidnapping for ransom (Pukos, 2006). For example, in 1999, the Madrid newspaper El Pais published “extortion letters sent to businessman, demanding payment of $75,000 to $93,750 and threatening retaliation if the demands were not met. The letters were signed with ETA`s symbol” (Shepard, 2002). Owing to increasing number of extortion and abduction by ETA militants, Basque businessmen began to abandon the Basque country (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2001).

The other financial source of ETA is the use of business connections for money laundering. The money obtained from gunrunning and drug smuggling and laundered by means of those business connections of ETA is used to support them. When considering that the Basque region is the most drug riddled region of Western Europe (Pukos, 2006), it can be said that ETA obtains an easy means of achieving a financial benefit from this market.
International Links

As mentioned earlier, according to some scholars (e.g., Crenshaw, 1999; Netanyahu, 1981, 1995; Martin, 2012) ethnic violence that we have been witnessing throughout the world shows that no ethnicity-based terrorist organizations can live without international support.

ETA used to have safe havens created by French governments in France territory until the 1980s. After ETA members who had a strong connection with the Basques in France attacked Spain they fled to French territory in order to hide (Babb, 2008). However, by the mid-1980s, thanks to international and domestic pressure on French governments, the French began to eliminate this safe haven. Finally, the Spanish and French governments reconciled in order to fight together against ETA (Babb, 2008). This was another important turning point in the fight against ETA in terms of the Spanish counter-terrorism process.

The international linkage of ETA was not limited solely to France, however. According to The Counter-terrorism Office of The U.S. State Department, countries such as Libya, Lebanon and Nicaragua, Algeria, and Palestine have provided training for ETA members. By the end of the 1970s, ETA militants had been trained in training camps in Palestine, Libya, and Algeria (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

ETA also maintains close ties with South American countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela and Colombia in order to use these countries for purposes of political asylum, logistic, and financial support. In 2008, Francisco Santos’s, the Colombia vice president, confirmed the linkage between ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombian (FARC). He stated that “the FARC's contacts with ETA and drug traffickers exporting cocaine to Europe are not new, and when they are
secure in Colombia, they try to do harm overseas” (Tehrantimes.com, 2008). Following the capture of the FARC’s leaders many documents and mail exchanges verifying connections between these groups were observed on their computers. In addition, it was stated by the Colombian investigation officials that ETA and FARC held meetings in Colombia to exchange information regarding combat tactics and methods for producing bombs (Expatica.com, 2008)

**Counter Terrorism Policies of Spanish Governments**

**Franco Term**

Many scholars (i.e., Barros et al., 2006; Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Cokmez, 2008.; Kern, 2007b; Pukos, 2006) claim that ETA was born as the consequence of the Franco dictatorial regime that lasted from the beginning of 1939 to his death in 1975. During this period, the prohibitions and repression of Franco on language, culture and even ethnicity accelerated the emergence of ETA. Likewise, as part of counter terrorism policy of Franco, every attack performed by ETA militants was responded to by the Franco regime swiftly and brutally. However, this was also a reflection of the “action-repression-action” strategy of ETA. For, Franco repressed not only ETA members, but also some innocent Basque people. Thus, ETA seemed like a heroic symbol of Basque nationalism.

The foundation goal of ETA was to protect the Basque language, culture and territory, and to advocate for independence of the Basque country against the repressive regime of General Franco (Cokmez, 2008). For this purpose, ETA used several acts such as assassinations, bombings, kidnappings against Franco’s soldiers, police officers and government officials. The killing of Carrero was one of the most notorious of these strategies. Only 45 armed forces and civilian were killed by ETA between 1959 and 1975 and in the last three years of the Franco regime, ETA attacks
increased markedly because of the rising repression of the Basque people (Barros et al., 2006). Thus, it can be said that the counter-terrorism policy of Franco triggered an increase in the attacks by ETA. Furthermore, this policy stimulated increased sympathy and support for the Basque people and ETA. Even though Franco’s swift and brutal intervention policy seemed to provide for a successful policy for defeating terrorist organizations in the short run, it failed in the long run because it lost public support. The terrorism literature suggests that terrorist organizations cannot reach their goal without public support and participation (Perkoski & Chenoweth, 2010).

Concerning this point, Pukos (2006) indicates that “ETA had succeeded not only in garnering support by provoking the repression of the Spanish state, but it had more importantly succeeded in showing that it could undermine the power and legitimacy of the regime” (p. 23). Thus, it might be said that ETA’s strategy won a victory against Franco regime and its repressive policies.

**Democratization Process in Spain**

Before Franco passed away, he assigned an unpopular man Juan Carlos, who was the previous Spanish king’s son, as the heir to the throne. Juan Carlos was a person who had libertarian and democratic perceptions. Thus, he pioneered the democratization process of Spain between 1975 and 1982. During this period, as his first job, Juan Carlos assigned Adolf Suárez to be the Prime Minister (Ozipek, 2006).

The first explanations and actions of Adolf Suárez are of importance in terms of the democratic transition of Spain. He explained that all legislative structures would be adapted to meet the EU’s standards and a new participatory constitution would be created as soon as possible. He also declared amnesty for political prisoners and exiles. Just three days after he was assigned, around 1500 political prisoners and exiles were granted amnesty (Conversi, 2002). As a reflection of the counter-terrorism
policy of Spain during that period, Spain had begun to eliminate its repression policy not only as far as the Basque people were concerned but also other ethnic groups like Catalonians. For this purpose, the Basque people who were political prisoners were released and former military measures placed upon the Basque region were also lessened. In 1977, the first democratic election was took place and the “Alliance of Democratic Center” (UCD) won this election. Saurez was again elected as prime minister of Spain (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

In terms of counter-terrorism policy, the most important event of this term was the creation of a new democratic and participatory constitution on late December, 1978. Unlike ETA or other ethnic marginal groups, the democratic constitution of Spain was made up of the participation of the whole Spanish community. The new constitution identified the Basque region’s autonomy including its economic and taxation autonomy, as well as establishing its own police forces, TV and radio broadcasting systems, and having autonomous education and health systems. Apart from national security and foreign affairs, the Basque parliament was authorized to carry out its independence as related to their own political and cultural issues (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

In fact, this democratic constitution and other related legal regulations of Spain provided a milestone in combating terrorism. As a result of the rights provided by the constitution, the Basque people began to trust the central government. However, during this period, even though many rights were given to the Basque people for which they had long struggled, ETA accelerated their independence campaign. According to ETA, there would be an authority gap after Franco and thus they could easily declare the independence of the Basque country (Conversi, 2002). As a result of this new strategy of ETA, they escalated violence against the Spanish
government. On this point, Babb indicates that “the Spanish populous became fully aware that ETA was not the knights in shining armor they had thought. ETA, instead of using the democracy to reestablish the dialogue of independence, became entrenched in continuing their killings. In 1980, ETA was blamed for the deaths of 118 people” (Babb, 2008, p.3).

ETA`s attacks increased tenfold during this transition period compared with the Franco term. Therefore, in order to defeat ETA, the Spanish government created special police forces, increased the coordination among security units, and created legal regulations against terrorism. However, since the special police forces and counter terrorism units abused the new legal regulations, some Basque people who had no connections with ETA were tortured and detained. Even though the security forces` anti-democratic practices were less than those carried out in the Franco period, their abuses against Basque people continued (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

As a result, it can be said that even though the Spanish government tried to enact many democratic regulations that tended to resolve the ethnic conflicts in Spain, ETA did not lose its popularity within the Basque community because of the security forces` abuses.

**Counter-Terrorism Policy of Democratic Spain**

In 1982, the Socialist Party (PSOE) won the national elections and Gonzalez became the new prime minister of Spain. While the Gonzalez government made some attempt to improve democracy, it increased the capacity of police forces at the same time in order to fight terrorism. One of the most important practices of the Gonzalez government was to use police forces against terrorist groups instead of the army. Thus, the socialist government aimed to prevent any anti-democratic practices of the
army. Moreover, social and economic reforms were put into place by the PSOE government at the same time as they were enhancing the police forces (Cokmez, 2008).

Another important counter-terrorism policy of Spain during this period was to implement “the social insertion” program; the objective of this legal regulation was the reintegration of terror militants who accepted to lay down their arms in the society. Many scholars consider this policy to be one of the most important policy interventions taken by the government, for, in 1982, 200 ETA militants took advantage of the social insertion and were released (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

*Political situation in Basque country*

In order to clearly understand the counter-terrorism policies and strategies of Spain, we need to understand the political structure of the Basque region. During that period, two parties substantially affected the Basque people; the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party), the HB (Herri Batasuna-Euskal Herritarrok), the EH Bildu (Euskal Herria Bildu- Basque Country Gather) (Cokmez, 2008). As has been pointed out previously, the PNV is the oldest and most established party of The Basque Country. The party has been employing Basque nationalistic ideology and ETA members have emerged from youths of this party. One of the most important characteristics of the PNV is to be a bridge between Spanish politicians and Basque nationalists, and to have impact on every aspect of Basque government. The regional Basque government has been led by the PNV since its inception in 1980 until today (Shepard, 2002). The PNV, nowadays, has identified itself as being democratic, pluralistic and humanitarian. The leading faction of the PNV condemns ETA violence and advocates independence by legal means (Shepard, 2002). Thus, the PNV has played a key role
in the resolution of the Basque conflict between the Basque people and the Spanish government. On the contrary, it is difficult to say the same thing for the HB (Herri Batasuna) that split off from the PNV, and was later called Batasuna and the EH Bildu which is left-wing, nationalist and separatist coalition party in Basque Country and Navarra. The most notorious characteristic of the HB was to have strong relations and connection with ETA (Cokmez, 2008; Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010). It also had the same political aims as ETA even though it received 18% vote in the 1990 election. In 2003, the HB was closed down by the Spanish Supreme Court and 24 managers were sentenced to four years in prison due to the fact that they refused to condemn ETA’s killings and had documents which showed that the party was financing ETA (Socolovsksy, 2001). Later, the decision of Spanish Supreme Court on HB was confirmed as legitimate by the European Court of Human Rights in July, 2009. Even if the HB denied any links to ETA, a significant number of party leaders were arrested due to their activities in ETA. The party’s leaders perceived the ETA members as Basque soldiers (Muro, 2009). Additionally, when going back to the late 1980s, the Gonzalez government and all the Basque region’s political parties except the HB signed “the Ajura Enea Agreement” which was about condemning the violence and fostering a democratic struggle against terrorism. Therefore, this provided a compromise between both political sides (Cokmez, 2008).

However, the banning of the HB was criticized by the Basque people, not only nationalists, who said the HB was a legal political party and its leaders were working in the legal arena even though they condone the ETA attacks (Barros, 2003; Gillespie, 2000).

However, banning political parties in a democratic system does not mean this will eliminate their political activities in the political arena. Thus, outlawed parties
like Batasuna tried to establish new parties under different names with different people. In the case of HB, some Basque nationalists, most of whom had been members of Batasuna, established Euskal Herria Bildu (EHB or EH Bildu) which is coalition party with separatist nationalistic parties Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar, Alternatiba, Sortu, and Amaiur in 2012.

Considering the vote rate of the newly establish party, EH Bildu, in the election for the Basque Parliament that took place on the 21st of October 2012\textsuperscript{13}, it became the second most influential party behind the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party), and took 25% of the vote and 21 seats\textsuperscript{14} (Table 4-2). The election results of 2012 show that banning the HB and imprisoning its leader has created a reactional atmosphere among the Basque people against the Spanish central government. The election results also imply that the Basque people’s desire for independence has gradually increased because the total vote rate of the PNV and EH Bildu, which are parties that defend the independence of the Basque country, is 59.64% (Figure 4-2).

It can be said that one of the reasons for the 25% of the vote achieved by the EH Bildu is its new strategy which based on economic welfare. Unlike the previous separatist political parties such as HB, Amaiur and EA, the Bildu has set up its policy on the resolution of income inequality in the Basque country. It did not bring to the fore its independence policy in this election. The current economic conditions of Spain may also have strengthened its hand in its political campaign.

\textsuperscript{13} The researcher of this study observed this election in the Basque region, Bilbao and Sen Sabastian, in order to evaluate objectively the political climate in Spain especially in the Basque region.

\textsuperscript{14} See all political parties vote rate in the Basque parliament 2012 election. (http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2012/autonomicas/14/)
Table 4-2: The regional election results of the Pro-Basque Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14.65</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>16.29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17.91</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-1: Basque Parliamentary Election Results, 2012

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15 Herri Batasuna attended to the election under the name of Euskal Herritarrok (EH) because of intending to expand this coalition to include a wider spectrum of sympathizers.

16 After the HB was outlawed, a coalition (such as Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar, Alternatiba, Sortu) was established under the name of Euskal Herria Bildu. EH Bildu was one of the big winners of the 2012 election which obtained 26.3 of the vote and 21 seats.
The Foundation of GAL (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups)

One of the other important issues of this period was the emergence of the illegal group, GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación - Antiterrorist Liberation Groups). In 1983, after one year, the PSOE won the election, and the GAL was formed by the Spanish police and secret service under the direction of Felipe Gonzalez in order to push the French government to reduce the role of France in their struggle against ETA in French territory, because ETA militants had been using the Basque region in the south part of France as a safe haven (Cokmez, 2008). The main goal of GAL was to terminate ETA militants in France. However, GAL was an illegal and secret group. The democratic structure of Spain could not allow any unlawful organization within the state even though its objective was to fight terrorism.

In fact, the relationship between Spain and France had deteriorated by mid-1980s markedly since France allowed ETA` members to enter to France and to conduct their activities in its territory. Therefore, it might be said that France indirectly supported ETA by making its territory a safe haven for ETA militants.

In order to fight terrorism, the “terrorism fighters” (the GAL) of the socialist Gonzalez`s government repeatedly invaded southern France to kill suspected ETA members between 1983 and 1987. However, GAL was criticized by politicians and people because of the fact some victims were not directly related to ETA. In 1998, the Interior Minister of the Gonzalez government, Jose Barrionuevo, the secretary of state for security, Rafeal Vera, and civil governor of Vizcaya were convicted and sentenced to prison for ten years because of GAL`s illegal activities and kidnappings. Furthermore, the Gonzalez government lost the election in 1995 because of corruption scandals and GAL`s illegal activities (Shepard, 2002).
In 1995, Jose Maria Aznar who was the leader of the opposition party, the People Party (the PP), at the time, won the election and became Prime Minister of Spain, and led an effective campaign against ETA. In the same year, ETA attempted to assassinate Aznar but they failed. Jose Maria Aznar embarked on a rigorous policy to drive ETA out of Spain and defeat terrorism (Babb, 2008). For this purpose, the Aznar government accelerated their police operations by cooperating with France and repressing ETA. During the period of Aznar’s prime ministership, he rejected any peacefully derived solutions, and negotiations with ETA. For this reason, ETA increased its acts of violence especially on the streets in the area known as “Kale Borroka” in the Basque region. During this period, the PNV, a coalition partner of the Aznar government, was discontented with Aznar’s rigorous policies in the Basque region. As a result of this dissatisfaction, in 1998, the PNV and the other Basque nationalist political party, HB (Herri Batasuna or Unity of the People), called on the Aznar government to negotiate with ETA (Counterterrorism Report of Spain, 2010).

Immediately after that ETA announced a first cease-fire as a part of their strategy. After the cease fire declaration, the Aznar government accepted they would negotiate with ETA in Zurich. The reconciliation was not achieved however, because ETA demanded self-determination and independence for the Basque country (Country Reports on Terrorism, 1999).

During the period of the Aznar governance, Spain pursued two fundamental policies to fight terrorism; the first was to increase police operations against ETA by cooperating with France, the second was the judicial repression of the parties or NGOs which had economic and political relations with ETA. For this purpose, the Aznar government imposed some legal regulations between 2000 and 2004 (Cokmez, 2008).
The most important event during this period of the Aznar governance was the Madrid train station bombing. The Spanish government blamed ETA for the bloodiest attack in Spanish history even though El-Qaida, a religious terrorist organization, was held responsible for this attack. In the Madrid railway bombings, 192 people were killed and 1,824 were wounded. The unrealistic discourse of Prime Minister Aznar resulted in the victory of the Socialist Party (PSOE) in the 2004 election (Pukos, 2006). Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero became the new prime minister of Spain. The Madrid train bombings and ETA`s attacks had a significant impact on Spanish society. Thus, the day following the attacks, approximately 11 million people demonstrated on the streets in order to show solidarity and reactions against the bloody violence (John, 2004).

**Current Situation**

Unlike Aznar, the Zapatero government desired to solve the ETA problem by negotiating with them. Thus, he followed a soft and peaceful path until 2006. However, negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government did not result in success (Cokmez, 2008). In March 2006, though ETA declared a permanent cease-fire, only nine months later, it set off a powerful car bomb at Barajas international airport in Madrid, and two people were killed. Therefore, the permanent cease fire ended dramatically. Immediately after the airport bombing, Zapatero announced that the peace process had been discontinued (Kern, 2007). Therefore, the Zapatero government changed their policies towards the fight against terrorism, and would not start negotiations with ETA unless all ETA militants disarmed (Kern, 2009).

Opposition parties of Spain and Spaniards have criticized the Zapatero government for giving concessions to ETA since that time. Today, Zapatero has also been criticized by the public for his feminist approach to fighting terrorism. However,
it seems that the defiance based counter-terrorism policy of Zapatero is resulting in success. Over the last five years, ETA has lessened its actions against the Spanish government considerably. The last video declaration of a ceasefire of ETA shows the desperation of ETA militants on 20th October, 2011, and they announced that they have laid down their arms. The leaders of the Spanish and European Unions have welcomed ETA's current declaration for disarmament.

In this chapter, I have attempted to evaluate the causes and consequences of the Basque conflict and ETA violence from both a historical, as well as a broad perspective. The following chapter will discuss some important empirical studies on terrorism.
Chapter V: Lessons Learned from Previous Studies

The application of economic models to the study of terrorism is not a new phenomenon even though the number of studies employing this approach have increased dramatically since the 9/11 terrorist attack (Llusa & Tavares, 2007). Sandler and Enders (2004), well known scholars in this area, stated that using economic methodology was one of the best ways of providing insights into studying terrorism. They suggested that economic analyses could be applied to evaluate the strategic interactions among opposing interests, such as among rival terrorists, the terrorists and the authorities, and among targeted countries. In their view, economic models could be used to clarify “how terrorists are apt to respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints [and] …analyze how governments react to terrorist-induced changes to their policymaking environment” (Sandler & Enders, 2004, pp. 2-3). From this perspective, this chapter aims to provide an overview of the literature of terrorism that has utilized similar empirical techniques to this study. Below are the brief summaries of terrorism-event studies that use time series analysis for evaluating the effectiveness of some governmental interventions.

Landes` study (1978), which was an economic study of U.S. aircraft hijackings, was one of the first studies evaluating counter-terrorism strategies. Landes used Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data for the period of 1961 and 1976 by focusing on the economics of deterrence. In order to examine the effectiveness of changes in laws and security measures, which are effective at airports, he employed analytical techniques. His study found that mandatory screening of passengers and carryon luggage at airports had a significant deterrence impact on reducing the number of hijackings since 1973, even though this deterrence based intervention is a burden on the US budget. He concluded that increases in the probability of
apprehensions, incarceration, and sentences were associated with significant reductions in aircraft hijackings over the time period between 1961 and 1976 (Landes, 1978).

