MUNICIPAL MANAGERS' RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC DEMANDS: CONNECTING ATTITUDBINAL WILLINGNESS, BEHAVIORAL WILLINGNESS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

by

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written under the direction of
Frank Thompson
and approved by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Municipal Managers’ Responsiveness to Public Demands: Connecting Attitudinal Willingness, Behavioral Willingness, Environmental and Organizational Factors

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Public responsiveness, or bureaucratic responsiveness to citizen demands, is central in public administration theories. It has become a key concept regarding the appropriate role of bureaucracy and professional administrators in a democratic political system. In city management, responsiveness to public demands should be particularly addressed given the fact that local professionals have constant and direct contact with local residents.

This dissertation builds on existing studies that identify the determinants of public responsiveness. One significant research gap of existing researches was noticed, that is, few studies have included public administrators’ willingness into the analysis framework. Current studies have identified organizational factors, environmental factors, features of policy clients and problem intensity as predictors of public responsiveness. However, examining public responsiveness without assessing individuals’ willingness would neglect their own interpretation and interaction with the environmental and institutional factors. It is at the individual level that the functioning of environmental and organizational factors is enacted.
This dissertation project focuses municipal managers’ public responsiveness in the formulation of local budgets. The main research questions of this study include: (1) What is the actual level of municipal managers’ public responsiveness? (2) Given the importance of municipal managers’ attitudes, how can we foster their favorable attitude toward public responsiveness? In other words, what are the determinants of their attitudinal willingness to be responsive to public demands? (3) What are the determinants of municipal managers’ public responsiveness? How do municipal managers’ attitudinal and behavioral willingness connect environmental and organizational factors in determining their public responsiveness?

The data in this dissertation was collected from New Jersey and Pennsylvania municipal managers. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) result indicates that the factor with the strongest impact on municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness is successful implementation and practices in other municipalities. It highlights the importance of social learning in acquiring and assimilating social knowledge. In the public responsiveness model, the structural equation modeling (SEM) result confirms that a thorough understanding of the determinants of public responsiveness cannot be separated from examining municipal managers’ attitudinal and behavioral willingness. It further suggests that environmental and organizational factors tend to enhance municipal managers’ public responsiveness (1) through institutional constraints; (2) through enhancing their perceived behavioral control.
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CHAPTER ONE

TOWARD A PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC RESPONSIVENESS

Literally, “responsiveness” means “quick to respond or react appropriately or sympathetically; answering (Webster dictionary).” In the field of public administration, public responsiveness indicates how fast and accurate administrators can spot and track the fluctuation of citizen desires, providing the “needed” services accordingly (Vigoda 2002). However, what exactly does it mean by ensuring public administrators’ actions reflecting the public needs? What are the criteria to measure the level of bureaucratic responsiveness? Does it mean that public administrators should act completely following the stated public preferences? What if an administrator’s own viewpoint is in conflict with that of legislators who serve as the representatives of the people? Or, should administrators arrive at their decisions of what is best for public interest based on their own expertise?

Responsiveness has been extensively examined in political science and business management literatures. The political responsiveness literatures focused on the relationship between public administration and politicians (Schumaker 1975; Chaney and Saltzstein 1998). However, the role of bureaucracy is largely neglected. Moreover, the rationale that elected officials represent public will is open to question (Yang and Pandey 2007). The business literatures investigated responsiveness to customer needs and ever-changing market. However, citizens are fundamentally different from customers in the sense that citizens have inalienable rights that customers do not have. This study seeks to understand responsiveness from the standpoint of public management. Public
administrator theorists have called for a more direct connection between public
administrators and citizens. In this vein, public responsiveness is conceptualized via the
relationship between public administration and the citizens. This study attempts to reveal
the complexity of public responsiveness by examining the relationship between citizen
preferences and professional expertise. Essentially, the notion of public responsiveness
represents understandings on how administrators should seek and safeguard public
interest.

This study is primarily interested in understanding public responsiveness in local
governance. This chapter firstly will discuss three models of public responsiveness,
namely, the citizen-driven model, the expertise-driven model and the pragmatic model.
Comparisons between three models will also be discussed.

Three Models of Public Responsiveness

Current studies have discussed the complexity of the concept of responsiveness
(Saltzstein 1992; Dubninck 2005; Bryer 2007; Yang and Callahan 2007; Yang 2007a;
Rainey 2009; Demir 2011). Three major perspectives emerge: The citizen-driven model,
the expertise-driven model and the pragmatic model of public responsiveness. They
differentiate from each other in terms of: (1) the role that administrators play in pursuing
public responsiveness; (2) the behavioral norms that administrators need to obey in
pursuing public responsiveness; and (3) the goal of public responsiveness. This chapter
will present these three perspectives of conceptualizing public responsiveness.
The Citizen-Driven Model of Public Responsiveness

The first model approaches public responsiveness as a citizen-driven concept, which argues that public administrators should fulfill their democratic responsibilities by faithfully carrying out citizen demands. Rourke (1969, p.3) notes that a responsive system is the one that “promotes a correspondence between the decisions of bureaucrats and the preferences of the community or the office-holders who presume to speak for the public.” Similarly, Verba and Nie (1975, p. 300) argue that responsiveness “refers to a relationship between citizens and government, one in which the citizen articulates certain preferences and/or applies pressure on the government and the government in turn---if it is responsive---attempts to satisfy these preferences.” Fried (1976, p.15) suggests that administrative responsiveness refers to “the congruence between the goals the organization or administrative system pursues and the goals desired by the people to whom the organization is responsible and under whose authority it operates.” A further definition is offered by Schumaker (1975, p. 494). He conceptualizes responsiveness as “the relationship between the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest group and the corresponding actions of the political system which is the target of the protest-group demands.”

The citizen-driven model of public responsiveness highlights administrators’ role as a subordinate to citizens and their legal representatives---elected officials (Wheeland 2000). Therefore, the behavioral norms and standards for administrators is that their decisions should be in conformity with the directives of their political superiors (Rourke 1969). The basic principles of representative democracy assign elected officials the legal
role to embody the public will and a superior position as opposed to administrators. In this sense, administrators should meet the expectations of the public through echoing the voices of political superiors. Given this “citizens get what they want” perspective, the level of congruence between bureaucratic actions and public opinions as indicated in political directives shows the level of bureaucratic responsiveness. Only the outcome that citizen demands cause, at least in part, changes in policy outputs could be considered as responsive (Schumaker and Loomis 1979).

In practice, however, administrators rarely act as instructed delegates. They make professional and independent judgment on behalf of citizens; they also have latitude in carrying out legislation (Svara 1990; Frederickson 1991). While democratic accountability is a crucial underpinning, public responsiveness does not simply mean administrators’ complete acceptance of public wishes (Yang and Pandey 2007). It is often impossible to satisfy all citizen demands. Service demands made by various citizen groups may conflict with each other. A single reliance on preferences voiced by citizens and their representatives may merely reflect scattered, unrepresentative, or short-term interest (Sharp 1981; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Frederickson 1991; Manring 1994). Administrators’ interaction with the public may be predominated by active individuals or active citizen groups. Administrators’ perception of citizen demands might be dominated by “officials, representatives of special-interest groups, and others with an obvious economic stake in the relevant project (Williamson and Fung 2004).”

The taste of individual preferences is also subject to constant change due to contextual reasons (Nalbandian 1991). In a given point of time, community residents
might place priority on the honesty and trustfulness of administrators, rather than on efficiency and social equity; they are likely to view administrators who share their current priorities as responsive. However, from a value trade-offs perspective, administrators should be very cautious in setting the community’s priorities. Over-emphasis on one value while neglecting others might jeopardize the city management as a whole. Moreover, with the advancement of a network governance era, governments are no longer the only provider of public services. Citizens, non-profit organizations, associations and business sectors share a co-production process with officials in delivering integrated services. In other words, today’s governance process involves many different groups and organizations in addition to government (Whitaker 1980; Provan and Milward 2001; Agranoff 2005 & 2007). Therefore, a complete correspondence between public administrators’ action and citizen preferences may not be an effective way to measure public responsiveness (Yang and Pandey 2007).

The Expertise-Driven Model of Public Responsiveness

The expertise-driven model believes that public responsiveness to citizen demands cannot be defined just as a match between explicitly stated demands and actual policy actions; it is more than seeking congruence per se (Sharp 1981). This model addresses the significance of professional expertise in identifying and pursuing social desirable ends (Bellah et al. 1991; Yang 2007 a). It is assumed that professional administrators know what is the best for the community; public responsiveness will be realized as long as administrators’ decision-making is guided by professional expertise (Stivers 1994), even though the result may not exactly mirror what citizens want.
(Schumaker and Loomis 1979). In other words, the expertise-driven model of public responsiveness focuses on harnessing professional expertise to advance interest of the public as a whole.

The assumption of the expertise-driven model of public responsiveness is that citizen opinions may just reflect private interests. They are unrealistic, impractical, ambiguous and devoid of meaning (Bozeman 2007). Even worse, “behavioralism” has criticized discussions on identifying public interest as “metaphysical and unscientific.” Simon, Simthburg, and Thompson (1950, p.551) concluded that “[R]esponsiveness to public interest, so defined, is responsiveness to one’s own values and attitudes toward social problems.” Meanwhile, this model believes in public administrators’ ability to identify situations in which the citizens and/or their legitimate representatives have failed to understand the public interest correctly (Box 1992). With no requirement on a simple congruence between citizen demand and bureaucratic action, the achievement of public responsiveness relies on administrators deploying the scientific standards of public administration profession (Kearney and Sinha 1988). Professional responsibility encourages administrators to listen to citizen demands, examine non-manifest demands, and learn from citizens (Mintzberg 1979), but more importantly, they reserve the flexibility to exercise expertise to guide action and mold citizen preferences when necessary. Such actions, as suggested by Box (1992, p.327), include “advocacy of a new policy direction in dealing with the council; taking a strong and inflexible stand on an issue, contrary to the expressed wishes of the council; using the normative view to shape daily decision; using the normative view to shape research documents and projects which will result in policy or procedure recommendations to the council; and working with
community groups to assist them in organizing and articulating their views.” Essentially, what they are supposed to respond to is the professional assessment that reflects holistic and long-term interest. They bear a responsibility to educate citizens, helping citizens articulate their preferences that are not manifest, understand broader interests other than one’s own and understand the complexities of the decision-making process. As Landy (1993, p.25) asserts, administrators “have the prime responsibility for teasing out the essential social and ethical issues at stake from the welter of scientific data and legal formalisms in which those issues are enveloped.”

The expertise-driven understanding of responsiveness does not require that administrators carry out their jobs merely on the basis of all citizens’ demand (Sharp 1981). It recognizes that public administrators may hold the reasonable position when conflicts occur between administrators and citizens. Then, administrators need not always obey citizen wishes if the discrepancy could be justified (Pitkin 1967). Public responsiveness could be achieved no matter if it is a result of citizen preferences coming into line with existing policy, or policy being reactive to citizen preferences (Shaffer and Weber 1974), as long as public administrators’ attempts to define and realize the public interest are done in a professional fashion. In other words, the expertise-driven perspective believes that professional expertise holds the key to achieve public responsiveness, even though responses may be independent of, or even contrary to, original citizen preferences (Schumaker and Loomis 1979).

A principle in this expertise-driven understanding of responsiveness is that public administrators act as experts in guiding citizens to make the most feasible decisions. The
ultimate role of administrators, they assume, is to respond to an “objective” measure of the need that comes from, but more than, an aggregation of citizen wishes (Schumaker and Loomis 1979). While the expertise-driven understanding of responsiveness does not emphasize a congruent outcome between citizen demands and bureaucratic action, an assertion like this may encourage administrators to overplay their professional judgment and put public interest at risk (Sharp 1981). Bureaucrats have been under the consistent allegations of being “cold” to seek and respond to general public’s interest and demands (Mosher 1982; Hummel 1987). Bureaucratic professional standards and norms are also questioned as being neutral and disinterested (Rourke 1992). The elitist and protectionist aspect of professionalism (Fox and Cochran 1990) has been highlighted to illustrate that administrators’ professional judgment may be bounded by one’s experience, socialization, and expertise (bounded rationality). Thus, over-emphasis of professional expertise and discounting citizen demands may just reflect administrators’ own notion of what is right for the public (Kearney and Sinha 1988).

**The Pragmatic Model of Public Responsiveness**

The citizen-driven model views public responsiveness as the maximization of citizen demands; whereas the expertise-driven model holds that public responsiveness is served when professional expertise has been employed to arrive at administrative decisions. However, the former is too idealistic and the latter one is insufficiently attentive to citizen preferences. As we consider the advantages and disadvantages of both models, it may not be a matter of choosing between one extreme and another. The third perspective adopts a pragmatic approach to ease the tension between public will and
professional expertise. It is “pragmatic” in the sense that while it acknowledges the significance of both citizen demands and professional expertise, it modifies the ideal promised by the citizen-driven model; at the same time, it is a process-based approach which enables a practical way to realize public responsiveness. As discussed earlier, excessive emphasis on a simple congruence may jeopardize the quest of holistic public interest, whereas excessive emphasis on professional expertise may end up being a symbolic or token response to citizen demands without actually solving problems (Sharp 1981). In the pragmatic model of public responsiveness, the conflict between professional expertise and citizen demand could be reconciled through a deliberative and learning process between public administrators and citizens. The pragmatic model shifts the focus away from identification of substantive “ends” to identification of procedures that will facilitate formulating desirable “ends”.

Firstly, rather than being subordinates and professionals, the pragmatic understanding emphasizes public administrators’ role as spokespersons for the community (Nalbandian 1990 & 1999; Demir 2011). Since public administrators are increasingly involved in all dimensions of governance process (Svara 1998), they are no longer just agents who act according to political directives, or professionals dominated by scientific knowledge. Administrators are also expected to be directly responsible to the citizens in the community. As Nalbandian (1999, p.188) noted, city management had transformed itself “from political neutrality and formal accountability to political sensitivity and responsiveness to community values themselves.”
Given the multiple roles that public administrators are performing (Wheeland 2000), they have to attend to multiple legitimate concerns in the pursuit of public interest. For instance, Bryer (2007) identifies six variants of administrative responsiveness in contemporary democracy: Dictated responsiveness to elected officials, constrained responsiveness to bureaucratic rules and norms, purposive responsiveness to professional goals, entrepreneurial responsiveness to customers of government, deliberative responsiveness to the public as partners or collaborators with administrators, and negotiated responsiveness to balancing potentially competing demands. Through a values perspective, Nalbandian (1991) argues that the value base of contemporary professionalism in local government include efficiency, representation, social equity, and individual rights. More specifically, Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) noted that public administrators should be held accountable to a constellation of competing values and norms, including the public interest; statutory and constitutional law; other agencies; other levels of government; the media; professional standards; community values and standards; situational factors; demographic norms and citizens. Thus, public administrators need to strike a balance among potentially competing demands.

Second, the pragmatic model argues that seeking public responsiveness should rest with a citizen participation process characterized by open communication, discussion, inquiry and deliberation. As Nalbandian (1999) argues, “[I]n the future the legitimacy of professional administrators in local government will be grounded in the tasks of community building and enabling democracy----in getting things done collectively, while building a sense of inclusion.” Discussion, dialogue and deliberation could transform raw opinions of both parties into reasonable decisions (Sharp1981; Hall 2002; Rowe and
Frewer 2005). Stivers (1994) suggested that public responsiveness begins with a dialogue guided by skillful listening. Skillful listening calls for administrators to regard themselves as listeners of the citizen voice during the pursuit of public interest. Skillful listening is not merely a conduct of listening as it requires administrators to be humble and seek diverse viewpoints, avoiding the everyday form of listening in which “we tend to listen in an ego-driven way, shaping what comes to us so that it fits our existing ideas, channeling it according to our desires and needs” (Levin 1989).

“[D]ialogue marked by skilled listening creates a shared reality, a public or common space that promotes responsiveness and a sense of mutual obligation or commitment.”(Stivers 1994, 366) “Listening…helps administrators glean important information, define situation more carefully, hear neglected aspects and interests, and facilitate just and prudent action in often turbulent environment. Listening offers the possibility for a real “reinvention” of agency policy ad management process.” (Stivers 1994, p. 368)

Open communication and democratic discussion with citizens enable administrators to access the under-represented and voiceless, and understand the context and reasoning of citizen’s demands. In deed, the extent to which authorities are willing to hear citizen voices---for instance, whether organizational procedures exist to reach out proactively to citizens or appropriately deal with citizen complaints---indicates the accessibility of policy makers to citizens (Schumaker 1975; Sharp 1981).

In fact, public deliberation has been widely identified as critical for achieving public responsiveness (Roberts 1997; Delli Carpini et. al 2004; Cooper et.al 2006;
Williamson and Fung 2004). The wicked problems facing today’s government require that government policies and programs meet public needs through a collaborative process (Churchman 1967; Rittel and Webber 1973; O’Toole 1997; van Bueren et al. 2003; Weber and Khademian 2008). Public deliberation is defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants (Chambers 2003, p.309).” Typical activities in deliberation, as identified by Gastil (2000, p.22), include “a careful examination of a problem or issue, the identification of possible solutions, the establishment or reaffirmation of evaluative criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal solution.” It is a talk-centric theory in which people with different backgrounds come together to discuss, debate and deliberate shared concerns and possible solutions (Chambers 2003; Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 2006). Such exchanges entail all affected to articulate their own positions, understand the views of others and reach reasonable policy and possibly consensus.

Through discussion, deliberation and collaboration with citizens, public administrators will recognize the value of negotiation, participation, compromise and innovation and free flow of information (Vigoda 2002). They will be willing to share their knowledge and skills with citizens, which are necessary for a meaningful citizen dialogue (Box 1998). Public administrators will gradually realize that the public is not merely a passive public service consumer but also actively taking social initiatives; they will also realize that a greater role of the public in administrative decision and activities is not threatening but beneficial to organizational mission and the society as a whole, since
the informed public could better understand the policy issues. Then, administrators will function as “facilitators, educators, and coparticipants, rather than deference-demanding experts or independently responsible decision makers (Adamas at al., 1990, p.235-236).” For example, Ho (2006) finds that citizen’s involvement in the process of developing performance measures increases an official’s perceived usability of performance data by enhancing the political relevancy and credibility of performance measurements.

For citizens, democratic deliberation also has educative potentials through which they could broaden their views to take in the larger public good (Deway 1927). The expertise-driven model has criticized the individual preferences for being self-centered, short-termed and scattered as a rational standard for public policy. Open public deliberation and discussion is a process enabling participants to listen to the views of others, to think alternative views and to conceive their own view in a way which takes account of the reasoning of administrators and the interest of others (Festenstein 1997). The pragmatic model believes that dialogue, discussion and public deliberation will sharpen individual intellectual and cognitive skills necessary for arriving at a joint-solution. In public discussions, individually held preferences or private interest could be challenged, reconsidered, and even transformed. Thus, the possible tension between individual preferences and professional expertise could be released. As Bozeman (2007, p.110) observed, “deliberation within the method of democratic social inquiry can promote the discovery of new courses of action and reveal underlying shared interested that may not be immediately obvious in light of the previously stated proposals and positions.”
Unlike a simple aggregation of competing interests in the individualist liberal understanding of democracy (Chambers 2003, Bozeman 2007), public deliberation strengthens democratic accountability by facilitating the reciprocal linkages between citizens and administrators, by generating pressure on administrators to justify their actions (Williamson and Fung 2004), by enabling administrators to recognize the civic value, or by nurturing citizens’ ability to consider broader, even opposite, views. In this process, administrators learn more about citizens and citizens learn more about administrators and local governance.

Thirdly, the pragmatic model of public responsiveness also addresses the importance of getting intended problems accomplished. As discussed earlier, it recognizes that the problem solutions are no longer achieved by simply imposing the individually held preferences or administrators’ expertise. Administrators need to balance multiple, potentially competing demands in deliberative and cooperative settings, making it possible for a shared solution (Cooper et al. 2006; Bryer 2009). The pragmatic model also acknowledges the importance of using common interest as a guidepost rather than just a concern in arriving at such problem solutions (Bozeman 2007). Public interest constitutes the ultimate ethical goal of political relationships (Cassinelli 1958). Even though the designated “response” to a given policy question cannot be known prior to public discussion in the pragmatic model, the pursuit of the “response” should always be conducted in a public spirit. Of course, common interest does not and cannot mean the interest of all members. A proposed solution that benefits most citizens but is against the interest of some will still be considered in the net common interest (Barry 1967). In sum, Denhardt and Denhardt (2007, p.84) best defined this notion of responsiveness as
following: “[W]hereas traditionally government has responded to needs by saying, “yes, we can provide that service” or “no, we can’t” …public administrators should respond to the requests of citizens not just by saying yes or no, but by saying such things as “Let’s work together to figure out what we’re going to do, then make it happen.”

**Figure 1 The Directions of Three Models on Public Responsiveness**

In sum, three models on public responsiveness shows that it is a complex concept due to controversies on questions like: “How should public interest be defined,” and “what is the best way to achieve public interest,” etc. Figure 1 presents the directions of three models on public responsiveness. The citizen-driven perspective emphasizes that the action of public administrators completely matches the citizen demands, whereas the expertise-driven perspective emphasizes advancing public interest under the guidance of professional expertise. Unlike the previous unidirectional categories, the pragmatic perspective is a reciprocal responsiveness in which administrators form a partnership with the citizens and in which an active, involved citizenry supports effective governance.
(Denhardt 2008). It is neither a simple match between administrative decision and individually held preferences, nor administrators’ technical judgment for what is best for the public as a whole. It recognizes that there is no pre-determined response. Rather, the response should be pursued in the “cooperative and deliberative process of experimental social inquiry (Bozeman 2007, p.110)”. In sum, the pragmatic understanding, which this dissertation encourages, outlines the achievement of public responsiveness in a democratic fashion featured by openness, public dialogue and deliberation. Table 1 summarizes the comparisons between three models of public responsiveness.

### Table 1. Comparison of Three Models of Public Responsiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>The Role of Administrators</th>
<th>The Behavioral Norm</th>
<th>The Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Citizen-Driven Model</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>Follow citizen demands and political directives</td>
<td>A congruence between citizens’ stated preferences and bureaucratic behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Expertise-Driven Model</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Professional expertise</td>
<td>The “objective” measure of citizen wishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pragmatic Model</td>
<td>Community spokesperson</td>
<td>Openness and public deliberation</td>
<td>“Discover” public interest through public discussion and deliberation; Balance competing demands under the guidance of public interest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Study Overview

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two will discuss firstly the determinants of public responsiveness suggested by existing researches. A
research gap----few studies have assessed the role of public administrators’ willingness to be responsive----will be identified. This research limitation is particularly relevant when it comes to this dissertation’s theoretical sample----municipal manager or chief administrative officer (CAO) in local government. Research questions of this study will also be presented at the end of this chapter. The third chapter introduces the research design, the development of survey instrument, the sampling approach, the data collection process and the preliminary survey results from New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 2011. Chapter Four empirically examines the determinants of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive, given the importance of their responsiveness-related attitude. In this study, attitudinal willingness is defined as the normative foundation of individual’s willingness to enact a given behavior. Chapter Five will introduce another dimension of municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive----behavioral willingness which reflects their utilitarian concerns in performing public responsiveness. The main purpose of this chapter is to propose a comprehensive theoretical model of municipal managers’ public responsiveness by connecting environmental factors, institutional factors, their attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness to be responsive. The final chapter (Chapter Six) summarizes the major findings of the entire dissertation and the theoretical contributions, followed by a discussion of the research limitations.
CHAPTER TWO

WHERE THIS STUDY FITS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the research gap in current studies of public responsiveness and illustrate the research questions of this dissertation. The potential theoretical contribution is two-fold: Firstly, this dissertation is interested in examining the public responsiveness of one specific group of administrators----municipal manager, or municipal chief administrative officer, who has substantial impact over the process and outcome of municipal service delivery (Mladenka and Hill 1977; Greene 1982; Folz and Abdelrazek 2009). Existing studies on public responsiveness have primarily focused on administrators who work in single-function agencies, such as state agency administrators (Yang and Pandey 2007), front-line administrators (Mladenka 1977; Vedlitz and Dyer 1984; Weissert 1994; Alkadry 2003), or specific groups of municipal administrators, such as police chiefs, public works directors and welfare directors (Greene 1982). We still have little knowledge about the actual level of municipal managers’ public responsiveness.

