

PRESERVING MEMORY: NEWARK AND RUTGERS  
IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S

An Interview with

STANLEY KAISH

Conducted by

Gilbert Cohen

JULY 24 AND 29, 1991

INTERVIEW: Stanley Kaish

INTERVIEWER: Gilbert Cohen

DATE: July 24 and 29, 1991

GILBERT COHEN: Okay. This is July 24, 1991. This is Gil Cohen, and I'm speaking with Professor Stanley Kaish in his home in Springfield, New Jersey. [Break in recording] Okay. We're back. Dr. Kaish has been on the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences in Newark since 1963. He is professor of economics with a Ph.D. in economics from NYU. He is currently chairman of the Business Department of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in Newark. And I was asking you before, Stan, if you could... a brief resume of your academic career.

STANLEY KAISH: Well, my academic career has been largely going to school. I have a bachelor's degree from Cornell and a master's degree from the Wharton School, which is an MBA. And then I was out of school for a while, and then went back to NYU and attended the business... Well, I attended Washington Square for a while, but graduated from the business school downtown, majoring in economics. And then I joined Rutgers as my first and only full-time academic job. I did some teaching at the University of Pennsylvania during my master's degree days. But Rutgers is my entire career, and I joined the Economics Department at a time when I was still working on my Ph.D. which was in sixty-three.

COHEN: How would you describe the old Rector Street campus physically?

KAISH: Well, I often think about my job interview and the campus itself. I had applied in several places around the New Jersey area, and I got a letter back from Helen Cook. And I called her, and she was on Lombardy Street at the time, where the Economics Department had its office, and said, "Why don't you come down and have an interview?" So I went down, and Lombardy Street was on the far side of Broad Street. And Helen was in the office, and I came. And we visited for about an hour. And Helen said, "You will do fine." [Laughter] And that was the recruitment and hiring process. That year she hired three of us in the same manner.

COHEN: Just like that, yes.

KAISH: And among the three of us, we've had a total of about eighty years of service. [Laughter] I guess there's something about that process that worked. What the campus consisted of was Lombardy Street where Helen then was; and James Street where we subsequently moved that year. And our classes were in Washington Square next to the VA building, where the business school was. And Rector and Fulton Street, I really didn't have much to do with except for the library. But I did get over and climb the four floors to the library because I was still working on my Ph.D. And I remember the library as being quite handy because it was compact and open stacked. When I would be looking for something, I would often find something else, which turned out to be very helpful. [Laughs] Having come from Cornell where they were closed stacks and you got what you asked for, I found being able to rummage to be a big plus. And it wasn't until after we'd been there for a while that the extension of the campus took place. But it

was essentially an urban.... We had a parking lot which was—I was at No. 10 James, and behind us was a parking lot. All that is where the Blue Cross is now.

COHEN: What was it like teaching in those facilities?

KAISH: Well, I taught in, I guess, 15 Washington Square. The windows were open, and I remember you were always—on the first floor you were always exposed to people going by. And there were a couple of episodes where somebody going by would shout in the window or participate. And you lived with it as well as you could. I wasn't air conditioned. It was...at the time it was really about what I was used to at NYU because NYU was in the old Rector Street building, where the chairs would creak, and it was hot and stuffy. I guess they empathized with the guys outside as we always thought of as the drunks.

COHEN: Can you tell us about that a little? Any episode that sticks out in your mind?

KAISH: No. Just some guy coming by yelling something like, "What are you filling their heads with all those lies for?"

COHEN: Oh! [Laughs] Any more—any more gems? [Laughter] Yes, really.

KAISH: I would try to assure the kids that, no, no, this was the word. [Laughs] I don't think the teaching experience there, under those conditions, was vastly different than what it was and what it subsequently became—in Hill Hall and the buildings there. The only thing was was this openness to the community that I thought was—as I think of now as memorable and quite remarkable.

COHEN: When you say openness to the community, are you saying that in a positive sense, in a pejorative sense?

KAISH: No, no. I'm just saying it in the geographical, literal sense. The windows were wide open, and anything that came by...you were exposed to whoever came by. The good people of Newark were never reticent to comment on what they saw there.

COHEN: Now how did the students respond to that condition?

KAISH: You know they were used to going to school in the same setting, and they took it in stride. It wasn't...I don't think it was threatening. I think if I were to have the same experience now, I might consider it more threatening than I considered it then. But I never considered Newark to be threatening in those days. I saw them as a harmless drunk. Now I'd probably see it as something quite ominous to be shielded from. But then it didn't seem like there were hazards. I was completely unaware of any hazards that might be coming my way.

COHEN: When did this awareness come about? When did the change occur?

KAISH: My what?

COHEN: A change in perception...that's very interesting.

KAISH: I guess it set in after the new campus went in, and we began to have classes in I guess it must have been Conklin before Hill Hall was open. Our offices were on James Street. We had moved from 10 James to 43 James or 42 James. I remember the Mutual Benefit Building went in. But we would have to walk from the James Street location over to the class and back and forth. And the Goodwill Industries was on that block and the library. Sort of the back of the museum where the garden is was on that block. And there were people on the block whom you'd go by, and they would panhandle you. And I guess it was then I began to feel a little alien in the setting.

COHEN: The trek from James to the University Heights campus along now University Avenue.

KAISH: Yes. We did that for quite a number of years because the Economics Department didn't move into Hill Hall until the very end. Hill Hall was the last of the buildings to go up of the original unit. And it must have been almost five years—or four years—that we trekked there.

COHEN: From James, yes.

KAISH: Yes. Hill was very slow going up. The only time any work seemed to get done on Hill was just before graduation.

COHEN: [Laughs] So it was the location. But how do you think—what was the impact of the Newark riots on this perception. The riots were in July of sixty-seven. The new campus really started going September of sixty-seven. Dedicated in sixty-eight. This perception, again, was....

KAISH: Well, I guess that was all part of the perception that.... The riots were—I won't say they were an abstraction—but I wasn't involved in the riots. I remember the summer of the riots, I was away when they occurred. I was on vacation. I remember hearing about them on the radio; we were up in Cape Cod. I know friends of mine were teaching summer school, and they have a much more real recollection of what it was like. And they tell tales of National Guard on the roads and everything. But by the time I got back to school, I guess the riots had taken place. There was a fact that they had taken place. But I nevertheless—I used to drive down Springfield Avenue to work, and I don't think I was ever upset by that. I looked at what there was. It was kind of a wreck. But then it was probably more the personal. In the back of my mind was the knowledge of these riots, but it was quite abstract. What was more personal was the [ ] going by. And knowing that there was this unrest in the city and then confronting these residents of the city, and generally they were the poorer residents who were hanging out at the Goodwill.

COHEN: Did you have any episodes or confrontations with any of the people?

KAISH: I had one guy hit me up for some money, not very substantial, for three or four dollars, with a promise to pay me back. And I innocently said that I thought he would. I gave him my address thinking he would pay me back, which was naïve. Not having resisted it, it never became threatening. I don't know if it would have or not. But I remember it twenty-five years later, so I guess it made an impression. This was alien territory.

COHEN: Among the faculty, was there any discussion on the reasons, the causes of the riots—faculty and students, I should say?

KAISH: Yes, yes. I think the riots really...the riots really took me by surprise, as I think about it. I don't know. Newark had obviously changed. I didn't grow up in Newark. My friends and my relatives came from Newark. Newark had changed. It was black, and it was poor. I think the mayor was white at the time. I think Addonizio was still the mayor. Well, I think, as I recall, I think it was just a surprise and almost an act of nature. I don't think—like an earthquake. I don't think I anticipated or could rationalize it at the time.

COHEN: Do you think the faculty or people you were associated with had similar perceptions?

KAISH: The riots and the student unrest kind of blend together. The riots—I think we just happened to be in Newark, and the riots just happened to be in Newark. I don't think we thought of ourselves as a part of the riots; they were someplace else in Newark, and we happened to be there. I think certainly the student unrest, which came later and it's kind of fuzzy in my mind because Vietnam....

COHEN: February of sixty-nine.

KAISH: I mean the riots were in sixty-eight.

COHEN: Sixty-seven, July sixty-seven, and then the takeover of Conklin was in February of sixty-nine.

KAISH: Yes. Well, even before that the Vietnam War and the demonstrations seemed very strange. And I think my reaction was to sort of dismiss it. It wasn't vivid in my consciousness. I was aware it was happening, but I went to class, the students went to class, I lectured, they were respectful. It's as if it was another—that was another world. It just wasn't really an every day, every moment part of my life. I think the economics faculty at the time was relatively conservative, relatively unsympathetic, to student causes and student rights as they were exercised. And we just went about our business. And it mostly intruded at faculty meetings when subjects would come up about...well, about that time the students were allowed access to faculty meetings, about that time they began to exercise the right. Actually, they only came very briefly. They fought hard to get the right to attend them. I guess it was about a year when they'd come and occasionally they'd speak. I haven't seen one at a faculty meeting in the last five years. But when they came they would lecture us occasionally on student rights and non-responsiveness. I remember one guy gave the classic: "Unless you bend before the wind, you will break." And that quote...again, I remember very clearly that....

COHEN: What was this in connection with? Do you recall what was the issue at that time?

KAISH: I really don't recall the issue. At the time I was on the Courses of Study Committee at the time. And there came to be a time when we began to try to develop a curriculum that was responsiveness to what we thought were student wants. And we met. This is only what the kid

was carrying on about: If you don't bend, you'll break. But what they seemed to want was a less structured curriculum. I guess not terribly different from what now they seem—what now seems to be the cultural diversity type thing. But they wanted a more flexible curriculum. And we met, and we tried to come up with something. But what we finally came up with was rejected by the faculty. And then I went off the committee and lost touch with it.

COHEN: What kind of flexibility, if you can recall, were they looking for?

KAISH: I just don't think they wanted any requirements. I think they just wanted to take courses. And what we came back with was actually to recommend that one option was that they take distribution requirements but that they not really have a major. The faculty had the good sense to vote down that.

COHEN: You're saying the committee had suggested distribution but no major?

KAISH: Yes.

COHEN: Oh, I see.

KAISH: I think Michael Jaye was the chair of the committee; this is not to put the blame on him. But you may want to talk to Michael about it. [Laughter] To our everlasting shame.

COHEN: Okay. And so the faculty insisted on a major.

KAISH: Well, the faculty, no, they didn't think it was a good idea. I think they did the genteel thing, which was send it back to committee.

COHEN: Now was this demand of the students, was this tied in with the civil rights movement, with the admissions demands of the black students? Or was it related to the anti-Vietnam War movement? Do you have any recollections of that?