Additionally, an intervention analysis study by Enders and Sandler contributed to the literature of the evaluation of policy on terrorism. The Enders and Sandler’s (1993) study, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: a Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis", evaluated the substitution effects of policies as these may have impacted different types of terrorism. They examined the different type of attacks generated by transnational terrorism during 1968 and 1988. They examined the impact of four passive and one active policy by the U.S. on various attacks by using the vector auto-regression (VAR) technique. The main purpose of using the VAR analysis in their study was to identify the interrelationships among the time series for different types of terrorist attack modes that behave as “substitutes” or “complements”. By doing so, they aimed to investigate the short run and long run impact of policies on terrorist tactics. They found that the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Libyan raid increased various types of terrorist events in the short term, but did not have a significant impact in the long run. Second, even though the fortification of the U.S. embassies and missions resulted in substitution into assassinations, these interventions lessened the attacks against the U.S. interests. Third, albeit resulting that metal detectors decreased skyjackings and threats, it increased assassinations and other types of hostage taking events not protected by detectors. Finally, they concluded that U.S. domestic laws instituted in during Reagan’s term of office, 1984, curbed terrorism, but had no impact on eliminating terrorist attacks (Walter Enders & Sandler, 1993).
Similarly an intervention policy analysis of skyjackings and other terrorist incidents, conducted by Cauley and Im (1988) is another important study in terms of measuring the effectiveness of deterrence based policy interventions implemented by the governments. In their study, Cauley and Im offered an interrupted time series analysis to examine the effectiveness of three anti-terrorism policies – an increased airport security screening by installing metal detectors in 1973, an increased security at U.S. embassies and other diplomatic missions in 1976, and the institution of the United Nations (UN) convention on preventing crimes against diplomatic personnel enacted in 1977- on several incidents occurring between 1968-to-1979. According to their findings, only the installation of metal detectors at airports had a significant impact on preventing terrorism both in the short and long term among these interventions. In contrast, their empirical findings showed that the UN convention was ineffective. They concluded that even if deterrence based anti-terrorist policies may be effective in the short run, they may be ineffective in the long run since terrorists would substitute alternative modes of acting (Cauley & Im, 1988).

Brophy-Baermann and Conveybeare (1994) also employed a time series intervention analysis in order to measure the effectiveness of six retaliation attacks (deterrence) by Israel on curbing terrorism by the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Lebanon between 1972 and 1988. Rational expectation theory was performed ND and applied to the policies of retaliation against terrorism in their study. They found that: “If terrorists have rational expectations, it will be difficult to alter the incidence of attacks from the natural process, unless terrorists can be surprised by an unexpected rate of retaliation that will cause a temporary deviation in attacks from the natural rate. Rational expectations also imply that governments may be better off if they are subject to a nondiscretionary retaliatory rule than if they have
full latitude in setting the rate of response”. (Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare, 1994, p. 209)

In the same vein, the Enders and Sandler’s study, entitled “Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?” in 2000, expanded their analysis to terrorism events between 1970 and 1996 (Lum et al., 2006). They applied time series techniques to investigate the current threat generated by transnational terrorist incidents. By using a vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis, they purposely quantified the heightened threat for both short run and long run periods. Their primary purpose was to explore the effectiveness of deterrence and defiance based policies including installation of the metal detectors, fortification of U.S. embassies and diplomatic missions abroad, the Libyan raid, and the reduction in the number of totalitarian governments after the end of the cold war by using data drawn from the ITERATE database. They concluded that even though there was a significant decline of terrorism incidents in terms of numbers after the post-cold war era, transnational terrorism still presented an alarming threat, and this threat ironically may be even more costly for society (Walter Enders & Sandler, 2000).

Furthermore, Barros (2003) employed intervention analysis to study specifically terrorist organizations such as ETA in Spain. He analyzed the effects of different political ideologies in power (political), police and military expenditures (deterrence), and the increase in foreign investments and tourism (economic effects) of assassinations and kidnappings conducted by ETA. In conclusion, he suggested that deterrence and political issues should be considered more intently by policy makers than economic issues, and that the politicization process of ETA would be facilitated because banning political arenas would increase the violent attacks of ETA (Barros, 2003).
Taking a different perspective, Drakos and Kutan (2003) adopted a consumer choice theoretical model for their study which was designed to analyze the regional effects of terrorism on the competitors’ market shares in the tourism sector of three Mediterranean countries, Greece, Turkey, and Israel where significant tourism reductions had occurred as a result of the high frequency of terrorist attacks in those venues over the time periods between 1992 and 2000. They found that terrorism significantly reduced tourist arrivals, and “the intensity of casualties and geographic location of incidents have significant own and cross-country effects on the market shares of involved countries” (Drakos & Kutan, 2003, p. 639).

In 2006, Barros et al. analyzed the duration of the “peacetime” periods between ETA terrorist attacks over the time period of 1968-2002 to examine the expectations of the people as related to terrorist attacks. To ascertain the covariates used in their study, which explained the ETA attacks, they employed both a parametric and a semi-parametric time series hazard model. The study concluded that ETA terrorist attacks increased in summer and decreased with respect to political interventions such as deterrence, repressive political governments, succedaneum terrorist activities, murders, and political accords. They suggested that “the Spanish government should enforce the necessary political accords in order to bring about a decrease ETA terrorist attacks. This political process has to be accompanied with deterrence actions and, to some extent” (Barros et al., 2006, p. 344).

Similarly, Eser’s (2007) study titled “The impact of the Turkish policies and actions toward the PKK terrorist organization: A time series analysis” also contributed to the terrorism literature by focusing on the specific terrorist organization, the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), in Turkey. Eser examined the effectiveness of both deterrence and defiance based governmental policies of Turkey...
and actions on the PKK terrorist attacks between 1995 and 2006. Eser found that even though the number of casualties decreased during the post intervention period, the interventions of Turkish governments had no statistically significant impact on the number of the PKK attacks. However, during the post-intervention period, the number of deaths per event increased significantly in summers (Eser, 2007).

Finally, Unal (2011) conducted a study examining the effectiveness of Turkey’s deterrence and defiance based on governmental policies aimed at decreasing the level of violence initiated by the PKK between 1984 and 2007, which is significant among the studies on counter-terrorism. In his study, he employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques. In the quantitative component, he utilized descriptive and VAR analyses to examine the impact of each individual policy on the PKK’s initiated violence. For the qualitative approach he interpreted the PKK related dynamics of the entire process by examining governmental books, documents and reports, and pro-PKK materials. His study found that the Turkish government’s deterrence based policies did not have a long-term sustainable deterrent impact on the level of PKK violence. He concluded that “regardless of the government’s policies the PKK’s ability to initiate violence did not entirely decrease” (Únal, 2011, p. 359).

The following chapter explains the methodological framework of this study, and includes the research questions, hypotheses, data collection and data analysis methods, the study variables, and the statistical techniques.
PART II: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter VI: Methods

The unexpected rise of ethnic conflicts during the post-cold war caused the emergence of many separatist terrorist organizations all over the world. In order to provide a global perspective, two terrorist organizations, the PKK (the Kurdish Workers' Party) and ETA (Basque Homeland and Independence), which emerged from the protracted Kurdish and Basque conflicts, are compared in this study. The purpose of this study was to examine the impacts of the Turkish and Spanish macro-level defiance based governmental policies toward the PKK and ETA in reducing level of violence.

In this chapter, I, first, discuss the research design, the research questions and hypotheses. Second, I provide information regarding the data collection methods, the sample characteristics, and the case and intervention selection criteria. And in the last section, I describe the data analysis process including the statistical and estimation techniques used in this study.

Research Design and Analytical Methodology

This study was an explanatory study in nature, and examined the characteristics of the two bloodiest separatist organizations, the PKK and ETA, in order to learn about their structures, common differences and similarities toward polices and democratic reforms initiated by the Turkish and Spanish governments. For this purpose, I employed quantitative techniques, and conducted a comparison between those two cases by applying time series techniques.

The purpose of using the time series analysis was to measure the overall impact of defiance and desistance based governmental policies on terrorist activities.
These policy interventions were measured both separately and together to examine their specific impact (i.e., ceteris paribus) on the level of violence of the PKK and ETA.

To examine each policy for both cases, I conducted the quantitative analysis by utilizing three different analytic techniques. First, I conducted a descriptive analysis of the longitudinal time series data. Then I conducted a Negative Binomial Model Estimation analysis in order to estimate the parameters of the model to be used in this study. Last, I employed a vector auto-regression (VAR) technique in order to analyze the impact of the governmental interventions on the level of violence initiated by the terrorist groups and vice versa. The short term and long term effects of the governmental interventions on violent attacks, and vice a versa, are examined in the context of the VAR estimation.

**Research Question and Hypotheses**

In order to address the core points of the study, the following research questions were explored:

“What is the impact of defiance and desistance based governmental policies on ethnicity based terrorist groups’ activities during the democratization period?”

I selected only those specific soft-line counterterrorism policies including democratic reforms such constitutional and legal amendments implemented by Turkey and Spain to measure the effectiveness of governmental policies. Those policies have implications regarding the theories of defiance/legitimacy and the desistance model in the counterterrorism literature. To clarify the main research question, the following two sub questions were also explored.

*Sub-Research Question (RQ1): Is there any decline or increase in the overall level of violent incidents and casualties initiated by the PKK and ETA?*
Terrorist groups have dynamic organizational structures. Thus they usually determine their attack strategies in accordance with domestic and international environments, the governments’ interventions (deterrence and defiance policies), and sometimes the publics’ perceptions (Wilkinson, 2011). In the selected time period, I examined whether there was a change in the attack strategy and tactics (attack type and target type) used by the PKK and ETA.

Sub-Research Question (RQ2) 2: Are there any changes in the tactics of the groups against the government during the intervention period?

By reviewing the characteristics of each intervention implemented in Turkey and Spain, I developed the hypotheses. The common point of those interventions has been to in the area of soft-line/desistance based governmental policies. Since these are grievance-oriented and exist in the social context regarding the ethnic conflict, these policies purpose is to diminish these grievances by meeting certain demands concerning the Kurdish and Basque conflicts. Therefore, these interventions directly target the Kurdish and Basque people and sympathizers of the terrorist organizations, the PKK and ETA, not the terrorists. Because the key point is the “public perception” in the legitimacy model, these policies aim to reduce public support for the terrorists, which is the most crucial point in the fight against ethnicity based terrorist organizations. In this context, these polices are expected to result in reduced levels of violent attacks initiated by the PKK and ETA.

However, in the literature, some (Rustow, 1970; Horowitz, 1985; Wilkinson, 2011; Hewitt, 1984) argue that the introduction of a transition period increases terrorist attacks especially ethno-terrorism since it provides a window of opportunity for intensifying ethnic grievances in the short run. This mostly results in the desire of the terrorist group to obstruct the democratic reforms enacted to mitigate ethnic
conflicts during transition periods. Terrorist groups may perceive these democratic reforms as sign of weakness. Given these considerations, I hypothesized that:

**H1**: If violent ethnic conflicts continue during the democratization period of a country, the effect of governmental policies (democratic reforms) on the elimination of the violent incidents would be less effective.

As mentioned earlier, defiance and desistance based governmental policies are expected to reduce the level of violent incidents based on the theoretical context. For this purpose, the Turkish government initiated four soft-line policy interventions toward the PKK.

**Turkey’s Policy Interventions**

The year 1999 was selected as the turning point in terms of Turkish democracy in this study. Considering the democratization process of Turkey after 1995, four important defiance and desistance based policy interventions stood out:

*The recognition of the candidate status of Turkey for accession into the European Union (EU) in 1999*: along with the momentum provided by the EU, helped Turkey initiate nine vital democratic reform packages, including ethnic, cultural, minority and social rights packages, which was mentioned in the previous chapters, in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

*The Returning Home Bill*: This policy was based on social integration and amnesty for the terrorists who wanted to capitulate by escaping from the PKK and it was implemented for six months during this period.

*The Active Repentance Law*: This policy was also a typical example of a desistance based policy. This repentance law aimed to give the PKK militants the opportunity to surrender, repent, and reintegrate into the society. It had the same
purpose as the “Returning Home Bill” intervention, and the Active Repentance Law enacted by Turkish Parliament in 2005 that is still effective;

*The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening"):* A ban on the fundamental ethnic cultural rights had caused long-standing Kurdish grievances in Turkey. In this sense, “the Democratic Initiative” later called the “Kurdish Opening” was initiated by the Turkish government in 2009 with the aim of decreasing the grievances within the Kurdish community in Turkey, and diminishing the level of support for the PKK.

Considering all the policies mentioned above that were implemented by the Turkish government during its ongoing transition, I hypothesized that:

*H2: The soft-line governmental policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of incidents and casualties inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.*

Spain’s Policy Interventions

*The Spanish Democratic Constitution:* This policy intervention, which came into force in 1979 after 40 years of the Franco regime, doubtless was one of the most important turning points in the history of Spain. It has been also considered as the first soft-line policy intervention not only toward ETA and the Basque conflict, but also toward solving other ethnic grievances. Since the democratic constitution of Spain recognized comprehensive rights including autonomy, cultural, social, democratic as one of the essential rights to every citizen, it was expected that providing those rights and lifting the restriction on the Basque language would result in a decreased level of support for ETA and a reduction in the number of incidents and casualties caused by ETA.
The Social Insertion Program: The policy of social integration likewise in the Turkish case provided significant opportunities to the ETA militants who accepted the opportunity to lay down their arms, and the offer to have those in the Spanish prisons reintegrate to a normal social life between 1983 and 1988.

Spain’s membership to the EU: Spain became a member of the European Community in 1986, which later turned into the European Union. The participation of Spain in the EU was selected to represent another important intervention in this study because it was assumed that the accession process of Spain to the EU played a significant role in stimulating democratic reforms in Spain. As a result of the EU membership, France accelerated its cooperation with Spain in the fight with ETA.

All policies discussed above were expected to decrease the level of support for ETA, and reduce the level of ETA initiated violence. However, in giving consideration to the transition period of Spain, which is also the focus point of this dissertation, I hypothesized that:

H3: The soft-line governmental policies implemented by Spain would increase the numbers of incidents and casualties inflicted by ETA during the democratization period in Spain.

Looking at the current situation of the long-lasting violence in Spain, ETA halted its activities against the Spanish government in 2011. Therefore, as a success story which has only just occurred, I assumed that the Spanish case provided an important perspective for countries that have been struggling with ethnic conflicts, Turkey in the present case. The advocates (i.e., Crenshaw, 1995; Hewitt, 1984; Smith, 1996; Ünal, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011) of the defiance/legitimacy based counter-terrorism policy suggest that democratic reforms initiated toward ethnic grievances
have an impact on ethno-terrorism in the long run by decreasing the level of support for terrorist organizations. In this sense, and considering the historical process of Spain’s democracy, I hypothesized that:

**H4:** *If democratic reforms continue to accommodate the demands of the ethnic community, decreasing violent ethnic conflicts in the long run would be most likely to occur.*

After applying standard time series methods separately to each case, the present dissertation aimed to compare both cases in order to measure the impacts of the Spanish and Turkish governments’ policies on the level of violence inflicted by the PKK and ETA. By doing so, the study evaluated the outcomes of the pre and post-intervention periods as related to terrorism in Turkey and Spain. The time period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2010 for the Turkish case, and from January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1990 for the Spanish case served as the primary time periods of the study. For both cases, the selected time periods consisted of the periods of transition in both Turkey and Spain. However, the Turkish democratization process is still in progress, even if Spain has completed its transition to being a well-established democracy.

As the turning point, 1999 for the Turkish case, 1979 for the Spanish case was selected in this study.

**Time Range**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Intervention Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(The Turkish Case)</td>
<td>1995-1999-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Spanish Case)</td>
<td>1975-1979-1990</td>
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**Intervention Selecting Criteria**

In selecting the interventions for study among the wide range of policy interventions identified for both cases, I used four criteria. First, I considered the common point of each intervention in both cases, which was that they were both involved in soft-line or defiance/desistance based governmental policies. Second, each intervention directly or indirectly had to contribute to the country’s democratization process by consolidating its democratic acquisitions. For instance, while the constitutional reforms for membership to the EU, the new civil constitution, and legal regulations toward ethnic grievances have directly affected the democratization process in each country, amnesty for militants or reintegration programs can indirectly affect the democratization process by providing a positive atmosphere among citizens.

Third, each policy intervention had to be initiated to solve ethnic grievances in the country at the same time along with the previous criteria. Fourth, each policy had to also be prominent among a variety of desistance based policies in the literature. Some of these policy interventions were examined by terrorism and ethnic violence literature in a different perspective. As mentioned above, this study primarily focused on the impacts of defiance based governmental interventions and their effect on the number of terrorist incidents and casualties inflicted during the transition periods of each country.

**Case Selection**

Lijpart (1975) stated that selecting appropriate cases for study is a highly significant step in the process of conducting a high-quality comparative case study. To select the most appropriate cases reflecting similar characteristics of a phenomenon is also a very important process for researchers. Otherwise, the
researcher may infer false generalizations. Moreover, this may make it impossible to address the issue, and to support the purpose of study. Therefore, two separatist terrorist organizations, the PKK and ETA, were selected for analysis in this study to provide a broad understanding of the responses of separatist terrorist organizations towards governmental policies and vice versa by evaluating similar cases.

This dissertation focuses on these two cases for several reasons. First, violent ethnic conflict constitutes an important aspect of both domestic and international politics in Turkey and Spain. Second, the PKK mostly imitates the attack strategies and the politicization processes of ETA. Third, almost all political parties in the Turkish Grand Assembly have suggested that the Basque problem can be considered as an example of how to solve the Kurdish Problem. This study also evaluates these arguments by comparing both cases. Fourth, as mentioned in previous chapters, Turkey and Spain became the center of frequent terrorist activities carried by the PKK and ETA over the past four decades. Fifth, even though each separatist terrorist organization had its own characteristics, and arose in a different environment, the geographic circumstances of each country provided the terrorist militants free movement across their borders. The Basque region in the south of France for ETA militants, and the northern part of Iraq and Syria, and the western part of Iran for the PKK militants have been the consummate sites involved during the related violent ethnic conflicts mentioned above. In this respect, these countries offer the researcher a unique laboratory for studying the impacts of governmental policy interventions toward terrorist organizations.

**Population and Sample**

All recorded violent terrorist events committed by the PKK from 1984 to the present, and by ETA from 1960 to the present, constituted the study population. The
sampling frame was created from this population by choosing the violent terrorist attacks (incidents and casualties) initiated by the PKK between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2010; and by ETA between January 1, 1975 and December 31, 1990.

**Data Collection**

Data analyzed in this study was obtained from several different data sources. The Dataset was mainly drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is run by the University of Maryland. The GTD is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2010. The GTD was founded by the Human Factors Division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in order to provide open source data on terrorist groups’ activities and events around the world (GTD, 2012). Its main objective is to provide datasets to researchers and analysts in order to increase their understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism on a global scale (GTD, 2012). In this dissertation, data related to essential variables including terrorist incidents, casualties, attack type, and target type were obtained from the GTD source. Collected data in the GTD is drawn from open source materials, which are publicly available, such as electronic news archives, and existing data sets. These include secondary source materials such as legal documents, reports, books and journals (GTD, 2012).

In fact, the GTD consists of three fundamental datasets: the first phase of data was collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service, the second phase was provided by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, and the last phase was provided by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) at the University of New Haven (GTD, 2012). The GTD dataset consists of information on more than 98,000 terrorist attacks including information on 43,000 bombings, 14,000 assassinations, and 4,700 kidnapping related to more than 1200 terrorist groups since
1970. As one of the most debatable issues within terrorism studies is the definition of terrorism, and the GTD employed the following three criteria to meet the researchers’ own definition of terrorism:

“1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; 
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law” (GTD, 2012).

Here, the first definition of terrorism most closely matched the present definition of terrorism as utilized in this case study to filter the dataset.

In order to standardize the data entered into the system by different contributors, the GTD uses a codebook. The codebook aims to reflect the collection and coding strategy, and decisions for selecting the desired GTD source data. The codebook also ensures that significant information concerning how to enter data in a standardized format is used in order to eliminate and minimize technical and human mistakes. The dataset of interest mentioned above for this study was that obtained from the GTD for the region of Europe and the countries examined were Turkey and Spain. All violent incidents committed by the PKK and ETA are included in the dataset.

In addition to the GTD resources, data related to unemployment rates in Spain and Turkey, which are collected by the statistical institutions of both countries was used. Lastly, data detailing the number of police operations against terrorist organizations, the number of surrenders, and the number of terrorists captured by the security forces of each country, which are also confidential data, were obtained from the Turkish and Spanish National Police forces by visiting the main HQs of each police unit.

Furthermore, in selecting the policy interventions to be used in the analysis of this study, it was felt it would be of benefit to obtain comprehensive sources which
would include books, newspaper articles, journal articles, specific legislation addressing the issue and especially government reports.

**Conceptual Definitions of Variables**

In order to examine the impact of defiance based governmental policies on terrorist activities, variables utilized in this study were categorized into three groups. First, the data related to terrorist activities was examined. The second group constituted the intervention variables, and the third group involved the control variables. The long term ceasefires of terrorist organizations, the unemployment rates, the foundation of GAL, the capture of the PKK leader, Frances cooperation with Spain, the numbers of police operations, and the numbers of captures were examined within the third group of variables.

