THE DIFFERENTIAL RECOVERY OF STATES
FROM MAJOR VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT OPPOSITION CAMPAIGNS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This study adds to the existing literature by bringing quantitative rigor to the study of how states recover from major opposition movements which are currently primarily qualitative in nature and mostly focused on how states recover from violent campaigns. Second, it begins to fill the gap in the absence of scholarly research in after transition structural stability. Many scholars have noted the fact that nonviolent campaigns emerge under certain conditions, and that they often succeed under another set of overlapping conditions. However, the longer-term impacts of these campaigns, are yet unknown. What this thesis has done is to examine a variety of potential impacts in the state’s structural stability indicators.

As we continue to see the number of opposition movements increasing today, and realize that campaign organizers make a choice between violent and nonviolent tactics, it becomes vital to understand which type of campaign will help to establish the state’s future success and in what areas that successful will be lasting. The research question this study sought to answer is; does the choice of campaign type, in terms of violent or nonviolent tactics being utilized, and whether the campaign was successful, have an impact on the future growth of the state as measured in structural stability indicators.
Successful nonviolent campaigns brought the most positive growth in increased: life expectancy, implementation of rule of law, degree of Democracy, infant mortality, respect for human rights, school enrollment and regional stability.

Unsuccessful violent campaigns brought the most damage in five of the indicators: long term economic growth, implementation of rule of law, degree of Democracy, respect for human rights and regional stability. It appears that these states suffered all of the damages of a major campaign without the hopeful changes that a new regime can bring.

It is hoped that future campaign organizers, and governments as well as individuals who want to support them, will see the numerous benefits of waging nonviolent campaigns and will choose peaceful means, in their quest for change.

And it is hoped that this work has shown that states are better off, and make greater progress in future growth and stability for having had a major nonviolent campaign.
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I also wish to thank my husband Paul, for his unqualified support all through this process.

DEDICATION

This Dissertation is dedicated to the fearless people throughout the world who have given their lives at the hands of the state’s violent reaction, to society’s nonviolent campaigns, in the hopes of bettering the lives of their countrymen.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The Topic: ................................................................. 1
    *Introduction*: ............................................................. 1
    *Definition of Terms*: ................................................... 2

II. Literature Review: .......................................................... 5
    *Review of existing studies*: ........................................... 5
    *Under what conditions are campaigns mobilized?* .................. 12
    *How is stability and growth measured?* ............................ 25
    *The contribution of this study* ....................................... 27

III. Organization of main sections of the dissertation: .................. 28

IV. Section One – After Campaign End, Measuring Structural Stability .... 31
    *Methodological Details*: .................................................. 31
    *Theories*: .............................. *introduces the structural stability indicators and why chosen*... 36
    *Hypotheses*: ................................ *what are the predicted results?* ................... 86
    *Data Sources*: ................................ *definition of each indicator and its source of data* ...... 111
    *Methods*: ................................ *describes the model used for this study* .................. 118
    *Findings and discussions*: .............................................. 124
    *Summary of Post-Campaign Structural Stability Analysis* ...... 171
    *Table 1. Summary results, five years post-campaign* ............ 173
    *Table 2. Summary results, ten years post-campaign* ............ 174
    *Table 3. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix* .............................. 176

V. Section Three – Campaign Case Studies: .............................. 177
    1. East Germany, 1989 Pro-democracy campaign— ................. 177
    3. Pakistan, 1994--1995 Muhajir campaign— ...................... 244
    4. Lebanon, 2005 Cedar Revolution— ............................... 280

VI. Summary and Conclusions: .............................................. 308
    1. Life Expectancy ....................................................... 308
    2. Long Term Economic Growth ........................................ 312
3. Rule of Law ......................................................... 315
4. Degree of Autocracy/ Democracy ................................. 319
5. Infant Mortality ...................................................... 322
6. Respect for Human Rights .......................................... 325
7. School Enrollment .................................................. 329
8. Regional Stability .................................................... 333

Overall Conclusion and contribution of this study ..................... 337
What this study suggests about methodology ............................. 338
Correlation is not causation .............................................. 340
Final words ........................................................................ 341

VII. Bibliography .................................................................. 343
Appendix A. List of campaigns used in the study ....................... 358
Appendix B. Regression Tables ............................................ 361
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Summary results, five years post-campaign ............................. 173
Table 2. Summary results, ten years post-campaign ............................... 174
Table 3. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix .................................................. 176
Table 4. Regression Results for Life Expectancy ..................................... 361
Table 5. Regression Results for Long Term Economic Growth ................. 362
Table 6. Regression Results for Rule of Law ......................................... 363
Table 7. Regression Results for Autocracy/Democracy ............................. 364
Table 8. Regression Results for Infant Mortality Rate .............................. 365
Table 9. Regression Results for Respect for Human Rights ...................... 366
Table 10. Regression Results for Employment to Population Ratio .......... 367
Table 11. Regression Results for School Enrollment ............................... 368
Table 12. Regression Results for Regional Stability ............................... 369
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Predicted changes in years of life expectancy from birth, five years after the campaign ended compared to world averages .............................................. 124

Figure 2. Predicted changes in years of life expectancy from birth, ten years after the campaign ended compared to world averages ............................................. 124

Figure 3. Predicted GDP PPP Per Capita relative to the US
Five years after Campaign End ................................................................. 132

Figure 4. Predicted GDP PPP Per Capita relative to the US
Ten years after Campaign End ................................................................. 132

Figure 5. Predicted Rule of Law score,
Five years after Campaign End ................................................................. 137

Figure 6. Predicted Rule of Law score,
Ten years after Campaign End ................................................................. 137

Figure 7. Predicted Polity five years after Campaign End ......................... 142

Figure 8. Predicted Polity ten years after Campaign End ......................... 142

Figure 9. Predicted Infant Mortality, five years after Campaign End .......... 148

Figure 10. Predicted Infant Mortality, ten years after Campaign End .......... 148

Figure 11. Predicted Respect for Human Rights,
Five years after Campaign End ................................................................. 151

Figure 12. Predicted Respect for Human Rights,
Five years after Campaign End ................................................................. 151

Figure 13. Predicted Respect for Human Rights with log of population size
Five years after Campaign End ................................................................. 155

Figure 14. Predicted Respect for Human Rights with log of population size
Ten years after Campaign End ................................................................. 155
Figure 15. Predicted Employment to Population Ratio
   Five years after Campaign End ........................................... 158

Figure 16. Predicted Employment to Population Ratio
   Ten years after Campaign End ........................................... 158

Figure 17. Predicted School Enrollment
   the year the Campaign Ended ........................................... 160

Figure 18. Predicted School Enrollment
   Five years after Campaign End ......................................... 160

Figure 19. Predicted School Enrollment
   Ten years after Campaign End ........................................... 161

Figure 20. Predicted Regional Conflict
   Five years after Campaign End ......................................... 167

Figure 21. Predicted Regional Conflict
   Ten years after Campaign End ......................................... 167
I. The Topic:

Introduction:

In many areas of the world people are seeking to change their living and working conditions through pressuring the ruling regime or foreign occupations, to make changes in its laws and policies. When this is not enough they often start to look for more than policy changes and begin to seek an entirely new regime or the expulsion of a foreign occupation. Many times, especially in the past, people seeking to bring about this change did so through violent means. This can happen through various forms such as assassination, military coup, and civil war. More recently other groups seeking to bring in a new regime are doing so through nonviolent social campaigns. These nonviolent campaigns work outside of the traditional institutional channels of change established by the state which include voting, running for political office, drafting new legislation, and petitioning elected officials. In contrast nonviolent social campaigns utilize strikes, boycotts, marches, sit-ins, protest campaigns and many other forms of demonstrations to bring attention and support for their cause, and increasingly change.

More than half of these nonviolent campaigns and over a quarter of the violent campaigns have been successful. This study will analyze to what degree, does the means of protest that brought about transition set the state up for future stability and growth. Do military coup d’états that usher in authoritarian rule with strong hierarchical frameworks and chain of command structures, better position the country for peaceful stability,
economic growth, and improved living conditions? Or do nonviolent social campaigns with their basis in democratic and inclusive principles, better position the state in the suite of structural stability indicators? These are the research questions that this study will analyze.

As the title of this thesis expresses, this work will analyze the differential recovery of states from major violent and nonviolent opposition campaigns, and will compare the recovery of states that have undergone regime change through violent means to those who have undergone regime change through nonviolent means to investigate which type of change sets states up for greater peaceful stability, economic growth and improved living conditions.

**Definition of Terms:**

“Violence is not the only effective means of action in crucial conflict situations. Throughout history, under a variety of political systems, people in every part of the world have waged conflict and wielded undeniable power by using a very different technique of struggle—one which does not kill and destroy” (Sharp, 1973:4). The technique used in nonviolent social campaigns is coined by Gene Sharp as nonviolent action. “Although it has been known by a variety of names, its basis has always been the same: the belief that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled, and when they withdraw that consent, they can control and even destroy the power of their opponent” (Sharp, 1973:4). “Nonviolent action is the active process of bringing political, economic, social, emotional or moral pressure to bear in the wielding of power in contentious interactions between collective action” (McCarthy:1990). Nonviolent action is not inaction, it is not
submissiveness, it is not avoidance of conflict, and it is different from passive resistance (Schock, 2003). It involves strategy, planning, organization, commitment, and wise use of resources. Nonviolent action refers to specific actions that involve risk and that invoke non-physical pressure of nonviolent coercion in contentious interactions between opposing groups. (Schock, 2003) “Participation in nonviolent action does not require that activists hold any specific ideological, religious, or metaphysical beliefs. Contrary to popular and scholarly assumptions, those who engage in nonviolent action are rarely pacifists” (Schock, 2003:705). It should be remembered that they are opposing the recognized authority of the state and the holders of power. Those who participate in nonviolent action do not assume that the state will not react with violence. In fact, “violence is to be expected from governments, especially non-democratic governments. The violent reaction of governments is often an indication that the movement is making progress. Governments respond with violence precisely because nonviolent action presents a serious threat to their power” (Schock, 2003:706).

Nonviolent action has been implemented by groups from all classes of society, on every continent, and throughout history. “It is not a method of contention that is used as a last resort, when the means of violence are unavailable” (Schock, 2003:706). Opposition campaigns are defined as: A series of continuous, purposive tactics or events involving a large group of people in pursuit of a common goal or political objective. Campaigns is continuous and involve several events and tactics, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such a expelling a foreign occupier, or overthrowing a domestic regime. (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008: 4).
“Unlike a onetime petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a campaign extends beyond any single event. Campaigns always link at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:119).

The campaigns included in this analysis are considered to be major campaigns in at least two ways: they are limited to those that involved at least one thousand people, so are major is size. And, secondly in their stated objectives, to be described as a major: “the campaign must have posed a major challenge to existing order, inasmuch as it produced a major government crackdown of campaign activists or resulted in the expulsion of a foreign occupier, or domestic regime” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008:4).

Campaigns can use violent or nonviolent tactics or often some mixture of both. They can be short, lasting only a few weeks or long and span decades. They can occur in weak and fragile states as well as those that are strong and powerful. All of the campaigns in this study occurred within the state, i.e. inter-state conflicts or global nonviolent social movements such as those fought for women’s rights, human trafficking, environmental causes and global warming, are not included in this analysis. The campaigns that are included in this study are those which have sought to remove the ruling regime of the state, or foreign occupying forces.

After transition to a new regime has occurred several structural stability indicators will be used to compare whether violent or nonviolent campaigns led the country to greater stability, economic growth, implementation of rule of law, transparency of government, improved living conditions, improved school enrollment, and decrease in infant mortality. Structural stability was defined by a research team at the German
Institute of Global Area Studies led by Andreas Mehler (2008) as: “the ability of societies to handle intra-societal conflict without resorting to violence”. The concept of structural stability has been gaining prominence in development policy circles because of its focus on the broad spectrum of activities which occur in the aftermath of regime change or intra-societal conflict, to stabilize the state.

II. Literature Review:

*Review of existing studies:*

Political scientists have long sought to understand what factors cause those seeking to make changes to their political regime turn to nonviolent means of protest while others will use violent measures with the same goals in mind. There are many studies depicting the success of the violent Soviet style military guerilla warfare and the Chinese style peasant guerilla warfare which have influenced other campaigns, especially in the first half of the 20th century. But from the second half of the twentieth century we see an emergence of nonviolent social campaigns which appear to have a greater probability for a successful outcome, than previously observed violent campaigns. Two of the most well publicized of these were the campaigns lead by Mahatma Gandhi in the 1930’s and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960’s. Current day campaign organizers can look back and see that some previous successful campaigns were violent while other successful campaigns were brought about through nonviolence. Several researchers point out that campaign organizers have a choice to
make between violent or nonviolent means of protest to bring about the change they are seeking.

Ackerman and Kruegler point out that “the strategic choice to use peaceful means by practitioners of nonviolent conflict is a critical variable that must be taken into account; and as more of these are occurring, it is becoming increasingly urgent to understand what circumstances are conductive to the success of nonviolent campaigns” (1994: xxi). Understanding the circumstances for success can help campaign organizers in their choice between violent and nonviolent means.

Ackerman and Duvall state that, “because violence became so widely accepted as a medication for injustice or tyranny, there was no incentive to consider less damaging alternatives for taking power, or to consider how effective these alternatives have been in the past” (2000:459). The work of nonviolent campaigns in the twentieth century have brought about the removal of dictators in Chile, and El Salvador, have brought independence for India, equal rights for South Africans, as well as democracy to Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania many, many others. But, “never in the postwar period did a military insurrection or violent coup, extend freedom to the people in whose name power was taken” (2000:459).

In considering the importance of the choices made, these researchers point out that nonviolent action, (and they emphasize the word action) is not passivity but is like violent combat in at least two ways: it does not succeed automatically, and it does not operate mysteriously—it works by identifying an opponent’s vulnerabilities and taking away his ability to maintain control. “To shift the momentum of conflict toward its goals, a nonviolent campaign has to:
1. Diversify the scope and variety of its sanctions
2. Keep the regime off balance with alert offensive moves
3. Defend its popular base against repression
4. Exploit any concessions
5. Undermine the regime’s claim to legitimacy and
6. Diminish its means of retaining control.” (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000:479)

Ackerman and Duvall explain that a mass violent campaign can force a favorable outcome in one of three ways: 1) coercing a ruler to surrender power or leave; 2) inducing a regime to compromise and make concessions; or 3) converting the regime’s view of the conflict, so that it believes it should no longer dictate the result. Those leading nonviolent campaigns must understand this and make choices that force a similar power-shift through nonviolence.

There is some concern that once the nonviolent campaign has overthrown a repressive government they have “little democratic experience and will have a hard time holding the course, but those who voice this concern fail to consider that nonviolent campaigns themselves are based on voluntary participation where each individual chooses their own course of action and this freedom of choice has strong parallels with a democratic system of government” (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000:503).

Kurt Schock explains that nonviolent action is one of many possible responses to an intolerable situation and he depicts a hypothetical hierarchy of progression in decision making. Following the path to nonviolent action, from the starting point of a situation of
political oppression and injustice is: “recognition instead of non-recognition, non-acceptance instead of accepting the current situation, political action instead of everyday forms of resistance or exiting the situation, non-institution action instead of the normal institutional channels such as voting, holding referenda, engaging in litigation, and finally nonviolent action instead of violent means for change” (2005:13). At each step there are decisions to be made between these alternative courses of action.

Schock also states that social scientist studying third-world states are seeing a shift from the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist strategy of violent action through militarization of peasants which causes a protracted “people’s war” against the state toward nonviolent strategies for successfully challenging regimes. He explains that this is due to a combination of factors including the fact that nation-states are now more capable of “suppressing private violence, the advancement in communications which has facilitated the organizing of nonviolent actions, and the formation of a global civil society where third parties now are playing a crucial role in shifting the balance of power in other states” (2005:17).

Gene Sharp also writes about the fact that people are making critical choices in his three volume collection, which is considered to be the seminal work in nonviolent action. In the first volume: The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part One, Power and Struggle he discusses the nature of political power and describes nonviolent action as an active technique of struggle not just passivity as many mistakenly consider nonviolence to be. The book presents the following description of the nature of political power and the choices people make: “There are two views of the nature of power. One can see people as dependent upon the good will, the decisions and the support of their governments. Or,
conversely, one can see that government is dependent on the people’s good will, decisions and support.” (Sharp, 1973:8) In Sharp’s definition the dynamic of how people think about power is changed as he puts it in the hands of the people.

Sharp quotes Mahatma Gandhi as saying: “there is a need for: 1) a psychological change away from passive submission to self-respect and courage; 2) recognition by the subject that his assistance makes the regime possible; and 3) the building of a determination to withdraw cooperation and obedience” (1973:31). Dr. King also stated this same concept when he said simply: “The only thing that we decided was that we weren’t going to go along with things that weren’t right, any longer!” (Carson, 1998)

In describing what he means by nonviolent action, the crucial question for Sharp was whether there would be action (in which he included both violent and non-violent approaches) versus inaction; and he points out that several writers have said nonviolent action is similar to military war with strategy, tactics, battles, courage, and discipline. Looking through history, Sharp identified 198 different nonviolent tactics which have been used over the years. He divides them into three broad categories: the first is largely symbolic actions such as parades, vigils, hunger strikes, and ceremonies. The second is non-cooperation, which has the sub-categories of economic (boycotts, and strikes), social (practiced in assemblies, and in churches), or political (voting, and the running for local office). And the third is direct intervention in the form of sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, and parallel governments.

Sharp states that to a degree which has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent technique operates by producing power changes; and this continues to remain an underdeveloped political technique. He states that throughout history the practice of
nonviolent action has usually been practiced “under highly unfavorable conditions and with a lack of experienced participants. Almost always there were no advance preparations or training, little or no planning, nor prior consideration of strategy and tactics or the range of methods available. But amazingly, the practice of the technique has been widespread, successful and orderly” (1973:101).

Charles Tilly explains that the choices made by campaign organizers are limited and based upon cultural and historical factors. He states that “challengers innovate only within a limits set by the repertoire already established by place, and time. He sees a great embedding of contention in previously existing history, culture, and social relations.” (Tilly, 2006:41) He chooses the word ‘repertoire’ purposefully to indicate that a choice of action is made, which is based upon the challenger’s past actions, familiarity with roles, and cultural norms. But says that innovation is important; in times of shifting circumstances, power-holders will tend to “cling to past proven performances, those actions that have brought them into power and kept them in-charge; and to the degree that challengers seek new means of collective claim making, expanding and changing their repertoires they will unsettle the power-holders and be successful in their pursuits” (Tilly, 2006:41).

Tilly states that completely new, genuinely unfamiliar actions almost always misfire, but perfect repetition from one performance to the next breeds boredom and indifference which is felt to be non-threatening and therefore does not lead to change. He feels that the challengers must expand their repertoires of contention to be successful, and that is difficult because repertoires are deeply cultural, structural, and based on shared understanding and history. Tilly explains that within these limits if challengers will
experiment with new forms of collective action where tactical advantage dictates, in small ways, over the long run innovations will accumulate into substantial changes in repertoires enabling success (Tilly, 2006).

Schock also points out that the ruling regime is making choices as well. As in game theory where two independent groups of actors make separate decisions at the same time, the interplay of choices made, determines the success of the outcome.

“Similar to the repertoires of contention available to dissidents there are the repertoires of social control that states have to respond to challenges” (Schock, 2005:30).

Schock brings out that “the use of violent repression from the controlling regime against nonviolent challengers may invoke a dynamic that increases resistance to the regime by contributing to mobilization of the opposition campaign” (2005:43). If the ruling regime responds with violence it is often a sign that they feel threatened. The challengers will see this changing dynamic and often feel that their actions are being taken seriously. Schock explains that: “it can make the challengers more committed to their struggle and is far more likely to generate questions about the legitimacy of an authority using violence on unarmed citizens; as well as exacerbating divisions within the political elite and security forces, and cultivating influential domestic or international allies” (2005:43). When the international news media expose the violence of the state in contrast “to the nonviolence of the protestors (if that is the choice they make) it casts the state in a negative light and may lead to shifts in opinion that alter power relations and lead to the protestors’ success” (Schock, 2005:43). For example, as the world watched the tanks roll into Tiananmen Square in June 1989, in opposition to the student’s peaceful
protests, the dramatic international news presentation of the events greatly swayed public opinion.

**Under what conditions are campaigns mobilized?**

Beyond understanding that choices are being made by both the campaign organizers and the ruling regime, researchers have looked at many different independent variables in seeking to determine under what conditions are campaigns mobilized and whether those campaigns will be executed via violent or nonviolent means. Economist, Paul Collier (2007) indicates that overall low income heightens the risk of civil war; slow economic growth and dependence upon primary commodity exports increases the likelihood of violent opposition. He distinguishes these variables from other factors which his work shows do not cause the emergence of violent campaigns: unequal income distribution, history of colonial repression of the state, nor ethnic strife.

Charles Tilly has tied the decision of establishing a new campaign as either violent or nonviolent, to the level of democracy in the state. Tilly observed: “Across the nineteenth century, nonviolent social campaigns generally flourished and spread where democratization was occurring and receded when authoritarian regimes curtailed democratic rights. This pattern continued during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: with the maps of full-fledged social campaigns and of democratic institutions overlapped greatly” (2004:125). The emerging perception is that the well documented success of several nonviolent campaigns, some established under principled nonviolent motives, others due to pragmatic nonviolent motives, is encouraging more groups seeking to make a change to turn to nonviolent means. It is thought that this is particularly true in democratic states where people are relatively free to gather in collective social protest,
hold protest marches, rallies, boycotts, strikes and any number of nonviolent protests with lower risk of reprisal. It is also felt that in autocratic states, where the people may be under a great deal of social control and repression, we will see those seeking regime changes to turn to violent tactics.

In addition to level of democracy, Tilly adds governmental capacity to the independent variables that he has studied. “Governmental capacity does not enter the definition of democracy, yet it strongly affects the chances for democratic processes. If high governmental capacity does not define democracy, it looks like a nearly necessary condition for democracy on a large scale. But expanding governmental capacity also promotes tyranny at the other end of the scale from democracy” (2005: 431). This leads Tilly to the conclusion that the relationship between governmental capacity and democracy is asymmetrically curvilinear.

Using these two variables, Tilly along with Sidney Tarrow lay out a quadrant of four dimensions, high government capacity with autocratic form of government, low government capacity with autocratic form of government, high government capacity with democratic form of government and low government capacity with a democratic form of government. Their analysis shows that very different sorts of contention prevail in the four corners of the quadrant.

Governments that are high in capacity with an autocratic form of government will experience campaigns for regime change which are violent clandestine oppositions and brief confrontations that the authors feel will be quickly repressed. Low government capacity states with an autocratic form of government will experience campaigns for change that break down into civil war. Governments that are low in capacity with a
democratic form of government the authors feel will experience campaigns for change in the form of military coups and struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups; and only in high governmental capacity states with democratic governments will campaigns for change be nonviolent and social in nature (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:57).

Other researchers looking at what independent variables affect the emergence and types of campaigns take a slightly different approach and look at the conditions of the state prior to the emergence of a campaign. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman study a large array of long-term data about political openings, transitions from authoritarianism, political rights, and civil liberties in order to better understand how key characteristics of the period prior to a transition correlate with the eventual outcome for freedom and democratic practice. Their research looks at the pre-transition environment of 67 states where a transition from authoritarianism occurred, to assess and code them according to three key characteristics:

a) The sources of violence that were present prior to the political opening;

b) The degree of civic or bottom-up versus power holder or top-down, influence on the process of change.

c) The strength and cohesion of a nonviolent civic coalition.

The study then compares these three transition characteristics with the degree of freedom that exists in each state using Freedom House’s rating of democracy on a seven point scale, with one representing the highest level of democratic political practices and effective adherence to fundamental civil liberties, and seven representing the absence of all political rights and massive or systematic human rights violations.
The study’s principle findings were first, that nonviolent: “Civil resistance campaigns are a major source of pressure for decisive change in most transitions. The force of civic resistance was a key factor in driving 75 percent of the transitions in our study, over the last 33 years.

Second principle finding; there is comparatively little positive effectiveness for freedom in top-down transitions that were launched and led by elite power holders. Only two transitions that have led to high levels of freedom today were driven from the power holders. That result translates to only 3 percent of the successful campaigns.

The third finding was the presence of strong and cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions. This was determined to be the most important factor among those that this study examined which contributed to lasting freedom. In 48 percent of the transitions studied, strong broad-based nonviolent civil coalitions were highly active and in many cases central to steering the process of change. Karatnycky and Ackerman found the stronger and more cohesive the nonviolent civil coalition operated in societies prior to transition, the deeper the transformation toward freedom and democracy.

The fourth finding the data suggests is that the prospects for freedom were significantly enhanced when the civil coalition did not use violence. And in those campaigns which turned to violent means, they were significantly less likely to produce sustainable freedom. “We find therefore that the choice of strategies employed by the civic coalition is therefore of fundamental importance to the outcome” (2005: 4).

The book Nonviolent Social Campaigns, A Geographical Perspective edited by, Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher brings out two interesting variables which affect where a campaign will be mobilized and with what tactics will they fight for
change (violent or nonviolent). The first section contained two overviews of nonviolent social campaigns one by Kenneth Boulding an economist and the second by Pam McAllister who offers the woman’s perspective and highlights the role of women in the nonviolent campaigns around the world. Boulding sets the stage by explaining that after two world wars, the great depression, enormous population growth and dramatic increase in per capita gross in world production, there is a widening disparity between the rich temperate zones and the poor tropics. To respond to this disparity, the world is seeing a surprising number of organized nonviolent campaigns as an instrument of social and political change.

The second article, written by Pam McAllister, discusses women in nonviolent campaigns. She writes of the peculiar strength of nonviolence which comes from the two-handed nature of its approach. This two-handed nature she describes as: “we won’t be bullied; but at the same time you needn’t fear us.” (in Zunes, 1999:19). It incorporates the ideas of non-cooperation as presented by Gene Sharp, but at the same time using a nonviolent, unthreatening approach which seems particularly coordinate with the role that women have played throughout history. McAllister states that although women are often under acknowledged in the press they have been central to many nonviolent civil campaigns over the past century, and she discusses three of them:

- The 1970’s Los Madres of Argentina, who protested in the town square for information on the disappearances of their sons.

- The 2,000 plus women, including the most vocal peasants, in Tokyo Japan in 1981, who marched through commercial district to remind the country about
Hiroshima as the peace-activities established after WW II began to be undermined.

- And the women at Greenham Common Peace Camp in England who watched and reported on the secret deployment of ground-launch cruise missiles (in Zunes, 1999).

Stephen Zunes provides an overview of unarmed resistance in the Middle East and North Africa. He explains that while terror, repression and war have dominated western media coverage of the Middle East there are numerous examples of nonviolent civil action, including: Women marching together through the streets of Beirut demanding an end to Lebanon’s sectarian violence; thousands of Israelis and Palestinians holding hands to encircle the entire Old City of Jerusalem for the cause of peace and self-determination for both peoples; and Saudi women driving cars through the streets of Riyadh in open defiance of the kingdom’s ban on female drivers. “With the U.S. and other powers pouring billions of dollars-worth of sophisticated armaments into the region, it may be too simplistic to blame the militarism and authoritarianism of the Middle East on cultural or religious factors” (1999: 39).

And Zunes points out that, despite Western prejudice to the contrary, many aspects of Islamic culture are quite consistent with the practice of nonviolent action. He explains that the true meaning of the Muslim’s jihad is: “the effort to improve one’s personal character, service to religion, and fulfillment of God’s will” (1999:42). He describes several nonviolent struggles including the 1919 revolution in Egypt, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, where protestors were encouraged to win-over military troops, the 1967 campaign to free the Golan Heights from Israel and once again join Syria, and the
1987 to 1991 Palestine Intifada, which had a greater effect in changing the world’s perceptions of the Palestinian plight than the decades of violent fighting. He concludes by saying the limited but significant success of nonviolent action in North Africa and the Middle East raises the hope that the injustices which have led to the rise of violent and extremist campaigns might be addressed increasingly through the power of nonviolent action.

The questions that Chenoweth and Stephan seek to explain in their book are: “why it is that nonviolent resistance often succeeds relative to violent resistance and under what conditions does nonviolent resistance succeed or fail” (2011:6). They have found that the success rates of nonviolent campaigns have increased as the success rates of violent insurgencies have declined. “The most striking finding is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts” (2011:7). This is especially interesting given that a scan of the dataset reveals that there have been more than twice as many violent campaigns (218) than nonviolent ones (105).

Chenoweth and Stephan’s central contention is that: “nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which they show to be an important factor in determining campaigns outcomes” (2011:10). They explain that participation in violent campaigns is generally limited to physically capable young males, whereas historically nonviolent campaigns have seen the participation of all members of society. Anyone can participate in boycotts, marches, parades and numerous other forms of nonviolent participation.
Chenoweth and Stephan also show that “nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective in getting results, and once they have succeeded, more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war” (2011:10). Nonviolent campaigns with their liberal and equal call for citizen participation have led to an increased level of democracy for the most part, while violent campaigns have led to governments with violent means of control and greater autocracy.

These researchers also urge that it is time for scholars to rethink power and its sources in any given society. “Although it [power] is often operationalized as a state’s military and economic capacity, our findings demonstrate that power actually depends on the consent of the civilian population, consent that can be withdrawn and reassigned to more legitimate or more compelling parties” (2011:25). This builds on the work of Gene Sharp in identifying the existing regime’s pillars of support and saying: “one can see that government is actually dependent on the people’s good will, decisions, and support.” (Sharp, 1973:8)

Chenoweth and Stephan note that the “many scholars have discussed the effects on the state of violent insurgencies, revolutions, civil wars, and other types of civil conflicts on regime type and the renewal of violent conflict. However, very few have compared the effects of nonviolent and violent insurgencies on the post conflict political milieu” (2011:205). They begin this work by comparing violent and nonviolent campaigns and the level of autocracy/democracy five years after the campaign has ended, as well as the likelihood of civil peace or recurrence of civil war. They present the argument that violent conflicts will likely result in rulers and new regimes that “hesitate to adopt democratic values and ideals, which would be the reverse the norms they have
established during the course of their violent struggles” (2011:219). And conversely the participants in successful nonviolent conflicts are “more likely to codify emerging norms of nonviolent contestation into domestic institutions, thus encouraging nonviolent bargaining and conflict resolution after the dispute has ended” (2011:219). Their results from five years after the campaign has ended, on polity scoring reveal that when violent insurgencies succeed, “the country that hosts the insurgency is much less likely to become democratic” (2011:219). Chenoweth and Stephan also found that among all insurgencies “a nonviolent campaign is much more likely to have a higher level of post conflict democracy, than a violent insurgency” (2011:213).

This study would like to build on the work in the after campaign arena begun by Chenoweth and Stephan and continue looking at how states differ in their recovery from major opposition campaigns. This study will compare violent and nonviolent campaign outcomes and then further break this down by whether the campaign was successful or failed to achieve its goals. This study will also take two measures, the first at five years after the campaign and a second at ten years to verify if the changes made in the first five post-campaign years are continued. And as described in the next section in addition to measuring the level of autocracy/ democracy in the polity scoring, this study will look at eight other stability indicators to provide a more comprehensive picture of how states recover from major campaigns.

The research study team at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) analyzed data on 58 countries between 1991 and 2000 for structural stability in an effort to predict the emergence of campaigns for regime change. The dependent variable in their study was “violence/ human security”; and their study investigated: “the
preconditions of structural stability and tested their mutual interconnections. Seven dimensions were analyzed:

1. Long-term economic growth. This dimension depends on the capability of increasing the accumulation of physical and human capital and on increasing productivity. The authors used GDP as published by the IMF.

2. Environmental security. This dimension is defined as the lasting and/or sudden negative change of an ecosystem. The author’s focus was placed on environmental stress with regard to water, population and soil. Two indicators from the seventh millennium development goal were aggregated: population with access to improved drinking water and slum population as a percentage of urban population (indicates potential environmental stress due to insufficient sewage).

3. Social equality. This dimension reflects the status in which all individuals have equal chances and opportunities to live their chosen way of life without having to endure extreme deprivations. It is reflected in a disparate allocation of economic, political and social resources. The authors chose the Gini Index to represent this dimension.

4. Governmental effectiveness. Is defined as the ability of states to deliver goods and services and carry out the normal administrative functions of government, such as revenue collection, necessary economic regulation and information management. The authors chose the “Governance Index” by Kaufmann et al. which incorporates 31 sources to arrive at an aggregated indicator for 213 states and territories.
5. Democracy. This dimension is defined by the authors as the entire adult population being able to participate in political decision making, by voting in regular, free, and fair elections. Several international indicators were scrutinized and the authors chose the Freedom House measure of Political Rights: in the subcategory ‘Electoral Process’.

6. Rule of law. The authors define this dimension as: state authorities do not act arbitrarily but within the civil rights and constitution, proclaimed by the people and that governmental action serve law and justice while being under independent judicial control. For a measure of this dimension the authors again turned to Freedom House, this time the category of ‘civil liberties’.

7. Inclusion of identity groups. This is defined as the acknowledgement of specific social groups as well as their integration into the political decision-making process. The authors sought to include both religious beliefs and ethnicity, and ended up constructing an indicator of their own from data made available by GIGA and the Cingranelli and Richards’ Human Rights Dataset.

The Study’s dependent variable was violence/human security, and the authors looked at two aspects of violence; first, war-like high intensity violence and second, every-day violence manifested in murder, manslaughter, robbery and rape. Both dimensions are signs of structural instability and were included in this project. For the dependent variable measurement the authors chose the ‘Peace and Conflict, Human Security Sub-index’ from the 2005 data of Marshall and Gurr of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM).
The GIGA results showed that none of the independent variables exhibited a strong correlation with the dependent variable of human security but, four of the variables were significantly and moderately correlated: social equality (-0.33), democracy (0.36), rule of law (0.46), and inclusion of identity groups (-0.35). Surprisingly, the social equality variable turned out to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable, which was contrary to the authors’ expectations. The authors explain this may be due to the limited data quality for this dimension, and several outliers.

The authors then sought to cluster the variables to determine if some combination of variables were mutually enhancing and could predict lack of violence and therefore structural stability. Although the results turned out to be tentative in character, the strongest correlations were for: democratic states with good rule of law were correlated with low violence, and second, states with low inclusion of identity groups along with lack of governmental effectiveness were correlated with a high degree of violence. The other dimensions: sustainable economic growth, environmental security, and social equality were inconclusive.

Overall the authors initial expectation that the correlation of the various dimensions of structural stability with the dependent variable of human security would result in clear clustering of variables predicting structural stability were not confirmed. But the study was valuable study in that it worked with many different social science indicators in an effort to predict structural stability and presented the usefulness and limitations of each.

Jack Goldstone and colleagues (2010) developed a global model for forecasting political instability through their analysis of 141 separate instability episodes between
1955 and 2003. The episodes included 44 adverse regime changes (which they define as dropping 3 or more points on the Marshall and Jaggers’ 21 point Polity IV scale), 12 revolutionary wars, 13 ethnic wars, a single isolated politicide and 71 complex episodes involving a combination of different types of instability that overlapped or followed upon each other in close sequence. “We developed a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80 percent accuracy” (2010:190). The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic movements, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21 point polity scale, their model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onset, leading the authors to conclude that “political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demographics, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability” (2010:190).

After testing over 50 independent variables, their model incorporates just four independent variables: a categorical measure of Regime Type, as indicated by patterns in the process of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation; Infant Mortality, logged and normalized to the global average in the year of observation; a Conflict-Ridden Neighborhood indicator, flagging cases that have four or more bordering states with major armed civil or ethnic conflict, according to the Major Episodes of Political Violence data set; and a binary measure of State-Led Discrimination, as indicated by a coding of 4 on either of the indices of political or
economic discrimination for any group tracked by the Minorities at Risk Project. The most striking result in the model is the identification of partial democracies with factionalism as an exceptionally unstable type of regime. (2010:197).

**How is stability and growth measured?**

Once an opposition campaign has been waged and a new regime has come into power the work of scholars turns to describing a host of stability indicators to measure the state’s ability to establish peace, enable growth and support the well-being of its people. Besides the analysis described above by Mehler and the GIGA Center, on the suite of structural stability indicators, there are many other scholars researching different aspects of stability.

Andrew Berg and Jeffrey Sachs are economists who define structural characteristics of developing states as: income inequality, share of agriculture in the state’s Gross National Product (GNP), as well as the state’s trade regime: and “where there are extreme inequalities of income, the pressures for redistributive policies tend to be greatest while the ability of the wealthy to resist the pressures for income redistribution also tend to be strong given their significant command over economic and political resources” (Berg, 1988:273). Another key dimension of economic structural stability is the extent to which agricultural versus urban interests influence the political decisions over economic policymaking. “Governments are most secure which find a significant base of support in the agricultural sector; this sector tends to favor more conservative and stable policies” (Berg 1988:273). A third dimension of economic structural stability is the state’s trade regime. “There is now a considerable amount of
evidence that outward orientation of trade policy enhances the growth prospects and therefore stability of developing countries” (Berg 1988:276).

In a report prepared for the African Development Bank (ADB) and the OECD Development Centre, Jean-Claude Berthelemy and colleagues defined three components of political structural stability as: 1) Political stability: based on the lack of the occurrence of strikes, demonstrations, violence and coup d’état. 2) An index of the softening of the political regime derived from information on releases of political prisoners, measures in favor of human rights, decisions promoting democracy, lifting of bans on demonstrations and public debates. 3) A measure of the lack of threats to democracy such as: dissolution of political parties, violence perpetrated by the police and the banning of demonstrations or public debates.

One could also discuss legal structural stability, the structural stability of the business environment, as well as the state’s social structural stability. Hurwitz admits that: “confusion abounds due to the lack of agreement concerning the meaning of the terms employed to define ‘stability’; and there is also a lack of consensus regarding the operationalization of these terms. But roughly discerned there are five commonly used conceptions of structural stability: “1) the absence of violence, 2) the duration of government, 3) the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, 4) the absence of structural change, and 5) a multifaceted social attribute. To this Ted Robert Gurr proposed an additional definition: regime persistence and adaptability” (in Hurwitz 1973:449). Goldsmith sums this up simply as “most writers appear to believe stability is a multidimensional phenomenon and try to tap it by developing composite measures. Some
of these are inadequate because, for instance, they include economic growth as an attribute rather than a result of stability” (1987:474).

**The contribution of this study.**

It is hoped that this study will add to the existing literature in several ways: first, it will bring quantitative rigor to the study of how states recover from major opposition movements which are currently primarily qualitative in nature and mostly focused on how states recover from violent campaigns. Second, it will begin to fill the gap in the absence of scholarly research in after transition structural stability. Many scholars have already noted the fact that nonviolent campaigns emerge under certain conditions, and that they often succeed under another set of overlapping conditions. However, the longer-term impacts of these campaigns, are yet unknown. In particular, existing studies only tend to look at whether the country becomes democratic (Chenoweth, Stephan, Epstein, and Gurr) and whether it relapses into civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, Licklider) after the campaign ends. These are somewhat narrow indicators, however, and don’t necessarily identify whether life improves in post-nonviolent campaign settings compared with post-violent campaign settings. What this thesis is doing is examining a variety of potential impacts in the state’s structural stability indicators. This is important because many observers argue that cases like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Iran, and Yemen suggest that nonviolent campaigns might make conditions worse rather than better. It is hoped that this study which is looking at a variety of indicators, will contest this emerging conventional wisdom with historical data and rigorous analysis, and prove to be very useful.
As we continue to see the number of opposition movements increasing today, and realize that campaign organizers make a choice between violent and nonviolent tactics, it becomes vital to understand which type of campaign will help to establish the state’s future success and in what areas that successful will be lasting. The research question this study is seeking to answer is; does the choice of campaign type, in terms of violent or nonviolent tactics being utilized, and whether the campaign was successful, have an impact on the future growth of the state as measured in structural stability indicators.

### III. Organization of main sections of the dissertation:

The thesis has two main sections. The first picking up after the transition to a new regime has occurred will investigate the impact of the campaign on the state. The analysis will bring together quantitative data in a suite of stability indicators measured five and ten years after each campaign ends, to analyze if violent or nonviolent campaigns better positioned the state to establish peace, promote economic growth and development, implement rule of law, and social stability. The data used for this portion of the dissertation will be secondary research pulling together data from numerous sources.

Data on historical campaigns will be pulled from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset compiled by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2008) and coupled with indicators collected by other sources including the World Bank, Freedom House, the Penn World Tables, the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, the
Uppsala University Conflict Data Program and a self-created index of regional stability. Data will be recorded for each indicator five and ten years after the campaign ends.

To handle the endogeneity prior to the event, a pretest of sorts is used to control for a measure of the indicator five years before the campaign. Endogeneity is the concern that there may be something about the state that leads campaign organizers to choose violent or nonviolent tactics, or to be successful, which also correlates with the dependent variable. Adjusting statistically for the indicator five years before the start of the campaign helps account for the endogeneity problem, but of course there are still limitations to making firm causal conclusions from non-experimental data of this kind.

Two regression tests will be run for each indicator, the first measuring the dependent variable five years after campaign end, the second measuring the dependent variable ten years after. Taking a measure of the dependent variable just after a governmental transition or even after a major unsuccessful campaign is unwise as states usually experience some instability in the period immediately after the campaign ends. Therefore this study will measure the stability indicators five years after the campaign ends to quantify the state’s progress or decline, and then ten years after to see if the trajectories of those effects remain constant.

The second section of the dissertation will contain four case studies of states that have experienced opposition campaigns. Qualitative data will be explored on the events leading up to the campaign, the means in which it was executed including whether it was violent or nonviolent and what factors lead to its success or failure. During the case studies as much as possible I will present: 1. the social basis of the conflict, estimating how much of the country supports the movement (i.e. how wide spread), 2. Social
characteristics - who are the movement organizers, how are they expressing their vision of what the state could be, 3. Where are movements occurring - rural versus urban, class, relation of protestors to government, and 4. The interests of the protestors (grievances, motivation, and nationalistic vision) as well as the population of potential followers that they appeal to, and also those who oppose them and how these considerations play out in public performances. Then the study will look at: are these things important in post conflict stability.

The first case study will be the 1989 pro-democracy campaign in East Germany which was a successful nonviolent campaign in a very autocratic state. At the time East Germany had a polity score of -9 so it was far down the autocracy scale with people living in a very controlled environment, and yet a nonviolent campaign arose which was successful.

The second case study will be the 1992-1994 Somalia militia insurgency which was a successful violent campaign in a strongly autocratic state. In 1992 Somalia had a polity score of -7. In contrast to East Germany, this campaign occurred in a state that was failing at the time as Somalia has been considered a failed state since the early 1990’s. The uniqueness of its grass-roots recovery and the extent to which public services are provided without a working central government will be discussed.

The third case study will be the 1994-1995 Muhajir campaign in Pakistan. In 1994 Pakistan was a strong democratic state with a polity score of +8. This campaign was violent and unsuccessful and I will explore the reasons why.

The fourth case study will explore the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. Lebanon was a mildly democratic state at polity +5, which experienced a successful
nonviolent campaign. It stood out as a successful nonviolent movement that brought increased democracy to a Middle Eastern state.

In choosing these campaigns I have sought a mixture of autocratic and democratic states, of campaigns that were nonviolent and violent, and to have campaigns that were both successful and those that failed to achieve their goals. They all occurred within a relatively short time frame, from 1989 to 2005 and show the difference in campaigns that were on-going in somewhat overlapping times. They also show that campaigns were occurring in many different parts of the world and in states with great variance in wealth, capacity, social customs, and geo-political environments. It is hoped that this mixture can give some indication of the qualitative aspects of opposition campaigns.

There are several strengths and weaknesses for both qualitative and quantitative methodologies and it is hoped that by using both methods in different sections of this work, these concerns will addressed. Qualitative studies provide a rich source of details and reveal variables which lead to individual campaign success but, they are limited in their ability to generalize their results to other campaigns. Quantitative studies provide that generalizability but because they are conducted at a higher level need the rich source of details that qualitative studies provide.

IV. Section One – After Campaign End, Measuring Structural Stability

Methodological Details:

The first section of the dissertation will analyze the state’s stability after the government has transitioned to a new regime or the end of a campaign which has not
been successful. This study will use and build upon the campaigns identified in the NAVCO dataset and will bring together quantitative data on a suite of stability indicators. The NAVCO dataset combines 323 cases of major non-state resistance campaigns from 1900-2006. The dataset brings together numerous cases of violent and nonviolent campaigns with the objectives of expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military juntas), and in some cases, other major types of social change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns). Omitted from their data set are major social and economic campaigns such as the civil rights movement and the populist movement in the United States. The data consists of consensus information from experts on major armed and unarmed insurrections, with the purpose of testing whether the rate of success varies on the level of democracy of the targets of the struggle. (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008:15)

It is often the case that campaigns use both violent and nonviolent methods, some at the same time, some alternating between methods over the course of the movement. This dataset addresses this dilemma by characterizing campaigns as “primarily nonviolent” or “primarily violent” based on the primacy of resistance methods employed as corroborated between multiple sources and experts in the field of nonviolent conflict (2008:16).

The nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by
Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). Finally, the cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used (2008:16).

Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as “violent.” Violent resistance involves the use of force to physically harm, or threaten to harm the opponent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from Kristian Gleditsch’s 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) for information on conflicts after 2002. The COW dataset requires 1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict (2008:17).

This same dataset will be used and added to with after-campaign structural stability indicators. The first indicator to be analyzed is ‘predicted life expectancy at birth’ and will use data from the World Bank (WB) Country Dataset to compare the effects of major violent and nonviolent campaigns for regime change on this important health indicator. A pre-campaign baseline will be compared to post-campaign measurements to enable the study of changes made in the state on the social determinants affecting longevity, after the campaign was over.

The second indicator is ‘long term economic growth’ which refers to “how a state’s macroeconomic assets (including natural resources) increase, and how the assets
are manifested by a growing per capita income over the course of time. The standard economic long-term growth models depend on the capability of increasing the accumulation of physical and human capital and on increased productivity due to technological progress” (Mehler 2008:7). Economists usually apply real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) This study will use GDP PPP per capita data which is available from the Penn World Table dataset version 7.0 (2011). The third indicator is ‘rule of law’ and is defined as “the authorities of the state do no act arbitrarily but rather within the civil rights of individuals as defined by the state’s constitution; governmental actions serve law and justice while being under independent juridical control, and individuals are guaranteed steadfast civil rights” (Mehler 2008:11). For rule of law, this study will use the measure of civil liberty by Freedom House. The extent of civil liberties in a state is calculated annually and coded from one to seven. The next indicator is ‘degree of Autocracy/Democracy’ which is coded on the 21 point polity scale of -10 to +10 (-10 representing the most autocratic states to +10 for the most democratic states). This data is available from Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, the principal investigators at Societal-Systems Research Inc. at Colorado State University. Since much of the analysis was based off of the idea that democracies handle opposition campaigns differently than autocracies, it was felt that a change in the level of democracy after regime transition and in subsequent years should be noted. This builds upon the work of Chenoweth and Stephan who looked at the changes in Polity at five years after the campaign; and will break this down by successful and unsuccessful campaigns, and also look at ten years after the campaign.
The fifth indicator is health of the population and we will use ‘infant mortality’ data available from the WB. Goldstone’s et.al model of predicting political instability showed that infant mortality was a better indicator of the health of the state, than numerous other health care indicators such as the of percentage of the state’s federal budget spent on healthcare, access to health care facilities, percentage of the population that has been immunized etc.. Infant mortality is defined by the WB as “the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year” (WB, 2011).

The next indicator to be investigated is ‘respect for human rights’. Data for this indicator was pulled from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) index, which is based on the following four components: torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings and disappearances.

The next indicator is ‘employment to population ratio’ and for this indicator this study will use data from the WB Country Dataset. The WB defines ‘employment to population ratio ages fifteen plus’ as “the proportion of a country’s working-age population that is employed. Ages fifteen and older are generally considered the working-age population” (WB, 2012). The sources of that data for the WB are the International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market Database which is refreshed annually; along with each country’s labour force survey coverage of their associated civilian population. The indicator for each country is compiled from average monthly estimates.

The eighth indicator is ‘school enrollment in primary years (percentage of net)’ and is defined by the WB as: “Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of children of official school age based on the International Standard Classification of Education 1997, who are
enrolled in school, to the population of the corresponding official school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music” (WB, 2011).

The last indicator is ‘regional stability’ and this study will use the Uppsala Conflict Database to create a new indicator that will calculate the percentage of neighboring countries in conflict. The Goldstone et al. model found that if four or more neighboring countries are in conflict the state under investigation has a greater likelihood of falling into violent conflict. Certainly neighbors in conflict put pressures on new regimes that have come into power by both violent and nonviolent campaigns, but the question becomes, which type of campaign better stabilizes the state and enables it to handle this pressure and not break down into conflict.

For all of these indicators the analysis will first determine the pre-campaign (or pretest) level for the indicator, and then measure the change for each variable after the campaign, comparing violent campaigns to nonviolent campaigns, and whether the campaign was successful, to investigate which type of campaign brings in changes that set the state up for more progress in each of the areas that the indicators are measuring. Overall summations and conclusions will then be drawn based upon the findings.

**Theories. --introduces the structural stability indicators and why chosen.**

*Life expectancy*—

Major opposition campaigns don’t leave the state where they found it. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow explain that: “Contentious campaigns for change, whether
violent or nonviolent, reshape the state’s political relations, institutions, opportunities, threats, and modes of behavior; and they thereby promote within the state a change toward either democratization or autocratization” (2007:67). Major opposition campaigns included in this dataset are those that are defined as involving at least one thousand people; and whether they are successful or fail in their efforts, they can bring significant change to the social determinants of the state. What are these changes? How does the recovery of states which experienced a violent campaign differ from those that experienced a nonviolent social movement? The truth is, we don’t really know. Very little quantitative analysis has been done to compare states recovering from violent campaigns to those recovering from nonviolent ones.

This study begins to fill this gap by comparing the impact of major opposition campaigns on predicted life expectancy, at birth. “Life expectancy is calculated by adding up the probabilities of surviving to every age and then applying one of several models to smooth out any random statistical fluctuations from one year of age to the next (Sullivan and Sheffrin, 2003).

In practice, life expectancy at birth is one of the best World Development Indicators that provide an indication of the overall health and general living conditions of the state. It incorporates all of the natural phenomena of climate, weather, geography, environmental factors, and global warming; as well as policy considerations including how the state is doing in supplying health care, how the state addresses food supply considering both those who are starving as well as those who are obese, as well as how the state deals with epidemics including HIV/AIDS, malaria, flu, etc. (Robine and Ritchie, 1991).
R. G. Wilkinson indicates that variations in Life Expectancy have been correlated with a wide variety of measures of socioeconomic status including car ownership, housing tenure, occupational class, overcrowding, education, and unemployment. His research brings to light “a significant tendency of mortality to be lower (i.e. higher life expectancy) in countries with more egalitarian distribution of income; not necessarily higher income but more egalitarian. This relationship has been identified in different countries, at different times, and with different measures of income distribution, suggesting that the effect is robust” (1992:165). He cites specifically a comparison between Britain and Japan whose income distribution and life expectancy were similar in 1970 and fairly typical of other OECD countries at that time. But, by 1992 Japan had the highest life expectancy in the world with no obvious explanation in the form of changing diet or health services. He did however observe that by 1992 “Japan had the most egalitarian income distribution of any country on record. Britain on the other hand, had an income distribution that had widened since the mid-1980’s while mortality among men and women aged 15-44 years increased greatly” (1992:167). Wilkinson also states that if Britain were to adopt an income distribution more like the most egalitarian European countries the slope of the regression equation would suggests that about two years might be added to the population’s life expectancy (1992:167).

Health related concerns also impact life expectancy. Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, S. Jay Olshansky et al. state that “from our analysis of the effect of obesity on longevity, we conclude that the steady rise in life expectancy during the past two centuries may soon come to an end” (2005:1138). They explain that the trend in life expectancy throughout history has been characterized by a slow and steady increase; a
pattern sometimes punctuated by volatility in death rates caused by epidemics and pandemic infectious diseases, famines, and war. But, “this volatility was dramatically curtailed in the mid-19th century as infectious diseases yielded to improved living conditions, advances in public health, and medical interventions” (2005:1139).

However, during the past 30 years the rise in life expectancy at birth in the United States has decelerated relative to this historical pattern, so much so that now the gains in life expectancy are much smaller than they were in previous decades, and if this trend were to continue on the same trajectory, life expectancy will go into decline. This would mean that for the first time in recorded history, the next generation would not be expected to live as long as the current one. “The proportion of people with extreme obesity has increased at an especially rapid rate such that now two-thirds of adults in the U.S. today are obese or overweight. These trends have affected all major racial and ethnic groups, all regions of the country, and all socio-economic strata” (2005:1140). Obesity has been shown to have a substantial negative effect on longevity, reducing the length of life of people who are severely obese by an estimated 5 to 20 years depending on the level of obesity.

