

Secret Diplomacy: The Practice of Back Channel Diplomacy by Liberal Democratic States

by

Nick Parfait Momengoh

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Global Affairs

Written under the direction of Dr. Richard Langhorne

And approved by

Newark, New Jersey

May 2013

Copyright page:

May 2013

Nick P. Momengoh

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Abstract of the Dissertation

Secret Diplomacy: The Practice of Secret Diplomacy by Liberal Democratic States

By Nick Parfait Momengoh

Dissertation Director:

Dr. Richard Langhorne

In January 1919, in the Paris Peace Conference, US President Woodrow Wilson stated that diplomacy ought to be: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” Due to the idea that diplomatic and foreign policy intrigues had led to the Great War of 1914-18, the call for transparency seemed the ultimate solution. Since then, secret diplomacy has been the object of controversy and a contradiction to the principles of liberal democracy. As the title indicates, this dissertation will focus on the practice of secret diplomacy by liberal democracies. This is a practice that has been condemned, and this dissertation is designed to use illustrations and analysis of secret diplomatic documents in order to investigate the following questions. Do liberal democracies still practice secret diplomacy? And, if they do, is such a practice justified in a democracy? Why is secret diplomacy still an object of debate for democracies? And, can secret diplomacy survive in this Information Age?

Most of the illustrations will be drawn from two Western liberal democracies: France and the United States.

The main challenge facing an academic researcher in studying secret diplomacy is the fact that a lot of diplomatic documents are not necessarily available or classified. Facing this challenge, this study will investigate how much evidence can be found by exploring the released documents and diplomatic archives. The significance of this study is two-fold. First, the plan is to redefine the concept of secret diplomacy within the parameters of international relations. It is important for the understanding of international relations and global governance to explore the practice of secret diplomacy. Then, the study will explore secret diplomatic cases from different point in time to provide the answers to the above questions. Another value of this investigation is based on the fact that the analysis brings Anglo/American/French studies into one place, and provides evidence to fill the gaps in the official story of those events. One needs to understand that open diplomacy only represents the “tip of the diplomatic iceberg.” The other side of the diplomatic iceberg is beneath the surface and under the “waters of international relations.”

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my main advisor Dr. Richard Langhorne for all the help, assistance, and support throughout the dissertation process. He also encouraged me to pursue my interest in international diplomacy in all its aspects. I also thank my dissertation advisors Dr. Susan Carruthers, Dr. Carlos Seiglie, and Dr. Frank Fischer, for all their advices and dedication to this project. I also would like to thank Dr. Aharon Klieman for providing an insight into the practice of the “Secret Statecraft” for democracies.

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Zénaïde and Jacques Momengoh. This is also dedicated to the memory of Ambassador Médard Momengoh.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction	1
A)- Purpose of the Research	2
B)- Literature Review	9
C)- Historical and Intellectual Debates	35
d)- Organization of the Dissertation	45
Chapter Two: Secret Diplomacy between the Wars	50
II-A- Locarno Treaty	
II-B- The Hoare-Laval Pact	
II-C- The Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact	53
II-C1- Analysis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Negotiations	
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
Chapter Three: Secret Diplomacy and French Diplomacy	66
III-A- Early Cases of Secret Diplomacy in France	66
III-B- Franco-German Secret Negotiations over Disputed Territories	70
III-B1- Analysis of the Franco-German Secret Negotiations over disputed territories	76
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
III-C- French Diplomacy and the Sèvres Secret Agreement	83
III-C1- Analysis of the Sèvres Secret Negotiations	86
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
III-D- Franco-German Secret Negotiations and the Rambouillet Accord	92
III-D1- Analysis of the Rambouillet Secret Negotiations	97

a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
Chapter Four: Secret Diplomacy and American Diplomacy	103
IV-A- Early Cases of Secret Diplomacy in the United States	103
IV-B- Anglo-American Secret Diplomacy and the “Project Alpha”	110
IV-B1- Analysis of the Anglo-American “Alpha” Negotiations	115
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
IV-C- Secret Diplomacy and the US Accommodation with Cuba	120
IV-C1- Analysis of the Secret Diplomatic attempts towards Cuba	127
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
IV-D- Secret Diplomacy and the US-China Rapprochement	134
IV-D1- Analysis of the Secret Negotiations with China	140
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
Chapter Five: Secret Diplomacy and Franco-American National Securities	147
V-A- Secret Diplomacy and US National Security: ABM Negotiations	148
V-A1- Analysis of the ABM Negotiations	154
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
V-B- Secret Diplomacy and France’s National Security: US Assistance	159
V-B1- Analysis of France’s US Nuclear Assistance Negotiations	166

a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
Chapter Six: Secret Diplomacy and US Negotiations on International Security	173
VI-A- US-Iran Secret Negotiations in the 1970s	174
VI-A1- Analysis of the US-Iran Secret Negotiations	182
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
VI-B- US-UK Negotiations and the “Secret Understanding”	188
VI-B1- Analysis of the US-UK Negotiations and the “Secret Understanding”	195
a)- Organization of the Negotiations	
b)- The Role of Secrecy	
c)- Government Particularities	
Chapter Seven: Secret Diplomacy and Democratic Principles	200
VII-A- Definitions of Terms	201
VII-B- Democratic Requirements	203
VII-C- Protection and Legality of Diplomatic Secrecy	208
a)- Government Secrecy in France	
b)- Government Secrecy in the United States	
VII-D- The Consequences of Diplomatic Secrecy	214
VII-E- The Future of Secret Diplomacy	215
a)- Diplomatic Institutions	
b)- Globalization and Technological Innovations	
Chapter Eight: Conclusion	222
Bibliography	237

Chapter One

Introduction

Dissertation Topic:

Secret Diplomacy: The practice of back channel diplomacy by liberal democratic states.

In January 1919, in the Paris Peace Conference, US President Woodrow Wilson stated that diplomacy ought to be: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”¹ Due to the idea that diplomatic and foreign policy intrigues had led to the Great War of 1914-18, the call for transparency seemed the ultimate solution. Since then, secret diplomacy has been the object of controversy and a contradiction to the principles of liberal democracy or “free society.” The topic of my dissertation is in the field of international diplomacy. As the title indicates, the dissertation will focus on the practice of secret diplomacy by liberal democratic states. This is a practice that has been condemned, and this dissertation is designed to use illustrations and analysis of secret diplomatic documents in order to investigate the following questions. Do liberal democracies still practice secret diplomacy? And, if they do, is such a practice justified in a democracy? Why is secret diplomacy still an object of debate for democracies? And, can secret diplomacy survive

¹ Lamont, Thomas William. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, April 1, 1919. Edited by Arthur Link, 60 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-1978), Vol. 65, 502.

in this Information Age? Most of the illustrations will be drawn from two Western liberal democracies: France and the United States.

(I)-A- Purpose of the Research

The main challenge facing an academic researcher in studying secret diplomacy is the fact that a lot of diplomatic documents are not necessarily available. Secret negotiations that are still in progress cannot be revealed as to avoid compromising those diplomatic missions. Many documents related to secret negotiations are classified or not available for twenty to thirty years and sometimes are not even released at all. Facing this challenge, this study will investigate how much evidence can be found by exploring the declassified documents and diplomatic archives. The secondary sources will be used to support the thesis and provide possible illustrations as well.

The significance of this study is two-fold. First, the plan is to redefine the concept of secret diplomacy within the parameters of international relations. It is important for the understanding of international relations and global governance to explore the practice of secret diplomacy. Although diplomatic activities are among the most visible aspects of international relations, one needs to understand that such open diplomacy only represents the “tip of the diplomatic iceberg.” The other side of the diplomatic iceberg is beneath the surface and under the “waters of international relations.” Therefore, by studying secret diplomacy, one might be able to understand and explain the complexities of international relations and inter-state politics.

Second, back channel diplomacy is often practiced behind the scene in parallel to official diplomacy. In this dissertation, this also means that secret diplomacy will not be synonymous with secret foreign policy, covert actions, espionage, or military intelligence. This study is not to be confused with the works performed by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States, or the General Directorate for External Security in France, or Her Majesty's Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom. Therefore the study will observe unofficial diplomatic negotiations or closed door diplomacy as a tool for the execution of foreign policy. The dissertation will be able to provide an insight into the way secret diplomacy actually takes place; within the same government and towards other governments.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the term secret diplomacy will be used interchangeably with back channel diplomacy, back door diplomacy or closed diplomacy. In practice, this term entails multiple activities such as back door negotiations, discreet contact, low key liaison, and secret transmission of messages, intelligence reports and third party intermediaries...

Another value of this investigation is based on the fact that the analysis brings Anglo/American/French studies into one place, and provides evidence to fill the gaps in the official history of those events. The study is different than others because it brings up an old debate and gives it a more contemporary relevance in today's world. And it offers the additional advantage that secret diplomatic documents only available in French will be explained in English and incorporated in the study. The investigation will also provide a basis for further studies in secret diplomacy when most classified papers become

available. Another particular aspect of the research is that American and French secret diplomatic practices will be comparable.

The primary method will be an historical analysis of secret diplomacy as conducted by a sample of liberal democratic nations: France and the United States. The plan is to include diplomatic cases from different points in time. Here, the strategy is to use simultaneously a chronological and a thematic structure in the analysis of the diplomatic cases. France and the United States were selected for illustration purposes. Both democratic nations participated in making the 1919 Settlement. The Paris Peace Conference was where US President Woodrow Wilson called for “open covenants...openly arrived at.” The conference and particularly the Covenant of the League of Nations approved Wilson’s proposition that the practice of diplomacy should be conducted “frankly and in public.” All the democratic nations pledged to practice open diplomacy in their international dealings. Both countries are industrialized liberal democracies, and have a long and complex diplomatic history.

It is interesting that the voluminous material particularly in journals on International Relations and International Relations Theory which was generated during the second half of the 20th century has virtually nothing to say about diplomacy, let alone secret diplomacy. Diplomacy was set aside as not being of academic interest, the province of historians at best. This stance has altered sharply in recent years and diplomacy has become the subject of degree programs and a raft of new books and articles. The most prominent of these is Paul Sharp’s work which makes the case for

regarding diplomacy as co-terminous with the international system itself.² Neither he, though, nor Geoffrey Pigman in the most recent study of contemporary diplomacy discusses secret diplomacy as such.³

The Oslo Peace accord of 1993 between the PLO and Israel, and the Clinton diplomatic initiative to seek peace in Northern Ireland, revived briefly scholarly interest in secret diplomacy. Then, the general climate of debate went back to an attitude of tolerance of government secrecy in foreign affairs as during the Cold War. In this study, the issue of secrecy will be explored neutrally. Therefore, secret diplomacy will not be presented as a deviant and occult sinister conspiracy as is sometimes portrayed.

It is necessary to define certain concepts to help us understand the relevance of this study. In this context, Western liberal democracies will include Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy. According to the principles of liberal democracy, political power lies in the hands of the people who are sovereign. The people are self-governed through their elected officials, and the elections are truly free and fair, and the political process is competitive among multiple and distinct political parties.

The term state is defined as a sovereign political entity which has a recognized territory with a population living under a government or a multi-government system.⁴

² Sharp, Paul. For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1999), 33-57.

³ Pigman, Geoffrey. *Contemporary Diplomacy*. Cambridge, UK-Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010.

Max Weber defined it as a compulsory political organization with a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory.⁵ The state system is the international arena in which these diplomatic cases take place.

The term secret diplomacy is less scientific or specific. In the current context, it could be defined as a “secret negotiation involving two or more states pursuing essentially peaceful high policy objectives, and which expresses itself in explicit communication, businesslike exchanges, and tacit achievable understanding or arrangement of such sensitivity as to preclude sharing these confidences with either domestic or international actors.”⁶ From another perspective, Secret diplomacy means diplomacy carried on by the government without the knowledge or consent of the people and behind closed doors. Through secret diplomacy policymakers pursue the goals of foreign policy through effective means of compromise, persuasion, and threat of war. Recently, it has also been termed as quiet diplomacy. In other words, secret diplomacy is the management of international relations behind closed door secret negotiations and without the knowledge or consent of the people. This study focuses on the activities of policymakers who shape policy formulation and the execution of foreign policy of states.

⁴ Oxford English Dictionary; Chief Editor John Simpson (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁵ Barfield, Thomas. *The Dictionary of Anthropology*. Vol. 306 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 445.

⁶ Klieman, Aharon. *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 10.

In this context, diplomacy is the management of international relations by communications to include negotiations leading to a bargain or agreement. In other words, it is the basic means by which states attempt to harness their power for the purpose of achieving their objectives and securing their interests.⁷ Harold Nicolson believed that a good definition is in the Oxford English Dictionary which defined it as “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.”⁸ Such negotiations include the field of politics, peacemaking, trade, economics, culture, environment, human rights, and human security... After defining diplomacy, it is also necessary to define the concept of negotiation. It is the method by which two or more parties communicate in an effort to change or refrain from changing their relationship with each other, with others or with respect to an object.⁹

Executive privilege means the right of the president and important executive branch officials, such as Cabinet members, the National Security Advisors or State Department officials, to withhold information from Congress, the courts and/or the public. In the United States, this right includes diplomatic information that the executive considers sensitive either to the nature of the negotiations or temporarily to maintain a diplomatic advantage. In France the political culture allows for the president to maintain

⁷ Viotti, Paul and Mark Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity*. 3rd Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 121

⁸ Nicolson, Harold. (Quoted in) *Diplomacy*. 3rd Ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963,), 4-5.

⁹ Goldman, Alvin and Jacques Rojot. *Negotiation: Theory and Practice*. (Hague; London; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 1.

a level of secrecy in the execution of foreign policy without parliamentary interference. In the United States the culture is geared towards openness. In both countries though, the government is expected to inform the people of prescribed domestic and foreign policies.

The study will first explore the initial environment surrounding the rejection of secret diplomacy after the Great War. Then, the dissertation will examine the diplomatic cases or type of diplomatic crisis that calls for this practice, and also examine the success or failure of secrecy in such negotiations. This will be done by combining the analysis of historical archives with declassified diplomatic documents. With this approach the study will be able not only to examine back channel diplomatic negotiations, but also collect perspectives from actual diplomatic Memoranda.

The backdrop of the study is to explain diplomatic secrecy in the context of liberal democratic societies. This presumes that the public in these countries have the legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of their government. They believe in the freedom of information as the foundation of democracy itself where the citizens are considered self-governed through their elected officials. This dissertation about secret diplomacy is based on that premise. All the explanations and justifications are also based on a liberal democratic foundation.

The study plans to focus on the declassified documents that are accessible. The National Security Archives and the Rutgers interlibrary loan system helped in the search for primary and secondary sources. Correspondences from the Nixon and Carter Presidential libraries were also explored. The use of the interlibrary system helped to

access books and articles on international diplomacy. The study also used the French diplomatic archives in Paris to obtain necessary information about French diplomacy where possible. Declassified papers from Foreign Ministers' private offices were examined. It is inevitable that this study depended on the documents that are available since most of them are still classified.

(I)- B) - Literature review

(I)-B1- Early Modern Diplomacy Theorists

The initial literature review covers the early modern diplomatic theories, because it is important to explore the foundation of classical diplomacy. In the fifteenth century, one of the early diplomatists, Phillip de Commynes suggested that negotiations should be conducted by wise and experienced diplomatists. He opposed summitry and conferences among "Princes or head of states." He suggested that the knowledge and experience of professional diplomatists serve the negotiations better than the politicians or head of states. This argument presupposed that international affairs should be handled by accomplished advisers and away from public pressure.

With the emergence of modern diplomacy in Renaissance Italy, discretion was considered important in negotiations. Due to the permanent pressure from rival states, the Italian city-states pursued the objectives of their foreign policy with greater continuity, agility, and also continuous vigilance. Diplomacy was needed to supplement the soldier. As public orator and secret negotiator, the successful diplomatist was valued at the same

level or above the successful general. This was so, because both were considered as agent for the preservation and aggrandizement of the state.¹⁰

In his diplomatic essay, Niccolo Machiavelli suggested that secrecy and honesty should be required of Ambassadors and envoys.¹¹ In diplomatic practice, even Machiavelli himself was not Machiavellian. He promoted what would be called later, *Realpolitik*.¹² It is the politics and diplomacy based “primarily on power and on practical and material factors and considerations, rather than ideological notions or moralistic or ethical premises.”¹³ The Spanish ambassador Antonio De Vera also insisted that secrecy was the foundation of all important negotiations. In his book, *The Perfect Ambassador*, Antonio De Vera stressed that secrecy was recommended in the actions of the ambassador. Secrecy was the foundation of the edifice and the cause of success and it also prevented the enemy from plotting against the process of the negotiations.¹⁴

This argument was further elaborated in the seventeenth century by the French Chief Minister Cardinal Richelieu in his *Political Testament*. There, he developed the doctrine of Raison d'état which calls for a continuous diplomatic activity in international affairs and a focus on national interests. He stated that it was necessary for the well-being

¹⁰ Mattingly, Garrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 59-63.

¹¹ Ibid; Berridge, pp. 120

¹² Mattingly, Garrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston; MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 40.

¹³ Robertson, David: *The Routledge Dictionary of Politics*. (Routledge, 2004), 420.

¹⁴ Berridge, *Diplomatic Classics: The Perfect Ambassador* (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 91.

of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, in all places, at a varying pace and intensity.¹⁵ Secrecy along with clarity in treaties was considered as essential to successful negotiations and for long lasting agreements. The Chief Minister Richelieu argued that secrecy provided a peaceful atmosphere where trust could develop. The early modern diplomatic thinker also advocated secrecy as the way to avoid sabotage by rival states or other obstructionists.

In the work of François de Callières' *De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains*, in the early eighteenth century, secret diplomacy was considered as embedded in the art of negotiation. He insisted that multilateral open negotiations could only serve as a prelude to the real diplomacy which was secret. The ability to keep a secret was important in acquiring the experience necessary to manage negotiations. Callières insisted that it was necessary and that a skillful negotiator should never find the success of the negotiation on false promises and the breach of faith.¹⁶

For Callières, one of the main representatives of the “French system of diplomacy,” secrecy was embedded in the art of negotiation and was essential to any successful and serious negotiation. He underlined the necessary ties and commerce between the European States which constituted a part of the same commonwealth.¹⁷ And

¹⁵ Berridge, G.R. *Diplomatic Classics*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, 116.

¹⁶ Berridge, *Diplomatic Classics: The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes* (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 134.

¹⁷ Callières, François de. *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, 16.

he suggested that secret negotiations could help in maintaining the peace. Therefore secrecy was necessary to manage the relationship between states.

He expressed the fact that the “management of international affairs called for technical competence, intellectual energy, and a compacted knowledge of men and events.”¹⁸ But he also took for granted that secrecy was extremely necessary to the generation of confidence and understanding. He believed that before a diplomat could proceed far in the search for negotiated settlements of disputes, confidence and confidentiality have to be established. He also suggested that “an able minister will take care that no man shall penetrate into his secret before the proper time.” Callières also suggested that secrecy was not to be used all the time for no reason. It was to be used only as necessary to the negotiations or the management of inter-state relations.¹⁹

Another diplomatic thinker of the time was Abraham Wicquefort. In the *Ambassador and his functions*, Wicquefort stressed the importance of secrecy in exercising his functions. On the issue of mediation he suggested that the ambassador had to be able to keep secrets so that he could gain the confidence of the rival parties in the negotiations. He also suggested that the ambassador had to negotiate without publicity

¹⁸ Callières, François de. *The Art of Diplomacy*. Edited by Karl Schweizer and H.M.A. Keens (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983), 33.

¹⁹ Callières, François de. *The Art of Diplomacy*. Edited by Karl Schweizer and H.M.A. Keens. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983, 34; 76.

until the agreement was reached. This implied that secrecy was essential to the process and practice of diplomacy.²⁰

For the early modern diplomacy theorists, secrecy in diplomacy was not necessarily synonymous to deviancy or lies in international relations, but rather as a necessary process of discretion in negotiations. Secrecy was considered as embedded in the diplomatic profession.

B2- Diplomatic History Analysts

In *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs 1598-1625*, Charles Howard Carter made the analysis of the Habsburg secret diplomatic documents. The diplomatic archives gave an insight in the foreign policy of the Habsburgs throne in Spain and the Netherlands.²¹ The analysis revealed that secret diplomacy relied heavily on intelligence, and secretive activities and secret agents. Secret information and intelligence reports were the basis for high-level decision-making on foreign policy. The practice of secret diplomacy at that time was, like in the pre-Great War period, based mainly on international intrigues, duplicity and deceptions. There was no debate about the practice of secrecy as it was considered as the reality of diplomacy.

²⁰ Berridge; *Diplomatic Classics; The Ambassador and his Functions*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, 134.

²¹ Carter, Charles Howard. *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625*. (New and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), 4

In *Renaissance Diplomacy*, one of the most important books on diplomacy ever written, Garret Mattingly discussed the origin and practice of modern diplomacy from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. The practice of secret diplomacy was part of the renaissance diplomacy from the beginning. The Italian Citi-states, with their small limited territories and equally armed neighbors, made continuous vigilance a necessity. They relied on diplomacy to solve their differences. Therefore secret negotiation was part of that cautionary process.²² In the norm of Renaissance, the diplomat needed to have the power of public persuasion, the ability to deliver a moving speech or an effectively argued letter, as well as being a good observer, reporter, and manipulator of events, public orator and a secret negotiator.²³ Secret diplomacy was not discussed as such but it was assumed as a part of international diplomatic.

In *Secret Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography, 1500-1815*, James Westfall Thompson and Saul Padover explored a key element in the practice of the secret statecraft from the sixteenth to early nineteenth century. They examined diplomatic archives written in cypher which gave another insight into the wide web of secret diplomacy.²⁴ As in most of the history of diplomacy, the transmission of secret messages was the main strategy for the state to survive the international double-dealings and intrigues of the era. This epoch, which saw the restructure of the secret statecraft with

²² Mattingly, Garret. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1971, 59.

²³ Ibid. Mattingly. 63.

²⁴ Thompson, James Westfall and Saul Padover. *Secret Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography, 1500-1825*. (New York, NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), 19-29

Cardinals Richelieu, Mazarin, and later Talleyrand, and also the publication of important diplomatic treatise, somehow made diplomatic and administrative secrecy the bedrock of foreign affairs.

In *Plombières: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Italy*, Mack Walker edited historians' analysis of the secret negotiations between European powers that led to Italian independence and the rejection of Austrian influence.²⁵ Secret correspondence and archives had been explored which provided another insight in the practice of secret statecraft in the nineteenth century. This provided an attempt to focus intensively on the evidence of secret diplomacy in a specific case of Modern History. The Plombières secret conference dealt with the Italian "Risorgimento" or the reawakening of Italy as a united national state. The mysterious secret diplomacy of Napoleon III of France and the wisdom of Prime Minister Cavour of Piedmont (part of Italian Citi-states) managed to orchestrate the support of France, Great Britain and the Pope and the Italian population to seek independence.

In *Histoire Secrète de Notre Temps : Histoire de la Diplomatie Secrète, 1789-1914* (Secret History of Our Time : History of Secret Diplomacy, 1789-1914), Jacques de Launay attempted and succeeded in explaining the main back channel diplomatic dealings from the French revolution to the First World War. The explanation went beyond the official history, and was based on the analysis of secret documents. Secret correspondences and secret pacts helped to describe the logic behind certain decisions

²⁵ Walker, Mack. *Plombières: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Italy*. (New York-London-Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968)

and historic events.²⁶ Secret letters from the great diplomatist Talleyrand and General Dumouriez brought light to French diplomacy during the revolution and the secret diplomacy of Napoleonic France. Additional details presented the transformation of Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the intrigues of Napoleon III whose secret diplomacy was often the reverse of his official policies. This analysis also exposed the risks and difficulties of the secret statecraft from Bismarck until the Great War of 1914-18.

Another book from the French diplomatic Historian Jacques de Launay, *Histoire de la diplomatie secrète 1914-1945*, highlighted the key points of the backdoor diplomacy of France and Germany between the Wars.²⁷ The book examined the diplomatic intrigues during peace times as well as war times, and provided an insight into the negotiations held outside of the League of Nations. The secret negotiators involved in secret diplomacy determined the steps to be taken by the front door diplomats. The Treaty of Locarno in 1925 until the Conference of Munich in 1938 was handled in this context.

The interwar period was again analyzed by George Liebmann in *Diplomacy Between the Wars: Five Diplomats and the Shaping of the Modern World*. The contributions of diplomats such as the American Lewis Einstein, the British Horace Rumbold, the German Johann Bernstorff, the Italian Carlo Sforza and the Turkish Ismet

²⁶ De Launay, Jacques. *Histoire Secrète de Notre Temps : Histoire de la Diplomatie Secrète, 1789-1914*. (Nyon, Suisse : Publications G.V. Service, 1973), 214.

²⁷ De Launay, Jacques. *Histoire de la diplomatie secrète 1914-1945* (Paris : Marabout Books, 1962), 6.

Inonu, were at the center of this work. For a period that is always linked with diplomatic failures, this exploration highlighted the few diplomatic successes, agreements, which delayed the war in many cases. This also emphasized that the French and British foreign policies were largely made against the advices of experts who led the respective foreign offices, such as Coulondre or Vansittart. Their efforts even delayed the entrance of Japan and Italy into the War which benefited Great Britain militarily.²⁸ These diplomats believed that the powers of their countries were limited and needed to be gathered and focus on major interests. Their informative dispatches and negotiating skills helped to present a different view on known historical events and a new look at a gray period in diplomatic history.

The *History of French diplomacy from 1815 until now* (L' Histoire de la diplomatie Française, de 1815 à nos jours) expanded the investigation of French diplomatic cases. This is mostly government undertakings that brought the official diplomacy to the front as the "other side of the coin." The research in this book is of high quality and received the input of many French scholars; Laurent Theis, Pierre Guillen, Georges-Henri Soutou, and Maurice Vaisse. Each scholar also dealt with the diplomacy of each French republic from the First to the Fifth Republic.

Another article exploring the back door diplomacy was authored by George P. Gooch. Gooch's *European Diplomacy before the War in the Light of the Archives*

²⁸ Liebmann, George. *Diplomacy Between the Wars*. (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008.)

examined the closed diplomatic approach during the inter-war.²⁹ He underlined the facts that after the Treaty of Versailles and US President Wilson's call for "open covenants...openly arrived at," Western European States struggled to redefine their negotiation strategy between diplomatic traditions of secrecy and the new open approach through the League of Nations and the difficulties of stabilizing international relations.

Another analysis of diplomatic history has been explored by Richard Langhorne and Keith Hamilton. In *The Practice of Diplomacy*, They explained the administrative side and evolution of diplomacy and stressed on the practice of secrecy in the "Old diplomacy."³⁰ Richard Langhorne stressed that diplomacy should be understood as being both the international negotiation and the statecraft or the art of conducting state affairs. Richard Langhorne also underlined the use of "Para-diplomacy" where statesmen employed the services of non-professionals or personal representatives without official diplomatic status in cases of secret or even open diplomacy.³¹

B3- Contemporary Diplomacy Theorists

²⁹ Gooch, G.P. "European Diplomacy before the War in the light of the Archives;" *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of the International Affairs 1931-1939); Vol.18, No.1, 77-102

³⁰ Langhorne, Richard and Keith Hamilton. *The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge T & F Group, 2011), 80.

³¹ Langhorne, Richard and Keith Hamilton. *The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. 2nd ed. (London & New York: Routledge T & F Group, 2011), 147.

In the early twentieth century, Sir Ernest Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* also expanded on the practice of diplomacy and the theory of it. Satow emphasized the importance of applied intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between sovereign states. This meant that diplomacy was the pursuit of state interests. It implied that some level of discretion was necessary to the practice of diplomacy. Satow accepted the need for secrecy as the main prerequisite of confidence coupled with an ethical dimension of the art of diplomacy.³² Secrecy could be kept either on the contents of the negotiations; knowledge that negotiations are taking place; or the identity of the negotiators.³³

Koni Zilliacus's *Mirror of The Past: A History of Secret Diplomacy* explored the diplomatic practice of Great Powers between the wars and presented an early warning about the pending Cold War. The analysis explained the attempt by Western democracies to establish a new World Order through the League of Nations and why it failed.³⁴ What came from this historical review was that the most important international right of the state was the right of self-preservation. In the context of international anarchy, this meant that states ought to use every diplomatic tool at their disposal to protect their national interests, hence the practice of secret diplomacy. But this study finds that Zilliacus also

³² Satow, Ernest. *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. In *Diplomatic Theories from Machiavelli to Kissinger*; by Berridge, G.R. & Maurice Keens-Soper. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 129.

³³ Roberts, Ivor. *Satow's Diplomatic Practice*. 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 515.

³⁴ Zilliacus, Koni. *Mirror of The Past: A History of Secret Diplomacy*. (New York, NY: Current Books Inc., 1946), 35.

put too much of the blames of the World Wars on Western democracies and the liberal economic system and power politics.

Wolfram Gottlieb's *Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War* presented another look at the secret statecraft. Through the study of memoranda and dispatches during the Great War, he examined the diplomatic secrecy behind the foreign policy and war strategy decisions. The analysis brought some light to the secret moves and countermoves of the great powers and presented general conclusions on the laws and logic of the diplomacy of power politics.³⁵ This clarified the issue of international play of forces, the objective causes, domestic politics and foreign policy strategies of the motivating factors behind complex and conflicting diplomatic secrecy.

Sir Harold Nicolson's *Evolution of the Diplomatic Method and Diplomacy* also supported the necessity of secrecy in international negotiations as a strategy until an agreement had been reached. However, the result of the negotiations should be made public in the interest of the people. Nicolson's book also explored the issues surrounding open diplomacy.³⁶ Nicolson's *Diplomacy* embraced a realist approach about the role of power and morality in international negotiations. This view supported the practice of secret diplomacy, and insisted that the aim of it was to maintain amicable relations and peace between nations. There is also an explanation of the distinction between diplomacy

³⁵ Gottlieb, Wolfram. *Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War*. (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957), 8-11

³⁶ Nicolson, Harold. *Diplomacy*. 3rd ed. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 37.

and foreign policy. Nicolson supported secret diplomacy as a method of negotiation, but opposed secret foreign policy which was deviant.³⁷

Nicolson also argued that the influence of public opinion in diplomacy rendered open diplomacy cautious and slow-moving which also restrained the freedom of action of the government in negotiations. Another article by Sir Harold Nicolson, *Modern Diplomacy and British Public Opinion*, also explored the issue of democratic diplomacy. He discussed the fact that secret diplomacy was being challenged by democratic diplomacy which was influenced by public opinion.³⁸ The article helps in understanding the influence of public opinion in a democratic political system, and its negative consequences in the practice of diplomacy.

Herbert Butterfield's *Diplomatic Investigations*, was tailored towards the necessity of realism in diplomacy. The English School's study also focused on the traditional theory of diplomacy where the state was central to any diplomatic analysis. The traditional role of diplomacy was believed to maintain the international order, and realism serves that purpose.³⁹ The criticism of secret diplomacy was explored and an attempt to explain that the old diplomatic methods were not merely a game of intrigues,

³⁷ Berridge G.R. & Maurice Keens-Soper. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 157.

³⁸ Nicolson, Harold, "Modern Diplomacy and British Public Opinion," *International Affairs*; Vol. 14; No 5 (Sept-Oct 1935): 599-618.

³⁹ Butterfield, Herbert & Martin Wight; *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theories of International Politics*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 190.

but rather a creative art that could be adapted to the new requirements of modern democracies.

Following in the footsteps of early modern thinkers, the classical view was more recently supported by other Contemporary Diplomacy Theorists such as Henry Kissinger and former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban. More than many other diplomats, Henry Kissinger practiced secret diplomacy as National Security Advisor and as US Secretary of State. He suggested that secret diplomatic methods were necessary for the national security of any nation, and was also a way to maintain order and stability in the international system.⁴⁰ Kissinger suggested that the diplomat had to search for a mutually acceptable concession in the negotiation. This argument emphasized that secrecy and confidentiality allow the parties involved to negotiate without being influenced by domestic pressures. Secrecy also freed the negotiators from “living up to the criteria set beforehand by the media and critics.”⁴¹ Following the realist tradition, Henry Kissinger’s approach also focused on the state as the center of diplomatic analysis and the key actor in international politics.

In the same realist category of thought, in *The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age*, Ambassador Abba Eban suggested that “negotiation, which used to be private, was now opened to the public scrutiny and debate.” Like Commynes before him, Ambassador Abba Eban also believed that Summitry and Conference

⁴⁰ Berridge G.R. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 160.

⁴¹ Ibid. Berridge. pp. 199.

Multilateralism had affected diplomacy in a negative way.⁴² This fact had affected diplomacy in that it had become hard to reach diplomatic agreements through public discussions.

More recently, in *U.S.-PLO: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*, Mohamed Rabie explored the secret negotiations between the United States, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He made an examination of the secret dialogues which led to the Oslo Accord and the 1993 Israel-PLO agreement.⁴³ The historic handshake between Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Yasser Arafat was the product of back door diplomacy. That started from the early shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, George Shultz, and James Baker, and the back door diplomacy of a few dedicated diplomats such as the Swedish Sten Anderson and the Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg. Those negotiations illustrated the process of dual track diplomacy where officials held public negotiations while other negotiators kept secret dialogues to reach an accord.

Another recent case was examined by Connor O'Clery. In *Daring Diplomacy: Clinton's Search for Peace in Ireland*, he brought the narrative of the effort of an American President to solve the conflict in Northern Ireland.⁴⁴ Beside the history of the

⁴² Eban, Abba. *The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age*. New York: Random House, 1983, 1.

⁴³ Rabie, Mohamed. *U.S.-PLO: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*. (Miami, FL: University Press of Florida, 1995)

⁴⁴ O'Clery, Connor. *Daring Diplomacy: Clinton's Search for Peace in Ireland*. Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1997.

American assistance to the peace process in Ireland, the book also illustrated the decision-making approach in the White House to handle secret diplomacy. It also presented another case, like the U.S.-PLO dialogues, where the U.S. Government had to negotiate with the IRA, a group branded as terrorist.

What is common to all those thinkers is the fact that they all subscribe to the traditional realist diplomatic theory. This means that they used a state-centric approach in all their analysis. The state was the main entity and the state system was the diplomatic environment of negotiations.

B4- Democratic Transparency Theorists

In this study the issue of transparency arose in the crossroad between secret diplomacy and democratic states. In this context, Dennis Thompson's *Democratic Secrecy* explored the issue of democratic accountability of public officials, and government secrecy. He suggested that some reasons for secrecy rested upon the very same democratic values that argued against secrecy. He recognized the importance of openness in democracy, and the consent of the people. But he also suggested that some democratic policies require secrecy.⁴⁵

Presenting an opposing view from the early modern diplomatists, James Russell Wiggins, in *Freedom or Secrecy*, explored the issue of secrecy in democratic states. He

⁴⁵ Thompson, Dennis. "Democratic Secrecy;" *Political Science Quarterly*; Vol. 20; No 2 (summer 1999), 181.

argued that the more the government becomes secretive, the less society remains free. This meant that diminishing the people's access to information about their government was to diminish the people's participation in government.⁴⁶ This is the inherent contradiction that liberal democratic states face.

This argument was also elaborated by Harold Punke. In *Secret Diplomacy and American Democracy*, he argued that the people, whose lives are affected by domestic and international political actions, are entitled to know every political decision made by their government.⁴⁷ He suggested that the practice of secret diplomacy overlooks the opinion of the public and analysis of other democratic instruments such as the press and the academics. The focus here is that a democratic society should use the democratic method of open debate in international and domestic forums.

In *The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings*, Harold Cross also argued that citizens of a self-governing society have the legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of their government affairs. He emphasized the fact that freedom of information was the very foundation for all the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution.⁴⁸ This argument leaves less room for any types of secrecy in government proceedings.

⁴⁶ Wiggins, James Russell. *Freedom or Secrecy*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 67.

⁴⁷ Punke, Harold. "Secret Diplomacy and American Democracy." *The Social Studies*; Vol. 47:3; (March 1956); 83.

⁴⁸ Cross, Harold. *The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), preface.

This argument was also supported by Wallace Parks. In *Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution*, Parks stated that the accessibility and availability of information about the executive and their operations affected the distribution of power in the government and the functioning of political process. This meant that people's access to information was important for the democratic system to function properly.⁴⁹

The examination of the argument of David Wise joined the same category. In *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy and Power*, David Wise argued that governmental secrecy was outside of the executive's constitutional authority. And he suggested that democratic accountability could not exist in a society in which the press was limited in what it investigated or reported.⁵⁰ Therefore he believed that a truly liberal democracy should be completely open in its governmental dealings.

In *Top Secret: National Security and the Right to know*, a strong argument was also elaborated by Morton Halperin and Daniel Hoffman. They argued that government officials use national security as a reason to withhold vital information from Congress, the court and the public with an aim to avoid democratic accountability.⁵¹ This argument suggested that secrecy in government was intentionally malicious. This argument was

⁴⁹ Parks, Wallace. "The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution," *The George Washington Law Review*; Vol.26; No.1; (October, 1957), 21.

⁵⁰ Wise, David. *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, secrecy and Power* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1974), 64.

⁵¹ Halperin, Morton and Daniel Hoffman. *Top Secret: National Security and the right to know*. Washington: New Republic Books, 1977, 31.

mostly based on the fact that there were no governmental rights to secrecy in the constitution. In the case of international diplomacy, they stated that there would be a reduction of defense budget and less intervention in international affairs, if the diplomatic system was fully open and accountable.

In examining the apparent contradiction between the people's democratic right to know and secrecy, Morton Halperin's article *Secrecy and the right to know* examined the Freedom of Information Act from its implementation in 1966, and its reforms in 1974 and 1983. And he stated that its flaw lies in the fact that the Act did not legislate on the standard for what should be kept secret. However, the Act did require government agencies to review documents after a certain period of time to determine whether a part or the entire documents should be made available to the public.⁵²

A more recent view was elaborated by David Hudson Jr. in *Open Government: An American Tradition faces National Security, Privacy, and other Challenges*. Hudson argued that the people retain the ultimate power, and must have access to their government, and have the means of acquiring information about government activities. This is possible by having access to government records, and for government to conduct public meetings.⁵³ This argument also suggested that National Security is often used as an excuse to deny information to the people.

⁵² Halperin, Morton and Daniel Hoffman. "Secrecy and the right to know," *Law and Contemporary Problems*; Vol. 40, No. 3, *Presidential Power: Part 2* (Summer, 1976), 132.