The operational definitions of the first group of variables explained in the code book were as follows:

a) *Incident date*: This variable refers to the month when incidents occurred. The format, mm/yyyy, was used to enter the data. When the exact date of the incident was unknown, the field was recorded as “0”

b) *The number of casualties*: This referred to the fatalities and injuries that occurred as a result of terrorist attacks. In the codebook, casualties were grouped into civilian, government, and terrorist categories (GTD, 2012). However, in this study, terrorist casualties were excluded.

c) *Attack type*: This referred to the attack methods committed by terrorist groups such as arson, armed assault, bombing, hostage and kidnapping, CBN (Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear) terrorism, hijackings, robberies, and assassinations (GTD, 2012). All these attack types are deeply and separately categorized in the codebook. However, four variables were formulated by reducing 10 variables in
the codebook used in this study; and included, armed assaults, bombings/explosions, arson and hostage takings/kidnappings.

d) Target type: This referred to the target selected by the terrorist such as government (security forces) or civilian as formulated from the code book.

The first group variables’ level of measurement was deemed continuous because monthly calculated number of incidents and casualties were used in this analysis.

The operational definitions of the second group variables were explained by employing two categories. In this regard, Turkey and Spain’s governmental policies selected in this dissertation were examined separately; as follows:

**Intervention variables:**

**Turkey**

a) The recognizing of the candidate status of Turkey for accession into the European Union (EU): The candidate status of Turkey was officially recognized on December 10, 1999 by the European Council at the Helsinki Summit without any preconditions and on an equal footing with other candidate states. Then, the EU started the negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Since Turkey’s entry to the EU means more rights not only for its Kurdish citizens, but also for other citizens such as Turks, the Laz, Arabians, and Circassians, the inception period related to negotiations of Turkey with the EU was selected as an important intervention. This is because, after accepting its candidacy status, the Turkish Government enacted nine crucial democratic reform packages up until the present time to meet the EU demands, and most of these were intended to improve
religious rights, minority rights, human rights, and democratic rights of its citizens.

b) *The Returning Home Bill:* The main objective of this policy was to provide an opportunity for PKK militants to repent, surrender, and reintegrate into society. The Returning Home Bill was signed on July 29, 2003, and expired six months later, on January 29, 2004.

c) *The Active Repentance Law:* As another policy intervention initiated by the Turkish government, the Active Repentance Law aiming to achieve the same purpose as the Returning Home Bill was enacted on Jun 1, 2005, within the Turkish Criminal Law, and is still effective.

d) *The Democratic Initiative (the Kurdish Opening):* The Turkish Government initiated the Democratic Opening Project on July 29, 2009, in order to stimulate its democratization process and eliminate the PKK attacks by accommodating the grievances of the Kurdish community. Even though the Turkish officials stated that democratic opening project aimed to ensure the same rights to all citizens living in Turkey, the main objective of this initiative was to solve the Kurdish Conflict, in particular (Kirişçi, 2009).

**Spain**

a) *The Spanish Democratic Constitution:* After nearly 40 years of Franco dictatorship, the new Spanish constitution was ratified by a referendum of the Spanish people on December 7, 1978. This was the turning point of Spain’s transition to democracy.
b) The Social Insertion Program (1983-1988): After the socialist party (PSOE) won the election, The Socialist Gonzalez government initiated the social insertion program which aimed to reintegrate terror militants who agreed to lay down their arms by January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1983. This intervention was implemented over five years and ended in 1988.

c) Spain’s membership to the EU: The other milestone in democracy history of Spain is its joining the European community (later turned into the European Union) on January 1, 1986. Since Spain’s transition to the well-established democracy gained acceleration, being a member of the EU is of high importance in terms of understanding Spanish history.

The level of measurement of these intervention variables discussed above was binary. The time period prior to these interventions was coded as 0, and the effective period of the interventions was coded as 1. When the intervention expired or was not effective, it was coded 0. The selected policy interventions were held as the dummy variable and the probable impact of these interventions on violent incidents was examined both individually and in aggregate form in this study.

Control Variables

a) Unemployment Rate: This referred to the percentage of people who were unemployed and looking for a job at the national level. Unemployment rates also referred to the economic conditions of the country. The level of measurement of this variable was continuous.

b) Ceasefire: A ceasefire can be described as a period where terrorist groups halt their activities temporarily or permanently, including attacks or actions against states or civilians. Ceasefires proclaimed by the PKK and ETA were also included into the present analysis since it was expected that they would be directly related to the
level of violence incidents. Even though ETA and the PKK declared several ceasefires during their insurgency histories, two noticeable and prominent ceasefires were included in both cases. In the ETA case, the first ceasefires lasted from January 1\textsuperscript{st} to February 23\textsuperscript{rd} in 1988 and from January 1 to March 27, 1989 and these were the periods presently analyzed.

In the PKK case, the long term ceasefire declared shortly after Ocalan’s capture in Nairobi on February 16, 1999 that took nearly 5 years and ended in June 1, 2004, and the second between October 1, 2006 and May 17, 2007, was analyzed. Ceasefires were expected to be highly influential variables (Ünal, 2011) because they most likely have an impact on any decline in terrorist activities. Therefore, these ceasefire periods for both cases were considered as the control variable. The time period where the ceasefire was effective was coded as 1 and other times were coded as 0.

d) *The Capture of the PKK Leader, Abdullah Ocalan:* The capture of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan was one of the most important milestones in Turkey’s ongoing fight against the PKK. Ocalan was captured and arrested on February 16, 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya. The level of measurement of this government’s action was also binary. The time period prior to this action was coded as 0, and the effective time period was coded as 1.

e) *French Cooperation with Spain:* By the mid-1980s, ETA used the Basque region in southern France as a safe haven. However, due to international and domestic pressure on France, she began to cooperate with the Spanish government and captured many ETA militants in its own territory. The time period prior to the cooperation with Spain was coded as 0, and the effective time period was coded as 1.
f) *The Number of Operations*: This referred to the frequency of operations carried by security forces of each country towards the terrorist organizations during the considered time period.

g) *The Number of Captured Terrorist*: This referred to the number of terrorists captured by the security forces in Turkey and Spain during the time period examined in this study. The aggregated number of captured terrorists refers to those who were captured, regardless of whether they were killed, wounded, or alive.

h) *The Number of Surrenders*: This referred to the total number of terrorists who were voluntarily capitulated from the PKK over the time period January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1995 and December 31\textsuperscript{th}, 2010 in Turkey.

i) *Group Size*: This referred to the yearly aggregated number of estimated group sizes of the PKK in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran during the considered time period.

An overview of the variables discussed above and concerning both cases is presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
Table 6-1: Characteristics of the Variables of the Turkish Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of incidents (INC)</td>
<td>DV Count</td>
<td>GTD Database</td>
<td>Aggregated number of violent incidents by the PKK for each month</td>
<td>Y_{1,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of casualties (CASUAL)</td>
<td>DV Count</td>
<td>GTD Database</td>
<td>Aggregated number of violent incidents by the PKK for each month that results in at least 1 casualty</td>
<td>Y_{2,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The recognizing of candidate status of Turkey for membership to the EU (D 1)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; December 1999 l ≥ December 1999</td>
<td>D_{1,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Returning Home Bill (D 2)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; August 2003, 1 between Aug. 2003 and Jan. 2004. And 0≥Jan. 2004</td>
<td>D_{2,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Active Repentance Law (D 3)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; Jun 2005 l ≥ Jun 2005</td>
<td>D_{3,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Initiative (“the Kurdish Opening”) (D 4)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; July 2009 l ≥ July 2009</td>
<td>D_{4,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Capture of the PKK leader (ACTION)</td>
<td>CV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; February 1999 l ≥ February 1999</td>
<td>C_{1,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)</td>
<td>CV Continues</td>
<td>Turkish Statistic Institution</td>
<td>Monthly unemployment rate starting with the first month=1</td>
<td>C_{2,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefires (CEASE)</td>
<td>CV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; February, 1999 l≥ February,1999 0 ≥ June, 2004 l≥ October, 2006 0 &gt;May, 2007</td>
<td>C_{3,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Number of Surrenders (SURREND)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Turkish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of those who surrender voluntarily and leave the PKK in each month</td>
<td>C_{4,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Number of Operations (OPERAT)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Turkish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of operations initiated by the security forces against the PKK in each month</td>
<td>C_{5,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of captured terrorists (CAPTURED)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Turkish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of captured terrorists who were killed, wounded, or alive per month</td>
<td>C_{6,T}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Group Size (SIZE)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Turkish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of estimated group sizes in each year</td>
<td>C_{7,T}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6-2: Characteristics of the Variables of the Spanish Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of incidents (INC)</td>
<td>DV Count</td>
<td>GTD Database</td>
<td>Aggregated number of violent incidents by the ETA for each month</td>
<td>Y_{1,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of casualties (CASUAL)</td>
<td>DV Count</td>
<td>GTD Database</td>
<td>Aggregated number of violent incidents by ETA for each month</td>
<td>Y_{2,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spanish Democratic Constitution (D 1)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; December 1978 1 ≥ December 1978</td>
<td>D_{1,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accession to the EU (D 3)</td>
<td>IV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; Jun 1986 1 ≥ Jun 1986</td>
<td>D_{3,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Cooperation (ACTION_2)</td>
<td>CV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; September 1985 1 ≥ September 1986</td>
<td>C_{1,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)</td>
<td>CV Continues</td>
<td>The National Statistic Institution of Spain</td>
<td>Monthly unemployment rate starting with the first month=1</td>
<td>C_{2,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefires (CEASE)</td>
<td>CV Binary</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>0 &lt; Jan, 1988 1 ≥ Jan, 1988 0 ≥ March, 1988 1 ≥ Jan, 1989 0 &gt; April, 1989</td>
<td>C_{3,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Number of Operations (OPERAT)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Spanish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of operations initiated by the security forces against the PKK in each month</td>
<td>C_{4,5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of captured terrorists (CAPTURED)</td>
<td>CV Count</td>
<td>The Spanish National Police</td>
<td>Aggregated number of captured terrorists who were killed, wounded, or alive per month</td>
<td>C_{5,5}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Data Analysis Process**

The unit of analysis of this study was represented by the two major separatist terrorist organizations, the PKK and ETA, and their responses towards governmental interventions of Turkey and Spain. Comparative data analysis was applied in order to develop a common point of view towards separatist terrorist organizations using time series techniques for both cases, respectively. Comparisons in social research can be used to learn about some specific characteristics that each case reflects (Schutt, 2011).

Hallin and Mancini (2004) emphasized the importance of comparative analysis in social science by stating:

> Comparative analysis is valuable in social investigation, in the first place, because it sensitizes us to variation and to similarity, and this can contribute powerfully to concept formation and to the refinement of our conceptual apparatus, and it makes it possible to notice things we did not notice and therefore had not conceptualized, and it also forces us to clarify the scope and applicability of the concepts we do employ (pp.2-3).

The use of comparative analysis enhances the researcher’s ability to assess different cases in the future. If some patterns, for instance, can be obtained from the Spanish case, those patterns might be used by the Turkish government towards resolving the Kurdish conflict and the related PKK problems.

In this section, I provide information regarding the methods used in this study to analyze the data and test the hypotheses. I structured the analysis in three stages, a descriptive analysis, followed by a Negative Binomial analysis, and ending with a Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis.

**Descriptive Analysis**

Large scale longitudinal datasets from the GTD and official government datasets were utilized in the descriptive analysis to provide wide-ranging information. I conducted descriptive analyses in the form of pre and post intervention approaches in order to examine the individual impact of policy interventions on the level of
violence. This type of analysis provided an opportunity to examine whether a change occurred in the level of violence when the particular policy was implemented by Turkey and Spain, and if so, the magnitude and direction of this change. For this purpose, I plotted the level of violence (the number of incidents and casualties separately) over the time periods between 1995 and 2010 for the PKK conflict in Turkey, and between 1975 and 1990 for the ETA conflict in Spain by using monthly interval datasets.

For purposes of the descriptive analysis of the study data, I employed two standard figures for each policy interventions. I first examined the number of violent attacks committed by the terrorist organizations, The PKK and ETA, separately. For this purpose, the data to be analyzed was drawn from the GTD. Second, I plotted the level of action, which means the number of operations and detainees held by the security forces of Turkey and Spain between the time periods examined in this study for both cases. For the second stage of the descriptive analysis, the data officially obtained from the national police units, Turkish and Spanish National Police, in both countries was used.

The descriptive analysis in the present study first demonstrated trends in changes in violence of the terrorist groups, that is the PKK and ETA groups, as a response to governmental policies. Second, this analysis provided an indication of the trends in change of the level of violence (counterinsurgency operations) initiated by the security forces in response to the terrorist groups´ attacks. Finally, I plotted the attack and target types of the terrorist groups over the time period examined in this study to better understand changes in the attack strategies of the PKK and ETA during the intervention period.
Negative Binomial Analysis

In the present study, the following models were examined in order to test the impact of governmental policy interventions on incidents/causalities. For general explanations, the terms $\varepsilon_{1,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{2,t}$ represent error terms and followed white noise processes with a zero mean and a constant variance $(0, \sigma^2)$. $c_i$ 's represented the constant terms and $S_k$ represented seasonal dummies if these were statistically significant. While $Y_{1,T}$ refers to the frequency of incidents committed by the PKK in the model (1), $Y_{2,T}$ refers to the frequency of casualties in the model (2) for Turkey. The same concepts were applied to the Spanish case, while $Y_{1,S}$ referred to the frequency of incidents carried by ETA in model (3), and $Y_{2,S}$ referred to the frequency of casualties in model (4) for Spain.

$$Y_{1,T} = c_1 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_1 D_{1,T} + \beta_2 (D_{2,T} + D_{3,T} + D_{4,T}) + \beta_3 D_{2,T} + \beta_4 D_{3,T} + \beta_5 D_{4,T} + \sum_{j=1}^{7} \alpha_{1,T,j} C_{j,T} + \varepsilon_{1,T} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{2,T} = c_2 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_1 D_{1,T} + \beta_2 (D_{2,T} + D_{3,T} + D_{4,T}) + \beta_3 D_{2,T} + \beta_4 D_{3,T} + \beta_5 D_{4,T} + \beta_6 D_{0,T} + \sum_{j=1}^{7} \alpha_{2,T,j} C_{j,T} + \varepsilon_{2,T} \quad (2)$$

In models 1 and 2, $\beta_i$ represented the effects of (i) the independent variable on the dependent variables for Turkey. The effect of $D_{1,T}$ was measured separately, because this effect was not only about the PKK, but also about the whole country’s situation. On the other hand; $D_{2,T}$, $D_{3,T}$ and $D_{4,T}$ interventions created a model that was aggregated as well as individually oriented. The reason for that was that the aggregated data could affect the dependent variables in the same direction. Then, the terms $\alpha_{1,T,j}$ and $\alpha_{2,T,j}$ were used to represent the effects of j, the control variable on the dependent variables for Turkey if these were statistically significant.
In models 3 and 4, \( \beta_i \) represented the effects of (i) the independent variable on the dependent variables for Spain. The effect of interventions was measured both separately and in aggregated terms. So, \( D_{1,S} \), \( D_{2,S} \), and \( D_{3,S} \) interventions created a model that was aggregated as well as individually oriented. The reason for that was that the aggregated data could affect the dependent variables whether in the same direction or not. Then, the terms \( \alpha_{1,S,j} \) and \( \alpha_{2,S,j} \) were used to represent the effects of the control variable on the dependent variables for Spain if these were statistically significant.

In this dissertation, it was known that the models 1-4 included count data as dependent variables, and that estimations of this type of model using “Count models” are more efficient than standard regression models (Wooldridge, 1997). That is, count models are employed when the dependent variable takes on integer values that represent the number of events that occur—examples of count data include the number of patents filed by a company, and the number of spells of unemployment experienced over a fixed time interval (Wooldridge, 1997). For models 1-4, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the parameters \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \) were obtained by maximizing a log likelihood function. In this situation, if the conditional mean function is correctly specified and the conditional distribution of \( y_i \) is Poisson, the MLE \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \) are consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normally distributed (Wooldridge, 1997).

\[
Y_{1,s} = \gamma_4 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_1 D_{1,s} + \beta_2 D_{2,s} + \beta_3 D_{3,s} + \beta_4 (D_{1,s} + D_{2,s} + D_{3,s}) + \sum_{i=1}^{4} \alpha_{1,s,j} c_{s,j} + \varepsilon_{1,s} \tag{3}
\]

\[
Y_{2,s} = \gamma_4 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_5 D_{1,s} + \beta_6 D_{2,s} + \beta_7 D_{3,s} + \beta_8 (D_{1,s} + D_{2,s} + D_{3,s}) + \sum_{i=1}^{4} \alpha_{2,s,j} c_{s,j} + \varepsilon_{1,s} \tag{4}
\]
The Poisson assumption imposes restrictions that are often violated in empirical applications. The most important restriction is the equality of the mean and variance. If the mean-variance equality criterion does not hold, the model is misspecified. If this occurs, several estimators may be used in the application for count data which relaxes this restriction. One common alternative to the Poisson model is to estimate the parameters of model (1 and 2) using the maximum likelihood of a Negative Binomial specification (Wooldridge, 1997). Here the variance parameter is jointly estimated with the conditional mean parameters $\beta$ and $\alpha$. The negative binomial distribution is also often used when there is over dispersion in the data. The variance parameter to be estimated in a Negative Binomial regression is therefore a measure of the extent to which the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. Consistency and efficiency of the negative binomial ML requires that the conditional distribution of $Y$ be a Negative Binomial (Wooldridge, 1997).

In this dissertation, the Huber/White’s method (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989) was used to estimate robust standard error estimates of parameters. The Huber/White for robust standard errors computes the quasi-maximum likelihood (or pseudo-ML) standard errors by using a class of models known as generalized linear models (GLM). For more discussion on GLM and the phenomenon of over dispersion (see McCullagh & Nelder, 1989).\(^\text{17}\)

Additionally, Wooldridge (1997) proposed a regression based test of the Poisson restriction mean and variance equality. In this study, to carry out the test, I first estimated the Poisson model and obtained the fitted values of the dependent variable. The test was based on an auxiliary regression of $e_{si} - 1$, on $\hat{y}_i$ and testing

\(^{17}\text{Further details on QML estimation are provided by Gourioux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984). Wooldridge (1997) provides an excellent summary of the use of QML techniques in estimating parameters of count models. See also the extensive related literature on Generalized Linear Models (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989)}\)
the significance of the regression coefficient where $e_{st}$ represents standardized residuals. The t-statistic of the coefficient was highly significant, leading to rejection of the Poisson restriction. Moreover, the estimated coefficient was significantly positive, indicating over dispersion in the residuals. This test may show a signal for over dispersion with the variance approximated roughly by $\nu = m(1 + \psi m)$.

To summarize, for the approach used in the count model estimation, it was necessary to estimate the two-step negative binomial QMLE specification (termed the quasi-generalized pseudo maximum likelihood estimator by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)) by using the estimate of variance parameter obtained from the Wooldridge test mentioned above. It should be noted that the control variables were selected by using the Akaike Information Criterion whether they were included or not.

Vector-Autoregression (VAR) Analysis

To address the research questions of this paper, I used a multivariate-model approach to examine the intervention-terrorist attacks relationships of interest. After defining the relationships between the interventions and terrorist attacks for each country (for Turkey, the 1st or 2nd; for Spain the 3rd or 4th model) in the step of the count model estimation, I tried to examine the directions of (lead/lag) as regards the dynamics between the interventions ($D_{t,t}$) and incidents/causalities ($Y_{1/2,t}$) for Turkey and Spain. This was done to try and show whether the government interventions had any leading effect on terrorist attacks or the opposite. This type of information is important because government interventions can create pressure on terrorists and they may thus increase their attacks in response to the interventions or the government interventions may increase after increasing terrorist attacks (Crenshaw, 1999).
To obtain the information discussed above, the general approach used is to apply VAR models which have become increasingly popular in recent decades. These models are estimated to provide empirical evidence on the response of a variable to various exogenous impulses in order to discriminate between alternative theoretical models of the socio-economy. This simple framework provides a systematic way to capture the presence of any rich dynamics in a multiple time series. As Sims (1980) and others argued in a series of influential early papers, VARs have promised to provide a coherent and credible approach to data description, forecasting, structural inference, and policy analysis.