KAISH: Well, I think the admissions.... The issue of the curriculum, I think that was just the students flexing their muscles. I can't logically link it up to anything except a rejection of authority. And I don't remember that it was specifically linked to...it wasn't linked to civil rights. I don't think there was anything cultural that they were after at the time. I don't think they were yet into the abandonment of Western Civilization as the heart of liberal arts education or the History of Western Civilization. I think it was just a rejection of authority. Well, you remember out of all this there was Committee one, Committee two; and I don't quite remember what Committee one and Committee two were about. But I think they came back with recommendations for opening the admissions and supporting new students coming in for the first couple of years and dropping the first semester's grades and waiving D's. And a lot of that stuff is still on the books.

COHEN: In the aftermath of the takeover of Conklin Hall, is that what you're talking about?

KAISH: My recollection is that it all sort of came back in time. That is, Conklin Hall was taken over. And again, we were off on James Street teaching...I guess we weren't even teaching in Conklin Hall. We were still teaching in Washington Square at the time. I knew Conklin Hall was taken over. I knew Bob Curvin...I was on this—some committee I was on got involved with Malcolm Talbott trying to deal with this. I remember going up to Malcolm Talbott's apartment where we caucused one night about what we were going to do. I guess several committees.... I guess I was involved with it to that extent. But out of it all came a settlement whereby they gave up the school—they gave up the building—and we agreed to rethink some of the conditions of their involvement in that.

COHEN: Do you remember any of the details of the caucus in Malcolm Talbott's apartment? What was said, who was there, anything you can provide there?

KAISH: I would be nice if I could or did, wouldn't it? No, I really don't. I just remember...I remember the apartment more than what came out of it. I know it ran into the evening. And I guess the issues were hardline versus compromise. I guess the resolution was...I just don't remember it actually happening. I remember the process. We were there, we caucused, we went from one room to another, and different committees caucused and got together. And evidently a policy emerged, the next thing, which comes back to me, is this series of changes which were introduced into the faculty. And there were some who protested them on the principles of watering down education. And others who championed them, and they passed, as you know.

COHEN: You mentioned Malcolm Talbott. What do you remember of him?

KAISH: Malcolm I remember...I guess he acted as the dean. Well, firstly he paid our faculty meetings a few visits in his capacity not as the dean, but he took over as the dean, I believe.

COHEN: He was acting dean.

KAISH: Yes.

COHEN: Yes, for that period. And vice president.

KAISH: He was there just before Blumenthal?

COHEN: Yes, yes. But he was the only one of the people who really had direct contact with them. So I'm trying to....

KAISH: Yes.

COHEN: Anything you can remember, his personality, what he did, that type of thing.

KAISH: Yes. I had the feeling that...I don't know what the depth was there. On the surface he was a salesman. He would fix you in the eye and talk directly to you. And when he was talking to large groups of people, he would walk among them. And I had the feeling that this was not our

run-of-the-mill funkering dean; that's what I'd say. [Laughs] He was like the guy who is out to sell something which was probably a notch about what we usually dealt with.

COHEN: [Laughs] What do you think, in retrospect, he was out to sell?

KAISH: Well, I guess peace in our time. I guess that's what he was selling. I guess now as I think about it, I guess we had peace in our time. There was a feeling that, I felt that... I subsequently had some students who I presume were there in what was an open admissions thing. I mean there was a sudden drop in the writing ability of some of the students. Not all of them. I mean there were some extraordinarily bad students. It goes beyond saying they were bad students. They were tragic in the kinds of things they would hand in. And I guess that was a revelation to me as to how weak in terms of basic skills some of the graduates were. And there's just no way they could succeed at college. I remember I used to come home and talk to Lois about it and my children then who were maybe eleven, twelve years old, who seemed to be better equipped than these students who were handing in exams. So I did have a feeling that whatever we had changed was sort of a fraud, and that there were kids coming in at that time who just weren't going to no way stay there. I think as it turned out there was a bit of a revolving door which became another source of trouble and pressure.

COHEN: Is that what you considered tragic?

KAISH: No, what I considered tragic was the weakness of the students. I remember an exam paper, an essay question answer, with three or four misspelled words, that sort of thing. But it was just... One guy, he just had no idea of what was expected of him, and no idea how to deal with it when he came to learn what was expected of him. Maybe I'm generalizing from a handful of cases, but there were a handful of very, very, very weak students.

COHEN: How did you deal with these students? How did you grade the students, how did you approach the students who were having difficulties?

KAISH: Well, I wrote on their papers, "Come see me!" Some did and some didn't.

[Break in recording]

COHEN: Well, we were talking again about these students. How did you deal with students, failing students, I mean who didn't have the preparation?

KAISH: I guess I didn't deal with them very successfully. I talked to them. I asked them why they couldn't write more, why they didn't write more? The answers were inarticulate in the sense of they just didn't know. They said they didn't understand what was going on. But they just couldn't express themselves. I think that went on for a year or so. I mean I think we had open admissions for about a year or two. And then I think the community colleges began more in earnest to take the weaker ones.

COHEN: The community colleges.



KAISH: Yes.

COHEN: Do you remember at this time what role did the Academic Foundations Center play in remediation?

KAISH: I think it came into existence at that time. And I never quite understood what EOF and Academic Foundations were. But I gather EOF were a certain group of students who came in under other circumstances, with financial support. And in fact there was also an issue over whether academic credit should be given for remedial courses, and how legitimate those courses were and how legitimate the faculty was. And again, there were issues that came and went that seemed important for a while, and then they just went away. I always had the feeling, justifiably or not—and probably not—but that the kid who came in and who needed Math 1, Math Skills 1, at that age probably wasn't ever going to become versatile. And they would learn some rote rules, but they never really developed an intuition for the math reasoning. The language, they may have come...in fact language, I think, was more teachable. But the math, I think, was sort of like the piano or riding a bicycle. If you don't do it by the time you're twelve, you're probably not going to do it. [Laughter] And I still have that sense. In fact I had a student—one of our more recent students—come to me just within the past month, who had graduated. He couldn't find a job that he wanted and had been doing some substitute teaching and was interested in becoming a commercial science teacher; that is, computers, office work. He didn't know shorthand, but he thought he'd like to—since he had a degree in business administration, he thought he'd like to teach business subjects. And would I help him prepare for this exam?

COHEN: Commercial science, did you say?

KAISH: I don't if commercial science is the right word.

COHEN: Oh, okay. Oh, yes. I understand.

KAISH: It was in the high schools.

COHEN: Sure.

KAISH: Teaching office procedures, the non-college track, the vocation track. He'd had some experience substituting, and he liked it. The kids liked him, and he was successful. And then he came in. And he had...somebody had prepared a preparation book like the Barron's for the SAT; this was a handbook of sample questions for the test that they give a certificate to teach this kind of thing. And he came with the math and the economics problems. And as we talked, I learned he had taken Math Skills 1 and 2. He knew how to multiply, and he knew how to divide. He wasn't quite sure when to do which, and I don't know how he made out with the test. But I sort of had the feeling that this is what I mean by fluency in the math reasoning. He could do the exercises. But what they call the word problems, he had difficulty doing. And I think that's probably.... I think—I have no reason to say because I have no firsthand experience, no systematic evaluation—but I think that's pretty much where the math skills people ended up. They ended up I think with a ceiling on where they were going.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Do you have any recollection of the development of the math skills remedial program on the campus, which I believe was headed up by Professor Pine? Any recollection of that?

KAISH: Charles Pine. I don't remember him as being involved in that, wasn't he?

COHEN: He apparently was very much. Cross-fertilization there.

KAISH: Well, I had lunch with Charlie one day, and, you know, as I think about it, we were talking about that. And I guess.... Yes, yes, I do remember talking to him about that. In fact, I talked about perhaps working with him, and he was sort of making overtures. No, I don't have any firsthand knowledge of that.

COHEN: When did things began to improve as far as the level of preparation of students is concerned...roughly?

KAISH: Well, there was this immediate sharp drop. And I didn't know that it was across the board. It was just that in my mind there are remembrances of extremes. They were terrible. I haven't seen those...then I stopped seeing those extremes. But I think probably the average level of aptitude went down, and I don't know that it ever came all the way back. But I think it was...if all of this happened in sixty-eight—is that when it is? When did the....

COHEN: Well, the takeover of Conklin was February sixty-nine, and then the pressure for admitting more minority students began to build. And the Urban University Department program was developed by sixty-nine, I believe. And seventy, seventy-one, I think, if you want to hang a date on it.

KAISH: Mm-hmm.

COHEN: So just wanted to sort of get your sense of what happened after that.

KAISH: Yes. Well, my sense is that there was, like I say, the extremes at the bottom vanished. I think there was probably improvement very, very gradually, all the way up. I don't have any recollection of any great improvement. I just have a recollection of these guys at the bottom leaving the picture. That is, somehow the revolving door stop revolving. About that time I was on the Scholastic Standing Committee, and I guess I developed for the first time an appreciation of the other aspects of student life because the ones who dropped out were being asked to write a request for reinstatement. And Lincoln Lawrence was the liaison between the faculty and—or between the dean's office—and the committee. And I was the chairman of the committee, and I dealt with Lincoln and I dealt with these letters. I don't remember exactly what year that was. But that was in the mid-seventies. And there began to develop an appreciation for the fact that these students had—or some of the students—had troubled lives, quite apart from their academics. And they talked about they couldn't study. There was fighting in the house. There was no privacy. Until then I never quite appreciated what went on outside the classroom. That experience, I think, shaped my sensitivity to extraordinary conditions. I think it made me more sympathetic towards students' circumstances.

COHEN: Do you have any recollections of any particularly poignant examples of students' problems?

KAISH: Oh, just.... No again, no specific ones. But I know that the same themes came up over and over again. People with either children of their own or younger children to take care of, and distractions in the house, moving and changing locations. Just all kinds of community and personal pathologies were hindering their education. Now some of these might have been embellishments. But we accepted them. And in fact there was a tendency to let them back in, and they would stay for another semester, another year. I don't know that there was a great deal of rehabilitation. But there was a leniency on the Scholastic Standing Committee's part.

COHEN: During that period, what effect did it have on the scholastic standards, actual—of the students that were let in? Just what happened during that period among the faculty? Because this committee was getting results.