⁵³ Hudson, David Jr. *Open Government: An American Tradition faces National Security, Privacy, and other Challenges*. (Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House Publishers, 2005), 8-9.

In *Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context*, Richard Chapman and Michael Hunt focused the role of accountability in a democracy. They stated that government officials should act in the interest of the people rather than their own interests.⁵⁴ The free flow of information allows the people to know the dealings of their government and their leaders' accountability. It is difficult to evaluate accountability in a democracy without government openness. This is because a modern democracy is based on constitutional processes that produce trust between the government and the governed.

B5- National and International Security Analysts

In *American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy*, Bruce Berkowitz explored the limits, the choices, and the decision making process in National Security issues. He analyzed the challenges for America Security apparatus to deal with the economics, politics, and technology development effects, and security threats while maintaining the advantages of a free market society and democratic norms.⁵⁵ The main point in this work is the belief that compromise and choices will help to balance this equilibrium.

⁵⁴ Chapman, Richard and Michael Hunt. *Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context*. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 139-141.

⁵⁵ Berkowitz, Bruce. *American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986)

In *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*, Loch Johnson examined the intelligence collection and analysis, the Covert Action, and the works of Counterintelligence.⁵⁶ In relation to this dissertation, the book provided an analysis of the accountability and safeguards against the possible government abuse of secret power. It also presented a case for National Security Intelligence as a protection against forces that oppose democracies and free societies. This analysis explored and highlighted an in-depth view of a field that is critical in assisting and strengthening secret diplomacy.

In *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Dan Caldwell and Robert Williams Jr. provided an analytical framework that makes it easier to understanding changes in international security.⁵⁷ After analyzing the traditional and new sources of insecurity, they explored the social and conditions of insecurity, and the rise of human security. In relation to this dissertation, the book provided a recent overview on global threats and insecurity, and the challenges in the common means to assure international security in a globalized world.

Some of the additional literature in the field of diplomacy has also been explored. The following will explore the diplomatic theories on conference diplomacy, and the historical and intellectual debates on secret diplomacy.

⁵⁶ Johnson, Loch. *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012)

⁵⁷ Caldwell, Dan and Robert Williams Jr. *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*. 2nd edition (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012)

(I)-B6- Diplomatic theories on conference diplomacy

After the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, conference diplomacy was equated with democratic diplomacy. The “open covenants...openly arrived at” of the League of Nations called for diplomatic negotiations to be conducted in the public view. Despite the condemnation of secret diplomacy, Western European democracies such as France and Great Britain did not share the US zeal for open diplomacy.

After the Great War, statesmen such as British Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur Balfour still defended secret diplomacy. Balfour compared secret negotiation to a business negotiation between firms. He stated that “in private both parties may put their case as strongly as they like,” but when “a controversy becomes public; all the fair give-and-take becomes difficult or impossible.”⁵⁸ Sir Edward Grey also stated that secrecy up to a certain point was necessary in diplomacy. Edward Grey insisted that negotiations should be conducted in secret.

Paul Reinsch criticized such approach. Reinsch considered secret diplomacy as “working in the dark” and concealing international undertakings. For Reinsch, secrecy generated suspicions and the total destruction of public confidence.⁵⁹ But he still suggested that there was a distinction between the methods of diplomacy and diplomatic

⁵⁸ Reinsch, Paul. *Secret Diplomacy: How far can it be eliminated* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), 141.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Reinsch. 141.

policies. Therefore the question was whether diplomatic negotiations should be carried on in public with full information given to the public and parliament. And whether diplomatic policy of a democratic government should be presented to the public and parliament at all times.

As mentioned earlier, the classical diplomatic thinkers valued as essential the use of secrecy in diplomatic negotiations. In the contemporary debate, it is important to analyze the theories of twentieth century diplomatic thinkers. Any examination of diplomacy has to consider it as an art that involves personal contact, consultation, persuasion, and negotiation.

To fully appreciate the debate, one needs to understand the functions of the art of diplomacy. Diplomacy involves coercion, persuasion, adjustment, and agreement. The application of secrecy or not has to be based on the methods of reaching and exercising its fundamental functions. Focusing on its broad functions, Elmer Plischke defined diplomacy as “the political process by which political entities (generally states) establish and maintain official relations, direct and indirect, with one another, in pursuing their respective goals, objectives, interests, and substantive and procedural policies in the international environment; as a political process it is dynamic, adaptive, and changing, and it constitutes a continuum; functionally it embraces both the making and implementation of foreign policy at all levels and involves, but not restricted to the

functions of, representing, reporting, communicating, negotiating, and maneuvering, as well as caring for the interests of nationals abroad.”⁶⁰

This broad definition was intended to be inclusive and encompassed the multidimensional aspects of diplomacy. The practice of secrecy in diplomacy has to be understood in this broad context. One has to take into consideration different processes of how nations ought to negotiate. Conference diplomacy, involving the public and the democratic parliament, ought to be evaluated on the basis of nations’ ability to exercise the various diplomatic functions needed to achieve their foreign policy objectives.

The issue could be seen as democratic process applied to diplomatic negotiation or as Harold Nicolson put it; “an attempt to superimpose upon international affairs the philosophy and practice of a liberal democracy’s domestic affairs.” Nicolson’s view represented the resistance to the “new diplomacy” as the Western European democracies tried to balance between diplomatic traditions and democratic diplomacy. In the same line of thought, British Cabinet Secretary Lord Hankey explained that “Ministers should be free to explain to their foreign colleagues, if they think fit, without fear of disclosure, all their difficulties, internal and external, public and personal.”⁶¹ He meant that if necessary the conference had to break into small commissions where a free exchange could take place in an intimate and confidential manner. He also suggested that at certain

⁶⁰ Plischke, Elmer. *Diplomacy: Search for its Meaning* In *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1979), 34.

⁶¹ Hankey, Maurice. *Diplomacy by Conference*. London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1946, 36.

stages of conferences, secrecy might be essential for the negotiators.⁶² His points attested to the fact that secrecy was natural in diplomatic negotiations without being an object of sinister undertakings. Lord Hankey warned against the tendency of premature publicity before or during the negotiations.

Lord Hankey also warned against the democratic tendency to require diplomatists to report to parliamentary committees on foreign affairs. He suggested that diplomatic ministers faced a “dilemma of having to choose between giving an incomplete account of events, and taking the risk of giving rather widespread knowledge on vital secrets.”⁶³ He explained the dilemma that the minister must be able to tell the truth to those committees, but if he tells the truth he spreads diplomatic secrets widely.

While Harold Nicolson represented the faction that negatively criticized conference diplomacy, later, other diplomatists such as former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk supported it. Dean Rusk stated that conference diplomacy which gathers many governments of the world added a new dimension to modern diplomacy and presented opportunities to initiate multiple contacts and negotiations on various issues.⁶⁴ Nicolson’s view was also in contradiction to a more recent approach by former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Christopher stated that open diplomacy helped the

⁶² Ibid. Hankey; pp.36

⁶³ Ibid. Hankey; pp.171

⁶⁴ Plishke, Elmer; “The New Diplomacy,” In *Modern Diplomacy: the Artists and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 66.

US reach its long-range objective of encouraging the growth of democratic institutions.⁶⁵ Christopher's view placed diplomacy within the spectrum of liberal democracy. It also presented the basis of the ideal of American diplomacy of openness.

This view of openness was also defended by the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. He believed that conference diplomacy allowed nations to speak not only for their own countries but also share responsibility with other nations of the world. He also suggested that conference diplomacy operated in the "daylight" as opposed to secrecy. The importance of publicity was stated by Dag Hammarskjöld as international diplomacy should operate in the "glass house."⁶⁶ He believed that old secrecy had lost its place and justification.

A more inclusive approach was presented by Dutch Ambassador Johan Kaufmann. He considered conference diplomacy to be an important forum for diplomatic skills and for the achievement of foreign policy aims. He defined it as "that part of the management of international relations between governments and of relations between governments and intergovernmental organizations that takes place in international conferences."⁶⁷ He advocated that "open covenants" were arrived at through procedures and negotiations which were open to the public at the beginning and final stages, while

⁶⁵ Christopher, Warren; "Normalization of Diplomatic Relations;" In *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1979), 37.

⁶⁶ Hammarskjöld, Dag; "New Diplomatic Techniques in a New World;" In *Modern Diplomacy: the Artists and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 90.

⁶⁷ Kaufmann, Johan. *Conference Diplomacy: An introductory analysis* (New York: Sijthoff-Leyden Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970), 21.

being confidential for the remaining part. Kaufmann attempted to show the advantages of conference diplomacy in reaching foreign policy goals while recognizing the need for confidentiality during negotiations.

(I)-C- Historical and Intellectual Debates and Secret Diplomacy

Through this study, it is clear that the debate over secret diplomacy was more active and intensified with the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Before then, there was little mention or criticism of secret diplomacy. Secrecy was accepted as part of the diplomatic trade. In Western democracies, the conduct of international affairs was left to the professional diplomats and statesmen without interference by the public or parliaments. Therefore, it is essential to outline the reasons for the shift in the position against back channel diplomacy. How did the shift in debate of opinion occurred and why?

Looking at it from the broad historical context, two forces emerged from the outbreak of the Great War: the call for maintaining the status quo and the call for change. First, coalition governments were formed in France and the UK as foreign policy was seen as outside of party politics. National unity was held to face Germany and other central powers. Then by 1917, the war time coalition governments weakened and the voice for a new type of international diplomacy became louder.

The overall practice of secret diplomacy was challenged based on the back room dealings of war cabinets and the fact that parliaments knew very little of the secret

treaties. The war also proved the limit of dynastic diplomacy. This was due to the fact that many monarchs got personally involved in diplomacy. The personal relations between leading monarchs meant that relations between nations improved or deteriorated based on affection or negative feelings among them. For instance, tensions between the German Kaiser Wilhelm II and his cousin Nicholas II of Russia influenced both countries relations. There were also tensions between England's King Edward VII and Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria. The German Kaiser also disliked his uncle King Edward VII and used his negative feelings to direct his diplomacy towards the United Kingdom.⁶⁸

When the international atmosphere began to sour significantly in the 1890s it was chiefly to the diplomacy of alliances and ententes that states turned and reliance upon the diplomatic machine and its members became more marked as the situation worsened in the early 1900s. In 1914, diplomacy was unable to control the vast forces that were unleashed and by 1916 it was clear that a catastrophe was occurring, apparently unstopably.

Unsurprisingly, diplomats and diplomacy itself suffered a profound collapse in their reputation as a consequence and a natural feeling emerged that whatever diplomacy was needed in the future must be handled in a different way and that above all the concept of diplomacy as existing in its own separate and secretive world must be abandoned. This more than anything else explained the revulsion from secrecy and also explained a great deal about why the League of Nations was constructed as it was.

⁶⁸ Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914*; (New Haven: Yale University Press, (1927), 186.

Moreover, where diplomacy had been employed during the war, it had largely been in highly secret negotiations between allies, chiefly to draw Italy into the war and then to keep her there, and in the case of the Germans and the Russians between enemies. The treaties resulting from the former contained incompatible elements which became embarrassingly apparent when, after the war, it became clear that the territories of the Ottoman Empire had been sold twice and sometimes three times over. The significance of this was most consequential when the determination of the American President to create new states in which ethnicities and frontiers would coincide came up against secret commitments made during the war.

This context helps to explain President Wilson's prior assumptions and attitudes during the Paris Peace Conference and the prominence of his complaints about secrecy in diplomacy and his belief, shared by others, that diplomacy had been conducted in an atmosphere of professional seclusion and an assumption of superiority. This is where and when secret diplomacy got a bad name and the suggestion that it was incompatible with democratic governance.

In addition to various commercial and military tensions, secret diplomacy was blamed for the breakdown of diplomacy in 1914. Secret diplomacy was criticized as the most vicious, immoral and dangerous power seized by rulers in defiance of the right of

the people.⁶⁹ It was also criticized as the “black art” that made and broke the alliances for profit.

In the environment of criticism of secret diplomacy, two major antagonistic forces emerged in France, Great Britain and even in Germany during the war. On the one hand the forces of “order” tended to be more conservative while supporting secret diplomacy and favoring expansionist war aims. On the other hand, the forces of “movement” tended to be more progressive and opposed secret diplomacy and annexationist war aims.⁷⁰ The forces of order advocated war aims that favored territorial expansion, as well as political and economic dominance in addition to self-defense. They also wanted these war aims to be discussed in secret cabinet meetings. While the forces of movement or progressives criticized the secrecy surrounding the war aims as well as condemning the secrecy around foreign policy, and also insisted that the war cabinet commit themselves publicly to non-annexationist war aims and people’s self-determination.

The mistakes in the execution of foreign policy casted a dark cloud over the overall method of secret diplomacy. Although diplomats took the back burner during the war, they were still blamed for the failure to maintain the peace. With the political and economic exhaustion of the Western powers, the progressive forces strengthened, and

⁶⁹ Low, Maurice A.; “The Vice of Secret Diplomacy;” *The North American Review*; Vol.207; No.747; (Feb.,1918), 209.

⁷⁰ Mayer, Arno. *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, 7.

called for the rejection of secrecy. They insisted that war aims and foreign policy debate be conducted in public platforms, in parliament, and in the press. The progressives advocated the popular control over foreign policy, and called for the new and open diplomacy.

The Western progressive forces grew even stronger after the Russian revolution. Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks released the secret diplomatic documents of the Tsar and vowed to practice open diplomacy. In 1917, the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and Germany was openly negotiated. Another boost to the progressive forces came from the support by US President Woodrow Wilson. After the US entry to the war, Wilson, who hated European diplomatic methods, decided to “bring light” to the “dark and sinister” European diplomacy. President Wilson saw this as a crusade for democracy and an opportunity to liberalize allied diplomacy. Thus, this historical context highlighted the progressive forces which affected the shift in debate of popular and political opinion in favor of open diplomacy, the rejection of secret diplomacy, and the public control of foreign policy.

For progressives, open diplomacy was initially formulated as a criticism of the theory, practice and objectives of the “old secret diplomacy.” All the prewar tensions, such as economic pressure of overproduction, increased armament and colonial rivalries were blamed as the result of secret diplomatic intrigues. This is the historical context in which progressive forces drew strength to push for the democratization of diplomacy and foreign policy.

This study also attempts to link the conflicting positions between the advocates of secret diplomacy and the proponents of open diplomacy by highlighting their intellectual approaches. From the intellectual context, there was the re-emergence in the debate of two old theories in the conduct of international relations. This was the environment of the debate between what would be later called classical realism and idealist liberalism and rationalism. These two approaches are rooted in the early theories elaborated by Machiavelli and Hugo Grotius. The early debate outlined the two arguments about the direction that international diplomacy ought to take. On the one hand the realist approach based on the practicality of interstate politics, and on the other hand the progressive idealist approach based on moralistic ideals and international law.

One approach rooted in realism where diplomacy was seen as working out a complex system of state actions, by balancing and counterbalancing forces and material resources and giving direction to the inner purposes of the state.⁷¹ This approach of early realism was favored by the advocates of *Realpolitik* who advocated the status quo favoring secret diplomacy.

The intellectual basis supporting realism in the execution of foreign policy goes back to Thucydides. The Greek historian explained the source of power politics as the nature of interstate politics due to the absence of an international central authority. Machiavelli pushed the cause further with a realist prescriptive approach which favored

⁷¹ Reinsch, Paul. *Secret Diplomacy: How Far can it be eliminated?* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922, 141.

the survival of the state and called for the “ruler” to apply a sense of practicality in his foreign policy decisions.

The early twentieth century realists approached the issue from the classical realist tradition. This meant that the state was believed to be the main entity, power was the predominant element, and state self-interest was the predominant motivation. This approach presupposed the rejection of moralistic and rationalist idealism. This realist theory was one of the guiding intellectual forces behind the support for secret diplomacy. The push for back door diplomacy took into consideration the antagonistic relations among competing states and the anarchy in the international politics. The theory of state-centrism influenced the realist statesmen who promoted the secret statecraft. International security was viewed from this perspective of international anarchy environment, which justified extreme caution and prudence. Therefore, the advocates of secret diplomacy believed that it was necessary, for the state self-defense and self-preservation, to maximize the national interest in a dangerous world of states rivalries.

The advocates of secret diplomacy presented a philosophy of history that viewed international relations as cyclical, which meant a dialectic interaction between causes and consequences of events which was rooted in human experience. The intellectual vision of realism was championed by international relations theorist Edward H. Carr. As a former diplomat, Carr justified the realist views by emphasizing on the anarchical character of the international relations and the necessity of the balance of power. This was an intellectual tradition that viewed nations as being naturally in a state

of perpetual war.⁷² It was presented as the realist view of international politics, which believes in objective laws that have their roots in human nature, and not in natural law.

Later, international relations realists such as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan drew their positions from various aspects of the early tradition of realism. Morgenthau would go on to explain that “international politics, like all politics, is the struggle for power.”⁷³ The same approach, along with diplomatic traditions and political expediency, also justified the support for secret diplomacy and power politics. This dissertation, which approaches the subject matter of international secret diplomacy through historical case studies, considers traditional realists’ emphasis on unitary, rational state, and national security as also the basis for their support for the secret statecraft.

The intellectual basis supporting a progressive approach in the execution of foreign policy was rooted in natural law, which is also the basis for the tenets of Hugo Grotius’ moralistic and idealistic theories of international relations. To respond to the absence of a central international authority, the idealists proposed a set of international laws for states to follow in order to maintain international order, state equality and stability by focusing on states’ common interests. This approach viewed diplomacy as transacting international business which favored open and public discussion of diplomatic affairs. For the improvement of international relations, the intellectual progressives

⁷² Carr, E.H. “The Twenty Years’ Crisis.” In Andreas Osiander’s “Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory,” *International Studies Quarterly*; Vol. 42; No.3; (Sept., 1998); 412.

⁷³ Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. 4th edition; New York: Knopf, 1966, 5.

avored solving international disputes by discussion and conferences as well as the policy of open door and international law.

After the Great War, idealist international relations theorists, such as Norman Angell Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern, supported a liberal progressive view of international relations. They envisioned a philosophy of history that saw international system as a directional historical process. This means that they emphasized the growing interdependence of states as an inescapable process of international relations and historical development. The idealist intellectual approach represented a break from traditional realist thinking of power politics. The idealists also supported a vision of a democratic new world order better suited for the industrial age and states interdependence.⁷⁴ The progressive views saw the states as having interconnected common interests rather than competing interests. They presented their view of international relations as the norm that diplomatic practice ought to conform to. This was so for the benefit of all sovereign nations.

This idealism should not be confused with utopianism. This was an idealism that took into account practical issues in international politics and a level of economic liberalism and industrial development. Idealist theorists favored an international authority that would coordinate mechanism such as conference diplomacy, international law, and institutionalized methods for peaceful settlement of international disputes.⁷⁵ The creation

⁷⁴ Ibid. Morgenthau. pp.411

⁷⁵ Woolf, Leonard. "International Government;" In Andreas Osiander's "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory;" *International Studies Quarterly*; Vol. 42; No.3; (Sept., 1998); pp. 418

of the League of Nations and later the United Nations was the projection of the ideals of such international authority. This approach of progressivism was the direct result of the horror caused by the Great War of 1914-18 and World War II.

Early international relations idealists also included advocates as diverse as President Woodrow Wilson, British theorist Norman Angell and French progressive thinker Jean Jaures. These idealist intellectuals expanded on the nineteenth century rationalist liberalism. This means that they relied on reason as the basis for the establishment of international political truths and order. Progressives advocated morality and reason rather than historical experiences and power politics as the guiding force in international relations.

In a push of supportive opinion toward open diplomacy, international theorist Norman Angell criticized secret diplomacy and advocated that “any negotiations that take place shall be public.” He called for journalists, academics, and politicians to inform the people about problems of foreign policies which the public should finally settle.⁷⁶ There was an idealist call for a rejection of the “old conception” of power politics and competing states interests, as well as the embrace of a progressive view that focused on interstate cooperation and harmony, common states interests, and informed public opinion.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Angell, Norman; “Public Opinion in Foreign Policies,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*; Vol. 66; Preparedness and America’s International Program; (July 1916), 138-139.

⁷⁷ Angell, Norman; “The Great Illusion,” A Reply to Rear-Admiral A.T. Mahan; *The North American Review*; Vol. 195; No. 679; (July 1912), 772.

Like Grotius, the early twentieth century idealists advocated the role of morality in international relations, the judicial settlement of international disputes, and the new democratic international order. Idealists also emphasized a progressive view that the changing circumstances demanded changing rules and laws to reflect the new international environment.

(I)-D- Organization of the Dissertation

The study will follow a certain plan. The introduction or chapter one explains mainly the different parts of the dissertation. The main idea in the introduction is to elaborate the plan of the dissertation which covers mainly the period after the Second World War. The post war era is important in diplomacy because it reiterated the call for multilateral open diplomacy with the creation of the League of Nations as did the United Nations later. The literature review explores the early modern or classical diplomacy theorists and their contemporary followers. The review also presented key diplomatic historians relevant to the theme of this dissertation.

The second chapter, Secret diplomacy and the Conference Diplomacy Era, explains the context in which the opposition to secret diplomacy arose, and the intellectual debate that surround it. After the Peace of Versailles, multilateral conferences became the norm with the League of Nations. Conference diplomacy was equated with democratic diplomacy. Although this study focuses on Western diplomacy, the dissertation examines the last major secret diplomatic case of the inter-war period: the

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. This case provides a contrast by illustrating how states with ideologically motivated regimes practice secret diplomacy. This is to set the general illustration of the secret diplomatic process. The dissertation acknowledges that certain cases of secret diplomacy such as the Hoare-Laval Pact of 1935, which allowed Mussolini to divide and invade Ethiopia, or the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which allowed the German invasion of Poland, had been sinister and added another bad reputation to the secret statecraft.

The third chapter, Secret Diplomacy and French Diplomacy, explores the early cases of secret diplomacy in France. Then, the chapter focuses on the post war negotiations between France and West Germany to settle their territorial disputes. This initiative was launched to rebuild a healthy and self-reliant West Germany on one hand, and rebuild a peaceful relationship between both countries on the other. The next case study explores the negotiations leading to the Rambouillet Accord of 1960. This case is important as it dealt with the bilateral Franco-German relations and the political and economic stabilization of Western Europe. After the meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer at Colombey- Les-Deux- Eglises, a series of high level secret negotiations followed which led to the Rambouillet Accord between France and Germany. These two cases were selected as illustrations of secret diplomacy between to friendly nations.

The fourth chapter, Secret Diplomacy and American Diplomacy, starts with a look into early cases of secret diplomacy in a country with a tradition of openness. The cases in this chapter were selected to illustrate the practice of secret diplomacy in the context of diplomatic necessity. Many nations that have disrupted their formal

diplomatic relations have reverted to alternative ways of communicating. The use of back channel diplomacy to deal with international disputes and problematic foreign relations is one of the alternative diplomatic approaches. In such circumstances, the use of secret diplomacy becomes a necessary strategy for negotiating with unfriendly nations.

Anglo-American negotiations before the Suez crisis in 1956 will be explored. The dissertation will also explore the attempts by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and President Kennedy to negotiate with Castro's Cuba in 1963. The risks involved in this diplomatic activity will be analyzed. The diplomatic efforts to bring a rapprochement between the United States and China will also be examined. The analysis provides an access to the process of secrecy in a search for dialogue with nations without respective diplomatic representation.

The fifth chapter, Secret Diplomacy and Franco-American National Securities, will focus on cases affecting directly the sovereign territories of France or the United States. National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of diplomacy, military power projection, economic and political power.⁷⁸ The use of diplomacy to facilitate or compel cooperation is part of foreign relations. Multiple measures are taken by the states to rally allies or confront threats in the protection of the national interest.

Since diplomacy has to serve the national interest, it is natural to analyze the exigencies of it. The illustration will be the exploration of the negotiations initiated by

⁷⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security

Henry Kissinger leading to the ABM Treaty in 1972. This was mainly an issue of National Security with international security implications. Another analysis here will be the negotiations between France and the United States to improve France's "force de frappe" for French national security.

The sixth chapter, Secret Diplomacy and US Negotiations on International Security, will examine secret diplomacy in a more global security context. The interaction between the practice of secret diplomacy and international security had preoccupied international relations theorists since Versailles. International security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations to ensure mutual survival and safety.⁷⁹ International security is linked with national security in the sense that it is the extension of domestic security in the global context. Some of the same security precautions used domestically finds their sources in international security context.

The first case study in this chapter will examine the negotiations between the United States and the Shah of Iran in the field of nuclear technology cooperation. The case is very important in this study due to its impact on nuclear non-proliferation. With the current climate of distrust between the United States, the World community and Iran, it necessary to draw some lessons by exploring a secret diplomatic case where Iran was seen as the friend of the West.

⁷⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_security

The other case for examination will be the negotiations between the United States and Great Britain related to their cooperation on decision making in the case of the possible use of nuclear weapons. This case was selected for its particular significance. First, it illustrates a case of diplomatic secrecy and difficulties between the most two friendliest allies. Second, it deals with the highly sensitive and important issue of nuclear arms. Third, this diplomatic case spans from the Roosevelt-Churchill Quebec agreement to the Nixon-Heath understanding, and possibly beyond. Another fact is that this case was kept secret for fifty years.

The seventh chapter, Secret Diplomacy and Democratic Principles, will focus on secret diplomacy and democratic principles. The chapter will examine the democratic principles in liberal democracies, and the apparent contradiction with secret diplomacy. It will explore whether there is a legitimacy and legality of secret diplomacy in France and the United States. The seventh chapter will also explore the effect that technological development had on diplomacy. It will also explore a possible future for secret diplomacy in the new globalized world with multiple international actors such as NGOs, IGOs, and Multi-National Corporations.

The eighth chapter will be the conclusion. The main goal of each chapter is to contribute towards the study of secret diplomacy and its purposes and also to provide an answer to the statement of purpose questions: Do liberal democratic states still continue to resort to secret diplomacy? Are there legitimate reasons for such practice? Why is secret diplomacy still an object of debate? And, can secret diplomacy survive in this Information Age?

Chapter Two

(II)- Secret Diplomacy between the Wars

(II)-A- The Treaty of Locarno

After the Peace of Versailles, European statesmen tried to balance secrecy with open diplomacy. One of the early achievements of their diplomatic efforts was the Treaty of Locarno in October 1925. With a combination of secret negotiations and open meetings, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain reached an agreement.

The Locarno treaties were seven agreements negotiated in Switzerland and formally signed in London in December 1925. The Locarno Treaty was ratified and became effective in 1926. The treaty was to appease the reparation burden on Germany and improve her relations with France, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain. The negotiators sought to secure the post-war territorial settlements. The Western Europe territory was guaranteed by the Treaty, but the Eastern Europe territories were left open for possible revisions. Germany promised not to attack France or Belgium and to resolve all territorial issues through diplomacy.⁸⁰ Germany also agreed to sign arbitration conventions with France and Belgium, and arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Therefore Germany agreed to refer disputes to an arbitration tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice. History, of course, tells us that Germany did not stick to the treaty.

⁸⁰ De Launay, Jacques. *Histoire de la diplomatie Secrète 1914-1945*. Belgique : Marabout Université, 1966, 35.

Officially, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann negotiated in Geneva, but maintained a back door channel to speed up the diplomatic process. They met secretly on September 17, 1926 to negotiate the withdrawal of French troops from Germany and to make additional war reparation reduction for Germany. They also discussed laying down the foundation of the political unity or European Union. Both were convinced that any prospect of a European political union would be based on the Franco-German understanding and peace agreement.⁸¹

Other inter-war efforts were launched by French industrialist and economic Minister Louis Loucheur and the Hungarian Count Henrich Coudenhove-Kalergi. Louis Loucheur tried unsuccessfully to advance his idea of a European Common Market through the League of Nations. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi also tried unsuccessfully to promote his idea of European Union through the League of Nations. Both Loucheur and Coudenhove-Kalergi resorted to secret negotiations and successfully coordinated the creation of the Franco-German Economic Committee.⁸²

(II)-B- The Hoare-Laval Pact

A major case of secret diplomacy of the inter-war period occurred during the Abyssinia-Italy war in 1935. The secret negotiations were conducted by British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval in Paris. Italy wanted to

⁸¹ Ibid. De Launay. 38.

⁸² Ibid. De Launay. 42.

colonize the independent state of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and avenge the humiliated defeat of Adowa in 1896. In 1934, Mussolini was encouraged in his ambition to conquer Abyssinia by French Premier Pierre Laval in a meeting in Rome. The British government tried to balance between the need to conciliate with Mussolini and maintain the authority of the League of Nations by upholding collective security. In June 1935, Anthony Eden, then British Secretary in charge of the League of Nations' Affairs, went to Rome to propose a compromise. He suggested that the UK would give Abyssinia access to the Sea through British Somaliland. In return, Abyssinia would surrender some of her outlying territory to Italy. He reiterated the need to respect the Covenant of the League, but Mussolini refused his proposal.⁸³

When Italy attacked Abyssinia in October 1935, British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare protested and called for economic sanctions. Although the United States and France also called for economic sanctions, they did so mainly in areas that did not affect much of their trades with Italy. For instance, Italy's supply of oil was not cut off and the country maintained its international commerce standing.

In the hope of conciliating with Mussolini and to prevent a possible Germany-Italy pact, Secretary Hoare and Premier Laval reached an accord in December 1935. The Hoare-Laval Pact divided Ethiopia and gave Italy the economic and administrative control over southern Ethiopia.⁸⁴ The secret pact was leaked to the French newspaper on

⁸³ Taylor, A.J.P.; *The Origins of the Second World War*; 4th ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968); pp.90

⁸⁴ Robertson, James. "The Hoare-Laval Plan;" *The Journal of Contemporary History*; Vol.10; No. 3; (July 1975): 439.

December 13, 1935. The British public opinion denounced the pact as “selling out Abyssinia,” and the weakness of the League of Nations, which failed to protect a member nation, was exposed. Initially the British Premier Stanley Baldwin endorsed the plan, then rejected it and replaced Samuel Hoare by appointing Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary. The secret pact added a negative image to secret diplomacy and revealed the irrelevance of the League of Nations.⁸⁵

The following diplomatic cases outline the practice of back channel diplomacy by Western democracies. But the first major case considered for detailed analysis, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, provides a contrast by illustrating how states with ideologically motivated regimes practice secret statecraft.

(II)-C- The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

Besides the Hoare-Laval Plan of 1935, which was related to the Italy-Ethiopia war, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is another major case of secret diplomacy in the inter-war period. Formally titled the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, the agreement was signed in Moscow in the evening of August 23, 1939. This is considered to be one of the major illustrations of secret diplomacy. The main objective of the agreement was that Germany and the Soviet Union pledged to remain neutral in the event that either country was attacked by a third nation. The pact was

⁸⁵ Taylor, A.J.P.; *The Origins of the Second World War*. 4th ed., (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 95.

negotiated by the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. In addition to the non-aggression deal, the treaty had a secret protocol dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into zones of influence.

Throughout 1939, for economic and military necessity, Germany and the Soviet Union engaged in negotiations. Germany needed raw materials from Russia and the Soviet Union wanted advanced technological equipment. The Soviet Union also wanted a military agreement with Germany to avoid isolation in case of a general war. Additionally the Soviets were also engaged in official diplomatic negotiations with France and Great Britain for a possible military alliance against Germany.

The first hint of these negotiations began in October 1938, when the German Ambassador to Moscow, Count Friedrich von der Schulenburg, approached Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to explore a possible improvement of the relations between the Reich and the Soviets. This was followed by secret meetings between Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov and Emil Wiel, the director of economic policy at the German Foreign Office. The result of the early negotiations led to the secret meeting on December 22, 1938 between Karl Schnurre, Economic Advisor in the German Foreign Ministry and Kossyrrev, the Soviet Trade Representative and Georgi Astakhov, Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.⁸⁶ Their discussion focused on the possibility of a trade treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union.

⁸⁶ Read, Anthony and David Fisher. *The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-1941* (New York; London: W.W.Norton & Company, 1988), 67.

The first diplomatic sign from the leadership came on January 12, 1939 when Hitler chatted for about an hour with Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov in the presence of the diplomatic corps in Berlin. This was interpreted as a friendly gesture between the Nazis and the Soviets. No archive of the detail of that conversation was available. Later, Hitler told Ambassador Merekalov that he had sent Karl Schnurre to start an economic negotiation in Moscow. In his speech on January 30, 1939, for the first time, Hitler did not criticize the Soviet Union. This was another diplomatic sign of a rapprochement with Moscow.⁸⁷

At the follow up meeting on May 17, 1939 Astakhov and Schnurre again vowed to maintain extreme secrecy of their negotiations. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov saw the economic negotiations as a prelude to any future political negotiation. The initial démarche was made on July 18, 1939 when Soviet Trade Representative Yevgeniy Barbarin signaled to the German leaders that the Soviet were willing to improve relations with Nazi Germany. The negotiations for an economic agreement were finalized on July 26, 1939. On July 28, 1939 Molotov sent a political instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin to start the negotiation for a political agreement with Germany.⁸⁸

The breakthrough came on August 12, 1939 when Molotov advised Astakhov to let Karl Schnurre know that Moscow agreed to speed up the economic negotiations to reach a treaty agreement. Schnurre went on to arrange a secret meeting with Molotov for

⁸⁷ Ibid. Read & Fisher. pp.71

⁸⁸ Dunn, Dennis. Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1998, 124-5.

August 15, 1939. German Ambassador von der Schulenburg and State Secretary Ernst Weizsacker were present. The German-Soviet Commercial Agreement was signed on August 19, 1939. The next day Stalin stopped the military talks with the French and British delegations.

Another marking point came when Ribbentrop sent a message to German Ambassador von der Schulenburg to convey to Moscow that he was prepared to visit Moscow to negotiate a “new path” in their relations. Ribbentrop suggested that normal diplomatic channels were too slow. Ribbentrop instructed Ambassador Schulenburg to read the message aloud to Molotov so as to assure the authenticity of his words. He also suggested that Schulenburg request a meeting with Stalin so that he could read the message aloud to Stalin. After the success of the Molotov-Schulenburg meeting, Friedrich Gauss, the Director of the Legal Department at the German Foreign Office, drafted the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union.

On August 16, 1939, German Secretary of State Ernst Weizsacker sent a message to Moscow that the “Germans accepted all of Soviets proposals and were ready to settle everything.” Stalin responded that he considered meeting the German Foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop. The intention was clear that both Germany and the Soviet Union desired a non-aggression agreement after their initial secret negotiations.⁸⁹

In the final round of the negotiations, to bypass the conventions of established diplomacy and avoid another delay in the transmission of messages, Hitler decided to

⁸⁹ Ibid. Dunn, Denis, 222.

write a personal letter to Stalin. The letter expressed his satisfaction over the signing of the economic agreement. Hitler expressed the need to enter into a political agreement with the Soviet Union. He welcomed the draft treaty presented earlier by Molotov. But he mentioned that the tension between Germany and Poland “became intolerable.” Therefore it was urgent to reach a political agreement with the Soviets.⁹⁰

Finally on August 21, 1939 Ribbentrop related Stalin’s response to Hitler. The Soviet leader agreed to meet Ribbentrop on August 23. In the letter, Stalin expressed his satisfaction with the economic treaty and the desire to finalize the Non-Aggression Pact. On the 22 of August, Ribbentrop flew to Moscow while avoiding the Polish air space. When Ribbentrop met Molotov and Stalin on the evening of August 23, 1939, the shocking news reached Western capitals; the non-aggression pact was signed and revealed to the world.

(II)-C1- Analysis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

The secret negotiations were organized through the highest governmental officials in Germany and the Soviet Union. But due to the hostility and mistrust between both nations, the early stages were delegated to middle rank officials in both foreign ministries. This was necessary so that both countries could deny the on-going

⁹⁰ Ibid. Dunn, Denis, 223.

negotiations in case of a premature leak to the public or other nations. When the economic agreement seemed possible, both Foreign Ministers got personally involved in the process. And it was only after the foreign ministers' negotiations that both Hitler and Stalin got involved. The role of both ambassadors in Moscow and Berlin was critical as both Schulenburg and Merekalov were involved in all the early explorations and preparations of the negotiations.

Another aspect of the organization was that the economic and trade experts handled the exploratory secret negotiations from which political negotiations were built upon. Molotov expressed caution but instructed his aid to engage in negotiations with the goal of improving economic relations and a possible political agreement.⁹¹ On the German side, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was himself in permanent contact with his Ambassador von der Schulenburg. German Economic Expert Karl Schnurre also followed Ribbentrop's instructions when he proposed to Astakhov a three-stage program for the normalization of relations: completion of trade and credit talks; improvement of cultural relations; and then political discussions. When Karl Schnurre suggested a secret protocol to be added in the trade agreement, it was Molotov who objected that it was inappropriate to do so. Archival telegrams proved the important and personal role played by Ribbentrop and Molotov in the secret negotiations' progress.

⁹¹ Roberts, Geoffrey: "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany;" *Soviet Studies*; Vol.44; No.1; (1992), 64.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

Despite the controversial nature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, this was a remarkable case of secret diplomacy. The negotiations were kept secret from the very beginning. The secrecy in these negotiations was employed as an offensive diplomatic strategy for a strategic goal. This is to say that the negotiators meant to drastically change the situation on the ground and to explore a new approach to the Nazi-Soviets relations. Therefore secrecy served its primary purpose of affecting such a radical change in the German-Soviet relations.

In analyzing the role of secrecy, one has to take into consideration the historical and political context of that time. The relationship between both nations was characterized as extremely adversarial. Nazi-Germany was an ideological sworn enemy of Soviet-Russia. Germany's Leader, Hitler, expressed many times his desire to destroy the Soviet Union.

Another factor was that the Western powers such as Great Britain and France were reluctant to deal with Stalin. The diplomatic negotiations for a military alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France were dragging. At first, an alliance with Western Powers seemed the safer course for Soviet leaders since they did not trust Hitler. But, the negotiations between USSR and Anglo-French delegations dragged for two months; May 27-July 23 1939. Both political and military negotiations dragged, and

fed Stalin's suspicions that Anglo-French leaders wanted Russia to go to war against Germany.⁹² Stalin was also concerned about a possible Anglo-German Pact. This view was based on the private visit by Lord Kemsley, a British publisher, to meet Hitler which was interpreted by Moscow as a possible intrigue.