Another study looked at environmental factors and showed that life expectancy can be increased when there is a decrease in fine particulate air pollution. C. Arden Pope III et al. showed that “a decrease of 10 ug per cubic meter in the concentration of fine particulate matter was associated with an estimated increase in mean life expectancy of 0.61 years + or – 0.20 (p=0.004), holding constant changes in socioeconomic and demographic variables as well as a proxy indicator for the prevalence of cigarette smoking. In other words reductions in air pollution accounted for as much as 15 percent
of the overall increase in life expectancy in the study areas” (2009:376). The study areas were 51 U.S. cities which made substantial efforts to improve air quality between the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Their analysis brings good news, “although multiple factors affect life expectancy, our findings provide evidence that improvements in air quality have contributed to measureable improvements in human health and life expectancy” (2009:386). They also state: “We found substantial variation, or scatter, around the regression line, indicating that the association with air pollution although significant, was only one part of the variation; clearly other important factors influence life expectancy” (2009:380).

These studies point to the numerous factors that can impact of life expectancy and the reasons why life expectancy is a good overall measure of how the state is managing environmental, socioeconomic, health care, and disease concerns. It is the contention of this author that states which experience nonviolent campaigns whether they are successful or fail to reach their goals, if the magnitude of participation is large enough, will bring about changes in the state that causes leaders to provide for the availability of steady nutritious food supplies, clean air, the availability of health services and if possible, employment that fosters more equal distribution of income.

Long term economic growth –

Economic growth is the increase in the amount of the goods and services produced by a state over time. It is usually measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic product (real GDP). Growth is generally calculated in real terms, that is, inflation adjusted terms, in order to remove the effect of inflation on the price of goods and services. Economic growth focuses on the desire to improve the standard of living for
the state’s people through increasing the level of goods and services that, on average, individuals purchase or otherwise have access to. Economic growth per capita is primarily driven by improvements in productivity. Increased productivity means producing more goods and services with the same amount of labor, capital, energy, and/or materials. Long-term economic growth depends upon the good management of the state’s resources along with the capability of increasing the amount of goods and services produced by the state which is often done by increasing productivity through education and technological progress.

The most commonly used indicator for economic growth is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The advantages of using GDP are: “First, GDP is easy to measure; secondly, GDP is a rough measure for the relative productivity of resource deployment; and thirdly, that it measures relative material welfare, irrespective of the individual sources of growth” (Mehler et al., 2008:7). It is a good general measure for how the state is managing its resources and a good indicator of economic growth, sustainability, and standard of living of the people.

There are some criticisms regarding the use of GDP even when taken down to the per capita level and applying purchasing power parity (PPP). The criticisms include the fact that it does not measure income disparity between people which can be significant and a major source of conflict. It also does not measure the on-going ‘informal’ economy which in some states is estimated to be as much as 40 percent or more of the state’s total income. And it does not measure any social progress being made by the state. But taken along with other indicators in a suite of stability indicators it was chosen as one measure
of how the government is managing its resources, growing the economy, sustaining development and standard of living for its people.

Although GDP per capita does not measure social progress directly some researchers taking a counterfactual argument are using GDP growth models to show what might have been. John Cuddington and John Hancock have measured the impact of AIDS on the growth path of the Malawian economy, one of the Sub-Saharan economies hardest hit by the epidemic. “This was done by using detailed demographic simulations for a counterfactual no-AIDS case and comparing it to both medium and extreme AIDS scenarios in an extended economic Solow growth model. The long term effects of AIDS on Malawi’s growth path are estimated by comparing the time paths of potential: real GDP, GDP per capita, savings, investment, and capital/labor ratio under alternative demographic scenarios” (Cuddington et al. 1994:364). What they found was that if the extreme scenario played out, Malawi’s economy would shrink by 1.2 to 1.5 percentage points, a large difference when it comes to real GDP.

Other researchers are showing that GDP also can give an indication of the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the state’s economic growth. Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee looked at the impact of FDI on the average annual rate of per capita real GDP. “We tested the effect of FDI on economic growth in a cross-country regression framework, utilizing data on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries over the last two decades. Our results suggest that FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing relatively more to productivity and growth than domestic investment. However, the higher productivity rates seen as a result of FDI held only when the host country had a minimum threshold stock of human capital
(measured in employees’ years of schooling). Thus, FDI contributes greatly to economic growth as measured in advancement in GDP only when a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced technologies is available in the host economy” (Borensztein et al., 1998:115).

Other researchers used GDP growth models to show that good governance positively affects public spending which leads to long term economic growth. According to the World Bank “Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law” (WB, 1994). Andrew Sunil Rajkumar and Vinaya Swaroop built upon earlier studies which looked at public expenditures in primary education and maternal health and measured outcomes in economic growth through progress in these areas. They realized that if they included bureaucratic quality and level of corruption in their model, they would get a truer picture of the effects of spending in these areas. Some of the good governance characteristics of public spending which can lead to better outcomes and increased GDP include: “a) a comprehensive and properly approved budget, b) internal control mechanisms including well-functioning and transparent financial management and procurement systems to insure funds are spent as intended and c) regular and timely reports to the legislature on actual expenditure in comparison to budgeted amounts” (Rajkumar et al., 2002:2). They used measures of corruption and bureaucratic quality put together by the US-based Political Risk Services Group, which provides information on how corruption reduces the effectiveness of government, and bureaucratic quality
impacts institutional strength and quality of the civil service. Their model showed that in states with high levels of corruption and low bureaucratic quality additional spending in education and maternal health actually lead to a decrease in the number of students who completed primary school and an increase in infant mortality. Their conclusion: “increasing public spending of health and education is as easier option than improving governance, but as our findings suggest the easier option may not lead to achievement of these goals” (Rajkumar et al., 2002:25).

Taken together these studies point to the reasons that long-term economic growth as measured in real GDP per capita, was chosen as an important indicator that reflects how the state is managing its resources to increase the standard of living of its people by funding social services (such as health services in response to the AIDS epidemic), managing foreign direct investment (to stimulate productivity and economic growth), and lessening bureaucratic road-blocks and corruption that are holding back development. It is the contention of this author that free market economies that are commonly associated with democratic political systems have historically made more progress economically than those associated with authoritarian forms of government. When power is limited into the hands of a few decision makers, the state inherently limits itself in the creative processes of business innovation, entrepreneurial ingenuity and rapid technological advancement. Some of that innovation is spawned from the Foreign Direct Investment as Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee describe above, some from the entrepreneurs within the state itself. But, when these processes are limited to a few individuals making all of the decisions, growth is inherently held back.
Further when these processes are limited by poor governance and corruption as elites act
to skim profits off the top instead of fostering long term economic growth, states that
don’t have transparency of government, checks and balances provided by good
institutions, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; progress suffers.
Strong civil society is associated with democratic forms of government. It is therefore
predicted that states which experience nonviolent campaigns and usher in governments
that are more democratic in nature will undergo increased economic growth while states
which experience violent campaigns become more autocratic in nature, will see declines
in economic growth indicators.

Rule of law–

The area of rule of law concerns the issues around individual liberty and freedom.
Put in classic terms by John Stuart Mill: “The only freedom which deserves the name, is
that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (Tamanaha, 2004:32). This brings up
an unenviable predicament, in the absence of law; an individual would be absolutely free
to do as they please but not secure. And if one were to give up liberty and come under the
state’s laws to further their self-preservation, they would now be safe from harm (or
safer) but would no longer be entirely free. Are the benefits that law brings worth the
trade off? These are the issues around rule of law and different states address these issues
in different ways.

“Modern liberal democracies offer a fourfold answer to this question.
First, the individual is free to the extent that the laws are created democratically.
Citizens have thereby consented to, indeed authored, the rules they are obliged to
follow. Second, the individual is free to the extent that government officials are
required to act in accordance with preexisting law. This requirement promotes
liberty by enabling individuals to predict when they will be subject to coercion by
the state legal apparatus, allowing them to avoid legal interference in their affairs
by not running afoul of the law. Citizens are subject only to the law, not to the
arbitrary will or judgment of another who wields coercive government power.
Third, the individual is free in so far as the government is restricted from
infringing upon an inviolable realm of personal autonomy. Often these protections
are referred to as civil rights or civil liberties, and are contained in state’s bills of
rights or human rights declarations. These restrictions may be substantive (strictly
prohibiting government incursion within the protected sphere) or only procedural
(the government must satisfy a high burden, like demonstrating compelling
necessity, before interference is allowed). Finally, freedom is enhanced when the
powers of the government are divided into separate compartments –typically
legislative, executive, and judicial – with the application of law entrusted to an
independent judiciary. This division promotes liberty by preventing the
accumulation of total power in any single institution, setting up a form of
competitive interdependence within the government” (Tamanaha, 2004:35).

O’Donnell explains that ‘rule of law’ is a disputed term, but historically and
minimally it refers to laws that are known and where possible written down, and
publicly promulgated by an appropriate authority. “Rule of law implies formal equality
in two senses. First, it is established in, and by, legal rules that are valid. Second, the
rights and obligations specified are universal, in that they attach to each individual
considered as a legal person irrespective of social position, with the sole requirement that
the individual in question has reached competent legal adulthood; this is the ‘equality of
all before the law’ requirement” (O”Donnell, 2004:33).

The UN Secretary General’s report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice
in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies” contains a definition which includes the fact that
Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities,
both public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards (in Hurwitz, 2005:2). It
requires, measures to ensure adherence to principles of supremacy of law, equality before
the law, fairness in the application of law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal uncertainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency (Hurwitz, 2005).

You can see the multifaceted aspects and embedded goals in this definition. Somewhat more simply said, a conference held by Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights which included representatives from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals’ Legal Center, drafted the following definition for Rule of Law: “Equality before the law; laws that are applied consistently (socially, economically, and politically); laws that spell out consequences for illegal activity; laws that serve a conception of order and regulation; laws that serve and inform institutions of society that preserve order and ‘fairness’” (Carr Center Workshop paper, 2006:2). Again we see the multifaceted nature of the concept of rule of law.

A core indicator of rule of law is the requirement that in addition to the citizens being bound by law, the rulers are also bound and government operates in an effective and predictable fashion. In most post conflict environments, however, this is very difficult to achieve. There is usually no remaining professional public bureaucracy and the executive tends to be over-dominant. Key institutions required to check executive power (parliament, the courts, ombudsman, civil society, the media) are weak, underfunded or non-existent. “The effectiveness of newly formed parliament is typically undermined by relative lack of parliamentarian experience in democracy, drafting and debating legislation, and holding the executive branch accountable. The courts that exist or are reinstated after conflict are often politicized, corrupt, or the judges have little independence and are subject to high level of executive interventions. Civil society tends
to be very weak in the post-conflict environment, as do the media structures” (Samuels, 2006:11).

“The sorts of changes required to create a professional committed bureaucracy and change the political culture are some of the most difficult and intangible aspects of any transition—requiring changes in behavior, expectations and norms” (Samuels, 2006:11).

Although there is no single definition widely agreed upon, there is a growing focus on rule of law reform requirements in aid and development packages, with most UN agencies, Breton Woods Institutions, Regional Banks and bilateral development agencies, all requiring some form of implementation of rule of law reform in their work with post-conflict states. “Many organizations see rule of law as the basis of economic development, democracy and the best hope for peace” (Samuels, 2006:1).

As new states or new regimes within a state emerge, scholars watch for the establishment and implementation of rule of law. It is generally expected that in democratic states where the people enjoy a relative level of individual property rights, that the citizenry will push for rule of law to protect individual ownership. So scholars watched with interest in the early 1990’s as the Soviet Union dissolved, to see if the new more democratic states, would implement a rule of law framework. In 1992 Russia implemented what became known as Big Bang reforms. “In Russia, these measures deregulated most prices on commodities and launched a mass privatization program, which distributed equity to managers and workers, or sold shares at public auctions. By July 1994, 70 percent of Russian industry had been transformed into joint-stock companies. From 1995 to 1997 a second wave of privatizations occurred, this time many
of the most valuable enterprises and natural resources including metals, oil and the utilities sectors, occurred through a program known as ‘loans for shares’” (Hoff et al., 2004:7). Researchers felt that privatization was going to encourage the new owners of property to lobby the state to develop institutions and implement rule of law.

“Privatization offers an enormous political benefit for the creation of institutions supporting private property rights because it creates new private owners who then begin lobbying the government to create rule of law and market-supporting institutions” (Hoff et al., 2004:2). But Hoff’s work found that in Russian case, this turned out not to be true. The authors found that mass privatization was initiated before institutions to support the rule of law were in place. The transfer of state property to private agents was accompanied by the stripping of Russia’s assets (Hoff et al., 2004). “Capital flight from Russia averaged $15 billion to $20 billing per year during 1995 to 2001, or five percent of GDP. The systematic evidence of the insecurity of property rights in Russia lead individuals not to push for new laws and institutions to support a rule of law framework, but instead to take what they could get from the state for themselves” (Hoff et al., 2004:8).

So we see a change in government, even one towards greater democracy was not necessarily accompanied with the implementation of rule of law that researchers predicted. States often have a hard time establishing the necessary institutions for its implementation in the immediate aftermath of transition and especially cultures with a long history of repression where the necessary institutions are not in place.

Another example of the problems that states face when rule of law is not implemented, is shown in the work of Robert Deacon. His research linked the lack of rule
of law to the problem of deforestation in a cross section of states. He studied the relationships between deforestation and population pressure, income growth, and insecure property rights, with data from 120 countries. The causes of deforestation are not well understood. “Deforestation in developing countries is sometimes attributed to population growth pressures which shows in slash and burn agriculture, logging, and demands for fuel wood, fodder and forest products” (Deacon, 1994:415). Another possible cause is economic growth in measured national income which is also often identified as a correlation if not cause of deforestation. “This argument links deforestation to economic development strategies that promote conversion of forests to plantation agriculture and the production of cash crops for export” (Deacon, 1994:420). But Deacon’s analysis showed the highest correlation was between deforestation and absence of rule of law measures, as seen in poorly enforced land ownership which exposed standing forests to a form of confiscation or default risk and thereby discriminated against capital intensive land uses. “Long fallow periods between harvests of nutrients are attractive only if the individual, family, or tribe has some assurance that a parcel of land and its forest cover will not be invaded by squatters, harvested by other timber companies or confiscated by a government official” (Deacon:1994:420). More often than not Deacon’s research showed that were rule of law and individual property rights were weak deforestation occurred at a rapid pace. There were some correlations with population pressures but the highest were with absence of rule of law, showing the importance for states to establish and implement rule of law. This is an important concern in post-conflict states where institutions are weak. Rule of law and regulations are not in
place to prevent the stripping of natural resources as weak civil societies are focused on more urgent matters.

These studies give an indication of what rule of law is and the important need for its implementation. It is the contention of this author that leaders of violent campaigns in the immediate aftermath thereof will be focused on securing power and controlling any opposing forces. The implementation of rule of law with its calls for the checks and balances of powers, transparency of government, and equal treatment under the law for both government and its citizens; would go against the objectives of these new leaders. It therefore seems fundamental that rule of law would suffer in the aftermath of a violent campaign.

At the same time, the expressions of active civil society in the form of freedom of association and organization, and calls for equal treatment under the law, are a characteristic part of nonviolent campaigns. If a nonviolent campaign were successful the democratic leaders ushered into office would have to realize the need to be responsive to citizen demands and understand that if they were not responsive to the citizens, the powerful citizenry would remove them as well. It seems intrinsic then in the aftermath of successful nonviolent campaigns that the establishment of rule of law would increase.

*Degree of Autocracy/ Democracy*—

This indicator reflects the degree of Autocracy or Democracy of the state. This is a continuum from the most autocratic states to the most democratic, and in between are the anocracies. As with much of the social science research it is important to understand that these are constructs that cannot be observed directly so researchers use indicators of these concepts, to tap the latent concept with varying degrees of success. “Theoretical
concepts are often rich and multi-faceted, whose substantive content is seldom totally captured by the available indicators: e.g., there is more to religiosity than frequency of church attendance, there is more to socio-economic status than income, and there is more to state power than the size of a country’s armed forces” (Treier and Jackman, 2003:2).

The way researchers address these concerns is to use statistical procedures to combine information from multiple sources, in an attempt to accurately express the latent concept. The researcher’s conceptualization of the construct, the measures that are available, the measures the researcher decides to include, and the weight of each measure in the mix, can all alter the outcome considerably. For example, many scholars (Lipset (1960), Linz (1975), Powell (1982) and Huntington (1991)) conceptualize democracy as a dichotomy. “Despite important variations in the degree of democracy, the distinction between contemporary nations meeting most of the democratic criteria most of the time and those failing to do so is fairly clear” (Powell, 1982). While Bollen and Jackman (1989) argue strongly that democracy is a latent continuous variable: “Dichotomizing democracy lumps together countries with very different degrees of democracy and blurs distinctions between borderline cases” (1989:612). It is easy to see that the manner in which the researcher conceptualizes the construct will have considerable impact on the resulting indicator and possibly the amount of measurement error as well.

One of the most widely used measures of Autocracy / Democracy is the 21 point Polity scoring produced by Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers and partially designed by Ted Robert Gurr. The unit of analysis for these authors is not the nation-state but rather the ‘Polity’ or political system; that is, the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs (Gurr, 1974).
At its theoretical core, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr argue that there are essentially three interdependent elements of democracy: the first is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about alternative political policies and leaders. This is accomplished through regular and meaningful competition among individuals and organized groups, an inclusive degree of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and a level of political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of democratic participation, procedures and institutions” (Jaggers and Gurr:1995:471).

Their second component of Western-conceived democracy is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power. In the U.S. this is handled through the ‘balance of powers’ between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

They identify the third dimension of democracy found in the contemporary political discourse of Western societies as the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. “Civil liberties, which is an older term to today’s more common reference to human rights; refers to freedom from slavery and servitude, torture, inhuman punishment, and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment” (Arat:1991:3). But, given the “paucity of the current, let alone historical data on civil liberties, we have not attempted to single out and then quantify this dimension of democracy” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:471). Instead these researchers focus on the first two ‘institutional’ dimensions of democracy.

More specifically, they state: “our operational indicator of democracy is derived from subjective coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment and the level of constraints on the chief executive. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as rule of law, a system of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and the like are treated as means to, or manifestations of, the institutional structures” (Jaggers and Gurr:1995:471).

On the other side of the spectrum the Polity IV scale measures autocracies which display diverse kinds of political systems but with common properties including lack of regulated political competition and limits of the chief executive. “In their mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress political participation; their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite; and once in office the executive exercises power with few or no institutional constraints. We also expect to find fundamental violations of political rights and civil liberties” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:471).

The Polity databases are constructed on the premise that there is no ‘necessary condition’ for characterizing a political system as democratic or autocratic; rather each dimension can be measured independently. In fact, there are several mixed authority patterns: “Singapore from 1965 to 1994 is an example of an Asian guided-democracy with an autocracy score of four (-4) and a democracy score of two (2), while Mexico’s one party democracy has a four/one (-4 / 1) combination for the 1979 - 1994 period. Such mixed patterns often characterize polities in transition” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:472).

The measures of institutional democracy and autocracy found in the Polity IV dataset are based on the subjective interpretation of historical monographs and other source materials by the authors and their associates. Aware of the problem of interpretation biases associated with judgmental measures of democracy, “we test the
validity of our measures against those of other researchers. The stronger the correlations between our measures and others’ indicators the higher our confidence in the empirical validity of our indicators and data. Keep in mind the other measures employ different judges, information sources and coding criteria” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:473). But the Polity IV authors express that the testing of validity of the 11 point scale on the autocracy side of the spectrum is more difficult because other researchers have not constructed an operationally separate indicator for autocracy; it is treated either as a binary category or as the inverse of democracy which does not allow for comparison.

The other measures of democracy are the Vanhanen data which measures political participation in terms of voter turnout and the vote share of the largest party. And there is the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) developed by Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand (2006) which combines the executive components of Polity with the participation measures of Vanhanen. But, by far the most widely used is the Polity IV measure.

Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II showed the use of the Polity IV dataset in their article: “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis form 1976 to 1996”. They examined the influence of democracy on state repression, using data from 147 countries during 1976-96. They found that the relationship between democracy and repression differs significantly from what had been identified in previous research. There is a threshold of domestic democratic peace which they found to be around a Polity measure of seven. Below this level for democratic states there was no discernible impact on the degree of human rights violations, but above this level democracy the influences of repression were in a negligible but roughly in a linear pattern. They conclude that “only those democratic regimes which fully develop
institutional practices and mass political behavior consistent with democratic principles will yield any pacifying effect on state repression” (2004:552). At the same time they found that autocratic political leaders also know that part of their claim to power is that while certain forms of political activity are eliminated (e.g., mass participation in the political process), others are extended and seen in the protection of citizens from political coercion. To use repression in this context is thus to invite questions about the legitimacy of the regime as well as the amount of power actually held by those in government over those in society. In essence they conclude that in strong democracies as well as strong autocracies one will not find a great deal of human rights abuses. The problems lie in the states in the middle.

This is referred to as the ‘more murder in the middle’ (MMM) argument (Eckstein and Gurr 1975; Gates et al. 2003; Lichbach 1984). These authors suggest that when political structures are uniformly ‘open’ and vote is allowed and where the legislature can counter the mandates of the executive; or uniformly ‘closed’ and there is no voting and where the legislature cannot interfere with the activities of the executive, it is believed that the political system is ‘coherent’. Within both of these systems the institutional structure conveys clear and consistent messages to everyone. In contrast, it is within the ‘incoherent’ systems (for example, when elections are allowed but legislatures cannot challenge or override the executive, or elections are held but there is only one political party), it is in these situations that it is argued, the institutional structure sends a mixed message to authorities and citizens, and thus the effective matrix of constraints on state activity, which is present in full democracies and autocracies does not exist. As a result, government authorities are left relatively free to behave as they wish and feeling insecure
or threatened in the incoherent system, are likely to increase their use of repressive action in an effort to establish and maintain control.

Another use of the Polity dataset is the testing of the ‘modernization theory’. Epstein et al., (2006) explain that modernization theory was first developed by Lerner in 1958 who designated as modern, those societies whose people are literate, urban-dwelling, and better off in the sense of commanding higher incomes. Lipset (1959) hypothesized that as societies develop economically their citizens no longer tolerate repressive political regimes. The rise in per capita GDP, he argued, triggers a transition to democracy. Epstein et al. tested this theory by breaking states into three groupings using the Polity IV scaling of regimes from -10 to 0 as autocracies, +1 to +7 as partial democracies, and +8 to +10 as full democracies. They found that both autocracies and full democracies are stable in the short run but of the partial democracies almost 40 percent of them, change their Polity scoring category after five years. “Movements in or out of the category of partial democracy account for 80 percent of the transitions in our sample” (Epstein et al., 2006:555). So there is more volatility in these partial or weak democracies. And focusing on this group with the use of duration analysis they found that indeed higher GDP per capita reduces the probability that countries fall out of democracy and into autocracy. Testing some of the reasons why this may be they also determined that trade openness helps stabilize full democracies but it does not help autocratic or partially democratic regimes move up the ladder. They also determined that ‘resource cursed’ states have a greater risk of falling into autocracy.

“Classifying countries into autocracies, democracies, and partial democracies proved valuable for an additional reason; it highlighted the significance of the middle
category—the partial democracies. These fragile democracies are more volatile than either straight autocracies or full democracies. This is the category upon which future research should focus” (Epstein et al., 2006:566).

Vreeland also looked at the anocracies to see if he could verify the research that shows that anocracies are more susceptible to civil war than either pure democracies or pure dictatorships. His analysis showed that “rather than being driven by political institutions, the finding is actually driven by the fact that the Polity index is coded with direct reference to political violence and even civil war itself” (2008:401).

He found in the breaking down of Polity into its five components that three of them have to do with the executive and two of them with political participation. The political participation components are defined in part by civil war. When he: “broke up the Polity index into its component parts and then recombined the components, leaving out those coded with reference to political violence, the instability of the weak level democracies were no longer found” (2008:402).

The five components are: XCONST – constraints on the chief executive, XRCOMP—competitiveness of executive recruitment, XROPEN—openness of executive recruitment, PARCOMP—competitiveness of political participation, and PARREG – regulation of political participation (Vreeland, 2008:402).

His study left out PARCOMP and PARREG components. When he tested the correlation between likelihood of civil war and an anocracy scoring on his revised polity measurement he found no correlation. He concludes that “the correlation found by the previous researchers may be due to the multicollinearity of having Political violence on
both sides of the equation” (2008:403). This interesting research shows the importance of understanding the component parts of the indicator being used.

These studies show how the Polity indicator has been used in several cases and why it is important to social science research to understand the theoretical constructs underlying the indicator being researched. Beyond these important considerations and thinking further on the instability of the weak level democracies, I believe it is important to understand how effective states, at different Polity scorings, are at weathering major opposition campaigns and adapting to changes from within the state. I believe that some of the causes behind the recurrence of conflict, the so called conflict-trap, are not solely economic as Paul Collier suggests, but that grievances are unresolved. Cease-fires are called and peace agreements are signed not because grievances are resolved but because one or both sides have run out of the means to continue the conflict. The question becomes; what changes in society occur after the fighting has stopped in these unsuccessful violent campaigns. Is there some government accommodation to the challengers; some freeing of restrictions; some movement toward more liberal or conversely more restrictive society? Is there a change that can be measured in Polity scoring? It’s also interesting to surmise how states might change following unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns. Does the massive swelling of street protests cause some change in existing leaders concerned that the next street protest may be large enough to topple the regime? Do regimes that survive nonviolent campaigns accommodate the challengers, free restrictions; or make other changes that can be measured in polity scoring?

I feel that even though research has shown that there is a great possibility of recurrence of violent conflict and threat of unresolved nonviolent campaigns recurring as well, that for
autocracies there may be some political discourse indicating changes will be implemented without any actual changes occurring, and that in democracies unresolved grievances will fold into other political processes, including the changing of leaders in elections, drafting of legislation, etc.. In sum, we won’t see unsuccessful campaigns significantly altering the Polity scoring of the state.

Infant mortality—

“Infant mortality has long been viewed as a synoptic indicator of the health and the social condition of a population, due in large part to the special vulnerability of the newborn to social conditions including poverty and substandard living conditions” (Gortmaker and Wise, 1997:147). Infant mortality rates have been seen as a type of social mirror that reflects broad social inequalities. Current patterns of infant mortality provide a useful illustration of the dynamic interaction of underlying social forces in determining trends in health outcomes. Some of these social forces include: the social and economic structure of society, access to health care services, the potential for prenatal intervention, cultural beliefs towards women, educational attainment, and ethnic disparities. A general measure of population health which infant mortality provides is useful for comparing the health status of a state over time and for comparing different states at a single point in time. It permits comparisons of state health care systems and programs, and may reveal states in need of attention. It also enables a common baseline for discussions between health care officials and policy makers.

The infant mortality rate (IMR) is defined as the number of deaths in children less than one year of age, per one thousand live births in the same year. It is regarded as a highly sensitive proxy measure of population health. Reidpath and Allotey explain that
IMR “is considered a good indicator for a population health as it reflects the association between the causes of infant mortality and the factors that influence the health status of the population as a whole, such as: economic development, general living conditions, social well-being, rates of illness, and the quality of the environment” (2003:344). More recently it has been argued that proxy measures of population health like IMR are problematic because they become the principal focus of health policy such that health strategies and health priorities are formulated with the proxy outcome measure in mind. As a consequence, health policies begin to target the chosen outcome measure, (i.e. focusing on infants) while ignoring the rest of the population for which the outcome measure was supposed to be an indicator (2003:344). This view has led to the development of more comprehensive measures of population health; for example the Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE). DALE and other similar measures are intended to be sensitive to changes in the health of all members of the population and account for the morbidity associated with non-fatal health outcomes, as well as mortality. But Reidpath and Allotey explain that in “those countries that are the poorest, and have the worst population health, the cost of more comprehensive measures may be prohibitive” (2003:345) and thus IMR is a more comprehensive measure enabling comparisons between states. Their analysis compared IMR to DALE and found a high correlation (r=0.91) indicating IMR is nearly as good of an indicator of population health as the more comprehensive measures and with less cost.

Health care professionals will generally divide infant mortality into two periods: neonatal which is the first 27 days of life and post-neonatal which is day 28 to the end of the first year. A study of the determinants of infant mortality in Malaysia parsed the data
into these two periods and found different factors led to mortality in the two groups. Using a graphical chain model to look at primary and secondary linkages they found that ethnicity, place of residence (village, estate, or land scheme), maternal age, and birth order, all statistically impacted infant mortality in the neonatal period. While maternal education, preceding birth interval (the closer children of the same mother are born together the greater the risk of infant mortality) and availability of prenatal care; were significant in the post-neonatal period (Mohamed et al., 1998:351).

A study of teenage pregnancies and the risk of infant mortality in Sweden showed that compared with mothers aged 20 to 24 years, adjusted risks of neonatal and post-neonatal mortality were significantly increased among the youngest mothers ages 13 to 15 years, while mothers aged 16 to 19 had a significant increase in risk in the post-neonatal period. For the very young mothers they found that the increased risk of adverse pregnancy outcomes were associated with socioeconomic conditions among teenagers including maternal health behaviors such as dietary habits, cigarette smoking and drug abuse, a decreased likelihood of adequate prenatal care and evidence indicating an independent effect of maternal biological immaturity on pregnancy outcomes. The high rates of very preterm birth among young teenagers almost entirely explained the increased risk of neonatal mortality in this group (Olausson, 1999:116).

Several studies found ethnic differences in IMR including a study of infant mortality trends from 1950 to 2010 in the United States, by Singh and Yu. There have been steady declines in the U.S. IMR in the past six decades, largely as a result of declines in mortality from pneumonia and influenza, respiratory distress syndrome, prematurity and low birth weight, and congenital anomalies (Singh and Ye...
1995). “Despite the overall reductions however, we found substantial racial/ethnic, educational, and income differentials in infant mortality still existed in the later years of their study sample” (Singh and Yu 1995:957).

Early evaluations of the implementation in the U.S. of Medicaid indicated that it helped to reduce disparities in the utilization of health services between poor and nonpoor families (Butler & Scotch 1978, in Gortmaker & Wise, 1997:151). It was hoped that more equal access and utilization to health services would eliminate the ethnic and racial differences in IMR. But the results of the Gortmaker and Wise study indicate no attenuation in the relative risk of infant mortality experienced by women with lower, compared with higher, levels of household income or racial disparities, during the past quarter of a century (1997:152). These findings mirror those observed in Britain where, decades after the implementation of the National Health Service, social class and ethnic disparities in infant mortality continued to persist (Black et al., 1982, Gray, 1982).

Although disparities persist, absolute rates of infant mortality for all groups in the U.S. have fallen dramatically over the past several decades as they have through most of the world. Technological advances in medicine coupled with social advances in more equal access to health care, has led to significant reductions. As an example, from 1990 to 2002 IMR declined from 49.7 to 28.9 per one thousand live births in Brazil. During the same period Brazil’s average Family Health Program coverage increased from 0 percent to 36 percent nationwide. Additionally access to clean water, hospital beds per one thousand, and female literacy were found to be negatively associated with IMR as they reduced the risk faced by infants (Marino, 2006:13). An even more dramatic reduction in IMR was observed in a study that looked at the Americas as a whole and measured a
decrease from 90.3 to 31.3 per one thousand live births between 1955 and 1995 (Schneider et al., 2002:538).

These studies give an overview of the many different social variables that are thought to impact infant mortality from ethnicity, maternal education, maternal age, marital status, maternal smoking and drug abuse, birth order and preceding birth interval, to prenatal care, and the availability of health care facilities. Wagner explains that “Infant mortality is not a health problem as many people consider it to be. It is a social problem with health consequences. It is analogous to traffic accident mortality in children; the first priority for improving traffic accident mortality in children is not to build more and better medical facilities, but rather to change traffic laws and better educate drivers and children. The solution is not primarily medical, but environmental, social and educational. The same is true for infant mortality; the first priority is not more obstetricians or pediatricians or hospitals, nor even more prenatal clinics or well-baby clinics, but rather to provide more social, financial, and educational support to families with pregnant women and infants (in Gortmaker & Wise 1997:156).

Building on the work of Wagner and the understanding that social factors are impacting IMR and not simply the availability of obstetricians or pediatricians, although they are important, this author would like to add the availability of good nutritious food both during pregnancy and within the first year of the child’s life. Perhaps the reason the availability of National Health Service in Britain and Medicaid in the U.S. did not have a large an impact as was anticipated is that poor families were still poor and may not have had equal access to nutritious food as other families. Turning to how this may impact the focus of this study, the differences between the recovery of violent and nonviolent
campaigns, I would predict that violent campaigns would be more disruptive to citizen’s access to groceries both the availability in the stores and markets of fresh food, and of people’s ability to travel to obtain them.

Both violent and nonviolent campaigns cause restrictions in the movement of people, but considering that in nonviolent campaigns only one side may be responding to the campaign with violence there is probably much less concern for the need to protect physical well-being in states with nonviolent campaigns then those that experience violent ones. There is less disruption of normal movement, including obtaining fresh food (and access to health care facilities) in nonviolent conflict settings than in violent ones. It would seem natural then that infant mortality would increase in states with violent campaigns, and may increase also in nonviolent settings but to a lesser degree.

So overall this indicator is going to be measuring the disruption in social services, the health and social condition of the state’s people, and their access to health care facilities and physicians as well as good nutritious food. It is my estimation that violent conflict is much more disruptive and will be reflected in this indicator.

Respect for human rights—

Amnesty International defines Human Rights as the:

“Basic rights and freedoms that all people are entitled to regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status. Human rights include civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty and freedom of expression; and social, cultural and economic rights including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, and the right to work and receive an education. Human rights are protected and upheld, by international and national laws as well as inter-state treaties” (2012).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the foundation of the international system of protection for human rights. It was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10th, 1948. This day is celebrated annually as International Human Rights Day. The 30 articles of the UDHR establish the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people. It is a vision for human dignity that transcends political boundaries and authority, committing governments to uphold the fundamental rights of each person.

Pagden explains that the concept of human rights is a: “Development of the older notion of natural rights. Human rights were thus tied …to an underlying idea of universality whose origins are to be found in the Greek and Roman idea of a common law for all humanity” (2003:171).

Just as there are multiple aspects of human rights there are multiple aspects of quantifying human rights violations. Data for this analysis was pulled from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. CIRI contains multiple indicators of human rights including: Freedom of Domestic Movement, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Women’s Political Rights, Workers Rights and the Physical Integrity Rights Index. The latter comprises the area that is most commonly found in the literature on Human Rights violations. The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index is an additive index made up of four components: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance.

In the CIRI index, Torture is defined as “the purposeful infliction of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials” (2010:404). Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Political imprisonment refers to “the incarceration of people by government officials because of
their ideas, including religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices, including proselytizing and their speech (2010:404) This can include non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; or membership in a group, including an ethnic or racial group. Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. This can include murders by private groups if private actors are instigated by the government. Disappearances refer to “unresolved cases in which political motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found” (2010:404). Disappearances and extrajudicial killings are closely related practices.

Cingranelli and Richards admit that human rights information is far from perfect. Observers differ in explaining what they witness; witnesses have better or worse memories; witnesses can be intimidated, corrupted, or even killed; victims can be intimidated and in many cases pertaining to physical integrity rights, victims have also been killed. Additionally, governments have incentives to lie; and violations may be taking place in an ongoing, long-standing conflict where observers cannot properly work (2010:400). Thus, accurate numbers of violations are rare, and all numeric data contain an inherent amount of measurement error.

To partially account for validity which is a concern in most social science measurement where an indicator typically represents latent, directly unobservable concepts; the authors’ website discloses full transparency on every measure and how the component parts were scored. They also provide clear definitions of the concepts they are measuring and what is being included in the measurement. “For example, whether the practice of water boarding (simulated drowning) constitutes torture as understood by international and U.S. law, has been the source of much debate since 2004” (2010:413).
When coding respect for physical integrity rights, CIRI coders are instructed to ignore the size of the population of the state in question. Taking population into account requires that the coders know the population size of each state and then must make a subjective decision about whether a certain number of incidents of torture, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings and disappearances, indicated that the use of these in that country in that year was ‘rare or exceptional’. Cingranelli and Richards felt that “this subjectivity would reduce the reliability of the measure” (2010:414). Instead they encourage users of the CIRI Physical Integrity rights data to include population size as a control variable in equations designed to explain variation in these scores. This study will therefore include a measure of population size from the WB country statistics for each campaign in our study taken at the time of transition.

There is a great deal of research which suggests that respect for human rights will increase with increased levels of democracy (Poe and Tate, 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Davenport 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Democracy promotes respect for human rights through the understanding that democratically elected leaders will uphold human rights either due to incentives (more votes, increased public support) or due to disincentives (they will fail to be re-elected). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) indicate that it takes full-fledged democracy, culminating in a system with multiparty system with active competition before there is reliable improvement. When they broke the Polity IV measure down into its component pieces to investigate if any specific aspects of democracy were necessary or sufficient to achieve improved quality of life in diminished human rights violations they found that “while we report substantial evidence that some aspects of the democratization process, namely the presence of multi-
party competition, yield greater human rights returns than others, a finding that echoes earlier research of Linda Camp Keith (2002), we also find that progress in human rights can only be achieved after there has been substantial progress on other dimensions that appear to function as necessary but not sufficient conditions” (2005: 440).

In other words states cannot rapidly improve human rights conditions by focusing on one or a few aspects of the democratization process at the expense of other aspects. It is common to hear of new states focusing on holding elections to establish democratization quickly as a first step in their efforts at nation building. But the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. would suggest that elections alone or even coupled with several other aspects of democracy (executive recruitment, and constrained executives) would not in themselves assure a decrease in human rights violations. “Still more disconcerting is the finding that the process of democratization does not consistently produce human rights benefits until it is virtually complete” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005:440).

Building a system of multi-party competition with constraints of the chief executive takes much longer to implement and is necessary before gain in human rights are observed.

Bueno de Mesquita’s et al. approach to split the Polity IV into its component parts also addresses the concern raised by Fein (1995) that the relationship between democracy and human rights may be non-linear. Fein’s thesis which has been called ‘More Murder in the Middle’ builds on the earlier work of Gurr and Muller (1986). The argument is that as states begin to democratize and new political space opens, those in power find themselves confronted by potential challengers who are eager to detract legitimacy from the regime and create a new one. Fearing a redistribution of resources and a new political order, governing elites in these ‘middle states’, resort to more human rights abuses to
contain potential challengers. Once democratization actually takes place, the violence declines again to a level that is lower that it was originally; thus the curvilinear relationship.

“Empirically, evidence of a quadratic relationship is strong at the composite level that assess democracy as one indicator of Democracy—Autocracy, but the evidence is decidedly mixed once the constituent sub-dimensions of the Polity indicator are disaggregated; with multi-party competitive participation in the electoral process (one of the last elements added when a society is becoming democratic) having the greatest affect” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 451).

Poe and Tate note: “That we expect military regimes to be more coercive than others probably surprises no one. Military juntas are based on force, and force is the key to coercion. Yet, in many of the nations in which soldiers forcibly take power, they do so alleging that the leaders they are replacing were themselves in violation the constitution and possibly were engaging in repression of the rights of citizens” (1994:858). These researchers are suggesting that violent campaigns can sometimes bring in autocratic leaders that improve the human rights standards of the state relative to what was present before the campaign and is sometimes the reason for the campaign. It makes sense that if the human rights climate is already poor that either nonviolent or violent campaign could potentially improve the states’ results on this indicator.

But for campaigns that failed to achieve their goals, it would seem that in the states where respect for human rights was poor, that violent campaigns might cause a worsening of respect for human rights as these leaders further clamped down, tortured and arrested campaign organizers; while there may be some improvement in respect for human rights in response to massive civil protests in the hope of accommodating peaceful protestors.
Employment to population ratio—

There are numerous indicators for determining the rate of employment. One of the most commonly used measures in the literature is the ‘unemployment rate’. It is defined as the share of the labor force without work and who are actively seeking employment. The definition of what it means to be actively seeking employment, and sometimes who is included in the labor force differs from country to country. It was therefore decided to use the ‘employment to population ratio ages fifteen plus’ instead of the more common unemployment rate for this study as a common definition across states was needed.

Many factors can affect the employment to population ratio including the amount of the federal budget that is directed toward military spending. “The real cost of the defense sector consists not only of the civilian goods and services that are currently foregone on its account; it includes also an element of growth that could have been achieved through larger investments in human or business capital” (Arthur Burns 1971, in Heo and Eger 2005: 792). In response to the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, President George W. Bush signed a defense bill on October 23, 2002 which increased the annual defense spending by more than $34 billion. Part of the justification for the increased expenditure was the viewpoint that it would create jobs and stimulate the economy. “Mueller and Atesoglu (1993) report that defense spending has facilitated economic growth in the United States. This perspective contends that defense spending enhances aggregate demand, creates jobs, and provides positive technological spillovers” (in Heo and Eger, 2005:793). But other authors, Heo and Eger included, find an insignificant relationship between U.S. defense spending and economic growth.
Chan (1987) makes the case that defense expenditures can affect economic growth both directly and indirectly through investment, employment and the volume of trade and exports. Investment decisions come into play as the federal governments decided between funding infrastructure projects: bridges, rail systems, interstate highways, communication systems, power systems or numerous social goods including schools, health care services, fire and safety services; for additional military and defense equipment and personnel.

The effect of defense expenditures on the rate employment of employment is controversial. In justification of the large defense budget the former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger stated in 1984 that a budget cut of $1 billion in defense spending would lead to the loss of 35,000 jobs. In contrast opponents of high levels of defense spending base their arguments on opportunity costs. According to DeGrasse (1983) and Huisken (1982), “dollar or dollar, civilian goods and services provide more jobs than military” (in Heo and Eger, 2005:797). One reason for the inefficiency is that the defense industry generally requires a high level of technical sophistication compared to the civilian industry. Aircraft, communication, missile and computer industries all require highly specialized personnel. These industries employ a relatively large proportion of well-paid engineers and scientists and a lower proportion of blue-collar workers. Since professional and technical workers have the lowest unemployment rate of any occupational category, the contribution of defense spending to employment, especially in the long run, is minimal. Additionally one must consider if these engineers and scientists were not employed in the defense industry, what could they be inventing and producing in other industries?
In his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy (1987) asserts that high levels of defense spending during the cold war left the U.S. with trade and budget deficits, lagging innovation and productivity, and declining economic infrastructure and international competitiveness. Gold (1990) also argues that increased spending on military programs has widened the U.S. trade deficit due to its dampening effect on exports (in Heo and Eger, 2005:799).

Careful analysis of the effects of increased defense spending after 9/11 revealed that an increase in defense spending has “a significant and delayed negative effect on investment, taking about a year for the economy to feel the shock” (Heo and Eger, 2005:807). The authors also found that the employment effect of defense spending is not significant; “we found that it did not create a lot of jobs for people who were otherwise unemployed. In contrast to Weinberger’s argument, that defense spending reduces unemployment, we find that defense spending neither helps nor hurts employment” (Heo and Eger, 2005:807). Overall defense spending hampers the volume of exports immediately and continues to do so in subsequent years hampering the state’s economic growth (Heo and Eger, 2005).

For our analysis one might predict that as governments face violent campaigns and increase defense spending even to fight an opponent within their own borders that they may also experience a decrease in their employment to population ratio. In a sub-national study of India 1956-2002 researcher Henrik Urdal investigated the relationship between population pressures and political violence. He looked at the relationship between political violence and unemployment due to bulges in youth population, as well as pressures that population growth put on natural renewable
resources, and differential population growth rates between religious groups. He argues that many states that are not normally considered to be weak, and certainly not failed – such as India, face low-intensity armed conflicts that can be best understood as political lobbying by insurgent groups resulting from high unemployment, unrealized human capital, and/or unequal access to public goods and services (2008:585). Urdal explains that most of the work that has been done in understanding population pressures has been cross-national studies comparing the populations of one state to another. With this level of analysis there is only “marginal if any, support for the three scenarios in our test: resource scarcity and conflict, youth bulges with associated high unemployment and conflict, and third differential growth rates of race or ethnic groups and conflict” (Urdal, 2008:591). He found that national demographic aggregates may not be capturing the diversity of local population dynamics and so performed his research at the sub-national level in India.

According to a resource scarcity perspective, population growth and density may lead to scarcity of renewable natural resources such as productive land, freshwater, and forests. Resource scarcity is assumed to lead to increased intergroup competition which may take the form of violent conflict. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) breaks the resource scarcity perspective down to supply-induced scarcity resulting from degradation of natural resources, demand-induced scarcity primarily caused by population growth, and structural scarcity where some groups within a population are excluded from equal access to resources (in Urdal, 2008:593). Urdal found that “organized armed conflict is more likely in states where potentially productive land is scarce and also when
agricultural wages are declining over time, reflecting key expectations in the causal scheme of Homer-Dixon” (2008: 607).

Youth bulges are of increasing concern as more of the developing world experiences declining mortality rates for the elderly concurrently with declining infant mortality. “Large youth cohorts are likely to be motivated for violence if they face limited employment opportunities, lack of political openness and crowding in urban centers” (Moller 1968, Choucri 1974, Huntington 1996, Goldstone 2001, in Urdal 2008: 595). Urdal’s work found that youth bulges increased the risk of violent conflict particularly in states with large male compared to female populations (2008:601).

There is now a broad agreement that ethnic identity represents an important psychological attachment to a collective of individuals of shared identity. Not that ethnic differences are the causes of conflict but that once conflict has begun individuals tend to align along ethnic lines. John Muller explains that “Ethnicity is important only as an ordering device after conflict has broken out” (2000:63). But, when ethnic, religious or racial groups grow at different rates this sometimes leads to fears of an altered political balance, unequal access to employment or to available resources. Urdal’s work found a greater risk of conflict was associated with states with linguistic fractionalization (2008: 601).

In all of these ways population pressures put direct pressure on available resources and indirect pressure on rate of employment and are positively correlated with violent conflict. The question for this study is; how may these pressures impact employment to population ratio after the campaign has concluded. In discussing the ‘conflict trap’ that states which have violent campaigns fall into Collier describes how the
effects of war lingers on after the violent conflict has stopped, so that the state’s economic performance and therefore employment to population ratio, is hampered for several years after the conflict has ended. He decomposes the effect of the conflict trap into economic factors including: low-income, slow growth, and dependence upon primary commodity exports, as well as several other factors including the availability of guns and trained military organizations, the unhealed hostilities between people (which he measured as a soaring rate of homicides and violent crimes), an unemployed workforce, and now a history of violence (2003).

Collier lays out his recommendations in three building blocks: aid, the governance of natural resources, and military interventions. “The latest evidence suggests that aid is particularly effective in raising growth during the post-conflict decade, and it is most effective in year’s four to seven” (2003:175). The observation is that aid pours in immediately after the conflict has stopped when the state is not yet able to absorb the aid and use it effectively.

For the second building block, the international governance of natural resources, Collier recommends a process similar to the Kimberly process which regulates the sale of diamonds such that the global community can be assured they are not buying diamonds that are funding rebel movements. Collier recommends establishing similar certification and tracking procedures for other primary commodities that inadvertently fund conflict, notably timber, coltan, coca and oil. Thus establishing transparency of governance of the states’ vital resources which has been linked to increased employment and fair employment practices.
The final area, coordinating reductions in military spending, is important because states experiencing civil war sharply increase their military expenditures and neighboring states tend to copy this increase for their own security. Additionally in the first few years after the conflict is over, the risks are often so high that states continue their exorbitant military spending for several more years. Collier recommends that the international community step in with peacekeeping forces, explaining that: “Even a large and well-timed aid program will not produce a substantial growth spurt until around the fifth post-conflict year” (2003: 184). If peacekeeping forces can be brought in immediately some of the funding redirected to military spending could be better used in capacity building, as well as policy and institutional reform, until the economy starts recovering. And the decrease in defense spending could be redirected to expanding other industries and reducing unemployment.

In terms of nonviolent campaigns a similar set of pressures on resources and employment caused by poor governance, population pressures, and defense spending could all be affecting these states’ employment to population ratios but with less justification for defense spending.

School enrollment—

Koïchiro Matsuura has led the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as Director-General since 2000. He explains that “learning and education are at the heart of all development” (2007:1). When the UN adopted the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) to dramatically reduce poverty by 2015, it set up two of them to specifically address education. MDG 2 aims to ensure that children everywhere—boys and girls—will be able to complete a full course of good
quality schooling (defined as, up to grade 11) and MDG 3 targets the elimination of gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015. But even beyond these two: “Indeed, learning is implicit in all the MDGs: improving maternal health, reducing child mortality and combating HIV/AIDS simply cannot be achieved without empowering individuals with knowledge and skills to better their lives” (2007:1).

The effect of education helps societies in numerous ways. The UN development report for 2004 calls education, for both genders but specifically for girls, the best hope for eliminating world poverty. When girls are educated numerous factors come into play which cumulatively can help pull societies out of poverty. Educated girls will tend to marry later, and have more equal marriage relationships. They will tend to have fewer more healthy children and associated better maternal health. Educated women also tend to become more involved in local politics and decision making, and make more inclusive decisions for the people of their communities. They also tend to be more financially independent and spur local economies through small independent businesses which supplement family income and help spur local economies. Schooling is therefore an important benefit and indicator for the social progress of society.

There are several studies that look at the effect of armed conflict on schooling. Shemyakina studies the effect of armed conflict on the accumulation of schooling in Tajikistan which was embroiled in one of the most devastating civil conflicts of the former Soviet Union region. The data suggest a negative association between conflict exposure and school enrollment in particular for girls ages 12-15. Looking at the longer-term impact of the conflict measured by the mean grade attainment by young adults,
Shemyakina “observed a downward trend in the attainment by the cohort of women who were of school age during the conflict” (2006:21). Shemyakina observed the largest drop in grade attainment for those who would have been in secondary school at the time of the fighting; and also observed an increasing gap in grade attainment between those who live in conflict affected regions compared to those who live in lesser affected areas. However, we do not find the same effect for men” (2006:21).

Enrollment rates for both boys and girls noticeably improved in the four years that passed between the national surveys. For instance, “85 percent of 14 year old girls from conflicted affected regions were enrolled in school five years after cease-fire as compared to only 77 percent of girls age 14 immediately after cease-fire” (2006:21). The author suggests that it is possible that older girls were viewed by their families as more vulnerable to risks associated with conflict activity (such as rape and harassment), and therefore kept at home. High enrollment rates among younger children, ages 8-12 suggest that during the conflict households attempted to protect the education of younger children by allowing them to complete at least primary school. Sheyakina also noted that the impact of conflict on enrollment decreased with time, as shown by follow-up measures five years after the conflict cease-fire.

In an event-study that analyzed the aftermath of civil war in a cross-section of states, Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol, found that “even though war has devastating effects and its aftermath can be immensely difficult, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and improvement are achieved” (2008:63). Forty-one states involved in internal wars over the period 1960-2003 were analyzed with a pre- and post-war comparison and their dynamic trends during the associated post-conflict
period examined. “In the case of primary-school enrollment, conflict states improve not only with respect to their pre-war level but also with respect to a control group of similar states without conflict. But secondary school enrollment fell behind and individual states were measured as either the same, or lower, than at least one of the control groups” (2008: 75). These authors found secondary school enrollment was negatively impacted for boys but not girls and attributed this to reasoning that older boys may have dropped out of school to become fighters in the combat.

School enrollment would seem to the one of the first or early among the stability indicators that would respond to cease-fires. It’s common for parents to feel that education will give their children a better life than they experience, and seem to want to send their children to school as soon as the fighting has stopped and the concern for their safety has subsided. Although it will take time for any changes in education funding and policy to become effective, enrollment matching pre-campaign levels should occur quickly.

*Regional stability*—

The final indicator under investigation in this study is regional stability. It is different than the other indicators in that it does not measure the factors within the state experiencing the opposition campaign but those of its surrounding neighbors. We sometimes hear of violent civil conflict spilling over into neighboring states (Collier, 2009, Gleditsch, 2007). But the recent ‘Arab Spring’ would suggest nonviolent social movements may have a spill-over affect as well. It is my contention that the early and positive results in Tunisia’s nonviolent campaign, provided encouragement to its regional neighbors to follow similar nonviolent tactics.
The conventional wisdom treats the causes of civil wars as purely domestic phenomena. It is implicitly assumed that the key causes of civil conflict within sovereign states also must lie within their boundaries. But even a cursory glance suggests that there are many transnational dimensions of civil wars. For example, “Insurgencies often recruit fighters and raise resources among kin and supporters in neighboring states, civil wars have historically been more likely to occur in border areas, civil wars sometime spill over into other states and have at times escalated to larger regional conflicts” (Gleditsch, 2007: 293). There are also concerns that the consequences of conflicts can lead other states to intervene. “This prominence of transnational characteristics in ongoing civil wars suggests that factors outside the boundaries of individual states may have at least some influence the risk of civil war onset” (Gleditsch, 2007: 293).

An influential study in the conventional wisdom of civil war is that of Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their definition of civil war presents it as a purely domestic phenomenon, which Gleditsch explains is how it is generally characterize in the field. Their theoretical approach emphasizes conditions facilitating insurgency against a central government, and avoids some of the problems with specifying who is doing the fighting and where in the state is it geographically occurring. Fearon and Laitin argue that “civil war is essentially a problem of ‘weak states’ with low capacity to deter rebellion. Characteristics favoring insurgency such as loot-able resources and mountainous terrain are central to their explanation, but they largely dismiss the role of international factors or factors which occur outside of the state’s borders” (2003: 86). Chenoweth and Stephan have questioned the assumption that violent conflict is a weak state problem, that “the power of the state
in question does not determine whether a campaign that emerges is nonviolent or violent. Most notably, nonviolent campaigns emerge in some of the most objectively powerful states in the world … and in roughly equal probability to violent campaigns” (2011:67). Throughout history violent conflicts have occurred in states with many different levels of strength and capacity.

