THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE AND THE PERPETRATION OF EXTREME

VIOLENCE (PEV) MODEL

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE AND THE PERPETRATION OF EXTREME

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This dissertation examines the processes by which psychologically normal individuals

become willing participants in genocide via a four-part discussion. Part one provides a

review of the literature on the psychology of genocides and critiques the existing

theoretical models. Part two then presents a new theoretical framework and introduces

the Perpetration of Extreme Violence model. Part three applies this new framework to

the analysis of an actual instance of extreme violence: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and

examines the degree to which the PEV model maps onto both the broader course of

events and the experiences of the actual perpetrators. Finally, part four utilizes two

empirical studies to test several of the underlying predictions of the PEV model. Study

One reveals that, consistent with the PEV's predictions, the degree to which individuals

endorse harm-legitimizing ideologies about a target group is positively related to levels of

outcome attitudes associated with the first three stages, as well as general levels of hatred

and support for harmful policies directed at the target group. Study 2 then takes the

analysis a step further by focusing on two additional predictions: (1) that exposure to

harm-legitimizing ideologies could increase endorsement of these ideologies, ultimately

resulting in more negative attitudes and support for harmful policies directed at the target group and (2) that the effects of ideology exposure on endorsement would be moderated by individual levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and/or Ingroup Identification Strength. Results fail to support both hypotheses suggesting that a single exposure to harm-legitimizing ideology is not strong enough to produce real attitude/belief change. Implications, limitations and future directions are discussed.

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Introduction

"It is demonic that they were not demonic."[1]

To murder a single person is an act that most find abominable. The thought of willingly supporting and participating in the extermination of an entire group of people is something of which most would like to think themselves incapable. And yet, time and again we see mass killing and genocidal movements sweep through entire nations and we are left to wonder why and how they garnered support.

The question of how groups of people can be swept up into extreme violence has plagued social scientists with increasing frequency since World War II. Following the Holocaust, researchers were faced with the daunting task of trying to explain why events unfolded as they did. In the decades since, the field of genocide research has seen a dramatic evolution as each new group of researchers adds another piece to the puzzle: shifting from pathological models to dysfunctional dispositions, and then again toward situational factors and obedience. Although the mounting theories provide glimpses into the actions of some, they still fall short of accounting for the immense scope of the violence.

With the genocidal death toll estimates well into the millions, it becomes clear that this must be the work of more than a handful of disturbed individuals or unwitting followers. Clearly, to achieve such levels of devastation, genocidal movements must rely on the support of numerous, otherwise normal, citizens. If this is the case, then the questions become: why do otherwise normal individuals become willing supporters and

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[1] Elie Wiesel, quoted in Baum (2008), reacting to a report by Robert Lifton (1986) that the Nazis were, for the most part, psychologically normal.

perpetrators of extreme violence? And how exactly do they make the transformation from average citizen to murderer?

To explore and attempt to answer these profound questions, this dissertation will take a three-pronged approach. The first section will review the key literature/theories surrounding individual perpetration of extreme violence, and will examine several recent models of genocidal violence. Building off of this foundation, the second section will propose a new model of willing perpetration of extreme violence, and will examine the degree to which it maps onto recent examples of genocidal violence, most notably Rwanda (1994). Finally, the third section will subject the model to empirical tests of its basic predictions via two studies.

Key Theories in the Psychology of Genocide

Defining Genocide and Differentiating it from other Forms of Extreme Violence

One of the preliminary issues facing researchers of extreme violence is differentiating between its various forms, ranging from ethnic cleansing to mass killing and finally genocide. Although the distinction may be minimal in some cases, it is necessary that we have a clear, working definition of these concepts to best understand what qualities might draw participants in. At its most simplistic, each form of violence is distinguished by two elements: what is the ultimate goal of the violence and who is the group being targeted?

On the "less extreme" end of the inter-group conflict spectrum lies ethnic cleansing. Based on the Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 780, ethnic cleansing is defined as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means, the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas." Put more plainly, it is a forced population relocation carried out via murder, torture, arrest/detention, sexual assaults, deportation, confinement of civilians to ghettos or camps, reproductive restriction and/or destruction of property. The ultimate intention of ethnic cleansing or forced population relocation is to rid an area of a particular target group (most often ethnic or religious) to create a more homogenous state. "Pure" ethnic cleansing may involve murder of groups of target individuals, but the primary aim is not the extermination of said group, merely their removal from the area.

Lying on the "most extreme" end of the intergroup conflict spectrum is genocide, "the extermination of an entire ethnic, racial or religious group" (UN Charter definition).

Unlike ethnic cleansing, genocide involves the "systematic and intentional targeting of a group for *destruction*," (Waller, 2002). In this case, the goal of the violence is to literally annihilate a whole group of people based on their group membership. Along with ethnic, racial and religious groups, other forms of eliminationist movements have been identified including politicide (the murder of groups on the basis of their political affiliation or for political purposes). Genocidal movements often include ethnic cleansing tactics early on as a means of controlling and relocating the target group for extermination, but ultimately the aim is to completely destroy a group down to its last member.

Finally, lying in a somewhere in between ethnic cleansing and genocide, is mass killing. Mass killing or mass murder, like genocide, involves killing groups of people, but lacks the same systematic, eliminationist focus. In general, mass killing occurs without the intention to exterminate the whole group and/or it may involve killing large numbers of people in situations where target group membership is more ambiguous. Genocide and mass killing often share similar roots, but mass killing generally lacks the same organized, systematic action and the same eliminationist goal.

Drawing distinctions between various types of extreme intergroup conflict allows us to best understand that the intent to completely and utterly destroy a social group is the key component that separates genocide from warfare, mass killing and ethnic cleansing. It is the processes by which perpetrators come to actively participate in the extermination of another group that is at the heart of this theoretical review and analysis. Due to overwhelming similarities, and in the name of simplicity, eliminationist movements will be referred to under the blanket term genocide; acknowledging that the targets of these movements may include political groups, as well as racial, ethnic and religious groups.

The key goal being the understanding of what elements contribute to individuals willing participation in the extermination of another social group.

The Unusual or Disturbed: Examining the Pathological Model

Due to the extreme brutality of genocidal violence, it is understandable that many early genocide researchers looked to psychopathology and extraordinary dispositions to explain why individuals might choose to involve themselves in these sorts of movements. This approach led many early inquiries to search for sadism or other personality disorders among both leaders and followers (e.g. Fendern, 1960; Charny, 1986). It is, after all, far easier to accept that psychologically abnormal individuals might be capable of inhuman acts than it is to believe that the average person might be a potential murderer. Although there certainly must be pathological individuals among the ranks of genocidal perpetrators such as the Nazis and Hutus, the level of pathology assumed by these researchers can only truly account for a very small minority of participants in extreme violence. How then, do we account for the rest?

In an attempt to expand the focus beyond the mentally ill, a second group of theorists instead argued that most perpetrators of extreme violence were likely driven, not by sadism, but by strong predispositions toward anti-democratic and/or aggressive tendencies. These tendencies, they argued, combined to produce an extreme, bordering on pathological, brand of authoritarianism, or a "fascistic" personality, which made these individuals and groups more likely to support totalitarian regimes (e.g. Adorno, et al., 1950; Dicks, 1972; Steiner, 1980). Drawn initially from examinations of members of the Nazi regime, those possessing fascistic personalities were characterized by their tendencies to: idealize authority figures, rigidly adhere to conventional social and moral

standards, abhor ambiguity, rely on stereotypes, possess an exaggerated need to submit to those in power and a desire to dominate those of lower rank (Kressel, 1996).

Taken together, it should not be surprising that individuals who possessed these predispositions to an extreme degree would be expected to readily take orders from a strong totalitarian leader, particularly when those orders were designed to eliminate a "threat" to their groups way of life. Although the study of personality is inherently focused on the individual, proponents of the fascistic personality hypothesis would also argue that the degree to which individuals are likely to hold these predispositions is also a product of their culture and the degree to which it values authoritarianism (Adorno, et al, 1950). These authoritarian cultures breed potential fascists by placing strong emphasis on order and hierarchy, encouraging personal achievement and rewarding those who follow the rules, and demanding submission to those in power. With a culture of willing followers, all that is needed is the right trigger, the right leader, and a clear target group for violence to emerge.

Both the pathological model and authoritarian/fascistic personality approaches provide some clues as to how and why many extreme outliers are drawn to violent causes. These insights are particularly useful when examining both the origins and trajectory of certain genocidal leaders, as well as those who are early volunteers for violent regimes. They do not, however, account for the vast majority of supporters of these movements, nor are they widely applicable when moving beyond the prototypical genocide, the Holocaust. Where the Nazis were significantly more organized, had propaganda ministries to indoctrinate the masses, and an organized network of leadership to oversee and devise efficient strategies to eliminate their targets, most other genocidal

regimes often do not have this level of structure to galvanize their support. To understand these perpetrators clearly, it is necessary to look for additional explanations.

Obedience, Roles and the Power of a Situation

As with these early theorists, those that followed in their footsteps found it difficult to accept that perpetrators could actually be willing to kill. If we cannot place the blame entirely on the sick or sadistic, then surely the perpetrators must be unwitting puppets of some evil dictator. This was, incidentally, the most famous excuse offered by perpetrators (most notably, Eichmann; e.g. Cesarani, 2006) for their actions.

Corroborating this belief, Zimbardo's (1969) prison study and Milgram's (1974) studies of obedience seemed to give clear indications that the most powerful force driving harmful behavior did not originate from the individual themselves, but rather was defined by the situations in which they were placed. Both lines of research seemed to show that the situation dictated what social roles were available to participants (prisoner/guard or subject/experimenter, respectively), imparted power dynamics and prescribed what behaviors/scripts would be appropriate for the parties involved. The troubling part was not that the situation exerted some influence on participations actions, however. Rather, it was troubling that participants seemed to completely defer to the situation when deciding how to behave, and ultimately acted in a more harmful manner than they would have otherwise.

Although these results fell in line with the belief that psychologically normal people would not instigate violence of their own accord, they simultaneously kindled fears about the harmful potential of the average person. On one hand, if extreme violence could largely be attributed to the simple "following of orders" (or roles), we could take

solace in the fact that the average individual would not be likely to initiate harming spontaneously. On the other hand, if the average person could be swayed to harm others under the guise of following a seemingly legitimate leader, we must acknowledge the harmful potential that we all possess. It seemed that supporters of the obedience hypothesis had found their evidence. If participants could be lead by a complete stranger to deliver electric shocks to a complete stranger (as seen in Milgrim's research) imagine the harm they might do if they felt some affinity for the perpetrator group. There were, however a few caveats to this effect.

Milgram's subsequent studies (also reported in Obedience to Authority, 1974) explored the conditions that might mitigate the willingness to obey authority. During these trials, he manipulated the structure of the situation in which participants found themselves and several pivotal cases emerged where individual's willingness to administer high level shocks was dramatically reduced: if the participant was in close proximity to the victim, if the authority figure was absent, and if the participant worked alongside others who refused to harm.[2] With these caveats in mind, it is understandable that genocide researchers began to question the applicability of the obedience hypothesis. It is true that some individuals are more driven to participate in extreme violence because they feel compelled to obey orders being given by authorities; either because they respect the authority who is giving the orders, or they fear the consequences of disobedience (Kressel, 1996). It is even fair to speculate that most participants in genocidal violence are at least partially motivated by a sense of duty to their group and its leaders. It is not,

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[2] It should be noted that no participants were actually harmed in the process of Milgram's (1974) experiments. The studies were designed to make the participants believe that they were hurting another participant, when in fact the other "participant" was always a confederate who was only pretending to receive electrical shocks.

however, realistic to assume that all perpetrators of violence are "innocent" because they were "just following orders." There are two reasons for why this is an unrealistic assumption.

First, and this is perhaps the most basic counterargument one can offer, even the most obedient follower chose to act. As Waller (2002) explains, obedience and conformity do not transform a completely innocent person into a killer. This interpretation of the results denies the agency of the perpetrators. Being placed into the role of a follower or subordinate can, however, reveal an individual's full capacity to inflict harm. This is not to disregard the real mortal peril in which some perpetrators find themselves, which may – through threat salience – compel them to act in a markedly aberrant manner. In cases where the violence has already started, individuals may find themselves reluctantly following along because the group expects them to join in the violence or be killed themselves.

Even in these extreme cases we cannot neglect the fact that the groups involved did not spontaneously arrive at this point of killing to avoid harm themselves. Reluctant followers cannot be completely absolved through their obedience, because they generally either supported anti-target group ideologies in the past or have, through inaction, allowed them to mutate into eliminationist sentiments.

The second counterargument to consider is that despite their compelling results, the Milgram (1974) studies are not a sufficient analog approximation of real genocidal movements. Although the same criticism can be leveled most laboratory experiments, it is a huge leap to take an individual who has been asked to harm another person once (under the guise of scientific inquiry, and with the reassurance that no permanent damage

will result), and apply it to someone who knowingly inflicts harm (or even kills) others day after day (Kressel, 1996; Waller, 2002). More specifically, perpetrators of genocide differ from Milgram's (1974) participants in three ways: (1) as mentioned before, perpetrators of genocide are generally being asked to harm the targets repeatedly, (2) while Milgram's participants could rationalize that they inflicted no real harm because of the ambiguous consequences of their harming behaviors, perpetrators of genocide are generally fully aware of the murderous consequences of their actions, and (3) perpetrators of genocidal violence are not likely to have the same level of close oversight by their leaders.

Genocides do not happen in a single day. As a result, perpetrators of extreme violence must face their harmful actions on a daily basis and come up with ways to alleviate the resulting cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The greater this dissonance is, the more likely individuals will seek ideological justification for their incongruous actions.

To maintain some level of psychological health, these perpetrators need to believe that there is some legitimacy to both the leaders they are following and the orders that they are fulfilling (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kressel, 1996). Milgram's (1974) participants had a host of ways to rationalize that their actions as not ultimately harmful because: they knew they were only participating a single experiment, they were acting in the name of science (for the "greater good") and had repeated reassurance that any harm they did inflict would not hold permanent consequences. Although this belief in harming for "the greater good" translates clearly to actual genocide perpetrators (Baum, 2008), the similarity ends there.

As mentioned before, genocides require their followers to perpetrate violence on a regular basis, and the perpetrators do not, generally, have the luxury of completely disassociating their evil actions from their deadly consequences. Where Milgram's (1974) participants were often separated from the recipient of the electric shocks, individuals perpetrating extreme evil are almost always aware of the consequences for their actions; even if they are not the ones who ultimately commit murder or inflict harm. This is not to say that they may not try delude themselves into thinking that nothing evil is coming of their actions by ascribing euphemistic language or avoiding consideration (Bandura, 1999). Ultimately, though, most perpetrators are probably, at least somewhat, aware of the murderous outcome of their collective efforts.

Finally, perpetrators of extreme violence are often not under direct scrutiny of leadership (most genocides are not so methodically organized), particularly in situations where they are being asked to harm regularly. As Milgram's (1974) follow-up studies show, having an absent or distant authority figure delivering orders significantly diminishes the effects of obedience. This makes sense, considering that if there is no authority present to verify that perpetrators compliance with orders, then there is logically no reason for perpetrators to continue to follow orders that they find objectionable? To maintain compliance with orders to harm the targets over time, even in the absence of a clear authority figure, there must be some other mechanism to provide justification for violent actions.

To reiterate, this is not to say that obedience to authority does not explain at least some portion of the motivation for individuals to perpetrate extreme violence. Orders from superiors certainly direct and encourage increasing violence among group members,

but individual perpetrators must still choose to act, rationalize their actions (particularly the more brutal ones), and find sufficient justification for continued perpetration of acts that they might otherwise find reprehensible. In the case of extreme violence, leadership is only as effective as it is perceived to be legitimate. As such, broader social beliefs and norms must be altered to provide reasonable rationale for authority of the leader, and the orders perpetrators receive (Staub, 1999; Dutton, 2007). If the orders to commit genocide are seen as too extreme, this would call into question the legitimacy (and sanity) of the leadership, making the masses far less likely to follow suit.

Clearly, it requires looking beyond a single explanation to completely understand the processes by which groups accumulate and sustain genocidal followers. Pathology, authoritarianism, and obedience all have their parts to play in instigating and perpetuating extreme violence but, even taken together, these explanations still fail to address how the more average members of groups become willingly involved. To understand these individuals, the best is to take a step back and examine how groups as a whole move from relative peace to violence. By understanding the broader motivations of these groups change over time, perhaps we can shed some light on how the perceptions and actions of their individual members parallel these shifts.

A Review of Existing Models of Genocide and Individual Evil

Approximately 40 years after the Holocaust sparked research into extraordinary violence, and only two years after the genocide in Rwanda, an invigorated push among genocide researchers resulted in the proposal of several new, more elaborate, theoretical models of the development of extreme violence and factors contributing to individual support of genocidal movements. Taking a predominantly group level focus, the aim of

these models was to explore how contextual, behavior and ideological factors might combine to push groups from relative peace to genocidal violence.

Stanton (1996) – "Eight Stages of Genocide"

Beginning with the broadest approach, Stanton (1996) offered one of the first, semi-linear, stage models of the processes groups experience as they move from relatively peaceful relations to genocidal violence (See Figure 1). Underlying the stage design was the prediction that perpetrators do not suddenly engage in extreme violence, instead they gradually come to accept violence as the only solution when dealing with the threat of a targeted outgroup. As such, each stage must proceed in order, from more benign processes to more extreme. Once groups have made their initial push through the stages, however, the semi-linear logic maintains that they may return to prior stages or that early stage beliefs/actions to manifest simultaneously with later stages as a means of reinforcing the foundational intergroup beliefs.

Stages one and two (classification and symbolization, respectively) are largely normal social phenomena whereby societies break into groups and each group is assigned labels, symbols and stereotypes (most often lead by the aggressor group). Stanton argues that tensions are more likely to arise when the society is divided into only two key groups, because this allows for an easier division of an "us" and "them." Once divided, resources, characteristics and value are differentially assigned to each group: with positive value being assigned to the ingroup and negative value to the targeted outgroup. When a strict "us" and "them" mentality is coupled with extraordinarily negative symbols, it can lead to stage three: dehumanization. Here the target group is more than just despised and portrayed in a negative light, it is actually denied its humanity (or

value) by the aggressors. This may involve equating outgroup targets with animals, vermin, insects, or tools as a means of "overcoming the normal human revulsion against murder," (Stanton, 1996).

After establishing the targets as devalued interlopers, aggressor groups then begin the process of organizing, polarizing, preparing and actually exterminating their targets. During these stages, leadership (generally the government) begins to assemble the followers necessary to complete its mission of defending the interests of the group. This may involve the use of "legitimate" armies or can be based on backdoor deals with militias (to provide deniability), informal mobs, or terrorist cells. Plans are made and ideology is disseminated among followers (and potential followers) to justify the ultimate use of violence. As groups accrue greater numbers of willing followers, they are drawn to more extreme views (both through intimidation of moderates and suppression of dissent). The state may then begin to identify and segregate target members of the population, which may include relocating them to ghettos and expropriating their property. This may also lead to the formation of "death lists" or circulation of names of enemy targets (Power, 2002). Ultimately, these processes give way to actual actions intended to exterminate the targets via mass killing.[3]

Stanton describes the final stage after the extermination of the targets (or attempts to do so), as "denial." Although this does not happen in all cases (Germany has largely accepted responsibility for the actions perpetrated during the Holocaust), many times, aggressors will seek to transfer blame to the victims or hide evidence of their actions to avoid international retribution. Of note, Stanton explains, is the lack of remorse many

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[3] Stanton emphasizes the use of "extermination" here because of the association of the target group with inhuman vermin.

immediate perpetrators feel regarding their crimes. This lack of guilt is a fairly good indicator that these individuals have strongly adopted the dehumanizing ideology about their victims since, as Milgram's (1974) study would suggest, one would expect perpetrators to feel guilty after harming a human being.

Stanton's stages provide an introductory view into the group level processes that are often implicated in the push toward extreme violence. These stages, however, find their primary utility when viewed as social trends to look for in potentially budding genocides. They do not, however, provide much explanation for variance individual support for genocide. Moving toward a psychological approach, Staub (1996; see Figure 2), proposed a more elaborate model of the development of eliminationist movements. Although this model shares the aim of Stanton's (1996) stages, to explore the processes that lead groups to extreme violence, Staub included additional elements that might help to explain individual/group variance.

Staub (1999) – Influences and processes contributing to genocide and mass killing

Incidences of extreme violence, Staub (1999) argues, tend to emerge out of similar circumstances: difficult life conditions, economic turmoil, political destabilization, and/or pre-existing conflict. As such, though violence may break out between newly divided groups, there is often a pre-existing base of polarized ingroup/outgroup beliefs and contextual justification for violent action. Adhering more to the frustration-aggression approach, this model holds that groups respond to threats to their basic needs by further dividing the ingroup/outgroup and displacing their frustration as aggression targeted at the targeted outgroup.

As an offshoot of their generally negative feelings about the targets, the aggressors may come to blame the targets for their difficulties (or use them as a scapegoat), even when they are not the actual cause of the problems. These negative feelings, and associated blame, serve to justify initial harming of the target group, which Staub argues, triggers a vicious cycle of: harming, justifying harming, and changing social norms (to make future harming acceptable). As the group legitimizes harming the target outgroup, the methods become more and more extreme, ultimately ending in the final stage: genocide/mass killing.

As with Stanton's stages, Staub's (1999) model shows the utility of stage models in understanding how groups build up to eliminationist violence. Both agree that a desire to exterminate another social group does not emerge suddenly out of peaceful relations, but instead builds over time. Perpetrator groups must gradually form more extreme views of their targets, and eventually may alter social norms to make the extermination of the target outgroup a legitimate solution to social problems. Unfortunately, even with Staub's inclusion of several group/individual characteristics that can explain variance in the movement from stage to stage (such as authority orientation, and group identification/self-concept), it remains unclear exactly where these orientations may have the most impact.

Also in need of further elaboration are the types of "legitimizing ideologies" most commonly implicated (and where they may have the most ability to garner support). To have a cohesive model of individual support for intergroup violence, it would be necessary to elaborate on the role of ideology and personality to best understand how and why hatred and harming are ultimately deemed acceptable.

Waller (2002) – Models of extraordinary evil

In response to one of these gaps in the literature, Waller (2002) used his book *Becoming Evil* to break down some of the contributing cultural and individual characteristics that may help explain a group and individual propensity to extraordinary evil. Most enlightening are his two models that focus on the characteristics of individuals that contribute to involvement in violent movements and the general characteristics of perpetrator groups that contribute to the emergence of extreme violence.

As with many of his predecessors in the area of genocide research, Waller leans heavily on the perspective that it is the responses to authority that dictate individual participation in genocide. Instead of treating obedience as a sort of pathology, though, Waller approaches moderate authoritarianism as a useful means of working within a broader society that values loyalty, commitment and support. What differentiates a likely perpetrator from their moderate peers, however, is the perpetrator's predisposition toward more extreme authoritarian leanings. Strong authoritarians, in this case, adopt this approach to leadership because they have found that working with the system gives them opportunities for advancement and a means of better meeting their needs.

Due to these strong authoritarian leanings, Waller (2002) argues that these perpetrators are also more likely to show commitment to ideologies espoused by those in authority and to perceive their outcomes as being largely dictated by external forces. When individual values conflict with their actions, these perpetrators are also likely to defer to the orders of their leaders and morally disengage (Bandura, 1999). This disengagement takes the form of adopting ideology to justify their evil actions, applying euphemistic language when discussing evil acts, and perceiving their actions as being less

evil when compared to the actions of the target. The primary goal of these actions is to enhance their professional self-interest (acting in ways that would lead to promotion and commendation). As a result, these individuals are far more likely to exhibit a heavy overlap between their personal identity and their group identity: their values tend to come from the group, and their goals generally have the group's best interest at heart (even if there is cost to them as an individual).

Returning to a more broad approach, Waller's (2002, Figure 3) second "Model of Extraordinary Human Evil," explores the three factors that influence responses to authority: the actor, the context and the targets. The response to authority, he argues is the biggest determining factor in whether individuals (and groups) will become participants in genocide, because it is the leadership that guides and justifies violence. In Waller's model, deference to authority is strongest among cultures that direct individuals to focus on rational self-interest (careerism), value professional achievement, and merge the roles of group and self.

Incorporating all of these elements leads to a society of willing self-subjugating followers who value group outcomes over personal gains - provided they receive commendation and honor as a result. Pushing them close to violence, actors who have strongly merged their group and personal identities are also more likely to defend group-centric ideologies that promote conflict, including: ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and desire for social dominance. Because these groups have a preexisting tendency towards deference to authority, Waller (2002) argues that it is easier for them to morally disengage when the group initiates aggression towards a targeted outgroup. For these groups, violence becomes a valued means of achieving the group's goals, and it is treated

as justified because the perpetrators believe (A) the targets have it coming to them, and/or (B) that the targets are inhuman.

Waller outlines more clearly how more authoritarian groups may come to adopt beliefs that commonly justify the perpetration of violence, but this model still falls short of providing a comprehensive picture of individual involvement in violence. Combining the insights gleaned from Waller's (2002) model with Stanton's (1996) and Staub's (1999) models, we are presented with a reasonable understanding of the key qualities that likely perpetrators possess and the beginnings of a genocidal "roadmap" of key attitudes/behaviors that groups are likely to initiate on their way from peace to extreme violence. These models, however, still leave a considerable gap when it comes to understanding the psychology of genocide (as opposed to group level phenomena). How is it that the average, moderate member of the population (as most members of groups seem to be), can be moved past socially acceptable extremes to commit unthinkable acts against their fellow man?

A New Model of Willing Support for Extreme Violence

To begin to fill in this gap, the Perpetration of Extreme Violence (PEV) model of individual support for genocidal violence is aimed at more firmly establishing how contributing contextual and individual factors, ideologies that justify violence, and relevant beliefs about the targets, may combine to produce violence. Building off of the stage model framework utilized in previous models, the PEV model theorizes that individual support for genocide does not emerge suddenly, but requires gradual ideological indoctrination and behavioral justification to occur. Individuals may vary in the speed with which they move through these stages, and it is probable that some may cycle through previous stages several times before they reach the final stage. Ultimately, if individuals adopt each justifying ideology, gradually move through the stages of harming, and can rationalize their harming then they should become willing and active perpetrators of violence.

As previously mentioned, the PEV model is interested in capturing willing perpetration of eliminationist violence [e.g. genocide, politicide, etc], and as such, discussion of individual support for other forms of violence, including general warfare, is not included. During their progression through the mid-to-late stages of the PEV model, it is acknowledged that individual participation may manifest as tactics associated with ethnic cleansing (mass relocation, reproductive suppression, etc) or murder without the intent to exterminate an entire social group. In this way, the PEV model can help to explain willing perpetration of some lesser forms of extreme violence directed at members of a targeted outgroup, but these forms of violence are included only as they relate to the gradual escalation of violence, and are not the intended endpoint.

Additionally, it should be noted that the focus of the PEV model is on the willing participation in extreme violence by psychologically normal, average citizens; as such, extreme outliers on either end of the spectrum (i.e. sadists or true altruists, etc), lie outside of the scope of this discussion. The purpose of the PEV model is to move beyond the perspective that perpetrators of genocidal violence must suffer from some sort of pathology (be it a disorder or an extreme authoritarian streak) or are simply hapless followers of some sadistic leader. Successful genocidal movements require far more support than sadistic personality and reluctant obedience can account for. As Milgram's (1974) experiments have shown, normal people (while under close supervision by a superior in a sterile environment), seem to have a far greater capacity to harm than we would like to think.

Unlike Milgram's experiments, however, gathering supporters for genocide is much more complex than having individuals follow direct orders to shock another participant under the guise of "science." Perpetrators of extreme violence often commit heinous acts as a part of their daily lives, without the same oversight by direct authorities. To reach this point, the willingness and motivation to harm must be internalized (Dutton, 2007). The PEV model, therefore, will also not focus on support based solely on transference of responsibility and obedience to authority. These types of support, although they may explain some supporter behavior, account only for unwilling or reluctant perpetrators; not the true supporters. Characteristics such as the regularly cited authoritarianism will, however, be included as potential moderators of individual response to authority and group related ideologies.

To best explore the PEV model of individual support and participation in extreme violence (see Figure 4), the discussion will be broken into four sections. The first section will explore the basic contextual factors that contribute to the emergence of genocidal violence. The intent of this section is to address what situational elements may provide a foundation for ideology legitimizing violence and what cultural values might contribute to individual desire to participate.

Section two will explore the moderating power of individual characteristics. Here, the primary source of individual variance in support and participation will be addressed, including: authoritarianism, social dominance, and group identification strength. Section three will outline the attitudinal/behavioral stages individuals move through, and the justifying ideologies that help to push individuals from relative peace to eliminationist violence. Finally, section four will apply the model to a recent example of genocide in Rwanda.

The Social Context

Most groups find ways to live alongside one another with only minor conflicts (Rummel, 1994). When addressing the issue of extreme violence the question becomes: what is it about certain groups (and their members) that pushes them toward not only violent conflict, but active attempts at extermination of another group? A common theme drawn from the literature on the psychology of genocide explains that extreme violence generally emerges when groups face shared difficulties (Staub, 2003). Conflict is ignited when one or both groups feel their ability to meet basic needs is threatened (e.g. Dollard, et al., 1939; Sherif, 1966; Berkowitz, 1993), particularly when necessary resources are scarce and the groups must compete for them. As a result, intergroup differences become

salient, as each members of each group attempt to secure resources for themselves and their own.

The key role of collective difficulties in motivating individual action/support in extreme violence lies in their incorporation of rational, or seemingly rational, reasons to fear a threatening outgroup. Because the target outgroup is competing with the perpetrator group for resources (these range from tangible goods such as land or food, to the less tangible, status or power), they pose a real threat to the perpetrator group's security. These fears are particularly prevalent in circumstances where past violence (and particularly, past subjugation) has occurred between the groups. Where unhealed victimization (real or perceived) exists, perpetrators are more likely to feel justified in pursuing retribution or "protective measures" to keep their targets from inflicting more harm (Kressel, 1996; Staub, 2003).

Also of import when considering what types of intergroup beliefs perpetrators may have (and likely rationale for their support of extreme violence), are the social hierarchy and its stability. In many cases, the collective difficulties facing the perpetrator and target groups result in broader social instability. Economic struggles, loss of a strong leader, and revolution, often leave a power vacuum and a general sense of hopelessness among group members; both of which provide an ideal opening for new, decisive leadership to garner support (Staub, 2003). Although the specific characteristics of these leaders lie outside of this particular discussion, their role is nonetheless important in directing violent ideology and promises of better days to potential (and active) followers. Support for intergroup violence, be it revolutionary (bottom-up violence) or suppressive

(top-down violence), is likely when group members feel they are working toward a better future (or at least, the best alternative) for themselves and their group.

Explaining individual variance – a genocidal personality

> "If intergroup behavior were first and foremost a matter of understanding the behavior of exceptionally disturbed individuals, it would not be the issue of vital consequence that it is today." (Sherif, 1966, p.13)

Despite years of research, theorists have yet to discover a true "genocidal personality." Building off of Adorno, et al.'s (1950) original exploration of authoritarianism and other analyses of the "fascistic personality" (Dicks, 1972), there has been great debate as to whether a single collection of personality traits could be used to describe all of the variance seen in perpetrator attitudes and actions. For this, and other reasons (concerns about its validity and right-wing leanings), the use of the original F scale has largely fallen out of favor when examining individual participation in extreme violence. In response theorist have largely moved away from a single "fascistic personality" hypothesis, and have opted instead to look at a multi-dimensional collection of dispositional traits that impact how individuals tend to interact with other group members, members of outgroups, and leadership.

Adapting and building upon Adorno's work, two of the most widely utilized personality theories: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation; hold much promise when examining individuals who would be more likely to support intergroup conflict and prejudice. These dispositions deal with two different aspects of how individuals orient themselves in society: (1) how do they respond to traditional values and authority? And (2) how strongly do they support the existence of a social hierarchy (particularly the current one)? In both cases, the possession of high levels of these dispositions correlate strongly with generalized prejudice, increased willingness to

follow leaders, and/or susceptibility to hateful ideologies; all of which increase the likelihood that individuals would willingly participate in extreme violence.

Although, as previously discussed, authoritarianism was one of the earliest characteristics to be explored; it has evolved somewhat since its original inception with Adorno, et. al's (1950) work. Recent adaptations of the theory acknowledge their focus on right-wing authoritarians, arguing that these individuals are likely to share several potent characteristics that make them more likely perpetrators of ideologically driven violence: conventionalism, submission and aggression. The biggest proponent of authoritarianism has been Altemeyer (e.g. 1981, 1996), and his research on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA).[4] By reviving and re-evaluating the F scale, Altemeyer's results suggest that there is a likely a connection between these characteristics and support for extreme violence. High RWA individuals, after all, tend to be more prejudiced, more submissive to conventional authorities, and more likely to adopt hateful ideology than low RWA individuals.

In a series of studies, Altemeyer revealed that exposure to hateful propaganda was enough to change the attitudes of high RWA individuals, including: increasing their denial that the Holocaust occurred, and increasing prejudice towards outgroups such as feminists and homosexuals (Altemeyer, 1996). Similarly, a recent study looking at the effects of hateful ideology on attitudes and policy decisions about illegal immigrants once again revealed that high RWA individuals were the most likely to adopt the ideology. These individuals expressed more prejudice and support for harmful policies directed at

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[4] It is noted here that the RWA scale has been designed primarily with a Western, and especially American, audience in mind. As a measure of authoritarianism in an international setting, some adjustments would likely need to be made.

illegal immigrants than moderate or low RWA individuals (Nofziger, in process). Altemeyer readily admits that this scale does not account for all types of potential authoritarianism, and that supporters of leftwing movements may share a similar type of authoritarianism.

Often used alongside the RWA has been the Sidanius & Pratto's (1999) Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Where RWA relates to support for leadership and conventionality, SDO emphasizes support for social hierarchy maintenance, and particularly, ingroup dominance. High SDO individuals generally show greater prejudice (particularly classism) than low SDO individual, as well as greater support for hierarchy-reinforcing ideologies. In the same study of propaganda effects on attitudes and policy decisions about illegal immigrants, SDO levels predicted similar attitude and policy support levels: high SDO individuals were more likely to express prejudicial attitudes about illegal immigrants and support harmful policies than low SDO individuals (Nofziger, in process). SDO level also seemed to be a better predictor of policy decisions than RWA (although both were significant), likely because the policies tended to result in the suppression of a lower status group.

It should be noted that authoritarianism and social hierarchy support are not inherently "evil" orientations to possess. A certain level of obedience to legitimate authorities is necessary to help societies function smoothly (Staub, 1989). So too is the support for a functional social hierarchy; peaceful conditions are rarely, if ever, seen in areas where anarchy is allowed to reign. Moderate levels each of these characteristics allow individuals and groups to reach a relative consensus about the ways in which groups will interact. Consider that most successful democracies and republics rely on

moderate levels of authoritarianism and social dominance to maintain order and perpetuate their social structure. When authoritarianism and social dominance are maintained in moderation, these types of societies remain the least likely to perpetrate extreme violence or genocide against their own citizens. Extreme violence is far more likely in societies that are too extreme (on either end), be they totalitarian or anarchic.

To gain a more comprehensive picture of likely participants in extreme violence requires moving beyond a simple examination of the high RWA or SDO individuals, particularly because these orientations tend to ignore leftist movements. There are other characteristics that may influence how individuals react to leadership and ideology that include their levels of interpersonal trust, social intelligence and moral judgment (Blass, 1991). Individuals who are more trusting of authority, possess deficient social intelligence, and lack internalized moral judgment may be more willing to follow orders than those who are less trusting, more socially intelligent, and have more strongly internalized morality. Similarly, individuals who possess an external locus of control may be more willing to follow extreme movements, because they rely heavily on externalized source of morality (such as a deity) or sense of predestination/fate to dictate their path in life. As a result, these individuals are more likely to involve themselves in violence if there is a religious or spiritual undercurrent to the movement's ideologies (Staub, 1996). This was the case among many Rwandans who believed that they were accepting fate, and also could be seen among the Germans who sought to achieve their "destiny" by creating a pure ethnicity (Waller, 2002).

Tied into this external locus of control is the possibility that certain individuals rely more heavily external sources, such as group memberships, to dictate their identity,

values/morals and actions than others. Referred to as strong social identifiers, these are

the individuals tend to highly value their affiliation with the ingroup, desire to be seen as

ideal ingroup members and heavily base their sense of self on the standards set by their

ingroup (Baum, 1994). This tendency to emphasize the group over autonomy means that

socially identified people are far more likely to suppress their individuality if it comes

into conflict with the group's agenda (Crandall, 2002). As a result, particularly the

strongly socially identified, would be expected to more easily adapt to changing

intergroup views, and to more quickly exhibit compliance when under scrutiny by fellow

group members.