Secondly, this dissertation is also interested in examining the determinants of municipal managers’ public responsiveness. Out of current studies, several determinants of public responsiveness have been identified. Some studies isolate the indices from an organizational study perspective, such internal environmental factors including organizational rules, organizational structure and administrative processes (Mladenka 1981; Vedlitz and Dyer 1984; Manring 1994; Alkadry 2003; Yang and Pandey 2007); others focus on external environmental factors, such as political control over bureaucracy
(Bella 1998; Chaney and Saltzstein 1998; Whitford 2002); the attributes and characteristics of policy clients (Jones et al. 1977; Antunes and Plumlee 1977; Getter and Schumaker 1978; Mladenka 1981) and problem intensity (Mladenka 1981). A research gap may exist in that extant theoretical frameworks may not be able to be applied for municipal managers. Municipal managers are the highest-level bureaucrats in local communities. This dissertation argues that when studying the municipal manager’s responsiveness to public demands, it should incorporate municipal manager’s own evaluation and willingness toward being responsive. Their willingness and subjective perception will channel the functioning of environmental and organizational antecedents.

**Existing Theoretical Framework of Public Responsiveness**

This section will summarize previous studies on the determinants of public responsiveness, including organizational factors, political control, policy clients’ attributes and characteristics, and problem severity.

**Organizational Factors**

Organizational factors are the most-widely discussed in responsiveness literatures (Alkadry 2003). Specifically, organizational structures and rules have the potential to impact administrators’ responsive behavior. This line of consideration is embedded in Rational Choice Institutionalism, according to which behavior could be deduced or predicted by discovering structural design and administrative procedures (McCubbins et al. 1989; Moe 1991; Potoski 1999).
Yang and Pandey (2007) offered an empirical observation showing how the degree of organizational centralization impact state-level health and human service agencies’ ability to respond to citizen demand. They reported that administrators are less likely to respond to changes of environment and citizen preferences if power and authority highly concentrate at the public agencies’ higher level. Similarly, Alkadry (2003) reported that easing Weberian model of control and hierarchy in bureaucracy will increase front-line administrators’ ability to respond to citizen demands. In other words, a structural design featuring the empowerment of front-line employees will increase their responsiveness to citizen demands.

The design of administrative procedures is also important for administrators’ responsive behavior. Manring (1994) suggested that workload and the reward structure need to be altered to recognize and encourage the time and negotiation efforts devoted to responsive management. Jones et al. (1977) pointed out the bureaucracy developed certain operational procedures to determine its response to citizen contacting, such as if the need of the receiving public is intense enough. Vedlitz and Dyer (1984) found out that one such criterion would be the amount of service request from a particular area. The city of Dallas is less likely to respond positively to those services that are in great demand. However, these processing procedures are important not mainly because they might constrain and delay bureaucratic response, as one might think (Yang and Pandey 2007). On the contrary, necessary procedures---such as “white tapes”---may be conducive to public demands on fairness, equity and transparency (Bozeman 1993; Frederickson 1997).
What is more important is whether these operational rules open avenues for public inputs, in other words, if the public’s satisfaction is taken into consideration when developing the responding criteria. For example, in his study on bureaucratic response to citizen contacting in Chicago and Houston, Mladenka (1981) observed that municipal bureaucracies prefer to work in a predictable fashion to decide the appropriate response to citizen demand. Organizational rules became the primary mechanism that the bureaucracy deploys to simplify and routinize its response to citizen complains. A possible result is that such demands cannot receive favorable response because they are processed in overwhelmingly standard and technical-embedded procedures.

Political Control

In the fragmented American political system, elected executives and legislators are presumed to be the legitimate representatives of public interest; they assume the legal responsibility to represent the wishes of the public. Elected officials, acting as the trustees of electors, are believed to be in a better position to discern and pursue the true interest of all citizens (Held 1996, p.92). Loveridge (1971) observed that major community demands, interests, and values are translated by the city council into policy agenda. Bureaucrats, however, are suspected of being biased in their policy making and implementation. Rourke (1992) discussed the long tradition of U.S. Presidents and Congress’ reluctance to accept that executive bureaucrats have neutral competence. For legislators as well as elected executives, responsiveness rather than neutral competence is the primary concern in the operation of a democratic bureaucracy. In this sense, how to reconcile bureaucracy
with democratic governance becomes a persistent topic since the very beginning of the field of public administration.

Harris (1964) concludes that there are two approaches to political control over bureaucracy: ex ante administrative procedures and ex post oversight. Typical ex post oversight actions include efforts to monitor, reward or sanction, such as reducing public agency’s budget (Balla 1998). Hearing held by legislators is also a form of political control when policies have been in effect (Bryer 2007). The purpose of ex ante control is to ensure that administrators obey and enforce the legislative decision, rules and regulations permitted by political officials (Finer 1941). First of all, legislators can use administrative process to enhance public responsiveness. According to the “deck-stacking” thesis, administrative procedures enfranchising legislator-favored constituencies could increase the likelihood of legislators’ preferences injecting into agency policies, providing protections against policy shift (McCubbins et al. 1989; Balla 1998). In addition, elected officials attempt to control bureaucracy through direct orders. Chaney and Saltzstein (1998) found that directive orders in the form of mandatory arrest laws, particularly city laws, are strongly linked with municipal police officers’ use of arrest as a response to domestic violence.

Political control over bureaucracy can also be understood through how much resource that bureaucracy can get from political superiors. Responding to the public opinions requires additional resources, such as financial and human resources. Legislators have the power to increase, decrease or maintain the level of resources that bureaucracy requests, which send out signals of legislators’ preferences (Wolf 1993; Yang 2008).
However, the limitation of political control has also been widely discussed. As we have mentioned earlier, the prerequisite of improving public responsiveness through democratic control, or political responsiveness, is that elected officials can actually represent public interest. In fact, poor representation could occur in representative democracy when voters can only express their preference through periodic elections.

Box (1998) summarized three reasons of the failure of representation:

- Elite group control of the public policy process. Within communities, individuals and groups compete to gain control over scarce resources through their impact on local governments. In an environment of competition and conflict, political and economic elites tend to dominate the local public policy process. Therefore, political principals may primarily represent the people of higher socioeconomic status.

- The loop democracy model. The majoritarian model of democracy assumes that the people are aware of their needs, they will choose a representative that best matches their preferences out of competing candidates; the job security of elected representatives will be determined by representatives reflecting people’s choices (Miller and Fox 2007). However, the prerequisite of representation that people have articulated and unified interests has always been questioned in realities. Miller and Fox (2007) observed that local elected officials are rarely facing competition on specific policy initiatives. The individuals who win city council elections are those who have close connection with existing interests. Demands
and needs cannot flow directly from citizens to elected officials through legislative representation.

- Individual knowledge. Compared to professional administrators, elected representatives generally do not have time and expertise to evaluate and supervise the operation of public programs. Because of this individual knowledge limit, the linkage between citizen preferences and the decisions of elected representatives could be broken.

At the local government level, Mladenka (1981) noticed that not all legislators are sensitive to citizen grievance. Some municipal council members who are in full-time positions, with staff support and representing constituencies geographically have more incentive to identify citizen demands than those who are elected at-large, in part-time position, and without secretarial support. Finally, like administrators, elected officials could simply act according to their own conception of correct public policy rather than their constituency’s attitudes. For example, Jones (1973) confirms that there is very little connection between political action of representatives and the policy attitudes of their constituency, even though representatives are under the pressure of electoral competitiveness. Representatives’ own attitudes are consistently the most important set of factors influencing their voting behavior. Individuals or citizens could not be effectively represented solely by those they elect. As Frederickson (1991, p. 404) put it, legislative representation is necessary, but it is far from being sufficient.
Policy Clients’ Attributes and Characteristics

Even when organizational rules do exist for evaluation and making appropriate response, there is still much flexibility in administrators’ application of the rules. Such leeway of bureaucratic response could be partially reflected in the fact that administrators determine their response based on the nature of policy clients.

Various client groups pose different level of political capital to influence policymakers (Booth and Richard 1998). Citizens or citizen groups with higher level of influence receive higher level of public responsiveness. Such influence could stem from citizens’ interest and knowledge related to public affairs. Verba and Nie (1972) found that people with higher socioeconomic status participate more in community affairs and accordingly community leaders are more responsive to them. Rosener (1982) reported that the presence or absence of citizen opposition impacted the California Coastal Commission’s decision on development permits. When there was opposition from environmentalists, commissioners tend to deny the permits, independent of commission staff recommendations.

Additionally, interested and knowledgeable citizens are more likely to participate in a collaborative governance process (Verba and Nie 1972). Collaboration, indeed, will make administrators face citizens’ demands and establish a long-term partnership in setting policy agenda, making policy and developing a shared understanding (Kathi and Cooper 2005). For instance, a survey conducted in North Carolina municipalities confirmed that about 43 percent of city managers cited citizen interest as an important motivator for their extra efforts to involve citizens in local budgetary process (Berner
The display of low interest would send a signal to administrators that the public is generally satisfactory with government performance, which will stimulate discount of citizen demand in policy-making.

Notably, this discrete level of interest in public affairs may be closely related to clients’ socioeconomic attributes, such as occupation, income and education (Verba and Nie 1972). For example, Jones et al. (1977) observed that individual contacts from upscale neighborhoods in Detroit receive quicker response than those from lower-income neighborhoods. Public response to citizen demands would be unequal, with higher income and white-majority neighborhoods receiving more and better services.

Task Difficulty

Public responsiveness may depend on the content of the requested service. Unlike Jones et al. (1977), Mladenka (1981), Levy et al. (1974) and Lineberry (1977) found no evidence for unequal distribution of public response on the basis of income and racial composition in the cities of Chicago, Houston, Oakland and San Antonio. Rather, Mladenka (1981) found that responsiveness is a function of the severity of the problem in the citizen complaint. Severe complaints, such as street conditions, sewer and traffic, require considerable resource to respond adequately. Therefore, such type of demands often receives a low level of favorable responsiveness. Similarly, Fossett and Thompson (2006) noticed the relationship between problem intensity and administrative responsiveness to disadvantaged children. Since the establishment of client-friendly Medicaid and the enrollment process of State Children’s Health Insurance Program need
additional fiscal and political investment, States with a high percentage of uninsured children are less likely to prioritize such enrollment.

**Limitations in Previous Studies: Where This Study Fits**

As indicated by earlier discussion, existing literature has primarily focused on public administrators who work in single-function agencies. Few have provided empirical evidences on municipal managers’ public responsiveness. Moreover, current literature has discussed how to improve public responsiveness by examining public organizations’ external environment, organization’s internal structure, rules, processes and regulations. Few studies, nevertheless, have provided systematic empirical evidence to support the linkage between these factors and the level of public responsiveness (see, however, Yang and Pandey 2007). Finally, the existing framework may have over-simplified the impact of environmental and organizational factors on public responsiveness. Environmental and organizational factors are often beyond the direct control of public administrators, however, their functioning is still impacted by the administrator’s own interpretation and judgment. For example, Kaufman (1981) found that political control could be minimized by administrators who are skillful in coping with the political complexities and shaping policy priorities. Also, Alkadry (2003) noticed that “the removal of structural constraints would not by itself enhance the responsiveness of administrators. Empowering employees…within the organization would result in empowered employees who (still) have personal constraints to being responsive (Alkadry 2003, p. 206-207)”.

Thus, Alkadry (2003) recommended that future research would benefit from assessing administrators’ responsive-related attitude.
This dissertation argues that a possible missing link in current studies is that, while environmental and organizational factors indeed influence public responsiveness, their functioning still depends on administrators’ subjective evaluation. Recall the pragmatic model of public responsiveness. It is defined as a process-oriented approach in which response is “discovered” through discussion and deliberation. Public administrator’s willingness to respect openness, discourse and deliberation holds the key to pursue public responsiveness. Moreover, it is at the individual level that environmental and organizational facilitators are enacted (Dunphy and Stace 1991; Steinburg 1992; Kumar et al. 2007). The information and beliefs originated from environmental and organizational factors will be processed spontaneously and reasonably by individuals. If administrators do not view being responsive as adding value to administrative process, they may discourage it. In other words, even with the existence of environmental and organizational enablers, administrators’ willingness still plays a facilitating or constraining role in regulating their behavior. From a social psychological perspective, Crano, Cooper and Forgas (2010, p.5) describe the indeterminacy in human’s behavior by emphasizing the role of individual mindset:

‘By symbolically distilling and representing social experiences, the individual acquires social expertise and attitudes, which lie at the core of the socialized “me.” Attitudes and symbolic representations in turn regulate subsequent behaviors----although attitudes are not acted out in a simple determinate fashion in everyday life. It is the role of the unique, creative “I” to continuously reassess, monitor, and redefine attitudes as they are
applied, injecting a sense of indeterminacy and openness into our social behaviors.”

When studying a municipal manager’s public responsiveness, individual administrator’s stance and willingness should be especially emphasized. Compared to an administrator who works in single-function agencies, a municipal manager is a generalist who bears more comprehensive and complicated responsibilities. Mladenka (1980) observed that the municipal manager controls service distribution outcomes, including parks, recreation, fire protection, refuse collection, and education. The manager is also a centrally located chief executive. They might differ from previous theoretical samples (administrators working in single-function agencies) in terms of their leverage over organizational factors and environmental factors. In this sense, questions addressing municipal manager’s acceptance to be responsive are of great theoretical and practical significance in understanding their actual responsiveness. In the following section, reasons to examine municipal manager’s willingness will be elaborated by making vertical and horizontal comparisons between municipal managers and other groups of public administrators.

**Vertical Comparison: the Level of Responsiveness**

Today, about a half of the U.S. local communities adopts a council-manager form, though the structure may vary to adapt to community characteristics (Box 1998). The evolution of the role of the municipal manager indicates that the municipal manager has played a significant role in the policy-making arena as well as implementation, which makes the research on how they understand democratic values necessary.
The position of professional municipal manager was introduced in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth century in the United States with the rise of urbanization, the popularity of business-corporate ideals and scientific management movement (Stillman 1974). This position was designed to ease the control of political parties and machines, to deploy technologies and professional expertise, and to set up long-term goals by professionals rather than short-term ones by politicians. According to Richard Childs’s 1911 “Lockport Plan” which outlines the designs of “council-manager” form of local government, two characteristics were envisioned (Hirschhorn 1997):

1. Power should be unified in the City Council. The primary concern of the council-manager form of government is to make government accountable to the people. Therefore, every power of the city has to be placed in the council so that the council alone will be responsible for municipal policies. The city manager, who is responsible for administrative operations, will report to the city council.

2. Administrative authority should be concentrated in an official appointed by and responsible to the Council. Administration will be concentrated in a single controlled executive. No other administrators will be appointed by the council; the manager is responsible for appointing all other administrative officials. In other words, the council has to exercise its control only through the chief administrative officer---the manager.

As an application of the politics-administration dichotomy model in city management, the council-manager plan of government consolidates the power of policy-making in the governing body and expects the city manager to be a politically neutral expert. Policy is made by the governing body and implemented by the chief administrator.
(Svara 1985). Community politics are believed to lead to low efficiency in local
government. Thus, isolating the city manager from machine politics and political spoils
permits expertise and efficiency to develop. As Nalbandian (1991, P.16) noticed, the
ideals of the council-manager form sees city manager as a professional, an administrative
expert “whose knowledge of managerial principles and scientific techniques frame the
planning and decisions required to deliver municipal services efficiently and
economically.” The responsibilities of such an administrative role is presented by White
(1927): 1. To see that the laws and ordinances are enforced; 2. To appoint and remove all
directors of departments and all subordinates officers; 3. To control all departments and
divisions; 4. To investigate the affairs of any department or conduct of any official or
employee; 5. To require the commission to appoint advisory boards; 6. To prepare and
submit to the commission a budget.

According to this dichotomy model, the way to connect municipal manager and
the public interest is to ensure that municipal managers respond to their political
superiors and promote efficiency through rationality and their expertise. It is the elected
officials who bear the responsibility to reach out to citizens and sense the demands and
needs of the public.

However, this conventional model in local governance which envisions a
dichotomy between politics and administration has been challenged in great number of
conceptual and empirical studies since early twentieth century (Svara 1990 & 1998;
Nalbandian 1990 &1999; Box 1992). City managers have assisted city councils and
actively engaged in various activities—including shaping public policy---other than
neutral policy implementation due to the changing context of municipal management (Nalbandian 1991; Svara 1999). Demir (2009) argued that, in addition to policy implementation, administrative goal setting, performance evaluation and personnel management, managers also engage in policy leadership, policy evaluation, political activities, policy analysis, and resource allocation. Specifically, Mladenka (1980) noticed that city managers have extensive opportunities in policy-making, such as initiating proposals, writing budgets, manipulating expertise and determining the delivery of services. Within the settings of local governance, Svara (1980) has attempted to conceptualize the relationship between elected officials and appointed professionals by identifying four functions of government process: mission, policy (middle-range policy decisions), administration (specific decisions and practices) and management. He argued that city managers have shared all four functions with elected officials. In a follow-up survey he conducted in North Carolina, Svara (1988) found that managers actually rate themselves more involved in all four functions than the elected officials.

Given the evolving role of municipal manager, the impact of organizational and environmental factors appears to be constrained by the municipal manager’s own stance in pursuing higher level of public responsiveness. Box (1998, p. 1401-141) noticed that administrators tend to keep representatives or “outsiders” away from everyday machinery of administration, such as aspects of personnel actions, budgeting, and specific decisions about programs, claiming that “outsiders” cannot “understand the technical realities of program administration, and would only cause confusion, delay and irrationality.” Herring (1936) pointed out that public interest is the standard that guiding the administrators. However, the value of this subjective and abstract conception is
psychological in the sense that the significance of public interest cannot go beyond the extent to which administrators perceive it. Discretion remains in the administrative process as to how to weigh the demands from conflicting groups. If administrators perceive that promoting public responsiveness brings along high costs and low benefits, they would be less receptive to demands of mass public. In other words, the municipal manager could be either a facilitator or barrier even with the existence of environmental and organizational enablers\textsuperscript{1}. The specific reasons include:

Firstly, although environmental factors—such as the influence of elected officials and policy clients—are beyond the control of public administrators, their functioning can actually be shaped by administrators. In their study on the relationship between political control and bureaucratic responsiveness, Chaney and Saltzstein (1998) concluded that administrators’ discretion coexist with democratic control. Administrators’ discretion may enhance or impede the effect of political control. With regard to the influence of policy clients, Yang and Pandey (2007) also recognized that public managers have certain level of discretion over the extent they allow the influence of policy clients. Therefore, efforts to improve responsiveness through external coercion may not be able to fully succeed without considering administrators’ values and willingness.

This is also true about organization factors. The technical-driven administrative procedures per se illustrate administrators’ reluctance to incorporate citizen input. Abandoning technical-oriented rules requires administrators’ attitudinal change. Similarly, even though efforts to mitigate bureaucratic structural rigidity provide administrators with greater possibility to respond, there is no evidence that they will actually do so
(Alkadry 2003). In this sense, structure is not everything. Organizations with the same or similar structures might have very different managerial outcomes depending on the individuals who operate them.

In the orthodoxy model of city management, the municipal manager is indirectly accountable to the people by fulfilling their legal obligation to the governing body. As a direct result of a more visible role, municipal managers have to legitimize their role by directly responding to political constituencies, community interests, and values (Nalbandian 1989). In this sense, municipal managers will have a great deal of impact on the level that community policies respond to public demands (Svara 1985; Dunn and Legge 2002; Zhang and Feiock 2010). The legitimacy of managers’ expanding role becomes grounded in their willingness to seek, balance and respond to diverse values in their actions.

**Horizontal Comparison: The Way of Pursuing Responsiveness**

The municipal manager as well as its own understanding on public responsiveness is also important for how public responsiveness will be achieved. The discussion of the way in which city manager’s public responsiveness is pursued highlights the importance of a proper role of governmental bureaucracies in democracy. The municipal manager not only has substantial influence over the level of public responsiveness, but also how certain level of public responsiveness is achieved.

In city management, municipal managers have the potential to leverage more resources than elected officials. Municipal managers have full-time positions and control over day-to-day operations. They are likely to have longer tenure in position than the
council members, through which managers acquire experience and specialized knowledge. In addition, the professional administrator, including municipal manager, is the primary source of information for the elected officials. Control over information translates into the power to gain influence. The city manager could use their administrative discretion to report only part of the information to advance their own interests. Even when managers share information with the public and the governing body, “the derivation of the information and the context within which it is developed are frequently unknown (Nalbandian 1991, p.25).” Likewise, Yang (2009) studied the credibility of performance information reporting in Taipei City government. He argued that dishonest information report could occur when reporting was purposefully delayed until the public interest has shifted away; or, when managers use complex statistics that are hard to interpret for stakeholders.

Given the institutional factors discussed above, some studies have reported that the municipal manager has greater impact than the governing body (Nalbandian 1991). Abney and Lauth (1982) are intrigued by the question of who has greater power over executive branch agencies, city manager or city council? Their survey of department heads of municipalities nation-wide with a population of 50,000 or more indicates that municipal department heads regard the chief executive as having more power over them than the city council. Supported by the executive reform movement, the power to propose budget, the power to remove department heads, and the expertise become the primary source of the municipal manager’s influence.
Therefore, with the formal and informal power, municipal managers could respond to the community in a way without sufficient presence of civic values. Responding to public needs could be conducted in an authoritarian and elite way (Denhardt 2008). Even worse, the preferences of the public could be politically manipulated by government elites. In order to advance their own agenda, public officials seek to manipulate public opinions through sophisticated public relation operations (Manza and Cook 2002), such as blaming environmental factors or uncontrollable factors to divert the attention of the public away from pressing issues within the community. Finally, public responsiveness could also be pursued with poor results. For example, civic dialogue or citizen participation could be undertaken without municipal managers’ commitment to develop shared responsibility and understanding.

Transforming municipal manager’s role perception in city management is the key to ensure that public responsiveness is pursued in a way that is compatible with democratic values. With a greater role in policy-making area, the municipal manager begins to assume responsibilities other than achieving efficiency. The break away from neutral technocrat and implementer exposes municipal managers to demands and interests from various community groups. The role expectation of the municipal manager has been shifted from a neutral and technical expert to a facilitator that could work with multiple groups and integrate multiple interests. Box (1998) divided three role types of city managers: implementers, controllers and the helper. The role of implementer and controller are two extremes in which the former avoids direct involvement in policy-making and the latter actively reaches out to elected officials and citizens to mobilize their own policy visions. Between these two extremes lies the intermediate type, the
helper, who primarily focuses on arriving at policy decisions through dialogue and deliberation. This typology developed by Box (1998) echoes his argument that it no longer makes sense for implementer and controller to be the guiding image of city managers.

A similar observation is offered by Nalbandian (1991) and Green (1987) who argued that today’s managers need to acquire more negotiating, brokerage, and consensus-building skills than their early predecessors. Stillman (1974) pointed out the central issue facing city managers today are complex interplay of community forces rather than the logical application of existing rules. Thus, he suggested a transformation of the city managers’ primary duties from technical-oriented, rule-oriented and neutrality-oriented to process-oriented, dialogue-based, value-based and innovation-oriented. Unless city managers agree to engage in a dialogue with citizens and groups in a way that is inclusive and constructive, the pursuit of public responsiveness may be merely symbolic efforts.