Each variable is expressed as a linear function of its own past values and past values of all other variables as shown in models 5-8. Each equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. The error terms \((e_{Y_t}, e_{D_t})\) are the surprise movements in the variables after taking past values into account. The notations of \(Y_{i,t}\) and \(D_{i,t}\) are used to represent endogenous variables in the VAR model.

**VAR model specification for the Turkish case:**

\[
Y_{i,T,t} = c + \alpha_1 D_{i,T,t-1} + \alpha_2 D_{i,T,t-2} + \beta_1 Y_{i,T,t-1} + \beta_2 Y_{i,T,t-2} + e_{Y_{i,T,t}} \quad (5)
\]

\[
D_{i,T,t} = c + \alpha_3 D_{i,T,t-1} + \alpha_4 D_{i,T,t-2} + \beta_3 Y_{i,T,t-1} + \beta_4 Y_{i,T,t-2} + e_{D_{i,T,t}} \quad (6)
\]

**VAR model specification for the Spanish case:**

\[
Y_{i,S,t} = c + \alpha_1 D_{i,S,t-1} + \alpha_2 D_{i,S,t-2} + \beta_1 Y_{i,S,t-1} + \beta_2 Y_{i,S,t-2} + e_{Y_{i,S,t}} \quad (7)
\]

\[
D_{i,S,t} = c + \alpha_3 D_{i,S,t-1} + \alpha_4 D_{i,S,t-2} + \beta_3 Y_{i,S,t-1} + \beta_4 Y_{i,S,t-2} + e_{D_{i,S,t}} \quad (8)
\]

To simplify the representation, VAR models contain only two lags and do not include control variables. In the present application, proper lag lengths were selected using the Schwarz criterion and some control variables were included, as outlined in Table 4.
After the estimation of a VAR, we are often interested in obtaining the impulse response functions. Impulse responses trace out the response of current and future values of each of the variables relative to a one-unit increase (or to a one-standard deviation increase, when the scale matters) in the current value of one of the VAR errors, assuming that this error returns to zero in subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to zero (Sims, 1980). To summarize, the impulse response function is a practical way of representing the behavior over time of $Y_{t,t}$ and $D_{t,t}$ in response to shocks to the vector $\left( \varepsilon_{Y_{t,t}}, \varepsilon_{D_{t,t}} \right)$.

Variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable into the $\left( \varepsilon_{Y_{t,t}}, \varepsilon_{D_{t,t}} \right)$ shocks to the VAR (Sims, 1980). Thus, the variance decomposition process provides information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables $Y_{t,t}$ and $D_{t,t}$ in the VAR.

**Strengths and Limitations of the Study**

*The Strengths*

As a comparative multiple-case study with the two cases, this study provides more concrete and accurately generalized results for developing a common pattern to be implemented than a single case study (Lijphart, 1975). In other words, a single-case study gives evidence from just one case, while a comparative case study deals with two or more cases to obtain more accurate generalizations. Hence, this comparative case study investigates two cases named ETA and the PKK to comprehend their responses against their governments’ policies to eliminate conflict.

This study thus provides a good opportunity for policy-makers to measure the costs and benefits of the existing interventions.
As one completed case, the ETA situation can serve as a good model for Turkey and countries in the same situation to help them understand the underlying factors concerning ethnic conflict and how to eliminate violent incidents. This is because, it was assumed that Spain’s government policies towards ETA during its democratization period and ETA’s response against those policies would be a good example for Turkey to follow.

The Limitations

Even though the current study has some strong points, there are some limitations. First, the nature of the study, precluded research conducted in a lab. Therefore, the researcher did not have the ability to examine all relevant events such as economic improvements, social trends, international events, and political crisis constants. Some of these developments may have occurred around the time of the intervention and could have influenced the outcome of the study. Thus, one of the most important features of the study is that all direct or indirect events were held constant. As an intervention, governments’ defiance based policies, which mean democratic reforms, and democratic initiatives were the focus of the study on terrorist organizations’, ETA and the PKK, and their activities. Thus, all governmental policies, such as economic policies were not included in this study.

Second, since the data used in this study was mainly collected from open sources, it was difficult to find information which was standardized or systematized. Some information needed to be verified, but sometimes it was not possible, and sometimes missing data was inevitable.

Third, another important limitation of this study was the governments’ willingness to provide access to real information related to terrorist incidents in open
source records. Naturally, officials sometimes want to protect the information source, and keep a real story secret in order to provide for internal investigative benefits.
PART III: OUTCOME OF THE STUDY

Chapter VII: Results, Findings and Policy Implications

In this chapter, I discuss the initial results from the present empirical analyses in the following order, respectively. I analyzed and report all selected governmental policies in three ways, that is, using descriptive, negative binomial and VAR estimation processes for each case, separately. In each section, I interpret and discuss the results and findings of each analysis since they each consist of different components.

For purposes of the descriptive analysis, I report the level of violence in accordance with the pre and post term outcomes of the particular policy. In the second section, I highlight the results of the negative binomial estimation that was conducted, and present results from the two different models mentioned in Chapter VI for both cases. In each case, while the first model examines the impact of the governmental policies on the number of incidents, the second model measures the effect of those policies on the number of casualties inflicted by the terrorist group.

In the third section, I present results from the analysis of the VAR estimates, where I used two different VAR models in order to provide a better picture of the prevailing two way relationships between the endogenous variables. Whilst the VAR Model 1 examines the two way relationship between defiance based governmental interventions (aggregated) and the number of incidents, the VAR Model 2 analyzes the effects of those aggregated policies on the number of casualties.

In addition, to the items above, I provide a comparison between the Turkish and Spanish cases by discussing their major findings. Finally, I present the theoretical and practical implications that emerged regarding these ongoing violent conflicts.
The Turkish Case’s Results, Findings and Discussions

Descriptive Analysis

This section provides an overview at the descriptive statistic’s outcomes related to the data employed in the analysis regarding the Turkish case. This section also provides information on the variable of violent incidents (INC) and casualties (CASUAL) initiated by the PKK, such as the frequency of the terrorist incidents and casualties, the number of observations, and the distribution of the variables used in the Turkish case. In addition to that, seasonality patterns over the 12 month period are assessed in this section.

From the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), I analyzed a total of 216 violent incidents that were observed from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2010. The frequency of violent incidents is portrayed in Figure 7-1, and the PKK attacks reached its maximum value between the years 1995 and 1999. From the Figure 7-2, the highest number of incidents observed in one month was 13. No incident was observed between the years 2000 and 2002, since a ceasefire was in effect.

Since monthly data points were used in the VAR estimates, I employed a monthly interval time series approach. In Figure 7-2, the highest number or frequency of incidents occurred during the summer seasons (Jul-Aug-Sep). The aggregated number of incidents observed was 109 (50.4 %) of 216 cases during the summer seasons. On the other hand, a sharp decline in the number of incidents was observed during the winter seasons, which basically implies seasonal effects on violent incidents initiated by the PKK. The information regarding violent incidents is plotted in the histogram along with their frequencies in Figure 7.1.
**Figure 7-1:** Histogram (Frequency) and Descriptive Statistics of Terrorist Incidents Perpetrated by the PKK

As portrayed in Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-3, with 192 observations, the observed average monthly number of violent incidents perpetrated by the PKK was nearly 1.12, and the observed average number of casualties was nearly 7. In terms of the descriptive data detailing the violent incidents (INC), when the mean of the number of incidents of (1.12) is compared to the standard deviation of (2.03), it seems that the standard deviation was almost two times greater than the mean.

In Figure 7-1, the number of incidents seemed to follow a non-normal distribution according to Jarque-Bera test statistics. The skewness value of 3.2 indicates that the series of the number of incidents (INC) are concentrated on the left of the mean, and has a log left tail. Since the data contains many zero values, the Kurtosis value (a measurement of flatness of the series) is extremely high (15.5).
In this study, a total of 1352 casualties (Table 7-1) as defined by the sum of the fatalities and injuries that occurred during the considered time period, 1995-2010 was observed. In Figure 7-3, which depicts the frequency of the inflicted casualties, the maximum value was observed between the years 1999 and 2008. From Figure 7-3, it can be seen that the highest number of casualties observed in a month was 174.

Since a ceasefire was in force, no casualties occurred between the years 2000 and 2002. As shown in the descriptive statistics depicting the numbers of PKK incidents, the impact of seasonality is also observed as regards numbers of casualties caused by the PKK. In Figure 7-4, while the number of casualties reached its maximum value during the summer seasons (Jul-Aug-Sept), a sharp decline is observed in the winter seasons. Considering the weather and geographic conditions of Turkey, this finding was to be expected.
Figure 7-3: Histogram (Frequency) and Descriptive Statistics of Casualties Perpetrated by the PKK

Similar to the descriptive statistics of the numbers of terrorist incidents, the Jarque-Bera test value of nearly 14750 in terms of numbers of casualties (CASUAL) means the present data was non-normally distributed. As a measurement of flatness of the series, the Kurtosis value was 44.4. When the mean of (7) is compared by the standard deviation of (18), it seems that the variation is very high.

Figure 7-4: Casualties Inflicted by Month
The casualty frequency series involved two categories: government (security force casualties) and civilian deaths or injuries. Figure 7-5 and Table 7-1 shows that the PKK mostly attacked citizens between the periods 1995 and 2010. The frequencies are described in Table 7-1. Within 1352 casualties, the number 59.6 percent or (807) casualties refers to the aggregated number of fatalities and injuries that occurred among civilians (Kurdish and Turkish). This indicates that even though it was expected that the PKK would mainly target law enforcement, military and diplomatic personnel, civilian causalities occurred more frequently than government causalities.

**Table 7-1: Frequency of Casualties by Target Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7-5: Annual Distribution of Casualties by Target Type**

*Figure showing the annual distribution of casualties by target type from 1995 to 2010. The red bars represent civilian casualties, and the blue bars represent government casualties.*
Looking at the frequencies of PKK incited incidents in Table 7-2, within 216 violent attacks, 38 percent or (82) of the incidents occurred in the form of armed assaults initiated by the PKK. It can be said that the methods of armed assaults and bombings/explosions were the major approaches used in their attacks. As discussed in the literature review, bombing is a very classical and common approach applied by terrorist organizations.

Table 7-2 indicates that the PKK did not favor arson, kidnapping and unarmed assault as a tactic during the entire observation period. In addition, the main target of the PKK in the overall period of observation was civilians.

**Table 7-2: Frequency of Terrorist Incidents by Attack Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage/Kidnapping</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Assault</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of incident types, Figure 7-6 reveals that there was a change in the tactics of the PKK. While the frequencies of bombings/explosion gradually increased over the years, the number of armed assaults clearly decreased during the intervention period.
Figure 7-6: Annual Distribution of Casualties Inflicted by Armed Assaults and Bombings/Explosions

![Graph showing annual distribution of casualties inflicted by Armed Assaults and Bombings/Explosions.](image)

Figure 7-7: The Overall Distribution of PKK-initiated Incidents by Attack Type

![Pie chart showing the overall distribution of PKK-initiated incidents by attack type.](image)
Descriptive Analysis of the Policy Interventions by the Turkish Government

As described in the previous chapters, four types of interventions implemented by the Turkish government for eliminating the PKK attacks were selected for study (Figure 7-8). In this section, I describe the results of the descriptive analysis conducted to evaluate the level of violence initiated by the PKK in the pre and post periods of the particular governmental policy at issue. In this section too, before analyzing each individual governmental policy, I review the important aspects of the particular policy such as the policy aim, the targeted population, and the outcome expectancy of the policy on the rate of violent incidents.

The best way to represent a qualitative variable as a quantitative one is to use dummy variable technique. In this study, when the intervention was effective, the dummy variable took the value 1, otherwise it took the value 0.

**Figure 7-8: Policy Interventions Implemented by the Turkish Government**
In order to provide consistency in the format, I formulated two standard figures for each individual policy intervention implemented by the Turkish government in response to the PKK attacks over the considered time period. In the first figure, I plotted only violent incidents and casualties initiated by the PKK using the GTD dataset. In the second figure, I plotted the number of security forces operations and the number of captured/apprehended terrorists in order to examine whether the PKK initiated violence as a result of Security force operations.

*D1: The Recognition of the Candidate Status of Turkey for Accession into the European Union (EU)*

Turkey`s candidate status for full membership was officially recognized by the EU on December 12, 1999, at the Helsinki summit (Keyman, 2007). Even though Turkey`s journey was not a new phenomenon, because Turkey`s official application to be a member of the EU was enacted on 14 April 1987, recognizing the application status of Turkey in 1999 has been accepted as a turning point for purposes of its democratic improvement (Balci, 2008; Çarkoğlu & Rubin, 2003; Keyman, 2007). This is because Turkey initiated nine crucial democratic reforms in order to meet the EU demands at this time. In other words, Turkey`s membership to the EU meant improving its stand on human rights, minority rights, social welfare, religious rights, and democratic rights for its citizens, including Kurds, Turks, the Laz, Arabians, Circassians, Greeks and Armenians.

*Policy:* In order to accede to the EU, the Turkish government begun to enact democratic reform packages between 2001 and 2007.

*Aim:* The main aim of this policy was to be a member of the EU by improving Turkey`s democratic system including its judiciary, political, military, human rights, and religious rights approaches. For this purpose, the Turkish government initiated the
nine democratic reform packages tabulated below: (Table7-3) In creating this table, I tried to provide key headlines for each package even if this included several different legislation amendments.

Scope: This policy intervention (democratic reforms) was designed to be implemented across the entire country.

Expectancy on the violent incidents: Even though the accession process of Turkey into the EU not directly targeted terrorists, it was expected that the reform packages would prevent nationalist Kurds` support to the PKK by meeting the Kurdish people’s demands. The democratic reforms were also assumed to result in reducing the PKK initiated violence since they were designed to decrease the political tensions among the Kurds.
Table 7-3: The Democratic Reform Packages of Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>February, 2002</td>
<td>Legislation amendments in the Constitution, Turkish Criminal Code, Counter-Terrorism Law, Criminal Procedure Law with regards to expansion of freedom of speech, lessening of detention time, protecting of the rights of prisoners and convicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>March, 2002</td>
<td>Legislation amendments in the Constitution, the Press Law, the Law on Political Parties, the Public Demonstration law, the Civil Servant Acts, the State Security Court Laws, the Provincial Administration Law, and the Gendarmerie Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>August, 2002</td>
<td>Legislation amendments with regard to removing death penalty, expanding freedom of speech and establishing of associations, reregulating of non-Muslim citizens' properties rights, enhancing of the cultural rights in the field of education and publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>January, 2003</td>
<td>Legislation amendments about the expansion of freedom of association, the prevention of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, the protection of the rights of prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>July, 2003</td>
<td>Legislation amendments with regard to releasing to use of ethnic and cultural languages in the mass-media and publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>July, 2003</td>
<td>Legislation amendments in many laws regarding the expanding of freedom of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>July, 2004</td>
<td>Legislation amendments with regards to eliminating military tutelage in the Turkish democratic system, and removing death penalty even in war condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Democratic Reform Packages</td>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>Legislation and constitutional amendments in the field of enhancing of cultural and religious rights, freedom of speech, eliminating of military tutelage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* This table was designed from the official reports published by the Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey.\(^{18}\)

In Figure 7-9, the shaded area indicates that the reform period related to Turkey’s EU membership process has been effective. During this period, the Turkish

state initiated the nine democratic reforms discussed above and the majority of those reforms were directed towards solving ethnic grievances in the country. As shown in Figure 7-9, starting at the point where this policy reached its full effect (Table 7-3) between 1999 and 2004, the level of violence initiated by the PKK decreased significantly for 5 years until 2004. However, the general trend demonstrates an increase in violent incidents from 2003 to 2010. The sharp decrease in the level of violence after 1999 overlaps with the long ceasefire period, which was unilaterally declared by the PKK right after the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy on the level of PKK initiated violence in the short run.

The graphic showing the trends in casualty numbers, as plotted in Figure 7-9, shows that the bloodiest year of the PKK violence that occurred during the pre and post intervention period was in 2008. In the pre intervention period, the graphic shows fluctuations in the level of violence by the PKK as observed from 1995 and 1999.

**Figure 7-9:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) Committed by the PKK-Democratic Reforms for the EU Membership (nine democratic reforms packages)
Figure 7-10 demonstrates the level of action (operation and captured) initiated by the Turkish security forces (military and police) towards the PKK during the time period selected for observation in this study. The level of action indicates a similar pattern to the level of violence inflicted by the PKK in the pre intervention period from 1995 to 2000. As indicated in Figure 7-10, after a sharp three-year increase (between 1995 and 1998), the level of action shows a steady decrease and reached the lowest level in 2000. Between 2000 and 2004, the level of action was very low until 2004. This time period overlaps with the longest ceasefire period (between 2000 and 2004) declared by the PKK. Between 2004 and 2010, the level of action shows a similar pattern to the number of violent incidents carried out by the PKK and reached the highest level in 2008 during the intervention period.

**Figure 7-10:** Level of Action (operations and captured) by the Security Forces-
Democratic Reforms for the EU Membership (nine democratic reforms packages)

It was considered that the expected impact of the democratic reforms (towards removing certain grievances concerning the Kurdish issue) on the level of violence inflicted by the PKK would take longer than expected because the policy targeted the social context, rather than targeting the PKK militants directly. From this perspective,
implementing the democratic reforms seemed to decrease the level of violence in the early years of this policy (between 2000 and 2004), as a short run effect. However, it should not be ignored that this period overlaps with the long term ceasefire of the PKK from 2000 to 2004.

**D2: The Returning Home Bill (July 2003- Jan 2004)**

In order to provide opportunities for the PKK militants to lay down their arms, the Turkish government initiated a number of repentance laws. Within the democratization context, one of the important repentance laws was “The Returning Home Bill” implemented between the years 2003 and 2004 when the unilateral ceasefire by the PKK was in force. This policy was based on encouraging the social integration process and providing amnesty for terrorists who wanted to capitulate by escaping from the PKK and it was implemented for six months during this period.

Policy: The Turkish government had ensured amnesty for the PKK militants who have never engaged in any kind of violent attack that resulted in casualties. This intervention directly targeted the PKK militants.

Aim: The main aim of The Returning Home Bill was to convince the PKK militants to repent and refrain from their terrorist activities and return to their homes and provided a reintegration process into society. This policy was also intended to trigger a disintegration process among the militants of the PKK who were hesitant about their terrorist behaviors.

Scope: This policy intervention was designed and implemented for the PKK militant who had not wounded and killed Turkish soldiers and citizens, and was willing to capitulate and lay down their weapons. For those who were eligible to benefit from this intervention, they could apply for repentance without sentencing. The Turkish government also provided as services under the witness protection act
opportunities for such repentances (Ünal, 2011). Second, this intervention also ensured a reduction in punishment for the militants who were responsible for violent attacks with casualties (fatalities and injured), if the terrorists were willing to cooperate with the security forces (Ünal, 2011).

*Expectancy on the violent incidents:* The Returning Home Bill was expected to result in reducing the PKK initiated violent incidents because it directly targeted terrorists and it was believed it would cause disintegration within the PKK.

The descriptive analysis of the impact of the Returning Home Bill policy (granting amnesty) for the PKK militants on the level of violence is plotted in the following Figures, 7-11 and 7-12. The shaded line shows those periods where the returning home policy was in effect. The results for the returning home bill indicated that it was ineffective in curbing the level of violence during the observed period, for the months that the policy was in force.

**Figure 7-11:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) Inflicted by the PKK - the Returning Home Bill
Considering the expected impact of this policy on the number of surrenders/capitulators, Figure 7-12 demonstrates an increase in the number of applicants to accept this policy. When the policy ended in the beginning of 2004, the numbers of surrenders returned to the normal trend level, as plotted in Figure 7-12.

During this intervention period, outlined in Figure 7-13, it is observed that the level of action showed a steady trend. The highest number of surrenders over the entire period occurred in 2000, as an outlier which is plotted in Figure 7-12. It should be noted that this sharp increase occurred right after the PKK leader was captured by the Turkish security forces.