Gleditsch cites the research of Deutsch (1977) and Jackson (1990) who argue that the borders of many developing states are highly porous and little more than meaningless lines on a map as states are too weak to effectively police their entire border. He explains that “porous borders provide a strategic advantage to rebels. Porous borders allow rebels to move back and forth freely enabling them to re-group and congregate. But for government forces to cross borders would violate state sovereignty and can create significant costs in terms of inter-state conflict and potentially international interventions” (2007: 295). Furthermore, many peripheral groups such as religious groups and ethnic groups, are not confined within the boundaries of individual nations, but extend easily into other states. Groups with a transnational community can often mobilize substantially more resources than one would expect from their characteristics in an individual country (2007: 295). Excluded minority groups in one state can be politically privileged in a neighboring state, making political or military support very likely.

Paul Collier explains that much of the costs for civil wars are borne by neighboring states. “Disease crosses borders easily with refugee populations and continues long after the fighting has ceased. Similarly the economic collapse also spreads from one country to the next. Since most countries are bordered by several others, the
combined costs of the war to its neighbors can easily exceed the cost to the country itself” (2009: 31).

The availability of guns also adds fuel to the fire. As one state increases its military expenditures, neighboring states will often do the same simply to ensure the balance of power is maintained.

“A government without guns cannot defend its citizens against a neighbor with guns. National security is presented as the ultimate national public good and military spending is the way to achieve it, often at the expense of other social goods. Unfortunately instead of making states more secure the increase in the availability of guns through high military spending significantly increased the risk of further conflict. From the military stockpile of arms, weapons leak into the hands of rebels and move across porous borders to fuel an increase in violence (Collier, 2009:113).

Although nonviolent conflict shares much with its violent counterpart, “the differences between the two have an important impact on both the means and consequences of a conflict. The theoretical assumptions underlying nonviolent struggle are significant and provide a challenge to a great deal of conventional thinking in the social sciences” (Zunes, 2000:181). The relative success of so many nonviolent social movements implies, as Gene Sharp noted, that political power is ultimately “fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources” (Sharp 1973, I: 8). Because “nonviolent action cuts off sources of [the regime's] power rather than simply combating the final power products of these sources,” it poses a much more severe threat to a regime's authority than does armed rebellion (III: 454). Furthermore, the success of nonviolent movements implies that power is pluralistic; that a ruler's power is determined by the degree to which subjects chose to follow orders. To the extent this is true; it is also true that even the most oppressive regime rules, to some degree, by the consent of the people. This trend indicates that nonviolent revolutions and revolts in
contrasts to violent revolutions grow out of the disintegration of concert, not simply the agitation of armed rebels (Zunes, 2000:181).

Nonviolent resistance is different than violent conflict in that it divides supporters of the status quo, renders government troops less effective, and challenges the attitudes of people in a country and around the world. A good example of this comes from the South African struggle against apartheid.

“Pictures of whites including: members of the clergy and other ‘upstanding citizens’ protesting discriminatory policies were broadcast on television worldwide, lending legitimacy to anti-apartheid forces and undermining the regime in a way that armed struggle never could” (Zunes, 2000:184). As nonviolent resistance within the country escalated, “momentum grew for the imposition of economic sanctions by South Africa's biggest trading partners. Unable to meet the rising costs of maintaining the apartheid system, the white government agreed to pursue reform (Zunes, 2000:184).

Another example that Zunes provides that shows the impact of nonviolent campaigns on the international community was that of the Israel / Palestine conflict.

“Television footage of Israeli repression of unarmed Palestinians during the 1980s had a similar sympathizing effect on Americans, which was significant because both private U.S. citizens and the U.S. government have done much to sustain Israel's military occupation of Palestinian land. The Palestinians succeeded at last in conveying the reality of their victimization to world public opinion” (2003:184).

Even as nonviolent campaigns are different in the theoretical assumptions that underlay the nature of struggle from their violent counterparts, they both impact their neighbors and the world community. They don’t exist in isolation. There are financial,
political, social, legal, and health consequences to neighboring states. It is the contention
of this author that nonviolent campaigns influence their neighbors perhaps to a different
degree and in different ways than violent campaigns, but no less significantly.

A final reason it was decided to study regional stability as an indicator is that it is
one of the four indicators in the forecasting political instability model developed by
Goldstone et al.

“Being situated in a ‘bad neighborhood’ was found to be a major risk factor, in
countries with four or more neighbors experiencing armed conflict being far more
likely to have future onsets of instability. Although we examined other ways to
measure the ‘bad neighborhood’ factor— including both linear and quadratic
measures based on the specific number of neighboring countries in conflict, and
other thresholds—the simple two-category approach shown here (yes/no to the
question of four or more neighbors are in conflict) provided the greatest accuracy
in the overall model” (Goldstone et al., 2010:197).

While it may seem that setting the threshold at four or more neighboring countries having
violent conflict would make for a very extreme and rare condition, Goldstone et at. found
that was not the case. “Of the 160 countries with populations greater than 500,000 in
2003, nearly half (77) had four or more bordering countries, and 11 of our problem onsets
(nearly one-tenth of all problem cases) occurred in countries with conflicts in four or
more neighbors. So while this condition may seem extreme, it was well represented in
our data” (Goldstone et al., 2010:197).

Realizing that regional stability is impacted by both violent civil conflicts as well
as nonviolent movements, and additionally understanding that it is part of important
forecasting models of political instability it was decided to investigate how violent and
nonviolent campaigns compare in their impact to regional stability measured five and ten
years after campaign end. This will be measured as the percentage of states in the region
with conflict compared to the total number of states in the same region, five and ten years after the campaign.

**Hypotheses. --what are the predicted results?**

*Life expectancy—*

As noted above major opposition campaigns don’t leave the state where they found it. Liberalization and greater access to political participation characterizes states moving to higher levels of democracy, repression and exclusion of access to political participation and restrictions of some social services, characterizes states moving to greater levels of autocratization. Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, are among the authors who have shown that nonviolent campaigns have a better chance of bringing about democracy or, at least increasing the level of democracy in the state, as they force governments to comply with the demands of its citizens. Likewise violent campaigns are often associated with ushering in a higher level of autocracy. To the degree that it is expected that active participating citizens will demand services that promote greater health in the form of: universal healthcare, the availability of healthcare facilities, state funding to treat major health threats such as: HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Flu; safe living conditions, decrease in the threat of violent crime, quick recovery from natural disasters etc. it is expected that in states which experience nonviolent campaigns which usher in greater levels of democracy, we will see life expectancy increase as a result of these changes. This is hypothesis 1.

But for states that experience violent campaigns Tilly and Tarrow draw a different trajectory: “Lethal conflicts have special features that set them off from other forms of
contentious politics. Killing, wounding, and damaging, affect the survival of participants as well as non-combatants, well after the immediate struggle has ended. Violent campaigns have been known to break up families and communities, destroy available labor supply, and eliminate the means of production, transportation, communication as well as destroy the states’ infrastructure” (2007:136). Recovering from violent conflict takes a larger toll on society economically, structurally, and physically and lasts well beyond the campaign’s end. In fact, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have shown that more people die in civil war from the spread of disease as they flee the fighting, than from actual battle deaths. These researchers estimated the percentage of battle deaths to total deaths from the civil wars in her sample and found, “the ratio of the number of battle deaths to total deaths from war, indicate that deaths from military operations are less than one third of all deaths due to war” (2008:9). The aftereffects including disease continue long after the fighting has ceased. Additionally the availability of the regularly supplied food sources may be disrupted as bridges, roads, and other infrastructure was targeted during the campaign. It may take years for these supply routes and regular sources of goods to once again be made available. It is therefore expected that states which have had a violent campaign, even if the campaign was not successful, these states will see a decrease in life expectancy measured five and ten years after the campaign as they struggle to recover from its impact whether the campaign is successful or unsuccessful. This is hypothesis 2.

Additionally for violent campaigns which are successful and usher in autocratic governments that are repressive, exclusive, and unresponsive to citizen demands for healthcare services, but instead provide only those services as it serves the state; it is
expected that overall life expectancy will decrease as a result of the change. This is hypothesis 3.

*Long term economic growth*—

In Paul Collier’s book *The Bottom Billion* he has a chapter on the Conflict Trap where he depicts the costs of civil war and violent conflict. A typical civil war will cost the global community roughly $4 billion (USD). For the state, these costs come in the form of reduction in economic growth due to loss of labor, funds being redirected to military spending, and destruction of infrastructure which is specifically targeted to hamper opposing forces; agricultural production comes to a standstill, businesses close, many of the most productive members of society join military or rebel groups. The state also experiences mass population movements as people seek refuge from the fighting but which leads to internally displaced people who are unprotected and vulnerable to harm and the spread of disease. There are also costs to neighboring states as refugees spill over borders with needs for housing, food, protection and medical care. And there are costs to the global community as 95 percent of the global production of hard drugs comes from conflict states (Collier, 2007). Today’s civil wars and violent rebel uprisings are especially costly to the state as they are not facing an external opponent but instead an opposing force within their own borders so that the state itself is paying for both sides of the conflict. Other researchers support Collier’s view of the costs of violent civil conflict with studies on war’s negative impact on development. Bodea and Elbadawi describe the misallocation of capital away from development in times of conflict to large military spending and Hoeffler describes the fact that on average two-thirds of deaths in conflict
situations are non-battle related (i.e. disease, starvation, injury) for those fleeing the fighting.

Chenoweth and Stephan explain that the costs of nonviolent campaigns may be lower than violent campaigns as they are typically not as devastating in social, political, and economic terms as those produced by violent conflicts. Some of the potential adverse effects of a nonviolent campaign include property damage, decreased economic growth, depending on the ability of the new leadership to inspire confidence in domestic and foreign investors. Sociopolitical cleavages may result following a successful nonviolent revolution, which may deepen if the popular uprising was less broadly based. In general, however, “we would not expect to see the same devastation of the physical infrastructure or long-term casualties that trouble societies emerging from civil wars” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:206).

The best way to promote peace, stabilization, and economic growth after a state has experienced a major campaign is still open for debate. Many who favor democracy accept the view that “free and fair elections, respect for civil liberties, and a market-oriented liberal economy are desirable objectives for developing states” (Paris, 2005:33). And “since the end of the Cold War and the removal of the major obstacle (i.e. the Soviet Union) a new consensus has emerged. The principal practitioners of peace building – the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, NATO, the African Union (AU), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – are all driven by a belief in the pacific powers of ‘liberalization’. This involves marketization (liberalization in the economic sphere) and democratization (liberalization in the political sphere)” (Turner, 2006:94).
But as Turner explains it’s not an easy road. Neoliberal economics was promoted throughout the developing world which came in the form of structural adjustment polices specified by the international financial institutions. Other donors and NGO’s generally followed the same liberal policy agenda and specified market liberalization and democratization as conditions for aid. This emphasis on economic liberalization, privatization, and integration into the world economy though the relaxing of trade barriers proved problematic as these policies “were pursued with little regard for the appropriateness to the situation on the ground and often with little regard for what local people wanted. In some states a radical set of laws were introduced which opened the economy wide to foreign corporations which more often than not were benefited instead of the local people in the state. Many times there was no requirement for the foreign corporation to reinvest in the country” (Turner, 2006:101). And too often the state government benefited from selling off the states’ assets but because of corruption this did not always translate into economic growth and benefits for the state’s people.

In *Globalization and its Discontents* Joseph Stiglitz, the former head of the World Bank describes the changes that are needed in the development discourse. Stiglitz’s critique focuses on “the need to create institutions which would underpin markets and private sector-led development, to create the conditions for an educated and healthy workforce, and ensure national ownership of the process” (Stiglitz, 2002:336). The international financial institution’s work needs to be individually tailored and specific to each state to create the greatest benefit for its people.

Turner explains, as it is currently practiced “Liberalization exacerbates social tension in post-conflict societies because it puts profits before people, privatization before
jobs, free trade before food security, private property rights before social welfare, and ‘western’ security before development” (Tuner, 2006:103). This is seconded by Shalmali Guttal: “Although the language of reconstruction programmes is rife with terms such as rights, good governance, sovereignty, and democracy, affected countries do not have the right to break with macroeconomic orthodoxy, challenge imbalances of global power and resource distribution, and chart their own paths toward rebuilding their societies and economies” (Guttal, 2005:80).

So although the international financial institutions may have had the recovering state’s best interest in mind, the structural adjustment policies that were set as requirements for aid, did more harm than good for many of these economies.

In terms of states that experienced a violent campaign and move toward greater autocracy, Collier also points out they may have at least one financial advantage. He explains that leaders in democracies who are concerned about the next election and want to show how much they have accomplished will choose to authorize relatively smaller infrastructure improvements which can be completed in the four years before the next election. Autocratic leaders who have no such requirement have sometimes chosen larger projects, such as major bridges, or water systems, which may take twenty years to complete but be of greater benefit to society. Collier explains that this is one of the reasons China growing so fast.

Bringing these critiques all together, it is anticipated that states which experience nonviolent movements that are successful will initially grow faster than violent campaigns that usher in greater autocracy because of the lower costs of recovery from damages to infrastructure and the opening of technological innovation and
entrepreneurial ingenuity that their economies experience. So GDP per capita will be higher for states with nonviolent successful campaigns than violent successful campaigns (hypothesis 4).

However as the structural adjustment policy requirements begin to slow down the economy of states that experienced a move to greater democracy through a nonviolent campaign as well as the long-term large development projects improving growth in states with violent campaigns and movement toward autocracy; it is expected that states which experienced successful violent campaigns will outperform states that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns ten years after transition (hypothesis 5). This will be depicted in the second graph which shows long term economic growth ten years after transition.

And finally it is predicted that unsuccessful campaigns will follow the same economic growth patterns as above with effects that are less strong (hypothesis 6).

*Rule of law*—

As mentioned above, many international financial institutions have rule of law requirements associated with development dollars because rule of law is considered one of the best hope for peace. But on average “39 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict in the first five years, another 32 percent return to conflict in the following five years” (Collier, 2004). “State-building theory has increasingly recognized that formal elections alone are not sufficient to initiate or sustain transitions to peace and democracy without rule of law reform. The accessibility of the justice system and its treatment of cases in an equal fashion are now considered fundamental to peace and democracy” (Samuels, 2006:23). “Rule of law institutions have been granted a primary
role in achieving national reconciliation. By addressing past human rights abuses and fighting impunity, domestic legal institutions can gain greater legitimacy among the population” (Hurwitz, 2005: ii). This is a tall order as even today there is no general agreement on the definition of rule of law nor how best to implement it in post-conflict settings. And certainly there is very little understanding of how implementation may need to be different when a nonviolent campaign has brought about change. So, even while many organizations are involved in aiding post-conflict and developing states with aspects of rule of law reform, the problems abound.

“The issue of coordination or the lack thereof, is one of the most recurrent problems of post-conflict peace building” (Hurwitz, 2005:10). Private sector consulting firms, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, state governments, multilateral organizations, the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and regional development banks are all engaged, with differing approaches in programs that seek to enhance rule of law in post-conflict and developing states. These organizations are not accountable to any single authority and without overall coordination, scheduling and planning, they often find that instead of reinforcing what each other is doing, and they find themselves contradicting each other on the best approach to be taken.

“There should be a centralized point of organization and leadership within the civilian realm (preferably the State Department) to lead and coordinate rule of law assistance, development policies, and strategy” says a Carr Center report (2006:2). In addition, a variety of functions in post-conflict environments are best carried out by civilians rather than military personnel. Many feel that a combined effort could prove to
be an effective collaboration in stability operations (Carr Center Workshop paper, 2006:2).

Other scholars agree: “there is a strong need for rule of law strategies to be based on people’s needs rather than on donor’s interests” (Hurwitz, 2005:11).

Another problem involves the lack of understanding the local culture and how best to assist in implementing rule of law practices. “There should be a move away from the exclusive focus on lawyerly expertise and a realization that multidisciplinary teams including anthropologists and country specialists would actually be more adept at designing and implementing rule of law programs in the challenging environments of post-conflict countries” (Hurwitz, 2005:9). Along these lines a research study by Amir N. Licht et.al found that in societies whose prevailing culture emphasizes the moral equality of individuals and which legitimized individuals’ pursuit of the own preferences: “We found greater compliance with formal legal rules, exercise of discretionary power undistorted by bribes, and societies that are more likely to develop and sustain institutions that promote societal transparency and equal treatment under the law” (Licht, 2003:9). In contrast a rule of law norm was less likely to find support in societies whose “culture emphasizes embeddedness. The key values in such cultures are respect for tradition, honoring elders, and obedience; which encourages people to seek guidance in sources other than the law” (Licht, 2003:9).

Another problem with successfully implementing rule of law is the unique situation that post-conflict states present. Particularly problematic are the concerns for peace and security, law and order, and the need for transitional justice. Transitions from civil conflict include “a devastated infrastructure, destroyed institutions, a lack of
professional and bureaucratic capacity, an inflammatory and violent political culture, and a traumatized and highly divided society” (Samuels, 2006:6). The public trust in the government will tend to be lower than in other developing countries. Other common problems include “a lack of political will, judicial independence, low technical capacity, low government respect for human rights as well as the existence of a shadow economy and widespread access to small arms” (Samuels, 2006:6).

Other scholars feel there is too much emphasis on the immediate security concerns just after conflict has ceased, and not enough emphasis on the long term implementation of a sustainable system of rule of law. “While rule of law reforms tend to focus on law and order, in particular in the immediate post-conflict phase, a wider range of legal matters that are likely to directly affect people, including property and inheritance rights, and access to justice and administrative authorities, should be given increased attention” (Hurwitz, 2005:11).

Another problem that is inhibiting the successful implementation of rule of law involves the lack of empirical and comparative experience. “Many initiatives in the justice sector have not been subject to careful monitoring and evaluation. The lack of empirical and comparative experience undermines the ability to develop strategies and programs that take account of potential strengths, weaknesses and unintended consequences of previous experiences” (Samuels, 2006:14). Some of the particular weaknesses in the literature include the “lack of rigorous cross country evaluations, and insufficient focus on empirical markers to evaluate outcomes rather than outputs” (Samuels, 2006:14).
One may be able to summarize all of these concerns into two broad phases. The first phase contains the immediate concerns of establishing peace, security, law and order. The second phase can be thought of as the more long term development issues: building a fair and just legal system, accountability of government, transparency, and equal implementation under the law. In phase one the immediate need is to regain some degree of law and order in the state, this phase will sometimes involve United Nations peacekeeping troops or non-state military partners. “Security should be the first priority of stability operations. Without the climate of basic security, nation building will be unsuccessful. Insurgents or terrorists will attack infrastructure, kill judges, assassinate police and teachers, and carry out other attacks to undermine overall stability” (Carr Center Workshop paper, 2006:5).

The second development phase aims to set up the more long term sustainable operation of law and order in the state, and represents an even more difficult challenge than the first phase. This second phase generally includes, recruiting and build-up of the police force, increase in the judicial capacity, upgrading prison infrastructure, drafting or re-drafting a state constitution, traditional and customary law reform to establish equal treatment under the law, establishing transparency and freedom of the press as well as establishing trade policy and economic rights for all.

The economy is generally devastated in the post-conflict environment. Crops will not have been planted or harvested and most legitimate businesses and commerce will have stopped operating because of the insecurity and violence. A shadow and criminalized economy is likely to have emerged. “One of the essential steps in stabilizing the peace is to encourage a return to legitimate economic activity. There is an urgent need
for a mechanism to resolve property (especially land, livestock, and commercial) disputes” (Samuels, 2006:10).

These needs are urgent but also need to be sustained as part of the second phase of rule of law implementation.

As new regimes come into power they have choices to make in terms of implementing rule of law. New regimes, who have won their way into power through violent conflict and the control of arms, may be better at establishing peace in the first phase of rule of law reform immediately after the fighting stops, but that peace is known to come with a price. ‘Disappearances’ and arbitrary arrests (i.e. equal treatment under the law not enforced) are known to be common in many of these states. It is therefore predicted that these states will score worse on rule of law than states which ushered in a new regime through nonviolence. (hypothesis 7). The states which had nonviolent campaigns may stumble on the security in the immediate aftermath of transition, but it is thought they will be more equal in treatment under the law, fairness, transparency, and the allowance of personal autonomy; the main tenants of rule of law when measured five years after transition.

By the time states reach the second phase of rule of law reform which concerns the sustaining operational issues around rule of law, it is expected that states which experienced a nonviolent campaign will score far better than those that experienced violent campaigns. If nonviolent campaigns usher in more democratic governments it is expected that equal treatment under the law, free elections, a constitutional implementation of balance of powers, transparency of government, freedom of the press, will all be stronger in these states enabling them to score better on this indicator than
states which experienced violent campaigns when measured ten years after campaign end. (hypothesis 8).

Lastly it is anticipated that unsuccessful campaigns may see a dip in rule of law. The United States after 9/11 experienced what could be called a decrease in rule of law. Under the banner of the “War on Terrorism” laws were passed that gave the government wider powers in surveillance, wire-tapping, and monitoring of individuals. Transparency of government decreased as security concerns came to the forefront. If other states respond in a similar fashion of impinging on civil liberties, following unsuccessful violent or major nonviolent campaigns they will see a decrease on their rule of law score. It is therefore predicted that states which experience an unsuccessful campaign of either type will show a decrease in rule of law as measured both five and ten years after the campaign ends. (hypothesis 9).

Degree of Autocracy/Democracy—

A review of Ted Robert Gurr’s article “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971” reveals some of the confusion in the debate around political stability, durability, and changes in a state’s polity score. “We speak of the ‘stability’ and ‘performance’ of political systems in ways analogous to physicians’ concern with the health of a patient or an economists’ evaluation of the efficiency of an enterprise. But, whereas physicians are largely agreed about the characteristics of healthy people, there is much inconsistency and disagreement about what constitutes the ‘vital signs’ of political system” (1974).

What are the signs that the polity is changing and in what direction will it move? Eckstein has argued “political system which performs well must have some degree of
efficacy, legitimacy, civil order, and durability” (1971). So, stating the reverse, if a state does not possess these characteristics we can expect to see some change. Gurr’s (1974) analysis confirmed these results; strongly democratic and highly autocratic political systems were more durable in their ability to respond to the stress of socioeconomic change, and saw fewer changes in their polity scoring than the mixed authority traits of the anocracies. But, generally looking historically over the nearly two hundred years in the study, he saw that: “The typical state at the onset of the 19th century was a traditional autocracy. Some were very large like the Spanish, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Czarist and Manchu empires. Others like the pre-Tokugawa Japan and Persia, as well as many smaller European monarchies were also typical at that time” (1974:1503). These polities had distinct characteristics in common: there was a high degree of centralization and institutionalization of political power, but few responsibilities for social and economic activities, and a lack of adaptability. “In almost every instance one can trace the demise of these traditional states to their inability to cope with the stresses generated by socioeconomic ‘modernization’ (1974:1503).

The early 20th century was a time of great political experimentation. By the mid-1970’s strong democratic as well as autocratic systems had formed. “The most salient characteristic of both of these ‘modern’ systems is their directiveness. The most durable political systems now are those which have responded to the stress of socioeconomic change by assuming the task of managing it, whether directly by state control of the institutions or socialization and production or indirectly by regulation and support of allied but quasi-autonomous institutions” (Gurr, 1974:1503).
Drawing from these studies to our work it is predicted that states that experienced a successful campaign were not able to respond to the pressures of ‘modernization’ as Gurr describes, and failed to adapt to the demands of the people. Of these that ushered in a new regime through nonviolence it is predicted that these states will see and increased in their Polity scoring toward greater democracy, (hypothesis 10). This is because nonviolent campaigns are formed by growing civil society, mass participation, individual autonomy; i.e. the roots of democratic society.

Of these that ushered in a new regime through a violent campaign it is predicted that these states will see a decrease in Polity scoring toward greater autocracy, (hypothesis 11). This is because violent campaigns are led by a few, will armed cadre who take power by force and restrict the freedoms of everyone else.

For the states that experienced an unsuccessful campaign, of either type, and weathered the storm and was able to deal with the pressures of a major campaign it could be said that they somehow responded and adapted, perhaps giving some concessions but not significantly altering their polity. So in these states we are expecting to see no, or very little change in Polity scoring, (hypothesis 12).

*Infant mortality*—

Infant mortality was found to be a better predictor of instability amongst the social variables tested than ethno-linguistic fractionalization, percentage of the population living in urban areas, female life expectancy, and percentage of school completed, population density, or many others (Goldstone et al., 2010:194).

Their model was able to predict the outbreak of both violent civil war and nonviolent social movements with the same simple model. This would imply similar
characteristics in the state lead to opposition campaigns of both types. But this is not to say that different campaign types don’t bring about very different outcomes in expenditures of social services, infrastructure, education, and overall health of the population.

Chenoweth and Stephan have revealed that nonviolent campaigns usher in more democratic forms of government and violent campaigns usher in more autocratic forms of government (2011:10). To the degree that citizens in democracies advocate for access to health care facilities, prenatal and post-natal education, and increases and more equalized social spending; it is predicted that IMR will decrease. (hypothesis 13).

Our earlier predictions regarding life expectancy showed that life expectancy will decrease when successful violent movement ushers in more autocratic forms of government. If the same health factors that impact life expectancy also impact IMR, it is expected that successful violent movements will be associated with the redirecting of funds away from health services and perhaps toward security services, as well as limiting access to nutritious food, health care facilities and trained health care professionals; leading to these states experiencing an increase in infant mortality (hypothesis 14).

If we can follow the same pattern as life expectancy for the campaigns that ended unsuccessfully we can expect to see health improvements for both nonviolent and violent campaigns which did not meet their goals and bring in a new government. So it is expected that both of these types of campaigns will see a decrease in infant mortality. It is thought that the existing regime although still in place may offer some accommodation to opposition campaigns and add some additional funding to the areas that promote health
and decrease infant mortality, although not as much as those states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns (hypothesis 15).

*Respect for human rights*—

That democracy ought to decrease governmental resort to terrorism and physical integrity rights violations is strongly argued by Henderson: “The democratic process, with its emphasis on bargaining and compromise, offer a meaningful alternative for handling conflict if leaders choose to use it. Democracy should not be viewed as an idealistic process, but as a realistic way to accommodate demands with a minimum of conflict… With a large measure of democracy, conflict should not grow as sharp as to invite repression” (1991:123-124). Henderson goes on to note that democracy “cannot be based on pseudo-participation. There must be legitimate channels, such as political parties and elections that can carry interests forcefully into government” (1991: 124).

Effective democracy provides citizens the means to oust potentially abusive leaders from office including those responsible for human rights violations. Poe and Tate even argue that “there can be a problem of tautology when one tries to put democracy and human rights into an independent – dependent variable relationship” (1994:856). It is therefore expected that states which experience successful nonviolent campaigns and increased levels of democracy will see improvements in respect for human rights (hypothesis 16). Additionally because of the work of Bueno De Mesquita et al. referenced above which indicated that results will not be seen simply because elections are held, we are expecting to see the increase in respect for human rights for these states more clearly in the ten-year after transition graph than the five-year after.
“That we expect military regimes to be more coercive than others probably surprises no one. Military juntas are based on force, and force is the key to coercion. Yet, in many of the nations in which soldiers forcibly take power, they do so alleging that the leaders they are replacing were themselves in violation the constitution and possibly were engaging in repression of the rights of citizens” (Poe and Tate, 1994:858). They define military regimes as those which “come to power as a consequence of a successful coup d’état, led by the army, navy or air force, that remained in power with a military person as the chief executive, for a least six months in a given year” (1994:858). Not all of the violent campaigns in our dataset are led by military personnel but there are parallels in the use of force and physical coercion. It is therefore anticipated that states which experience successful violent campaigns will see a decrease in respect for human rights (hypothesis 17). Additionally to the degree that these new leaders are replacing leaders who were themselves engaging in repression of the rights of citizens as suggested by Poe and Tate, it is expected that we will see this relationship more clearly ten years after transition than five years after.

And for the states which experience unsuccessful campaigns, to the degree that existing leaders feel threatened by major campaigns it is expected that respect for human rights will decrease. This will probably be more so for violent campaigns than nonviolent campaigns as historically it was felt that violent campaigns were more threatening (hypothesis 18).

As suggested by the authors of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project and source of the data for this indicator (Cingranelli and Richards), additional tests will be run to control for population size. This may be at least partially controlled for by our model of
incorporating a measure of the indicator five years before the campaign began as a covariate in the regression analysis, but we will run both test and look at the R-squared to determine which one is explaining more of the dependent variable.

*Employment to population ratio*—

In considering the causes of intra-state opposition campaigns the important work of Collier and Hoeffler (2001) makes the distinction between grievance, a motivation based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is treated, frequently with a strong historical dimension; and greed, an acquisitive desire to gain in personal wealth, power and prestige. The important question is whether contemporary campaigns are more the product of grievances or more the result of greed.

Some of the grievances producing opposition campaigns are related to economic factors: systematic economic discrimination against groups based on ethno-linguistic or religious differences, lack of resources causing extreme poverty and poor social conditions. Related to this, are the concerns of environmental conflict, specifically the struggle over land use and water rights in situations of acute shortage of livelihood. So both present-day and historical grievances can play a crucial part in the coalescing of groups that serves as a basis for collective action in contemporary conflicts” (Murshed, 2002:389).

Discussion of greed as a motive for conflict has mainly arisen in the context of natural resource endowments, where an abundance of which appears to increase the risk of a country falling into violent conflict as the state’s wealth in oil, precious gems, and timber, for example are centered in the hands of a few elite. (Murshed 2002:389).
If one could take a broad perspective, the argument could be put forth that grievance motives resulting from population pressures directly and unemployment indirectly may result in more nonviolent campaigns. And those motives of greed with its desires for increased wealth, power, and prestige may result in more violent campaigns. It is pretty clear to see that when a large portion of the population is excluded a collective movement is more likely to form, and if they are successful we might expect the rate of employment to increase. Rueda (2006) however, cautions that as societies move toward greater democracy there is not an automatic shift to policies that promote increased employment as one might expect. His research shows that most labor (read blue-collar) are not active in the political process with the result that even social democratic governments establish policies that favor those he refers to as ‘insiders’ i.e. business owners, corporate executives, and those that already are in position of wealth. So we are expecting to see the rate of employment to increase but perhaps not to a great degree (hypothesis 19).

It is also expected that when a few individuals or smaller group of individuals are seeking power and wealth for themselves, that a violent campaign is more likely to form. If they are successful we might expect the rate of employment to remain unchanged as one group of elites are replaces with another as the employment to population ratio remains about the same (hypothesis 20). The work of David Rueda (2006) supports this hypothesis as he states to the degree that autocratic governments seek to stay in power and establish policies that promote elite benefits, labor will suffer and unemployment will rise.
As for the opposition campaigns that are not successful, no real change in the employment to population ratio is expected, unless existing regimes redirect funds away from social programs which may be providing employment to security forces and defense spending in which case, as explained above, we would expect to see a small decrease in the employment to population ratio (hypothesis 21).

School enrollment—

The MDG’s push for universal primary education by 2015 has significantly increased educational enrollment in many of the poorest states. However progress has been uneven with significant obstacles identified by UNESCO (2011) including: poverty, geographic isolation, HIV/AIDS, corruption, gender and ethnic discrimination and violent conflict. Conflict-affected countries are some of the farthest away from achieving universal education. UNESCO (2011) reported that 18 percent of the children of primary school age are found in conflict countries, yet these countries account for 48 percent of the children out-of-school.

In a study of school enrollment and attendance in Central South Somalia which has the world’s highest proportion of primary school-age children not in school and one of the longest current civil wars (since 1991), Peter Moyi found large gender and regional gaps in school enrollment. “About 47 percent of girls and 29 percent of boys in the highest conflict area of Central South Somalia had never enrolled in school” (2012:3). It appears that parents are concerned for the safety of their children on the way to school. Moyi also found that “teachers are also concerned for their own safety because schools have been frequently targeted for attack. Al-Shabaab militia has been cited by the UN
Secretary-General for violence directed at schools. Most trained teachers have fled the civil war with female teachers being especially scarce” (2012:2).

Moyi also suspects that the gender imbalance among teachers could also be affecting whether or not parents allow girls to attend school. The parents of girls are reluctant to send their daughters to school lacking female teachers. “The best hope for education in Somalia is the informal Koranic schools which are owned and operated by the community. They play a significant role in education especially early childhood education” (Casanelli & Abdikadir 2007, in Moyi 2012:2). They are informal schools that seek to spread Islamic principles and lifestyle; however they also teach arithmetic, Somali language and Arabic, but are unregulated, and vary widely from district to district.

In studying how violent conflicts affect school enrollment in 19 states experiencing sub-national civil wars the UNESCO ‘Education for All Global Monitoring Report for 2011’ found a weak relationship between schooling and conflict but identified four factors that may be influencing their results: 1) lack of opportunities for comparison due to the small number of observations, 2) the level of data analysis – data was aggregated at the fairly high level of provinces but conflicts tend to flare up at the local level, 3) some evidence that household survey data was not being equally distributed to conflict and non-conflict areas skewing the results, and 4) regions identified as ‘peaceful’ are also indirectly affected by conflict and therefore are not appropriate control groups for measuring the effect of conflict on school enrollment (Chaluda et al, 2011:6). But overall the report did find that “attendance rates are lower in conflict areas than in ‘peaceful’ areas with net attendance rates for primary schools on average 11 percentage
points lower in conflict areas than in non-conflict regions” (2011:2). The report also discovered that “regions within states that already had a weak school attendance pattern were more vulnerable to attendance declines when conflict erupted” (2011:2).

In summary whether the decline in school enrollment is found in primary or secondary school, in the attendance of boys or of girls, in a weak relationship with a small sample size or a strong relationship; all these studies indicated that school enrollment declined for states experiencing internal violent conflict. It is therefore predicted that states which experience a successful violent campaign will show a decrease in net school enrollment when measured five years after transition to a new government, and will move back up to pre-campaign levels by ten years after (hypothesis 22).

Nonviolent campaigns are generally not completely without any violence. Schock explains: “Those who participate in nonviolent action do not assume that the state will not react with violence; in fact, violence is to be expected from governments, especially non-democratic governments” (2003:706). The violent reaction of governments is often a positive sign and an indication that the movement is a threat to the existing government. Regimes respond with violence precisely because nonviolent action presents a serious threat to their power (2003:706).

But when comparing the level of violence between violent and ‘nonviolent’ campaigns since only one side is primarily using violent tactics, during nonviolent campaigns, they may be less negatively impactful to the people of the state. It is therefore thought that successful nonviolent campaigns will show a decrease in net school enrollment because of the violence from the government, but not as large a drop as that of states that experience violent campaigns, when measured five years after transition to a
new regime, and will move back up to pre-campaign levels by ten years after (hypothesis 23).

The results for unsuccessful campaigns are expected to be similar in direction and magnitude to successful campaigns, because they are all ‘major’ in size, and it is thought that the impact to school children would not be effected by whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful (hypothesis 24).

For an extra step in this analysis this study will also compare the results of violent and nonviolent campaigns measured in the year the campaign ended. I believe there may be difficulty measuring the impact of conflict on school enrollment five years after campaign end as parents may have already sent their children back to school immediately following cease-fire or shortly afterwards. The net percentage of school enrollment seems to be an indicator that would have a short recovery period. Unlike the implementation of rule of law or the progress of economic growth, school enrollment may start to change as soon as the fighting stops.

This study will also compare the results of the different campaign types to world averages for the same time periods for reference, to see how the impact of major campaigns compare to the progress in education for the rest of the world.

**Regional stability**—

According to the realist paradigm anarchy is the central feature of the international system, with equal and sovereign states that do not recognize any higher or centralized authority. They differ in their military capabilities and strength but not in their sovereignty or independent authority over their land. Additionally, states are assumed to be unitary and rational actors that are self-motivated to seek prosperity and security.
Given the condition of anarchy, every state is responsible for its own security and thus potentially considers all other states as potential threats. It is a self-help system where states accumulate power for reasons of both defense and deterrence. The balance of power is constantly in question. When states build up their own security they make the system as a whole more insecure as other states may interpret this buildup as offensive posturing and match this build up with increased military spending of their own.

Given the above paradigm it is quite easy to see that a violent campaign waged within one state engendering increased military spending by the government and a buildup of arms, could cause a corresponding military buildup in a neighboring state. And as Collier explains, “high military spending significantly increases the risk of further conflict. We believe that the decision of the government to spend on the military inadvertently signals to citizens that it is planning aggressive action, and this signal may forewarn rebel movements to take action” (2009: 113). It is therefore predicted that the number of regional conflicts will increase following a successful violent campaign, and that this can be measured in a higher percentage of regional conflicts five and ten years after campaign end (hypothesis 25).

For successful nonviolent campaigns it is anticipated that because of the increase use of police and security forces there may be some buildup of funding in security which may cause a corresponding buildup in neighboring states, but not to the degree of governments fighting violent campaigns. Recall that even when facing nonviolent campaigners the government almost always responds with violence, but not generally to the degree of those fighting a violent opponent. It is therefore predicted that there will be some increase in regional conflicts but to a lesser degree than the amount instigated by
violent campaigns (hypothesis 26). Note: a study by Enterline and Greig which looked at regional stability, greater peace, and increased democratization in the Middle East following the 2003 democratization of Iraq found mixed results. “We conclude that strong democracies reduce the incidence of war in the region while weak democracies increase the frequency of war in their neighbors” (2005:1075). This study is not going so far as to break down the dichotomy of state capacity at this time, but looking at the cumulative effect since our dataset has both strong and weak democracies coupled together, we will expect to see some cancelling out and an overall effect of increased regional conflict, but not as high as those following violent campaigns.

For unsuccessful campaigns the effects could be even higher than successful campaigns as incumbent leaders redirect funds to build-up arms and increase security forces to hold off opposing campaigns; to a sufficient degree to defeat the campaign. It is therefore predicted that unsuccessful campaigns will see directionally similar results to violent campaigns but to an increased degree (hypothesis 27).

Data Sources. --definition of each indicator and its source of data

Life expectancy—

The data used for this test was pulled from the WB site under World Development Indicators, and the specific indicator chosen was: “Life expectancy at birth, total (years)” (WB data set, 2012). The data is compiled from the following male and female life expectancy at birth sources: (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects, (2) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years), (3) Census reports and other statistical publications from national
statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Programme, and (6) U.S. Census Bureau: International Database.

**Long term Economic Growth**—

It was not possible to use GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) due to a lack of adequate data for all states in our sample. PPP equalizes the purchase of a common basket of goods so that states can be compared to one another. It was therefore decided to use a PPP converted GDP per capita relative to the United States, to allow for a comparison between states. The data used for this test was taken from the Penn World Table which is considered one of the most complete dataset of economic indicators for 188 states, from 1950 until today. Penn World Table defines GDP per capita relative to the United States as: “PPP Converted GDP Per Capita Relative to the United States, average GEKS-CPDW, at current prices, [cgdp2] (US = 100)” (PWT, 2011).

**Rule of Law**—

Data for our study for rule of law was taken from the Freedom House’s measure for civil liberty. Freedom House’s measure: “allows for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state” (FH, 2012). The survey does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. The methodology of the survey is derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development. “The survey findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis
and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor and balanced and unbiased judgments, and is often scored on par with other similar studies.” (FH, 2012).

Each state is assigned a numerical rating on a scale from one to seven; with one indicating the highest degree of civil liberty and seven the lowest degree of civil liberty.

“Rating of 1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established and generally fair system of the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups.

Rating of 2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as some limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women.

Ratings of 3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 include those that moderately protect almost all civil liberties to those that more strongly protect some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil liberties in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating.
Ratings of 6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.

Rating of 7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity” (FH, 2012).

In this last rating, arbitrary arrests and disappearances are often common; along with differences in the application of law and the states policies.

*Degree of Autocracy/Democracy*—

The data for the measures of Autocracy / Democracy is the 21 point Polity IV scoring produced by Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers and designed by Ted Robert Gurr. The unit of analysis for these authors is not the nation-state but rather the ‘Polity’ or political system; that is, the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs (Gurr, 1974).

Jaggers and Gurr state: “our operational indicator of democracy is derived from subjective coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and the level of constraints on the chief executive” (1995:471).

On the other side of the spectrum the Polity IV scale measures autocracies which display diverse kinds of political systems but with common properties including lack of
regulated political competition and limits of the chief executive. “In their mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress political participation; their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite; and once in office the executive exercises power with few or no institutional constraints. We also expect to find fundamental violations of political rights and civil liberties” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:471). The 21 scale spans from -10 representing the most autocratic states to +10 for full democracies.

*Infant mortality*—

Data for this analysis was taken from the World Bank Country Dataset. The WB site defines IMR as: “Infant Mortality Rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age per one thousand live births in a given year” (2012). The estimates are developed by the United Nations Inter-agency Group for child mortality which includes: UNICEF, WHO, WB, UN DESA, and UNDP.

*Respect for human rights*—

Data for this analysis was pulled from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index is an additive index made up of four components: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. It ranges from 0 (no respect for any of these rights) to 8 (full respect for these four rights). The CIRI authors use a mixed-methods approach to creating their indicator, employing content analysis of qualitative material describing respect for human rights in states around the world to create quantitative indicators. The CIRI human rights scoring is considered ‘standards-based’ because their coders rate actual governmental practices relative to standards set in international law. They do not rank states relative to
one another (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010:399). The sources of their data are the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International’s Annual Report.

Cingranelli and Richards admit that human rights information is far from perfect. “Observers differ in explaining what they witness; witnesses have better or worse memories; witnesses can be intimidated, corrupted, or even killed; victims can be intimidated and in many cases pertaining to physical integrity rights, victims have also been killed” (2010:400). Additionally, they point out that “governments have incentives to lie; and violations may be taking place in an ongoing, long-standing conflict where observers cannot properly work. Thus, truely accurate numbers of violations are rare, and all numeric data contain an inherent amount of measurement error” (2010:400).

To partially account for these measurement concerns Cingranelli and Richards use at least two trained coders for each measure for each state and extensive definitions of the concepts being measured comprised of: the measurement scheme, detailed instructions on how to transform the qualitative source information into numeric scores, directions on where to find information for each indicator, and country-examples at each scoring point drawn directly from source materials. To test whether different coders were applying identical measurement procedures to the same information Cingranelli and Richards used the Krippendorff’s r-bar reliability statistic. Krippendorff’s r-bar ranges from 0 (no reliability) to 1.0 (perfect reliability). The CIRI scoring typically is .94 indicating very high inter-coder reliability.
Employment to population ratio—

The World Bank (WB) country dataset is the source of the data for this indicator. The WB defines ‘Employment to Population Ratio ages fifteen plus’ as “the proportion of a country’s population that is employed compared to the standard working age portion of the population. Ages fifteen and older are generally considered the working-age population” (WB, 2012). The WB sources the data from the International Labour Organizations’, Key Indicators of the Labour Market Database which is refreshed annually; and each country’s labour force survey coverage of their associated civilian population. The indicator for each country is compiled from average monthly estimates.

School enrollment—

The data for this indicator was taken from the World Bank Country Data Set. The specific indicator is defined as: “School enrollment, primary percent net: the ratio of children of the official primary school age who are enrolled in primary school to the total population of children of the official primary school age” (2012).

Regional stability—

A regional stability indicator was created by this author with data pulled from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). “All” categories were used which is comprised of: war (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year) and minor conflict (at least 25 but less than 1000 battle related deaths in one calendar year), non-state conflict (the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state which results in at least 25 battle related deaths) and one-sided violence (the use of armed force by the government of a state against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year). This data was supplemented with data on
additional campaigns from the NAVCO dataset to account for under-represented nonviolent campaigns.

The Goldstone method of four or more neighboring states in conflict, proved to be problematic as it appeared that there were both violent and nonviolent campaigns in a region that could have been influenced by a campaign in a given state, but not a physically located neighbor. For example Egypt is not a physical neighbor to Tunisia but seems to have been influenced by its successful nonviolent campaign in the spring of 2011. For that reason it was decided to use UCDP’s eleven regions and calculate a percentage of states in conflict within each region. UCDP’s regions are: North and South Africa, North, Central, and South America, Central/South and East Asia, West and East Europe, the Middle East and Oceania.

Methods. --*describes the model used for this study*

*The model*—

A regression model was used to analyze the effects of violent and nonviolent campaigns on each indicator. This was further broken down by analyzing any differences between campaigns that were successful and those that failed to achieve their goals.

For each campaign in the NAVCO dataset, the value for each indicator was recorded at five years before the campaign began, the year the campaign started, as well as five and ten years after its conclusion.

For this study, campaigns that were longer in duration than two years were removed from the NAVCO dataset, because it was felt that the value of each indicator would change normally over time, making it difficult to explain that a change in the
indicator’s value was due to a campaign when the campaign stretched on for numerous years. For example, some of the violent campaigns continued on for decades. The Burmese campaign lingered on for 58 years, the Chinese Communist movement for 47 years, the Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces campaign went on for 43 years and the nonviolent campaign in West Papua continued for 42 years. These were the longest durations in the dataset, but give an indication of the enormous length of some of these campaigns. One would expect the value of the structural indicators in the study to change somewhat naturally over these long time periods along with the rest of the world. For that reason it was determined to eliminate all campaigns from the dataset that were longer than two years in an effort to control for extraneous variables and show that any changes in the indicator were more likely to be due to the major campaign event that occurred. It was also determined to limit the campaigns to those which began after 1975 when more robust data are available on the structural indicators in the study. Although the internet provides ready access to numerous sources of data, many of them do not go back to prior to the end of the cold-war years. Also, many of the sources had data for the high capacity states that were providing a wealth of data on the structural indicators but had very little data on the same indicators from poorer states. In seeking a balance between including the longest time period possible and having a robust amount of data to work with from all states, it was determined to limit the campaigns in the dataset to those which began after January 1st, 1975. This brought a total of 81 campaigns that were combined with the structural indicator data.
A Regression Model was used with four independent variables and, alternately, two
different dependent variables. The dependent variables were the measure of the indicator
under investigation at five and ten years after the campaign ended.

The first independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the
campaign was primarily nonviolent (coded as 1) or violent (coded as 0). As noted above
most campaigns are a mixture of both violent and nonviolent tactics. This variable
records the main tactic that was used to affect the campaign result.

The second independent variable is another dummy variable measuring whether
the campaign was successful (coded as 1) or unsuccessful (coded as 0). Partial success,
for example those that were scored as limited reforms, were marked unsuccessful (and
coded as 0) as the protestor’s goals were not truly (or not yet) fully realized, even though
some of their goals were brought to fruition.

The third independent variable is an interaction term which is included to capture
any additional effects of having both a nonviolent and a successful campaign. Over and
above the violent/nonviolent and successful/unsuccessful variables the interaction term
measures if there is any additional impact on the dependent variable, through having both
of these conditions. A tolerance test for co-linearity was performed to verify the
regression model is not double counting the results through the interaction term. Co-
linearity is generally a problem when there is a high correlation between the independent
variables. In this case, co-linearity would be a problem if violent campaigns always failed
(for example) and nonviolent campaigns always succeeded; so that both variables were in
essence measuring the same effect. This does not appear to be the case as both violent
and nonviolent campaigns have been both successful and unsuccessful; but the tolerance test will verify this statistically.

To help address the endogeneity problem, a covariate is used to control for a measure of the indicator five years before the campaign started. Endogeneity is the concern that there may be something about the state that leads campaign organizers to choose violent or nonviolent tactics, or to be successful, which also correlates with the dependent variable. Adjusting for how the indicator is doing five years before the campaign begins helps account for this problem because common cause of both the event and the outcome are likely to be captured, at least somewhat, in the pretest level of the indicator. However, this analytical strategy does not address other possible confounding factors not capture by the pretest level of the indicator. As a result, the evidence of causation from these analyses remains limited.

Two regression tests were run, the first measuring the dependent variable five years after the campaign ended, the second measuring the dependent variable ten years after. Taking a measure of the dependent variable just after the governmental transition for a successful campaign, or even at the end of a major campaign that was unsuccessful, is generally unwise as states usually experience a period of instability in the immediate aftermath of a major campaign.

The following equalization shows the regression model for an outcome on each indicator.

$$\text{Outcome after} = B_0 + B_1 \text{ (tactics)} + B_2 \text{ (success)} + B_3 \text{ (tactic x success)} + B_4 \text{ (outcome before)} + \text{error}$$
The equation predicts the “outcome after” the campaign, and as mentioned both five and ten year follow-up periods will be tested. “Tactic” is coded 1 for nonviolent and 0 for violent, and “success” is coded 1 for a successful campaign and 0 for an unsuccessful one. There is an interaction term, “tactic x success” as well as a control for the pretest level of the “outcome before” the campaign. The “B's represent the coefficients that will be estimated, including the constant (B0).

Beyond showing the regression statistics, the results will be shown in a bar graph with four bars indicating the effect of the dependent variable caused by: 1. Successful nonviolent campaigns, 2. Successful violent campaigns, 3. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns and, 4. Unsuccessful violent campaigns. The middle of the graph will be a zero line indicating no change from the pre-campaign measure of the indicator. Positive bars indicate the campaigns of that type have improved that state’s measure on the indicator; negative bars mean the campaign’s affect decrease the state’s measure (except on a few graphs where a decrease in the indicator was a positive result, in the normative sense. For example, a decrease in infant mortality is a positive outcome. When this is the case it is noted on the figures).

On some graphs where the data is available there will be two sets of four bars. The first set will indicate the effects of the campaign on the state, the second set will indicate the statistically predicted world averages; enabling the comparison of individual opposition campaign types to world averages overall. For example the study of the life expectancy indicator, will compare the effect of violent and nonviolent campaigns on predicted life expectancy at birth and then compare them to how life expectancy changed in the world overall, during the same period. This suggests that campaigns may caused
the states which experienced them to either fall behind the progress made in the world or soar ahead, and bring the state progress that they would not have experienced without the campaign. This is important because observers argue that states may have been better off had the campaign not occurred. This test will begin to reveal if that is correct.

You will notice on the figures that have world averages that they are slightly different for each category of campaign type. This is because care was taken to match the world average for each year with the years that the campaigns occurred, in each category. For example, successful nonviolent campaigns tended to occur more recently when greater progress was being made in development and therefore is slightly higher than the other categories.
Findings and discussions.

Figure 1. Predicted changes in years of life expectancy from birth, five years after the campaign ended compared to world averages.

![Bar chart showing predicted changes in life expectancy](image)

*Note: Predicted changes in years of Life Expectancy by transition type, five years after the campaign ended holding pre-campaign Life Exp. constant at the Mean. Squared Multiple $R^2=0.833$, *** $p<0.01$, $N=74$, Tolerance $>10\%$ in all bars.*

Figure 2. Predicted changes in years of life expectancy from birth, ten years after the campaign ended compared to world averages.

![Bar chart showing predicted changes in life expectancy](image)

*Note: Predicted changes in years of Life Expectancy by transition type, ten years after the campaign ended holding pre-campaign Life Exp. constant at the Mean. Squared Multiple $R^2=0.791$, *** $p<0.01$, $N=67$, Tolerance $>10\%$ for all bars.*
Regression analysis of the eighty one historical cases that were studied from 1975 to 2006 revealed that states that had a major opposition campaign of any type saw less gains in life expectancy compared to world averages when measured five years after the campaign ended. This shows that states have a rough time following a major campaign. The states that experienced a successful nonviolent campaign fared the best with 2.47 improvement in life expectancy in the five year period following the campaign but did not see as much growth as world averages for the same number of years. There is generally an interim period when the existing government has been ousted but new leaders are not yet elected so services, including health services, may be disrupted or suspended. During this period the state may be slower in recovering from natural disasters and violent crime may be up. Trust in the government may be affected, or other interruptions may be occurring in the areas effecting life expectancy.

Successful violent campaigns fared the worse with a decline of 3.19 years, revealing the policy changes that were put in place by the new government in the aftermath of the successful violent campaign decreased the states’ life expectancy from birth by 3.19 years. Babies that were born five years after a successful violent campaign are predicted to live 3.19 years less than those born before the campaign began; while the world average increase by 3.38 years during the same time. This in essence drops these states back six and a half years, from the rest of the world.

The results for unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns were in the positive direction but made the least gains of all four types of campaigns. The results were not statistically significant and could have occurred by chance. The results reveal a growth in life expectancy of 1.41 years which is less than half of the world average for the same five
years. Recall that the dataset only includes only those campaigns that were designated as ‘major’ and saw at least one thousand participants. It’s interesting that a movement that size did not significantly alter the predicted life expectancy at birth, such that it could be separated from chance, for these states. It shows how entrenched the factors that impact life expectancy are, and how remarkable the other results are which were able to modify life experience trajectories.

Surprisingly the results for unsuccessful violent campaigns were also in the positive direction, in contrast to violent campaigns that were successful, and this result was statistically significant. These campaigns did not usher in a new regime, but the existing regime must have made changes that brought life expectancy forward. Perhaps there was some accommodating to the demands of the protestors even though their goals were not obtained.

There were no significant differences between the four lines of world averages (showing in red in figures 1 and 2). The reason they are slightly different is due to the mix of states and time periods involved. States that experienced a nonviolent campaign that was successful tended to be slightly above the average in wealth so a greater growth rate in life expectancy would be expected; hence we see slightly higher comparison to world average for those states. Similarly states that experienced a successful nonviolent campaign tended to be slightly later in time when greater strides and growth rates in life expectancy were being experienced across the world.