**Research Questions**

Given the considerable influence of municipal managers on service delivery, their willingness to be responsive is critical in fulfilling their civic obligations. According to the pragmatic understanding of public responsiveness, responding to citizen demands requires municipal managers to actively seek, examine and interpret public preferences; it also expects municipal managers to facilitate dialogue, participation and develop partnerships (Nalbandian 1999). These efforts involve a fundamental change in bureaucratic culture and can hardly be successful without municipal managers’
recognition and/or support. As Gawthrop (1998, p.24) stated, “to commit oneself to the service of democracy requires, at least, a conscious and mature awareness of (1) the ethical impulses of democracy, (2) the transcendent values of democracy, and (3) the moral vision of democracy.”

However, few existing studies have included the individual’s willingness into the theoretical framework in analyzing public responsiveness. Particularly, few studies have assessed how municipal manager’s willingness channels those organizational and environmental factors in impacting their public responsiveness. Although the idea of enhanced public responsiveness is appealing theoretically, we still have little empirical evidence regarding how municipal managers view the necessity of promoting responsiveness to public demands. The question of municipal managers’ willingness to solve issues by seeking citizen voices in a deliberative process remains largely unexamined.

This dissertation argues that municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive mediates the impact of environmental and organizational determinants on the actual level of their public responsiveness. Examining public responsiveness without assessing individuals’ willingness would neglect their own interpretations and interactions with environmental and organizational factors. Municipal managers can develop two kinds of willingness to be responsive (Kretch et. al 1962): (1) municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness to be responsive which refers to whether municipal manager has a favorable or unfavorable normative evaluation toward being responsive. It is an indication of how municipal managers view the importance of citizen engagement and professional
expertise in advancing public interest; (2) municipal manager’s behavioral willingness to
be responsive which refers to municipal managers’ readiness to perform public
responsiveness. Essentially, it is municipal managers’ evaluation on the practicability of
implementing public responsiveness. Compared to attitudinal willingness, behavioral
willingness to be responsive is a broader concept in that it not only reflects individual’s
normative considerations but also utilitarian ones in implementing public responsiveness.

Attitudinal willingness is important given its potential impact on regulating
individual’s behavior. Attitudinal willingness to be responsive is based on the recognition
of the value of public responsiveness. Municipal managers with a favorable attitude
toward public responsiveness are likely to feel that responding to public demands is
compatible with their personal ethics, professional standards of performance, and
personal values. However, responding to public demands still depends on individual’s
behavioral willingness. Behavioral willingness is a combination of both attitudinal
willingness and contextual factors. In addition to attitudinal factors, municipal managers
may also take a practical approach to their public responsiveness. Even if municipal
managers have a sense of attachment to the value of public responsiveness, they will
consider the level of administrative practicability that supports and enables them to do so.
Behavioral willingness, thus, is a result of balancing attitudinal and contextual concerns.
The municipal manager with attitudinal willingness to be responsive may not necessarily
have behavioral willingness due to contextual constraints. More nuanced discussion on
the distinction between these two concepts will be presented in following chapters.
Note: The main purpose of this diagram is to illustrate the relationship between environmental factors, organizational factors, individual characteristics, municipal managers’ willingness to be responsiveness and the actual behavior of public responsiveness. Attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness may not share the same set of determinants.

Specifically, this study argues that municipal managers’ public responsiveness is not only impacted by environmental, organizational factors and individual characteristics, but also by their attitudinal and behavioral willingness. A thorough understanding of the determinants of public responsiveness cannot be separated from examining their willingness. This dissertation also proposes that their attitudinal willingness is shaped by environmental, organizational factors and some individual characteristics. Then, environmental factors and organizational factors, individual background factors and
attitudinal willingness altogether determine the readiness of municipal managers to perform the behavior of being responsive to citizen demands. Figure 2 illustrates the proposed conceptual model of this study.

In sum, this study is primarily interested in municipal managers’ public responsiveness. Research questions of this dissertation include:

- What is municipal managers’ level of being responsive to citizen demands?
- Given the importance of municipal managers’ attitude, how can we foster their favorable attitude toward public responsiveness? In other words, what are the determinants of their attitudinal willingness to be responsive to public demands?
- What are the determinants of municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive to public demands? What are the utilitarian concerns that impact municipal managers’ behavioral willingness?
- What are the determinants of municipal managers’ public responsiveness? How do municipal managers’ attitudinal and behavioral willingness connect environmental and organizational factors in determining their public responsiveness?
CHAPTER THREE

SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION

This chapter describes the data collection process for examining the research questions. The research sample for this study is municipal managers in the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The measurement of each variable and the analysis techniques are presented in relevant chapters.

The questionnaire was developed in order to answer three main research questions: First, what is the level of municipal managers’ public responsiveness? Second, given the importance of attitude, what are the determinant factors of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to public preferences? Third, whether a higher level of managers’ positive attitude to respond to public preferences would necessarily lead to a more responsive government?

Survey Research

The primary data for this research was collected from self-administered mail surveys conducted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania from September through December 2011. Even though a self-administered mail survey is more time-consuming compared to telephone surveys, it has the advantages of asking relatively complex and detailed questions. Given that the theoretical population is municipal managers, an Internet survey may not be appropriate for this study. Compared to Internet surveys (e.g. email surveys), self-administered surveys appear more formal and respondents feel more obligated to complete a survey request sent by mail.
Sample

The population of interest should be chief executive administrators in all municipal governments. Due to time and budget constraints, this study will only collect data from two states—New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Major reasons for choosing New Jersey and Pennsylvania are that municipalities in these two states are diverse enough in terms of local government structures, managers’ ideologies and demographic characteristics. The percentage of municipalities that have a position of appointed manager in New Jersey and Pennsylvania are 72.6% and 25.9%, respectively.

Directed by elected officials, municipal managers are responsible for most of the day-to-day administrative operations of the municipalities. According to International City/County Management Association (ICMA), the typical responsibilities of municipal managers include “prepares a budget for the council’s consideration; recruits, hires, terminates, and supervises government staff; serves as the council’s chief advisor; and carries out the council’s policies.” As the chief executive and administrative official of the municipalities, municipal managers have considerable influence over local policies. Meanwhile, they should have distinct intentions to be responsive to citizen demands due to the institutional arrangements and career interests. In this sense, they fit well with our research purposes.

There are 566 subcounty general-purpose governments in New Jersey, including boroughs, cities, towns, townships and villages. Among them, 411 municipalities have current positions of city manager or business manager as of 2011. Therefore, the survey
questionnaires were sent to 411 municipal managers/business administrators in New Jersey.

In Pennsylvania, there are 2562 sub-county general purpose governments which consist of four types of municipalities: cities, boroughs, first-class townships, and second-class townships. Townships in Pennsylvania are divided into two classes. The first-class townships are those having a population density of 300 or more per square mile. All other townships are second-class. 663 municipalities in Pennsylvania have the position of manager/chief administrator, including 307 boroughs (46.3%), 32 cities (4.8%), 72 first-class townships (10.9%) and 252 second-class townships (38.0%). Due to time and budgetary constraints, a random sampling was conducted by using Excel. A total number of 300 municipalities was generated as the final sample. Among these 300 municipalities, there are 129 boroughs (43.0%), 18 cities (6.0%), 39 first-class townships (13%) and 114 second-class townships (38.0%). Although cities and first-class townships are a little overrepresented, the final sample overall represents our sampling frame in Pennsylvania.

**The Development of Questionnaire**

Two questionnaires were designed for New Jersey and Pennsylvania respectively. For the most part, the two questionnaires share the same set of questions. These questions address four major categories: the municipal manager’s public responsiveness to public demands, local government’s organizational character, local government’s operational environment and municipal manager’s personal information. The only difference between these two questionnaires lies in the questions addressing a manager’s professional networking. In New Jersey survey, municipal managers were asked about
the frequency of attending meetings or activities organized by the New Jersey League of Municipalities (NJLM) and New Jersey Municipal Management Association (NJMMA). In the Pennsylvania survey, managers were asked about the frequency of attending meetings or activities organized by the Pennsylvania League of Cities and Municipalities (PLCM) and the Association for Pennsylvania Municipal Management (APMN).

Because the survey was self-administered, careful attention was paid to the clarity of the questions and instructions. The first draft of questionnaire was designed in Mid-June, 2011. It was then reviewed by all dissertation committee members. The guidelines of the revision include, keeping the questionnaire in appropriate length, making the questions vernacular, and trying to avoid socially desirable response. The major revision was concerned about how to measure accurately the dependent variables, particularly how to distinguish the measurement of municipal managers’ intention to be responsive and their actual level of responsiveness. The revised version of the questionnaire was then sent to some students enrolled in the Executive Master of Public Administration (EMPA) and Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs at Rutgers University for comments and suggestions. They have practical experiences of working with professional managers in local governments. Therefore, their comments and suggestions helped to identify and correct the potential problems in the questionnaire. After this round of revision, some questions were deleted from the questionnaire to make the questionnaire more condensed and some other questions were rephrased to make them easier to understand. The final versions of the questionnaire are presented in the Appendix.
Data Collection

In order to incorporate the demographic data of each municipality into the survey results, each questionnaire was labeled with a municipality code number before it was sent out. Each mail package includes a questionnaire, a cover letter and a stamped return envelope. The cover letter provides information with regard to this study’s general purpose, the rights of the respondents, the possible usage of the survey data and the instructions on completing the survey questionnaire. All these steps serve the purpose of increasing the response rate.

The directory of New Jersey municipal managers was obtained from the New Jersey League of Municipalities. In early September 2011, the first round of survey was sent to 412 New Jersey municipal managers/business administrators. About three weeks later, a follow-up email was sent out as a reminder to those managers whose email addresses were accessible publicly. For convenience purposes, an electronic version of the questionnaire was also attached in the email. The second round of the survey was sent out on October 22, 2011 with the same questionnaire but with a revised cover letter to elicit more responses. In order to increase the response rate, phone calls to those municipal managers who did not respond in the first wave were also made from late October through early November 2011. The final round of the survey was sent out around mid-November. After three rounds of survey, 198 municipal managers/business administrators returned their questionnaires with a response rate of 48.1%.

The directory of Pennsylvania municipal administrators was obtained from www.newpa.com. Due to time and budget constraints, two waves of surveys were
conducted in Pennsylvania. The first round of survey was sent out to 300 managers/chief administrators in our sample on November 5, 2011. As of November 22, the response rate for surveys in Pennsylvania is 28%. A follow-up survey was sent out on November 23, 2011. According to the survey results, two municipalities said they do not have current positions of municipal managers. Therefore, the sample of our study in Pennsylvania would be 298 managers/chief administrators. After two rounds of survey, 137 managers/chief administrators responded with a response rate of 46.0%.

**Preliminary Survey Results**

To answer the first research question, this section presents preliminary survey results regarding the actual level of municipal managers’ public responsiveness. The rest of the variables will be presented in the following chapters where they are discussed.

**Municipal Managers’ Public Responsiveness**

According to the balanced perspective, public responsiveness is defined as a contextual concept so that a specific policy area could provide a more realistic test. This research specifically focuses on municipal managers’ public responsiveness in the formulation of local budget. Budgeting is a key function of government in which special expertise is required. Municipal managers are generally responsible for the preparation and management of local budget. They monitor, report and make recommendations regarding the city budget. Typically, they work with city mayor and/or heads of each department to prepare budget reports and deliver information to the public.
The survey results confirmed the leading role of municipal managers in preparing local budgets. When it comes to drafting the budget proposal, the results show that a majority of municipal managers in New Jersey and Pennsylvania are either solely or jointly responsible for drafting the budget proposal. In New Jersey, 75.51% of municipal managers who responded directly participate in drafting the local budget; In Pennsylvania, 89.7% of municipal managers who responded to the survey question directly lead the process of local budget formulation. The specific working patterns are summarized below.

### Table 2. The Actors Responsible for Drafting Local Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Jersey Municipalities</th>
<th>Pennsylvania Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>148 (75.51%)</td>
<td>122 (89.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager</td>
<td>111 (56.63%)</td>
<td>113 (83.09%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + Chief Financial Officer (CFO)</td>
<td>21 (10.71%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + Mayor</td>
<td>6 (3.06%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + Mayor + Chief Financial Officer (CFO)</td>
<td>4 (2.04%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + City Council</td>
<td>2 (1.02%)</td>
<td>1 (0.74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + Finance Director (Finance Committee)</td>
<td>2 (1.02%)</td>
<td>3 (2.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + CFO + Finance Committee</td>
<td>2 (1.02%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager + Treasurer</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5 (3.68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Total</td>
<td>196 (100%)</td>
<td>136 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Citizens, on the other hand, may not have budget knowledge and related technical expertise. In fact, citizen engagement in the budgetary process or participatory budgeting has received a great deal of attention in public administration literatures (Ebdon and Franklin 2006, Franklin, Ho, and Ebdon 2009, Zhang and Yang 2009). While efforts have been made to get citizens informed and educated in the process, scholars are wary of the possibility that a symbolic process of citizen involvement may take place without authentic influence on the local budget (Ebdon and Franklin 2006, Zhang and Liao 2011). To what extent that a two-way dialogue has been facilitated and to what extent citizen preferences could influence local budgets remain unclear. In this sense, public responsiveness of municipal managers in the local budget is of both theoretical and practical significance.

Recall the definition of public responsiveness in this dissertation, the balanced model of public responsiveness addresses the following two dimensions: (1) the process which rests with openness, dialogue and deliberation between the administrators and the public; (2) achieving the outcome under the guidance of citizen interest. Four items were used to measure public responsiveness in a 1-5 scale with 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=neutral, 4=sometimes and 5=always. The four items are: (1) In formulating the local budget, whether the municipal manager makes sure citizens are aware of the major problems (the process); (2) In formulating the local budget, whether the municipal manager makes sure that citizens’ perspectives are solicited (the process); (3) In preparing budgetary proposals, whether the municipal manager has discussions with citizens about possible alternatives (the process); (4) whether the views offered by citizens in the budget process strongly influence the municipal manager’s decisions (the outcome).
The survey results indicate that municipal managers in our sample possess a relatively high level of public responsiveness in the formulation of local budget. Around 60% of municipal managers reported their responsiveness to public demands in the local budget above the midpoint of 3.00. The mean of public responsiveness in our sample is 3.53 which is also above the midpoint of 3.00. Municipal managers of both states have shown similar levels of public responsiveness, with municipal managers from New Jersey having a slightly higher level of public responsiveness. The statistical distribution of municipal managers’ public responsiveness in local budget formulation is presented in Table 3 and Table 4.

**Table 3. Distribution of Municipal Managers’ Public Responsiveness in the Formulation of Local Budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>22.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>30.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>38.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>48.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>61.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13.29</td>
<td>74.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>84.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>92.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>97.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>331</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Municipal Managers’ Public Responsiveness in the Formulation of Local Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Responsiveness (New Jersey)</th>
<th>Public Responsiveness (Pennsylvania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also compared public responsiveness between municipal managers from New Jersey and those from Pennsylvania by using two-sample mean comparison test. According to the T-test results, the t-statistic is -0.8554 with 329 degree of freedom. The corresponding two-tailed p-value is 0.393 which is greater than 0.05, indicating that there is no significant difference in public responsiveness between municipal managers from two states.

As an exploratory study, we also compared municipal managers’ public responsiveness based on their demographic characteristics. Such factors include their gender, age, tenure, and party affiliation (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). We compared public responsiveness between male and female municipal managers, noticing that there is no significant difference between the two groups. We also found that there is no significant difference between municipal managers who are under the age of 50 and those who are 50 years old and above; between municipal managers who have been in their current position for less than 6 years and those who have worked for 6 years and more.
Democratic municipal managers also showed no difference from those who identified themselves as Republicans. The interesting results showing that municipal managers’ demographic characteristics have no impact seems to suggest that their public responsiveness in the local budget might be primarily driven by factors, such as environmental, organizational and other types of individual factors, such as their value, attitude, personality, past experience and perceived risk. The comparison of public responsiveness are presented in Table 5 through Table 8.

**Table 5. Comparison of Public Responsiveness between Male and Female Municipal Managers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Municipal Managers</th>
<th>Female Municipal Managers</th>
<th>T score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Responsiveness</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6. Comparison of Public Responsiveness between “Younger” and “Older” Municipal Managers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Younger” Municipal Managers</th>
<th>“Older” Municipal Managers</th>
<th>T score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Responsiveness</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Comparison of Public Responsiveness between “Less Experienced” and “More Experienced” Municipal Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Less Experienced” Municipal Managers</th>
<th>“More Experienced” Municipal Managers</th>
<th>T score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Responsiveness</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Comparison of Public Responsiveness between Democratic and Republican Municipal Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Municipal Managers</th>
<th>Republican Municipal Managers</th>
<th>T score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Responsiveness</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FOUR

MUNICIPAL MANAGERS’ ATTITUDINAL WILLINGNESS TO BE RESPONSIVE: THE DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Given the importance of municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive, this chapter focuses on one of the two dimensions----municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive. The dissertation defines municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness as the extent to which they accept the normative value. This chapter seeks to answer what are the explanatory factors of municipal managers’ attitudinal acceptance to be responsive.

Understanding Attitudinal Willingness to Be Responsive

Attitude is a concept that has been extensively examined in social psychology and organizational behavior literature, given its impact in predicting and regulating behavior. Generally, it represents a person’s learned predisposition to respond in a favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to an object or entity (Berelson and Steiner 1964; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Egaly and Chaiken 1993). In this dissertation, the municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness to be responsive refers to the extent to which municipal managers possess favorable or unfavorable evaluation toward responding to public demands. It reflects to what extent municipal managers hold positive beliefs and favorable feelings about the value of public responsiveness per se.

In our survey questionnaire, five items were designed to measure municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive, including:
(1) I know what is best for the public, based on my professional expertise (Reverse coded).

(2) I am experienced enough to know the public needs without consulting with the public (reverse coded).

(3) In my previous experience of seeking citizen input in administration, citizens provide constructive ideas.

(4) Decisions are a lot better if they follow discussions with citizens.

(5) Citizens who participate know what they really want.

These five items then were subjected to a factor analysis to test if they could be divided into fewer dimensions and validate the construct for attitudinal willingness. Principal Component Analysis was performed to explore the structure of the variables. The factors attempt to detect the common variability among a set of items, and then group individual items into new unrelated factors (Hall 2007).

Two common factors were extracted, signifying that five items could be reduced to two dimensions. Altogether, the two common factors explained 62.47% of the variance in the measures.

### Table 9. Total Variance Explained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unrotated</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Orthogonal Rotation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>Proportion%</td>
<td>Cumulative%</td>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>Proportion%</td>
<td>Cumulative%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>1.830</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>1.637</td>
<td>32.74</td>
<td>32.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>1.293</td>
<td>25.86</td>
<td>62.47</td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>62.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>14.76</td>
<td>77.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 4</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>12.49</td>
<td>89.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10. Rotated Factor Loadings (Pattern Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first two items were loaded onto one common factor (Factor 2), including (1) the superiority of professional expertise and (2) the necessity and obligation of consulting with citizens—all with approximately same weights. This common factor is recognized as “identity-based attitudinal willingness”, as it reflects municipal managers’ normative view of public administration, particularly their professional identity as a spokesperson for the community rather or merely an expert who makes public policies just based on their expertise. Professional identity is concerned with right and wrong, with duty and obligation. As a profession, public administration has some indispensable normative components that prevent public administrators from abusing the socially mandated power that they have (Gibson 2003). Among others, respect for public value has been almost universally regarded as a necessary ethical component of public officialdom (Nye 1997). Harmon (1974) defined two basic types of professional identity for public administrators: professional-technocrat man and politico-administrative man. Professional-technocrat man emphasizes specialized knowledge to perform tasks. Decisions should be made primarily based on objective and technical criteria. Político-administrative man realizes that public administration is inevitably political. Decisions should be made through discussion, bargaining, negotiation and reciprocity. Harmon’s discussion suggests that
municipal managers with identity as professional experts are less likely to seek public inputs as part of their professional duty, and rely primarily on professional expertise in public policies. The survey conducted by Greene (1982) in New Jersey confirmed that one reason of local administrators’ limited receptivity of public preferences is their professional-technocrat orientation of policy-making, which prioritizes objective and technical criteria and discounts citizen demands. In sum, identity-based attitudinal willingness reflects the extent to which municipal managers identify themselves as a community spokesperson who would treat citizen involvement as a professional obligation in developing public policies.

The other three items were loaded onto another common factor (Factor 1), including (3) the ability of citizens to articulate their demands, (4) the ability of citizens to provide constructive ideas, and (5) the extent of policy improvement due to public discussion. Again, these items were loaded with similar weights. This common factor was labeled “perception-based attitudinal willingness”, as it appears to represent municipal managers’ attitude willingness to be responsive building on their direct experience and instrumental evaluation of engaging citizens. It reflects municipal managers’ perceptions of citizen contribution and qualification in the governance process. This type of attitudinal willingness comes from municipal managers’ positive experiences with engaging citizens, from the municipal manager’s instrumental and experiential thoughts about what public responsiveness could contribute. Attitudinal willingness could be instrumental in that municipal managers would make an assessment according to their actual experiences and consequences of engaging citizens. It is conceived as municipal managers encoding the attributes and beliefs about being responsive. Municipal
managers’ perception of active and knowledgeable citizenry, or municipal managers’ perception of improved policy quality through being responsive should be associated with municipal managers’ positive evaluation of public responsiveness. In sum, perception-based attitudinal willingness reflects the extent to which municipal managers have positive perceptions of engaging citizens in public policies.

Table 11. Comparison Between Identity-Based and Perception-Based Attitudinal Willingness to Be Responsive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective Pair</th>
<th>Identity-Based Attitudinal Willingness</th>
<th>Perception-Based Attitudinal Willingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutiful-Undutiful</td>
<td>Useful-Useless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political-Apolitical</td>
<td>Beneficial-Harmful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Untechnical-Technical</td>
<td>Valuable-Worthless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, empirical literature has suggested that municipal managers’ attitude toward being responsive is not encouraging (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Steel et al. 1993). Compared to members in the business environment, municipal managers may lack the momentum to respond to their policy clients due to a lack of a definite indicator of the ultimate end of bureaucratic action (Downs 1967). DeLeon (1997) pointed that policy research today is largely carried out by technically-trained policy analysts who are skillful at detailed policy studies and cost-benefit analysis. Greene (1982) found that administrators in New Jersey municipalities, including municipal managers, police chiefs, public works directors, code enforcement officials and welfare directors, exhibit generally limited receptivity to citizen demands. Thus, administrators’ attitude toward citizen contacts actually serves an important linkage between citizens’
request and agency’s response actions. Unless managers could embrace representation, individual rights and social equity as part of their professional values along with efficiency (Nalbandian 1999), they will not become less resistant to toward citizen demand just because what elected officials and citizens tell them to do (Greene 1982).

Observation like this connotes that positive attitude toward being responsive may not necessarily be embedded in bureaucratic culture. Some scholar even believes that bureaucracy is by nature unaccountable and unresponsive (Hummel 1994). It requires conscious and purposeful effort to parallel managers’ decisions with the public preference. In other words, municipal managers do not automatically develop into responsive administrators. Research on public responsiveness needs to address how to nurture and foster municipal managers’ awareness to be sensitive, sympathetic, and reactive.