**Figure 7-12:** The Frequency of Surrenders/capitulators by the PKK during the Entire Effective Time Period.
Figure 7-13: Level of Action (operations and captured) by the Security Forces- the Returning Home Bill

![Graph showing level of action over time](image)

D3: The Active Repentance Law (Jun 2005 and after)

The Active Repentance Law was implemented by the Turkish government with the same purpose and scope of the policy of the Returning Home Bill. It was initiated in 2005 and is still in effect. As seen in the Returning Home Bill policy, this intervention includes an amnesty and a reduction in punishment for the terrorists.

In Figure 7-14, the shaded area demonstrates that the period of the Active Repentance Law was effective. This policy is still in force. Figure 7-14 indicates a sharp increase on the level of violence initiated by the PKK in 2005 when this policy began. Then, this trend showed a sharp decrease until 2006.

Considering the study period, where the active repentance law was in effect, the results of this policy show an inconsistent pattern with regard to its impact on the level of PKK violence. During the intervention period, the number of casualties reached its highest level in 2008, while the number of incidents remained similar to its normal trend. Since the pre intervention period overlapped with the long ceasefire
period declared by the PKK, there was no increasing or decreasing trend as regards the level of PKK violence observed between 1999 and 2005.

**Figure 7-14:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) initiated by the PKK - the Active Repentance Law

![Figure 7-14: Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) initiated by the PKK - the Active Repentance Law](image)

**Figure 7-15:** the Frequency of Surrenders/capitulators by the PKK during the Study Period.

![Figure 7-15: the Frequency of Surrenders/capitulators by the PKK during the Study Period.](image)
I also plotted the number of operations and captures in Figure 7-16. This figure demonstrates a sharp increase in the number of captured individuals who attacked civilians and the Turkish government in 2008 when the PKK violence reached its highest level (Figure 7-14).

**Figure 7-16:** Level of Action (operations and captured) by the Security Forces- the Active Repentance Law

Even though the expected impact of this policy was an increase in the number of surrenders by the PKK, and disintegration of the terrorist group, Figure 7-15 indicates that the level of surrenders kept up a steady trend during the intervention period.

Considering the aim of these amnesty laws, the Returning Home Bill and the Active Repentance Law, Figures 7-12 and 7-15 indicate that these laws, by and large, had no effect on the numbers of surrenders. In addition, they did not reduce the level of PKK violence during the period that these policies were in effect (Figures 7-11 and 7-14).
**D4: The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening") (Jul 2009 and after)**

The Turkish government put into effect the ‘Democratic Initiative’ popularly known as ‘the Kurdish Opening’ or ‘the Democratic Opening’ at the end of the 2009. This policy was based on efforts to respond effectively to Kurdish demands concerning cultural rights, freedom of expression, and governance. The Kurdish opening initiative is one of the most crucial policy initiatives in the history of the Kurdish conflict in terms of showing the Turkish State’s changing mentality regarding the Kurdish Issue (Barkey, 2009). For this purpose, the Turkish government implemented a number of democratic reforms including allowing free speech and singing in the Kurdish language in public, and the opening of private Kurdish language courses. It also allowed TV and radio broadcasting in Kurdish. This policy intervention is still in effect.

*Policy:* This policy was initiated to provide a comprehensive, multi-tiered approach to resolving problems between the Turkish government and Turkey’s Kurdish population (Kirişçi, 2009).

*Aim:* The main aim of this policy was to diminish the existing tensions between the Kurds and the government by implementing several cultural and democratic reforms mentioned earlier. By doing so, the Turkish government’s purpose was to prevent the support of nationalist Kurds for the PKK.

*Scope:* This policy was designed for the entire Kurdish community who inhabited Turkish territory. The expected outcome underlying the Kurdish opening was to force the PKK to lay down its arms by meeting the nationalist Kurds’ demands in a democratic way (Kirişçi, 2009). The democratic opening initiative was directly targeted to the Kurdish community and the PKK militants.
Expectancy on the violent incidents: The Turkish government expected two outcomes to result via this policy intervention. First, it was expected to reduce the PKK initiated violent incidents in a long run since the Turkish government had met some of the democratic demands of the Kurds. In other words, preventing public support for the terrorists was expected to result in a reduction of violent PKK incidents (Ünal, 2011). Second, in the short run, this policy was expected to diminish existing tensions among the Kurds against the Turkish state, and reduce the Kurds’ support for the terrorists.

The democratic initiative policy (the Kurdish opening) was adopted in 2009, and is still in effect. As shown in Figure 7-17, the number of violent incidents demonstrates a sharp increase and a sharp decrease in 2010 with the implementation of this policy in 2009 until 2010.

**Figure 7-17:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) by the PKK – the Democratic Initiative

As indicated in Figure 18, however, the level of action (operations and captured) shows a similar trend to the level of violence initiated by the PKK. As seen
in the level of incidents by the PKK, an increasing and decreasing trend is observed in the level of action taken by the Turkish security forces.

**Figure 7-18:** Level of Action (operations and captured) by the Security Forces - the Democratic Initiative

Since this policy is a soft-line policy and targets grievances that cause ethnic conflicts directly, the expected impact of this policy on the level of violence may take longer. Because the data shows the post-term period of this policy is not marked, it is difficult to compare it with the pre policy term. Thus, a better evaluation about the effectiveness of this policy on the level of violence may be made by analyzing its long term effect.
In brief, in the descriptive analysis section, I analyzed the distribution of the level of violence initiated by the PKK during the time period that a particular policy intervention was in effect. The results of this analysis showed whether a change occurred in the level of violence, and the direction of the trend as a response to the particular policy implemented by the Turkish government. Before starting the Negative Binomial and VAR analysis, the descriptive section of this study aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding regarding the data used in this study and information about the particular soft line governmental policy initiated by the Turkish government within the time period selected. In the next section, I analyze the specific and cumulative impacts of the governmental policies adopted by Turkey on the level of PKK-initiated violence during the considered time period.

**Estimation Results**

In this section, in order to examine the relationship between the defiance/desistance based governmental policies of the Turkish state and the level of violence initiated by the PKK, I employed two quantitative techniques including the Negative Binomial and VAR model estimation approaches. In this section, I first describe the two Negative Binomial models (Model 1: Incidents, Model 2: Casualties) I analyzed these models in order to test the hypotheses of this dissertation, and then I describe the findings of the VAR models that evaluated the two way relationships between the level of violence initiated by the PKK and selected governmental policies (D2+D3+D4) which were targeted directly towards solving the grievances of the Kurdish conflict, and the PKK. The VAR estimations were also used to provide a summary of the short term and long term impacts of all selected policies on the level of violence (VAR Model 1: Incidents;, VAR Model 2: Casualties:) initiated by the PKK, and vice versa.
Negative Binomial Model Estimation Results and Findings

Several estimators may be used in the application of count data which relax the restrictions placed on use of this model. However, one common approach is to use the maximum likelihood of a Negative Binomial specification in order to estimate the parameters of the model.

As described in the data analysis section; the variables explaining the violent incidents and casualties that resulted were divided into two main categories. The first involved the explanatory variables testing of the basic hypotheses of this study in relation to representative forms of government interventions. The second involved the control variables. In addition to that, since the descriptive results displayed an apparent seasonality as outlined in the previous section, seasonal dummies were included in the model.

Table 7-4 shows the results of the *incidents model* (INC) as estimated by the Negative Binomial. To further examine these results, it was noted that the incidents were influenced by seasonality because of the fact that 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th and 12th months had a statistically significant impact on incident rates according to the 95% confidence level, on average. In fact, Table 7-4 demonstrates incidents rarely occurred in the winters, while they mostly occurred in the summers. The following Table (7-4) shows the NB results (Incidents Model) regarding the individual and aggregated impact of Turkish governmental interventions on the level of violent incidents inflicted by the PKK.

In Table 7-4, it can be seen that the Variable D1 has a negative and statistically significant effect on incidents at a 99% confidence level. This shows the accession process to the European Union had a mitigating effect on the PKK initiated incidents. However, this result may be affected by the overlapping effect of *ceasefires*. In other
words, the significant decrease of D1 on incidents may have originated from the unilateral inaction decision of the PKK to undertake a ceasefire.

Table 7-4 reveals that D2 had a statistically insignificant effect on the level of violence during its implementation period. Considering the time period (six months) this intervention was in force, the data period may have been inadequate for analyzing the specific impact of the Returning Home Bill Policy, which was an amnesty targeting the PKK militants directly on the level of PKK initiated violent incidents. In addition to that, as seen in D1, D2 might be affected by the overlapping impact of the unilaterally declared ceasefire. As plotted in Table 7-4, however, D3, the Active Repentance Law which has been perceived as an amnesty, had a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of incidents carried out by the PKK at a 99% confidence level during its implementation period (2005-2010). The Democratic Initiative policy, D4, had a statistically insignificant effect on the level of violent incidents, as described in Table 7-4.

Table 7-4 shows the aggregated effect of governmental interventions (D2+D3+D4) on the number of incidents initiated by the PKK was positive and statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. Considering the cumulative impact of these policies, this result clearly demonstrates that the defiance (soft-line) based governmental interventions implemented by the Turkish state had an increasing effect rather than a decreasing or neutral effect on PKK-initiated incidents, contrary to the Turkish government’s expectations.
Table 7-4: Negative Binomial Model Results for PKK initiated Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-2.65</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-2.42</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(1)</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-2.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(2)</td>
<td>-33.51</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-80.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(4)</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(7)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(12)</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-2.62</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-4.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERAT</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURREND</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Akaike info criterion 2.55
Log likelihood -234.04
Likelihood Ratio statistic 91.88
Prob(LR statistic) 0.00

According to the results of the casualties model (CASUAL) estimated by the Negative Binomial model in Table 7-5, casualties are influenced by seasonality, and the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 12th months are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. In fact, as seen in the incidents model, the frequency of casualties rarely occurred in the winter seasons. The NB results (Casualties Model) regarding the individual and aggregated impact of Turkish governmental interventions on the level of casualties by the PKK are plotted in Table 7-5.

From Table 7-5, it can be seen that the variable D1 had a negative and statistically significant effect on casualties at the 99% confidence level. This shows the accession process to the European Union had a significantly mitigating effect on casualties. Considering the expected impact of Turkey’s accession process to the EU,
this policy effort provided an opportunity for democratic development and better welfare opportunities not only for the Kurds, but also for the whole country. Thus, this type of mitigating effect may be expected. However, when taking into account the practical effect of ceasefires declared by the PKK, it is clear that the EU accession process overlapped the ceasefires period, which started in 1999 and ended in 2004, as seen in the NB Incidents Model. Therefore, it may be said the mitigating effects of the EU on casualties may have resulted from ceasefires which were unilaterally declared by the PKK.

Table 7-5 reveals that D2, the Returning Home Bill had a statistically insignificant effect on the level of casualties during its implementation period. Considering the time period (six months) during which this intervention was in effect, the data may be too limited for examining the specific impact of D2 on the level of PKK initiated violent incidents. As plotted in Table 7-5, however, D3, the Active Repentance Law which has been perceived as an amnesty, had a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of casualties initiated by the PKK at the 99% confidence level during the time period it was in force (2005-2010). In addition, the Democratic Initiative policy, D4, also had a statistically significant and positive impact on the level of PKK initiated casualties, as described in Table 7-5.

Interestingly, even though the NB Incidents Model results related D4 was statistically insignificant, the Casualties Model results showed that D4, the Democratic Initiative/Kurdish Opening policy, was statistically significant and had a positive effect on the number of casualties carried by the PKK at a 99% confidence level. This result clearly demonstrates that the PKK aimed to inflict bloodier attacks in small numbers of incidents as a response to this policy targeting the Kurdish community directly.
In Table 7-5, showing the aggregated effect of governmental policies, (D2+D3+D4) the variable was statistically significant and positive at a 99% confidence level. Table 7-5 indicates that the aggregated impact of defiance/desistance based governmental policies of Turkey had an increasing effect rather than a decreasing or neutral effect on casualties during the intervention period, contrary to the Turkish government’s expectations.

**Table 7-5: Negative Binomial Model Results for Casualties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(2)</td>
<td>-125.23</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-284.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(4)</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(7)</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(12)</td>
<td>-1.08</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-5.88</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERAT</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Akaike info criterion: 5.76  
Log likelihood: -535.02  
Likelihood Ratio statistic: 370.81  
Prob(LR statistic): 0.00

In addition to the Negative Binomial (NB) analysis, in the next section I present the VAR estimates for the aggregated effects of all selected policies on the level of violence initiated by the PKK during democratization period using the constructed VAR Models (VAR Model-1, VAR Model-2).
VAR Model Estimation Results and Findings

The complexity of social relationships has led researchers to develop a method of examining many cases with simultaneous equations, rather than with single-equation models. In real life, it is observed that social variables mutually influence on another. Additionally, it is hard to distinguish whether a social variable is endogenous (affected) or exogenous (affecting). Therefore, VAR (Vector Auto Regression) estimations have been proposed in order to solve these difficulties.

In the previous sections, the relationship between selected governmental policies and the level of violence carried out by the PKK were analyzed by using a one-way structural approach (from interventions to attacks) that employed Negative Binomial regression models. However, NB regression techniques cannot provide any information on two way relationships that may exist between endogenous variables. Therefore, this section describes efforts to try to find out if two way relationships (if, any) existed between these study phenomena.

Specifically, I developed two equations, for the selected governmental interventions, and the level of PKK violence. These equations consisted of the endogenous variables including their lagged values, and some control variables (as in the Negative Binomial case, the VAR models may contain control variables like seasonal dummies, and other exogenous variables which may affect endogenous variables). In this component of the analysis, statistically significant seasonal dummies (1st, 2nd, 4th and 7th months), and numbers of operations by the security forces were used to control for the relationship between endogenous variables.

I therefore employed two VAR models. While VAR Model-1 analyzed the relationship between the PKK initiated incidents and defiance/desistance based selected governmental interventions (D2+D3+D4), VAR Model-2 examined the
relationships between the PKK initiated casualties and those selected policies by the government.

Before estimating the parameters of the VAR Model-1, the optimal lag length should be selected to obtain a lagged effect for examining the impact of each endogenous variable on the other variables. In this sense, Table 7-6 reveals that the optimal lag length for VAR Model-1 was eight (8) for the endogenous variables according to the Likelihood-ratio test.

**Table 7-6: Lag Order Selection Criteria for VAR Model -1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag</th>
<th>LogL</th>
<th>LR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-485.6550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-239.6647</td>
<td>445.5157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-236.1583</td>
<td>6.272495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-235.6336</td>
<td>0.926927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-229.4388</td>
<td>10.80663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-228.6890</td>
<td>1.291255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-227.5978</td>
<td>1.854952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-227.2114</td>
<td>0.648413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-216.1687</td>
<td>18.28184*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-214.5942</td>
<td>2.571621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-213.9277</td>
<td>1.073780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-212.6137</td>
<td>2.087888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-212.0375</td>
<td>0.902624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)

After estimating the VAR Model-1 with 8 lags, I conducted the Granger Causality Test to examine the causality relationship between the endogenous variables. Table 7-7, which reveals the Granger Causality Test results for VAR Model-1, shows the direction of causality is two-way at a 90% confidence level (prob value<0.10). However, the results indicate the causality from interventions to incidents is stronger than the causality from incidents to interventions since the
confidence level of the first case is higher than the second case\textsuperscript{19} as described in Table 7-7.

**Table 7-7:** Granger Causality Test Results for VAR Model-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: INC</th>
<th>Excluded Chi-sq</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>27.0456</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: D2+D3+D4</th>
<th>Excluded Chi-sq</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>9.81724</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To show VAR-Model-1 estimates of reliability, I performed the autocorrelation test on the residuals of the model. In Table 7-8, the probability values demonstrate that the residuals obtained from VAR-1 had no autocorrelations at the 99\% confidence level for 9-24\textsuperscript{th} lags. This result indicates the interpretation of the results regarding VAR Model-1 may be meaningful.

**Table 7-8:** VAR Model-1 Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Adj Q-Stat</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.47902</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.88746</td>
<td>0.1555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.95304</td>
<td>0.3043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>28.54632</td>
<td>0.0368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>27.81249</td>
<td>0.1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>30.85236</td>
<td>0.1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>34.02759</td>
<td>0.2549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>33.38192</td>
<td>0.4246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.93467</td>
<td>0.5341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>35.39995</td>
<td>0.6708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>46.15571</td>
<td>0.3839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>55.65332</td>
<td>0.2343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>53.07408</td>
<td>0.2220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>56.57158</td>
<td>0.2097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>60.06908</td>
<td>0.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>63.56658</td>
<td>0.1851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order.

\textsuperscript{19} Since these results give same interpretation, variance error decomposition results are omitted in this study.
Figure 7-19 reveals the VAR results for VAR Model-1 and indicates the relationship between the governmental policy intervention initiated by the Turkish government and the PKK initiated violent incidents and vice versa, where I also incorporated the retaliation effect (operations of security forces) into these VAR estimates. In Figure 7-19, the horizontal dashed lines represent the confidence level of the responses. The horizontal solid lines are cumulative responses of one standard-deviation shock in each endogenous variable. In other words, the data show the chance in the level of violent incidents after one unit shock/impulse given the policy intervention variable in order to analyze how those policies affected the level of violent incidents over the 36 months period. According to the right top graphic in Figure 12, the cumulative response of the level of violent incidents after one-standard deviation shock was applied to the policy interventions became positive and significant in the short term (up to 12 months). Then its effect became insignificant and gradually declined to a zero level over time.

Similarly, the bottom left graphic in Figure 7-19 demonstrates that cumulative response of interventions after one-standard deviation shock was applied to the level of violent incidents, which became positive and significant in the short term (up to 36 months), but its effect was not significant in the long term.
In the same way as in the case of the VAR Model-1, before estimating the parameters of the VAR Model-2, the optimal lag length was selected to assist in obtaining a lagged effect for each endogenous variable relative to the other variables. Thus, I plotted the Lag order selection criteria for VAR model-2 in Table 7-9, which reveals that the optimal lag length of VAR Model-2 was twelve months (12) for the endogenous variables.
Table 7-9: Lag Order Selection Criteria for VAR Model-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag</th>
<th>LogL</th>
<th>LR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-947.1032</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-675.2196</td>
<td>492.4113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-674.7006</td>
<td>492.4113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-674.3876</td>
<td>0.553010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-672.9133</td>
<td>2.571702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-672.7265</td>
<td>0.321686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-669.3675</td>
<td>5.710428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-668.9167</td>
<td>0.756284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-664.1430</td>
<td>7.903125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-663.9114</td>
<td>0.378277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-662.4767</td>
<td>2.311404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-661.5846</td>
<td>1.417457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-650.6305</td>
<td>17.16146*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)

After estimating the VAR Model-2 with 12 lags, the Granger Causality Test was deployed to examine the causality relationship between the endogenous variables (governmental policy interventions initiated by the Turkish government and the level of PKK initiated casualties), and the results are plotted in Table 7-10. The Granger Causality Test results reveal that the direction of causality between those endogenous variables is bi-directional or occurs in a two-way direction at the 90% confidence level (prob value<0.10). On the other hand, the causality from the governmental interventions to the level of casualties (Prob<0.01) is stronger than the causality that existed between the level of casualties to the governmental interventions (Prob<0.10) since the confidence level of the first case is higher than second case. Therefore, it may be concluded that the quick and violent response of the PKK (the level of sensitivity) to the Turkish government`s interventions is stronger than the degree of response of the Turkish government to the PKK violent attacks (casualties) over the time period assessed.

20 Since these results give same interpretation, variance error decomposition results are omitted this study.
Table 7-10: Granger Causality Test Results for VAR Model-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Chi-sq</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: CASUAL</td>
<td>D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>32.0737</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>CASUAL</td>
<td>10.34574</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To show VAR Model-2 estimates of reliability, I performed the autocorrelation test on the residuals of the Model. In Table 15, the probability values show that the residuals obtained from the VAR Model-2 have no autocorrelations at the 99% confidence level for 12-24th lags. This indicates the interpretation of the results may be meaningful.

Table 7-11: VAR Model-2 Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Adj Q-Stat</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.17879</td>
<td>0.0375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.64320</td>
<td>0.1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.75469</td>
<td>0.3166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>26.36273</td>
<td>0.0491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26.71747</td>
<td>0.1434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>30.16216</td>
<td>0.1794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>32.18068</td>
<td>0.2672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>32.60841</td>
<td>0.4369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>34.36675</td>
<td>0.5464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>35.26510</td>
<td>0.6831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>45.82872</td>
<td>0.3962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>54.31068</td>
<td>0.2466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order.