Each country also had different military cultures and priorities. The differences were not only between Soviet and Anglo-French priorities, but also between French and British army professional cultures. Knowing that their political leaders did not want a war, the Anglo-French military negotiators proposed a defensive plan, whereas Soviet military leaders wanted a more offensive plan. Lacking intelligence on the real strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet army, Anglo-French delegations focused on reaching an agreement on a set of principles. But the Soviets wanted a plan of an offensive military operations established in case of a German aggression.⁹³

The British and French leaders wanted a pact with Soviet-Russia that would build a front for the alliance and deter Hitler without going to war, and hoped that Poland would compromise over Danzig. But, on their side, the Russian leaders wanted an alliance that would defend them against Germany's war machine. The French leaders also reluctantly preferred a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance while still securing British military assistance. And France did not want to go to war over Danzig since Poland did not want the Soviet Army to be deployed on its soil for its protection. Fearful of a

⁹² Taylor, A.J.P. *The Origins of the Second World War*. 4th ed., (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 242.

⁹³ Watt, Donald Cameron; *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 454.

possible Franco-British-Russian alliance, German Ambassador von der Schulenburg and von Ribbentrop pushed for a Nazi-Soviet Pact.⁹⁴

The necessity for back door diplomacy was the confidential way for the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany to deal with each other. The tension was high, there was less common interest, and both nations needed discretion. The first secret meeting between Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov and German State Secretary Ernst Weizsacker on April 17, 1939 was an economic negotiation. Merekalov wanted to solve the Skoda Arms factory issue. The Skoda Arms factory had been a Czech company fulfilling Soviet weapons orders. After Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, the Soviets wanted to ensure that their orders would be honored. But the secret meeting also became a venue where the Soviet Ambassador expressed a wish for a possible rapprochement.⁹⁵ The meeting was significant as the two diplomats used the occasion to explore not only an economic deal, but also possible political negotiations.

The Memorandum from German Secretary Weizsacker suggested that Ambassador Merekalov underlined the ideological differences between both countries in the meeting, but he acknowledged that secret negotiation was the best approach to deal with their issues. Merekalov's telegram to Moscow about the secret meeting also stated

⁹⁴ Ibid. Watt, Donald C. pp.455

⁹⁵ Roberts, Geoffrey; "Infamous Encounter: The Merekalov-Weizsacker Meeting of April 17 1939;" *The Historical Journal*; Vol.35; No.4; (1992), 921.

that Weizsacker recognized differences in political principles but confirmed that Germany as well desired to explore economic relations with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶

Another possible reason for secrecy was uncertainty about the possibility of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. This explained why the highest government officials were not included in the exploratory and preparatory phases. They waited in the background, while directing the process. When Molotov became Soviet Foreign Minister, the Soviet Ambassador did receive secret instructions from him. It was only when the secret economic negotiations seemed fruitful that Ribbentrop came to the front.

It would have been very difficult for both sides to engage in open door diplomacy. At the early stage it would have caused frictions in the military negotiations between the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. This would have caused a possible mobilization in Poland, and the Baltic and Northern states. Both Soviet and German leaders would have appeared as hypocrites from the start. Therefore back channel diplomacy was the most probable channel for such high risk exchanges between two archenemy nations. The early secret meetings also created a friendly and encouraging tone in the conversations and the build-up of some basic level of trust necessary for discreet negotiations.

The back door diplomatic channel was also appropriate because of the ongoing military tension between Nazi-Germany and Soviet-Russia. Diplomacy had to serve the national interest. At that time Germany was concerned about fighting a war on two fronts.

⁹⁶ Ibid. Roberts, Geoffrey, 922.

Soviet-Russia felt not ready for a war, and needed either a military alliance with the Western Powers or an understanding with Germany along the lines of non-aggression. From the Soviet Union's perspective, the treaty was a peace initiative as it delayed a possible war against Germany. Germany saw it as a temporary measure from a military standpoint. Therefore the Soviet Union entered the treaty from a position of weakness whereas Germany was in a position of strength.

The diplomatic archives of the secret protocol were removed from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1946. Russian officials suggested that the content of the secret pact was known only to Molotov and Stalin.⁹⁷ The main controversial point was the division of the spheres of influence. At the time of the agreement there was no mention of the military occupation of Poland. A telegram from Ribbentrop to Schulenburg on September 3, 1939 suggested to Molotov and Stalin that Germany would pursue the Polish resistance into the Soviet zone of influence, unless the Soviet Red Army occupies the eastern part of Poland. The diplomatic archive suggested that the military occupation of Poland was a political expediency rather than a diplomatic deal between Germany and Russia. Even the Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Nikolai Sharonov, was not aware of any secret protocol.⁹⁸

The argument supporting the method of back door diplomacy does not justify the destruction of nations or/and the murder of populations. Secret diplomacy had acquired a

⁹⁷ Roberts, Geoffrey; The Soviet decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany; *Soviet Studies*; Vol.44; No.1; (1992), 71.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Roberts, Geoffrey, 71.

sinister connotation because of “negative secret clauses.” The diplomatic merit of the negotiators such as German Ambassador von der Schulenburg and Soviet Ambassador Aleksei Merekalov or Soviet trade negotiator Georgi Astakhov was due to the fact that they brought two arch-enemy nations to the table to sign a non-aggression treaty. But the diplomatic accomplishment was overshadowed by the evil intentions of Hitler and Stalin.

c)- Government particularities

Both Nazi-Germany and Soviet-Russia were governed by two dictators, Hitler and Stalin. Of course both leaders had no regard for freedom and both political systems did not tolerate any freedom of information for their populations. Both regimes considered democracy as a weak political system that produces a weakened military and a decayed economy that brought the Wall Street crash of 1929. Ideological stance played a major role in this secretive process as no consideration was taken into account, except for what was in the interest of Hitler and Stalin.

Despite the accomplishment of the diplomats involved in the secret negotiations to make the agreement possible, one aspect of the pact was very controversial. Nazi-Germany and Soviet-Russia divided Northern and Eastern Europe into zones of influence. The secret protocol was a green light for Germany to attack Poland and exerted much suffering to the populations.

Without regard to either consideration or respect for the Polish population, the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact added a very negative image to secret

diplomacy. The fact that the “secret protocol” justified military aggression and a territorial expansion, for Nazis-Germany and Soviet-Russia, at the expense of Poland and the Baltic states was clearly a sinister and deviant treaty. It is also important to mention that Germany did not intend to honor the Treaty for the entire ten years as it was stipulated.

Chapter Three

(III)- Secret Diplomacy and French Diplomacy

III-A- Early Cases of Secret Diplomacy in France

The tradition of secret diplomacy is part of the French political culture and history. As early as the beginning of the modern states, France had used secret diplomacy to settle its political problems in Europe, and diplomacy was mainly controlled by Monarchs. The earliest “*Conseil Secret*” designed to handle foreign affairs was organized under Louis XI, and later under François I, in the fifteenth century. There was no Foreign Ministry, as this was the time when state affairs were handled by the “Clercs du secret” and “Secrétaires des finances.”⁹⁹

In 1648, the Westphalia settlement was the result of secret negotiations. Beside the main religion issue, three other issues caused the thirty year war; the determination of Sweden, the position of Spain in the Rhine-Land, and the territorial issues of Western and Central Europe. One of the early proponents of secret negotiations was the French Chief Minister Cardinal Richelieu. He negotiated the Peace of Prague in 1635 to settle the religious issue in Europe. Then he negotiated with the Holy Roman Emperor’s Minister Johann von Werth to stabilize European relations. He also secretly negotiated with the Dutchman Hugo Grotius who was the Swedish Ambassador assigned for Swedish territorial issues.

⁹⁹ LaRoche, Carlo. *La Diplomatie Française* (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), 12.

Other Westphalia settlement secret talks were conducted in Munster and Osnabruck between the French Plenipotentiary Count Claude de Mesmes d'Avaux and the German Count Conrad von Lutzow who was the Imperial Plenipotentiary. Count d'Avaux who had been Richelieu's Ambassador to the Holy German Empire, suggested that Munster and Osnabruck negotiations would count as one congress to settle European differences.

Richelieu's successor Cardinal Mazarin, an Italian in the service of France's King Louis XIII and later under Louis XIV, assigned Count Abel Servien to expedite the details of the treaty in 1641. Count Abel Servien secretly met with the Pope's envoy Cardinal Chigi and the Venetian Ambassador Aloisi Contarini and both served as the mediators in the discussion. The negotiations were long drawn out but they reached a satisfactory conclusion.

The final details of the treaty document were written in Paris at Chief Minister Mazarin's home. The essential clauses of the treaty of Westphalia were discussed and drawn up by a secret diplomat of the Duke Maximilian of Bavaria sitting at the table in Paris with Cardinal Mazarin. The document was then officially presented to ambassadors and ratified in Munster and Osnabruck on October 24, 1648.¹⁰⁰

The Westphalia settlement of 1648 was conceived along the lines of compromise. The Osnabruck treaty settled the religious issue and the Holy Roman Empire territorial

¹⁰⁰ Mowat, R.B. *A History of European Diplomacy 1451-1789*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928, 110.

affairs, and the Munster treaty focused on the other territorial issues and Sweden. A complete amnesty was granted to all and all territories were restored to their owners as of 1618. The Westphalia settlement brought some level of peace in Western Europe. Bilateral wars such as France against Spain continued but at a low pace and low intensity. Another benefit of the negotiations was that the freedom of commerce by land and Sea was decreed.

Historical archives also revealed the secret negotiations during the peace treaty of Pyrénées in 1659. The secret negotiations were conducted by French secret envoy Hugues de Lionne and the Spanish envoy Penarada. Cardinal Mazarin provided all the instructions to his secret envoy. Then the follow up discussions were conducted secretly between French Chief Minister Cardinal Mazarin and Spain's Minister Don Antonio Pimental de Prado, a Sicilian nobleman in the service of Spain's King Felipe IV. Most of the discussions were held in Ile de Faisans between the two countries' borders.

After twenty four secret meetings, the treaty of Pyrénées for peace between France and Spain was ratified on November 7, 1659. Most of the leg work was secretly done by Hugues de Lionne who acted as Cardinal Mazarin's Secretary and Don Pedro Coloma, the Spanish Secretary.¹⁰¹ The treaty of Pyrénées was a great achievement for the Chief Minister Mazarin and for French diplomacy. From the treaty, France took over Spain's position as the leading power in Europe.

¹⁰¹ Mowat, R.B. *A History of European Diplomacy 1451-1789*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928, 120.

Secret diplomacy was practiced in France since the early modern state system in the fifteenth century. The seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had multiple cases of secret diplomacy and the efforts by diplomatists such as Maurice de Talleyrand to settle conflicts. France participated in the 1815 Vienna Peace Conference that set up the Concert of Europe. Talleyrand and other diplomatists such as the Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh drew up a new world order in Europe. It was the model for peace until the onset of insecurity in the 1890s. Then, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States vowed to practice open diplomacy in the context of the League of Nations.

Between the Wars, as explained in the previous chapter, French diplomacy struggled to forge a new direction between the open diplomacy of the League of Nations, and a long tradition of the old diplomacy. After the Second World War, new realities of the Cold War created an environment where France and West Germany could re-establish their relationship and address long-standing issues.

(III)-B- Franco-German Secret Negotiations over disputed territories

As stated earlier, the tradition of secrecy had been part of the French political culture that goes back to King Louis XI, in the fifteenth century, before the creation of the French Republic. After the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations, the call for conference diplomacy became even louder.

Yet, the study of the French diplomatic archives provided interesting cases of secret diplomacy. One such case is revealed by the study of the archives of the negotiations between France and her former arch-enemy Germany over the territorial issues of Saar and Alsace.

To improve the Franco-German relations and solve their territorial issues, secret negotiations were led by Louis Joxe, French Ambassador to Germany. On January 5, 1956 Ambassador Louis Joxe secretly met with German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and German State Secretary Walter Hallstein. Both parties came to the conclusion that no understanding at the European level could be achieved without a Franco-German entente. The secret discussions set the foundation for the next negotiation between Ambassador Louis Joxe and Chancellor Adenauer and West German President Theodor Heuss.¹⁰²

During the Joxe-Adenauer meeting, the German Chancellor reiterated the need for a direct and frank negotiation between both countries and the importance of a discreet

¹⁰² Joxe, Louis; "Memorandum of Conversation: French Ambassador Joxe and German Foreign Minister Von Brentano," (January 5, 1956); Declassified on January 7, 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 1-2

channel of communication. The discussions centered on the creation of the Common Market and European political institutions. Ambassador Joxe reaffirmed the necessity of solving the issue of the Saar region. The main idea consisted of maintaining the French and German economic ties with Saar to serve the interests of both countries. On the other hand Saar political control was to be handed over to Germany.¹⁰³

Before the Brussels meeting with European Foreign Ministers, West German Foreign Minister von Brentano met privately with French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay. The discussion centered on the Franco-German cooperation and the status of the Saar region. They discussed the basis for France to hand over the political control of Saar to Germany.¹⁰⁴ The date of February 20, 1956 was selected for the next secret meeting relative to solving the Saar problem. Both sides hoped to appease the tension with local Saar industrialists and politicians. The quasi-independent position of Saar was not welcomed by either country.

In the private meeting between West German Ambassador to France von Maltzan and Guy Mollet, the French Premier concluded that Saar was the basic problem in the large context of the Franco-German entente. Guy Mollet also confirmed French diplomatic support to Germany in dealing with the Soviet Union. Another discussion centered on the issue of Germany's disarmament and the integration of Germany into the European political and economic reconstruction. Guy Mollet expressed his views that any

¹⁰³ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.3

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.6

missteps in public diplomacy could be ironed out in secret negotiations.¹⁰⁵ The archives clearly confirmed the importance that both sides placed on using discreet channels of communication.

Later, Ambassador Joxe met privately with the German State Secretary Walter Hallstein. Their discussion brought up many points of misunderstanding between the two nations. The German diplomat expressed his government's concerns that the tension between the two countries was still high. The French Ambassador explained the dedication of his government to the cause of the Council of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Hallstein stated Adenauer's desire to rebuild Germany's military force. The French Ambassador reiterated that France would tolerate the revival of the German military only within the context of NATO.¹⁰⁶

In Luxemburg, the German delegation included Chancellor Adenauer, Foreign Minister von Brentano, Secretary of State Walter Hallstein, and two specialists in French affairs, Boechse and Kessler. The French delegation included Premier Guy Mollet, new Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and Ambassador Maurice Faure. The discussion included all the territorial issues such as Saar, Alsace, and the Moselle canal. At the end

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.19

¹⁰⁶ Joxe, Louis; Memorandum of Conversation: French Ambassador Joxe and German Secretary of State Hallstein; (January 5, 1956); Declassified on January 7, 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 22

of the meeting, Chancellor Adenauer expressed his complete support for the European policy agenda and reconstruction.¹⁰⁷

On September 15, 1956 German Secretary Walter Hallstein met secretly with the “Three Wise men.” Although the details of the meeting and the identities of the “Three Wise men” involved were never communicated, a French diplomat, Christian de Margerie who was present related in a secret Memorandum that the issues discussed included Franco-German relations, EURATOM, Common Market and the possibility of a European Union. The archives also confirmed that the private meeting was held in Palais de Chaillot in Paris. Christian de Margerie also assisted in another private meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Guy Mollet at the French Embassy in Brussels.¹⁰⁸

Before the Adenauer-Mollet meeting in Brussels, a secret meeting between French Secretary of State Maurice Faure and German Secretary of State Walter Hallstein took place on September 17, 1956. They wanted to reach some understanding on the Saar region and the Moselle canal before the Adenauer-Mollet meeting. The private dinner between Adenauer and Guy Mollet was held on September 29, 1956 at the French

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. 33-34

¹⁰⁸ De Margerie, Christian; “Memorandum of Meeting between Secretary Hallstein and the Three Wiseman;” (September 15, 1956); Declassified in January 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 50

Embassy in Brussels. The German Foreign Minister Heinrich Von Brentano and Walter Hallstein were present.¹⁰⁹

Besides their agreement on most of the international political issues, Adenauer and Mollet settled the monetary issue of Saar. The region's currency was to be converted to the Deutschmark. They reached an agreement on the Moselle canal and the grand canal of Alsace. They also agreed on preparing a draft of the treaty to deal with all their territorial issues.¹¹⁰

The reconstruction of Europe was the issue that brought them together but no concrete agreement was signed. Guy Mollet explained to Adenauer the details of his meeting with British Premier Anthony Eden. He also presented the ideas to be analyzed on issues such as the Council of Europe and the European Community of Armament. Both leaders were committed to continue secret negotiations to solve their remaining differences.¹¹¹

The territorial agreement over Saar included a three year transition on the monetary conversion. This was based on the purchasing power of the French franc. But the rate of exchange was determined later. It was agreed that Germany would keep the withdrawn French francs in Saar, and could use them later in other international

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. De Margerie. pp.52

¹¹⁰ Ibid. De Margerie. pp.53-54

¹¹¹ De Murville, Maurice; Memorandum of Conversation by Maurice Couve de Murville: "Meeting between Adenauer and Guy Mollet;" (September 29, 1956); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp 1-4

purchases. But the compromise was agreed upon that Germany would destroy about half of the Saar's French francs in circulation. This was to avoid any monetary crisis in France with the excess franc bills in German hands. An understanding was also agreed on the Industrialist Roechling's property issue. Herman Roechling was a Nazi sympathizer who exploited French industries and used slave labor during the war. They agreed on three billion francs to be transferred to France to cover the Roechling properties and industry.¹¹² The text for the final agreement was drafted.

On the issue of the canal of Alsace, Guy Mollet agreed that France would not build it beyond the Vogelgrun industrial plant. The French Premier and the German Chancellor also agreed that any derivational canal adjustment on the Rhine's hydro-electric industries would be made, but Germany would pay any additional cost resulting from this arrangement. In this context they decided that France would control the energy produced by the Rhine hydro-electric industries.¹¹³ Finally, it was confirmed that Germany no longer had any claim over the Alsace region.

The negotiations also found a common ground on the issue of the Moselle canal. It was decided that a new company would be created. France, Germany and Luxemburg would all finance the project. There would be a rotating company presidency between France and Germany. There would also be two directors from each country. The taxes of the company would be lowered. France, Germany and Luxemburg would each take

¹¹² Ibid. De Murville. pp.58

¹¹³ Ibid. De Murville. pp.59

control of the ports bordering the canal.¹¹⁴ They decided to make the result of the negotiations public the next day and announced the day for signing the treaty.¹¹⁵

(III)-B1- Analysis of the Franco-German Territorial Negotiations

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

The diplomatic discussions over the Saar and Alsace regions had always been a dividing issue in Franco-German relations. The post war negotiations were carried out in the context of alliance politics. The French and German leaders also decided that official diplomatic channel would slow down the process. A particular aspect of the organization of the negotiations was the fact that secret negotiations were conducted by the Ambassadors and envoys that operated within the context of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the approval of the French Premier.

Leading the secret negotiations was French Ambassador to Germany Louis Joxe. He dealt directly with the German chief diplomats: Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and State Secretary Walter Hallstein. He kept the French Premier and Foreign Minister aware of the progress of the negotiations. The ability to report directly to the

¹¹⁴ Ibid. De Murville. pp.59

¹¹⁵ Joxe, Louis; Memorandum from Ambassador Louis Joxe: "Meeting between Adenauer and Guy Mollet;" (October 2, 1956); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 64

decision makers in France was a necessary plus for the negotiator.¹¹⁶ The French Premier and Foreign Minister controlled all the diplomatic steps by providing guidance to Ambassador Joxe who still led the exploratory and preparatory secret negotiations in Germany.

Another organizational aspect was the leading role that Ambassador Joxe played in European Council negotiations. Ambassador Joxe negotiated with other foreign ministers from Benelux. In other secret meetings Ambassador Joxe met with the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the Benelux, under the chairmanship of Belgium Prime Minister Henri Spaak. The meetings were necessary in the sense that it laid down additional basis for European political and economic institutions.¹¹⁷

It is important to notice that other secret negotiations were conducted in a private residence in Luxemburg. On June 2, 1956 a secret meeting was held in the house of René Mayer, a respected authority in Luxemburg. René Mayer provided all the necessary accommodation for the negotiators. Ambassador Joxe and Secretary Hallstein prepared the schedule and issues to be discussed at the private residence.

Despite the re-emergence of multilateral diplomacy in 1945 and the adjustment of the Quai d'Orsay to include a conference secretariat to manage international organizations and conferences, the French Premier and the Foreign Minister continued to

¹¹⁶ Joxe, Louis; "Memorandum of Conversation: French Ambassador Joxe and German Foreign Minister Von Brentano;" (January 5, 1956); Declassified on January 7, 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 1-2

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.4

practice secret diplomacy in handling their territorial dispute with Germany. The leadership made use of the expertise and experience of the French ambassador to Germany to handle private negotiations with the German leadership.¹¹⁸ This shows that the French leaders did not bypass the ambassadors, but rather used their services to facilitate the diplomatic efforts.

The importance of the Saar agreement could not be overstated. Although France accepted to attach Saar to Germany, the accord increased the prospect of a real bilateral political and economic relation between both nations. It was also a prelude for a German support of the French nuclear program.¹¹⁹ This was the basis for a European security project.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

The decision to handle the territorial dispute through discreet negotiations came from both Germany and France. Mutual consent is an important variable of secret diplomacy where both countries agreed to abide by the rules and exigencies of the back channel negotiations. Secrecy in this context was employed as a routine diplomatic strategy for a tactical purpose. This means that negotiators desired to maintain the friendly relationship they had while using secrecy to advance the negotiations. The French Premier and the German Chancellor approved the use of back channel

¹¹⁸ Allain, Jean-Claude; Guillen; Soutou; Theis & Vaisse. *L'histoire de la diplomatie Française; de 1815 à nos jours*. (Paris : Edition Perrin, 2001), 373.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. Allain, Jean-Claude... pp.401

negotiations mainly as a diplomatic expediency for organizational simplicity, and to avoid any unnecessary internal or external pressure.

There was no obstruction from the bureaucratic machine of the Foreign Ministries. Although many members of the inner circle were involved, there was no leak of information about the negotiations. The private atmosphere of the negotiations provided an environment where frank and direct conversations took place. The diplomats on both side maintained the discretion throughout the negotiation process.

In his Memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Joxe expressed his satisfaction in the advantage of holding secret negotiations with German Secretary Walter Hallstein. The Chancellor's plan for improving relations with France and his fear that the French Government was too accommodating with the Soviet Union were discussed in secret. Adenauer was suspicious of the Soviet Union's European policy. Adenauer's suspicions could have alarmed the Soviet government if they were made public.

While the negotiations were being held, the French Premier Guy Mollet made statements against the German unification to the American newspaper "*US News and World Report*."¹²⁰ In the interview, Guy Mollet also suggested the increase in French troops by one hundred thousand. These statements were interpreted by the German

¹²⁰ De Margerie, Christian; Memorandum from Christian de Margerie: "Report from Foreign Ministry: Guy Mollet's US Interview;" (April 6, 1956); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 18

parliament as an attempt to neutralize Germany. Despite the fact that the German leadership disapproved such statements, the secret negotiations were not interrupted. The process continued until the agreement was reached. This was mainly because the French Premier privately reassured the German leaders that France would honor its NATO obligations, and that he wanted to continue the secret negotiations until an agreement was reached.

Held in the context of the alliance politics, the secrecy in the negotiations over Saar region was not due to the distrust of the official channels, but mainly due to diplomatic expediency and organizational practicality. After World War II, despite some level of distrust, France considered West Germany as a friendly nation. Most Western European nations and the United States also supported the new Franco-German entente. Therefore, they did not fear any sabotage of the negotiations. But Premier Guy Mollet encouraged the back channel approach to gain time and avoid the long process of the Foreign Ministry bureaucratic machine. It is important to notice that the Premier did not reject the bureaucracy altogether. The French Secretary of State, Maurice Faure, and the Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay, and his replacement Christian Pineau coordinated all the negotiations progress and searched for breakthroughs whenever possible. Both experienced diplomats also helped to control information to avoid any leaks of the discussions details to the public or parliaments. That is why secrecy was a matter of expediency and organizational simplicity rather than the avoidance of political risks.

Secrecy was also encouraged by both Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Guy Mollet, so that the negotiations could be frank and direct. The privacy and confidentiality

were part of the European diplomatic tradition. Also, the territorial issues between both nations were negotiated in secrecy as to allow the diplomats to manage the fear of any failure in case of premature disclosure.

The importance of the early secret meetings between Secretary Faure, Ambassador Joxe and Secretary Hallstein could not be overstated since they paved the way for the settlement of all Franco-German territorial issues. They ironed out the remaining points of disagreement which led Adenauer and Mollet to sign the deal.

c)- Government Particularities

Germany and France did not announce the ongoing negotiations to their respective populations until the final agreement. The negotiating methods were not democratic and there was no explicit consideration of any democratic norms. The leaders made public the results only after they reached an agreement. Secrecy was guarded despite the fact that both nations were liberal democracies.

Another aspect that could be underlined was that both Paris and Bonn were very accommodating in their negotiating style.¹²¹ Contrary to previous disputes over Saar and Alsace, this time both sides kept their promises, no lies or explicit threats were used, and none exploited in public the domestic difficulties of the other during the negotiations.

¹²¹ Ikle, Fred Charles. *How Nations Negotiate*. New York & London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964, 90.

There was a mutual understanding on the implementation of the joint agreement details as well. It needs to be remembered that the old disputes over Saar and Alsace were also handled expeditiously under the context of alliance politics caused by the exigencies of the Cold War.

Although both French and German leaders agreed to handle their differences through secret negotiations, Guy Mollet also encouraged the German Chancellor to make public some of the issues discussed. The French Premier also made public some issues discussed. These were made not to abide by any democratic principles, but rather to control the flow of information and counter any false rumors from critics, which could come from the total lack of available information.

The negotiations were a success in a sense that secrecy was maintained throughout the negotiations and the objectives of the secret negotiations were met. The immediate consequence of this success was the renewed trust between both countries, and the strengthening of the Western alliance. There are other particularities that need to be analyzed. These negotiations were conducted in the context of the French fourth republic. Prime Minister Guy Mollet had the executive power, but that power was weakened by a heavy parliamentary involvement. The goal of the constitution at that time was to reconcile the parliamentary democracy with the ministerial power and stability. This mixed democratic government type produced some confusion since the ministers were accountable to report to the parliament.

At that time the Foreign Minister still held a strong control of his department, and this fact also weakened the authority of the Prime Minister over his Cabinet. Therefore, the success of the negotiations and secrecy depended on a strong collaboration between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Secrecy was maintained against other elements of the government, but all the key diplomatic officials were brought on board.

The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 by Jean Monet also helped to create an environment of confidence between the two arch-enemies. This helped to prevent any future war between France and Germany. The whole process was facilitated by the consent by German diplomatic officials who maintained secrecy and were also comfortable in the practice of the old secret statecraft.

(III)-C- French diplomacy and the Sèvres secret agreement

Among the reasons for French diplomatic intervention in the Suez crisis, the Algerian war could be placed on the top of the list. The French government resented the fact that Nasser was providing military assistance to the FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front). In addition to this, there was the expropriation of French assets in Egypt, and the restriction on the freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. The French government was also concerned about the fate of the employees of the Suez Canal Company.

One of the most significant actions taken in the context of secret diplomacy was the agreement of Sèvres. This was a secret agreement concluded in October 1956

between France, Great Britain and Israel to confront Nasser's actions. After Nasser's arms deal with the Soviets in 1955, Israel felt threatened. This action was followed by Egyptian training of Palestinian Fedayeen to infiltrate Israel to commit terrorist acts. Israel considered a formal collaboration with France and Great Britain to prevent diplomatic isolation in a case of a preventive war against Egypt.

The first action was taken by French General Maurice Challe, Chief of Staff of French Forces. To respond to Nasser's position, he sent a cable to Great Britain for a strategy to confront Egypt. General Challe gave the information to the Israeli Defense Representative in Paris, Joseph Nahmias who in turn cabled Prime Minister Ben Gurion. The cable also identified a Franco-British plan to launch the "Operation Musketeer" against Egypt.¹²² During the meeting between Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet, Ben Gurion sent a message that he could join the secret negotiation to make the meeting tripartite. The French considered this option to decrease mistrust between Britain and Israel for a joint action in Suez. Guy Mollet sent the invitation to Ben Gurion to come to Paris for a secret negotiation.

Previously, France had concluded with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir and an Israeli military delegation, a secret agreement which provided Israel with new tanks, mobile artillery, and Mystère IV aircrafts. The initiative started in June 1956 with a secret meeting between French and Israeli military officials in Vermans, France. At this time Israel was branded by Arabs, Communists and much of the Third World as an "agent of

¹²² Bar-On, Mordechai. "David Ben Gurion and the Sèvres Collusion;" In *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*; edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 148.

colonialism.” This pushed Ben Gurion to seek western support and alliance. He also wanted to maintain the flow of military equipment from France. Yet he was still against any British plan.

French Premier Guy Mollet sent General Maurice Challe and French diplomat Louis Mangin to escort Ben Gurion from Jerusalem to Sèvres. Ben Gurion immediately told General Challe not to use the British proposal in the meeting since Israel rejected it. General Challe and Louis Mangin engaged in a negotiation on the plane to soften Ben Gurion’s position. The secret meeting was to start on October 22, 1956 at the villa Bonnier de la Chapelle in Sèvres, France.¹²³

In the secret negotiation, Ben Gurion sat face-to-face with French Premier Guy Mollet, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, and General Bourges-Maunoury. The French authorities explained their need to execute “Operation Musketeer.” This was accentuated by the French capture of an arms shipment from Egypt to the Algerian rebels. Maurice Bourges-Maunoury promised to Ben Gurion that France would continue to help Israel with equipment and intelligence information. By the end of the secret negotiation, the Israeli Premier finally agreed to the Franco-British proposal with minor modifications. This also included some diplomatic strategies to be used after the Israeli attack against Egypt.¹²⁴

¹²³ Ibid. Bar-On, Mordechai. pp.148

¹²⁴ Ibid. Bar-On, Mordechai. pp. 154

The essential element in the Franco-British plan was that Israel would launch an attack deep in the Sinai Peninsula; the British and French would send Israel and Egypt an ultimatum; “Operation Musketeer” would then be launched to occupy the Suez Canal to assure free passage of Western ships. The most important aspect of the meeting was that the whole agreement was to remain secret. The British leaders were not to admit to any knowledge of the secret arrangement. France, Great Britain and Israel had made the secret agreement in the interest of all three nations.¹²⁵

On the first evening of the negotiation, Ben Gurion sat face to face with the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. There was tension in the encounter since Ben Gurion had a preconceived idea about the antagonistic behavior of Selwyn Lloyd. Despite the poor chemistry between them, the negotiation went on in a frank and formal atmosphere.

The Israeli and French negotiators wanted a written secret agreement to be drafted. Despite British opposition to the written format, the Protocol of Sèvres was signed on October 24, 1956. This provided much satisfaction to the Israeli Prime Minister who put his copy of the folded document right in his pocket. On the British side, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd signed the document for Her Majesty’s Government.¹²⁶

(III)-C1- Analysis of the Secret Agreement of Sèvres

¹²⁵ Ibid. Bar-On, Mordechai. pp. 154

¹²⁶ Ibid. Bar-On, Mordechai. pp.154

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

The Anglo-French diplomatic initiatives of Sèvres also constituted a different type of diplomatic strategy. The diplomatic process was secretive and joint with Great Britain. But the strategy did combine a diplomatic aspect and a covert military action and Israeli involvement.

The negotiations were handled secretly by the French Premier with the assistance of the Foreign Minister and the advisory of the military command. Although very few officials were involved in the process, the diplomatic maneuvering was controlled by the French Prime Minister using the traditional method of secret diplomacy to handle a crisis situation.

Another important organizational feature was that the exploratory and preparatory steps were handled by high officials in France, UK and Israel. The Sèvres agreement was an extension of the Anglo-French's "Operation Musketeer" which was designed to deal with the looming Canal Suez crisis. All three nations dealt with the matter as a political expediency to bring a halt to the actions of Nasser. The secret negotiation was also handled as a secret summit between policy decision makers of the highest ranks. Very few officials were involved and the bureaucratic machineries of the British Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay were not brought in.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

It took about twenty years before certain details of the agreement became available. The reasons for secrecy at Sèvres paralleled mission "Alpha." But France was

facing a much tougher challenge with the rebellion in Algeria. The Franco-British initiative was pursued while the crisis reached its high point. “Operation Musketeer” also included diplomatic secret negotiations in London where French diplomat Couve de Murville met US diplomat George Allen. Allen made it clear that the US would not support any type of Franco-British colonial expedition. The Sèvres secret meetings took the American position into account, but miscalculated the American response.

The level of secrecy itself was a matter of dispute in the handling of “Operation Musketeer.” Prime Minister Anthony Eden was unhappy with the signing of the document. Selwyn Lloyd wanted more than just secrecy on the meeting. He wanted the meeting to be denied, and also erased from the annals of history. This meant that Selwyn Lloyd wanted to state that the secret negotiation never took place. He wanted no written record of the meeting that took place. Later, Anthony Eden sent diplomats Patrick Dean and Donald Logan back to Paris to retrieve all copies of the document. But at that time Ben Gurion was already on his way back to Israel. On one hand the British Premier wanted Nasser ousted. On the other hand, he did not want to give the impression to Arabs that Great Britain colluded with Israel to destroy an Arab leader.

On his part, the Israeli Premier Ben Gurion was willing to keep the Protocol secret for a long time. But he still wanted to keep a record of the document as not to deny its place in history.¹²⁷ The Israeli Premier was initially opposed to this plan. Ben Gurion was not aware of the US-British Project “Alpha” which was designed to work out a

¹²⁷ Ibid. Bar-On, Mordechai. pp.158

diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli problems. He therefore did not trust the “good faith” of British policy in the Middle East because of the close relationship between the UK and Arab states.

The first personality to reveal this secret diplomatic agreement was the former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau when he published his Memoirs in 1976. Other pieces of the puzzle were released by former British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s Memoirs in 1978. The French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau stated that Nasser’s action of defiance was confronted through force so that France could attempt to control the war in Algeria.¹²⁸ That was one of the reasons for secrecy. But the dilemma of the British position of being “friend” with both the Arabs and the Israeli also justified secrecy. This was mainly to avoid any backlash from Arab governments.

Another reason for diplomatic secrecy was the French arms sale to Israel. France did not want to bear the full responsibility of arming Israel because they did not want to face the full hostility of the Arab nations. The logic of the French weapon sales to Israel was the fact that Egypt received arms from the Soviet Union through the “Czech arms deal.”

French Premier’s secrecy approach was also fuelled by the fact that the Egyptian military supported the Algerian Nationalists. The Algerian war was draining French resources. The diplomatic negotiation with Nasser to stop his military support of the

¹²⁸ Bar-On, Mordechai; “David Ben-Gurion and the Sevres Collusion;” in *Suez 1956: The Conflict and its Consequences*. Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); 145.

Algerian rebellion was unsuccessful. Nasser's refusal to admit his aid to the Algerian NFL pushed Guy Mollet to consider secret diplomacy and possible military action against Egypt.

The military component of the agreement added additional controversy to the diplomatic secrecy. The negotiations were conducted outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Opinion in the French administration was divided on how to deal with Egypt. Therefore certain personalities took the matter outside of the traditional Quai d'Orsay machinery. The secret diplomacy process was handled by Premier Guy Mollet, General Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, Minister of War Max Lejeune and few other diplomats and Generals.¹²⁹ The approach was somewhat different from the way secret diplomacy had been handled by the Quai d'Orsay for many years.

c)- Government Particularities

Secrecy was maintained throughout the process, but the main objective of the agreement was not met. This was mainly due to the Franco-British miscalculation of the American response, and the Soviet retaliation threats. The analysis of the negotiations also revealed that the agreement was meant to remain secret. Not only the negotiations left the populations and the parliaments unaware of the proceedings, the results of the agreement were also kept secret. The secret clause added a negative image to secret

¹²⁹ Vaisse, Maurice; "France and the Suez Crisis;" in *Suez 1956: The Conflict and its Consequences*. Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 142.

diplomacy as “Operation Musketeer” came across as a “secret military collusion” rather than a diplomatic endeavor. The agreement was not only conducted outside of any democratic norms, it also became an aggressive strategy of deception.

The Sèvres agreement did encourage Israel to attack Egypt. Although the secret negotiations could be considered as normal based on the situation at that time, the secret clause for a military action could be criticized as inappropriate for the diplomacy of liberal democracies. Secret diplomacy as such was already controversial from a democratic perspective; the secret agreement for a military action defeated the potential achievement that could have been reached diplomatically. This was also accentuated by Selwyn Lloyd’s insistence on there being no draft of the agreement. He wanted no record of the agreement to be available so that he could deny the meeting ever took place. Overall, the Sèvres secret negotiations constituted a remarkable case of secret diplomacy. Although secrecy was maintained by all participants, it failed to achieve its intended objectives of maintaining Franco-British control of the Suez Canal.

Prime Minister Guy Mollet preferred to focus on domestic issues. But the role of France as a colonial power and its realities complicated matters. Although a very open domestic politician by character, Mollet handled the crisis and other diplomatic cases in a very secretive manner. There was split in the government over the future status of Algeria, and the way to handle the Suez Crisis. Premier Guy Mollet proved to be an able secret negotiator, but his handling of the Algerian crisis constituted the failure of his foreign policies, and the inability to reconcile decision-making processes between the executive and the parliament triggered the collapse of the fourth republic.

(III)-D- Franco-German Negotiations and the Rambouillet Accord

In the diplomatic history of Franco-German cooperation, the Rambouillet Accord between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer was a significant step and another major case of secret diplomacy. There was a private meeting at Colombey which was held on the 29-30 of October 1958. The private meeting between the two leaders dealt with the issues of bilateral cooperation and the European reconstruction. Although the meeting was known to the press, no detail of the substance was made available.

The initial meeting was held on September 14 1958 at de Gaulle's private residence in Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises, France. After returning to Germany, Adenauer

only reported that he was pleased with the private meeting and that it was the basis for future negotiations. The only record of the meeting was a hand written note by General de Gaulle. The note confirmed that the meeting was important, long, free, frank, cordial and in a trustful atmosphere. De Gaulle noted that the past hostility between both countries finally ended, and Germans and French could “work side by side,” and live in harmony. He reiterated that cooperation between France and Germany was the foundation of the European reconstruction and that it provided a strong Western alliance.¹³⁰

This was followed by a private meeting between the French Ambassador in Germany, Louis Joxe and the new German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Albert van Scherpenberg. In those negotiations they discussed in detail the Common Market, Franco-German technical cooperation, policy towards the Soviet Union, and the compensation to the victims of the Nazis, especially the victims of Nazis’ medical experiments. They also discussed launching the Franco-German economic and cultural committee.¹³¹ There was an exchange of confidential messages from de Gaulle and Adenauer. Adenauer’s note informed de Gaulle of the secret meeting he had had with the Soviet Ambassador and their discussion over the status of Berlin.