It should be noted that although this tendency to go along with the group

manifests in much the same way, the actual experience of this process of adopting group

identity might diverge. For some strong identifiers, the belief that the perpetrator ingroup

tends to be "right" leads them to more easily adopt the hateful beliefs espoused by their

ingroup, and they base their harmful actions on these beliefs. For the rest, the desire to

appear as an ideal group member (and avoid ingroup policing) drives them to comply

outwardly with initial harming, and the adoption of the associated beliefs about the

targets follows as a means of justification.

In summary, the PEV model acknowledges the important role that individual

predispositions may play a role in explaining variance, from person to person, in

readiness to adopt ideology and willingness to follow leadership, (See Figure 5 for sub-

model of individual dispositions as a moderator of adoption of ideology). That is to say,

some individuals may find themselves more willing to go along with the group/leader

with less persuading or pressure, while others require greater external pressure to

cooperate (Waller, 2002). As previously mentioned, the first type of individual is likely to be the person whose actions are motivated by previously adopted beliefs about their ingroup, the targets and/or their role in relation to leadership/deities/etc. These individuals are more likely to begin harming because they *want* to, or because they feel justifiably compelled to.

The latter sort of individual is more likely to be the type of person who initially follows their group/leader out of a sense of duty or fear, and their continued participation would hinge on their ability to subsequently legitimize their actions. These are the individuals who are more likely to begin harming because they feel they *must*. Individuals in these circumstances would be expected to either find ideological impetus for further harming, or to remove themselves from the system. This could involve being targeted by ingroup policing (and potentially being killed themselves), leaving the area, or finding a position in the group that allows them to participate in a less "harmful" capacity (facilitating harm, without actually killing anyone themselves).

A note on the role of ideology

To best address the gradual movement of willing followers from relative peace to genocidal violence, the PEV model has been broken up into a series of five attitudinal and behavioral stages. Each stage is best understood as an antecedent-outcome pairing. Driving the progression from stage to stage are the antecedents, or harm-legitimizing ideologies. These ideologies are particular types of beliefs about the ingroup/target to which individuals are exposed to and eventually may adopt. Each message tends to be carefully crafted and disseminated by the group leadership to provide justification for antipathy toward the targets and later for harming the targets. If individuals adopt these

beliefs, the outcomes are the increasingly negative attitudes and behaviors exhibited towards the targets. As individuals move from relative peace to extreme conflict and each harm-legitimizing belief becomes more extreme, so too do the outcomes become more extreme (moving from basic fear/distrust to support for harming to actions to harm, etc).

Within the early stages of the model, these ideologies are within the realm of fairly normal intergroup beliefs and/or attitudes ("they" are a separate entity from us, "they" are different, "we" are good/"they" are bad, etc), and alone do not often result in major conflicts, let alone violence. In most cases, the perpetrators and targets already have sown some of these early seeds of antipathy and are merely waiting for the right set of circumstances to nurture them into hatred and violence. As previously described, these circumstances most often arise in the form of collective difficulties: need frustration, political destabilization or conflict. It is when the perpetrators attempt to deal with their mounting problems by looking for a cause (the targets), that the intergroup beliefs take a more extreme and focused tone.

Building upon Staub's (1996) theory, the PEV model argues that harm-legitimizing ideologies are most effective at producing willing support when their messages are tailored to fit the real or imagined threats that the perpetrators believe to face at the hands of the targeted outgroup. These messages (as will be discussed in greater detail in the following section) provide individuals with justification for targeting and ultimately eliminating a particular outgroup by answering four key questions: (1) Who am I (and what defines my group)? (2) Who are they (and why are they different, bad and/or threatening)? (3) Why do we need to get rid of them? (4) Why is murder

justified? As individuals move from one stage to the next, it is their adoption of the ideologies into their sense of self provides them with the answers to these questions and a reason to willingly harm.

It should be noted that, given the range of individual variance in susceptibility to harm-legitimizing ideologies and general willingness to harm the targets, that many individuals would not be expected to make it through all five stages of the PEV model. As the beliefs about the targets and the actions expected of the perpetrators become more extreme, the PEV theory predicts that the number of individuals willing to accept the justifications put forth by the leadership will decrease with each subsequent stage. This results in a funneling effect, whereby it is predicted that some percentage of the population will "opt-out" of proceeding to the next step by: selecting positions that will allow them to stay at an earlier stage (i.e. working as a clerk who tracks target group members, but does not actually participate in any killing), leaving the area entirely, going into hiding, or facing death themselves.   To illustrate this effect, the PEV stages (see Figure 4) have been drawn to reflect the diminishing number of willing perpetrators as the group moves from relatively benign stages to more extreme.

Stage 1: Moving from Relative Peace to Fear/Distrust of the Target Group

The emphasis of this first stage is to address how individual identity and group beliefs shift when groups move from a state of relative peace and tolerance to a state of intergroup tension. It is acknowledged that in most cases, this is not a rapid change in intergroup relations or even a recent development. Rather, the antecedent of the first stage is often comprised of many foundational intergroup beliefs that have been building over the course of months, years or even generations. This is largely because most of the

antecedent ideologies/processes associated with stage one find their basis in fairly normal group processes: classification (or reclassification) of groups, the institution of mutual exclusivity between the in-group/outgroup membership and polarization of groups. Armed with just these intergroup beliefs, most societies have experienced little more than intergroup tensions and certainly do not see conflict on a large scale.

During this stage, the emergence of new collective difficulties[5] result in group identities becoming salient, as new groups form or existing groups are further segregated. In some cases, mounting disagreements over how to negotiate these difficulties result in a schism within a single group, where new ingroup/outgroup lines are drawn, and group memberships are redefined. More often, existing divides between ethnic, religious, political, or ethnic groups are widened as groups seek explanations for their shared problems.[6] Under both sets of circumstances, the resulting intergroup rifts force individuals to choose sides (if that is even a viable option), and leads them to begin severing ties with outgroup members. As a function of these divisions, heterogeneous groupings are often forced into homogeneity, excluding and exiling less prototypical members, to more clearly establish "us"/"them" distinctions. Once these rigid in-group/outgroup distinctions are in place, group membership takes on the quality of being mutually exclusive (i.e. you cannot be one of "them" and one of "us") and even may be imputed with innate origins (Stanton, 1996; Staub, 2003; Smith, 2011).

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[5] As previously noted, these difficulties are most commonly in the form of recent/ongoing warfare (e.g. Germany and Rwanda), economic instability (e.g. Germany, Rwanda and Yugoslavia), or revolution/political instability (e.g. Cambodia).

[6] Divisions typically occur between a powerful majority group and a minority group, as with: the Nazi's targeting the Jewish (and other minority) populations, the Turks targeting the Armenians or the Hutu government targeting the Tutsis; but, in the case of revolution it may happen the other way around: as with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, (Staub, 2008).

Once groups are firmly split, distinguishing characteristics of both the perpetrator group and the target group are more clearly defined. This may include basic ethnic or religious affiliations, aspects of appearance, socioeconomic status (SES), and/or languages. These characteristics are then ascribed a valence based on whether they are ascribed to the perpetrator group or target group. Born out of basic tendencies to favor the in-group and derogate the outgroup (e.g. Tajfel, Flamant, Billig & Bundy, 1971; Brewer, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), these beliefs are taken to extremes as groups associate "good" with the perpetrators and "bad" with the targets. Social comparisons between the perpetrator group and the targets yield a sense of relative deprivation and as a result, the perpetrators are typically depicted as being the victims (real or imagined) of the threatening target group (Van Zomeren, et al. 2004; Van Zomeran, Postmes & Spears, 2008). This sense of deprivation is magnified because the perpetrators view themselves as the entitled group, as well as the more noble and moral of the groups, and as a result they begin to associate feelings of resentment and anger with the targets. In this way, the target groups "bad" role balances out the perpetrators "good," and the target group members are depicted as being threatening (again, this may be real or imagined), untrustworthy, and generally bad.

The antecedents of segregating "us" from "them," and the stigmatizing the targets again sow the seeds of the resulting attitudinal outcome, fear/distrust toward the target group and its members. These feelings of fear and distrust emerge from a sense of negative interdependence with the target group (competition instead of cooperation in response to difficulties; e.g. Sherif et al., 1961) and are most visible in the rhetoric explaining the intergroup split: as the perpetrators begin to describe themselves as

victims, and the targets as different/threatening. Most often, these attitudes manifest behaviorally as self-segregation by the perpetrators and avoidance of the targets. Perpetrators who subscribe to the declarations of intergroup difference find themselves uncomfortable dealing with target group members, and as a result, actively begin seeking more exclusive interactions with other ingroup members. In doing so, they involve themselves in a self-feeding cycle of polarized intergroup beliefs: drawing comfort/security from their interactions with the ingroup, adding their fears about the targets to the collective consciousness and refusing to engage in intergroup interactions that might disprove their negative beliefs about the targets.

Stage 2: Moving from Fear/Distrust of the Target Group to Target Blame/Scapegoating

Once the perpetrator group and target group have been rigidly divided, and perpetrators find themselves seeking almost exclusively the company of their own group, they simultaneously begin to sacrifice their autonomy. This leads to the antecedent of stage two, the deindividuation of perpetrator and target group members, which occurs in two ways: (1) a push for ingroup members to unify and strongly identify with the perpetrator group, and (2) the perception that all targets are homogeneous and collectively threatening.

The first deindividuation process occurs as a fairly natural response to threat. When a group feels it is under siege by external sources, the members often derive a sense of security when they unify as a large whole, than they would as independent agents (e.g. Condor & Brown, 1988; Waller, 2002; Staub, 2003). To facilitate this perpetrator unification, the ideological messages shift to emphasize the importance of ingroup identification, loyalty and unity in the face of the threatening target group. The

internalization of these beliefs, along with the feelings of security derived from being a member in the group, lead individuals to more easily adopt and espouse group ideals. As a result, perpetrators not only see themselves as one of the group, but they begin to define appropriate beliefs and actions based on the values and goals of the group. This drawing together of the perpetrator group also simplifies the process of ratcheting up aggression by increasing the sense of anonymity, and allowing for the diffusion of responsibility (Hewstone et al, 2008).

Paralleling this, individuals begin to not only see themselves as agents of a larger organization, but also begin to view target group members as homogeneous agents of their threatening group[7] (Staub, 1989). Although perceptions of outgroup group similarity are common in normal social circumstances (Brewer, 1978), the perpetrators avoidance of target members and thus lack of individuating experiences, drive these perceptions to extremes. The decline, and ultimate cessation, of meaningful dyadic intergroup interactions leaves a void of information about the targets. To fill this void, perpetrators find themselves relying on stereotypes and group ideologies to determine their perceptions of the target group. As a result, perpetrators become more inclined to deny the autonomy of their targets and thus find it easier to engage in more uniform treatment of the target group members (Hewstone et al, 2008).

This reliance on negative stereotypes and ideologies about targets perpetuates existing fears, fuels future avoidance of intergroup interaction, and increases the sense that all targets must be alike (because limited information is presented to the contrary). Individual target group members are denied their individual value, instead being

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[7] For example, Hitler and his party's reclassification of the Jewish population as a monolithic "super category of 'The Jew,'"(Smith, 2011).

evaluated on the basis of their group characteristics. This can be simplified to a philosophy of "they are all alike, and as a result, they are all evil." Even more troubling is that this tendency to lump outgroup members together may spread to other similar outgroup members, increasing the threat to others in the social network.

Following the antecedent deindividuation of the target and perpetrator groups, the pre-existing fears and distrust, coupled with ongoing collective difficulties, morph into target blaming or scapegoating. At the heart of this shift from simple distrust to blame, is the fact that the perpetrators continue to find their needs being frustrated by negative events that lack a clear cause, and about which there is limited clear information (Glick, 2008). Since the perpetrator groups are relatively ill-equipped to determine the true source of their problems (it is either a manifold problem or lies beyond their control), or do not wish to take responsibility for having caused the problem themselves, the perpetrators begin to look outward for a likely cause. In this way, competition with the target group for necessary resources (real or imagined), a history of victimization and/or prior conflicts with the targets draw the perpetrators' attentions to the target group as a likely set of trouble-makers and establish a sense of legitimacy for blaming them for the current situation (Waller, 2002; Staub, 2003).

Building on these pre-existing difficulties associated with the targets, the deindividuation of the target group members and the perceptions of them as a homogeneous collective or organization dramatically increases the degree to which they are perceived as a threat. Rhetoric begins to incorporate elements of target blaming, arguing that not only are "they" different and threatening, but that they are (or have been) actively seeking to destabilize and overthrow the perpetrator group. This process of

laying the blame on the target group is a tempting because it allows the perpetrators to alleviate anxiety produced by the collective difficulties by providing a manageable set of possible solutions (i.e. we must deal with the target threat). After all, it is much easier to deal with a tangible group of people than it is a set of complex and vague forces that lie may lie outside of your control (or to assume responsibility for your own troubles; Glick 2008).

The PEV model differentiates here between "justified" and "unjustified" target group blame for collective difficulties. Scapegoating, for the purpose of the PEV model, is the blame of a target group for collective difficulties, of which they are not actually the cause (Glick, 2010). This distinction is drawn because, in many cases, pure scapegoating does not actually occur. With few exceptions (most notably the targeting of the Jewish populations during the Holocaust), target groups are often guilty of, at least, some of the actions perpetrators blame them for (i.e. past conflicts, oppression, etc). The intent of this distinction, though, is not to exonerate perpetrators of genocide for their crimes, only to differentiate between ideological underpinnings for these two processes.

Convincing potential supporters that an innocent target group is guilty of crimes against the perpetrator group is a far more difficult prospect than blaming collective difficulties on a group that has previously inflicted harm upon the perpetrator group. In this way, the outcome of Stage 2 can be experienced in one of several different ways. Some perpetrators may blame the target group for collective difficulties for which the target group is actually the cause (pure target blame). Other perpetrators may initially blame the target group for past wrongs (of which the targets are actually guilty) and may use this as a platform for blaming them for additional problems of which the targets are

not the cause (target blame and scapegoating). Conversely, some perpetrators may blame a completely innocent target for collective difficulties of which they are not a cause (pure scapegoating). Ultimately the resulting belief is still the same: "they" are the source of our problems, and "we" would be better off without "them."

At this point, the offered solutions begin to take harsher tones; as suggestions of potential policies and actions incorporate increasing levels of harm directed at the target group. Early evidence of the combined forces of fear/distrust and blame of the targets may manifest in the form of non-violent tactical suggestions intended to formally segregate the target group from the perpetrator group and/or to persuade the target group to leave (lest they be forcibly removed). As tensions build, these solutions may also manifest as more violent hostility toward the group, with the perpetrators calling for blood.

Stage 3: Target Blame/Scapegoating transforms into Approval of Actions to Harm

As target blame begins to metamorphose into hostility, harmful policy solutions suggested by the perpetrator group begin to gain greater support. Up until this point, the perpetrators tend to refrain from openly harming the targets, even though the target group has been distinguished as a threat, and a separate entity from the perpetrator group. This restraint may be explained by the social norms and values of the society, which still dictate that it is wrong to harm other people. To gain approval for the harmful solutions the perpetrator group has put forth, then requires the antecedent belief that it is permissible to harm members of the target group because they do not warrant the same moral consideration.

With target members already being judged on the basis of their collective identity, justifying harming merely requires increasing the perpetrator/target group distinction to a more exacting level. Specifically, the perpetrators need to delegitimize their victims by redefining the target group as one that does not deserve equal consideration and protection (Bar-Tal, 1990). The easiest way to draw this distinction between the perpetrator and target groups is through the denial of the target group's humanity by establishing that they are "subhuman, nonhuman or antihuman" (Moshman, 2007, pg 121). This devaluation of the target group usually manifests in two ways: dehumanization and/or demonization (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Stanton, 1996; Haslam, 2006).

Dehumanization entails the purposeful denial of humanity, and with it the values, morals, and rights associated with being a full member of society. This devaluation of the targets may take many forms, including the depiction the targets as: bestial, vermin, or pests (e.g. Waller, 2002; Smith, 2011); an infection or disease of the state (e.g. Baum, 2008; Smith, 2011); as non-human objects, or as "tools" being manipulated by their threatening group (Stanton, 1996). History is replete with many examples of propagandists denying the humanity of their targets: the Turks referring to the Armenians as "dogs or pigs", claiming that bullets were "too valuable for such subhuman creatures" (justifying the use of more brutal methods such as asphyxiation, stabbing, clubbing, or starvation; Smith, 2011), and characterizing the Armenians as "dangerous microbes" (Mehmed Resid, professor legal medicine in Istanbul and major player in the genocide, as quoted in Smith, 2011); the Khmer Rouge characterizing the Cambodian city-dwellers as "ugly microbes" and the intellectuals as "cabbage minds" (Baum, 2008);

the Nazis' comparing the Jews to an infestation of lice (see Image 1), or classifying the Jews as an infectious "disease spreading parasites" against whom Hitler, and his party, were the only "competent healers" (Musholf, 2007, pg. 25).

The important point of dehumanization is to change the standards of morality associated with the persecution and harming of target members. If "they" are not actually human, then denying them rights, segregating/deporting, or even killing them does not hold the same penalties as if these actions were perpetrated against a "true human". Demonizing is - in most cases - an associated process to dehumanization, whereby targets lose their humanity because they are portrayed as inherently evil or monstrous (Waller, 2002). Examples include depictions of the Cambodian intellectuals as "class enemies" of the Khmer Rouge and urging the "sweeping away of all monsters and demons" (*Red Flag* publication Vol. 11, 1966; as quoted in Smith, 2011); and the Nazi depiction of the Jews as a monstrous octopus threatening to take over the world (see Image 2). A key distinction between the mechanisms of dehumanization and demonization should be made. Where dehumanization uses the denial of humanity as a means of justifying a different "moral code" for the targets (i.e. one that would apply to animals or objects), that does not define discrimination and harming as wrong, the demonization of a target group defines the targets as open violators of the existing moral code (or at least the moral code held by extremist perpetrators). By labeling the targets as inherently evil and unwilling/unable to change, the perpetrators can claim them as a legitimate target for aggression. Harming then becomes a moral imperative to cleanse the area of the targets that corrupt the sanctity of the perpetrator groups' existence.

Although they work in different ways, the outcome of dehumanization and

demonization is largely the same. Both types of devaluation ultimately aid in the

reduction of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), about target harming by reframing

the target identity. In their denial of the targets humanity and/or their classification of the

targets as evil, the perpetrators acknowledge a disconnect between the way things "are"

and the way things "appear" (Smith, 2011). As such, it is possible for the targets to

appear human, and yet lack the necessary qualities that would make them fit for moral

inclusion (they lack a soul, they are beasts in human form, etc; Smith, 2011). This

distinction between "us" and "them" facilitates further intergroup division and lends

credence to an innately based mutual exclusivity. As a result, groups are typically

portrayed as "irrevocably distinct and their mixture is an affront to nature" (Smith, 2011;

pg. 147).[8]

As perpetrators adopt the antecedent belief that targets are less than human, the

outcome is an increase in approval of actual actions to harm the targets. It should be

noted that, at this stage, perpetrators are likely not harming individual target group

members directly, although they may seek further separation from the targets, and they

will almost certainly vote for policies that would assist in this goal. Approval of harming

may take many forms, including: supporting harmful policies (segregation, deportation,

and/or taking away basic rights), participating in protests against target members, and

possibly joining agencies (bureaucratic, military or militia) that work toward

implementing discriminatory policies. Actual harming of the target group at this stage is

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[8] This was certainly a cornerstone of Hitler's beliefs, particularly as they related to his
theories of ethnic purity outlined in *Mein Kampf*, and has been reiterated in other
genocidal propaganda such as the Hutu Ten Commandments (as translated in Powers,
2002).

closer to those actions associated with ethnic cleansing: mass relocation, forced

conversion or assimilation, reproductive monitoring, and similar measures. Any support

for "mass killing" early on would likely fall under the guise of policing which is to say,

the use of lethal force against targets who violate the aforementioned policies.

Stage 4: Moving from Approval to actual Actions to Harm

With the target group stripped of their humanity, and perpetrator group's

sanctioned harming having already been established, many perpetrators will be drawn

into participation in actual harming at this stage. After witnessing and even supporting

earlier actions to harm the target group, the perpetrators begin to formally shift their

normative treatment of harming behavior (Baum, 2008). The more that the perpetrators

harm the targets, the more acceptable and routine these actions seem to be. As such, the

antecedent for stage four is the normalization of violence and the acceptance of

increasingly brutal tactics toward the targets, (Staub, 2008). This is most clearly seen in

the general shift of in-group policing of the perpetrator group. Where group members

may have previously been penalized for harming other individuals within the society,

they are now likely to face penalties for failing to participate in target harming. In this

way the group mentality morphs into "target or be targeted."

Perpetrators who are most closely associated with agencies or groups that support

harming behaviors are the most likely to find opportunity (or be the most expected) to

harm targets. In more organized genocides, this may involve: being stationed in work

camps, working with a military unit to "clear" an area, and other such activities. In less

organized genocides, this may involve participation in local militia groups or working

directly with local leadership on terror campaigns. At the heart of the shift in norms is

the belief that all perpetrator group members are expected to participate in the on going

target harming, facilitate it, or at the very least, not interfere with the more active

members.

It is at this point that many reluctant perpetrators may also be motivated to harm

by a sense of duty to the group and an obeisance to the authorities that are steering the

genocide (Waller, 2002). Especially among those who are slower to adopt anti-target

ideology, this deference to authority[9] and group goals may provide them with at least

some desire to harm the targets (even without a real "burning hatred" for them;

Sternberg, 2001). These individuals would be expected to eventually adopt more strong

anti-target attitudes as they continue to harm the targets and seek justification for these

actions. On the other end of the spectrum are individuals who have very strongly adopted

the aforementioned beliefs about the target group who may be more willing to harm

target members without the need for direct orders to do so.

A Note on Feedback Loops

As mentioned previously, individuals may react differently to each of these stages

depending on how strongly they have internalized the antecedent harm-legitimizing

ideologies. In some cases, perpetrators may only weakly adopt the anti-target beliefs,

acting mainly out of fear or deference to authority. Cognitive dissonance may arise

where their harmful actions fail to align with their values and beliefs about the target

group, (Festinger, 1957). To deal with these dissonant feelings, individuals may cycle

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[9] Organized genocide is most likely in cultures that are predisposed to high levels of authoritarianism, such as those in Germany, Turkey, Cambodia and Rwanda (Staub, 2008). In these groups, following orders provides a strong enough rationale for early harming, and associates a sense of responsibility and duty with otherwise objectionable actions.

back through stages two, three and four; seeking justification for their actions and ultimately providing themselves with further motivation to continue harming in the future. These feedback loops are not intended to account for those individuals who fail to adopt the group-based justifying ideologies in the first place (acting *only* out of fear or obedience). They do, however, help explain how some individuals may transition from having a cursory involvement with these beliefs, to ultimately adopting them to assuage feelings of guilt about their actions.

Final Stage: Moving from general harming to Actions to Exterminate

After revisiting the justifications for harming the targets provided in stages two through four to reduce their cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), perpetrators ultimately establish a reasonable belief that members of the target group should not only be harmed, but exterminated. A shift from general harming to eliminationist goals most often occurs when perpetrators realize that their early harming actions seem to yield positive results for the perpetrator group (primarily as alleviation of their collective difficulties), the perpetrators come to fully believe that the world would be better off without the targets, and/or they fear retribution by the surviving targets if they are not fully eliminated. This results in two separate attitudes toward genocide: (1) invigoration at seeing "results," or at least, a decrease in the sense of threat posed by the targets; and/or (2) increased fear resulting from concerns that the targets might retaliate if left alive (Staub, 2003). The processes underlying the perpetrators shift toward eliminationist aims are facilitated by their continued segregation of the perpetrators from the targets (socially and often physically), which creates a safe haven for the like-minded perpetrators to become more extreme in their goals and views. Group isolation has an

effect of strengthening existing beliefs, as both group consensus and vocal, extreme members, are able to push the group closer toward extreme violence (Waller, 2002).

When perpetrators fully adopt a belief that simple harming is no longer enough, they begin to shift into the final stage. Here perpetrator dominance over targets translates into a need to completely eliminate the target group. Individual perpetrators who have been loyal to the group and who have gradually adopted the ideologies justifying harming are the most likely to actively participate in this extermination. These are the followers that believe that the only means of successfully reaching group goals is to use whatever means are available to systematically end the lives of target group members.

Returning to the definition of genocide, it is this eliminationist intent that ultimately separates this most extreme form of violence from other types. Although no genocides have been truly "successful" (i.e. have completely eliminated their targets), many have been successful in garnering the support of willing followers who carry out the daily work of killing the targets. An important distinction should be made here: followers who have reached the point of willing participation in genocide need not actually enjoy the act of killing the targets. In fact, most do not find pleasure in the brutality of murder (Gourevitch, 1998). What perpetrators at this stage would find satisfaction in is the knowledge that their actions are helping to advance their group toward their ultimate goal. These individuals need not enjoy doing the things they do, but they do feel justified in their violence because it is for the greater benefit of their group.

Applying the PEV model: Genocidal violence in Rwanda

The purpose of this section is to examine the degree to which the PEV model maps onto an instance of genocidal violence and to examine its utility in explaining the typical pattern which perpetrators of genocide go through to become willing murders. In the previous section, historical examples were offered for the harm-legitimizing ideologies antecedents and the attitudinal/behavioral outcomes for each stage. Although these snapshots of genocidal movements provide support for the existence of each element in isolation during the course of the average genocide, they do little to reveal the overall utility of the PEV's stage design.

Unfortunately, the ethical concerns surrounding the instigation of actual genocidal violence in a lab setting render the testing of the full model difficult, if not wholly impossible. Without the ability to craft a controlled scenario in which one could empirically test all of the models predictions, the best means of examining the quality of the PEV model is to explore how well it maps onto the development of a genocidal movement and the experiences of the average followers of said movement. This can be accomplished in three steps: (1) an in depth analysis of the historical context prior to conflict and its role in defining both the perpetrator group and the targets, (2) a careful examination of the manner in which the events unfolded and the degree to which they map onto the PEV's stages, and (3) the exploration of how the progression of events was experienced by the average follower and the degree to which their perceptions/actions fit those predicted in the model.

The 1994 genocide of the Tutsis is a prime candidate for testing the PEV model because of its relative recency. As the genocidal violence occurred within the past

twenty years, there is a wealth of information about the underlying causes that led to the development of the conflict, as well as a preponderance of first-hand accounts/materials.

To best explore each of the three steps using the Rwandan genocide, the following discussion will first examine the historical context of the group identities and relations before delving into steps two and three. These remaining steps will examined for each stage of the model, along with a critique of how well the reality of the Rwandan genocide, and specifically the perceptions/actions of the perpetrators, fit the order of the PEV's stages. Finally, a discussion of the implications of this historical analysis will be included at the end of the section.

Historical Context: Pre-Colonial – Independence (1962)

Most official accounts of the origins of the Hutu and Tutsi identities are drawn from the early recordings of the colonial period in Rwanda and reveal a handful of the European biases (e.g. Fujii, 2009; Tatum, 2010). Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, it is largely agreed that Rwanda's population was made up of a three-caste system: Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa. Living in dispersed groups, the majority of the areas' residents fell into either the Hutu category if they were cultivators, or they were part of the Twa, forest-dwelling minority.[10] The cultural landscape shifted dramatically in the 14th century when groups of Tutsi pastoralists migrated into the area and conquered the region's Hutu majority. This led to a series of advancements in technology (such as pastoralism and ironworking), a more unified culture, and a centralized, monarchic form of government (Fujii, 2009). In response to this new and powerful minority, the Hutus largely

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[10] The Twa held minimal significance to the Europeans, and are thus often neglected in Rwandan histories

assimilated to a system of vassalage that offered Hutu farmers a chance to obtain cattle (and along with them, power and status) in exchange for labor/gifts.

This history, while certainly containing elements of truth,[11] also clearly reveals the some of the origins behind the beliefs of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority. Primarily, it presents the notion that Hutus and Tutsis are distinct groups, and that the Tutsis were generally a more advanced or group that had succeeded in uniting the otherwise scattered Bantu savages. Extrapolating from this, the historical narrative ultimately suggests that the Tutsis were justified in their holding of positions of power (Fujii, 2009).

Unfortunately for the Hutu majority, the arrival of European colonialists in the 19th century served to further establish this version of events and its associated social hierarchy. To a large extent, this was due to the fact that the physical characteristics shared by the Tutsi elite set them apart from the Hutu majority in a manner that was consistent with European expectations. Possessing an ethnic framework borne out of the eugenics movement, the colonialists perceived fairer skin and more identifiably European features (having smaller noses, a taller and thinner frame, etc.) as being marks of higher intelligence (Tatum, 2010). As a result, Europeans who were confronted with the Tutsi royalty and elite viewed them as a separate and superior ethnicity to the Hutus because they possessed many of these features. (e.g. Destexhe, 1995; Fujii, 2009)[12]. Using this approach to categorization, the Germans, and later the Belgians, reinforced perceptions of

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[11] The Hutus were farmers, and the early Tutsi seem to have migrated in from outside the region (although it is unclear exactly where they originated).

[12] Unfortunately, since many of the generalizations about the Hutu and Tutsis were based on a small sampling, most notably the royal court, it failed to account for the true diversity within each of these groups (Fujii, 2009).

an ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis. This allowed status and power to become firmly imprecated with the Tutsi identity.

It should be noted that although the Hutus and Tutsis are often portrayed as separate ethnic groups, the actual source of their intergroup division was more on the level of two different "orders" (taken from the German word *Stand*; Tatum, 2010), or occupational groups. The original distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi group members were largely based on the amount of social clout and/or resources (particularly cattle) that a given individual possessed (e.g. Des Forges, 1999; Fujii, 2009). In fact, even the group names communicate the difference in hierarchical position (Hutu referring to "commoner" and Tutsi meaning "noble"), not ethnic divisions (Fujii, 2009). Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the average Hutu and Tutsi were not truly distinct beyond their placement in the social hierarchy. Indeed, the two orders shared the same territory, religion, language (Kinyarwanda), and culture. Further, it was not uncommon for Hutus and Tutsis to intermarry (Vanderwerff, 1996), or for a Hutu to be reclassified as a Tutsi if he acquired more cattle or status in the community (Gravel, 1968; Prunier, 2001). The primary problem facing most Hutus was that they found themselves in a system that increasingly provided few opportunities to make this jump – a problem that was only exacerbated by the arrival of the Europeans.

As with other cases of colonization, the Europeans sought to divide and conquer the locals in order to establish a foothold in the region. To do this, they reinforced and widened the existing intergroup divisions partially because it distracted the native people from the colonial presence (Tatum, 2010). By transforming Hutu and Tutsi group

membership into ethnic identities, the Europeans introduced a sense of fundamental difference between the otherwise similar groups.

They were then able to enforce an "ethnic hierarchy" by creating a self-feeding cycle of class stratification and subjugation. First, in order to underscore a seemingly innate difference between Tutsis and Hutus, the colonists dictated group membership based largely on appearances. This helped those elites designated as Tutsi assume positions of power in the central and local leadership, which in turn provided the Tutsis with greater access to resources and education. Simultaneously, this placed those deemed to be Hutu into the "most hated and humiliating" positions[13] and provided them little opportunity to better their situation (Newbury, 1988; pg. 141). The result of this cycle was an increasingly entrenched "ethnically based" hierarchy that heavily skewed power toward a small minority of Tutsis at the top, while the Hutu majority at the bottom were often subjected to exploitation and discrimination based on their supposed ethnic inferiority (Fujii, 2009).

This system worked relatively well, as long as the Tutsis were happy with their positions of power and the Hutu majority was kept largely uneducated and unquestioning of their situation (Tatum, 2010). Unfortunately, this sort of tenuous peace could not hold for long, and in the late-1950's the Belgians found themselves with a powder keg waiting to explode.

The 1950's marked a turning point in Hutu and Tutsi relations, as well as the beginning of the Hutu/Tutsi violence. Because all of the members of Rwandan society

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[13] *Ubureetwa,* for instance, was a particularly servile form of citizenship that required a client to perform menial services for the local hill chief as payment for use of land, and was required, under colonial law, of all Hutu men who were not in salaried jobs (Fujii, 2010).

who had been alive during the pre-colonial period of relative cooperation between Hutus and Tutsis were no longer alive, all that was left in the collective cultural consciousness was the "memory of colonization" – and the ethnic divide created by the Europeans (Prunier, 2001; pg 112). This left no clear cultural legacy for the Hutus beyond their recent subjugation at the hands of the white administration and their preferred group, the Tutsis. Additionally, the spread of Pan-Africanism through much of central Africa had brought with it increased anti-colonial sentiment and deeper resentment toward the Tutsis, who inarguably benefitted from the European presence. In response to the Pan-African message and the growing unrest, Grégoire Kayibana and his extremist party PARMEHUTU, put out calls to arms such as the "Hutu Manifesto." This helped incite the early motions toward militarization among the Hutus.

In this tense atmosphere, growing threats of violence continued to mount. Soon, assassination attempts of opposing leaders by both Hutu and Tutsi extremists ignited the first explosion of genocidal violence in late 1959. It was at this point that the Hutu rebels instigated a revolution against the Tutsi rule: massacring between 20,000-50,000 Tutsis (Prunier, 2001; Tatum 2010) and forcing 150,000 more to flee to the surrounding areas of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the Congo. In one fell swoop, the Hutus to managed to depose the Tutsi monarchy, dramatically reduce the Tutsi population and institute the countries first democratic system of government. In a complete reversal, those Tutsis who remained were largely excluded from positions of power.

The 1960 elections saw the Hutu majority installing Hutu representatives into high-level positions in the government for the first time, under president Grégoire Kayibana. Although this seemed to be a step in the right direction for securing majority

control, it was an imperfect solution for unifying the population (Marcheck, 2008; Staub,

2008). Even under the Hutu majority government, the elites in charge were largely

dictated by the Belgian colonialists; having been those who gained the favor of the

colonial leaders prior to independence. As a result, infighting occurred frequently

between the elites in the north and south as they competed for control of the government

(Prunier, 2001).

Additionally, the new administration did little to dissolve the "ethnic state"

instituted by the Europeans, even after independence from Belgium in 1962 (Pruner,

2001; pg 112). In many ways they continued to make the situation worse by

discouraging mixed marriages between the Hutus and remaining Tutsis, maintaining a

mandatory identification card system (which required individuals to openly identify as

Hutu or Tutsi and allowed for government tracking of group members)[14], and instituting

quotas on positions in education and civil service to increase the Hutus presence and

force Tutsis out (Destexhe,1995).

Stage 1: Late-colonialism (Hutu rebellion) – 1972 (Burundi massacres)

Examining the historical context of the Rwandan genocide clearly reveals that

many of the foundational beliefs necessary for intergroup tension and conflict were in

place long before Rwanda's independence (and the escalating violence that followed).

Under the rule of the Europeans, the Rwandans found themselves perpetually aware of

their Hutu or Tutsi identification, and this ultimately led to an internalizing of the ethnic

definitions of these memberships. For these reasons, the presence of the colonial powers

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[14] The Belgians originally put this identification system into place in the 1920's. Their standards of ethnic classification were based on a mixture of both current social standing and physical characteristics (Prunier, 2001).

can be seen as the first of several catalysts for conflict because they laid the groundwork

for Hutus' resentment of the Tutsis.

As previously discussed, the Germans and Belgians entered into the region as an

alien force and superimposed their own ethnic hierarchy over the existing Hutu and Tutsi

identities by imparting myths about ethnic differences between the groups (e.g. Destexhe,

1995; Fujii, 2009). To a great extent, this process of reclassification and the resulting

codified social hierarchy succeeded because it mapped neatly onto the existing division

of power (with a Tutsi monarchy/leadership and Hutu subjects). The key difference that

the European model added, however, was a sense of innate value difference based on the

ethnic hierarchy. As a result, unlike previous generations where powerful Hutus could be

absorbed into the Tutsi class and their Hutu origins could be "forgotten" (Gravel, 1968),

the Rwandans of the colonial period found themselves with new ethnic definitions that

reinforced group boundaries lines, and made the group membership mutually exclusive.