Figure 7-20 demonstrates the VAR results for VAR Model-2 and indicates the relationship between the governmental policy intervention initiated by the Turkish government and the level of PKK initiated casualties and vice versa, where I also incorporated the retaliation effect (operations of security forces) and the seasonal effect into these VAR estimates.
In Figure 7-20, the horizontal dashed lines denote the confidence level of the responses (the error band the impulse response function). The horizontal solid lines represent the cumulative responses of one standard-deviation shock in each endogenous variable. In other words, the figure shows the chance in the level of casualties after one unit shock/impulse was applied to the policy intervention variables in order to analyze how those policies affected the level of casualties over the 36 month period. Figure 7-20 shows the cumulative response of casualties after one-standard deviation shock was applied to the policy interventions became positive and significant in the short term (up to 12 months), and then its effect became insignificant and gradually declined to zero level. By the same token, the bottom left graphic in Figure 7-20 shows that the cumulative response of interventions after one-standard deviation shock applied to the level of casualties became positive and significant in the long term; however, its effect was not significant in the short term.
Figure 7-20: Impulse Response Graphics of VAR Model-2
The Spanish Case’s Results, Findings and Discussions

Descriptive Analysis

Similarly to the Turkish case, this section first provides a descriptive analysis related to the data employed in this study. Then, it provides an overview on the dependent, independent, and control variables such as the frequency of properties, the number of observations, and the distribution of the variables used in the Spanish case. In addition to that, seasonality patterns over the 12 month period are also assessed in this section. Finally, in the descriptive analysis, I examine the level of violence in accordance with the pre and post term periods of the particular policy at issue as implemented by the Spanish government.

Apart from the descriptive analysis of the Turkish case, in the Spanish case, I analyzed the data which covered the time periods between January 1, 1975, and December 31, 2012 in order to examine the long term effect of the defiance based governmental policies of Spain on the level ETA attacks. Since the violence carried out by ETA was terminated by Spain in 2011, this analysis was designed to help establish predictions about the future of ongoing violent ethnic conflicts such as the PKK.

From data extracted from the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), I analyzed a total of 1,147 violent incidents carried by ETA that were observed from January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1990. The frequency of violent incidents initiated by ETA is portrayed in Figure 7-22, showing the number of ETA attacks reached their maximum value (35) in 1989. The figure detailing the annual distribution of the frequency of violent incidents (Figure 7-21) shows that between the years 1978 and 1990, and the year 1989, ETA attacks reached their highest values. From Figure 7-22, the maximum number of terror incidents observed in a month was 35.
**Figure 7-21:** Annual Frequencies of ETA Inflicted Incidents

![Figure 7-21: Annual Frequencies of ETA Inflicted Incidents](image)

**Figure 7-22:** Histogram (Frequency) and Descriptive Statistics of Terrorist Incidents Perpetrated by ETA

![Figure 7-22: Histogram (Frequency) and Descriptive Statistics of Terrorist Incidents Perpetrated by ETA](image)

As portrayed in Figure 7-22 and Figure 7-24, showing 192 observations, the observed average monthly number of violent incidents inflicted by ETA was nearly 6, and the observed average number of casualties was nearly 7. In terms of the descriptive data detailing the ETA initiated violent incidents (INC), when the mean of the number of incidents of (5.97) is compared to the standard deviation of (5.73), it seems that the value of the standard deviation was quite close to the mean value.
In Figure 7-22, the number of incidents seemed to follow a non-normal distribution according to Jarque-Bera test statistics (325.10). The skewness value of 1.9 indicated that the series of the number of incidents (INC) was concentrated to the left of the mean, and had long right tail. Since the data contained many zero values, the Kurtosis value (a measurement of flatness of the series) was extremely high (8.07).

As shown in Figure 7-23, the highest frequency of incidents occurred mostly during the spring seasons (Apr-May-Jun). On the other hand, a sharp decline in the number of incidents was observed during the winter seasons, which basically implies seasonal effects on the level of violent incidents initiated by ETA.

**Figure 7-23:** Seasonality of ETA Attacks by Month

In this study, a total of 1,257 casualties (Table 7-12) as defined by the sum of the fatalities and injuries occurred between 1975 and 1990. In Figure 7-24, which depicts the frequency of inflicted casualties, the maximum value observed in a month was 64.
Similar to the descriptive statistics of the number of violent incidents, the Jarque-Bera test value of nearly 1,143 in terms of numbers of casualties (CASUAL) means the present data was non-normally distributed. Besides, the Kurtosis value was 13.4 as a measurement of flatness of the series. When the mean of (6.5) is compared to the standard deviation of (10), it seems that the variation was very high.

A seasonality pattern was also observed in regard to the casualties inflicted by ETA. In Figure 7-25, while the number of casualties reached its maximum value during the months (May-Jun-July), a sharp decline was observed in the winter seasons. The seasonality pattern of casualties differed slightly from the INC series. These results show that the deadly attacks initiated by ETA mostly occurred in the summer seasons, which was also the tourism season in Spain.
Figure 7-25: Casualties Inflicted by Month

The annual distribution of the frequency of incidents (Figure 7-26) shows the number of ETA initiated casualties reached a peak in 1979. Figure 7-26 indicates that the number of casualties increased in the years (1978-1980) and the years (1986-1987).

Figure 7-26: Annual Frequencies of ETA Inflicted Casualties
As mentioned in the Turkish case, I divided the casualty frequency series into two categories: government (security forces) and civilian casualties. Figure 7-27 and Table 7-12 show that ETA mostly attacked citizens between 1975 and 1990. Within 1,209 casualties, the number 69 percent or (834) casualties refer to the aggregated number of fatalities and injuries that occurred among civilians (Basques and Spaniards). Contrary to general expectations, these results indicate that ETA mainly targeted civilian rather than law enforcement, military and diplomatic personnel.

**Table 7-12: Frequency of ETA-initiated Casualties by Target Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7-27: Annual Distribution of ETA-initiated Casualties by Target Type**

[Graph showing annual distribution of casualties by target type from 1975 to 1990, with details for civilian and government casualties for each year.]
Looking at the frequencies of ETA incited incidents in Table 7-13, within 1,117 violent attacks, it can be seen that 39 percent or (440) of the incidents occurred in the form of armed assaults carried out by ETA. It can be said that the methods of armed assaults and bombings/explosions were the major tactics used in their attacks. However, Table 7-13 also reveals that ETA did not favor Hostage/Kidnapping during the entire observation period. On the other hand, bombing was a very classical and common approach applied by ETA.

**Table 7-13: Frequency of ETA-initiated Incidents by Attack Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage/Kidnapping</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of attack types, Figure 7-28 and 7-29 reveals that there was a change in the tactics of ETA during its violent history. While the frequencies of bombings/explosions gradually increased over the years from 1982 to 1990, the number of armed assaults clearly decreased during the intervention period. This result indicates that ETA aimed to initiate more deadly attacks against both civilians and the Spanish state after 1981, in particular.
**Figure 7-28**: Annual Distribution of ETA-initiated Incidents by Attack Type

![Line graph showing the annual distribution of ETA-initiated incidents by attack type from 1975 to 1990.](image)

**Figure 7-29**: The Overall Distribution of ETA-initiated Incidents by Attack Type (1975-1990)

![Pie chart showing the overall distribution of ETA-initiated incidents by attack type.](image)
Figure (7-30) shows the entire period from 1975 and 2012. While the shaded area demonstrates the cumulative process of the defiance based governmental interventions of Spain, the blue and red line show the monthly distribution of casualties and incidents initiated by ETA during the observation period.

Figure 7-30 also indicates that even though the violence perpetrated by ETA showed an increasing trend at the beginning of Spain’s policy interventions, such as the democratic constitution, enacted in 1979, and the start of the process towards membership status in the EU in 1886, the level of violence perpetrated by ETA gradually decreased until 2009. However, in 2010, ETA violence was completely terminated and eventually ETA was forced by the Spanish government to announce a permanent ceasefire and a state of inactivity against civilians and the Spanish state (Conversi, 2002). No subsequent violence by ETA was observed as of December, 2012 (in Figure 30).

**Figure 7-30:** The Distribution of Entire Period of ETA Initiated Violence-The Aggregated Effect of Defiance Based Governmental Policies (between 1975 and 2012)
Descriptive Analysis of the Policy Interventions (1975-1990) by the Spanish Government

As described in chapter VI, three types of defiance based policy interventions implemented by the Spanish government for eliminating ETA violence were selected for examination in this study (Figure 7-31). I described the results of the descriptive analyses conducted to evaluate the level of ETA initiated violence in the pre and post periods of the particular governmental policy at issue. In this section, I also conducted the same analytic procedures as those employed for the Turkish case. Thus, before analyzing each individual governmental policy, I reviewed the important aspects of the particular policy such as the policy, the aim, the targeted population, and the outcome expectancy of the policy on numbers of violent incidents.

Here, I attempted to show each policy intervention at the descriptive level. Therefore, when the intervention was effective, the dummy variable took on the value 1, otherwise it took on the value 0.

Figure 7-31: Policy Interventions implemented by the Spanish Government
In order to provide consistency in the format, I plotted two standard figures for each individual policy intervention initiated by the Spanish government in response to ETA’s attacks of violence over the considered time period. I plotted only violent incidents and casualties initiated by ETA in the first figure using the GTD dataset. The number of operations and the number of captured/apprehended terrorists carried out by the Spanish security forces were also plotted in the second figure in order to analyze whether the ETA initiated violence occurred as a result of the Security forces operations.

**D1: The Spanish Democratic Constitution:**

The new Spanish constitution was ratified by a referendum of the Spanish people on December 7, 1978 after nearly 40 years of the Franco dictatorship. This can said to be the turning point in Spain’s transition to democracy. The democratic constitution of Spain recognizes comprehensive rights including autonomy, cultural, social, and democratic rights as some of the essential rights of every citizen, not only Basques.

**Policy:** In order to improve its record of democracy, the Spanish government enacted the new democratic constitution in 1979.

**Aim:** The main aim of this policy was to improve its democracy record to the level that other European countries had reached. By so doing, Spain also proposed to solve its deep rooted problems such as ethnic grievances. With this new constitution, a number of democratic reforms and legal amendments including judiciary, political, military, identity, human rights, and religious rights were implemented by Spain during the transition period.

**Scope:** This policy intervention (the democratic constitution) was designed to be implemented across the entire country.
Expectancy on the violent incidents: Even though the new constitution of Spain did not directly target terrorists, it was expected that providing those rights and lifting restrictions on the Basque language would result in a reduction of the level of support for ETA as well as in the number of incidents and casualties inflicted by ETA.

In Figure 7-32, the shaded area indicates that the period of the Spanish soft-line policy, the democratic constitution, was in effect. During this period, the Spanish state initiated democratic reforms towards the ethnic grievances of the Basques in accordance with the new constitution. As shown in Figure 7-32, when this policy reached its full effect in 1979, the level of violence initiated by ETA increased significantly. However, the general trend after that demonstrated a decrease in the rate of violent incidents from 1981 to 1985. A sharp decrease in the level of violence after 1989 was also observed.

The casualties’ trend, as plotted in Figure 7-32, shows that the bloodiest years of ETA violence during pre and post intervention period were the years 1979 and 1987. In the pre intervention period, the fluctuations in the level of violence by ETA were very low as observed from 1975 and 1979.
Figure 7-32: Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) Committed by ETA-The Democratic Constitution of Spain

Figure 7-33 indicates the level of action (operation and captured) initiated by the Spanish security forces (military and police) towards ETA during the time period selected in this study. The level of action indicates a different pattern as regards the level of violence inflicted by ETA during the pre-intervention period that extended from 1975 to 1979.

As indicated in Figure 7-33, the annual number of operations was not high (between 0 and 14) when comparing this Spanish case to the Turkish case (between 0 and 90). However, a slight increase was observed during the post intervention period until 1989. Figure 7-33 also demonstrates that there was a sharp decrease in the number of captured/apprehended persons between 1977 and 1979. An increasing trend regarding the level of captured persons by the Spanish security forces was observed between the years 1979-1988.
The level of action shows a similar pattern to the number of violent incidents carried by ETA and that this reached its highest level between the years 1984 and 1985 during the intervention period.

**Figure 7-33:** Level of action (operations and captured) by Spanish Security Forces.

The Democratic Constitution of Spain

![Graph showing level of action by Spanish Security Forces](image)

Considering the impact of this policy on the level of ETA initiated violence, this had an increasing effect, rather than a decreasing effect, over the ten years.

**D2: The Social Insertion Program (1983-1988):**

The Spanish government initiated the social insertion program in order to provide a window of opportunity to the terror militants who accepted the opportunity to lay down their arms on January 1, 1983. This intervention was implemented for five years until 1988.

**Policy:** The Spanish government ensured an amnesty for ETA militants who had never engaged in any kind of violent attack that resulted in casualties. This intervention directly targeted ETA militants.
Aim: The main aim of the Social Insertion Program was to convince ETA militants who repented their terrorist activities, to return to their homes, and provided them with a reintegration process into society.

Scope: This policy was designed for ETA militants who were willing to capitulate and lay down their weapons.

Expectancy on the violent incidents: The Social Insertion Program was expected to result in a sharp reduction of the level of violent incidents initiated by ETA because this policy directly targeted terrorists and was designed to cause disintegration within the terrorist group.

The descriptive analysis of the impact of the Social Insertion Program policy for ETA militants on the level of violence by the ETA militants is plotted in the following Figures 7-34 and 7-35. The shaded line shows the periods when the Social Insertion Program was in effect. The results of this policy demonstrate that it was ineffective in reducing the level of violence inflicted by ETA during the intervention period. Even though a slight decrease on the number casualties was observed in the early period of this intervention, the level of violent incidents showed an increasing trend until the end of 1987. In this intervention period, the deadliest attacks of ETA were observed in 1987.
**Figure 7-34:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) Committed by ETA - The Social Insertion Program

![Graph showing incidents and casualties](image)

Figure 7-35 indicates that the highest number of captured during the whole period selected in this case was observed in 1985 when the PKK violence reached the highest level (see Figure 7-33).

**Figure 7-35:** Level of Action (operations and captured) by the Security Forces - The Social Insertion Program

![Graph showing captured and operations](image)
Considering the specific aim of The Social Insertion Program, this policy intervention did not have any impact on reducing the level of ETA violence overall during the period when this policy was in effect (Figure 7-34). However, it can be said that this intervention increased the volatility of the captured person in that period.

D3: Spain’s membership to the EU:

Joining the European community (later turned into the European Union) on January 1, 1986 can be seen as another important soft-line policy intervention in the history of Spain. With the EU membership, Spain’s transition to becoming a well-established democracy gained acceleration. This was because Spain enacted many social, political, cultural, and economic reforms in the area of human rights, minority rights, social welfare, religious rights, and democratic rights for all its citizens, including Basques, Catalans, and Galicians.

Policy: In order to improve the economic and democratic development of Spain, Spain joined the EU as a member state in 1986. This policy can be accepted as another important intervention by Spain during the transition to becoming a well-established democracy.

Aim: The main aim of this policy was to improve the social and economic welfare of all citizens including the Basques, Catalans, and Galician. The EU membership also helped Spain to improve its democratic system including its judiciary, political, military, human rights, and religious rights systems.

Scope: This policy intervention (democratic reforms) was designed to be implemented across the entire country.

Expectancy on the violent incidents: Even though Spain membership in the EU did not directly target terrorists, it was expected that this process would prevent the nationalist Basques’ support of ETA by meeting the Basque people’s democratic
demands. This general policy was also assumed to result in a reduction of the level of violence initiated by ETA since it was designed to decrease the political tensions among the Basques.

In Figure 7-36, the shaded area demonstrates that the policy intervention period of Spain (D3) was in effect. As shown in Figure 7-36, in the early period when this policy was in force between 1986 and 1989, the level of violence (casualties and incidents) initiated by ETA showed an increasing trend until 1990. After 1990, a sharp decrease was observed in the level of ETA initiated violence.

The casualties’ trend, as plotted in Figure 7-36, shows that the bloodiest year of ETA violence occurred during the intervention period in 1987. Figure 7-36 also demonstrates that there was a normal trend regarding the level of casualties by ETA particularly from 1981 to 1986, in the pre intervention period.

**Figure 7-36:** Level of Violence (incidents and casualties) Committed by ETA-The EU Membership of Spain
Figure 7-36 indicates the level action (operation and captured) initiated by the Spanish security forces (military and police) towards ETA during the time period selected in this study. As shown in Figure 7-37, after a sharp increase in the pre intervention period (particularly between 1981 and 1985), the level of action showed a steady decrease and reached the lowest level in 1990 when Spain completed its transition period.

Even though the number of operations continued during the intervention period, a steady decrease in the number of captured militants after 1988 was observed (Figure 7-37).

**Figure 7-37:** Level of action (operations and captured) by the Spanish Security Forces-The EU Membership of Spain

Considering the expected impact of the EU membership of Spain on the level of violence initiated by ETA, it may have taken longer than anticipated because this policy targeted the social context rather than targeting terrorist group militants (Crenshaw, 1999). From this perspective, the EU membership of Spain seemed to increase the level of violence in the early years of this policy (between 1986 and
1989), as a short run effect. However, it had a decreasing impact on the level of violent incidents by ETA in the long run since this intervention helped to reduce public (sympathizers) support for the terrorist organization.

In summary, in this descriptive analysis section, I examined the distribution of the level of violence initiated by ETA during the time period that particular policy interventions were in force. Since all selected policies in the Spanish case were soft-line/defiance based policies, they targeted the society or grievances that cause ethnic conflict directly. Thus, the expected impact of such policies on the level of violence may have taken longer than expected (Byman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1999), as seen in the Spanish case.

The descriptive analysis and results of this study clearly show that even though ETA increased its violence in the short run against the Spanish state during the particular policy implemented by Spain, in the long run, the level of violence initiated by ETA substantially decreased because of the lack of public support for the terrorists.

Since the aim of all selected soft-line policy interventions was to reduce sympathizers’ support to terrorist organization, ETA, Spain was successful in reducing ETA initiated violence after the 1990s. And in 2011, ETA had to announce a permanent ceasefire against the Spanish state. Today both Basques and Spaniards accept the fact that ETA violence has been terminated.

By conducting the above descriptive analysis, this section aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding regarding the data employed in this study, and information about the effect of the particular soft-line policy initiated by the Spanish government on the level of ETA initiated violence during democratization period. In the next section, I analyze the specific and cumulative impacts of the governmental policies by Spain on the level of ETA-initiated violence by employing the Negative
Binomial and VAR analyses over the selected time period, which represented the democratization period of Spain.

**Estimation Results**

In this section, I employed two quantitative techniques including the Negative Binomial and the VAR model estimations in order to analyze the relationship between the desistance/soft-line based governmental policies of Spain and the level of violence initiated by ETA. For this purpose, as carried out in the Turkish case, I, first, utilized two Negative Binomial models (NB Model 1: Incidents, NB Model 2: Casualties) in order to test the hypotheses of this dissertation, and then I analyzed the findings of the VAR models to evaluate two way relationships between the level of violence initiated by ETA and aggregated governmental policies (D1+D2+D3). To analyze a short term and long term impact of all selected policies on the level of violence (VAR Model 1: Incidents, VAR Model 2: Casualties;) initiated by ETA and vice versa, I also conducted VAR estimations.

**Negative Binomial Model Estimation Results and Findings of Spanish Case**

In this section, as described in the data analysis process, I tested the hypotheses of this study with two models, (Model 1: Incidents, Model 2: Casualties), respectively. In addition to the explanatory variables and the control variables selected in the analysis of negative binomial estimation, seasonal dummies were also included into the model since the descriptive statistic results displayed apparent seasonality.

Table 7-14 shows the results of the *incidents model* (INC) estimated by the Negative Binomial. With respect to these results, incidents were influenced by seasonality because of the fact that 6th month period had a statistically significant
effect on incidents at the 95% confidence level, on average. Following Table (7-14) shows the NB results (Incidents Model) regarding the individual and aggregated impact of soft-line governmental policies of Spain on the level of incidents by the PKK.