¹³⁰ De Gaulle, Charles: “Memorandum: De Gaulle-Adenauer Meeting at Colombey,” (October 29-30, 1958); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 154

¹³¹ Ibid. De Gaulle. pp.187

Another follow up private meeting was held between de Gaulle and Adenauer on November 27, 1958. Their discussion focused mainly on economic cooperation between western allies. De Gaulle obtained support on German economic assistance to France. In return de Gaulle promised French support for West Germany's foreign policy objectives. For the first time the General expressed the French support for German rearmament.¹³²

The two leaders also discussed the status of Berlin and the DDR (East Germany).

Adenauer also stressed the pending Soviet threat to block access to Berlin by the Western Allies. They both weighed on the possible American response, in case the Soviets blocked the city of Berlin.¹³³

This meeting was followed by a very secret meeting between Adenauer and the new French Prime Minister Michel Debré and the new French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The main point of the discussion was about the western response to the Soviet threats. The Prime Minister urged a united front between allies and not to present any diplomatic impression of political division among western allies. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville also reiterated a strategic diplomatic stance in the next negotiation with the Soviets in an attempt to solve the problem diplomatically. They also planned the diplomatic approaches that allies would take in the next Geneva conference with the Soviet Union. Both sides agreed not to accept any Soviet proposition that would threaten Western security. The negotiators also believed that the Soviets wanted to break

¹³² Ibid. De Gaulle. pp.201

¹³³ De Murville, Maurice Couve; Memorandum of Conversation: "De Gaulle-Adenauer Meeting;" (March 4 1959); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1261; pp. 85

up the Western European political and economic stability. Michel Debré suggested a strategy to obtain diplomatic support from the United States.¹³⁴

The final series of secret negotiations of Rambouillet was held on August 5, 1960. In the meeting, de Gaulle and Adenauer approved a plan for the political unification of Western Europe. They decided on a conference of European Economic Community members to address the details of political, economic, cultural and military issues.¹³⁵ This agreement was built on the edifice established by Jean Monnet who started with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community which laid down the foundations of the European Union.

They also extended an offer to the United Kingdom to join the Union and decided that the UK would not participate in the preparatory committee of the Common Market, but could join it later. Adenauer suggested a strategy that would not antagonize the United Kingdom, because a strong British support was needed on NATO issues. General de Gaulle attached an extreme importance to the Rambouillet negotiations. He instructed his foreign minister to supervise all preliminary works on European political and economic reconstruction. He also confirmed that the basis of the European Union were to be elaborated only by France and Germany. De Gaulle suggested that complete secrecy was needed on their negotiations about NATO issues. The General also insisted on the

¹³⁴ Ibid. De Murville. pp.117

¹³⁵ Joxe, Louis; Memorandum: "Private Meeting between De Gaulle and Adenauer at Rambouillet;" (August 5, 1960); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1263; pp. 39

creation of independent French nuclear “force de frappe” to be independent from NATO Command.¹³⁶

Adenauer expressed his support to the project of European political unification. Both stated the necessity for the project to create a strong and effective political mechanism. This was to become a solid European Confederation. Another agreement was on a regular meeting of not only foreign ministers, but also defense, finance, cultural, and economic ministers. There was a decision on the creation of a permanent European secretariat that could deal with much of the problems faced by European nations. Other issues such as customs, commerce, and foreign aid to developing nations, US economic support to Europe and the creation of a European parliament were also addressed. The discussion included the issue of a direct suffrage for the European parliamentary elections. Only France and Germany were to work on the details of the judiciary aspects of the new organization.

Both leaders also vowed not to present an impression of Franco-German hegemony in Europe. De Gaulle instructed his foreign minister to contact the foreign ministers of Italy, Netherlands and Belgium and report to them some of the proposals discussed privately at the Chateau de Rambouillet.¹³⁷ They also desired to improve the

¹³⁶ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.40

¹³⁷ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.41

relations between Germany and the United Kingdom.¹³⁸ There was the necessity to include Great Britain in the reconstruction of Europe.

(III)-D1- Analysis of the Rambouillet Accord Negotiations

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

The Rambouillet negotiations have to be understood in the context of the Cold War and alliance politics. When General de Gaulle came back to power and assumed the Presidency of the Fifth Republic, he brought with him the objective of double security vis-à-vis Germany and the Soviet Union. He also wanted to maintain French neutrality between the East-West confrontations. The General wanted Europe to offer a third neutral bloc between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Up to 1958, French diplomats at the Quai d 'Orsay were able to continue secret negotiation along with open diplomacy. The French President took care of the overall foreign policy. This was mainly correspondence with foreign dignitaries, negotiating with Ambassadors and foreign leaders. But the daily activities of diplomacy were still under the Minister of Foreign Affairs who supervised most of the diplomatic strategies.

General de Gaulle believed that the quest for leadership in Europe and the World passed through diplomacy. He even appointed the diplomat Michel Debré as Prime Minister and diplomat Maurice Couve de Murville as Foreign Minister with

¹³⁸ Ibid. Joxe, Louis. pp.43

limited authority. As did his predecessors, the French President also continued to maintain complete control over the affairs of the colonies in Africa, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

Despite de Gaulle's control over foreign policy, he included Ambassador Louis Joxe in the exploratory and preparatory stages, and brought Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, and Premier Michel Debré in his close "entourage." The diplomatic secrecy was maintained despite the involvement of three different departments: the Presidency, the Prime Minister's office, and the Foreign Ministry. De Gaulle included the Foreign Minister while bypassing the machinery of the Quai D'Orsay. The French Ambassador to Germany was included during the entire organization of the secret negotiations of Rambouillet.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

General de Gaulle took control of foreign policy like no other previous French president. He was able to continue secret diplomacy by developing an internal presidential foreign policy team, and sometimes keeping the Foreign Minister only aware of generalities and the official side of diplomacy. To achieve his diplomatic strategies, de Gaulle appointed diplomats such as René Broillet as Chief of Staff of the Champs-Élysées, and diplomats such as Geoffroy De Courcel and Etienne des Roziers as

Secretaries General of the Presidency.¹³⁹ In the Rambouillet Accord context, secrecy also served as a defensive diplomatic strategy for a tactical purpose. This means that both nations meant to preserve their alliance while planning for the European reconstruction by improving their bilateral relations and planning for the political and economic re-structure of Europe.

All three diplomat-advisors had worked very close with the General in the secret negotiations during the Second World War. They were familiar with the “old diplomacy” and the settlement of issues by the back channel. Not only did they take control of the secret diplomatic machinery, they also gave President de Gaulle the complete control over French Foreign Policy as demanded by the Fifth Republic constitution.

The secret negotiations of Rambouillet were prepared by what was known as “*entourage secret du President*,” which made the necessary diplomatic decisions. Only after their decisions that the Council of Ministers with the Foreign Minister went through the general aspects of the negotiations and assisted in the official aspects of the negotiations. The General also believed in the “force of words” and a well-developed use of language or allocution. A negotiator such as Ambassador Louis Joxe was brought in “*l’entourage secret*” based on his diplomatic abilities and trustworthiness.

To reassert French’s neutrality in world affairs, General de Gaulle wanted to prove that France had “*les main libres*” or free hands in international negotiations. The

¹³⁹ Les Affaires étrangères et Le Corps Diplomatiques Français ; Tome II ; 4th Part ; (Paris : published by CRNS (1984), 35.

assistance of his secret collaborators and advisors allowed General de Gaulle to negotiate secretly the new cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1964, and the reestablishment of relations with Communist China long before President Nixon's historic trip to Beijing in 1972. He also maintained France's influence in the third world, and withdrew the French army from the NATO Central Command. He also tried to maintain French's influence over the French Canadian Province of Quebec. But this last effort was not so successful.

The main reason for secrecy in the negotiation had to be analyzed in the context of Cold War security. From the French perspective, secret diplomacy at Rambouillet helped the country meet certain objectives. The first was to guarantee French security by maintaining the division of Germany. France, Great Britain and Russia shared the concern over a possible German military revival. Therefore France maintained relations with the Soviet Union on one hand. On the other hand, France needed a second security protection against the Soviet Union. This objective was achieved by integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the western bloc, and by obtaining the Anglo-American security guarantee. This double diplomatic strategy approach was achieved through secret negotiations by French diplomats who handled and balanced relations with Germany, Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States.

Another important decision contributing to the secret negotiations was that while they promoted European political and economic unification, France and Germany wanted to maintain their own sovereignty. The new organization was not planned to become supranational. The new organization was to coordinate its response to the Soviet military threat within the structure of NATO alliance.

But the new organization or European Union was also designed to become a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union. To carry these objectives secrecy was extremely necessary to avoid alarming allies and enemies alike. France negotiated from a position of political strength while being economically weak. The secrecy was used in the context of a defensive diplomatic strategy of maintaining and strengthening existing relations. It is also important to realize that the failure of the Suez operation in 1956, and the near collapse of relations with the United States constituted a background of these secret diplomatic efforts.

C) - Government Particularities

The Rambouillet Accord was conducted away from public and media pressure, the diplomats ironed out all the details of the agreement without informing their respective parliaments. But it is necessary to notice that the Rambouillet Accord helped to diffuse the tension between France and Germany which was essential for both democracies. The “entourage secret” of de Gaulle worked through the back channel to reach an agreement. Through secret diplomacy de Gaulle convinced the German leader to support French’s access to a nuclear power rank, despite Germany’s concerns.¹⁴⁰ The achievement of French secret diplomacy not only prevented the two countries from going back to the pre-war military tension, but it also allowed both nations to develop sound

¹⁴⁰ Vaisse, Maurice ; Histoire de la Diplomatie Française de 1815 à nos Jours; (Paris : Edition Perrin, 2001), 441.

economic and cultural cooperation, and maintain their democratic way of life. The Rambouillet Accord of 1960 was an important step in the development and integration of Europe as well as the improvement of the Franco-German bilateral relations.

As an Army General, De Gaulle enjoyed being in complete control and as a politician, he was very comfortable with secret diplomacy. As one of the architect of the fifth republic constitution, he made sure to increase the power of the president in foreign affairs. The new constitution of the democratic government of France concentrated power under a unitary state system. And, the diplomatic authority was completely placed under the executive control of the president.

Therefore, De Gaulle was able to handle diplomatic secrecy away from parliamentary control. And he also kept secrecy from other members of the government or even within his own Cabinet. He did enjoy public support and confidence that he believed he had the people's mandate to direct foreign policy in the interest of the nation.

The remaining chapters will continue to examine other diplomatic cases where France and the United States practiced secret diplomacy to reach their foreign policy objectives. The diplomatic cases illustrate the practical application of secrecy in the exercise of diplomacy.

Chapter Four

(IV)- Secret Diplomacy and American Diplomacy

IV-A- Early Cases of Secret Diplomacy in the United States

Contrary to France and the United Kingdom which have a very long diplomatic history, the United States is considered as a relatively new nation in the context of international diplomacy. Although the United States has an early tradition of openness in

governmental dealings, there are cases of early involvement in secret diplomacy. This investigation of the secret diplomacy in the United States shows some particularities not usually published. Prior to the Great War of 1914-18, the United States had mostly stayed away from the conflicts in Europe. American diplomacy, far from the open diplomatic process later proclaimed by President Wilson, sometimes used the “old diplomatic method.” Although they stayed away from European conflicts in Asia, Africa, and in the Balkans, circumstances pushed America to join the international scene, particularly in East Asia after 1898.

In the 1890's President Grover Cleveland and Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham practiced caution in dealing with the European powers. But the border dispute between Venezuela and the British Guiana brought America into contact with the “old diplomacy.” An American Diplomat, William Lindsay Scruggs, the US Minister to Venezuela became the bridge between American diplomacy and the old secret diplomacy “à la Européenne.”

Knowing that Secretary of State Walter Gresham could not press Great Britain to come to the table to negotiate the border issue, William Scruggs lobbied secretly powerful members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, such as Henry Cabot Lodge to ask the US President to force Great Britain to accept the United States as the mediator for the Anglo-Venezuelan crisis. Although, an American diplomat, William Scruggs lobbied for the Venezuela government. He received most of his secret information about the country from Dr. Andrade, the Venezuelan Minister in Washington, DC. On May 1, 1895 the persistent diplomat met privately with Grover

Cleveland in the President's vacation home in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. This secret meeting was the beginning of the turning point in American isolationist foreign policy. He convinced President Cleveland that intervening in the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute was in the American interest and was a way of protecting the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁴¹

Although, he was later dismissed from his position due to a bribery case, William Scruggs continued to lobby secretly for the Venezuelan government and met many members of Congress and US Presidents. After the death of Secretary Gresham, Richard Olney became the US Secretary of State. The new State Secretary was even more secretive than his predecessor.

Richard Olney contacted Sir Julian Paunceforte, British Ambassador in Washington, to press the case to Prime Minister Robert Salisbury for an American mediation in the Anglo-Venezuelan crisis. But, the British Premier, Lord Salisbury did not think that American interests were involved. Secretary Olney continued to press secretly until he gained the support of a British Cabinet member, Lord Lyon Playfair, who secretly promised to engage the American arbitration despite Lord Salisbury's opposition.

Both sides prepared for war. But in June 1896, Sir John Ardagh, British Director of Military Intelligence, warned the government that England could not win the war against the US. His memorandum pushed the British diplomats to engage in the

¹⁴¹ Grenville, John and George B. Young. "Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy," *Studies in foreign policy 1873-1917*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966, 176.

negotiations with the Americans. After months of secret negotiations, the Anglo-Venezuelan treaty was signed on November 12, 1896. But, ironically, with his lack of experience in international intrigues, US Secretary of State Richard Olney ended up giving Great Britain all the territory she wanted at the expense of the Venezuelan government that he was supposed to protect.¹⁴²

Another instance of early secret diplomacy was observed during the Cuban revolution in the 1890s. Secretary Olney secretly supported the Cuban insurgents against the Spanish Monarchy. Thinking that he could use the same strategy that he used in dealing with England, Richard Olney wanted the US to be the mediator and to press the Spanish to reduce their hold on the island, and maybe convince the Cubans to accept an autonomous status rather than full independence. He failed in this approach as Spain was not as flexible as Great Britain. Spain practiced an old form of colonization. The Spanish throne wanted to maintain complete control over all their colonies.

Secretary of State Richard Olney believed that a solution to the Cuban crisis could be achieved through secret negotiations with foreign diplomats rather than through open diplomacy. But, lacking the reliable sources of information that the Europeans had, the Secretary of State was inclined to listen to the advice of a rich American planter in Cuba, Edward Atkins, not to support Cuban independence and the revolutionaries. Edward Atkins advice proved detrimental to the negotiations, and caused a diplomatic failure with Spain.

¹⁴² Grenville, John and George B. Young. "Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy;" *Studies in foreign policy, 1873-1917*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966, 177.

In America, secret diplomacy was also practiced by President McKinley. He believed that secrecy would give negotiations all the best chances for success. He worked hard to prevent any secret information from reaching the press and inflaming the public opinion. He sent a secret instruction to Spain on July 6, 1897 through the American Ambassador to Madrid Stewart Woodford. Ambassador Woodford presented Spain with a chance to accept US mediation, so that the United States would guarantee some of Spain's rights in the island of Cuba. Woodford also engaged in secret inquiries among the Great Powers of Europe to observe neutrality in case of a war between the United States and Spain. The Spanish government rejected the US mediation offer and persisted in pursuing a war with the Cuban revolutionaries. The chain of events that followed led to the Spanish-American war. The war with Spain broke American neutrality and brought American diplomacy into contact with the "old diplomacy."¹⁴³

Most US diplomatic accords from 1900 to 1914 were semi-public based on the reality of the time. The United States was not involved in most of the crises in the old world. President Teddy Roosevelt openly mediated the peace treaty between Russia and Japan after their war in 1905. America stayed away from the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy and the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. Nascent American diplomacy was aware of the diplomatic intrigues of the old world.

¹⁴³ Grenville, John and George B. Young. "Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy," *Studies in foreign policy, 1873-1917*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966, 181.

The Theodore Roosevelt administration worked to improve the US navy and foster a new image of America as a new world power. At that point America had colonies, Cuba and the Philippines, like European powers, but its diplomatic methods were still based on business strategies or dollar diplomacy, or sometimes a military strategy rather than a purely diplomatic approach.

Before Woodrow Wilson, at the Hague Conference of 1907, US Secretary of State Elihu Root suggested eliminating the secret treaties between nations. He proposed to have international law as the standard for nations to draft their treaties and register all the treaties in a uniform way among all nations through a central organization. His proposition was rejected. Of course, Europe was not ready for such a diplomatic system of checks and balances. European statesmen were comfortable and sure of the strength of the secret diplomatic methods in crisis resolution and in the promotion of their foreign policy objectives. Later in 1912, the election of Woodrow Wilson reduced the American spirit of expansion. President Wilson was already resentful of the diplomatic practices of Europe. After the Great War of 1914-18, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 became the stage for Wilson's open covenants agenda.

During the interwar period, the United States went back to its policy of isolationism. Believed that European crisis would not affect the country, the US stayed away until it was forced to enter the World War II after Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt started to forge a new path in American diplomacy as a world superpower with international responsibilities.

Sir Herbert Butterfield, a British Philosopher of History, stated that “One wonders whether the success of conferences must not ultimately depend on new forms of what used to be called ‘secret diplomacy’.”¹⁴⁴ He clearly implied that the new diplomacy would still rely on some new forms of secrecy or discretion. To handle disrupted formal diplomatic relations, the United States have reverted to alternative ways of communicating. The use of back channel diplomacy to deal with international disputes and problematic foreign relations is one of the alternative diplomatic approaches. In such circumstances, the use of secret diplomacy becomes a necessary strategy for negotiating with unfriendly nations.

The following cases also show one of the approaches that the United States used to deal with problematic diplomatic relations. The United States resorted to the back channel diplomacy in an attempt to resolve the Middle East crisis, during an attempt to communicate with Cuba after the Missile Crisis. The back door approach was again used to deal with the US-non recognized communist government of China in 1971-72.

As in the previous chapter, the following diplomatic illustrations provide exceptional insight into different ways in which back channel negotiations actually take place. The cases to be explored also present an understanding of modern diplomacy and these illustrations are major strategic initiatives of historical importance. These cases

¹⁴⁴ Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight. *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theories of International Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press & London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968, 181.

demonstrate, as Israeli professor Aharon Klieman put it, the type of diplomacy which “takes place behind the scenes, beneath the surface, and between the lines.”

(IV)-B- Secret diplomacy and the Anglo-American “Project Alpha”

In the search for peace in the Middle East, British and American diplomats engaged in diplomatic actions to bring about the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict before the Suez Crisis. One of the first aspects of secret diplomacy was the contribution by individual third party personalities. One such personality was Maurice Orbach, British MP, who engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Cairo and Jerusalem in November 1954 and January 1955. He met President Nasser and his Advisor Ali Sabri and submitted Israeli proposals to them. Nasser expressed his wish for peace with Israel, but he stated that Arab pressure hindered open negotiations at that time.¹⁴⁵

Maurice Orbach then delivered Nasser's messages to Israel. Nasser was willing to allow Israeli non-strategic cargoes through the Suez Canal, stop hostile propaganda and political warfare, prevent border incidents and begin high-level secret negotiations. But Maurice Orbach was unable to bring both sides to reach an agreement.

Another attempt of secret diplomacy was carried by Elmore Jackson. He was an American Quaker at the United Nations. He dealt with the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, Ahmad Hussein and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi. Jackson shuttled between Cairo and Jerusalem between July and September 1955. He presented the Egyptian request for the adjustment of Israel's borders and the repatriation and compensation of Palestinian refugees. He also brought to Nasser a proposal from Israeli

¹⁴⁵ Shamir, Shimon. "The Collapse of Project Alpha;" In *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*. Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 77.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion.¹⁴⁶ He was also unsuccessful in bringing Egyptians and Israelis to the table.

Other personalities such as Ralph Bunch, former head of the UN Commission on Palestine, the British MP Hector McNeil, the Foreign Minister of Canada Lester Pearson, and the British MP Colonel Cyril Banks also contributed to the private negotiations to help bring about stability in the Middle East.¹⁴⁷ But their efforts were also unsuccessful.

Unable to bring about a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the effort was then directed to the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. In that regard, a series of secret negotiations were held in Paris. The Israeli Chargé d' Affaires Shmuel Divon maintained contact with Egyptian Press Attaché Abdel-Rahman Sadeq. In 1953 Israel suggested a series of high level secret talks, lifting of economic boycott and a termination of war threats. Nasser also wished for a secret negotiation, but claimed that they could not afford to deviate from the rules of boycott on Israel. Nasser's message was conveyed to Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett.¹⁴⁸ The Paris back door negotiations also did not bring a settlement to the conflict.

The British and American officials also took additional measures in the attempt to reach a settlement in the Middle East. Between October 1953 and October 1955, President Eisenhower sent the Industrialist Eric Johnston as personal envoy to find a

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.77

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, Shamir, Shimon. pp.78

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.76

solution to the dispute over the Jordan River water resources. Johnston shuttled between Israel and Arab capitals. His plan was accepted by Israel but rejected by the Arab League.¹⁴⁹

In early 1953, US diplomat Kermit Roosevelt convinced Nasser of the expediency of an agreement with Israel. Later in January 1955, Nasser agreed to meet secretly former Israeli Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin. Yigael Yadin presented to President Nasser the Israeli plan and the willingness to compensate the Gaza Strip refugees and proposed that its Arab neighbors could have the right of passage through Israel. Kermit Roosevelt's effort was soon aborted when Egypt sentenced to death two suspected Israeli spies.

In November 1955 President Eisenhower launched the diplomatic mission code-named "Gamma." He appointed his personal friend Robert Anderson, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, to carry a series of secret negotiations with Nasser and Ben Gurion. Between December 1955 and March 1956, Anderson shuttled secretly between Cairo and Jerusalem. There were discussions of the problems of Jerusalem, the refugees and the Jordan River waters, but no agreement was reached. Anderson also tried to initiate a Ben Gurion-Nasser meeting with no success. Ben Gurion accepted but Nasser refused. Anderson reported to Eisenhower the failure of mission "Gamma" and the difficulties encountered from his secret negotiations in the Middle East.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.79

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.80

In 1955, another major attempt to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute was jointly initiated by the United States and Great Britain. The project secret code name was “Alpha.” The initial plan was drafted by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Under-Secretary for the Middle East in the British Foreign Office. Shuckburgh travelled to the Middle East and had meetings with local leaders before writing the plan. The main objectives were to engage in secret diplomatic missions to bring a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, to consolidate the position of the West in the Middle East, and to check the penetration of communism in the region. The ambitious project “Alpha” aimed at ensuring a close cooperation with the United States, territorial concessions by Israel, guarantees of Israel security by the major powers, an understanding with Egypt and an over-all settlement.¹⁵¹

The Shuckburgh’s draft was endorsed by Sir Anthony Eden and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Shuckburgh worked in Washington with Francis Russell, a US Diplomat. In March 1955 US Ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade, submitted the plan to Nasser. The plan was then presented to Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion rejected the plan. The plan requested substantial Israeli territorial concessions. Nasser welcomed the plan but insisted on substantial concessions from Israel.

Multiple series of secret negotiations were attempted by British and American diplomats in 1955-56. The project Alpha was the main focus of British foreign policy in the Middle East. But when military tension rose in the Middle East, and the British

¹⁵¹ Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.81

Premier lost all hopes of cooperation with Nasser, Anthony Eden adopted a hard line policy towards Egypt and project “Alpha” died quietly.¹⁵²

With the mounting tension in the region, the round of negotiations was then carried by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. He favored open diplomacy. He openly shuttled between Egypt and Israel gathering commitments to preserve the cease-fire. He was assisted by the British Ambassador in Cairo Sir Humphrey Trevelyan. The UN Secretary General failed to bring both parties together, mainly because both Israel and Egypt held very inflexible positions. Two days after Hammarskjöld’s report, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and a new crisis exploded.

(IV)-B1-- Analysis of the Anglo-American’s “Alpha” Negotiations

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

Multiple secret diplomatic negotiations were initiated by Great Britain, France and the United States to find an understanding between Egypt and Israel in the 1950s and to preserve western interests. From the Anglo-American perspectives the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict was considered a matter of national interest. After multiple shuttle diplomacy initiatives by UK and US personalities, missions “Gamma” and “Alpha” constituted new diplomatic strategies in dealing with the Middle East crisis.

¹⁵² Ibid. Shamir, Shimon. pp.83

First, Eisenhower's mission "Gamma" was a new type of diplomatic initiative. He assigned to a diplomatic project a strategy of a covert operation. The execution of the plan was given to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson. Special envoy Anderson followed presidential instructions and maintained discretion. The difficulty in reaching a diplomatic breakthrough was due in part to the non-participation of Great Britain and France in the diplomatic process. Both the UK and France held major interests in the region. They could have had some influence in the process. Mission "Gamma" based its hopes on the fact that both Israel and Egypt wanted "something" from the US. Israel wanted to obtain weapons and Egypt wanted US financial support for its Aswan High Dam project as well as the weakening of the Baghdad Pact. "Gamma" also did not use the services and diplomatic expertise of the ambassadors in the region. In the end, Presidential Envoy Anderson applied secret negotiation strategies to assure confidentiality between Egypt and Israel, but the major obstacle to the mission came from its rejection by Egypt's Nasser.

In the case of "Alpha," a collaborative effort was made between the US and Great Britain. It was a Foreign Office project with its master mind Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh. The strategy combined diplomatic strategies with a covert operation approach. A major organizational difference by comparison to the "US Project Gamma," "Project Alpha" utilized the diplomatic resources of ambassadors in the region, and was based on findings from local leaders on the field. First, the plan was well thought-out and elaborated by an experienced British diplomat, and coordinated with an experienced American diplomat. Shuckburgh and Russell controlled the process and instructed their respective

Ambassadors in Cairo and Jerusalem. They also briefed the British Premier and the American President and Secretary of State on the progress and difficulties in the negotiations.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

The first thing to notice is that “Alpha” was kept secret for thirty years until the release of the archives. The diplomatic project “Alpha” was handled differently from project “Gamma.” British Under-Secretary Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh based the project on the field mission he took to the Middle East. US ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Francis Russell added his secret envoy expertise. The project “Alpha” also had a covert operation approach applied to a diplomatic mission. This is to say that secrecy itself served as a transposition of covert military strategy into a diplomatic plan. This meant that secrecy was to the extent that the overall objectives of mission Alpha were not fully displayed to the participants- Egypt or Israel. The plan, approved by Sir Anthony Eden, included overall foreign policy objectives, and established general diplomatic coordination.

In the case of “Operation Alpha,” secrecy was employed as an offensive diplomatic strategy for a strategic goal. This was due to the fact that a great effort was

made to keep everything secret, and the goal was to change drastically the situation of the Israeli-Egyptian relations. The negotiators worked secretly to improve the relations between Arabs and Israelis while protecting Franco-British and American interests in the region.

The mission “Alpha” was conducted in a very secret manner and only few trusted officials from the US and the UK knew of the plan. Another reason for secrecy was also to assure dialogue between Israel and Egypt without the interference from other Arab Nations, the press, and the Soviet Union’s obstruction. The process of secret diplomacy was then considered as a secure way to exchange messages between the leaders involved. Additional obstacles were erected due to the fact that Egypt and other Arab nations were officially in a state of war with Israel.

Another aspect of the secret negotiations was the use of a third country venue. In Paris, Israeli and Egyptian diplomats maintained contacts within the diplomatic corps. This was done in parallel to “Operation Alpha.” But only a few officials in the British Foreign Office and Washington knew of both initiatives. At that time any open negotiation between them would have been considered as Egypt’s betrayal of the Arabs’ main objective: the destruction of Israel.

The content of those secret diplomatic initiatives came from the Israeli Archives and the personalities’ memoirs in the UK and the US. Mission “Alpha” was an improvement as compared to mission “Gamma.” The failure of Alpha was due to its rejection by Israel’s Premier Ben Gurion because of the plan’s demand for substantial

Israeli territorial concessions. Despite Anglo-American efforts to reach a settlement, Israel and Egypt were not so eager to deal with each other. Therefore, the secret diplomatic project “Alpha” was a failure. This is due to the fact that although secrecy was maintained for the entire time of the negotiations, “Alpha” failed to achieve its intended goal of improving the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

c) - Government particularities

The secret negotiations of the “Gamma” and “Alpha” projects did not follow any democratic norms. Elected officials and both populations were kept in the dark for over thirty years. Due to the sensitivity of the problem and the management of various interests, there was extreme caution taken to avoid any leak. The majority of the members of both governments were not even briefed on those diplomatic attempts.

The democratic notion of the people’s right to know approach was considered neither during the negotiations nor after the fact. One could only wonder whether both governments would have informed both populations if “Alpha” succeeded. The lack of any relevance to liberal democratic principles has to be analyzed from a purely political perspective as a diplomatic necessity.

It is also important to notice that secrecy was maintained successfully throughout the whole “Alpha-Gamma” episode. This was mainly because the number of officials informed was very small, and the partners on the other side-Israel and Egypt- were also accustomed to secrecy.

(IV)-C- Secret diplomacy and the US accommodation with Cuba

The question of re-establishing relations with Cuba has been an issue in American foreign policy since the embargo was placed on February 7, 1962. But before his death, John Kennedy was among the very few American Presidents who took some initiatives for accommodation with Cuba. In 1963, a series of secret negotiations took place to explore the possibility of negotiation with Fidel Castro. The difficulty of communicating directly with Cuba and the lack of diplomatic representation pushed both sides to use an alternative means.

The unlikely link was a New York Lawyer James Britt Donovan. He was the negotiator for the release of the American citizens from Cuba’s prisons and for improved conditions for the Bay of Pigs’ prisoners. Donovan discussed the re-establishment of

relations with Castro's Physician Rene Vallejo. Donovan reported his meeting with Castro's confidant to Kennedy's aid Gordon Chase, who was the Latin American Specialist in the National Security Council.¹⁵³ In a secret memorandum, Gordon Chase stated that the State Department made the breaking off of Cuba's Sino/Soviet ties as a condition to the re-establishment of relations with Cuba. The memorandum also confirmed the objection by John Kennedy to such an inflexible requirement by the State Department which blocked any chance of diplomatic dialogue.

The first major breakthrough was explored by ABC News reporter Lisa Howard. After interviewing Nikita Khrushchev, and covering the Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit, she went to interview Castro. After the interview, Lisa Howard reported to Kennedy's aids that Castro was open to the idea of rapprochement. Howard wrote that Castro was ready to discuss issues such as the Soviet Personnel and military hardware on Cuban soil; compensation for expropriated American lands and investments; and the Cuban assistance to communist movement in Latin America. She also suggested that Kennedy send an official to Cuba for discussion.¹⁵⁴ She offered herself as the back-channel intermediary to facilitate the negotiations with Castro.

Lisa Howard opened a back channel to the JFK administration through William Attwood, a former journalist and an advisor to Adlai Stevenson at the US mission in the United Nations. After discussing the Cuba-US rapprochement with Howard, Attwood

¹⁵³ Chase, Gordon; "Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy;" In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives, March 4, 1963); Declassified on 02/05/1997;

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. Chase, Gordon. In Kennedy & Castro.

sent a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman and US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson. Attwood also opened a channel through Gordon Chase in the National Security Council. Chase was the deputy to NSA McGeorge Bundy and the way to reach President Kennedy.

In a secret memorandum to Gordon Chase, Attwood asked for a permission to establish a discreet and indirect talk with Cuban officials.¹⁵⁵ Attwood suggested that the anti-Castro policy of the US was only fueling Castro's anti-Americanism. He argued for some type of accommodation between the two countries. Attwood reported Howard's message that Castro was proposing to send a plane to Mexico where it could pick up the US official and bring him to a secret airfield near Havana. Fidel Castro would meet the US official alone to negotiate the main points of differences between both countries.¹⁵⁶ The administration gave Attwood permission to explore direct contact with Carlos Lechuga, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Lechuga was considered by the JFK administration as a prudent channel.

On September 24th 1963, Attwood met privately with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and reported on his meeting with Carlos Lechuga. Robert Kennedy made his suggestions to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy who authorized Gordon Chase to maintain contact with Attwood. Robert Kennedy underlined the danger of such

¹⁵⁵ Attwood, William. "Memorandum to Averell Harriman & Gordon Chase;" In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives, November 22, 1963); Declassified on 09/06/1995.

¹⁵⁶ Attwood, William; "Secret Memorandum to Gordon Chase;" In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 22, 1963; Declassified on 04/12/1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

back channel negotiations which could cause a congressional investigation if those contacts were leaked to the press or the US Congress. Still, Robert Kennedy encouraged Attwood to report any development to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and to maintain extreme secrecy on all the negotiations.¹⁵⁷

In a secret memorandum by NSA McGeorge Bundy, John Kennedy suggested that Attwood could meet Castro's Physician Vallejo at the United Nations headquarters in New York so that discretion could be maintained. Kennedy wanted Attwood to acquire the hard evidence from Vallejo about Castro's seriousness toward a secret dialogue. Only after then that he could send a US official to Cuba.¹⁵⁸

John Kennedy instructed Attwood through McGeorge Bundy that certain points should be discussed in the Attwood-Vallejo meeting. The issues such as Cuba's submission to external communist influence and Cuba's support to other Latin American Revolutionaries were to be discussed before he would send Attwood to Cuba. Bundy wanted Attwood to convey those intentions verbally to Rene Vallejo and not by cable. These extra precautions were taken to assure that president Kennedy was not on record as requesting a dialogue with Fidel Castro.¹⁵⁹ For the purpose of this study the only proof of President Kennedy's involvement and knowledge of the back channel dialogue to

¹⁵⁷ Attwood, William; "Secret Memorandum to Gordon Chase;" In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 8, 1963; Declassified on 04/12/1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁵⁸ Bundy, McGeorge; "Secret Memorandum for the Record; JFK suggestions," In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 12, 1963; Declassified on 06/25/1996) Washington: National Security Archives,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. Bundy, McGeorge.

improve relations with Cuba was through the taped conversation with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy.¹⁶⁰

John Kennedy set up a schedule to provide his instruction to Bundy and Attwood three days before his assassination. But before then President Kennedy sent two covert messages to Castro. In the speech before the Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 19th 1963, the strategy was to convey to Cuba that if Castro stop providing assistance to Latin American insurgents, “everything would be possible.” This was to convey to Castro a real possibility of rapprochement between the two countries. The second message was sent through a French journalist Jean Daniel, a friend of Attwood, who met Kennedy in October 1963 on his way to Havana. In a meeting with Fidel Castro on November 22nd 1963, Jean Daniel conveyed Kennedy’s message that Castro had to stop his assistance to Revolutionary groups in Latin America before the embargo could be lifted. The meeting was interrupted by the news of Kennedy’s assassination.¹⁶¹ The assassination brought a halt to the negotiations. But when Johnson took office, there was another attempt by Fidel Castro to resume the negotiations started with Kennedy.

¹⁶⁰ “Transcript of Recorded tapes of conversation between President Kennedy and NSA McGeorge Bundy,” Declassified tapes, In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives).

¹⁶¹ Kornbluh, Peter; “JFK and Castro,” Cigar Aficionado; September/October 1999;
http://www.cigaraficionado.com/webfeatures/show/id/JFK-and-Castro_7300

In a secret memorandum, Gordon Chase, Latin American Specialist in the NSC, expressed an argument in favor of resuming the secret negotiations with Cuba.¹⁶² Chase understood the difficulty for President Johnson to pursue a dialogue with Cuba. But Chase suggested that a new instruction be given to Ambassador William Attwood to approach Cuban UN envoy Carlos Lechuga with a proposal of continuing the talks.

In a message from Castro to Johnson given to Lisa Howard, the Cuban leader proposed to resume the secret negotiations started with Kennedy. This was a verbal message to convey trust and secrecy.¹⁶³ In that message Castro reiterated the fact that he would guarantee secrecy in the negotiations. Lisa Howard suggested that she could continue to be the back door intermediary. She reported the exact words of Castro: “tell the President I realize fully the need for absolute secrecy, if he should decide to continue the Kennedy approach. I revealed nothing at that time...I have revealed nothing since...I would reveal nothing now.”¹⁶⁴

The Cuban leader stressed that he “hoped that Cuba and the United States can sit down in an atmosphere of good will and mutual respect and negotiate our differences.” He also stated that all areas of contention would be discussed in a climate of mutual

¹⁶² Chase, Gordon; “Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, NSA: Cuba—Item of Presidential Interest;” Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 25, 1963); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁶³ Howard, Lisa; “Verbal Message from Castro to Johnson;” In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (February 12, 1964); Declassified LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. Lisa Howard.

understanding. Castro also believed that “this hostility between Cuba and the United States is both unnatural and unnecessary, and can be eliminated.”¹⁶⁵

In a secret memorandum to President Johnson, US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson made the point that the secret negotiations had reached the point of agenda preparation. He suggested that the back channel could resume at a low level to avoid any possible embarrassment. William Attwood could be instructed to contact Castro’s physician and confidant Rene Vallejo. Stevenson reiterated the fact that negotiations could not be done through official channel, therefore “secrecy should be guaranteed.”¹⁶⁶

In July 1964, Gordon Chase reiterated, in a secret memo to NSC chief McGeorge Bundy, the importance of resuming the secret talks with Cuba. Since William Attwood had been appointed US Ambassador to Kenya, Chase recommended Sidney Yates (Attwood’s deputy) to be the new intermediary. Chase also suggested that Ambassador Stevenson was too high a profile to continue as intermediary. The negotiations needed to be at a low level as not to attract any attention either from the press or from any other obstructionists.

Gordon Chase also expressed concerns over Lisa Howard. She organized a phone conversation from her apartment between William Attwood and Rene Vallejo. Chase questioned whether her phone was secured. If her phone was tapped the secret negotiations would be revealed. Chase suggested that the change of channel and

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. Lisa Howard.

¹⁶⁶ Stevenson, Adlai; “Memorandum to President Johnson,” Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (June 16, 1964; Declassified on 04/12/1996); LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

intermediaries would be explained to Castro as necessary for the sake of maintaining secrecy in the negotiations.¹⁶⁷ But President Johnson did not give his approval to exploit the back channel approach to deal with Fidel Castro. Kennedy's Cuba diplomatic initiative died quietly.