In the resulting hierarchy, it is easy to see how many Hutus found themselves

disenfranchised and would be looking for social change: the Tutsis were given all of the

European respect, social status and social benefits; while the "Hutus lived with the idea

that they were ugly and stupid and that God had created them to labor under the

leadership of the Tutsis," (Prunier, 2001; pg. 112).

Reacting to this sense of injustice, the Hutu rebellion in 1959 marked a pivotal

moment in the Hutu and Tutsi relations. For the first time since the arrival of the Tutsis,

the Hutus found themselves in a position of power over their former oppressors and were

able to redefine their group identity on their own terms. What resulted was not a move

toward unification but rather a continuation of the existing conflict over solidarity (who

belonged) and legitimacy (who would rule; Fein, 1999). Instead of dismissing the notion that the Hutus and Tutsi were different ethnic groups, the Hutu elite perpetuated this sense of innate difference (Mamdani, 2001), even going so far as to compare it to the difference between male and female (Des Forges, 1999). In fact, more extreme Hutus even went so far as to rail against this push toward unification arguing that it was a "Tutsi trick to divide and weaken the Hutus by destroying the sense of ethnic identity" (Des Forges, 1999; pg. 73), and stressing that the Tutsis could never be considered true Rwandans because they had invaded and stolen Rwanda from its rightful inhabitants.

Putting these events in the framework of the PEV model, it becomes clear that the Rwandans were negotiating the antecedents and outcomes associated with Stage One around the time of their independence from European colonization. The division of Hutus and Tutsis along "ethnic" lines, which was the hallmark of the European colonization, had produced a substantial period of alienation and disenfranchisement for many Hutus. As a result the Hutus began to view the Tutsis as the true outsiders (even more so than the Belgians), because they had supported the oppression of the Hutus while accepting the benefits that came along with their supposed ethnic superiority (Tatum, 2010). As predicted in Stage One, intergroup tensions typically emerges when circumstances: dictate the reclassification or restructuring of group memberships, the membership in the groups is defined as mutually exclusive, and the resulting groups become viewed as polar opposites; and the European presence had done much to set this process in motion.

Prior to the Hutu rebellion, the Europeans had done a fair job of installing a mutually exclusive, ethnic division between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Following their rebellion, the Hutus used this preexisting division to restructure group identities to be

associated with Hutus as "true ethnic Rwandans" whereas the Tutsis were "outsiders". Additionally, once the Hutu elite gained control of the government, much of the redefinition of the groups involved dispelling the myths of Tutsi superiority.

Here we see elements of *schadenfreude*[15] and Hutu resentment weaving their way into the general derogation of the Tutsis. In most cases, *schadenfreude* emerges in situations where the target is a rival for some material interest (such as access to power or land), resulting in feelings of envy and resentment towards the targets (Feather & Sherman, 2002). It is particularly likely to occur in situations where rivals would see profit from the defeat/removal of the target, especially when the target is close in proximity (as with a neighbor; Spears & Leach, 2008). In the case of the Hutus, particularly among the elite, the pre-existing hierarchy was associated with the unjust subjugation of the Hutus at the hands of the Tutsis. Following this logic, the Hutus denied the legitimacy of the Tutsis' claim to power (which had been reinforced by the European ethnic hierarchy) and targeted them as an act of revenge for a history of perceived wrongdoing. This tendency for majority groups, particularly those who have been oppressed or previously victimized, to target successful minorities groups has been seen in a number of other historical examples of genocidal violence such as the Nazis targeting the Jews and the Turks targeting the Armenians (Glick, 2008).

With deep divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis in place and unhealed wounds coloring perceptions of the Tutsi targets, it is not difficult to see how early feelings of Hutu resentment could transition into burgeoning fear and distrust of the Tutsis; especially since the Hutus had taken their experiences prior to their uprising and turned

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[15] Defined as the "malicious pleasure that can be experienced at the misfortune of another," (Spears & Leach, 2008).

them into their "chosen trauma" - important collective memories that become the lens through which a society/group views the world and which guides their response to the world (Volkan, 1997). Through this lens, the Hutus were the long-standing victims of the Tutsis who had invaded their lands and oppressed them for generations. This depiction of the Tutsis as rapacious outsiders was strengthened by the fact that the Hutus distrusted the Tutsis for adopting the colonial hierarchy and accepting the benefits it afforded them while failing to aid the Hutus.[16]

In addition to viewing the Tutsis as untrustworthy, many Hutus feared the possibility of Tutsi retaliation for the 1959 massacres and subsequent exile of 150,000 Tutsis; a fear that many Hutu elites perpetuated and exploited to secure their positions in government (Prunier, 2001). This fear was later made manifest in 1972, as the Hutus reacted to the Tutsi led violence in Burundi and begin to wrestle with the possibility of this anti-Hutu violence expanding into Rwandan territory. The reality of these fears and the associated distrust of the Tutsis (at home and in neighboring nations) added to anti-Tutsi sentiments and led to more extreme rhetoric in the following years.

Stage Two: Burundi massacres 1972 - 1990

In early 1972, Hutu insurgents in the neighboring Burundi lead an uprising in which resulted in the deaths of approximately 800-1200 Tutsis in the towns of Rumonge and Nyaza-Lac. In response, the Tutsi-led government, under Michel Micombero, proclaimed martial law and systematically began a massacre of Hutu citizens that ultimately left approximately 120,000-150,000 Hutus dead (Lemarchand, 1996; Smith,

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[16] It should be noted that this type of transgenerational projection, or tendency for perpetrators to transfer their fears (based on the victimization of previous generations) to the present targets is not an uncommon element in genocidal ideology; being present in not only Rwanda, but also the violence in Yugoslavia (Fein, 1999).

2011), and began a period of bloodshed that lasted from 1972-1990. Due to many similarities shared by the Hutus in Burundi and those in Rwanda (both were the majority group, both had a history of subjugation by the Tutsi minority; Lamarchand, 1996) these massacres sent shockwaves across the region as they made the fears of many Rwandan citizens manifest.

In their wake, many extremist Hutus began to openly wonder about the strength of the president Kayibanda's regime. Their solution was to stage a military coup in July of 1973 that installed the Army Chief of Staff, Juvenal Habyarimana, as the new president. This move ushered in a two-decade period of dictatorial style government, where unilateral control[17] by Habyarimana and his extremist party *Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le dévelopement* (MRND).

Despite the fact that the early period of Habyarimana's reign was marked by relative peace, unrest again began to emerge as the 1980's brought with them new economic strife for the region. Following the Burundi massacres, Rwanda became host to large groups of Hutu refugees who had fled the violence. Unfortunately, for a country whose population already exceeded the land's carrying capacity (Marcheck, 2008), this influx of new residents added strain on the largely agrarian economy to produce enough for both the domestic consumption and for export. The problem was further exacerbated by the fierce competition for land and resources with the end result being that little land was allocated for the purpose of food production (Tatum, 2010).

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[17] Habyarimana established a single party system with his rise to power, and it is widely believed that the MRND regularly engaged in election fraud, and single candidate voting to ensure overwhelming majority re-elections (Gourevitch, 1998).

Although the dramatic increase in population and strain in the agricultural sector would have been enough to trigger further tensions, they were not the only problems that Rwanda was enduring. In addition to food shortages, Rwanda found itself facing dramatic decreases in profits from key exports (coffee and tin) as well as a loss of external funding sources.

Under Kayibana, Rwanda had become something of a "donor darling" (having just gained independence and installing a democratic government) and was able to secure large grants from numerous western nations to aid in building a self-sustaining, pro-democratuc infrastructure. The military coup in 1973 that shifted the government toward a dictatorship, however, resulted in many concerns among the donors. Habyarimana's regime did little to assuage the donors' concerns through the 1980's and following the fall of the Berlin wall (and the associated western emphasis on democracy that followed), relations with most of the financiers were at a breaking point (Fujii, 2009). After persisting in their refusal to liberalize and reform the one party system, most of the financial backers pulled out in the early 1990's.

This second catalyst for conflict, economic depression, provided the MRND and the president with a chance consolidate their control.[18] The Rwanda people were looking to the government for solutions to the mounting problems, and Habyarimana's regime exploited this opportunity to redirect public attention away from the government's role in the economic difficulties and to shift frustration toward a new target: the Tutsis. At the

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[18] Similar economic strife in the 1980's and 90's was also a key contributing factor to the emergence of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and was similarly exploited by extremist politicians (Biro, et al, 2004).

heart of this process was the fusion of two key elements: positive vision or "Hutu Power," and the identification of the enemies (Des Forges, 1999).

The first element "Hutu Power" played off of the belief that the Hutus were the rightful citizens of Rwanda and that their biggest strength against the impending storm was their "great majority" (*rubanda nyamwinshi*; Des Forges, 1999; pg. 82).   As the publication *Kangura* extolled:

> "Your unity, your mutual understanding, your solidarity are the certain weapons of your victory… You understand when the majority people is divided; [then] the minority becomes the majority," (as translated in DesForges, 1999; pg. 82).

The second element came in the form of reminders of the oppression by the Tutsis and the myth of "Tutsi unity," (their "clannishness" which had allowed them to successfully conquer Rwanda in the past and "enabled them to continue exercising undue influence in the present;" Des Forge, 1999; pg 73).   At the heart of these arguments was the belief that modern Tutsis were alike and strongly linked to the historical conquerors that had oppressed the earlier generations of Hutus. As a result, the messages exclaimed, that a Tutsi would surely become caught up in the same cycle of violence as his forefathers, and therefore could never be trusted (Des Forges, 1999).

At this point, it bears mentioning that the MRND party held control not only of the national/local governments, but also the media. For a population that largely lacked the capital to purchase the technology necessary to receive news from more objective international media, the primary sources of information for Rwandans came via domestically produced print publications, such as the extremist magazine *Kangura* ("Awaken!") and the public radio. As a result, *Kangura* and public radio broadcasts

became the mouthpiece of the extremist government and an efficient means of communicating their anti-Tutsi sentiments to the masses.

Among these messages it was not uncommon to find sentiments that recalled the Nazi characterizations of the Jews; particularly when comparing documents such as the Nazis "Protocols of the Learned of Elders of Zion" to the now infamous "Tutsi Ten Commandments" (published in *Kangura* in 1990, see Appendix A) which characterized all Tutsis as "thirsty for blood and power, seeking to impose their hegemony over Rwanda" and as "dishonest in business," seeking "only the supremacy of their ethnic group" (as translated in Schabas, 2000; pg. 145).

Returning to the PEV model, the period following the Burundi massacres in the 1970's (to the beginning of the 1990's) fits the projected shift from Stage One to Stage Two. At this point, the model predicts that intergroup beliefs shift from simply dividing the perpetrator/target groups and encouraging group polarization to promoting deindividuation of both the targets and perpetrators. The outcome of this shift, as predicted in Stage Two, should be the addition of target blaming/scapegoating for collective difficulties to the existing fear and distrust.

Examining the circumstances in 1970 -1990 Rwanda, this shift was facilitated by the inclusion of two additional catalysts for conflict: violence in the region (specifically violence directed at perpetrator group members) and economic depression. Although the inclusion of additional catalysts over the course of escalating conflict is not a requirement of the PEV model, it does help explain why groups may make the shift from stage to stage. In this case, the violence in Burundi provided the government with an ideal opportunity to deindividuate their Tutsi targets by ascribing violent nature to their

membership and treating the group as a monolithic collective; while simultaneously

encouraging the deindividuation of the Hutu populace by providing both the guidelines

and motivations for increasing their group unification.

Perhaps the best exemplar of the joint deindividuation of the Hutus and Tutsis

came with the "Hutu Ten Commandments." In one stroke, the extremists outlined the

ways in which the Tutsis were alike and problematic, while simultaneously providing

guidelines for what "real Hutus" should be. It should be noted that this notion of real and

false Hutu was a new addition to the rhetoric during this period and marked a shift from

targeting only a clearly defined Tutsi out-group, to the inclusion of traitors to the Hutu

ingroup (Des Forges, 1999). Beginning in this period, "real Hutus" were cautioned to be

on the lookout for fakes (either Tutsis masquerading as Hutus, or Hutu traitors) who

could be spotted by their tolerance for the Tutsis and their lack of commitment to Hutu

solidarity. Using propaganda pieces such as these, the government provided Hutu

individuals with plenty of incentive to increase their ingroup unity and to adopt the

prototypic characteristics/beliefs the outlined. For your average Hutu, their options were

to either join up, or risk being "outed" as a traitor.

In the presence of the ongoing collective difficulties, the deindividuation of both

groups facilitated the outcome of Stage Two: target blaming and/or scapegoating. As

discussed previously, the primary difference between blame and scapegoating is the

degree to which the targets hold some responsibility for the circumstances for which they

are blamed.[19] To best understand which type of blame is at work, it is necessary to

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[19] Again, this is not to excuse the harming of a "guilty" target, but is primarily a means of differentiating the between their origins and the nuances of the beliefs. As a reminder, scapegoating occurs when targets are innocent (or at least, the cause is sufficiently

consider both the circumstances for which the Tutsis were blamed, and also the degree to which they may have had a hand in their origins.

The earliest forms of Tutsi blame dealt directly with the Tutsis' treatment of the Hutus prior to and during European rule; and the disadvantages (such as unemployment, lack of education, poverty, etc) this left for much of the Hutu majority, even after independence (Fujii, 2009). Because the Tutsis were the ruling class for much of the recent history, and because they aided in the oppression of the Hutus by the Europeans (or at least benefited from it), it seems reasonable to argue that the Tutsis were not completely blameless. Propagandists fed on this undercurrent of this logical blame, and expanded it to include supposed new or potential crimes for which the Tutsis would likely be guilty of, such as infiltrating the Hutu government to steal back power (Glick, 2008), posing as Hutus to avoid facing their crimes, and actively working to return to the "old ways" of Hutu subjugation (Des Forges, 1999).

In addition to this blame for past subjugation was a campaign of Tutsi blame for ongoing unrest and violence in the region. Radio messages would frequently remind the Hutus of the massacre perpetrated by the Tutsis in Burundi, and other Tutsi rebel stirrings beginning to emerge in Uganda (Fein, 1999). The trouble, however, was that the messages would assign the blame to *all* Tutsis; indicating that not only should the they be blamed for their group's past violence, but that *all* Tutsis could be guilty of an ongoing campaign of murder (Des Forges; 1999). In both cases, the propagandists relied on a strategy of taking a known crime perpetrated by the Tutsis and embellishing upon it to increase feelings of fear and distrust. Additionally, it was not uncommon for Hutu

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ambiguous) of the supposed wrong, and target blame occurs when the targets had at least some hand in the situation.

propagandists to rely on a tactic known as "accusation in a mirror" to project their plans

for violence onto the Tutsis: claiming that the Tutsis planned to wipe out the Hutus as a

means of justifying their own plans for future attacks (Des Forges; 1999).

The final crime for which the Tutsis found themselves blamed during this period

was the economic depression (Glick, 2008). Although part of this blame stemmed from

the influx of Hutu refugees that had followed the Burundi attacks, the vast majority of

this rationale behind this accusation was groundless. In this aspect, the Tutsis largely

served as a scapegoat, taking the blame for a problem for which they were not the true, or

at least primary, cause. Examining the circumstances, it seems far more likely that the

mismanagement of the population and resources by the Hutu elites (who often were more

concerned with obtaining their share of the "dwindling pie"; Prunier, 2001), the failure to

designate sufficient land for food production (Tatum, 2010), the military coup by the

Hutu extremist party which resulted in a dictatorship (Gourevitch, 1998), and the

resulting loss of funding sources (Fujii, 2009) were more at fault than the influx of Hutu

refugees fleeing Burundi from the Tutsis. When taken in the context of the other

collective difficulties the Hutus faced, however, it is not difficult to see how this would

be a simple extrapolation on the themes of Tutsi threat and untrustworthiness.

Stage 3: The cockroach and the butterfly (1990-early 1993)

As if to realize the Hutus' growing fears about Tutsi retaliation, October of 1990

brought with it the first invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi rebels, and the start of a bloody

three-year-long civil war. Backed by Uganda, the invading army was comprised largely

of the Tutsi refugees who had found their repeated pleas for a peaceful return to Rwanda

ignored. Having gained military training and resources through their participation in

Yoweri Museveni's rebellion against Milton Obote's administration in Uganda, the

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) banded together in an attempt to gain Rwandan attention

for their cause through violence (Fujii, 2009).

In response to this invasion, Rwanda found itself with a surprising amount of

support and weaponry coming from France, Egypt, and South Africa to help combat the

incursion (Fein, 1999).[20] This response of international support not only introduced more

sophisticated weaponry into the region, but it also gave the indication that the

international community would turn a blind eye to Hutu/Tutsi violence (Prunier, 2001).

Even with the added firepower, however, the Rwandan government and its army were

largely ineffectual. In an attempt to compensate for this weakness, the extremists in the

military used seized the opportunity to begin training new paramilitary forces, known as

the *Interhamwe* ("those who stand [fight/kill] together") and the *Impuzamugambi* ("those

who have the same [or a single] goal"). These "armies" were largely made up of young

Hutu men who were taught to kill with machetes and other crude weapons (Marchack,

2008); and were told that their ultimate targets would be Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Despite measures to expand the militaristic forces, the Rwandan government

found itself under extreme pressure (both international and regional) to sign a peace

agreement with the RPF and end the civil war in 1993 (Fujii, 2009). On April 4, 1993

president Habyarimana finally caved to this pressure and signed the Arusha Accord; an

agreement that largely settled on the side of the RPF. In addition to expanding the

government from a single party system and incorporating an RPF presence in the

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[20] It is believed that the French primarily offered their support because they viewed
Uganda, and by extension the RPF, as threatening Anglophones in the region (Prunier,
2001.

government, the Arusha Accord also allowed for the return of 500,000 refugees - a move that increased the population by about 7.4% (Fein, 1999). Although these measures aided in appeasing the RPF and Tutsi refugees, they exponentially increased the fears that many Hutus held toward the Tutsis.

For example, the invasion by the RPF and the resulting civil war served as salient reminders of the Tutsi capacity for violence (recalling again the Burundi massacres in 1972), and increased fears of future Tutsi vengeance against the Hutus for the 1959 massacres. Of specific note was the growing regret among the Hutu extremists that their predecessors had spared so many of the women and children during the 1959 massacres; allowing them to flee, breed, and send new Tutsis to seek revenge for their kin (Prunier, 2001). Additionally, the sweeping changes to the government introduced by the Arusha Accords threatened the security of Hutu rule as they required that the Hutus and Tutsis share power, and allowed many Tutsis to reclaim their former statuses and reputations. The introduction of a multi-party system also dramatically changed the political landscape as it established a moderate Hutu *Mouvement démocratique républicain* (MDR) alongside the RPF presence in the government. In response to this incursion by moderates and Tutsis, the president and his inner circle responded by creating their own new extremist party *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR).

Rather than using the media as a means to quell the fears of the population, there was a pronounced increase of fearmongering along with a more vocal derogation of Tutsi and moderate Hutu targets. Songs such as "Bene Sebahinzi" ("Sons of the Fathers of the Farmers") and "Nanga Abahutu" ("I hate Hutus", referring to moderates) by Simon

Bikindi were heard, often on repeat, across the radio stations as they called true Hutus to arms:

> "The servitude, the whip, the lash, the forced work that exhausted the people, that has disappeared forever. You, the great majority [rubanda nyamwinshi] pay attention and, descendents of Sebahinzi, remember this evil that should be driven as far away as possible, so that it never returns to Rwanda." (as translated in Des Forges, 1999; pg. 77).

This period also saw the expansion of the propaganda machine with the creation of the extremist radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in early 1993.

In line with the predictions of the PEV model, this period marked a shift from Stage Two deindividuation to the incorporation of Stage Three: target devaluation, dehumanization, and demonization. The invasion of the RPF and the subsequent reentry of thousands of Tutsi refugees revealed the tenuous situation in which the extremist government had found itself. Civil warfare had shown the Rwandan (Hutu) army was woefully insufficient to curtail any large-scale violence should it reemerge (Marchack, 2008), and many feared that the Tutsis might exploit this to regain control. In order to alleviate these fears and shore up the Hutus' position, many of the extremists began to rally support for a preemptive strike.

In order to gain this support, it was necessary to change the rules regarding how the Tutsis should be treated in Rwandan society. Up until this point, Tutsis had largely been characterized as different, dangerous, and homogenous, but they still retained some degree of their humanity (outside of the rhetoric, little open persecution against the Tutsi had occurred; Prunier, 2001). The escalation of conflict and the mounting threat that they now posed to the extremists' reign combined to change this in the early 1990's. Taking the opportunity that the international community had given them by largely ignoring or

even aiding in their fight against the Tutsis, the Hutu extremists exploited this tolerance

by claiming that it legitimized their fight against the Tutsi (Prunier, 2001). The last

remaining obstacle was to expand the accepted enemy beyond the RPF soldiers to

incorporate the rest of the Tutsis and anyone else who stood in the way.

This was where dehumanizing and demonizing depictions of the Tutsis played the

largest role. Having established previously that all Tutsis were essentially the same and

unlikely to change their violent and oppressive natures, the first step in devaluing the

Tutsi was the of redefinition of these aspects as indicators of an inherent evil. In cases

such as Bikindi's songs, it became commonplace to depict the returning Tutsis as an "evil

that should be driven away as far as possible" (Des Forges, 1999). Others characterized

them as monstrous or dangerous "devils" that would stop at nothing to exterminate the

Hutu if given a chance[21] (Power, 2002). The rest often delegitimized the Tutsi by

exaggerating their supposed immorality: such as a graphic depiction published in the

paper *Echo des Milles Collines* (1991) which showed a Tutsi backstabbing[22] a Hutu

(Glick, 2008), or the yet another depicting Tutsi women as whores who used sex to cloud

the minds (obfuscating the true plight of the Hutu) of foreigners and (Prunier, 2001).

While the demonizing messages usually relied on these basic messages (they are

inherently evil, immoral, or monstrous), the dehumanizing language used to describe the

Tutsis was impressive in its breadth and variety. Perhaps the most notorious article,

published in a 1993 issue of *Kangura*, was the article entitled "A cockroach cannot give

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[21] This is also another instance of the "accusation in a mirror" tactic, which gained in its popularity during this period.
[22] Similar accusations have also been leveled against other targets of extreme violence, such as the Jews in Germany and the Armenians in Turkey. These claims often find their roots in the preexisting distrust of the targets and fears of possible retribution by the targets for the wrongs that have been perpetrated against them.

birth to a butterfly." This was the first clear instance where the term *inyenzi* (cockroach) was used to describe Tutsis, and reveals the culmination of the extremist, harm-legitimizing ideology to this point:

> "We began by saying that a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. It is true. A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach… The history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil are just as we knew them in the history of our country. We are not wrong in saying that a cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. Who could tell the difference between the inyenzi who attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960's. They are all linked…their evilness is the same. The unspeakable crimes of the inyenzi of today…recall those of their elders: killing, pillaging, raping girls and women, etc." (as translated and quoted in Des Forges, 1999; pg. 74-75).

This passage, beyond providing an excellent example of the types of dehumanizing language favored by the Hutu extremists, clearly shows how the beliefs from the PEV's first three stages can combine to produce particularly poisonous rhetoric: it plays on the fears of Tutsi violence and revenge, depicts Tutsis as being the same (faceless and unchanging), and compares them to insects. As the Hutu extremists began to plot retaliatory violence against the Tutsis, their terminology often – and unsurprisingly - built upon these characterizations: being treated as "the big clean up" (Kiernan, 2007; pg. 552), "bush clearing" or "operation insecticide" (Waller, 2002).

What is most problematic was that these characterizations of the Tutsis as vermin extended beyond the RPF members and men of fighting age to incorporate women and children as intended victims. As previously discussed, many Hutu extremists felt that their failure to wipe out the Tutsi women and children along with the men during the 1959 massacre allowed the refugees to breed the army which invaded in 1990 (Prunier, 2001). To keep this from happening again, they lumped the women and children in with

the rest of the vile Tutsis: "Tutsis caused problems and must be exterminated with their eggs." and "If you cannot catch the louse, you kill its eggs" and "if you set out to kill a rat, you must kill the pregnant rat." (Kiernan, 2007; Waller, 2002; Smith, 2011).

The publication of this delegitimizing rhetoric grew in both frequency and intensity during this period, paralleling the growing unrest and violence in the region. By this point, the Hutu extremist leadership had devised plans for a widespread, preemptive attack on the Tutsis, and had already initiating some early "rehearsals" across the region. These were intended, primarily to prepare the military and paramilitary forces, but also aided in acclimating common citizens to the coming waves of violence (Des Forges, 1999).[23] It should be noted that although most average citizens were not directly engaged in violence against the Tutsis, this period marked the start of major preparations for genocidal violence across the country.

Examining the Perpetrators: Analysis of Cultural Values, Norms and Situational Factors

Thus far, this analysis of the build up to the Rwandan genocide has focused on the broader course of events, and their effects on the rhetoric and attitudes of the period. These elements, although certainly important when attempting to understand why groups of people may become involved in genocides, fall short of explaining the experience of the average individual. As the purpose of the PEV model is to explain the *psychology* of willing supporters of genocide (and not simply the group-level processes at work), it is necessary to take the additional step of examining how average Rwandans fit into this network of growing animosity and violence.

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[23] These included outbreaks of anti-Tutsi violence in more than a dozen communities between 1990-1993, the largest taking place in the Kibilira community during the periods of October 1990, March 1992, December 1992 and January 1993. These resulted in the deaths of over 2000 Tutsi and dozens of moderate Hutu (Des Forges, 1999).

To do this, there are several factors which need to be considered: (1) the cultural values and dispositions which influence individual responses to leadership and might impact susceptibility to propaganda, (2) the situational factors that impact individuals' ability to access information and the ways in which they perceive/use it (both actual news and propaganda), and ultimately (3) the degree to which the actual experiences and perceptions of average perpetrators fit (or fall short) of these projected patterns of ideological adoption and participation. These factors have been broken up into two sections, with the first examining the cultural and situation factors, and the second (following Stage Four and Five) providing a more detailed examination of the individual experiences.

Interviews with civilians, perpetrators and victims reveal two strong cultural values that likely played a role in influencing individual support for genocidal violence: the Rwandans' tendency towards "German-like" obedience to authority (Prunier, 2001; pg. 112) and a strong emphasis on group conformity (Gourevitch, 1998). Authoritarianism, as we have seen, is characterized by a strong reverence for power, idealization of authority, an exaggerated need to submit, and a tendency to adhere to the moral standards laid out by those in power (Kressel, 1996). Although not inherently problematic in moderate amounts, extremely authoritarian cultures tend to be more likely to breed and maintain the types of totalitarian regimes that instigate extreme violence. For this reason, the strong levels of authoritarianism in Rwanda help to explain how and why the government was allowed to develop into what amounts to a dictatorship people between the 1970's and 1990's. As Francois Xavier Nkurunziza (a Kigali lawyer with a Hutu father and Tutsi mother who survived by hiding), sums it up:

"Conformity is very deep, very developed here…In Rwandan history, everyone obeys authority. People revere power, and there isn't enough education." (interview reported in Gourevitch, 1998; pg. 28).

In addition to allowing the Habyarimana's government to maintain control, the extreme deference to authority also explains why many Hutus supported and followed the party's policies that placed strict levels of control over the population: submitting to the required registration, reporting their ethnic group on their identification cards, and allowing their movements to be closely monitored when they relocated (Prunier, 2001).

It is not terribly surprising that in addition to an authoritarian disposition, many Hutus also shared a strong tendency to conform to the group. For most these tendencies were probably strongly linked and had been communicated in much the same manner. Researchers have suggested that the high levels of conformity and obedience likely resulted from the fact that many of the perpetrator Hutus had grown up undereducated, in homes that were "bereft of emotional support," during a time when ongoing violence had introduced a great deal of uncertainty, and a strong leader stressed the importance of Hutu/Tutsi identification and difference (Smith, 1998; Gourevitch, 1998). Much of the rhetoric associated with deindividuation during Stage Two, such as the "Hutu Ten Commandments," was likely easier for the more authoritarian and conforming Hutus to accept because it played on their natural tendency to adopt the group standards and to uphold orders passed down from leaders. Additionally, the choice of the Tutsis as targets for aggression likely appealed to the Hutus because their exclusion and death would be allow the Hutus to obtain something of a group level "destiny:" the return of what was rightfully theirs (the land and power in Rwanda; Waller, 2002).

Authoritarianism and conformity are certainly factors that help to explain some of the reasons why many Rwandans accepted the rule of Habyarimana's dictatorial regime, and would have been more likely to adopt ideologies communicated by their group and its leadership. They also fit with the PEV's predictions regarding the characteristics that contribute support for genocidal violence (chiefly that strong levels of authoritarianism and ingroup identification/conformity are associated with greater willingness to adopt party rhetoric, and to follow commands to kill). These are not, however, the only factors which influenced Rwanda participation in the escalating violence.

Rwanda in the 1980's and 1990's was a nation still reeling from the influence of European colonialization, and found itself faced with the problems of reaching social and economic stability. Unfortunately, even within the new Hutu "democracy" in place, most Hutus found themselves undereducated (a result of their exclusion under the Europeans) and in poverty (due to the overpopulation, poor economy and lack of land). These two factors contributed to dramatic, and dramatically different, motivations for joining up with the anti-Tutsi violence.

First, the lack of education resulted in an estimated 50% of Rwandans being completely illiterate during this period of turmoil (UN Human Development Reports 1990), and as a result, a large portion of the population was completely reliant upon the radio for their news. With airwaves largely controlled by the government, particularly the RTLM, radio became an extremely effective means of spreading propaganda to a large audience across the nation. Compounding the effects of the propaganda's "reach," was the fact that most (surveys have estimated about 90%) of the population trusted the

radio as a means of gaining accurate news and information (Gatwa, 2005).[24] These

findings reveal an additional connection between the group level harm-legitimizing

ideologies and the actual experience of the individual.   To put it simply, not only were

the harm-legitimizing ideologies being spouted by the leadership and extremists, these

messages were reaching the majority of populace, *and* were often accepted as truth.

In addition to the lack of education, poverty was a major motivator for many to

become involved in the anti-Tutsi movement. In interviews with incarcerated

perpetrators, Fujii (2009) noted that many indicated that material incentives played a part

in enticing them to engage in early harming. For some, the disenfranchisement they felt

as a result of their impoverished situation lead them to join up with the paramilitary

forces because they felt they had little to lose. Others were lured in by the offer of pay or

saw the violence as an opportunity to seize the property of wealthy neighbors, while still

others entered into the conflict only when they stood to gain from the orders (such as

those to loot and pillage). In a nation with such widespread poverty, it is easy to see how,

there were often more willing supporters of the violence when there was the potential for

material gain. As Nkurunziza goes on to explain:

> "You take a poor, ignorant, population and give them arms, and say, 'It's
> yours. Kill' They'll obey. The peasants who were paid or forced to kill,
> were looking up to people of higher socio-economic standing to see how
> they behave. So the people of influence, or the big financers, are often the
> big men in the genocide. They may think that they didn't kill because
> they didn't take a life with their own hands, but the people were looking to
> them for their orders. And, in Rwanda, an order can be given very
> quietly." (interview reported in Gourevitch, 1998; pg. 28).

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[24] This trust was also largely the result of limited alternatives. Most people could not
afford television, and did not have access to international news sources, so they were
effectively a captive audience (Gatwa, 2005).

Taken together these factors suggest that the majority of Hutus were exposed to, and that many probably adopted the harm-legitimizing ideologies being communicated between the 1960's and the 1990's. This is due, to a large part, to the fact that Habyarimana's regime exploited many of the aforementioned characteristics of the Hutu group to maximize their cooperation: demanding obedience, emphasizing group unity and prototypicality, varying the media of their messages (and ensuring control over the radio stations), and providing economic incentives for participation. As a result, when the final call to exterminate was made, the extremists found they had a significant amount of support across the nation.

Stage 4: 1993 – April 1994 (the assassination of Habyarimana)

Early 1993 brought with it promise of a more inclusive Rwandan government, and hope of reconciliation between the RPF and the Hutus. Unfortunately, these positive changes failed to come to fruition when Hutu/Tutsi violence broke out yet again in Burundi in October of 1993. Following the 1972 massacre and ensuing violence (which had largely subsided by 1990), the government was restructured and a Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, had been elected at its head. A period of relative peace followed the election, but was shattered when Ndadaye was assassinated on October 21, 1993 by a rebel army lead by Tutsi insurgents, and the Hutu massacres broke out again (Fujii, 2009).

Yet again, the violence in Burundi sent shockwaves through the upper ranks of the Rwandan government and dramatically shifted public opinion on the Tutsi issue. Firstly, it provided Habyarimana's regime with an excuse to halt the installation of the

transitional government; arguing that it was just such government restructuring that had compromised Burundi and would result in a similar "slide toward anarchy" in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995). Secondly, the violence provided additional fuel for extremist arguments that Tutsis, no matter who they were and where they resided, were inherently violent and would stop at nothing to regain their power over the region (Fujii, 2009). And thirdly, it provided yet another example that violence between the Hutus and the Tutsis would largely be tolerated by the international community, thus opening the door for preemptive strikes by the Hutu extremists against the Rwandan Tutsis. Alison Des Forges, head of two international commissions for the investigation of human rights abuses in Burundi and Rwanda, sums it up neatly:

> "There was a conscious weighing of the risks. In that sense, yes, it was rational. I think if we were going to go back and capture the thinking of the planners, a crucial point was the violence in Burundi and the total failure of the international community to react to that. In October 1993 there were 50,000 people killed in Burundi and no one did anything and this encouraged the extremists and made it possible to argue to other people, 'Look, we can get away with it. Why not do it?'" (interviewed in Fein, 1994, Pg 23).

The outbreak of anti-Hutu violence in Burundi, and the still-fresh wounds from the civil war with the RPF, provided plenty of fodder for the strengthening of anti-Tutsi sentiment and made the Tutsis "more immediately frightening" (Des Forges, 1999; pg. 88). Further fanning these flames, rumors were spread about supposed instances of Tutsi driven violence within Rwandan borders (some of these acts were actually carried out by Hutu extremists, others were simply fabricated), in an effort to bring the threat closer to home and instigate small scale violence across the country. For example, Radio Rwanda repeatedly broadcast reports that a "human rights group" in Nairobi had issued a press release warning of impending attacks by Tutsis against the Hutus and their political

leaders in Bugesera (a southern district in the Eastern province of Rwanda; Des Forges, 1999; pg. 89). As a result of this supposed report, gangs of Hutus in the region took up arms the following night and slaughtered known Tutsi residents.

Recent history had given the extremists a wealth of examples of Tutsi violence to draw from, and as a result much of the rhetoric of this period shifted from simply offering rationales for targeting the Tutsi to making violence against the Tutsis an imperative. The primary argument underlying this new tactic was that a preemptive strike against the Tutsis would be beneficial to the Hutus for two reasons: (1) it was a necessary precaution to keep the Tutsis from exacting further vengeance for the 1959 massacres, and (2) the excision of the Tutsis would provide the Hutus with the chance to reclaim the land that was "rightfully" theirs (Prunier, 2001). Adopting these beliefs not only gave motivation for outright aggression against the RPF and the Tutsis, it also legitimized the use of violence as a tool for realizing the extremist Hutu agenda.

With these beliefs in hand, the Hutu radicals began to exploit the chaos (resulting from the ongoing regional violence, economic distress, and political competition in the region) as an ideal opportunity to stage "practice for the catastrophe to come" (Des Forges, 1999; pg. 87). Small scale violence, such as that perpetrated in Bugesera, were encouraged by Hutu extremists as a means of establishing tolerance for greater levels of violence among the Hutu population and to allow for extremists in the local governments to shore up their control. These new instances of violence, in conjunction with the "rehearsals" encouraged during the civil war, were the first clear indications that the use of violence against Tutsis was becoming normalized.

As Stage Four of the PEV model predicts, perpetrators often build up support for genocidal brutality by first inuring the populous to lower level harming (such as looting, pillaging, beatings), which gradually increases to more isolated murders (most often resulting from low level harming that has gotten out of control), and finally massacres. Additionally, as in this instance, violence is typically framed as both necessary ("it will let us take what is ours") and legitimate ("it is a preemptive strike against a known hostile force"); removing any remaining moral ambiguity regarding its application.[25] The result of this normalization, as predicted by Stage Four, is the expansion of public support for the use of violence on the target problem, final preparations for extreme violence (and/or genocide), and the expansion of open harming.