KAISH: Oh, well, the Scholastic Standing Committee would, as one of its assignments, would look at the ones who were being flunked out. Another of its assignments was to look at grade inflation, which was...I mean here are all these obviously weaker students both from SAT scores and personal experience in the classroom, and more and more kids were making the dean's list and the honors list. And there was a grade inflation going on. So one of our charges was to look at that as well. And we came back again with a recommendation, again, which seems to be my unhappy experience, was voted down by the faculty. And the recommendation was that a certain percentage of honors be accorded to a certain percentage of the students rather than a certain grade-point average, which was now occupied by fifty or sixty percent of the students. And that became a political issue on the floor. That made me...there were people who responded that we were pitting one against the other, putting them in this competitive situation which wasn't fair to them. And what did it matter anyway that we were just sharing the reward system with more students. These were the words of some faculty. I remember, since I was the one who tried to sell this thing again, not accepting that obviously what it meant was that they weren't so much a legitimate earning, but that good grades were being debased. An A was debased, so a kid who really earned an A was the same as the kid who got a grade-inflation A. And so it debased the currency.

But the faculty didn't seem to buy that. And to the best of my knowledge has never adopted a percentage. I think honors are still by grade point. The dean's list still covers half the wall, it comes out. So.... I also have a recollection that we had a lot of African students coming in about then...at least in the Economics Department. We had a lot of Nigerian and other students. I think this was in the days of...I guess it must have been during the seventies when OPEC was riding high, and the Nigerians could afford to send more students. And among the Economics Department, we seemed to get the majority of them, I think, as a recollection. Some were very good, and some were very bad. But here also was a culture we hadn't been prepared to deal with. Because this was a culture in which everything was negotiable. And no matter what the grade was, it was just the opening bid. And you would have the kids show up on your doorstep. If they got an F, they'd lobby for a D or a B. If they got a C, they'd lobby for a B. It didn't matter. We

began to realize that this was a cultural thing; they were used to dealing in the bazaar rather than in the retail shop. But you didn't just take a price. You argued for it.

So there were several Nigerian students who were just legends in the Economics Department. I mean you can go talk to Peter Loeb or to Jack. And we just have vivid, vivid remembrances of these guys coming with tears streaming down their cheeks. And as soon as you said, yes, [snaps] the tears would disappear, and a smile would light up. And they'd say, "Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir." And off they'd go. But generally we didn't get the brighter lot of them. I know there are some very bright Nigerian students, but we didn't seem to get them. But there was a network, apparently an Old Boy Network. A lot of them came to Newark-Rutgers.

COHEN: And it was just a network? There was no recruitment—

KAISH: As far as I know—

COHEN: —as far as the administration was concerned?

KAISH: I don't think the administration recruited. They could have, but we sure had...we didn't have a statistical random appearance of them. We had lots of Nigerians. In fact we began to offer a master's degree program; they began to enroll in that, too. They would graduate and then continue on to get another degree.

COHEN: We were touching before on the takeover of Conklin Hall. Do you have any feelings, any opinions on what conditions existed on campus and the society that caused the takeover of Conklin? What was the grievance, in your opinion?

KAISH: In my opinion, what was the grievance? In my opinion, I don't know that there was a grievance. In my opinion I think of the climate in the air. And I think it was a contagion of rebelliousness. And I think it had already happened out in California, I think. It happened in New York. And I think it just happened in New Jersey. I think it was the thing to do. I really don't know what the grievances were. Probably they had to do with admissions, that's what they had to do with. I think I have a better understanding gathered through the media of what they were in these other places than in Newark. But, you know, I think it had to do with access and to do with a feeling that it was a white establishment stuck down as an island in the middle of black Newark. And the black community wanted access, more access, to it. How real the grievances were, I've no way of knowing.

I know that we had very few blacks in our classes. My other recollection is that when I taught before that, I think I had classes where maybe there'd be one black in the class. I felt an awkwardness in dealing with certain topics which had to do with income distribution and poverty. I felt ill at ease, had to do with...you know there's this theory in economics about marginal productivity and wages being related to marginal productivity and things which lead to employability. And trying to explain income distribution then to a lone black who sort of became the spokesman for the people. I remember feeling somewhat ill at ease. And blacks were very rare in the class. And they were obviously...I'm sure there was a belief in the community that there ought to be greater representation. I also know as history unfolded that there never came to

be great representation of blacks in the Rutgers-Newark population, to the great embarrassment of the university. They could never attract and hold I think the numbers they were after. I think there was a widely-held belief that a black student who was a strong student wouldn't be attending Rutgers-Newark. With all the scholarship money around and with their desire to get out of their house and their community, the chances are they'd be recruited away to a residential school. And Rutgers-Newark would probably end up with the weaker, urban black students anyway. But you ask me what their grievances were. I'm not aware of grievances which warranted—I guess this is a funny way to talk—which warranted that kind of an action.

COHEN: Your perceptions. You mentioned the student, the lone black student in the class—by way of the question. Further, how did events in the community, in society at large, the war in Vietnam affect your classroom work?

KAISH: Well, my personal reaction.... I remember that I certainly underestimated the war in Vietnam. I underestimated the size of it, I underestimated the impact of it. And I remember having a class in which a very bright, mature student raised the issue of Vietnam and its impact, again, on the fiscal stability of the economy. Not the social implications, but the economic side of it. And of course this was a time when Lyndon Johnson was not...he wanted the Great Society, and he wanted to fight the war. He wasn't going to tax for it. And I thought we could absorb it. And I didn't think the war was going to be as much of a dislocator of economic resources as it turned out to be. And I remember answering in that mode. And I remember him discussing it as something that he disagreed with. I remember thinking not so long after that that he was right. That this thing turned out to be all-pervasive, very long, and nothing we could do with one arm tied behind us. And at the time it looked like—and I was lecturing as if we were doing it with one arm tied behind us. So we had classroom discussion on that. I mean war financing is a topic of economic—a little-known part of the curriculum. So here was a someone making the example. And certainly subsequently, when the outcome of the inflation which followed the war activities became evident, it became an excellent case in point.

COHEN: How did the demonstrations on campus and confrontations with the local police affect relationships with students, with colleagues, within the classroom?

KAISH: To tell you the truth, that whole thing which... I noticed the focus on.... What's interesting about Rutgers perhaps in the sixties was removed from me. I don't know. I don't know that there were.... I don't recall that there were police and conflicts. Now that you mention it, I guess maybe I'm aware of an awareness. And maybe this is part of the story. We were isolated. That was going on and had nothing to do with the eighth floor of Hill Hall where I was. We were busy with our regressions. [Laughter] And, you know, we'd talk reactionary talk. We certainly weren't sympathetic and maybe not totally aware. But, you know, certainly not sympathetic. No bleeding hearts of the eighth floor. [Laughter]

COHEN: Harder to see.

KAISH: Yes. See, what was happening meanwhile, someplace along the line there came to be...my professional life got more involved with this shift of student interest. I guess as an outgrowth of the sixties and early seventies, sociology and psychology became majors which

people got interested in, and resources began to slide there. But it was maybe along the mid-seventies or late seventies, that resources—that student interest shifted over into economics and into business subjects. And we as a department, we became much more involved in trying to cope with this than in coping with some general social pathology. We were more worried about the hundreds of students who were showing up and the lack of resources that we got out of the administration, which I'd be happy to go into about.

COHEN: Yes, very shortly, I hope. [Laughter] Okay. I want to just go back a second. You mentioned the shift from sociology and psychology to economics. Why was there the initial interest in sociology and psychology, in your estimation?

KAISH: Well, I think students were interested in changing the world. And I guess at first they thought they could change it through sociology, and then they thought they could change it through psychology; that is, the problems of the sixties were seen to be social problems. And I guess the students wanted to learn about how to deal with them and how to understand them. I don't know how many of the sociologists went on to become lawyers, which would have made a lot more sense for changing the world. But I have a feeling that that accounted for the flourishing of those fields, the behavioral fields.

COHEN: Yes.

KAISH: And then the War on Poverty and the income distribution questions began to suggest that maybe business and economics were the way that the world could be changed. And then maybe there was just a little less other-directedness and more inner-directedness as students, I guess, the well-documented selfishness....

[Break in recording]

COHEN: Okay. You were talking about the different motivations for....

[End of Tape #1]

COHEN: Okay, we are back with Dr. Kaish, and we were talking about changing the world. And while we're talking about changing the world, what role do you think that ideological differences played among the faculty, students if you will, during the period of the late sixties, seventies.

KAISH: I think there's a feeling that the students, radical students—and I guess you have to assume anybody who seized Conklin Hall could be called a radical student—would have left-leaning politics. And I think there were faculty sympathizers with the radical students who also had left-leaning politics. And I think in the faculty similarly there was and remains a conservative group. And these groups became antagonists. I think the women's movement also added another dimension, and the women's movement aligned itself with the radical elements. And again, the same political conservatives were resisting change. The left, I think, also tended to ridicule and/or resist change for the women. And all of that impinged on my experience because in the Economics Department, I believe, we had extreme elements on either side, and they coexisted within this rather small department.

COHEN: What impact did this situation have on the teaching, was it beneficial to the students or the opposite?

KAISH: Well, economics is a subject which you can teach either as a positive or as a normative science, as we say. Certainly the theory was presented in a straightforward manner by faculty from either leaning. But I certainly think the normative aspects of it were presented differently. And the students of economics at that time sort of hit it from both sides because there were strong devotees from both positions.

COHEN: Was this a plus for diversity then?

KAISH: I think so. I think hopefully the students were bright enough not to be confused by it. And I think...I always made it a point to separate out editorial from news content. And I always made it a point to tell them that economists were expert on economics and no more expert on ideology than anybody else. And, what you should do is take your economics instruction as authoritative and the other as impressionistic. I hope most of our faculty did that. So I think it's enriching for a student to hear different points of view, as long as they don't make the mistake of transferring the authority that the faculty member has in his profession and therefore think that he's a wise man.

[Break in recording]

COHEN: Back to Dr. Kaish. And we were talking about the teaching of economics—positive economics and normative economics.

KAISH: Normative economics.

COHEN: How did you get away with being positive about the normative?

KAISH: Well, in economics you describe where the market forces are going. And then you don't like where they're going, you effect some policy changes. And I think the attitude toward the policy changes are the specifics of the policy changes. Or your comment as to the validity of the proposed policy changes is what shaped different instruction that they got from people with different points of view. And to go back to where we were, I think that a faculty member has a lot of power; and if he abuses it, he can do a lot of indoctrination. And on the other hand, if he says this is the cafeteria of ideas and select from them, that's fine. I believe that there is a real danger that some of the faculty may color everything as indoctrination rather than as an offering at the cafeteria. That's unfortunate.

COHEN: We were talking before about resources, specifically for the economics and business programs, and you were saying some interesting things. And I wish you'd get back to that.