The second regression analysis reveals the progress of states on life expectancy ten years after the campaign ended and shows states which experienced campaigns of all types improving in life expectancy at a greater rate than world averages. Although world
averages increased across the board, states that experienced a campaign grew at faster rates.

By ten years after the campaign ended states that experienced a successful nonviolent campaign again performed the best on life expectancy. Life expectancy increased from 2.47 years five years after the end of the campaign to 4.54 years, by ten years after the end of the campaign moving slightly ahead of the world average. So these states not only recovered from the campaign but caught up and moved ahead of where they would have been, had there not been any campaign. This positive effect points to the value of waging nonviolent campaigns over violent ones. This indicates that the states in our study made positive advances in the component areas that affect life expectancy as compared to those that experienced a violent campaign. More funding could have been moved to health care, income could have been made more equal, environmental conditions could have been improved, and/or additional funding could have been allocated to recover more quickly from natural disasters. We cannot tell from these results if the new government itself, or new international partners or perhaps international donors aided these states in their quest to improve living conditions and life expectancy. But it can be said that the state either put more funding aside for these improvements on its own, or better positioned itself with partners who provided funding in these areas. Successful nonviolent campaigns were the only type of campaign that caught up to world averages and surpassed them.

The ten year after campaign regression analysis revealed that successful violent campaigns also saw gains as these states’ predicted life expectancy improved from -3.19 years which was measured five years after the campaign end, to -2.59 years ten years out;
although this was the least improvement in growth of all four types of campaigns. This was an improvement of roughly one half of a year while world averages increased more than one year for the same time period. The new regimes that violent campaigns ushered into office, continued to make changes which held their state back in the areas that promote growth in life expectancy.

Measured ten years after the campaign ended unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns continued to see gains, improving from 1.41 years measured five years after, to 3.01 years measured ten years after. But again these results were not statistically significant. These are good results and stronger than violent campaigns that were successful but, not as good as violent campaigns that were unsuccessful.

Violent campaigns which were not successful and did not usher in a change in regime, saw predicted life expectancy increases from 1.76 years as measured five years after the campaign end to 3.73 years measured ten years after the campaign. This group experienced the second highest rate of improvement (after nonviolent successful campaigns). Perhaps leaders in these states put more resources into accommodating the people in the form of greater availability of health care, improved infrastructure, greater availability of food supplies etc., in the hopes of preventing a future opposition campaign. Perhaps they felt that funding in these areas was a better way of staying in office then increasing military spending as the new leaders who were ushered into power through a successful violent campaign were doing.

Hypothesis one stated: in states which experience nonviolent campaigns which usher in greater levels of democracy we will see life expectancy increase as a result of these changes. Five years after the campaign ended, measured life expectancy was behind
world averages initially negating the hypothesis. But by ten years after the campaign, these states rose above world averages confirming this hypothesis. However, states that had an unsuccessful nonviolent campaign were still behind world averages ten years after the campaign ended so hypothesis one, was not confirmed for those states.

Hypothesis two stated that recovering from violent conflict takes a larger toll on society economically, structurally and physically and lasts well beyond the campaign’s end. It was therefore expected that states which have had a violent campaign will see a decrease in life expectancy even five and ten years after the campaign as they struggle to recover from its impact, regardless of whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful. This proved to be true for violent campaigns which were successful, but not true for unsuccessful violent campaigns. It may be that relative to successful violent campaigns there was not as much disruption in the state, perhaps lower levels of conflict, not as many refugees fleeing the fewer war-torn areas, not as many arms flowing into the state; hence the resource constraints preventing success and perhaps lower violent crime rate five and ten years later.

A second possible explanation is that unsuccessful campaigns did not usher in a new regime with high military spending. It is very probable the existing regime might also redirect funds to military spending to respond to the security risk from rebel movements, but it appears not as much as those governments that won their way into office through violence. Existing governments that survived violent campaigns were able to reverse the trends of the violence and increase those factors that promote extended life.

Hypothesis three states that for violent campaigns which are successful and usher in autocratic governments that are repressive, exclusive, and unresponsive to citizen
demands for healthcare services but instead provide only those services only as it serves
the state will see overall life expectancy decrease as a result of the change. This was
confirmed in both regression tests measured five and ten years after the campaign ended.
Paul Collier explains that: “rebellion is an extremely unreliable way of bringing about
positive change. Rebel leaders who claim to have launched a civil war for the good of
their country are usually deceiving themselves, others, or both” (2007:28). Funding
which may go to health services, the environment, social services, or the equalization of
income in states that experience nonviolent campaigns, will often go to the military and
police forces in states that experience violent campaigns. New leaders know that they
were successful in coming into power through violence and they tend to invest in high
military spending, to maintain their new position. “Governments in post-conflict societies
are well aware that they are living dangerously. Typically, they react to this risk by
maintaining their military spending at an abnormally high level” (Collier, 2007:27).

In addition to the high military spending Collier points out another reason for the
drop in life expectancy five and ten years after the campaign ends: “The emerging pattern
seems to be that guns become cheap during conflict because so many get imported
through official and semi-official channels that a proportion of them leak onto the
informal market” (2007:33). And when Collier and his associates analyzed if the greater
availability of arms had an effect on the violent crime rate using homicide data which is
the best-defined violent crime (common definition across states) as well as best-reported:
“We found that political peace does not often usher in social peace. The end of political
fighting ushers in a boom in homicides and other violent crime” (2007:34). Violent crime
would certainly correlate with lower life expectancy as well as funding away from social programs and toward military and police budgets.

Future studies should verify if the trajectories continue fifteen and twenty years after the campaign has ended. It would be interesting to note if states that experienced nonviolent campaigns continue to improve their predicted life expectancy rate and continue to out-pace world averages. This would indeed be very encouraging news for today’s advocates of nonviolence.
Figure 3. Predicted GDP PPP Per Capita relative to the US
Five years after Campaign End.

Note: Predicted changes in GDP per capital relative to the U.S. by transition type, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign GDP per capital relative to the U.S. constant at the Mean. R-squared=85.6%, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, N=64, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 4. Predicted GDP PPP Per Capita relative to the US
Ten years after Campaign End.

Note: Predicted changes in GDP per capital relative to the U.S. by transition type, ten years after campaign end holding pre-campaign GDP per capital relative to the U.S. constant at the Mean. R-squared=79.6%, *p<0.05, N=57, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
The results measured five years after campaign end showed that successful nonviolent campaigns did have a positive effect on GDP per capita improving GDP by 0.39 percentage points. And the results measured five years after showed that states that experienced successful violent campaigns saw a drop in GDP per capita as predicted verifying hypothesis 4. It should be noted that the regression analysis showed that these results were in the direction predicted but not statistically significant. So it appears that states that experience a nonviolent campaign were able to recover and move the economy forward while states that experience a successful violent campaign saw a decrease in GDP per capita by 3.36 percentage points from where the state was five years before the campaign began. This could be due to a combination of factors including costs of rebuilding infrastructure targeted for attack during violent campaigns, increased security concerns and funds being redirected to military budgets, increased regulation and control preventing the emergence of new businesses. The fact that the results are not statistically significant means we cannot reject the null hypothesis which states that these results could be due to chance, but the direction of the impact on GDP per capital is interesting to note.

In hypothesis 5 I predicted that as the structural adjustment policy requirements will slow down the economy of states that experienced a move to greater democracy through a nonviolent campaign, while long-term large development projects will improve growth in states that experienced successful violent campaigns and movement toward autocracy. This would result in states which experienced successful violent campaigns to outperform states that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns ten years after transition. Results in Figure 4 which shows the ten year view confirms that the economy
of states that had successful nonviolent campaigns and moved to democracy did slow down and in fact moved into the negative direction. Ten years after a successful nonviolent campaign the GDP per capita had decreased by 0.61 percentage points relative to what it was five years before the campaign started, confirming the first part of hypothesis 5. But states that experienced successful violent campaigns did not see the gains in terms of long-term improvement projects that Collier would suggest. In fact the GDP per capita was less than what it was five years earlier showing perhaps that it is taking these states longer to recover than is suggested. It should be noted that these results also are not statistically significant and could be due to chance but, it is very interesting to see the direction of the impact on GDP per capita. If the structural adjustment policy requirements are indeed the cause of the reversal in GDP for states that moved to greater democracy, these results would point to an urgent need for the international financial institutions to reconsider the requirements that they impose.

Unsuccessful campaigns of both violent and nonviolent types were significant and in the predicted directions when measured five years after the end of the campaign verifying the first part of hypothesis 6. States which experienced a major unsuccessful nonviolent campaign saw their GDP per capita relative to the U.S. only decrease by 0.01 percentage points, while states that experienced a major unsuccessful violent campaign saw their GDP per capita relative to the U.S. drop by 5.51 percentage points. That’s a major drop and even further than states that had successful violent campaigns. Perhaps these states had all the negative effects of the costs of rebuilding infrastructure without any of the benefits of an authoritarian government authorizing major improvement projects. Also when nonviolent campaigns were unsuccessful we did not see the positive
effects to GDP per capita as we did when campaigns were successful. The unsuccessful campaign results were better for nonviolent campaigns than violent campaigns, but both were in the negative direction. Hypothesis 6 also predicts that ten years after campaign end we will see the reversal from structural adjustment policies hitting states that experienced a nonviolent campaigns and to a lesser degree because the campaign was not successful. This was not proven in the results and in fact this group had the most gains. Perhaps because the campaign was not successful and transition to a true democracy did not occur, that the state may have still moved in the direction of democracy but did not have structural adjustment requirements set and the harms they brought to other economies. These states saw GDP per capita growth of 0.88 percentage points, a positive improvement in long term economic growth. Hypothesis 6 also predicted an improvement in states that moved toward autocracy through long-term infrastructure projects. This result was statistically significant and in the direction predicted. States that had unsuccessful campaigns made improvements ten years after campaign end over where they were five years after campaign end. But unsuccessful violent campaigns were in a worse position economically than successful violent campaigns ten years after campaign end, which is contradictory to my prediction that the effect would not be as strong. Unsuccessful violent campaigns were the least successful in long term economic growth, over all of the other campaign types. This may be because the governments in these states redirected funds from infrastructure rebuilding and put it towards security but did not have the major growth projects and so were left in a worse position economically. This part of hypothesis 10c was not validated.
It’s interesting to note that by five years after campaign end, successful nonviolent campaigns had a positive effect on GDP per capita and all other campaigns had negative effects with the worst being unsuccessful violent campaigns. This should be encouraging to nonviolent campaign organizers interested in the future of their country.

It is also interesting that between five and ten years away from campaign end the effects on long term economic growth, from nonviolent campaigns reverses depending upon whether the campaign was successful. Five years after campaign end, successful campaigns are correlated with positive GDP while unsuccessful campaigns saw a slight negative effect to GDP; but by ten years after the campaign this was reversed. States that had successful campaigns now had GDP per capita which was negative while states that had unsuccessful campaigns now had GDP per capita figures that had move into the positive range. This suggests that as a global community we are not doing a good job of helping budding democracies as the gains from new democratic leadership are not being sustained.

Another observation is that while unsuccessful violent campaigns had an improvement ten years after campaign end compared with five years after end, violent campaigns that were successful saw worse effect on GDP per capita during the same years. GDP was better five years after campaign than ten years after. In fact both types of successful campaigns which ushered in new governments saw a drop in GDP per capita between five and ten years while unsuccessful campaigns saw improvements. New governments may want to focus more in these areas.
Figure 5. Predicted Rule of Law score, Five years after Campaign End
*Note: negative scores denote progress*

![Bar chart showing predicted Rule of Law score five years after campaign end.]

Note: Predicted changes in Rule of Law Score, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Rule of Law Score constant at the Mean. R-squared=42.3%, ***p<0.01, N=67, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 6. Predicted Rule of Law score, Ten years after Campaign End
*Note: negative scores denote progress*

![Bar chart showing predicted Rule of Law score ten years after campaign end.]

Note: Predicted changes in Rule of Law Score, ten years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Rule of Law Score constant at the Mean. R-squared=32.7%, ***p<0.01, N=57, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
By five years after the successful transition to a new regime brought into power by a nonviolent campaign these state’s rule of law score had increased by nearly two points (-1.82). This is very good news for these states who grew within five years’ time to more equal treatment under the law, or they could have fewer disappearances and arbitrary arrests, a more equitable judicial system, a greater constitutional balance of powers, transparency of government, and/or freedom of the press. These states saw more gains in these areas than states which experienced any other type of campaign.

At ten years’ time, states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns held their gain of -1.82 but did not improve any further. This would imply all of the gains received in this area were experienced within the first five years after transition to the new regime. Perhaps the constitutional amendments were made by that time, changes to the judicial system were made, disappearances and arbitrary arrests decreased all within the years immediately following transition; and then did not continue to change further. Freedom of the press did not continue to improve between years five and ten, nor did the freedom of elections, balance of powers etc.

By five years after the successful transition to a new regime brought into power by a violent campaign these states’ rule of law score had decreased slightly (0.17) from what it was before the campaign began. No improvements in the areas of rule of law, or if there were some improvements they were counter balanced by losses in other areas. As mentioned above, Paul Collier’s argument again proves true: “rebellion is an extremely unreliable way of bringing about positive change. Rebel leaders who claim to have launched a civil war for the good of their country are usually deceiving themselves, others, or both” (Collier 2007:28). These states are known to experience an increase in
arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and impingement on individual liberties and this data verifies that argument.

By ten years after campaign end these states were able to turn this around and begin to bring positive change in the rule of law areas. By ten years after transition the rule of law areas improved by a third of a point (-0.30) indicating the negative trajectory in arbitrary arrests and impingement on individual liberties that these states experienced immediately after transition were stopped, and they moved above their pre-campaign levels. Of course because rule of law measures so many different things it is not possible to know what specifically was improved by each of these states, only that they have as a whole moved ahead of where they were before the campaign began.

States that experienced a nonviolent campaign that was unsuccessful performed the second best overall on rule of law. By five years after campaign end these states had improved by over a point (-1.11) and by ten years nearly a point and a half (-1.46). Even though these campaigns were not successful their states saw improvements in rule of law. These campaigns still had a positive effect on their states. Perhaps leaders who survived these campaigns realized improvements in more equal treatment under the law might stem off future campaigns, or perhaps the changes came in increased transparency of government or greater freedom of the press. It’s interesting that the regime survivors of nonviolent campaigns made changes in the positive direction.

In contrast leaders who survived violent campaigns made changes in the negative direction. States that experienced violent campaigns that were unsuccessful fared the worst in terms of rule of law. By five years after campaign end, rule of law had decreased by more than a half a point (0.68). By ten years after campaign end, these states were still
behind by nearly a quarter of a point (0.21). These states were the only ones in the negative, ten years after campaign end. Leaders of these states made negative changes in the areas of rule of law and were still behind where they were, ten years after the campaign end. It appears that these leaders feared further attacks and clamped down on civil liberties which had a negative effect on rule of law.

The first hypothesis in this set predicted that states which experienced a violent campaign which was successful will score worse on rule of law than states which ushered in a new regime through nonviolence, measured five years after transition. (hypothesis 7). This hypothesis was confirmed in the direction of the results, although the test for statistical significance showed that the results could have happened by chance so we cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The second hypothesis in this set predicted that successful nonviolent campaigns will usher in more democratic governments which will make changes toward more equal treatment under the law, free elections, a constitutional implementation of balance of powers, transparency of government, freedom of the press, enabling them to score better on this indicator than states which experienced successful violent campaigns when measured ten years after campaign end. (hypothesis 8). This hypothesis was also confirmed in the direction of the results, but again the test for statistical significance showed that the results could have happened by chance so we cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The third hypothesis in this set stated the prediction for campaigns that were not successful was: to the degree that states act in a similar fashion to the US, in its “War on Terrorism” where laws were passed giving greater surveillance capabilities to law
enforcement and impinging individual civil liberties, these states will see a decrease in rule of law as measured both five and ten years after the campaign ends. (hypothesis 9). This prediction proved true for violent campaigns but not for nonviolent campaigns. States that experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign did indeed lose ground in the areas measured by rule of law. It appears these states may have followed at similar path to the US. But those that experienced a nonviolent campaign saw positive gains. These states did not clamp down, become less transparent, limit freedom of the press, or back off on judicial equal treatment under the law. And both of these results were statistically significant.

This important result has to be encouraging for nonviolent campaign organizers. The states in our study that experienced a nonviolent campaign, whether it was successful or failed to fully reach its goals, saw positive gains in rule of law.
Figure 7. Predicted Polity five years after Campaign End.

Note: Predicted changes in Polity Score, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Polity Score constant at the Mean. **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01, R-squared=47.6%, N=73, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 8. Predicted Polity ten years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Polity Score, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Polity Score constant at the Mean. ***p < 0.01, R-squared=39.6%, N=64, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
By five years after the campaign ended those states which experienced a successful nonviolent campaign had increased in polity scoring by 9.46 points on average. This is a major gain toward democracy and fully supports the researched mentioned earlier that nonviolent campaigns usher in democracy. It is important to realize that many of these states started way below the neutral-zero mark and were autocratic regimes. So the results are not indicating that all of these states have now moved up to polity scorings or 9 or 10, but that as a whole they moved up 9.46 points from their starting point. This isn’t simply adding a few democratic freedoms to a repressive society. This is a major shift.

By ten years after the successful nonviolent campaign ushered in a new regime the gains were held and even move up a little higher to 10.09. So, on average these states no only held on to the gains in having more competitive elections, implementing restrictions on executive power, and implementing more equal competition for elected office, but made further progress in institutionalizing these changes in their societies.

Five years after successful violent campaigns ushered in a new regime these states remained about where they were, with the average change in polity scoring measured at 0.31 points in the direction of democracy. It’s interesting that they did not become more repressive or autocratic, did not significantly alter the restrictions on executive power, and did not start to have more or fewer elections. Basically these states remained where they were before the campaign began.

By ten years after successful violent campaigns ushered in a new regime, these states moved 3.67 points on the polity scale toward democracy. Perhaps by this time there was more equal competition for public office, more checks and balances on the different
branches of government, or more equalized voting access. Perhaps by ten years after campaign end the leaders did not feel as threatened and vulnerable as they did initially and loosened some restrictions. Something that is not revealed in the bar chart is how many of these states had another campaign, which could have been violent or nonviolent, within the ten years’ time since the campaign ended. This figure is simply showing the average of how these states did as a whole over the ten year period since the successful violent campaign ended. It’s possible that these states could of have several more major campaigns and Paul Collier’s research on the ‘conflict trap’ which indicates almost seventy percent of states that experience major violent conflict will experience another outbreak (or campaign) within ten years’ time, would almost assure that most of them had a repeat into violent conflict. But even with that, it is interesting that as a whole these states gained 3.67 polity points toward democracy over the ten year period since the campaign ended.

States which experienced nonviolent campaigns which were not successful and did not usher in a new regime none the less also moved to higher levels of democracy. These states moved 5.94 points toward democracy on average, by five years after their campaigns ended. The campaigns that these states experienced moved them toward greater freedoms, more equal participation in voting, or perhaps more restrictions on executive power even without a change in regime. This result was statistically significant at the p <0.01 level indicating this did not happen by chance. The major nonviolent campaigns that these states experienced had the effect of moving them toward greater democracy.
By ten years after campaign end, states that experienced an unsuccessful nonviolent campaign continued moving toward greater democracy and moved up 8.33 points on average. This result was statistically significant at the p < .001 level, indicating again the movements were not by chance. Eight points on the polity scale is really remarkable and comparable to the difference between a weak fragile democracy and a strong democracy, or a mid-range autocracy to a weak democracy; very different experiences for everyday life in society.

The states which experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign saw a slight move in polity toward greater autocracy (-0.73). These states were the only group that saw polity scoring move in that direction. It is quite clear that regime leaders who survived violent campaigns clamped down on freedoms. Perhaps these leaders cancelled elections, orchestrated more ‘crony’ political appointments, or gave themselves more sweeping powers; in their efforts to hold on to political office. Even though the change was slight, these results were statistically significant at the p < .01 level.

By ten years after the campaign ended states that experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign had reversed the trend toward greater autocracy and moved up an average 1.83 points on the polity scale toward democracy. The efforts to clamp down on freedoms, which happened within five years after the campaign, were reversed and more freedoms were given than there were in the state, before the campaign began. All of the states which experienced any kind of a campaign had all moved in the direction of democracy, by ten years after the campaign ended; with successful nonviolent campaigns moving the most, and unsuccessful violent campaigns moving the least.
Hypothesis 10 predicted that states that ushered in a new regime through nonviolence will see and increased in their Polity scoring toward greater democracy. This proved to be true as these states saw the greatest gains toward democracy on average moving up 9.46 polity points by five years after campaign end and 10.03 by ten years after. On average successful nonviolent campaigns moved their countries to greater levels of democracy.

Hypothesis 11 predicted that states that ushered in a new regime through a violent campaign will see a decrease in Polity toward greater autocracy. This proved to be untrue as at five years after the campaign the results were nearly flat/ slightly positive and by ten years had moved in the positive direction to greater levels of democracy than before the campaign began. Perhaps by that time leaders felt secure enough to offer an increase in some freedoms, cannot see the specifics for these states in the averages, just the direction they moved as a whole and the magnitude of the change.

In hypothesis 12 it was predicted that the states that experienced an unsuccessful campaign, of either type, and weathered the storm and were able to deal with the pressures of a major campaign it could be said that they somehow responded to and adapted, perhaps giving some concessions but not significantly altering their polity. So in these states it is predicted that there will be no or very little change in polity scoring. For unsuccessful campaigns that were nonviolent this was not the case. These states had the second highest change in their polity scoring on average, moving significantly in the democratic direction. To a lesser extent states which experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign also saw significant changes first in the autocratic direction and then by ten years out reversed this direction and moved toward greater democracy. It is true that
these states saw less movement that those that experienced other types of campaigns but their movement was still statistically significant, on average. So this last hypothesis was not confirmed, these states experienced significant changes in their level of democracy.

Similarly to earlier results with other indicators, these results should to be encouraging to today’s nonviolent campaign organizers. They must see that whether they are successful or fail in their efforts, if their campaign is typical of historical averages, they will move their state toward greater democracy by a significant amount.
Figure 9. Predicted Infant Mortality, five years after Campaign End
– note negative score indicates improvement.

Note: Predicted changes in Infant Mortality, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Infant Mortality constant at the Mean. ***p < 0.01, R-squared=81.2%, N=72, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 10. Predicted Infant Mortality, ten years after Campaign End
– note negative score indicates improvement.

Note: Predicted changes in Infant Mortality, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Infant Mortality constant at the Mean. ***p < 0.01, R-squared=77.3%, N=65, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
States that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns saw a good decrease in IMR. From the pre-campaign average these states reduced IMF by 14.51 births per one thousand measured in the year that was five years after the campaign ended. By ten years after the campaign, the IMR had decreased by 22.94 births. These are statistically significant results and clear that these states put resources towards the factors that reduce IMR. This could have been greater availability and more equal access to health care facilities and information, or may have included pre-natal education on the risks of alcohol, smoking, poor diet, or counseling to instruct young families on the dangers of short intervals between children and/or numerous other factors. Hypothesis 13 which predicted IMR would decrease with successful nonviolent movements was confirmed.

States that experienced successful violent campaigns saw an increase in IMR when measured five years after the campaign ushered in a more autocratic government. IMR increased by 11.01 births per one thousand above the pre-campaign average. By ten years after the campaign ended these states had improved but still had an IMR of 7.98 births higher than the pre-campaign average. It appears that these states redirected funds away from those programs which lower infant mortality. These results were statistically significant and confirmed hypothesis 14 which predicted IMR would increase with successful violent movements.

States that experienced an unsuccessful campaign of either type saw some improvement in IMR, but not enough that the results were statistically significant and could have occurred by chance. By five years after campaign end states which experienced a nonviolent campaign reduced infant mortality by -7.66 births and those that experienced a violent campaign reduced infant mortality by -12.08. Both were in the
positive direction but out of one thousand not enough to be significant. By ten years after the campaign ended states which experienced both of these types of campaigns continued to improve. Nonviolent campaign states decreased infant mortality by -15.41 and violent campaign states by -16.46. It appears that existing regimes that survived these campaigns did not redirect funds away from health care and education as did those that experienced successful violent campaigns. These results confirm hypothesis 15 which predicted some improvement in IMR but not as much as states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns and higher levels of democracy.

It is interesting that the results of the analysis of IMR are so similar to Life Expectancy even down to the fact that the results for unsuccessful violent campaigns were better than unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns in both analyses. It seems that when states survive a violent campaign whether they are autocratic or democratic more change is made which supports health in these states than those that experienced unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns. Perhaps this is due to the historical impression that violent campaigns are more successful and therefore a greater threat than nonviolent campaigns; so that leaders in these states move more funds into areas which could be said to appease the public.

Leaders in states which survived unsuccessful campaigns maintained the status-quo more than new governments which came into power following successful campaigns. They made some changes in the areas that promote a decrease in infant mortality, but not as much as new leaders in states with successful campaigns. The results for states with unsuccessful campaigns reveal that some accommodations may have been made but no radical shift or major change in the areas affecting health.
Figure 11. Predicted Respect for Human Rights, Five years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Respect for Human Rights, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Respect for Human Rights constant at the Mean, **p < 0.05, ***p<0.01, R-squared=35.7%, N=38, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 12. Predicted Respect for Human Rights, Ten years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Respect for Human Rights, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Respect for Human Rights constant at the Mean. *p < 0.10, R-squared=30.0%, N=34, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
States that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns saw a good improvement in respect for human rights. From the pre-campaign average these states improved human rights score by 1.70 measured five years after the campaign ended. By ten years after campaign end the human rights score had increased further to 2.17. The five-year after score was statistically significant and a clear indication that these states had made changes towards improving their human rights records. This could have been in any of the component parts of the CIRI. Hypothesis 16 which predicted that respect for human rights would improve with successful nonviolent movements was confirmed. But unlike the test of Bueno De Mesquita et al. which showed that the improvements in human rights would not be evident until full democracy was realized, the states in our sample showed gains early on by the five-year mark and some additional improvement by the ten-year mark.

States that experienced successful violent campaigns surprisingly showed an improvement in their human rights record, nearly as high as states that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns, when measured five years after the campaign ushered in a more autocratic government. The statistically significant improvement in human rights was 1.65 on the CIRI scale. This would seem to support the theory described above by Poe and Tate that military juntas which forcibly take power often justify themselves by claiming that they are replacing leaders who themselves were violating the rights of the citizens. So when these new leader come into power they initially improve the state’s human rights record. But, by ten years after the campaign ended these results were reversed as the human rights record dipped below where the state was before the campaign began. It appears that the new government in these states clamped down
forcefully and violated the human rights of their citizens to hold onto power, somewhere between five and ten years after campaign end. These new leaders clamped down to a greater degree than the previous regime. The five-year result did not confirm hypothesis 17 which predicted the human rights record would fall with successful violent movements; but it was confirmed by the ten-year mark.

States that experienced an unsuccessful campaign saw mixed results with respect for human rights increasing for states which experienced nonviolent campaigns and decreasing for states which experienced violent campaigns, negating hypothesis 18. We had predicted that both types of unsuccessful campaigns would result in a drop in respect for human rights with unsuccessful violent campaigns dropping further. But nonviolent campaigns seemed to have caused an improvement in respect for human rights. Both of these results were statistically significant and could not have occurred by chance. It’s interesting that they were in the opposite direction. States which had violent campaigns clamped down on citizen’s physical integrity rights as the leaders may have felt threatened. But those that survived a nonviolent campaign had the opposite reaction and although may have felt threatened, gave more freedoms and rights. By ten years after the campaign ended both of these trends moved back closer to the pre-campaign state. It looks like the accommodations which were given to nonviolent campaigners as well as the human rights violations experienced by violent campaigners both decreased by this time, moving these states back closer to where they were pre-campaign.

The R-squared on both of these figures reveals that at the five-year mark the mix of independent variables were only explaining 35.7 percent of the variance in the dependent variable and at the ten-year mark the independent variables were only
explaining 30.0 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. As Cingranelli and Richards suggested this study added the log of population size to see if it would explain more of variance of the dependent variable and again checked the tolerance to verify that I was not double counting.
These figures include the Log of Population Size

Figure 13. Predicted Respect for Human Rights
Five years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Respect for Human Rights, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Respect for Human Rights constant at the Mean. **p < 0.05, ***p<0.01, R-squared=44.6%, N=38, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 14. Predicted Respect for Human Rights
Ten years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Respect for Human Rights, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Respect for Human Rights constant at the Mean. R-squared=30.6%, N=34, Tolerance > 10% in all bars. None of the effects above are statistically significant.
In the graph depicting changes in respect for human rights five-year after campaign, none of the results are as they were predicted. States which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns did show improvements in respect for human rights but not nearly as much as other states. States which experienced successful violent campaigns showed major improvements and were the highest of the all states. Those that experienced unsuccessful nonviolent movements were just behind them and nearly three times more than states that experienced successful nonviolent movements. And states with unsuccessful violent also improved over their pre-campaign position.

All of these results were statistically either at the p-value < 0.01 or 0.05. R-square was also improved from 35.7 percent on the first test to 44.6 percent when the log of population size was added to the mix of independent variables.

One possible explanation for the progress of states with violent campaigns is the proposal from Poe and Tate which suggested that violent campaigns are wages in states that already are experiencing poor human rights records and some of the force behind the campaign is to alleviate this problem.

One concern with the data is the small sample size. Out of the 81 cases in the data set, CIRI Human Rights data was only available for 38 of them. The small sample size could cause some questioning of the results. Further test should be done with increased sample sizes to verify these results.

By ten years after campaign, we have a graph which is quite similar to the ten-year graph without the log of population size added into the mix; although this time none of the results were statistically significant. The R-squared for both are nearly the same at 30.0 percent at first and 30.6 percent when the log of population size was included. The
size of the population is not really adding any more information. Perhaps the model being used which accounts for the problem of endogeneity, with a pre-campaign measure of the indicator is already accounting for population size.

Overall by ten years after the campaign ended respect for human rights increased for states which experienced a nonviolent campaign whether it was successful or failed to reach its goals and decreased for states which experienced a violent campaign.

It’s interesting that states that experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign fared worse than those that experienced a successful violent campaign. It appears that existing governments that weathered a violent campaign clamped down on its citizens to a greater degree than new governments that were ushers into power through violence; although both of these brought their states to a worse position on human rights than where they were pre-campaign. This would seem to support Poe and Tate’s explanation that at least some of the reason behind violent uprisings in the torture, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings and disappearances experienced at the hand of the existing regime.
Figure 15. Predicted Change in Emp. To Pop. Ratio
Five years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Employment to Population Ratio years fifteen plus five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Employment to Population Ratio constant at the Mean. R-squared=90.9%, N=19, Tolerance > 10% in all bars. None of the effects above are statistically significant.

Figure 16. Predicted Change in Emp. To Pop. Ratio
Ten years after Campaign End

Note: Predicted changes in Employment to Population Ratio years fifteen plus five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Employment to Population Ratio constant at the Mean. R-squared=80.8%, N=12, Tolerance > 10% in all bars. None of the effects above are statistically significant.
There are two issues should be noted here; first none of the results were statistically significant so this measure could have occurred by chance, and second is the very small sample size. Out of the eighty-one test cases in our sample there were only nineteen with a before and after measure at the five year mark and only twelve with results before and after at ten years. These low values for ‘N’ seriously question the validity of the results, therefore no further discussion of hypotheses 19, 20, and 21 will be carried in this work. Further studies should be conducted with larger sample sizes and statistically significant results before an accurate representation could be presented.
Figure 17. Predicted change in School Enrollment, the Year the Campaign Ended.

Note: Predicted changes in School Enrollment, measured the year the campaign ended holding pre-campaign School Enrollment constant at the Mean. R-squared=89.9%, N=18, Tolerance > 10% in all bars. World averages: R-squared=79.9%, N=81.

Chi-square test of the difference between Campaign and World Average: Chi-sq.=15.569, df = 3, p-value=0.0014

Figure 18. Predicted change in School Enrollment, five years after Campaign End.

Note: Predicted changes in School Enrollment, measured five years after the campaign ended holding pre-campaign School Enrollment constant at the Mean. R-squared=79.8%, N=20, Tolerance > 10% in all bars. World Averages: R-squared = 81.3%, N=81.

Chi-square test of the difference between Campaign and World Average: Chi-sq.=9.985, df = 2, p-value=0.0068
There were great differences in the net percentage of school enrollment for primary aged students in the year that the campaign ended and they were significantly different from world averages. States which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns showed a net percentage improvement of 2.85 percentage points compared to 2.06 world average measured at the year the campaign ended. This was the only type of campaign to show positive growth in enrollment at this time, and even slightly surpassed the average for the rest of the world. It appears that the government crackdown on nonviolent campaigns did not deter parents in these states from sending their primary students to school.
By five years after successful nonviolent campaigns ended the net percentage of students attending school had dropped significantly down to 0.53 percent while the world average continued to improve by 3.63 percent. It would seem that if the decrease in school enrollment compared to world average was due to parents concern for their student’s safety we would have seen the drop in the year of transition not five years afterwards. This would imply that it was not the conflict itself but some other factors that were holding back student enrollment; perhaps this is the suspension of classes while school facilities that were targeted during the conflict were being rebuilt. Or perhaps this is a measure of the transition period that states go through as they move to a new regime.

By ten years after successful nonviolent campaigns end the net percentage of students attending primary school had swung back up by 7.39 percentage points moving ahead of the 5.16 percent increase in the rest of the world. This was the highest increase of any type of campaign. It appears that by this time states had made it past the transition period and invested again in education. The prediction of this study based upon the literature review was that there would be an initial decrease in net enrollment followed by an increase back up to pre-campaign levels (hypothesis 23). The decrease was not measured in the year that the campaign ended, which may be due to parents concern for student’s safety during the government’s aggressive/violent response to the campaign, but five years later during the transition period. By ten years after campaign end the net enrollment had not only move back up to pre-campaign levels but had moved ahead of the 5.16 percent the rest of the world experienced. This is indeed encouraging for nonviolent campaigns. These results confirm this hypothesis, although the timing was not as expected.
States that experienced a successful violent campaign only showed a half of a percentage point (-0.52%) decrease compared to a measure five years before the campaign began. World averages increased by 1.78 percentage points during this time. For reference the average net percentage rate for primary school enrollment five years before the campaign began was 73.44 percent. So an increase of 1.78 percentage points or a decrease of -0.52 can be a difference in thousands of students and may be even stronger for secondary school students. In consonance with the research mentioned above (Shemyakina 2006, Moyi 2012) the effects of violent conflict on primary school enrollment is not great unless education is specifically disrupted because classroom facilities have been targeted.

But when measured five years after campaign end the results are very different. Primary school enrollment in states with successful violent campaigns dropped by more than ten percentage points to -11.82 percent. The fact that the decrease was five years after campaign end indicated that the decrease in school enrollment was not due to concerns for student’s safety during the violence, but changes made in the state by the new regime ushered into power through violence. My earlier study on long term economic growth showed that GDP PPP decreases for states which experience violent campaigns, perhaps these parents could no longer afford to send students to school with the changes the new government was implementing.

When measured ten years after campaign end the decline in net percentage of school enrollment continued to fall to -13.69 percentage points even as world averages continued to improve over the same period. The decline in school enrollment has to be considered as a warning sign for the future of these states. As the United Nation’s
Millennium Development Goals designated education as crucial for the future of developing states, the states in this group were moving in the opposite direction. The hypothesis for these states was: that states which experience a successful violent campaign will show a decrease in net school enrollment when measured five years after transition to a new government, and will move back up by ten years after (hypothesis 22). The five year prediction was true, but not at ten years as school enrollment continued to decline for these states.

The results for states that experienced unsuccessful campaigns initially look very similar to states that experienced successful violent campaigns. Net primary school enrollment declined by about a half of a percent (-0.39 for unsuccessful nonviolent and -0.52 for unsuccessful violent campaigns) when measured the year the campaign ended. This shows that the effect of major opposition campaigns whether successful or unsuccessful, violent or nonviolent were roughly the same the year the campaign ended, except for successful nonviolent campaigns which soared ahead even surpassing world averages.

But by five years after campaign end the unsuccessful campaigns were no longer similar. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns improved net school enrollment by 7.16 percent while unsuccessful violent campaigns moved slightly higher from where they were at campaign end but still below pre-campaign averages. The unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns almost doubled the progress made in the enrollment rates of the rest of the world and had by far the made the greatest improvement of any of the states that experienced a campaign. Although the nonviolent campaign was unsuccessful, it is
clear that these states made investments and changes that focused on improving the education for their primary school aged children.

At ten years after campaign end states which had experienced unsuccessful campaigns had enrollment rates that were similar to world averages. Whereas when measured at five years after campaign end unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns had enrollments rates nearly double world averages (7.16 percent compared to 3.83) by ten years after campaign end this had slowed down as was slightly below the world average (4.38 percent compared to 4.47). It appears that the effect of the campaign and the positive changes implemented in education had lost some of its focus by ten years after the campaign. Unsuccessful violent campaigns also moved closer to world average and for these states this meant great improvement in school enrollment. At five years after campaign end these states were at -0.36 compared to world average at 2.73 percent, by the ten year mark they were much closer (3.82 percent compared to the world average of 5.23). It appears that the effect of unsuccessful campaigns had lost much of their impact by ten years after campaign end. The hypothesis for these states was that: unsuccessful campaigns are expected to be similar in direction and magnitude to successful campaigns, because they are all ‘major’ in size, and it is thought that the impact to school children would not be effected by whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful (hypothesis 24); this turned out not to be true. Whereas the results for successful campaigns were positive for states which experienced nonviolent campaigns and negative for violent campaigns the results continued in these opposite directions and did not regress back to world averages. But for states which experienced unsuccessful campaigns although at the five year mark there were some fluctuation, by ten years they were both
close to enrollment rates for the rest of the world. So this hypothesis was not
substantiated.

In the end only states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns were
ahead of world averages, successful violent campaigns were well below pre-campaign
levels and unsuccessful campaigns of both types were on-par with enrollment rates for
the rest of the world.
Figure 20. Predicted Change in Regional Conflict, five years after Campaign End
- Note negative score indicates improvement

Note: Predicted changes in Regional Conflict, five years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Regional Conflict constant at the Mean. ***p < 0.01, R-squared=37.6%, N=79, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.

Figure 21. Predicted Change in Regional Conflict, ten years after Campaign End
- Note negative score indicates improvement

Note: Predicted changes in Regional Conflict, ten years after campaign end holding pre-campaign Regional Conflict constant at the Mean. ***p < 0.01, R-squared=27.8%, N=70, Tolerance > 10% in all bars.
States with successful violent campaigns did correlate with an increase the number of conflicts in the region when measured five years after the campaign, although the results were not statistically significant and could have occurred by chance. These states increased regional conflict by four percentage points. By ten years after the successful violent campaign ended the regional effect was back down to zero. It was exactly as it was before the campaign began. In the voile world of developing states this seems to make sense. Ten years after a conflict ends the buildup of arms is no longer impacting regional stability. But it should be noted that not all of our violent campaigns are in developing states, and the measured effect is in developed as well as developing states. In conclusion the five-year after campaign end measure confirmed the first hypothesis (25) that we would see an increase in the percentage of conflicts, but not the measure ten years after the campaign ended.

States with successful nonviolent campaigns also increased the number of regional conflicts when measured five years after these campaigns ended, although these results too, were not statistically significant. And as predicted the increase in the number of regional conflicts was not as high as those of successful violent conflicts. These states were correlated with a two percent increase in regional conflict. By ten years after successful nonviolent campaigns ended, the amount of regional conflict decreased by three percentage points, and these campaigns, were the only type of campaigns to see this decreasing trend. We may be seeing that nonviolent campaigns not only improve the social indicators of the state: life expectancy, GDP PPP, rule of law, etc. but also may be bringing a peace benefit to the region. It could be that successful nonviolent campaigns are encouraging campaigners in near-by states to choose nonviolent tactics and for near-
by governments to forgo drastic amounts of increased military spending. The five year
measure confirms hypothesis 26 which predicted a modest amount of increased conflict,
but encouragingly the ten year measure did not!

Hypothesis 27 predicted that the increases in regional conflicts could be even
higher for unsuccessful campaigns as incumbent leaders redirected funds to fighting
security concerns and indeed they were. Unsuccessful violent campaigns were correlated
with the greatest increase in regional conflict with results that were statistically
significant, five years after campaign end. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns were
correlated with a modest increase in regional conflict. These campaigns caused more
regional instability than their successful counterparts. By ten years after unsuccessful
violent campaigns ended, regional conflict was still five percentage points above where it
was before the campaign began and this result was also statistically significant. Stated in
another way; the risk of further violence within a region increased by five percent when
any state in the region had an unsuccessful violent campaign. The states with
unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns were closer to pre-campaign levels than the violent
ones but still two percentage points above (a gain in instability) where they began. The
gains in regional stability and peace experienced by the regions that had a successful
nonviolent campaign were not matched when the nonviolent campaign was unsuccessful.
These results confirmed hypothesis 27.

These results show that both violent and nonviolent campaigns do have an effect
on regional stability as shown in the number of conflicts in the region. In accordance with
predictions from the Realist paradigm, a violent conflict and buildup of military strength
and arms in one state did cause an increased risk to other states in the region.
Correspondingly a successful nonviolent campaign initially caused the same increased risk to other regional states but by ten years after campaign end, these states had ushered in a three percent decreased in the risk of conflict and greater peace for the other states in their region. This is an encouraging result.

An interesting follow-up study would be to increase the time period of the study so as to increase the number of cases, and see with a larger ‘N’ if more of the results become statistically significant.
Summary of Post-Campaign Structural Stability Analysis

Nine structural stability indicators were analyzed with several of the results contradicting what the literature review would suggest. Especially surprising was the variance in the types of campaigns which were most successful across the different indicators.

When measured at five years after the end of the campaign, states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns had made more progress than any of the other states in seven of the eight remaining indicators: life expectancy, long term economic growth, rule of law, Autocracy/Democracy, infant mortality, respect for human rights and regional stability. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns showed the greatest progress in school enrollment. Successful violent campaigns which ushered in new regimes were not as successful as other types of campaigns in any of the indicators chosen for this study.

In terms of the failures or least amount of progress, when measured five years post-campaign, states that had experienced successful violent campaigns were least successful in improving life expectancy, infant mortality, and school enrollment; substantiating the theories that states go through a hard time following major opposition campaigns and go through a long recovery period even when they are successful. States that experienced unsuccessful violent campaigns were the least successful in five areas: long term economic growth, rule of law, Autocracy/Democracy, respect for human rights and regional stability. States with violent campaigns (looking at successful and unsuccessful together) were least successful in seven of the stability indicators analyzed.
The results measured ten years after camping end were very similar but not exactly matched to the five year measure showing some uneven progress in states with different types of campaigns. States with successful nonviolent campaigns had made the most progress in seven areas: life expectancy, rule of law, Autocracy/Democracy, infant mortality, respect for human rights, school enrollment, and regional stability. States which experienced unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns made the most progress in long term economic growth. Overall states with successful nonviolent campaigns made the most progress in the greatest number of indicators analyzed here.

The results for the least successful states at the ten year mark exactly matches the five-year results. States with successful violent campaigns made the least progress in predicted life expectancy, infant mortality and school enrollment. But overall states which had unsuccessful violent campaigns made the least progress in the most areas: long term economic growth, rule of law, Autocracy/Democracy, respect for human rights and regional stability.

The following two tables represent a pictorial summary of the results, for five and ten years post-campaign. The numerical references refer to: (1) states which had this type of campaign, on average, made the most progress on this indicator, (2) second, (3) third, (4) states which had this type of campaign made the least amount of progress on this indicator.
Table 1. Summary results, five years post-campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Successful Nonviolent</th>
<th>Successful Violent</th>
<th>Unsuccessful Nonviolent</th>
<th>Unsuccessful Violent</th>
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<td>4***</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy/Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>1***</td>
<td>4***</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human rights</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrollment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively
Table 2. Summary results, ten years post-campaign.

<table>
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<th>Successful Violent</th>
<th>Unsuccessful Nonviolent</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Life expectancy</td>
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<td>4***</td>
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<td>2***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>4***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocracy/Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
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<td>4***</td>
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<td>Respect for human rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>School enrollment</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively

There are two main findings from this analysis. Besides the hoped-for and realized fact that successful nonviolent campaigns made the most progress in the structural stability indicators; is the interesting result that unsuccessful violent campaigns made the least progress. It appears that these states had all of the disruption of the campaign but as the old regime remained in place, changes were not made and these states had the least amount of progress in the areas measured by these indicators.

The following Pearson Correlation Matrix reveals that we do have five strong correlations between the indicators. Infant mortality is very strongly negatively correlated with life expectancy (Pearson $r = -0.93$), implying that states are putting the same focus on life at the beginning as they do on factors that lead to extending the length of life; addressing health care as a whole without emphasis on a particular phase of life.
Another very strong negative relationship is between infant mortality and school enrollment with Pearson $r = -0.84$. It appears that states which cared for the birth of newborns also made sure they attended school. Or, in other words, placed the same amount of care on both, however high or low that may have been.

Drawing from these two relationships, the Pearson also shows that school enrollment is also strongly correlated with life expectancy (Pearson $r = 0.80$). This relationship is not quite as high as the others and the summary of our results above show some differenced in the progress made between states with different types of campaigns. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns made more progress in school enrollment, while unsuccessful violent campaigns made more progress in life expectancy; highlighting the importance of breaking down the study by campaign type and success rates.

Separately, life expectancy was very strongly correlated with long term economic growth (Pearson $r = 0.74$) perhaps reflecting that as the wealth of the state improves so does life expectancy. Long term economic growth was also very strongly correlated with infant mortality rate in a negative relationship (Pearson $r = -0.72$). All of these relationships with IMR supports the Goldstone et al. study which showed its importance as a predictor of the stability of the state.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>-0.18</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant mort.</td>
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<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We will now begin the case studies to analyze how these structural stability indicators were altered in the recovery of four major opposition campaigns.
V. Section Three – Campaign Case Studies:

1. *East Germany, 1989 Pro-democracy campaign—*

   The East Germany pro-democracy campaign of 1989 was chosen as a case study because it occurred in a well-developed economically strong state with a strong autocratic government (polity -9), that experienced a nonviolent campaign.

I. History, background and events leading up to the revolution–

   Near the end of World War II the Yalta Conference held in February 4–11, 1945, was the second of three wartime meetings of the heads of state of the victorious allies: the United States represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United Kingdom represented by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the Soviet Union represented by General Secretary Joseph Stalin, for the purpose of discussing Europe's post-war reorganization. The conference convened in the Livadia Palace near Yalta, in the Crimea. Stalin was the first to advocate that Germany be divided up to eliminate its ability to function as a single state power. The conference participants agreed and determined the demarcation line for the respective areas of occupation that the victors would administer. Germany was broken into four segments which were administered by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. The later Potsdam Conference held in July and August 1945 officially recognized the zones and confirmed jurisdiction of the Soviet Military administration in Germany from the Oder and Neisse rivers to the demarcation line. The Soviet occupation zone which later became East Germany included the former states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
and Thuringia. The city of Berlin was placed under the collective control of the four administering powers (Naimark, 1995).

Each of the occupying powers assumed rule in its zone by June 1945. The allied powers originally pursued a common policy for Germany focused on removing Nazi influence and demilitarization, in preparation for the restoration of a democratic German nation-state. Over time however the western zones and the Soviet zone drifted apart economically, at least partially due to the Soviet’s much greater use of the disassembly and acquisition of German industrial goods under its control as a form of reparations. “Reparations were officially agreed among the Allies but the Soviet troops went over and above what was agreed upon and organized specialized trophy battalions to remove 1.28m tons of materials and 3.6m tons of equipment which amounted to roughly a third of the productive capital in the eastern occupation zone, as well as large quantities of agricultural produce” (Naimark, 1995:165).

Growing economic differences combined with developing political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union caused the United States, Britain and France to agree to unite the Western zones and establish a West German republic. The Soviets responded by leaving the Allied Council and creating an East German state. Three days later a separate currency reform was introduced in the Soviet zone. In May 1949 elections were held in the Soviet zone for the German People’s Congress to draft a constitution for a separate East German state. However voters were only allowed to approve or reject slates of candidates drawn from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands –SED), thus allowing the SED with Soviet backing, to predetermine the composition of the People’s Congress.
The SED modeled itself as a Soviet-style party of the ‘new type’ and the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee were formed. According to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, each party body was controlled by its members and committed itself ideologically to Marxism-Leninism. The 1949 constitution formally established a democratic federal republic and created the Upper house which was called Landerkammer (States Chamber) and the Volkskammer (Peoples Chamber). The SED controlled the Council of Ministers and reduced the legislative function of the Volkskammer to one of acclamation. In 1956 the National People’s Army (National Volksarmee—NVA) was created and East Germany became a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Several consecutive five-year plans accelerated efforts towards collective agriculture and nationalization of the industrial sector, but encountered difficulties as emigration increased and the labour drain exceeded a total of 2.5 million citizens between 1949 and 1961 (Naimark, 1995). Roughly half of this steady stream of emigrants were young people under the age of 25. Additionally around half a million people crossed the sector borders in Berlin each day in both directions enabling them to compare living conditions in both states. In August 1961 the East German Council of Ministers announced that “in order to put a stop to the hostile activity of West Germany’s and West Berlin’s revisionist and militaristic forces, border controls of the kind generally found in sovereign states will be set up at the border of East Germany including the border to the western sector of Berlin” (Kopstein, 1997). What the council did not say was that this measure was directed primarily against East Germany’s own population, which would no longer be permitted to cross the border. In the early morning hours of August 13th
temporary barriers were put up at the border separating East and West Berlin and the connecting roads were ripped up. Police units stood guard and turned away all traffic at the sector boundaries. Over the next few weeks the barbed wire was replaced by a concrete wall. People living in the border areas were evicted from their homes. From one day to the next, the wall separated streets, squares, and neighborhoods from each other and severed public transportation links. In the years to come the barriers were reinforced and further expanded as the systems of controls at the border were solidified. In the end the wall that ran through the city center separating East and West Berlin was 43.1 kilometers (26.8 miles) long. Border fortifications separating West Berlin from the rest of the East Germany were 111.9 Kilometers (69.5 miles) long. Over 100 thousand people tried to escape across the Berlin Wall between 1961 and 1989. More than 600 of them were shot and killed by East German border guards or died in other ways during escape attempts (Kopstein, 1997).

Another effect of the emigration was shown in the declining industrial growth rate which occurred steadily after 1959 causing the Soviet Union to recommend that East Germany implement the reforms of the Soviet economist Evsei Liberman, an advocate of the principle of profitability and other market principles within communist economies. An economic reform program provided for some decentralization in decision making and the consideration of market and performance criteria was therefore implemented in the new economic system aimed at creating an efficient economy and transforming East Germany into a leading industrial nation. The new economic system brought forth new elite in politics and in management of the state’s economy. For a time the economy
improved as the number of professional positions and jobs for the technically skilled increased, followed by increased wages and an increase in the supply of consumer goods.

But by 1968 the SED had launched a new campaign replacing the economic system with the ‘Economic System of Socialism’ which reintroduced centralized planning in the structure-determining areas of electronics, chemicals, and plastics. This was coupled with a massive propaganda campaign to win citizens to its ‘Soviet-style’ socialism with its focus on restoring the worker to prominence, and was to be achieved within the context of centralized state planning. The SED leadership had limited success in winning popular support for the repressive system, as the higher material progress of West Germany continued to attract East German citizens to move across the border.

The ‘Berlin Agreement’ normalized relations between East and West Germany. It was signed by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union and protected trade and travel relations between the city of West Berlin (which was physically located within the state of East Germany) and the West German state. It also aimed at improving communication between the two parts of the city of East and West Berlin. The ‘Basic Treaty’, signed by the Soviet Union and West Germany, effective June 1973, politically recognized two German states and both countries pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty. In September 1973, both states joined the United Nations and received international recognition for the first time. East Germany was known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) while West Germany was known as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

The relationship between East and West Germany improved as trade restrictions were eased and communication between the peoples of both states increased. Even as the
SED declared itself a socialist nation-state of workers and peasants, and a constituent part of the socialist community of states through the Warsaw Pact, its leaders admitted the persisting psychological and emotional attachment of East German citizens to the singular German tradition and culture and by implication to their West German neighbors. While the East German people were outwardly supportive of the SED, many expressed privately the desire of future unification with their West German neighbors (Naimark, 1995). Although the GDR began to be recognized as internationally competitive in some sectors such as mechanical engineering and printing, the central control and administration of the SED had a negative impact on economic growth causing GDR to slip behind the progress made by the FRG.

As the GDR fell behind its western neighbors, 1989 brought on the uprisings that became known as the ‘Autumn of Nations’ and at times also called the ‘Revolutions of 1989’ as several central and eastern European states experienced either nonviolent or violent revolutions by their people. The overturn which began in Poland in the Spring of 1989 continued in Hungary, and grew to include East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania; with Romania being the only campaign to overthrow its Communist regime violently. The events in Tiananmen Square China also occurred in 1989 and although they were unsuccessful there were powerful images of courageous defiance from that protest that helped to spark events in other parts of the world.