By January 1994, plans for large-scale violence were nearly in place. Reports from the United Nations Force Commander, Roméo Dallaire, during this period confirm that at least four major weapons caches had been established and plans were in the works for a full-scale extermination of the Tutsis. Additionally, Dallaire's informants revealed that at least 1,700 *Interhamwe* militia members had been trained in government forces camps and that extremists had gathered lists of the names of all known Kigali Tutsis. It was clear from these findings that the *Interhamwe* was seeking to provoke the RPF to provide an excuse to engage in all out warfare (*Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 1999). Despite these warning signs, the UN largely ignored the impending conflict, opting to focus on the ongoing violations of the Arusha Accords by Habuarimana's regime.

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[25] Dehumanization and demonization provide rationale as to why it would not necessarily be wrong to kill the targets, but do not necessary provide sufficient motivation for the use of force. By reframing violence as necessary and legitimate, it fills in this motivational gap.

Genocide: April 1994 – July 1994

The reemergence of anti-Hutu violence in Burundi provided an additional catalyst for conflict, but it was not until the assassination of president Habyarimana in April 1994, that the violence in Rwanda tipped, and became genocidal. Habyarimana, a number of his high ranking cabinet members, and the new president of Burundi (Cyprien Ntaryamira) were on a flight returning to Kigali airport on April 6, 1994, when their airplane was shot down as it prepared to land. Most scholars agree that this act of terrorism was likely perpetrated by Hutu extremists looking to create seemingly "legitimate provocation" for inciting violence (e.g. Tatum, 2010; Fujii, 2009; Des Forges, 1999), but their public outcries quickly shifted the blame onto the RPF and Tutsis. In any case, the assassination provided the perfect opportunity for Hutu extremists to mobilize their militias and implement their genocidal plans.

Immediately following the assassinations, perpetrators answering the calls to violence largely did so not out of an emotional response to the loss of their president, but because the violence was the culmination of months of planning and training (Tatum, 2010). Within hours of the assassination, soldiers of both the Presidential Guard and the militias were provided with lists of the names and locations key Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) elites who resided in and around the capital of Kigali. Over the next 24 hours, members of these forces engaged in a military coup, systematically eliminated all of the prominent opposition members in the capital area who might threaten the extremist cause (i.e. attempt to steer the population away from violence). To assure that no Tutsis escaped, roadblocks were established along most major avenues out of Kigali and the

soldiers manning them were given instructions to kill anyone who was Tutsi, who appeared to be Tutsi, or who was helping Tutsis flee (Fujii, 2009).

In the days following Habyarimana's assassination, the typical perpetrators fell into two categories: (1) the early adopters, and (2) the opportunistic. The early adopters were largely comprised of those who had, at some point prior to the Habyarimana's assassination, found common cause with the Hutu extremists and had opted to formally join up with one of the military or paramilitary forces. As a group, they were more likely to be characterized as the idealists of the movement: those who had more quickly/easily internalized the harm-legitimizing ideologies included in the government's propaganda, and whose actions were more likely to be motivated by these beliefs (rather than other sources such as material gain, obedience or fear). Although this group was sizeable,[26] their numbers cannot account for the extent and the spread of the violence.

This is where the opportunists came in. Unlike the early adopters who were largely driven to violence by a desire to see the Tutsis and moderate Hutus exterminated, the opportunists were most commonly driven towards the violence because it allowed them some sort of material gain. To entice opportunists and spread the violence from the capital, officials sanctioned looting and pillaging in areas where Tutsis and moderate Hutus were known to reside (Des Forges, 1999). By opening up the doors to low level crimes against the targets that would result in tangible material gains, the extremists were able to recruit the opportunists and then could urge them to escalate to violent acts like

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[26] It is difficult to pin down an accurate membership figure, as most militia members did not wear uniforms or other identifying materials, but it is approximated that over 30,000 members (or approximately one member for every 10 households in Rwanda) were likely active by the end of the genocide (Des Forges, 1999).

pillaging goods, destroying homes, and eventually killing of the inhabitants of these homes.

Outside of the capital, violence began at different times depending on the militia presence, local leadership, and the number of willing supporters (Fujii, 2009). Areas where the leadership had strongly supported Habyarmiana's party[27] were frequently the first to take up the call. Other regions, particularly those in the south, took days or even weeks to respond.[28] In most cases, the local leadership drummed up support by building off of the extremists "ethnic war" framework, arguing that the massacres of the Tutsis were actually just an extension of the civil war (which would never be resolved via negotiations or bargaining; Fujii, 2009). To make their calls to violence more effective, they incorporated the recent instances of violence as justification for attacking the RPF (and by extension other Tutsis), and tailored their arguments to fit regional concerns: accusing Tutsis of harboring RPF rebels in the north, or emphasizing the Tutsis' responsibility for the presidential assassination (in Ngali). In all cases, the extremists urged that this "war" had radically changed the rules and expectations of behavior; specifically, that it was every true Hutu's duty to aid in the annihilation of the enemy threat and those who failed to assist in the cause would be deemed traitors (Fujii, 2009).

In this move to expand the violence from the initial military coup to an all-out genocide, we see the Hutus entering into the final stage of the PEV model: incorporating genocidal ideologies into their identities and engaging in active violence directed at the extermination of the targets. It should be noted here that the Hutu conviction that the

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[27] Particularly those in the north, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, and the capital Kigali (Fujii, 2009).

[28] A minority argued for peace and an end to conflict, but they were largely ignored, (Fujii, 2009).

Tutsis deserved annihilation was not new to this period. Extremists had been calling for

Tutsi blood for several years as they put the necessary machinery in place to carry out

their ultimate plan (see the *Independent Report* to the UN, 1999). Even so, the actual

violence against the Tutsis prior to the 1994 assassination was not driven by the goal of

wholesale Tutsi extermination. Rather, these acts of aggression had only intended to

eliminate a small percentage of the targets (even the 1959 massacre had spared most of

the Tutsi population) and/or were directed at alternative ends entirely (homeland defense

against the RPF, and/or small scale "rehearsals" to train militia troops). The

assassination of Habyarimana and the coup in Kigali that followed changed this by

opening the doors to frank discussion of a Tutsi genocide and as a result, it was widely

known that the violence was intended to eliminate the Hutus' now "ethnic" rival

permanently.

Aiding in the dissemination of this new directive was the RTLM radio station,

which became known by the Human Rights Watch as the "voice of genocide" (Prunier,

2001). During the course of the violence, the RTLM reiterated calls to "stamp out the

Tutsi cockroaches (*inyenzi*)," they named key targets, called out "traitors who deserved to

die", and urged the Hutus to "fill the half empty graves" (HRW, 1994; pg 2). In addition

to these calls to murder, the station reminded the perpetrators to target Tutsi women,

children, and even unborn children because all Tutsis posed a threat to the Hutus' future.

The ultimate message was clear to all listened: the ideal world to be created by the Hutus

was one that lacked any Tutsi (Staub, 2008).

As the reach of the violence moved out of the capital, and the perpetrators

expanded beyond militia members, the violence shifted from organized military strikes to

a more "intimate genocide" (Gourevitch, 1998). In the small towns and villages where

the violence spread, the victims and the methods were dramatically different then those

associated with the original attacks in Kigali. For starters, the victims of the Hutu

violence outside of the capital were not detached political elites or other powerful

strangers. Instead, the Tutsis (or moderate Hutus) in question were neighbors, friends or

even family members to the Hutus that hunted them. Consider the experiences of

Apollon Kabahizi, a Tutsi survivor:

> "One day I said to my best friend, who was a Hutu, ' Do you think you
> can pick up a machete and cut me with it, just because I'm a Tutsi. Is that
> something you can do?' "Of course not,' he said. 'Are you sick or
> something?' But this same guy, my friend – well, I discovered later that he
> had killed my mother. My mother fed him; she brought schoolbooks for
> him because his own mother had died. He was my best friend. That's
> what genocide does." (quoted in Cowley, 2005).

Not only were the average perpetrators being asked to kill members of their own

families and neighborhoods, but they were doing so with extreme brutality. Whereas the

militias and military had greater access to impersonal weapons (such as guns), most of

the perpetrators outside of the capital were left to murder less sophisticated weaponry.

Many Hutus did not have access to firearms, so the weapon of choice for most of the

murders was a machete. This meant that rather than being able to quickly shoot a victim

and leave, most of the murders involved a slow, deliberate process; often involving

hacking at the victim for several minutes before the victim was incapacitated and/or

finally died (Tatum, 2010). To be able to stomach, and justify such brutality required

either extreme certainty in one's genocidal beliefs or extreme pressure from the outside.

As we have seen, some Hutus seem to have adopted the extremist ideologies and

voluntarily joined the violence as a logical course of action. Others did not seem to hold

such strong beliefs. In the case of the opportunists, ideology was not a primary motivator for their involvement, but their participation could be bought for the right price. The remaining group of perpetrators would be classified as the reluctant murderers. These individuals were the ones who did not involve themselves in the violence unless they were ordered to do so by their local leaders, or their peers put sufficient pressure on them to join (Des Forges, 1999). Their initial involvement was often a form of self defense, intended to protect them from ingroup policing (Tatum, 2010), and their continuing participation was a factor of whether they (A) continued to be observed by authorities or their peers, or (B) they sufficiently adopted the anti-Tutsi ideologies which justified their actions (Fujii, 2009).

Within a few weeks of the start of the violence, hundreds of thousands of Hutus had joined the extremists in their extermination of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus.[29] Extreme violence took place across the nation and began to expand to include a broader victim pool. As Diamond (2005) notes, mass killing took place in towns where only a single Tutsi lived, which indicates that Hutus were also actively killing other Hutus. This suggests that perhaps the underlying motivation of many perpetrators was not necessarily based on ethnic ideologies, but was instead a result of desires to settle scores or to seize resources belonging to the wealthy in their area (Diamond, 2005). Murder freed these individuals from feelings of inferiority and allowed them to obtain land. Further, murder held the promise of a nation free of concerns about the Tutsis taking over again (Prunier, 2001).

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[29] Rwanda's ability to achieve widespread mobilization is actually very unusual for the region; where most instances of violence have failed to move outside of major or capital cities (Straus, 2004).

By the early summer of 1994, an estimated 800,000-1,000,000 Rwandans, or approximately 20% of the population, had lost their lives as a result of the violence (e.g. Des Forges, 1999; Hewstone, 2008; Glick, 2008). Despite the unfathomable scope of the violence, the international community did little to intervene during the height of the genocide. It was not until July 1994, that a Tutsi-led army managed to defeat the government army and put an end to the bloodshed (Staub, 2008).

Examining the Perpetrators: Characterizations and Experiences of the Willing Followers

Earlier in the discussion it was emphasized that the purpose of this analysis is to examine the *psychology* of the willing perpetrators of the Rwandan. Although the broader discussion has examined of the course of events, the harm-legitimizing ideologies present in the rhetoric, and some of the cultural/situational characteristics that contributed to the willing support of the Hutu citizens; a complete analysis of the psychology of the average perpetrator requires the analysis to go one step further. To bring the discussion full circle, therefore, the purpose of this section is to examine the last of the three factors necessary for a thorough psychological examination: an exploration of the actual experiences of perpetrators; and to provide a critique of the degree to which the PEV model fits (or does not fit) the perceptions and actions of average followers.

In the aftermath of the violence, a number of researchers worked on recording and preserving the experiences of the perpetrators to attempt to gain first-hand insight into their actual beliefs, motivations, and actions. Their interviews reveal both the large degree of similarity many perpetrators shared, as well as some of the sources of individual variation. The purpose of this section is not to recount the numerous

individual stories, but rather to examine the patterns these ethnographers uncovered and to gain a general sense of the reality of genocidal perpetration.

The previous section examined several categories of perpetrators that were classified as the "early adopters," the "opportunists," and the "reluctant followers." Each of these characterizations forms a subcategory of what Fujii (2009) calls "the Joiners." To clarify, Joiners were the "lowest level actors" in the Rwandan genocide who were responsible for committing most of the violence. In a series of interviews with perpetrators of the genocide, Fujii (2009) discovered that in addition to sharing the same rung on the genocidal ladder, most Joiners also shared a number of key similarities: the majority were otherwise normal members of their communities, were married and had families, and still lived in the area in which they were born. Further, many were farmers, some had Tutsi family members, and none held positions of power. Conversely, relatively few had formal training in killing/combat. Although these joiners shared many of the same characteristics, they did not all participate in the violence in the same way: many actively murdered, others typed up lists of names or drove victims to the sites where they were murdered, some pillaged, and a small percentage went above and beyond (raping or torturing in addition to murder; pg. 130).

Just as there was variance in the parts that the Joiners played, there was also a fair amount of variance in the degree to which they remained faithful to their parts (Fujii, 2009; pg. 123). Many carried out the directive to kill Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) regardless of whether there was an immediate authority present. Others were less faithful to the cause, following orders or acting like those around them when they were being observed, but not continuing to harm when left to their own devices. Most indicated that

it was common knowledge that those who did not engage in the violence would be subject to harassment, beatings, suspicion and death threats. Fujii's interviewees went on to explain that most of the variance in their actions was the result of the fact that they "knew better" than to adopt all of the rhetoric that they were presented with, and that it played varying roles depending on the situation (pg. 123).

Clearly the divisions between the "early adopters," the "opportunists" and the "reluctant followers" indicate variation in both action and motivation. For some, ideology was clearly a more important factor than it was for others. The interviews with perpetrators and survivors reveal four key explanations: ethnic fear/hatred, situational forces, personal motives (particularly greed), and what Fujii (2009) terms the "logic of contamination" (pg. 99).

The ethnic fear/hatred explanation argues that participants involved themselves willingly in the violence because they had internalized much of the harm-legitimizing ideology and earnestly felt the genocide of the Tutsis was a form of self-defense or a means to obtaining a "pure" Rwanda. This particular explanation most closely aligns with the PEV model's prediction that many willing volunteers enter into the violence, because they feel the murder of the targets is not only justified, but that it is necessary. As we have seen, this type of ideologically motivated action is likely to be most closely associated with the "early adopters" who voluntarily joined the *Interhamwe* or other military/paramilitary groups prior to 1994. Revealing the extent to which many perpetrators had adopted the rhetoric of the period and used it to legitimize their actions, perpetrator Elie Ngarambe, explained in an interview:

> "[he and his comrades] did not know that the Tutsi were human beings, because if they had thought about that, they wouldn't have killed them."

He goes on, " Let me include myself as someone who accepted it; I wouldn't have accepted that they are human beings." (Goldhagen, 2009; pg. 182)

It should be noted that this process of using ethnic fear/hatred to drive initial harming only characterized the "early adopters." In many other cases, the initial acts of harming were driven by some other explanation; and if fear/hatred were adopted as an additional motivator, it was done so as a means of alleviating cognitive dissonance after the fact (Fujii, 2009).

The most widely cited rationale for the perpetrators involvement in the violence was the situational explanation. As Fujii notes, it was not uncommon for people to explain the general violence as "Hutus going after Tutsis" (pg. 89), but these ethnic definitions of events rarely extended to explanations of any one individual's actions. Instead many of the perpetrators blamed their actions on the presence of key authority figures, following orders and/or mob dynamics. This emphasis on the power of the situation is not terribly surprising, as it has frequently characterized the explanations of perpetrators of other genocides,[30] and it removes the onus for the actions from the perpetrator themselves. That being said, the situational explanation cannot be completely disregarded.

For one thing, willingness to participate did vary widely as a function of the presence of the aforementioned social pressures, and also as a function of the relationship the Hutu perpetrator shared to his victim (Fujii, 2009). Group dynamics played a huge role in dictating when and where murder was likely to take place. The members of the *Interhamwe* often exploited this to increase compliance by: sending out groups of killers,

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[30] Consider again the famous Eichmann defense, e.g. Cesarani, 2006.

rather than individuals, placing emphasis on the importance and culpability of every role

in the process (whether it was delivering the victims, tying them up, bearing witness to,

or actually committing the murder), and instituting strict codes of behaviors that heavily

punished deviance. Where group dynamics often facilitated violence, the relationships

the perpetrators had to their potential or actual victims played a mixed role (Fujii, 2009).

For some, a close relationship to the victim resulted in actions to aid the victims in escape

or hiding, or even an outright refusal to follow orders to kill. In other cases, holding

particularly negative feelings towards a particular individual (such as distrust, anger, or

greed) could lead perpetrators to actively seek them out as a victim.[31] In most cases,

some element of situational pressure was unavoidable, but typically cannot completely

explain the actions perpetrators *chose* to take.

The third explanation, personal motives, returns us to the discussion of the role

that poverty and greed played in enticing Hutus towards violence. As we have seen,

greed was a primary motivator of many of the "opportunists" who exploited the ongoing

violence as a chance to claim land and resources of wealthier neighbors. Even for those

who did not immediately volunteer or turn to looting during the anarchy of early April

1994, the potential for material gain often still played a role. In these cases, some

individuals were incentivized to join up with the local *Interhamwe* or Hutu Power groups

in exchange for money, food/drink, or even drugs (Des Forges, 1999). Others joined

when they discovered that the violence could help them settle feuds with neighbors or to

lay claim to resources that would better their situation. It should be noted that this

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[31] Interestingly, many survivors also ascribe situational explanations to the violent actions of their friends and neighbors, rather than attributing their actions to an "evil" disposition. This reveals the importance role that contact played in humanizing some of the members of both groups (Staub, 2008; Fujii, 2009).

explanation, although often useful for understanding what drew a large number of low level perpetrators in for their first few kills, falls short of accounting for their ongoing participation in the violence (particularly when financial or material gain was not a factor).   In most of these cases, an additional explanation would have been necessary to provide continuing motivation for murder.

The final explanation for perpetration of genocide by the Hutus finds its basis in the Rwandan emphasis on group conformity. Given the strong impetus to identify and conform with one's group, the "logic of contamination" explanation makes sense: people viewed themselves and others on the basis of their associations with groups, and assumed that no individual was truly individuated from those they associated with. As a result, people could become "tainted" if they spent too much time with the wrong groups (Fujii, 2009).

This belief that people could become "contaminated" most clearly explains why perpetrators could define Tutsis as RPF, and why some targeted other Hutus as ethnic "traitors" or Tutsi sympathizers. Above and beyond this, the belief that one could be deemed un-Hutu on the basis of their associations and actions drew many Hutus towards the extremist groups in an effort to confirm their Hutu identity (Fujii, 2009). By self-segregating, this avoidance of contamination facilitated the deindividuation process outlined in Stage Two of the PEV model. It provided Hutus with excellent motivation to strengthen their identity and conform to group norms, and facilitated the indoctrination of more extreme ideologies.

For most perpetrators, no single explanation would encompass all of their actions over the course of the genocide. As the violence spread, it incorporated a wider variety

of both perpetrators and victims. This necessitated an ever-evolving set of potential

motivators (material goods, ideology, or fear) to keep perpetrators active and diminish

resistance. Whether an individual was drawn into the genocide because they were

coerced, or because they were a fervent believer in Hutu Power, the end result was the

same: all perpetrators had to live with the atrocities they had committed.

It is acknowledge here that for a number of perpetrators, the PEV model's

progression of ideological adoption did not necessary characterize their initial trajectory

toward involvement in the genocide. The model does, however, help to understand how

these individuals were able to cope with their actions after the fact. For some who were

not initially motivated by fear/hatred of the Tutsis, these beliefs were often after the fact

to help explain that their violence was actually self-defense. In other cases, the

internalization of dehumanizing rhetoric allowed perpetrators to engage in a profound

sense of moral apathy towards the Tutsis (Goldhagen, 2009).   As Ngarambe (Goldhagen,

2009) indicated, incorporating this belief about the Tutsis (and Hutu victims) provided

relief from cognitive dissonance associated with murder, and allowed perpetrators to

assume a regain a relatively normal self-concept following the end of the violence.

Discussion

The genocide that took place over the course of only a few short months in

Rwanda is a particularly devastating example of the extremes to which intergroup

violence can be taken under the right circumstances, with the right perpetrators and the

right victims. In this case, a history of subjugation of the Hutu majority combined with

their subsequent revolution and ongoing regional violence to ultimately create a situation

ripe for Tutsi extermination – once there was a dramatic enough change to the intergroup

beliefs.   Outside of the obvious loss of life, what makes this genocide particularly

troubling is the fact that the violence was able to escalate so rapidly despite the fact that

the Hutus and Tutsis shared many common factors which typically "protect" against

violence such as a common language (Kinyarwanda), common heritage, movement

between groups, and extensive intergroup contact (Vanderwerff, 1996). The failure of

these commonalities to prevent violence bespeaks of major shifts that had, over the years,

rendered these qualities unimportant in the cultural consciousness. The explanation of

this process is where the PEV theory provides crucial insights.

This is largely because, as the analysis in the previous sections reveal, strong

parallels exist between the PEV's stages and the actual events in Rwanda. Firstly, the

violence that unfolded in 1994, did not suddenly emerge as a reactionary retaliation for

the assassination of Habyarimana; but was rather the result of the gradual evolution of

intergroup ideologies and the inculcation of strong anti-Tutsi sentiments. Over the period

preceding the violence, a series of catalysts (most notably the economic strife and

ongoing violence in the region), drove the conflict in a more extreme direction and

ultimately aided in the Hutus' legitimization of Tutsi extermination. Secondly, the harm-

legitimizing ideologies present in both the propaganda and cultural lexicon of the time

align closely with the progression and extremity predicted in the first three stages of the

PEV model. In this way, intergroup difference was established before deindividuation

began, and both were in place when target dehumanization occurred. These beliefs

gradually built upon one another and, in the context of the escalating violence in the

region, lent legitimacy to more extreme ideologies. Finally, the civil war and violence in

Burundi facilitated the final two stages: normalization of violence and the incorporation

of eliminationist goals into the Hutu identity. This dramatically aided in restructuring the perpetrators views of anti-Tutsi violence.

In these ways, the PEV theory shows a great deal of utility in understanding the evolution of genocidal violence in Rwanda. It also shows great potential for explaining the processes which willing followers go through to reach the point that they would voluntarily involve themselves in the extermination of a target group. This is largely because these "early adopters" and volunteers are the ones who most readily absorb and apply the aforementioned harm-legitimizing antecedents in the PEV's stages. As a result, these followers are typically close behind the extremists and leadership who are driving the progression and espousing the rhetoric. The PEV's stages do not seem to hold as much explanatory power for the initial harming of more reluctant,[32] or otherwise motivated (greed), perpetrators who often join in once the violence is underway. For these individuals, the PEV model provides a better indication of the ways in which harm-legitimizing ideologies may be adopted as post-hoc justification for previously committed violence, and it clarifies the ways in which groups may exert pressure on these individuals to participate.

In conclusion, an exploration of the contributing factors, course of events and intergroup beliefs associated with the Rwanda genocide make a strong case for the utility of the PEV model in explaining the psychology of willing participation in genocide. It is noted that this analysis is somewhat limited in that it has only examined a single case of

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[32] Note that the purpose of the PEV model is to outline the actions of willing participants in genocide, and as such is not intended to explain the experiences of those who act out of pure obedience, greed or other motivators (as discussed in the previous section).

genocidal violence, and as a result, it is possible that the conclusions that have been drawn may not extend to other examples.

Although it is certainly possible that eliminationist violence may emerge following a wildly different pattern, it seems unlikely. Underlying this prediction is the fact that, as the theory section has shown, all of the core components of the PEV theory and its stages have been present in other examples of genocidal violence. As a result, it seems probable that the majority of the PEV's predictions would be proven true when examining willing perpetrators in other genocides. Future analysis of these other examples will be required to provide a more diverse test of the PEV's predictions and its overall utility as a model of the psychology of willing perpetration of extreme violence.

Empirical Tests of the PEV's Predictions

The purpose of the preceding sections were three-fold: to outline the development of the Perpetration of Extreme Violence (PEV) theory, explore the stages and predictions of the PEV model and begin to test the utility of the model to explain willing perpetration in an actual instance of genocide. From the first two levels of discussion, it is evident that host of factors contribute to willing perpetration of extreme violence, and that support emerges gradually over time. Additionally, historical examples presented, and the case study of the Rwandan genocide, provide significant support for the model's predictions regarding the role of harm-legitimizing ideologies as a means of justifying the use of extreme violence. They also lend support to the model's stage design, indicating that the more extreme antecedent beliefs tend to build upon more benign, and the resulting attitude/action outcomes follow a similar trajectory (building in intensity/scope as time progresses). Although these analyses have been beneficial in understanding the broader utility of the PEV model, they are by no means empirical tests of the theory.

To attempt to bridge this gap and incorporate more thorough tests of the PEV's predictions, two studies were developed. Due to the ethical and logistical concerns surrounding the study of the full model, it is impossible to fully replicate the gradual process by which these movements evolve or measure willingness to exterminate an actual social group in a controlled laboratory setting. As such, the present research will focus primarily on the basic predictions of the model and the antecedent/outcome pairings of first three stages.

As previously outlined, these three stages deal with how individuals come to fear or distrust a target group, blame or scapegoat a target group, and ultimately become

willing to support the harming of members of a target group. As a linear model, each stage is necessarily preceded by the stages outlined before it; such that the more benign ideologies/behaviors/attitudes precede the more extreme. Just to refresh, the predictions for each stage are as follows:

1. Stage 1: Exposure to ideology that rigidly divides individuals into mutually exclusive groups ascribes positive beliefs and values to the perpetrator in-group and negative (threatening) beliefs and values to the target out-group should increase individuals' fear/distrust the targeted out-group (and its members).

2. Stage 2: Exposure to ideology that deindividuates both the target group (portraying them as homogeneous and as a threatening collective) and the perpetrator in-group (emphasizing group conformity and unity) should blame of the targeted out-group (and its members) for collective difficulties.

3. Stage 3: Exposure to ideology that denies the humanity of the target group, devalues the target group and/or demonizes the target group should increase perpetrator group member willingness to support harming the out-group.

These stages are intended to provide a linear series of attitude and behavioral "snap-shots" via which we can see the gradual shift from peaceful coexistence to conflict. Although these stages should initially proceed in order, it is possible that earlier stages may be revisited, aiding in the accumulation of harmful ideologies and reducing cognitive dissonance as individuals move from stage to stage. As such, individuals who

are in the midst of Stage 2 (beginning to blame the target group for collective difficulties) may still experience increases in their fear/distrust of the target group as they encounter more harm-legitimizing ideology. Similarly ideological messages in Stage 2 will likely include both those components emphasized in Stage Two as well as Stage One. This repetition serves to reinforce the relevant beliefs about the target group.

Explaining Individual Variance: Personality Factors

As with prior theory, the PEV model also predicts that certain individuals will be more susceptible to the effects of ideology that legitimizes target group harming, than others (e.g. Kressel, 1996; Waller, 2002). These susceptible individuals share similar dispositional traits that primarily influence the ways in which they relate to both their social group and the relevant group leadership. In a broader sense, individuals who are more strongly predisposed to emphasize group identity over individual identity (Baum, 2008) and to defer to authorities (Adorno, et al. 1950; Altemeyer, 1981), are generally more likely to adopt the beliefs espoused by their in-group and its leaders (Rokeach, 1960; Crandall, et al, 2002). Incorporating these existing dispositional theories, the model predicts that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1996), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and In-group Identification strength (Baum, 2008) will moderate susceptibility to harm-legitimizing ideologies.

Present Research

Two studies were designed to address three of the basic predictions of the PEV model:

1. Individuals' levels of hate/negative attitudes toward target groups, and support for policies designed to harm the targets are positively related to the degree to which they endorse harm-legitimizing ideologies.

2. Exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies increases levels of hate of targets and willingness to harm targets.

3. The adoption of more "benign" ideologies precedes more extreme ideologies by necessity.

Additionally, Study Two included measures of relevant dispositions traits (RWA, SDO, Identification) to assess their potential as moderators of the effects of harm-legitimizing ideologies. It was predicted that those who hold stronger levels of these dispositions would be more susceptible to the harm-legitimizing ideologies, showing greater support for harmful policies and PEV stage outcomes (fear/distrust of targets, target blame and/or support for target harming). Those who hold weak levels of these dispositions, on the other hand would be expected to show little to no susceptibility to the ideologies, with only limited support for harmful policies and PEV outcomes across the board.

Study One was designed as a survey-based exploration of prediction 1, intended to assess the relationship between levels of ideologically relevant beliefs, PEV stage outcomes (fear/distrust, target blame and support for harming), hatred toward targets, and support for policies designed to harm target members of several real-world target groups. Additionally, Study One served as a preliminary study intended to aid in the selection of an appropriate target groups for use in Study Two. Study Two then used these target groups to focus on the more general second and third predictions: that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies could increase hate toward the targets, PEV stage outcomes

(fear/distrust, target blame and support for harming) and support for harmful policies, and that the stage relevant ideologies must follow the predicted path (building a foundation of more benign beliefs and then adding more extreme ideologies on top). To do this, Study Two compared the relative effectiveness of each of the early stage ideologies in isolation.

Study One

Study One consisted of a survey aimed at a broad examination of how support for

harm-legitimizing ideologies outlined in the first three stages of the PEV model relate to

attitudes about toward groups (fear/distrust, blame and willingness to harm), how they

relate to levels of hatred toward different real-life target groups, and how they support the

harming said groups. This was a necessary first step in the empirical analysis of the PEV

theory's utility because the model's foundational prediction (that harm-legitimizing

ideologies shape perpetrator beliefs and actions) presupposes a real-world relationship

between these poisonous ideologies and actual harmful attitudes and behaviors.

In addition to assessing the relationship between endorsement of harm-

legitimizing ideologies, attitudes (fear/distrust, target blame and support for target

harming), hatred, and support for harmful policies, Study One also gave insight into

which groups are presently salient targets for American[33] aggression. Having this

information was key, as the PEV model argues that extreme conflict is most likely to

emerge between groups that have some existing level of animosity. This is because the

underlying rancor is instrumental in both driving the creation of new ideology that

justifies harming a target group and lending legitimacy to more extreme intergroup

beliefs. To most closely recreate these circumstances, Study One therefore served as a

preliminary assessment of potential target groups to be used in Study Two.

Hypotheses

In line with the PEV model's first prediction, it was hypothesized that a positive

relationship exists between levels of endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies, hatred

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[33] And more specifically, Americans who are members of the Mechanical Turk subject
pool.

toward the targets, stage related attitudes (fear/distrust of targets, target blame and willingness to support target harming), and support for harmful policies, such that: those who more strongly endorse ideologies legitimizing target harm would also be expected to express greater hatred toward the targets, greater levels of stage related attitudes, and greater support for policies designed to harm the targets.

Additionally, based on the PEV model's stage design, it s predicted that endorsement of later stages harm-legitimizing beliefs and attitudes should mediate the effects of the endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs and attitudes on levels of general hatred and support for policies designed to harm the targets. Specifically, endorsement of more benign beliefs/attitudes (Stages One and Two), should increase endorsement of more extreme beliefs (Stage Three), resulting in more extreme levels of hatred and policy support.

<div align="center">Methods</div>

Participants

Two hundred seventy-five participants[34] were recruited online via the Mechanical Turk system to participate in a survey for compensation ($0.60 per participant). Of these participants, one hundred thirty-nine were male and one hundred thirty-six were female. Sixty were between the ages of 18-24, eighty-six were between 25-31, fifty were between 32-38, thirty were between 39-45, twenty-five were between 46-52 and thirty-two were above 53. Two hundred twenty-one participants were white/Caucasian, and fifty-four

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[34] Two hundred eighty five participants were originally recruited. Ten were excluded because they failed two or more of the Instructional Manipulation Checks, indicating that they were not carefully reading the instructions/items.

identified as non-white. One hundred thirty-seven identified as Christian or Catholic, one hundred thirty-seven identified with other religious affiliations, and one did not report.

Design

Study One employed a simple survey that was divided into seven separate, between subjects, target group conditions: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, racists, homosexuals, atheists, college students, and the middle class. These target groups were selected because they were likely negative (Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, racists and homosexuals) and neutral (college students and the middle class) target groups for most Americans. All survey conditions contained the same questions, differing only in the target group to which they referred. To minimize fatigue associated with the length of these measures, participants were randomly assigned to complete only one questionnaire containing one of the possible seven group conditions.

Materials

All questionnaires contained the same basic items intended to assess participants' levels of harm-legitimizing beliefs, hatred, levels of PEV stage related attitudes, and support for policies intended to harm one of the seven target groups. A total of thirty-seven items and a demographics questionnaire were included in each of the final surveys (see Appendix B for an example of a complete survey).

Feeling Thermometers. Three items were included to assess general feelings about the target group (Cronbach's alpha=.96), Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they feel warm/cold, close/distant and like/dislike the target group by indicating their feelings on three provided 0-100 "degree" feeling thermometers (see Appendix C).

Hate Scale. The target hate scale was designed to focus more specifically on emotional/behavioral responses to the target group associated with hatred. Designed as a modification of the Triangular Hate Scale (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008), this scale consisted of five items that assessed feelings of threat, disgust, avoidance, repulsion, and anger associated with the target out-group (Cronbach's alpha=.95; see Appendix D). For each item, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with five statements, one for each feeling, on a 0-10 scale (End/Midpoint labels: 0=No Agreement, 5=Moderately Agree, 10=Completely Agree).

Harm-legitimizing Belief measures. The harm-legitimizing belief measures consisted of three subscales designed to assess participants' endorsement of the harm-legitimizing ideologies predicted in stages 1-3 of the PEV model (Cronbach's alpha=.94; see Appendix E). Three items assessed perceptions of in-group/target group mutual exclusivity/polarization (Stage 1; Cronbach's alpha=.85). Three items assessed beliefs about target group homogeneity and in-group loyalty (Stage 2; Cronbach's alpha=.55).[35] Finally, three items measured the degree to which participants dehumanize/demonize/devalue the target group (Stage 3; Cronbach's alpha=.87). For each item, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement/disagreement on a 0-10 scale (End/Midpoint labels: 0=No Agreement, 5=Moderate Agreement, 10=Complete Agreement). Each belief sub-scale contained one item that was positively

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[35] This subscale showed weak reliability. This is likely because participants were viewing the dual deindividuation processes (that of the ingroup, and that of the targets) as conceptually distinct. As a result, the scale was broken in two: one item assessing ingroup unity ("We should unite against ____"), and one item assessing target homogeneity ("_____ are all alike."). The positively worded item was not reliably linked with either of these items, and was thus discarded.

worded. These items were reverse coded so that higher value was associated with disagreeing with these statements.

PEV Stage Related Attitudes Measures. This series of measures consisted of nine items (three items per sub-scale for each of the first three stages) intended to assess fear/distrust of the targets, target blame and willingness to harm the targets (Cronbach's alpha=.93; see Appendix F). The fear/distrust sub-scale (Cronbach's alpha=.85) included three items intended to assess perceptions that the targets are threatening, cannot be trusted, and should be avoided. The target blame sub-scale (Cronbach's alpha=.85)[36] included two items intended to assess the degree to which individuals hold the target group responsible for in-group problems. Finally, the willingness to harm sub-scale (Cronbach's alpha=.87) included three items intended to assess general approval of in-group actions to harm the target group. All items asked that participants indicate their level of agreement with a statement by selecting a number on a 0-10 scale: a response of 0 indicated no agreement, a response of 5 indicated moderate agreement and a response of 10 indicated complete agreement. Each attitude sub-scale contained one item that is positively worded. These items were reverse coded so that higher value was associated with disagreeing with these statements.

Positive/Neutral Filler Items. To help obfuscate the purpose of the questionnaires, a series of six neutrally/positively balanced items was also included along with the previously described scales (Cronbach's alpha=.8; see Appendix G). All items asked that participants indicate their level of agreement with a statement by selecting a number on the same 0-10 scale: a response of 0 indicated no agreement, a response of 5 indicated

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[36] The original alpha was .72. Deleting the third, positively worded, item in this subscale brought this value up to .85.

moderate agreement and a response of 10 indicated complete agreement. These items were intended to mimic the style of the questionnaire items, but were not intended to measure any key beliefs about the targets. As such, they were not included in the analysis.

Policy support measure. The policies measure was an adaptation of the Policy Responses to Israel (Cohen, Jussim, Harbor & Bhasin, 2009) and the Policy Responses to Illegal Immigration scales (Nofziger, in process), consisting of five items that asked participants to indicate their support for five different policies intended to harm the targets (Cronbach's alpha=.81[37]; see Appendix H). Three of these policies were negatively worded (i.e. taking rights away from the group or otherwise harming them), and two of the policies were positively worded (i.e. providing benefits to the group). Positively worded items were reverse coded (so that higher value was associated with NOT supporting these policies). For each item, participants were asked to indicate their level of support for the policy on a 0-10 scale (End/Midpoint labels: 0=No Support, 5=Moderate Support, 10=Completely Support).

Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs). The Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs) were an adaptation of the methodology developed by Oppenheimer et al. (2009) to assess whether participants are paying attention to instructions. These checks consisted of three items embedded within the experimental measures and that mimicked their format: two were be presented along with the attitudes, beliefs and hate measures, and one was included at the end of the policy measure. Unlike the questions included in each measure, the instructions included with the IMC items asked participants to respond

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[37] One positively worded item ("_____ protection") was excluded due to low reliability. This raised the reliability from .73 to .81.

in a manner that indicated they had read the instructions (see Appendix I), rather than responding to the question in the standard format (in this case, indicating their level of agreement or support).

Procedure

Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk to participate in an online survey designed to examine how attitudes about a variety of social groups related to their support for group relevant policies. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were redirected to the online survey. Instructions provided on the first page explained that they would be presented a series of questions that were designed to measure their feelings, attitudes and policy support relating to a variety of social groups. Before beginning the questionnaires, the participants were also presented with instructions including reminders that: their responses were anonymous, they were to respond honestly and that items were included to assess the degree to which they were paying attention to instructions.

After reading through the instructions, participants began the questionnaire. Items from the scales were presented in two parts: as an "attitude measure" and a policy measure. The "attitude measure" included the feeling thermometer, hatred scale items (plus the filler items), harm-legitimizing belief measures and PEV stage related attitude measures. After completing the "attitude measure", participants were presented with the policy related items. After completing all attitude and policy items, participants were asked to complete a series of demographic items and were debriefed regarding the purpose of the research.

<div align="center">Results and Discussion</div>

Preliminary Analyses

Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for all measures are reported in Table 1. Scores on the hatred scale, harm-legitimizing belief measures, PEV attitudes measures, and policy support measure are presented as averages to maintain the 0-10 range of scores (higher values of each indicate greater levels of hate, endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies, levels of stage relevant attitudes, and support for target-harming policies respectively). Each of the PEV attitudes sub-scales and harm-legitimizing belief sub-scales are presented separately and as a scale total. The scores from the feeling thermometers are presented as an average score out of a possible 100.

Main Analyses

The main analyses were designed test the hypothesis that endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs is positively related to hatred, harmful attitudes (fear/distrust, target blame and support for target harming), and support harmful policies related to the target group. A series of eight sets of correlations were employed to test this assertion, one overall, and one for each target group (Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class (see Table 2)). These correlated the harm-legitimizing belief average (total) scores with all of the main measures: hatred, Stage 1 attitudes (fear/distrust of the targets), Stage 2 attitudes (target blame), Stage 3 attitudes (willingness to harm targets) and policy support.

The results overwhelmingly supported hypothesis, for both the overall correlations and each individual target group: the level of harm-legitimizing belief endorsement was significantly, and positively, related to levels of hatred, PEV attitudes (fear/distrust, blame and willingness to harm), and support for harmful policies directed

at the targets (p's<.02)[38]. Individuals who more strongly endorsed harm-legitimizing

beliefs were therefore also more likely to express greater amounts of: hatred toward the

targets (r's>.73), fear and distrust of the targets (r's>.72), target blame (r's>.64), general

willingness to harm the targets (r's>.65), and support for policies designed to harm the

targets (r's>.41).

Mediational Analyses

Given that Study One assessed levels of harm-legitimizing belief endorsement

and attitudes for the first three stages of the PEV model, as well as two key outcome

variables (policy support and hatred), it provides an excellent opportunity to conduct

some preliminary tests of the model's stage design. Specifically, it is possible to examine

the prediction that the endorsement of more extreme, later stage, ideologies may mediate

the effects of early stage ideologies on levels of hatred and support for harmful policies.

This prediction suggests that the degree to which an individual endorses benign

ideologies has two effects on their beliefs and policy support. First, this endorsement of

benign, early stage, ideologies has a direct affect on their levels of hatred and support for

harmful policies support, such that the more an individual endorses harm-legitimizing

ideologies from the early stages, the greater their levels of hatred and support for harmful

policies. Second, the benign, early stage, ideologies serve as foundational beliefs that

lend credibility to more extreme ideologies. As a result, greater endorsement of benign

ideologies facilitates adoption/endorsement of more extreme ideologies, resulting in

further justification for hatred and support for harmful policies. To test the meditational

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[38] All but one p value were <.001. The correlation between support for harmful policies
and harm-legitimizing belief endorsement for illegal immigrants was the only exception
with a significance value of p=.02.

hypothesis, two models were constructed (see Figures 6 and 7) to focus on how Stage

Three mediates the effects of Stage One/Two on the outcome variables of hatred and

policy support.

For the purpose of this analysis, the measures of ideological endorsement and

stage relevant attitudes were combined to form two composite scores: a "benign

ideology" independent variable (i.e. all items assessing endorsement of Stage One and

Stage Two harm-legitimizing ideologies and attitudes), and an "extreme ideology"

mediator (all items assessing endorsement of Stage Three harm-legitimizing ideologies

and attitudes). These composite scores were used, rather than individual items/scales,

because the antecedent/outcome measures for each stage were highly correlated,[39] and it

reduced concerns about collinearity. Additionally, taking into account the correlational

design of Study One, this simplification of the model minimized the number of causal

assumptions to just the most basic, while still allowing for a meaningful test of the PEV

model's stage predictions. The final composite scores were correlated with one another

and with the two outcome variables (see Table 3), yielding the predicted strong

correlations positive overall (r's > .76, p's<.001).

To establish mediation requires meeting four separate criteria (Baron & Kenny,

1986). First, the mediator should be significantly affected by the independent variable.

The strong correlation between Stage One/Two and Stage Three endorsement of

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[39] Stage One and Stage Two attitude and harm-legitimizing belief measures, all r's > .85,
p's<.001 (see Table 1). Due to its significantly weaker correlation with all other
measures, the item assessing ingroup unity was excluded from these composite scores.
The remaining item for Stage Two harm-legitimizing belief endorsement, which assessed
perceptions of target homogeneity, was included in the final composite. Stage Three's
antecedent ideological endorsement and outcome attitudes similarly were strongly
correlated, r(270)=.90, p<.001.

attitudes/ideologies, r(270)=.95, p<.001, suggest a strong relationship, and a regression of Stage Three endorsement on Stage One/Two confirmed the presence of a significant positive effect, β=.95, t(268)=50.79, p<.001.

Second, the dependent variable should be significantly affected by the independent variable, in the absence of the mediator. Again, the strong correlations between the Stage One/Two endorsement of attitudes/ideologies and the outcome variables (hatred: r(271)=.94, policy support: r(270)=.82) suggest a strong relationship. Regressing each outcome variable on the Stage One/Two endorsement scores confirmed the significant effects for the independent variable on the dependent variables: for hatred, β=.94, t(269)=45.82, p<.001; for policy support, β=.82, t(268)=23.12, p<.001.

Third, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable should significantly decrease when the mediator is added to the model. And fourth, the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable should remain significant, even when controlling for the independent variable. These two criteria were tested via two separate regression analyses that regressed each of the outcome variables (hatred, Figure 7 and policy support, Figure 8), on both Stage One/Two and Stage Three endorsement.

The first model (Figure 6) examining the outcome variable of hatred revealed that the link between the Stage Three mediator and hatred, even when controlling for Stage One/Two, β=.34, p<.001. This supports the hypothesis that Stage Three at least partially mediated the effects of Stage One/Two on hatred. Further supporting the mediation hypothesis, the path from Stage One/Two to hatred decreased from β=.94, p<.001, to β=.58, p<.001. A Sobel's (1982) test indicated that this reduction in the paths was significant (z=5.29, p<.001). As predicted, the results suggest that there are two routes by

which endorsement of early stage ideologies/attitudes impacted hatred toward the target: (1) by directly increasing levels of hatred toward the targets, and (2) via mediation by lending credibility to and increasing endorsement of more extreme ideologies of later stages.

The second model (Figure 7) examining the outcome variable of policy support revealed that the link between the Stage Three mediator and policy support, even when controlling for Stage One/Two, $\beta=.61$, $p<.001$. This supports the hypothesis that Stage Three at least partially mediated the effects of Stage One/Two on policy support. Further supporting the mediation hypothesis, the path from Stage One/Two to policy support decreased from $\beta=.82$, $p<.001$, to $\beta=.24$, $p<.05$. A Sobel's (1982) test indicated that this reduction in the paths was also significant ($z=5.42$, $p<.001$). This model similarly supported the hypothesis that there are two routes by which endorsement of early stage ideologies/attitudes impacted support for harmful policies: (1) by directly increasing levels of policy support, and (2) via mediation by lending credibility to and increasing the endorsement of more extreme ideologies of later stages.

Taken together these results support the PEV model's prediction that earlier stage ideologies/attitudes play two key roles in dictating feelings of hatred toward the targets and, most critically, support for policies designed to harm the targets. First, the endorsement of even the most seemingly benign ideologies/attitudes (e.g. they are different from us, they are all alike they are bad, they are threatening) increases individuals feelings of hatred and support for harmful policies directed at the targets. Secondly, these more benign ideologies/attitudes provide a foundation for more extreme ideologies/attitudes, lending them credibility and increasing individual

adoption/endorsement. As a result, these new, more extreme beliefs/attitudes (e.g. they are less than human, they are evil, they should be harmed) further ratchet up feelings of hate and provide stronger justification for supporting harmful policies.

These results strongly suggest that there is merit to a stage design for any model examining the development of antipathy and aggression toward a targeted outgroup. It should be acknowledged, though, that they fall short of providing a conclusive test of the PEV's specific stage predictions. This is largely due to Study One's correlational design, which rendered it a less than ideal venue for examining a complex series of causal relationships between the stages, and their associated antecedent/outcome pairings. To truly capture the full complexity of the model's predictions, research employing longitudinal assessments and more sophisticated regression modeling would likely be required.

Preliminary Testing for Study Two – Comparing Target Groups

As Study One was intended to aid in the selection of a potential target group for Study Two, two one-way (Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class) ANOVAs were conducted to determine if one group was significantly more negatively viewed. To provide an overall measure of dislike for the targets, the first ANOVA was computed using a total score comprised of the four main dependent variables: hatred scale, harm-legitimizing belief measures, PEV attitudes measures, and support for target harming Policies measure. This resulted in a significant effect for target group: $F(6, 264)=49.87$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.51$, (see Table 4). A series of Tukey's pair-wise comparisons was used to determine which group was most significantly disliked. These comparisons revealed that

homosexuals, atheists, college students and the middle class did not significantly differ

from one another, and were viewed positively overall (average M=1.56, SD=1.91 ; t's<-

.76, p's>.98). The remaining groups (Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, and racists)

were all viewed significantly more negatively, with: Muslim extremists as the most

negative (M=6.87, SD=2.29; t's>7.09, p's<.001), racists coming in closely behind

(M=5.59, SD=1.97; t's>4.48, p's<.001) and illegal immigrants being viewed relatively

neutrally (M=3.53, SD=1.99; t's>3.74, p's<.004). These three groups differed

significantly from one-another, except for Muslim extremists and racists (although it did

approach significance; t(76)=2.82, p=.07). The second ANOVA was conducted using the

feeling thermometers to provide a more general comparison of feelings toward the

groups. This test provided greater insight into the degree to which groups were either

positively or negatively viewed overall, which was particularly important when selecting

a neutrally viewed target group for Study Two. This analysis also yielded a significant

effect for target group: F(6, 265)=44.46 , p<.001, η²=.50, (see Table 4). A series of

Tukey's pair-wise comparisons was used to determine where significant intergroup

differences occurred. These comparisons revealed the following pattern: the middle class

was most positively viewed (M=72.22, SD=21.87), followed closely by college students

(M=61.12, SD=21.81) and atheists (M=57.94, SD=32.48);[40] homosexuals (M=52.83,

SD=31.86),[41] illegal immigrants (M=37.03, SD=20.47)[42], Muslim extremists (M=11.04,

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[40] The middle class, college students and atheists did not differ significantly, all t's<2.63, p's>.12.

[41] Homosexuals were significantly more neutral than the middle class, (t(75)=3.59, p=.01), but did not differ significantly from atheists (t(75)=.96, p=.96) or college students (t(83)=1.61, p=.68).

SD=2.92), and racists were the least positively viewed (M=6.89, SD=10.67).[43] See Figure 8 for a graphical breakdown of the dislike and feeling averages by group.

Taken together, these results suggest that Muslim extremists and racists were the most negatively viewed of the target groups, and were largely viewed similarly by the participants. On the other end of the spectrum, the middle class, college students, atheists and homosexuals were largely viewed the same, and were typically viewed more positively by the participants. Meanwhile, in the middle on both measures, illegal immigrants appear to be the most neutrally viewed of the groups. Although the purpose of these analyses was to determine what group was viewed most negatively and which group was viewed most neutrally (for use in Study 2), the degree of variance associated with these measures raise concerns about potential participant effects. To determine which negative target group would be the best fit for Study Two, and to examine some of the additional sources of variance, a series of analyses were conducted to examine possible sex, race, religion and political affiliation effects.

Additional Analyses – Sex, Age, Race, Political Party, Religious Affiliation

Due to an interest in addressing overall patterns of group evaluations, closely examining demographic effects was not necessary for the analysis of the primary hypotheses. These results did, however reveal a significant amount of variance between subjects that may be explained by group effects, at least in part. To test for sex, age, race, political party and religious affiliation effects on the Dislike and Feeling Thermometer

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[42] Illegal immigrants were not significantly different from homosexuals (t(72)=2.86, p's<.001p=.07), but were significantly different from all other groups (t's>4.48, p's<.004).
[43] The difference between Muslim extremists and racists was, again, not significant (t(75)=.77, p=.99), but both groups were viewed significantly less positively than all other groups (t's>4.68, p's<.001).

averages a series of 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class)) x (Demographic categories) ANOVAs were employed.

The first set of ANOVAs examined sex effects using two 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class)) x 2(Sex: Male, Female). These ANOVAs yielded no significant main effects for dislike or general feelings scores (p's>.41); nor did they yield significant interactions (p's>.19; see Table 5). The second set of ANOVAs examined age effects using two 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class)) x 6(Age group: 18-24, 25-31, 32-38, 39-45, 46-52, 52+). These ANOVAs yielded no significant main effects for dislike or general feelings scores (p's>.29); nor did they yield significant interactions (p's>.39, see Table 6). The third set of ANOVAs examined race effects using two 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class)) x 2(Race: White, Non-white).[44] These ANOVAs yielded no significant main effects for dislike or general feelings scores (p's>.78); nor did they yield significant interactions (p's>.18, see Table 7).

The fourth set of ANOVAs (see Table 8) tested for political party effects via a series of 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists, racists, college students and the middle class)) x 3(Political Party: Republican, Democrat, Independent/Other). The first ANOVA, examining differences in dislike did not yield a significant interaction: $F(12, 249)=1.35$, $p=.19$, $\eta^2=.01$, but did yield a significant main

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[44] Racial categories were recoded in this manner due to extremely small N's for all categories other than Caucasian/white.

effect for political affiliation: $F(2, 249)=3.71$, $p=.03$, $\eta^2=.005$. A series of Tukey's

pairwise comparisons revealed that Democrats ($M=2.73$, $SD=2.88$) reported significantly

less dislike than both Republicans ($t(169)=3.09$, $p=.007$) and Independents ($t(220)=2.95$,

$p=.009$), and that Republicans ($M=3.70$, $SD=2.67$) did not significantly differ from

Independents ($M=3.47$, $SD=2.90$; $t(145)=.68$, $p=.78$). The second ANOVA, examining

differences in general Feelings also failed to yield a significant interaction: $F(12,$

$250)=1.43$, $p=.15$, $\eta^2=.01$; but did yield a significant main effect for political party: $F(2,$

$250)=8.56$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.01$. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed a similar

pattern of responses: with Democrats ($M=50.79$, $SD=34.28$) reporting significantly more

positive feelings than both Republicans ($t(170)=3.82$, $p<.001$) and Independents

($t(221)=4.36$, $p<.001$). Similarly, Republicans ($M=35.97$, $SD=31.58$) did not

significantly differ from Independents ($M=37.41$, $SD=30.81$; $t(145)=.40$, $p=.93$).

The final set of ANOVAs (see Table 9) tested for religious affiliation effects via a

series of 7((Target Group: Muslim extremists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, atheists,

racists, college students and the middle class)) x 2(Religion: Christian/Catholic, Other).[45]

The first ANOVA, examining differences in dislike yielded a significant main effect for

religious affiliation: $F(1, 256)=10.21$, $p=.002$; and a significant interaction: $F(6,$

$256)=3.02$, $p=.02$. To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the

significant interaction between target group condition and participant religion and to

accomplish this, simple effects for both target group and religion were examined

separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for

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[45] Religious affiliation was recoded in this manner because comparisons between
Christians and Catholics yielded no significant differences (p's$>.95$). All other religious
affiliations either had N's too small to yield interpretable results or were not significantly
different from one another (p's$>.78$).

target condition, the alpha level was set for each at .008 ($\alpha/7 = .05/7$). There was no

significant difference for religion in the illegal immigrants condition, $F(1, 32)=2.65$,

$p>.008$, the racists condition, $F(1, 38)=1.28$, $p>.008$, the homosexual condition, $F(1,$

$39)=5.33$, $p>.008$ the college student condition $F(1, 43)=1.15$, $p>.008$, or the middle

class condition, $F(1, 37)=1.30$, $p>.008$. A significant difference was found between the

religious affiliations in the Muslim extremist condition, $F(1, 36)=7.40$, $p<.008$, and the

atheist condition, $F(1, 38)=8.58$, $p<.008$. In both cases, the Christians/Catholics were

expressing more dislike (Muslim extremists: M=7.76, SD=1.94; atheists: M=2.85,

SD=2.02), than those of other religions (Muslim extremists: M=6.12, SD=2.14; atheists:

M=1.07, SD=1.63).

The second set of participant religion simple effects again adjusted the alpha level

to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha

level of .004 ($\alpha/2 = .008/2$). There was a significant difference between the target group

conditions for Christians/Catholics, $F(1, 130)=28.99$, $p<.004$. A series of Tukey's

pairwise comparisions revealed that Christians/Catholics disliked Muslim extremists

(M=7.76, SD=1.94) significantly more than any other group, t's > 3.78, p's<.004.

Racists (M=5.31, SD=2.10) were the second most disliked group, and they differed

significantly from all groups (t's > 3.54, p's<.01), except for illegal immigrants,

$t(39)=1.54$, p=.71. Illegal immigrants (M=3.85, SD=1.80) additionally did not

significantly differ from atheists (M=2.85, SD=2.02; $t(38)=1.54$, p=.71, or homosexuals

(M=2.32, SD=2.51; $t(45)=2.57$, p=.14). College students (M=1.86, SD=1.71) and the

Middle class (M=1.31, SD=1.51) were viewed most positively, and both did not differ

significantly from one another, nor were they significantly different from homosexuals or

atheists (t's< 1.77, p's>.58). There was also a significant difference between target groups for individuals of other religious affiliations, F(6, 133)=36.07, p<.001. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons, again confirmed that individuals of other religious affiliations disliked Muslim extremists (M=6.12, SD=2.15) significantly more than all groups (t's>5.15, p's<.001), except for racists (M=5.97, SD=1.72; t(34)=.28, p=1.00). All other groups were viewed more positively and did not differ significantly from one another (t's<2.83, p's>.23): illegal immigrants (M=2.76, SD=1.89), the middle class (M=1.94, SD=1.94), college students (M=1.30, SD=1.30), atheists (M=1.07, SD=1.63), and homosexuals (M=1.00, SD=1.45).

The second ANOVA, examining differences in general Feelings also yielded a significant main effect for religious affiliation: F(1, 267)=10.73, p=.001; and a significant interaction: F(6, 267)=5.49, p<.001. To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the significant interaction between target group condition and participant religion and to accomplish this, simple effects for both target group and religion were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for target condition, the alpha level was set for each at .008 (α/7 = .05/7). There was no significant difference for participants' religion in the illegal immigrants condition, F(1, 32)=2.91, p>.008, the Muslim extremists condition, F(1, 37)=2.07, p>.008, the racists condition, F(1, 37)=.04, p>.008, the homosexual condition, F(1, 40)=1.70, p>.008, the college student condition F(1, 43)=.29, p>.008, or the middle class condition, F(1, 37)=2.27, p>.008. A significant difference was found between the religious affiliations in the atheist condition, F(1, 38)=25.06, p<.008, with the Christians/Catholics (M=97.33, SD=61.71) expressing significantly less positive feelings towards atheists than

individuals of other religious affiliations (M=221.24, SD=82.89). In both cases, the Christians/Catholics were expressing more dislike (Muslim extremists: M=7.76, SD=1.94; atheists: M=2.85, SD=2.02), than those of other religions (Muslim extremists: M=6.12, SD=2.14; atheists: M=1.07, SD=1.63).

The second set of participant religion simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .004 ($\alpha/2 = .008/2$). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for Christians/Catholics, $F_{(6, 133)}$=24.89, p<.004. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisions revealed that Christians/Catholics again showed the least positive feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=18.00, SD=35.42) and racists (M=23.94, SD=29.30; t(40)=.26, p=1.00), and that both groups differed significantly from all other groups (t's>2.30, p's<.02) . Atheists (M= 97.33, SD=61.71), illegal immigrants (M=98.43, SD=62.68) and homosexuals (M=144.92, SD=108.49) differed significantly from Muslim extremists/racists (t's>3.29, p<.02) not significantly differing from one another (t's<3.04, p's>.06). College students (M=185.23, SD=83.26) did not differ significantly from homosexuals (t(46)=1.95, p=.45), and college students did not significantly differ from the middle class (M=232.63, SD=57.41; t(41)=2.14, p=.32). There was also a significant difference between target groups for individuals of other religious affiliations, $F_{(6, 134)}$=31.22, p<.001. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons, again confirmed that individuals of other religious affiliations had the least positive feelings about racists (M=19.45, SD=34.93; (t's>3.88, p's<.003), and that they were significantly different from all groups except for Muslim extremists (M=49.05, SD=66.91; t(34)=1.47, p=.77). Illegal immigrants (M=139.31, SD=51.96) did not differ

significantly from college students (M=174.00, SD=56.85), homosexuals (M=183.56, SD=72.79), or the middle class (M=202.05, SD=68.63).[46] Atheists (M=221.24, SD=82.89) were viewed significantly more positively than illegal immigrants (t(30)=3.77, p=.005), but were not significantly more positively viewed than homosexuals, college students or the middle class (t's<2.61, p>.15).

These results indicate that at least some of the variance was explained by participants' religious and political party affiliations. In both cases, the results revealed a main effect where one group reported significantly more positive feelings (or less dislike) than the others: in the case of political parties, it was the Democrats; in the case of the religious groups it was the "Other" category.

The significant interactions for religious affiliation help to determine where this pattern diverges. When deciding which target groups to use for Study Two, it was important to minimize the possibility of an interaction with religious affiliation to help simplify the final statistical models. This meant that if the illegal immigrants were selected as the neutral target (having taken the middle slot in both main analyses), the negative target group should follow the same main effect pattern of means (with Christians/Catholics viewing them more negatively than Other religions). This is where the reversal for the racists target group became integral for making the final target selection.

Recall that racists were tied for most disliked target group with the Muslim extremists on both the Dislike and the general feelings measures. Taken alone, these results indicated that either group would be a good candidate for the negative target

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[46] All t's <1.96, p's>.47.

group, but the interaction with religious affiliation reveals that the selection of Muslim extremists as the negative target group (in a study that compares them to illegal immigrants), would be a better choice, as it would result in simpler model: i.e. one that is likely to have only a main effect for religious affiliation and no interaction; than one which contained racists (which would have an interaction). As a result, the final target groups selected for Study Two were the illegal immigrants (neutral) and Muslim extremists (negative).

<div align="center">Discussion: Study One</div>

The purpose of Study One was twofold. First, it provided a real-world examination of the most basic assumption of the PEV model: that the degree to which individuals endorse harm-legitimizing ideologies (as they relate to the target group) is positively related to their levels of hatred toward the targets, fear/distrust of targets, target blame and willingness to harm said targets. And second, it served as a preliminary test of potential target groups for use in Study Two.

The results overwhelmingly supported the hypothesis that the endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies about a target group[47] are positively related to levels of hatred, stage relevant attitudes,[48] and support for policies that would harm the targets. Most interestingly, these results held across all target groups: both positive/neutral and negative, indicating that even weak levels of these harm-legitimizing beliefs can be associated with some antipathy. Additionally, the consistent presence of these

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[47] In this case the ideologies included: they are different/bad, they are all the same/we should unite against them, and they are less valuable/human or are evil.

[48] The stage relevant attitudes were fear/distrust of the targets, target blame and willingness to harm the targets.

relationships across targets also suggests that these types of potentially poisonous beliefs do lie outside of the realm of relatively normal intergroup perceptions.

That said, it should be noted that the levels of harm-legitimizing belief endorsement and negative attitudes were relatively low with only two exceptions (Muslim extremists and racists), and often revealed generally positive associations with the targets (particularly the middle class, college students, atheists and homosexuals). This likely indicates that harm-legitimizing ideologies are not active in the public consciousness for social groups that do not pose an immediate threat and, as a result, have not been widely adopted or particularly salient. On the other hand, it is not terribly surprising that groups who are associated with more visible controversy or threat, such as the Muslim extremists and racists are also the targets of more harm-legitimizing rhetoric and negative attitudes.

In the case of Muslim extremists, ongoing unrest in the Middle East and salient terrorist attacks such as 9/11 likely bring with them collective concern about the threat of violence. As a result, a greater tolerance for anti-Islamic sentiments exists in public discourse. Given that Muslim extremists have been the target of outspoken pundits and politicians, it is not unreasonable to assume that most Americans have had at least some exposure to harm-legitimizing beliefs in the media (they are different from us, do not share our moral beliefs, are threatening, cannot be reasoned with, etc) and, as their scores indicate, have adopted at least some of them. When looking at antecedent beliefs that lead to intergroup conflict, it is somewhat easy to understand how a group that poses a legitimately violent threat (such as Muslim terrorists), may come to be associated with

these ideologies. What is interesting, however, is that racists (who are a very different type of target group) are also associated with similar levels of disdain.

This is likely due to the fact that, although they pose much less of a physical threat to most Americans, racists do pose a substantial threat to core liberal values such as egalitarianism. Given that racists were one of the groups for whom self-identified Democrats indicated more antipathy than their more conservative or independent peers, (a reversal of the main effect for political affiliation), this explanation of the findings makes sense. The belief in a racial hierarchy associated with racist actions and attitudes lies in direct violation of integral in-group values of liberals, namely that all groups are inherently equal and should be treated as such. Additionally, this conscious violation of egalitarian ideals places racists outside of the protection of concerns regarding political correctness. As a result, not only are liberals more likely to adopt negative beliefs/attitudes about racists, but they are also more likely to express them openly.

This pattern of intergroup difference reveals a great deal about which groups appear to be salient negative and neutral targets for this American population.[49] Contrary to initial suspicions, not all groups who have been the center of heated public debate, such as homosexuals and atheists, are associated with particularly negative beliefs or attitudes. Even illegal immigrants, who have been in and out of the news and are regularly the center of political controversy, appear to be viewed in a relatively neutral manner. Far from posing a problem for the research of harm-legitimizing ideologies, groups such as illegal immigrants actually provide an interesting opportunity.

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[49] It is noted here that the American population being referred to here are those Americans who are actively participating on the Mechanical Turk system, and who would serve as the subject pool for both Studies One and Two.

Given that the purpose of Study Two is examine whether exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies can increase negative attitudes and support for target harming, it would be beneficial to find groups for whom these types of negative messages would not seem wildly out of place. In the case of Muslim extremists, the negative targets selected for Study Two, the pre-existing negative beliefs about the group reflect the presence of some of these harm-legitimizing ideologies in the public discourse. As with realistic targets of aggression, the introduction of new harm-legitimizing beliefs would likely not arouse too many concerns, because there is a foundation of negative beliefs in place to lend legitimacy to them.

This is where illegal immigrants present an excellent comparison. Since they are also a group that has been the center of public debate, it is likely that most Americans have at least some awareness of the most basic forms of harm-legitimizing ideology (they are different, they could not be like true Americans, etc). As with Muslim extremists, this would mean that introducing more extreme beliefs (such as those that dehumanize illegal immigrants) would also not be completely outside of the realm of expected rhetorical arguments.

For these reasons, Study One has proven a useful first step in understanding the roles which harm-legitimizing ideologies play and the degree to which they appear to be present in the American social sphere. Consistent with the PEV model's predictions hatred, negative attitudes (fear/distrust, blame and willingness to harm) and support for harmful policies are positively related to the general endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs. Additionally, this pattern appears to hold across social groups, regardless of whether they are typically more positively or negatively viewed.

It is noted that there are two caveats and limitations to this study. First, the lack of strong reliability for the Stage Two (deindividuation of target group and ingroup) subscale raises some concerns about the utility of this stage for an American audience. The lack of a strong relationship between the parallel processes of ingroup conformity and outgroup homogenizing suggest that these are conceptually distinct for most individuals, and may not present in equal measure. Consider, in the case of a relatively diverse and individualistic American audience, it is likely that group conformity and the strengthening of a unilateral "American" identity are not strong ideals.[50] The relatively weak correlations indicate as much (no r values including the ingroup unity item exceeded .39, see Table 1). This is not terribly surprising, given that these measures were taken in the absence of a strong external motivator (such as a terrorist attack by the targets), meaning that American unity is probably not a particularly salient consideration. Additionally, for this population, it seems probable that the belief that targets are homogeneous is likely treated as an extension of the antecedent beliefs associated with Stages One and Three of the PEV model. The strong correlations between the item assessing target similarity and those assessing perceptions of intergroup difference/mutual exclusivity (Stage One: r=.82) and those assessing target devaluation (Stage Three: r=.89) suggest this is likely the case.

Second, given the correlational nature of this study, it is acknowledged that causal inferences cannot be drawn based on these results. This is somewhat limiting when attempting to assess the utility of the PEV's stages, because their antecedent-outcome pairings necessarily assume that endorsement of the harm-legitimizing ideologies results

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[50] This stands in contrast to the aforementioned Rwandan tendency towards group conformity that may have facilitated this step.

in increasingly negative attitudes and actions. As a result, further research would be necessary to more clearly establish a timeline for the adoption of harm-legitimizing ideologies and the expression of the PEV's outcome attitudes (fear/distrust, blame and support for harming). In order to fill this gap, Study Two was designed to manipulate exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies in an effort to see if this would increase endorsement of these ideologies and result in more negative attitudes.

Study Two

The intention of Study One was to assess one of the most basic assertions of the PEV model: that a relationship exists between the endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies in the first three stages of the PEV, attitudes toward the targets (fear/distrust, blame, and willingness to harm), feelings of hate, and the support for harming target groups. Building upon this foundation, Study Two was designed to explore the prediction that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies in the early stages of the PEV model would increase endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs, ultimately resulting in an increase in negative attitudes toward the targets and willingness to harm the targets. Additionally, Study Two assessed the prediction that certain individual dispositions (Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Group Identification Strength) could serve as moderators of the effects of ideological exposure on ideological endorsement.

To truly assess the stage design of the PEV model would involve subjecting individuals to multiple exposures and varied forms of harm-legitimizing ideology over time. It is, after all, from these circumstances that most real-world conflicts seem to emerge. Unfortunately, the logistical and ethical concerns surrounding this sort of steady indoctrination render this approach impossible to safely implement. In an effort to assuage these concerns while still providing a test of the models predictions, the ideologies from the early stages of the PEV model were examined independently and compared.

As previously noted the lack of strong reliability for the Stage Two (target and perpetrator deindividuation) subscale during Study One raised several concerns regarding

the operationalization of these ideologies and their inclusion in Study Two. Principally,

that the low reliability for the subscale indicates that the two processes of deindividuation

(calling for in-group conformity, versus characterizing the outgroup as homogeneous)

were being treated as conceptually distinct from one another and were manifesting to

varying degrees.

In the case of ingroup deindividuation, the low correlations between the ingroup

unity/conformity item and the other measures of beliefs/attitudes reveal that, for this

sample, ingroup deindividuation is perhaps not a strong factor dictating intergroup beliefs

(nor is it particularly affected by them). This is not terribly surprising, given that Study

One was examining an American subject pool and, as a result, these participants are

likely to be more diverse and individualistic than the typical perpetrator group on the

verge of genocide. In the absence of a strong external motivator (such as the introduction

of salient violence perpetrated by the targets) it seems probable that a sample drawn from

the same subject pool would show a similar disconnect between their attitudes/beliefs and

deindividuation; and would thus not respond strongly to rhetorical arguments that call for

unification and conformity. As such, this element of Stage Two has been omitted as an

ideological condition from Study Two.

For the parallel process of target deindividuation, the results suggest an entirely

different set of issues. Primarily, the strong correlations between the target homogeneity

item and the Stage One and Three subscales indicates that the notion that targets are "all

the same" is not probably not being perceived as conceptually distinct from the processes

of dividing/polarizing the groups (Stage One) and devaluing the targets as a group (Stage

Three). Additionally, from a purely logistical standpoint, it is nearly impossible to

generate a believable rhetorical argument that only emphasizes target similarity without drawing on elements of the other stages. In an effort to make the manipulation as conceptually distinct as possible, this element of Stage Two has also been omitted as a separate condition and was instead incorporated into the Stage One and Three messages.[51]

Taking this addendum to the original three-stage design into account, Study Two examined the impact of exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies in a slightly different manner than was originally planned. In addition to exposing some individuals to either the Stage One or Stage Three harm-legitimizing ideologies, Study Two added two comparison control groups. The first was a threat salience condition, which examined the possibility that simply mentioning the targets in a threatening manner (but making no specific reference to one of the harm-legitimizing beliefs) was enough to increase target salience and thus increase endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs and levels of negative attitudes. The second control was a pure control group, providing arguments about a benign issue unrelated to the targets. This control was intended to provide a baseline comparison group whose scores were based only on pre-existing beliefs/attitudes about the targets.

In addition to this manipulation of ideological exposure, Study Two examined the role that the particular choice of targets played. To do this, the ideological messages were either in reference to the neutral target group (illegal immigrants) or the already disliked target group (Muslim extremists), which had been selected during Study One. This comparison allowed for a closer examination of the underlying assumption that

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[51] It is noted that in the interest of assessing the presence of deindividuating beliefs, the two original items from the subscale were included in Study Two as dependent variables.

harm-legitimizing ideologies would be more effective when they related to a group that was already being negatively targeted (i.e. intergroup tensions already exist and some foundational harm-legitimizing beliefs may already have been adopted). Additionally, it allowed for exploration of the differential role that the cultural context of intergroup relations (i.e. pre-existing intergroup tensions versus neutral feelings) played in determining how benign/extreme ideologies were interpreted, and whether they were adopted or discounted.

Finally, Study Two incorporated three measures of individual dispositions that have been linked to increased susceptibility to hate-speech: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and Group Identification Strength. Previous studies have shown that RWA and SDO are often positively related to prejudice (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and that they may serve as moderators of the effectiveness of ideological exposure on attitudes and policy decisions (Altemeyer, 1996; Nofziger, in process). As a general rule, those who possess strong levels of either worldview tend to be more likely to adopt anti-outgroup beliefs/attitudes than those who possess moderate or low levels.[52] In addition to these well-established dispositional measures, several items were included to assess the degree to which individuals identify with their American ingroup and the level of importance they ascribe to this identity. The PEV theory predicts that those individuals who more strongly identify with their ingroup and value their membership will be more supportive of ideologies espoused by the members of the ingroup, as well as more willing to suppress their individual

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[52] Those who are particularly low in RWA and/or SDO are more likely to show either no change as a result of ideological exposure or may even indicate a reactionary boost in positive views (Altemeyer, 1996; Nofziger, in process).

beliefs/values to conform to those of the group (Baum, 1994; Crandall, 2002). As a result, Group Identification Strength fit in neatly with RWA and SDO as potential "boosters" of ideological effectiveness.

Hypotheses

The PEV model generally predicts that exposure to any sort of harm-legitimizing ideology may be enough to make existing antipathy toward the targets salient. As such, those exposed to harm-legitimizing ideologies (as compared to a neutral control group) would be expected to:

1. report more hatred toward the target out-group,

2. show greater endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs (mutual exclusivity/polarization, in-group loyalty/target homogeneity and dehumanization/demonization of targets),

3. exhibit more stage related attitudes (fear/distrust of the targets, target blame and willingness to harm targets), and

4. indicate greater support for policies that intended to harm the target out-group.