(IV)-C1- Analysis of the Secret Diplomatic attempts towards Cuba

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

A major aspect of the organization of these secret negotiations is the fact that the initial intermediaries for diplomatic dialogue were not government officials, but rather journalists Lisa Howard, William Attwood, and Attorney James Donovan. This fact helped in keeping the secrecy and the illusion that the administration was not involved in exploring the possibility of dialogue with Cuba.

Another fact in the organization of the negotiations was that the State Department was not included in the diplomatic process. The State Department had an inflexible stance on its policy towards Cuba. The US State Department wanted Cuba to distance herself from China and the Soviet Union before resuming negotiations. Very few administration officials were involved. Kennedy also avoided a departmental struggle by not confronting directly the position of the Department of State. Kennedy let all the

¹⁶⁷ Chase, Gordon; "Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy: Adlai Stevenson and Lisa Howard;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (July 7 1964; Declassified on 07/12/1995) LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

exploratory and preparatory steps to be handled by citizens with no personal or professional gain from the outcome of the negotiations.

To explore the back channel diplomacy approach, the analysis of Gordon Chase took into consideration the two major obstacles to dialogue. First the domestic political situation in the United States was not favorable to the dialogue with Cuba. Therefore Chase suggested that the cause for dialogue would later gain support if “American people can be shown that the offensive missile threat and subversion threat are under control.” He also recognized that the US policy toward Cuba had been nasty. With the “Bay of Pigs Invasion, Missile Crisis, Castro Assassination attempts,” and the administration hoped that the Cuban leader realized that the Soviet Union could not assure the island’s security and might be ready for dialogue.¹⁶⁸

Another important assessment was that Castro provided some stability in Cuba and that if toppled, his Lieutenants Che Guevara and Raoul Castro were considered too radical and not able to govern Cuba at that time. Lisa Howard explored the possibility of dialogue with Castro, and offered herself as the intermediary between Castro and US negotiators. All her assessments and suggestions were used as the basis of analysis for a possible negotiation with Cuba.¹⁶⁹

The use of the third party was also necessary in the organization of the secret negotiations. William Attwood had conversations with Seydon Diallo, the Guinea

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. Chase, Gordon.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. Chase, Gordon.

Ambassador to Cuba. Ambassador Diallo reported to Attwood his dialogue with Castro who wanted to move Cuba from the communist bloc to a position of non-aligned like Yugoslavia or India. Castro did not like the status of communist satellite and was looking for a way out.¹⁷⁰ The interactions with the Guinea Ambassador were valuable in the exploratory phase. Another third party intermediary was the French journalist Jean Daniel who transmitted certain messages personally to Castro. This proved that the organization process was not from top to bottom as many other cases explored so far. The organization of the Cuba accommodation initiative was a bottom to top diplomatic approach.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

It took about thirty years before the first documents related to the Kennedy attempt to communicate with Castro, became accessible. One reason for the secrecy, from the political perspective, was to avoid an internal domestic obstruction from conservatives and even many moderates in US Congress as well as hardcore communists in Havana. The tension was still high after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the US, neither the Congress nor many members of the JFK administration were keen on the idea of accommodation with Castro. It was therefore important and prudent to engage in secret diplomacy to explore signs of reciprocity and establish basic level of confidentiality before the real dialogue can take place.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. Chase, Gordon.

In the context of dialogue with Cuba, secrecy was used as an offensive diplomatic strategy for a strategic goal. This means that the goal was to change drastically the US-Cuba relations and re-establish diplomatic relations. The secrecy was handled by intermediaries outside of the administration and even away from the State Department. The State department's inflexible approach could have caused friction in the JFK administration. This was another reason to support and engage in secrecy to avoid premature departmental struggles in foreign policy decision towards Cuba.

Kennedy's preference for secrecy was another reason. The President suggested to National Security Advisor Bundy that they "should explore the issue of rapprochement in a non-dangerous way." This implied that the dialogue with Cuba should be private and extremely confidential to avoid any misunderstanding with the US Congress or any premature leak to the press. John Kennedy did not like the logo of "being soft on communism."

Discretion was also assured by the intermediaries themselves. Lisa Howard offered her apartment as a venue for a meeting between Attwood and Rene Vallejo, Castro's physician and confident. Attwood had a phone conversation with Vallejo from Lisa Howard's apartment on November 18, 1963. Another venue was suggested for a meeting in Cuba between Attwood and Castro. Vallejo told Attwood that discretion and security would be guaranteed. This whole back channel diplomacy approach was also taken to avoid any embarrassment by either side if the discretion was broken up.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Ibid. Chase, Gordon.

Additional measures of secrecy were suggested by President Kennedy to maintain confidentiality and avoid possible blame to the administration if revealed. Kennedy suggested that Advisor William Attwood was to be removed from the Government payroll before sending him to Cuba. This was a discretionary precaution in case the trip was revealed to the press or the US Congress. The President wanted the option to deny that there were attempts by the administration to negotiate with Castro if there was a premature leak. Kennedy also suggested that for absolute secrecy his intentions were to be reported verbally and no cable should include those intentions. Despite the opposition of the State Department, Kennedy instructed Bundy to explore the dialogue venue by “quietly enticing Castro over to us.”¹⁷²

Lisa Howard stated that Fidel Castro was looking for a rapprochement with the United States. The Cuban leader also suggested a back channel approach so that obstructionists on both side would be left in the dark. This also suggested that there was consent on secrecy from both sides. For the purpose of secret dialogue, Castro designated his confidant Rene Vallejo, as the contact person for the negotiations. This was a sign that Castro was serious about dialogue and the trustworthiness of his intermediary. Secrecy also allowed Castro to control information and prevented any leak to the Cuban Politburo.

The back channel was also necessary due to the foreign relations realities of that time. After the Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban Missile crisis, holding an official

¹⁷² Chase, Gordon; “Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy; Cuba –Policy;” Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (April 11, 1963; Declassified on 02/04/1997); Washington: National Security Archives;

dialogue would have been politically unwise. The dialogue would be open to obstructions not only from US conservatives and Cuban extremists but as well from the Soviet Union and Latin American revolutionaries. Therefore engaging in open diplomacy would have made a diplomatic breakthrough almost impossible. Other issues at stake considered were Kennedy's reelection chances in 1964 and Castro's ability to control "hardcore communists" in Cuba.

After Kennedy's assassination, Lisa Howard, William Attwood and Gordon Chase continued to promote the idea of accommodation with Cuba. The need for secrecy was even more necessary with the Johnson administration. Johnson's desire not to be painted as "soft on communism" came from the pressure by Senator Goldwater and ultra-conservatives who nominated him as Republican Presidential candidate in 1964.

The second phase of secrecy was reciprocated by Castro. Castro understood that Johnson could make hostile statements about Cuba during the 1964 campaign while secret talks continue. This also suggested that Johnson could inform him, unofficially, if any hostile action was required for domestic political considerations. Castro told Lisa Howard that he would not take any retaliatory action in that case. Castro even prepared an agenda of negotiating points given to Carlos Lechuga for a meeting with William Attwood at the UN. He also suggested that Rene Vallejo would still maintain contact with William Attwood on key points of the negotiations. But President Johnson did not explore Kennedy's back channel diplomacy towards Cuba. The new President also expressed less interest in the matter.

C)- Government Particularities

Diplomatic secrecy and internal government secrecy was maintained throughout the negotiation process. Attorney General Robert Kennedy even warned about the intrusion of the US Congress if the negotiations were made public. This meant that no elected officials were aware of the secret dialogues in the exception of the Commander-in-Chief. Kennedy did not even brief the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or seek support from the State Department. He was willing to deny the existence of the back channel meetings if necessary. Absolute secrecy left the population and the Congress in the dark.

The back channel approach was the alternative way to attempt to deal with an enemy state. This was also an illustration of how nations without diplomatic relations could negotiate. At the height of the Cold War, an open diplomatic approach would have made it difficult to achieve a success due to multiple challenges. In the end both John Kennedy and Castro used secret diplomacy as a diplomatic necessity. The process failed since the desired goal of rapprochement was not met, although secrecy was maintained throughout the entire exploratory process. It is very difficult to imagine any scenario where open diplomacy could have been applied in lieu of the secret diplomatic approach.

In this context, the federal system of government with checks and balances, presented a fragmented political authority process. This type of democratic government put President Kennedy in a very difficult situation. The Congress was not favorable to

any rapprochement with Cuba. The knowledge of this diplomatic case by Legislators could have produced a Congressional investigation. The potential consequences of a leak could have been very devastating for the Kennedy administration. At the end, failure in this endeavor could be attributed to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the unwillingness of President Johnson to explore a diplomatic agreement with Cuba.

(IV)-D- Secret Diplomacy and the US-China Rapprochement

After the Chinese revolution in 1949, the US did not recognize its communist government. President Nixon was interested in changing the relations between both countries, and also exploiting the possibility of the new adversarial Sino-Russian relationship. Besides the traditional conflict between Washington and Beijing, the Vietnam War and the US intrusion into Cambodia and Laos complicated matters.

The initial contact was a letter to the US military attaché to France, General Walters. In the letter, Henry Kissinger instructed him not to hand over the note but to read the letter to his contact at the Chinese Embassy in Paris. The text included a proposal on the issues to be discussed from the bilateral Washington-Beijing relations to the Vietnam War, Cambodia, Laos and even Taiwan.¹⁷³

The initial contact was followed by a secret meeting on September 27, 1970 in Paris between Henry Kissinger and Jean Sainteny, a French diplomat. At Sainteny's apartment, both diplomats discussed the political and military situation in Vietnam, Cambodia and Communist China. Jean Sainteny agreed to establish a back channel communication with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. Huang Chen was one of the only two ambassadors who were members of the Chinese central committee. This fact assured Kissinger that the message would reach decision makers in Beijing. Jean Sainteny also confirmed that Mr. Bujon, the French Ambassador in Vietnam, stated

¹⁷³ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum for the President from Kissinger: "Contact with the Chinese;" Kissinger's Secret Trip to China. (Sept. 12, 1970; Declassified on January 4, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

that China wanted to join the UN. They also designated Richard Smyser as Sainteny's contact for secret messages directed at Kissinger.¹⁷⁴

Another opportunity was seized during the private meeting between President Nixon and Pakistan President Yahya Khan at the United Nations in October 1970. Besides discussing bilateral US-Pakistan aid negotiations, tension between Pakistan and India, and the situation in the Middle East, Nixon delivered a message to the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai through President Khan. He also suggested Paris as the venue for the secret talks and that he considered establishing a high-level contact with China. Nixon reiterated the importance of secrecy in the initial dialogue with the Chinese.¹⁷⁵

On October 27, 1970 another secret meeting was held between Henry Kissinger and the communist President of Romania, Nicolai Ceausescu. Held at the Blair House in Washington, the meeting was to clarify the US diplomatic position for Ceausescu to convey to Beijing. The private discussion covered the possibility of a coalition government in South Vietnam, and the US desire to establish diplomatic communications with Communist China. In the meeting Ceausescu also agreed to convey any message from Beijing to Washington.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: "Meeting Kissinger/Sainteny; (Sept. 27, 1970; Declassified January 3, 2002) Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁷⁵ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between President Nixon and Pakistan President Yahya Khan.; (October 25, 1970; Declassified on May 9, 2001) Washington: national Security Archive.

¹⁷⁶ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon: "Kissinger's Conversation with President Ceausescu;" (October 27, 1970; Declassified on May 9, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

The next message was conveyed to Henry Kissinger from Pakistan's Yahya Khan. The message was delivered by Pakistan Ambassador in Washington Agha Hilaly. The secret message came from the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai. Chou En-Lai explained that Mao welcomed the possibility of a meeting between both countries' representatives. The Chinese leader also welcomed a high level talk to discuss improving relations and the modalities of the negotiations. President Yahya's personal comment was a favorable appraisal of the Chinese intentions during his visit to Beijing.¹⁷⁷

In another meeting with the Romanian Ambassador to the US, Corneliu Bogdan, Henry Kissinger relayed another secret message for the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai. He expressed the willingness to discuss the whole range of Sino-American issues including the problem of Taiwan. He also affirmed that the degree of US military presence in Asia was related to the degree of tension in that region. This meant that the US would reduce its military presence as the tension diminishes in the region.¹⁷⁸

The Deputy Assistant to Kissinger, General Alexander Haig again contacted General Vernon Walters in Paris. He instructed the US Military Attaché to transmit Kissinger's note to the French Diplomat Jean Sainteny. To maintain authenticity and discretion, he was to read the letter only, and once Sainteny arranged the meeting with Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen, he would also read Kissinger's note to the Chinese

¹⁷⁷ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum for President Nixon: "Chinese Communist Initiative;" (December 9, 1970; Declassified on January 3, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁷⁸ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: "Meeting between Kissinger and Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan;" (January 29, 1971; Declassified on January 11, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

diplomat. Kissinger reminded Sainteny of the need to maintain secrecy with the exception of briefing French President Georges Pompidou. Henry Kissinger also requested a secret meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen in Paris.¹⁷⁹

Another message from Kissinger was delivered to Pakistan President Khan by US Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland. Kissinger wanted Khan to prepare all the technical detail for the secret trip to China for a secret meeting with Chou En-Lai. It basically confirmed to the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan that President Nixon agreed that direct high level negotiations were necessary to resolve the issues dividing both countries. Nixon authorized Kissinger to discuss the possibility for a presidential visit to Beijing, and the preliminary exchange on all issues of mutual interest. Nixon also suggested that the precise details of Henry Kissinger's trip be strictly secret.¹⁸⁰

During the secret meeting on July 9, 1971, between Henry Kissinger and the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai, many outstanding issues were discussed; Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Korea, the possibility of the Japanese expansionism, tension between India and Pakistan, arms control with the Soviet Union and bilateral US-China relations. Kissinger and Chou En-Lai also discussed the move toward a pacific coexistence agreement.

¹⁷⁹ Haig, Alexander. Message from Haig to Walters; "Letter to Mr. Jean Sainteny from Kissinger;" (April 27, 1971; Declassified on January 4, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁸⁰ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum for the President; "Meeting between Kissinger and Ambassador Farland;" (May 15, 1971; Declassified on January 3, 2002); Washington: National Security Archive.

In the negotiations, to appease Chinese leaders, Henry Kissinger confirmed that the United States would not support a “two China policy.” This meant that the US considered Taiwan as a part of mainland China but both Chinese territories needed to negotiate a peaceful political settlement for unification. He also reiterated that there would be no American support of the Taiwanese independence movement. The United States would not support any military invasion of Taiwan by mainland China either.

In the discussion over the Vietnam War, Kissinger also briefed Chou En-Lai on the secret negotiations in Paris with North Vietnamese for a US withdrawal from South Vietnam. This plan included the release of all prisoners and the application of the Geneva Accord of 1954. The proposition also included the withdrawal of all foreign troops such as South Korean and Australian troops. Kissinger also suggested that the withdrawal from Cambodia/Laos civil wars were considered international matters as long as there was a presence of North Vietnamese troops in those countries. To calm Chinese fears, Kissinger also confirmed that the United States would not support a nuclear Japan, and would secretly communicate to China of any arms control deal with the Soviet Union.¹⁸¹

The discussion culminated with the invitation of President Nixon to China. The modalities for the Mao-Nixon Summit were laid out. The issues discussed, between Kissinger and Chou En-Lai, were to serve as part of the presidential negotiation. A joint communiqué was drafted to be announced when the National Security Advisor goes back to Washington. Many issues were discussed. Some were agreed upon in principles and

¹⁸¹ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation; “Secret Meeting between Kissinger and Chou En-Lai;” (July 9, 1971; Declassified on May 9, 2001); Washington: National Security Archive.

there was disagreement upon matters of timing and understanding of events. It was expected that President Nixon would find more points of agreement during his visit to Beijing. It was agreed that there were no preconditions to the Nixon-Mao Summit. The two leaders were to elaborate on the issues already discussed by Kissinger and Chou En-Lai.¹⁸² What followed were the announcement of the President's trip to China and later the re-establishment of US diplomatic relations with China.

(IV)-D1- Analysis of the of US secret negotiations with China

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

Prior to the Nixon's China initiative in 1970, despite the non-recognition of communist China by the United States, both countries were engaged in official negotiations at the ambassadorial level for sixteen years with a total of one hundred and thirty six meetings from 1954 to 1970. They used both the Geneva and the Warsaw venues to communicate.¹⁸³ The early efforts with official negotiations went nowhere. Due to tensions between Beijing and Moscow, the United States and China reverted to secret diplomacy to address their differences with the hope of reaching diplomatic normalization.

¹⁸² Ibid. Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation

¹⁸³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-American_relations#Relations_frozen

An important fact about the organization of secret negotiations was that all exploratory and preparatory steps were handled within the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger. Neither the State Department nor its chief, the State Secretary William Rogers were brought in the diplomatic process. But Kissinger included certain US Ambassadors and some State Department Officials in the secret process. And all the diplomatic decisions were made by either President Nixon or National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

The importance of the third party intermediaries in the China initiative was remarkable. Kissinger used different back channel intermediaries such as French diplomat Jean Sainteny to coordinate the negotiations in Paris. The French diplomat served as intermediary between Kissinger and the Chinese Ambassador in France. Nixon and Kissinger also used their friendship to Pakistan President Khan and Romanian President Ceausescu to communicate with Chinese communist leaders. The Romanian ambassador in the US was also used as intermediary between Kissinger and Romania President Ceausescu. The enlisting of third parties intermediaries added another controversy to secret diplomacy since foreign officials were briefed while not even the US Chief diplomat, State Secretary William Rogers was included.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

It took almost thirty years before the diplomatic archives of the China initiative became available. The main reason for secret negotiations was later explained to the US

Congress by Nixon himself: “We could not risk advance public disclosure of these conversations whose outcome we could not predict. This would have risked disillusionment by inflating expectations which we could not be certain of meeting. And it would have created pressures on both the Chinese and the American sides, forcing both of us to take public positions which could only have frozen discussions before they began.”¹⁸⁴

Secrecy served a strategic goal in an offensive diplomatic strategy. This meant that back channel was used for a strategic goal of drastically changing the situation of Sino-American diplomatic relations while readjusting the international balance of power between the Western and Eastern Blocs. Besides this embrace of secret diplomacy as a diplomatic necessity, Nixon and Kissinger took into consideration major political concerns. At the domestic level, they wanted to avoid open opposition from Cold War conservatives in America, and the pro-Taiwan lobby. They also wanted to negotiate outside of the State Department control and its bureaucracy which they regarded as slow. At the bilateral level, they wanted to overcome distrust between China and the US by establishing confidentiality, and minimize the cost of failure if the negotiations did not succeed. At the international level, they wanted to exploit the Sino-Russian rift through

¹⁸⁴ US Foreign Policy for the 1970s; A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon; February 9, 1972; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972; pp.33; In Aharon Klieman’s *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*; pp.21

diplomacy, and avoid explaining the administration diplomatic actions to allies and other foreign governments.¹⁸⁵

Kissinger also emphasized the importance of secret communication which could be held without outside pressure or questions of national prestige. They seized on the fact that there was no long-term clashing interests between the US and China. In the process, Henry Kissinger ordered the stop of the on-going ambassadorial negotiations in Warsaw. This was to keep control of the whole negotiating process. It was due to the fear that the Soviets could easily access any secret information from Poland.¹⁸⁶ It was also a judgment call to prevent any leak or obstruction by the Soviets.

To create a level of confidentiality and trust, President Nixon revealed to Chou En-Lai that the United States was engaged in secret negotiations with the Soviet Union for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. And that the US would not conclude any agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China.¹⁸⁷

During the back channel negotiations, Premier Chou En-Lai made a gesture of public diplomacy. He invited the US table tennis team with some US journalists to

¹⁸⁵ Klieman, Aharon. *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 23.

¹⁸⁶ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: "Meeting between Kissinger and Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan;" (January 29, 1971; Declassified on January 11, 2002); Washington: National Security Archive.

¹⁸⁷ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum of Conversation: "Nixon-Chou En-Lai-Kissinger;" (February 24, 1972; Declassified on 05/30/2003); Washington: National Security Archives.

Beijing as sign of a new page in Sino-American relations. He hoped to show the Chinese desire to improve relations with the US, and the drive for international recognition and admission to the United Nations. He still kept the secrecy about the ongoing back channel communication with the US.

President Nixon reciprocated the public gesture by asking the White House Press Secretary to release a statement that the US was prepared to improve contact between American people and Chinese people. He meant to expedite visas for Chinese visitors to the US. He also suggested a relaxed currency control to allow the use of US dollars by the PRC. Nixon also lifted restriction on American oil companies which prevented them from providing fuel to Chinese civilian cargoes. These public gestures provided a trustful atmosphere for the on-going secret negotiations.¹⁸⁸ In his response, Chou En-Lai confirmed that they were prepared to maintain strict secrecy in regard to Kissinger's trip and considered secrecy as essential to the potential success of the meeting.

In the negotiations Henry Kissinger also reminded Chou En-Lai of the need for extreme secrecy so that they could meet "unencumbered by bureaucracy, free from the past, and with the greatest possible latitude." This meant the establishment of a secure channel of communication which was direct and discreet and within the control of President Nixon and Chairman Mao.

¹⁸⁸ Nixon, Richard. Statement by President Nixon: "diplomacy with China;" (April 14, 1971); Washington: National Security Archive;

As a side note to the fruitful discussion, secret negotiations also allowed Henry Kissinger to plead for the release of four Americans sentenced to prison in China. He did not want to discuss the circumstance of their arrest. But he merely requested an act of mercy from the part of the Chinese government to pardon the convicted. The US diplomat reaffirmed that he was just asking for a favor as a sign of good faith in the potential of the new Sino-American friendship.¹⁸⁹ The nature of the private negotiation contributed to this request without political implications.

The Nixon's China initiative was a case of diplomatic necessity. This was a case where secret diplomacy allowed the US to negotiate with a nation which did not have diplomatic relations, and not even recognized by the United States. Among many reasons, the US President felt the need for secrecy due to the type of hostility, the legal status of the Sino-American relationship, the type of communication needed, and other circumstances such as war and diplomatic misunderstanding.

c)- Government Particularities

Many of the reasons that led to the secrecy in the negotiations were also part of the main reasons why the people and the elected officials were not brought in. This was also one of the main characteristics of the Nixon foreign policy implementations. Before the agreement, Nixon and Kissinger could not justify to Americans that they intend to

¹⁸⁹ Kissinger, Henry. "Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger-Chou En-Lai;" (July 11, 1971; Declassified on 05/09/2001); Washington: National Security Archives;

antagonize the Soviet Union by initiating a rapprochement with communist China. There was a public mistrust of the Chinese communist government and a major opposition in the US Congress would have prevented any chance of diplomatic breakthrough.

Upon his return to Washington, Henry Kissinger did report to a few newsmen the key points of his trip to Beijing, without elaborating on the substance of the negotiations. This was not to abide by any democratic principles or respect for the people's right to know. This was mainly to control the information available to the people and the press. It was a measure to suppress any possible rumor or leaks.

President Nixon and his Advisor Henry Kissinger were by character very prone to secrecy. Nixon had resentment of the press and even of the functional democratic process. Nixon kept secrecy from the press, from his political allies and Party, from the members of his own administration, and even from his own Secretary of States William Rogers.¹⁹⁰ Nixon mistrusted almost everyone, except his right hand diplomat Henry Kissinger. The success of the secret negotiations with China overshadowed the fact that the process was non-democratic.

Secrecy was maintained throughout the process, and the secret negotiations reached its intended goal of US-China rapprochement. The internal secrecy within the government and even within the Nixon administration was highly condemned during the

¹⁹⁰ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Moscow Trip;" (April 17, 1972; Declassified on 07/07/1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

President's impeachment hearing in Congress in 1974. But one needs to understand that the actual impeachment was due to the Watergate scandal at the domestic policy level.

Chapter Five

(V)- Secret Diplomacy and Franco-American National Securities

In 1783, George Washington stated in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*: "I cannot hesitate to contribute my best endeavors towards the establishment of national security in whatever manner the sovereign power may think proper to direct."¹⁹¹ This statement suggested the long tradition of the extent to which political leaders are willing to take for the protection of national security. National Security is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from

¹⁹¹ The Oxford English Dictionary;
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/125287?redirectedFrom=national%20security#eid35384788>

disruption from outside; and to control its borders.¹⁹² In other words, National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of diplomacy, military power projection, economic and political power.¹⁹³ The use of diplomacy to facilitate or compel cooperation is part of foreign relations. Multiple measures are taken by the states to rally allies or confront threats in the protection of the national interest.

In the context of the dissertation, this chapter will explore the practice of secret diplomacy in the case of national security. In diplomatic cases ranging from the ABM Treaty negotiations, to the French request for US Assistance in nuclear development, the back channel approach had been the diplomatic choice.

(V)-A- Secret Diplomacy and US National Security: the ABM Treaty Negotiations

In the 1970s, one of the most important arms control treaty was the ABM Treaty of 1972. To address the arms race problem, President Nixon assigned a task force to analyze the possibility of a strategic arms limitation proposal to the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger presented the findings on May 23, 1969. What followed was an interesting combination of front channel diplomacy with a back channel strategy component.

In a Memorandum to President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger presented the study results which stated that a proposal which banned MIRVs

¹⁹² Brown, Harold. *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 4.

¹⁹³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security

(Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) meant a decline in the US second strike capability or improved the Soviet second strike ability or both. The study also found that if the ABMs were banned, this would increase the Soviet second strike capability, but no advantage by striking first. Therefore a ABMs ban would be more in the Soviets interest than that of the United States.¹⁹⁴ Nixon used those findings in the plan for the negotiation strategy with the Soviet Union.

The official negotiations began in November 1969 in Helsinki, Finland. In the first meeting the diplomats discussed their views on strategic and defensive nuclear forces. The Chief Soviet negotiator was Vladimir Semenov who was assisted by Petr Pleshakov. The US chief negotiator was Gerard Smith, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was assisted by Ambassador Graham Parsons from the State department. While the official front channel negotiations were going on, and the talks were not making much progress, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger opened a back channel negotiation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. In their secret meeting on January 28, 1971, Kissinger and Dobrynin focused on negotiating an understanding on a separate ABM agreement and a freeze on the size of strategic nuclear forces.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to the President Nixon; "Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals;" (May 23, 1969; Declassified on June 29, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁹⁵ Kissinger, Henry; "Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger-Dobrynin Meeting;" (January 28, 1971; Declassified on February 2, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger and Dobrynin followed up with a phone conversation on May 11, 1971. Henry Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed on a separate ABM Agreement and a limitation of strategic weapons.¹⁹⁶ Dobrynin suggested that any decisions on force freezes had to be handled after reaching the ABM agreement. Both also agreed that only after the agreement had been reached through the back channel that they would instruct their respective official negotiators to present the results in Helsinki and Vienna.

Before receiving the instruction on future weapons technology, the official delegation completed drafts of an ABM agreement and the initial agreement on limiting strategic weapons. The draft included the limitation of test launchers, mobile ABMs, multiple ABMs, interceptor missiles and the transfer of ABMs to third countries.¹⁹⁷

To analyze the future ABM systems issue, Henry Kissinger presided over a National Security Council's closed meeting on August 5, 1971. Kissinger wanted to explore the issue before submitting to Nixon for a decision. The working group had to weigh up on how the US National Security would be affected by such a limitation on ABM systems. At the end of the meeting, Kissinger opted for a complete prohibition of future ABM systems.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Transcript of Conversation; "Dobrynin-Kissinger Phone Conversation;" (May 11, 1971); Declassified on April 12, 2001; Washington: National Security Archive.

¹⁹⁷ Smith, Gerard. Secret Cable 842 to state department; "U.S. Proposed Agreement;" (July 26, 1971; Declassified on August 3, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

¹⁹⁸ Spiers, Ronald. Memorandum; "Future ABM Systems – Verification Panel Meeting;" (August 5, 1971; Declassified on January 6, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives.

In a secret back channel cable, the US chief negotiator Ambassador Gerard Smith also appealed personally to President Nixon to support the prohibition of future ABM Systems. He believed that both the United States and Soviet Union should limit all future ABM Systems, and not only the existing type of hardware. His rationale was that the prohibition could curb any future arms race with the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁹

On November 30, 1971, during the official negotiations in Vienna, the Soviet negotiator Aleksander Shchukin agreed on the ban of future ABM Systems.²⁰⁰ An important step was reached on January 7, 1972 when both sides agreed on multiple points. Ambassador Gerard Smith suggested putting the agreement in treaty format for their superiors' approval. The suggestion was welcomed by the Soviets negotiators. But the Soviet negotiators were still split on the future ABM technology issue.²⁰¹

In a private conversation between Raymond Garthoff and Soviet negotiators Grinevski and Kishilov on April 14, 1972, both sides agreed not to transfer ABM Systems to other countries and not to deploy them outside their national borders. The agreement also included the types of ABM and the number of ABM sites. The agreement was reached in the airplane while flying back to Helsinki. Another private conversation

¹⁹⁹ Smith, Gerard. Letter to President Nixon; "Future ABM Systems;" (August 7, 1971; Declassified on December 13, 1999; Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁰⁰ Smith, Gerard; Memorandum; "SALT MemCon;" (December 2, 1971; Declassified on November 18, 1994); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁰¹ Memorandum of Conversation: "US-USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No 13;" (January 7, 1971; Declassified on 08/06/2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

was held while riding a snowmobile on the Tundra in a cross-country ski camp.²⁰²

Despite the understanding between the delegations, each side needed new instructions from their superiors.

While some improvements were being made through the front channel, Kissinger was still having secret meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. On April 17, 1972 Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Moscow. He met Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. They discussed various issues such as the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, Bilateral Trade, Vietnam War, European Security, and the ongoing ABM negotiations. Before the secret trip, Kissinger was working through the back channel with Dobrynin to include the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in the SALT Agreement.²⁰³ Although this proposition gave an advantage to the Soviets in the number of submarines, the United States were compensated by acquiring launch bases in Western Europe.

On the second day of the negotiations, Kissinger and Brezhnev discussed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Brezhnev suggested that each site could have an InterContinental Ballistic Missile site within the ABM site with one hundred interceptors deployed. They dealt with most of the issues necessary to reach an arms limitation

²⁰² Memorandum of Conversation: "SALT Problems and Prospects;" (April 14, 1972; Declassified 08/06/2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁰³ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Moscow Trip;" (April 17, 1972; Declassified on 07/07/1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

agreement.²⁰⁴ Kissinger also suggested a conference with the Soviets on the security of Europe, which would include major Western European countries. He also reiterated to Brezhnev the advantage of détente; the US was willing to improve trade with Russia and provide them with advanced technology.

In the discussion about the ABM agreement, the decision was for the US and the Soviet Union to reduce the number of submarine launchers unilaterally. Since they could not force France and Great Britain to reduce their productions, the Soviets decided to adjust their numbers to match any increase by France and Great Britain. The Soviet leader also suggested bringing Secretary of State William Rogers into the secret talks, but Kissinger warned that doing so could bring publicity and leaks.²⁰⁵ The discussion also covered the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the size of the area that each country would protect under the agreement. The secret talks also covered the situation in Berlin, the possible change in leadership in West Germany, and the situation in East Germany and other European affairs. At the end of the meeting, Soviet Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev took Henry Kissinger aside and they had another private discussion in which no record was made available.

Before Nixon's official trip to Moscow, Henry Kissinger gave the President a summary report on the SALT negotiations. It contained what was negotiated secretly and the remaining issues to be addressed during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. He also

²⁰⁴ Ibid. Kissinger. pp.3

²⁰⁵ Ibid. Kissinger. pp.23

included the agreements reached by the official delegation in Helsinki. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger went to Moscow on May 20, 1972. Although the trip made the news, the discussions were private. Both sides included the official negotiators only on May 26, 1972 when the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on force freezes were signed. The treaty document was officially released to the press on June 13, 1972.

(V)-A1- Analysis of the Secret Diplomacy behind the ABM Treaty

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

This diplomatic case is very significant as an illustration of the dual track diplomacy. The diplomatic process combined the open door diplomacy with a back door channel. Kissinger's concern was that the official channel was making slow progress and that the negotiations in Vienna and Helsinki might undercut the back channel approach. He wanted to control the process and manage the release of information without leaks.

The ABM Treaty negotiations were more organized and structured than other Nixon's diplomatic achievements. There were multiple components to the process. There was an official delegation composed of diplomats and weapons experts handling the front channel negotiations in Vienna and Helsinki. The National Security Council also held closed meetings to evaluate the diplomatic progress and points of agreement. The State department was consulted in the official negotiation process, and some state department negotiators were involved as well. The Defense department was also involved in an advisory and weapons expertise capacity.

But secret talks were kept within the National Security Council under the leadership of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger consulted directly with Nixon on crucial decisions. He controlled all the secret diplomatic negotiations and participated in back channel communications with the Soviet leadership. He provided counsel to the official negotiators in Helsinki and Vienna as well. But the official negotiators in Helsinki and Vienna were not aware of the back channel process.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

The first documents related to the secret negotiations of the ABM Treaty were made available after twenty five years. The ABM secret negotiations used an offensive diplomatic strategy. Secrecy was used for a strategic goal of radical change on strategic weapons. This was an aggressive attempt to change the existing status of the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Back door activities by Henry Kissinger were aimed at speeding the diplomatic process, increasing efficiency and multiplying the chances of reaching a breakthrough. The designation of Kissinger as the Special Secret Envoy provided an assurance to the Soviet leadership as to his ability to maintain secrecy and his overall trustworthiness in the back channels.

The combination of both back and front channel diplomacy could also provide contradictions and confusion in negotiations. This was the case when the official negotiations stagnated on the issue of future ABM techniques, and the official negotiator Ambassador Graham Parsons sent a secret cable to obtain guidance from the State

Department whereas the true decision maker was Kissinger in the National Security Council.

Ambassador Parsons wanted the contradiction between the State and Defense departments sorted out. The issue was whether to include future ABM technology in the proposal or not. This meant blocking any future weapons technology such as space-based laser weapons or land-based laser systems. Ambassador Parsons himself believed that the future weapons were not to be included in the treaty to make room for a special commission to look over the entire national security strategy. There was also a split in opinion within the state department.²⁰⁶ This was a problem that led to contradictions in the official negotiations.

The proposals that Henry Kissinger secretly negotiated in Moscow were handed as instructions to the official US Negotiators in Helsinki. He also recommended that the official delegation add a request to include the ABM radars in the agreement. Most of Kissinger's discussion and agreements through the back channel with Ambassador Dobrynin, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Leonid Brezhnev, were added to the official negotiators' agenda. Kissinger was assisted by some of the National Security Council Staff such as Ambassador John Negroponte and Senior Advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

Leonid Brezhnev, jokingly told Kissinger that the two of them could accomplish a lot through back channel diplomacy and if it were possible they could abolish their

²⁰⁶ SALT Negotiation; Secret Cable 799 to State Department; "Decision on Foreclosing Possible Future ABM Techniques;" (July 12, 1971; Declassified on August 1, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

Foreign Offices. This meant that the Soviet leader valued the back door diplomacy more than official negotiations. Kissinger and Brezhnev agreed to keep most of their draft agreement in extreme secrecy to avoid possible leaks. They also agreed that some issues were not to be mentioned to their respective Foreign Affairs departments until the Nixon-Brezhnev summit.²⁰⁷

Secret negotiations also allowed Kissinger and Brezhnev to discuss the Vietnam War without outside pressure. In private discussions Leonid Brezhnev provided some suggestion on the US troop withdrawal from Vietnam. He emphasized the need to halt the bombing to reach a diplomatic agreement before the troop withdrawal. Nixon's strategy was to continue negotiations while keeping up the bombing of North Vietnam. Nixon's main goal was the "Vietnamization" of the War, whereby the war would be left to South and North Vietnam without US troops.²⁰⁸

Secrecy on ABM negotiations was a matter of consent. Both Kissinger and Brezhnev relied on back door negotiations to reach a diplomatic agreement. This meant that only the solutions that had been agreed upon through back door negotiations were to be included in the final draft of the treaty. All these details were to be handled before the

²⁰⁷ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Kissinger-Brezhnev Meeting;" (April 22, 1972; Declassified on 07/07/1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. Kissinger. pp. 13

official Nixon-Brezhnev summit where both leaders were expected to sign the ABM treaty.²⁰⁹

c)- Government Particularities

The ABM Treaty back channel negotiations combined with front channel diplomacy did produce some confusion in the process. But, this case was a diplomatic success in the sense that secrecy was maintained throughout the whole negotiations and the parties reached an agreement. But questions remained whether a breakthrough could have been reached through front channel diplomacy. The official negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna helped to appease the elected officials in the US Congress and the people that actions were being taken to curb the arms race.

The combination of back door and front door diplomacy leading to the ABM Treaty was necessary for many reasons. The United States, the Western allies and the rest of the world were concerned with the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the official negotiation provided some relief to domestic and international groups that “something” was being done for world stability. The back door diplomatic aspect was designed to reach a solid agreement through a process that allowed both Kissinger and Dobrynin and Brezhnev to be frank and direct without outside pressure.

²⁰⁹ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; “SALT Agreement;” (May 1972; Declassified on February 2, 1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

The people's right to know was not observed and democratic principles as such were not the concern of the political leaders. As stated before, Nixon and Kissinger preferred to handle international issues through the back door diplomacy. Secrecy was maintained, but the fact of keeping secret from other members of his own Cabinet, and others within the government brought a very negative image to the Nixon administration. This created a climate of mistrust between the President and the Press, and with the people in general.

(V)-B- Secret Diplomacy and French National Security: US Assistance

In addressing their national security capability, France engaged in a series of negotiations to obtain the assistance of the United States in the area of nuclear development. American and French diplomats and defense officials employed back channel diplomacy to handle the nuclear assistance issue. The initial reaction of the US administrations in the 1950s and 1960s was against any assistance to the French nuclear program. But in 1970 President Nixon reversed the policy of non-assistance to accommodate some of the French requests.

At the time of the first French nuclear test in 1960, the US administration was mostly opposed to assisting France in nuclear weapons research. In 1957, the first French request was made towards the United Kingdom, when French Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury requested British assistance, for the nuclear development program. The French request was discussed at a meeting in Bermuda between the US State Secretary John F. Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. Both the US and the UK were skeptical about providing nuclear assistance to France.²¹⁰ But both Foreign Secretaries concluded that an open opposition to an ally such as France would be diplomatically dangerous. So they decided to handle the rejection issue secretly through back door diplomacy.