When the Communist states adopted various forms of centralized control of the economy they began to fall behind the economic growth of their democratic neighbors with free market economies, resulting in a comparative decline in their living standards. These communist states bound together in the Warsaw Pact which was signed in 1955 as
a means to foster a unified, multilateral political and military alliance that would tie Eastern European capitals more closely to Moscow. The original signatories to the Warsaw Treaty Organization were the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany. Although the members of the Warsaw Pact pledged to defend each other if one or more of them came under attack, the Pact emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. Its charter states that it is organized around collective decision-making but, the Soviet Union ultimately controlled most of the Pact's decisions, various leaders who were loyal to Moscow were brought into power and the Soviets maintained a military presence throughout the territories they occupied. During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 which was a nationwide anti-authoritarian campaign, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to assert control. Similarly in 1968 the Soviet Union repressed the Prague uprising by organizing the Warsaw Pact states in an invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The first signs of major reform came in 1986 when Mikhail Gorbachev launched a policy of glasnost, or openness, in the Soviet Union, emphasizing the need for perestroika, i.e. economic restructuring. By the spring of 1989 the Soviet Union had held its first multi-candidate election in the newly established Congress of People’s Deputies. Although glasnost was meant to advocate openness and the allowance of political criticism, initially this was only permitted in accordance with the political views of the ruling party. The general public in the eastern bloc states were still threatened by secret police and political repression. Gorbachev urged his East European counterparts to imitate glasnost and perestroika, in their own states. However, while reformist in Hungary and Poland were emboldened by the force of liberation spreading from East to
West, other Eastern bloc states remained openly skeptical. These regimes owed their creation and continued survival to Soviet-style authoritarianism, backed by Soviet military power and economic subsidies. Believing that Gorbachev’s reform initiatives would be short-lived, orthodox Communist rulers like East Germany’s Erich Honecker, Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov, and Czechoslovakia’s Gustav Husak obstinately ignored the calls for change (Steele, 1994).

By 1989, through Gorbachev’s influence the Soviet Union had repealed the Brezhnev Doctrine in favor of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies. In a July 7, 1989 speech, Gorbachev implicitly renounced the use of force against other Soviet bloc nations. As Hungary, East Germany and Poland and the other Eastern bloc states developed their own version of communism, the Gorbachev position of non-intervention became known as the Sinatra Doctrine in a reference to the Frank Sinatra song “My Way” as each of the states developed the Marxist principles of communism in their own way. Through Solidarity, Poland became the first Warsaw Pact state to break free of Soviet domination. Hungary was next in reverting to a non-Communist form of government.

In May of 1989 government elections were held in GDR which only served to further anger the public when it was revealed that the SED supported National Front candidates which the people rejected by large numbers, won with 98.5 percent of the vote (Sebetsyen, 2009). In increasing numbers, East German citizens applied for exit visas or sought ways to leave the country illegally.

In August 1989 the first cracks in the Iron Curtain appeared when Hungary began dismantling its 150 mile long barbed wire fence bordering Austria and removed its border
restrictions. This increasingly destabilized the GDR and Czechoslovakia over the summer and autumn as thousands of their citizens illegally crossed over to the West through the open Hungarian-Austrian border (Stokes, 1993). By the end of September 1989, it is estimated that more than 30,000 East Germans had escaped to the West before the SED denied travel to Hungary. Thousands of other East Germans tried to reach the West by occupying the West German diplomatic facilities in other Eastern European capitals, notably the Prague Embassy where thousands camped in its muddy garden from August to November. Having been shut off from their last chance for escape, an increasing number of East Germans participated in the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig on September 4, 11, 18, attracting crowds of 1,200 to 1,500 demonstrators each time. Many were arrested and beaten, but the people refused to be intimidated and the September 25th demonstration attracted 8,000 demonstrators.

The demonstrations occurred as crowds gathered in the streets of Leipzig following Monday afternoon prayers. State repression and SED control of society meant that any opposition had to be organized within institutions that were shielded from state control. “Religious subcultures offered a rival set of identities and values while generally accommodating the demands of the regime. Within the free social space offered by the church, a peace movement emerged which played an important role in linking together various groups committed to nonviolent protest, peace, and human rights” (Pfaff, 2001:280). In 1978 the Union of Protestant Churches and the SED government reached the ‘Accommodationist Church in Socialism’ agreement. As a result, the church was afforded greater autonomy in exchange for political neutrality. The church leaders agreed not to speak out publically against the SED; but, this did not prevent large crowds of
people exiting a church service to spontaneously gather in the streets and protest against repression. The Church unintentionally, but willingly, provided a means of organizing large crowds with little logistical planning and communication which was severely restricted.

II. The revolution itself–

After the fifth consecutive Monday demonstration in Leipzig, on October 2\textsuperscript{nd} that attracted 10,000 protesters, the SED leader Erich Honecker, issued a ‘shoot to kill’ order to the military. A huge military force of combat troops supplementing the local police presence were on-hand for the following Monday, October 9\textsuperscript{th} as rumors spread that a Tiananmen Square-style massacre was being planned (Pritchard, 1998).

On October 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} Gorbachev visited East German to mark the 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the formation of the German Democratic Republic, and urged the SED to accept his glasnost and perestroika reforms. Among his remarks was the famous quote: “Wer zu spat kommt, den bestraft das leben” (he who is too late, is punished by life). But Honecker remained defiant and opposed to internal reform, with his regime even going so far as to forbid the circulation of Soviet publications that it viewed as subversive. Virtually ignoring the problems facing the country Honecker and the rest of the SED regime celebrated the 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary in East Berlin. The celebrations included soldiers marching on parade with missiles driven by on large trucks to display the republic’s weaponry. That same night, the first of many large demonstrations occurred in the capital of East Berlin, followed by other similar demonstrations for freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, in other major cities across the country putting further pressure on the regime to reform.

In spite the rumors that the SED regime was planning a massacre on October 9th, an incredible 70,000 people demonstrated in Leipzig in the streets following the usual Monday prayers. The security forces on the ground daringly refused to open fire and instead let the demonstration continue peacefully. This victory of the people facing down the threat of violence encouraged more and more citizens to take part in subsequent demonstrations. The following Monday, October 16th saw 120,000 demonstrators on the streets of Leipzig.

Faced with ongoing civil unrest, the ruling SED deposed Honecker two days later on October 18th, and replaced him with the number-two man in the regime, Egon Krenz (Sebetsyen, 2009). Although Krenz made promises to open up the regime from above, few East Germans were convinced. The demonstrations continued to grow, and on Monday October 23rd and 30th the number of Leipzig protesters reached nearly 300,000 each time. In Alexanderplatz (the large public square and transport hub in the central Mitte district of Berlin), November 4th demonstrations saw half a million citizens converged on the capital demanding freedom in the largest protest the GDR ever witnessed.

On November 1st the border to Czechoslovakia was re-opened, and the Czechoslovak authorities soon let all East Germans travel directly to West Germany without further bureaucracy, thus lifting their part of the Iron Curtain. Unable to stem the ensuing flow of refugees to the West through Czechoslovakia, the East German authorities eventually caved in to public pressure and allowed East German citizens to
enter West Berlin and West Germany directly, via existing border points. On November 9th, without having been properly briefed the regime spokesman Günter Schabowski in a TV press conference stated that the planned changes were to go into effect immediately. Hundreds of thousands of people took advantage of the opportunity and soon new crossing points were forced open in the Berlin Wall by the people, including sections of the wall literally torn down as this symbol of oppression was overwhelmed. The fall of the Berlin Wall was in reality the end of the SED communist regime in East Germany.

On November 13th the GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph and his entire cabinet resigned. A new government was formed under a considerably more liberal Communist, Hans Modrow. On December 1st the Volkskammer removed the SED’s leading role from the constitution of the GDR. Three days later, on December 3rd Egon Krenz resigned as leader of the SED and as head of state. December 7th saw Round Table talks open between the SED and other nascent political parties. On December 16, 1989 in an effort of solvency, the SED was dissolved and the party reformed as the SED-PDS Party of Democratic Socialism (German: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus), abandoning Marxism-Leninism and sought to become more mainstream. The SED-PDS as a democratic socialist political party was active in Germany from 1989 to 2007. It was the legal successor to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), but never gained much popularity.

Modrow became the de facto leader of East Germany until free elections were held on March 18, 1990—these were the first to be held in that part of Germany since 1933. The SED-PDS was heavily defeated. Lothar de Maizière of the East German Christian Democratic Union became Prime Minister on April 4, 1990 on a platform of speedy reunification with West Germany. Following negotiations between the two
German states, a Treaty on ‘Monetary, Economic and Social Union’ was signed on May 18th, and came into effect on July 1st. It replaced the East German mark with the deutsche mark and declared the intention for East Germany to accede to the German Federal Republic via Article 23 of GFR’s Basic Law. Article 23 laid much of the ground work for this by providing for the swift and wholesale implementation of Federal law and institutions in East Germany. By mid-July most state property, covering a large majority of the GDR’s economy was transferred to the Treuhand (German Trust Agency), which was given the responsibility of overseeing the transformation of GDR’s state owned businesses into market-oriented privatized companies and included everything from much of the industrial sector to agricultural land and forests. On July 22nd 1990 the five former federal states that existed before the creation of the GDR were reinstated as states within the new combined German state. The Unification Treaty established the accession date of October 3, 1990. With few exceptions, at accession the laws of East Germany were replaced overnight by those of West Germany. In September negotiations involving the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom, which established the conditions for German reunification, were agreed on as the Allies of World War II renounced their former rights in Germany, and agreed to remove all occupying troops by 1994. The Kremlin's willingness to abandon such a strategically vital ally marked a dramatic shift by the Soviet superpower and a fundamental paradigm change in international relations, which until 1989 had been dominated by the East-West divide. Germany became fully sovereign on March 15, 1991.
III. Revolution outcome including measures on the stability indicators –

*General statements and introduction:*

It was the victorious allies of World War II that divided Germany into occupation zones which later became East and West Germany. The German people themselves had not made this decision and when the nonviolent campaign brought about independence, the reunification of Germany became a natural first step in national expression. The forty-five year period from 1945 to 1990 had brought numerous changes between the GDR and the FRG politically, legally, socially, economically, but not culturally as they continued to share the same language, customs, and traditions. Many people still had relatives and friends on the other side of the wall. And so the difficult processes of nation building and state building became for East Germany a reunification with their western neighbor. In this section I will review the changes East Germany made as it separated itself from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact alliance, grew democratically, and reunited with West Germany. I will review these changes within the framework of the topic areas discussed in Section II: life expectancy, long term economic growth, implementation of rule of law, polity, infant mortality, respect for human rights, school enrollment as well as regional stability. As appropriate I will combine these topic areas together for easier reading and continuity.

*Life expectancy:*

The history of East and West Germany offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of political, economic and social factors on mortality changes. As of the early 1970’s mortality trends in East and West Germany diverged. Life expectancy at birth in East Germany increased with a low gradient for both sexes, while life expectancy in West
Germany rose more rapidly during the 70’s. With the collapse of the socialist regime in 1989 and reunification one year later, life expectancy in East Germany initially dropped for a short period and then increased at an accelerated pace. This increase in life expectancy was more pronounced for females than for males.

Using data published by the German Statistical Office 1980-1998, mortality patterns across all ages were investigated to track the changes of different age groups in life expectancy (Gjonca, et al., 2000). “We found profound differences between the two German states in the decline of old age mortality (people living longer) prior to reunification. Mortality at ages 80 and above started to decline in West Germany in the mid 1970’s. Not until ten years later did oldest mortality begin to decrease in East Germany” (Gjonca et al., 2000:9). German reunification in 1990 had little, if any effect on the long-term trend of the oldest members of the population in West Germany. But in contrast East German death rates for the oldest ages decreased markedly after 1990. “Our central findings were that old-age mortality declined earlier and gradually in West Germany and that East Germany was characterized by later and more abrupt decline that coincided with German reunification. Moreover it appears that this period factor operated without delay because the mortality decline became visible immediately after reunification” (Gjonca et al., 2000:11). This is somewhat surprising, because traditional epidemiological risk factors such as nutrition or changes in the health care system are thought to operate over rather long periods. However, some newer studies (Sitch et al., 1991) suggest that dietary changes can have immediate and profound effects on health. It is also true that some of the changes that came with reunification came quickly. The social and economic union between the two states was established in July 1990, and
pensions were raised to West German levels shortly thereafter. Pension payments made up the largest share of social expenditures in both German states. In 1990 the monthly pension of an East German retired employee was 40 percent that of his or her West German counterpart. After reunification as the West German pension scheme was implemented in East Germany it made retired people one of the groups that benefited most from the transformation.

Similarly, laws implementing the Western health care system in East Germany were passed in the summer of 1990, giving East Germans eligibility to receive medical care according to Western standards after that date. It also became possible to transfer patients to Western facilities if a particular treatment was not available in the East. Health care and pension systems were part of the institutional transfer of reunification and were implemented overnight.

As women generally make more use of medical services than men do, they immediately benefited more from medical care improvements than East German men. At the time of reunification it is estimated that the East German health care system was 15 to 20 years behind that of the West (Mielck, 1991).

“We speculate that the financial weakness of the socialist health care system in the GDR was one of the main reasons why the decline in old age mortality was relatively slow prior to reunification. After reunification the Western health care system was quickly installed in East Germany. Consequently, the accelerated decline in old age mortality occurred immediately after 1990, first for women followed quickly by the men” (Gjonca et al., 2000:14).

Old age mortality is just one of many aspects of human development that might be used to evaluate the effects of reunification, and the East German case suggests that reunification did have a beneficial effect on the death rates of the oldest members of the population which fell considerably.
In Berlin a ‘Health and Social Survey’ was conducted in 1991 using self-ratings of health and social characteristics from a representative sample of 4,430 Berlin residents aged 18 and over (Hillen et al., 2000). The residents were from both East and West Berlin. “Self-rating of health is an important indicator of general health and has proved to be a useful instrument for national and transnational epidemiological studies on inequalities in health” (Hillen et al., 2000:575). Residents of the former East experienced relative deprivation in comparison with the former West with a lower standard of living and lower spending per capita on health care. However, this may be balanced as “the Socialist society in the East was thought to have some fewer stressful life events in terms of unemployment, and difficulties relocating and obtaining housing, and paying for childcare. The principles of the socialist ideology included the leveling out of social class differences proven to be linked with stress, as well as less emphasis on personal responsibility for one’s own health” (Hillen et al., 2000:575).

The results showed that at the time of reunification and immediately thereafter the East Berlin population experienced great political upheaval, high unemployment, and a period of high uncertainty of the future. Their actual life expectancy dropped by nearly a full year in 1990 and 1991 and caught back up by 1992 to match that of West Germany. Self-reported health initially also showed a significant decreased for the East German population for those over 60 years of age. For all other age groups the stress of the political collapse in the East seems to have been balanced with positive expectations for the future, as the merging of health care occurred quickly and became a major benefit of reunification.
One other finding: “The beneficial effects of a health promoting life style were also found to be more pronounced in West than East Berlin. This might be explained by the fact that more people in the West considered fitness to be important and participated in active sports on their own, whereas those in the East tended to rely on the state for health care services” (Hillen et al., 2000: 579). These results support the earlier findings for the state as a whole which showed accelerated decrease in mortality of its oldest citizens.

**Long term economic growth:**

Prior to the successful nonviolent campaign the population of the GDR lived in a typical Soviet-style economy. Political and economic decision-making was centralized at the top; the major means of production including all industrial firms were owned and managed by the state. “A rigid plan guided the allocation of resources and the distribution of product outputs. Profits in the form of investible funds were collected by the one-tier system of state banks and under the control of state planning authorities, were channeled to the firms according to rather arbitrary priorities” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:1). The fixed prices of goods did not convey any reliable or relevant information about the true state of the business or the economic scarcities they faced. All of the industries had been organized as state monopolies. Foreign trade was conducted by a government monopoly and the exchange of goods with other socialist countries mostly took the form of barter.

In the absence of competition and private ownership, managers of the firms were not driven by self-interest to make profits; they merely strove to fulfill the prescribed quota targets. As the firms could not go bankrupt, they had little incentive to improve efficiency, maximize profits or grow the business. By 1989 industry in the GDR
exhibited four major weaknesses: 1. Firms tended to keep huge inventories of raw material as a buffer against unexpected and unplanned problems with suppliers, which in a capitalist market economy would be considered a costly mistake. 2. The tendency toward under specialization showed up in foreign trade. “The GDR’s exports were roughly, less than half that of the Dutch although the Netherlands are of comparable size in terms of population” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:3). 3. The structure of what goods and services were traded between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) of the Eastern Bloc was determined based upon political bargaining instead of a market-based assessment of economic viability. And 4. Managers had no incentive to keep the physical capital stock in good operational order. In a market economy a systematic neglect of the physical assets and machinery would show in a declining stock market value of the firm, under centralized planning, state ownership of the means of production managers had no incentive to safeguard and augment the future productivity potential of the firm. As a consequence by 1989 the existing capital stock of most GDR firms was technologically outdated, in poor condition and largely economically and ecologically obsolete, dropping the productivity of GDR workforce far behind their western neighbors.

At the time of reunification “the obsolescence of a large part of the present GDR capital stock and the un-competitiveness of many goods and services produced, meant that a large percentage of the workforce had to leave their previous employment and change to new more efficient firms over the course of the adjustment process” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:7). With reunification firms lost their well protected distribution outlets and began changes to enable them to compete directly with western suppliers.
These changes occurred over a period of years if not decades and included: “a pronounced shift of resources within manufacturing from inefficient and obsolete products to new industries and products, considerable improvements in the quality of products, higher degree of inter-firm and international specialization to reap the benefits of economies of scale, more efficient use of resources, considerable reduction in the average size of firms (including number of employees) and reorganization and privatization of existing firms” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:8).

With the large number of firms and workforce involved the transition was not an easy one. Certain sectors began immediately to see private ownership and independent spin-offs including maintenance, transport and construction. Other sectors followed what was recently done in Poland and established ‘holding’ agencies, known as the Treuhandanstalt or Trust Agencies, to set up joint stock or limited liability companies enabling them to be put up for sale. “This scheme had the advantage of establishing strong incentives to constitute efficient management of these firms immediately and waste no funding on keeping clearly unviable firms in business” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:12). As firms were purchased from the Treuhandanstalt, the proceeds were then given back to the firms as initial subsidies to help put them on good footing. Others argued that the proceeds should have been dispersed to the GDR population to assuage the adverse social consequences that arose during the swift adjustment process, including high unemployment and job relocation.

Employment and economic growth continued to be slow, in fact much slower than what economic growth models would predict. A dozen years after the October 3rd, 1990 reunification, fiscal transfers to East have been massive. “A total net transfer of 940
billion Euros has been paid from West to East Germany for the time span from 1991 to 2003, equating to one-third of East German GDP” (Uhlig, 2008:3). Despite these transfers, convergence of living and working conditions in East Germany to those in the West has been slow. Barrow (1991) predicted more realistically that “per-capita growth in the East would be initially 1.5 to 2 percentage points per year higher than in the West. This ‘growth advantage’ means that it will take about 15 years to eliminate one-half of the gaps. Continuing on in this pattern, the East would eventually catch up to the West, but in a couple of generations rather than a couple of years as was initially hoped” (in Uhlig, 2008:2). The growth rate was in fact 1.6 percent from 1999 to 2003 in line with predictions, but what was not accounted for was that emigration continued steadily particularly for those 18 to 29 years of age. Additionally standard economic growth models would predict that industry would exploit the cost advantage and move into East Germany with its relatively low wages, high unemployment, lower real estate, and good/comparable educational system. But surprisingly Uhlig (2008) found this not to be the case. He attributed this to the reality that while firms can produce their products in isolation, selling their goods presents a problem of efficiency, if there are no other collocated firms ready to buy and sell their goods in exchange. The reciprocal effects of firms buying and using each other’s products are needed to move the economy forward. “Economic reasoning would imply that this convergence would happen quickly, but the thwarted convergence in Germany attests to the fact that firms are often more productive by specialization as part of a larger network of firms, instead of trying to work in isolation. There is little in history to suggest that governments can accelerate convergence” (Uhlig, 2008, 19).
Implementation of the rule of law and respect for human rights:

There is a great debate amongst scholars as to why sovereign states would subject themselves to binding international human rights obligations and the implementation of the rule of law within their own borders. Why would any government favor establishing an effective independent international authority with the sole purpose of which is to constrain its domestic sovereignty? On one side of the argument is the “realist” position of E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau that maintain “the superpowers employ coercion or inducement to unilaterally extend their geopolitical self-interest” (in Moravcsik, 2000:221). Similarly Kenneth Waltz asserts that “throughout history powerful nations invariably seek to impose their views on other nations” (Moravcsik, 2000:221). On the other side of the argument are the “ideational theorists” who stress the:

“transformative power of normative moral discourse itself. In this view a critical characteristic of political action is that it is ‘principled’ –that is, the altruistic and moral motives of actors have persuasive power in themselves. Accordingly, the most fundamental motivating force behind human rights regimes is not rational adaptation, let alone coercion, but transnational socialization – the logic of appropriateness” (Moravcsik, 2000:223).

But Moravcsik explains that if you look at European history after World War II neither of these arguments accurately describe the set of countries that pushed for the establishment of international human rights institutions. It was the new democracies that were in the forefront of this push. “The most plausible explanation links support for international human rights protection to domestic democracy and commitment to the rule of law. In this view, which has been termed ‘liberal constructivism’ established democratic governments seek to extend their domestic values abroad and recognize other who do so. The more democratic they are, the more likely their espousal of human rights values” (Moravcsik, 2000:223). It is useful to assume that international institutional
commitments, like domestic institutional commitments, are self-interested means of “locking in” particular preferred domestic policies in the face of future political uncertainty. Terry Moe (1990) observes that most political institutions arise out of a political structural choice in which the winners use their temporary hold on public authority to design new structures and impose them on the polity as a whole. Institutions are weapons of coercion and redistribution, the structural means by which political winners pursue their own interests. Governments establish courts, administrative agencies, central banks, and other independent bodies as means by which the winners of political conflict seek to commit the polity to preferred policies and lock-in their views for future generations. Governments seek to establish reliable judicial constraints on future power holders that may seek to subvert democracy from within. Sovereignty costs are weighted against establishing human rights regimes even as greater political stability weighs in favor of it.

Additionally new states seeking to enhance the credibility of their domestic policies bind themselves to international human rights institutions as well as the implementation of rule of law practices at home, in an effort to legitimize themselves before the international community.

Postwar West Germany was a strong supporter of the establishment of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) as well as the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. “Postwar West Germany contemporaneously adopted systems of constitutional judicial review, and moved toward a separation of powers with an independent judiciary” (Moravcsik, 2000:232). It seems likely that each of the three occupying powers (the United States, Great Britain and
France) would insist upon this even if there was not enough support domestically to establish institutions that ‘locked-in’ independent rule of law and human rights policies. And at reunification, East Germany came under these institutions as well, implementing strong West German policies towards rule of law and human rights.

Prior to reunification Freedom House rated East German respect for human rights as a six on their seven point scale with one representing a wide range of civil liberties and seven few or no civil liberties. A score of six represents: “Countries that strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. Arbitrary arrests and disappearances are known to occur. They may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.” At the same time West Germany was rated a score of two representing: “enjoyment of a range of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established and generally fair system of rule of law with free economic activity but some limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and some discrimination against minority groups and women.” It would seem reasonable that as the laws were changed overnight at reunification that it took some time for the changes in civil liberties to catch up. But as the enforcement of law began in earnest in 1990 and changes in civil liberties did as well.

**Autocracy/Democracy:**

Progress toward democracy in East Central Europe occurred rapidly in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. “As a result of the radical reforms and revolutions of 1989-1990 in East Central Europe, new elites throughout the region committed themselves to
establishing democratic political regimes in their countries” (Bernhard, 1993:314). The growth of civil society was an important factor in creating pressure on authorities to secure their acknowledgement of the co-dependent relationship of authorities and the citizenship of society. ‘Civil society’ first appears in political philosophy in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century. By the late eighteenth century certain political forces within civil society became strong enough to successfully challenge the power of the monarchies at the time (Bernhard, 1993). The ‘western’ response prepared the way for capitalism and culminated in the late nineteenth century in the creation of full parliamentary democracy. Political parties representing conflicting interests became the means through which competing forces in civil society contested state power. The eastern variant consolidated feudalism in a new and stronger form. The Russian (Eastern) response was to bind the society in a much tighter relationship with the monarchy (Bernhard, 1993). The press was subjected to greater censorship than the West, and certain ethnic groups were subjected to legal discrimination. In Poland the emergence of several social movements which began as labor strikes in the late 1970’s marked the first major opposition in the Soviet Bloc. These movements culminated in the birth of Solidarity and the first development of an active civil society within a Communist state. Prior to the East German Revolution of 1989 there were scattered resistance campaign in the GDR in the form of anti-war (when the SED sent troops abroad) and ecological protest. “In comparison to the other countries of East Central Europe, opposition on human rights grounds and regular underground publishing got a late start in the GDR” (Bernhard, 1993:321). This was at least partially due to the efficiency and all-encompassing nature of the SED’s security apparatus. But by the summer of 1989 when
large numbers of East Germans began to use Hungary’s newly opened border with Austria to flee to Western Germany, coupled with Gorbachev’s refusal to sanction mass repression of demonstrators, the SED’s time in power became limited. The inability of the Honecker regime to bring an end to the demonstrations and emigrations, either by repression or promises of reform, led to its downfall. Initially a group of prominent communists from the ruling party who were more open to dialogue with civil society, including Egon Krenz, and Hans Modrow, replaced Erich Honecker and his more rigid supporters.

The new government with Modrow as prime minister began to negotiate for reform and free elections with independent political groups, most notably the ‘New Forum’, an umbrella group of different activists who began to channel to the regime the demands of the demonstrators. But the inability of the new leadership to adapt to the growing radicalism of the demonstrators led to the rapid evaporation of any credibility that the SED may have had. Attempts to regroup as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) under the leadership of Gregor Gysi did little to stem its downfall.

When the demonstrators pushed the subject of reunification to the top of the political agenda with its chants of “We are one people” the West German political parties began to assist local opposition forces. In short, political parties from FRG intervened and in concert with local forces began to organize civil society along the FRG patterns” (Bernhard, 1993:322).

The new opposition in East Germany, typified by the New Forum, was able to negotiate with the re-vamped SED regime on behalf of the demonstrators for the liberation of the public space and the holding of free elections, but it did not dominate the
newly liberated public space. Before East German civil society had a chance to develop itself in a unique and individual fashion, “the radical demands of the demonstrators for reunification permitted West German political parties to take a decisive role in shaping the political contours of the public space. East German civil society soon came to resemble an extension of the civil society of the FRG” (Bernhard, 1993:323).

Thus the GDR which had a Polity IV scoring of -9 in 1989 merged with FRG with a scoring of +10 in a radical change from a very strongly autocratic state to full and complete democracy within a year as the law of the West replaced those of the East overnight at reunification. October 3rd is celebrated each year as unity day.

For decades, West Germany's allies had stated their support for reunification; only Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who speculated that a country that “decided to kill millions of Jewish people” in the Holocaust “will try to do it again”, was one of the few world leaders to publicly oppose it (Wiegrefe, 2010). As reunification became a realistic possibility, however, significant NATO and European opposition emerged. Both British Prime minister Margaret Thatcher and French President Francois Mitterrand publically opposed the reunification as the time grew near.

“Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that neither the United Kingdom nor Western Europe wanted the reunification of Germany. Thatcher also clarified that she wanted the Soviet leader to do what he could to stop it, telling Gorbachev ‘We do not want a united Germany’. Although she welcomed East German democracy, Thatcher worried that a rapid reunification might weaken Gorbachev, and favored Soviet troops staying in East Germany as long as possible to act as a counterweight to a united Germany” (Wiegrefe, 2010).

“Although Thatcher had initially stated her support for German self-determination in 1985, she now argued that Germany’s allies had only supported reunification because
they had not believed it would ever happen” (Wiegrefe, 2010). Similarly, a representative of French President François Mitterrand reportedly told an aide to Gorbachev, “France by no means wants German reunification, although it realizes that in the end it is inevitable” (Wiegrefe, 2010). But Condoleezza Rice the U.S. Secretary of State speaking on behalf of the U.S. said that: “The United States – and President George H. W. Bush – recognized that Germany had gone through a long democratic transition. It had been a good friend; it was a member of NATO. Any issues that had existed in 1945, it seemed perfectly reasonable to lay them to rest. For us, the question wasn't should Germany unify? It was how and under what circumstances? We have no concern about a resurgent Germany” (Wiegrefe, 2010). And so the states with very different political systems did combine.

Infant mortality:

While infant mortality did not significantly change after reunification, researchers that study demographics noted a significant drop in fertility. “Almost overnight the East German population had to adapt to new political, economic, and social systems; all of which had a dramatic impact on fertility behavior. Whereas demographic trends in West Germany remained largely unaffected by unification, in East Germany the number of births fell from 200,000 in 1989 to only 79,000 in 1994” (Conrad et al., 1996:331). This represents a decline of 60 percent over five years, although most of the change occurred in 1991 and 1992. The number of marriages also fell sharply, declining by 60 percent between 1989 and 1994 as well. “This was the most substantial fall in birth rates that has ever occurred in peace-time in any state” (Conrad et al., 1996:331).

In the effort to encourage women to enter the workforce back in 1972 the SED introduced measures which combined the liberalization of abortion and wider availability
of contraceptives with a number of pre-natal measures ranging from financial incentives for marriage and birth including the provisions of cost-free day care for children older than one year of age. A 1976 package extended these benefits and introduced a baby-year, a one-year leave for the mother after giving birth with full salary and the guarantee of keeping her job. (Winkler, 1989 in Conrad 1996:334). These policies were put in place as a response to an earlier drop in birth rates after the mid-1960’s that occurred in the midst of chronic labor shortages, low productivity and low wages which made women’s participation in the work force a necessity both for the economy and for the family. Demographers also noted a “pronounced difference between East and West Germany in the period before reunification in the age of childbearing women. Whereas in East Germany the average age was 22 with almost no births to women over 30; in West Germany the age of childbearing women was much more evenly distributed with the average age at 26. This was due to the incentive structure that was geared toward leading young adults step by step into the mainstream of socialist society” (Conrad et al., 1996:335). The guarantee of employment at predictable income levels helped young couples to plan for the future and to make long-term commitments, such as to family and children, at an early age. Even when marriages did not last, single mothers were fully protected by the pro-natalist measures of the SED. Further, marriage guaranteed couples that they would later get employment in the same locality.

But the process of reunification had an immediate effect on the demographic behavior of the East Germans. “In the first year following these events it was mostly older married women who sharply limited their fertility, those who already had one or two children decided not to have more. But by 1993 the decline became most pronounced
in the younger age groups” (Conrad et al., 1996:337). The number of marriages dropped as dramatically as the number of births.

Two factors impacted the number of births. The first is the emigration out of East Germany continued heavily during the reunification and young adults were strongly overrepresented among the migrants. Second, the uncertainty of the future led women and families who chose to remain in East Germany to limit the number of children that they had. “The sudden change in the rules governing family benefits and tight housing markets are further salient elements of a completely changed incentive structure surrounding family formation” (Huinink 1995, in Conrad et al., 1996:342). Conrad concludes by saying “Thus, we interpret East German demographic choices as manifestations of rational behavior. Further, we predict an incremental adaptation to the West German pattern of family formation behavior, with respect to its level (number of births) and particularly its timing (childbearing age)” (1996:343). This seems natural as the regulations and incentives for childbearing were the same for both East and West Germany after reunification.

*School enrollment:*

The reunification of Germany was at first greeted with excitement on both sides of the Wall, however, it did not take long for disillusion to set in. Initially the East Germans were “hoping simply for a reform of their existing systems, with perhaps some increased funding, they were soon disappointed and had to accept the fact that a fusion was out of the question; instead, East German school systems were expected to assimilate to those of West Germany without much discussion” (Pritchard, 1998).
The restructuring of the education system played a crucial role in the transformation of East Germany; consequently, enormous sums were pumped into East German schools and the training of teachers.

School enrollment percentages were not a concern in either East or West Germany as both countries continued to have enrollment rates greater than 98 percent of school age children attending classes both before and after reunification. However the school systems were very different and presented an enormous challenge to replace the former GDR system with that of the FRG.

In the former East German system the guiding concept behind educations was, “the development of the ‘Allseits entwickelte sozialistische Personlichkeit’ or, comprehensive socialist personality” (Marsh et al, 1999:331) with a broad scientifically oriented general education. This educational guideline was part of a collectivist notion of a unitary, general education based on ten years of full-time schooling and was intended to overcome individual disparities of all kinds. Quite different from modern western systems, the elementary educational system began with pre-school where children from 4 to 5 years of age began schooling, continued on to kindergarten at age 6 and completed ten years of formal education. In this system there was no explicit streaming of students according to ability level. Everyone was given the same curriculum, same books, same teaching styles inattentive of abilities and talents. Moreover the focus was on building socialism, collective action, standardization, alikeness.

The former West German system was characterized by the liberal notion that a variety of school careers should be offered to students by providing different paths for achieving final qualifications based upon the individual’s talents and abilities. The
traditional German system which was re-implemented after World War II was characterized by early and selective assignment to different tracks of secondary schools based upon abilities. After four years of elementary school, students generally were slated for one of three different types of secondary school (hauptschule --lower track, realschule --middle track, or gymnasium --upper track) based on their previous school performance. Typically students in the hauptschule and realschule attend until ninth or tenth grade. In contrast the elite gymnasium students attended school through grade 13 and were typically expected to continue their education through university.

At reunification the former East German school system was largely transformed into the West German system with relatively few changes in the West German system. This was a slow and arduous process; teacher re-training, curriculum re-development, upgraded school facilities and alternative programs for the gifted and talented took years to develop and put in place. At the time of reunification consistent with the strong emphasis on social comparisons, the East German students had, “significantly lower academic self-concepts (their beliefs in their own academic abilities) than did their West German counterparts. This study predicts that years will pass before the educational differences will begin to equalize” (Marsh et al., 1999:345).

Regional stability:

Regional stability has been discussed above. But to reiterate briefly, as Gorbachev changed the Soviet policies from the Brezhnev doctrine to what became known as the Sinatra doctrine it was clear that the Eastern Bloc states were on their own.

Poland was the first to oppose their authoritative regime with a nonviolent campaign. The campaign lasted ten years from 1979 to 1989 with strikes, protest
marches, boycotts, religious blessings and confirmations, before success came. Hungary was next with its nonviolent campaign which lasted roughly 10 months. East Germany follows next with a campaign lasting only several months. In fact, in the Eastern Bloc as a whole: Albania, Romania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, besides Poland, Hungary and East Germany, all had campaigns for change which began in 1989. Similar pressures were impacting all of these Eastern Bloc states: economic stagnation, increased poverty, decreasing standard of living, coupled with the changes in political support from the Soviet Union, led to campaigns for regime change that inevitably encouraged each other.

In addition to these campaigns, in the rest of the world: China, Benin, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Liberia, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Mali also experienced campaigns for regime change. There were twenty-three campaigns in all which began in 1989 and all were nonviolent except for Romania, Liberia and Mali. It seems only natural that nascent groups of activists would take encouragement from each other to fight for rights within their own states.

2. **Somalia, 1992-1994 militia insurgency**—

The 1992 to 1994 militia insurgency campaign in Somalia was chosen as a case study because it was considered a successful violent campaign that occurred in a strongly autocratic state (polity -7). This contrasts with East Germany which was also strongly autocratic but experienced a nonviolent campaign. It is also different from East Germany in that Somalia is a weak and fragile state that experienced government collapse the year prior to the insurgency.
I. History, background and events leading up to the revolution–

The Federal Republic of Somalia, as it is officially known, achieved independence from Britain and the remaining portion of what is now Somalia achieved independence four days later from Italy on July 1st 1960. It has a population of over ten million people who are primarily Sunni Muslim (CIA World Factbook, 2012). Eighty-five percent of the population is pastoralists, many of whom are nomadic. Formerly when the British and Italians had control, they established British Somaliland in the north-west and Italian Somaliland in the north-east and southern parts of the territory. “Following World War II as the colonizing powers withdrew from Africa, the area that Italy held became a territory under U.N. mandate (as a consequence of Italy’s defeat in the war); this gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain some experience in political self-governance, which the area held by the British as a militarily administered protectorate did not have” (Tripodi, 1999:68).

I.M. Lewis’s (1962) anthropological study of Somalia at the time of independence had two simple but strong messages: 1) the Somalis have a highly equalitarian society with pastoralism as a base, although livestock, the most vital economic asset is not evenly distributed; and 2) the fundamental organizing principle of their way of life is segmentary clanism. In the absence of institutionalized state structures and weak governmental authority, civil associations mainly along clan-lines, and loyalty to one’s lineage, defined the characteristics of Somali politics and social life. The people lived fairly independently and peacefully. “As a whole there was a general lack of forms of oppression that is often associated with class societies, although gender-based exploitation was a characteristic feature” (Samatar, 1992:632).
At independence the new regime inherited a weak economy, a deepening budgetary deficit, growing urban population largely unhinged from productive labour, and intensifying competition among the dominant social groups for the resources that were available. Aid packages and infrastructure improvement projects did come from Italy, but as Gilkes explains, these helped Italy more than Somalia as construction contracts were often awarded to foreign (Italian) firms (1993:23).

This and other projects provided lucrative contracts to Italian construction firms in particular, as well as unpublicized payoffs to Somali government officials who decided amongst the construction firms.

“The stagnant economy, and the lack of sustainable avenues to lower the unemployment rate, were difficult challenges for the new state” (Samatar, 1992:633). Since the country did not produce a surplus of any product which could be used to reinvest and expand the economic base, resources had to be obtained from elsewhere. In the mid-1960’s during the cold-war help came from the Soviet Union who saw Somalia’s strategic location on the Gulf of Aden as an asset. But the aid did not improve the base of pastoralism or peasant agriculture on which most Somalis depended and was thought to go into the pockets of the elite decision makers.

“The failure of the Soviet aid to improve traditional sectors and to create new domestic forms of accumulation made the state budget the most lucrative source of funds. It was the competition among the elite for these resources that ultimately led to the degeneration of the major political parties and final demise of parliamentary governance” (Samatar, 1992:633). In the elections of 1964, twenty-four political parties vied to send candidates to parliament. “The main way to get access to state funds was to become an
elected political representative or, even better, a minister, and this goes a long way to explain the large number of parties and candidates in the 1964 and 1969 elections” (Samatar, 1992:634).

Shortly after the elections, Somalia’s newly elected President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke made several well-publicized inspection trips to the military headquarters in Mogadishu and reportedly planned to send some senior officers to be trained in the Soviet Union or force them into retirement so that he could replace them with his own men. On October 15th 1969 while paying a visit to the northern town of Las Anod, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead by one of his own bodyguards. His assassination was quickly followed by a military coup d’état on October 21st in which the Somali army led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power without encountering any armed opposition. A one-party government based on scientific socialism and Islamic tenets was installed. Emphasis was placed on the Muslim principles of social progress, equality and justice (Samatar, 1992:634).

Initially the revolutionary army established large-scale public works programs and successfully implemented a state-wide literacy campaign which helped to dramatically increase the literacy rate. But then a program of nationalization of the industry and land was initiated where the regime took control of all of the state’s assets, dissolved the parliament as well as the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution (Yang, 2000). The new regime’s foreign policy placed an emphasis on Somalia’s traditional and religious connections with the Arab world and joined the Arab League in 1974. Barre also served as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, the predecessor of the African Union (Yang, 2000). “Somalia’s initial friendship with the
Soviet Union and later partnership with the United States enabled it to build the largest army in all of Africa by the mid-1970’s” (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999:222). By the 1980’s the moral authority of Barre’s regime began to collapse. Many Somalis had become disillusioned with life under military dictatorship and its strategy of divide-and-rule through blood-ties. “The resources of the state were being increasingly misappropriated on a grand scale. Having purged the military and appointed loyalists and immediate family members to all key positions Barre then used civil service posts and public funds to reward and punish other opportunistic members of the elite” (Samatar, 1992:636). The regime was weakened further in the 1980’s as the Cold War drew to a close and Somalia’s strategic importance to the Soviet Union and the U.S. diminished. The government became increasingly totalitarian, and resistance movements encouraged by neighboring Ethiopia sprang up across the country.

“Ample evidence suggests that by the mid-1980’s Somalia was already a failed state. With the partial exception of the security sector, most government institutions had begun to atrophy. Fierce government repression, heightened cleavages along clan lines and animosities between local groups along with gross levels of corruption, all combined to accelerate the state’s decline” (Menkhaus, 2006:80). The public school system, which had been doing well in the 1970’s, fell apart. Due to the violence production on state-run farms and in factories plummeted. “Government ministries were almost entirely dysfunctional despite a bloated civil service, due in part to chronic absenteeism and cronyism; effective and committed civil servants were seen as a threat and removed” (Menkhaus, 2006:80).
The year 1991 began a time of great change for Somalia. The Barre regime was ousted that year by a coalition of opposition groups including: The United Somali Congress military led by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the Somali National Movement led by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, the Somali Patriotic Movement led by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in addition to the following armed groups: Manifesto, Somali Democratic Movement and Somali National Alliance. These groups were roughly clan-based and were backed by Ethiopia’s ruling Derg regime and by Libya who benefited by a weak Somalia. Barre and his armed supporters remained defiant. They located themselves in the south and caused further escalation of violence there, and which finally broke-down into a multi-party civil war. “The collapse of public law and order, and the fragmentation of the opposition, meant that ordinary people increasingly found themselves falling back on the ties of lineage and traditional clan membership that they knew they could trust” (Simons, 1994:820).

But others such as Catherine Besteman disagree. She states that by 1991 journalist, pundits, politicians and some academics, had settled upon a singular explanatory scheme for analyzing the situation in Somalia. The image of a country unable to rid itself of ancient rivalries that played out along clan-lines was repeated over and over in the news media, while press headlines spoke of restoring ‘order’ and ‘democracy’ to a people suffering under clan rivalries (1996:123). But Besteman explains that there are several problems with this depiction.

“The emphasis on a clan basis of Somali society obscures both the degree of flexibility and the distinctions of status that cut across clans. Somali society contains out-caste groups, such as those with Bantu ancestry, that are not part of any clan. Furthermore, Somali clan membership is not irrevocably ascribed at birth. Movement between clans not only is possible but is particularly widespread in the populous south. Another factor that has served to limit clan
solidarity in the south is the centrality of village ties. Rural agricultural and agro-
pastoral villages typically contain people from a number of different clans and have village committees which make decisions about land and water use that cut across the traditional clans” (1996: 124-125).

For most of the twentieth century, ‘status’ in society, which is derived from collective social constructions of race, language, and gender, has presented a far greater constraint on individual agency and identity than clan membership which is considered to be more easily altered (Besteman 1996:125). Status and identity are based upon a wide range of physical characteristics as well as affiliations, associations, physical location, and cultural ideologies. Therefore, presenting the conflict in Somalia as clan-based rivalries, instead of the common issues faced by many societies of race and class, oversimplifies the reality on the ground. In sum, Besteman says, “The most important point here is that the conflict, banditry, and the vicious assaults that plagued the population of Somalia were not the result of deep, ancient clan hostilities. Rather, ongoing conflict has been the product of struggles for control of productive and lucrative resources” (1996:128).

The success of the Barre’s regime strategy to divide and rule through blood-ties in the end consumed its own strength, and thereby led to the total collapse of governmental authority by the end of 1991 (Samatar, 1992:637). Weapons were readily available and inter as well as intra-faction conflicts continued to ensue. As each faction tried to overtake and weaken its competitors the social fabric of society as well as physical infrastructure was destroyed. Schools, communication facilities, bridges and roads were particularly targeted. As the violence played out the factional rivalry proliferated and broke down further into smaller and smaller unorganized units, until a system of anarchy supervened.
To remove itself from the conflict, the north-eastern portion of the state, formerly colonized by the British, declared its independence as Somaliland in May 1991. But has not yet been recognized by any foreign government or the U.N. (Samatar, 1992). As the factional multi-party civil war disrupted agriculture production and food distribution in conflict areas as well as the state as a whole; the situation was compounded by an exceptionally severe drought which induced a famine that was estimated to have killed about 300,000 people. Reported estimates indicated that “nearly one-third to one-half of the population had died or was on the verge of starvation” (Samatar, 1992:625). These events led the United Nations Security Council in 1992 to authorize a limited peacekeeping operation ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Its use of force was limited to self-defense and although originally welcomed by all sides, it was soon disregarded by the warring factions (Atkinson, 1994).

II. The revolution itself–

UNOSOM I was unable to ameliorate the famine conditions brought on by the ongoing multi-fraction civil war and the compounding drought. The United Nations began to make plans for direct intervention. This consisted of two phases: UNITAF, a US-led humanitarian intervention with limited enforcement duties, and UNOSOM II, an UN-led humanitarian intervention with extensive enforcement functions. “Disarmament, was not specifically written into UNITAF’s mandate although the country was awash with vast amounts of weaponry at the time, and many in the U.N. held the position that the
operation was not going to be successful unless disarmament occurred” (Patman, 1997:509).

On November 24th 1992, the Bush administration informed the new U.N. Secretary General Dr. Boutros-Ghali that the U.S. was prepared to lead a multilateral enforcement operation in Somalia. There were several events that brought about the U.S. decision to send troops to Somalia which may not be the best argument for putting troops in harm’s way; these included: “the mid-1992 well-publicized visit of Senator Nancy Kassebaum to Somalia and her public call for the U.S. to provide active support for U.N. operations” (Gilkes, 1993:22). This led to a series of celebrity visits which put the situation in Somalia on the agenda of the international community. “Candidate Bill Clinton seized on the issue as evidence of President Bush’s failure in foreign policy; and just before the Republican National Convention in August, Bush responded by announcing an airlift of emergence food aid, and later that the U.S. would send troops to Somalia only if it was agreed that the U.S. would lead the multinational force” (Gilkes, 1993:22). The U.S. was concerned about the possible spread of Islam to Somalia’s neighbors in Kenya and Ethiopia, having very little understanding of the varied practices of Islam at the time. And there was also the concern, which was seen as the hidden agenda of the U.S. and U.N., to “reunify Somalia by reincorporating the republic of Somaliland that had proclaimed its independence in May 1991” (Gilkes, 1993:23).

Looking back now, some twenty years later, it would seem that some of the events that led to the decision to send troops had nothing to do with the humanitarian crisis and concern for the Somali people and may have thwarted the success of the operation.
During negotiations between the U.S. and the U.N. it became plain that the U.S. was not proposing to establish a U.N. protectorate in Somalia and that any American troops deployed there would remain under U.S. command. While voicing some reservations about these conditions Boutros-Ghali accepted the U.S. offer. “On December 3rd the Security Council unanimously endorsed the U.S. initiative, recognizing that the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and resolved to restore peace, law and order, and stability, with a view of facilitating the process of a political settlement” (Patman, 1997:511). As a consequence, Resolution 794 authorized the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Unrestrained by the need for consent from the Somali factions, UNITAF troops were permitted under common rules of engagement the possible use of deadly force, including pre-emptive action beyond self-defense to accomplish the humanitarian mission” (Patman, 1997:511). However, under the conditions of the collapsed state in which the operation was launched, “it was not certain who the enemy was or against whom the military action was to be directed” (Adekanye, 1997:359).

In what became known as ‘Operation Restore Hope’ the U.S. and U.N. soon clashed over whether the mandate for the operation included the disarming of Somali militias. U.S. Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said: “disarmament was not a stated part of our mission and our signed agreement has not changed that” (Reuters 12/4/1992 in Patman, 1997:511). The U.N. however, took a much broader interpretation of the mandate. “In the view of the U.N. Secretary-General and other senior U.N. officials ‘secure environment’ was inconceivable without disarmament. Indeed, Boutros-
Ghali believed he had a private understanding on this matter with the Bush administration. But the Bush administration denied this” (Patman, 1997:511). The U.N. wanted the UNITAF to use its overwhelming military advantage to create an environment that would be both conductive to humanitarian operations and the future process of national reconciliation. In other words,

“Boutros-Ghali feared that if the factions were not disarmed, there would be no hope for future peace and much of the humanitarian work during Operation Restore Hope would be little more than a Band-Aid exercise” (Adekanye, 1997:364). The willingness to abandon weapons and enter civilian life generally depends on the extent to which the security environment together with the viability of continuing political processes is perceived to be taking root. In the long run, social and economic progress, reflected in increased job opportunities, food security and welfare provisions are the decisive factors (Adekanye, 1997).

Clearly Somalia in 1992 was a long way from any perception that political processes were taking root.

The dispute between the U.S. and the U.N. centered on what constituted a secure environment in Somalia. Political concerns in addition to strictly security considerations shaped the American position. A number of factors were involved. First, “Washington made a firm distinction between humanitarian and politically strategic intervention” (Patman, 1997:512). Because the operation in Somalia was deemed to belong to the former category, the Bush administration seemed “anxious to adhere to the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs. Underlying this was a tacit recognition that, ultimately
civil wars are about the distribution of power and that disarming would by definition involve the U.S. in Somali’s political process” (Patman, 1997:512).

Thinking back on U.S. history and its negative experience and lack of public support, when it inserted itself in the political process of Vietnam, it is not difficult to appreciate its reluctance in Somalia.

“Another factor in the decision was the consideration that “a policy of active disarmament would have been potentially expensive. The U.S. was probably keen to keep its phase of the U.N. operation limited because it was paying the cost of about $30 million a day to keep troops in Somalia. If disarmament was pursued that figure would have risen sharply” (Patman, 1997:512). Seen from the White house, these factors indicated that the political consensus supporting the U.S. participation in Operation Restore Hope could collapse if active disarmament became the goal of the operation.

Two days after the launch of UNITAF on December 11th 1992, Robert Oakley, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, secured a ceasefire agreement between the two main fighting factions in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi and General Aideed. Despite the veneer of agreement, the seven-point ceasefire brokered by Oakley had in fact been points that were previously agreed upon at various times during the previous nine months. “Moreover, Oakley’s dialogue with the two key warlords shocked and dismayed many Somalis and foreign aid workers. Instead of arresting the warlords, the U.S. treated them as legitimate political players at a time when they were on the back-foot and their authority was ebbing” (Patman, 1997:513). Thereafter, the UN’s position was limited and their ability to search for a political solution was severely circumscribed by the involvement of the faction leaders.
By January 1993 the situation on the ground had improved partly because of the brokered ceasefire agreement and the U.S. presence along with the presence of other nationals in the U.N. force; and partly because the drought had ceased which made food sources more available. But January 1993 also saw increased violence from several newly empowered factions. “In early 1993, 200 supporters of General Aideed stoned the U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu, forcing the U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to cut short his visit to the Somali capital. By February, U.S. troops were fighting running battles with thousands of rioters after General Aideed publicly accused the U.S. of favoring a rival warlord, Siad Hersi Morgan, in Kismayo” (Patman, 1997:515). Mogadishu fell victim to a soaring crime rate. “Relief aid workers and foreign journalist became favorite targets as the gunmen resumed control of large areas of the city” (Patman, 1997:515).

The deteriorating security situation eventually jolted the UNITAR forces into periodic weapons searches and confiscations that were independent of the disarmament agreements. But this was done in a piecemeal fashion instead of an overall comprehensive plan. “The absence of a clear U.S. vision on disarmament and open differences with the U.N. predictably muddled policy in Mogadishu” (Patman, 1997:516).

The increased attacks against the U.S. and U.N. forces in Mogadishu motivated the UNITAF forces to support efforts to support the formation of a local police force that could begin to establish a secure environment. On February 6th a Somali police force consisting of more than 2,000 members began operations in the Somali capital for the first time in several years (Patman, 1997). A judicial committee was also formed, with an equal number of magistrates and judges named by the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions.
But these efforts did little to restore rule of law. “The legal process was fundamentally compromised by the involvement of appointees from the two warring factions; as neither group would permit the arrest of its own members” (Patman, 1997:517).

Three months later in March 1993 the news began to report that U.S. President Bill Clinton shared the view of his predecessor George H. W. Bush that the U.S. should not stay any longer than absolutely necessary, and that plans were underway for the withdrawal of 3,000 troops from Somalia. Although the security situation was deteriorating on the ground; according to U.S. General Robert Johnston, “UNITAF had accomplished its mission: we reversed a devastating famine and now it is safe to walk the streets” (Patman, 1997:518). But senior U.N. officials, including Boutros-Ghali, denied American claims that the U.S.-led force had created a secure environment.

It was in this context that the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 814 on March 26th 1993 authorizing UNOSOM II with an expanded mandate to include disarmament as well as protection of humanitarian relief supplies and personnel, although the size of the force was much smaller. “The initial complement of 16,000 U.N. troops drawn from a large number of countries, struggled to fill the vacuum left by the 37,000 strong UNITAF force” (Patman, 1997:519). The difficulties in commanding a multinational force that was already spread thin led to several mistakes in June and July. Under U.N. direction on June 17th the U.S. Rapid Deployment Unit (a segment of the UNITAF force) attacked a hospital in Digfer mistakenly thought to contain militia members and on July12th it bombed a house where dozens of clan elders (not warlords) were meeting to discuss peace initiatives, killing them all.
In partial response to these events on June 5th, “warring factions retaliated and 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were brutally killed during pre-arranged weapons verification inspection visits to some of Aideed’s authorized weapons storage sites in south Mogadishu” (Patman, 1997:519). It appears that Aideed perceived the UNOSOM II mandate of disarmament as a direct challenge to his power which was based upon the arming of his followers.