**Determinants of Attitudinal Willingness**

A shared understanding regarding human attitude is that attitude is the product of social experiences. Attitude is not innate; it is learned and organized through experiences (Halloran 1976; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). The question here is what is the source of a municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness and how to decrease municipal manager’s attitudinal resistance to be responsive. Responsiveness indicates relevance, change and adaptation (Yang 2007a). As implied earlier, it does not only mean that municipal managers should promptly respond to the consistent changing citizen demands as they do routine jobs, it also means that municipal managers should change their way of dealing with citizens from an exclusive to an inclusive and collaborative way as they develop
policy options. It should be noted that some literature has discussed the determinants of attitude formation and attitude change separately (Cooper 2010; Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). However, this dissertation believes that individual attitude formation and attitude change are intertwined. The process of attitude formation and change are continuous and inseparable (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Therefore, the factors that influence attitude change are also relevant in the discussion on attitude formation. The determinants of city manager’s attitudinal willingness to be responsive will be discussed from both perspectives of attitude formation and attitude change.

Attitude formation and attitude change has its roots in social psychology studies. Halloran (1976) associated attitude formation and change with the information that the individual receives from the communication process. He highlighted the socialization process and group influences in shaping individual attitude. The socialization process serves to reduce the internalized tension generated by individual interaction with the social context. In this process, an individual learns “the ways of a given society or social group so that he can function within it (Halloran 1976, p.31).” The socialization process is essentially a learning process. An individual imitates the behaviors of his models in order to gain recognition, similar status, or avoid punishment. Learning could be occurred in direct teaching, training or instruction. It could also occur when the individual attempts to “copy” the behavior of the “significant others.” In the socialization process, the “significant others” are those who have particular standing in relation to the individual and are therefore especially significant in the development of one’s attitude. Group influence emphasizes how group affiliations of the individual determines the individual’s attitude. Halloran (1976) noted that individual attitude depends on the attitudes and
norms of reference groups to a large degree since groups have two functions: the comparative function which set the standard for the members and the normative function which provides the source for individual’s values and perspectives.

According to Halloran (1976), factors that are relevant to a municipal manager’s attitude change might also include personal influence and personality traits. Communications with persons---such as colleagues, the influential and the expert---plays an important role in influencing one’s attitude. Such personal influences could take place through face-to-face communications. For example, municipal managers who receive a great deal of information might turn to their colleagues, especially immediate subordinates, for help in sorting out this information. These colleagues can provide municipal managers with input that is outside the managerial immediate circles. Personal influences could also occur through mass media. Mass media may act as the link between the “opinion leaders” and the individuals. The social structure and the value of the society could be conveyed to the ultimate follower through the mass media. Personality traits address what types of persons are more likely to change their personal beliefs and attitudes during their interaction with social contexts. Cohen (1969) defines cognitive styles as a consistent way in which people process information. People differ with each other on their cognitive styles. For example, some people have a strong need to make sense of their experience and acquire new knowledge, whereas other people are more content to remain ignorant about the world around them. Hovland and Janis (1959) noticed that personality could influence a person’s readiness to accept certain arguments, presentations and appeals. People with higher level of susceptibility are more likely to respond to persuasive communication.
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) linked the formation of attitude with the individual’s salient beliefs. They defined the beliefs as the information an individual has about the object or entity. Each belief links the object to some objects, values, concepts or attributes. For example, a person’s belief that his friend is an honest person links his friend (object) with the attribute “honesty.” According to the frameworks of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Ajzen (1991), once a person forms beliefs about an object, he automatically and simultaneously acquires an attitude toward that object. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) identified three sources of information shaping one’s beliefs. One is direct observation which results in the formations of descriptive beliefs. However, The second is inferential belief which is based on previously learned relationships. For instance, a person who is smiling is assumed to be happy. Finally, belief could be formed by accepting the information provided by outside source, such as newspaper, books, television and Internet. This is called informational beliefs.

In addition to the studies referenced here that directly investigate determinants of individual attitude, other research has evaluated the individual’s attitudinal preferences in more specific realms. In the field of public administration, a related topic with attitudinal willingness to be responsive is the discussion on public service motivation (PSM). Public service motivation is a concept born out of scholar efforts to displace economic tools in explaining public administration problems. Public choice movement sees that individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest. Therefore, the monetary incentive systems are emphasized within government. However, Perry and Wise (1990) argued that public service is seldom identified with individual utility maximization. They use the notion of public service motivation to predict the behavior of public sector employees. Public
service motivation is defined as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations (Perry and Wise 1990).” It is an attitude and a sense of duty. They identified that public service motivation is composed of rational, norm-based and affective motives. Public service motivation and individual willingness to be responsive could share some common predictors, because both connote certain “idealism” as a guide for bureaucratic behavior, especially the love and imperative to protect all people, sensitivity to public interest, and the desire to contribute to society as a whole. The municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness to be responsive could be regarded as a specific indication of one’s public service motivation (Perry et al., 2008).

Several studies have explored the antecedents of public service motivation. Perry et. al (2008) is interested in testing the impact of socialization on public service motivation. They find that family socialization as individuals grew up, the frequency of attending religious activities, and the frequency of formal volunteering is related to public service motivation. Moynihan and Perry (2007) found that education and membership in professional organizations are closely related to public service motivation. Another line of study is interested in the impact of organizational factors (Perry 1997). Moynihan and Perry (2007) investigated public managers at state-level agencies and concluded that red tape, tenure, hierarchical authority and reform efforts are associated with PSM. Particularly, reform orientation and hierarchical authority is positively related with the civic duty/commitment to public interest dimension of public service motivation. Dehart-Davis et. al (2006) examined the influence of demographic data on public service
motivation. They found that female public managers score higher in compassion and attraction to policy making than their male counterparts.

**Theoretical Model and Hypotheses**

Given previous studies in social psychology and public administration and the theoretical population of interest in this dissertation, I include three categories of explanatory variables in the theoretical model: the socialization process which essentially reflect environmental stimulus includes influences from professional education, professional network, awareness of success stories, and prior private sector work experience. Fundamentally, these factors are environmental factors. The organizational factor includes internal-communication adequacy. Personal belief and disposition include city managers’ market orientation and innovation propensity. Demographic variables such as age, gender and community complexity are included as control variables.
One goal of professional education is to build students’ characters and enhance students’ values and ethics (Kearney and Sinha 1988; Menzel 1997). Mosher (1982) suggested that professional education in public administration is a solution to enhance administrators’ responsive-related values. Professional education would ensure responsiveness by exposing administrative professionals to a broader outlook rather than narrowly defined interests (Mosher 1982; Nalbandian and Edwards 1983). Similarly, Jennings (1989) argued that one purpose of professional graduate programs in public affairs and administration is to prepare students to manage public interests in a more responsive way. In sum, professional education has the potential to shape professional
norms and attitude that increase city managers’ sympathy and sensitivity to public demands.

**H\textsubscript{a1}:** Municipal managers will have greater attitudinal willingness to be responsive if they hold a MPA degree.

Professionalism could also influence managers’ responsiveness-related attitude through the professional organizations that municipal managers are affiliated with. Professional organizations offer guidance on how municipal managers should respond to the public preferences (Zhang and Feiock 2010). For instance, ASPA’s (American Society of Public Administration) code of ethics urges ASPA members to exercise discretionary authority to promote the public interest; to involve citizens in policy decision-making; and to respond to citizens in ways that are complete, clear and easy to understand. In its code of ethics, The International City/Council Management Association (ICMA) also indicates that municipal managers should recognize that the chief function of local government at all times is to serve the best interests of all people. Therefore, active members of professional organizations are more likely to internalize the professional values.

**H\textsubscript{a2}:** Municipal managers will have greater attitudinal willingness to be responsive if they are active members of professional organizations.

Municipal manager’s attitude toward being responsive could be influenced by successful stories in other municipalities (Kumar et al. 2007). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified one source for institutional isomorphism is mimetic process. Other municipal managers’ successful practice in promoting public responsiveness may nurture
managers’ attitudinal willingness by being aware of successful strategies and lessons. Success stories may reduce municipal managers’ attitudinal resistance toward being responsive. Thus, this study hypothesizes:

Hₐ₃: The awareness of success stories in improving responsiveness enhances the municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Evidence has shown that workplace socialization affects managers’ attitudes and perceptions (Boardman et. al 2010). Municipal managers’ prior work experience might affect the formation and change of those attitudes that are related to their current job. This study suggests that municipal managers with private sector work experience internalize the private sector norms that might be at odds with those in public sectors. Government organizations and agencies are distinct from private organizations in terms of their operational rules, goals and expectations (Bozeman 2000). Municipal managers who are socialized in private sector might experience a dissonance between the values they have internalized and the expectations of the new workplace. Professional expertise derived from an environment characterized by dealing with a specific group of clients or consumers, short-term transactions, and emphasis on results may lower municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to respond to the interest of a whole community, the establishment of a long-term partnership with policy clients, and procedural legitimacy. Therefore, this study hypothesize:

Hₐ₄: Having worked in the private sector prior to current position is negatively associated with municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive.
Organizational Factor

An effective internal communication is crucial to form municipal managers’ work-related attitude (Downs 1967). Effective internal communication ensures that municipal managers receive complete and accurate information from their subordinates. Bureaucrats at the bottom of the hierarchy are among the first to perceive the changing environment---particularly, the consistently changing public demands and preferences. According to Lipsky (1980), street-level bureaucrats, or low-level employees, are confronted with real world challenges. They are not just policy implementers. Rather, they stand at the front-line of service delivery to test if the stated policy needs to be conformed, adjusted or completely changed in the course of their direct interaction with citizens. As Downs (1967, p.195) observed, “the original impetus for change comes from the bottom of the hierarchy and “bubbles up” to the appropriate action officials. The people who normally initiate or propose changes in a large organization are not usually the ones who decide whether those changes will be carried out.” In this sense, adequate internal communication could facilitate the citizen feedback to be passed along to municipal managers and form closer-bonds between municipal managers and the community.

H_{a5}: Effective internal communication between municipal managers and their subordinates is positively associated with municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive.
**Personal Belief and Disposition**

Market orientation is a governance belief or model according to which governments will perform better if they behave like private organizations. It is the underpinning principle of New Public Management (NPM) movement that intends to alter bureaucratic structures and management toward the adoption of private sector practices. The market orientation typically seeks to improve the government performance by introducing competitors, contracting-out and cost reduction into service delivery (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

Regarding the relationship with citizens, market orientation treats citizens as customers. Administrators are held accountable to customers, or the people they are delivering services to (Bryer 2007). It emphasizes on making public organizations customer-oriented and providing alternative forms of service delivery. The customer metaphor, however, has received a great deal of criticism. Frederickson (1994) criticized that the customer-centered model puts citizens in a reactive role limited to liking or disliking services. Government agenda setting is largely beyond citizens’ control. Schachter (1995) believed that the customer metaphor differentiates citizens who voluntarily contact government agencies and those who prefer to have no contact with the bureaucracy. As a result, public administrators with customer metaphor would be discouraged to reach out to the silent majority. Yang and Pandey (2007) suggested that public responsiveness could be biased if treating citizens as customers, since customer preference does not equal public interest. The customer metaphor may direct municipal managers’ attention to salient policy clients rather than the whole community.
Hₐ₆: Municipal managers’ higher market orientation is negatively associated with their attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Innovation has been regarded as a predictor of public organization’s performance improvement, such as the use of performance information (De Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan and Pandey 2010) and the honest reporting of performance information (Yang 2009). However, few studies have tested the relationship between innovation and responsiveness-related attitude. The reasoning of linking innovation and attitude towards responsiveness is that they both indicate change, adaptation and social relevance (Borins 2000; Yang 2007a). In order to enhance public responsiveness, municipal managers should become advocates of changing dominating beliefs, bureaucratic structures and processes.

Specifically, I argue that innovative municipal managers are more likely to have responsiveness-friendly attitudes because the use of new technology, process improvement and empowerment of communities and citizens are three major characteristics of innovative thinking in administration (Borins 2000; Fiorino 2000). First, for municipal managers with greater acceptance of administrative innovation, they might show greater interest in information technology use. Thus, avenues for citizen voices and citizen engagement are broadened because managers’ access to citizens becomes easier and cheaper (Buss et al. 2006; Yang and Lan 2010). Second, process improvement means applying innovation to make governmental process faster, easier, friendlier, such as “one-stop shopping” (Borins 2000). Thus, the redesign of governmental process cannot be achieved without questioning the existing process and learning from
the public to assess government accessibility. Third, innovative thinking also favors collaboration with citizens. Crompton (1983) uses the example of issuing recreational vouchers to illustrate that administrative innovation could enhance public responsiveness and accountability by granting citizens more control over the delivery of recreation services.

Hₐ?: Municipal managers’ greater administrative innovation disposition will lead to higher level of their attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Control Variables

Age could influence municipal managers’ attitude. Current literatures offered two conflicting views on the impact of age on managers’ support for administrative reforms. On one hand, younger managers may be more receptive to new perspectives to their job (Steel et al. 1993; Kearney et al. 2000). Older managers may have been socialized to accept organizational missions and routines; hence, they will be less willing to change status quo (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Steel et al. 1993; Damanpour and Schneider 2006). On the other hand, one may argue that older managers are more confident in gaining control of the reform agenda (Kearney et al. 2000; Damanpour and Schneider 2009). As mentioned earlier, municipal managers will be more insightful due to the knowledge they learn from job experiences. When they become more senior and experienced, they will be more likely to be respected and confident in their ability to resolve issues raised during the reform; thus, they may be more willing to support the initiatives of enhancing responsiveness.
Combing these two competing views, we expect that relationship between age and managers’ attitude toward being responsive is not linear. Age may be negatively related to managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to the point where existing organizational rules and procedures that managers have been socialized with facilitate their willingness to be responsive.

\( H_{a8} \): Municipal manager’s age has a convex (U-shaped) relationship with their attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Previous studies found gender differences in public service attitude. Public bureaucracy is culturally a masculine construct. Ferguson (1984) argued that public administration discourse which is based on male perspective emphasizes control and subordination. Stivers (2002) believed that the notions of expertise and leadership reflect masculine autonomy rather than feminist responsiveness, professional expectations rather than societal expectations. By contrast, sympathy, care and love are considered to be culturally feminine quality (DeHart-Davis 2006). It is thus hypothesized:

\( H_{a9} \): Female municipal managers have higher level of attitudinal willingness to be responsive than male municipal managers.

Community characteristics are associated with the diversity of local residents’ service demands (Walker 2008). Previous researches found that municipalities with more diverse demands are more likely to listen to citizens and accept a greater role by citizens in order to avert intense social conflicts (Protasel 1988; Ebdon 2000). For example, if the economic activities are quite diverse it would be relatively difficult for city administrators to develop public policies without working with the community to identify the real
demands and preferences. Municipal managers would be motivated to be more responsive in order to facilitate the information processing. On the other hand, if the community residents are homogeneous in terms of socio-economic status, municipal managers may assume that they are fully capable to establish the needs and preferences of the community by themselves. Consequently, municipal managers facing more complex economic and resident environment are more likely to realize the benefits of collaborating with the community to solve problems, thus more willing to be responsive. Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the external environment complexity and municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

$$H_{a10}:$$ Higher level of household medium income is positively associated with municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to citizen demands.

$$H_{a11}:$$ Greater percentage of White population is negatively associated with municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to citizen demands.

$$H_{a12}:$$ Greater population of the community is positively associated with municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to citizen demands.

**Methodology**

The sampling and data collection process have been illustrated in Chapter 3. The measurement of dependent variables, independent variables and control variables will be discussed in this section. All items—except the count variable of professional organization involvement, the dummy variable of private sector work experience and
control variables—were measured on a five-point Likert scale by municipal managers’ response: 1= “strong disagree”, 2= “disagree”, 3= “neutral”, 4= “agree”, 5= “strongly agree”.

Measurement of Independent and Control Variables

In this study, two items are used to measure the professionalization of city managers: whether municipal managers hold a Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree and the frequency of attending professional organizations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania respectively. The professional education is a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the city manager has a MPA degree and 0 indicating that the city manager has education degrees other than MPA. 26.81% city managers in total hold MPA degrees.

The professional organization participation is measured by the approximate number of times city managers attend meetings or activities organized by two major professional organizations within their state. In New Jersey, the two organizations are the New Jersey League of Municipalities (NJLM) and New Jersey Municipal Management Association (NJMMA). In Pennsylvania, the two organizations are Pennsylvania League of Cities and Municipalities (PLCM) and Association for Pennsylvania Municipal Management (APMM). According to the mission statement, these organizations share the common goals to promote professional management in communities. They act as an agent for administrators’ professionalization. The city managers in New Jersey have higher interest in terms of attending meetings and activities organized by professional organizations. The mean of this measure in New Jersey is 5.47 while 2.59 in Pennsylvania.
The peer group influence refers to the city managers’ awareness of successful implementation of public responsiveness in other municipalities. Success in other municipalities helps to lower city managers’ attitudinal resistance and reinforce their attitudinal willingness to be responsive. This variable was measured on a 1-5 scale by city managers’ responses to the questions if they are aware that some city managers are committed to promoting public responsiveness and they have been successfully doing so. The mean is 3.81 and the standard deviation is 0.54. The reliability scale coefficient of the two questions is 0.78.

Prior work experience in private sector is a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating having work experience with private company and 0 indicating no such experience. Among 296 city managers who are in the final sample, majority of city managers, or 70.15% of city managers, has work experience in private sector.

Communication adequacy indicates how much and how accurate municipal managers could receive from policy feedback through internal communication. It was measured by municipal managers’ perception on whether they have adequate communication with immediate subordinates (e.g., department leaders) about the municipality’s strategic direction, whether front-line employees provide sufficient feedback on work performance and whether information or experiences are shared in regular meetings. The mean of this measure is 4.12 with a standard deviation 0.48. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.61.

In current theoretical model, a city manager’s personal beliefs and disposition examines two aspects: city managers’ beliefs regarding market competition and administrative innovation. Market orientation measures city managers’ belief with respect
to using market mechanisms to enhance the quality of public service. It was measured by their perception if government should be the only provider of public service and if competition could reduce the cost of government services. The scale reliability coefficient of this measure is 0.77. The mean of perceived importance of competition is 3.68; the standard deviation is 0.73. The innovation proposition was directly measured by city managers’ self-reported perception of whether or not they like to try different ways to solve community problems. On a 1-5 scale, the city managers show relatively high level of interest in administrative innovation. The mean of this measure is 4.12 with a standard deviation at 0.60.

The first set of control variables involve city managers’ demographic variables, including age and gender. Another set of control variables---the community characteristics were measured by the total population, the percentage of White residents and the medium household income of the local community. The data was collected from www.city-data.com. Since population size may have a curvilinear relationship with the dependent variable, its natural logarithmic terms were used. Table 12 exhibits the distribution of municipal managers’ gender and Table 13 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the rest of the control variables.

### Table 12. Distribution of Municipal Managers’ Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>75.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13. Univariate Statistics of Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>53.25</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>14,259.35</td>
<td>21,964.39</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>278,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White %</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Income</td>
<td>70,822.79</td>
<td>29,323.93</td>
<td>21,687</td>
<td>173,786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, table 14 presents the summary of dependent variables, independent variables and control variables and their measurement.

Table 14. The Measurement of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal Managers’ Attitudinal Willingness to Be Responsive</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>Identity-based Attitudinal Willingness</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (<strong>α=0.63</strong>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. I know what is best for the public, based on my professional expertise&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. I am experienced enough to know the public needs without consulting the public&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception-based Attitudinal Willingness</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (<strong>α=0.60</strong>)</td>
<td>1. Decisions are a lot better if they follow discussions with citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Citizens who participate know what they really want.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. In my previous experience of seeking citizen input in administration, citizens provide constructive ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional education</strong></td>
<td>If municipal manager has a MPA degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional network</td>
<td><strong>In Pennsylvania survey:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by Pennsylvania League of Cities and Municipalities (PLCM)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by Association for Pennsylvania Municipal Management (APMM)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>In New Jersey survey:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by New Jersey League of Municipalities (NJLM)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by New Jersey Municipal Management Association (NJMMA)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Success stories*  
(a=0.78) | I know that some city managers are committed to working with citizens to solve community issues. |
|           | I am aware that some city managers can successfully balance the public’s needs and professional expertise through a mutual dialogue with citizens. |

| Prior work experience in private sector | If the city managers have private company work experience before they assume current position. (No=0, Yes=1) |

| Organizational communication adequacy*  
(a=0.61) | I have adequate communication with immediate subordinates (e.g., department leaders) about the municipality’s strategic direction. |
|          | Front-line employees provide sufficient feedback to me on work performance. |

| Market orientation*  
(a=0.77) | Competition should be introduced into the delivery of public service. |
|          | Competition can moderate the cost of government services. |

| Innovation proposition* | I like to try different ways to solve community problems. |

<p>| Age | Please indicate your age. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Please indicate your gender: male or female?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Female=0, Male=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White %</td>
<td>The percentage of White population in a given municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Income</td>
<td>The household medium income in a given municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>The total population of a given municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  

a. All items are measured on a 1-5 scale (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree).

b. The items are reverse coded.

**Analytical Technique**

The dependent variable---municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive has two dimensions, therefore, two models are employed to test the hypotheses: the identity-based attitudinal willingness model (the identity model) and the perception-based attitudinal willingness model (the perception model). Since two models share the common predictors, covariance between two dimensions of attitudinal willingness could exist (Martin and Smith 2005). Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is used to estimate the parameter of two separate linear regressions simultaneously and improve the efficiency of parameter estimation. In this case, since the two dependent variables share same exogenous variables, it also could be called multivariate regression. Whether the error terms of the two regressions are correlated is tested. Table 15 reports the correlation matrix of the errors from two estimated regressions.
Table 15. Correlation Matrix of Residuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identity-based attitudinal willingness</th>
<th>Perception-based attitudinal willingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity-based attitudinal willingness</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception-based attitudinal willingness</td>
<td>0.1163</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It shows that the residuals are positively correlated. The null could be rejected at the 0.05 level ($\chi^2(1) = 4.019$, $p=0.045$). There is some unobserved factor that predicts both identity-based attitudinal willingness and perception-based attitudinal willingness but which has not been included in the model. All these confirm that seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is appropriate in this study.

**Results and Discussion**

**Descriptive Statistics**

Among 296 municipal managers that are in the final model, both dimensions of attitudinal willingness to be responsive are higher the scale midpoint of 3. The result shows a moderate level of identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive. The variable ranges from 1-5 with mean of 3.11 and standard deviation of 0.69. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.63. Compared to identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive, municipal managers have a higher level of perception-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive with a mean of 3.35. The standard deviation of this measure is 0.56. The reliability scale coefficient is 0.60. Overall, municipal managers’ attitude regarding public responsiveness is characterized by relatively high consistency between the two dimensions.
**Correlation Matrix**

Table 16 reports the correlation matrix. Most of the correlation coefficients are not high with the highest at -0.43. Identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive and perception-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive is positively related, but only very weakly ($r=0.18$, $p<0.01$). Professional socialization, which include professional education and professional association, is not correlated with both affect and cognition models. The success stories in other municipalities is positively correlated with both dimensions of attitudinal willingness. Media is only positively correlated with cognition-based attitude ($r=0.17$, $p<0.01$). Having prior work experience in private sector is negatively correlated with the perception-based attitudinal willingness ($r = -0.13$, $p<0.05$). Interestingly, market orientation is positively correlated with perception-based attitude. Communication adequacy and innovation disposition are not correlated with either of the dependent variables. None of the control variables are correlated with both dependent variables, except that age is positively correlated with the perception-based attitude. In sum, there are more factors that are correlated with the perception-based attitudinal willingness.
Table 16. Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CW</th>
<th>AW</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>MO</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception-based willingness (CW)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity-based willingness (AW)</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional education (PE)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association (PA)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peer group (SS)</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Work experience in private sector (WE)</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication Adequacy (CA)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Market orientation (MO)</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovation disposition (ID)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Population (P)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (%)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.43***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=297. ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1
Regression Results and Discussion

The regression results are reported in Table 17. Both models are statistically significant ($F=2.36$ for the identity model and $F=5.33$ for the perception model).