The French request was made secretly to the UK and then to the US. In the US, the discussion between Defense Secretary Thomas Gates Jr., the Atomic Energy

²¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation between US State Secretary Dulles and UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd: "Bermuda Meeting in 1957;" (March 21-23, 1957; Declassified on January 6, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Commission and the State Department analyzed the issue of accommodating the French request. The US new stance was based on the statement by French General Beaufre that President de Gaulle would offer full cooperation to NATO if the US provided France with POLARIS missiles. De Gaulle's request was also made unofficially through back channel.²¹¹ In a confidential letter to the US Ambassador in London, the US State Department informed the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan of the official policy on US assistance to France. The letter reaffirmed the continued US assistance to NATO forces, but no formal nuclear assistance to France.²¹²

When John Kennedy came to power in 1960, Under Secretary of State George Ball suggested a new approach in dealing with the French government. Ball wanted to use US nuclear assistance to induce the French government to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and bring the French forces back into the NATO command. The recommendation included helping France in developing warheads for MIRAGE IV aircraft, submarine-missile delivery, and supplying substantial weapons and design data.²¹³ The conclusion was that the US needed to delay its assistance to France. This was mainly due to the difficulty in dealing with General de Gaulle. Diplomatic negotiations with France on

²¹¹ Memorandum of Conversation: "Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;" (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²¹² Secret Telegram from US Department of State to US Ambassador in London: "US Military Assistance to France;" (May 8, 1961; Declassified on March 6, 1992); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²¹³ Memorandum to the President: "A Further Nuclear Offer to General de Gaulle?" (August 8, 1963; Declassified on July 14, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

nuclear assistance were further delayed when National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy advised the Secretary of State Dean Rusk that no strategic weapons delivery assistance would be accorded to France unless it was to improve the position of NATO. The instruction, which was given to the State and Defense Departments, suggested that no nuclear assistance be extended either intentionally or unintentionally.²¹⁴

A major shift in US assistance to France came with President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1969. In a secret memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, NSA Henry Kissinger announced that a systematic study of a possible bilateral military cooperation with France was conducted. Kissinger also decided to direct such negotiations through the National Security Council machinery and not the State Department.²¹⁵ The decision was also made that the President would not let NATO conditions prevent a possible nuclear cooperation with France. Nixon and Kissinger also believed that US assistance would help improve Franco-British military cooperation.

On January 23, 1970 the French requested formally, but through a back channel, US assistance in the development of their ballistic missiles. The French Minister of Armament Jean Blancard made the request through the US Department of Defense. But

²¹⁴ Kissinger, Henry: Action Memorandum from National Security Advisor to State and Defense Departments; "US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France;" (April 20, 1969; Declassified on July 12, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²¹⁵ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum; "Guidance to State and Defense Departments on Our Attitude toward Military Cooperation with the French;" (April 15, 1969; Declassified on August 30, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

NSA Henry Kissinger suggested that the Defense Department should not follow up on this assistance request until President Nixon had discussed the issue with the French President Georges Pompidou. He wanted to complete the background study of nuclear technology cooperation before the Nixon-Pompidou meeting.²¹⁶

In the meantime a Department of Defense Official John Foster met Jean Blancard privately. Blancard requested US assistance and advice on their missile development program. John Foster's memorandum was sent to Kissinger requesting permission to continue private negotiations with Blancard. Foster wanted to go to Paris for the secret negotiations.²¹⁷ He also wanted to cover all the requests related to the French Ballistic Missiles, both land-based and submarine based, as well as sea-based force missiles.

In the official meeting between Kissinger and President Pompidou, the French President expressed the desire to establish a private channel of communication. He designated one of his personal assistants Georges Gaucher as the main contact person and wanted Kissinger as the US partner representing Nixon.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense: "Assistance to the French Missile Program;" (January 27, 1970; Declassified on January 10, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²¹⁷ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: "Cooperation with the French;" (December 16, 1968; Declassified on May 8, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²¹⁸ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Summary of My Conversation with President Pompidou;" (February 23, 1970; Declassified on June 19, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

From the Defense Department John Foster and General Andrew Goodpaster were assigned to secretly negotiate with the French Minister of Armament Jean Blancard, and the French Chief of Staff. They were to explore a practical cooperation on naval and strategic forces and possibly the area of tactical nuclear weapons. Kissinger gave instructions to General Goodpaster, and he also sent back channel oral messages to US Ambassador Freeman in London to brief Prime Minister Harold Wilson on the Franco-American secret negotiations.²¹⁹

The secret negotiations were satisfactory to the point where President Nixon directed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to proceed with a limited assistance to France in the areas of information on nuclear effects simulators, high technology applicable to missiles, reentry vehicles and intelligence on Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missiles. Although the negotiations continued, at that stage a partial success was already achieved by both sides.²²⁰

Another series of secret negotiations were conducted by the new French Defense Minister Michel Debré. Debré expressed concerns over the German's interests in uranium enrichment. France did not want the US to help Germany in developing a nuclear weapons program. This was a French National Security concern. Further secret

²¹⁹ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to President Nixon; "Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French;" (March 10, 1970; Declassified on July 12, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²²⁰ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to Defense Secretary; "US Assistance to the French Missile Program;" (March 9, 1970; Declassified on May 8, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

negotiations were conducted between Michele Debré, French Ambassador Jacques Morizet, and Henry Kissinger. They were all satisfied so far with the progress of the secret negotiations and desired to improve cooperation on national security issues.

The secret negotiations reached another breakthrough in October 1971. President Nixon approved the request to help France improve the “operability and reliability” of their land-based and sea-based ballistic missile systems. The technical discussions began in June 1971 and the formal agreement was signed in October 1971. Another series of negotiations were held in Paris in June 1972. These secret negotiations touched on the US-French ballistic missile cooperation, nuclear safety exchanges, nuclear strategy and coordination of NATO and French Forces. These negotiations also included the decision to assist France in the areas of missile reliability, quality control, propulsion and missile testing. The back channel meetings in Paris were coordinated by then US Ambassador to France, Sergeant Shriver.²²¹

The secret negotiations continued in 1973, 1974 and 1975. At that time National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State. As such he represented the State Department which was not included in the previous secret negotiations. The diplomatic negotiations on nuclear safety cooperation were expanded to include assistance in the area of underground testing. Another major private meeting was conducted on August 1, 1975 at the US Embassy in Helsinki. Secretary of State Kissinger

²²¹ US Embassy in France; Memorandum to Kissinger: “Military Cooperation with France, NSDM 103 and 104:” (April 1971; Declassified on February 4, 2004); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

met the new French President Giscard D'Estaing and his new Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues. The discussion centered on French nuclear programs and their improvement. At the end, the US finally agreed to assist France in her national security program.

(V)-B1- Analysis of the Secret Diplomacy behind the US Assistance to France

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

During the Kennedy administration, the state department was included in the negotiation process related to French nuclear requests. They did consider assisting France with the development of warheads for MIRAGE IV aircraft, or supplying substantial weapons effects.²²² But, Under Secretary George Ball advised President Kennedy that a nuclear assistance to France without political conditions would compromise the US interests in Europe and the Western Alliance. The back channel diplomacy choice was also a process that would not expose the diplomatic difficulty that the United States faced in dealing with General de Gaulle. In the words of Under-secretary George Ball: “whenever the hand of friendship has been stretched across the sea, General de Gaulle has put a dead fish in it.”²²³

²²² Memorandum to the President: “A Further Nuclear Offer to General De Gaulle?” (August 8, 1963; Declassified on July 14, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²²³ Ball, George. Memorandum to President Kennedy; “A Further Nuclear Offer to General de Gaulle;” (August 8, 1963; Declassified on July 14, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

The tension in the Franco-American relations came from the General's rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty. Not only did he refuse to sign it, he also nurtured a plan to keep French army outside of the NATO command. France needed US assistance but de Gaulle did not want any political requirement attached to it. De Gaulle believed that "France was entitled to be a member of the inner group of world powers that make the decisions on world problems." The US wanted to use the nuclear assistance to induce de Gaulle to sign the Test Ban Treaty, and to restore France's effective role in the Western Alliance, and finally repair the Franco-American diplomatic relations. The US placed the blame for the failure of these objectives on the shoulders of General de Gaulle and his government.²²⁴

The organization of the secret negotiations from Kennedy to Nixon was wider than most back channel approaches of its kind. The negotiations included the State Department and the Defense Department weapons experts. The diplomatic process was controlled by the National Security Council, first with McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy and later by Henry Kissinger under Nixon.

The main particularity of the negotiations was the existence of three parallel diplomatic tracks. One track was the semi-open summitry approach between American, British and French leaders. These negotiations were known to the press, but the substance remained secret. The second track was secret diplomacy handled by Kissinger and the Defense Department with their French counterparts. The second track was also the

²²⁴ Ibid. Ball. pp.1

channel used by Kissinger to brief the UK Foreign Office. The third track was a very secret channel between Henry Kissinger and Georges Gaucher, President Pompidou's Assistant. The Kissinger-Gaucher back channel was not known to the negotiators handling the second track secret negotiations. The third track was a very secret channel known only by the highest decision makers in Washington and Paris.

Another particularity was that the US Ambassador in France and his Military Attaché coordinated the secret negotiations in Paris. The French Ambassador in Washington and Defense Minister were deeply involved in the secret negotiations as well. The circle of advisors was wider than most US secret bilateral negotiations. All three tracks were handled with extreme caution.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

The diplomatic case of US nuclear assistance to France is a significant illustration of multi-track secret diplomacy strategy. The use of back channel diplomacy was initially a precaution employed by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations as well as the Macmillan Cabinet, to handle the refusal of assistance to the French nuclear weapons program. First, the secrecy was used not to embarrass an ally such as France, but also not to provide to the Soviets any sense of a breakdown of diplomatic coordination within the Western alliance. Secondly, when Nixon took power, secrecy was used to assure expediency without interference, but also to maintain discretion as well as denying information to the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc countries.

The Nixon policy stance was based on the new assurance by President de Gaulle that he would offer full cooperation to NATO if the US provided France with POLARIS missiles. De Gaulle also chose a back channel strategy to submit his request.²²⁵ This was an expediency measure as well as de Gaulle's personal preference to control sensitive national security issues.

The British position on nuclear cooperation with France was not favorable either. The British government did consider assisting France but only within the context of Western Alliance. During the US secret negotiations with France, the US Embassy in London kept the Foreign Office informed. The US Embassy also suggested that an oral communication be maintained with the Foreign Office instead of a formal written exchange. This was necessary for confidentiality and to avoid any leaks to the British press. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand sent instructions to William Galloway, US Embassy Political Counselor, to orally convey to the Foreign Office the US position on French requests.²²⁶

The British Foreign Office also consented to the use of oral assurances from the US on dealing with the French request. Since the French government did not formally request assistance, the National Security Advisor did not approve a formal response. This

²²⁵ Memorandum of Conversation: "Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;" (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²²⁶ Memorandum to Henry Kissinger: "British Position on Nuclear Cooperation with France;" (October 21, 1969; Declassified on August 30, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

back door diplomatic approach was also taken by the United States to maintain flexible options in the case that the US President changed his position on nuclear assistance to France.

In early 1970s, French President Pompidou also consented in establishing a private channel of communication. He designated his assistant Georges Gaucher to handle the back door negotiations with NSA Henry Kissinger. Both Pompidou and Nixon believed that back channel diplomacy was the best approach for the highly sensitive national security exchange.²²⁷ Both Presidents also agreed that “secrecy would allow them to be frank with one another, to inform one another clearly, and to seek significant ways of working together.”²²⁸

Another reason for the back channel diplomacy was to focus on areas where both nations had similar vision to cooperate on national security issues. It was also an opportunity to explore the Western stance towards the Soviet Union without making “headline news.” In their private meeting, Nixon also revealed to Pompidou the moderate diplomatic strategy that he intended to use in dealing with the Soviet Union. He also suggested that the best approach was to “negotiate with the USSR in a way that did not weaken the US position or the European position towards the Soviet Union.”²²⁹

²²⁷ Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; “Summary of My Conversation with President Pompidou;” (February 23, 1970; Declassified on June 19, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²²⁸ Sonnenfeld, Helmut. Memorandum of Conversation; “Nixon and Pompidou;” (February 24, 1970; Declassified on June 11, 2003); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

²²⁹ Ibid. Sonnenfeld. pp.4-5

The role of secrecy was also important since both Nixon and Pompidou included their respective defense departments so that military experts could discuss the technical and military aspects of the negotiation. The goal of these secret military negotiations was to reach a military arrangement before Nixon could review and approve the US nuclear assistance draft. The importance of maintaining secrecy and these extra precautions were also to avoid alarming allies and other Cold War rivals.

Later in the negotiation process, there was a concern over a possible leak through the French Press. But both the US and French Presidents vowed to maintain confidentiality and if necessary to provide only general statements to the press.²³⁰ They were also willing to deny that such secret negotiations were taking place in the case of premature disclosure.

c)- Government Particularities

The issue of US assistance to France's national security was a long negotiation process that went through multiple administrations. During the entire secret negotiation process, the US and French leaders did not follow any democratic principles based on the people's right to know. The non-democratic stance was reinforced when US Defense Secretary Thomas Gates Jr. suggested giving assistance to France without Congressional legislation and bypassing the US Atomic Energy Act, which required extensive

²³⁰ Sonnenfeld, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation: "French Nuclear Programs;" (August 1, 1975; Declassified on February 4, 2004); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

restriction on nuclear cooperation with other nations.²³¹ The strategy was to deny information to the elected officials so that the negotiators could negotiate freely without the “watchful eyes” of the US Congress.

At that time, bypassing elected officials, they hoped to manage the unexpected and relieve the fear that helping the French might put pressure on the Germans to engage in nuclear weapon programs themselves. This was also considered in the context of alliance politics.

The dilemma between practicing secret diplomacy for national security reasons and abiding by the democratic principles still looms in the horizon for the liberal democracies. There is a level of tolerance of secrecy from the population and legislators when it comes to national security. In the United States as well as France, there is less criticism of government secrecy since the Cold War. This “Cold War mentality” has affected the process and issues of democratic transparency. As demonstrated in the literature review, the criticism of government secrecy had remained active despite the level of acceptability by different milieu.

²³¹ Memorandum of Conversation: “Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;” (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Chapter Six

(VI)- Secret Diplomacy and US Negotiations on International Security

In February 1999, former US Defense Secretary William Cohen stated: "We have to yet really seriously debate the constitutional issues and whether or not we're willing to give up more freedom in order to have more security."²³² The interaction between the practice of secret diplomacy and international security had preoccupied international relations theorists since Versailles. International security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations to ensure mutual survival and safety.²³³ In the broad sense, it encompasses a wide range of issues that affect the welfare of human

²³² "Quote from former US Defense Secretary William Cohen; http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/william_cohen_quote_c9a5

²³³ "International Security" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_security

beings- defense, economics, health- and other social issues that cross national borders.²³⁴

International security is linked with national security in the sense that it is the extension of domestic security in the global context. Some of the same security precautions used domestically finds their sources in international security context. To enhance international security as a collective good, nations rely on negotiations and international cooperation.

One has to wonder whether secret diplomacy is necessary in the cases of global security negotiations. The issue still remains problematic if the participants are liberal democracies. Such “free nations” as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have a strong democratic tradition and secret negotiations are questionable in the context of democratic principles.

This chapter explores diplomatic cases where negotiations about international security had been handled through back channel diplomacy. The United States resorted to closed diplomacy to deal with the Iranian nuclear program under the Shah, and also to address the “secret understanding” with the United Kingdom. In both cases diverse channels of negotiations were employed along the back door diplomacy.

(VI)-A- US-Iran Secret Nuclear Negotiations in the 1970s

²³⁴ Viotti, Paul and Mark Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity*. 3rd edition. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 560.

With the recent climate of mistrust between Iran, the US and the world community over Iranian nuclear program, it is interesting to notice that US policy makers faced a similar challenge in the 1970s. But at that time Iran was considered a friendly nation by the United States and the diplomatic relations were very cordial.

In the 1970s, like today, US policy makers had to address the Shah's nuclear intentions. In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde*, it was reported that the Shah stated: "Iran would acquire nuclear weapons sooner than one would think." And he also stated that "Iran is not thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons."²³⁵ As in the current situation, the ambiguity of these statements projected uncertainty over Iran's true nuclear intentions.

The starting point was the Indian nuclear test in 1974. The fear of nuclear proliferation increased in South Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, when the Shah decided to purchase eight nuclear power reactors from the United States for "civilian purposes," the US reevaluated its nuclear policy assistance process.

In June 1974, a Pentagon report confirmed that Iran had concluded agreements with France for five nuclear power reactors. Iran engaged in negotiations to purchase eight additional reactors from the United States. The Shah had also purchased ten percent of shares in the French "Eurodif" uranium enrichment plant. Iran wanted a licensing for a

²³⁵ Helms, Richard; Memorandum for the department of defense: "Shah's alleged statement on nuclear weapons;" (June 24 1974; Declassified on 06/30/2005); confidential memorandum, pp.2; Washington: National Security Archives.

plutonium reprocessing plant of its own.²³⁶ All these actions signaled a possibility of developing a nuclear weapons capability.

In a secret meeting in Vienna in April 1975, the US negotiators Sidney Sober and Nelson Sievering stated that the reprocessing of US supplied fuel would be accepted only if it was used in a multinational plant. The United States had to be involved in the management of the Iranian reprocessed fuel. Like today, the Iranian negotiator Akbar Etemad rejected any US veto in the reprocessing question and claimed Iranian sovereignty in the matter.²³⁷

The US negotiators considered the Iranian position but did not want to weaken the US non-proliferation stance. The Shah's position was communicated to the State Department by then US Ambassador in Tehran, Richard Helm. The Shah rejected the US position and the US safeguards requirement was seen as incompatible with Iranian sovereignty. He also implied that France and Germany did not include such restraint on their nuclear reactors deals.²³⁸

By the time Gerald Ford assumed the presidency, the secret negotiations stalled over two main issues: the amount of enriched uranium supplied by the United States

²³⁶ Sumner, Gordon Jr. ; Pentagon Assessment: "Briefing Notes: Iran and Nuclear Weapons;" by Major General Gordon Sumner Jr; Near East/South Asia Region; (July 29, 1975; Declassified 2004); Washington: National Security Archives;

²³⁷ Cable from State department; draft of meeting for the US Embassy in Tehran; "Nuclear Agreement for Cooperation;" (October 1975; Declassified in 2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

²³⁸ Helms, Richard; Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to State Department; "Shah's position on Safeguards issue;" (November 1975; Declassified on 05/28/2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

which might be stored in Iran, and the Iranian right to reprocess US supplied fuel without US approval. The negotiators, Sidney Sober, Assistant State Secretary and Nelson Sievering, Atomic Energy Commissioner, held on to the US official position while exploring ways to accommodate Iranian concerns.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of state, the secretary of defense and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Security Advisor General Scowcroft summarized President Ford's position about the negotiations. President Ford wanted the negotiations to resume under the terms that clearly fostered US non-proliferation policy, promoted US-Iran interests, advanced US domestic nuclear objectives and stood a chance of mutual acceptance. Ford authorized the diplomats to inform Iran that the US would allow Iran to store low enriched uranium that it might purchase from a US facility. Ford also instructed the US negotiators to explore the multinational fuel reprocessing approach.²³⁹ Although the details of the negotiations had remained a secret, a very limited number of officials were briefed.

The secret negotiations resumed with a meeting in Tehran on February 23, 1976 between the Shah, Robert Seamans, the Energy Research and Development Administrator, and Carlyle Maw, the Under-Secretary of state for International Security Affairs. Robert Seamans and Carlyle Maw presented the US nuclear position as stated in Ford's letter to the Shah. The US negotiators explained US policy, which was and still is

²³⁹ Scowcroft, Brent; Secret Memorandum to state secretary: "Next Steps in our Negotiation of Nuclear Agreement with Iran;" (February 4, 1976; Declassified on 03/05/2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

committed to the prevention of the use of nuclear technology for weapons development. They also asked the Shah to take a leading role in preventing the spread of nuclear technology by foregoing the acquisition of nationally owned and operated reprocessing plants. This meant that the Shah had to accept a multinational controlled reprocessing plant. The Shah was not explicit in his verbal response. But Robert Seamans and Carlyle Maw left the meeting with an optimistic view that an agreement formula might be attainable.²⁴⁰

In a Memorandum, the head of the Nuclear Energy Agreement staff Alfred Atherton Jr. summarized the State Department's recommendations for the National Security Council and the President. Based on the divergence of recommendations the US negotiators needed a presidential guidance before the next meeting with Iran's negotiator Akbar Etemad.²⁴¹ The approach was to offer the multinational reprocessing plant proposal to Iran on an ad referendum basis. If Iran finds it acceptable, it would be the approach to present later to the US Congress.²⁴²

The recommendations from Robert Seamans and the State Department were brought together in a common memorandum to National Security Advisor General Scowcroft for a possible guide line for US negotiators. As proposed by Robert Seamans, the initial suggestion to Iran was to accept the multinational reprocessing plant approach.

²⁴⁰ Scowcroft, Brent; Memorandum to President Ford: "Response from the Shah on Nuclear Cooperation;" (March 22, 1976; Declassified on 03/05/2004); Copy from Gerald Ford Library; Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁴¹ Ibid. Scowcroft. pp.4

²⁴² Ibid. Scowcroft. pp.8

If unsuccessful the second proposition was for the US to accept the Iranian national reprocessing but under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in addition to US personnel for facilities inspections.²⁴³

Another issue that added concerns during the secret negotiations was the West German nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt met the German Ambassador Bernt von Staden in Washington. They discussed Iran's nuclear ambitions and US concerns. Although the ambassador gave the detailed text of the German-Iranian agreement to Kissinger, the US concerns were not properly addressed. The ambassador also handed a copy of the German official statement about the Iranian deal. But Kissinger stated that the US position was for Germany not to transfer any reprocessing plant to Iran. Ambassador von Staden explained that there were strict requirements listed on confidential letters between Iran and Germany. The copies of those secret agreements were handed over to Kissinger.²⁴⁴

US Under-Secretary Charles Robinson summarized in a memorandum for State Secretary Henry Kissinger the points to be reconciled before continuing the secret negotiations. The difference in the approaches discussed by Kissinger and Etemad and

²⁴³ Springsteen, George; Secret Memorandum for General Scowcroft from state department: "Next Steps in our Nuclear Negotiations with Iran;" (April 16, 1976; Declassified in 2004); Copy from Gerald Ford Library; pp.1; Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁴⁴ Sonnenfeldt, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation between US Secretary Kissinger and German Ambassador Von Staden: "Germany/Iran Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation;" (July 2, 1976; Declassified on 03/31/2005); Copy from State Department; Washington: National Security Archives.

those elaborated by the US negotiating team in Tehran were brought together. The point focused on the bi-national reprocessing plant option. This meant that the supplier (France, Germany or USA) would be actively involved in the process. The last resort option was for the US to accept Iran's request to reprocess fuel in its own national plant. But the US would have to implement strong safeguards.²⁴⁵

The change of administration from Gerard Ford to Jimmy Carter also affected the secret negotiations with Iran. The new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance cabled the new US Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan to continue the secret negotiations. But at that time President Carter proposed a non-proliferation policy bill to the US Congress. Carter wanted the bill to be approved by Congress before pursuing the negotiations with Iran. Carter elevated the standard for safeguards in any nuclear deal with Iran. This surely affected the decision of the Iranians to drop their insistence on building a national reprocessing plant.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Sidney Sober confirmed this new Iranian position with Akbar Etemad in Tehran in May 1977. Akbar Etemad also wanted the US to treat Iran in a favorable manner for signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.²⁴⁶ Akbar Etemad wanted to resume secret talks before Carter's

²⁴⁵ Robinson, Charles; Secret Memorandum to State Secretary: "Nuclear Negotiations with Iran;" Prepared by Under Secretary Charles Robinson; (August 18, 1976; Declassified on 10/05/2006); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁴⁶ Sullivan, William; Confidential Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to Assistant Secretary Atherton: "US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and US-Iran Energy Discussions;" (May 1977; Declassified 06/25/2008); Washington: National Security Archives.

energy bill passage in Congress. He also agreed that Iran needed to review the new bill. Iran was also interested in what the new bill provided for with regard to US rights to reduce or terminate fuel supplied to another nation.²⁴⁷ This was essential before resuming negotiations on a new bilateral agreement. Sidney Sober reiterated Carter's concerns that there should be a tight control of highly enriched uranium since they were readily usable in nuclear weapons.

On June 18, 1977 another secret meeting was held between the Shah and Assistant Secretary Sidney Sober. The Shah reiterated his desire to acquire eight US-supplied nuclear power reactors. He dropped the request for a national reprocessing plant. He expressed concerns about the possibility of non-approval of the new energy bill by the US Congress and the delay that could come from it.²⁴⁸

At a secret negotiation in May 1977 in Vienna, Louis Nosenzo, the director of the Nuclear Policy and Operation in the State Department, went through the US-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement with Iranian negotiators. They agreed that new agreement was to further the objectives on the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and enhance the protection of international environment from radioactive, chemical and thermal contamination.²⁴⁹ Also, the new agreement approved the reprocessing of plutonium in the

²⁴⁷ Ibid. Sullivan. pp.3

²⁴⁸ Sullivan, William; Confidential Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State: "Audience with the Shah;" (June 18, 1977; Declassified on 06/20/2008); pp.1-2; Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁴⁹ Vance, Cirrus; Confidential Cable from State Department to US Embassy in Tehran: "US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement;" (February 1978 & May 1978; Declassified on 06/25/2008); pp.1-3; Washington: National Security Archives.

United Kingdom or France or another mutually agreed country. The United States promised to meet Iran's peaceful nuclear needs. The new agreement was signed by the US and Iran's negotiators pending the signatures of President Carter and the Shah of Iran.

Turmoil in Iran brought in a new government with the Shah still on the throne. The new government paralyzed the decision-making process in the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization and the Ministry of Energy. The final nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and Iran was never signed by President Carter and the Shah of Iran. This was due to the Islamic revolution which overthrew the Shah of Iran after which Ayatollah Khomeini took power in February 1979.

(VI)-A1- Analysis of the US secret negotiations with Iran

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

In the 1970s, the secret negotiation with Iran was organized differently from other Kissinger's back channel dealings. This was so because he controlled the process from the State Department. President Ford included the State Department and the Defense Department in all the processes. The National Security Council conducted the decision making analysis, and the Atomic Energy Commission also provided expert negotiators.

One reason for the inclusion was that Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State and remained active in the National Security Council.

The main issue of concern for US policymakers was the fear of nuclear weapons proliferation. The United States wanted to sell the nuclear power reactors to Iran for civilian purposes. Due to tension in the Middle East and the Indian nuclear test, the back door diplomacy approach was determined by both parties as appropriate.

The US was also forced to the negotiating table because of the defense department report of pending deals between Iran and Canada, Germany, South Africa and France. Knowing that the US was no longer the only source of supply, the need for accommodation was eminent. The negotiators also used the radiation risks to deter Iran from acquiring its own nuclear reprocessing plant, and stressed the mutual financial gains from the nuclear agreement.

Based on the economic situation in the United States, President Ford wanted to negotiate the sale with Iran. But he also wanted to balance the commercial aspect with the US nuclear policy of non-proliferation. Since the Shah's true intentions were not clear, Gerald Ford wanted to attach a series of safeguards in the nuclear deal to protect against possible Iranian diversion of nuclear materials to a weapons development program.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

Secrecy played an important role in the Iranian nuclear negotiations. It provided an atmosphere of confidence between the United States and Iran. Another reason for secrecy was to prevent a nuclear weapons “fever” in the Middle East and South Asia. After India’s nuclear test, a nuclear Iran would have pushed many nations in the Middle East to pursue the same route. The secret diplomatic efforts were employed on behalf of a defensive diplomatic strategy. In that context the US was dealing with a friendly state in order to redefine cooperation in the new nuclear environment while maintaining control against unacceptable modifications to enable nuclear weapons manufacture.

The Iranian nuclear issue was considered both a national and international security problem. As a national security issue, the United States considered the possibility of a hostile regime take over after the Shah. In that regard the new Islamic regime would be armed with a nuclear weapon. As an international security issue, the prevention of nuclear proliferation was a major concern. Therefore the secret diplomatic process was necessary to manage not only the nuclear cooperation with Iran, but also monitor the attitudes of other nuclear technology suppliers such as France and Germany, and carefully uphold the US non-proliferation policy.

As in the current situation, the difficulty during the secret negotiations came from the inconsistencies in the true intentions of the Iranian leadership. There were inconsistencies in the Shah’s position. Negotiator Akbar Etemad also started with the need for Iran to develop nuclear relations with India. He went on to state that Iran might want to develop peaceful nuclear explosions because it was economically useful in infrastructure building. He also insisted that the main reason for the nuclear reactors was

for energy. He then suggested coming to Washington to explain Iran's nuclear policy and position.²⁵⁰ These changing statements increased the US concerns over proliferation. Secrecy was then important for both nations "not to lose face" to their public and the international community, and control information.

The difficulties in the secret negotiations also came from the different position held by the state department. Although Energy Commissioner Robert Seamans and Under Secretary Carlyle Maw presented the same recommendation to President Ford, the state department presented its own standard for continued negotiations. The state department wanted Iran to accept the US veto over reprocessing and accept a multinational control before negotiations could continue. But the state department also agreed with the idea of suggesting an option to purchase back spent fuel if other approaches failed.²⁵¹

The Iranian position in the secret negotiations was also affected by the desire by Pakistan to develop a reprocessing plant. In a state department meeting Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Under Secretary Alfred Atherton Jr. discussed the multinational reprocessing plant approach and the difficulty for Iran to accept restrictions while

²⁵⁰ Helms, Richard; Memorandum from US Embassy in Tehran to State department: "memorandum of conversation: Iranian Nuclear Policy;" (January 1976; Declassified on 06/25/2008); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁵¹ Ibid. Helms. pp.1

Pakistan had a free hand.²⁵² Therefore secrecy was also necessary to balance Iran's nuclear ambitions with the progress made by Pakistan and India.

Using front channel diplomacy would have exposed both nations to a public stance of defiance and inflexibility. The current debate over the Iranian nuclear program with its semi-open multilateral conference diplomacy approach feeds the hostility and defiance atmosphere that previous US policy makers avoided. The current Iranian nuclear ambition is based on the same nationalistic ambition that started with the Shah of Iran. But one has to wait and see if both countries could reach a diplomatic agreement as in the past.

c)- Government Particularities

In an effort to abide by some democratic principles and satisfy the government transparency promise that he made, Gerard Ford did brief key Senate foreign relations committee members. The briefing complicated the process and added a burden to the negotiators. They had less flexibility as they were to remain within the guideline submitted to Congress. The briefing stressed that US would control the Iranian reprocessing of fuel to safeguard against diversion. The negotiators had to find an agreement within the proposed policy to Congress.

²⁵² Sonnenfeldt, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation: "Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear Reprocessing;" State Department Meeting; (May 12, 1976; Declassified on 04/05/2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

The difficulty in the negotiations, added by the briefing, also meant that the negotiators took into consideration the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Congress could block any nuclear export deal which it determined not to be in the “US security interests.” The approach used by President Ford was different from Nixon in the sense that he wanted to continue secret negotiations on one hand, but wanted to negotiate a confidential congressional pre-approval guarantee on the other hand.²⁵³ This meant that he would make the US-Iran nuclear agreement public only after he secured a secret approval from key Congress members. This was the closest he got to be in line with democratic principles. Of course, Ford’s strategy did not include informing the people or getting public opinion.

Another aspect of the negotiations was that the State Secretary had to work with the White House Nuclear Task Force on all policy matters and the commercial risks in the agreement. The strategy was to convince influential members of Congress that the non-proliferation approach was included in the agreement. It also meant that the negotiations and the agreement had to be coordinated with the Energy Research and Development Administration, reviewed by the State Secretary and the National Security Council and forwarded to President Ford.²⁵⁴ In that sense the negotiation process included all the main nuclear related agencies.

²⁵³ Helms, Richard; Secret Action Memorandum from US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State: “Strategy designed to meet the issues raised by Iranians in the discussions in Tehran on Nuclear Power Agreement;” (August 12, 1976; Declassified on 10/05/2006); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁵⁴ Ibid. Helms. pp.8-10

The finalized agreement not only delayed any Iranian ambitions on nuclear weapons, it also increased the standard of requirement to avoid any divergence of nuclear material to weapons program. The process was very difficult due to the sensitivity of the matter and especially the fact that the US negotiators had to maintain secrecy while briefing key members of Congress. Another difficulty in the process was managing information and maintaining secrecy among a large number of government agencies. One could notice that President Ford's handling of the process was the closest he got to abide by the democratic norms.

Later, the move by President Carter to include a Congressional approval on an Energy Bill before resuming the secret negotiations not only added delay in the process, but it also reduced the flexibility of the US negotiators. The Congressional hearing process was slow by tradition, therefore linking secret negotiations with any Congressional hearings added difficulties and delay. In overall, the diplomatic process was a bit more democratic under Presidents Ford and Carter. And the failure came from unforeseen events and turmoil at the domestic level in Iran.

**(VI)-B- Secret Understanding between the United States and United
Kingdom**

Most of the previous cases of secret diplomacy had been conducted between opposing nations or allies with different objectives. The “secret understanding” between the United States and the United Kingdom presents an interesting diplomatic case. This was a case where two most friendly allies used secret diplomacy to come to an understanding on an issue over which they basically had similar interests and opinions. The issue in question was the consensus in the decision-making process on the use of strategic weapons.

The initial Anglo-American understanding arose during World War II when President Franklin Roosevelt and Premier Winston Churchill signed the Quebec Agreement stipulating that neither nation would launch nuclear attacks without each other’s consent. But after the war, the US Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prevented the US President from sharing responsibility for decisions on nuclear weapons. In 1950, during the Korean War, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee went to Washington to seek an understanding with President Truman on consensus over nuclear weapons use.

During a private negotiation on December 7, 1950, President Truman confirmed to Prime Minister Attlee that he would not use nuclear weapons without consulting with the British Premier. The British Prime Minister requested the agreement be put in writing, but President Truman refused. For Truman, this was meant to be a “secret understanding” between both leaders where the agreement was not officially written. Both nations had similar broad foreign policy objectives: to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples; to promote confidence among freedom-

loving countries; to eliminate the causes of war; and to advance the democratic way of life.²⁵⁵

A series of secret negotiations were held by British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks, Herbert Morrison and US Ambassador at large, Philip Jessup. The discussions were based on how this understanding could be guaranteed, and how the British Prime Minister would handle the issue with the British Parliament if necessary. The American negotiators insisted that the understanding should not be explicit on the use of nuclear weapons, but only mention consultation on war in general and be limited to the use of British bases. The American negotiators also expressed US complaints about security in respect of British personnel in the nuclear field. They insisted that the British personnel should follow the American security clearance procedure.²⁵⁶

The American position was designed to bring both viewpoints as close as possible on the issue of general war. UK Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks agreed to limit the discussion to the subject of general war. The British negotiators therefore agreed that there would not be a formal agreement or treaty, but “an expression of intent which meant a commitment.”

When Winston Churchill came back to power in 1951, the British Prime Minister felt the need to reaffirm the secret understanding. In a discreet phone conversation, the

²⁵⁵ Jessup, Phillip; Memorandum for the Record: “Truman-Atlee Conversation;” (December 4-8, 1950; Declassified on June 30, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁵⁶ Jessup, Phillip; Memorandum of Conversation: “US-UK Consultation on Atomic Warfare;” Secret Understanding between the US and UK; (September 11, 1951; Declassified on June 8, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.;

British Embassy Counselor B.A.B. Burrows contacted US Ambassador David Bruce to relate a secret message from Winston Churchill. The message expressed the Prime Minister's concerns over a rumor that the US President wanted to use the atomic bomb in China's Yalu River Dams to prevent any further Chinese infiltration to Korea during the war. After a discussion between President Truman and Ambassador David Bruce, a draft was transmitted to the British diplomat B.A.B. Burrows for Winston Churchill. In the President's answer, he reassured the Prime Minister that the rumors were unfounded. He confirmed that conventional bombing were conducted against power plants in North Korea to prevent power transmission to the North Korean war industry. Harry Truman reaffirmed that he would not use the atomic bomb without consulting with the British Prime Minister.²⁵⁷

This episode was followed by a Truman-Churchill meeting. The private meeting included US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, US Ambassador Walter Gifford, UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and UK Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks. During the talks, President Truman stated that under the US law, he was assigned responsibility for deciding on the use of atomic weapons. If necessary he would authorize its use, but would consult the Prime Minister. Churchill confirmed he understood that the President had to act within the US law. But he expected the fullest cooperation before the use of

²⁵⁷ Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum for the Record: "Message from President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill;" (June 30, 1952; Declassified on June 8, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

atomic weapons. This was especially necessary in regard to the atomic bases in England.²⁵⁸

In March 1953, a major negotiation was held between UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, UK Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In the negotiation Anthony Eden wanted a reaffirmation by the Eisenhower administration of the “Truman-Churchill communiqué of 1952.” The understanding was that the use of US bases in the UK would be a matter for a joint decision between both governments. Anthony Eden also wanted President Eisenhower to make a secret and personal assurance to Churchill, as did Truman to Attlee and Churchill. Antony Eden insisted that secrecy would be maintained by Winston Churchill if such a private pledge was given. Secretary of State Dulles stated that such an assurance was not official and non-binding to the US government. The non-binding memorandum draft reaffirming the “secret understanding” was signed by the Secretaries without reference to personal Presidential assurance to the Prime Minister.²⁵⁹

When Harold Macmillan came to power in 1957, the British Prime Minister felt the need to reaffirm the secret understanding again. In a secret letter to Eisenhower, Macmillan suggested that secret talks be held in Washington to deal with the procedure on the use of atomic weapons. He wanted an updated procedure for the decision to launch

²⁵⁸ Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum of Conversation: “Truman-Churchill Talks;” (January 7, 1952; Declassified on June 17, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁵⁹ Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum of Conversation; “The use of UK bases and Consultation with the UK on the use of atomic weapons;” (March 6, 1953; Declassified on June 30, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

nuclear retaliation by the United States. The British Premier appointed Sir Patrick Dean to head the British negotiation team.²⁶⁰ The US President appointed Robert Murphy to head the US negotiators. Both men were experienced and professional diplomats.