Now drawn in to the fractional fighting the U.N. launched a manhunt for Aideed, with U.S. participation, and tried to forcibly disarm his militia. But the “window of opportunity for disarmament had long since closed” (Patman, 1997:519). The killing of Pakistani soldiers was followed by the killing of 19 U.S. soldiers in October 1993. This famous incident was depicted in the U.S. film ‘Black Hawk Down’ which showed the dead bodies of U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The media campaign had come full circle. The initial pictures of the famine’s victims which prompted U.S. leaders with encouragement from the public to send troops to Somalia, by October 1993 roughly one year later, the media’s display of pictures of U.S. casualties prompted the withdrawal of forces as soon as possible. The U.S. withdrew all of its servicemen by March 1994; the U.N. removed all peacekeepers by March 1995. U.S. forces in Mogadishu constantly ran into difficulty over both the conception and duration of their commitment. From the outset Washington stressed that UNITAF was strictly a humanitarian mission; in the words of President Bush, “the U.S. did not intend to dictate political outcomes” (Patman, 1997:527). But the situation on the ground dictated the need for another course of action. Both U.S. and U.N. forces became embroiled in the factional conflict without the political will to invest resources needed to
turn the situation around. In the end, by choosing to work with the Somali warlords instead of building up society through clan elders and leaders that Somali people respected, the Americans “sought to base the solution to Somalia’s troubles on the very forces bearing considerable responsibility for tearing the country apart” (Patman, 1997:533).

Another area of concern was the amount of Somali involvement in the whole process. “UNOSOM I and II were reluctant to recruit Somalis. Few, if any, were consulted before the troops moved in, and efforts at reconciliation were mainly confined to those responsible for the present state of the country” (Gilkes, 1993:24). There is an obvious need of local reconciliation of the clan groups before national debate could occur and involvement of Somali people would seem to be a necessary step in reconciliation. The approach taken by the U.S. and the U.N. focused on the immediate situation and not a long-term solution.

The short-lived UNITAF operation was considered successful as the humanitarian crisis subsided although this may have had more to do with the fact that the drought ended and food supplies became more readily available than the efforts of the military. The two other operations UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II were considered unsuccessful as peace was never truly established nor self-governance of Somalia begun.

“In the end, for the United States, the cost came to 32 killed in action, 172 wounded and $1.3 billion spent through June 30th 1994” (Poole, 2005:69). In a report from the U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Walter S. Poole sums up the challenges faced by the U.S. forces:

“The U.S. experience in Somalia has proven unique for two reasons. First, intervention sprang entirely from the humanitarian motive of saving lives; the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff officers confronted the question of whether and how to use military force in a situation that threatened no U.S. security interests and met none of the historic criteria for intervention. The lessons learned from Somalia made them keen to avoid a situation where military commitments mounted while political goals remained misty.

Second, the international force was primarily under United Nations command (UNOSOM I and II). Here the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff officers had to cope with the difficulties of an operation that was being managed not only by U.N. headquarters personnel in New York but also by dozens of contributing governments with conflicting motives and priorities” (Poole, 2005:5).

Looking from the perspective of the violent campaign that was organized, scholars have rated 1992-1994 events in Somalia as a militia insurgency that successfully ousted U.S. and U.N. forces. But a more detailed depiction of events might describe this as factional warlords that opposed U.S. and U.N. forces assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid, when it suited them, and aided them at other times when it met their needs. This action did eventually bring about the withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. forces and so is considered a successful violent campaign. This left an unstable security situation which has precluded the establishment of a functional federal government for these past twenty years.

III. Revolution outcome including measures on the stability indicators—

General statements and introduction:

Since January 1991 Somalia has been without a functioning central government, making it the longest-running state of complete collapse, in modern history. More than a dozen national peace and reconciliation conferences have been held to establish a
working central government, including several sponsored by the UN, but none have yet succeeded.

Subtle changes have marked many aspects of contemporary economic and political life in Somalia since the early 1990’s. “Driven by gradual shifts in the interests of local actors and in the manner in which they seek to protect and advance those interests, a trend toward greater security, implementation of rule of law, and predictability is, the agenda increasingly embraced by business people, neighborhood groups, professionals and even some militiamen who over time prefer the stability of paid employment in a private security force to the dangers of banditry” (Menkhaus, 2006:76). What is beginning to emerge is nascent grassroots governance acting in the absence of formal government. They are a dynamic assortment of evolving efforts at creating stability but have the advantage of enjoying a high degree of legitimacy and local ownership; something that cannot always be said about the top-down state-building projects that have been tried.

Somalia’s current coalition government is enacting numerous political reforms with an emphasis on transparency and accountability. The Central Bank of Somalia was also re-established and a national plan as well as an effective anti-corruption commission was put into place (African Development Bank.org, 2010). In July 2009 Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government hired global professional services firm Price Waterhouse Coopers to monitor development funding and to serve as a trustee of its accounts in Mogadishu for the security, healthcare, and education sectors. This was followed in November 2009 with Somalia’s re-engagement with the African Development Bank (AfDB) after nearly two decades of interruption. A $2 million grant
was provided by the AfDB for financial and technical assistance; specifically “to develop a sound legal framework for monetary and fiscal institutions and human as well as institutional capacity building; also establishing public financial systems that are transparent (AfDB.org, 2010).

Somaliland to the north provides an interesting contrast to the prolonged collapse of Somalia to the south. After weathering the same turbulent period of political crisis under General Barre in the late 1980’s Somaliland experienced their own version of armed conflict between factional groups in the early 1990’s up until 1996. Since then it has experienced some impressive successes. “The national budget is modest, typically between $20 and $30 million per year, much of which is derived from customs revenues collected at the seaport of Berbera, taxes on importation of the mild narcotic plant qaat from Ethiopia, and from landing fees. Most of the budget, currently around 50 percent, has been devoted to the military in the form of salaries for soldiers working to demobilize militiamen. “Still the government has also been able to build functional ministries, a public school system, a respected police force, and municipal governments that in a few instances have been among the most responsive and effective formal administrative units in all of Somaliland and Somalia” (Menkhaus, 2006:91).

This is not to say that Somaliland has not also had its share of setbacks. Internal political divisions between the government and opposition forces remain acute, resulting in some human rights concerns as the government sought to repress the media and jail its critics. Additionally corruption in the judiciary has reduced public confidence in the state government. There are also concerns that the Somaliland government is poorly equipped
to cope with a major internal Islamist challenge if one were to come about, due to lack of resources.

“There is additional irony in Somaliland’s ability to achieve so much by way of state building with no external recognition and with only modest, perhaps even what could be called incidental levels of external financial and technical assistance. Somaliland serves as a reminder that external assistance may not be as crucial to the success of state building as international organizations often presume” (Menkhaus, 2006:91). Some internal advocates actually now fear the negative impacts that too much external assistance may have on Somaliland.

Looking to the future for Somalia one has to consider that the failed efforts at state building and the formation of a national government have resulted in Somalis creating small pockets of governance on their own to furnish needed services. These nascent efforts at governance now sometimes act as spoilers to larger efforts as they are reluctant to give up control of airports, customs revenues, and the public buildings that have been taken over for private use. Some regions have income-generating seaports and airports which others do not, and they may be unwilling to see those revenues redistributed to other regions or even to cede control over port revenues to a national government. It is anticipated that these groups will fight to maintain control over what they perceive to be their asset. This leads some scholars (Menkhaus, Gilkes) to state that partnerships and decentralized governance is the best hope for the future of Somalia combining what is already working locally with what is essential for national unity. Scholars would call this a mediated state, in which a central government with limited power and capacity relies on a diverse range of local authorities to execute core functions
of government, and mediate relations between local communities and the state. The central government would limit itself to a few essential competencies not already provided by local, private or voluntary sectors. For their part, local authorities would gain recognition from the state for their practices of good governance in providing public service functions and earn legitimacy as a result. The Somali people would retain the services already provided by local authorities, while gaining the advantages afforded by a functional central government. “The theoretical appeal of a decentralized ‘building block’ approach lies in a realization and acceptance of the fact that a simple restoration of the former unitary Somali state is improbable for the indefinite future. The concept allows for a loose federal structure which builds upon local nascent governance already taking place” (Gilkes, 1999:577).

Life expectancy and Infant Mortality:

Until the collapse of the federal government in 1991, the organizational and administrative structure of Somalia’s healthcare sector was overseen by the Ministry of Health. Regional medical officials enjoyed some authority, but healthcare was largely centralized. The socialist government of former President Siad Barre had put an end to private medical practice in 1972 (Leeson, 2007). Much of the national budget was devoted to military expenditure, leaving few resources for healthcare among the many services vying for the remaining funds.

Somalia’s public healthcare system was largely destroyed during the civil war. As with other previously nationalized sectors, informal providers have filled the vacuum and replaced the former government monopoly over healthcare, with access to local facilities
now witnessing a significant increase in their numbers. Many new healthcare centers, clinics, hospitals and pharmacies have been established through some home-grown Somali initiatives (Leeson, 2007). “The cost of medical consultations and treatments in these facilities is low, at $5.72 per visit in health centers, and between $7.83 - $13.95 per bed per day in primary through tertiary hospitals” (WHO, 2010). It is now estimated that ninety-five percent of the population is covered through these home-grown initiatives.

Comparing Somalia’s reported life expectancy during the insurgency to five and ten years later some good improvements are revealed. Life expectancy during the insurgency was 50 years of age, when the world average was 68. Five years later life expectancy improved by five years to 55 when the world average improved one year to 69. Ten years after insurgency life expectancy increased again by one year to 56 as the world average remained unchanged at 69. This shows a good improvement rate compared to the world average which could be due to the availability of medical care as well as the decrease in violent conflict.

Somalia has one of the lowest HIV infection rates in Africa. This is thought to be due to “the Muslim nature of Somali society and the adherence of Somalis to Islamic values” (Velayati et al., 2007:486). The estimated HIV prevalence rate in Somalia in 1987 (the first year it was reported) was 1 percent. A more recent estimate from 2007 now paces it at only 0.5 percent of the nation’s adult population, despite the ongoing civil strife (Velayati et al., 2007). This challenges the traditional notion put forth by many scholars that rape is endemic to war.

Between 2005 – 2010 as compared to the pre-war 1985-1990 period, infant mortality per 1,000 live births also fell from 152 to 109.6 (UNDP, 2010).
Correspondingly maternal mortality per 100,000 births also fell from 1,600 in the pre-war period to 1,100 in the later years (UNDP, 2010). According to the U.N. Development Programme data on the midwifery workforce, there are a total of 429 midwives in Somalia with a density of 1 midwife per 1,000 live births. Eight midwifery institutions presently exist in the country and regulated by the government. A license is required to practice professionally. These are good improvements for a state operating without a central authority.

*Long term economic growth:*

According to the Central Bank of Somalia, despite experiencing civil unrest, Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy; based mainly on livestock, remittance money, transfer companies and telecommunications, although its economy remains one of the poorest in the world. As with neighboring countries, Somalia’s economy consists of a mixture of both traditional and modern areas. The Central Bank of Somalia (2010) estimates about 80 percent of the population are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists, who keep goats, sheep, camels and cattle. The nomads also gather resins and gums to supplement their income as the pastoralism is mainly subsistence-oriented.

The World Bank (2010) reports that electricity is now in large part supplied by local businesses, using generators purchased abroad. By dividing Somalia’s cities into specific quarters, the private sector has found a manageable method of providing the major cities with electricity. Customers are given electricity choices tailored to needs, such as evenings only, daytime only, 24 hour supply, or a specific charge per light bulb.
Due to its proximity to the oil-rich Arab Gulf, it is also believed that Somalia may contain substantial unexploited reserves of oil as well.

The prolonged absence of a central government has meant that the private sector and in some cases partnering with nonprofits, is the only provider of services normally associated with the state. The private/nonprofits sectors in some areas are the only providers of healthcare and education. In other areas they operate seaports, airports, local electric and piped water grids. Sectors where businesses either see no profit or are discouraged by the problems of collective goods (e.g., road maintenance and public sanitation), are left for the state to address. Some NGO’s such as the International Crisis Group feel that this approach of ‘privatize everything’ that Somalia has taken has created a largely unregulated economy in which criminal economic activity, such as drug smuggling, flourishes. Poor border patrols in the region and the absence of custom agents collecting taxes on imports and exports, have transformed Somalia into a major depository for commercial goods flowing into East Africa.

But, there is some good news as well: Somalia now also offers some of the “most technologically advanced and competitively priced telecommunications and internet service in the world (Coyne, 2008:154). Since the early 1990’s various international telecomm companies (Sprint, ITT, and Telenor) have partnered with local nascent providers to skip the installation of wired-land lines and went directly to the next generation of cellular technology. These partnerships with multinational corporations enable local firms to offer the cheapest and clearest phone calls in Africa (Coyne, 2008:155). Somalis use the service to perform everything from banking activities via mobile phones to wireless internet access.
Menkhaus feels that at least some of the credit for the economic progress goes to the: “UNOSOM I and II operations which poured enormous amounts of money as well as sizable employment and contract opportunities into the country, and have inadvertently helped to stimulate and strengthen legitimate businesses” (2006:82). This funding shifted business activities away from a war economy toward construction, telecommunications, trade and services. In the process, it helped to reshape local interests in security to protect growing businesses and fair implementation of rule of law, and eventually local power relations as well.

*Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights:*

The legacy of the civil war has been profound. It includes unaddressed war crimes and deep inter-faction grievances over the atrocities that were committed; massive levels of stolen property, unresolved property disputes, and occupied territories; the rise of warlords and others with vested interests in continued lawlessness and impunity; the near-universal spread of armaments; the destruction of much of the capital city of Mogadishu; the looting of nearly all public goods and state properties; the flight of as many as a million Somalis emigrants abroad; and the unresolved secession of Somaliland in the north (Menkhaus, 2006:81). Addressing this level of destruction, displacement, and division presents an enormous challenge to state building.

Menkhaus states that most general observers are unaware of the extent to which public goods have been looted. “Gravel on the runway at Mogadishu’s international airport has been removed in places by contractors for building projects elsewhere. The
old Parliament building has been entirely dismantled, its valuable red bricks now serving new purposes in hundreds of ovens across the city” (Menkhaus, 2006:81).

The group that has received the least amount of external support but that has had the most success in producing day-to-day governance in Somalia is at the municipal, and in Mogadishu neighborhood, level. Immediately after the UNOSOM I and II, and UNITAF efforts, a ‘radical localization’ of politics occurred which manifested itself in informal, overlapping polities loosely held by local authorities: elders, intellectuals, business people, and Muslim clergy, who have worked together to oversee, finance, and administer local sharia courts. When conditions are right, these groups have been able to cooperate with common goals, to cobble a modest judicial and law enforcement structure (Menkhaus, 2006:85). These efforts vary widely from location to location, but have made more progress than any other efforts.

The first generation of sharia courts was created in the mid-1990’s and possessed several defining features. “First, local communities widely embraced and supported them as a means of restoring rule of law. Second, they were created by and served a specific sub-faction or local community” (Menkhaus, 2006:85). This made them strictly local in nature, unable to project their authority beyond a town or neighborhood, and rarely able to exercise jurisdiction over other factions. “Third, the sharia courts were formed and controlled by a coalition of local interests, including elders, business people, and traditional Sufi-sheikhs” (Menkhaus, 2006:85).

The courts operated within Somali customs including the custom of allowing parties to the dispute, or crime, choose between customary or sharia law. Because elders
and business people funded and oversaw these hybrid judicial arrangements, the courts tended to be moderate in nature and generally opposed to radical interpretations of Islam. “These courts have been most successful in areas where the power of local warlords and militias was already on the wane” (Menkhaus, 2006:86). Still quite fragile, these courts have not had success in opposing powerful warlords, but in settling complaints and disputes on the local level. A viable and working court system is needed before businesses will form and new investment funding is pledged, and so is a necessary first step to recovery.

Lawlessness remains a serious problem in Somalia, but “the egregious levels of violent crimes and level of impunity associated with the early 1990’s are generally a thing of the past” (Menkhaus, 2006:89). The consensus is that things are getting better; and this includes the level of reported human rights abuses. Five and ten years after the 1992-1994 insurgency, the main perpetuators of human rights violations were the warring factions. But this has also improved as the local sharia courts have taken hold. As of 2004, ten years after the insurgency, Somalia has seen some decrease in factional fighting as the number of members in the warring groups was on the decline and a new Transitional National Government was being formed. At the time of the insurgency, Freedom House rated Somalia’s Rule-of-Law scoring as 7, which represents: “few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity” (FH, 2012). As of 1999 (five years later) and 2004 (ten years) Somalia was rated 4, which represents: “moderately protect almost all civil liberties to
those that more strongly protect some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others” (FH, 2012). Clearly progress is being made.

**Autocracy/Democracy:**

Since 2000 Somalia has seen the rapid rise to power of several Islamist groups which by the middle of the decade controlled most of south-central Somalia. “The rise of these Islamist groups poses a challenge to secular and traditional political leaders, the fledging Transitional Federal Government (TFG), neighboring states and the West” (Menkhaus, 2006:76). The leading Islamic group, Al-Shabaab has taken vigorous steps to remove or marginalize social and political organizations that might have the potential to serve as a rival power base.

But as mentioned above in the area of rule of law, today Somalia is also seeing the rise of informal systems of adaptation in the areas of security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government. This is being driven by coalitions of business groups, traditional local authorities, and civic groups who are promoting more ‘organic’ forms of public order (Menkhaus, 2006:74). “Whether the informal mosaic of local authorities and coping mechanism that have emerged in Somalia constitutes nascent state building is debatable” (Menkhaus, 2006:74). But, they are meeting with some success in communities where top-down efforts have failed. Local communities are not sitting-by idle while state failure deteriorates the security situation and brings a halt any progressive economic activity. Instead communities are adapting in a variety of ways to minimize risk, protect members of the community, and enable them to seek a means of livelihood.
In some Somali locations, most notably, the towns of Beled Weyn, Borama, Hargesisa, Jowhar, Luuq, and Merka, the local groups that have emerged constitute incipient municipalities that do more than simply keep the peace via a sharia court. They have also managed to provide some basic services, operate piped water systems, regulate marketplaces, and have collected modest levels of taxes and user fees to cover meager salaries. Typically, these successful municipalities have been led by dedicated mayors working closely with local NGO’s committed to capacity building, town elders and business people. As with local sharia courts implementing rule of law, these nascent municipalities have enjoyed enormous popularity in the local community, but they have also proven to be vulnerable to the machinations of warlords and jealous politicians and have the vagaries of clan tensions (Menkhaus, 2006:86).

What has emerged in Somalia by way of governance since the 1992-1994 years has been a loose constellation of locally run villages separated by long stretches of pastoral statelessness. In the pastoral lands the people are used to not having any governance, so the collapse of the state did not impact them or alter their way of living significantly. “In the small towns and villages, business partnerships exists which weave extensive commercial networks that transcend factional conflict throughout the countryside” (Menkhaus, 2006:87). These are all grass-roots efforts giving a semblance of normal society.

Another important change in the Somali political landscape includes the nature of warfare. Armed conflict continues to plague much of Somalia, but since 1995 and the end of UNOSOM II, its nature, duration, and intensity have changed significantly. “From 1995 to 2005 the majority of armed conflicts in Somalia have occurred locally, pitting
sub-factions against one another in an increasingly fragmented political environment” (Menkhaus, 2006:88). Armed conflict after 1995 tended to be shorter in duration and less lethal in terms of the number of causalities. This is thought to be due to limited support from sub-faction members who have now experienced decades of conflict.

In the latter half of the 1990’s commercial opportunities began to spring up in Somalia along with the need to transport goods across the countryside to the ports for shipping. This placed a premium on security and the good governance of local communities, along the main transport corridors and in ports and urban markets. “Leading business people in Mogadishu refused to pay taxes to the warlords and instead have hired militiamen from beneath the warlords, often their second or third in command, and assigned them to protect the local sharia courts and municipal governments. These militias promptly became an impressive source of law and order, at the expense of the much-weakened warlords” (Menkhaus, 2006:88). The establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2004 has led to the temporary decline of these militias as the business people shifted their support to the new transitional government. But they were re-established several years later as the TNG proved unsuccessful.

As discussed above the answer may be a thin central government over a mediated state that has the advantage of reducing the threat which a strong federal government has posed in the past, to opponents of the regime in power and thereby reducing the likelihood of spoilers. This could change over time as the capacity of the central government expands and is not expected to be fixed but to evolve over time. The notion of a mediated state is rooted in the study of pre-modern state formation in Europe where ambitious monarchs with limited power were forced to maneuver and make deals with
local rivals to extend their realm of authority. “This produced situations in early modern Europe that sounds oddly familiar to contemporary Somalia. France, for instance, was described as a nation characterized by parceled and overlapping jurisdictions, multiple legal codes, and a plethora of internal tariffs and taxes. As such, the mediated state is considered by some historians as a major obstacle to state building” (Menkhaus, 2006:104). But, Charles Tilly observes that it has been successful in European state formation as "centralized governments: abridged, destroyed, or absorbed rights previously lodged in other smaller units” (1975:35).

But, something akin to a mediated state appears to be emerging in a number of failed or weak states in the developing world. In neighboring Kenya, for instance, the government has partnered with coalitions of local nongovernmental organizations, traditional leaders, and other civic groups to manage and prevent armed conflict in border areas. In some locations, these ‘peace and development committees’ have made dramatic improvements in public security and rule of law, allowing a government that is willing but unable to extend its authority into its frontier zones the capacity to do so (Menkhaus, 2006:104). In Somalia an important advantage of a mediated state approach is that it could reassure potential state-building spoilers by reducing the reach and ambition of the central government. And as Letitia Lawson and Donald Rothchild recently observed, “Africans have begun moving away from colonially designed juridical statehood to fashion empirical formulas that respond to the messiness of their current realities. Only time will reveal whether these new flexible structures prove to be an effective answer to the problems in governance of weak states” (2005:228).
School Enrollment:

Since the collapse of the Somali state in January 1991, Somalia has been a country without any level of organized systems of learning. A generation of children has now grown up without any formal education. Somalia’s children are being denied their right to two of the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “1. Everyone has the right to education…which shall be free of charge… and compulsory. 2. Education shall be directed to the full development of human personality, and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UNESCO, 1991:16). During the years of 1992 to 1995 factional fighting, school facilities, technical training centers and universities became among the first casualties of the senseless mass destruction of the country’s total infrastructure. “The physical destruction of the facilities was, at times, peculiarly coupled with the targeting of the educated cadre among the warring factions” (Abdi, 1998:327). This left the country without any educational system.

Historically before colonization, education consisted of informal systems of learning in traditional tribal and often nomadic Somalia. “The training of the young by the elderly comprised: the history of manners, methods of using the environment, responsibilities to society and fighting skills. Later schools were formed by religious men who taught children how to read, write and memorize the Koran” (Abdi, 1998:329). This was essentially male-oriented as all of the teachers were men and most of the students were boys. This preferential treatment for boys basically continued the gender-biased/male-dominated culture in decision making in community affairs.
The Italian colonial government was required under U.N. Trusteeship between 1950 and 1960 to prepare Somalia for independence, and in the process to educate the Somali population. “Article IV of the Trusteeship Agreement specifically required the setting up of modern education systems for Somali children and adult learners” (Laitin 1976, in Abdi, 1998:332). As Somalia became an independent nation on July 1st, 1960, education was promoted as the country’s best available venue for socio-economic advancement.

During the years of military rule (1969 to 1990) one major advancement in education was the institution of Latin script for the writing of the Somali language. This enabled more wide-spread communication across the state and helped the national development as well as national identity. “The writing of the Somali language coupled with a literacy campaign in the rural areas was responsible for sharply increasing the rate of literacy which immediately went from a dismal five percent to an estimated fifty-five percent by the mid-1970’s” (Abdi, 1998:333).

But by the mid-1980’s the problems of corruption and mismanagement were compounded by the effects of the cold-war which included a disproportionate availability of armament. There were also border conflicts that Somalia inherited from the colonial legacy and because of super power opportunism; Somalia became one of the most militarized states in the world. Consequently, social programmes such as education and health care received minimal funding. “The combination of internal conflict, super power opportunism, economic decay, and institutional corruption, eventually lead to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. And with the collapse of the state educational institutions and facilities were among the first casualties” (Abdi, 1998:335). The
deliberate destruction of schools, university lecture halls, libraries and laboratories, sometimes complemented by the targeting of teachers themselves were used at tactics in the factional fighting to prevent the growth and development in the members of the warring factions (Abdi, 1998).

Five and ten years after the violent campaign of 1992-1994 there is still no organized system of learning in place and millions of Somalia’s children are at the mercy whatever informal education they can pick up. It seems most similar to the pre-colonial days when elders or local authorities did what they could to teach the younger generation the skills that they would need to survive and for their livelihoods. But, Somalia’s youth are “fast adopting the culture of thuggery, war-like attitudes toward life, participating in factional and sub-factional conflicts, and survival on the fringes of an otherwise disintegrating society” (Abdi, 1998:336).

Sadly Samatar sums up the situation in Mogadishu as follows: “Mogadishu is unlikely to see peace. Of the estimated twenty thousand armed militia roaming the streets, only about five thousand are controlled by the two main warlords in the city” (1991:141). The remaining fifteen thousand youths roaming the streets are answerable to no one. So many hungry youths armed with assault rifles are likely to use their weapons as a means to gainful employment. “They will continue looting, pillaging and terrorizing the city with no end in sight” (1991:141).

In the years since the militia insurgency the violence has decreased in some areas, and some informal schools have sprung up, but there are still many children without access to any form of formal education and are learning on the streets. There are also concerns that these young fighters “may be more hostile to any peace and reconciliation efforts. To
them, a government that restores law and order, would reduce the demand for their services as potential gangsters, robbers and bandits, in the lifestyle that is most familiar to them” (Finnegan, 1995 in Abdi, 1998:337).

The question becomes how can Somali society assure that choice be made available and opportunities permanent. For the education system it’s looking like the grass-roots efforts springing up on their own, unregulated and unfettered, have the best chance of educating the next generation until a working government is able to supply books, classrooms, paid teachers, and agreed upon curriculums. The mosaic of grass-roots educational efforts with different objectives, varying levels of quality, meeting varying needs but also without corruption, for the betterment of the future generation and the future of Somalia, would seem to have the best chance of success.

Regional Stability:

The amount of violent conflict experienced within Somalia directly reflected the amount of conflict going on in the region. At the time of the insurgency the Uppsala University Armed Conflict Dataset reported that fifty percent of the states in the region were also experiencing some form of armed conflict including all of Somalia’s direct neighbors. Similarly to Somalia, in three of the regional conflicts at least one of the parties was comprised of non-state actors. It could not be justifiably argued that the regional conflicts caused or brought about the internal factional fighting in Somalia, but it could be argued that neighboring states were responding to the same drivers that brought about the Somali conflict, drought causing famine, excessive availability of arms left over from the cold war, and colonial powers that provide large amounts of government funding which was fought over and caused internal conflicts.
By 1999, five years after campaign end the Uppsala Dataset reports that the amount of conflict in the region had dropped to twenty-one percent. This also reflects the pattern within Somalia as there was still some factional fighting, but the famine had passed, and some local municipal governance had started to form. By 2004, ten years after campaign end conflict in the region had decreased further to thirteen percent with only Ethiopia, Sudan and Algeria of the Northern African states experiencing conflict. Somalia continued to improve as well although without a centralized government.

It is my contention that wars do not happen in isolation, even if they are internal civil wars. States cannot and do not isolate themselves entirely from the international community and each is impacted by events in neighboring states as well as many who are impacted by global events. As one state experiences conflict, Collier (2007) explains, that its build-up in arms is reflected in neighbors following suit and building-up of their weaponry as well, to maintain the regional balance of powers. Funding is drawn away from social services and toward military spending as instability increases. Additionally in the case of Somalia we saw that the drought caused a famine which led to internal fighting for scarce food resources. This same drought affected Ethiopia and Sudan causing conflicts within those states. Increasingly it seems clear that we live in a global community and conflict in one state invariably impacts its neighbors and larger region as well.

3. **Pakistan, 1994--1995 Muhajir campaign**—

The 1994 to 1995 Muhajir campaign in Pakistan was chosen as a case study because it was a violent campaign that occurred in a state that varied greatly in polity
over the years since its formation but at the time of the Muhajir campaign was a strong
democratic state (polity +8).

I. History, background and events leading up to the revolution–

Pakistan was established on August 14th 1947 as an independent nation for people
of the Muslim faith from the regions in the east and north-west of the British Raj, now
India, where there was a Muslim majority and mass migration of 17 million people. The
name Pakistan literally means “land of the pure’ in Urdu and Persian. Initially it was a
dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth II became Queen of
Pakistan and remained so until Pakistan became an Islamic and Parliamentary republic in
1956. A civil war in 1971 resulted in the secession of East Pakistan which became the
new state of Bangladesh (Lak, 2008).

Pakistan’s current population estimate is 190 million people, making it the sixth
most populous state in the world (CIA World Fact book, 2012). It is located at the
crossroads of the strategically important regions of South Asia, Central Asia, and
Western Asia. It is ethnically and linguistically diverse, as is its eastern neighbor, India.
Over sixty languages are currently spoken in Pakistan, but the official language, Urdu is
understood by 75 percent of the population. About 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim.
The vast majority are Sunni, with Shi’i estimated to be between ten to twenty percent of
the population (Lak, 2008). It is divided into three major geographic areas: the northern
highlands, the Indus river plain, and the Baluchistan plateau. The northern highlands
contain some of the world’s highest mountain peaks including five of only fourteen in the
world, that are over twenty-six thousand feet, the highest of which is K2 at 28,251 feet.
Pakistan is made up of four main providences: Baluchistan, Sindh, Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa as well as the capital of Islamabad and the federally administered tribal areas in the northwest, which includes Kashmir.

While still part of British ruled India the ‘All-India Muslim League’ rose to popularity in the late 1930’s amid fears of under-representation in the Hindu dominated political climate. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, considered the founder of Pakistan, espoused a two-nation theory reviving the mid-nineteenth century concept that was popular before British colonialism. The famous and largely nonviolent struggled for Indian independence led by Mahatma Gandhi was comprised mainly of Hindus seeking independence from British rule. Muslims felt they were on the side-lines in the Hindu dominated political arena (Lak, 2008). The Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution in 1940 which espoused the two-nation theory and declared Pakistani independence. When the British gave up direct rule in 1947, Pakistan was formed.

In the bloody partitioning of India and Pakistan, millions of Muslims moved to Pakistan as millions of Hindus and Sikhs moved out of the area to India. Since then Pakistan has been characterized by periods of political instability, military rule, and four wars with neighboring India. Pakistan maintains good relations with all Arab and most other Muslim states. Since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Pakistan’s closest strategic military and economic ally has been China. Pakistan and India continue to be rivals. The on-going conflict over the disputed Kashmir region continues to be a major point of rift. Pakistan currently administers only the western portion of the Kashmir region, while India controls the eastern portion in the still unsettled dispute. Pakistan has the seventh largest standing armed forces in the world, and is currently the only Muslim state that is a nuclear power (Lak, 2008).
Apart from its own conflicts, Pakistan has been an active participant in several United Nations peacekeeping missions. It considers itself a leading Muslim state and actively participates in conflicts where Muslim people are at risk. This included playing a major role in the Somali conflict and rescuing trapped American forces in Mogadishu during 1993. Overall Pakistani armed forces have been the largest troop contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions of any nation (United Nations Media, 2008).

Pakistan is a rapidly developing economically and is considered one of the ‘next eleven’ that is, the eleven states that, along with the BRIC’s (Brazil, Russia, India and China), have a high potential to become one of the world’s largest economies in the twenty-first century (Grant, 2011). The economy is semi-industrialized, with primary centers of growth along the Indus River. The diversified economies of Karachi and Punjab’s urban centers co-exist with the less developed areas in other parts of the state. Pakistan has made its greatest strides in economic growth during the periods of military rule. This goes against the commonly held beliefs that army generals are not good political leaders and often stymie economic growth when they take over as political leaders. The composition of Pakistan’s economy has changed from mainly agricultural to a strong service base. Today agriculture accounts for only 21.2 percent of the GDP, but according to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, Pakistan produced more wheat than all of Africa (21,591,400 metric tons) and nearly as much as all of South America (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan, 2010:10).

The literacy rate of the population for those over fifteen years of age is just over half at 54.9 percent. But this varies greatly by region and by sex; male literacy in urban centers is over 70 percent but female literacy in tribal areas is as little as 3 percent.
(Kristof, 2010). The government launched a nation-wide initiative aimed at eradicating illiteracy and providing basic education to all children. The constitution of Pakistan requires the state to provide free primary and secondary education to all children but, funding and resources have not been made available to make this a reality. There are a growing number of madrasahs that provide free Islamic education and offer free room and board to students who come mainly from the poorest strata of society. After criticism over terrorists’ use of the madrasahs for recruitment purposes, efforts have begun to regulate them (Synovitz, 2004).

Since the partition of the British Raj into India and Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan has undergone a turbulent process of nation-building. While seeking to create sufficient consensus and the institutions necessary for stable internal politics, four times have military leaders taken over and led the country under martial law. They were able to do this because “the army was setup as the most powerful component of the ruling establishment. This was due mainly to the fact that at partition Pakistan was two disparate regions (now Pakistan and Bangladesh) with a hostile and many times more powerful state in between them. Security related concerns have continued to dictate national policies, allowing the defense department to play a major and decisive role in external as well as internal affairs” (Malik, 1996:677). The head of the military can veto any legislation that is passed by the parliament.

Prior to 1947 the state’s economy was largely dependent on agriculture, which gave rise to one elite group, the land-owning class who “often resisted measures such as democratization, accountability and land reform. They have been known as the ‘secret hand’ or ‘invisible government’ and do not allow the maturing of political processes and
democratic institutions” (Malik, 1996:681). The migration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan resulted in another elite group, the industrialists, who quickly came to control most of the state’s industry and commerce. These two groups have never been able to work together to establish a democratic system or come to agreement on whether Pakistan should be an Islamic state.

Other sectarian violence also splintered the state and prevented the building of the democratic institutions necessary to avoid internal violence. “Sectarian violence has risen phenomenally in Pakistan over the 1980’s and 1990’s. It has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who constitute 90 percent of the world’s Muslims and 75 to 85 percent of Pakistanis, and Shi’is, who constitute the remainder, and metamorphosed into political conflict and militant organizations that champion their causes and operate for the most part in the political rather than religious arena” (Nasr, 2000:171). The principle protagonists in the conflict are the “Sunny Pakistan Army of the Prophet’s Companions (Sipah-ii Sahaba Pakistan, SSP) established in 1984 and Pakistan’s Shi’i Movement (Tahrir-I Jafaria Pakistan, TJP) formed in 1991” (Nasr, 2000:171). These groups have waged a brutal and bloody campaign to safeguard the interests of their respective communities. Assassinations, attacks on mosques, and bomb blasts have claimed 581 lives and over 1,600 injuries between 1990 and 1997 (Nasr, 2000:171). Sectarianism in Pakistan, especially among the Sunnis became more militant and grew in the 1980’s to combine the demand for an Islamic state with a drive to marginalize other religious minorities. Some Instrumentalist explanations emphasize that conflict may have more to do with economic competition over limited resources and political opportunities, than any religious differences. “It follows that, if the structure of a
political system permits the use of identity mobilization for political gain or rewards political leaders for engaging in identity politics, then the political system is likely to experience identity mobilization along sectarian lines and also experience conflict, which can be violent” (Nasr, 2000:173). Ethnic or sectarian mobilization therefore can be seen as a by-product of political leaders’ ambitions of power, and the sects’ aims for securing economic and political advantage, and not primarily religious in nature; although that is the banner that militants gather around.

Interesting in Pakistan the Sunni/Shi’i sectarian conflict “did not become an issue until after the intensification of regional politics following the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the Afghan war of 1980, and the Pakistani state’s failure to prevent the political forces they unleashed, from influencing domestic politics” (Nasr, 2000:175). The Iranian revolution changed the character of both Sunni and Shi’i politics in the region. The first successful Islamic revolution had been carried out by Shi’is, emboldened the Shi’i community regionally and politicized its identity. “The government’s efforts to contain Shi’i resurgence were complimented by those of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, who were also concerned about Shi’i activism in their regional neighbor Pakistan, and in what they saw as Iran’s growing influence there” (Nasr, 2000:178). In 1980 Iraq began a war with Iran that lasted eight years, and Saudi Arabia was wary of Iran’s ideological and military threat and was leading a bitter campaign to contain Iran’s revolutionary zeal and limit its power in the Persian Gulf region (Nasr, 2000:178).

Pakistan was important in the struggle for control of the Persian Gulf, as well as in the erection of a ‘Sunni wall’ around Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iraq therefore developed a
vested interest in preserving the Sunni character of Pakistan, and began to finance madrassas and militant Sunni organizations to the benefit of the SSP.

The onset of the Afghan war further deepened Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Sunni population in Pakistan as Taliban militants, Sunni SSP militants, and the Pakistani military, many of whom were trained in the same facilities in the North-West Frontier Province and had united to support the spread of Islam in Afghanistan; as the Russians invaded from the north. But as sectarianism grew and expanded into the politics of Pakistan, it remained muddled and unsettled in direction and effectiveness.

For its part the Pakistani government viewed a consensus between Sunni and Shi’i sects as dangerous to their interests. If Islamist parties were able to work together in a united front it could focus its energies on the demand for an Islamic state, and pose a real threat to the government, laying the grounds for a strong Islamic electoral alliance. “The government therefore concluded that it would be better to let them fight it out and spend their energies in sectarian conflict rather than challenge the existing political order” (Nasr, 2000:187).

At times this erupted in violent attacks in the streets which prevented people access to their employment or movement across the state. “Faced with competition for power, the political leadership used sectarianism as a political tool, as have elements of the military, the landed elites and the criminal networks. The manner in which state leaders manipulated cleavages of identity has thus increasingly become institutionalized in the political process” (Nasr, 2000:187).

Immigration and movement within Pakistan also impacted stability of the state. In the early 1990’s the number of Pathans, from Afghanistan as well as from the North-
West Frontier Province of Pakistan changed the composition and demographics in the cities in the South, and particularly in Karachi. “The Pathan community has been closely tied to both Sunni orthodoxy and militancy, and have benefited financially from the legal as well as illegal (narcotics trade) linkages that were spawned by the Afghan war” (Nasr, 2000:183). Together the Pathan controlling influence eventually led to conflict with the Muhajirs, the dominant ethnic group in the city. Pathans weakened the influence of the Muhajir community by enlarging the wedge between Shi’i and Sunni factions within the Muhajirs, as they sought to redefine the main axis of conflict in Karachi as sectarian rather than ethnic, to weaken Muhajir influence and gain power for the Phathans (Nasr, 2000:183).

So we see multiple on-going intersecting conflicts across both ethnic and sectarian alliances, coupled with arms coming into the country through neighboring wars, as well as other neighbors seeking to influence events within Pakistan. All this created messy and uncertain pockets of instability. Pakistan at times has been called “an archipelago of power” (Nasr, 2000). Meaning the government did not control the whole state but only administered pockets of control, while there were vast areas in between where it was unclear who was in control.

What is clear is that the periods under military rule have been the periods of greatest economic growth, but this growth has not enhanced democracy as it was growth without the expansion of civil and political rights. “Economic growth has failed to produce a strong and large middle class in Pakistan; instead it has simply created and strengthened only the elite groups” (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:976). One of the leaders who advocated for the two-nation theory (India/Pakistan) and first leader of
Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah died in September 1948 leaving confusion over whether Pakistan should remain secular or should follow the momentum for Islamization generated during the struggle for independence (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:974). To this day the state still struggles to answer this question. All of Jinnah’s successors have struggled unsuccessfully with the post-independence socioeconomic and ethnic tensions. “The failure of democratic experiments from 1947 to 1958 can be attributed to several specific factors: one was factional strife and the inability of the Muslim League to become an all-encompassing national party. Another was the bitter contest between the president and prime minister over leadership of the central government with most of their short terms in office also leading to unstable policies” (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:976).

Once Pakistan received full independence from Britain in the late 1950’s there were several turn-overs of power between military and democratically elected leaders. Field marshal Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 through a military coup d’état. He immediately dissolved the National Assembly and imposed martial law. Khan ruled until 1969 and worked with the elites to bring about rapid economic growth, averaging 5.5 percent annually (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:977). The landowning elite, the industrial elite, the bureaucratic elite, and the military elite all became very strong. This resulted in ethnic class friction especially because the Bengali citizens in East Pakistan were not very well represented in the elite groups.

From 1970 to 1977 the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly and Z. A. Bhutto’s democratic government came into power. The PPP was basically a grass-roots movement organized by Bhutto, who was given the
mandate to eradicate the class structures. He incorporated Islamic values and implemented measures that curtailed some of the powers of the elite class. But during his years in office, large scale manufacturing declined substantially as well as agricultural production. Bhutto repeatedly used “military might to ‘punish’ his opponents, and his close reliance on the military made it possible for the military to intervene in domestic situations without much opposition, and it do so in 1977 by removing Bhutto from office” (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:978).

General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq came to power through a military coup in July 1977 and led the state for eleven years. The rationale for the coup put forth in the media was that the March 1977 elections had been rigged (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:979). Again under military rule economic growth was strong at 6.3 percent. All sectors except services and construction showed improved growth performance. The high growth rate was partially due to the fact that approximately ten million people, or 11 percent of the population, left the state to seek employment elsewhere. Remittances came back to Pakistan and boosted the economy. Although living standards improved for those who remained, political repression persisted. “There was no press freedom, and economic development again caused friction between different ethnic groups, especially in the city of Karachi. Narcotics and guns poured into the state and became major problems during the crisis in Afghanistan” (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:980).

Z. A. Bhutto’s daughter, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto came to power after the death of General Zia in 1988. Her PPP party (her father’s former party) combined with elements of the former Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to form a democratic government with barely a working majority. Her government was crippled
from the start due to the passing of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (engineered by General Zia) which gave an inordinate share of power to the president. Formerly the presidential office was seen as primarily ceremonial, now the division of power hampered any changes she tried to implement. In foreign affairs she preferred a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, as well as negotiations with India. Both of these tactics were met with fierce opposition by the army who viewed her moderation as unpatriotic (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:981). Overall her liberal policies gave more women a place in the political arena and there were sizable increases in allocations for health and education, but the economy remained stagnant and lingering ethnic conflict caused the military to step in and remove her from office.

In Bhutto’s autobiography she emerges as a person who is torn between the democratic-liberal ideal, which she is thought to have acquired through her education at Radcliffe, in the U.S. and Oxford, in the UK; and an autocratic reality which is part of her feudal social background for which she was groomed by her father. But, “while she showed courage and determination in opposing the military regime of General Zia, she made little effort to democratize the PPP, and made no effort to hold elections within the party” (Shafqat, 1996:657). She showed pragmatism while de-radicalizing the party, preferring a market economy to the persistent socialist rhetoric of the PPP which included the pursuit of privation; but concentrated on expanding personal power by advancing and promoting those loyal to her within the PPP (Shafqat, 1996:658).

There were also some reversals in foreign policy. The military under General Zia had begun to pursue an active role in foreign policy and proposed a confederation which was to be a loose economic, cultural, strategic cooperation, with Iran, Turkey,
Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Benazir Bhutto on the contrary visualized “developing an association of democratic nations concentrated on security arrangements and strategic consensus with democratic partners” (speech at Harvard University, June 1989). In this context her attitude was that India should be seen as a democratic nation and relations between India and Pakistan reviewed in that spirit. This position infuriated the military leaders who viewed India as a constant threat.

Benazir Bhutto’s poor political performance gave Mian Nawaz Sharif the opportunity to become prime minister. He led the state from 1990 to 1993. “But like his predecessor he was unable to manage the ethnic tensions and growing conflict, along with the Persian Gulf crisis that seriously affected remittances from Iraq and Kuwait (Monshipouri and Samuel, 1995:983). He resigned in July 1993.

The PPP won a majority of the seats again and ushered Benazir Bhutto back into power. This time she took a markedly different approach and linked the festering question of Kashmir to the need to expand Pakistan’s nuclear program. She developed greater ties with the Pakistani military and increased their funding. By this time she realized that he military was a potent factor in Pakistani politics and the longevity of her government depended upon sustaining its trust and confidence. But she also found herself in the middle of an ethnic opposition campaign in Karachi, which is the focus of this case study.

The campaign highlighted in the NAVCO dataset under study was the 1994-1995 Muhajir campaign which occurred during Bhutto’s second time in office. ‘Muhajir’ in Urdu means refugee, and in the present context Muhajirs are those Muslims who fled India at the time of partition in 1947 and came to Pakistan mainly settling in the cities of
Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukker, and Mirpurkhas, in the southwestern province of Sindh. Others settled in Punjab but their migration was not a traumatic as they spoke the same language and had many of the same customs and traditions as those across the border in Punjab India.

In contrast to the immigrant population in Punjab, the majority of the Muslim migrants who moved into the south western cities of the Sindh province hailed from the then British provinces of Bombay, Bihar, the Central provinces of Berar and Delhi, as well as the princely states of Hyderabad (India), Baroda, Kutch and of the Rajputana district. These Muhajirs were a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic group of people who mainly spoke the Urdu language or dialects thereof. Separate from the common language, over a period of a few decades, these people from disparate areas shared the common experience of partition and migration, as well as political opposition to the military regime of Pakistan, and evolved into a their own distinct ethnic grouping (Verkaaiik, 1994). What defines them now are their high levels of education, urbanism and the Urdu language. In the 1990’s they made up 7.5 percent of the population, but 60 percent of the urban population in Karachi and a large percentage of several other cities in the province of Sindh (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan, 2010).

The idea of a separate Pakistan was pioneered by the Muslim noble and aristocratic class, and settling in Pakistan was strongly associated with the independence movement based on the two-nation theory. For the vast majority however, fleeing to Pakistan was the only choice they had after suffering from communal riots in various parts of South Asia where the Muslim populations being small minorities were at the
mercy of the majority community. Many had lost their properties and homes and arrived in Pakistan on foot.

Upon arrival in Pakistan the Muhajirs did not assert themselves as a separate ethnic identity but were at the forefront of constructing an Islamic Pakistani identity. Muhajirs were key to the vote for the anti-hardline elements. Muhajirs dominated the bureaucracy of the early Pakistani state, largely due to their higher levels of educational attainments. This angered the landed-elite (wealthy locals who owned large tracks of land) who previously held most of the government positions and controlled the laws that were passed. As one former Muhajir bureaucrat puts it, “immediately we realized that the real power players were the landed elites. While India was working hard at abolishing its feudal structures, the system in Pakistan was too young, and too weak to do the same. There was little we could do to limit their (landed-elites) growing influence” (Baloch, 2012:3). The nation’s capital was transferred from Karachi first to Rawalpindi and then to Islamabad where the landed elites had more prominence. This further disturbed the Muhajir community as they had gravitated toward Karachi for its centrality to the seat of political power. “Within the space of a few years, the military-run establishment and the landed elites began pushing the Muhajirs to the margins of politics” (Baloch, 2012:3).

During the years of General Zia the landed-elites were able to have legislation passed which implemented a quota system restricting the movement and employment opportunities of the Muhajirs. Two other events deepened the Muhajir/Sindh-elite polarization. “In September 1988 more than 250 people, mainly Muhajirs, were killed when a dozen gunmen opened fire on unarmed people in Hyderabad. And in May 1990 a demonstration primarily made up of Muhajir women and children was brutally crushed
by the Sindhi police in Hyderabad leading to the deaths of over 60 demonstrators. The killings led to a backlash in Karachi and the killing of 40 Sindhis” (Ahmar, 1996:1034). Since then Muhajir-Sindhi relations have remained strained.

The Muhajirs had never liked the idea of identifying themselves on the basis of race or nationality and were always supportive of ‘Pakistani nationalism’ instead of regionalism. For example, the Muhajir community viewed the nation-wide adoption of the Urdu language as a source of unity and identity in Pakistan. However, the Sindhi’s viewed this as an attack on their historical culture and traditions, which pre-dated the creation of Pakistan and the arrival of the Muhajirs (Baloch, 2012:3). The landed elite and Sindhi leaders argued that those who had migrated to Sindh at the time of partition should assimilate to the local culture. Circumstances forced the Muhajirs to seek their identity along ethnic lines. During the years of General Zia, the Muhajirs sense of economic and political deprivation reach its peak. “Clientelism, corruption, and inflation cut further into the pool of available jobs, frustrating the urban educated youth” (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:4). The Muhajirs began to organize and promote ‘Muhajir nationalism’ and unify under one leader Altaf Hussain. The Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) was formed in March 1984; six days after General Zia extended the rural-urban quota system for another ten years (Ahmar, 1996:1033). “It is now widely accepted that the MQM, after its formal establishment in 1984, was supported and backed by the military dictatorship, in part to break the opposition to the military in province of Sindh” (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:4). A Sindh-based movement opposing General Zia’s military regime had been gaining ground. So it was thought that promoting the MQM, the General had hoped to break the opposition by dividing it on ethnic lines. It may also be part of the
reason that the campaign was fought with violent tactics. But the government’s support did not last long and ended completely with the General’s death in 1988.

The government began to turn on the MQM in the form of raids, witch hunts of its leaders, and mass arrests. By 1991 the MQM began to respond with a reign of terror in Karachi. Heavily armed MQM militants operated as an organized Mafia as extortion and coercion became the order of the day. Journalists who wrote anything critical of the MQM were hounded and the newspaper offices were raided (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:4).

II. The revolution itself–

The MQM grew to become a state within a state. The maltreatment of two army officers in Karachi by some MQM activists in 1991 was a turning point in determining the military’s response to the organization’s growing influence in urban Sindh.

“‘Operation Cleanup’ was launched in May 1992 by the army against what it called ‘anti-social elements’ in Karachi, particularly against the MQM. This led to a prolonged confrontation in which an urban guerrilla war was fought in the streets of Karachi” (Ahmar, 1996:1034). “Afraid that the monster that they had originally supported had gotten out of control the military junta attempted to splinter the MQM by promoting a dissenting faction within the Party. In the months that followed, the MQM Party was directly targeted – its workers arrested or forced underground, their families brutalized” (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:5). An army’s press campaign against the MQM publicized secret MQM torture chambers, and reported stories of rape and extortion. This period was regarded as the bloodiest in Karachi’s history, where thousands of citizens were killed and forced the MQM leader, Altaf Hussain, to flee the fighting and lead the organization
remotely from his base in London. The use of rocket launchers against security forces and state installations became common during this time.

The sustained violence cost thousands of lives, as the army was accused of carrying out genocide against the Muhajir community. Unlike in the rural areas, the army’s crackdown in the cities, primarily Karachi, was greeted with widespread allegations of extreme partisanship. Paramilitary rangers in armored vehicles warily patrolled the narrow back-streets of Karachi’s residential neighborhoods. MQM youth fought against army rangers from the sandbagged balconies of apartment buildings” (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:4). May and June 1994 marked a period of violent resistance by a militant wing of the MQM as the conflict took its most bloody turn. MQM militants surfaced again in mid-summer and systematically began to ambush military patrols using rocket launchers. Government offices and police stations were also targeted. During the months that followed “Karachi came to a virtual halt as the MQM and military forces battled it out on the city’s streets” (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:2).

In its attempts to exterminate the militant core of the MQM, the state resorted to a calculated policy of collective punishment –massive pre-dawn ‘siege and search’ operations and house to house searches were conducted that led to the illegal arrest and detentions of over 75,000 men. Most of these men, often innocent relatives or friends of MQM activists, were blindfolded, paraded down to the local police station, and tortured or beaten until their families paid an extraction fee for their release. The state’s counterinsurgency measures also included outright murder. In the daily newspapers, reports of the deaths of MQM militants “killed in police encounters” became an accepted euphemism for blatant extra-judicial killings (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:3).
Since the Muhajir community as a whole bore the brunt of a program of systematic intimidation and harassment by the state, even those Muhajirs who had previously not supported the MQM, and did not believe in the politicization of their Muhajir identity, now felt that they had no choice but to support it (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996:5).

On November 30th, 1994 the army withdrew from Karachi as it did not want to be seen as fighting a civil war against the Muhajirs, but they were replaced by paramilitary troops and an expanded police force; as the violence continued, and in the following two years, the city experienced the highest casualty rate claiming the lives of thousands of people.

Since Benazir Bhutto’s return to power in 1993, the MQM has been waging an urban guerrilla war of increasing ferocity against her government. In 1995 an average ten to twenty persons died daily as a result of terrorist activity, and in the past two years (1994-95) over six thousand have died in terrorist-related acts, including about two hundred security force personnel. “One may not agree with Benazir Bhutto, but she has been categorical and emphatic in saying that the MQM is a terrorist organization, that its leadership has been charged with criminal acts, and that it must surrender its weapons and accept judicial proceedings in the courts before any political dialogue will be initiated” (Shafqat, 1996:671). Bhutto also was quick to point out her conviction that the MQM is not the sole spokesman of the entire Muhajir community either in Karachi or the other urban centers of Sindh and did not represent them accurately to the public. Her position was to discredit them by alienating them and denominating them as a terrorist organization that did not represent the rest of the organization.
The hostility between the MQM and the established ruling regime deepened as a result of alleged extra-judicial killings of MQM members by the security forces. “From July 1995 to the end of the year, as many as 70 police encounters have taken place in the city. Of these in the last month alone 11 encounters took place resulting in the death of 23 MQM activists or sympathizers” (Ahmar, 1996:1035). “As a result of the civil strife in Karachi 1,113 people were killed in 1994 and 2,095 in 1995. The government has denied the extra-judicial killings and has blamed the MQM for most of the violence. Additionally about 150 people have been killed in ethnic/sectarian and political violence in Karachi in the first two month of 1996” (Reuters, March 11, 1996).