In Table 7-14, it was observed that the Variable D1 had a positive and statistically significant effect on incidents at the 99% confidence level. This shows that the Democratic Constitution of Spain had an increasing effect on the number of ETA-initiated incidents rather than a decreasing effect.

Table 7-14 reveals that D2 and D3 had a statistically insignificant effect on the level of incidents during the period when these policies were in effect. However, it showed the aggregated effect of governmental interventions of Spain (D2+D3+D4) on the number of incidents initiated by ETA was positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Considering the cumulative impact of these policies during the transition period, this result clearly indicates that the defiance (soft-line) based governmental interventions implemented by the Spanish state had an increasing effect rather than a decreasing or neutral effect on the level of violent incidents, contrary to the Spanish government’s expectations.
Table 7-14: Negative Binomial Model Results for ETA-initiated Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(6)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D1+D2+D3)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERAT</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-9.96</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-2.25</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Akaike info criterion: 5.081450
Log likelihood: -479.8192
LR statistic: 162.6130
Prob(LR statistic): 0.000000

According to the results of the casualties model (CASUAL) estimated by the Negative Binomial model in Table 7-15, casualties in the 7th month were influenced by seasonality.

From Table 7-15, the variable D1 had a positive and statistically significant effect on casualties at the 95% confidence level. This shows the Democratic Constitution of Spain had a significantly increasing effect on casualties inflicted by ETA. Table 7-15 also reveals that D2 (The Social Insertion Program), and D3 (The EU Membership of Spain) had a statistically significant impact on the level of casualties at the 99% confidence level during the period the policies were in force.

Interestingly, similar to the Turkish case results, even though the NB Incidents Model results of the Spanish case related individual policies D2 and D3 were statistically insignificant, the Casualties Model results indicated that D2 and D3 were statistically significant and had a positive effect on the number of casualties inflicted by ETA at the 99% confidence level. This result may be interpreted that ETA aimed
to employ bloodier attacks in a small number of incidents as a response to these policies, as seen in the PKK case.

In Table 7-15, showing the aggregated effect of governmental policies on the level of violence, the (D2+D3+D4) variable was statistically significant and positive at the 99% confidence level. Table 7-15 indicates that the aggregated impact of defiance / desistance based governmental policies of Spain had an increasing effect rather than a decreasing or neutral effect on casualties inflicted during the democratization period of Spain.

**Table 7-15: Negative Binomial Model Results for ETA-initiated Casualties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>-1.621</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SEAS(7)</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>-1.838</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>1.998</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>3.564</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>2.194</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D1+D2+D3)</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>4.427</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERAT</td>
<td>-0.441</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-10.633</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>4.199</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>-0.669</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>-2.984</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Akaike info criterion: 5,057693
Log likelihood: -477,5386
LR statistic: 166,5633
Prob(LR statistic): 0.000000
VAR Model Estimation Results and Findings

In the previous sections, I employed the Negative Binomial Models under the one-way structure approach to analyze the relationship between selected governmental policies and the level of ETA initiated violence (from interventions to attacks). However, the NB regression technique cannot provide information on two way relationships that may exist between endogenous variables. Therefore, this section examines if two way relationships (if, any) existed between these phenomena.

Specifically, I developed two equations; selected governmental interventions and the level of ETA inflicted violence (incidents and casualties). These equations consisted of the endogenous variables including their lagged values, and some control variables. In this component of the analysis, the number of operations (OPERAT) and the number of captured (CAPTURED) by the security forces, and the French cooperation (FRANCE) were used to control for the relationship between the endogenous variables. Since seasonality had no statistically impact on the level of ETA-inflicted violence in a general manner, I excluded seasonal dummies from both VAR Models.

I therefore employed two VAR models in this section. While the VAR Model-1 analyzed the relationship between the ETA-initiated incidents and defiance/desistance based selected governmental interventions (D1+D2+D3), the VAR Model-2 analyzed the relationships between the ETA initiated casualties and those which were aggregated governmental policies (D1+D2+D3).

Before estimating the parameters of the VAR Model-1, the optimal lag length should be selected to obtain a lagged effect for analyzing the impact of each endogenous variable on the other variables. In this respect, Table 7-16 reveals that the
optimal lag length for VAR Model-1 was one (1) for the endogenous variables according to Likelihood-ratio test.

**Table 7-16: Lag Order Selection Criteria for VAR Model -1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag</th>
<th>LogL</th>
<th>LR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-811.8925</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-472.2763</td>
<td>667.9120*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-470.8639</td>
<td>2.746254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-469.5052</td>
<td>2.61183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-466.6997</td>
<td>5.330291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-466.0905</td>
<td>4.899623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-463.6276</td>
<td>0.858845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-459.4068</td>
<td>7.738136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-458.7592</td>
<td>1.172911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-456.8705</td>
<td>3.378723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-456.3245</td>
<td>0.964521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-456.1097</td>
<td>0.374749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-454.4743</td>
<td>2.816582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)

After estimating the VAR Model-1 with 1 lag, I conducted the Granger Causality Test\(^{21}\) to analyze the causality relationship between the endogenous variables. Table 7-17 which shows the Granger Causality Test results for VAR Model-1, demonstrates the direction of causality is two-way at the 90% confidence level (prob value<0.10). However, apart from the Turkish case, the results from the VAR model-1 in the Spanish case indicate the causality from incidents to interventions is stronger than the causality from interventions to incidents since the confidence level of the first analysis (Prob value =0.0801) is higher than latter (Prob value= 0.0121) as described in Table 7-17.

---

\(^{21}\) Since these results give same interpretation, variance error decomposition results are omitted in this study.
Table 7-17: Granger Causality Test Results for VAR Model-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: INC</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Chi-sq</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2+D3+D4</td>
<td>3.063057</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0801</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: D1+D2+D3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>6.234563</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the next step in the VAR estimates, I performed the autocorrelation test on residuals of the model to show VAR-Model-1 estimates of reliability. In Table 7-18, the probability values demonstrated that the residuals obtained from VAR-1 had no autocorrelations at the 99% confidence level for 2-12th lags. This result indicates the interpretation of the results regarding VAR Model-1 may be meaningful.

Table 7-18: VAR Model-1 Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Adj Q-Stat</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.749539</td>
<td>..*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.331592</td>
<td>0.5039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.456667</td>
<td>0.4883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.53088</td>
<td>0.4841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.39717</td>
<td>0.3012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.86033</td>
<td>0.1392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.18013</td>
<td>0.2525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.50227</td>
<td>0.4381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.81276</td>
<td>0.3800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.67195</td>
<td>0.5317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>35.96848</td>
<td>0.6523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>38.36636</td>
<td>0.7110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order.

Figure 7-38 reveals the VAR results for the VAR Model-1 and describes the relationship between the defiance based governmental policies (D1+D2+D3) initiated by the Spanish government and the ETA initiated violent incidents and vice versa, where I also incorporated the retaliation effect (OPERAT and CAPTURED) and
cooperation effect (FRANCE) into these VAR estimates. In Figure 7-38, the horizontal dashed lines represent the confidence level of these responses. The horizontal solid lines are cumulative responses representing one standard-deviation shock for each endogenous variable. In other words, the figure shows the change in the level of violent incidents after applying one unit of a shock/impulse to the policy intervention variable in order to analyze how those policies affected the level of violent incidents carried out over the 12 month period. According to the right top quadrant of the graphic in Figure 7-38, the cumulative response of the level of violent incidents recorded after applying a one-standard deviation shock to the policy interventions showed this became positive and significant in both the short and long term. This means that ETA showed persistent reactions to interventions implemented by the Spanish Government.

Similarly, the bottom left quadrant of the graphic in Figure 7-38 demonstrates that after applying a one-standard deviation shock to the level of violent incidents the cumulative response of interventions became positive and significant in the long term. But, it may be inferred that ETA’s response level was higher than Government’s response level over the 12 month period.
Similarly to the VAR Model-1 (INC), before estimating the parameters of the VAR Model-2, an optimal lag length was selected to assist in obtaining an estimate of the lagged effect for each endogenous variable relative to the other variables. Thus, I plotted the Lag order selection criteria for the VAR Model-2 in Table 7-19, which indicates that the optimal lag length of the VAR Model-2 was eight months (8) for the endogenous variables.
Table 7-19: Lag Order Selection Criteria for VAR Model-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag</th>
<th>LogL</th>
<th>LR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-913.1214</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-583.0580</td>
<td>649.1247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-578.9956</td>
<td>7.899197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-577.6156</td>
<td>2.652721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-577.0297</td>
<td>1.113072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-576.7756</td>
<td>0.477241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-570.5339</td>
<td>11.58189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-565.7465</td>
<td>8.776869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-559.7728</td>
<td>10.81894*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-556.5118</td>
<td>5.833647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-555.8704</td>
<td>1.133062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-553.4987</td>
<td>4.137349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-548.8753</td>
<td>7.962542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)

As the other procedure utilized in analyzing the VAR estimates, I deployed the Granger Causality Test to examine the causality relationship between selected endogenous variables, namely the governmental policies initiated by the Spanish government and the level of casualties inflicted by ETA. The results from the Granger Causality Test are plotted in Table 7-20. According to these results, the direction of causality between those endogenous variables was bi-directional at the 95% confidence level (prob value<0.05). On the other hand, the causality effect relating the governmental interventions to the level of casualties (Prob<0.01) was stronger than the causality effect observed between the level of ETA initiated casualties and the governmental interventions (Prob<0.05) since the confidence level of the first case was higher than second case\(^{22}\). Therefore, it may be concluded that the violent response of ETA (the level of sensitivity) to the Spanish government`s interventions was stronger than the degree of response of the Spanish government to ETA’s violent attacks (casualties) over the time period observed.

\(^{22}\) Since these results give same interpretation, variance error decomposition results are omitted this study.
Table 7-20: Granger Causality Test Results for VAR Model-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: CASUAL</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Chi-sq</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1+D2+D3</td>
<td>20.67898</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: D2+D3+D4</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Chi-sq</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CASUAL</td>
<td>17.66784</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To depict the VAR Model-2 estimates of reliability, I also performed the autocorrelation test on the residuals of Model-2. In Table 21, the probability values show that the residuals obtained from VAR Model-2 had no autocorrelations at the 99% confidence level for the 9-24th lags. This indicates the interpretation of the results may be meaningful.

Table 7-0-21: VAR Model-2 Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Adj Q-Stat</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.54314</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.36468</td>
<td>0.0999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.29370</td>
<td>0.2258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.69084</td>
<td>0.0965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>24.02616</td>
<td>0.2413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.80201</td>
<td>0.3633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>29.20223</td>
<td>0.4023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>33.79590</td>
<td>0.3808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>37.20497</td>
<td>0.4134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>40.40620</td>
<td>0.4523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>61.40284</td>
<td>0.0423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>64.73476</td>
<td>0.0539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>65.28366</td>
<td>0.1021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>69.48397</td>
<td>0.1064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>70.16607</td>
<td>0.1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>72.88603</td>
<td>0.2089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order.

Figure 7-39 demonstrates the VAR results for VAR Model-2 and indicates the relationship between the defiance based governmental policies enacted by the Spanish government and the level of ETA inflicted casualties and vice versa, where I also
incorporated the operations and captured (OPERAT and CAPTURED) by the Spanish security forces, and the French nation’s cooperation (FRANCE) into this VAR estimate.

In Figure 7-39, the horizontal dashed lines denote the confidence level of the responses (the error band the impulse response function). The horizontal solid lines represent the cumulative responses after applying a one standard-deviation shock to each endogenous variable. Namely, the figure demonstrates the chance in the level of casualties after a one unit shock/impulse was applied to the policy intervention variables to examine how those policies affected the level of casualties over the 36 months period. Figure 7-39 shows that the cumulative response of casualties after one-standard deviation shock was applied to policy interventions became positive and significant (up to 36 months), and its effect were persistent. By the same token, the bottom left graphic in Figure 7-39 shows that cumulative response of interventions after one-standard deviation shock applied to the level of casualties became positive and significant in the short and long term. Additionally, it may be said that the magnitude of response of the casualties was higher than the response of government; this also supported the Granger causality results.
In summary, this section described the VAR Models’ results accompanied by the results obtained from both the negative binomial estimates and the descriptive analysis for both cases in this study. The common point of all the analyses employed in the present study was to examine the correlation between defiance/soft-line based governmental policies and the level of violence initiated by an ethnicity based terrorist group. The VAR and NB model results and descriptive analysis in the Turkish and Spanish cases demonstrated that the soft-line governmental policies implemented by Turkey and Spain were associated with an increase in the level of violence (incidents and casualties) especially in the short run during the democratization period. The following section discusses the findings obtained from these three analyses within the theoretical framework of the study.
Discussion

In this section, I discuss the three analyses and their findings from a counter-terrorism perspective. I compare the findings of the Turkish case with the findings of the Spanish case. For this purpose, I discuss the findings of the descriptive analysis, the negative binomial and VAR estimation analyses, respectively.

Discussion Arising from the Descriptive Analysis

According to the findings of the descriptive analysis of the Turkish and Spanish cases, the data clearly indicated a strong association between the defiance based/soft-line governmental policies and the level of violent incidents initiated by the ethnicity based terrorist organization. In each case, I analyzed the effect of governmental policies on the level violence by examining the situation in both the pre and post intervention period.

Descriptive results in each case showed that the trend in terrorist attacks increased in the short run when the defiance based policies were initiated during the democratization period, in particular. However, in the Spanish case, the results of the descriptive analysis clearly demonstrated that ETA violence ceased in the long run. It was observed that violent incidents by ETA have not occurred since 2010. One may said that since defiance based governmental policies target grievances in the society, public support for terrorist activity declines accordingly in the long run (Crenshaw, 1999).

The descriptive analysis also showed that there was change in the attack strategy of terrorist organizations, the PKK and ETA. Both groups` attack type against civilian and government changed from one of armed assaults to the use of
bombings/explosions. This shows that both groups wanted to carry out more deadly attacks to show they were still powerful actors.

Another common feature of the PKK and ETA was that they mostly targeted civilians rather than the security forces or government during the intervention period. In addition to that, the Turkish and Spanish security forces’ operations did not result in a decrease in the level of violence over the entire period.

Discussion Arising from NB Models

The findings of the NB Models as regards casualties and incidents in both cases, for the Turkish and Spanish cases, demonstrated that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between the defiance based governmental policies and the level of violence initiated by the ethnically motivated terrorist groups. Even though the selected policy interventions in each case were expected to reduce the level of violence (incidents and casualties), the increasing trend of both incidents and casualties as a response to those policies may be interpreted from four perspectives.

First, as discussed in the literature review section of this study, in order to capture the attention of society and seek more support, groups used terror as a tool. Thus, terrorist groups may respond to cultural and social reforms with increasing violence (Crenshaw, 1995). Some terrorist groups, especially ethnically motivated groups, as observed this study, may perceive such policies as a sign of weakness, and a compromise on one of their demands, and may see it as a victory based on their increasing violence (Ünal, 2011). In this sense, it may be said that one of the important reasons for increasing the level of violence by the PKK and ETA during the democratization period of each country was to obtain more concessions from the government.
Second, the democratic initiatives and reforms toward removing ethnic grievances involved defiance and desistance based policy as mentioned in earlier. Therefore, their expected impact on the level violence may take longer than expected since they targeted grievances in the society to reduce their support for terrorist groups rather than targeting the militants. However, with respect to the NB estimation results, from the increasing trend of the level of violent incidents in response to such social policies it may be inferred that the PKK and ETA responded violently to the constitutional and democratic reforms to prevent their probable immediate impact on the Kurdish and Basque community by indicating that they were still powerful actors in solving the ethnic problem. For instance, considering the Democratic Constitution of Spain, it is clear that it provided for expanded autonomy and rights, including democratic, political, cultural, and economic rights, not only for the Basques, but also for other ethnic societies in Spain. Thus, it could be expected that this policy would have a mitigating effect on the level of casualties inflicted by ETA. However, the results showed that ETA did not buy this policy during the democratization period of Spain.

Third, according to Crenshaw’s (1988) organizational approach, the targets of terrorism are symbolically related to the organization’s ideological beliefs. Violence is thus the intentionally adopted choice of the terrorist group and explains the result of the organization’s struggle for survival. The organization’s leader offers many incentives to the followers to guarantee organizational maintenance (Crenshaw, 1988). Therefore, some terrorist groups can obtain more benefits from illegal activities such as drug trafficking, weapon and human smuggling beside terrorism as mostly seen in the PKK case (Laciner, 2008; Radu, 2006; Sahin, 2001; Steinberg, 2008; Ward & Hill, 2002). In addition, terrorist groups enjoy international and
regional support (Martin, 2012), which may make those groups key players in the
country or region. Therefore, with respect to the NB estimation results, one of the
reasons for the increasing level of violence during the intervention period may have
been that the terrorist groups were not willing to lose their gains obtained from their
illegal activities and being seen as a regional actor. Thus it may be said that while the
PKK was enjoying benefits from the illegal transnational organized crime activities
such as drug trafficking, weapon and human smuggling beside terrorism that it was
involved in, ETA was enjoying international support until the mid-1980s.

Lastly, considering the targeted population of the amnesty policies (D2 and D3
in Turkish case, D2 in the Spanish case), the government targeted those militants who
were not involved in any armed battle with the security forces or had not killed any
citizen directly. Therefore, regarding the reasons for failure of these amnesty policies
one may say that since the terrorist groups have a highly hierarchical structure, the
counter strategies taken by the leadership cadre against these policies impaired the
success of these laws. For this reason, while the policy known as the Social Insertion
Program (D2) of Spain had no effect on decreasing the of the level of ETA initiated
violence, the Active Repentance Bill (D3) of Turkey produced an increase of PKK
initiated violence during the period when these policies were in force.

Even though all the reasons mentioned above have attempted to explain why
the ethnicity-based terrorist groups increased their attacks during democratization
period, it should not be ignored that there is no one simple answer to explaining this
process, and each alternative approach should be evaluated simultaneously with the
other.

In addition to that, in the Turkish case, for instance, when we look at the
significance of the “SIZE” variable in Tables 7-4 and 7-5, it is clear the PKK was
easily able to recruit its sympathizers and succeeded in renewing itself despite the increasing number of counter operations by the security forces during the intervention period. Considering the mean \((m=5,145)\) size of the PKK, the PKK can be still accepted as being a very strong and dangerous terrorist organization in the world.

From Tables 7-4 and 7-5, it can be noted that the NB estimation results also demonstrated the national unemployment variable (UNEMP) was not significant in explaining the numbers of casualties/incidents in both cases. This may be interpreted to mean that the PKK and ETA-initiated attacks had no direct relationship with the socio-economic conditions of the country. Even though I embedded the national unemployment variable (UNEMP) into the theoretical models of the Spanish case, I excluded this variable from the practical analysis because it produced irregular results in terms of interpretation. Besides, the result also demonstrated that the national unemployment rate of Spain had no statistically significant impact on the ETA initiated violence rates.

Apart from the common features of both cases, there were some differences in terms of the NB findings. First, in the Turkish case, while the number of operations and captured (OPERAT and CAPTURED) carried by the Turkish security forces had no statistically significant impact on the PKK initiated violence (See Table 7-4 and 7-5), in the Spanish case, the number of operations (OPERAT) carried out by the Spanish security forces had a statistically significant and decreasing effect on the rates of ETA violence at the 99% confidence level. On the other hand, the number of captured (CAPTURED) initiated by Spain was statistically significant, but showed an increasing (positive) effect on the level of ETA-initiated violence during the transition period (See Table 7-19 and 7-20).
Second, considering the overall impact of seasonality in the Spanish case, seasonality had no statistically significant impact on the level of violence (both incidents and casualties) committed by ETA. However, in the Turkish case, seasonality had a significant impact on the rates of PKK violence during the democratization period of Turkey. As seen in Table 7-4 and 7-5, while the rates of PKK violence decreased significantly in the winter season because of geographic and severe weather conditions in the region, the level of violent incidents significantly increased in the summer season.

The NB analysis also found that French cooperation with the Spanish government particularly after 1986 had a statistically significant and negative impact on the level of ETA violence. The result clearly shows that if the neighborhood countries or international community supports a country in the fight against terrorist groups, the terrorist activity will gradually decrease. It may be concluded that one of important reasons why Turkish governments failed in the fight with the PKK is that neighborhood countries’, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, directly supported the PKK militants by providing them with a safe heaven and training camps as mentioned in the earlier chapters.