After a series of secret negotiations, Robert Murphy and Sir Patrick Dean signed a joint report on the procedure for the use of nuclear retaliatory forces by the United States. The agreement reaffirmed that a joint decision would have to be taken in the use of “strategic weapons.” Although the agreement reported a “secret understanding,” it did not confirm a binding commitment by the government of the United States.²⁶¹

After the election of John Kennedy, the UK Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frederick Miller and US Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant met secretly in Paris in December 1960. The British diplomat expressed Macmillan’s concerns that the new President had to reaffirm the secret understanding. Sir Frederick Miller suggested that President Eisenhower inform the President-elect Kennedy of the “secret understanding.” Soon after taking office, President Kennedy responded to Macmillan’s letter. The President-elect reaffirmed that the “secret understanding” would be honored. The use of nuclear weapons on US bases in Britain would be a matter of joint

²⁶⁰ MacMillan, Harold; Letter to President Eisenhower; “The use of atomic weapons;” (April 24, 1958; Declassified on July 17, 1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁶¹ Murphy, Robert and Patrick dean; Report to President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister; “Procedure for the Committing to the Attack of Nuclear Retaliatory Forces in the United Kingdom;” (June 1958; Declassified on 07/23/1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

decision.²⁶² The President's response reaffirmed the Murphy-Dean agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. The agreement repeated the language of the Truman-Churchill communiqué as well.

After Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson reaffirmed to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the new British Prime Minister that he intended to honor the secret understanding. In a memorandum, the President reiterated the history of the secret understanding from Truman-Atlee in 1950 to Macmillan-Kennedy. He also included the launching of the new US Polaris submarines in the "secret understanding."²⁶³

When Harold Wilson came to power in 1964, he reaffirmed the secret understanding. But the British Prime Minister did not want to include the nuclear depth bomb which was already assigned to NATO command. The understanding was reaffirmed with minor adjustment. The Prime Minister's top secret memorandum reiterated the same language included in the Murphy-Dean agreement of 1958, and the Truman-Churchill communiqué.²⁶⁴ President Johnson agreed with the "Wilson's assumptions." He also agreed that the depth bombs stored in Great Britain for use by the Netherlands forces could only be used after a joint UK-US decision.

²⁶² Kennedy, John F.; Letter to Prime Minister MacMillan; "Understanding with the British on the use of British bases and Nuclear Weapons;" (January 27, 1961; Declassified on February 5, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁶³ Johnson, Lyndon; Memorandum; letter to the British Prime Minister: "Understanding with the British;" (February 28, 1964; Declassified on February 23, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

²⁶⁴ Wilson, Harold; Memorandum; Letter to US President Johnson; "Anglo-American Understanding on the use of Nuclear Weapons;" (August 5, 1965; Declassified on February 23, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

With the change in power in the United States and Great Britain, the leaders wanted to reaffirm the “secret understanding.” President Nixon and Prime Minister Edward Heath also used the back channel diplomacy to deal with this partnership. In a secret letter to the Prime Minister via US Embassy in London, President Nixon agreed with Edward Heath on the amendments to the “secret understanding.”

Another back channel meeting was held in 1974. Sir John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet and Sir Peter Ramsbotham, UK Ambassador to the US met with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The discussion focused on the peace issue in the Middle East, the UN resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis and the War in Vietnam. But the negotiators included the secret UK-US understanding. This time, Sir John Hunt wanted the understanding to include the nuclear bases in Bermuda. This was agreed by Kissinger in the broad sense but not specifically. They agreed on the “secret understanding” as did their predecessors.²⁶⁵

(VI)-B1- Analysis of the secret understanding between the US and the UK

a)- Organization of the Negotiations

One interesting aspect of the secret understanding is that it took fifty years before the archives of the initial Truman-Attlee communiqué of 1950 became available. The reasons for secrecy in this diplomatic case are multiple. The main source of the

²⁶⁵ Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation; “Nuclear release agreement” (April 26, 1974; Declassified on August 1, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

diplomatic challenge was that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 rested the responsibility on the use of the atomic weapons on the shoulder of the US President alone. The British Premiers wanted a written guarantee that would bound the US President to consult the British Prime Minister. From the US perspective a binding agreement would have weakened the role of the US President as Commander-in-Chief.

The structure of the negotiations was still informal despite the involvement of the US Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary from the beginning. After a series of diplomatic difficulties on both sides, the statesmen appointed experienced diplomats Patrick Dean and Robert Murphy to handle the negotiations. This was a significant step in the negotiating process which resulted in the first written agreement in 1958 which dealt with the issue in general terms.

In later administrations, the negotiations were handled by close advisors to the British Prime Ministers and the US Presidents. The extreme secrecy requirement of those dialogues affected the structure of the talks and the personalities involved. Both Foreign Secretaries and respective ambassadors were involved in the process.

b)- The Role of Secrecy

Secrecy in this diplomatic case was employed for tactical purposes as a routine process of handling diplomatic negotiation. But it was still part of the defensive diplomatic strategy. This means that the secret negotiations were intended to maintain and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and not to change Anglo-American

relations. Both allies wanted to maintain the existing agreement since the Truman-Attlee communiqué of 1950, but the US was unable to commit legally to the agreement.

One main reason for secrecy was the fact that the negotiations dealt with the sensitive issues of national and international security. Up to 1959, only the US, Russia and the UK belonged to the nuclear club. There was also a need for confidentiality due to the fact that the United States did have nuclear bases in other Western countries such as Italy. The US President did not want other Western nations to require joint decision making agreement in regard to nuclear bases held in their territories. Therefore, Secrecy was essential.

Truman and Eisenhower did not want any written agreement. By the time Sir Patrick Dean and Robert Murphy drafted a written document in 1958, the US President still did not want any binding commitment. The secret negotiations basically led to a secret oral commitment, but even the Dean-Murphy agreement did not explicitly commit the US President to the “Secret Understanding.”

The extent of secrecy was such both the UK and the US had only a restricted number of people aware of it. The British Prime Minister was assisted by the Foreign Secretary, the UK Ambassador and few advisors. On the American side the US President, the Secretary of State, and few members of the National Security Council. Each time the new US President or British Prime Minister came to office, he had to be briefed by his predecessor on the “secret understanding.”

One of the reasons why the British Prime Minister had to seek a commitment was that there was still no explicit written agreement. Each US President had to confirm that he would consult personally with the British Prime Minister before the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear-equipped US bases in Britain. President Nixon for instance added to the agreement the new US missiles, submarines and aircrafts which could be used for a possible retaliation. But Nixon also stated that the secret understanding was restricted to forces based in Great Britain or forces assigned to a NATO Commander.²⁶⁶

c)- Government Particularities

From the stand point of democratic principles, both the US President and the British Prime Minister handled the “secret understanding” without the consent or awareness of the US Congress or the British Parliament, and surely not their respective populations. The difficulty in applying the democratic principles also came from the fact that the issue was considered in the context of both countries’ national security with high international security implications. Therefore, besides the fact that they did not want to involve other allies for various reasons, they also did not want the Soviet Union or China to be aware of the Western Alliance security strategy and not to exploit the difficulties in US-UK security decision making process.

²⁶⁶ Nixon, Richard; Nixon Letter to Edward Heath: “Nuclear Consultation with the British;” (December 15, 1970; Declassified on September 12, 2003); Washington: National Security Archives.

The democratic dilemma of secret negotiations was that each domestic constituency did not know the dealings of their government and what was committed in their name. What the domestic constituency had to know or not know about foreign policy still enflamed the democratic accountability debate. The populations were left in the dark along with elected officials. In this context the issue of accountability in the democratic governments came to the front. The statesmen and diplomatic leaders avoided democratic accountability to their respective populations in the name of national and international security.

One could assume that the British Prime Ministers and the US Presidents had continued on the “secret understanding” until the end of the Cold War and possibly today. One needs to wait until the release of additional diplomatic documents to find out whether the “secret understanding” continued beyond the Cold War.

Chapter Seven

(VII)- Secret Diplomacy and Democratic Principles

One of the founding fathers of the United States of America, Patrick Henry, stated that: “to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man.”²⁶⁷ The advocate of democracy and individual freedom warned against the tendency of the democratic government to keep secret over the “business” of government which should be “public.” Free societies guarantee the “right to know” for their citizens. Yet the practice of diplomacy has shown that secrecy was still a part of the routine in international relations for liberal democracies.

In this chapter, the issue raised by the analysis is the apparent contradiction between diplomatic secrecy and the principles of democracy. On the one hand democracy requires leaders to disclose information to the governed, but on the other hand

²⁶⁷ Cross, Harold. *The People’s Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); preface;

decision-makers still limit the public's access to information especially in foreign affairs. The main issue in this chapter is therefore an attempt to explore the practice of secret diplomacy in relation to the requirements of democratic principles.

(VII)-A- Definitions of Terms

To explore the dilemma of the liberal democracies selected, France and the United States, it is necessary to define certain concepts for clarification. In this study, the term “secret diplomacy” could be defined as an “unofficial negotiation involving two or more states pursuing essentially peaceful high policy objectives, and which expresses itself in explicit communication, businesslike exchanges, and tacit achievable understanding or arrangement of such sensitivity as to preclude sharing these confidences with either domestic or international actors.”²⁶⁸ In other words, it is the conduct of diplomacy behind closed doors and without the knowledge or consent of the citizens.

The definition of democracy helps us understand its principles. The term democracy could be defined as a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of

²⁶⁸ Klieman, Aharon; “Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quiet Diplomacy;” (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988); pp. 10

representation involving periodically held elections.²⁶⁹ In a few words, President Abraham Lincoln defined it as the “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

In a democracy, transparency provides the openness to the public which allows for the government to be accountable to the people. It can be defined as “a condition in which information about governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or other outsiders.”²⁷⁰

Foreign policy is the general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one sovereign state in its interactions with other states.²⁷¹ And the term diplomatic persuasion is the art of convincing other states that their interests are best served by taking actions favorable to the interests of one’s own state. Its principal instrument is dialogue.”²⁷²

Government secrecy in democracies could be defined as “a result of a deliberate act on the part of those who govern to keep the governed from knowing something at a given point in time.”²⁷³ Multiple reasons could motivate the government in withholding

²⁶⁹ “Democracy,” Merriam-Webster dictionary; <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy>

²⁷⁰ Finel, Bernard and Kristin Lord. “Transparency and World Politics,” *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*. Edited by Finel and Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 3.

²⁷¹ “Foreign Policy,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foreign%20policy>

²⁷² Freeman, Chas; “Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy,” (Washington: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1997); 121.

²⁷³ Friedrich, Carl. “The Pathology of Politics.” (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 175-209. In Itzhak Galnoor’s *Government Secrecy in Democracies*. (New York: NYU Press, 1977), 276.

information from the people. To analyze the dilemma between the “People’s Right to Know,” the requirement of democracy and the practice of secret diplomacy, one has to look into the diplomatic tradition, evolution and necessity in the realistic world of national rivalries.

As stated in the first chapter, secrecy was considered as embedded in the practice of diplomacy since the early beginning of the modern states. The tradition of secrecy was carried well into the twentieth century with major adjustments to accommodate with the new realities.

What was common to many diplomatic thinkers was the fact that most of them subscribed to the traditional theory of diplomacy. This means that they used a state-centric approach in their analysis. The state was the main entity and the state system was the diplomatic environment where all the analysis took place.

(VII)-B- Democratic Requirements

The people’s Right to Know and political participation are essential in a democratic system. In his *Social Contract*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the early modern democracy theorist and former diplomatic Secretary to the French Ambassador in Venice, stated that “democratic citizenship demanded regular participation in the political process of the country’s problems. Citizens’ participation in deliberation was regarded as

essential if they were to shape the process and conditions of their political choice.”²⁷⁴ In liberal democracies, this democratic principle of citizen participation is also coupled with accountability and transparency.

Among the key principles of democracy, it is important to underline citizen participation in government, the accountability of elected and appointed officials, and transparency in government. In the context of this study, it literally means that the people have to participate in some ways in the domestic and foreign policy process as well. For accountability, it also implies that diplomatic and foreign policy implementations have to take into account the general will and wishes of the people, and to know the officials who should be accountable for those decisions. And for transparency, the people and the press have to be able to access information about the activities of the government, about the decisions being made in the name of the people, and about the reasons for those decisions.

In the same context, Ian Shapiro suggested that the “democratic systems involve a mix of decision-making mechanisms and considerable delegation to administrative agencies. But these different mechanisms are all subservient to majoritarian political decision making in various ways...”²⁷⁵ This also implies that the decision-making

²⁷⁴ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; “The Social Contract;” ; Cited by Dennis Barthory and Wilson McWilliams in Itzhak Galnoor’s *Government Secrecy in Democracies*; (New York: New York University’s Press, 1977), 5.

²⁷⁵ Shapiro, Ian. *The Real World of Democratic Theory*; (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 65.

process has to take into consideration the will of the people expressed in various democratic processes.

James Russell Wiggins, in *Freedom or Secrecy*, explored the issue of secrecy in democratic states. He argued that the more the government becomes secretive, the less society remains free. This meant that diminishing the people's access to information about their government was to diminish the people's participation in government.²⁷⁶ This is the inherent contradiction that liberal democracies have to deal with.

In *The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings*, Harold Cross also argued that citizens of a self-governing society must have the legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of their government affairs. He emphasized the fact that freedom of information was the very foundation for all the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution.²⁷⁷

This argument was also supported by Wallace Parks. In *Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution*, Parks stated that the accessibility and availability of information about the executive and their operations affected the distribution of power in the government and the functioning of political

²⁷⁶ Wiggins, James Russell. *Freedom or Secrecy*. London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 67.

²⁷⁷ Cross, Harold; *The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings*; (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); preface;

process. The people's access to information was important for the democratic system to function properly.²⁷⁸

The examination of the argument of David Wise joined the same category. In *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy and Power*, David Wise argued that governmental secrecy was outside of the executive's constitutional authority. And he suggested that democratic accountability could not exist in a society in which the press was limited in what it investigated or/and reported.²⁷⁹ Therefore David Wise believed that a truly liberal democracy should be completely open in all its governmental dealings.

In *Top Secret: National Security and the Right to know*, a strong argument was also elaborated by Morton Halperin and Daniel Hoffman. They argued that government officials use national security as a reason to withhold vital information from Congress and the public, with an aim to avoid democratic accountability.²⁸⁰ This argument suggested that secrecy in government was intentionally malicious. This argument was mostly based on the fact that there were no governmental rights to secrecy in the constitution. In the case of international diplomacy, they stated that there would be less intervention in international affairs, if the diplomatic system was fully open and accountable.

²⁷⁸ Parks, Wallace. "The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution." *George Washington Law Review*; Vol.26; No.1; (October, 1957), 21.

²⁷⁹ Wise, David. *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, secrecy and Power*; (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1974), 64.

²⁸⁰ Halperin, Morton and Daniel Hoffman. *Top Secret: National Security and the right to know*; (Washington: New Republic Books, 1977), 31.

A more recent view was elaborated by David Hudson Jr. in *Open Government: An American Tradition faces National Security, Privacy, and other Challenges*. Hudson argued that the people retain the ultimate power, and must have access to their government, and have the means of acquiring information about government activities. This is possible by having access to government records, and for government to conduct public meetings.²⁸¹ This argument also suggested that National Security is often used as an excuse to deny information to the people.

In *Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context*, Richard Chapman and Michael Hunt focused the role of accountability in a democracy. They stated that government officials should act in the interest of the people rather than their own interests.²⁸² The free flow of information allows the people to know the dealings of their government and their leaders' accountability. It is difficult to evaluate accountability in a democracy without government openness. This is because a modern democracy is based on constitutional processes that produce trust between the government and the governed.

Most arguments elaborated by democracy transparency theorists spoke against the lack of people's participation and the lack of public involvement in governmental decision making processes. The people's participation and access to information were argued as essential to the proper functioning of democracy.

²⁸¹ Hudson, David Jr. *Open Government: An American Tradition faces National Security, Privacy, and other Challenges*. (Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House Publishers, 2005), 8-9.

²⁸² Chapman, Richard and Michael Hunt. *Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context*. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 139-141.

(VII)-C- Protection and Legality of Diplomatic Secrecy

Not having a secrecy clause in their constitutions, and to address the diplomatic secrecy dilemma, many liberal democracies have erected legal protections for some governmental practices. This is especially the case in the realm of national and international security where the emphasis is on the pursuit of national interests. In France as well as the United States, certain legal measures had been taken to justify governmental discretion yet not to blindly ignore the liberal democratic principles of the Republic. The legal protection of governmental secrecy is intended to justify this practice in the context of the democratic right of the people to access governmental information.

(VII)-C1- Government Secrecy in France

The culture of secrecy is, by tradition and practice, prevalent in France's governmental administrative processes. In France, the state is the supreme arbitrator of social and political issues, providing order, stability and continuity. Some of these supra-qualities are attributed to the administrative machinery. The enlarged role of the state and the power of its public administration had created a sense of legitimacy of secrecy.²⁸³ Therefore, there is some level of tolerance from the people of administrative secrecy in

²⁸³ Manor, Yohanan. "France." In Itzhak Galnoor's *Government and Secrecy in Democracies*. New York: New York University Press, 1977, 236.

government. Despite political changes, the administrative culture of secrecy had persisted until the fifth republic.

The practice of secrecy is somewhat protected by the Penal Code. Although the Article 11 of the 1789 *Declaration of Human and Citizens Rights* established the freedom of expression and speech by the people, the Article 378 of the Penal Code included many penalties to civil servants for the violation of “le secret professionnel.”²⁸⁴ Since 1970, there has been a thirty year window preventing secret documents from becoming accessible through the national archives. The *Law on Access to Administrative Documents* was amended in 1978. It added rules which meant that diplomats and Foreign Ministry civil servants were forbidden to publish information deemed secret by the government. By the same token it meant that the right to know of the people was not explicitly limited, but was affected by the many rules that prevented public administrators from revealing secret government information. The article L211-3 of the “*Code du Patrimoine*,” (Code Heritage) even extended “le secret professionnel” to include the custodians of the administrative documents and archives which are deemed not accessible by the public.²⁸⁵

In 2004, under President Jacques Chirac, another amendment to the 1979 *Law on Archives* of the “*Code du Patrimoine*” added restrictions stating that files held in the

²⁸⁴ Ibid. Manor. pp.240

²⁸⁵ « Code du Patrimoine ; Article L211-3 » ;
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000019202816&idSectionTA=LEGISCTA00006159940&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006074236&dateTexte=20110614>

archives containing information related to international diplomacy and national security could be held from thirty up to one hundred and fifty years.²⁸⁶

In 2005, still under President Jacques Chirac, the amendment was made to include additional European Union directives. It still guaranteed the right of all people to access administrative documents held by public bodies, but also underlined restrictions: “There are also mandatory exemptions for documents that would harm the secrecy of the proceedings of the government and proper authorities coming under the executive power; national defense secrecy; the conduct of France’s foreign policy; the State’s security, public safety and security of individuals.”²⁸⁷ This restriction clearly included diplomatic documents while avoiding specifying government’s limit.

The people are allowed to access information from national archives. “La Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs (CADA) is charged with oversight of the documents release process. It can mediate disputes and issue recommendations but its decisions are not binding. There is no internal appeal under the law and all appeals are heard first by the CADA. It handled over 5,400 requests in 2004, up nearly ten percent from the previous few years. On average, around fifty percent of its recommendations were for the body to release the information that it was withholding and ten percent against the requestor. In twenty percent of cases, the document was given before the

²⁸⁶ “Amendment to the Law on Archives,” <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

²⁸⁷ “Law on Access of Administrative Documents,” <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

CADA made its decision. Privacy is listed as the most significant reason for upholding denials (around fifty percent of the time) followed by preparatory documents.”²⁸⁸

Although CADA helps citizens to obtain the release of government information, applications relating to the diplomatic archives are almost non-existent. Considered as part of foreign policy and national interests, it is mainly left to the Foreign Ministry and the presidency to release information before thirty years.

Scholars, individuals, civil groups and organizations could request diplomatic information after thirty years but the government still decides what to release in matters of diplomacy and foreign affairs in general. As one could notice, all these restrictions limit the ability of the citizens, scholars and the press to access secret diplomatic information from the French government. It is therefore a dilemma that the democratic government of France has to balance between diplomatic secrecy and the respect for liberal democratic principles.

(VII)-C2- Government Secrecy in the United States

In the United States, in general, the culture of openness is prevalent in government. Contrary to France, the state is not viewed as the supreme arbitrator of

²⁸⁸ Freedom of Information in France (CADA: Commission d'accès aux documents administratifs); <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

social and political issues. But, as in France, Americans have the right to know the dealings and activities of their government. This is symbolized by the *Freedom of Information Act* of 1966, which was amended in 1974, 1996 and in 2007, and also the *Electronic Freedom of Information Amendments of 1996*. There are also groups and independent agencies such as the National Security Archives, American Society of Access Professionals, and the Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, Electronic Privacy and Information Center and many others which help citizens obtain information from the government agencies.

Recently, the people's right to know was extended by a Memorandum signed by President Barack Obama in 2009. The memorandum urged executive departments and agencies to take specific actions to implement the principles of transparency and public participation. In order "to increase accountability, promote informed participation by the public, and to create economic opportunity, each agency shall take prompt steps to expand access to information by making it available online in open formats."²⁸⁹ This action illustrated that the executive and its agencies were in favor of openness in respect to government information.

But another FOIA article still provided protection to government secrecy. In the *Freedom of Information Act, article 5 U.S.C. section 552b*, it specifies that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to matters that are: "specifically authorized and established by an Executive secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,

²⁸⁹ Memorandum by President Obama for the executive departments and agencies;
<http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf>

and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.”²⁹⁰ Foreign policy being controlled by the President and the Executive branch, diplomatic documents fall under the Executive order. Therefore the executive branch and its agencies could classify diplomatic documents based on a number of reasons they think appropriate to do so.

In another recent Memorandum, President Obama issued an Executive Order 13526- *Classified National Security Information*, in which he redefined the classification process. First, he acknowledged the need to prescribe a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security information, and defense information against international terrorism. The President acknowledged that the principles of democracy require that the American people be informed of the activities of their government. He also confirmed that the United States’ progress depended on the free flow of information both within the government and with the American people.

But President Obama also underlined that national security requires that certain information be kept in confidence in order to protect Americans, the American democratic institutions, US homeland security, and the interactions with foreign nations.²⁹¹ This executive order clearly included documents related to US diplomacy with foreign nations. In other words, the Executive Order-13526 expressed the need to

²⁹⁰ Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. & 552 as Amended by Public Law No.104-231, 110 Stat. 3048; http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XVII_4/page2.htm

²⁹¹ Classified National Security Information; President Obama’s Executive Order 13526-; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>

maintain diplomatic secrecy and limit people's democratic right to know in order to protect the democratic way of life.

(VII)-D- The consequences of diplomatic secrecy

It must be underlined that there are many negative consequences in secrecy. It can be readily recognized that diplomatic secrecy could erode the people's confidence in their government. Secrecy could also affect democratic accountability in free societies.

Secret diplomacy carries the additional risk of administrative confusion. When too many channels are employed there is a possibility of disorder and inconsistency in diplomacy which could affect efficiency itself and the loss of international credibility.²⁹² Therefore extreme caution needs to be applied when engaging in the secret statecraft. But the sound practice of secret diplomacy could provide many advantages in the policy application and decision-making process in foreign affairs.

The analysis of the secret diplomatic cases revealed that there were some benefits in maintaining certain negotiations secret. Diplomatic secrecy is essential in the maintenance of national security in a world of national rivalry. It is necessary for the protection of the people that their government keeps a level of secrecy on national security matters. Secrecy was necessary in the explored diplomatic cases involving national defense and international security. The French scholar Carlo La Roche went

²⁹² Klieman, Aharon. *Statecraft in the dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 132.

further and stated that “secrecy was the soul of negotiation. And that the methods employed to deal with domestic public matters were not suitable in dealing with foreign nations.”²⁹³

Maintaining secrecy in international negotiations could also prevent the uncontrolled flows of information which might compromise the expected agreement. In this context, “transparency might exacerbate conflict by providing too much information and making it more difficult to reach accurate judgments about another state’s intentions.”²⁹⁴

(VII)-E- The Future of Secret Diplomacy

(VII)-a- Diplomatic Institutions

The major changes in diplomatic institutions had been the advent of the resident ambassador in Italy of the fifteenth century, and the emergence of the Ministry of Foreign affairs under Cardinal Richelieu in seventeenth century France. Despite the fact that many diplomatic traditions had faded away due to the speed of communication and transportation, most traditional diplomatic institutions had survived the technical innovations. The substance of diplomacy had remained almost the same while

²⁹³ LaRoche, Carlo; “La Diplomatie Française ; (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), 75.

²⁹⁴ Finel, Bernard and Kristin Lord; “The Surprising Logic of Transparency;” In *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*; edited by Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 144.

incorporating the new technical inventions and adapting to the new international environment.

Diplomacy as an institution has become over the years a part of the customary international law. And this institutionalization was codified as such in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Today, diplomacy as an institution is still playing pretty much the same role while adapting to new realities.²⁹⁵ This adaptation expanded the functions of the diplomatic institution. Nowadays, more than just representation, communication, negotiation, observation, and reporting, diplomacy covers a great deal of various public relations activities.

The challenge to the traditional diplomatic institution is a fact in the current globalized world. This is mainly due to the shift and dispersal in authority away from states. The shift of power from politics to economics, shared international environment with new regimes such as NGOs, IGOs and Multi-National Corporations.²⁹⁶ In the United States, for instance, the diplomatic establishment is adjusting to information age realities. There is now an extensive use of electronic communications and information resources to deal with a variety of global issues.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Leguey-Feilleux, Jean-Robert; "The Dynamics of Diplomacy;" (Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 2.

²⁹⁶ Rosenau, James; "Diplomacy, Proof, and Authority in the Information Age," In *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*; edited by Finel and Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 326.

²⁹⁷ Dizard Jr., Wilson; *Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in the Information Age*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 1.

Although the traditional role of the state has changed in the sense that new agencies and institutions now share the same international arena, the advantages of secret negotiations could still be applied by states, civil societies or the new international organizations...

The importance of experienced diplomats cannot be overstated. They are still needed to analyze the politics of foreign nations and international institutions. The ever diversified and complex international environment makes it more valuable to have sound diplomats' analysis and judgment. Some have claimed the end of the state centric era. But it looks more likely that the nation state will survive amid the changes and the new crowded international environment. Therefore diplomacy will adapt to the changes, and negotiation will remain a human activity that would mostly not be replaced by machines...

In stressing this point, former US Secretary of States George Shultz highlighted certain key aspects of diplomacy. He pointed that most negotiations are part of a process that call for a long-term relationship in dealing with the ups and downs of diplomacy. Good diplomacy also entails a process of analyzing information, and that "there is no substitute for touch and feel in these processes." He also expressed the fact that information technology cannot replace solid diplomatic reporting. The technology is an excellent means of communication, but it still needs excellent communicators. Therefore

the diplomat in the field, respected, well-connected, and linguistically competent, is still an essential contributor.²⁹⁸

(VII)-b- Globalization and Technological Evolution

The issues of globalization and technological innovations have always affected the practice of diplomacy. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the twentieth century, and the twenty first century, globalization and technology improvement had changed international communications. As suggested in his book, *The Essentials of Global Politics*, Richard Langhorne argued that the “technological advances have broken down many physical barriers to worldwide communication which used to limit how much connected or cooperative activity of any kind could happen over long distances.”²⁹⁹

Richard Langhorne underlined the invention of the steam engine which changed sea and land transport, and the invention of electric telegraph which improved communication. He also mentioned the invention of the telephone and later the orbit satellite in the twentieth century. The invention of the computer and the internet transformed the speed, volume and efficiency in communication.³⁰⁰ All these

²⁹⁸ Shultz, George; *Diplomacy in the Information Age*,” In *The Information Revolution and International Conflict Management*. (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1997), VII.

²⁹⁹ Langhorne, Richard. *The Essentials of Global Politics*. (London: Holder Education & Oxford University Press, (2006), 2.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. Langhorne. pp.3

technological innovations had affected the practice of diplomacy. It had increased the frequency of meetings and summits among high level authorities, and facilitated the movement of goods and people.

The current wave of technological development with the widespread availability of information cannot be underestimated or ignored. The effects of the internet, satellites, email, cell phones, and television bring instant news to a widespread of world audiences in real time.

Despite those changes, the art of negotiation has mainly remained the same between humans. And despite new actors in the global stage, many diplomatic institutions have maintained or improved their roles. Innovations in communication and transport have influenced international relations and diplomacy. The use of the internet has affected in a significant way, and still provides further changes in diplomacy. But, as Denis Stairs stated in *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*, “in politics, some realities –often the most fundamental ones- don’t change much at all.”³⁰¹ The argument is that diplomacy and diplomats are mainly concerned with three basic functions: First, the acquisition and delivery of intelligence which has been affected by digital communication but still retained its basic principles such as careful analysis and implications of the acquired information. Secondly, the internet still has not altered the conduct of diplomatic negotiations between representatives of various nations. And thirdly, diplomacy still

³⁰¹ Stairs, Denis; “Professionals and Amateurs in the Diplomacy of the Age of Information.” In Janice G. Stein and Colin Robertson’s *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*; (Toronto, Canada: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 193.

maintained its function of designing and managing public relations activities abroad and at home.³⁰²

The current diplomatic functions are still valuable in diplomatic negotiations. The ambassador or the special envoy is still needed to conduct secret and open negotiations. It is still not conceivable that foreign negotiations would be handled by the finest computers invented or “futuristic robot diplomats.” Therefore it is a firm belief that valuable diplomatic exchanges would still need human interactions, collaboration, understanding and analysis. Only human can bridge the many national differences, be it cultural, religious, political, ideological, linguistic or basic personal differences.

The recent effect of such networks as WikiLeaks reveals some secret foreign policy information and threatens the secret statecraft. WikiLeaks had also revealed secret diplomatic cables and military secret documents in its website as well as giving the information to newspapers such as The Guardian and The New York Times.³⁰³ These revelations had the potential to put some diplomatic officials and other individual lives in danger. It is important to know that diplomatic cables require an understanding of its context and its analysis. And WikiLeaks does not provide the essential and sound diplomatic analysis as would professional diplomats and foreign policy analysts. Therefore Wikileaks would probably not stop secret diplomacy but might even strengthen

³⁰² Ibid. Stairs, Denis. pp.194

³⁰³ Star, Alexander. Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy. New York: Grove Press, 2011. (Introduction, Reporting and Analysis by The New York Times), 9-13

it. In a sense, democratic governments would go to further length to conceal important back door negotiations, intelligence, and information if possible.

One could state that the use of the internet and speed of information and communication are advantageous and constitute additional applications to the practice of diplomacy, but as a “technological instrument, tool or vehicle” serving diplomacy rather than a “substance” change or substitute to diplomacy. Diplomacy and diplomats have adapted to the new technology while maintaining basic diplomatic functions. Therefore secret diplomacy would adapt to the new technology and not disappear. Although secret meetings and negotiations have become difficult to conceal in the current globalized world, secret diplomacy would still be possible in the Digital Age.

As mentioned earlier, traditional diplomacy is facing challenges from globalization and the new interactive media. It is most likely that diplomacy will continue to adapt to the new global media. The so called “CNN Effect” which broadcasts international events in real time has forced many leaders to abide to the democratic requirement of transparency, and pushed them to produce faster and open decision making processes. But, this fact also pushed them to design other reliable ways to transmit confidential information. In the current environment of international terrorism and other security challenges, it is still imperative to establish reliable approaches to maintain diplomatic secrecy when necessary.

Chapter Eight

(VIII)- Conclusion

In conclusion, one could state that the practice of secret diplomacy by liberal democracies has persisted and the reasons for such practice have remained mostly the same. As in the past, the main diplomatic stages still start with the initial signals and contacts which establish mutual consent to the back door approach, then the private conversation, then the secret negotiation, and then the agreement or other forms of understandings or settlements. Despite the wave of new diplomatic approaches, back channel diplomacy has been practiced alongside open and conference diplomacy during the interwar, the Cold War, and until possibly today. One has to patiently wait until the release of additional diplomatic archives, which would mostly prove the continuance of back channel diplomacy.

The old debate of secret diplomacy versus democratic principles, although less active now, is still applicable to today's democratic societies. It is still a challenge to balance democratic principles with diplomatic secrecy. This incompatibility was underlined in the 19th century by the French democracy theorist and observer Alexis de Tocqueville. He stated that foreign policy calls for the perfect use of those qualities in which a democracy is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of internal

resources of the state, but it cannot combine its measures with secrecy which is a characteristic of an aristocracy.³⁰⁴

In response to this challenge, liberal democracies have erected laws to protect such practice by the government, and created in a sense its legitimacy. It is necessary to outline the difference between the “Old secret diplomacy” with its emphasis on intrigue and deceit, and the “new secret diplomacy” with its main focus on confidence building and collaboration.

Secret diplomacy has gone through some changes and development. In the evolution of diplomacy, a remarkably high point was reached in its reputation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The activity had become fully professionalized by then and it acquired a highly structured form. The international history of the 19th century shows a very high reliance on diplomacy and a correspondingly lower tendency to resort to war. The practical results of the gradual elevation of diplomacy were seen to be broadly satisfactory. And the largely confidential methods and specific skills involved in managing the flow of international politics justified the tendency to allow a special role, highly specialized, secretive, and above and beyond domestic political differences to develop beyond the understanding of common people. The old secret diplomacy was mostly based on tactics and strategies of war. This was a continuous struggle for political

³⁰⁴ De Tocqueville, Alexis, and Bruce Frohnen. *Democracy in America*. Vol. 10. Gateway Books, 2003.

advantages, prestige and power for Monarchs, and seeking to accomplish those objectives through various international intrigues.

When the Great War broke out in 1914, diplomacy was blamed and its tendency to be a separate and secretive art was rejected. This more than anything else explained the strong dislike of diplomatic secrecy and also explained why the League of Nations was constructed as it was. This context helps to explain President Wilson assumptions and attitudes during the Paris Peace Conference and his complaints about secrecy in diplomacy. His beliefs and other Progressive thinkers blamed the fact that diplomacy had been conducted in an atmosphere of professional seclusion and an assumption of superiority. This was the context where suggestions developed about the incompatibility between secret diplomacy and democratic governance.

During the interwar period, the interest of the states became more prominent while still pursuing the same objectives through a mixture of conferences and secret diplomacy. And after World War II through the end of the Cold War, the state increased in strength while pursuing various objectives by using more conferences, and public diplomacy while resorting to secrecy whenever necessary. During the Cold War, secrecy was mostly tolerated in democratic societies. The tension between Western and Eastern blocs increased the amount of covert activities. Although such activities were handled by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or Her Majesty's Intelligence Services, diplomatic secrecy as a tool of foreign policy was usually not challenged in democracies in view of the overall Cold War atmosphere. Therefore, despite sharing the international stage with new actors such as non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental

organizations and multi-national corporations, the democratic state had preferred to use the back door diplomacy in many instances.

More than just state power, the “new secret diplomacy” had been used in more various negotiations such as cooperation for peace; as was the case during Kissinger’s Paris secret negotiations for Peace in Vietnam, or in strengthening alliances; as was the case during the US-UK secret understanding for decision-making in the use of nuclear weapons, or commercial transactions and the betterment of the population in general. In practice, secret diplomacy entails multiple activities such as back door negotiations, discreet contact, low key liaison, and secret transmission of messages, intelligence reports and third party intermediaries...

As illustrated by the case studies, the main reason for such practice has been to withhold information which, if revealed, could cause damage to national and/or international security or prevent a diplomatic advantage or breakthrough. Back channel diplomacy has also been practiced by diplomatic necessity, political expediency, or organizational practicality, where confidence was needed for a convenient exchange of information between representatives of different nations, be they allies or enemies.

The positive reasons for diplomatic secrecy also include relieving tensions, resolving misunderstanding, opening or reopening channels, increasing communications, and building confidence. Other reasons include using a negotiating process free from media influence, avoiding domestic or international obstructions, and possibly reaching a diplomatic breakthrough.

As illustrated in the diplomatic cases, secret diplomacy was also practiced as a method of reaching agreement and compromise between the negotiating parties. As the former Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban stated, “the theme of a diplomatic process is compromise. A diplomatic negotiation typically ends with neither party ecstatically victorious or abjectly humiliated.”³⁰⁵ This also implies that secret diplomacy should be practiced for the benefit of each participant and not to destroy any entity or people.

Any study of diplomacy must take into consideration the fact that the ultimate goal of diplomacy “consists in obtaining the maximum national interest with a minimum of friction and resentment by others.”³⁰⁶ Negotiation is one of the methods to settle differences, and it requires flexibility in the manner of bargaining and in regard to the accommodation reached. Successful diplomacy depends on “producing the climate of opinion in which the desired ends can be most easily obtained; on devising the forms of agreement in which these ends can be translated into practical accomplishments; and on perceiving the right moment at which the maximum effort can be applied.”³⁰⁷ These general considerations should be pursued in secret or open diplomatic processes. Therefore, national interest objectives are primordial while states have to make sure not to go against democratic requirements at the proper disclosure time.

Despite these benefits, it is necessary to realize that secret diplomacy is only one tool among the many available to states for handling the complexities of foreign

³⁰⁵ Eban, Abba; *Diplomacy for the Next Century*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998, 46.

³⁰⁶ Webster, Charles. *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy*. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1962, 3.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Webster, Charles. pp.3

affairs. Therefore, secrecy should not be used all the time in all situations for no reason. It is imperative for the state to use secret diplomacy only when it is absolutely necessary. Therefore, despite the legality of secret diplomacy in liberal democracies such as France and the United States, statesmen and diplomats need to refrain from abusing the method.

The choice of diplomatic strategies and reliable channels of communication are very important. Because some diplomatic cases are better served by open or public diplomacy and sometimes even a multilateral conference might be appropriate for certain diplomatic situations. It is also necessary to mention that conference diplomacy could be lengthy at times, as was the case with the Law of the Sea Conference which took nine years to produce a new treaty.³⁰⁸

As the early debate on the direction of international diplomacy outlined Machiavelli's realism and Grotius' moralist rationalism, the contemporary diplomacy theorists continued a variation of the same discussion. The early debate outlined the two arguments about the direction that international diplomacy ought to take. On the one hand the realist approach based on the practicality of interstate politics, and on the other hand the idealist rationalism approach based on moralistic ideals and international law.