The grievances of the dominant Muhajir community in Karachi include discrimination in employment, admission to educational institutions, and persecution by the provincial government which is heavily composed of native Sindhis and by the Punjab-dominated federal bureaucracy. Their demands for a new administration, setup under better, more equal, socioeconomic status is contradictory to the Muhajir’s initial aims at independence in 1947, when they sought to fit in with their fellow Muslims, and establish the state as the only democratically elected Muslim country. But by the early 1990’s, years of discrimination had brought them to the place where they were violently seeking a new administrative setup.

“The confrontation between state authorities and the MQM, the absence of a political process at the local government level, and the breakdown of law and order has made the urban cities of Sindh a major test case in the development of Pakistan’s future politics” (Ahmar, 1996:1036). The violence in urban Sindh, particularly Karachi not only cost Pakistan in economic terms but also as a source of embarrassment to the state
internationally, because of the charges of human rights violations by security forces. Pakistan’s first independent weekly newspaper the *Friday Times*, reported:

“investigations carried out by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan have revealed that the October 11, 1995 killing of MQM activists was not the result of an ambush or a shoot-out but was part of an ongoing police practice of eliminating suspected criminals or terrorists opposing the state” (Friday Times, Dec. 7th 1995:8).

There is a portion of Muhajirs who felt that the MQM did not accurately represent them and were leading them down the road toward destruction (Hasan Iqbal Jafri in Ahmar, 1996:1037). They point out the MQM record of operating torture cells, using terrorist methods against the journalist community and suppressing dissent within its own rank and file goes against their desires for religious freedom and independence. As a result by, 1995 anti-Muhajir sentiment was noticeable in all the provinces of Pakistan and the Muhajir people were viewed with suspicion. “MQM is intolerant of dissent both from within the organization and from without. It has no internal democracy but is instead tailored around one personality, Altaf Hussain” (Ahmar, 1996:1037). There were no internal elections and policy was established only by Hussain. The fractional Haqqiqi MQM group emerged in Karachi because of the intolerant policies of Hussain. Criticism against the MQM leadership particularly Hussain was considered unpardonable. The MQM leadership dealt harshly with the dissidents and compelled them to leave the city. The Haqqiqi opponents of Altaf Hussain also assert that Muhajirs themselves have suffered the most at the hands of the MQM because of the political violence propagated by the so-called protectors of Muhajir rights.
Seeing that power was eroding both within and from outside of its ranks, particularly from the Sindh landed-elites, the Muhajirs felt they had no choice but to think in terms of a separate political and administrative status in the urban areas of Sindh (Ahmar, 1996:1038). They thought their survival was at stake. Capturing state power in urban Sindh had many benefits; Karachi generated about 60 percent of Pakistan’s total revenues and 80 percent of Sindh’s. It also accounted for two-thirds of Pakistan’s trade and industry as well as almost one half of its GDP. But at the time the leading ethnic group in urban Sindh had no meaningful governmental representation in either the province or the Federation. Muhajirs also felt alienated because of lack of employment opportunities, especially as their level of literacy was higher than others in the communities where they resided. The employment problems came to a head when Z. A. Bhutto nationalized banks and heavy industry where many Muhajirs were employed. During the 1970’s and 1980’s as a result of the influx of illegal refugees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran and Burma into the cities of Sindh the Muhajirs felt particularly squeezed (Ahmar, 1996:1040).

The dominant perception among the Sindhi elite was that if the Muhajirs and particularly the MQM were not stopped, it would eventually lead to the division of their providence. This was especially troublesome given the industry and wealth that was created in Karachi. “Therefore the position of the Sindhi elite was suspicion toward the Muhajirs and an interest in preserving the imbalance of their representation in the government of the province” (Ahmar, 1996:1040). There was even talk of sending non-Sindhis back to their ‘native country’ of India. The PPP tried to condemn MQM agitation
and its demands for Muhajir autonomy, and portray the MQM as an anti-state and pro-

While the Muhajir community held the state’s institutions responsible for their
prevailing ordeal and suffering, the moderate MQM elements felt unable to resist the
militant’s influence. For many MQM supporters, the future seems bleak and in their
view, the only solution to the dispute was to carve out a separate province comprising
Karachi and Hyderabad for the Muhajirs (Ahmar, 1996:1042). Given the absence of any
framework in the Constitution to deal with ethnic issues, various ethnic forces in Pakistan
have demanded some type of constitutional reforms that would grant ethnic minorities
more autonomy for self-determination or at least self-governance within the federal
structure. This would have resulted in an administrative shake up and the creation of
more provinces which the changing military-democratic regimes have yet to accept.

“New political realities demand fresh administrative divisions! The head of the MQM
team negotiating with the government, Ajmal Dehlavi, told a group of journalists back in
fail, the MQM was ready to force the demand for a separate province.

Foreign governments also weighed in, on the issue as some of their nationals
became victims in the cross-fire. The killing of two Americans came amid the surge of
violence in Karachi during 1995. It appeared that the Americans were targeted in reprisal
for Prime Minister Bhutto’s visit to the United States, giving rise to speculation that the
killing was aimed at sabotaging relations between the two states. Assistant U.S. Secretary
of State John Shattuck “criticized the government of Pakistan for harassing its political
opponents and suppressing the Muhajir Quami Movement. He also accused government
security forces of serious human rights abuses, including extra-judicial detention, and torture of prisoners and detainees” (Ahmar, 1996:1044).

Minister of State for External Affairs, Salman Khrushid, became the first Indian official to speak on the issue of the violence in Karachi. He expressed India’s concern over the violence and said it could cause instability in the region if allowed to continue. He spoke of mounting pressure from the relatives of Muhajirs in India, and declared, “A continuation of atrocities will put pressure on the government of India to take action. At the current time we are watching the situation closely but are in no position to get involved in the dissident movement in Pakistan” (Ahmar, 1996:1045). Respecting the principle of state sovereignty, India choose not to interfere with internal disputes within Pakistan, but made it publically known that they were receiving requests from the relatives of Muhajirs within India to take action; and in this way publicly voiced their disapproval of Pakistan’s actions which put pressure on the state.

The violence in Karachi also damaged Pakistan’s support in the disputed area of Kashmir, as both Amnesty International and the Pakistan Human Rights commission heavily criticized Islamabad for serious human rights violations against the followers and supporters of the MQM. “Pakistan found it embarrassing to raise the matter of human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir when its own record in Karachi was not clean” (Ahmar, 1996:1045).

The MQM leader, Altaf Hussain, also used nonviolent techniques when he felt the need warranted more wide-spread participation. “Whenever Hussain issued a strike call, the response was overwhelming and the city of Karachi as well as the other urban centers of Sindh came to a grinding halt. These strikes had a crippling effect on the social,
cultural, economic and commercial life in Karachi and much of the country” (Shafqat, 1996:672).

On July 4th 1995, the MQM released to the press an eighteen-point list of demands that formed the basis of its negotiations with the government. It demanded, among other things: “an end to Operation Cleanup and compensation to its victims, increase of urban Sindh representation in federal and provincial services, repatriation of stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh, unconditional withdrawal of false cases against MQM workers, and constitution of a commission of Supreme Court and High Court judges to investigate alleged crimes committed by law enforcement agencies against MQM members” (Ahmar, 1996:1047). In response, the government handed over a list of twenty-one requirements to the MQM team in Islamabad on July 14th 1995 calling upon the MQM to: “renounce violence publicly, give up the ethnic cleansing of Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans in Sindh, stop killing law enforcement personnel, and denounce publicly as a principle the atrocities and gross violation of human rights committed by the Indian occupation forces in Jammu and Kashmir” (Ahmar, 1996:1047). Deep mistrust on both sides prevented much progress on the demands. The government took a two pronged approach of offering talks for reconciliation as it sustained the official crackdown on the militant portion of the MQM. The strategy to contain and suppress the MQM, particularly its hard core, has yielded some results. “A large number of MQM activists have been arrested, leaders of other opposition parties (including the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif) have become apprehensive of openly supporting the MQM, and the press is questioning the validity of the MQM’s defiance of state authority” (Shafqat
1996:671). The PPP regime succeeded in exposing the radical and terrorist character of the MQM to the Pakistani public and turned the tide of opinion against them.

Unlike the Bengalis who had an overwhelming majority in East Pakistan, the Muhajirs had only a fragile majority and only in the urban areas of Sindh. Therefore the possibility of Karachi becoming another Bangladesh and a separate entity from Pakistan was always only a remote possibility. The 1994-1995 Muhajir campaign was considered unsuccessful from the point of view of the campaign organizers, as it did not bring about any major changes. However, the conflict has remained an unresolved and simmering problem that continues to flare up from time to time.

III. Revolution outcome including measures on the stability indicators –

Since 2002 the Muhajir party has emerged as a strong political force in Pakistan, where Hussain has been central to nominating local candidates for political positions within Karachi and for the government of the province in Sindh. In 2005, ten years after campaign end, Hussain’s nominee for mayor, Mustafa Kamal, was elected in Karachi, and is considered to be doing well (Baloch, 2012:5). The MQM has made efforts to re-brand itself as a national party that transcends ethnic boundaries. In 2000, five years after the campaign, the MQM was the Pakistani Parliament’s fourth largest party with 25 lawmakers in the 342 seat National Assembly (Baloch, 2012:8). And since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the MQM has “consistently presented itself abroad as the West’s friend in Pakistan. The group’s extensive media arm reaches out to the foreign press to highlight apparent counterterrorism successes in Karachi and to warn of Islamic militant
infiltration in the city” (Baloch, 2012:8). Today the MQM is a coalition partner of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

*General statements and introduction to the revolutionary outcome:*

Western International policymakers are beginning to come to agreement on the component parts comprising good governance. Among the important component the list: civil instead of military rule; democracy instead of dictatorship; governance should include actors from civil society into the policy process; they should respect and protect human rights of all peoples; they should promote free markets over state interference and regulation in economic processes; governments should be accountable to its people and not corrupt, they should adhere to fiscal discipline and avoid large deficits; and finally, they should favor restraint over aggressive and belligerent postures in international relations with other states (Wilke, 2001:2).

Both five and ten years after the unsuccessful Muhajir campaign Pakistan still struggled with finding good governance. In May 1998, following its arch-rival India, the government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif conducted five nuclear tests, there by adding new fuel to the already volatile geopolitical climate of the region. One year later Pakistan’s bid to capture the “Kargil” territory in the Indian part of the disputed Kashmir region brought the two sides to the brink of a major (and potentially nuclear) war. Even Pakistan’s long-time allies, the United States and China, withheld their support as they approached nuclear war. Since then, Pakistan has repeatedly been censured for alleged support for violent non-state actors in Kashmir, Afghanistan and other places in the region (Wilke, 2001).
On October 12th 1999, five years after the Muhajir campaign began, Pakistan’s armed forces staged another military coup replacing the government of Nawaz Sharif with General Pervez Musharraf in another change over from democratically elected regime, to military rule, as the state continues to move back and forth between the two forms of government. By this time the fiscal deficit had reached an all-time high as economic growth was strangled by post-nuclear sanctions implemented by the international community concerned about Pakistan likelihood of going to war with India. Meanwhile ‘Transparency International’ in 1999 ranked Pakistan amongst the most corrupt nations in the world (Wilke, 2001). Numerous violent conflicts continued both within the borders and in neighboring interventions which has continued to destabilize the state.

**Life expectancy:**

Life expectancy in Pakistan has kept pace with improvements in life expectancy for the rest of the world but has consistently been four years less than the world average. Life expectancy in Pakistan in 1995 was 62 years and the world average was 66. By year 2000 Pakistan’s life expectancy had ticked up to 63 years as the world average moved up to 67. Ten years after the campaign, in 2005 Pakistan’s life expectancy was 64 years and the world average 68.

It is a positive sign that it continues to keep pace with the rest of the world but also a sign that it is not investing in health care, living conditions, or the social services that have brought other states forward.

One other explanation is put forth by Spencer Moore. Looking at the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy his research verifies that a negative relationship exists (as income inequality decreases, life expectancy increases) but found it
to be especially pronounced in “periphery” states (those with limited industry sector
diversions) in which he includes Pakistan. The “Peripherality reflects a historical process
of economic and social marginalization in which peripheral states have been excluded
and disempowered from more symmetrical trading relationships” (Moore, 2006:630).
Framed around a state’s role in the global system, “Unequal development, a global
stratification of production and labour, and the dominance of core nations, over the
periphery are seen to characterize the global system …as it disempowers and
marginalizes periphery states including their capacity to exercise national sovereignty
around health issues, and has been shown to negatively impact life expectancy” (Moore,

Part of the marginalization of Pakistan has come through sanctions from the
international community in response to its nuclear capability. Pakistan has suffered under
limited trade arrangements, sanctions, and limited partnerships in the international
community.

*Long term economic growth:*

Since the time of the unsuccessful Muhajir campaign the fiscal crisis has
worsened and the state’s capabilities have decreased. Given the geopolitical conditions in
South Asia in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s the large portion of military expenditure is
not surprising. But as state revenues are put toward the military instead of infrastructure
projects, schools, and economic stimulus encouraging new businesses, the state as a
whole is held back.

But there are some economic aspects of the army’s work that did have a positive
effect. The army’s involvement in civil affairs could be interpreted as an attempt to
rescue the more profitable parts of the state and the economy, from bureaucracy and corruption. The ‘Water and Power Development Authority’ controlled by army officers is a good example. The army has more efficiently run the important utility since 2000 when it took it over. And in 2001 they also took control of the railways and saved them from bankruptcy (Wilke, 2001).

The leading cause of the slow economic growth in private enterprise is the rampant corruption. With the state focused on military threats; business regulations, trade regulations, tax laws and watch-dog organizations never developed to watch and prevent corruption or the exploitation of the state’s resources. Within this framework it is not surprising that a well-disciplined military could step-in and manage an industry with better results than industry experts.

*Implementation of the rule of law:*

The government’s human rights record is generally regarded as poor by domestic and international observers, although there have been some improvements since 2000. Security forces use excessive and sometimes lethal force and are complicit in extrajudicial killings of civilians and suspected militants. The police and military have been accused of engaging in physical abuse, rape, and arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly in areas of acute conflict. Although the government has sought at times to enact measures to counter these problems, abuses have continued. Compounding the human rights concerns and lack of rule-of-law, the courts suffer from lack of funds, outside intervention, and deep case backlogs that lead to long trial delays and lengthy pretrial detentions. Many observers both inside and outside of Pakistan contend that Pakistan’s legal code is largely concerned with crime, national security, and domestic tranquility and less with the protection of individual rights. Provincial and local governments have frequently arrested journalists and closed newspapers that report on
matters perceived as socially offensive or critical of the government. Journalists also have been victims of violence and intimidation by various groups and individuals. In spite of these difficulties, the press publishes freely, although journalists often exercise self-restraint in their writing. In 2002 citizens participated in elections for the National Assembly, but those elections were criticized as deeply flawed by domestic and international observers (Library of Congress, 2005:27).

“Societal actors also are responsible for human rights abuses. Violence by drug lords and sectarian militias’ claims numerous innocent lives, discrimination and violence against women are widespread, human trafficking is problematic, and debt slavery and bonded labor persist. The government often ignores abuses against children and religious minorities, and government institutions and some Muslim groups have persecuted non-Muslims and used some laws as the legal basis for doing so. The Blasphemy Law, for example, allows life imprisonment or the death penalty for contravening Islamic principles, but legislation was passed in October 2004 to eliminate misuse of the law. Furthermore, the social acceptance of many these problems hinders their eradication. One prominent example is honor killings (“karo kari”), which are believed to have accounted for more than 4,000 deaths from 1998 to 2003. Many view this practice as indicative of a feudal mentality and as an anathema to Islam, but others defend the practice as a means of punishing violators of cultural norms and view attempts to stop it to as an assault on their cultural heritage” (Library of Congress, 2005:27).

Autocracy/Democracy:

Benazir Bhutto led the state from October 1993, during the Muhajir campaign until her government was dismissed in November 1996. Malik Meraj Khalid was appointed as a caretaker Prime Minister and ruled for only four months until Nawaz Sharif was re-elected to the office. Sharif ruled until his government was deposed by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, and Martial law was imposed in the entire country. Musharraf led the country under military rule for three years until November 2002 when another series of elected rulers once again held the office of Prime Minister (Records of the National Assembly, 2012).

“Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s basic problem inhibiting its growth is the permanent and integral involvement of its armed forces in the state’s internal affairs.
Repeated military interference is thought to lead to bad governance. But developments in Pakistan would seem to contradict this widely accepted assertion” (Wilke, 2001:4). Many have argued that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have brought the state’s capabilities: “to a new low, and that both had a poor record on human rights and democracy as well. Their rule resembled a democratically elected dictatorship” (Wilke, 2001:4). The Cabinet and Parliament bodies were bypassed regularly by the Prime Minister who preferred to rule through loyalists and members of their own families. During both administrations army officers became directly involved in civil administration. “Army officers were employed to conduct the census, to catch stray dogs, to construct non-military roads and to track down ‘ghost schools’ (those institutions that exist only on paper)” (Wilke, 2001:4).

Once Musharraf took over and led the government, he pursued good governance practices that were far superior to those of the previously elected leaders. According to many observers, he implemented measures to bring down the level of corruption in numerous areas including: first, documenting the economy, this was done through a tax survey and then broadening of the tax base. His also led a public anti-corruption and accountability campaign which involved a number of non-governmental organizations in the decision-making. Musharraf cracked-down on arms smugglers and removed numerous weapons from society. He also pushed power and accountability down the local and grass-roots levels, and increased the participation of women in local parliaments by establishing a 30 percent quota system” (Wilke, 2001:4). In what was viewed as efforts, ‘more concerned with doing what was right than being re-elected’, great strides were made to bring the state forward.
However the state also swung from a Polity of +8 during the Bhutto government to -6 during General Musharraf’s rule, (five years after campaign end) then up slightly to -5, ten years after campaign end. Today (2012) the polity is back up to +6 and under democratic rule which is based in part on the building of political institutions established during the Musharraf years.

*Infant mortality:*

The World Health Organization estimates that in Pakistan more than 89 percent of the birth deliveries and 80 percent of maternal deaths occur at home; with 80 percent of deliveries attended by only a traditional birth attendant. As little as one in twenty women with complications of pregnancy or childbirth reach a facility with a trained emergency obstetrical care attendant (Jokhio et al., 2005:2092). The Infant mortality rate was estimated at 86 per 1,000 live births in 1995. For comparison the infant mortality rate for the world as a whole was 58 per 1,000 live births that year (WB, 2012). By five years after the campaign ended the infant mortality rate had kept pace with world average declines, and reduced to 76 per 1,000 live births. But by ten years after the campaign ended Pakistan fell behind world averages and slowed the trajectory of improvement. Today out of 223 countries tracked by the WB, Pakistan is ranked 198 in infant mortality. This is a somewhat surprising figure given that Pakistan is a technologically advanced nuclear power and economically projected by some estimates to advance rapidly along with the BRICs. It shows that Pakistan has but its focus on military advancement as health care and women’s rights have been neglected in comparison to what other states have done. In 1998 Pakistan became the seventh state in
the world to have nuclear capabilities, after its neighbor India, but still ranks 198 in terms of infant mortality.

“In the 1990’s it became widely accepted that training traditional birth attendants was likely to have little effect and cause only a small reduction in maternal or infant mortality” (Jokhio et al., 2005:2097). Jokhio, Winter and Cheng sought to challenge this assumption and set out to see if a new government program in Pakistan which was seeking to improve the training and capabilities of the traditional birth attendants, could reduce maternal and infant mortality through education of good birthing practices. Pakistan’s Ministry of Health was trialing a new “Lady Health Workers Programme” in 1998 as an element in its plan to raise the health status of women and children in rural villages and poor urban areas. The program consisted of three days of training in how to conduct a clean delivery, use of a disposable delivery kit, information on when to refer women for emergency obstetrical care, (assuming emergency obstetrical care was available and a means to bring the woman to the care center was available) and care of the newborn. The traditional birth attendants were asked to visit each woman at least three times during the pregnancy to check for danger signs. The result of Jokhio et al.’s clustered randomized controlled trial showed the “crude perinatal rate of death among the intervention group in the government’s programme was 84.8 per 1,000 live births as compared with 120 in the control group” (2005:2095). “Our results show that substantial improvements in outcomes are achievable within the existing infrastructure. These data should inform policy decisions directed toward reducing neonatal and maternal mortality in developing countries” (Jokhio et al., 2005:2099). But it appears that it did not, as the
The trajectory of improvement in infant mortality in Pakistan since the Muhajir campaign has slowed down and not kept pace with the rest of the world.

*School enrollment and Respect for human rights:*

The cultures of south Asia are gender stratified to a great degree and characterized by patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence, inheritance and succession practices that exclude women, and hierarchical relations in which the patriarch or his relatives have authority over family members. Two arguments have been advanced in the literature to support the hypothesis that women in Pakistan have less autonomy and control over their own lives than do women in India. The first argues that in Pakistan as in other Islamic settings, women occupy a separate and distinctive position that effectively denies them education and autonomy. The second argument draws on research conducted in India and shows that social systems that characterize the southern region provides women with more exposure to the outside world, more voice in family life, and more freedom of movement, than do the social systems of the northern remote areas. These northern areas are most similar to most of Pakistan. When researchers Jejeebhoy and Sathar accounted for the remoteness, there was no difference between the Islamic areas of Pakistan and the Hindu areas of India. Their research showed that the remoteness of the “region plays a major conditioning role, and once region is controlled, Muslim women exert about as much autonomy, and girls have as much access to education, as do Hindu women and girls, wherever they reside” (2001:687). Their research showed that women in the north have relatively little autonomy or freedom of movement, limited access to education, limited inheritance rights in practice and limited opportunities for control of economic resources. After marriage, a young woman is expected to “remain largely invisible to
outsiders and under the authority of her husband’s family. She has little say in domestic decisions and little freedom of movement. About the only means available to enhance her standing and even security in her husband’s home is through her fertility and particularly the number of sons she bears” (2001:690).

Many authors have suggested other measures of women’s status. Prominent among them is delayed age at marriage, as it is thought that women who delay marriage are observed to be more independent and have more autonomy and self-confidence than those who marry earlier ages. Additional measures include spousal age difference (Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979), joint family residence, and village endogamy (marriage within the village). The research of Jejeebhoy and Sathar showed that few South Asian women have a say in their choice of husband or the timing of their marriages with those in remote areas, which includes much of Pakistan, being less likely than women from more coastal regions who are thought to have greater access to outside influences, and have some say in choosing their husbands (2001:695).

As mentioned above the figures for the literacy rate in Pakistan confirm these findings. The literacy rate of the population, for those over fifteen years of age, is just over half at 54.9 percent. But this varies greatly by region and by sex; male literacy in urban centers is over 70 percent but female literacy in tribal areas is as little as 3 percent (Kristof, 2010).

*Regional stability:*

As noted throughout this description of Pakistan, security concerns due to regional (in)stability have played a major role in the formation of Pakistan’s government
and its allotment of strong powers and authority to its military as well as its continued allotment of large portions of its yearly federal budget.

This situation seems unlikely to change unless the geopolitical climate in the region becomes altered. The Kashmir dispute would need to be resolved, the relationship with India would need to change significantly and become non-threatening, and stability would need to come to Afghanistan as well as Iran before any real change within Pakistan could take place.

4. Lebanon, 2005 Cedar Revolution—

The 2005 Cedar revolution in Lebanon is the last of the case studies in this work. It was chosen as a case study because it was considered a successful nonviolent campaign that occurred in a democratic state (polity +5). This contrasts with East Germany which was also experienced a nonviolent campaign but was in a state that was strongly autocratic. It is also different from all of the other campaigns in this work in that it only lasted 60 days.

I. History, background and events leading up to the revolution—

Lebanon is a state on the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and borders Syria to the north and east, and Israel to the south. The earliest evidence of civilization in Lebanon dates back more than seven thousand years, pre-dating recorded history. The current state of Lebanon gained its independence from its French colonial power in 1943. Independence occurred while the French were preoccupied in Europe with the invasion of Germany (Geling, 2012).
The name Lebanon comes from the Semitic root LBN, meaning ‘white’ in reference to the snow-capped Mount Lebanon (Room, 2005). It is known for its moderate Mediterranean climate. In ancient times, Lebanon was covered by large forests of cedar trees, the national emblem of the state. The forests currently cover 13.4 percent of the land (WB, 2012). Because of its location and fair financial regulations, Lebanon became regional center for finance and trade.

Lebanon is divided into a number of different sects. As of 2010 the most common are the Sunni who make up 27 percent of the population, Shi’i at 27 percent, Maronite Christian at 21 percent, Greek Orthodox at 8 percent, Druze Muslims at 5 percent, Greek Catholic at 5 percent, and other Christian groups making up the remaining 7 percent (Geling, 2012:10). Each of these sects has its own territory for the most part with only a few areas where two sects are mixed together. Each sect also has their own interpretation of history. “The sects derive their identity from their perspective of history and individual struggle against the other sects. Together with a segregated educational system, this leads to different vision in each sect about Lebanon’s past and its future” (Geling, 2012:10). This leads Parliamentarian Farid al-Khazen to conclude that the “sectarian divide in Lebanon is not caused by religious differences but by the political differences between communities” (Geling, 2012:11).

Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy, which implements a special system known as Confessionalism, intended to deter sectarian conflict and attempt to fairly represent the demographic distribution of the eighteen recognized religious groups. Under the Confessional system, members of a religious group vote only for candidates within their own group. The system is set up to proportionally allot positions in
government to each group. When the system was first established in 1943 it was based upon the proportion of religious groups present during the previous census which occurred in 1932. The Presidential office has to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’i Muslim, the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Speaker of Parliament at Greek Orthodox (Zahar, 2011). The Parliament is divided equally between Christians and Muslims and proportionally between the different denominations.

The executive branch consists of the President who is the head of state, and the Prime Minister who is considered to be the head of the government. The Parliament elects the President for a non-renewable six-year term; and the president appoints the Prime Minister following consultations with the Parliament. The President and Prime Minister form the Cabinet which must also adhere to the sectarian distribution set out by Confessionalism.

The Confessional system encourages clientelism. “In exchange for a vote, the candidate grants favor to voters within their block. This makes Lebanon in theory a democracy, but in practice a corrupted state in which nepotism and sectarianism thrives” (Geling, 2012:14). Hilal Khashan explains the difference between Lebanon’s system and a true democracy: “The right to vote doesn’t mean Lebanon is a democracy. To be a democracy there should be democratically led political parties that all people have equal access to participate in. The Lebanese political system is divided by the sects. Therefore, voting is not participating in decision making, it is only validating the current political system” (in Geling, 2012:14).
The Lebanese legal system is based on the French system and is a civil law country with the exception of matters related to personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance …) which are governed by a separate set of laws designed for each sectarian community. For example the Islamic personal status laws are inspired by Sharia law. For non-Muslims there are Christian and Jewish religious courts which handle the same concerns (El Samad, 2008).

Lebanon is a major recipient of foreign military aid as a result of its position at the crossroads to the Arab world and geopolitically in the center of the Middle East. David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reports that as of 2008 Lebanon was second only to Israel in the receipt of U.S. military aid, estimated to be $400 million in 2005.

“Lebanon has long been considered by Western scholars as the most stable democracy in the Arab World. But the democracy was weak and deficient as a system because equal opportunities for citizens as well as political accountability of officials and institutions were lacking” (Krayen, 2011:1). Because of the tensions that were not resolved through a democracy, in 1975 a full-scale civil war broke out pitting a coalition of Christian groups against the joint forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) residing in southern Lebanon, left-wing Druze, and Muslim militias. Christian groups made up more than 50 percent of the population at the time. In June 1976 Syria sent in its own troops into the fray, under the banner of restoring peace.

The civil war heavily damaged Lebanon’s economic infrastructure, cut national exports in half, and all but ended Lebanon’s strategic position as a major financial center and banking hub for the middle-east. The economic recovery was helped by laws
regulating a financially sound banking system with good transparency coupled with open borders, which enables sound financial transfers. Financial services and tourism are the major sectors in Lebanon’s economy. In 2009 the NY Times ranked Beirut the number one travel destination worldwide due to its unique nightlife and hospitality (2009, Jan. 11). Although it is ideally suited for agriculture in terms of water availability and soil fertility, and has the highest proportion of cultivable land in the Arab speaking world, it does not have a large agricultural sector. With only 12 percent of the total workforce dedicated to agriculture, it is the least popular economic sector in Lebanon (WB, 2012).

In the midst of the civil war, in 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon. “In the wake of the invasion, the U.S. involvement in Lebanon grew and was aimed mainly at brokering a withdrawal agreement between Lebanon and Israel that, it was hoped, would be a precursor to a fuller peace treaty between the two states” (Krayem, 2011:4). The Lebanese-Israeli agreement was reached on May 17, 1984 but ran into strong opposition from Syria because of the disputed the border strip in Bekaa Valley region in the south, and was not formally ratified. But Israel continued its withdrawal and left most Lebanese territories except for southern Lebanon. At the same time the Lebanese government turned away from the U.S. and Israel, and opened a dialogue with Syria.

After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli government sought to establish a Lebanese government with more friendly relations to itself. But the Iranian and Syrian governments sought to undermine any government in Lebanon and wanted to keep it as a weak state, so that they could continue to use Lebanon for their proxy fight against Israel. It was at this time that Tehran adopted the growing Shi’i militant group, Hezbollah. “Tehran bankrolled Hezbollah and sent its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard,
to train it. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad also supported Hezbollah and oversaw its operations against Israeli troops. This ensured that Hezbollah operations did not expose the Syrian army to military confrontation with Israel in the southern Lebanon Bekaa Valley” (Rabil, 2007:43). Syria also helped by providing supply routes to the Bekaa Valley through its territory.

The growing Hezbollah Shi‘i movement was attracted to the Iranian brand of Islam for several reasons. “In Iran the practice of Islam transferred power from traditional political institutions to the clergy. This was possible because, unlike Sunni Islam, Shi‘i Islam was governed by a hierarchical religious order, similar to Catholicism, in which young and capable clerics could rise through the ranks to positions of considerable power” (Nizameddin, 2008:482). Because of the hierarchical system “Lebanon’s Shi‘i clerics from different factions were easily organized by Iranian representatives to form Hezbollah with the goal of establishing an Islamic state within Lebanon based on the Iranian model” (Nizameddin, 2008:475).

In a number of terrorist attacks through the 1980’s, Hezbollah proved its capability, determination, and the lethality of its tactics. “Although their support for Hezbollah was unwavering, Damascus and Tehran were not always in agreement on Hezbollah’s movements and sparred publically over Hezbollah’s June 14, 1985 threat to execute hijacked TWA flight 847 passengers on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport” (Rabil, 2007:43). And in 1987 when Hezbollah began to act on its own “Syrian troops shot twenty-seven Hezbollah fighters after they refused to obey a Syrian officer’s order to remove a West-Beirut checkpoint” (Rabil, 2007:43). Assad began to see that
Hezbollah was not only a resistance movement but was growing into a strong Lebanese political force.

Lebanon has always had a special relationship with its neighbor Syria which includes an open border for cheap Syrian labor to come into Lebanon and fill low level positions that the Lebanese did not want to perform. “Both countries understood well each other’s mutual interests in allowing cheap Syrian workers into Lebanon” (Chaicraft, 2006:2). While the Lebanese economy held up during the early years of the civil war, the widespread view that Syrian workers were much-needed persisted for the first eight years of the war. “The beginnings of real change in the public discourse about foreign workers appear to be rooted in the economic crisis which set-in after 1983. The currency began a long a precipitous descent, budget and trade deficits increased while debt, unemployment and inflation all intensified and led to anger about the Syrian presence” (Chaicraft, 2006:4). In this atmosphere there were calls for restrictions on foreign, especially Syrian labour. “The Minister of Labour finally issued law number 261 in August 1986 preventing the employment of foreign labour in a variety of professions except those involving skills scarce in Lebanon” (Chaicraft, 2006:6). The Lebanese economic problems continued through the 1990’s, after the long civil war ended and into the twenty-first century. Growing budget and trade deficits, and sharp increases in the external debt, started to look unsupportable by the turn of the twenty-first century (Chaicraft, 2006:6).

On March 14, 1989, Army commander Michel Aoun and troops under his command began a self-declared ‘War of Liberation’ ostensibly against all foreign forces, but in reality the effort was directed against the Syrians (Krayem, 2011:5).
movement had devastating consequences; instead of curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, it caused an increase in their numbers from around thirty thousand up to close to forty thousand, and the areas under General’s Aoun authority became besieged with fighting. As a reaction to the devastation of the ‘War on Liberation’ the public intolerance for the continuation of the civil war grew increasingly strong (Krayem, 2011:5). After fifteen years of conflict it became generally accepted that none of the warring factions could decisively win the war. And because of the polarization among the warring factions, external intervention was used to help frame the settlement agreement. The parties met for several weeks in the city of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia to discuss national reconciliation.

In September 1989 the Lebanese Parliament agreed to the Ta’if Accord, which ended the war and created a blue-print for a post-war settlement. The war which officially ended in December 1990 left a devastated economy as well as an estimated 150,000 killed and another 200,000 wounded in the fifteen year war (NY Times, 2012). Lebanon retained the sectarian structure that it had before the war, but adjusted the proportions of the confessional system to reflect the changes in the demographics of the population. This gave more political power to the Sunni and Shi’i groups. The accord also included an outline timetable for Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon. But the Syrian military did not withdraw as specified.

Syria sought to use Hezbollah both to pressure Israel for a return of the Golan Heights and to undermine the development of any opposition movement in Lebanon. Because of Syrian participation in the Gulf War, it was seen favorably in the international community and was granted the role of trusteeship in the Ta’if accord and charged with
rebuilding Lebanon’s state institutions. Among the proposals put forth by Assad were:

“Pro-Syrian officials would staff all Lebanese state institutions and the army; Damascus would retain effective veto power over the ministries of the interior, defense and foreign affairs; Hezbollah would take the lead on military operations against Israel and enjoy the political support of the Lebanese government…” (Rabil, 2007:44). Through the 1990’s and turn of the century the Lebanese government toed the Syrian line and exiled or jailed major opposition figures.

“Even as Syria consolidated their influence over Lebanon, some observers interpreted the election of the new Prime Minister, Lebanese-Saudi businessman Rafiq al-Hariri who came into power in 1992, as a sign of a renewed Saudi role in Lebanon” (Krayem, 2011:7).

Before the 1975-1990 civil war the Lebanese confessional elites considered the state inherently civilian and non-belligerent so the army recruitment was kept low along with the budget and the military’s distance from public affairs. After the civil war many put their trust in the military. “The population longed for order and was willing to see the military play a central role in Lebanon’s political reconstruction” (Picard, 2011:5). But from the period of 1990 onwards Syria targeted security requirements as a tool of control over the Lebanese society. “Part IV of the Ta’if agreement made official the presence of 15,000 to 25,000 Syrian troops and the subordination of the Lebanese army in addressing security concerns over Israel and other external dangers” (Picard, 2011:6).

In the end, the Ta’if accord updated the proportion of offices held by the different religious groups making it more representative of the changes in demographics, but did not eliminate the Confessional system which provides no incentive for members of
different sectarian groups to form alliances and work together to make legislative
decisions. The voters still do not vote for a national candidate and are limited to only
those within their Confessional group. The Ta’if accord provided a step forward, but not
a basis for a stable democratic system. Additionally, as al-Hariri came into power, instead
of modernizing and reforming the existing administration, he kept the inefficient
government intact and established a parallel one tied to his office (Krayem, 2011).

Hezbollah continued to be a strong presence in southern Lebanon, and with
Syrian support it was “exempted from the post-war demobilization that occurred in 1991
on the pretext that the South remained occupied” (Picard, 2011:15). Until the Israeli army
withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah was a substitute for the Lebanese army, organizing and
leading a successful guerrilla resistance against the Israelis. After the Israeli withdrawal,
“Hezbollah took military control of the ‘liberated’ areas down to the international border,
heralding a globalized trend toward privatization and trans-nationalization of the security
sector” (Picard, 2011:15). Hezbollah is organized hierarchically and is an institution
made up of a “few thousand combatants, with a command structure inspired by the PLO.
It was organized in small, mobile, extremely well trained, decentralized autonomous cells
which combined sophisticated intelligence technology, high-tech arms and audacious
improvisation” (Picard, 2011:16). It has been successful against several the Israeli
invasions and was the sole cause of its exit in 2000.

During this time, relations between Syria and the U.S. as well as the U.N.
deteriorated. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1559 which called for the
disarmament of non-governmental groups within Lebanon. The people of Lebanon saw
this as a direct attack on the overbearing Syrian influence and were encouraged by these
events and sought to reclaim their state from Syrian occupation. Former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt began to encourage and support anti-Syrian politicians. “The Syrian regime fought back and ordered the assassination of al-Hariri, which sparked the mass nonviolent protest of the Cedar Revolution” (Rabil, 2007:45).

II. The revolution itself–

Syria kept persecuting the Lebanese leaders who resisted its occupation and influence in Lebanon. Threats of violence and disappearances were common among the elite. The threats came to a head when former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated in Beirut on February 14, 2005 by a massive car bomb that killed sixteen people.

“The assassination of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, coming soon after Arabic television beamed astonishing pictures of neighboring Iraqis risking their lives to vote, ignited long-simmering, anti-Syrian animosity among the Lebanese Christian and Sunni communities” (Blanford, 2005:3). The Iraqi elections were considered the Arab equivalent of the toppling of the Berlin Wall. It was a sign of freedom, and standing for individual rights. The Lebanese opposition was also encouraged by international pressure against Syria, particularly from the U.S. and France (Blanford, 2005:3).

From the beginning of the implementation of the Ta’if accord the principal opponents of Syria’s heavy-hand and tutelage in Lebanon were the Maronite Christians. In 2001 the Maronites held a formal reconciliation with their traditional foes the Druze. This heralded a significant anti-Syrian alliance between the two main sects in Mount
Lebanon. al-Hariri’s tacit association with the opposition promised to bring the previously quiescent but seething Sunni community into the opposition (Blanford, 2005). “If Syria assassinated al-Hariri in the expectation that his death would decapitate the Opposition, as the Lebanese opposition assumes, it was a serious miscalculation. al-Hariri’s murder brought the Christian, Druze, and Sunni communities together in open defiance of Syrian hegemony” (Blanford, 2005:3). The anti-Syrian demonstration emphasized national unity as numerous Lebanese’s flags waved in the crowds. On February 18th the opposition launched the “Independence Peaceful Uprising” to liberate Lebanon, motivating the Lebanese masses to gather together in peaceful opposition. The Lebanese occupied the streets in Beirut and in particular the damaged area around the Saint Georges Hotel, site of the al-Hariri attack which became a focal point of the peaceful opposition. Lebanese flags were flying everywhere as patriotic songs played in street concerts and the radio. Around the globe the diaspora held parallel mass rallies to support the freedom and independence of their relatives back home (Salti, 2005:25). The size of the protest crowds continued to grow; and on February 28th the pro-Syrian Lebanese government resigned from office.

On March 5th the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (son of Hafez) bowed down somewhat to the national and international pressure and announced that the Syrian army would pull out from Lebanon in two stages, but failed to set a timetable for their withdrawal. The NGO ‘Lebanon’s Global Information Center’ (LGIC) reports that the “popular nonviolent demonstrations continued to grow and reached their peak on March 14th when the Lebanese people rallying against Syrian occupation held the largest demonstration in Lebanon’s history with over a million participants” (LGIC, 2012).
Several events raised cautious expectations of a return to a legal and fair national system under civilian rule, which were in clear opposition with Syrian authoritarian practices. One of these events was the change of position of the army. The army Commander in Chief, Michel Sleiman, provided some insight into the change which occurred in the military’s perspective, while commenting on the army’s dealing with the huge civilian demonstration: “we execute the political will which emanates from a generalized national consensus. I approached this question from the point of view of the will of the nation, which I see today as the wish to live in peace. As a result I applied the popular wish and not the official commands which were to clear the streets and remove the crowds” (Picard, 2011:26). This has been a key point in successful nonviolent campaigns. As the military authority changes from supporting the ruling regime to supporting the citizens participating in the mass protest, one of the main pillars of support holding up the regime is removed and will often lead to its fall from power.

By the end of March the Syrian government had pulled out most of their troops and dismantled its intelligence stations in Beirut and north Lebanon (LGIC, 2012). But pro-Syrian militants were also active and dozens of car-bomb explosions took place around the state and took the lives of anti-Syrian political leaders in the following months. Numerous unclaimed car bomb explosions (one of the primary tactics used during the civil war) occurred in March which tried to disrupt the protests and remove people from the streets. No one claimed responsibility, but it was clear that Shi’i leaders with Syrian connections had the most to lose from the protests.

The Shi’i community was the only one that remained publically ambiguous in its stance toward Syria. “While the lack of Hezbollah participation in the protest showed
their support for Syria, the impoverished Shi’ites workers regarded the estimated one
million Syrian laborers living in Lebanon as direct competition for jobs; while Shi’i
farmers in the rural south and Bekaa Valley deeply resented being forced to compete with
cheaper produce imported from Syria” (Blanford, 2005:4).

Although some reports ‘from the street’ in Beirut expressed that by the beginning
of April people began to feel that the “traffic in the city is almost back to normal;” and
that “rumors abound that undocumented or ‘illegal’ Syrian workers were leaving
Lebanon in droves” (Salti, 2005:23). However, most Lebanese continued to adjust to
living in fear and taking precautions against the arbitrary explosions of violence from car
bombs. “There is no rhyme or reason to the booby-trapped cars, and the logic of
spreading terror seems to have taken hold. Most people have changed to shopping at
small local grocery stores near their apartments, avoiding big shopping centers and their
parking lots; as checkpoints are set up all over the city to reassure people that there is
some safety” (Salti, 2005:23).

On April 7th the United Nations Security Council ordered an international
investigation into the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri. “In response to continuous
international pressure and in the face of popular protests, the Syrian government pledged
to pull out by April 30, 2005 after nearly thirty years of occupation” (LGIC, 2012).

“Washington and the West subsequently adopted the responsibility of restraining
Hezbollah with more vigor knowing that the democratically elected government of Fuad
Siniora that came to power in the summer of 2005 was helpless in the face of Lebanon’s
best armed and amply funded military organization” (Nizameddin, 2008:492). This was
demonstrated by Hezbollah’s occupation of Beirut in May 2008. To counter this force the
U.S. provided aid and training to the state’s official armed forces. "The Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) can be a model of what can work," U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Matthew Spence told a Washington audience Wednesday Feb. 20, 2013. While U.S. support for the LAF is comparatively modest — $75 million a year — it provides training as well as weapons and is an important element to ‘underscore the U.S. partnership’ with Lebanon” (Slavin, 2013:1).

The force of the nonviolent revolution coupled with significant international pressure, caused Syrian forces to officially withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. But Syria continued to use Lebanon’s state institutions and contacts within them to assure financial contracts flowed to Syria, as Syrian workers remained within Lebanon, and Hezbollah remained a strong political and military force (Rabil, 2007:45). Although Syrian troops have withdrawn from Lebanon, “their departure is little more than a symbolic acknowledgment of Lebanese sovereignty as the backbone of Syria’s influence in Lebanon – its intelligence apparatus – have merely gone underground” (Gambill, 2005:35). It is estimated that Syrian economic revenue from Lebanon amounts to several billion dollars a year. To give an indication of the magnitude of one aspect of this revenue, an early 1992 report from the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, estimated that the Syrian military earned between $300 million and $1 billion annually from narcotics production and trafficking in Lebanon. “Whether by extorting protection payments, collecting bribes, or even becoming active partners with the Lebanese traffickers, … most individual Syrian officers and troops directly profit from the drug trade” (in Gambill, 2005:36). So although the Syrian troops
are no longer in Lebanon, “none of Syria’s most important Lebanese revenue streams have been cut” (Gambill, 2005:40).

Hezbollah did not support the Cedar revolution, but remained quietly on the sidelines as their benefactor was ushered out of the state.

On May 28\textsuperscript{th} 2006, Israel Defense Forces launched air raids supposedly against Palestinian terrorist bases within Lebanon. This was in retaliation against rocket attacks on its northern border. The armed presence of Hezbollah drawing close to the border quelled the air raids. Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud responded by “commending Hezbollah’s resistance and criticizing the political forces in the U.N. that had called for its disarmament” (Rabil, 2007:46). Hezbollah continues to provide a means by which the Syrian government can exert pressure on the Lebanese government and impede the appointment of anti-Syrian officials to sensitive posts (Rabil, 2007). In February of 2007 there was an incident where the Lebanese authorities detained a truck transporting weapons to Hezbollah in violation of the new U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. “While the Lebanese government is now emboldened to confront Syrian interests, it appears that Hezbollah’s position remains secure” (Rabil, 2007:47). The Lebanese government did not comply with either U.N. resolution 1559 or 1701 which required the militant Shi’i Hezbollah group in the south to disarm. For its part Hezbollah believed “the whole purpose of 1559 was to impose a U.S. order in Lebanon which would be to accept the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon and establish peace with Israel” (Blanford, 2005:4).

Following the Cedar Revolution, Syria’s role in Lebanon today is far less powerful than it was during the 1990’s but, now it is Tehran that seems to be
orchestrating and backing both Hezbollah and Assad’s moves within Lebanon. “Iran has adopted Syria’s former role in the country and is sending a message to Washington as well as to Arab capitals that there can be no resolution to the crisis in Lebanon without Iranian involvement” (Rabil, 2007:49).

Following the successful Cedar Revolution, Hezbollah attempted to re-brand itself as a political organization and endeavored to “break the taboo that bars Islamist movements from obtaining the two sensitive positions of Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs” (Alagha, 2005:35). But international pressure especially from the U.S. and France stood in the way and more moderate Shi’i candidates were put in these positions. “Immediately after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad announced his intention to withdraw Syria’s army from Lebanon, Hezbollah sought to fill the vacuum in the country’s political scene; explaining that international powers are trying to take advantage of this vacuum and impose their tutelage over Lebanon” (Alagha, 2005:36). Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasralla delivered a fiery speech in which he vowed the party’s complete engagement in Lebanese political and economic life as well as participation in government institutions including if possible some of the highest cabinet posts (Alagha, 2005:35). Most Lebanese now view Hezbollah as a national liberation movement and not a militia. The state has no current plans to move forward with the U.N. resolutions which called for disarmament (Alagha, 2005:36).

So although the successful revolution brought about the removal of the Syrian occupation forces it was not the total withdrawal of Syrian influence, and although the resignation of the pro-Syrian government in Beirut created some instability and power vacuums where former rebel movements sought to fill influential cabinet posts, it was a
tremendous victory none the less. The U.S. Department of State had this to say on the seventh anniversary of the Cedar Revolution: “In 2005 the people of Lebanon shattered the myth that the only way to produce change in the region is through violence and conflict. The United States salutes the brave and proud Lebanese who peacefully took to the streets in 2005 to demand a better future for themselves and their homeland” (U.S. Dept. of State, March 14, 2012).

III. Revolution outcome including measures on the stability indicators –

General statements and introduction:

Anti-Syrian sentiment had been building in Lebanon since the early 1990’s when Syria was designated the guardian of the Ta’if accord and used its position to control politically the Lebanese elections and to put in candidates that were favorable to its own interests, economically to award itself profitable contracts, and militarily build up a rebel militia in Hezbollah that it could control from afar.

It took the assassination of al-Hariri to trigger the revolution. But once it began the tremendous mass protests could not be stopped by car-bombs or any other means. In the short period of 72 days, from February 14\textsuperscript{th} to April 26\textsuperscript{th}, the occupying military force and associated intelligence operations were removed, in one of the most quick and well publicized nonviolent campaigns in history.

Life Expectancy:

In the World Bank’s list of 220 states, Lebanon ranks 90\textsuperscript{th} in terms of projected life expectancy at birth (WB, 2012). In 2000 life expectancy at birth for Lebanon was
71.25 years. By 2005 it had improved to 72.63 (a gain in 1.38 years), and by 2010 it had improved again to 74.79 years (a gain of 2.16 years). For comparison, the world life expectancy at birth also improved during this time but not as much as Lebanon. In 2000 life expectancy at birth for the world average was 64 years. By 2005 it improved slightly to 64.33 (a gain of a third of a year), and by 2010 it had improved to 66.12 (an improvement of 1.79 years). (data from WB, 2012).

This indicates that Lebanon was improving the life expectancy of its people at a greater rate than the world average before the revolution and continued to do so afterwards. When the world improved by a third of a year in the early 2000’s, Lebanon improved by 1.38 years; and when the world improved by 1.79 between 2005 and 2010, Lebanon improved more than two years at 2.16. This shows that Lebanon was already improving the quality of life for the people in the state before the Cedar revolution and continued to make improvements greater than the pace of the world average, afterwards. The peaceful removal of the occupying forces did not significantly alter the trajectory of growth.

For a comparison to other states in the region: Israel ranked 18th at 81.07 years in 2012, Jordan ranked 29th at 80.18 years, West Bank ranked just above Lebanon at 89th with 75.24 years, Lebanon was 90th at 75.23 years, Syria was 93rd at 74.92 years, Iraq was 143rd at 70.85 years and Iran was 145th at 70.35. Lebanon is in the middle of its immediate neighbors, except for Israel and Jordan who are quite far ahead. It’s good to see that the pace of improvement in Lebanon continued and increased slightly following the peaceful revolution (data from the WB, 2012).
Long Term Economic Growth:

Lebanon’s GDP is high compared to other Arab non-oil driven economies. The Lebanese people are relatively well-educated, and the state is considered to be a middle-income economy (CIA World Factbook, 2013). The Lebanese economy grew 8.5 percent in 2008 and 9 percent in 2009 despite the global recession. By 2010, five years after the cedar revolution, the GDP PPP per capita is estimated at a healthy 7.5 percent. However, the security and political instability in the Arab world is expected to have a negative impact on the domestic business and economic environment going forward (Bayoumy, 2010).

Lebanon faces some major challenges notably a very high level of public debt exceeding 150.7 percent of the GDP ranking fourth highest in the world in 2010 (WB, 2010). Debt of this magnitude would naturally slow down the economy as well as curb government spending on major projects. Remittances from Lebanese living abroad account for one-fifth of the GDP (Bayoumy, 2010). But this has decreased with the global recession.

Lebanon also has a serious problem with corruption. “A 2001 United Nations Corruption Assessment Report, estimated that Lebanon loses more than $1.5 billion annually as a result of graft, that is nearly ten percent of the state’s GDP” (in Gambill, 2005:37). Five years after campaign end, Transparency International (TI) was still ranking Lebanon amongst the states with “serious government corruption” (TI, 2010). By 2012 this had improved slightly, but Lebanon still is among the lowest third. According to the TI (2012) website “Corruption translates into human suffering, with poor families being extorted for bribes to see doctors or to get access to clean drinking water. It leads to
failure in the delivery of basic services like education or healthcare. It derails the building of essential infrastructure, as corrupt leaders skim funds”. To sustain itself as a middle-income state and move forward, Lebanon will need to come to grips with the graft and corruption undermining its progress.

*Implementation of the Rule of Law:*

The historical weakness of the judiciary caused discrepancies between the image that the army and police intend to project and their actual capacity to enforce rule of law which raised many doubts with respect to their declared missions. As the Cedar revolution transpired these doubts again came to the fore. “Taking advantage of Lebanon’s ultra-liberal post-civil war economy, the Syrian leaders had secured the lion’s share in huge benefits from financial and real-estate investments of privatized reconstruction projects and established fruitful networks for future works” (Picard, 2011:23). During the fifteen years from 1990 to 2005, that the Lebanese army and police had been subordinate to Syrian rule, they were sometimes forced partners in the corrupt activities that ensued; as were the political leaders and civil servants who were forced to abide by Syrian rule or be forced out. “Rumors persisted of senior Lebanese officials partnering with Syrian leaders in extortion from companies and banks was alleged to have cost the state more than $1.5 billion per year” (Picard, 2011:24).

But the actions of the Cedar revolution did prove positive in this regard. Five years before the campaign, Freedom House’s measure of rule-of-law scored Lebanon a dismal five on its one- to-seven point scale (one representing the best, seven the worst). Five is just above the rating: “very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may allow a
few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion” (FH, 2013). By the year 2005 this had improved to four, and by 2010 improved again to three: “moderately protect almost all civil liberties” (FH, 2013). So it seems the Syrian actions of bribes and siphoning off of profits and kick-backs, is not the way Lebanon wants to operate when they were left to themselves.