Additionally, the stage order predicted in the PEV model argues that more benign ideologies necessarily precede more extreme ideologies. In practice, two possible hypotheses emerge:

1. First, given the linear nature of the PEV model and its reliance on ideological accumulation, it is predicted that ideologies from the later stages (particularly Stage Three) may not be as effective or believable when presented without preceding ideological messages. This prediction stems from the fact that the ideological messages cited by the PEV model build upon one another from

more benign to more extreme. Following the stages in order, adopting the

ideologies of each preceding stage should lend legitimacy to the later stages

by providing foundation/justification for more extreme beliefs, and thus make

the more extreme ideologies easier to accept. Proceeding through the stages

in order is particularly necessary when perpetrator groups hold less negative

pre-existing beliefs about the targets, as in situations where the targets are

originally appraised neutrally. Under these circumstances, exposure to more

extreme ideologies (Stage Three), without first adopting more foundational

beliefs (Stage One) may produce some level of discomfort or skepticism,

making the ideologies less effective. Following this logic, a linear pattern of

results would be expected for the neutral target group, illegal immigrants.

This pattern predicts that the basic threat salience message would be more

effective than Stage One, that Stage Three would be the least effective

ideological condition, and that the Control would show the lowest levels of

negative attitudes, beliefs, and policy support. Put another way, one would

expect levels of target hatred, stage relevant beliefs/attitudes, and support for

target harming to follow the pattern: threat salience > Stage One > Stage

Three > Control.

2. The second hypothesis posits that groups with existing tensions may be more

responsive to the more extreme ideologies because they already hold some

foundational level of antipathy toward the group. In the case of a negatively

evaluated target group, it is possible that prior exposure to some of the

foundational beliefs (that the targets are different, bad, and/or the same) may

inform the existing beliefs about the group and allow individuals to "fill in the gaps" when exposed to more extreme beliefs. Following this logic, a different linear pattern of results would be expected for the negative target group. In this case the pattern would predict that Stage Three ideology would be the most effective, Stage One would be moderately effective, the threat salience message would be the least effective, and the Control – again - would be associated with only baseline levels of negative attitudes, beliefs and policy support. Put another way, one would expect levels of target hatred, stage relevant beliefs/attitudes, and support for target harming to follow the pattern: Stage Three > Stage One > threat salience > Control.

Underlying both of these hypotheses is the prediction that the degree to which harm-legitimizing ideologies are endorsed mediates the effectiveness of harm-legitimizing ideologies to produce greater levels of hatred, attitudes/beliefs, and support for target harming (See Figure 5 for the basic model). For mediation to occur, exposure to some form of harm-legitimizing ideology should increase levels of endorsement for harm-legitimizing ideologies more broadly (this may be the result of the ideologies' ability to trigger salience of existing negative beliefs about the targets, or the adoption of new beliefs) and, as a result, the higher levels of endorsement should lead to an increase in the expression of hatred, negative attitudes, and greater support target harming policies.

Finally, the PEV model predicts that individual predispositions (RWA, SDO and In-group Identification strength) will moderate the effects of exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies on the degree to which these ideologies are endorsed (Figure 5).

It is predicted that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies would be most effective: leading to high levels of endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs among those high in RWA/SDO/In-group Identification. These effects are expected to be most pronounced in the Stage Three condition for the negative targets, and the more benign conditions (Stage One and/or the threat salience condition) for the neutral targets, as the worldviews associated with these predispositions foster easier assimilation of harmful beliefs about targets and may carry a certain degree of prejudice along with them. On the other hand, those low in RWA/SDO/In-group Identification would be expected to show little or no difference in their endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs as a result of exposure to any particular harm-legitimizing ideology, with the most effective being among the more benign ideologies or control for both target groups.

<div align="center">Methods</div>

Participants

Three hundred fifty-two[53] American participants were recruited online via the Mechanical Turk system to participate in an online survey for compensation ($1.00 per participant). Of these participants, one hundred eighty-three were male, one hundred sixty-eight were female, and one did not report. Eighty-eight were between the ages of 18-24, one hundred twenty-eight were between 25-31, forty-seven were between 32-38, thirty-two were between 39-45, eighteen were between 46-51, and thirty-nine were above 52. Two hundred seventy-six participants were white/Caucasian, seventy-five identified

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[53] Three hundred and sixty-one participants were originally recruited via Mechanical Turk. Nine were excluded due to one or more of the following: they indicated that they were not currently residing in the US and/or indicated that their country of origin was not the US, they failed two or more of the IMC's, or revealed that they had guessed the purpose of the study.

as non-white, and one did not report. One hundred sixty-nine identified as Christian or

Catholic and one hundred eighty-three identified with other religious affiliations.

Design

A 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x

2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) design was employed. Each

condition corresponded to the type of information that participants were given about their

own group and the out-group, and which out-group was targeted.

Across ideological message conditions, this information was presented in the

context of policy briefings about the target group. In all cases, the manipulation

consisted of two separate messages that were presented by two sets of political

commentators (fabricated research institutes and credentials were included). In the

control condition (see Appendix J), the messages dealt with a benign issue unrelated to

either target group: the results of a study assessing university student perceptions of the

shift from classroom only courses to an online-only format. For the threat salient

condition, the messages were presented as opening paragraphs to longer arguments that

made mention of the target group as being a potential threat to American safety, but did

not include any ideological relevant information (see Appendix K). These messages

were nearly identical for each target group, with only the target group being manipulated.

The remaining harm-legitimizing belief conditions (Stage One and Stage Three) each

contained the opening paragraph from the threat salient condition, along with a secondary

paragraph that included the harm-legitimizing ideology for the appropriate stage. These

additional paragraphs also maintained similar language/phrasing between target group

conditions, but some minor adjustments were made to incorporate more salient

stereotypes about each group. Those in the Stage One condition received additional information that emphasized in-group/target difference, mutual exclusivity and polarization (see Appendix L). Finally those in the Stage Three condition received additional information that devalued, dehumanized, and demonized the target group members (see Appendix M).

The group conditions were a between-subjects manipulation intended to compare the impact of the harm-legitimizing ideologies on attitudes/policy decisions related to both a negative out-group and a neutral out-group. Half of the subjects received messages and questions relating to the neutral target group (illegal immigrants), while the other half of the participants received messages and questions related to the negative target group (Muslim extremists). This resulted in eight between subject conditions: Control/Neutral Target, Control/Negative Target, threat salience/Neutral Target, threat salience/Negative Target, Stage One/Neutral Target, Stage One/Negative Target, Stage Three/Neutral Target, and Stage Three/Negative Target.

Materials

In all conditions, participants were provided with the versions of the hatred scale (Chronbach's alpha=.94), harm-legitimizing belief measures (Chronbach's alphas: total=.93, Stage 1=.86, Stage 2=.68,[54] Stage 3=.82), PEV stage related attitudes measures (Chronbach's alphas: total=.94, fear/distrust=.87, target blame=.77, willingness to harM=.87), policy support measure (Chronbach's alpha=.78)[55], target feeling thermometers (Chronbach's alpha=.94), and Instructional Manipulation Checks

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[54] Due to the low reliability, the items were separated for this scale. One item was kept to assess ingroup unity and one item was kept to assess target homogeneity.
[55] The "_____ Protection" item was omitted based on low reliability in Study One.

associated with either the Muslim extremist or the illegal immigrant target group. This resulted in two separate surveys (1 illegal immigrant and 1 Muslim extremist) consisting of 37 items each (see Appendix N for a full sample questionnaire). Additionally, they were provided with:

Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Altemeyer's (2007) Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (an updated version of the 1996 scale) will be employed. It consists of 22 statements, and responses are given on a seven-point scale (average Cronbach's alpha=.85; for Study Two, Chronbach's alpha=.95). Positively worded items will be reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of RWA (see Appendix O for full scale items).

Social Dominance Orientation Scale. Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) Social Dominance scale will be employed. It consists of 16 statements (average Cronbach's alpha=.8; for Study Two, Chronbach's alpha=.95), and responses were given on a seven-point scale (see Appendix P for full scale items). Positively worded items will also be reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of SDO.

In-group Identification Scale. This scale will consist of 4 items (Chronbach's alpha=.92), intended to assess strength of affiliation with the relevant in-group. All items will be measured on a 1-7 scale with a response of 7 indicating greater identification with the in-group (see Appendix Q).

Procedure

Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk to participate in an online survey designed to examine how people interpret social messages and make policy decisions related to a variety of social issues. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants

were redirected to the survey on a separate site. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the eight separate surveys; each containing one of the ideology and target group condition combinations (Control/Neutral Target, Control/Negative Target, threat salience/Neutral Target, threat salience/Negative Target, Stage One/Neutral Target, Stage One/Negative Target, Stage Three/Neutral Target, Stage Three/Negative Target).

Instructions provided on the first page explained that they would be presented with a series statements presented by noted social commentators relevant to a randomly selected social issue or group, and they would then be asked to respond to a series of comprehension questions as well as items measuring their beliefs, support for group relevant policies, and their decision making process. Included with these basic instructions was a reminder to carefully read the questions/instructions because questions had been included to catch inattentiveness (see Appendix N for sample instructions).[56] Finally, the instructions reminded participants that their responses were anonymous and that honesty was valued.

After reading through the basic instructions, the participants were told to begin "block one." This block contained a comprehension exercise that was actually made up of the ideological manipulation essays and a series of questions intended to assess if they had paid attention to the details of the messages. Once these items were finished, the participants were then told that they would be moving onto "block two," which was intended to assess their general social beliefs and attitudes about a variety of controversial social issues. This section contained the main dependent measures of the

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[56] After a number of complaints regarding the length of the instructions from Study One, and the patronizing tone associated with the "bogus pipeline" directions and IMCs, the instructions were simplified for use in Study Two (see Appendix ___*** for a sample questionnaire).

survey: the harm-legitimizing belief, stage attitude, hatred, feeling thermometers, RWA/SDO/Group Identification and the policy decision measures. The items for these scales were intermixed (with the exception of the policy scale, because the items asked participants to indicate their support, rather than agreement) and were included along with filler items intended to obfuscate the purpose of the measures.

After completing "block two," the participants were directed to a short demographics questionnaire and manipulation check. After completing these items, participants were then told that this was the end of the study and were thanked for their participation. To complete the survey and receive credit (in the form of a completion code), participants were required to read through a thorough debriefing and respond to a series of questions to ensure their comprehension of the purpose of the study.

<div align="center">Results</div>

Preliminary Analyses

Means, standard deviations, and correlations were calculated for all dependent variables (see Table 10). Averages were calculated for the hatred scale, harm-legitimizing belief measures (total and subscales, except for Stage Two), PEV stage related attitudes measures (total and subscales), and policy support measure. Higher values again indicate greater levels of hatred, harm-legitimizing beliefs, support for harmful policies, and stage relevant attitudes respectively. The feeling thermometers were also combined into average scores so that scores reflect the 0-100 scale: with scores closer to 0 indicating negative feelings and scores closer to 100 indicating positive feelings about the group.

Average scores were also calculated for all disposition assessments: RWA, SDO and In-group Identification. Higher values indicate greater levels of RWA, SDO and In-group Identification respectively. Means, standard deviations and correlations for the dispositional measures and dependent measures are included in the following tables for ease of interpretation: for correlations with harm-legitimizing belief subscales and total (Table 11), for correlations with stage relevant attitude subscales/total and the policy support measure (Table 12), and for correlations with feelings and hatred (Table 13). The means by target group and ideological condition are graphed in Figure 9.

To test for sex, race, age, religion and political affiliation effects a series of 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x (Demographic categories) ANOVAs were conducted for each of the dependent variables: feeling thermometers, hatred scale, the policy support measure, stage relevant attitudes and harm-legitimizing belief measures.

Preliminary Analyses – Sex Effects

The first set of analyses examined sex effects via a series of five 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 2(Sex: Male, Female) ANOVAs.

For the harm-legitimizing belief endorsement measure (see Table 14), there was no significant main effect for participant sex: $F(1, 333)=1.39$, $p=.24$, $\eta^2=.01$; and a significant interaction between target group and participant sex: $F(1, 333)=4.01$, $p=.04$, $\eta^2=.01$ (see Figure 10). To interpret this significant interaction between sex and target group, simple effects for both target group and sex were examined separately. To control

for a Type I error rate across the two simple effects for target group, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2$ = .05/2). There was no significant difference between men and women in the Muslim extremist condition: $F(1, 171)$=.50, p>.025. There was, however a significant difference between men and women in the illegal immigrant condition: $F(1, 174)$=5.50, p<.025. A review of the group means reveals that men (M=4.01, SD=2.62) showed a greater level of endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs about illegal immigrants than women (M=3.08, SD=2.69).

The second set of sex simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .0125 ($\alpha/2$ = .025/2). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for men: $F(1, 179)$=19.55, p<.0125. A review of the group means reveals that men endorsed significantly more harm-legitimizing ideologies about Muslim extremists (M=5.75, SD=2.58) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=4.01, SD=2.62). Similarly, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for women: $F(1, 166)$=52.64, p<.01. A review of the group means reveals the same pattern, with women endorsing significantly more harm-legitimizing ideologies about Muslim extremists (M=6.04, SD=2.66) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=3.08, SD=2.69).

The second ANOVA on the PEV stage attitudes, yielded no significant main effect for sex, nor any interactions: F's<3.71, p's>.06[57] (see Table 15). Similarly the third ANOVA on policy support also failed to yield a significant main effect or significant interactions: F's<1.84, p's>.11 (see Table 16).

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[57] The interaction between target group condition and sex, $F(1, 328)$=3.71, had a p-value of .06, and thus failed to meet the .05 significance level.

The fourth ANOVA on hatred, yielded no significant main effect for sex (see Table 17): $F(1, 332)=.65$, $p=.42$. It did, however, reveal a significant interaction between target group and sex: $F(1, 332)=7.46$, $p<.01$ (see Figure 11). To interpret this significant interaction between sex and target group, simple effects for both target group and sex were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two simple effects for target group, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2 = .05/2$). There was no significant difference between men and women in the Muslim extremist condition: $F(1, 173)=1.71$, $p>.025$. There was, however a significant difference between men and women in the illegal immigrant condition: $F(1, 173)=6.60$, $p<.025$. A review of the group means reveals that men (M=3.51, SD=2.90) showed a greater level of hatred towards illegal immigrants than women (M=2.40, SD=2.83).

The second set of sex simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .0125 ($\alpha/2 = .025/2$). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for men: $F(1, 180)=32.44$, $p<.0125$. A review of the group means reveals that men reported significantly more hatred toward Muslim extremists (M=5.93, SD=2.72) than they did toward illegal immigrants (M=3.51, SD=2.90). Similarly, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for women: $F(1, 164)=85.19$, $p<.01$. A review of the group means reveals the same pattern, with women reporting significantly more hate toward Muslim extremists (M=6.50, SD=2.88) than toward illegal immigrants (M=2.40, SD=2.83).

The fifth ANOVA on general feelings, yielded a significant main effect for sex: $F(1, 327)=4.21$, $p=.04$ (see Table 18), and an interaction between participant sex and

target group: F(1, 327)=6.30, p=.01 (see Figure 12). To interpret best interpret these combined results, it was necessary first address the significant interaction via a series of simple effects for both target group and sex. To control for a Type I error rate across the two simple effects for target group, the alpha level was set for each at .025 (α/2 = .05/2). There was no significant difference between men and women in the Muslim extremist condition: F(1, 172)=.10, p>.025. There was, however, a significant difference between men and women in the illegal immigrant condition: F(1, 173)=10.67, p<.025. A review of the group means reveals that men (M=27.95, SD=24.70) showed less positive feelings overall towards illegal immigrants than women (M=38.54, SD=27.06).

The second set of sex simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .0125 (α/2 = .025/2). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for men: F(1, 179)=36.03, p<.0125. A review of the group means reveals that men reported significantly less positive feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=8.87, SD=15.63) than they did toward illegal immigrants (M=27.95, SD=24.70). Similarly, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for women: F(1, 160)=83.73, p<.01. A review of the group means reveals the same pattern, with women reporting significantly less positive feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=7.81, SD=14.45) than toward illegal immigrants (M=38.54, SD=27.06).

Taken together, these results reveal that overall, men tended to hold more harm-legitimizing beliefs and negative feelings (both generally and specifically hatred) about illegal immigrants than women did. Men and women did not differ significantly in their views of Muslim extremists, and both tended to indicate more negative feelings and

harm-legitimizing beliefs about Muslim extremists than they did about illegal

immigrants. Additionally, it is noted that men and women did not differ in their overall

policy decisions or PEV stage related attitudes.

Preliminary Analyses – Race Effects

The second set of analyses examined race effects via a series of five 4(Ideological

messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal

immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 2(Race: White, non-White)[58] ANOVAs.

For the endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies, there was no significant

main effect for participant race, nor any significant interactions: all F's<1.04, p's>.38

(see Table 19). The second ANOVA on PEV stage related attitudes, similarly yielded no

significant main effect for race, and no significant interactions with race: F's<1.90,

p's>.18 (see Table 20).

The third ANOVA on policy support (see Table 21), yielded no significant main

effect for participant race: $F(1, 332)=.56$, $p=.46$, but did yield a significant interaction

between target group and participant race: $F(1, 332)=4.08$, $p=.04$, and a significant three-

way interaction between participant race, target group and ideology condition: $F(6,$

$332)=2.52$, $p=.02$. To best understand this combination of results, it was necessary to

separate the three-way interaction and examine the source of the interaction. To do this,

a series of two 2(Target Group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 2(Participant

Race: white, non-white) ANOVAs were first conducted for each of the ideological

conditions separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the four analyses for

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[58] Racial identification was recoded into white/non-white because there were too few
individuals identifying in the non-white categories to provide a meaningful comparison
on their own.

ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4$ = .05/4). These revealed significant interactions between participant race and target condition only in the threat salience condition, $F(1,158)$= 8.35, p<.0125, (see Figure 13; all other ideological conditions: F's<2.73, p>.0125, see Table 22).

The next step was to examine this significant two-way interaction via a series of simple effects for both target group and participant race in the threat salience condition. To control for a Type I error rate across the two simple effects for target group, the alpha level was again adjusted for each at .006 ($\alpha/2$ = .0125/2). There was no significant difference between individuals identifying as white and those identifying as non-white in the Muslim extremist condition: $F(1, 39)$=.81, p>.006. There was, however a significant difference individuals identifying as white and those identifying as non-white in the illegal immigrant condition: $F(1, 41)$=9.76, p<.006. A review of the group means reveals that, in the threat salience condition, individuals identifying as white (M=5.93, SD=2.86) showed significantly more support for harmful policies directed at illegal immigrants than those identifying as non-white (M=2.13, SD=1.66). The second set of participant race simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .003 ($\alpha/2$ = .006/2). There was no significant difference between the target group conditions for individuals identifying as white: $F(1, 65)$=.14, p>.003. There was, however a significant difference between target group conditions for individuals identifying as non-white: $F(1, 11)$=11.03, p<.003. A review of the group that, in the threat salience condition, individuals identifying as non-white showed significantly greater support for harmful policies directed at Muslim

extremists (M=7.21, SD=2.72), than they did for policies directed at illegal immigrants (M=2.13, SD=1.66).

The fourth ANOVA on hatred, yielded no significant main effect for sex, nor any significant interactions: F's<1.6, p's>.21 (see Table 23). The fifth ANOVA on general feelings (see Table 24), yielded a significant main effect for race, $f(1, 327)=10.13$, $p=.002$, as well as a significant interaction between target group and participant race: $F(1, 327)=4.85$, $p=.03$, $\eta^2=.001$ (see Figure 14). To best interpret these combined results, it was necessary first address the significant interaction via a series of simple effects for both target group and participant race. To control for a Type I error rate across the two simple effects for target group, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2 = .05/2$). There was no significant difference between individuals identifying as white and those identifying as non-white in the Muslim extremist condition: $F(1, 173)=.31$, $p>.025$. There was, however a significant difference between men and women in the illegal immigrant condition: $F(1, 173)=6.39$, $p<.025$. A review of the group means reveals that individuals who identified as white reported significantly less positive feelings towards illegal immigrants (M=29.71, SD=25.01) and showed less positive feelings overall towards illegal immigrants than individuals who identified as non-white (M=42.50, SD=28.00).

The second set of race simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .0125 ($\alpha/2 = .025/2$). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for individuals who identified as white: $F(1, 268)=39.02$, $p<.0125$. A review of the group means reveals that individuals who identified as white reported significantly less positive

feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=7.78, SD=13.79) than they did toward illegal immigrants (M=29.71, SD=25.01). Similarly, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for individuals who identified as non-white: $F(1, 71)=21.09$, $p<.0125$. A review of the group means reveals the same pattern, with individuals who identified as non-white reporting significantly less positive feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=11.02, SD=20.06) than toward illegal immigrants (M=42.50, SD=28.00).

Taken together, these results suggest that again, most of the individual variance occurred when the illegal immigrants were the target group. On the whole, both individuals who identified as white, and those who identified as non-white, endorsed similar levels of negative beliefs, attitudes and feelings towards Muslim extremists. Where individuals differed based on their racial identification, the pattern generally held that individuals who identified as white were indicating more negative feelings, and more support for harmful policies directed at illegal immigrants (and then, only in the threat salience condition).

Preliminary Analyses – Age Effects

The third set of analyses examined participant age effects via a series of five 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 2(Age: 18-31, 32+)[59] ANOVAs.

The first ANOVA examined age effects on endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs. This yielded no significant main effect for age (see Table 25), $F(1, 334)=1.40$,

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[59] This division of ages was selected because it would place those born in the 1980's and 1990's, who were more likely to be college students or graduate students into one category. Additionally, since there were too few individuals in each of the groupings above 32, these individuals were grouped together as more established adults, born before the 1980's in the second category.

p=.24, but did yield a significant interaction between age and ideological condition, $F(3, 334)=6.48$, p<.001 (see Figure 15). To interpret this significant interaction between ideological condition and participant age, simple effects for both ideology and age were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the four simple effects for ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4 = .05/4$). There was no significant difference between the age groups in the control condition: $F(1, 86)=.53$, p>.0125, nor was there a significant difference between the age groups in the stage three condition: $F(1, 90)=3.84$, p>.0125. There was, however a significant difference between older and younger adults in the threat salience condition: $F(1, 77)=13.13$, p<.012. A review of the group means reveals that older adults (M=5.58, SD=3.12) showed a greater level of endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs after exposure to the threat salience message than younger adults (M=3.59, SD=2.41). Additionally, there was a significant difference between older and younger adults in the stage one condition: $F(1, 83)=5.45$, p<.125. A review of the group means reveals that the pattern reversed, with younger adults (M=5.35, SD=3.05) showing a greater level of endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs after exposure to the stage one message than older adults (M=4.02, SD=3.09).

The second set of age simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .006 ($\alpha/2 = .0125/2$). There was not a significant difference between the ideological conditions for older adults: $F(3, 131)=2.88$, p>.006. There was, however, a significant difference between the ideological conditions for younger adults: $F(3, 206)=4.91$, p<.006. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine which ideological conditions differed significantly. These comparisons revealed a significant difference

between the control and threat salience condition for young adults, $t(101)=2.83$, $p=.03$: younger adults in the threat salience condition (M=3.59, SD=2.42) reported significantly less endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs than young adults in the control (M=5.12, SD=2.72). Additionally, there was a significant difference between the threat salience condition and the stage one condition, $t(103)=3.23$, $p=.01$: younger adults more strongly endorsed harm-legitimizing beliefs in the stage one condition (M=5.35, SD=3.05) than they did in the threat salience condition (M=3.59, SD=2.42). All other comparisons were not significant, t's<2.04, p's>.17.

The second ANOVA for age effects on PEV stage relevant attitudes (see Table 26), similarly, yielded no main effect for age, $F(1, 329)=1.04$, $p=.31$, but did yield a significant interaction between age and ideological condition, $F(3, 329)=6.75$, $p<.001$ (see Figure 16). To interpret this significant interaction between ideological condition and participant age, simple effects for both ideology and age were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the four simple effects for ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4 = .05/4$). There was no significant difference between the age groups in the control condition: $F(1, 86)=.18$, $p>.0125$. A significant difference was found between the age groups in the threat salience condition: $F(1, 77)=10.92$, $p<.0125$. A review of the group means reveals that older adults (M=6.16, SD=3.21) reported more negative attitudes after exposure to the threat salience message than younger adults (M=4.14, SD=2.55). The difference between the age groups was also significant for the stage one condition: $F(1, 83)=7.60$, $p<.012$. A review of the group means reveals the reversed pattern with younger adults (M=5.77, SD=2.99) reporting more negative attitudes after exposure to the stage one message than older

adults (M=4.21, SD=2.93). Finally, there was a significant difference between older and younger adults in the stage three condition: $F(1, 90)=4.87$, p<.125. A review of the group means reveals a pattern similar to that in the threat salience condition, with older adults (M=5.80, SD=2.89) showing more negative attitudes after exposure to the stage three message than younger adults (M=4.59, SD=2.58).

The second set of age simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .006 ($\alpha/2 = .0125/2$). There was not a significant difference between the ideological conditions for older adults: $F(3, 130)=3.47$, p>.006. There was, however, a significant difference between the ideological conditions for younger adults: $F(3, 205)=4.19$, p<.006. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine which ideological conditions differed significantly. These comparisons revealed a significant difference between the threat salience condition and the stage one condition for young adults, $t(103)=3.06$, p=.01: younger adults reported more negative attitudes in the stage one condition (M=5.77, SD=2.99) than they did in the threat salience condition (M=4.14, SD=2.55). All other comparisons were not significant, t's<2.25, p's>.11.

The third ANOVA for age effects on policy support (see Table 27), yielded a significant main effect for age, $F(1, 333)=5.77$, p=.02, and a significant interaction between ideological condition and age, $F(3, 333)=3.11$, p=.03 (see Figure 17). To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the significant interaction between ideological condition and participant age. To do this, simple effects for both ideology and age were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the four simple effects for ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4$

= .05/4). There was no significant difference between the age groups in the control condition, $F(1, 86)=.67$, $p>.0125$, nor was there a significant difference between the age groups in either of the stage ideology conditions: the stage one condition, $F(1, 86)=1.17$, $p>.0125$, and the stage three condition, $F(1, 91)=3.92$, $p>.0125$. A significant difference was found between the age groups in the threat salience condition: $F(1, 78)=8.71$, $p<.0125$. A review of the group means reveals that older adults ($M=7.06$, $SD=2.63$) showed a reported more support for harmful policies after exposure to the threat salience message than younger adults ($M=5.17$, $SD=2.76$).

The second set of age simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .006 ($\alpha/2 = .0125/2$). There was not a significant difference between the ideological conditions for older adults: $F(3, 129)=0.78$, $p>.006$, nor did the difference between ideological conditions for the younger adults reach significance: $F(3, 212)=3.25$, $p>.006$.

The fourth ANOVA for age effects on hatred (see Table 28) yielded no significant main effect for age, $F(1, 333)=.68$, $p=.41$, but did yield a significant interaction between age and ideological condition, $F(3, 333)=7.52$, $p<.001$ (see Figure 18). To interpret this significant interaction between ideological condition and participant age, simple effects for both ideology and age were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the four simple effects for ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4 = .05/4$). There was no significant difference between the age groups in the control condition: $F(1, 86)=.55$, $p>.0125$, nor was there a significant difference between the age groups in the stage three condition: $F(1, 90)=2.80$, $p>.0125$. There was, however a significant difference between older and younger adults in the threat salience condition:

F(1, 77)=13.26, p<.012. A review of the group means reveals that older adults (M=5.35, SD=3.05) showed greater levels of hatred after exposure to the threat salience message than younger adults (M=3.63, SD=2.78). Additionally, there was a significant difference between older and younger adults in the stage one condition: F(1, 83)=8.63, p<.125. A review of the group means reveals that the pattern reversed, with younger adults (M=5.35, SD=3.05) showing greater levels of hatred after exposure to the stage one message than older adults (M=4.02, SD=3.09).

The second set of age simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .006 (α/2 = .0125/2). There was not a significant difference between the ideological conditions for younger adults: F(3, 205)=3.64, p>.006. There was a significant difference between the ideological conditions for older adults: F(3, 131)=5.07, p<.006. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine which ideological conditions differed significantly. These comparisons revealed a significant difference between the threat salience condition and the stage one condition, t(103)=3.06, p=.01: older adults reported more hatred in the stage one condition (M=3.35, SD=3.30) than they did in the threat salience condition (M=5.97, SD=3.59). All other comparisons were not significant, t's<2.26, p's>.12.

The fifth ANOVA for age effects on general feelings (see Table 29) also yielded no significant main effect for age, F(1, 334)=1.40, p=.24, but did yield a significant interaction between age and ideological condition, F(3, 334)=6.48, p<.001 (see Figure 19). To interpret this significant interaction between ideological condition and participant age, simple effects for both ideology and age were examined separately. To

control for a Type I error rate across the four simple effects for ideological condition, the alpha level was set for each at .0125 ($\alpha/4$ = .05/4). There was no significant difference between the age groups in the control condition: $F(1, 86)$=.08 p>.0125. Nor was there a significant difference between the age groups in the threat salience condition: $F(1, 77)$=2.14, p>.0125. Additionally, there was not significant difference between the age groups in the stage one condition, $F(1, 83)$=4.13, p>.0125. There was, however a significant difference between older and younger adults in the stage three condition: $F(1, 90)$=8.60, p<.0125. A review of the group means reveals that older adults (M=5.35, SD=3.05) showed less positive after exposure to the stage three messages than younger adults (M=3.63, SD=2.78).

The second set of age simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .006 ($\alpha/2$ = .0125/2). There was no significant difference between the ideological conditions for younger adults: $F(3, 205)$=0.78, p>.006. The difference between ideological conditions for older adults approached significance, but failed to surpass the lowered alpha level: $F(3, 130)$=4.23, p>.006.

Taken together, these results suggest that participant age was associated with wide variance in how individuals responded to the ideological conditions. Across measures, the threat salience condition was associated with strong negative beliefs, attitudes and feelings from the older adults, and with much more positive responses from the younger adults. These results were mirrored by the stage three condition (there were no significant differences between the threat salience and stage three conditions for any measure). Interestingly, there is a marked departure from this pattern for the stage one

condition with younger individuals reporting more negative reactions than older individuals. In the case of the PEV stage related attitudes, this departure was associated with vastly more negative attitudes among the younger adults and more endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs (as compared to other ideological conditions).[60] In the case of hatred, this marked departure manifested in a dramatically reduced level of hatred reported toward the targets by older adults (as compared to other ideological conditions).[61] These results suggest that perhaps the ideologies that emphasized intergroup difference and mutual exclusivity (stage one beliefs) may be more effective for younger individuals. On the other hand, it seems that generally threatening messages or those that blatantly devalue the targets (stage three) may be more effective for older individuals.

Preliminary Analyses – Religious Affiliation Effects

The third set of analyses examined religious affiliation effects via a series of five 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 2(Religion: Christian/Catholic, Other)[62] ANOVAs.

The first ANOVA for religious affiliation effects on endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies (see Table 30), yielded no significant interactions, (F's<.34, p's>.60), but it did yield a significant main effect for religious affiliation, $F(1,$

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[60] The only significant difference was between stage one and the threat salience conditions.

[61] Again, the only significant difference was between stage one and the threat salience conditions.

[62] Similar to Study One, the Christian and Catholic groups were not significantly different on the dependent measures, and there were insufficient numbers of the other religious groups to make meaningful comparisons on their own.

334)=25.14, p<.001. Examining the means, Christians/Catholics (M=5.41, SD=2.76) generally endorsed more harm-legitimizing ideologies than those who were affiliated with other religions (M=4.10, SD=2.88). The second ANOVA for religious affiliation effects on PEV stage related attitudes (see Table 31), similarly yielded not significant interactions (F's<1.43, p's>.23), but did yield a significant main effect for religious affiliation, F(1, 329)=25.37, p<.001. The means reveal that Christians/Catholics (M=5.74, SD=2.74) were also expressing more negative attitudes than individuals who were affiliated with other religions M=4.46, SD=2.92). The third ANOVA for religious affiliation effects on policy support (see Table 32), again yielded no significant interactions (F's<1.23, p's>.29), but yielded a significant main effect for religious affiliation. The means revealed a similar pattern, with Christians/Catholics (M=6.94, SD=2.62) showing more support for harmful policies than individuals affiliated with other religions (M=5.28, SD=2.73). The fourth ANOVA for religious affiliation effects on hate (see Table 33) followed this pattern as well, yielding no significant interactions (F's<.74, p's>.60), but yielding a significant main effect, F(1, 333)=18.40, p<.001. Again, the means followed a similar pattern, with Christians/Catholics (M=5.19, SD=3.22) expressing more hatred overall than individuals affiliated with other religions (M=4.08, SD=3.25).

The fifth ANOVA for religious affiliation effects on general feelings (see Table 34) was the only one to yield both a significant main effect, F(1, 328)=6.79, p=.01, and a significant interaction between religious affiliation and target group, F(1, 328)=4.17, p=.04, (see Figure 20). To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the significant interaction between group condition and participant religious affiliation

and to achieve this, simple effects for both target group and religious affiliation were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for target condition, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2 = .05/2$). There was no significant difference between the religious groups in the Muslim extremist condition, $F(1, 167)=.23$, $p>.025$. A significant difference was found between the religious groups in the illegal immigrant condition: $F(1, 173)=10.79$, $p<.025$. A review of the group means reveals that Christians/Catholics (M=27.56, SD=24.79) held less positive feelings about illegal immigrants than individuals of other religions (M=38.20, SD=26.80).

The second set of religious affiliation simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .0125 ($\alpha/2 = .025/2$). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for Christians/Catholics: $F(1, 162)=36.03$, $p<.0125$. Examining the means reveals that Christians/Catholics held significantly less positive feelings about Muslim extremists (M=7.43, SD=15.11) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=27.56, SD=24.79). There was also a significance between the target group conditions for individuals of other religions: $F(1, 178)=83.38$, $p<.0125$. The means similarly show that individuals of other religions held significantly less positive feelings towards Muslim extremists (M=9.03, SD=15.00) than they did towards illegal immigrants (M=38.20, SD=26.80).

Taken together, these results largely parallel the pattern from Study One. Overall, individuals who identified as Christian or Catholic expressed more negative attitudes,

beliefs and policy support than individuals from other religious groups.[63] Additionally, the results fit the pattern expected for both target groups, with the Muslim extremists being perceived as most negative by both groups, and the illegal immigrants being perceived more neutrally.

Preliminary Analyses – Political Party Effects

The fifth and final set of analyses examined political party effects via a series of five 4(Ideological messages: control, threat salience, Stages One, Stage Three) x 2(Target group: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists) x 3(Political Party: Republican, Democrat, Independent) ANOVAs.

The first ANOVA for political party effects on harm-legitimizing belief endorsement (see Table 35) revealed no significant interactions (F's<2.86, p's>.06), but did yield a significant main effect for political party, $F(2, 325)=20.85$, $p<.001$. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed that all three parties significantly differed from one another, t's>3.38, p's<.001. In general, the pattern was linear with Republicans (M=6.24, SD=2.42) indicating more endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs than Independents (M=5.10, SD=2.87), who also indicated more endorsement than Democrats (M=3.71, SD=2.75).

The second ANOVA for political party effects on PEV stage related attitudes (see Table 36) yielded both a significant main effect for party, $F(2, 320)=22.76$, $p<.001$, and a significant interaction between party and target group, $F(2, 321)=23.74$, $p=.01$ (see Figure 21). To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the

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[63] The only exception was the general feelings towards Muslim extremists, where both Christians/Catholics and other religiously affiliated individuals indicated similarly negative feelings.

significant interaction between group condition and participant political party and to accomplish this, simple effects for both target group and political party were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for target condition, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2 = .05/2$). There was a significant difference between the political parties in the illegal immigrant condition, $F(1, 168)=21.74$, $p<.025$. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed that all political parties differed significantly in the illegal immigrant condition (t's>2.69, p's<.02), yielding a linear pattern: Republicans (M=5.82, SD=2.08) holding the most negative attitudes, Independents (M=4.34, SD=3.05) falling in the middle, and Democrats (M=2.58, SD=2.28) with the fewest negative attitudes. A significant difference was also found between the political parties in the Muslim extremist condition: $F(1, 170)=5.55$, $p<.025$. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the Muslim extremist condition, the Republicans (M=7.62, SD=2.01) differed significantly from Democrats (M=5.92, SD=2.34), $t(100)=3.40$, $p=.002$, and also differed significantly from Independents (M=6.20, SD=2.46), $t(105)=2.84$, $p=.01$. The Independents did not, however, differ significantly from the Democrats, $t(141)=.72$, $p=.75$.