KAISH: Well, there is a drift of students into business. There's some history for how economics came to absorb them. In the 1960's—again I guess around sixty-six or sixty-seven—the school of business became the Graduate School of Management; they went out of the undergraduate

teaching business. And there was no one around to teach undergraduate students in the business area. The Economics Department absorbed two or three of their cast-off faculty, the business school's cast-off faculty, and offered courses in finance and in accounting. Offered a few courses. And as student interest changed, we found ourselves called upon to offer more and more, but we weren't getting the resources to offer them. We asked the administration for resources, we drew up memoranda, we drew up projections. I remember going down with the then Dean Robey with a very elaborate projection of enrollments and got some lip service, but never got the resources. In fact we had strictly a part-time operation. And along the way I got the job to be the director of the segment of the Economics Department which catered to the business students. And we even came to offer a major essentially taught by part-time faculty. So I think that the administration either because of its liberal arts roots or because of—I mean this the most generous construction on it—or because of some shift in the form of tenured faculty, just never paid any attention to it this development.

But this was at a time of rapid expansion of higher education. This was at a time of rapid growth of the College of Arts and Sciences. I think there was plenty of opportunity to steer resources there, and they never did. The growth was never there in terms of resources. Subsequently, the administration was forced to do something because accreditation problems with the graduate program forced the legitimizing of the undergraduate program. In other words, the graduate program, the graduate school, couldn't keep its accreditation unless the undergraduate business program was also accredited. And it couldn't be accredited with the faculty it had. They had to give it resources, and that's how it began to become legitimate. And there were some mighty wars fought then.

COHEN: And the rest is history, as they say.

KAISH: Well, the rest is bloody history. But I mean there was an effort to get the resources; they weren't forthcoming. Then once they were forthcoming. There was a suggestion that business and accounting would probably be separated from the Economics Department. Needless to say, the Economics Department, having nurtured this thing, wanted to hang onto it. And so there came to be a big floor fight in the faculty on that issue, which the Economics Department lost. And, you know, it wasn't very generously dealt with by the administration. The administration reached the committee members, and the committee members reached the faculty. And the poor old Economics Department got stripped of its crown jewels.

COHEN: To what would you attribute the popularity of the business program?

KAISH: Vocational interests. I think.... Well, there was a recession in the mid-seventies. And I think students began, after the Vietnamese War ended and after hard times arrived, that changing the world seemed less important than making a living. And I think students in their search for relevance began to discover that nothing was more relevant than making a living. And they, perhaps mistakenly, thought that this was the avenue toward employability.

COHEN: Again going back to what we were talking about before, again about the availability of resources for management-related theories and talking about the Center for Business Cycle Research. Could you go into that in some detail?



KAISH: Yes. I don't exactly remember which years it was. But there was a gentleman named Jeffrey Moore, whom students of economics recognized as one of the towering figures from business-cycle studies...he was the director of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington. He was the president of the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York. He was one of the developers of the whole Leading Indicators System, which is used for forecasting. And what happened was as economics began to tilt away from empiricism—I won't even say empiricism—as it began to tilt more towards modeling from the kind of work Moore was doing, which really wasn't all that theoretically-based, but was much more empirical, the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he was centered, sort of got rid of him, and they got rid of the thing that it stood for for thirty or forty years. That is, Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell had founded this thing with the idea of studying the economic data as it indicated the ebbing and flowing of business activity. The National Bureau moved away from that, and they jettisoned Moore, all his tapes, all his records, all his technology. And Jack Cullity, one of our colleagues, had been a student of Arthur Burns and a long admirer of Moore. And he convinced Moore that he ought to see whether Rutgers would take him in and he convinced Rutgers, I think, that it ought to take him in. And I don't know what the details of the arrangement were, but I do know that Moore came, and he brought two or three people who worked with him in New York who were steeped in the techniques. They weren't academics. They were a couple of women who had just been with him for thirty years and knew everything about the techniques. And he set up shop in Conklin Hall in the basement. And had some tapes which Rutgers tried to take in. Eventually he moved over to Ackerson Hall.

But what happened was Rutgers simply wasn't able to give him the computer support that he wanted. Not that he wanted, that he needed. And as a result, he had to go to MIT. He needed a certain program and access to certain packages. And MIT had them online. With MIT it cost him more money than, as it turned out, he could afford. And I guess he was around for three or four years. During that time he impacted very positively on my career. He impacted very positively on any number of undergraduate students who went on to work for him and get jobs in the Federal Reserve System, jobs at the Stock Exchange, jobs that they could never have aspired to without his sponsorship. He was a very positive influence. But there came, I guess, hard times in the early eighties, and I guess it was—I guess it's less than ten years he's gone. He must have left around eighty-three, eighty-four.

COHEN: That's what I thought, yes.

KAISH: Because I know...I remember charting the recession of eighty and eighty-one in his place. I think it was eighty-four that he left. But there came a time when he was running in the red because he was spending so much money on his computers; and the business cycle, of all ironic things, which he was a student of, dried up corporate philanthropy. [Laughter] He couldn't raise the money. Of course any good student of business cycles knew that the recovery would come, and times would turn up. But Rutgers, with its great perceptiveness, told him he'd have to get out of here. And they gave him, I guess, six months' notice, and he cast about, and was taken in across the river by Columbia University. And he lives happily there to this day. Probably acquiring more ink in the newspaper and more time on television than the rest of the faculty put together. And it's a great tragedy. I blame the administration.

COHEN: I wanted to talk about community-university relations. And were you in any way involved in the immediate community, surrounding community—organizations and so on, in your capacity as a Rutgers faculty member?

KAISH: Well, I remember.... At the time I was serving, as you well know, I was the mayor of Springfield. I was involved in politics.

COHEN: I wanted to touch on that in a second. I was talking the immediate Newark community.

KAISH: No, well this is how I got involved. The dean, Norman Samuels, who was then either the provost or the dean, I'm not quite sure which, decided that there ought to be a community outreach to the legislators and the freeholders of Essex County and the Newark legislators. And my only credential for being involved was my being a politician in Springfield. So he asked me and a few others to meet with the freeholders. We hosted one evening when we were sugaring them up, showing them Rutgers hospitality. And then my understanding was that we got rapped on the knuckles for—Newark got rapped on the knuckles—for taking an independent course free of New Brunswick and trying to exert some legislative leverage which wasn't orchestrated by New Brunswick. And this was an exercise that was never repeated, never pursued. So Newark-Rutgers as a separate entity trying to get its due cause from the university through the community, using the Essex County community and the Newark community to pressure Rutgers and the legislature to send more money to Newark, I think was, my understanding was, stopped within Rutgers because this wasn't consistent with central administration policy.

COHEN: Do you have any further details on that effort to pressure the legislature, who was involved or when it occurred?

KAISH: Well, I guess it occurred while I was mayor. It was probably late seventies, early eighties. Who was involved was I think Norman, maybe Greg Capprio, some of the senior faculty. I remember—I just remember the day, lots of small talk, and this was.... This was supposed to be the first of many meetings, but there was never another one. When I inquired what happened, it was always, well, it wasn't part of the central administration's plan. It didn't want the Newark campus to be operating independently. Other than that, community involvement? I personally did not. I mean I personally, as I've indicated several times, saw myself involved with the department and the school and the students and members of the community as they came through in their role as students. But, I didn't do any outreach.

COHEN: Going back to seventy-four, what years were that again, you were mayoring in Springfield?

KAISH: Well, I think my mayoring in Springfield was seventy-six to about eighty-five; that is, my involvement with the Springfield Township Committee. Yes, this was probably around 1980.

COHEN: What was the content of this effort of the Newark group, specifically with the legislature?

KAISH: Well, money, influence. The Newark campus was withering—I don't know if it was withering on the vine. But I think there was a feeling that Newark wasn't getting its share. And if it wasn't going to be offered, perhaps we can get some influence with people to try to direct them a little more in our direction. I guess we took a lesson from the student radicals.

COHEN: What was the nature of the communication? Just how did the administration communicate with the Newark group to inform them that this was a no-no?

KAISH: Oh, I don't know. Whenever I mentioned this thing— And again, your whole exercise here are to preserve the living memory of events, and I was one of those involved in this. Whenever I mentioned it to the provost, who was also involved, we generally laughed or smiled and said that that wasn't meant to be at that time. We couldn't march to our own drummer or even attempt to.... Newark didn't have a drum.

COHEN: This is the provost Young?

KAISH: The provost was Samuels.

COHEN: Oh, in the eighties. Oh, so Samuels was....

KAISH: Well, I don't know whether Samuels was then the provost. But, you know, when I talk to him now about it, he was certainly involved in it. Young may have been the provost at the time.

COHEN: Okay.

KAISH: When did Young stop being the provost?

COHEN: If I remember correctly, Samuels became the provost in eighty-two, I believe. I don't have my notes.

KAISH: Yes. The dates are elusive. It was probably right around then.

COHEN: You had a distinguished career in Springfield politics. How did it in any way relate to your academic work?

KAISH: Well, you know, from the point of view of examples, it was enriching. I wrote a paper—I wrote a couple of papers—which were relevant to the topic. I wrote an article on rent control, and I wrote an article on property valuation which grew out of interests I generated here. But I think mostly it had to do with life experience that you can bring into the classroom. I think very possibly what's wrong with the way education is the moving, certainly in areas such as economics, is away from anecdotal experience towards abstraction. And I think the nature of the faculty who are coming out of graduate programs, a lot of foreign students who are going on to pursue Ph.D.'s in subjects like finance and operations research and computer science and economics, really have no institutional setting in this country or this culture. And they can teach

their subject, but I don't think they can provide the setting for it. And I think that's something that the students miss when they experience this education.

COHEN: Well, what kind of anecdotal, if you will, experience do you recall bringing into the classroom and into your papers, for that matter?

KAISH: Well, the choices.... Economics is the study of choosing and prioritizing. And in municipal government we have to make choices and hopefully they would be made in terms of marginal utility considerations, trade-offs, what is the most important thing to do under the circumstances with incremental money. And I used examples drawn from our municipal government to illustrate other points. The rent control certainly was intrusion into market forces. And a lot of what we teach is market forces. I was certainly able to share with the students the very considerable social pressures and political pressures which lead otherwise sensible politicians to impose regulations which they know are counter to market forces. And the outcomes are apartment shortages for rent control and deterioration of property. And we had that in Springfield. And I shared those experiences with the students. Property valuation is a matter also of a capitalization of the earnings of an asset. And rent controls impact these earnings capabilities, affect the capitalized values which in turn affect the taxable base of a community and reduce shifts in the taxable base and shifts in the burden. And I discussed those issues with the students. In fact I wrote about them.

