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Modal primitivism

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TitleInfo
Title
Modal primitivism
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Wang
NamePart (type = given)
Jennifer
NamePart (type = date)
1984-
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Jennifer Wang
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author
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Zimmerman
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Dean
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Dean Zimmerman
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Advisory Committee
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chair
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Schaffer
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Jonathan
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Jonathan Schaffer
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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King
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Jeffrey
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Jeffrey King
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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Cameron
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Ross
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Ross Cameron
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Advisory Committee
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outside member
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Weatherson
NamePart (type = given)
Brian
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Brian Weatherson
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Advisory Committee
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outside member
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Rutgers University
Role
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degree grantor
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NamePart
Graduate School - New Brunswick
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school
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Text
Genre (authority = marcgt)
theses
OriginInfo
DateCreated (qualifier = exact)
2013
DateOther (qualifier = exact); (type = degree)
2013-05
Place
PlaceTerm (type = code)
xx
Language
LanguageTerm (authority = ISO639-2b); (type = code)
eng
Abstract
Modal primitivism is the view that there are modal features of the world which cannot be reduced to the non-modal. Theories which embrace primitive modality are often rejected for reasons of ideological simplicity: the fewer primitive notions a theory invokes, the better. Furthermore, modal primitivism is often associated with the view that all modal features of the world are irreducibly modal, which appears unsystematic and unexplanatory. As a result, many prefer modal reductionism. This work is an articulation and defense of a modal primitivist theory of modality which requires minimal ideology and is systematic and explanatory. On this version of modal primitivism, only some modal features of the world are irreducibly modal—namely, incompatibilities between certain properties or relations. Other modal features of the world are reducible to a combination of primitive incompatibilities and the non-modal features of the world. In chapter 1, I introduce various issues in the metaphysics of modality, giving appropriate background for what follows. My modal primitivist theory of modality is introduced in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 2, I argue that a well-known modal reductionist theory of modality is not as ideologically innocent as it’s thought to be: modal primitivism has the upper hand with respect to primitive notions. I then introduce the primitive notion of incompatibility and show how this notion can be used to account for de dicto modality, which concerns purely qualitative modal claims. In chapter 3, I present a theory of de re modality, that which concerns modal claims involving particular individuals. Since on this theory the de re is reducible to the de dicto, it requires no more primitive modality than that which appears at the level of the de dicto. I end in chapter 4 by arguing against a rival modal primitivist theory, showing that the primitive notion that it countenances, dispositionality, cannot account for all modal claims.
Subject (authority = RUETD)
Topic
Philosophy
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Title
Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD
Identifier
ETD_4655
PhysicalDescription
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electronic resource
InternetMediaType
application/pdf
InternetMediaType
text/xml
Extent
vii, 140 p.
Note (type = degree)
Ph.D.
Note (type = bibliography)
Includes bibliographical references
Note (type = vita)
Includes vita
Note (type = statement of responsibility)
by Jennifer Wang
Subject (authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Modality (Theory of knowledge)
Subject (authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Metaphysics
Identifier (type = hdl)
http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.1/rucore10001600001.ETD.000068994
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TitleInfo
Title
Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier (type = local)
rucore19991600001
Location
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NjNbRU
Identifier (type = doi)
doi:10.7282/T36T0K6Z
Genre (authority = ExL-Esploro)
ETD doctoral
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Rights

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The author owns the copyright to this work.
RightsHolder (type = personal)
Name
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Wang
GivenName
Jennifer
Role
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RightsEvent
Type
Permission or license
DateTime (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact); (point = start)
2013-04-12 13:39:56
AssociatedEntity
Name
Jennifer Wang
Role
Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. Graduate School - New Brunswick
AssociatedObject
Type
License
Name
Author Agreement License
Detail
I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
Copyright
Status
Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
Reason
Permission or license
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Technical

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ETD
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windows xp
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