The second set of political party simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .008 ($\alpha/3 = .025/3$). There was a significant difference between the target group conditions for Republicans, $F(1, 65)=9.05$, $p<.008$. Examining the means reveals that Republicans held significantly more negative attitudes about Muslim extremists (M=7.62, SD=2.01) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=5.82, SD=2.08). There was also a significance between the target group conditions for Independents, $F(1, 123)=17.57$,

p<.008. The means similarly show that Independents held significantly more negative

attitudes towards Muslim extremists (M=6.20, SD=2.46) than they did towards illegal

immigrants (M=4.34, SD=3.05). Finally, there was a significant difference between

target group conditions for Democrats as well, F(1, 150)=70.00, p<.008. The means

similarly reveal that Democrats held significantly more negative attitudes about Muslim

extremists (M=5.92, SD=2.34) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=2.58,

SD=2.28).

The third ANOVA for political party effects on policy support (see Table 37)

revealed no significant interactions, (F's<2.50, p's>.08), but did yield a significant main

effect for political party, F(2, 324)=21.75, p<.001. A series of Tukey's pairwise

comparisons indicate that all groups differed significantly from one another, t's>3.3,

p's<.003. The means followed the same linear pattern, with: Republicans (M=7.74,

SD=2.28) indicating the most support for harmful policies, followed by Independents

(M=6.41, SD=2.72), and the least support being indicated Democrats (M=5.04,

SD=2.68).

The fourth ANOVA for political party effects on hatred (see Table 38) yielded a

significant main effect for political party, F(2, 324)=15.94, p<.001, and a significant

interaction between target group and political party, F(2, 324)=4.08, p=.02 (see Figure

22). To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the significant

interaction between group condition and participant political party and to manage this,

simple effects for both target group and political party were examined separately. To

control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for target condition, the

alpha level was set for each at .025 (α/2 = .05/2). There was no significant difference for

political party in the Muslim extremist condition, $F(2, 172)=3.59$, p>.025. A significant difference was found between the political parties in the illegal immigrant condition, $F(1, 170)=18.54$, p<.025. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed that all political parties differed significantly in the illegal immigrant condition (t's>2.69, p's<.02), yielding a linear pattern: Republicans (M=4.99, SD=2.65) expressing the most hatred, Independents (M=3.39, SD=3.21) falling in the middle, and Democrats (M=1.79, SD=2.17) with lowest levels of hatred.

The second set of political party simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .008 ($\alpha/3 = .025/3$). Again, there was a significant difference between the target group conditions for Republicans, $F(1, 67)=13=.10$, p<.008. Examining the means reveals that Republicans expressed more hatred toward Muslim extremists (M=7.38, SD=2.39) than they did towards illegal immigrants (M=4.99, SD=2.65). There was also a significance between the target group conditions for Independents, $F(1, 123)=27.79$, p<.008. The means similarly show that Independents expressed more hatred towards Muslim extremists (M=5.94, SD=2.89) than they did towards illegal immigrants (M=3.39, SD=3.21). Finally, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for Democrats as well, $F(1, 150)=86.94$, p<.008. The means similarly reveal that Democrats expressed more hatred towards Muslim extremists (M=5.97, SD=2.85) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=1.79, SD=2.17).

Finally, the fifth ANOVA for political party effects on general feelings (see Table 39), yielded both a significant main effect for party, $F(2, 319)=14.81$, p<.001, and a significant interaction between target group and political party, $F(2, 319)=19.01$, p<.001

(see Figure 23). To interpret these combined results, it was necessary to examine the significant interaction between group condition and participant political party and to accomplish this, simple effects for both target group and political party were examined separately. To control for a Type I error rate across the two initial simple effects for target condition, the alpha level was set for each at .025 ($\alpha/2 = .05/2$). There was no significant difference for political party in the Muslim extremist condition, $F(2, 172)=.36$, $p>.025$, but a significant difference was found between the political parties in the illegal immigrant condition, $F(1, 170)=36.52$, $p<.025$. A series of Tukey's pairwise comparisons revealed that all political parties differed significantly in the illegal immigrant condition (t's>3.73, p's$<.003$), yielding a linear pattern: Republicans ($M=12.50$, $SD=13.17$) expressing the least positive feelings, Independents ($M=28.76$, $SD=25.14$) falling in the middle, and Democrats ($M=44.85$, $SD=24.14$) with the most positive feelings.

The second set of political party simple effects again adjusted the alpha level to control for a Type 1 error rate across the additional two analyses, resulting in the alpha level of .008 ($\alpha/3 = .025/3$). There was no significant difference between the target group conditions for Republicans, $F(1, 67)=.79$, $p>.008$. There was, however a significant difference between the target group conditions for Independents, $F(1, 123)=29.13$, $p<.008$. The means similarly show that Independents expressed less positive feelings towards Muslim extremists ($M=9.68$, $SD=14.70$) than they did towards illegal immigrants ($M=28.76$, $SD=25.14$). Finally, there was a significant difference between target group conditions for Democrats as well, $F(1, 150)=136.61$, $p<.008$. The means similarly reveal that Democrats expressed less positive feelings towards Muslim

extremists (M=6.83, SD=12.64) than they did about illegal immigrants (M=44.85, SD=24.14).

Taken together, these results suggest that political party played a large role in people's attitudes, beliefs and policy support. On the whole, the Republicans expressed more negative attitudes, beliefs, and policy support than either of the other parties, and often the Independents and Democrats followed in a linear pattern. Similar to previous analyses, these showed a main effect for target group with individuals generally viewing the Muslim extremists more negatively than they view the illegal immigrants.

Main Analyses

The preliminary analyses examining subject effects confirmed some initial suspicions: that the target group makes a difference (with people typically viewing Muslim extremists more negatively than illegal immigrants), and that group memberships associated with more conservative ideologies (Christianity/Catholicism and Republican party affiliation) or majority group membership (identifying as white) are also associated with more negative treatments of the target groups overall. Unfortunately, in addition to outlining these general patterns, the preliminary analyses hinted at weak to nonexistent effects for the harm-legitimizing ideology manipulation.

The intent of the main analyses was to test the most basic hypotheses: (1) that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideology is results in greater levels of endorsement of harm-legitimizing beliefs, stage relevant attitudes, support for harmful policies, expressions of hatred, and negative feelings, and (2) that there are two alternative patterns of efficacy (benign must precede extreme, and/or the "fill in the blanks" approaches). Unfortunately, as the preliminary results revealed, there were no strong overarching

effects for ideological condition in any of the early analyses. The only clearly significant effects emerged when taking participant age into account, and the pattern they reveal is somewhat mixed.

Overall, these results suggest that the only really significant differences occurred between the threat salience and stage one conditions, and then only because they elicited the most extreme reactions. Younger people showed what appears to be reactance to the threat salience messages: responding more positively (expressing fewer harm-legitimizing beliefs and negative attitudes, specifically) after exposure to the threat salience message, than they did when exposed to the stage one message (t's>3.06, p's<.02). On the other hand, older adults showed significantly more negatively (expressing more hatred, specifically) to the threat salience messages than they did to the stage one messages (t (166)=3.06, p=.01).

Taking these age effects into consideration, it makes little sense for the main analyses to examine a statistical model without participant age taken into account. Even with age accounted for, however, the results failed to consistently support the first hypothesis: that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideology should result in more negative attitudes, beliefs, and policy support. Across all dependent variables, exposure to the harm-legitimizing ideologies from stage one or three failed to produce attitudes significantly more negative than the baseline levels in the control condition. As a result, it is also not possible to test the second set of hypotheses regarding the patterns of efficacy.

Mediation Analyses – Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing ideologies

The next set of analyses was intended to examine the meditational hypothesis that predicted that the effects of exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies would be mediated by the degree to which individuals endorsed harm-legitimizing ideologies more generally. This hypothesis argues that exposure to harm-legitimizing ideologies should increase salience of previously adopted harm-legitimizing ideologies and lead to the adoption of additional harm-legitimizing beliefs. This increase in ideological endorsement would then increase the effectiveness of the ideological exposure, resulting in more negative attitudes and policy support towards the targets.

To test the meditational hypothesis for each target group a series of eight models would need to be examined: two for PEV stage related attitudes, two for policy support, two for hatred and two for general feelings. To facilitate interpretation, these models were divided by target group with four separate models for each group (see Figure 5 for sample model). The first step before beginning the meditational analyses was to establish that the independent variable. Ideological message type had a significant effect on the mediator, endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideology. Unfortunately, none of the ANOVAs in the main analysis yielded significant results for ideological condition on any of the iterations of the harm-legitimizing ideology endorsement measures for either of the target groups. As a result, it is not possible to conduct further analyses to test the meditational hypothesis.

Examining Moderators – RWA, SDO and In-group Identification

The final layer of predictions dealt with the ability of certain individual predispositions (RWA, SDO, and/or in-group identification strength) to moderate the affects of ideological exposure on the individuals' level of general endorsement of harm-

legitimizing beliefs. The PEV model predicts that high levels of RWA/SDO/In-group

Identification are associated greater susceptibility to harm-legitimizing ideologies. As a

result, if an individual who is high in RWA/SDO/Group Identification is exposed to

harm-legitimizing ideologies, they would be expected to more easily adopt them and thus

show a greater degree of endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs overall. On the other

hand, those who are low in these dispositions would be expected to show little, if any

effect for ideological exposure on their levels of endorsement. To test these moderation

hypotheses, a series two-stage multiple regression analyses were used (these were

separated by target group for ease of interpretation)[64].

To utilize hierarchical regression analyses with a categorical independent variable

(in this case, ideological condition), the variable was dummy-coded into three new

variables (groups-1=comparison groups). Each of these compared one of the ideological

conditions to the control condition resulting in the following coding schemes: threat

(0,1,0,0), stage one (0,0,1,0), stage three (0,0,0,1). Additionally, to ensure that zero was a

meaningful value for the regression analysis, the harm-legitimizing belief endorsement

measure and dispositional measures (RWA, SDO, Group Identification) were centered by

subtracting the overall mean each individuals' average score for each scale.

Moderation – RWA, SDO and Group Identification for illegal immigrants conditions

The first set of analyses examined the possible moderation of ideological

exposure effects by RWA, SDO, and Group Identification, as they related to the illegal

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[64] It is noted here that due to concerns that dispositional traits (RWA, SDO and Group
Identification Strength) might also vary as a function of participant age, the dispositional
traits were subjected to one-way ANOVA's. None of these ANOVA's yielded a
significant effect for age group on RWA, SDO or Group Identification (F's<2.0,
p's<.07), so age was excluded from the moderational analyses.

immigrant target group. The first step in this analysis employed a model testing only the main effects for ideological exposure and dispositional traits (RWA, SDO and Group Identification; see Table 39). Across all models, exposure to ideology (as compared to the control) showed no significant main effects, t's<-1.20, p's>.23 (see Tables 40-42 for associated β's), on the endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies. Each of the dispositional measures was, however a significant predictor of harm-legitimizing endorsement: RWA (β=.67, p<.001, see Table 40), SDO (β=.89, p<.001, see Table 41) and Group Identification (β=.45, p<.001, see Table 42). These results suggest that those who were higher in RWA, SDO and/or Group Identification were also expressing more endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs about illegal immigrants.

The second stage consisted of models which included the interaction terms, computed by multiplying each ideological condition comparison (ideology condition vs. control) variable with the scores on RWA, SDO, and In-group Identification to create nine new variables: Threat x RWA, Stage One x RWA, Stage Three x RWA, Threat x SDO, Stage One x SDO, Stage Three x SDO, Threat x Group Identification, Stage One x Group Identification, and Stage Three x Group Identification. When these interaction terms were included in the models, the results yielded only one significant interaction (see Tables 40-42 for the complete models): the difference between stage three and the control significantly interacted with SDO scores (β=.-16, p=.03, see Table 41). To interpret the nature and direction of this significant interaction, the SDO model was retested at ± 1 SD from the mean of SDO mean. The resulting prediction equations are graphed in Figure 24.

These results suggest that those high in SDO expressed more harm-legitimizing ideologies overall, but that they showed some mild reactance to the Stage Three ideological message: reporting less endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies in the Stage Three condition, as compared to the control. Those low in SDO showed lower endorsement levels overall, and showed almost no change as a function of their ideological condition.

Moderation – RWA, SDO and Group Identification for illegal Muslim extremists

The second set of analyses examined the possible moderation of ideological exposure effects by RWA, SDO, and Group Identification, as they related to the Muslim extremist target group. The first step in this analysis employed a model testing only the main effects for ideological exposure and dispositional traits (RWA, SDO and Group Identification; see Table 42). Across all models, exposure to ideology (as compared to the control) showed no significant main effects, t's<.94, p's>.35 (see Tables 43-45 for associated β's), on the endorsement of harm-legitimizing ideologies. Each of the dispositional measures was, however a significant predictor of harm-legitimizing endorsement: RWA (β=.89, p<.001, see Table 43), SDO (β=.36, p<.001, see Table 44), and Group Identification (β=.50, p<.001, see Table 45). These results suggest that those who were higher in RWA, SDO and/or Group Identification were also expressing more endorsement for harm-legitimizing beliefs about Muslim extremists.

The second stage consisted of models which included the interaction terms, computed by multiplying each ideological condition comparison (ideology condition vs. control) variable with the scores on RWA, SDO, and Group Identification to create nine new variables: Threat x RWA, Stage One x RWA, Stage Three x RWA, Threat x SDO,

Stage One x SDO, Stage Three x SDO, Threat x Group Identification, Stage One x Group

Identification, and Stage Three x Group Identification. When these interaction terms

were included in the models, the results yielded only one significant interaction (see

Table 42 for the complete models): the difference between stage one and the control

significantly interacted with Group Identification Strength scores (β=.22, =.01, see Table

45). To interpret the nature and direction of this significant interaction, the Group

Identification model was retested at ± 1 SD from the mean of Group Identification mean.

The resulting prediction equations are graphed in Figure 25. These results suggest that

those high in Group Identification expressed more harm-legitimizing ideologies over all,

but that they showed much stronger endorsement in the Stage One condition than any of

the others (the rest of the conditions were not significantly different from the control).

Those low in Group Identification showed lower endorsement levels overall, but

interestingly, seemed to respond in a similar manner (albeit more weakly) to the Stage

One ideological message: reporting more endorsement in that condition than in any other.

<center>Discussion: Study Two</center>

Study Two was designed to begin to test the utility of the Perpetration of Extreme

Violence (PEV) model's stages by examining four of its underlying predictions. First,

the most basic prediction of the PEV model, that exposure to harm-legitimizing

ideologies should result in more negative beliefs, attitudes and policy support toward the

targets. Second, that the PEV's stages should proceed in order, with the more benign

ideologies coming before the more extreme. Third, that the degree to which individuals

endorse harm-legitimizing ideologies mediates the effect of ideological exposure, such

that those who more strongly endorse ideologies following exposure will also express

more negative attitudes, feelings and policy support. And finally, fourth, that individual

dispositions (RWA/SDO/Group Identity strength) moderate the effects of ideological

exposure on harm-legitimizing ideology endorsement such that those high in these

dispositions will be most likely to adopt new ideology and show the greatest endorsement

of harm-legitimizing ideologies, while those low in these disposition will show little or

no change as a result of ideological exposure.

Unfortunately, Study Two failed to yield results that were supportive of these

predictions. None of the analyses yielded a strong overarching effect for ideological

exposure, nor did they suggest a clear pattern of stage order. Those significant

interactions that did emerge between ideological condition and subject effects revealed

that many participants were showing some degree of reactance to the ideologies

(particularly among younger participants), and that perhaps the strongest case could be

made for the Stage One condition: younger adults seemed more responsive to this stage,

indicating more negative beliefs. Similarly, the moderation analyses for Muslim

extremists revealed that Group Identification strength seemed to be associated with a

spike[65] in harm-legitimizing ideology endorsement in the Stage One condition.

Unfortunately, none of these patterns was sufficient to produce a major change overall in

attitudes, beliefs, and/or policy support across participants.

This lack of results stands in contrast to the previously conducted studies that

have found effects for small doses of hate-speech (Altemeyer, 1996; Nofziger, in

process), and strong moderation effects for dispositional characteristics (RWA and SDO

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[65] This effect appears to be slightly stronger in those who were higher in Group
Identification than those who were low, although both groups showed some increase in
the Stage One condition.

specifically). Examining the results from Studies One and Two hints at several possible reasons for this failure to replicate. The first reason could potentially relate to the choice of target groups. Study One allowed for a preliminary comparison of potential target groups and aided in the selection of a negative target and a neutral target. The underlying theory behind this selection was that perpetrators tend to target groups about whom they already hold some negative feelings/beliefs and that, in doing so, they have a foundation upon which to add the more extreme harm-legitimizing ideologies. Given that Muslim extremists already seemed be a strong target of American dislike, as results from Study One suggest, they seemed to be a good fit. One unintended consequence of this use of a demonstrably despised group, however, was that the ideological messages about them likely added little in the way of new ideological information that might have produced real changes in their attitudes/beliefs or policy support. As a result, individuals largely continued in their previously held levels of harm-legitimizing beliefs, negative attitudes, and support for extremist related policies.

For illegal immigrants, however, the results paint a different picture. Where the Muslim extremists were selected as a negative target because they were consistently disliked, illegal immigrants were chosen to provide a more neutral comparison group. Unfortunately, rather than being a group that was consistently viewed in a neutral manner, the neutral means on the attitudes, beliefs, and policy support measures from Study One most likely reflected the extreme variance in American attitudes towards them as a target group (which averaged out to a neutral score). The numerous interactions between subject effects and target group (particularly based on participant race, religion and political party affiliation), confirm this large amount of variance and help to explain

why the ideological messages held little overarching effect on participants attitudes,

beliefs and policy support.

The second reason that the manipulation likely held little overarching effect on

attitudes, beliefs and policy support has to do with the context in which they were

presented. It is possible that participants were wary of the messages because they were

aware that they were participating in a psychological study. For many of the Mechanical

Turk participants, the completion of psychological surveys makes up a large portion of

their activity on the site and so, as a result, many of them probably have exposure to the

types of deception and manipulation techniques that were implemented in this study.

This potential wariness about deception and the inclusion of a manipulation likely cued

many of them into the role that the "social message" portion played in the study.[66]

Additionally, in an effort to create a shorter, more manageable study, many of the

traditional methods of manipulation/purpose obfuscation were not included (additional

essays, longer and more varied questionnaires, etc.), and as a result it is possible that this

may have made the purpose of the study more obvious to participants. This remains an

ongoing struggle when creating surveys for an online audience, as longer surveys tend to

open up the greater possibility of participant distraction or fatigue, but they also allow for

the inclusion of greater safeguards against participants learning the true intent of the

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[66] Note: participants were explicitly asked if they felt deceived, and what they believed the purpose of the study was. Those who explicitly stated that they believed the intent was to examine how the essays affected participant attitudes were excluded from the analysis. Although this likely accounted for some of those who realized the purpose of the study, it likely did not account for all of those who realized the true purpose of the manipulation. Some participants may have opted to alter their response to this question (or provide no response) for fear that they would be excluded from analyses and/or would not receive payment if they indicated they were aware of the deception/purpose (despite being told that their compensation would not be impacted by their response to the question).

study. Future research examining the role of ideological exposure would have to find a balance between these two factors: incorporating more items/messages about a variety of groups, but minimizing the number of dependent measures, for instance.

The third, and final reason, that the manipulation may have produced few changes in attitudes/beliefs stems from the fact that it was only a single dose of ideology, coming from an unknown (in this case fabricated research policy research groups) source. In actual cases of intergroup violence, harm-legitimizing ideologies are most effective at changing group/individual attitudes when they are presented consistently, over time by a source that is deemed legitimate (e.g. Staub, 1999; Dutton, 2007). Additionally, these messages are most effective if they are presented as a sort of unilateral truth about the targets/perpetrators, and are not presented in the context of large-scale dissent (which would detract from its credibility).

Unfortunately, these conditions do not translate well to empirical studies of the impact of ideological exposure in a research setting, particularly not one conducted in America. One pronounced shortcoming is that the exposure in this, and other studies, amounts to a single *known* exposure. Outside of this single exposure, little can be said about any given individual's previous exposure to harm-legitimizing beliefs, and perhaps more importantly, their exposure to counter beliefs. Since American media is widely varied on issues relating to the treatment of these target groups (especially illegal immigrants), it is not too surprising that a single ideological message in isolation would have little impact on its own. Compounding this limited effect from a single exposure

was the fact that the source of the information[67] was not familiar to the participants, having been fabricated for the purpose of the study. As a result, these messages likely carried little weight for the participants, or at least did not elicit the response one would expect if the messages came from a trusted/known source.

Taken together, these limitations reveal some of the overarching concerns related to the research of the perpetration of extreme violence utilizing common empirical methodologies. Extreme violence is most commonly preceded by months, years or even decades of steady, carefully crafted ideological indoctrination. Followers do not suddenly come to believe that a group they once held in neutral (or even positive) regard is pure evil and in need of extermination. As such, to suddenly attempt to spread such notions about most groups would likely lead to more than a few raised suspicions and could easily turn off the audience the speaker intended to persuade. Taking this into consideration, it is unlikely that it would be possible to capture this level of steady indoctrination via a traditional empirical study (or even a series of studies). As such, future research should expand out of this methodological model to incorporate other tactics that would directly tap into perspectives of actual perpetrators (ethnographic interviews) or less directly examine the true content of intergroup beliefs (content analyses of media messages in areas of conflict).

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[67] The articles were framed as policy memos from two fabricated research institutes (see Appendices ____***).

General Discussion

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the psychology of willing perpetration of extreme violence in four parts. The first part explored the literature on the psychology of genocidal perpetration and provided a critique of the current theoretical models. The second part then proposed a unified theory of willing perpetration of extreme violence, and the Perpetration of Extreme Violence model. The third part then applied this new theoretical framework to an actual case of genocidal violence, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and discussed the degree to which the PEV model helped to explain the development of the conflict and willing participation in the violence of the period. The fourth and final part attempted to test the model's basic predictions empirically via two studies. Together, these parts reveal a comprehensive look at the processes by which individuals may become willing perpetrators of extreme violence, the degree to which the PEV theory provides a useful framework for tracing their progression from normal citizen to murderer, and – finally - some of the limitations of research into the area of genocidal psychology.

Following in the footsteps of earlier theories (e.g. Stanton, 1996; Staub, 1999; Waller, 2002) the Perpetration of Extreme Violence theory/model argues that successful genocides rely on the support of large groups of average individuals. Although there are certainly many perpetrators whose violent actions can be attributed to obedience and/or fear, assuming these explanations out of hand fails to capture the full extent to which perpetrators must *decide* to inflict harm, and the extent to which they must later provide rationale for their actions (either to appease their own cognitive dissonance or to explain to the outside world why they would willingly murder). History has shown that for every

reluctant perpetrator, there are often several who willingly join up with a movement because they believe that they are fighting a legitimate threat to their group.   It is the PEV model's goal to help explain how these individuals come to adopt this belief that target extermination is imperative, and to simultaneous explore how/why others may fail to reach this level of zealous support.

It is acknowledged that genocidal violence is a complex phenomenon that arises from a number of factors, only some of which can be accounted for by any one theory. The goal of the PEV model has been to elaborate on the existing theory, with historical examples in mind, to provide a more cohesive framework through which to view individual support for extreme violence. It is important to note that although historical patterns of individual perpetration of genocidal violence suggest the integral role of harm-legitimizing beliefs in motivating violence, and that these seem to map onto the PEV's stages, the model is also subject to many of the limitations that have constrained prior models. As such, it is possible that not all perpetration of extreme violence may fit neatly into these stages.

In genocidal movement, there may exist those individuals who do not strongly adopt the types of justifying ideologies that might give them a *desire* to involve themselves in the ensuing violence. Some may act primarily out of self-interest, focusing on personal or ingroup gains and only expressing passive devaluation of their targets (i.e. they simply fail to see them as a legitimate group of people or they do not actively hate them). Despite this, these individuals would still be expected to respond to the polarizing ideologies and normative shifts that legitimize the use of violence because they, too,

should show a similar pattern of behaviors since they desire the same positive outcomes for both themselves and their group that their violent acts are purported to benefit.

It is also necessary to acknowledge here that some individuals may reach a certain point in the PEV model and fail to completely immerse themselves in the perpetrator group ideology, resulting in a failure to move past one of the stages of the PEV model. These individuals would be expected to either find a means of removing themselves from the building violence (generally by fleeing) or to securing a position within the perpetrator group that allows them to not draw attention to themselves. In their passivity, these individuals continue to contribute to the cycle of violence in their neglect even though they may not directly inflict violence. In these instances, individual personality characteristics mentioned previously help to account for this behavioral variance. These perpetrators still fit into the PEV model, they simply do not progress through all of the stages. Additional exploration will be necessary to determine the broader applicability of this new model of individual support for genocide.

Future research into the psychology of genocidal/extreme violence perpetration, and future tests of the PEV model, should likely follow in the footsteps of Fujii (2009), and take the form of ethnographic studies of past or potential perpetrators. Both of these methods would better capture the actual experiences of those who have, or are likely to, engage in willing participation in extreme violence and could clarify some of the individual variance that occurs over the course of the escalating conflicts. As a more direct test of the content and order of the PEV's stage predictions, content analyses should be employed to examine the prevalence of different types of harm-legitimizing beliefs in the media, government (or perpetrator leadership) issued statements and/or

other key outlets over different periods of escalating violence in both historical genocides and ongoing conflicts. In the context of additional historical analyses (such as the one included in this dissertation on Rwanda), these broader examinations of the evolution of harm-legitimizing ideologies over time would provide the clearest support or critique of the models predictions.

As genocidal violence has continued well into recent history (with Bosnia and Rwanda both taking place in the mid-nineties, and more recently the violence in the Sudan), research into the psychology of the perpetrator is still a vital area of study. In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge the concerns leveled by Waller (2002) that caution is necessary when examining the motivations and beliefs of perpetrators of great evil. The purpose of this research is not to unintentionally absolve perpetrators of their crimes by revealing their "seemingly sound"[68] rationale for their actions. Instead, the goal of the PEV model is to expand awareness of the types of attitudes, beliefs, and actions that perpetrators use to justify their generally unthinkable goal: target group extermination, so that future acts of abominable violence may be avoided.

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[68] "Seemingly sound," here because the ideology which perpetrators often adhere is intended to excuse normally heinous acts as morally just. Perpetrators may no longer believe violence is wrong, but that does not justify the harm they inflict upon their victims.

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Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study One Dependent Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Feelings	--											
2. Hate	-.75**	--										
3. Stage 1: Fear/Disturst	-.75**	.89**	--									
4. Stage 2: Target Blame	-.71**	.91**	.87**	--								
5. Stage 3: Support harm	-.71**	.88**	.87**	.87**	--							
6. PEV average	-.76**	.93**	.96**	.95**	.96**	--						
7. Stage 1: Divide/polarize	-.76**	.89**	.88**	.85**	.86**	.90**	--					
8. Stage 2: Ingroup unity	-.16**	.39**	.36**	.38**	.37**	.38**	.35**	--				
9. Stage 2: Target homogeneity	-.64**	.90**	.85**	.88**	.87**	.90**	.82**	.39**	--			
10. Stage 3: Devalue	-.74**	.93**	.89**	.90**	.90**	.93**	.90**	.35**	.89**	--		
11. H-L Belief Average	-.75**	.94**	.91**	.91**	.91**	.95**	.96**	.47**	.91**	.97**	--	
12. Policy Support	-.66**	.76**	.78**	.74**	.83**	.89**	.81**	.34**	.74**	.80**	.82**	--
M	43.2	3.60	2.97	3.11	3.20	2.99	3.44	2.47	2.63	2.97	3.03	3.61
SD	33.2	3.10	3.04	3.01	3.01	3.02	3.06	2.67	3.39	3.11	2.79	2.84
N	274	275	273	274	273	272	257	272	274	273	270	274

** $p<.001$.

Variables 3-6 are associated with the PEV stage related attitude subscales and the overall average scores. Variables 7-11 are associated with the Harm-Legitimizing Belief endorsement subscales and the overall average scores.

Table 2

Intercorrelations between Harm-Legitimizing Belief Endorsement and Dependent Variables by Target Group

	Illegal immigrants	Muslim extremists	Atheists	Racists	Homo-sexuals	College Students	Middle class	Total
Variable	Endorsement of Harm Legitimizing Beliefs							
General Feelings	-.52**	-.49**	-.70**	-.37*	-.74**	-.17	-.52**	-.75**
Hate	.73**	.87**	.93**	.78**	.97**	.92**	.91**	.94**
Stage 1: Fear/Distrust	.72**	.86**	.84**	.79**	.88**	.73**	.78**	.91**
Stage 2: Target Blame	.70**	.86**	.92**	.64**	.95**	.76**	.90**	.91**
Stage 3: Support Harm	.65**	.86**	.82**	.79**	.92**	.72**	.91**	.96**
Policy Support	.41*	.85**	.87**	.82**	.97**	.55**	.88**	.82**
N	34	38	39	39	38	44	38	270

** p<.001, *p<.05. Stages 1-3 refer to the PEV stage related attitudes subscales.

Table 3

Intercorrelations between Composite Variables, Hatred and Policy Support

	1	2	3	4
1. "Benign" Beliefs: Stages One and Two	--			
2. "Extreme" Beliefs: Stage Three	.95**	--		
3. Hatred	.94**	.93**	--	
4. Policy Support	.82**	.84**	.76**	--
N	270	271	271	272

Table 4

Analysis of Variance for Target Group Condition on Overall Dislike and General Feelings

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total	Target Compared	Effect Size
VARIABLE										F	η^2
Dislike Avg.	M	3.53	6.87	1.43	5.59	1.78	1.52	1.49	3.15	49.87** (6, 270)	.51
	SD	1.99	2.29	1.97	1.97	2.27	1.60	1.78	2.87		
Feeling	M	37.03	11.04	57.94	6.89	52.83	61.12	72.22	43.19	44.46** (6, 271)	.50
	SD	20.47	18.24	32.48	10.67	31.86	32.82	21.87	33.16		

**p<.001.

Dislike Avg. refers to the general dislike measure which was calculated by calculating individual averages for the harm-legitimizing belief endorsement measures, the PEV stage related attitude measures, the policy support items and the hate scale items. General Feelings refers to the individual averages on the feeling thermometer measures. For Target Groups: 1 = Illegal Immigrants, 2 = Muslim Extremists, 3 = Atheists, 4 = Racists, 5 = Homosexuals, 6 = College Students, 7 = Middle Class.

Table 5

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects on Dislike and General Feelings

Source	df	F	η²	p
Between Subjects Dislike Averages				
Sex (S)	1	.64	**.0006**	.41
Target Group (TG)	6	49.48	**.24**	.001
S x TG	6	1.20	**.006**	.31
error	257			
Between Subjects General Feelings Averages				
Sex (S)	1	.21	**.0001**	.65
Target Group (TG)	6	45.60	**.19**	.001
S x TG	6	1.46	**.006**	.19
error	258			

Significance at p < .05.

Table 6

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects on Dislike and General Feelings

Source	df	F	η^2	p
Between Subjects Dislike Averages				
Age (A)	5	.92	**.004**	.47
Target Group (TG)	6	36.15	**.17**	.001
A x TG	30	1.06	**.03**	.39
error	229			
Between Subjects General Feelings Averages				
Age (A)	5	1.24	**.004**	.29
Target Group (TG)	6	33.93	**.19**	.001
A x TG	30	1.05	**.02**	.40
error	230			

Significance at $p < .05$.

Table 7

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects on Dislike and General Feelings

Source	df	F	η²	p
Between Subjects Dislike Averages				
Race (R)	1	.07	**.00005**	.80
Target Group (TG)	6	27.61	**.13**	.001
R x TG	30	1.51	**.007**	.39
error	257			
Between Subjects General Feelings Averages				
Race (R)	1	.08	**.00005**	.29
Target Group (TG)	6	26.16	**.11**	.001
R x TG	30	.78	**.003**	.40
error	230			

Significance at p < .05.

Table 8

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects on Dislike and General Feelings

Source	df	F	η^2	p
Between Subjects Dislike Averages				
Political Party (PP)	2	3.71	**.005**	.03
Target Group (TG)	6	40.69	**.19**	.001
PP x TG	12	1.92	**.01**	.19
error	249			
Between Subjects General Feelings Averages				
Political Party (PP)	2	8.56	**.01**	.001
Target Group (TG)	6	38.16	**.15**	.001
PP x TG	12	1.43	**.01**	.15
error	250			

Significance at p < .05.

Table 9

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects on Dislike and General Feelings

Source	df	F	η²	p
Between Subjects Dislike Averages				
Religion (R)	1	10.21	**.007**	.002
Target Group (TG)	6	55.89	**.23**	.001
R x TG	6	3.02	**.01**	.007
error	263			
Between Subjects General Feelings Averages				
Religion (R)	1	10.73	**.006**	.001
Target Group (TG)	6	48.12	**.17**	.001
R x TG	6	5.49	**.02**	.001
error	267			

Significance at p < .05.

Table 10

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study Two Dependent Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Feelings	--											
2. Hate	-.70**	--										
3. Stage 1 PEV	-.76**	.89**	--									
4. Stage 2 PEV	-.66**	.91**	.84**	--								
5. Stage 3 PEV	-.68**	.88**	.87**	.85**	--							
6. PEV overall	-.74**	.93**	.95**	.94**	.96**	--						
7. Stage 1 HLB	-.71**	.89**	.88**	.85**	.89**	.92**	--					
8. Stage 2a HLB	-.40**	.66**	.59**	.62**	.65**	.65**	.62**	--				
9. Stage 2b HLB	-.62**	.83**	.80**	.81**	.87**	.87**	.82**	.60**	--			
10. Stage 3 HLB	-.67**	.93**	.86**	.85**	.89**	.91**	.88**	.66**	.83**	--		
11. HLB overall	-.70**	.94**	.89**	.88**	.93**	.95**	.96**	.73**	.89**	.97**	--	
12. Policy	-.58**	.61**	.67**	.66**	.72**	.72**	.69**	.43**	.65**	.71**	.71**	--
M	20.8	4.61	5.58	4.71	4.92	5.08	5.56	2.67	4.55	4.70	4.73	6.07
SD	24.7	3.28	3.11	2.86	3.18	2.90	3.11	3.00	3.58	3.07	2.90	2.80
N	344	349	348	352	349	345	351	352	351	352	350	349

** $p<.001$

All scores are reported as averages of the items on each respective scale. PEV refers to the attitude items assessing stage relevant attitudes: Stage 1 = fear/distrust of targets, Stage 2 = target blame, and Stage 3 = willingness to harm targets. HLB refers to the harm-legitimizing belief subscales assessing beliefs that: Stage 1 = the groups are mutually exclusive and polarized, Stage 2a = the targets are homogeneous, Stage 2b = the ingroup should unify, and Stage 3 = the targets are sub-human.