Realism especially has had an enormous influence on the theory and practice of international relations. As the study traced its origins back to the Greek political historian Thucydides, and contrary to idealists, realists claim they accept and understand the world

³⁰⁸ Leguey-Feilleux, Jean-Robert; *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*. Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, 6.

as it is. The foundation of this idea is that the struggle for power defines politics, and is the permanent feature of international relations.³⁰⁹ Prominent Realists from Max Weber, E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger, represent various aspects of this vision of international relations. They claim that realism provides a general theory explaining the essence of international politics, the reasons and justifications of states' foreign policies, and the solutions to the complexities of the problems facing states, and also explains the place of morality (or lack of) in foreign policy. Their theories had supported the practice of the secret statecraft.

On the progressive side, the idealism and rationalism should not be confused with utopianism. This was an idealism that, unlike utopianism, took into account practical issues in international politics and a level of economic liberalism. Idealist theorists favored an international authority that would coordinate mechanisms such as conference diplomacy, international law, and institutionalized methods for peaceful settlement of international disputes.³¹⁰ The creation of the League of Nations and later the United Nations was the projection of the ideals of such international authority.

Different aspects of these two intellectual approaches dominated international relations theories for the remainder of the twentieth century and would affect the twenty-first century as well. The contemporary realist school and the idealist liberalism theories

³⁰⁹ Smith, Michael J. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*. (Baton Rouge, LA and London, UK: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 1-3.

³¹⁰ Woolf, Leonard; "International Government;" cited in Andreas Osiander's "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory," *International Studies Quarterly*; Vol. 42; No.3; (Sept., 1998); pp. 418

are rooted in this early debate. The realist approach favored a closed diplomatic process handled by expert diplomats, and the idealism rationalist advocated an open diplomatic process controlled by public opinion and parliament in its diversity. In the current international situation, the practical progress made in the field of international law cannot be underestimated. Therefore one could state that the mixture of realism and some level of idealism reflect much of the contemporary international relations realities.

This dissertation also identifies the practice of secrecy within elements of the same government. The reasons for internal secrecy exist when different department or agencies debate but could not come to a consensus on the bargaining or decision-making. To avoid or prevent departmental struggles, and assure a smooth or agreed diplomatic decision making process, the internal secrecy strategy could be employed.

Internal secrecy is sometimes employed to allow the diplomats to operate outside of the official diplomatic procedures or purely to neutralize and render other agencies/departments ineffective in the decision making process. For instance, the Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel negotiations during the strategic arm limitation treaty were in part a way to avoid scrutiny by other government agencies in Washington. The Soviet Ambassador was approached not only by Kissinger, but also by President Nixon himself who consented in keeping other US Government insiders in the dark.

As analyzed in the case studies, sometimes the character of the decision maker/leader could be more prone to secrecy. Different from the times where Talleyrand, Castlereagh and Metternich practiced secret diplomacy as the routine process of

negotiations, Leaders such as Napoleon III of France and German Chancellor Bismarck had been renowned for dreaming up extraordinary secret diplomatic schemes. But, if not to the same extent, contemporaries such as President Nixon, or even President De Gaulle have practiced extreme secrecy in foreign policy matters. The Nixon presidency for instance operated mainly in secret and resented any democratic procedures, both domestically and internationally. He kept things secret from the Press, his own Cabinet members, the Congress, and other US Government agencies as well as other foreign governments as one could expect. Also, President De Gaulle's policy on Africa or other former colonies for instance was mostly secretive despite the image presented to the world of mutual Franco-African cooperation.

The negative image of secret diplomacy as the deviant form of international intrigue and deception is still present. This dissertation acknowledged that secret diplomacy has been used as a vicious method of deceit with catastrophic consequences. At times the practices were vicious and concealed harmful motives while confusing and misleading people for selfish objectives. As illustrated, cases such as the Hoare-Laval Pact which allowed the division of Ethiopia by Mussolini or the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact which allowed the invasion of Poland, demonstrated that the old secret statecraft of the pre-Great War was still possible.

It is imperative to distinguish this approach from a secret diplomacy keeping secret its plans and negotiations which would have in themselves honest motives. Diplomatic secrecy which was based on the desire to prevent interference with the prompt and complete realization of legitimate goals is different from plain questionable

dealings.³¹¹ Some entities and democratic states may still be practicing secret diplomacy for dubious dealings which one day will be revealed. But cases of negative use of the secret diplomatic methods should not inhibit the practice which is essential in many positive diplomatic negotiations.

The requirements of national and international security occupy a crucial place when dealing with the issue of democratic transparency. Although security cases were analyzed, further research would be necessary in security studies. A deep investigation to address questions such as; who should be informed of security negotiations? When should parliament or Congress be informed? And, what information should be communicated? The diplomats need to have the ability to negotiate without being watched over by legislators.

The balance of power in a type of government that requires checks and balances could complicate matters. In the United States for instance, the President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the nation's chief diplomat and the main executor of all the instruments of national and international security. He represents the United States and its people to the world. And, to exercise his duty, he/she needs expertise, speed, efficiency and sometimes requires extreme secrecy.³¹²

Yet, in matters of security more than anything else he/she needs the support and sometimes authorization of the Congress. This is so because the Congress has

³¹¹ Ibid. Leguey-Feilleux. pp.137

³¹² Henken, Louis. "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," *Foreign Affairs*. (Winter 1987-88), 307.

tremendous power in this domain. The Congress has the power to declare war, to raise an army, to provide and maintain a navy, to regulate land, air, and naval forces, to tax and spend money for the common defense, to ratify treaties, and approve the President's appointed ambassadors.³¹³ Therefore, the Congress has to ensure that there is some conformity between the actions of the Executive and its accountability to the people. The Congress has to express the public's concerns and keep an "eye" on the possible abuse of power in the process of secrecy.

The collaboration between the two branches could be advantageous in reaching a diplomatic agreement, and facilitate the ratification process once the treaty reaches the Senate floor. There should be also a balance of approach in this process. Because, the widening the circle of Government insiders and legislators could delay the diplomatic process as illustrated by the US-Iran nuclear cooperation negotiations during the Ford and Carter administrations.

This study also acknowledged that the effects of economic globalization and technological innovations such as the internet have influenced the practice of diplomacy. The wave of technological change became significant in the 19th century. The invention of the telegraph, photography, the telephone, the train, and the widespread print of the newspaper had significant effects on the practice of diplomacy. For instance, the gradual improvement of the national press, combined with the rise of literacy, created a desire by

³¹³ U.S. Constitution: Article 1; Section 8. The Powers of the Legislation, The Constitution of the United States.

the print media to publish sensational news. Government and diplomatic secrecy fell into this journalistic pursuit for widespread circulation.

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, speed in communications has increased the challenge in maintaining diplomatic secrecy. There has been a dialectic interaction between diplomacy and technological innovations. This process has increased the use of public diplomacy which is important for democracies. The increase in international regimes also increased the commitment to transparency and the disclosure of government information. Diplomacy has also adapted to the new technological advancement with the increase of meetings and the speed in communication and transmission of messages. This has affected diplomacy in the sense that decision makers have to produce fast decisions in a fast moving world.

Also, secret diplomacy is still applicable in this Information Age despite the challenge to maintain secrecy due to the current speed of communications. The current wave of technological developments with the widespread availability of information cannot be underestimated or ignored. The effects of the internet, satellites, email, cell phones, and television bring instant news to a widespread of world audiences in real time. The world is more transparent now than in any previous times in history. More people are able to be organized for political or economic or social actions, and even more could expose their views to a worldwide audience through the use of networked computers and sophisticated cell phone systems.

New technologies are changing the pace and pattern of international diplomacy. Therefore, diplomacy benefits on using the global information revolution, with its powerful telecommunications and information processing capabilities, to manage the complexities of international relations. Diplomats will also gain from studying ways in which information technologies can be used to manage conflicts and prevent actions with potential deadly consequences; from the spread of dangerous diseases, stopping the traffic of human beings, the proliferation of strategic weapons, to include stopping terrorist actions.

Despite those changes, the art of negotiation has mainly remained the same between humans. And despite new actors in the global stage, many diplomatic institutions have maintained or improved their roles. Innovations in communication and transport have influenced international relations and diplomacy in acquiring and processing of information. But the massive flow of information, sometimes fragmented, decentralized, and mostly contradictory could produce confusion, and when not analyzed, could have negative effects in social organization actions. This is for instance the case when the information provided is unreliable, slanted or distorted and misleading as is usually the case with political, cultural and religious extremists' networks.

With the fact that the government no longer has a monopoly over information, the press becomes an independent partner that societies need to gather information and sort out what is newsworthy and potentially accurate. As former US Secretary of State George

Shultz stated that good diplomacy relies on relevant and accurate information.³¹⁴ The process of sorting out and analyzing information requires an alert and experience group of diplomats.

The massive flow of information also adds challenges to diplomacy and to leaders who have to sort out real issues and data from the internet mass media's sometimes unsubstantiated opinions. Therefore, it is important to know that the role of the diplomats as open or secret negotiators and foreign policy analysts is still valuable in the current advanced Information Age. This large amount of information needs to be processed and analyzed by diplomats so that its true meaning could be useful in decision making.

Technologies could not replace courage or leadership skills which are necessary for diplomats and policymakers to confront the complexities of problems that the world communities face. This also means that policymakers need to adapt and integrate the tools of the new technologies so that they can be able to provide quick, but reliable diplomatic strategies and effective management decisions.

It is also important to understand that the need for a more transparent type of diplomacy will increase in the liberal democratic nations. There is an increase in the number of democracies. Although most are still fragile, they all advocate the increase of government transparency. One has to accept the fact that it has become harder to maintain diplomatic secrecy in this information age. It is therefore necessary to

³¹⁴ Shultz, George; *Diplomacy in the Information Age*, "In The Information Revolution and International Conflict Management. (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1997), VII.

strengthen the public and open diplomacy side. But it would still remain necessary in foreign affairs for the experienced diplomats to negotiate secretly in order to maintain the confidentiality which is sometimes crucial in international bargaining and exchanges. The same technology that is used to expose secrecy could be used to help maintain discretion in negotiations.

Yet with all its advantages, secret diplomacy should not be used to suppress democracy or deny individual rights and freedoms. There needs to be a balance between the requirements of diplomacy, national and international security and the norms of democracy. The need for transparency and the free press are valuable for the proper functioning of a democratic society. The debate over the practice of secret diplomacy by the democratic states has to take into consideration all the necessary factors explored and additional studies would benefit the field diplomacy.

This study and analysis also concludes that there need to be a balance between the use of open diplomacy and instances of secret bargaining. This also means that the issues of security and state self-interest and state preservation have to be balanced without losing the benefits of a free society. This is necessary for the development of the political, economic, and socio-cultural health of the state. In the same category, the balance between open diplomacy and instances of secret diplomacy ought to be the recipe in international relations. This combination of various approaches might be the proper recipe for a functioning liberal democracy in a very competitive world.

This mixture of approaches was well expressed by President Eisenhower in January 1961. In his farewell address to the Nation, President Eisenhower stated that “In the councils of government... Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.”³¹⁵ If one has to respect the democratic institutions in the globalized international arena of the Information Age, the balance between diplomatic requirements and democratic norms is essential.

Consolidated Bibliography

Primary sources

(III)- Secret Diplomacy and French Diplomacy

(III)-A-Franco-German Secret Negotiations over disputed territories

De Margerie, Christian; “Memorandum of Meeting between Secretary Hallstein and the Three Wiseman;” (September 15, 1956); Declassified in January 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259;

De Margerie, Christian; Memorandum from Christian de Margerie: “Report from Foreign Ministry: Guy Mollet’s US Interview;” (April 6, 1956); French Ministry of Foreign

³¹⁵ Eisenhower, Dwight D.; “Farewell Address to the Nation, 1961;” In Elizabeth McClancy’s *Democratic Principles: Portraits and Essays*; (Lenox, MA: Hard Press Editions, 2008), 5.

Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 18

De Murville, Maurice; Memorandum of Conversation by Maurice Couve de Murville: "Meeting between Adenauer and Guy Mollet;" (September 29, 1956); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259;

Joxe, Louis; "Memorandum of Conversation: French Ambassador Joxe and German Foreign Minister Von Brentano;" (January 5, 1956); Declassified on January 7, 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259;

Joxe, Louis; Memorandum of Conversation: French Ambassador Joxe and German Secretary of State Hallstein; (January 5, 1956); Declassified on January 7, 2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259;

Joxe, Louis; Memorandum from Ambassador Louis Joxe: "Meeting between Adenauer and Guy Mollet;" (October 2, 1956); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 64

(III)-B- Franco-German Negotiations and the Rambouillet Accord

De Gaulle, Charles: "Memorandum: De Gaulle-Adenauer Meeting at Colombey;" (October 29-30, 1958); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1259; pp. 154

De Murville, Maurice Couve; Memorandum of Conversation: "De Gaulle-Adenauer Meeting;" (March 4 1959); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1261; pp. 85

Joxe, Louis; Memorandum: "Private Meeting between De Gaulle and Adenauer at Rambouillet;" (August 5, 1960); Declassified on 01/07/2003; French Ministry of Foreign

Affairs; Diplomatic Archives; Series: Europe 1944; Sub-Series: West Germany; Vol. 1263; pp. 39

(IV)- Secret Diplomacy and American Diplomacy

(IV)-A- Secret diplomacy and the US accommodation with Cuba

Attwood, William. "Memorandum to Averell Harriman & Gordon Chase;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives, November 22, 1963); Declassified on 09/06/1995.

Attwood, William; "Secret Memorandum to Gordon Chase;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 22, 1963; Declassified on 04/12/1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

Bundy, McGeorge; "Secret Memorandum for the Record; JFK suggestions," Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 12, 1963; Declassified on 06/25/1996) Washington: National Security Archives,

Chase, Gordon; "Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives, March 4, 1963); Declassified on 02/05/1997;

Chase, Gordon; "Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, NSA: Cuba—Item of Presidential Interest;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (November 25, 1963); Washington: National Security Archives.

Chase, Gordon; "Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy: Adlai Stevenson and Lisa Howard;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (July 7 1964; Declassified on 07/12/1995) LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

Chase, Gordon; "Secret Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy; Cuba –Policy;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (April 11, 1963; Declassified on 02/04/1997); Washington: National Security Archives;

Howard, Lisa; "Verbal Message from Castro to Johnson;" In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (February 12, 1964); Declassified LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

Stevenson, Adlai; "Memorandum to President Johnson;" Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (June 16, 1964; Declassified on 04/12/1996); LBJ Library Copy; Washington: National Security Archives.

"Transcript of Recorded tapes of conversation between President Kennedy and NSA McGeorge Bundy;" Declassified tapes, In Kennedy & Castro: The Secret History. (Washington: National Security Archives).

(IV)-B- Secret diplomacy and the US-China rapprochement

Haig, Alexander. Message from Haig to Walters; "Letter to Mr. Jean Sainteny from Kissinger;" (April 27, 1971; Declassified on January 4, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum for the President from Kissinger: "Contact with the Chinese;" Kissinger's Secret Trip to China. (Sept. 12, 1970; Declassified on January 4, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: "Meeting Kissinger/Sainteny; (Sept. 27, 1970; Declassified January 3, 2002) Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between President Nixon and Pakistan President Yahya Khan.; (October 25, 1970; Declassified on May 9, 2001) Washington: national Security Archive.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon: "Kissinger's Conversation with President Ceausescu;" (October 27, 1970; Declassified on May 9, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum for President Nixon: "Chinese Communist Initiative;" (December 9, 1970; Declassified on January 3, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: "Meeting between Kissinger and Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan;" (January 29, 1971; Declassified on January 11, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum for the President; “Meeting between Kissinger and Ambassador Farland:” (May 15, 1971; Declassified on January 3, 2002); Washington: National Security Archive.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation; “Secret Meeting between Kissinger and Chou En-Lai;” (July 9, 1971; Declassified on May 9, 2001); Washington: National Security Archive.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation: “Meeting between Kissinger and Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan;” (January 29, 1971; Declassified on January 11, 2002); Washington: National Security Archive.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum of Conversation: “Nixon-Chou En-Lai-Kissinger;” (February 24, 1972; Declassified on 05/30/2003); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. “Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger-Chou En-Lai;” (July 11, 1971; Declassified on 05/09/2001); Washington: National Security Archives;

Nixon, Richard. Statement by President Nixon: “diplomacy with China;” (April 14, 1971); Washington: National Security Archive;

(V)- Secret Diplomacy and Franco-American National Securities

(V)-A- Secret diplomacy and US National Security: the ABM Treaty Negotiations

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to the President Nixon; “Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals;” (May 23, 1969; Declassified on June 29, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; “Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger-Dobrynin Meeting;” (January 28, 1971; Declassified on February 2, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; “Moscow Trip;” (April 17, 1972; Declassified on 07/07/1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; “Kissinger-Brezhnev Meeting;” (April 22, 1972; Declassified on 07/07/1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; “SALT Agreement;” (May 1972; Declassified on February 2, 1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

Memorandum of Conversation: “US-USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No 13;” (January 7, 1971; Declassified on 08/06/2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

Memorandum of Conversation: “SALT Problems and Prospects;” (April 14, 1972; Declassified 08/06/2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

SALT Negotiation; Secret Cable 799 to State Department; “Decision on Foreclosing Possible Future ABM Techniques;” (July 12, 1971; Declassified on August 1, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

Smith, Gerard. Secret Cable 842 to state department; “U.S. Proposed Agreement;” (July 26, 1971; Declassified on August 3, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives.

Smith, Gerard. Letter to President Nixon; “Future ABM Systems;” (August 7, 1971; Declassified on December 13, 1999; Washington: National Security Archives.

Smith, Gerard; Memorandum; “SALT MemCon;” (December 2, 1971; Declassified on November 18, 1994); Washington: National Security Archives.

Spiers, Ronald. Memorandum; “Future ABM Systems – Verification Panel Meeting;” (August 5, 1971; Declassified on January 6, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives.

Transcript of Conversation; “Dobrynin-Kissinger Phone Conversation;” (May 11, 1971); Declassified on April 12, 2001; Washington: National Security Archive.

(V)-B- Secret Diplomacy and French National Security: US Assistance

Ball, George. Memorandum to President Kennedy; "A Further Nuclear Offer to General de Gaulle;" (August 8, 1963; Declassified on July 14, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry: Action Memorandum from National Security Advisor to State and Defense Departments; "US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France;" (April 20, 1969; Declassified on July 12, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum; "Guidance to State and Defense Departments on Our Attitude toward Military Cooperation with the French;" (April 15, 1969; Declassified on August 30, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense: "Assistance to the French Missile Program;" (January 27, 1970; Declassified on January 10, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: "Cooperation with the French;" (December 16, 1968; Declassified on May 8, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Summary of My Conversation with President Pompidou;" (February 23, 1970; Declassified on June 19, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to President Nixon; "Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French;" (March 10, 1970; Declassified on July 12, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum to Defense Secretary; "US Assistance to the French Missile Program;" (March 9, 1970; Declassified on May 8, 2002); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Kissinger, Henry. Memorandum to President Nixon; "Summary of My Conversation with President Pompidou;" (February 23, 1970; Declassified on June 19, 2001); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum of Conversation between US State Secretary Dulles and UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd: "Bermuda Meeting in 1957;" (March 21-23, 1957; Declassified on January 6, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum of Conversation: “Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;” (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum to the President: “A Further Nuclear Offer to General de Gaulle?” (August 8, 1963; Declassified on July 14, 2006); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum of Conversation: “Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;” (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum to Henry Kissinger: “British Position on Nuclear Cooperation with France;” (October 21, 1969; Declassified on August 30, 1999); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Memorandum of Conversation: “Defense Secretary Gates, Acting State Secretary Dillon, and Atomic Energy Commission Chief Mr. McCone: Nuclear Sharing;” (August 24, 1960; Declassified on January 13, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Secret Telegram from US Department of State to US Ambassador in London: “US Military Assistance to France;” (May 8, 1961; Declassified on March 6, 1992); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Sonnenfeld, Helmut. Memorandum of Conversation; “Nixon and Pompidou;” (February 24, 1970; Declassified on June 11, 2003); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

Sonnenfeld, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation: “French Nuclear Programs;” (August 1, 1975; Declassified on February 4, 2004); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

US Embassy in France; Memorandum to Kissinger: “Military Cooperation with France, NSDM 103 and 104;” (April 1971; Declassified on February 4, 2004); Washington: National Security Archives & Wilson International Center.

(VI)- Secret Diplomacy and US Negotiations for International Security

(VI)-A- US-Iran Secret Nuclear Negotiations in the 1970s

Cable from State department; draft of meeting for the US Embassy in Tehran; "Nuclear Agreement for Cooperation;" (October 1975; Declassified in 2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

Helms, Richard; Memorandum for the department of defense: "Shah's alleged statement on nuclear weapons;" (June 24 1974; Declassified on 06/30/2005); confidential memorandum, pp.2; Washington: National Security Archives.

Helms, Richard; Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to State Department; "Shah's position on Safeguards issue;" (November 1975; Declassified on 05/28/2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

Helms, Richard; Memorandum from US Embassy in Tehran to State department: "memorandum of conversation: Iranian Nuclear Policy;" (January 1976; Declassified on 06/25/2008); Washington: National Security Archives.

Helms, Richard; Secret Action Memorandum from US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State: "Strategy designed to meet the issues raised by Iranians in the discussions in Tehran on Nuclear Power Agreement;" (August 12, 1976; Declassified on 10/05/2006); Washington: National Security Archives.

Robinson, Charles; Secret Memorandum to State Secretary: "Nuclear Negotiations with Iran;" Prepared by Under Secretary Charles Robinson; (August 18, 1976; Declassified on 10/05/2006); Washington: National Security Archives.

Scowcroft, Brent; Secret Memorandum to state secretary: "Next Steps in our Negotiation of Nuclear Agreement with Iran;" (February 4, 1976; Declassified on 03/05/2004); Washington: National Security Archives.

Scowcroft, Brent; Memorandum to President Ford: "Response from the Shah on Nuclear Cooperation;" (March 22, 1976; Declassified on 03/05/2004); Copy from Gerald Ford Library; Washington: National Security Archives.

Springsteen, George; Secret Memorandum for General Scowcroft from state department: "Next Steps in our Nuclear Negotiations with Iran;" (April 16, 1976; Declassified in 2004); Copy from Gerald Ford Library; pp.1; Washington: National Security Archives.

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation between US Secretary Kissinger and German Ambassador Von Staden: "Germany/Iran Agreement for Nuclear

Cooperation;” (July 2, 1976; Declassified on 03/31/2005); Copy from State Department; Washington: National Security Archives.

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut; Memorandum of Conversation: “Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear Reprocessing;” State Department Meeting; (May 12, 1976; Declassified on 04/05/2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

Sullivan, William; Confidential Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to Assistant Secretary Atherton: “US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and US-Iran Energy Discussions;” (May 1977; Declassified 06/25/2008); Washington: National Security Archives.

Sullivan, William; Confidential Cable from US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State: “Audience with the Shah;” (June 18, 1977; Declassified on 06/20/2008); pp.1-2; Washington: National Security Archives.

Sumner, Gordon Jr. ; Pentagon Assessment: “Briefing Notes: Iran and Nuclear Weapons;” by Major General Gordon Sumner Jr; Near East/South Asia Region; (July 29, 1975; Declassified 2004); Washington: National Security Archives;

Vance, Cyrus; Confidential Cable from State Department to US Embassy in Tehran: “US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement;” (February 1978 & May 1978; Declassified on 06/25/2008); pp.1-3; Washington: National Security Archives.

(VI)-B- Secret Understanding between the United States and United Kingdom

Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum for the Record: “Message from President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill;” (June 30, 1952; Declassified on June 8, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum of Conversation: “Truman-Churchill Talks;” (January 7, 1952; Declassified on June 17, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

Arneson, Gordon; Memorandum of Conversation; “The use of UK bases and Consultation with the UK on the use of atomic weapons;” (March 6, 1953; Declassified on June 30, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kennedy, John F.; Letter to Prime Minister MacMillan; “Understanding with the British on the use of British bases and Nuclear Weapons;” (January 27, 1961; Declassified on February 5, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

Kissinger, Henry; Memorandum of Conversation; “Nuclear release agreement” (April 26, 1974; Declassified on August 1, 2000); Washington: National Security Archives.

Jessup, Phillip; Memorandum for the Record: “Truman-Atlee Conversation;” (December 4-8, 1950; Declassified on June 30, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

Jessup, Phillip; Memorandum of Conversation: “US-UK Consultation on Atomic Warfare;” Secret Understanding between the US and UK; (September 11, 1951; Declassified on June 8, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.;

Johnson, Lyndon; Memorandum; letter to the British Prime Minister: “Understanding with the British;” (February 28, 1964; Declassified on February 23, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

MacMillan, Harold; Letter to President Eisenhower; “The use of atomic weapons;” (April 24, 1958; Declassified on July 17, 1998); Washington: National Security Archives.

Murphy, Robert and Patrick dean; Report to President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister; “Procedure for the Committing to the Attack of Nuclear Retaliatory Forces in the United Kingdom;” (June 1958; Declassified on 07/23/1996); Washington: National Security Archives.

Nixon, Richard; Nixon Letter to Edward Heath: “Nuclear Consultation with the British;” (December 15, 1970; Declassified on September 12, 2003); Washington: National Security Archives.

Wilson, Harold; Memorandum; Letter to US President Johnson; “Anglo-American Understanding on the use of Nuclear Weapons;” (August 5, 1965; Declassified on February 23, 2005); Washington: National Security Archives.

Secondary sources

“Amendment to the Law on Archives;”

<http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

Classified National Security Information; President Obama’s Executive Order 13526;

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>

« Code du Patrimoine ; Article L211-3 » ;

<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000019202816&idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006159940&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006074236&dateTexte=20110614>

“Democracy;” Merriam-Webster dictionary; <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy>

Kornbluh, Peter; “JFK and Castro;” Cigar Aficionado; September/October 1999;

http://www.cigaraficionado.com/webfeatures/show/id/JFK-and-Castro_7300

“Foreign Policy;” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foreign%20policy>

Freedom of Information in France (CADA: Commission d’access aux documents administratifs); <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. & 552 as Amended by Public Law No.104-231, 110 Stat. 3048; http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XVII_4/page2.htm

Memorandum by President Obama for the executive departments and agencies;

<http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf>

International Security; “Quote from former US Defense Secretary William Cohen;

http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/william_cohen_quote_c9a5

International Security; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_security

“Law on Access of Administrative Documents;”

<http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/france/>

Oxford English Dictionary; Chief Editor John Simpson; (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).

The Oxford English Dictionary; second edition; Vol. IV; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)

Sino-American relations; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-American_relations#Relations_frozen

US Foreign Policy for the 1970s; A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon; February 9, 1972; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972; pp.33; In Aharon Klieman's *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*; pp.21

U.S. Constitution: Article 1; Section 8. The Constitution of the United States.

Books

Allain, Jean-Claude; Guillen; Soutou; Theis & Vaisse. *L'histoire de la diplomatie Française; de 1815 à nos jours.* (Paris : Edition Perrin, 2001),

Angell, Norman; "The Great Illusion;" A Reply to Rear-Admiral A.T. Mahan; *The North American Review*; Vol. 195; No. 679; (July 1912),

Bar-On, Mordechai; "David Ben-Gurion and the Sevres Collusion;" in *Suez 1956: The Conflict and its Consequences.* Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989);

Barfield, Thomas. *The Dictionary of Anthropology.* Vol. 306. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997).

Bazouni, Yvan. *Le Métier de Diplomate.* Paris : L'Harmattan, 2005.

Berkowitz, Bruce. *American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy.* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986)

Berridge, G.R. *Diplomatic Classics.* Basingstoke, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004,

Berridge G.R. & Maurice Keens-Soper. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001),

Brown, Harold. *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World.* (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1983)

Butterfield, Herbert & Martin Wight; *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theories of International Politics.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968),

Caldwell, Dan and Robert Williams Jr. *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*; 2nd edition (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012)

Callières, François de. *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*; (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963);

Carter, Charles Howard. *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625*. (New and London: Columbia University Press, 1964);

Christopher, Warren; "Normalization of Diplomatic Relations;" In *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1979),

Cross, Harold. *The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953)

De Launay, Jacques. *Histoire de la diplomatie secrète 1914-1945* (Paris : Marabout Books, 1962),

De Launay, Jacques. *Histoire Secrète de Notre Temps : Histoire de la Diplomatie Secrète, 1789-1914*. Publications G.V. Service, Nyon, Suisse, 1973.

De Tocqueville, Alexis, and Bruce Frohnen. *Democracy in America*. Vol. 10. Gateway Books, 2003.

Dizard Jr., Wilson; *Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in the Information Age*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

Doise, Jean & Maurice Vaisse. *Diplomatie et Outil Militaire, 1871-1991 : Politique Etrangere de la France*. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1992.

Dunn, Dennis. *Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow*. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1998,

Eban, Abba. *The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age*. New York: Random House, 1983,

Eban, Abba; *Diplomacy for the Next Century*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998,

Eisenhower, Dwight D.; "Farewell Address to the Nation, 1961;" In Elizabeth McClancy's *Democratic Principles: Portraits and Essays*; (Lenox, MA: Hard Press Editions, 2008),

Finel, Bernard and Kristin Lord. "Transparency and World Politics," *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*. Edited by Finel and Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000),

Finel, Bernard and Kristin Lord; "The Surprising Logic of Transparency;" In *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*; edited by Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000),

Freeman, Chas; "Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy;" (Washington: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1997);

Franck, Thomas and Edward Weisband. *Secrecy and Foreign Policy*; (New York-London-Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Friedrich, Carl. "The Pathology of Politics." (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 175-209. In Itzhak Galnoor's *Government Secrecy in Democracies*; (New York: NYU Press, 1977),

Grenville, John and George B. Young. "Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy;" *Studies in foreign policy 1873-1917*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966,

Goldman, Alvin and Jacques Rojot. *Negotiation: Theory and Practice*. (Hague; London; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003),

Gottlieb, Wolfram. *Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War*. (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957),

Halperin, Morton and Daniel Hoffman. *Top Secret: National Security and the right to know*. Washington: New Republic Books, 1977,

Hammaraskjold, Dag; "New Diplomatic Techniques in a New World;" In *Modern Diplomacy: the Artists and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979),

Hankey, Maurice. *Diplomacy by Conference*. London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1946,

Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1990)

Hudson, David Jr. *Open Government: An American Tradition faces National Security, Privacy, and other Challenges*. (Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House Publishers, 2005).

Ikle, Fred Charles. *How Nations Negotiate*. New York & London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964,

Johnson, Loch. *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012).

Kaufmann, Johan. *Conference Diplomacy: An introductory analysis* (New York: Sijthoff-Leyden Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970).

Kaufmann, Johan. *The Diplomacy of International Relations: Selected Writings*. The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy* (New York-London-Toronto-Sydney: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994).

Klieman, Aharon. *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988)

LaRoche, Carlo. *La Diplomatie Française* (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1946),

Lamont, Thomas William. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, April 1, 1919. Edited by Arthur Link, 60 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-1978), Vol. 65, 502.

Langhorne, Richard and Keith Hamilton. *The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge T & F Group, 2011),

Langhorne, Richard. *The Essentials of Global Politics*. (London: Holder Education & Oxford University Press, (2006),

Les Affaires étrangères et Le Corps Diplomatiques Français ; Tome II ; 4th Part ; (Paris : published by CRNS (1984),

Leguey-Feilleux, Jean-Robert; "The Dynamics of Diplomacy," (Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).

Liebmann, George. *Diplomacy Between the Wars*. (New York-London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2008).

Lippmann, Walter. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1932.

Louis, Roger and Roger Owen. *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*. Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989;

Mattingly, Garrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1971),

Manor, Yohanan. "France." In Itzhak Galnoor's *Government and Secrecy in Democracies*. New York: New York University Press, 1977,

Mayer, Arno. *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959,

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. 4th edition; New York: Knopf, 1966,

Mowat, R.B. *A History of European Diplomacy 1451-1789*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928,

Nicolson, Harold. *Diplomacy*. 3rd ed. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1963),

O'Clery, Connor. *Daring Diplomacy: Clinton's Secret Search for Peace in Ireland*; (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1997)

Parks, Wallace. "The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution." *George Washington Law Review*; Vol.26; No.1; (October, 1957),

Pigman, Geoffrey. *Contemporary Diplomacy*. Cambridge, UK-Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010.

Plischke, Elmer. *Diplomacy: Search for its Meaning*" In *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1979), 34.

Plischke, Elmer. *Conduct of America Diplomacy*. Toronto-New York-London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1950.

Rabie, Mohamed. *U.S.-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*. (Miami, FL: University Press of Florida, 1995)

Read, Anthony and David Fisher. *The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-1941* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988),

Remy, Pierre-Jean. *Trésors et Secret du Quai d'Orsay: Une Histoire Inédite de la Diplomatie Française*. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Paris : Editions Jean Claude Lattes, 2001.

Reinsch, Paul. *Secret Diplomacy: How far can it be eliminated* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922),

Roberts, Ivor. *Satow's Diplomatic Practice*. 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),

Robertson, David: *The Routledge Dictionary of Politics*. (Routledge, 2004),

Rosenau, James; "Diplomacy, Proof, and Authority in the Information Age," In *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*; edited by Finel and Lord; (New York: Palgrave, 2000),

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; "The Social Contract;" ; Cited by Dennis Barthory and Wilson McWilliams in *Itzhak Galnoor's Government Secrecy in Democracies*; (New York: New York University's Press, 1977).

Rowat, Donald. *Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries*. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1979.

Satow, Ernest. *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. In *Diplomatic Theories from Machiavelli to Kissinger*; by Berridge, G.R. & Maurice Keens-Soper. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001),

Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914*; (New Haven: Yale University Press, (1927),

Shapiro, Ian. *The Real World of Democratic Theory*; (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011),

Shils, Edward. *The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies*. Introduction by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996.

Shultz, George; *Diplomacy in the Information Age*," In *The Information Revolution and International Conflict Management*. (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1997),

Shulzinger, Robert. *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*. (New York, Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1989.

Spanier, John and Eric Uslander. *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas*. 4th Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978.

Stairs, Denis; "Professionals and Amateurs in the Diplomacy of the Age of Information." In Janice G. Stein and Colin Robertson's *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*; (Toronto, Canada: McClelland & Stewart, 2011).

Star, Alexander. *Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy*. New York: Grove Press, 2011. (Introduction, Reporting and Analysis by The New York Times).

Taylor, A.J.P.; *The Origins of the Second World War*; 4h ed. (New York: Athenaeum, 1968);

Thompson, James Westfall and Saul Padover. *Secret Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography, 1500-1825*. (New York, NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963),

Vaisse, Maurice ; *Histoire de la Diplomatie Française de 1815 à nos Jours*; (Paris : Edition Perrin, 2001),

Vaisse, Maurice; "France and the Suez Crisis;" in *Suez 1956: The Conflict and its Consequences*. Edited by Roger Louis and Roger Owen. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),

Viotti, Paul and Mark Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity*. 3rd Edition. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 121.

Walker, Mack. *Plombières: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Italy*. (New York-London-Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968.)

Watt, Donald Cameron; *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989),

Webster, Charles. *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy*. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1962,

Wiggins, James Russell. *Freedom or Secrecy*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964,

Wise, David. *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, secrecy and Power* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1974),

Articles

Angell, Norman; "Public Opinion in Foreign Policies;" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*; Vol. 66; Preparedness and America's International Program; (July 1916), 138-139.

Carr, E.H. "The Twenty Years' Crisis." Andreas Osiander's "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory." *International Studies Quarterly*; Vol. 42; No.3; (Sept., 1998); 412.

Gooch, G.P. "European Diplomacy before the War in the light of the Archives;" *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of the International Affairs 1931-1939); Vol.18, No.1, 77-102

Halperin, Morton and Daniel Hoffman. "Secrecy and the right to know," *Law and Contemporary Problems*; Vol. 40, No. 3, Presidential Power: Part 2 (Summer, 1976), 132.

Henken, Louis. "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution." *Foreign Affairs*. (Winter 1987-88), 307.

Low, Maurice A.; "The Vice of Secret Diplomacy;" *The North American Review*; Vol.207; No.747; (Feb.,1918),

Nicolson, Harold, "Modern Diplomacy and British Public Opinion," *International Affairs*; Vol. 14; No 5 (Sept-Oct 1935): 599-618.

Parks, Wallace. "The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution," *The George Washington Law Review*; Vol.26; No.1; (October, 1957), 21.

Punke, Harold. "Secret Diplomacy and American Democracy." *The Social Studies*; Vol. 47:3; (March 1956); 83.

Roberts, Geoffrey: "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany;" *Soviet Studies*; Vol.44; No.1; (1992), 64.

Roberts, Geoffrey; "Infamous Encounter: The Merekalov-Weizsacker Meeting of April 17 1939;" *The Historical Journal*; Vol.35; No.4; (1992), 921.

Robertson, James. "The Hoare-Laval Plan;" *The Journal of Contemporary History*; Vol.10; No. 3; (July 1975): 439.

Sharp, Paul. For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1999), 33-57.

Thompson, Dennis. "Democratic Secrecy;" *Political Science Quarterly*; Vol. 20; No 2 (summer 1999), 181

Woolf, Leonard. "International Government;" In Andreas Osiander's "Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory;" *International Studies Quarterly*; Vol. 42; No.3; (Sept., 1998); pp. 418

Nick P. Momengoh

EDUCATION:

Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey

Doctorate Degree in International Affairs: May 2013

PhD thesis: Secret Diplomacy by Liberal Democracies

Master's Degree in International Affairs: October 2011

Specialty: International Diplomacy; Foreign Policy; Global Security

Buffalo University, the State University of New York

Master's Degree in Media Studies: May 2006

Specialty: Modern Media

Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts

Graduate Diploma in American Studies: May 1995

University of Brazzaville, Congo-Brazzaville

Bachelor's degree in Modern Languages: May 1994

Major: English-French; Conversant in: Spanish-German

EMPLOYMENT:

- January 2009 – Present **Account Executive, Star ledger News • Newark, New Jersey**
- Analyzed clients' accounts and promoted Media/News related products.
 - Gained practical knowledge of all aspects of the Media industry.
 - Maintained current knowledge of national and international news.
- January 2006 – July 2008 **Account Executive, ICT Financial • Buffalo, New York**
- Established and maintained productive financial relationships with clients.
 - Developed the discipline to work individually and with an international team.
- July 1998 – May 2005 **Investment Specialist, M&T Bank/Investment • Buffalo, New York**
- Developed analytical abilities to study complex international issues.
 - Prepared analytical reports and monitor national and international transfers.
 - Acquired a general understanding and knowledge of various organizational and administrative planning, strategies and objectives.