Table 17. SUR Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identity Model</th>
<th>Perception Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.100)</td>
<td>-0.152 (0.076)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association</td>
<td>0.004 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success stories</td>
<td>0.230 (0.077)**</td>
<td>0.296 (0.059)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector work experience</td>
<td>-0.093 (0.089)</td>
<td>-0.126 (0.068)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication adequacy</td>
<td>-0.079 (0.071)</td>
<td>-0.073 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market orientation</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.053)**</td>
<td>0.139 (0.041)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>-0.081 (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.109 (0.033)**</td>
<td>0.068 (0.025)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.000)**</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.000)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.128 (0.096)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White%</td>
<td>-0.239 (0.231)</td>
<td>-0.122 (0.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Income (in$1,000)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-0.050 (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>2.58***</td>
<td>5.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>297</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in cells are seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) coefficients, and standard errors are in parentheses. * $p=0.10$; ** $p=0.05$; *** $p=0.01$.

Contrary to the hypotheses, results show that two aspects of professional socialization—professional education and professional networks are negatively
associated with the perception-based attitudinal willingness. Professional training and professional associations provide cognitive guidance for occupational autonomy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They enhance municipal managers’ ability as well as discretion in dealing with local community issues. Municipal managers with MPA degrees and active presence in professional associations might be more self-confident in local governance than those with other degrees or less visible in professional associations. As a result, they become more likely to discount the usefulness of public voices.

Meanwhile, professional education and professional networks are not related with municipal managers’ identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive. It could be interpreted as the failure of professionalization in influencing municipal managers’ professional ethics. Formal training and professional network are two important vehicles for disseminating professional norms and values. However, some studies have noted the limitations of professional socialization in making a difference in impacting individual’s value (Bhatti et. al 2011). According to a survey regarding the utility of MPA programs, Grode and Holzer (1975) found that administrative skill courses, such as personnel administration, budgeting and planning, were rated as the highest value among various courses by MPA degree holders. Particularly, municipal administrators rated practical courses much more highly than respondents in other occupations. Driven by their practical job positions, municipal administrators have special preferences of attending skill-related courses, which could be considered as a reason to explain the failure of MPA programs in cultivating their sense of connectedness. The implication is that public administration education should pay special attention to balance MPA students’ interest in practical skills with public service ethics.
The potential influence of professional associations on administrative ethics could be weakened by some individual-level and organizational-level factors. Gordon and Babchuk (1959) noted that while some members join the professional association to access the latest professional information, others, however, attend the association merely with instrumental purposes, such as building inter-personal relationships, maintaining prestige, and achieving goals that cannot be achieved by individuals. Municipal managers in professional associations are united by their occupation status rather than by their joining purposes. Svara (2009) noted that most members of the public administration professional association focus on particular areas within the field, such as emergency management, personnel management and so on. If professional associations only satisfy the members by improving their specialized knowledge, associations may fail to cultivate democratic values. Professional public administration associations should help members acquire a broader perspective of public administration, as well as critical analysis and reflexivity by providing wide-ranging discussions. Municipal managers who have extensive interaction with people from different backgrounds---such as people from academia, private sector, or non-profit organizations---are likely to have a broader perspective on city governance and government performance, which lower the possibility of being “cold” administrative technicians.

The regression results support that municipal managers’ awareness of success stories in other municipalities is positively with both identity-based and perception-based attitudinal willingness. In fact, this variable has the largest impact in both models. The impetus for decision makers to adopt a new policy has been well documented in policy diffusion literatures (Shipan and Voden 2008; Bhatti et. al 2011). According to the policy
diffusion perspective, being aware of the successful stories of promoting public responsiveness in other municipalities can prompt municipal managers to adopt similar policy through the mechanisms of learning and imitation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The incentives for municipal managers to learn and imitate originate from their efforts to enhance professional reputation and career mobility (Teske and Schneider 1994). Learning and imitation start from examining whether policy adopted elsewhere is successful (Shipan and Voden 2008). A successful case could be identified by observing reduced social tension, increased social support and municipal managers’ reappointment and etc. Once successful examples are identified, municipal managers begin to understand that public responsiveness could bring themselves instrumental benefits and substantially impact the outcome of a policy, the lives of community residents and the community as a whole. This sense of instrumentality and accomplishment could also arouse municipal managers’ inner compassion to be sympathetic and caring. Then, they continue to examine how policies are adopted. They learn the lessons from other leading municipalities. This process enables municipal managers to reflect how success could be achieved in their own municipalities, during which they start to realize why the public could contribute to the overall quality of public policy. Here, the policy implication is that the use of case study and comparative analysis is an effective way to nurture municipal managers’ emotional and cognitive arousals to promote public responsiveness.

As expected, municipal managers’ prior work experience in private sector is negatively associated with their perception-based attitudinal willingness. The differences between government and private sector cover a range of dimensions, including reward system (Rainey 1983), organizational structures, training, culture and incentives (Kelman
Therefore, “sector switchers” might experience conflicting values. Municipal managers who have prior work experience in the private sector assume their current position with the expectation that they are the potential suppliers of efficiency, effectiveness, leadership and administrative innovation. They have strong incentives to signal credentials through their professional performance. As with private sector, objective and measurable objectives may be over-emphasized. Municipal managers might think about and measure, for example, the objective economic development but overlook the contribution of civic engagement and community cohesiveness. For these municipal managers, being responsive to public demands would be regarded as burdensome to improve the policy efficacy. The result also indicates that with or without a private sector background is not likely to affect municipal managers’ identity-based attitudinal willingness. This is probably because these municipal managers already have their professional identity when they decide to switch from private to public sector. Identity-based attitudinal willingness could be formed even without relevant experience.

Communication adequacy is not statistically significant in both models. Firstly, this is probably because municipal managers and their colleagues have been socialized to share a similar way of thinking. Hummel (1994) argued that bureaucratic experiences lead to five symptoms that are unique to the bureaucrats: bureaucratic society, bureaucratic personality, bureaucratic culture, bureaucratic language, and bureaucratic thought. Thus, the assorted and filtered information that municipal managers receive from colleagues may just confirm, support and reinforce their original judgment. Another possible explanation is that information could be purposely distorted by subordinate officials in order to tell what would please their superiors most. In addition to directly
lying, strategies---such as delayed reporting, blaming uncontrollable events, sophisticated statistics and jargons---could also be deployed purposefully by employees to hide information (Bohte and Meier 2000; Yang 2009). When municipal managers cannot receive undistorted policy feedback through internal communication, they may not be able to appreciate the values and possible contributions of citizen inputs. In sum, this finding suggests the importance of external information source in the formation of municipal managers’ attitudes. Internal communication might be more likely to influence municipal managers’ attitudes when it is supplemented by external information channels.

It is interesting to note that market orientation has an inconsistent impact on municipal managers’ identity-based and perception-based willingness. The result illustrates that market orientation is positively related with municipal managers’ perception-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive. Market orientation emphasizes introducing multiple service providers. The achievement of reduced cost through competition prompts municipal managers to believe in the instrumentality of collaborative management. However, the influence of market orientation may be not be strong enough to build up municipal managers’ identity as a community spokesperson. The regression result supports the hypothesis that market orientation is negatively associated with the identity-based attitudinal willingness. Market orientation emphasizes competition as the source of rationality. Municipal managers use privatization and contracting out as alternative ways of delivering service. Consequently, municipal managers primarily connect with groups or individuals who have a high-stake interest in the outcome of policy decisions. Municipal managers might be captured by these “customers” who can be expected to attempt to gain the policy outcomes they prefer.
Representation is relevant here since municipal managers may only respond to a subset of citizens (Schachter 1995; Yang 2007 b). They may lack benevolence for all people that will be affected by the policy.

The result demonstrates that municipal managers’ innovation disposition is not statistically significant in both models. A possible explanation is that currently most innovations are designed and implemented not for the purpose of facilitating dialogue and discussion. Jaskyte (2011) suggested two kinds of innovations in government institutions: administrative innovation and technical innovation. The former pertains to organizational structure, administrative system, procedure and human resources. However, it could be used primarily for managerial reasons, such as slowing down government growth and minimizing government size (Hansen 2011). The technical innovation refers to the implementation of a program, product and service that is new to the prevailing organizational practice. A typical example is that municipal managers use information technology to disseminate information. However, it could be symbolic if information is disclosed unidirectionally only with the purpose of informing and educating citizens. Unless administrative and technical innovation are implemented to promote mutual communication and dialogues, municipal managers’ general innovation disposition may not be able to be a predictor of their attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Among all control variables, only municipal managers’ age is statistically significant with the dependent variables. Contrary to the original hypothesis, municipal managers’ age shows a reversed U-shape relationship with both dimensions of attitudinal willingness to be responsive. It indicates that municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness
is getting higher when they become more senior, experienced and confident in dealing with community issues. However, after they reach a certain age, they become socialized into bureaucratic rules and procedures. Their attitudinal willingness to be responsive becomes lower. All other control variables, including municipal managers’ gender and community characteristics, are not related to municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness.

It shows that municipal managers, regardless of their gender and the community they work for, may have attitudinal willingness to be responsive.

Conclusions

This chapter examines the predictors of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive. Municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness is defined as the extent to which they possess favorable evaluation toward responding to public demands. Two dimensions of attitudinal willingness are examined: identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive and perception-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive. The former emphasizes municipal managers’ professional ethics and obligations to be caring and connected, whereas the latter demonstrates municipal managers’ experiential and instrumental thoughts on the consequences of responding to citizens.

The regression result shows that municipal managers’ identity-based attitudinal willingness and perception-based attitudinal willingness share some determinant. They are both influenced by municipal managers’ current values. Market orientation is positively associated with municipal managers’ perception but negatively related with their identity as community spokesperson. Both dimensions of attitudinal willingness are
also influenced by an institutional isomorphism factor: the awareness of success stories in other municipalities that pressures municipal managers’ to adopt similar strategies in order to secure their current positions. Moreover, municipal managers’ perception-based attitudinal willingness has some additional determinants. It will be fostered by factors that could facilitate communication and interaction between municipal managers and the public, including avoiding sole-reliance on professional expertise and an appraisal system that rewards engagement. All these factors provide opportunities for municipal managers to understand the values of citizen input. In this sense, institutional mechanisms that foster the direct interaction between municipal managers and community residents is crucial to nurture and ensure municipal managers’ perception-based attitudinal willingness.
CHAPTER FIVE

FROM ATTITUDINAL WILLINGNESS TO PUBLIC RESPONSIVENESS: THE CASE OF LOCAL BUDGETING

Given the importance of attitudinal willingness, the previous chapter has discussed the determinants of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive to public demands. Since the eventual goal of this dissertation is to foster a higher level of municipal managers’ public responsiveness, the question remains as to whether municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness could be translated into their actual behavior. Even though attitudinal willingness to be responsive is important, municipal managers with favorability toward public responsiveness may still be reluctant to implement public responsiveness due to external constraints. This chapter will continue to study another dimension of municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive---their behavioral willingness. Behavioral willingness to be responsive reflects municipal managers’ readiness to perform the behavior of responding to public demands. This chapter will adapt the Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010) to explain the translation of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness into their actual public responsiveness. By incorporating both attitudinal and behavioral willingness to be responsive, a theoretical model of municipal managers’ public responsiveness will be constructed.
Beyond Attitudinal Willingness: Municipal Managers’

Behavioral Willingness to Be Responsive

Defining Behavioral Willingness

Does a municipal manager with a positive attitude necessarily have the willingness to enact public responsiveness in their daily work? Instincts tell us that attitude is closely related to behavior. Municipal managers with a positive attitude toward public responsiveness will presumably be more willing to perform public responsiveness. It has been widely assumed that there is a correspondence between one’s attitude and the way in which a person behaves. However, this assumption may oversimplify the relationship between attitudinal willingness (attitude) and behavior (Eiser 1986). As discussed in the last chapter, attitudinal willingness is the individual’s evaluation on the object or entity per se. Expressed attitude may merely express socially desirable responses rather than one’s actual attitude (Kelman 2005). While attitude is important in regulating behavior, it may only be of limited predictability. It would not be surprising that municipal managers believe being responsive to public demands is good but actually do not act. As Freedman et al. (1970) pointed out,

Attitudes always produce pressure to behave consistently with them, but external pressures and extraneous considerations can cause people to behave inconsistently with their attitudes. Any attitude or change in attitude tends to produce behavior that corresponds with it. However, this correspondence often does not appear because of other factors that are involved in the situation.
Theorists have suggested that the possible dissonance between attitude and behavior is because attitude alone cannot fully explain why or why not people conduct certain behavior (Kelman 2005, Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, Forgas et al. 2010). Individual’s willingness to perform a given behavior is a multidimensional concept in which normative attitude is only one of the bases. There are some other personal and situational factors that might influence people’s willingness to enact a given behavior.

First, some personal factors are noticed. Whether individuals have the required skills might influence their performance of a given behavior. A lack of necessary skills makes people less likely to perform the behavior even though they are in favor of it (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) also noticed that individuals having a direct experience with the object are more likely to exhibit a higher consistency between attitude and behavior. For example, it is plausible to assume that municipal managers who have personal experience working with citizens are more likely to act in accordance with their expressed attitude. Personality traits also could be one reason. Snyder (1974) found self-monitoring could moderate the impact of attitude on behavior. Self-monitoring is defined as self-observation and self-control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness. He categorized self-monitoring into high and low self-monitoring individuals. Individuals with high self-monitoring look to the behavior of others for cues to define their own response and model the behavior of others who appear to be behaving appropriately. As a result, high self-monitoring might hinder the expression of one’s “true” attitude. There might be a lack of consistency between attitude and behavior for high self-monitoring individuals. On the contrary, individuals who are low in self-monitoring would not be so concerned about social appropriateness of their
expression. Their behavior seems to be controlled from within by their real attitude. They express and behave as they feel it.

Some studies identified external or situational factors as another group of factors influencing the relationship between attitude and actual behavior. Situational factors are reflected in the objective constraints on the performance of a behavior. As the objective complexity increases, the utility of attitude-like variables decreases and the importance of other factors increases. External constraints would hinder the performance of behavior regardless of the actor’s attitude. Yang and Callahan (2007) included administrative practicability to explain citizen involvement at the level of municipal government. They reported that excessive workload is one of the constraints to explain municipal managers’ reluctance to involve citizens in strategic decision-making. Deepening interaction with citizens adds to the numerous responsibilities that municipal managers already assume.

Situational factors are also reflected in external expectations of performing certain behaviors. Individuals learn the social expectation in socialization process. They are expected to abide by the desirable expectations. Violation of these expectations would render individuals in a troublesome position. Kelman (2005, p.162) noted, “individuals are seen as pawns of larger social forces rather than creatures able to command their own behavior based on their won attitudes.” For example, municipal managers may shift to becoming more supportive toward being responsive when expecting to interact with those who are active supporter of public responsiveness, and to be more cynical when they are expected to interact with those who are less supportive.
All these personal and situational factors indicate that attitudinal willingness alone may not be able to fully capture the individual’s willingness to enact a behavior. Besides attitudinal standing, individuals also make their decisions based on implementation concerns, that is, whether they have sufficient resources to carry out, whether they have necessary capability to overcome barriers and avoid risks in performing a behavior. Individuals evaluate their own capacity, assess the support they can potentially have and calculate the benefit/cost of conducting certain behavior. If their capability is constrained, the barriers outweigh the support, or if the costs outweigh the benefits, individuals may opt to not perform the behavior regardless of their normative stance. For example, in our study, a municipal manager might hesitate to consistently respond to citizen demands because of the time and risks tied up with doing so.

In fact, this typology in studying individual’s psychological bases of behavior has also been used in public administration literature. Romzek (1990) suggested that psychological ties to the organization are crucial to the recruitment and retention of high quality employees for the public service. She reported that there are two kinds of psychological ties to the organization. One psychological tie is based on shared values. Employees feel loyalty to the organization not based on calculations of what they could gain or lose, but because they share the value of the organization and have a sense of importance about their organization’s mission. The other set can be taking a utilitarian, transactional or investment approach to the workplace. Public employees feel they are tied to the employers because they have invested a lot of time and energy, or “sunk cost”, in an agency. They make their career decisions by calculating whether they have more to gain from changing employers than by staying where they are.
Discussions above indicate that attitudinal willingness alone cannot completely predict individual’s willingness to do something. Eventually, whether individuals will perform the behavior depends on the result of weighing the attitudinal evaluations against other concerns related to implementation. This result is the key to successfully translate individual’s attitudinal willingness into actual behavior. Fishbein and Ajzen have developed a theoretical model to systematically explain this process. The Reasoned Action Model developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) suggests that attitudinal willingness cannot fully predict individual’s behavior. Individual’s behavior is also driven by behavioral intention or behavioral willingness, which is defined as the \textit{readiness} or desire to perform certain behavior. It indicates how much effort individuals are planning to exert. While attitudinal willingness primarily examines whether the object \textit{should} be pursued, behavioral intention or behavioral willingness primarily considers whether the object \textit{could} be achieved. Behavioral intention is the result of balancing attitudinal willingness and practical concerns. The Reasoned Action Model (RAM) suggests that behavioral intention is not only affected by attitudinal willingness, but also affected by other two groups of practical concerns: subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. Subjective norms are a person’s view of the likelihood that important referent individuals or groups would like him or her to perform. It is defined as the perceived social pressure to perform or not perform a given behavior. The greater pressure that people feel, the more likely they will comply with the behavior. Kelman (2005) noted that social pressure may not influence what goes on inside people’s head (attitude); however, it may affect what people show (behavior). Another factor that co-jointly influences behavioral willingness is the individual’s perceived behavioral control.
It is the extent to which people believe that they are capable of performing a given behavior and they have control over its performance (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Perceived behavioral control is based on the availability of information, skills, opportunities and other resources required to perform the behavior as well as possible barriers or obstacles. According to Ajzen (1991), perceived behavioral control is very similar to the notion of self-efficacy which measures people’s beliefs about their capabilities to exercise control over events. If individuals do not perceive that they are capable of performing certain behavior, they may not have intentions to perform certain behavior even though they hold positive attitude or they are under strong social pressure to do so. In sum, the Reasoned Action Model (RAM) identifies behavioral intention as a key factor in linking people’s behavior with their attitudinal willingness, factors related to social pressures and people’s perceived behavioral control.

Adapting the Reasoned Action Model, this study argues that municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive is composed of two levels: attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness. These two levels of willingness all have an impact on municipal managers’ level of public responsiveness. The more fundamental and basic level of one’s willingness is attitudinal willingness. As discussed in Chapter 3, attitudinal willingness to be responsive mainly indicates municipal managers’ recognition of the value of public responsiveness per se. Behavioral willingness is a more comprehensive level. Municipal managers’ behavioral willingness or behavioral intention (In this study, these two terms will be considered interchangable) to be responsive is defined as their readiness to perform public responsiveness, in other words, how much effort they are willing to exert to perform public responsiveness. Essentially, behavioral willingness is the municipal
managers’ personal estimate of the likelihood of performing public responsiveness. Municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to perform public responsiveness is based on a particular combination of attitudinal and implementation concerns. The relative importance of these predictors may vary from one individual to another. One municipal manager may not have behavioral willingness to be responsive because of his/her negative attitude, but another might fail to have such willingness primarily due to lack of necessary support to be responsive.

**Comparison between Attitudinal and Behavioral Willingness**

Attitudinal willingness could be seen as the foundation of behavioral willingness. Municipal managers with a positive attitude toward being responsive have a higher potential to have behavioral willingness. However, municipal managers with attitudinal willingness may not necessarily have behavioral willingness due to limited social pressure or perceived control over the implementation process. It is plausible to assume that municipal managers with positive attitudes toward public responsiveness vary in their level of public responsiveness due to behavioral intention. By examining municipal managers’ behavioral willingness, their concerns on the administrative practicability of responding to public demands will be addressed: whether responding to public demands requires considerable cost, whether the benefits of conducting public responsiveness outweigh the overall cost, and whether they have controls over the process of implementing public responsiveness and etc. Figure 4 shows the relationship between municipal managers’ attitudinal and behavioral willingness to be responsive.
Figure 4. The Relationship Between Municipal Managers’ Attitudinal, Behavioral Willingness to Be Responsive and Public Responsiveness

Generally, municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive is transferrable among different working organizations. Attitudinal willingness reflects municipal managers’ internalized value system. Once municipal managers acquire a personal sense of the importance about the value of being responsive, they will retain such attitudinal willingness even if they move to work in another municipality or position. However, behavioral willingness is context sensitive and therefore not easily transferable. Behavioral willingness is closely related to a particular work environment and the organization that municipal managers are working in. It is more susceptible to influences from the environment and requires environmental support to sustain. Municipal
managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive may be decreased if they move to a municipality or organization that no longer offers supportive resources and opportunities.

Municipal managers’ attitudinal and behavioral willingness to be responsive also differ in terms of how government institutions could play a facilitating role. As indicated by the last chapter, effective socialization programs are needed to internalize the value of public responsiveness for municipal managers, eliciting their attitudinal willingness. Among socialization programs, government organization is only one of the socialization agents. Compared to attitudinal willingness, government organizations have more tangible opportunities to elicit behavioral willingness. Organizations could offer resources and support to the extent that municipal managers believe they have behavioral control over the enactment of public responsiveness and the benefits outweigh the costs when performing public responsiveness.

In sum, this study argues that a comprehensive understanding of municipal managers’ public responsiveness should take their behavioral willingness into consideration. In addition to attitudinal willingness, there is another equally important aspect of municipal managers’ willingness to be responsive---behavioral willingness to be responsive. While attitudinal willingness is the evaluation of the value of public responsiveness, behavioral willingness to be responsive is a more contextual concept that combines both municipal managers’ attitudinal standings and concerns related to perform the object. The concerns of municipal managers in performing public responsiveness refer to the social pressure they receive from stakeholders and the extent of behavioral control they perceive in performing public responsiveness.
Theoretical Model and Hypotheses

This research seeks to propose an exploratory model to study municipal managers’ public responsiveness by connecting their attitudinal willingness to be responsive, behavioral willingness to be responsive, environmental factors and institutional factors. Adapting the Reasoned Action Model (RAM), this study argues that municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive is influenced by their attitudinal willingness to be responsive, their perceived social pressure from key stakeholders (subjective norms) as well as their perceived behavioral control. Essentially, municipal managers’ social pressure and perceived behavioral control are tied with environmental and institutional factors. In turn, their public responsiveness is determined by a particular combination of attitudinal willingness, behavioral willingness, social pressure and perceived behavioral control. Figure 5 presents the conceptual model.
According to the Reasoned Action Model (RAM), factors that impact municipal managers’ concerns in implementing public responsiveness refer to: (1) those impact municipal managers’ perceived social pressure to perform public responsiveness. Perceived social pressure is municipal managers’ perception that important others desire or expect the performance of public responsiveness. The stronger the social pressure, the more likely that municipal managers will form the behavioral willingness. (2) those impact municipal managers’ perceived behavioral control. Perceived behavioral control is the extent to which municipal managers believe that they are capable of performing public responsiveness. It takes into account the necessary skills and possible obstacles to engage in being responsive. Essentially, these concerns reflect influences of environmental and institutional factors that either facilitate or impede municipal
managers’ intention to carry out public responsiveness. Perceived social pressure and behavioral control underscore the incentives and managerial capacity to engage in public responsiveness. In the operationalized model (Figure 6), factors that represent municipal managers’ social pressure and perceived behavioral control will consider the extent of media influence, the extent of political support they receive from elected officials, political representativeness of elected officials and the extent of citizen satisfaction with municipal government, the degree of their perceived red tape and their ability to coordinate among organizational units. Among these factors, media influence, support from elected officials, citizen satisfaction and political representativeness are associated with both municipal managers’ social pressure and perceived behavioral control.