COHEN: You mentioned two papers. These appeared where?

KAISH: One was in the *Appraisal Journal*, and the other was in the *Review of Political Economy*, as I recall, *Journal of Political Economy*.

COHEN: I'd like to go back to curriculum, the economics end of the subject.

[Break in recording]

We are back. Could we go into how the curriculum in the Economics Department changed during this period—late sixties through the seventies?

[Break in recording]

This is the twenty-ninth of July 1991. Resuming my interview with Dr. Stanley Kaish at my home in Springfield this time. And, Dr. Kaish, we were talking about—before we ended the interview last time—we were talking about, just started to talk about the curriculum. I want to start out with the curriculum in the Economics Department. Could you describe the curriculum before the new campus emerged in the late sixties, what was it like in what I call the Rector Street campus; maybe called the Lombardy Street campus?

KAISH: Well, mainstream economics really hasn't changed an awful lot, and the curriculum certainly reflects mainstream economics. What perhaps has changed are faddy topics or topics which are topics of the times such as environmental economics, economics of poverty, urban economics. And women the economy each of those is a course which was added to the

curriculum in the Economics Department over the years. Some of them haven't been taught. Perhaps they were taught only a couple of times; either the person who added it lost interest or left the college, but they still carried it on the curriculum and it's still listed. And they sort of represent a list of the popular interests within the profession. And our program mirrored that. But the mainstream.... You may know the book by Samuelson which I think its first edition came out in 1948 or forty-six. I used the third edition as a student. I taught out of the eleventh edition. [Laughs] Not much is new. I mean the Samuelson has added and taken on a partner recently. But there's a continuity in the subject. And similarly the major theory... certainly the micro theory got pretty well codified by the end of the thirties. And most of micro theory as its taught to undergraduates hasn't changed a lot. The macro theory has, but that's been a matter of changes in the profession. And the requirements of the students have been essentially to take the core theory and to take electives; and of course the electives take up most of what's offered. And a lot of what was offered was these trendy subject as they came and went.

There was one other major change in the profession, and that was the mathematization of economics, which came a little ahead of the mathematization of several of the other social sciences, but it's certainly what's been happening in social science. And early on mathematical skills were comparatively rare, and you'd find somebody who would be specialized in statistics or mathematical economics. But their training early on has now become everybody's training coming out of school. So rather than be something taught by a unique, anointed few, these are courses now which everyone can teach, everyone under the age of thirty-five can teach. And they are part of the curriculum as well. I've been out of economics for—I've been out of the department—for a while, but I have the distinct impression that increasingly students who are serious about graduate school are being advised to take courses with the Math Department. And in fact among the old folks such as myself and others in the department, there's a feeling that the essence of the subject as learned by students in graduate school has been slighted, and there may be a move back, a reaction back. But the historical essence, the institutional essence has been slighted because there are multiple courses on multiple regression and various mathematical techniques, and graduate school only includes so much. There's a feeling that economic history, economic institutions, the history of economic thought probably aren't very well understood by the bulk of new economists.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Why is this happening?

KAISH: Well, I think the philosophy of the field has modeled itself on physical science. And it requires skills of the physical scientists which involve now pretty good computer skills, pretty good understanding of database availability, pretty good econometric skills, pretty good abstract mathematical reasoning skills; history tends to become a little less of a priority.

COHEN: You mentioned computer skills. What's been the effect of the number crunching capabilities that computers have? What's been the effect of that on the curriculum, on how economics is taught, how it's practiced?

KAISH: Well, how it's practiced, the effect has been awesome. It's made real-life problems accessible in terms of real numbers, real data; rather than simulated, simplified problems which you would have to enter all the data, now that they are in the database. You can do a lot of

operations on a large database sets. That's an imitation of life to come, and that's what economists do. What I don't think has been all that successful has been the use of programmed learning or teaching, at least in my experiences. The publishers keep trying to put this stuff out, and I think the faculty keeps looking at it, and it's available at every professional meeting, and there are samples. I just am not too sure that our department at least has been successful in using that. Now mind you, I've been out of the Economics Department for five years. So maybe they are. But my impression is that it hasn't been too well integrated into any of the courses.

COHEN: You mentioned that the historical perspective is being downplayed now, that there's less history, history of economics, being taught, American economics. How important is that?

KAISH: Well, I think it's...my own feeling is that it's very important. United States history is as much an economic history as a cultural history. And I don't know that the historians are as interested in economic history as the cultural history. And normally it's been a subject which has fallen in between. But the economists have elected to pick up their share of it. Some of the giants in the field were very well versed—such as George Stigler. Maybe the giants now are very well versed, too. But the run-of-the-mill aren't. And I think the giants in the field certainly have comprehensive knowledge. But I think the typical graduate student coming out hasn't been taught it. Unless he's taken the trouble to learn it on his own, he probably will never learn it.

COHEN: You mentioned the new courses that were taught, some of the more trendy courses. Could you go into— What kind of enrollments did the department have in those courses?

KAISH: Well, the enrollments were pretty good. I think enrollments are as much a matter of when the course is offered and how many electives are offered. But Women in the Economy has been offered...that's the one that's been offered pretty well consistently. Now it's offered for the Women's Studies Study Program, and it gets—my understanding is that it gets pretty good demand. I think when they were offered, they got pretty good demand. Urban Economics at the time of the riots became a popular thing. There was an Urban Studies Program, and it was generated in concert with that. I think that whole program may have hooked onto that. Marxian Economics was one which certainly was trendy. Marxian Economics was offered at all schools. It certainly had a greater flowering of interest during the late sixties and early seventies. Now I don't think it gets as much enrollment. Again now, it's sort of a history of thought course, and it seems to fail both on intrinsic subject and approach.

COHEN: When there was change, were there specific requests for such courses from students to faculty to introduce these courses?

KAISH: Well, it works both ways. I think the department would ask its faculty to think in terms of new courses and submit proposals to the faculty to consider. On the other hand.... Well, it worked either way. They came forth spontaneously or faculty members would also come up with them. I don't think we ever went out and really recruited anybody per se, looking for this kind of an area specialization.

COHEN: So you're saying then that there was no impact on the faculty recruitment, whatever changes came about in the curriculum?

KAISH: Well, all of these departments...none of the College of Arts and Sciences departments are terribly deep in terms of numbers. As I recall, our recruitment was more along conventional lines of looking for a monetary person or a macro person or a micro person or a labor person or an international person, which are the most conventional. But I don't recall looking for a poverty person, for instance.

COHEN: In the seventies—we talked last time about the pressures for curriculum reform, for diversity. You mentioned one proposal that was made to drop majors and things like that. How did the general curriculum reform, such as it was, impact on the enrollments in the economics major?

KAISH: Well, I think the economics major was more affected by the advent of the Business and Accounting Programs. I think they probably, at least at the beginning...well, at the beginning they added to the numbers of economics majors because they were counted as economics majors. Towards the end they sort of ate into it because they were separated out. That was the dominant factor. What was it you were asking me, how what affected it?

COHEN: Well, how did the general curriculum reform—the demands for diversity, for dropping majors, for loosening up—how did that affect your department specifically, if at all?

KAISH: The demand for loosening up. I don't think so. Actually probably over the years that I was involved, the economics major required an increasing number of courses rather than an decreasing. When I first got there, I think only the introductory course was required. Then intermediate theory was added. Then statistics was required and econometrics was added. So I think the direction was structuring it as the rigor of professional rules, and we mirrored that in our own little way.

COHEN: So actually changes in the profession.

KAISH: Yes, yes. I think, to the extent that there was response to the times it was in offering these courses...they came and went.

COHEN: What were the pressures for separating the business program from the Economics Department? What led up to that?

KAISH: Well, it depends on whose version you're hearing. My recollection and my impression is that there were a couple of guys on the board of trustees who quite correctly identified our program as not serving the interests of the business students. These were graduates of the business program from back in the thirties and forties. They had found their way into positions of substantial influence, and there were two vocal people. And as I mentioned to you earlier, it became a part-time program. We were never adequately funded for our students' needs. And they either got some complaints or they figured it out for themselves. And they were correct in that this program was nothing Rutgers should be proud of. And I think they called it to the administration's attention. And the administration, in response, looked around for a fall guy, and the Economics Department was the fall guy, you know; under the allegation that, well, we were

diverting our resources more toward conventional economics rather than towards these new emerging demands. And the feeling was the only way it could really get its just desserts was to put it under the aegis of someone who was only interested or primarily interested in business education. I think that really was a red herring. I think the notion that anything that large may have warranted some kind of restructuring receives no argument from anyone. But whether the rationale was as I've just suggested or whether the restructuring should have been a separation at the time was hotly contested by the members of our department.

COHEN: Why was it hotly contested?

KAISH: Well, because we had—who knows?—three or four hundred students of whom three quarters were in business. And the idea was to carve three quarters of the department out, which we felt something of a personal interest in: One, we had kept business offerings when the rest of the college had abandoned it, and we had diverted our resources towards it. And now the idea was to carve out these students. No, there's a matter of just wanting to possess what you've always possessed. In hindsight from the point of view of members of the Economics Department, it was a marvelous simplification of everyone's life just to get rid of all these students and all that commotion that went with it. From my point of view, I went with the commotion so it gave me no relief. I didn't go into it immediately. I got drafted into it later on.

COHEN: To retain the—you're saying?

KAISH: No, I got drafted into becoming involved with the business program.

COHEN: With the business program.

KAISH: See, what happened was as the numbers grew, I was, in addition to my teaching duties, my faculty duties, I became the director of the business program under the Economics Department. So I wore this other little hat. And so I used to receive the students with their queries about the program. And I was instrumental in such recruitment as we did for the program. When it was split off, I remained with the Economics Department. And Professor Rosenberg was hired and brought in to be the chairman of the department. But, you know, there was considerable resistance. The then, I guess the dean then, Norman Samuels, was anxious to see it split off; either to satisfy these two guys or because he thought it had to be done. I don't know. Leo Troy was our senior faculty member and never a shrinking violet. So he led the charge against it. There were committee hearings, planning committees, and courses of study committees. And lots of arm-twisting went on. And when the vote finally came, there was something like maybe a hundred and eighty-four to fourteen for splitting this thing off. And that was it.

COHEN: How did the issue of the creation of the separate Business Department, before it actually was accomplished, how did you perceive its impact on faculty lines in economics and on enrollments in the courses. I'm not sure about that part of it.

