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Non-tax revenue and subnational democracy
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Keller, Lukas Konstantin. Non-tax revenue and subnational democracy. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T30P0XM7

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TitleNon-tax revenue and subnational democracy
NameKeller, Lukas Konstantin (author); Zucco, Cesar (chair); Davis, Eric M (internal member); Kaufman, Robert R (internal member); Rutgers University; Graduate School - New Brunswick
Date Created2013
Other Date2013-05 (degree)
SubjectPolitical Science, Resource curse--Colombia, Revenue--Colombia, Democracy--Colombia
Extentv, 52 p. : ill.
DescriptionAn influential group of political economists posits a negative relationship between the relative size of non-tax revenues in public balance sheets and the level of democracy in a given county. While empirical evidence for this proposition is largely based on cross-national studies, scholars have largely neglected subnational contexts as important domains of research. Addressing this disjuncture, the author studies the electoral impact of two important subnational non-tax revenues - natural resource royalties and central-government fiscal transfers - at the municipal level in Colombia. Employing a propensity score matching approach to attenuate problems of omitted variable bias, a quantitative analysis of Colombia's 1119 municipalities shows that higher levels of fiscal transfers and petroleum royalties had no discernible impact on the average level of competitiveness in the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections. If anything, there seems to be a positive impact of non-tax revenues on electoral contestation. Supported by qualitative evidence from theoretical outliers in the set of observations, the results suggest that non-tax revenue promotes electoral competition by raising the stakes of attaining political office. At the same time, abundance in fiscal transfers and resource royalties may undermine democratic governance through means that are not reflected in electoral margins.
NoteM.A.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
NoteIncludes vita
Noteby Lukas Konstantin Keller
Genretheses, ETD graduate
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T30P0XM7
Languageeng
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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