Autocracy/Democracy:

After the Cedar revolution the successful coalition of Sunni, Druze and Maronites led the government from June 2005 until January 2011 and committed itself to close security cooperation with the West. Lebanon received U.S. support and new armament for the struggle against trans-national terrorist networks, as the West became concerned about the growing influence of Hezbollah and its ties with Syria and Iran (Picard, 2011:4). Thus Lebanon remained hostage to regional conflict as well as to international tensions, most notably growing animosity between the U.S. and Iran (Picard, 2011:4). Before Sept. 11, 2001 and the designation of al-Qa’ida as a terrorist network and a global enemy, the U.S. and the NATO allies had led the Lebanese security services into the fight against international drug trafficking, illegal immigration, human trafficking and other terrorists networks. Cooperation remained between the weak democracy in Lebanon and the stronger ones in the West until the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, turned the tide and gave rise to local and trans-regional Islamic insurgency that spilled over into neighboring states including Lebanon (Leenders in Picard, 2011:11). But once again, following the Cedar revolution and the withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence units, Western military cooperation increased as the Lebanese army became gradually
involved in the fight against Jihadist local cells. “Western powers were willing to reform and train the LAF on their own terms and in relation to their strategic priorities. The U.S. Congress approved an aid budget in February 2007 that included $280 million for security as top-brass U.S. Officers stressed the necessity to counterbalance the influence of Syria and Hezbollah” (Picard, 2011:12). Lebanon began to be integrated into the West’s ‘War of terror’ in the form of financial and political support.

As the benefactors of the state changed after the Cedar revolution so did the level of democracy. From about 1970 onwards Lebanon’s rating the on the Polity scale was a weak democracy at +5. Following the revolution in 2006 it was rated +8 where it remained five years after the campaign ended and still is today. +8 reveals a good working democracy with mainly equal opportunities for all, including equal access to voting, although Lebanon still operates within the Confessional System. Democracy was strengthened in the 2008 Doha agreement as shown in this statement from the U.N. media services:

“The U.N. welcomes and strongly supports the agreement reached by Lebanese leaders in Doha on May 21, 2008 ..., which constitutes an essential step towards the restoration of Lebanon's unity, stability and independence. We hail the agreement between Lebanon’s western-backed majority government and the Hezbollah-led opposition, in the state’s efforts to elect a new president, establish a national-unity cabinet and address Lebanon's electoral laws. The Security Council reaffirms its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders and under the sole and exclusive authority of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory” (UN News & Media, 2008).

Debates are ongoing as to how to improve the level of democracy in Lebanon even further and breakdown the sectarian coalitions which are holding back full democracy. One solution is to turn the whole state into a single, heterogeneous constituency and have all voters, have the ability to vote for all candidates. “Proponents
of this option argue that it would lead to durable interethnic coalitions rather than instrumental ones, ultimately paving the way for national unity” (Salloukh, 2006:651). Additionally the needed uncertainty of a national election, where no candidates are automatically assured a position; would be expected to decrease the magnitude of corruption, as clientelism would automatically contract.

_Infant Mortality:_

As indicated in previous case studies, infant mortality is a good overall indicator of the level of health in the state and the scores for Lebanon have been improving steadily. In 2000 (five years before the revolution) infant mortality was measured at an average of 29.3 deaths per 1,000 live births. By 2005 this had improved to an average of 24.52, and by 2010 improved again to 16.4. So the year 2000 rate had almost been cut in half by 2010. This is a great improvement. For comparison the world averages for infant mortality per 1,000 live births was 54 in year 2000, 50.11 in 2005 and 44.13 in 2010. Lebanon is well below the world average and is also improving at a greater rate (data from WB, 2012).

Although it appears the trend in Lebanon was already sloping downward, the Cedar revolution altered the trajectory and the decrease in infant mortality occurred even more quickly. There was an average drop in 4.78 deaths between years 2000 (29.3 deaths) to 2005 (24.52 deaths). This was improved by an average drop in 8.12 deaths between 2005 (24.52 deaths) and 2010 (16.4 deaths).

It seems the Fuad Siniora regime that came into power in the summer of 2005 allocated more funding toward health care or took other measures which improved the health of the state. Perhaps the freedom from the Syrian occupation dictating the
allocation of resources played a part in the improvement. What is clear is that different choices were made and health care was given a higher priority than it had been in the past.

**Human Rights:**

According to the NGO ‘Reporters without Borders’: “The media have more freedom in Lebanon than in any other Arab country. Despite its small population and geographic size, Lebanon plays an influential role in the production of information in the Arab world, and is at the core of the regional media network with global implications” (Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). Freedom of the press is often associated with good governance, low levels of corruption, and respect for human rights. So it is a good sign that ‘Reporters without Borders’ is giving Lebanon a positive rating.

In terms of the human rights indicator used for this study the Cingranelli and Richard’s CIRI Human Rights Data Project, Lebanon consistently scored 3.9 on a scale from 0 representing no respect for human rights to 8 representing full respect for human rights. Lebanon scored 3.9 in years 2000, 2005 and five years after the campaign in 2010. There are four components to the CIRI score: torture, political imprisonment, extra judicial killings, and disappearances. Lebanon consistently scored well on disappearances (2), in the medium range on political imprisonment (1) and extra judicial killings (1), and poorly on torture (0). Lebanon’s scoring did not change in the ten years from five years before the campaign until five years after, indicating that the Cedar revolution did not have a great impact on this aspect of society. Respect for human rights neither improved nor worsened during this time. (data from CIRI dataset, 2012).
School Enrollment:

The sectorial divisions of Lebanon translate into uneven results and progress in education with some sectors reporting better results than others. Although Lebanon does not provide data on national school enrollment, literacy rates suggest that it is still behind other Arab states even though it is considered a middle-income state. Five years prior to the Cedar revolution Lebanon’s adult population literacy rate was 66 percent, compared to an average for Arab states which had a literacy rate of 82 percent. By five years after the campaign ended, Lebanon had improved to 74 percent, but the average for Arab states had also improved to 90 percent, still leaving Lebanon behind its Arab counterparts (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012).

Lebanon’s lack of attention to education also shows in the CIA World Factbook ranking of percentage of GDP dedicated to education. Out of 163 states that are tracked, Lebanon was at the low end at 158 due to only allocating 1.8 percent of its GDP toward education. For comparison, the most rapidly advancing state, (in terms of education) Timor-Leste dedicated 16.80 of its GDP to education that same year, 2010.

This is a disappointing result for a state seeking to modernize and unify its people. It would appear that Lebanon’s sectorial differences are preventing the formation of a national education policy and the increased funding necessary to bring the state forward. The Cedar revolution did not alter the amount of funding pledged to education.

Regional stability:

The strategic location of Lebanon means that it is impacted by its neighbors in numerous ways; neighboring conflicts such as the one between Israel and Palestine spill
over into Lebanon in the form of Palestinian refugees, and sometimes warring party advances.

Additionally regional alliances such as Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, with the aid of Russia sometimes play out their grievances with the West inside of Lebanon. Some of this was shown in the U.N. Security Council passing resolution 1559 and later 1701 which was similar, in an effort to control the amount of weapons within Lebanon and the direction the state was moving towards. The U.S. and France continually seek to undermine Syrian and Iranian hegemony which they had obtained through their partnership with Hezbollah. “UN Resolution 1559 passed on September 2, 2004, demanded the disarming of all militias in Lebanon, and condemned the forced extension to the presidential term of Emile Lahoud who was known to have Syrian connections” (Nizameddin, 2008:476). The resolution implied that military action would be taken against Syria and possibly Iran, if they did not comply. But, “Putin’s emboldened Middle East strategy seemed to counterbalance such threats at the Security Council, and his stance indirectly strengthened Hezbollah’s hand in the complex web of Lebanese politics by stalling international action against the party’s guardians, Iran and Syria” (Nizameddin, 2008:476). Russia’s interests in supporting Hezbollah became more acute following the Chechen war, which increased Russia’s concern about the growth of militant Sunni groups. “Moscow suggested that the real Muslim threat came from Sunni Taliban-style Islam and, as the Chechen conflict worsened, it made sense to Russia to consolidate relations with the rival Shi’ites” (Nizameddin, 2008:488). Russian military sales to Iran and Syria increased markedly at that time. Israel’s major fear was that these weapons were going to arrive at their northern border. “These concerns were realized
during the war of 2006 when Hezbollah used advanced Russian-made anti-tank missiles, procured originally by Syria, that succeeded in considerably stalling the advance of the Israeli army into Lebanon, and effectively undermined Israel’s overall military offensive” (Nizameddin, 2008:488).

Lebanon is the playing field for international powers, regional alliances, and neighboring conflicts which all had a hand in determining Lebanon’s internal matters as: who is elected to office in Lebanon, what U.N. resolutions would be obeyed, and what would be the future direction of Lebanon’s foreign policy. It’s clear that there are regional influences that are impacting Lebanon. It was the displeasure with foreign occupation forces that brought about the Cedar revolution but, continue to influence Lebanon today.
VI. Summary and Conclusions:

This final section will briefly restate the theoretical projections and analytical findings for each of the eight structural stability indicators that were analyzed. And then will verify if the statistical findings were supported by the four case studies. The study will then summarize the answer to the main question: did the type of campaign that was waged have an impact on this indicator?

1. Life Expectancy

*Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.*

To quickly reiterate, predicted life expectancy, at birth is the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life time. In practice, it is a measure of the overall quality of life in the state and is sometimes thought of as the potential return on investment in human capital by the state. It incorporates all of the natural phenomena of climate, weather, geography, environmental factors, and global warming; as well as policy considerations including how the state is doing in supplying health care, how the state addresses food supply considering both those who are starving as well as those who are obese, as well as how the state deals with epidemics including HIV/AIDS, malaria, flu, etc. (Robine and Ritchie, 1991).

Hypothesis one stated: in states which experience nonviolent campaigns which usher in greater levels of democracy we will see life expectancy increase as a result of these changes. The statistical results showed initially (five years) life expectancy was behind world averages, but by ten years after the campaign ended, these states rose above
world averages confirming this hypothesis. However, states that had a nonviolent campaign that was unsuccessful were still behind world averages ten years after the campaign ended so hypothesis one, was not confirmed for those states.

Hypothesis two stated that recovering from violent conflict takes a larger toll on society economically, structurally and physically and lasts well beyond the campaign’s end; and that states which have had a violent campaign will see a decrease in life expectancy even five and ten years after the campaign as they struggle to recover from its impact, regardless of whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful. This proved to be statistically true for violent campaigns which were successful, but not true for unsuccessful violent campaigns. It may be that relative to successful violent campaigns there was not as much disruption in the state. A second possible explanation is that unsuccessful campaigns did not usher in a new regime with high military spending.

Hypothesis three stated that additionally violent campaigns which were successful will fare worse overall. This was confirmed in both regression tests measured five and ten years after the campaign. Paul Collier explains that: “rebellion is an extremely unreliable way of bringing about positive change. Rebel leaders who claim to have launched a civil war for the good of their country are usually deceiving themselves, others, or both” (2007, p.28). New leaders know that they were successful in coming into power through violence and they tend to invest in high military spending, to maintain their new position. “Governments in post-conflict societies are well aware that they are living dangerously. Typically, they react to this risk by maintaining their military spending at an abnormally high level” (Collier, 2007:27).

Are the findings supported by the case studies?
With the collapse of the socialist regime in East Germany in 1989 and reunification one year later, life expectancy in East Germany initially dropped for a short period and then increased at an accelerated pace. This increase in life expectancy was more pronounced for females than for males who were thought to be taking more advantage of newly available health care services than their male counterparts. “Our central findings were that old-age mortality declined earlier and gradually in West Germany before reunification, and that East Germany was characterized by later and more abrupt decline that coincided with the reunification. Moreover it appears that this period factor operated without delay because the mortality decline became visible immediately after reunification” (Gjonca, et al., 2000: 11). This strongly confirms the statistical result that life expectancy increases following nonviolent campaigns.

Comparing Somalia’s reported life expectancy during the insurgency to five and ten years later some good improvements are revealed. Life expectancy during the insurgency was 50 years, when the world average was 68. Five years later life expectancy improved by five years to 55 when the world average improved one year to 69. Ten years after insurgency life expectancy increased again by one year to 56 as the world average remained unchanged at 69. This shows a good improvement rate compared to the world average which could be due to the availability of medical care as well as the decrease in violent conflict. This contradicts the statistical finding that life expectancy decreases following violent campaigns and may be due to the result that peace was better than years of violence.

Life expectancy in Pakistan has kept pace with improvements in life expectancy for the rest of the world but has consistently been four years less than the world average.
It is a positive sign that it continues to keep pace with the rest of the world but also a sign that it is not investing in health care, living conditions, or the social services that have brought other states forward. Part of the marginalization of Pakistan has come through sanctions from the international community in response to its nuclear capability. Pakistan has suffered under limited trade arrangements, sanctions, and limited partnerships in the international community. But, the overall result, keeping pace with improvements worldwide, confirms the statistical finding that states which had unsuccessful violent campaigns saw improvements in life expectancy.

In 2000 life expectancy at birth for Lebanon was 71.25 years. By 2005 it had improved to 72.63, and by 2010 it had improved again to 74.79 years. World life expectancy at birth also improved during this time but not as much as Lebanon. This result confirms the statistical finding that life expectancy increases following nonviolent campaigns although in this case, it was a trend that continued and slightly improved further following the successful campaign.

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

Both the statistical analysis and three of the four case studies showed that the type of campaign that is waged, if it is successful, does have an impact on life expectancy. If a violent campaign is successful life expectancy of the population suffers. But, encouragingly if a nonviolent campaign is waged, and especially if it is successful, after some time of recovery, growth in life expectancy can exceed world averages.
2. Long Term Economic Growth

*Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.*

Long-term economic growth depends upon the good management of the state’s resources along with the capability of increasing the amount of goods and services produced by the state. This study used a PPP converted GDP per capita relative to the United States, to allow for the comparison between states.

The statistical averages by five years after campaign end showed successful nonviolent campaigns had a positive effect on GDP per capita and all other campaigns had negative effects with the worst being unsuccessful violent campaigns. It is also interesting that between five and ten years away from the end of the campaign, the effects on long term economic growth, from nonviolent campaigns reversed depending upon whether the campaign was successful; successful campaigns are correlated with positive GDP while unsuccessful campaigns saw a slight negative effect to GDP. But by ten years after the campaign this was reversed; states with successful campaigns now had GDP per capita which was negative while states that had unsuccessful campaigns now had GDP per capita figures that had moved into the positive range. This suggests that as a global community we are not doing a good job of helping budding democracies as the gains from new democratic leadership are not being sustained.

Unsuccessful violent campaigns were the least successful in long term economic growth. This may be because the governments in these states redirected funds from infrastructure rebuilding and put it towards security but did not have the major growth projects and so were left in a worse position economically.
But states that experienced successful violent campaigns did not see the gains in terms of long-term improvement projects that Collier would suggest as one of the rare advantages that we have seen in autocracy. In fact the GDP per capita was less than what it was five years earlier showing perhaps that it is taking these states longer to recover than is suggested.

**Are the findings supported by the case studies?**

With reunification East German firms lost their well protected distribution outlets and began changes that enabled them to compete directly with western suppliers. These changes occurred over a period of years and included: “a pronounced shift of resources within manufacturing from inefficient and obsolete products to new industries and products, considerable improvements in the quality of products, higher degree of inter-firm and international specialization to reap the benefits of economies of scale, more efficient use of resources, and reorganization and privatization of existing firms” (Siebert and Schmieding, 1990:8). With the large number of firms and workforce involved the transition was not an easy one.

The growth rate was in fact 1.6 percent from 1999 to 2003 in line with predictions, but what was not accounted for was that emigration continued steadily particularly for those 18 to 29 years of age. Additionally standard economic growth models would predict that industry would exploit the cost advantage and move into East Germany with its relatively low wages, high unemployment, lower real estate, and good/comparable educational system. But Uhlig (2008) found this not to be the case. The findings confirm the statistical result for nonviolent successful campaigns which
observed a slight increase by five years after the campaign and a reversal with a small
decrease by ten years, as firms try to rebuild themselves.

According to the Central Bank of Somalia, despite experiencing civil unrest,
Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy; based mainly on livestock,
remittance money, transfer companies and telecommunications, although its economy
remains one of the poorest in the world. The GDP PPP relative to the U.S. in 1994 was
$1.51; by 1999 this had dropped to $0.89, and by 2004 recovered somewhat to $1.16
(data from Penn World Table, 2011). Note, these figures are relative to the U.S. per $100
earned, not a daily or annual rate. Somalia’s results are in line with the statistical results
at the five year mark but improvements at ten years contradict the statistical average. This
could be due to Somalia’s large informal economy that continues to operate even under
state failure.

Since the time of the unsuccessful Muhajir campaign in Pakistan and given the
geopolitical conditions in South Asia in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, a large portion
of military expenditure is not surprising. But as state revenues are put toward the military
instead of infrastructure projects, schools, and economic stimulus encouraging new
businesses, the state as a whole is held back. However there are some economic aspects
of the army’s work that did have a positive effect. The army’s involvement in civil affairs
could be interpreted as an attempt to rescue the more profitable parts of the state and the
economy, from a corrupt bureaucracy. Pakistan’s GDP PPP relative to the U.S. in 1995
was $6.53, in 2000 had improved to $12.73 and by ten years after the campaign $13.9.
These results go against the statistical averages which measured a drop in GDP five years
after the campaign and some recovery by ten years. It may be due to the positive aspects of the army’s involvement in civil affairs.

Lebanon’s GDP is high compared to other Arab non-oil driven economies, and the state is considered to be a middle-income economy (CIA World Factbook, 2013). Although Lebanon also has a serious problem with corruption which holds back its long term economic growth. Five years after the campaign, Transparency International (2010) was still ranking Lebanon amongst the states with “serious government corruption”. Lebanon’s GDP PPP relative to the U.S. in 2005 was $24.02 and by 2010 had improved to $32.53 exactly in-line with the statistical results.

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The type of campaign that was waged, if it was successful, did have an impact on the state’s long term economic growth as different types of campaigns sent economic growth in different directions. Furthermore East Germany and Lebanon confirmed these results. Somalia and Pakistan did not however, probably because of the informal economy and high percentage of nomadic pastoralists in Somalia, and the positive effects of the government’s take-over of vital industries in Pakistan.

3. **Rule of Law**

*Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.*

“A core indicator of rule of law is the requirement that in addition to the citizens being bound by law, the rulers are also bound and government operates in an effective
and predictable fashion” (Samuels: 2006:11). In most post conflict environments, however, this is very difficult to achieve.

The seventh hypothesis predicted that states which experienced violent campaigns which were successful will score worse on rule of law than states which ushered in a new regime through nonviolence. This hypothesis was confirmed in the direction of the results by five years, but by ten years had reversed and these states showed some improvement. Also the prediction that these states would score worse overall and lose the most ground in implementation of rule of law, was not correct. States with unsuccessful violent campaigns lost the most ground.

The eighth hypothesis predicted that successful nonviolent campaigns will usher in more democratic governments which will make changes toward more equal treatment under the law, free elections, a constitutional implementation of balance of powers, transparency of government, freedom of the press, enabling them to score better on this indicator, five and ten years after the campaign. This hypothesis was also confirmed.

The ninth hypothesis predicted for states with unsuccessful violent campaigns that act in a similar fashion to the U.S., in its “War on Terrorism” where laws were passed giving greater surveillance capabilities to law enforcement and impinging individual civil liberties, will decrease in rule of law as measured both five and ten years after the campaign ends. This prediction proved true for violent campaigns but not for nonviolent campaigns. States that experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign fared worst overall. But those that experienced a nonviolent campaign even though unsuccessful saw positive gains. These states did not clamp down, become less transparent, limit freedom of the press, or back off on judicial equal treatment under the law.
*Are the findings supported by the case studies?*

“Postwar West Germany contemporaneously adopted systems of constitutional judicial review, and moved toward a separation of powers with an independent judiciary” (Moravcsik, 2000:232). And at reunification, East Germany came under these institutions as well, implementing strong West German policies towards rule of law and human rights.

Prior to reunification Freedom House rated East German implementation of rule of law as a six with “very restricted civil liberties that strongly limit the rights of expression and association” (FH, 2013). At the same time West Germany was rated a score of two representing: “enjoyment of a range of civil liberties” (FH, 2013). East Germany’s laws were changed overnight at reunification but, it took some time for the changes in civil liberties to catch up. But as the enforcement of law began in earnest in 1990 changes in civil liberties did as well, confirming the statistical average for successful nonviolent campaigns.

Immediately after the UNOSOM I and II, and UNITAF efforts in Somalia, informal overlapping local authorities: elders, intellectuals, business people, and Muslim clergy, began to work together to oversee, finance, and administer local sharia courts in the absence of a working federal government. These efforts varied widely from location to location, but have made more progress than any other efforts. At the time of the insurgency Freedom House rated Somalia’s respect for Human Rights, in their Rule-of-Law scoring as 7, which represents: “few or no civil liberties, virtually no freedom of expression or association” (FH, 2012). As of 1999 (five years later) and 2004 (ten years) Somalia was rated 4, representing: “moderate protection of almost all civil liberties” (FH,
2012). Clearly progress is being made in Somalia, and this contradicts the statistical average which showed that successful violent campaigns are initially associated with a lessening of rule of law, but recover somewhat later. This may be due to the lack of a working central government and local authorities taking it upon themselves to do what they can to establish rule of law at the local level.

The Pakistani government’s human rights record is generally regarded as poor by domestic and international observers, although there have been some improvements since 2000. Security forces use excessive and sometimes lethal force and are complicit in extrajudicial killings of civilians and suspected militants. Many observers contend that Pakistan’s legal code is largely concerned with national security, and less with the protection of individual rights. Pakistan’s scoring on rule-of-law improved slightly five years after the campaign when it was under military rule. This contradicts the statistical average which reveals that states with unsuccessful violent campaign experienced the worst drop in this indicator. But by ten years after the campaign Pakistan had lost ground in rule of law while still under military rule, and matched the statistical expectation.

During the fifteen years following the Lebanese civil war from 1990 to 2005, the Lebanese army and police were subordinate and sometimes forced partners in the corrupt activities that ensued under Syrian tutelage. But the actions of the Cedar revolution did prove positive in this regard. Five years before the campaign, Freedom House’s measure of rule-of-law scored Lebanon was a dismal five. By the year 2005 this had improved to four, and by 2010 improved again to three: “moderately protect almost all civil liberties” (FH, 2013). So it seems the Syrian actions of bribes and siphoning off of profits was not replicated in Lebanon after the peaceful revolution. Lebanon confirms the statistical
average that successful nonviolent campaigns lead to gains in implementation of rule of law.

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The type of campaign that was waged did have an impact on rule of law, with nonviolent campaigns, whether successful or unsuccessful bringing gains in rule of law; and violent campaigns causing loss of ground. However, if violent campaigns were successful they reversed this trend and gained ground by ten years after the campaign. These results were confirmed in all of the case studies except for Pakistan at five years after the campaign ended, which may be due to the special role the military plays in the good governance of Pakistan.

4. **Degree of Autocracy/ Democracy**

**Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.**

This study used the 21 point Polity IV scoring derived from subjective coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and the level of constraints on the chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:471).

Hypothesis ten predicted that states that ushered in a new regime through nonviolence will see and increased in their Polity scoring toward greater democracy. This proved to be true as these states saw the greatest gains toward democracy on average moving up 9.46 polity points by five years after the campaign, and 10.03 by ten years after.
Hypothesis eleven predicted that states that ushered in a new regime through a violent campaign will see a decrease in Polity toward greater autocracy. This proved to be true within five years but by ten years after the successful violent campaign this trend was reversed. The polity scoring of these states reversed and moved up to greater levels of democracy than before the campaign began. Perhaps by that time leaders felt secure enough to offer an increase in some freedoms.

In hypothesis twelve it was predicted that the regimes that experienced an unsuccessful campaign, of either type, will see no or very little change in polity scoring. For unsuccessful campaigns that were nonviolent this was not the case. These states had the second highest change in their polity scoring on average, moving significantly in the democratic direction. To a lesser extent states which experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign also saw some movement first in the autocratic direction and then by ten years out reversed this direction and moved toward greater democracy. By ten years after the campaign ended all of the states had moved toward greater democracy with those that had nonviolent campaigns making the most progress.

Are the findings supported by the case studies?

By the summer of 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the two halves of Germany were on opposite ends of the polity spectrum. Thus the GDR which had a Polity IV scoring of -9 in 1989 merged with FRG with a scoring of +10 in a radical change from a very strongly autocratic state to full and complete democracy within a year as the law of the West replaced those of the East overnight at reunification. The East German changes in polity scoring confirm the statistical averages.
What has emerged in Somalia by way of governance since the 1992-1994 years has been a loose constellation of locally run villages separated by long stretches of pastoral statelessness. In the pastoral lands the people are used to not having any governance, so the collapse of the state did not impact them or alter their way of living to any great degree. Since its failed state status, Somalia has no official polity scoring, just a constant dotted line at the -7 level. We cannot say the campaign changed the polity of the government, since there is no working central government in place.

Once Musharraf took over and “led Pakistan, he pursued good governance practices that were far superior to those of the previously elected leaders led a public anti-corruption and accountability campaign, pushed power and accountability down the local and grass-roots level” (Wilke, 2001:4). However the state also swung from a Polity of +8 during the Bhutto government to -6 during General Musharraf’s rule, (five years after campaign end) then up slightly to -5, ten years after campaign end following the predictions of the statistical averages.

After the Cedar revolution the successful coalition of Sunni, Druze and Maronites led the government from June 2005 until January 2011 and committed itself to close security cooperation with the West. As the benefactors of the state changed after the Cedar revolution so did the level of democracy. From about 1970 onwards Lebanon rating the on the Polity scale was a weak democracy at +5. Following the revolution in 2006 it was rated +8 where it remained five years after the campaign ended and still is today. +8 reveals a good working democracy with mainly equal opportunities for all, including equal access to voting, although Lebanon still operates within the Confessional System, Lebanon confirms the statistical averages.
**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The type of campaign waged did have an impact on this indicator, with states that experienced unsuccessful violent campaigns moving toward autocracy five years after the campaign and all others moving toward greater democracy. By ten years after the campaign the averages for all states that experienced any type of campaign had moved toward greater democracy.

These results were confirmed by all the case studies except for Somalia which was excluded.

5. **Infant Mortality**

**Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.**

Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) “is a good indicator for the population’s health as it reflects the association between the causes of infant mortality and the factors that influence the health status of the population as a whole: economic development, general living conditions, social well-being, rates of illness, and the quality of the environment” (Reidpath and Allotey, 2003:344).

States that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns saw a good decrease in IMR in a clear indication that these states put resources towards greater availability and more equal access to health care facilities and information, confirming hypothesis 13.

States that experienced successful violent campaigns saw an increase in IMR when measured five years after the campaign ushered in a more autocratic government. By ten years after the campaign, these states had improved but still had an IMR of 7.98
births higher than the pre-campaign average. It appears that these states redirected funds away from those programs which lower infant mortality confirming hypothesis 14.

States that experienced an unsuccessful campaign of either type saw some improvement in IMR, but not enough that the results were statistically significant and by ten years after the campaign continued to improve. It appears that existing regimes that survived campaigns did not redirect funds away from health care and education as did those that experienced successful violent campaigns, confirming hypothesis 15.

**Are the findings supported by the case studies?**

While infant mortality did not significantly change after reunification, researchers that study demographics noted a significant drop in fertility. “Almost overnight the East German population had to adapt to new political, economic, and social systems; all of which had a dramatic impact on fertility behavior” (Conrad et al., 1996:331). This represents a decline of 60 percent over five years. But, there was no major change in the rate of infant mortality as the East German communist system had made significant investments in social planning, family planning and health care. This does not confirm hypothesis 13 which stated that states which had a successful nonviolent campaign would see a drop in IMR.

Somalia’s public healthcare system was largely destroyed during the civil war. As with other previously nationalized sectors, informal providers have filled the vacuum and replaced the former government monopoly over healthcare, with access to healthcare centers and clinics that are witnessing a significant increase in their numbers, through some home-grown Somali initiatives (Leeson, 2007). Infant mortality fell from 152 in 2005 to 109.6 in 2010 (UNDP, 2010). This contradicts the statistical averages which
measured a worsening of the IMR following successful violent campaigns. This may be due to the fact that the successful campaign did not usher in a more autocratic government as many of the others did.

The World Health Organization estimates that in Pakistan 80 percent of deliveries are attended by only a traditional birth attendant, with as little as one in twenty women with complications of pregnancy or childbirth reaching a facility with a trained emergency obstetrical care attendant (Jokhio et al., 2005:2092). The Infant mortality rate was estimated at 86 per 1,000 live births in 1995. By five years after the campaign the infant mortality rate had kept pace with world average declines, and reduced to 76 per 1,000 live births. But by ten years after the campaign, Pakistan fell behind world averages and slowed the trajectory of improvement. Today out of 223 countries tracked by the WB, Pakistan is ranked a poor 198 in infant mortality. This goes against the statistical findings which showed improvement following unsuccessful violent campaigns and appears to be a reflection of Pakistan’s focus on geopolitical security concerns over internal social services.

Infant mortality scores for Lebanon have been improving steadily. In 2000 infant mortality was measured at an average of 29.3 deaths per 1,000 live births. By 2005 this had improved to an average of 24.52, and by 2010 improved again to 16.4 almost cutting in half the 2000 rate. This is a great improvement (data from WB, 2012). Lebanon’s improvement in IMR confirms the statistical findings that successful nonviolent campaigns ushered in regimes that made improvements in health care.

Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?
The type of campaign waged did have an impact on this structural stability indicator with states which experienced successful violent campaigns pulling funding away from health care and states which experienced any other type of campaign showing improvements. States with successful violent campaigns were worst overall when measured five years after campaign end, and recovered somewhat by ten years. States with successful nonviolent campaigns did the best overall and made the most progress ten years after the campaign showing the improvements made in these states were continued. Of our case studies only Lebanon’s results reflect the statistical findings for reasons explained above.

6. Respect for Human Rights

_Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings._

The U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the foundation of the international system of protection for human rights. The 30 articles of the UDHR establish the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people, in its vision for human dignity that transcends political boundaries and authority, committing governments to uphold the fundamental rights of each person. Data for this indicator from the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index is made up of four components: disappearances, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture. It ranges from 0 (no respect for any of these rights) to 8 (full respect for these four rights).

States that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns saw a good improvement in respect for human rights. From the pre-campaign average these states improved human rights score by 1.70 measured five years after the campaign ended and by ten years, had increased further to 2.17 confirming hypothesis 16.
States that experienced successful violent campaigns surprisingly showed an improvement in their human rights record, nearly as high as states that experienced successful nonviolent campaigns, when measured five years after the campaign ushered in a more autocratic government. The statistically significant improvement in human rights was 1.65 on the CIRI scale. This would seem to support the theory described above by Poe and Tate that military juntas which forcibly take power often justify themselves by claiming that they are replacing leaders who themselves were violating the rights of the citizens. But, by ten years after the campaign ended these results were reversed as the human rights record dipped below where the state was before the campaign began.

States that experienced unsuccessful campaigns saw mixed results with respect for human rights increasing for states which experienced nonviolent campaigns and decreasing for states which experienced violent campaigns, negating hypothesis 18. We had predicted that both types of unsuccessful campaigns would result in a drop in respect for human rights. It is interesting that these results were in the opposite direction. States which had violent campaigns clamped down on citizen’s physical integrity rights as the leaders may have felt threatened and these states did the worse overall on this indicator. But those that survived a nonviolent campaign had the opposite reaction and although they may have felt threatened, they gave more freedoms and rights. By ten years after the campaign ended both of these trends loss ground and moved back closer to the pre-campaign state.

Are the findings supported by the case studies?

CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index data is not available for East Germany. But if we could use the Soviet Union, who had a large hand in East German politics as a
proxy for what East Germany may have been like, we see big improvements from before and after reunification. In 1989 the Soviet Union had a score three on the Index with a good rating for disappearances (2), moderate for extrajudicial killings (1), and poor for political imprisonments (0) and torture (0). But, the united Germany five years after the campaign had a perfect score of eight, and by ten years after the campaign had lost ground in political imprisonments (1) and torture (1) for an index rating of six. This goes against our statistical findings which showed states with nonviolent successful movements improving by five years and then continuing to improve by ten years after the campaign. The direction is the same, but the unified Germany appears to have lost some ground by ten years.

Lawlessness remains a serious problem in Somalia, but some scholars feel that “the egregious levels of violent crimes and level of impunity associated with the early 1990’s are generally a thing of the past” (Menkhaus, 2006:89). The consensus is that things are getting better; and this includes the level of reported human rights abuses. Five and ten years after the 1992-1994 insurgency, the main perpetuators of human rights violations were the warring factions. But this has improved slightly as the local sharia courts have taken hold. The CIRI index does not have data for the failed state since the insurgency. Five years before the campaign Somalia had a score of zero. It’s encouraging to hear scholars are beginning to feel this is turning around, but without data Somalia cannot be included in our results.

Pakistan’s main problems in the area of human rights appear to be gender related and may not be computed in this index. Jejeebhay and Sathar’s research showed that “women in the north have relatively little autonomy or freedom of movement, limited
access to education, limited inheritance rights and limited opportunities for control over economic resources. After marriage, a young woman is expected to remain largely invisible to outsiders and under the authority of her husband’s family (2001:690).

Pakistan’s score on the index the year the Muhajir campaign began was three with poor component scores in political imprisonments and torture. By five years after the campaign this had fallen to two with a poor score in extrajudicial killings and by ten years dropped further to one. This goes against the statistical averages which showed that many of the states that have violent campaigns improved slightly at the five year mark and then when back down. Pakistan has been in steady decline.

Lebanon consistently scored four on the CIRI physical integrity rights index, in years 2000, 2005 and five years after the campaign in 2010. Lebanon scored well on disappearances (2), in the medium range on political imprisonment (1) and extrajudicial killings (1), and poorly on torture (0). Lebanon’s scoring was unchanged in the years from five years before the campaign until five years after, indicating that the Cedar revolution did not have a great impact on this aspect of society. Respect for human rights neither improved nor worsened during this time. (data from CIRI dataset, 2012).

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The type of campaign waged did have an impact on this indicator with states that experienced an unsuccessful violent campaign losing ground in respect for human rights and all others making progress within five years of the start of the campaign. But, by ten years after successful violent campaign states joined the unsuccessful ones in a worsening of human rights. This is another indicator that verifies Collier’s statement that: “violent campaigns are an extremely unreliable way to bringing about positive change” (2007:27).
Our case studies this time were not a good representation of the statistical findings with only East Germany at the five year mark and Pakistan at the ten year mark substantiating the statistical results.

7. **School Enrollment**

*Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.*

Two of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were specifically set up to address education. MDG 2 aims to ensure that children everywhere—boys and girls—will be able to complete a full course of good quality schooling and MDG 3 targets the elimination of gender disparity in primary and secondary education.

By five years after the end of successful nonviolent campaigns, these states had the net percentage of students attending school show improvement by a half of one percent (0.53) while the world average improved by 3.63 percent. Perhaps this was due to the suspension of classes while school facilities that were targeted (by regime forces) during the conflict were being rebuilt. But by ten years after the conclusion of successful nonviolent campaigns primary school attendance had swung up by 7.39 percentage points moving ahead of the 5.16 percent increase in the rest of the world. This was the highest increase of any type of campaign. It appears that by this time states had made it past the transition period and invested again in education.

Primary school enrollment in states with successful violent campaigns dropped by more than ten percentage points to -11.82 percent, five years after the campaign. The fact that the decrease was five years after campaign end indicated that the decrease was not
due to concerns for student’s safety during the violence, but changes made in the state by
the new regime ushered into power through violence. When measured ten years after the
campaign the decline in school enrollment continued to fall to -13.69 percentage points
even as world averages continued to improve over the same period.

The results for states that experienced unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns initially
were the most improved overall, while unsuccessful violent campaigns moved slightly
lower than pre-campaign averages. At ten years after the campaign, states which had
unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns had enrollments rates nearly double world averages
(7.16 percent compared to 3.83) and by ten years after the campaign, this had slowed
down as was slightly below the world average (4.38 percent compared to 4.47). It appears
that the effect of the campaign and the positive changes implemented in education had
lost some of its focus by ten years after the campaign.

In the end only states which experienced successful nonviolent campaigns were
ahead of world averages, successful violent campaigns were well below pre-campaign
levels and unsuccessful campaigns of both types were on-par with enrollment rates for
the rest of the world.

*Are the findings supported by the case studies?*

The restructuring of the education system played a crucial role in the
transformation of East Germany; consequently, enormous sums were pumped into East
German schools and the training of teachers. Enrollment rates were not a cause of
concern in either East or West Germany as both countries continued to have enrollment
greater than 98 percent attendance both before and after reunification. However the
school systems were very different and presented an enormous challenge to replace the
former GDR system with that of the FRG. But, the results for East Germany are basically flat as there was no great improvement or decrease in enrollment. This confirms the flat results of the statistical average at five years after the campaign. But by ten years after the campaign the statistical average improved greatly as the already high East German results continued unchanged.

In Somalia during the years of “1992 to 1995 factional fighting, school facilities, technical training centers and universities became among the first casualties of the senseless mass destruction of infrastructure and at times, coupled with the targeting of teachers” (Abdi, 1998:327). This left the country without any educational system. Five and ten years after the violent campaign of 1992-1994 there is still no organized system of learning in place and millions of Somalia’s children are at the mercy whatever informal education they can pick up. School enrollment data are not available for Somalia but, we can assume that with formal education having been discontinued the informal efforts that are taking its place are to a much lesser degree, so these results do confirm the statistical average which showed a decrease in school enrollment following violent campaigns.

School enrollment data are not available for Pakistan before 2001 but, if literacy rate can be used as a proxy we can present some results. The definition of literacy rate from USESCO Institute for Statistics is: “Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life” (UNESCO, 2013). In 1994 the year the campaign began literacy rates was 37 percent, by 1999 it had improved to 42.7 percent, and ten years after the campaign had improved again to 49.9 percent. This steady improvement goes against the
statistical findings for states with successful violent campaigns which showed slight
decrease at five years and then confirms the improvement at ten years following the
campaign.

The sectorial divisions of Lebanon translate into uneven results and progress in
education with some sectors reporting better results than others. Although Lebanon does
not provide data on national school enrollment, literacy rates suggests that is still behind
other Arab states even though it is considered a middle-income state. Five years prior to
the Cedar revolution Lebanon’s adult population literacy rate was 66 percent, compared
to an average for Arab states which had a literacy rate of 82 percent. By five years after
the campaign ended, Lebanon had improved to 74 percent, but the average for Arab states
had also improved to 90 percent, still leaving Lebanon behind its Arab counterparts
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). Lebanon’s steady improvement goes against the
statistical average which was nearly flat for these states.

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The type of campaign again had a measurable impact on the structural stability
indicator. By ten years after the campaign, states which experienced nonviolent
campaigns had made gains in school enrollment or literacy while states which
experienced violent campaigns lost ground. States which had nonviolent campaigns
which were successful even exceeded the progress made in the rest of the world; meaning
that although the recovery from the campaign was initially difficult these states caught up
and surpassed world averages improving where they would have been had the campaign
not occurred.
For our case studies only Lebanon’s results did not confirm the statistical findings either at five or ten years.

8. **Regional Stability**

*Brief restatement of theoretical projections and analytical findings.*

The final indicator that was studied was regional stability. Even as nonviolent campaigns are different in the theoretical assumptions that underlay the nature of struggle from their violent counterparts, both types of campaigns impact their neighbors and the world community. They don’t exist in isolation; there are financial, political, social, legal, and health consequences to neighboring states.

States with successful nonviolent campaigns did correlate with an increase in the number of regional conflicts when measured five years after these campaigns ended, confirming hypothesis 26. By ten years after successful nonviolent campaigns ended, the amount of regional conflict decreased by three percentage points, and these campaigns, were the only type of campaigns to see this decreasing trend. We may be seeing that nonviolent campaigns not only improve the structural stability indicators of the state, but also may be bringing a peace benefit to the region.

States with successful violent campaigns also increased the number of conflicts in the region when measured five years after campaign ended, and by ten years after the regional effect was back down to zero. It was exactly as it was before the campaign began. In the voile world of developing states this seems to make sense. Ten years after a conflict ends the buildup of arms is no longer impacting regional stability.
Hypothesis 27 predicted that the increases in regional conflicts could be even higher for unsuccessful campaigns as incumbent leader’s redirected funds to fighting security concerns and indeed they were. Unsuccessful violent campaigns were correlated with the greatest increase in regional conflict, five years after campaign. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns were correlated with a modest increase in regional conflict. By ten years after unsuccessful violent campaigns, regional conflict was still five percentage points above where it was before the campaign began. The states with unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns were closer to pre-campaign levels than the violent ones but still two percentage points above where they began.

Are the findings supported by the case studies?

As Gorbachev changed the Soviet policies from the Brezhnev doctrine to what became known as the Sinatra doctrine it was clear that East Germany and the other Eastern Bloc states were left to run things in their own way. Poland was the first to oppose their authoritative regime with a nonviolent campaign. Hungary was next with its nonviolent campaign and East Germany followed soon behind. In fact, in the Eastern Bloc as a whole: Albania, Romania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, besides Poland, Hungary and East Germany, all had campaigns for change which began in 1989. Similar pressures were impacting all of these Eastern Bloc states: economic stagnation, increased poverty, decreasing standard of living, coupled with the changes in political support from the Soviet Union, led to campaigns for regime change that inevitably encouraged each other, and confirmed our the statistical results.
The amount of violent conflict experienced within Somalia directly reflected the amount of conflict going on in the region. At the time of the insurgency the Uppsala University Armed Conflict Dataset reported that 50 percent of the states in the region were also experiencing some form of armed conflict including all of Somalia’s direct neighbors. Similarly to Somalia, in three of the regional conflicts at least one of the parties was comprised of non-state actors. It could not be justifiably argued that the regional conflicts caused or brought about the internal factional fighting in Somalia, but it could be argued that neighboring states were responding to the same drivers as brought about the Somali conflict including: drought causing famine, excessive availability of arms left over from the cold war, and colonial powers that provided large amounts of government funding that was fought over and caused internal conflicts.

By 1999, five years after campaign end the Uppsala Dataset reports that the amount of conflict in the region had dropped to 21 percent. This also reflects the pattern within Somalia as there was still some factional fighting, but the famine had passed, and some local municipal governance had started to form. By 2004, ten years after the campaign, conflict in the region had decreased further to 13 percent with only Ethiopia, Sudan and Algeria of the Northern African states experiencing conflict. Somalia continued to improve as well, contradicting the pattern found in the statistical results.

Pakistan’s security concerns are due to its geopolitical location and the regional instability, and these have played a major role in Pakistan’s allotment of strong powers of authority to its military as well as its continued allotment of large portions of its yearly federal budget. This situation seems unlikely to change unless the geopolitical climate in the region becomes altered. The Kashmir dispute would need to be resolved, the
relationship with India would need to change significantly and become non-threatening, and stability would need to come to Afghanistan as well as Iran before any real change within Pakistan could take place. Since the Muhajir campaign regional conflicts have steadily decreased from 38 percent in 1994 to 16 percent in 1999, to 12 percent in 2004 contradicting the statistical findings for unsuccessful violent campaign states. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear power may be having more of an effect on the region than the internal Muhajir campaign.

Lebanon has been the playing field for proxy wars of the international powers, regional alliances, and neighboring conflicts which all had a hand in determining Lebanon’s political affairs. It’s clear that there are regional influences that are impacting Lebanon, and that Lebanon’s Cedar revolution is impacting the region with the Palestinian Intifada following shortly after its successful conclusion. These results confirm the statistical findings.

**Summary, did the type of campaign have an impact on this indicator?**

The peace benefit is hopeful. Not only do successful nonviolent campaigns improve domestic matters but make a positive contribution regionally as well. The type of campaign waged had a measurable impact on this structural stability indicator. By ten years after the campaign was concluded; successful nonviolent campaigns had brought peace to the region; successful violent campaigns had brought no change; and unsuccessful campaigns of both types brought further instability. The results for East Germany and Lebanon both confirmed these results. Somalia and Pakistan were exceptions, for reason explained above.
Overall Conclusion and contribution of this study

The eight structural stability indicators and four case studies did show that the type of campaign that was waged and whether it was successful or failed to achieve its goals, did had an impact on both internal structural stability and regional stability. The main contribution of this study is in the understanding it brings to how states recover differently from violent and nonviolent campaigns that succeed or fail.

Successful nonviolent campaigns brought the most positive growth as shown in the largest gains in seven of the indicators. The areas that these campaigns made the largest gains were: life expectancy, implementation of rule of law, degree of Autocracy/Democracy, infant mortality, respect for human rights, school enrollment and regional stability. Unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns brought the most gains in long term economic growth.

Unsuccessful violent campaigns brought the most damage in four of the indicators: long term economic growth, implementation of rule of law, degree of Autocracy/Democracy, respect for human rights and regional stability. Successful violent campaign brought the most damage to three indicators: school enrollment, life expectancy and infant mortality. It appears that these states suffered all of the damages of a major campaign without the hopeful changes that a new regime can bring. It is hoped that in the future, more indicators could be added to the study to expand the robustness of the results.
What this study suggests about methodology

This work supports the argument that both quantitative and qualitative analyses are important and useful methodologies; and are valuable in that they supply different information. The quantitative analysis described the historical trends in recovery from major campaigns with some unexpected results. For example, for all states that had any type of major campaign, by ten years after the campaign had ended, all had moved to greater democracy. This is a surprising result given the common argument that violent campaigns, military coups d’état and rebel insurgencies are thought to usher in new regimes with greater autocracy, which they did at five years post-campaign but by ten years this had changed. Another unexpected result that the quantitative analysis revealed was that states that experience a successful violent campaign, by five years afterwards had made improvements in respect for human rights, at least those measured in the component areas of the CIRI Index: torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and disappearances. Further analysis revealed the suggestion that leaders who take power through violence are often replacing those with poor human rights records.

The qualitative analysis also revealed some unexpected results but, different from those communicated through the quantitative analysis. Generally speaking it is the difference between a statistical average and an individual case. Sometimes the case is in line with the average, other times above or below it. In this study, the years that Pakistan was under military rule and made the most economic progress communicated that individual cases don’t always fit the statistical predictions. The qualitative analysis went on to describe how military leaders unconcerned with the next election will make different decisions than democratically elected officials. This unique qualitative analysis
informs what may be possible for other states. It stands apart from the average and communicates what Pakistan has done successfully. Lebanon is a case that more closely aligned with the statistical predictions. The successful nonviolent Cedar revolution moved the state to higher levels of democracy, improved its infant mortality rate, increased life expectancy and improved GDP PPP relative to the US all in line with statistical predictions. So the case studies can reveal when states are confirming the results of other states in the averages, and when unique circumstances lead them to take a different path.

Taken by itself a case study does not allow one to generalize and surmise how typical the individual case may be. For instance taking the Pakistani example by itself, we would not know how common it is for military rulers to bring economic growth to their state. Taking the other handle and only performing the quantitative analysis we would not be able to explain why the outliers are different from the average. We would need the rich details that case studies bring. In sum, both quantitative and qualitative methodologies are helpful and complement each other in usefulness.
**Correlation is not causation**

A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, by Franz H. Messerli reports an association between per capita chocolate consumption and the number of Nobel Prize recipients per ten million people (2012: 1562). Switzerland stood out far above other states with Sweden and Denmark following behind. Obviously chocolate consumption is unlikely to cause Nobel prizes, and therefore this association at best would be considered a correlation which is accounted for by other unmeasured variables; perhaps state’s investment is science. A correlation simply means that there is a relationship or association between two things. Correlations can be positive (an increase in one also shows an increase in the other), or negative (an increase in one is associated with a decrease in the other).

To get at causation and be able to say that something caused something else scientists look for several factors. One is the sequence of events. If one event is always preceded by the other it is more likely to be a causal relationship but to say definitely that one caused the other scientists often look to perform a randomized controlled trial (RCT) which is considered the ‘gold standard’ of experiments. The RCT involves the random assignment of participants into treatment and control groups with the ‘randomization’ aiding in accounting for other possible factors or explanations for the results. In the social sciences this is not always possible. States were not assigned to have major campaigns and the outcomes were measured only after the fact.

Some other possible explanations for the outcomes measured following major campaigns might include the fact that the state was ready for change. Perhaps the media had been suppressed, economic growth held back, neighbors who were living under
similar circumstances were experiencing better living conditions … all may prime the state for change. So perhaps the fact that the state was ready for change brought about the outcome (economic growth, increased life expectancy, respect for human rights etc.) with or without a campaign occurring. And also readiness for change could also be correlated with the state having a major campaign. So the unmeasured variable associated with both a change in the outcome of the stability indicators and having a major campaign could be the state’s readiness for change.

Another potential alternative explanation is the unmeasured regional influence. This work spoke about regional stability as something that is not often measured or considered when a major campaign occurs within a state’s borders. But the early 1989 ‘Autumn of Nations’ and the more recent ‘Arab Spring’ inform that campaign organizers within states are influenced by their neighbors. It is another possible unmeasured variable that can be associated with both the outcome changes in the stability indicators and having a major campaign.

So we see there could be several underlying factors correlating with both the event and the outcome negating the thesis that the campaign caused the outcome. All we can accurately say is that they are correlated.

**Final words**

It is hoped that future campaign organizers, and governments as well as individuals who want to support them, will see the numerous benefits of waging nonviolent campaigns and will choose peaceful means, in their quest for change.
And it is hoped that this work has shown that states are better off, and make greater progress in future growth and stability for having had a major nonviolent campaign.
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### Appendix A. List of campaigns used in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Beg. year</th>
<th>Nonviol</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville (ROC)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second People Power Movement</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-dem movement</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose Revolution</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulip Revolution</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar Revolution</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B. Regression Tables

Table 4. Regression Results for Life Expectancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>12.342***</td>
<td>17.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.154)</td>
<td>(3.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Exp. 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>-0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.538)</td>
<td>(1.670)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>-4.955***</td>
<td>-6.310***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.948)</td>
<td>(2.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>6.018***</td>
<td>7.840***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.327)</td>
<td>(2.632)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>0.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.

Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 5. Regression Results for Long Term Economic Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.403*</td>
<td>-3.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.898)</td>
<td>(2.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP rel. to US 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>5.497**</td>
<td>5.839**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.202)</td>
<td>(2.759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>2.150</td>
<td>1.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.672)</td>
<td>(3.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.750</td>
<td>-3.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.262)</td>
<td>(4.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively
Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 6. Regression Results for Rule of Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.372*** (0.871)</td>
<td>3.820*** (1.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.284 (0.135)</td>
<td>0.301 (0.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.793*** (0.503)</td>
<td>-1.674*** (0.562)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.507 (0.601)</td>
<td>-0.515 (0.678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.196 (0.717)</td>
<td>0.517 (0.827)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-squared | 0.423 | 0.327 |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.386 | 0.275 |
Num. observations | 67 | 57 |

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively
Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-3.592**</td>
<td>-0.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.457)</td>
<td>(1.593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity 5 years prior</strong></td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonviolent (dummy)</strong></td>
<td>6.671***</td>
<td>6.503***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.699)</td>
<td>(1.838)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Success (dummy)</strong></td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>1.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.112)</td>
<td>(2.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction (dummy)</strong></td>
<td>2.483</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.514)</td>
<td>(2.812)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **R-squared**            | 0.476        | 0.396        |
| **Adjusted R-squared**   | 0.445        | 0.355        |
| **Num. observations**    | 73           | 64           |

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*, ***, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively

Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 8. Regression Results for Infant Mortality Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.576</td>
<td>10.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.075)</td>
<td>(6.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMR 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>4.426</td>
<td>1.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.990)</td>
<td>(6.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>23.091***</td>
<td>24.443***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.413)</td>
<td>(7.933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>-29.941***</td>
<td>-31.960***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.008)</td>
<td>(9.616)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.

Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 9. Regression Results for Respect for Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.447*</td>
<td>1.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.990)</td>
<td>(1.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resp. for HR 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>3.754***</td>
<td>2.231*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.176)</td>
<td>(1.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>3.769**</td>
<td>1.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.573)</td>
<td>(1.515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>-3.698**</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.802)</td>
<td>(1.829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*., **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively
Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.731</td>
<td>-0.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.850)</td>
<td>(12.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp. To Pop. 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>1.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>-3.164</td>
<td>-7.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.116)</td>
<td>(8.533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>-3.216</td>
<td>-6.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.894)</td>
<td>(6.782)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>1.470</td>
<td>7.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.728)</td>
<td>(10.417)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.

Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 11. Regression Results for School Enrollment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.741</td>
<td>27.153*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.647)</td>
<td>(13.567)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sch. Enroll. 5 years prior</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>0.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>7.522</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.284)</td>
<td>(6.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>-11.463</td>
<td>-17.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16.470)</td>
<td>(13.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>4.834</td>
<td>20.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20.758)</td>
<td>(18.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively

Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Table 12. Regression Results for Regional Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg. Stability 5 years prior</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (dummy)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. observations</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively
Column ‘A’ represents the value of the indicator five years post campaign, and ‘B’ ten years post campaign.
Judith G. Stoddard

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PhD, Global Affairs, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 2013
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Thesis Title: The Emergence of Opposition Movements.

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BA, Psychology, State University of New York, Oswego, NY 1979
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Senior Manager, security and disaster recovery on the largest outsourcing contract in IT history. 2010 to present
Director International Partnerships, AT&T International 2000 to 2006
Technical Manager: AT&T International. Led team base lining service levels to 185 countries, conducted surveys, analyzed monthly metrics, presented results to upper mgt. 1996 to 2000
Member of the Technical Staff: Bell Labs. Technical Manager, data-mining and analysis of large call volume quality dataset. 1985 to 1996
Director Oswego Women’s Center 1980 to 1985

Publications.