KAISH: Well, as I mentioned to you earlier, the demand was growing, the resources weren't forthcoming. The department petitioned for more lines. My historical perception of what went on



is we didn't get the kind of lines that we needed, if any, and the program was overwhelmingly taught in a part-time manner. I guess another aspect of the split was, I think I mentioned the accreditation business last time; so that also has to be paid some service. In all the time I remember, when we first set up the business program, we inherited, I think, two or three people from the business school: an accountant, then another fellow came over to run the accounting program for the business school; we got half of his line. John Gillmore [sp]. And we had a finance guy whom we got. But we didn't really have a marketing person. We had no one in the areas of production and management; no one in the area of management per se. Really this whole program had all the dimensions of a business school with one or two teachers. We did get authority to recruit a couple of people like Dr. Bates, I remember. Sy Fine was, as I recall, the first real pure person for the business program, that I got to recruit for a marketing person, and we had him coming out of Bradford School at the time. That was maybe eleven years ago; it must have been 1980.

COHEN: That was before the separate department was created?

KAISH: I was recruiting Sy probably in the last year of the merged department.

COHEN: Merged department, yes. Now in retrospect, what's your judgment of the effects—beneficial or the opposite—of the separation of the two programs?

KAISH: Well, see, one of the arguments we tried to make to the college was that as soon as you stuck the business thing out and make it a separate entity, you're leaving a very ripe asset for what we then thought would be GSM to access. That is, as long as it was merged with economics, it was sort of an ungainly thing for them to access. But once it was prepackaged into a Business Department, it was of interest to the business school. And indeed this would remove a lot of the resources and the students from the College of Arts and Sciences. This was the argument which was made in a document that the department prepared....perhaps I could get hold of a copy.

COHEN: That would be good, yes.

KAISH: I know Leo has one. And we suggested a structure which would answer the reasonable concerns, and that was to have like a unit of management studies which would contain the Economics Department, Business, Accounting, very much as eventually it emerged but without the economics. What eventually became...business and accounting became the Unit of Management Studies in the Economics Department. So anyway, that was our concern. Part of the argument, which was ignored, of course that's exactly what's happening now.

COHEN: The last meeting or a recent meeting, yes.

KAISH: But of course very few people remember or care. But we smiled knowingly.

COHEN: Could you just recap the proposal, the recent proposal, at the FASN meeting, which I didn't attend, about the business program and GSM.

KAISH: Well, President Lawrence in looking around decided that the state of management education at Rutgers University was chaotic from a structural point of view. That there was a business school in Camden, a business school in New Brunswick, graduate school in Newark, and an undergraduate department in Newark. And his hand was forced, I think—and almost immediately—when GSM was looking to hire a new dean, and they couldn't really get the kind of a person they wanted from among the available talent because they thought, when they looked at the structure of this thing, they didn't want to get caught up in the cross politics; plus they knew it wouldn't stand for the long run and that they didn't know what they'd end up with. So he decided, I believe, that they wanted some resolution of the structure before they went back and recruited a dean.

So he went through the motions of first asking each of the New Brunswick and Newark units whether they'd be interested in considering restructuring; and if so, he would appoint a committee. We responded positively as did others. And he did appoint a committee under the chairmanship of Joe Seneca, who was an economics professor in New Brunswick. And the committee met in June and July and it's finished meeting. It drafted its report, and the report recommends a single business school comprising three sub-schools: the New Brunswick undergraduate school, the Newark undergraduate school, and the Graduate School of Management to service the two campuses. And Camden is being left as is. So that's not history. That's only a couple of weeks old.

COHEN: Well, yes. Something has to be said about that. So what you saw about ten years ago pretty much has come to pass.

KAISH: Yes, I think the dean acknowledges that it pretty much is what came to pass. Pretty much, given the size of the business operation now, it's pretty awkward. It's not just its size. It's the preferences of faculty and the difficulty of recruitment. It's pretty awkward to keep it housed in the college of arts and sciences.

COHEN: What has the whole development of the business program done to the liberal arts character of the college in Newark?

KAISH: Well, I think that David Hosford argues and I think I agree with him, that the college in Newark is in part a liberal arts college. But it's in part of a professional school as well. That is, there are professional programs, he lists them more easily than I. But I guess they include social....

[End of Tape #2]

COHEN: Okay, we are back with Dr. Kaish. And we were talking about the effect of the business programs on the liberal arts—or the College of Arts and Sciences.

KAISH: Well, as I think about it, the distribution requirements, as well as elective courses, in the Arts and Sciences become heavily populated with business students. Now, I frankly don't know the extent to which the Arts and Sciences faculty is cognizant of this or responsive to it or shapes their course content. I rather hope they don't. But, you know, that's something I really

don't know. Our majors, or the business majors, are fifty percent Arts and Sciences. So the students take at least sixty credits of Arts and Sciences. And they're at the disposal of the Arts and Sciences faculty. How the Arts and Sciences faculty has responded to them, I don't know. My understanding is that like other students that is that there is a cross-section, some of their best students are from the business and accounting groups and some of their worst students are. The rest of each category are the Arts and Sciences groups. So I don't know how it's affected the offerings of the Arts and Sciences departments. I guess to the extent to which departments have shrunk or there's been a diversion of resources, it would have impacted on the offerings, the variety of courses.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. The average...how would you evaluate the education, if you can, of the average business major at Rutgers in Newark in terms of an overall general education sense?

KAISH: I think it's a good education. I think that the faculty we now have in ninety-one is a good faculty, and probably stronger than the students, which is a problem. There's in some degree a mismatch in the level at which many of them want to pitch it and which the students are prepared to absorb it. But my own impression is that the education is reasonably balanced, that is, within the context of management subjects. They get communication skills, they get quantitative skills, they get people skills, they get group dynamics, they get lots of courses in which they're broken down into groups and these groups interact with one another as the content of the course. And coupled with that, their sixty credits of liberal arts, I think, they're learning a good blend of skills from their major as well as the Arts and Sciences content. I think there's an underestimation of the quality of what's offered, in part perhaps by what some of the students take away from it. That is, I think there are right now in 1991 there are some weak students, and I think there's a broadly-held belief that in the last few years the students have gotten weaker. Either weaker in their innate abilities or weaker in their motivation and willingness to put in the effort. But they don't carry away as much of what's offered to them as they might.

COHEN: You were talking about the faculty—as you mentioned before—the qualifications of the faculty. How successful was the Economics Department, and later the business program, in recruiting the kind of faculty that you wanted, and your colleagues wanted during the late sixties and then into the seventies? What kind of progression in recruitment of faculty at that time?

KAISH: Well, I think you've got to measure it in terms of the—I don't think it's a change in orientation—but certainly the emphasis on research quality which have come to the fore with the Bloustein and the Pond administration. I think in large measure when I first got here, most of the faculty were from Columbia—most of the Economics faculty—were from Columbia, City University, and NYU. You know it was a faculty of convenience, adequate to the job, and convenient to recruit. When we began to try to recruit from the quality Ph.D. programs as they're widely identified, the Wharton or the Harvard, Yale, Princeton, UCLA, Berkeley, Chicago, we had relatively little success in recruiting from there. Recently Doug Coate has had more success because I think he has a Chicago network of contacts. There's a recognition that these are pretty good people in the Economics Department, and a few Chicago guys have come. But that's the only place. There was one guy from the University of Utah, but he came and he went. So economics hasn't really been able to respond to the desire for people who are trained at the top research schools. Similarly, we've had the same problem with business, only the character of it

isn't quite the same. Most new Ph.D.'s want to teach graduate students. And since the typical business school is a graduate program—MBA is the norm, and they all expect to teach MBA students—the way we were structured, they didn't have this opportunity, and it was difficult to sell them on the virtues of teaching sixty undergraduates at a pop.

What we were able to recruit—and I think it turned out to be advantageous—were people with odd backgrounds, people who didn't have straight out of school, out of graduate school into the academic job market. But rather people who had some industry background, people who were trained in other things and had gone back to be retreaded in management subjects, people who had been consultants and had gotten tired of that rat race. And as a result, the faculty we do have is very diverse, much more liberal arts background, much more graduate education in liberal arts than you'll find in most business schools. Probably much more than in GSM. Certainly much more than New Brunswick. And I think adds to the texture of what we offer. So diversity has become the an advantage I think in that sense.

COHEN: And you're saying this is as far as the Economics Department faculty? Or economics and business programs?

KAISH: No, in these last comments about the unusual backgrounds it's strictly business. Economics is...well, economics I don't think has recruited for a long time. They've been shrunk. But there the problem is still to try to find guys from the best schools. I think they may find guys from the best schools, but they're not the best guys. And I don't know that there's been a lot of success in holding onto tenure-able faculty.

COHEN: Starting in the seventies, you mentioned briefly the administration's emphasis on research, publications. How did that impact on promotional considerations in your department in the seventies...and beyond?

KAISH: Well, I personally have always been out of harmony and out of sympathy with that, and it's no secret to the administration. I thought—and think—given our student population, that it's important to have people who are interested in teaching undergraduates and are able to teach undergraduates. And I would tend to evaluate faculty more sympathetically than the university in many instances. The university increased its research expectations. A lot of our faculty in the Business Department have met that expectation; a lot of them haven't. When we merged with University College, we acquired half a dozen people, and of those I think only one has managed to stay on and win tenure. So I just don't think it's been the great evolution that Rutgers...at least it's been this development. Again, that's my reaction to it. I think we've lost some awfully good people, and I'm upset by it. I mean we've lost some people quite likely who had actually met the Rutgers standard in my estimation; but there was such anxiety in Newark to be sure we were right up there with all the other units, that I think we treated them a little more severely than other places might have treated them. And I think they got screwed over...

COHEN: In the recruitment efforts, how did the department go about complying with affirmative action requirements for minorities and women?

KAISH: Well, we're certainly very much aware of affirmative action requirements. And when we went through all the steps of advertising, in the beginning advertised in the newspapers which

would be read by minority audiences, I remember.... I can tell you a few anecdotes which... I guess that's the point of this, is to get anecdotes.

COHEN: Part of it. [Laughs]

KAISH: The first time, when affirmative action was first coming along, there were zealous administrators who were in charge of it. And I was recruiting for the marketing position that I told you I hired Sy Fine for. I was recruiting for that. And I assembled a pool and sent down the documents. And the message came back that, no, this wasn't sufficient. Keep searching. And I kept searching. And I had a bigger pool, and I sent it down, and it was dragged on and on. He had other opportunities. He was the only one I could hire; they wouldn't hire him. If I knew then what I know now, I'd have said the hell with it! You hire somebody. I'm not going to kill myself. But it almost was making me physically ill. Finally somehow or other it came to pass. Another time I assembled a pool... actually this may have been the same time. There was a place on the charts where you were supposed to write up the race and age of all the applicant members. Most of them I had no idea. There was no place where they'd say race and age. I put unknown on about eighty percent of them that came back for race. They came back saying that's not acceptable. You have to tell us what race they are. And tell them I have no way of telling what race they are. And they'd say, well, that's unacceptable. So I placed an ad in my naïveté inviting people to submit resumes and indicating their race on the resume.