Since a specific policy area provides a more realistic test of the proposed model, this research only focuses on municipal managers’ public responsiveness in the formulation of local budgets. The reason why local budgeting was chosen is that it is a key function of government in which special expertise is required. Citizens, however, may not have budget knowledge and related technical expertise. Thus, public responsiveness of municipal managers in the budget process becomes particularly significant.

Recall the definition of public responsiveness in this dissertation, the pragmatic model of public responsiveness is defined in two aspects: (1) the process which rests with dialogue, discuss and deliberation, (2) the policy goal that is achieved under the guidance of public spirit. The following four items were used to capture public responsiveness in the formulation of local budgets: (1) In formulating the local budget, whether the municipal manager makes sure citizens are aware of the major problems (the process); (2)
In formulating the local budget, whether the municipal manager makes sure that citizens’ perspectives are solicited (the process); (3) In preparing budgetary proposals, whether the municipal manager has discussions with citizens about possible alternatives (the process); (4) The views offered by citizens in the budget process strongly influence the municipal manager’s decisions (the goal).

Figure 6. The Operational Model

Note: For clarity reason, the direct relationship between variables (including affect-based attitudinal willingness, cognition-based attitudinal willingness, media influence, political representativeness, political support, public support, perceived red tape and coordination) and public responsiveness is not shown in this figure.
Media Influence

Media is a primary source from which municipal managers acquire public opinions (Moyihan and Pandey 2005). The level of media influence, first of all, will largely determine the amount and quality of information that municipal managers could obtain, including citizens’ demands and citizens’ feedback on government performance. For example, complaints about inadequate public service, high waste, and illegal behaviors through media are all indications of a performance gap. Greater media influence is likely to impact policy process by setting agenda and placing municipal managers under the public’s oversight. If media influence were too weak, municipal managers would be less likely to treat public opinion and feedback seriously; they would not feel motivated to seek public preferences, confront the obstacles and barriers in incorporating citizen opinions. As a result, public opinions and citizen involvement may not be accounted as key elements in formulating decisions. In contrast, under a strong media influence, municipal managers are more likely to “face citizens’ demands to treat them as equal partners and to incorporate various stakeholders into policy making (Yang and Pandey 2007, p.220)”.

$H_{b1.1}$: Higher level of media influence is positively related to municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive.

$H_{b1.2}$: Higher level of media influence is positively related to municipal managers’ public responsiveness.
Political Representativeness

The council-manager relation is important in shaping municipal managers’ behavior. Political representativeness of legal representatives, or the extent to which city council members maintain deep connections with their constituents, could become a source of municipal managers’ social pressure to perform public responsiveness. Political representation is rooted in formal jurisdiction (Frederickson 1999). In local governments, council members who serve as the intermediaries as citizens and local government are elected either by district or at large. Compared to at-large representatives, district representatives are believed to have a higher level of political representation because they are elected by constituents from a smaller jurisdiction who tend to have more shared interests and demands (Zhang and Liao 2011). At-large representatives who are elected by all citizens tend to be responsible for the overall city government management, while district representatives tend to primarily focus on the interests of their own districts. A likely result is that city-wide concerns such as the efficient operation of city government are more likely to attract the attention of at-large representatives, whereas the provision of services to a particular area is more likely to enter the agenda of district representatives (Southwick 1997). With less concern on the overall fiscal performance, district representatives tend to favor that more services should be provided to their constituencies (Southwick 1997). Their perception of representation effectiveness is related to the effectiveness of service delivery. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the higher percentage of representatives elected by district with a given city council, the more oversight and political pressure that the elected body might exert on municipal managers to advance citizen demands, especially voices from minority and marginalized groups. In
this study, political representativeness is operationalized as the ratio of the number of
council members elected by district to the total number of council members. It is
hypothesized:

\[ \text{H}_b2-1: \] Political representativeness is positively associated with municipal
managers’ perceived red tape.

\[ \text{H}_b2-2: \] Political representativeness is positively associated with municipal
managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive.

\[ \text{H}_b2-3: \] Political representativeness is positively associated with municipal
managers’ public responsiveness.

**Citizen Satisfaction**

Along with other levels of government, local government is facing the challenges
stemmed from the changing demographic, economic and technical environment (Florina-
Maria 2010). In addition to media and elected officials, the citizen is another source of
social pressure to hold administrators accountable (Kuo 2012). Satisfaction of the citizens
indicates that the public generally trusts municipal managers’ credentials and place less
pressure on managers to fulfill their responsibilities. Municipal managers’ perceived
citizen satisfaction from the public influences how they view the environment and act.

Public administrators, including municipal managers, work in a consistent
tension between managerial flexibility and political accountability (Kim 2005; Cooper et.
al 2008). On the one hand, managers need to retain some level of flexibility and
discretion to make efficient decision; on the other hand, they need to be accountable to
citizens. Like elected officials’ trust, citizen satisfaction or trust in government could
relieve the tensions between these two. Citizens with greater satisfaction and trust in
government are likely to delegate more discretion and flexibility to managers through
their legal representatives in government. Thus, it is logical to predict:

H_{b3-1}: Citizen satisfaction is negatively associated with municipal managers’
perceived red tape.

H_{b3-2}: Citizen satisfaction is positively associated with municipal managers’
ability to coordinate.

Satisfaction/trust of the citizens indicates recognition of municipal managers’
credentials, which will naturally increase municipal managers’ perceived behavioral
control. Citizen trust mitigates the cost that citizens voluntarily accept the decisions made
by the government (Tyler 1998). Citizens’ voluntary compliance with administrative
decisions is important because it ensures efficient functioning of managers’ authority at
affordable cost. Furthermore, according to Kim (2005), citizen trust in government will
facilitate cooperation between the public and the government, which is indispensable for
a collaboration governance process. It is thus hypothesized:

H_{b3-3}: Support of the public is positively associated with municipal managers’
behavioral willingness to be responsive.

H_{b3-4}: Support of the public is positively associated with municipal managers’
public responsiveness.
Support from Elected Officials

Elected officials assume the responsibility of working as liaisons between the city government and the public. Political support from elected officials is vital in shaping municipal managers’ behavior because elected officials will significantly impact: (1) the resources that municipal managers could deploy to engage in certain behavior; (2) the incentives of municipal managers to engage in certain behavior. In this vein, some studies indicate a negative relationship between elected officials’ dissatisfaction and public responsiveness: First, dissatisfaction or distrust from elected officials makes municipal managers more likely to be constrained by excessive rules. Public organizations are political in nature (Moe 1995). Elected officials design the organizational rules in order to ensure that public bureaucrats do what they are told to do. The choice of organizational procedures does not only serve the technical purposes such as efficiency and effective. It also reflects the political purpose of elected officials since the choice of bureaucratic procedures is also the choice of public policy’s direction. For elected officials, another reason why the design of bureaucratic procedures is important is that elected officials have to grant municipal managers discretion because of the expertise and knowledge problems (Moe 1995). Elected officials need to strategically constrain municipal managers while providing municipal managers with autonomy and incentives. When elected officials are satisfied with municipal managers’ job performance, the granted discretion would be maximized to the affordable level. In this sense, when municipal manager perceive high level of dissatisfaction from elected officials, they are more likely to be constrained by restrictive bureaucratic procedures (Yang and Pandey 2009).
H$_{b4.1}$: Political support of elected officials is negatively associated with municipal managers’ perceived red tape.

Second, elected officials are vital in providing necessary resources for responding to public demands, including financial, technical and human resources. Satisfaction, trust or support from elected officials is a vital source of power for public organizations and public managers (Wolf 1993; Yang 2008). As Fernandez and Pitts (2007, p. 331) explained,

Political overseers have the authority to pass legislation or put policies in place that mandate change, and they also control the flow of vital resources that are needed to sustain a transformation. Political overseers can influence the outcomes of a change process, in addition, by crafting and then conveying a vision of the need for change and by selecting political appointees who are sympathetic to change and who have the knowledge and skills required for managing the transformation.

H$_{b4.2}$: Support of elected officials is positively associated with municipal managers’ ability to coordinate.

Lastly, support from elected officials will provide municipal managers with the sense of control in being responsive. Municipal managers work in a risk-averse pattern (Stevens and McGowan 1983). Consistent support from elected officials may make municipal managers feel more comfortable in letting the public have a greater role and feel less threatening in experimenting with administrative reforms (Yang 2008). Enhancing responsiveness to public preferences would necessarily change the status quo
of how governmental process is organized. This is not easy to achieve since efforts to seek citizen inputs and collaborate with citizens imply potential disequilibrium in organizational environment. With more citizen voices being respected and more citizens entering the policy arena, the distribution of organizational resources and power, the degree of environmental stability and complexity may be altered. Moreover, adopting a responsiveness-friendly policy denotes fundamental changes for municipal managers. In order to seek citizen inputs and engage citizens in the governance process, municipal managers need to change their way of doing business routinely. It also requires encouraging and nurturing managers’ ability of forecasting, creativity, and experimentation (Borins 2000). Support from political superiors would create necessary flexibility or autonomy for experimenting, without which the traditional bureaucratic process and culture can hardly be changed (O’Toole 1990; White and McSwain 1990; Moynihan and Pandey 2010). On the contrary, in a distrustful political environment, municipal managers tend to stick to the rules to avoid risks, which will make them less likely to consider public demands regardless of their attitude toward public responsiveness per se (Kelman 2005; Yang 2008).

Other scholars argue that a supportive external environment is actually negatively related to municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to interact with the public. Political support implies leadership stability in public organizations (Yang 2008). Existing studies have suggested that stable organizational leadership may resist changes in terms of their own attitudes and behavior. New organization leaders, however, are more likely to accept attitudinal and behavioral changes through knowledge transfer, learning and introducing new norms and values (Fernandez and Pitts 2007). Therefore,
stability in public organizations’ external environment may jeopardize municipal managers’ motivation to enhance their level of being responsive. Indeed, municipal managers may feel the need to listen to citizens, learn from citizens and collaborate with citizens when they sense elected officials’ dissatisfaction with status quo.

In order to test whether more political support fosters or discourages responsiveness-related behaviors, it is hypothesized:

$H_{b4.3}$: Political support of elected officials is positively associated with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive.

$H_{b4.4}$: Political support of elected officials is positively associated with municipal managers’ level of public responsiveness.

**Inter-Unit Coordination**

In addition to environmental factors, this study will also consider organization-level influences. The first organizational factor to be considered is inter-unit coordination. Being responsive often requires municipal managers being able to coordinate administrators or different units of local government. Municipal managers are often dealing with complex issues with tight budget and limited resources. For example, advancing open e-government requires the coordination and collaboration between technical and budgetary departments. Public issues like these cannot be solved by a single administrator or department.

Willem and Buelens (2007) defined three types of inter-unit coordination: (1) formal coordination that is in the form of rules, formal procedures, and manuals; (2)
lateral coordination that is not planned and often used during task implementation, such as teamwork, task groups and liaison roles; (3) informal coordination. Coordination will make better use of the scarce resource and thus offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented services (Christensen and Lægreid 2008). Such coordination often involves “formulation of goals, budgeting, contracting, communication systems, formal reporting and hierarchal planning (Lie 2004).”

In order to facilitate coordination among colleagues, municipal managers should be able to maintain effective administrative leadership (Sullivan et. al., 2012), motivate public employees, build up sharing objectives, norms and values, and nurture mutual trust (Christensen and Lægreid 2008). If municipal managers could effectively coordinate different units of local government, they would feel that they are less constrained by the unnecessary organizational rules and they could use instrumental authority to ensure their control. In other words, effective coordination makes municipal managers feel they have sufficient behavioral control over the formulation and achievement of goals, being capable of responding to citizen demands. Taking together, it is hypothesized:

**Hypothesis 5.1**: Higher level of internal-organization coordination is positively associated with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive.

**Hypothesis 5.2**: Higher level of internal-organization coordination is positively associated with municipal managers’ level of public responsiveness.
Perceived Red Tape

Red tape can be defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but not advance the legitimate purposes that the rules were intended to serve (Bozeman 1993).” Perceived red tape may be different from the observed red tape. One person’s perceived red tape might be another person’s necessary rules. However, there is an emerging consensus that perceived red tape might influence people’s behavior in a complicated way (Feeney and Bozeman 2009).

One argument is that red tape may be used by municipal managers to maintain or increase their control over governance process. As discussed above, responding to citizen demands requires municipal managers to be able to coordinate with relevant stakeholders who might have competing demands with each other. For example, when municipal managers receive residents’ objection about a property development project, they should have sufficient confidence in dealing with the political alliance that property developers may have with political superiors, subordinates and interest groups, without the fear of losing jobs, authority and control. Rainey, Pandy and Bozeman (1995, p.568) reported that public managers use red tape against the sense of insecurity:

Public managers frequently issue and emphasize red tape because they feel insecure about their authority and control over their subordinates and about their ability to rely on their subordinates…public managers feel that their hierarchical authority is weakened by civil service rules and other administrative constraints, by political interventions and oversight, by unions, and by political alliances that subordinates may have with legislators and interest groups.
It is in the sense of ensuring municipal managers’ sense of security that red tape could facilitate their behavioral willingness to be responsive.

Another stream of research addresses the detrimental effect of red tape. After all, the concept of red tape is based on the notion that it has damaging effects on government performance, such as structural complexity, excessive paperwork, and delays (Bozeman 2000; Feeney 2012). Perceived red tape could suppress municipal managers’ behavioral intention to be responsive to public demands. Tight organizational rules and regulations indicate tight control of political principals. When municipal managers are constrained by excessive rules, they feel they have limited control over intended behavior. Then, rules become the final savior for them in order to avoid any risks in implementing policies. If municipal managers do not know what the right thing is, they will stick to the rules to ensure that they are doing it correctly (Kelman 2007). For example, Brewer and Walker (2010) found that internal red tape and the inability to remove poorly performing administrators is likely to impact negatively government performance. It is believed that red tape makes public organizations more self-serving, less able to achieve core missions and less responsive to service users (Brewer and Walker 2010). In this study, it is hypothesized:

\( H_{b6-1} \): Municipal managers’ perceived red tape is negatively associated with their behavioral willingness to be responsive.

\( H_{b6-2} \): Municipal managers’ perceived red tape is negatively associated with their level of public responsiveness.
Attitudinal Willingness

Municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive is believed to directly influence their behavioral intention of being responsive. It is plausible to assume that municipal managers with favorable attitudes are more likely to exert greater efforts to respond to the public demands. Even if organization and external environment do not provide sufficient support, municipal managers with attitudinal willingness can derive personal meaning from being responsive since they believe in the normative value. Thus, it is hypothesized:

H_{b7.1}: Municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness is positively associated with their behavioral willingness to be responsive.

Similarly, municipal managers with higher attitudinal willingness are also more likely to have higher level of public responsiveness.

H_{b7.2}: Municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness is positively associated with their level of public responsiveness.

The Impact of Behavioral Willingness

Adapting the Reasoned Action Model (RAM), this study argues that behavioral willingness to be responsive has a direct impact on municipal managers’ actual level of public responsiveness. While attitudinal willingness reflects municipal managers’ acceptance of the democratic value per se, behavioral willingness examines how much effort that municipal managers are willing to exert based on their subjective assessment of management capacity and administrative practicability. The notion of behavioral willingness is particularly relevant when we are facing economic downturn today. While budget gets tighter, municipal managers have to provide the same service, or even
improving services, to local residents. They become very sensitive to any activity that will potentially raise the administrative cost. Only when municipal managers perceive a reasonable balance between the benefit and cost of being responsive, they will have behavioral intention to do so.

H_{b58}: Municipal managers with higher behavioral willingness to be responsive have higher level of public responsiveness.

**Methodology**

**Measurement**

Details on the measurement of each variable are provided in Table 18. All measures were based on municipal managers’ self-reported response. Most of the variables were measured by multiple items except the media influence, perceived red tape, and political representativeness. The measurement of public responsiveness and attitudinal willingness will not be presented here because they have been discussed in previous sections.

Municipal managers’ behavioral willingness primarily addresses concerns on the adoption of public responsiveness. Unlike attitudinal willingness which refers to whether public responsiveness *should* be promoted, behavioral willingness reflects municipal managers’ judgment on whether public responsiveness *could* be pursued based on administrative practicability. Their level of behavioral willingness is a reflection of municipal managers’ perceived administrative cost and the balance between the potential benefit and cost. Only when the perceived benefits outweigh the cost may municipal
managers be motivated to be responsive. In this study, municipal managers’ behavioral
willingness was measured by their perceptions on the external pressure, cost, risk and
challenge of performing public responsiveness in a 1-5 scale (1=strongly disagree,
5=strongly agree).

Support from elected officials was measured by a three-item index. All three
items were also measured in a 1-5 scale with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral,
4=agree, and 5=strongly agree. One item tapped municipal managers’ perceived general
trust from elected officials; another item assessed the perceived elected officials’ trust on
municipal managers’ administrative decision-making; and the third item evaluated the
perceived elected officials’ trust on municipal managers’ performances. The
measurement of internal coordination was designed to assess the extent of coordination
and collaboration within the local government between municipal managers and their
subordinates (Christensen and Lægreid 2008).

The rest of the variables were measured by a single-item since their validity and
reliability have been tested by previous studies. Media influence was measured by
municipal managers’ perception to the extent that their decision-making is influenced by
media opinions (Yang and Pandey 2007). Citizen satisfaction was measured by the extent
that municipal managers perceive that their job was positively evaluated by citizens
(Yang and Pandey 2007). Municipal managers’ perceived red tape was measured by a
single-item global measure (Rainey et. al., 1995; Pandey and Scott 2002). Lastly,
political representativeness was measured by the percentage of district-elected
representatives in the entire city council (Zhang and Liao 2011).
## Table 18. Variables and Measurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal managers’ public responsiveness</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>In formulating local budget, I make sure citizens are aware of the major problems we face.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In formulating the local budget, I make sure that citizens’ perspectives are solicited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In preparing budgetary proposals, I have discussions with citizens about possible alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The views offered by citizens in the budget process strongly influence my decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal willingness</strong>&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>Identity-based attitudinal willingness:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I know what is best for the public, based on my professional expertise (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I am experienced enough to know the public needs without consulting with the public (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception-based attitudinal willingness:</strong></td>
<td>Citizens who participate know what they really want.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In my previous experience of seeking citizen input in administration, citizens provide constructive ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisions are a lot better if they follow discussions with citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral willingness</strong>&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>If I spend a lot of time in discussion with citizens, effectiveness of my municipal government tends to decline (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If I reach out to citizens to discuss administrative matters, I run real risks that they will criticize me (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It takes a lot of time and effort to effectively involve citizens in municipal decision-making (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is hard to satisfy public demands (R).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media influence</strong>(^b)</td>
<td>Media opinion exerts great influence on my decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Representativeness</strong></td>
<td>The ratio of the city council seats elected by district to the total seats of city council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support from elected officials</strong>(^b)</td>
<td>Most elected officials in my municipal government trust me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>My administrative decisions are supported by elected officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most elected officials are satisfied with my performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen satisfaction</strong>(^b)</td>
<td>Average citizens say that my municipal government is doing a good job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived red tape</strong>(^c)</td>
<td>If red tape is defined as “burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on the organization’s effectiveness,” how would you assess the level of red tape in your organization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong>(^b)</td>
<td>As a city manager, I coordinate several work units to facilitate collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In my municipal government, information or experiences are often shared in meetings or during teamwork.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
(R) Reverse coded
a. Items were measured on a five-point scale (never, seldom, neutral, sometimes, always).
b. Items were measured on a five-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree).
c. Items were measured on a ten-point scale with 1=the least red tape and 10 = the highest level of red tape.
d. Item was measured by the actual number of tenure.
Analysis Technique

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to test the theoretical model (shown in Figure 6). SEM allows a more complex modeling to estimate multiple interrelated relationships (Tran and Cox 2009). I assess the proposed relationship by following a two-step approach suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). This approach requires testing the reliability and validity of measurements before the test of theory. As an exploratory study, a separate measurement model was tested for five latent variables, including municipal managers’ public responsiveness, their affect-based and cognition-based attitudinal willingness, behavioral willingness and internal coordination. The measurement model did not include other latent constructs (including pressure from elected officials and the public), since their measurements were derived from previous studies (Pandey, Yang and Pandey 2007, 2009).

Although the indicator variables for latent variables are ordinal, maximum likelihood (ML) will be used as the method to estimate the model assuming that ordinal variables are continuous in nature. This is acceptable when the number of Likert scale is 4 or greater and when the indicator variables meet the assumption of conditional normality (Yang and Pandey 2009).

Results

Univariate Analysis

Table 19 reports the univariate statistics for all variables. Municipal managers reported moderately high level of public responsiveness in the formulation process of
local budget. By contrast, municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness—both affect-based and cognition-based—was relatively low given that there was a large gap between the means and the scale midpoints. The dissonance between attitudinal willingness and the level of public responsiveness indicates that there should be additional explanatory factors. Municipal managers exhibit higher level of behavioral willingness than their attitudinal willingness to be responsive, since it was above the scale midpoint. Municipal managers reported relatively low level of media pressure, whereas they feel higher level of political support and perceived ability to coordinate internally.

Table 19. Univariate Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Items in Scale</th>
<th>Potential Scale Range</th>
<th>Midpoint</th>
<th>Observed Minimum Score</th>
<th>Observed Maximum Score</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Responsiveness (Local Budget)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Willingness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity-based Attitudinal Willingness</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception-based Attitudinal Willingness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Influence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Representativeness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of the Elected Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Satisfaction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Tape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interunit Coordination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Correlation matrix

Table 20 shows the strength and patterns of all bivariate correlations. As expected, municipal managers’ behavioral willingness, identity-based attitudinal willingness, perception-based attitudinal willingness, behavioral willingness, media influence, perceived political support and coordination are all positively associated with municipal managers’ public responsiveness in formulating the local budget. The exception is that political representativeness and the perceived red tape are not associated with public responsiveness. It also found out that social pressure factors (media influence and political representativeness), public support and organizational coordination do not affect municipal managers’ behavioral willingness. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients is between 0.11 and 0.34, with the highest correlation coefficient between cognition-based attitudinal willingness and public responsiveness in formulating local budget.
Table 20. Bivariate Correlations  
\( (N=292) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public Responsiveness (Local Budgeting)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Behavioral Willingness</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Perception-based Attitudinal Willingness</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Identity-based Attitudinal Willingness</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Media Influence</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Political Representativeness</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Support of Elected Officials</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Citizen Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Perceived Red Tape</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>-0.29***</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>10. Interunit Coordination</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *\( p<0.1 \), **\( p<0.05 \), ***\( p<0.01 \)
Measurement Model

Stata 12.0 was used to validate the measures of the five latent variables: public responsiveness, internal coordination, behavioral willingness to be responsive, identity-based and perception-based attitudinal willingness. First, Cronbach’s alpha, average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR) were used to test the reliability of the measures. I obtained Cronbach’s alpha for each set of construct (0.56-0.83), surpassing the threshold identified by Nunnally (1967) and Churchill (1979) for exploratory study. AVE and CR are regarded as better indicators for reliability in SEM. AVE reflects the overall amount of variance in the indicators accounted for by the latent construct. Higher AVE indicates higher level of variance in the indicators explained by the common factor. AVE for all latent constructs passed the acceptable level of 0.50 (0.50 - 0.95). I further calculated CR which measures the internal consistency of the measures (0.66-0.99). All results indicated acceptable level of reliability.

In examining convergent validity of latent constructs, all loadings for each construct exceeded the critical value of 0.05 and all factor loadings were significant (p<0.05). Meanwhile, AVE for all constructs were higher than 0.5 and CR was higher than AVE for each construct. Combining both results indicated evidence for convergent validity.