Discussion Arising from VAR Models

The results of the VAR Model-1 and VAR Model-2 in both cases verified and extended the findings obtained from the NB Model estimates. According to the results of both VAR models, the two way causality relationships between the endogenous variables (INTERVEN↔INC/CAUSAL) were statistically significant (as deduced from the Granger test) and positive (as deduced from the impulse-response analysis). Considering the short term (within one year) effect of the Turkish government’s
policy interventions on both the level of violent incidents and causalities, the PKK increased its attacks immediately after every important intervention implemented by the Turkish government. In the same way, VAR results from the Spanish case showed that ETA increased its deadly attacks against the Spanish government and civilians in particular in response to soft-line policy interventions initiated by Spain in the short run. One may say that one reason for the increasing level of violence initiated by the PKK and ETA was to frustrate the probable positive (expected) impact of these policy interventions (Crenshaw, 1999), not only on the Kurdish and Basque community, but also on their militants during the democratization period of each country.

The VAR findings also indicate that the Turkish government’s policy interventions were ineffective in reducing the level of violence (incidents and casualties carried by the PKK) over time periods of one to three years. However, in the Spanish case there was a consistent relationship between the defiance based governmental policies and the level of ETA initiated violence. When the government initiated a new soft-line policy towards the Basque conflict, ETA attacks increased in the short run for five months and then this reaction transformed to a persistent effect. In addition, when ETA attacks increased, the government implemented a soft-line policy intervention towards the Basque conflict to eliminate public support for the ETA militants.

The impulse-response analysis of both VAR Models demonstrated the frequency of incidents/casualties increased by deviating from its normal level in the case of unexpected policy interventions in the Turkish case. In addition, this increasing effect occurred within 12 months of the implementation of the policy interventions. Therefore, it may be estimated that if the Turkish government currently initiated any form of democratic reform to eliminate ethnic violence, the terrorist
group would increase its attacks within 12 months as a response to this policy intervention.

On the other hand, the Impulse-response analysis of both VAR Models also shows that the Turkish government initiated a policy intervention in the long run (between one and three years), when an unexpected increase in PKK initiated violence occurred. In other words, as a response to the increasing violence by the PKK, the Turkish government implemented a policy intervention lasting between one and three years. One reason for this might be that public opinion and the consultation process played a key role in the policy making process in Turkey. For instance, in 2004, the PKK increased its violence against the Turkish state by disrupting its ceasefire, which began unilaterally in 1999. However, 17 months later, in June 2005, the Turkish government initiated an intervention, termed the ‘Active Repentance Bill’ which was perceived as an amnesty for the PKK militants who decided to decline terrorism. On the other hand, as a response to this policy intervention, the PKK unexpectedly increased its attacks against the Turkish state within one year to thwart its militants from leaving the organization.

In the Spanish case, the Impulse-response analysis of both VAR Models indicates that the responses of both interventions and level of violence (incidents and casualties) to the shocks were effective in both the short and long term.
Chapter VIII: Conclusion

In this dissertation I examined the impact of defiance/soft-line based governmental policies on the rates of terrorist attacks in the cases of the PKK and ETA over time. For this purpose, I tested a series of hypotheses regarding each of the selected policies. To draw conclusions, in this chapter, first I discuss the findings of the analysis by comparing the Turkish and Spanish cases. Then I present the theoretical and policy implications, and recommendations for ethnicity based terrorism.

Findings on Defiance/soft-line Based Governmental Policies

According to the Negative Binomial Models` estimation results in the Turkish and Spanish cases, the study found that the soft-line policies enacted by the government had a significant and positive effect on the level of violence (incidents/casualties) inflicted by the PKK and ETA during the democratization process of each country. This finding was in contrast to the expectations of the Turkish and Spanish governments. The related hypotheses were:

H2: The soft-line governmental policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of incidents and casualties inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.

H3: The soft-line governmental policies implemented by Spain would increase the numbers of incidents and casualties inflicted by ETA during the democratization period in Spain.
Results from the VAR estimates verified the results from the Negative Binomial and Descriptive Analyses in the present study. Based on the VAR models in the Turkish case, an increase in the number of PKK initiated incidents/casualties as a response to these policy interventions occurred in the short run (up to 1 year). Considering the long term effect of the interventions during the period observed when the violent conflict continued, the number of incidents and casualties returned to its normal tendency (trend) after a year of policy interventions. In addition, the VAR models also revealed that the Turkish government was able to initiate policy interventions for periods lasting between one and three years in response to the PKK’s increasing attacks. On the other hand, in the Spanish case, when the government initiated a new soft-line policy towards the Basque conflict, ETA attacks considerably increased in the short run for five months and then this reaction transformed to a persistent effect in the long run during the democratization process of Spain. The related hypothesis is:

H1: If violent ethnic conflict continues during the democratization period of a country, the effect of governmental policies (democratic reforms) on the elimination of the violent incidents is less likely.

Three analysis were used in this study, including a descriptive, and Negative Binomial and VAR estimates, where, both cases indicated that the Democratization/transition period had a statistically significant and increasing effect on the level of violence inflicted by ethnically motivated terrorist groups. Additionally, results from the descriptive analyses in the Spanish case showed that when the country completed its transition to a well-established democracy, the level of violence gradually decreased in the long run because of the fact the countries’ defiance/soft-line based policies prevented public support for the terrorist group. The related hypothesis is:
H4: If democratic reforms continue to accommodate the demands of ethnic community, decreasing violent ethnic conflict in the long run is most likely.

Both the VAR Models and Negative Binomial models` results and also the descriptive analyses clearly demonstrated that seasonality had a significant impact on the PKK attack rates in the Turkish case. Before and during the intervention period, the PKK attack rates considerably decreased in the winter, due to severe weather conditions. However, in the Spanish case, while the descriptive analyses indicated that seasonality had an effect on the trend of the ETA initiated violent incidents, the Negative Binomial and VAR estimates` results did not confirm this finding obtained from the descriptive analysis.

In light of the aforementioned points, the findings obtained in this dissertation from three analyses clearly demonstrate that defiance based governmental policies implemented during the democratization period increased the level of violence carried out by ethnic based terrorist group in the short run, rather than decreasing or neutralizing the terrorism. However, when the country continued its soft-line policies and targeted the ethnic grievances in the society, not the terrorists, and reached the status of a well-established democracy, the level of violence considerably decreased in the long run since public support for the terrorist organizations was eliminated thanks to those governmental policies particularly those directed towards countering ethno-terrorism.

In the following section, I present the theoretical and practical implications for the filed based on the present study` s findings mentioned above.
Theoretical and Practical Implication

In this section, I first briefly discuss the general approaches of counter-terrorism policy and their basic premises in the theoretical context. Then, I briefly touch upon the characteristics of Turkish counter-terrorism policies toward the PKK violence especially during its democratization period. Last, I conclude with policy recommendations with regard to the solution for the Kurdish conflict and reducing of the PKK violence, and ethno-terrorism in general within the context of the findings of this study. Since Spain succeeded in defeating ETA, the discussion with regard to the ETA case is not included within the scope of this section.

The counterterrorism approaches discussed in this dissertation were developed by scholars within the frame of the countries’ perception of threat. Some (i.e., Dugan et al., 2005; Mead, 2005; Netanyahu, 1981) explained that the cause of terrorism is political. In regards to this point, in order to achieve a specific political purpose, terrorism is intentionally selected as political tool. For others (i.e., Byman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1999; Hewitt, 1984; Unal, 2009), the cause of terrorism (especially ethnicity-based terrorism) is perceived as a consequence resulting from grievances regarding “desperations, deprivations, and deficiencies in the social, economic and political context” (Unal, 2009, p. 349). As discussed earlier, in these perceptions of terrorism mentioned above, countries often employ a range of policies from deterrence/hard-line to defiance/soft-line policies in order to deal with violent conflicts.

Countries adopting hard-line counter-terrorism policies however, utilize force to incapacitate terrorists and their supporters/sympathizers (collective punishment) including retaliatory operations, punishing individuals (even non-combatant individuals), imposing heavier sanctions, increasing security measures in the potential
targets or region, and so forth (Mead, 2005; Netanyahu, 1981). Because this approach perceives the cause of terrorism as a political (ideological) cause, this view does not consider the social, cultural, and economic components that lie behind the violence.

On the other hand, countries employing soft-line counterterrorism policies believe that terrorism is a consequence of certain societal grievances. This approach mostly focuses on the reasons for terrorism that lead extremists to fight against civilians or governments. From this point of view, one crucial step to resolving terrorism is to cure the grievances that exist in the social, cultural, economic, and political context. Thus, countries adopting this approach in countering terrorism target overall society regarding the core grievances. Proponents of this approach mostly contend that the repressive policies implemented by governments to punish terrorists or mostly their supporters/sympathizers, not only increases their hatred for the government, but also results in increased grievances in the society as a whole. In addition to that, in this view, the application of repressive policies on ethnic based terrorism (ethno-terrorism) in particular may result in creating mythologies of martyrdom, strengthening group solidarity, increasing public support for the militants, and opportunities to invoke revenge (Byman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1995, 1999; Kim & Yun, 2008; Wilkinson, 2011). Even though repression policies may result in reducing the level of violence in a short run (Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 1993; Landes, 1978), these policies might be counterproductive rather than acting as a deterrent in the long run, especially in the case of ethno-terrorism (Schneckener, 2002).

Considering ethnically motivated terrorism, the application of conventional counterterrorism policies toward the terrorist group may render the conflict more complex because of the nature of the grievances. Thus, it can be said that fighting
with ethnically-based terrorism is harder to quell than politically motivated terrorism because ethnically motivated terrorist groups have an opportunity to extract broader support from the population (Byman, 1998, 2002; Crenshaw, 1999). Therefore, it is not as easy to stop or reduce this form of violence compared to other types of terrorism. Additionally, in the context of ethnically motivated terrorism, it is really difficult to isolate regular civilians or sympathizers from the core violent group (Byman, 1998). Therefore, countries struggling with ethnicity-based terrorism should focus more on its causes and employ soft-line policies to counter the grievances in a social context in order to arrive at a permanent solution. And these governmental policies must target the supporters or sympathizers of the terrorist group rather than focusing solely on incapacitating terrorists (Ünal, 2011). This may prevent any unintended consequences that can arise as a result of these policies.

In this study, I focused solely on defiance/soft-line governmental policies in both Turkish and Spanish cases during the transition periods of each country. The immediate expectation of defiance based policies is a reduction in the level of violence initiated by the terrorist group in the short run, and the termination of this violence in the long run; however, this study found that soft-line governmental policies implemented by Turkish and Spain were associated with an increase in the level of violence (incidents and casualties) especially in the short run during the transition period. The findings of the Spanish case demonstrate that soft-line governmental policy had a significant impact in reducing the level of violent incidents in the long term after completing its transition period. This is because soft-line governmental policies eliminate the support from sympathizers of the terrorist organization since they directly target the grievances in the society. As seen in the Spanish case, even the nationalist Basque population and sympathizers of ETA started
to criticize ETA violence after 1980s when the soft-line governmental policies were initiated by Spain. Therefore, it obvious that even though the Spanish soft-line policies did not have an impact on the level of ETA initiated violence in the short run, they reached the success they desired by terminating ETA violence in the long run. In the Turkish case, to analyze the effectiveness of soft-line policies on the level of PKK violence in the long term, we need to have sufficient data which covers 20 or 30 years after the interventions as seen in the Spanish case. Considering the long term effect of these policies on the level of violence, Turkey should resolutely continue its soft-line policies targeting the grievances of the Kurdish society.

Turkey relied solely on implementing deterrence based policies until 1999. Even though these policies had a short term and mid-term decreasing effect on the levels of PKK initiated violence, overall, they did not have a sustainable impact on the level of violence. These repressive policies targeted the PKK militants directly, rather than focusing on the causes of the conflict that led to the violent opposition. Then, Turkish government initiated the use of a mixed method approach which consisted of deterrence based and soft-line policies. In other words, on one hand, Turkey initiated some social, cultural and democratic reforms toward the ethnic grievances in the society, while the Turkish security forces (military and police) continued their operations against the PKK because armed militants and violence in cities affected the quality of life of people living in the country, and it increased the level of its operations after every deadly and sensational attack carried by the PKK. Recent initiatives of Turkey toward the Kurdish conflict target not only the civilian Kurds (sympathizer of the PKK) but also PKK militants who want to leave terrorism in order to disintegrate the organization.
In fact many scholars (i.e., Ergil, 2000; Eser, 2007; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Laciner & Bal, 2004; Ünal, 2011) contend that there is no conflict and social distance between the Kurds and Turks at the ground level of society. Generally speaking, Kurds and Turks lived peacefully for 500 years, until the PKK provoked the Turkish state’s policies in the region. Thus, the PKK and the Kurdish issue should be uniquely assessed. The PKK is often erroneously evaluated in the West as representing the Kurdish identity. However, as seen in this study, these are two different issues. While the Kurdish issue refers to enhancing the Kurdish people and their minority rights, the PKK states the terrorism is implemented for purposes of `getting back Kurds’ rights’. Therefore, no matter what the terrorist organizations’ motives are about, violent actions that the terrorist organization resort to undermine the democratization process.

According to the present study’s results, transition periods have a significant but unintended impact on the level of violence initiated by ethnically motivated terrorist groups, in the present case, the PKK and ETA. Defiance based governmental policies initiated during this period may increase the rates of violent incidents, rather than having a decreasing or neutralizing effect. However, these soft-line policies targeting grievances directly have resulted in reducing the level of support from the public for the terrorist organization in the long run. By so doing, this process may force the terrorist group to declare a permanent ceasefire and eventually to lay down their arms.

In addition to that, it is clear that ongoing PKK violence has resulted from the deadlocks of Turkey’s repression policies that lead radicals/sympathizers` to provide support to the PKK. The Turkish state’s repression policies that took a long time to diminish, provided an opportunity to the PKK to manipulate the unintended outcomes of these policies. Thus, the Turkish government should immediately adopt new
initiatives in its soft-line based counterterrorism policy context toward the Kurdish society. For this purpose, first, Turkey should implement some constitutional regulations to improve the cultural and political rights for all its citizens and which covers all ethnic identities living in Turkey by highlighting the rights of all ethnicities. Besides this, Turkey should compromise by implementing a new civil and democratic constitution\textsuperscript{23}. A new democratic constitution will provide a remedy for solving Turkey’s problems and lead Turkey to resolve several of its deep rooted grievances, including the Kurdish grievances.

Third, we know that without the support of the political parties that represent the majority of the people in the country, it is extremely difficult to find a sustainable solution to solving grievances. The opposition parties in the Turkish parliament such as the CHP (Republican Public Party), the MHP (Nationalist movement Party) and the BDP (Peace and Democratic Party) which is a pro-Kurdish party have isolated the ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in reaching a rooted solution for addressing the Kurdish problem. Without a comprehensive reconciliation process that ensures the contribution of all political parties, it is difficult to resolve the Kurdish issue as desired. Therefore, the AKP government should find a way of bringing the majority of the opposition parties together in the Turkish Grand Assembly in order to solve the Kurdish issue. By doing so, a favorable environment in the country and between sides may be ensured and will help to solve this long standing problem. This is also an important step for establishing a functional democracy as seen in the case of Spain.

Fourth, findings with regard to the case of the PKK suggest that since the PKK exploits democratic and social reforms such as constitutional and legal amendments,

\textsuperscript{23} The new constitution making process has begun with the participating of all political parties in Turkish Parliament after 2011 election.
the “Kurdish Opening”, the PKK violence has increased in order to eliminate the effectiveness of these reforms regarding Kurdish community. In contrast, the Kurdish people are pleased with those reforms and wants Turkey to take further actions (Dagi, 2010). Therefore, even if PKK violence increases to sabotage the current process, Turkey’s democratization process should not be terminated. As we can see in the Spanish case, despite an increasing number of ETA attacks, the democratization process in Spain continued until the attacks were completely eliminated.

Fifth, in the counter-terrorism context, the prevention of external support for terrorist organizations can be considered as a turning point in terms of fighting particularly against ethno-terrorism (Crenshaw, 1999; Martin, 2012; Netanyahu, 1995; Vigna, 1989). The ETA case also confirmed that it is difficult to combat terrorism without international support. In addition, for some (Netanyahu, 1981, 1995; Vigna, 1989) terrorist violence cannot be curved solely by domestic measures. Being based on the present study`s findings, the cooperation between Spain and France in the realm of intelligence sharing, police operations and judicial matters made ETA’s power much weaker than before. Thus, the Turkish government should ensure the support of the international community such as the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) while setting the agenda against the countries or groups supporting the PKK.

The international community identifies some countries as supportive of terrorist activities. Iran, for example, is a banned country by the UN because of its nuclear activities, and also a country that is on the list of terrorism supporting states in the US. Given that the PKK is highly active in Iran and Syria, and that counter operations are very limited, the international community should be invited to be as active in the Al Qaida case as in the PKK case.
Sixth, it can be noted that security forces have a serious responsibility while they are conducting operations against a terrorist group. Because false arrests and human rights violations increase the hatred against the state in the fight, especially in the case of ethnically motivated terrorist groups (Byman, 1998), the security forces should be extremely sensitive during any operation. Even though those operations and judgment processes seem to be carried out in accordance with the law, they also should be very careful to protect the fundamental rights of the sympathizers and moderate groups. In light of the aforementioned points, the Turkish security forces, especially the police should be very sensitive in the separation between terrorists and sympathizers or moderate groups when carrying out operations against the PKK. Otherwise the PKK may easily manipulate these operations and exploit them against the state in order to ensure the popular empowerment of the Kurds.

Eventually, many ethnic conflicts in the world demonstrate that a resolution for solving these problems may be possible as in the examples of countries such as Spain, the UK, and Belgium which have well-established democracies rather than anti-democratic countries or less functional democracies such as the Sudan, Iraq, India, Georgia, and China. Thus, countries should continue to consolidate their process towards democracy in order to provide a permanent solution for solving their ongoing ethnic conflicts despite the fact that the violent groups may increase their attacks against the state and civilians. While the country is fighting terrorist groups within its territory on one hand, it should not neglect to implement democratic reforms meeting all citizens’ democratic demands, on the other. The states thus may solve their protracted ethnic conflicts in the long run. Therefore, the Turkish state should also continue its democratic reforms regardless of the methods used by the PKK.
Future Research Recommendations

One of the main purposes of this study was to examine the relationship between defiance based governmental policies implemented during the transition period toward democracy and the level of violence carried by ethnically motivated terrorist groups by comparing the cases of Turkey and Spain. This study therefore consisted basically of empirical work. I could not gain access to informants from the terrorist groups; however, if such access is achieved, it would be useful to conduct a study that examines the causal relations between the soft-line counter-terrorism policies and terrorist group attacks by examining the perceptions of the militants. In order to identify the intended and unintended consequences of such policies in the social context, such an analysis would be of immense significance. In other words, qualitative research is needed to better understand how terrorist groups perceive the government’s policies at the individual level.

The present study attempted to identify the impacts of government policies on ethno-terrorism (the level of violence) at the international level by comparing two important cases, the PKK (ongoing) and ETA (eliminated). However, in order to better understand country level differences and similarities in countering ethno-terrorism, more ethnic conflict cases should be examined and compared.

More research concerning terrorist groups’ psychology and perceptions is also indicated to provide another crucial step in the process of identifying the actual effect of the varied deterrent and defiance policies directed towards terrorist groups, particularly those involved in ethno-terrorism. In this regard, group-level research is clearly needed to reveal the impact of various soft-line government policies on the collective psychology of militants over time. To this end, qualitative research, as well as quantitative research is needed.
As well, even though most counter-terrorism policies are implemented in order to decrease the prevailing level of violence directly, the social, political, economic, psychological, and international context underpinning the violence should be carefully examined, together with these policies. Therefore, more case studies, both qualitative and quantitative, are needed to assess the effects of governmental policies on the level terrorism at the local and international levels within the social, political, economic, and psychological context.
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Awards

- The number of occupational awards obtained from Turkish national Izmir Police Department and training department, Ankara, Turkey. (2001-2005-2008-2010)

- Exceptional performance awards in the field of police training obtained from UN in Afghanistan (April 2008)