COHEN: Uh-oh.

KAISH: Race on the resume. Well, I quickly got a call from the dean's office. Some alumnus had seen this ad which said, "Professor of marketing wanted. Indicate race." [Laughter] So, you know, I said, "How the hell am I supposed to find out what their race is if you won't let me ask? But you insist on knowing it." And that was the end of it. They never asked me for it again, and they stopped harassing me. Again in retrospect, it was a new toy. It was a new toy that now maybe had some legitimacy, but it fell into the hands of zealots because who else is going to be interested in such a new toy? And life became very difficult.

COHEN: How did you resolve that dilemma?

KAISH: It just went away.

COHEN: I mean the dilemma of finding out what the race was or the ethnicity of a person was without advertising that you wanted the information.

KAISH: I don't know how they handled it. They said such things as, well, look for clues. And I mean it seems to me that was the worst kind of approach to the thing. I mean if someone was educated in Africa, it's a clue. If someone was educated in what you know is a black university, it's a clue. But the overwhelming number of applicants offers no clue. And, you know, if you interviewed people, it would be catch as catch can, whatever. But generally in an interview, half a dozen out of an applicant pool of fifty, so who knows what the rest of them were?

COHEN: Well, how successful was the department in recruiting minority faculty during those years, ten, fifteen years?

KAISH: Well, successful relative to the availability. In economics there's a very tiny population of American blacks. There are African blacks available, but not too many. That is there a figure called the "availability number." And in economics it's always been very low. And I think over the years in economics there were maybe two black faculty who were in the department, who came from very good graduate schools. But unfortunately neither one received tenure. In women we were, I think, more successful, but not successful enough to satisfy some of the women who had who wanted more representation. But as I mentioned to you, I was hired by a woman, Helen Cook. And that was economics. About the same situation held with the business. There are black accountants and black lawyers who are in the business faculty. Relatively few black Ph.D.'s. A lot of Asians. And we, I think, had a representative mix. Oh, I think as departments run, we were relatively enriching the university's data, but not by any means representative of the population.

COHEN: Concerning the affirmative action recruiting women, recruiting and promoting women, what methods were used for recruiting women faculty?

KAISH: Well, the Women's Association of Economists. And we would write there... I guess—let me go back. Because I guess I was intent on indicating absurdities. And one of the absurdities—

COHEN: By all means.

KAISH: Another absurdity was we did have to advertise from the beginning in magazines and in newspapers and media that was directed towards minority or female readership. So I placed an ad in the *Newark Afro-American* or something. Again, the affirmative action people I think at this point had... in Rutgers University in Newark as it was being implemented in 1980, had driven me to the point of doing the most absurd things to give the appearance of giving them what they wanted. They wanted a black newspaper, I'd give them a black newspaper, although I knew there was a very small chance of a Ph.D. recent graduate from a research institution coming from it. So we advertised in this Afro-American Newark newspaper. And of course nothing came of it. What did come of it was a phone call from a Puerto Rican newspaper who said, "How come you've advertised in the Afro-American newspaper, and you didn't advertise in my newspaper?" So I said, "Well, I didn't think you could reach the proper audience, and we didn't have the money." Well, it came to the point where he was essentially threatening all kinds of dire consequences and publicity if we didn't advertise in his newspaper. I ended up turning the matter over to the dean. I gave him the dean's phone number and said, "You call him. I don't have the money. But if you can talk him into it, hey, be my guest." But it never happened. We didn't advertise there.

And then a couple of years later it was decided that it was just too expensive. Suddenly you didn't have to advertise in specific media. Just advertise in the media where the general profession was likely to find it. We would write to departments to announce the position, and, as I say, there was this Women's Economic Association that we would contact. And it got down to we simply advertised in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* as well as the professional journals

of the specialty, under the assumption that faculty members of all colors and genders read those who were interested in their profession.

COHEN: On the Newark campus, when did the move for equal rights for the women faculty get underway?

KAISH: When did it get underway? I don't know. You probably know better than I do. I know we had an active member in the form of Professor Beth Nimi who unfortunately passed away. And she certainly raised my consciousness of some of the superficial aspects of the argument. That is, I remember the first time I ever heard "chairperson" I heard from her lips, and it seemed like an absurdity. And now it seems like a perfectly normal word. Fresh-person I never did get used to. I think it became obvious to me that the women members of the faculty saw one another socially and saw one another professionally and paid attention to what was going on in the college and put up a slate of officers to be on committees and were represented beyond random selection. And I mean they were certainly affirmative in their actions. And more power to them. If the rest of the faculty is going to be inert, the group is going to coalesce and be active, and it usually moves its agenda. And I think they did.

COHEN: Who were some of the leaders that you recall at that time among the women faculty?

KAISH: Well, the same ones that are now: Virginia Tiger, Mary Segers, Beth Nimi, Marie Collins, Jo Breeder [sp] maybe to a degree. I think they're probably the same ones that were involved.

COHEN: What was your perception of the justice of the claim of the women faculty at that time?

KAISH: Well, I'm not sure what their... If their claim was that they were paid less than the male faculty, it wasn't part of my personal experience among the faculty members who were involved at the time. I guess there were two women, Eva Hursh and Beth Nimi, in our department. And Eva, I think, had probably topped out early in her research effort and was paid as someone who had topped out early. Beth Nimi was a go-getter and was still a prolific publisher relative to Newark standards, and I think she was appropriately compensated. So my departmental experience really didn't reflect what they were alleging. If their overall statistics could show that for people of comparable research accomplishment and comparable years were making the traditional sixty percent that was the case in the broader economy, I would say there's no excuse for that, and I'd say they had a legitimate grievance and complaint. Harassment? Certainly if people perceived that they were the victims of sexual harassment and it upset them, they should take action to redress it. I guess what one might think of as normal chatter or normal male-female interaction from the male's point of view was offensive to the female. If that's so, people should stop. I'm not sure it's always so. But I guess I would be guilty of it if it was offensive to the other side. I would be inclined to make small talk which would have gender references.

COHEN: Was harassment a major issue?

KAISH: I think salary was the major issue, and I think frequency of representation was a major issue. But I think harassment was either overt or a kind of condescending—inoffensive from the male point of view, but perhaps offensive from the female point of view, remarks. I think the society has certainly become more sensitive to that what seems harmless may not be.

COHEN: Yes. Talking about grievances, I wanted to touch on the role of the AAUP and, well, starting with the first contract in 1970. How effective has it been in your opinion, as a bargaining agent? What good has it done?

KAISH: Well, I'm a member of the AAUP. I wonder why. It's free ridership. Well, it's not free ridership; forty percent ridership is available. You get an argument among economists, and I've argued with my economics friends because economists would argue that in the long run you're not really going to sustain pay levels beyond that which would have been forthcoming anyway. So, you know, frankly I think we've seen rather good salary growth during the sixties. Salaries were going up, as I recall, eight percent a year or something. A pretty good rate. So I thought AAUP was doing a pretty good job in that respect. In terms of grievances, I think the procedure has, with one or two exceptions, has proven just to be an exercise in frustration and futility. You're allowed to grieve. And if you win your grievance, it goes back to the procedure where in many instances the same thing happens all over again. I don't know. I'd like to know how many people who were denied tenure eventually get tenure.

[Break in recording]

COHEN: We're back with Dr. Kaish. We were talking about...I just want to make sure that we're recording. [Break in recording] Okay. We're back again. We were onto AAUP and the grievance procedure.

KAISH: Well, what I have are just impressions. The impression is that I don't know of many cases throughout the university where someone has been denied tenure, grieved and gotten tenure. Offhand I can think of maybe one or two. I do know it's a very time-consuming process, and therefore a very expensive process. And if it's not going to produce anything, either they ought to forget about it or get an arbitrator. But it should amount to something. If you're going to go through all of this exercise, there should be a result at the end other than more exercise. So I don't know if it's within the AAUP's power to win an improved grievance procedure. But the way it is now, they may as well not bother.

COHEN: Was AAUP involved with any of the affirmative action test cases—I think there was at least one test case on campus—among the women faculty, that you're aware of?

KAISH: I'm not aware of the test cases. What were they?

COHEN: I don't know. I know there was one faculty member I think who went to court.

KAISH: Paula Hayne?



COHEN: I don't if it was Paula Hayne or if it was Dorothy Dinnerstein. I know—at least I heard there was a case. There was a case, but I...

KAISH: Eventually Paula Hayne lost in court on alleging I think age and sex discrimination.

COHEN: Oh, I wasn't aware of that. That must have been something in the seventies anyway.

KAISH: Well, it may have started out in the seventies, which is exactly my point.

COHEN: Yes, yes. I thought there had been one case fought in the seventies with someone in the seventies and that the case had been settled. My information is fuzzy at this point. Okay. I wanted to get onto the subject of the graduate school. And my question is, why was it established to begin with?

KAISH: The Arts and Sciences graduate school?

COHEN: The graduate school which grew out of the graduate programs, with the first dean of the graduate school being Gilbert Panson. Why was the graduate school, in your perception, established?

KAISH: Well, I guess—I haven't thought much about it. I know we did have a master's program which was offered in economics. Probably it was established to respond to the aspirations of certain faculty to teach graduate education. I don't know, since it never got any resources in many of the departments, I don't know that it was more than a token response to those aspirations. There were a couple of departments like chemistry and psychology which traditionally had strong graduate programs. The opportunity to offer them came to history, economics, sociology, but no faculty lines. So whatever we did in the graduate, we took away from the undergraduate. And I taught in it for a few years. In fact, part of the problem was the difficulty of recruiting students. And I remember wanting to advertise for students, but I couldn't get any money for advertising either. I finally got enough to place a little want ad in the financial section, and we got about a dozen responses from that. So what the rationale for it was, I presume was to add to the trappings of a larger institution, one. To satisfy the demands of faculty. But to my mind the administration, apart from financing the dean's office, never financed anything else.

COHEN: Okay. I'd like to get into the area of the various administrations of the university and the college. You've been there at Rutgers since 1963 and had an opportunity to observe the administrations of Mason Gross and Edward Bloustein. Any opinions, insights, comparing the two administrations during a transitional period?