Third, I tested for discriminant validity using correlation method and AVE method. The highest correlation between any two constructs is 0.44, indicating acceptable discriminant validity. I also tested the discriminant validity by comparing whether the
square root of AVE for each construct was greater than its highest correlation with any other construct. All constructs passed the tests.

Finally, the model fit indices of measurement model generally supported the measurement model. The comparative fit index (CFI=0.90) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI=0.87) indicated an acceptable model fit. The root mean square error of appropriation (RMSEA=0.06) and the standardized root mean square residual (RMR=0.05) all met the required standard. The $\chi^2/df$ ratio (163.96/80=1.79) met the criteria ($\chi^2/df < 3$). Though the model chi-square is significant ($p=0.000$), this would not be a large concern considering chi-square is extremely sensitive to model complexity (Perry et al. 2008). Generally, these results support the use of the measures.

**Structural Model**

The second stage of SEM analysis is to use structural models to test whether the direct and indirect relationship between the variables in the proposed model was consistent with the result found in the data analysis. Multiple fit indexes were used to evaluate each model’s overall fit. The results of multiple fit indexes were presented in Table 21. The structural model showed acceptable level of model fit. The $\chi^2$ statistic is not significant at .50 level ($p=0.3770$), and $\chi^2/df$ (1.075) meets the criteria ($\chi^2/df < 3$). RMSEA for the model was below 0.08, it is deemed that the overall fit of the model was adequate. CFI and TLI were greater than 0.90, indicating a good model fit and more than 90% of the covariation in the data could be reproduced by the analytical model. A small standard root mean squared residual (SRMR) is considered to be good fit. The SRMR is below the conventional acceptance level 0.08. The coefficient of determination (CD) is
like $R^2$ for the whole model. Again, the values of CD indicate acceptable level of model fit. The modification indices show no path should be added or deleted from the model.

### Table 21. Goodness-of-Fit for Structural Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>TLI</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
<th>CD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thresholds</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The results of path coefficients are presented in Figure 7. According to the results, identity-based attitudinal willingness to be responsive does not have a direct relationship with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive. Meanwhile, perception-based attitudinal willingness is directly associated with both municipal managers’ behavioral willingness and public responsiveness. Two factors representing social pressure (media influence and political representativeness) are found to have no impact on municipal managers’ behavioral willingness. They either have no impact or indirect relationship with public responsiveness. On the contrary, factors that are associated with municipal managers’ perceived behavioral control all have indirect or direct relationship with public responsiveness. The path coefficients of all supported hypotheses are non-trivial (absolute value $> .10$).
Findings and Discussions

Media Influence

Interestingly, the result shows that mass media pressure does not impact municipal managers’ behavioral willingness as well as their public responsiveness in formulating local budgets. A possible reason is that municipal managers may have significant level of discretion in allowing the influence of mass media (Yang and Pandey 2007). Budgeting is a policy area where professional administrators have more superior
information compared to the public. Municipal managers could have a certain level of leverage over the external environment by deciding the scope and frequency of disseminating budgetary information. One suggestion made by Baker et al. (2005) for enhancing municipal public hearings is to use multiple media and greater media frequency to create public interest and increase public awareness. In fact, this explanation could be supported by our survey result which reveals that only 17% of municipal managers in our theoretical sample frequently coordinate with local media, such as TV and radio, to communicate with the public regarding budgetary issues. Another perspective to explain the non-significant impact of media influence is the nature of government communication. Government, particularly local government, needs to communicate a broad range of information with a broad range of audiences compared to business organizations (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey 2008). Government is at the center of all communication networks. Thus, media coverage on one specific public event could be easily and quickly replaced by another topic. This frequently changing climate makes the media focus on a specific policy issue and media influence hard to sustain. It also should be noted this research only examines the influence of traditional media. With the advancement of social media and related technology, future study could be conducted to examine the influence of social media on responsiveness-related behavior.

**Political Representativeness**

Our result shows that political representativeness of the elected body is not statistically related to municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive. Again, it seems to suggest that municipal managers indeed have leverage over external
environments including political pressure from elected officials. Pressure from elected officials is not one of municipal managers’ major concerns with respect to the cost or challenges in implementing responsive budgeting. Ho (2002) found out that many elected officials have difficulties in understanding the financial statements of local governments. As a result, “the responsibility of ensuring financial accountability of government falls largely on small group of financial administrators and auditors (Ho 2002, 99).” Due to municipal managers’ central role in the process of formulating budgets, they may have the abilities to minimize political pressure and oversight (Yang and Pandey 2007).

The hypothesis that public representativeness will have a positive relationship with municipal managers’ perceived red tape is supported. As indicated earlier, district representatives will presumably know better the preferences of their particular districts and are less concerned with efficiency of city-wide operations, than the at-large representatives (MacManus 1985). While at-large representation tends to elect someone representing median voters, district representation is more likely to elect someone from minority groups, either ethnic minority groups or policy minority groups, to the city council (Southwick 1997). In nature, bureaucratic structure is negotiated between elected officials and administrators to serve political purposes. Change in political context requires organization to change the way it is operated. Combining the two, the presence of a larger proportion of district representatives, thus, would lead to a higher degree of municipal managers’ perceived red tape since district representatives may use organizational rules to ensure equity and fairness for marginalized groups (Frederickson 1997). The result also shows that political representativeness has a positive relationship with municipal managers’ public responsiveness in budgeting via the mediation of red
tape. By increasing the percentage of district representatives, more diverse issues will be brought to the council meeting. It also increases citizen participation in council meeting and responsiveness to the minority groups in the distribution of benefits (MacManus 1985).

**Citizen Satisfaction**

Citizens evaluate the performance of local government. If they are satisfied with the general performance of local government, citizens tend to exert less pressure on government officials and are more likely to cooperate. Our result confirms that municipal managers’ perceived citizen satisfaction is negatively related to red tape and positively related to interunit coordination. Municipal managers are not working in a closed system. It seems to suggest that institutional constraints imposed by political superiors could be relieved by external factors, including citizen feedback.

More importantly and interestingly, the result shows that citizen satisfaction has a negative relationship with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive. This is probably because this study only measures municipal managers’ perceived citizen satisfaction rather than the actual citizen satisfaction. When municipal managers believe that their performance was recognized by citizens, they may be reluctant to change the status quo. After all, any change in how municipal managers work with citizens and process citizen input would necessarily bring in unforeseen risks and challenges. This finding brings attention to a culture of skeptical distrust. As Kim (2010) noticed, citizen’s right to criticize government, gather and demonstrate is crucial to ensure government’s democratic accountability.
In contrast, according to the total effects, citizen satisfaction has a positive relationship with municipal managers’ public responsiveness in local budgeting. As indicated earlier, even though citizen satisfaction does not positively promote municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsiveness, it may be able to facilitate public responsiveness by increasing citizens’ political efficacy. By focusing on electronic participation, Kim and Lee (2012) observed that citizen’s satisfaction with the user-friendliness of e-participation applications is positively associated with citizens’ access to information, sharing with other participants and self-learning and development. They also noticed that e-participants’ satisfaction with quality of government response to them is positively associated with their perceived influence on decision-making. In return, citizen’s political efficacy motivates them to discuss and have a dialogue with government officials, through which public responsiveness is enhanced. It is also possible that the relationship between citizen satisfaction and public responsiveness is reciprocal. Municipal managers should attempt to increase citizen satisfaction by being responsive to the public.

**Support from Elected Officials**

Support from elected officials is found to be negatively associated with municipal managers’ perceived red tape. This is consistent with previous studies that show red tape increases as inspections are imposed from external stakeholders (Walker and Brewer 2008, Yang and Pandey 2009). It also shows that support from elected officials is positively related to municipal managers’ ability to effectively coordinate within the organization. For municipal managers maintaining a supportive relationship with political
superiors, rules and rigidity might be eased. In contrast, municipal managers who lack political support and trust would be subject to political intervention which includes increased red tape and decreased autonomy in coordination.

The result supports that political support is positively associated with behavioral willingness to be responsive. Previous studies have suggested that increased political support means leadership stability. It would lead to administrators’ perception of greater security and lower cost so that they are more willing to take risks and experiment new ways of doing things (Yang and Pandey 2011). In other words, steady political support could directly lead to municipal managers’ higher behavioral intention.

The result also supports that hypothesis that political support is positively associated with municipal managers’ public responsiveness. Political support could facilitate the use of two-way engagement mechanisms, which is an indication of our synthesized perspective of public responsiveness. Municipal managers are often under pressure to meet competing expectations in a timely as well as effective way. Especially when facing budget cuts, municipal managers can only perform limited policy agenda. With limited time frame and limited resource, municipal managers are driven to show immediate return on investment from government programs to their political superiors. However, responding to citizen demands often takes a much longer timeframe. Thus, strong political support would make municipal managers feel more flexible in terms of resources and the timeframe to figure out solutions through dialogue and discussions. Interactive engagement mechanisms (eg. public hearing and citizen advisory board) which require more patience from all stakeholders are more likely to be adopted, which
facilitates joint problem solving among all stakeholders. Finally, supportive relationship may also facilitate communication between elected officials and municipal managers so that citizen demands could be effectively transmitted to municipal managers through elected officials.

One of the major reasons for a hostile relationship between elected officials and municipal managers is that they have different professional rationales. Elected officials have the power of policy-making, so their attention is primarily drawn to please constituents through policy development. In contrast, municipal managers run the administration; they tend to improve government performance through gradual gains that come from operational change. However, this does not mean that relationship between elected officials and municipal managers is not compatible. Political support could still be earned by municipal managers who are skillful in coping with environmental complexity (Yang and Pandey 2007). For the purpose of fostering public responsiveness, on the one hand, elected officials should gain more understanding on the day-to-day operation of local government; on the other hand, municipal managers should identify and seize controllable opportunities to gain political support (Behn 2002).

**Inter-unit Coordination**

The result shows that municipal managers’ ability to coordinate effectively within the organization is not associated with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive. Given the path results, it probably suggests that municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive is primarily driven by environmental factors and their attitude rather than by organizational ones. Even with the removal of organizational
constraints on municipal managers, they still need incentives from key stakeholders in governance process, particularly political officials and citizens, to forge their behavioral willingness to be responsive.

However, inter-unit coordination indeed has a positive relationship with municipal managers’ public responsiveness in budget formulation. Due to the complexity of this process, being responsive often involves the collaboration of different units of local government. Coordination could facilitate dialogues, joint planning and exchange of resources between different units of government organization. Interunit coordination could also enhance public responsiveness in local budgeting by facilitating sharing interdepartmental knowledge. Wilem and Buelens (2007) noted that interunit coordination, particularly lateral coordination and informal coordination, has the potential to improve organization-wide knowledge sharing, thus preventing conflicts between policy programs and forming holistic solutions. Furthermore, effective interunit coordination, especially informal coordination, signifies an open atmosphere within the organization for policy discussion, which allows more citizen input to be incorporated.

Perceived Red Tape

The bivariate correlation matrix shows that municipal managers’ perceived red tape has a negatively and statistically significant relationship with their behavioral willingness to be responsive. However, perceived red tape lost its statistical importance in the path analysis results of SEM. The possible reason is that the SEM model has washed away the effect of red tape when it is measured in aggregated form (Brewer and Walker 2010). The negative impact of red tape on behavioral willingness may have been
mitigated by the motivation provided by their attitudinal willingness. Those municipal managers determined to be responsive to public demands will be able to find ways to overcome barriers. As Ammons (2004) noticed, determined managers find ways to work within legal restrictions and other administrative rules so that they could work around or change them. Municipal managers should not simply use rules and regulations as managerial alibis to excuse themselves for inaction (Ammons 2004).

Surprisingly and interestingly, municipal managers’ perceived red tape is found to be positively associated with their public responsiveness in formulating a local budget based on its total effect. Again, it reflects that our global measurement probably may fail to capture the multidimensional nature of red tape. It demonstrates that administrative procedure or regulation is necessary to ensure democratic values when dealing with policy issues that are driven by specialized expertise. Reflecting on the idea of “entrepreneur government”, Denhardt (2008, p.144) discussed the risks of overemphasizing innovation and neglect of democratic control:

The “shadow” side of the entrepreneur is characterized by a narrow focus, an unwillingness to follow rules and stay within bounds, and a preference for action so strong as to threaten accountability…Cutting red tape…requires opportunism, single-mindedness, and extraordinary confidence in one’s personal vision…As a practical matter, in real organizations, entrepreneurial managers pose a difficult and risky problem: they can be innovative and productive, but their single-mindedness, tenacity, and willingness to bend the rules make them very difficult
to control…it denies the public a role in determining the expenditure of public funds and the design of public programs.

There is no a “feasible” level of rules or regulations that fit all policy areas. While red tape is generally detrimental to policies such as solving citizens’ complaints about the quality of public service, red tape could be necessary for policies that municipal managers have advantages with respect to professional knowledge, skill and expertise. There should be a balance between the ease of regulation and the “slower and more hesitating but more involving and perhaps democratic efforts (Denhardt 2008, p.144).”

**Attitudinal Willingness**

Municipal managers’ identity-based attitudinal willingness is positively associated with their behavioral willingness, whereas perception-based attitudinal willingness is found to have no impact on behavioral willingness. It suggests that professional ethics have more influence than instrumental thoughts in terms of motivating municipal managers to be responsive. For municipal managers with stronger identity as a community spokesperson, they would less likely be constrained by lack of external incentives.

However, the impact of identity-based attitudinal willingness on public responsiveness is mediated by behavioral willingness. It does not have a direct relationship with performing public responsiveness. Professional identity primarily denotes municipal managers’ recognition of the value of public responsiveness, independent of practical concerns. Such self-identity may not be able to directly motivate
or push municipal managers to perform public responsiveness. Rather, its impact has to rely on the realization of behavioral willingness.

Perception-based attitudinal willingness is based on municipal managers’ instrumental and experiential evaluation of public responsiveness along the line of like or dislike (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). It is a result of direct interaction with citizens; it is also a reflection on prior experience of being responsive. In this sense, perception-based attitudinal willingness has more behavioral implications, thus, a direct relationship with public responsiveness. In fact, perception-based attitudinal willingness is the strongest predictor of public responsiveness in the model. It confirms the argument in the previous chapter that attitudinal willingness is vital in shaping municipal managers’ public responsiveness. This implies that facilitating municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive should focus more on perception-based attitudinal willingness. In order to enhance municipal managers’ perception-based attitudinal willingness, the intervention could be designed to bring in positive experience and outcomes. Consider, for example, during the beginning phase, individuals who are selected to negotiate with municipal managers on behalf of local community could be those who can articulate the requests and who have expertise on relevant topics.

**Behavioral Willingness**

The inclusion of behavioral willingness into the research model emphasizes the importance of municipal managers’ perceived administrative practicability in fostering public responsiveness. As predicted, behavioral willingness to be responsive is positively associated with municipal managers’ public responsiveness in doing the local budget.
Behavioral willingness to be responsive is the municipal managers’ estimate of the likelihood or perceived probability of performing public responsiveness. According to the Reasoned Action Model, behavioral willingness is a combination of attitudinal, normative and control considerations. The result also shows that identity-based attitudinal willingness has the strongest impact among all three antecedents of municipal managers’ behavioral willingness, implying that attitude plays a primary role in shaping their behavioral willingness.

**Conclusion**

This study confirms that municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness are among the determinants of their public responsiveness. Particularly, their behavioral willingness to be responsive is influenced jointly by their attitudinal willingness to be responsive and environmental factors, including their social pressure from citizens and their perceived political support. Institutional factors, including red tape, political representativeness of the elected body and interunit coordination seem to have no association with municipal managers’ behavioral willingness to be responsive. It also offers suggestions on how to improve municipal managers’ public responsiveness in local budgeting. As a policy area that requires specialized expertise, attitudinal willingness, behavioral willingness, political support, political representation of the elected body, citizen satisfaction, inter-unit coordination and red tape are all associated with municipal managers’ public responsiveness directly or indirectly. To increase municipal managers’ public responsiveness in local budgeting, we should pay special attention to those factors that facilitate municipal managers’
perceived behavioral control (political support, interunit coordination and citizen satisfaction/trust), those factors that shape their subjective norms to perform public responsiveness (red tape and political representativeness of city council) and their own willingness to be responsive.
CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter summarizes the whole dissertation project. It will firstly review the theoretical framework and the key findings, and then present the theoretical contribution and implications of this study. Research limitations and possible research directions in the future will also be discussed.

Theoretical Contributions

The overall research objective of this dissertation project is to: (1) clarify the complexity of the concept of public responsiveness; (2) identify the antecedents of municipal managers’ public responsiveness in the formulation of local budget. The findings of this study also have both theoretical and practical implications to the study of public administration, especially for city government management.

First, this study provides a pragmatic model of understanding the concept of public responsiveness. The understanding of the facilitators of public responsiveness has to be built on a clear understanding of the concept per se. This study presents three streams of understanding public responsiveness. The citizen-driven model of public responsiveness argues that public administrators should completely and faithfully follow citizen demands. It is a “citizen-get-what-they-want” perspective. Within such a model, public administrators are treated as passive delegates whose decisions should be in conformity with political directives. The second model is the expertise-driven model which addresses the significance of professional expertise in identifying and pursuing
desirable ends. The underlying assumption of this model is that citizen demands are self-centered, scattered, and short-termed. Only through professional expertise can holistic public interest be revealed. The third model, which this dissertation argues for, is a procedure-oriented approach which adopts a pragmatic approach to ease the tension between public will and professional expertise in pursuing public interest. It is “pragmatic” in the sense that it acknowledges the ideal of a citizen-driven model and the necessity of the expertise-driven model; At the same time, it uses a process-based approach which rest with public discussion and deliberation to realize public responsiveness. This model of public responsiveness also emphasizes public administrators’ intentions or willingness to engage citizens in a reciprocal process.

Second, this study is one of the first few studies to include public administrators’ individual willingness into the analysis of public responsiveness. This dissertation builds on existing studies that attempt to identify the determinants of public responsiveness. One significant research gap of existing researches was noticed, that is, few studies have included public administrators’ willingness concerning the analysis framework. Current studies have identified organizational factors, environmental factors, features of policy clients and problem intensity as predictors of public responsiveness. However, examining public responsiveness without assessing individuals’ willingness would neglect their own interpretation of the environmental and institutional factors. This observation is particularly true when it comes to this study’s population of interest --- municipal managers. This study is also one of the few studies to focus on municipal managers’ public responsiveness in one particular policy area---the formulation of local budget.
Third, this study distinguishes two levels of the individual’s willingness to be responsive. It argues that two levels of individual willingness to be responsive should be taken into account. The first and more basic level is individual attitudinal willingness which refers to their evaluation of the value of public responsiveness per se. The second and more comprehensive level is municipal managers’ behavioral willingness which is their readiness to enact public responsiveness. It is a particular combination of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness and their concerns related to the implementation of public responsiveness, including the social pressure they received and the perceived behavioral control.

Fourth, by arguing that attitudinal and behavioral willingness mediate the impact of environmental and organizational factors on public responsiveness, this study, firstly, could examine the determinants of municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness. Secondly, this study could propose a theoretical model of public responsiveness by connecting environmental factors, organizational factors, municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness to be responsiveness and their actual level of public responsiveness.

**Implications**

According to the research findings, this study provides some theoretical and empirical implications to public administration literature.

First, it is important to provide social learning opportunities for municipal managers in order to nurture their positive attitude toward being responsive. The attitudinal willingness model showed the factor with the strongest impact is observing
successful implementations and practices in other municipalities. It highlights the importance of social learning in promoting municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive. Social learning is a process of acquiring and assimilating new experiences and useful social knowledge (Korten 1981). It could be divided into maintenance learning and innovative learning (Botkin et al., 1979). Nurturing a positive attitude toward public responsiveness falls into the category of innovative learning which is directed to create new values. Our result shows that conventional training and textbooks may not be the best way to transmit social knowledge like the value of public responsiveness. As Korten (1981) suggested, the key to successful innovative learning is to encourage a number of social experiments by imitating other municipalities, through which experiences are exchanged. In sum, municipal managers should not only pay attention to technical learning, they should take a broader approach to learning which include redefining policy goals, adjusting problem strategies and interactions among actors (Fiorino 2001).

Second, this study confirms that a thorough understanding of the determinants of public responsiveness cannot be separated from examining municipal managers’ willingness. It implies that top management indeed takes a central role in bringing any adjustment into the relationship between public administration and citizens. Attitudinal willingness is found to be the strongest factor in influencing municipal managers’ public responsiveness in budget preparation, signifying the importance of bureaucratic mindset reorientation. At the same time, behavioral willingness is also found to be significantly associated with public responsiveness. The policy implication is that the incentives of municipal managers should be taken into consideration in facilitating the adoption of administrative innovations. The regression result that municipal managers’ behavioral
willingness is not associated with organizational factors, such as red tape and interunit coordination, probably implies that even with the removal of organizational constraints, municipal managers still need external pressure (citizen disapproval) and external resource support (political support from elected officials) to forge their behavioral willingness to be responsive.

Third, this study also provides some empirical implications by explaining how external environment and organizational factors impact municipal managers’ public responsiveness. In a policy area that is embedded in specialized expertise, environmental and organizational factors tend to enhance municipal managers’ public responsiveness (1) through institutional constraints, such as red tape; (2) through enhancing their perceived behavioral control, such as, their increased ability to coordinate organizational units effectively, the improved citizen approval, and the increased political support. Direct pressure from mass media and city council may just have limited or no impact in municipal managers’ actual level of public responsiveness.

Research Limitations

In spite of the theoretical contribution of this study, it also has some limitations.

First, the results should be interpreted with caution beyond the sample of municipal managers. Other types of public administrators may have a different professional socialization process than municipal managers. The mechanisms that they could utilize to respond to public demands may not entail frequent face-to-face interaction as municipal managers do. For the public responsiveness model, other groups of administrators, such as public employees, may have different leverage over
environmental and organizational factors, thus, a different level of perceived political support, red tape, attitudinal willingness and behavioral willingness to be responsive. Future study should verify the results with other types of public administrators.

Second, this study only considers municipal managers’ public responsiveness in the formulation of the local budget, which represents the development of new policies. As we mentioned, the local budget is a policy area which is characterized by professional expertise and specialized skills. Other policy areas, however, might have a different set of determinants of municipal managers’ public responsiveness. For example, future study could directly examine municipal managers’ public responsiveness in dealing with citizen complaints, which represents a municipal manager’s daily routine.

Third, municipal managers’ attitude changes over time. The cross-sectional study cannot ensure causality between the determinants and municipal managers’ attitude. To better capture the dynamics of attitudinal change, longitudinal study may be needed in the future.

Fourth, measurement of this study could be improved in future studies. Some of the variables could be more directly measured in a refined survey instrument. For example, survey questions could directly ask municipal managers about their behavioral intention to perform public responsiveness.

Finally, the attitudinal willingness model only examines the direct relationship between the determinants and municipal managers’ attitudinal willingness to be responsive. It would be interesting to see the interaction between the determinants of attitudinal willingness in future research. It would also be interesting to see the
interaction effects between attitude and other factors in determining behavior (Kelman 2005). Future research could study the interaction effect between attitudinal willingness to be responsive and other factors. It is possible that other factors will decrease the strength of attitude on behavior since such variables compete with attitude to explain behavior. For example, political support will decrease the strength of attitudinal willingness. Since limited organizational and environmental factors were included in the public responsiveness model, future studies could also include more determinants of behavioral willingness to address municipal managers’ social pressure and perceived behavioral control.

In sum, this study presents preliminary theoretical framework and findings related to municipal managers’ public responsiveness. There is still much room for improvement in future studies.

