DescriptionPsychopathological delusions, such as the Capgras delusion, the Cotard delusion, and the florid delusions that accompany schizophrenia, have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. They are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed; delusional individuals tend not to act on their delusions or draw appropriate inferences from the content of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their "delusional reality." I argue that these features support non-doxasticism about delusions. Non-doxasticism is the thesis that, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. After developing the prospects for non-doxasticism, I offer a novel non-doxasticist cognitive model. Delusions are pathological acceptances that are caused by powerful and aberrant cognitive feelings.