KAISH: Well, it's obvious that Bloustein wanted to take the university in a direction and to a level that hadn't been taken by Mason Gross. As I indicated earlier, from Newark's point of view, I don't think that was a sensible direction. Newark's mission is as an urban college, and Newark's constituency is kids who live in Passaic and Paterson and Newark and Union who are working fifteen hours a week and scratching together enough time and money to go to school. I don't know that the faculty and research accomplishments and the distractions of research

accomplishment demands on faculty is a sensible frame to put down in Newark. I guess I've told Dean Hosford on occasion it's like going out and looking for a Stradivarius violin and giving it to some fourth-grader to play with, to put our faculty in front of our students. The quality of the instrument is unnecessary for the results you're going to get, and you may even damage the instrument. So I'm not all that sympathetic with the direction that the university went under President Bloustein. I know that, again, our program in terms of faculty per student credit hour offered is profoundly less well-endowed than New Brunswick's business school or certainly GSM. And part of that is the tradition of starving Newark. And a part of the tradition of starving Newark is whatever Newark has, it has to use its cash cows to fund its research departments inside its scientific departments. I think the university legitimately goes in that way. But I don't think every college within it has to be a clone of every other one.

COHEN: During that period of time there were a number of deans. How would you assess Herbert Woodward's tenure?

KAISH: Woodward was the dean when I got there, and he must have been effective because he and McGill ran the whole thing. And there were three area chairs; there were no departments. Well, I guess there were, but there were three area chairs, him, and McGill. I never saw much of Woodward, but they told me he used to like to sit with his geology charts and not be bothered and let McGill do it all. So I guess the first of the deans that I became more cognizant of were the ones that came after Woodward. Gilliland came along. Do you remember who they all were?

COHEN: Well, William Gilliland followed Herbert Woodward. What were your impressions of his deanship?

KAISH: Well, I just remember that he came in after a big search. I guess he was a theatrical person. I just thought that he was trying to get away from where he was, and he used the college. He came after a big search. He was the dean for a few years and went on the faculty. We never saw much of him as a university-wide figure. I think maybe he was either deposed or he was about to be deposed. I'm not sure. They all tend to run together. But I have no lasting impressions of him other than when he came, he was new and a curiosity. No particular impact. I just think he was happy to get out of where he was.

COHEN: You said he was deposed?

KAISH: I'm not sure if he was deposed.

COHEN: By whom?

KAISH: Was he the dean when the turmoil occurred?

COHEN: Well, as far as the chronology, I know that he succeeded Woodward. And then Talbott became the acting dean and vice president.

KAISH: He was the dean, right.

COHEN: No, before.

KAISH: He left, and Talbott came in. It was under stress. I think the stress was the unrest. At least that's my association. It may be inaccurate or unfair, but my recollection is that.

COHEN: Your recollection is that.

KAISH: He was the dean at the time. The reason Talbott got thrust into the breach was he resigned, but he resigned in response to the difficulties.

COHEN: Yes. Well, in the previous conversation we talked about Malcolm Talbott. And I was wondering if anything that you said there, if you could add to that in terms of his handling of the administration of the college and his term as vice president, to what you said before.

KAISH: No, I don't have all that clear an image. My image of Malcolm Talbott is of the person, not the administrator. Again, in my mind's eye, I see him as striding, strutting, cajoling and smiling. But I don't have much of a feel for the results of all that. I guess in retrospect, tranquility returned, and a relative degree of prosperity came to Newark. We perhaps picked up more resources right after then than we had before. So you have to measure those as a plus for Malcolm. He then became the provost?

COHEN: Well, he never became the provost. I mean he was vice president, and then he didn't get the provost's position. And then Jim Young was the provost.

KAISH: You know it's sort of hard to separate out what he did in what role.

COHEN: Sure, I understand.

KAISH: I think compared to his predecessor, he was certainly stronger, more self-confident, on sure ground. Probably he was credited as taking the situation in hand at the time.

COHEN: Did you ever have any feeling for why he didn't get the provost's position at that time, in retrospect?

KAISH: No. I really.... I don't know whether it was a matter of someone wanting to reward Jim Young, and this was a place for him. Whether it was an anti-Malcolm or a pro-Jim Young move. I don't know. I didn't move in those circles. I'm sure that the people who were involved in administration knew, but I didn't know. I didn't care.

COHEN: The first dean of the college on the new campus was Henry Blumenthal. And what can you say about his deanship?

KAISH: Well, I knew and liked Henry. A great deal I knew him. When I retired, he was the section head of social science. I met with Henry when either I was a committee chair or department chair, some kind of chair... a number of meetings I was at. I thought Henry was a wise, perhaps equally shrewd—maybe wise isn't the word—but a shrewd assessor of

opportunities, of what was doable with the resources and the circumstances. I thought Henry was not only an able person, but a compassionate person, a good person; I liked him.

COHEN: His acting successor after two years as dean was Gilbert Panson—perceptions there?

KAISH: He was...I always had the perception that he was inaccessible. I didn't find him a very warm person or a very approachable person. I always felt ill at ease with him for whatever reason, he wasn't. Maybe a wise tactic was to be quiet and wait for you to talk. And I always felt that I was looking for some lead that I never got. And I just had no rapport there whatsoever.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. And his successor, Richard Robey?

KAISH: Well, Richard Robey was the one I went to to try to anticipate the growth of the business program, and we went with all our projections and our memoranda...from whom I got nothing. So as a visionary, I give him a low grade. I know he was involved in some chicanery—or at least it's alleged he was involved in some promotional chicanery. I think Richard Robey—it's not nice to speak ill of the departed—but was a rascal and a scoundrel.

COHEN: What was the promotional chicanery?

KAISH: Well, I don't know that it's part of the record. I mean my understanding is Michael Jaye's promotion, the documents got a little scrambled. Irregularities appeared.

COHEN: The move in the faculty to censure him? The committee report expressed some dissatisfaction.

KAISH: Yes. I think there was dissatisfaction with him as a person. Again, I was sort of a fringe element here. I brought him my recommendations; I got turned down. And I didn't have anything to do with him particularly. But one hears and one hears that he... I don't know. There were card games that he participated in. There were rumors about advantages he took of different people due to their level within the hierarchy. And again, it's all rumor, it's unsubstantiated rumor. I don't know that it belongs in the formal archives. The general impression was that he was sort of a rascally guy. He wasn't up to the Rutgers standard. Or maybe he was. [Laughter]

COHEN: His successor, Norman Samuels, our present provost. What can you say about his deanship?

KAISH: A very clever operator. Actually it was Norman who orchestrated the breakup of the Economics Department. And so I have to admire the skill with which he manipulated the committee, the vote of the committee. Norman, always knew what he was about. I think Norman made some terrible decisions with regard to our Austrian Economics Program and with regard to Jeffrey Moore. But those were Norman's decisions. I think they were mistakes. But from the point of view of a day-to-day operative, Norman was pretty good.

COHEN: Can you fill me in on the Austrian Economics Program?

KAISH: Didn't I tell you about the Austrian Economics?

COHEN: I went through that whole tape, but I may have...maybe that was, maybe you discussed that when the machine was off.

KAISH: Maybe I did. Austrian Economics is an approach which calls itself value-free and non-interventionist. It's a positive theory. It doesn't espouse government intervention. It's main man is Ludwig von Mises, and he wrote [unintelligible]. And Hayek. Hayek was his name. He was the main man. And it goes back to the 1880s. Anyway, it comes to pass that a group of conservative foundations had fell into rapture with Austrian Economics. And they were supporting programs here and there, generously. It also comes to pass that we had on our faculty, a couple of guys, who were, as an avocation, very much involved in these Austrian programs. A fellow named Walter Bloch and Walter Grinder, who was a sometime teacher with us. And it came to pass that they had access to the foundations that were supporting these Austrian programs. There was also a student of theirs over the years who is now a Ph.D. student at NYU, who was then a PhD student, named Richard Fink. And Fink was an instructor. We had hired Fink. Very bright individual, an Eagle Scout-type, entrepreneurial young man. And they loved Fink. The foundations loved Fink. And Fink arranged for our department, if it would, hire I guess it was three Austrian economists and offer an Austrian program; two hundred and fifty thousand dollars up front plus the promise of a half a million a year, ad infinitum to have meetings and summer programs and professional programs. The sort of thing George Mason is now doing, the sort of thing NYU was doing. NYU has an Austrian program, George Mason. We really weren't being asked to hobnob with the devil that no one else had hobnobbed with. And on the Rutgers scale, that was a pretty significant sum of money. We set the program up. We had a meeting to which we had luminaries come to the campus from around the world for a three-day meeting. It was really a very large, extravagant meeting.

COHEN: What year was that?

KAISH: The was probably around eighty I guess, maybe seventy-nine. It was a big meeting.

COHEN: Okay.

KAISH: And the main speaker was the fellow who was—my memory for name is beginning to slip—but the guy who was Reagan's chairman of the Economic Advisors and the president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Anyway he was the feature speaker. And so that happened, and we were giving some courses. There were a couple of students who came. A fellow named Tyler Cowen [sp], a girl from Nebraska who was attracted to this thing; these are the two smartest kids ever to come. Tyler Cowen eventually got a Ph.D. from Harvard and is now teaching at George Mason. It drew bright people, lots of money, scholars from around the country. And this was our Austrian Program. Granted we were a small department and these were three of thirteen people who would be in this Austrian mold. But we had these people to recruit. We would be recruiting.... I mean we already had Bloch and Fink; so we what we had to do was hire another one. Anyway, the more liberal elements of the faculty were horrified at all this. And they were women and the women became horrified. I guess they got to Samuels. Samuels pulled the rug out from under it. Reneged on the hiring, reneged on keeping Fink on.

Fink picked up and went to George Mason, and he took the Austrian Program with him. He took Tyler Cowen, and he took the girl from Nebraska. And Fink subsequently became vice president in charge of development for George Mason, and now works for Koch Industries, which was the major institution, the major foundation, that supported this whole thing. Went right on up like a skyrocket. And we were left, you know with our memories of what it was and what might have been, a feeling that Norman really hadn't made a good judgment. He made a political judgment in our estimation. I mean he is political.

COHEN: Okay.

KAISH: So that was our Austrian program, catch Jack and Leo Troy if you want a longer diatribe. [Laughter]

COHEN: I probably will do that. Anything that we've touched on that you'd like to go back to?

KAISH: No, I think you've been generous with your time and your tape.

COHEN: And you with yours.

KAISH: I'd be happy to go on. No, I think you've covered it.

COHEN: Well, thank you very much.

KAISH: My pleasure.

[End of Tape #3]

-----[End of Interview]-----

Reviewed and Edited by Catherine Carey 6/17/2013