**Future Research Direction**

Future research on public responsiveness could be pursued in following aspects:

First, the survey findings could be tested with samples from other states. This study only collected data from municipal managers in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. As the survey findings indicated, there is no significant difference between the two states in terms of municipal managers’ public responsiveness. A possible explanation is that these two states share some similarities in the form of local governments, the demographics and the political climate. Future study could test if the findings still hold true in other regions, such as the Southern states, which have different community characteristics than those in the Northeast.
Second, future study could include additional explanatory variables in the theoretical models. For example, in the attitudinal willingness model, it is plausible to consider the impact of the academic community and citizen advocacy groups on municipal managers’ socialization, and thus their attitude. In the public responsiveness model, we only included two organizational factors--- municipal managers’ ability to conduct inter-unit coordination and their perceived red tape. Other organizational factors, such as formalization and municipal managers’ institutional authority, could be examined in future studies.

Finally, since this study uses a recursive model to explain municipal managers’ public responsiveness, caution needs to be taken when interpreting the causality of the model. In the public responsiveness model, paths in both directions could exist between factors. For example, our model only proposes a one-way between municipal managers’ perceived political support and their public responsiveness. However, municipal managers with higher levels of public responsiveness may in turn lead to a higher level of political support. In other words, the relationship may be reciprocal. Future study could use simultaneous regression model to examine the potential two-way relationship. Qualitative studies, such as interview and focus groups, may also be a useful addition in future studies to explore the causation.
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White, O. F. and McSwain, D. J. 1990. The phoenix project: Raising a new image of public administration from the ashes of the past. *Administration and Society*, 22, 3-38.


Dear Municipal Manager/Administrator,

I am a Ph.D. Candidate from the School of Public Affairs and Administration at Rutgers University-Newark. I am conducting a research project investigating municipal managers’ work tasks in order to better understand the overall operation of local government. This project also follows up on a study conducted by Rutgers Prof. Yahong Zhang two years ago.

I cordially invite all municipal managers (chief administrative officers, city administrators, town administrators, business administrators) in New Jersey to participate in this research. Your participation is completely voluntary but it is essential to the success of the research. Your responses will remain confidential to the extent allowed by law. The results of the research may be published, but only in aggregate form and your personal information will not be used in any situation. Therefore, you do not face any potential risk in the survey. Return of the questionnaire will be considered your consent to participate.

Enclosed with this letter is a brief questionnaire. It takes approximately 15 minutes to complete. Please return your response in the stamped, self-addressed envelope I have provided at your earliest convenience. I would especially appreciate if you return your response within two weeks. The aggregated results of the survey will be provided via email in early 2012.

This study has been approved by Rutgers University Institutional Review Board (Protocol # E12-066). If you have any question about your rights in completing this questionnaire, please contact the IRB administrator at (732) 932-0150 × 2104 or at humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu. If you have any questions concerning the research, please contact me at (584) 354-4449 or at yuguo@pegasus.rutgers.edu. Thank you for your time and expertise!

Sincerely,

Yuguo Liao
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
111 Washington Street, Newark, NJ 07102
1. Regarding your work environment, please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most elected officials in my municipal government trust me</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My administrative decisions are supported by elected officials</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most elected officials are satisfied with my performance</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media opinion exerts great influence on my decision-making</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I work hard, but the local media still find fault with my work</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average citizens say that my municipal government is doing a good job</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal networks are necessary for me to do my job efficiently in my municipal government</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have my own network with people that can advise me when I face a problem or need help</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Citizens may contact you when they have problems with public service. Please indicate the frequency of following statements. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I welcome citizens’ suggestions on how to improve public service</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I receive a citizen’s complaint, I investigate it within a few days</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work to develop solutions to citizen grievances, I discuss them with citizens over the phone, by email or other means</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work to develop solutions to citizen grievances, I incorporate citizen preferences into the solutions</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my responses to citizen requests or complaints leave them pleased with the outcome</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. In your municipality, who is responsible for drafting the budget proposal?

- [ ] Municipal manager
- [ ] Mayor
- [ ] Other (please specify): ________________

4. Regarding budgeting activities, please indicate the frequency of following statements. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In formulating the local budget, I make sure citizens are aware of the major problems we face.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In formulating the local budget, I make sure that citizens' perspectives are solicited.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In preparing budgetary proposals, I have discussions with citizens about possible alternatives.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The views offered by citizens in the budget process strongly influence my decisions.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Please indicate the frequency of the following methods in your municipal government that involve citizens in budgeting. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public budgetary hearings</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forums or workshops open to citizens during budget preparation</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for citizens to speak at regular meetings</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen advisory boards</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with the local media, such as TV and radio, to invite the public comments</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen surveys about program priorities and spending needs through mail, Internet or telephone</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posting budget materials on Internet sites</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotlines for citizens to provide suggestions or comments</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (please specify)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Regarding citizen involvement in administration, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens who participate know what they really want</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my previous experience of seeking citizen input in administration,</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens provide constructive ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know what is best for the public, based on my professional expertise</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am experienced enough to know the public needs without consulting</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I spend a lot of time in discussions with citizens, effectiveness of my</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>municipal government tends to decline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I reach out to citizens to discuss administrative matters, I run real</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risks that they will criticize me</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions are a lot better if they follow discussions with citizens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It takes a lot of time and effort to effectively involve citizens in</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>municipal decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits of involving citizens in decision-making outweigh the costs</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work with citizens, I am skillful in eliciting their participation</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is hard to satisfy public demands</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident that I can reduce criticism from the public</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know that some city managers are committed to working with citizens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to solve community issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am aware that some city managers can successfully balance the</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public's needs and professional expertise through a mutual dialogue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. If red tape is defined as "burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on the organization's effectiveness," how would you assess the level of red tape in your organization? (Please circle one number)

Almost No Red Tape

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

Great Deal of Red Tape
8. We are interested in your views about rules and procedures of decision-making, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency is more important than fairness in advancing public interest.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some groups and citizens deserve special consideration because they are much more vital to the future of the community than others.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition should be introduced into the delivery of public service.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition can moderate the cost of government services.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have adequate communication with immediate subordinates (e.g., department leaders) about the municipality’s strategic direction.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-line employees provide sufficient feedback to me on work performance</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I stay in close touch with elected officials concerning the key administrative issues.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like to try different ways to solve community problems.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I encourage employees to make suggestions in improving our work performance.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a city manager, I coordinate several work units to facilitate collaboration.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my municipal government, information or experiences are often shared in meetings or during teamwork.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers are customers and should be treated as such.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government should be entrepreneurial.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government should develop non-tax revenue resources.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be financial incentives for municipal employees to be more entrepreneurial.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Please assess the level of record keeping in your municipal government on a scale of 1 to 10. *(Please circle one number)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Extremely Low</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Extremely High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
10. When making important decisions about local services in your municipality, how important is it to have a long-term perspective? (Please circle one number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of Little Importance</th>
<th>Extremely Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. On an overall basis, please rate the effectiveness of your municipal government in accomplishing its core mission on a scale of 1 to 10. (Please circle one number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Effective At All</th>
<th>Extremely Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by New Jersey League of Municipalities (NJLM)?

Approximate number of times in a year ____________

13. How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by New Jersey Municipal Management Association (NJMMA)?

Approximate number of times in a year ____________

14. Please indicate how long you have worked in each of the following three types of organizations. Put 0 if you do not have any experience with that type.

a. Public (government)...........Approximately _______ year(s) (including the years of your current position)

b. Private company................Approximately _______ year(s)

c. Non-profit organization.......Approximately _______ year(s)

15. How long have you been in your current position as a municipal manager: ____________ year(s)

16. In your municipality, how is the position of mayor selected? (Please mark one box with an X)

- [ ] Direct election by voters
- [ ] Selection by council (commission) members from among themselves
- [ ] Highest number of votes among council members in the general election
- [ ] Rotation of council (commission) members through position of mayor.

17. Is the mayor one of the council (commission) members?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No, the mayor has separate power.
18. How many of your current council (commission) members are of the following ethnicities?
   Number of African-Americans ____  Number of Hispanics ____
   Number of Asian-Americans ____  Number of Caucasians ____

19. How many council positions are selected at-large and by district?
   Number of seats elected at-large _________  Number of seats elected by district _________

20. Who appoints the position of municipal administrator/manager? (Please mark one box with an X).
   □ Mayor  □ Council  □ Mayor and council  □ Other (Please specify) ____________

21. Your gender:  □ Male  □ Female

22. Your age: ___________

23. Your racial identification (Please mark one box with an X):
   □ Caucasian  □ African-American  □ Hispanic
   □ Asian-American  □ Native American  □ Other

24. What is your political affiliation? (Please mark one box with an X)
   □ Democratic  □ Republican  □ Other Party  □ No party affiliation

25. What is your highest level of formal education? (Please mark one box with an X)
   □ Attended high school, but did not graduate
   □ High school graduate
   □ Attended college, but did not graduate from a 4-year college
   □ Graduated from a 4-year college
   □ Attended graduate school, but did not graduate
   □ Graduated with a MPA degree
   □ Graduated with other graduate degrees (e.g. MBA, JD)
   □ Other (please specify) ____________

Thank you for your time to complete this questionnaire.
Your assistance in providing this information is much appreciated!
Dear Municipal Manager/Administrator,

We are writing this letter to you to ask your help in our study of local government administrators. This study is sponsored by National Center for Public Performance (NCPP) at the School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University. Its purpose is to better understand the overall operation of local government.

We cordially invite all municipal managers (chief administrators) in Pennsylvania to participate in this research. Your participation is completely voluntary but it is essential to the success of the research. Your responses will remain confidential. The results of the research may be published, but only in aggregate form and your personal information will not be used in any situation. Therefore, you do not face any potential risk in the survey. Return of the questionnaire will be considered your consent to participate.

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Sincerely,

Marc Holzer
Dean and Professor
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark

Yuguo Liao
Ph.D. Candidate
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration - Rutgers University, Newark
Pennsylvania Municipal Administrator Survey

1. Regarding your work environment, please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most elected officials in my municipal government trust me...................</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>My administrative decisions are supported by elected officials.............</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most elected officials are satisfied with my performance.....................</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media opinion exerts great influence on my decision-making..................</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>I work hard, but the local media still find fault with my work...............</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average citizens say that my municipal government is doing a good job......</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal networks are necessary for me to do my job efficiently in my municipal government.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have my own network with people that can advise me when I face a problem or need help.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Citizens may contact you when they have problems with public service. Please indicate the frequency of following statements. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I welcome citizens' suggestions on how to improve public service............</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I receive a citizen's complaint, I investigate it within a few days.....</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work to develop solutions to citizen grievances, I discuss them with citizens over the phone, by email or other means..................</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work to develop solutions to citizen grievances, I incorporate citizen preferences into the solutions.........................................................</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my responses to citizen requests or complaints leave them pleased with the outcome.................................................................</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. In your municipality, who is responsible for drafting the budget proposal?

☐ Municipal manager  ☐ Mayor  ☐ Other (please specify): __________________

4. Regarding budgeting activities, please indicate the frequency of following statements. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In formulating the local budget, I make sure citizens are aware of the major problems we face.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In formulating the local budget, I make sure that citizens’ perspectives are solicited.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In preparing budgetary proposals, I have discussions with citizens about possible alternatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The views offered by citizens in the budget process strongly influence my decisions.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5. Please indicate the frequency of the following methods in your municipal government that involve citizens in budgeting. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public budgetary hearings</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Forums or workshops open to citizens during budget preparation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunities for citizens to speak at regular meetings</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen advisory boards</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with the local media, such as TV and radio, to invite the public comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen surveys about program priorities and spending needs through mail, Internet or telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posting budget materials on Internet sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotlines for citizens to provide suggestions or comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Regarding citizen involvement in administration, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements. (Please mark only one box in each row with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens who participate know what they really want</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my previous experience of seeking citizen input in administration, citizens provide constructive ideas</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know what is best for the public, based on my professional expertise</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am experienced enough to know the public needs without consulting with the public</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I spend a lot of time in discussions with citizens, effectiveness of my municipal government tends to decline</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I reach out to citizens to discuss administrative matters, I run real risks that they will criticize me</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions are a lot better if they follow discussions with citizens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It takes a lot of time and effort to effectively involve citizens in municipal decision-making</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits of involving citizens in decision-making outweigh the costs</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I work with citizens, I am skillful in eliciting their participation</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is hard to satisfy public demands</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident that I can reduce criticism from the public</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know that some city managers are committed to working with citizens to solve community issues</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am aware that some city managers can successfully balance the public's needs and professional expertise through a mutual dialogue with citizens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. If red tape is defined as "burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on the organization's effectiveness," how would you assess the level of red tape in your organization? (Please circle one number)

Almost No Red Tape

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Great Deal of Red Tape
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
8. We are interested in your views about rules and procedures of decision-making, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements. *(Please mark only one box in each row with an X)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency is more important than fairness in advancing public interest.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Some groups and citizens deserve special consideration because they are much more vital to the future of the community than others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition should be introduced into the delivery of public service.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition can moderate the cost of government services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I have adequate communication with immediate subordinates (e.g., department leaders) about the municipality’s strategic direction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Front-line employees provide sufficient feedback to me on work performance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I stay in close touch with elected officials concerning the key administrative issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I like to try different ways to solve community problems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I encourage employees to make suggestions in improving our work performance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>As a city manager, I coordinate several work units to facilitate collaboration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In my municipal government, information or experiences are often shared in meetings or during teamwork.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxpayers are customers and should be treated as such.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local government should be entrepreneurial.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local government should develop non-tax revenue resources.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be financial incentives for municipal employees to be more entrepreneurial.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Please assess the level of record keeping in your municipal government on a scale of 1 to 10. *(Please circle one number)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Extremely Low</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Extremely High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. When making important decisions about local services in your municipality, how important is it to have a long-term perspective? *(Please circle one number)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of Little Importance</th>
<th>Extremely Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. On an overall basis, please rate the effectiveness of your municipal government in accomplishing its core mission on a scale of 1 to 10. *(Please circle one number)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Effective At All</th>
<th>Extremely Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by Pennsylvania League of Cities and Municipalities (PLCM)?

Approximate number of times in a year __________

13. How often do you attend meetings or activities organized by Association for Pennsylvania Municipal Management (APMM)?

Approximate number of times in a year __________

14. Please indicate how long you have worked in each of the following three types of organizations. Put 0 if you do not have any experience with that type.

a. Public (government)..........Approximately ______ year(s) (including the years of your current position)
b. Private company............Approximately ______ year(s)
c. Non-profit organization....Approximately ______ year(s)

15. How long have you been in your current position as a municipal manager: __________ year(s)

16. In your municipality, how is the position of mayor selected? *(Please mark one box with an X)*

- [ ] Direct election by voters
- [ ] Selection by council members from among themselves
- [ ] Highest number of votes among council members in the general election
- [ ] Rotation of council members through position of mayor.

17. Is the mayor one of the council members?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No, the mayor has separate power
18. How many of your current council members are of the following ethnicities?
   Number of African-Americans __________ Number of Hispanics __________
   Number of Asian-Americans __________ Number of Caucasians __________

19. How many council positions are selected at-large and by district?
   Number of seats elected at-large __________ Number of seats elected by district __________

20. Who appoints the position of municipal administrator/manager? (Please mark one box with an X).
   □ Mayor  □ Council  □ Mayor and council  □ Other (Please specify) __________

21. Your gender:  □ Male  □ Female

22. Your age: __________

23. Your racial identification (Please mark one box with an X):
   □ Caucasian  □ African-American  □ Hispanic
   □ Asian-American  □ Native American  □ Other

24. What is your political affiliation? (Please mark one box with an X)
   □ Democratic  □ Republican  □ Other Party  □ No party affiliation

25. What is your highest level of formal education? (Please mark one box with an X)
   □ Attended high school, but did not graduate
   □ High school graduate
   □ Attended college, but did not graduate from a 4-year college
   □ Graduated from a 4-year college
   □ Attended graduate school, but did not graduate
   □ Graduated with a MPA degree
   □ Graduated with other graduate degrees (e.g. MBA, JD)
   □ Other (please specify) __________

Thank you for your time to complete this questionnaire.
Your assistance in providing this information is much appreciated!
APPENDIX C: NEW JERSEY SURVEY SAMPLE FOLLOW-UP EMAIL

Dear Municipal Administrator,

Three weeks ago, we mailed you a questionnaire seeking information about your career information. We are writing this email to encourage you to respond to our survey questionnaire. Our study is a project of National Center for Public Performance (NCPP) at Rutgers-Newark. It seeks to better understand the operation of local governments. As a chief administrative officer, your participation is extremely helpful to us.

If you have already responded to this survey, our deepest thanks and please disregard this mailing. If you have not returned the questionnaire, we appreciate your help in providing valuable information. Your responses will remain completely confidential. We will not release data publicly that will enable others to deduce your identity. For you convenience, we have attached the electronic version of the questionnaire. You can return your response via email at yuguo@pegasus.rutgers.edu.

If you have any questions or comments about this study, please contact Yuguo Liao at (585)354-4449 or by email at yuguo@pegasus.rutgers.edu. Again, thanks for you help!

Sincerely,

The National Center for Public Performance

School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University-Newark

The research team:
Marc Holzer, Dean and Professor
Frank J. Thompson, Professor
Yahong Zhang, Assistant Professor
Yuguo Liao, Ph.D. Candidate
APPENDIX D: NEW JERSEY SURVEY SAMPLE REPLACEMENT LETTER

RUTGERS
School of Public Affairs and Administration

Dear Municipal Manager/Administrator,

We are writing this letter to you as a follow up to ask your help in our study of local government administrators. About one month ago we mailed you a questionnaire seeking information about your professional experience. This study is sponsored by National Center for Public Performance at the Rutgers School of Public Affairs and Administration. Its purpose is to better understand the overall operation of local government. As a municipal manager (chief administrative officer, city administrator, town administrator, business administrator), your response is extremely valuable to us.

If you have already responded to this survey, our deepest thanks and please disregard this mailing.

If you have not returned the questionnaire, we encourage you to do so. For your convenience, we have enclosed a replacement survey questionnaire. Your responses will remain completely confidential. No data will be released at individual level.

If you have any questions about this survey please contact Yuguo Liao at (585) 354-4449 or via email at yuguo@pegasus.rutgers.edu. Again, we appreciate your assistance with this important study.

Sincerely,

Marc Holzer
Dean and Professor
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark

Yuguo Liao
Ph.D. Candidate
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark
APPENDIX E: NEW JERSEY SURVEY SAMPLE FINAL LETTER

Dear Municipal Manager/Administrator or current administrator,

We are writing this final letter to encourage you to respond to our study of local government administrators. About two months ago we mailed you a questionnaire seeking information about your professional experience. This study is sponsored by National Center for Public Performance at the Rutgers School of Public Affairs and Administration. Its purpose is to better understand the overall operation of local government. In order to ensure that we have a representative sample, your response is extremely valuable to us. Your responses will remain completely confidential. No data will be released at the individual level.

If you have not returned the questionnaire, we encourage you to do so.

This study has been approved by Rutgers University Institutional Review Board (Protocol # E12-066). If you have any question about your rights in completing this questionnaire, please contact the IRB administrator at (732) 932-0150 or at humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu. If you have any questions concerning the research, please contact Yuguo Liao at (584) 354-4449 or at yuguo@pegasus.rutgers.edu. Thank you very much for your time and wish you a happy holiday season!

Sincerely,

Marc Holzer
Dean and Professor
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark

Yuguo Liao
Ph.D. Candidate
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark
APPENDIX F: PENNSYLVANIA SURVEY SAMPLE REPLACEMENT LETTER

Dear Municipal Manager/Administrator or current administrator,

We are writing this letter to you as a follow up to ask your help in our study of local government administrators. About three weeks ago we mailed you a questionnaire seeking information about your professional experience. This study is sponsored by National Center for Public Performance at the Rutgers School of Public Affairs and Administration. Its purpose is to better understand the overall operation of local government. As a municipal manager (chief administrative officer, city administrator, town administrator, business administrator), your response is extremely valuable to us.

If you have already responded to this survey, our deepest thanks and please disregard this mailing. If you have not returned the questionnaire, we encourage you to do so. Your responses will remain completely confidential. No data will be released at the individual level.

This study has been approved by Rutgers University Institutional Review Board (Protocol # E12-066). If you have any question about your rights in completing this questionnaire, please contact the IRB administrator at (732) 932-0150 x 2104 or at humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu. If you have any questions concerning the research, please contact Yguo Liao at (584) 354-4449 or at yugu@pegasus.rutgers.edu. Again, we appreciate your assistance with this important study and wish you a happy holiday season!

Sincerely,

Marc Holzer
Dean and Professor
National Center for Public Performance
School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University-Newark

Yguo Liao
Ph.D. Candidate
National Center for Public Performance
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Rutgers University-Newark
CURRICULUM VITAE
Yuguo Liao

Education
May, 2013 Ph.D., Rutgers University-Newark Campus.
Major: Public Administration.

Dissertation
Municipal Manager’s Responsiveness to Public Demands: Connecting Attitudinal Willingness, Behavioral Willingness, Environmental and Organizational Factors

Committee
Frank J. Thompson (Chair), Marc Holzer, Yahong Zhang, Hindy L. Schachter.

2007 Master of Arts, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.
Major: Public Administration.

2004 Bachelor of Arts, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China.
Major: Public Administration.

Academic Awards
2011 Dissertation Research Grant, School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University, $500
2010 Asian Junior Paper Award, Global Public Administration Network, $250
2010 Dissertation Fellowship, Rutgers University, $18,000.00
2007-2009 Graduate Teaching Assistantship, Rutgers University
2004 Excellent Student Scholarship, Sun Yat-sen University
2003 Excellent Student Scholarship, Sun Yat-sen University
2002 Excellent Student Scholarship, Sun Yat-sen University

Academic Positions
Summer 2013 Instructor, Analytical Methods (MPA), Rutgers University
Summer 2013 Instructor, Research Design (MPA), Rutgers University
Spring 2013 Instructor, Research Design (MPA), Rutgers University
Spring 2013  Instructor, Public Performance Measurement On-line Certificate
Fall 2012   Instructor, Research Design (MPA), Rutgers University
Spring 2012  Instructor, Public Performance Measurement On-line Certificate
Summer 2011 Instructor, Administrative Transparency (MPA), Rutgers University
2010        Dissertation Fellow, Rutgers University
2009 – 2010 Research Assistant, Public Performance Measurement and Reporting Network
2007- 2010  Graduate Teaching Assistant, School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University

Professional Position

2007- 2010   Secretary, Chinese Section on Public Administration, American Society for Public Administration

Areas of Specialization and Teaching Interests

Public Management, Quantitative Analysis, Citizen Involvement, Organizational Theory and Behavior, Bureaucratic Politics, Administrative Ethics.

Publications


Teaching Experience

Research Design (MPA), Rutgers University (Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Summer 2013)

Public Performance Measurement Certificate (On-line course), Rutgers University (Spring 2012, Spring 2013)

Administrative Transparency (MPA), Rutgers University (Summer 2011)

Public Health (Teaching Assistant), Rutgers University (2008 - 2010)

Public Organizations (Teaching Assistant), Rutgers University (2007 -2010)

Introduction to Public Administration (Teaching Assistant), Rutgers University (2007 -2010)

Conference Presentations


Yuguo Liao, Exploring the “high trust-high performance” chain. Presentation at the annual conference of American Society for Public Administration, April 9-13, 2010. San Jose, CA.

**Other Academic Activities**

Manuscript Reviewer, *Public Performance and Management Review*

Panel moderator, the 1st Global Conference on Transparency Research, May 19-20, 2011. Newark, NJ.

Digital governance evaluator, the 2009 Digital Governance Survey, E-Governance Institute, National Center for Public Performance, Rutgers University.

Conference organizer, the 4th Sino-US International Conference on Public Administration, June 7-8, 2008. Newark, NJ.

**Professional Associations**

American Society of Public Administration (ASPA)
Public Management Research Association (PMRA)
ASPA Section on Chinese Public Administration
References

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