Table 11

Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Dispositional Measures and Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement subscales and total

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. RWA	--							
2. SDO	.55 **	--						
3.Group Identity	.48 **	.41 **	--					
4. Stage 1: Divide/Polar	.49 **	.48 **	.45 **	--				
5. Stage 2: Ingroup Unity	.44 **	.42 **	.31 **	.62 **	--			
6. Stage 2: Target similar	.48 **	.43 **	.42 **	.82 **	.60 **	--		
7. Stage 3: Devalue	.51 **	.49 **	.41 **	.88 **	.66 **	.83 **	--	
8. HLB totals	.53 **	.51 **	.45 **	.96 **	.73 **	.89 **	.97 **	--
M (SD)	2.99 (2.21)	2.73 (2.15)	6.47 (2.70)	5.56 (3.11)	2.67 (3.00)	4.55 (3.58)	4.70 (3.07)	4.73 (2.90)
N	348	345	352	351	352	351	352	350

**p<.001.

Table 12

*Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Dispositional Measures and
PEV Stage Related Attitude subscales/total and Policy Support*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. RWA	--							
2. SDO	.55 **	--						
3.Group Identity	.48 **	.41 **	--					
4. Stage 1: Fear/Distrust	.41 **	.44 **	.38 **	--				
5. Stage 2: Target Blame	.49 **	.45 **	.42 **	.84 **	--			
6. Stage 3: Support harm	.50 **	.51 **	.40 **	.87 **	.85 **	--		
7. PEV attitude average	.48 **	.49 **	.42 **	.95 **	.94 **	.96 **	--	
8. Policy Support	.46 **	.45 **	.41 **	.67 **	.66 **	.72 **	.49 **	--
M (SD)	2.99 (2.21)	2.73 (2.15)	6.47 (2.70)	5.58 (3.11)	4.71 (2.86)	4.92 (3.18)	5.08 (2.90)	6.07 (2.80)
N	348	345	352	348	352	349	345	349

**p<.001.

Table 13

Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Dispositional Measures,
General Feelings and Hatred Averages

	1	2	3	4	5
1. RWA	--				
2. SDO	.55 **	--			
3.Group Identity	.48 **	.41 **	--		
4. General Feelings	-.22 **	-.32 **	-.25 **	--	
5. Hate	.42 **	.44 **	.38 **	-.70 **	--
M (SD)	2.99 (2.21)	2.73 (2.15)	6.47 (2.70)	20.80 (24.73)	4.61 (3.28)
N	348	345	352	344	349

**p<.001.

Table 14

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Beliefs

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.20$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.58	**.001**	.63
Target Group (TG)	1	69.86	**.05**	.001
Sex (S)	1	1.38	**.002**	.24
S x TG	1	4.01	**.002**	.05
S x IC	3	.92	**.001**	.43
IC x TG x S	6	.89	**.003**	.51
Error	333			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Male	4.27	5.55	3.11	5.68	4.34	6.49	4.20	5.47	4.85
Female	3.34	6.56	3.52	5.46	2.31	6.33	3.11	5.79	4.59
Total	3.83	5.96	3.32	5.57	3.47	6.40	3.89	5.64	4.72

Table 15

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
$R^2=.23$				
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.29	**.001**	.83
Target Group (TG)	1	85.86	**.05**	.001
Sex (S)	1	1.02	**.001**	.31
S x TG	1	3.71	**.002**	.06
S x IC	3	.72	**.001**	.54
IC x TG x S	6	.86	**.003**	.52
Error	328			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean PEV Stage Related Attitudes by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Male	4.12	5.92	3.29	6.57	4.57	6.57	4.64	5.89	5.18
Female	3.06	7.04	3.55	6.09	2.83	6.80	3.28	6.08	4.95
Total	3.88	6.37	3.42	6.35	3.83	6.70	4.02	6.00	5.07

Table 16

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
$R^2=.06$				
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	1.12	**.002**	.34
Target Group (TG)	1	2.57	**.001**	.11
Sex (S)	1	.56	**.0003**	.46
S x TG	1	1.84	**.09**	.18
S x IC	3	.51	**.001**	.68
IC x TG x S	6	1.74	**.005**	.11
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Policy Support by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Male	6.75	5.90	4.85	6.48	6.33	7.12	6.63	5.35	6.17
Female	5.88	6.54	5.87	6.13	5.04	7.10	5.24	5.82	5.95
Total	6.33	6.15	5.37	6.32	5.78	7.11	5.98	5.60	6.07

Table 17

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.27$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.65	**.002**	.58
Target Group (TG)	1	117.72	**.15**	.001
Sex (S)	1	4.21	**.005**	.04
S x TG	1	6.30	**.01**	.01
S x IC	3	1.17	**.004**	.32
IC x TG x S	6	.44	**.003**	.86
Error	327			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Hatred by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Male	3.61	5.89	2.84	6.33	3.75	6.16	3.76	5.41	4.70
Female	2.66	7.44	2.73	6.25	1.75	6.29	2.44	6.20	4.50
Total	3.15	6.50	5.37	6.29	2.90	6.23	3.16	5.84	4.60

Table 18

Analysis of Variance for Sex Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Source	Df	F	η²	p
		R²=.29		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.45	**.001**	.72
Target Group (TG)	1	113.86	**.08**	.001
Sex (S)	1	.65	**.0004**	.422
S x TG	1	7.46	**.005**	.007
S x IC	3	.70	**.002**	.56
IC x TG x S	6	.61	**.003**	.72
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean General Feelings by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Male	27.14	12.15	30.89	6.70	29.38	7.47	24.53	7.76	18.78
Female	37.50	10.22	30.93	2.58	43.98	6.95	42.07	10.06	23.17
Total	32.07	11.40	30.93	4.87	35.60	7.19	32.50	9.01	20.86

Table 19

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Harm-Legitimizing Belief Endorsement

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.18		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	1.12	**.002**	.34
Target Group (TG)	1	45.71	**.03**	.001
Race (R)	1	.53	**.0003**	.47
R x TG	1	.57	**.002**	.45
R x IC	3	1.04	**.002**	.38
IC x TG x R	6	.46	**.001**	.83
Error	333			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
White	3.91	5.98	3.64	5.70	3.21	6.22	3.77	5.66	4.80
Non-white	3.38	5.86	1.40	5.48	3.99	6.71	3.52	5.55	4.46
Total	3.83	5.96	3.32	5.67	3.47	6.34	3.69	5.55	4.73

Table 20

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
$R^2=.22$				
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.92	**.002**	.43
Target Group (TG)	1	64.17	**.04**	.001
Race (R)	1	1.90	**.001**	.17
R x TG	1	1.84	**.001**	.18
R x IC	3	.85	**.001**	.47
IC x TG x R	6	.88	**.003**	.51
Error	328			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean PEV Stage Related Attitudes by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
White	4.01	6.51	3.85	6.32	3.72	6.60	4.22	5.99	5.19
Non-white	3.13	5.75	1.02	6.75	4.04	6.88	3.64	6.02	4.64
Total	3.88	6.37	3.42	6.40	3.83	6.40	4.02	6.00	5.07

Table 21

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.08$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	1.85	**.003**	.14
Target Group (TG)	1	5.12	**.002**	.02
Race (R)	1	.56	**.0002**	.46
R x TG	1	4.08	**.002**	.04
R x IC	3	1.02	**.001**	.39
IC x TG x R	6	2.52	**.01**	.02
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Policy Support by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		TOTAL
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
White	6.11	6.22	5.93	6.17	5.93	6.93	6.48	5.48	6.13
Non-white	7.67	5.81	2.13	7.21	5.50	7.40	4.98	6.32	5.82
Total	6.33	6.15	5.37	6.37	5.78	7.05	5.98	5.60	6.06

Table 22

Analysis of Variance for Race and Group on Policy Support, by Ideological Condition

Source	df	F	η^2	p
Control Condition $R^2=.02$				
Race (R)	1	.51	**.001**	.48
Target Group (TG)	1	1.18	**.002**	.28
R x TG	1	1.51	**.002**	.22
error	84			
Target Salience Condition $R^2=.16$				
Race (R)	1	2.92	**.01**	.09
Target Group (TG)	1	10.84	**.15**	.002
R x TG	1	8.98	**.01**	.004
error	76			
Stage One Condition $R^2=.06$				
Race (R)	1	.001	**.00001**	.98
Target Group (TG)	1	4.65	**.01**	.03
R x TG	1	,44	**.001**	.41
error	83			
Stage Three Condition $R^2=.04$				
Race (R)	1	.22	**.0004**	.64
Target Group (TG)	1	.06	**.0001**	.81
R x TG	1	2.66	**.005**	.11
error	89			

Table 23

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.26$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.30	**.001**	.83
Target Group (TG)	1	76.94	**.06**	.001
Race (R)	1	1.61	**.001**	.21
R x TG	1	.80	**.001**	.37
R x IC	3	.82	**.002**	.48
IC x TG x R	6	.55	**.002**	.77
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Hatred by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		TOTAL
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
White	3.35	6.51	3.12	6.41	2.64	6.19	3.31	5.85	4.72
Non-white	1.93	6.45	.80	6.03	3.40	6.08	2.84	5.80	4.13
Total	3.15	6.50	2.79	6.34	2.90	6.16	3.16	5.84	4.60

Table 24

Analysis of Variance for Race Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.31		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.46	**.002**	.71
Target Group (TG)	1	95.68	**.12**	.001
Race (R)	1	10.13	**.01**	.002
R x TG	1	4.85	**.006**	.03
R x IC	3	1.67	**.006**	.17
IC x TG x R	6	1.89	**.01**	.08
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean General Feelings by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
White	31.05	8.95	24.94	5.22	35.06	7.04	28.24	9.16	18.50
Non-white	38.22	23.04	66.89	2.28	36.63	8.44	40.73	8.10	29.57
Total	32.07	11.40	30.93	4.74	35.60	7.38	5.98	9.01	20.86

Table 25

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.23$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.04	**.00001**	.99
Target Group (TG)	1	68.69	**.04**	.001
Age (A)	1	1.40	**.001**	.24
A x TG	1	1.96	**.001**	.16
A x IC	3	6.48	**.02**	.001
IC x TG x A	6	.64	**.002**	.70
Error	334			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
18-31	4.28	5.95	2.71	4.66	4.27	6.61	3.30	5.34	4.60
32+	3.24	6.12	4.41	7.14	2.19	6.08	4.47	6.09	4.95
Total	3.83	5.96	3.32	5.67	3.47	6.40	3.69	5.65	4.74

Table 26

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.26		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.02	**.000003**	.99
Target Group (TG)	1	81.95	**.05**	.001
Age (A)	1	1.04	**.001**	.31
A x TG	1	.73	**.0004**	.39
A x IC	3	6.75	**.01**	.001
IC x TG x A	6	.92	**.003**	.48
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean PEV Stage Related Attitudes by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
18-31	4.31	6.17	2.93	5.57	4.59	7.12	3.44	5.78	4.96
32+	3.27	6.68	4.44	6.03	2.60	6.03	5.14	6.30	5.27
Total	3.88	6.37	3.42	6.70	3.83	6.70	4.02	6.00	5.08

Table 27

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Source	Df	F	η²	p
			R²=.08	
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.33	**.0005**	.81
Target Group (TG)	1	1.63	**.001**	.20
Age (A)	1	5.77	**.003**	.02
A x TG	1	.03	**.00002**	.85
A x IC	3	3.11	**.005**	.03
IC x TG x A	6	1.51	**.004**	.18
Error	332			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean Policy Support by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
18-31	6.19	5.91	4.91	5.47	6.04	7.36	5.27	5.45	5.80
32+	6.53	6.53	6.27	7.80	5.36	6.72	7.40	5.84	6.50
Total	6.33	6.15	5.37	6.37	5.78	7.11	5.98	5.60	6.07

Table 28

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.30		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.52	**.001**	.67
Target Group (TG)	1	110.14	**.08**	.001
Age (A)	1	.68	**.0004**	.41
A x TG	1	.69	**.0004**	.41
A x IC	3	7.52	**.02**	.001
IC x TG x A	6	.75	**.003**	.61
Error	333			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Hatred by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
18-31	3.61	6.34	2.12	5.32	3.81	6.70	2.63	5.76	4.52
32+	2.56	6.76	3.99	7.95	1.44	5.49	4.17	5.97	4.76
Total	3.15	6.50	2.79	6.34	2.90	6.22	3.16	5.84	4.61

Table 29

Analysis of Variance for Age Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.30$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	1.08	**.004**	.36
Target Group (TG)	1	110.53	**.13**	.001
Age (A)	1	.92	**.001**	.34
A x TG	1	.50	**.001**	.48
A x IC	3	4.12	**.02**	.007
IC x TG x A	6	1.78	**.01**	.10
Error	332			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean General Feelings by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
18-31	27.83	16.42	34.85	4.85	29.54	5.27	38.30	12.07	21,98
32+	37.72	4.26	23.87	4.58	45.30	9.81	21.29	4.33	18.97
Total	32.07	11.39	30.93	4.74	35.60	7.18	32.50	9.01	20.80

Table 30

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.24		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.40	**.001**	.75
Target Group (TG)	1	70.74	**.04**	.001
Religion (R)	1	25.14	**.02**	.001
R x TG	1	.34	**.0002**	.56
R x IC	3	.02	**.00005**	.99
IC x TG x R	6	.76	**.003**	.60
Error	332			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Christ./Cath.	4.48	6.72	4.39	5.91	3.97	7.18	4.59	6.41	5.42
Other	3.05	5.44	2.14	5.54	2.91	5.30	3.03	4.97	4.11
Total	3.83	5.96	3.32	5.67	3.47	6.40	3.69	5.65	4.74

Table 31

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
R^2=.27				
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.21	**.0003**	.89
Target Group (TG)	1	88.86	**.05**	.001
Religion (R)	1	25.37	**.01**	.001
R x TG	1	1.43	**.001**	.23
R x IC	3	.13	**.0002**	.94
IC x TG x R	6	.64	**.002**	.70
Error	332			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean PEV Stage Related Attitudes by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Christ./Cath.	4.63	7.24	4.37	6.56	4.56	7.19	5.03	6.74	5.74
Other	3.01	5.79	2.38	6.30	3.01	6.00	3.26	5.37	4.46
Total	3.88	6.38	3.42	6.40	3.83	6.70	4.02	6.00	5.08

Table 32

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.12$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.63	**.001**	.60
Target Group (TG)	1	2.92	**.001**	.09
Religion (R)	1	32.38	**.02**	.001
R x TG	1	.14	**.00006**	.71
R x IC	3	.10	**.0001**	.96
IC x TG x R	6	1.23	**.003**	.29
Error	333			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean Policy Support by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Christ./Cath.	7.27	6.88	6.18	7.13	6.63	7.90	6.87	6.62	6.94
Other	5.20	5.69	4.53	5.94	4.82	6.00	5.33	4.67	5.28
Total	6.33	6.16	5.37	6.37	5.78	7.11	5.98	5.60	6.07

Table 33

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Source	Df	F	η²	p
		$R^2=.29$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.29	**.001**	.73
Target Group (TG)	1	113.24	**.08**	.001
Religion (R)	1	18.40	**.01**	.001
R x TG	1	.27	**.0002**	.60
R x IC	3	.29	**.00006**	.83
IC x TG x R	6	.74	**.003**	.62
Error	333			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Hatred by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Christ./Cath.	3.83	7.42	3.87	6.67	3.11	6.73	4.17	6.57	5.19
Other	2.36	5.90	1.59	6.15	2.66	5.52	2.46	5.21	4.08
Total	3.15	6.50	2.78	6.34	2.90	6.23	3.16	5.84	4.61

Table 34

Analysis of Variance for Religion Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Source	Df	F	η²	p
		R^2=.28		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.54	**.002**	.66
Target Group (TG)	1	111.63	**.14**	.001
Religion (R)	1	6.79	**.009**	.01
R x TG	1	4.17	**.005**	.04
R x IC	3	.48	**.002**	.70
IC x TG x R	6	.32	**.002**	.93
Error	328			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean General Feelings by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Christ/Catho	24.64	9.89	26.71	5.51	32.21	6.35	25.89	6.09	18.24
Other	41.07	12.46	35.57	4.32	39.44	7.18	37.08	11.47	23.13
Total	32.07	11.40	30.93	4.74	35.60	6.09	32.50	9.01	20.80

Table 35

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.32		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.29	**.0005**	.83
Target Group (TG)	1	48.39	**.03**	.001
Political Party (PP)	2	20.85	**.02**	.001
PP x TG	2	2.86	**.003**	.06
PP x IC	6	1.52	**.005**	.17
IC x TG x PP	9	1.11	**.006**	.35
Error	325			

Significance level p<.05.

Mean Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Republican	5.34	5.55	6.03	5.95	5.28	8.07	5.52	7.56	6.24
Independent	4.08	5.59	4.07	6.09	4.30	6.63	3.60	5.33	5.10
Democrat	2.01	6.51	2.02	4.94	2.23	4.40	3.19	5.23	3.71
Total	3.74	5.96	3.32	5.67	3.47	6.40	3.69	5.65	4.73

Table 36

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.34$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.29	**.0004**	.83
Target Group (TG)	1	60.27	**.03**	.001
Political Party (PP)	2	22.76	**.02**	.001
PP x TG	2	4.31	**.004**	.01
PP x IC	6	.98	**.003**	.44
IC x TG x PP	9	.72	**.003**	.69
Error	320			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean PEV Stage Related Attitudes by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Republican	5.54	6.63	5.63	6.96	5.69	8.30	6.67	7.89	6.68
Independent	4.16	6.01	4.75	6.52	4.73	6.61	3.90	5.73	5.42
Democrat	2.11	6.69	2.25	6.07	2.52	5.22	3.29	5.52	4.08
Total	3.82	6.37	3.42	6.39	3.83	6.70	4.02	6.00	5.07

Table 37

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		$R^2=.18$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.36	**.0004**	.78
Target Group (TG)	1	.07	**.00003**	.79
Political Party (PP)	2	21.75	**.02**	.001
PP x TG	2	2.50	**.002**	.08
PP x IC	6	.65	**.001**	.69
IC x TG x PP	9	.84	**.003**	.58
Error	324			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Policy Support by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Republican	7.88	6.04	8.16	7.30	7.42	8.48	8.61	7.13	7.74
Independent	6.78	6.35	6.14	6.74	6.37	7.35	6.15	5.32	6.41
Democrat	4.45	5.97	4.15	5.58	4.76	5.40	5.07	5.28	5.04
Total	6.30	6.15	5.37	6.37	5.78	7.11	5.98	5.60	6.07

Table 38

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Source	Df	F	η^2	p
		R^2=.36		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	.08	**.0002**	.97
Target Group (TG)	1	85.97	**.06**	.001
Political Party (PP)	2	15.94	**.02**	.001
PP x TG	2	4.08	**.005**	.02
PP x IC	6	1.10	**.004**	.36
IC x TG x PP	9	.65	**.004**	.75
Error	324			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean Hatred by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Republican	4.82	6.57	5.20	6.72	4.71	7.63	5.40	8.10	6.10
Independent	3.09	6.13	3.80	6.38	3.83	6.21	3.00	5.05	4.88
Democrat	1.38	6.90	1.50	6.15	1.59	4.85	2.55	5.71	3.67
Total	3.06	6.50	2.79	6.34	2.90	6.22	3.16	5.84	4.61

Table 39

Analysis of Variance for Political Party Effects, Target Group and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Source	Df	F	η²	p
		$R^2=.41$		
Ideological Condition (IC)	3	1.77	**.01**	.15
Target Group (TG)	1	81.06	**.09**	.001
Political Party (PP)	2	14.81	**.03**	.001
PP x TG	2	19.01	**.001**	.001
PP x IC	6	.49	**.003**	.82
IC x TG x PP	9	1.20	**.01**	.31
Error	324			
Significance level p<.05.				

Mean General Feelings by Condition

	Control		Threat Salience		Stage One		Stage Three		Total
	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	Illegal	Muslim	
Republican	13.31	20.13	11.07	.20	11.56	6.03	14.14	6.29	10.54
Independent	27.76	13.40	26.22	7.10	27.44	7.40	32.60	9.67	17.85
Democrat	54.26	5.67	40.14	3.58	50.32	8.15	38.27	9.44	28.15
Total	32.58	11.40	30.93	4.74	35.60	7.18	32.50	9.01	20.82

Table 40

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and RWA on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Illegal Immigrant Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.45		
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.17	-.03	-.38
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.52	-.09	-1.19
	Three	-.001	.00	-.001
	RWA	.81	.67	11.56**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.46		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.12	-.02	-.82
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.52	-.09	-.99
	Three	-.01	-.001	-.30
	RWA	.66	.54	4.61**
Interaction Terms	Threat x RWA	.31	.13	1.12
	One x RWA	.11	.05	1.66
	Three x RWA	.19	.07	1.21

** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .001

Table 41

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and SDO on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Illegal Immigrant Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.53		
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.19	-.03	-.47
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.20	-.03	-.49
	Three	-.13	-.02	-.33
	SDO	.89	.73	13.81**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.55		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.13	-.02	-.33
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.18	-.03	-.47
	Three	-.10	-.02	-.25
	SDO	1.01	.82	7.54**
Interaction Terms	Threat x SDO	.06	.03	.33
	One x SDO	-.14	-.06	-.76
	Three x SDO	-.42	-.16	-2.23*

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$

Table 42

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and Group Identification Strength on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Illegal Immigrant Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.12		
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.63	-.10	-1.20
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.21	-.03	-.41
	Three	.06	.01	.12
GROUP IDENTIFICATION STRENGTH		.47	.45	6.61**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.12		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.66	-.11	-1.25
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	-.26	-.04	-.50
	Three	.11	.02	.21
GROUP IDENTIFICATION STRENGTH		.39	.38	2.78*
Interaction Terms	Threat x GROUP	.19	.08	.92
	One x GROUP	-.08	-.04	-.42
	Three x GROUP	.18	.10	.96

** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .001$

Table 43

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and RWA on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Muslim Extremist Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.12		
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.16	-.03	-.32
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.22	.04	.44
	Three	-.16	-.03	-.34
	RWA	.56	.47	6.94**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.12		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	-.20	-.03	-.40
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.10	.02	.20
	Three	-.16	-.03	-.33
	RWA	.33	.28	1.81
Interaction Terms	Threat x RWA	.07	.03	.27
	One x RWA	.44	.19	1.81
	Three x RWA	.34	.16	1.45

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .001

Table 44

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and SDO on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Muslim Extremist Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.14		
Ideological Condition	Threat	.17	.03	.31
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.84	.13	1.54
	Three	.07	.01	.13
	SDO	.44	.36	4.89**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.15		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	.13	.02	.23
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.85	.14	1.54
	Three	.09	.02	.17
	SDO	.48	.39	2.73**
Interaction Terms	Threat x SDO	-.26	-.10	-.98
	One x SDO	.12	.05	.45
	Three x SDO	-.05	-.02	-.21

** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .001

Table 45

Relationship Between Exposure to Ideology and Group Identification Strength on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement for the Muslim Extremist Target Group

		Endorsement of Harm-legitimizing Ideologies		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Main Effects		R^2=.12		
Ideological Condition	Threat	.43	.07	.83
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.46	.08	.94
	Three	-.003	.00	-.01
GROUP IDENTIFICATION STRENGTH		.47	.50	7.32**
With Interaction Terms		R^2=.12		
Predictor variable		B	β	t
Ideological Condition	Threat	.25	.04	.47
(Dummy Coded, Compares Ideology to Control)	One	.12	.02	.24
	Three	-.13	-.02	-.28
GROUP IDENTIFICATION STRENGTH		.26	.28	1.95*
Interaction Terms	Threat x GROUP	.14	.08	.81
	One x GROUP	.54	.22	2.53*
	Three x GROUP	.24	.15	1.38

** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .001$

Figure 1
Stanton's (1996) "Eight Stages of Genocide" model

1. Classification

↓

2. Symbolization

↓

3. Dehumanization

↓

4. Organization

↓

5. Polarization

↓

6. Preparation

↓

7. Extermination

↓

8. Denial

Figure 2
Staub's (1999) model

Influences and processes contributing to genocide and mass killing   (Staub 1999)

Legitimizing Ideologies
Individual Identity Type
Authority Orientation

Culture

Group Self-Concept
Cultural Devaluation
Ideology of Antagonism
Unhealed Victimization

Instigators

Difficult Life
Conditions

Intergroup
Conflict

Threat
To
Basic
Needs

Elevating In-Group

Derogating Out-group

Scapegoating

Creating or
Adopting Ideology

Initial
Harming

Altered Societal
and Individual
Identity

And

Changes in Norms
and Institutions

Mass Killings
Genocide

Bystanders

Figure 3
Waller's (2002) model

A Model of Extraordinary Human Evil - Waller 2002

Figure 4
The Perpetration of Extreme Violence (PEV) model

CULTURAL CONTEXT & COLLECTIVE DIFFICULTIES:
Economic Struggle, Competition for Resources, Revolution, History of Violence, etc.

Group Classification/Reclassification (mutual exclusivity), Polarization

Fear/Distrust of Target Group

Deindividuation (targets and perpetrators)

Target Group Blame   Scapegoating of Target Group

Dehumanization/Demonization/Devaluation

Approval of Actions to Harm Target Group

Normalization of Harming

Actions to Harm Target Group

Reconstruction of Identity based on Ideology

Actions to Exterminate Target Group

Figure 5
Moderated Mediation model

```
                        ┌─────────────────────────┐
                        │  RWA, SDO and/or Group   │
                        │ Identification Strength  │
                        └─────────────────────────┘
                                    │
                                    ▼
┌──────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Exposure to Harm-│      │  Endorsement of  │      │ Harmful Attitudes,   │
│   Legitimizing   │─────▶│ Harm-Legitimizing│─────▶│ Hatred and Support   │
│   Ideologies     │      │   Ideologies     │      │ for Harming Targets  │
└──────────────────┘      └──────────────────┘      └──────────────────────┘
         │                                                      ▲
         └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 6
Mediation Model: Extreme Ideologies Mediate Effects of Benign Ideologies on Hatred

All coefficients are standardized and significant at p<.05.
The coefficient in parentheses was obtained from a model without the mediator.
The change in this coefficient is statistically significant (p<.05).

Figure 7
Mediation Model: Extreme Ideologies Mediate Effects of Benign Ideologies on Policy
Support

All coefficients are standardized and significant at $p<.05$.
The coefficient in parentheses was obtained from a model without the mediator.
The change in this coefficient is statistically significant ($p<.05$).

Figure 8
Study One DVs by Target Group

Figure 9
Study Two DVs by Condition

Note: for all measures except for the general feelings measure, higher scores indicate greater levels of negative attitudes, beliefs and support for harmful policies. For the general feelings measure, higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 10
Interaction: Participant Sex and Target Group on Harm-legitimizing Ideology Endorsement

Note: Higher scores indicate greater levels of harm-legitimizing beliefs (group difference/polarization, deindividuation and target devaluing).

Figure 11
Interaction: Participant Sex and Target Group on Hatred

Note: Higher scores indicate more hatred toward the targets.

Figure 12
Interaction: Participant Sex and Target Group on General Feelings

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 13
Interaction: Participant Race and Target Group on Policy Support

Note: Higher scores indicate greater support for policies designed to harm the targets.

Figure 14
Interaction: Participant Race and Target Group on General Feelings

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 15
Interaction: Participant Age and Ideological Condition on Harm-legitimizing Belief
Endorsement

Note: Higher scores indicate greater levels of harm-legitimizing beliefs (group
difference/polarization, deindividuation and target devaluing).

Figure 16

Interaction: Participant Age and Ideological Condition on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Note: Higher scores indicate greater levels of stage related attitudes (fear/distrust, blame and support for harming).

Figure 17
Interaction: Participant Age and Ideological Condition on Policy Support

Note: Higher scores indicate greater support for policies designed to harm the targets.

Figure 18
Interaction: Participant Age and Ideological Condition on Hatred

Note: Higher scores indicate more hatred toward the targets.

Figure 19
Interaction: Participant Age and Ideological Condition on General Feelings

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 20
Interaction: Participant Religion and Target Group on General Feelings

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 21
Interaction: Participant Political Party and Target Group on PEV Stage Related Attitudes

Note: Higher scores indicate greater levels of stage related attitudes (fear/distrust, blame and support for harming).

Figure 22
Interaction: Participant Political Party and Target Group on Hatred

Note: Higher scores indicate more hatred toward the targets.

Figure 23
Interaction: Participant Political Party and Target Group on General Feelings

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards the targets.

Figure 24
Moderation: Simple Effects for SDO on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement About Illegal Immigrants

Note: higher scores indicate more endorsement for harm-legitimizing ideologies about illegal immigrants. High SDO scores were calculated by subtracting the mean +1 SD (4.88) from each score. Low SDO scores were calculated by subtracting the mean -1 SD (.57) from each score

Predictive equations:
Harm-legitimizing belief endorsement = -1.01 - .13(threat)-.18(stage one) - .10 (stage three) + 1.01(SDO) + .06(threat x SDO) - .14 (stage one x SDO) - .42 (stage three x SDO)

High SDO = 3.92 + .16 (threat) - .68(stage one) – 2.15(stage three)
Low SDO = -.43 - .1(threat) - .68(stage one) - .34 (stage three)

Figure 25
Moderation: Group Identification Strength on Harm-legitimizing Belief Endorsement
About Muslim Extremists

Note: higher scores indicate more endorsement for harm-legitimizing ideologies about
Muslim extremists. High Group Identification scores were calculated by subtracting the
mean +1 SD (9.17) from each score. Low SDO scores were calculated by subtracting the
mean -1 SD (3.87) from each score

Predictive equations:
Harm-legitimizing belief endorsement = 1.05 + .25(threat) +.12(stage one) - .13(stage
three) + .26(Group Identification) + .14(threat x Group) +.54(stage one x Group) +
.24(stage three x Group)

High Group Identifiers = 3.43 + 1.53 (threat) + 5.07(stage one) + 2.07(stage three)
Low Group Identifiers = 2.06 + .79(threat) + 2.21(stage one) + .80(stage three)

Image 1
Polish Propaganda Example of Dehumanization of the Jews

Nazi propagand poster from WWII – caption "Jews are lice, they cause typhus"

Poster published in Poland in March 1941
Source: http://www.ushmm.org/propaganda/archive/polish-antisemitic-poster/

Image 2
Nazi Propaganda "Jews as Threatening Octopus" Dehumanizing Propaganda

Antisemitic cartoon by Seppla (Josef Plank)--An octopus with a Star of David over its head has its tentacles encompassing a globe.
Credit line: Library of Congress, courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.
Date: Circa 1938

Source: http://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/arts/ARTPROP.HTM

Appendix A
"The Hutu 10 Commandments" & examples of Kagura/RTLM messages

1

KANGURA,   K0157990

KEY:

The extracts are written in normal print.

━━━━━━━━━━   ━━━━━

1990:

No 6 December 1990:

Page 8: The 10 commandments:
1. Every Hutu must know that any Tutsi woman, wherever she is, is working for her Tutsi ethnic group. In consequence, every Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
-who espouses a Tutsi woman
-who takes a Tutsi woman as a concubine.
-who takes a Tutsi woman as his secretary or his protegee.
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu girls are more worthy and more conscientious in their role as women, wives, and mothers. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons to their senses.
4. Every Hutu must know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. He only aims at the supremacy of his ethnic.
        "The night will be told by the one who spent it." (Literal translation of a Rwandan proverb.)
Consequently, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
-who makes an alliance with Tutsis in his business.
-who invests his money or the State's money in a company of a Tutsi;
-who lends or borrows money from a Tutsi;
-who gives favors to Tutsis in business (granting importing licenses, banking loans, building plots, State markets...)
5. Strategical posts as well as political, administrative, economical, military, and security ones must be put in hands of Hutus.
6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be Hutu in the majority.
7. The Rwandan Armed Forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October 1990 war teaches us that. A soldier can't take a Tutsi woman as a wife.
8. Hutus must stop taking pity on Tutsis.
9. -The Hutus, wherever they are, must be united, interdependent and worried about the condition of their Hutu brothers.
        - The Hutus of the interior and from outside must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting by their Bantou brothers.
        - They have to constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda.

2

- The Hutus must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy Tutsi.
10. The 1959 Social Revolution, the 1961 Referendum, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu and at all the levels.
Every Hutu must widely diffuse the present ideology.
Any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother for having read, diffused and taught this ideology is a traitor.

1991:

No 23 October 1991:

Last page:
Colonel Rwendeye's photograph:
Caption: " We will always remember Colonel Rwendeye, who sacrificed himself for the mass, and we will avenge him and his mates."

No 25 November 1991:

In the editorial: We Hutus, are now angry.
It is now evident that if that continues like that, the mass can take part in that war in another way because wars are identical.

No 26 November 1991:

The cover:
Special: Tutsi, God's race.
Which arms should we use to vanquish Inyenzi forever? (A machete is drawn in front of this title.)
If the Hutu 1959 Revolution should be brought back, for us to vanquish Inyenzi-Ntutsi.

Editorial(page3, 3rd column):
But what we can affirm is that as long as the government does not dare to affirm that we are fighting against Inyenzi constituted of Tutsis and supported by Tutsis all over the world, the war will never come to an end. And the National Armed Forces don't have to search for the enemy in Mutara and in the volcanoes, forgetting that even inside the country, the enemy, where he is, is still persevering, except that now, we have started making plans against the Inkotanyi of the towns, if they do not correct themselves. Their accomplices, who can be found all over the country, especially in the higher posts, will pay for the blood of Hutus who continue to be killed or made infirm by Inyenzi-nkotanyi.

Page 15, 2nd column, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs:
Now that it is evident that the Inkotanyi who are attacking us are Tutsis who want to restore the monarchy, if the mass kills the "Virgiles" who support the Inkotanyi, will they deny that they did not irritate us?

...You Rwandans, do you accept that the Rwandan Armed Forces continue to wait for the enemy who will come from Uganda while they left enemies in Kigali and in other towns? The Inkotanyi and the "Virgile" must know that they don't bleed milk, because now we are angry for the blood of Rwandans (citizens and soldiers) who are being killed by Inkotanyi.

No 28, December 1991:
Page 15, title: The Tutsis of Central Africa are now in danger since all the Hutus are aware that the minority is" the meat of ravens."

4

1992:

No 33 March 1992:

Cover: The bad Hutus are those who divide Rwanda for they want to get satisfied and who forget that the enemy of Hutus is one for all of them.

1993:

No 39 January 1993:

Cover: The picture is showing Hutus (CDR) with traditional arms, and saying: "if we do not participate in the government, we will do what you have done too."

No 40 February 1993:

Editorial: "Ruhengeri and Byumba were attacked, and the Tutsis drank champagne."
1st column, 1st paragraph:
Hutus must be eager to be happy in the same way. It is said that a wound made by a spear is cured by another hot one (literal translation of a rwandese proverb.)

Page 6, last paragraph:
Don't worry: when we will reach our objective of taking power, we will shout and those who must die will die. It will be worse than it has been for the Bagogwe? . . "

Last page: Ngeze's photograph:
Caption: " All the families who know that they have sent their children to Inyenzi aiming at exterminating the Rwandan Armed Forces and all the Hutus, will pay for their blood that was destroyed by Inkotanyi."

Page 13: Title: RTLM: <u>The sun cannot light where a Tutsi has put his clothes to dry.</u> (Literal translation of a rwandese <u>proverb.</u>)

[redacted]

Page 14: I am not concerned, I am a CDR's member.

1. You the Hutu who took back your property in 1959 after Inyenzi had fled from Rwanda, leave your property as the Arusha agreements say.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

2. Rwandese citizen, get ready to be ruled by the force of whip and to give taxes in order to enrich the Inyenzi as the Arusha agreements say it.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

3. Soldier, member of the Rwandese army, <u>give out your arm</u> and <u>go to cultivate the marsh as the</u> Arusha agreements say it.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

4. Rwandese tradesman, you who are always worried, get ready to pay more taxes to enable the government comprising Inyenzi to pay the loans taken in order to buy arms to attack the majority mass as the Arusha agreements say it.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

5. Hutu Minister, leave Kigali and go to work in Byumba where the <u>Inkotanyi</u> ~FPR~ can capture you as the Arusha agreements say it.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

6. Rwandese who goes by taxi, get ready to go on filling the Inyenzi's pockets, you see that their relatives are constantly raising their prices before they come, now that they are coming, forty will be multiplied by four.

" I am not concerned, we will use our own ones, I am a CDR's member."

7. Civil servant, give out your office, and give the place to the Inyenzi as the Arusha agreements say it."

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

8. All the Hutus, get ready to be treated by the Inyenzi who do not look at injections full of AIDS, because the Arusha agreements gave them the Health *(the ministry of health.)*

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

9. Hutu who is still asleep even if you are intelligent, get ready to be liquidated by Inyenzi as the Inyenzi Museveni has done in Uganda.

" I am not concerned. I am a CDR's member."

10. You innocent people, get ready to lose your peace as the Arusha agreements say it." We are not concerned. We are CDR's members."

[redacted]

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1994:

No 59 March II 1994:

Editorial: 3rd column: Because it (RPF) is aware that if it attacks, all their people will be exterminated and at that time, we will have known them because we will be spending the days with them and will be working with them.

Appendix B
Study One Example Packet

Thank you for your interest in this research.

The purpose of this study is to examine the social judgment process; specifically, how people's attitudes and beliefs about a variety of social groups relate to their support for group relevant policies. Over the course of this survey, you will be asked to respond to a series of questions measuring your attitudes about a variety of groups and your support for hypothetical policies related to each group. These scales are broken up into a series of blocks so that all of the items in a particular block pertain to only one group. After finishing a block, you will be instructed to move on to the next until all blocks are completed. Once you have completed the study, you will be provided with a "completion code" which you will need to enter on Mechanical Turk to receive compensation for your work.

After clicking next, you will be directed to the first block of questions. This block of questions pertains to your attitudes and policy decisions relating to _____. Please note that there are a variety of different types of questions for this block and you will need to read the instructions carefully to ensure your answers best represents your feelings, level of agreement with the statement or level of support for the described policy. Failure to read through the instructions will be detected via a series of items that will require you to answer questions in a particular way, and those not responding to these items in the appropriate manner will be excluded from the study. To ensure proper responses, please be sure to read both the instructions and items carefully on each page.

Additionally, remember that your responses are anonymous. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers and, though it may be difficult at times, we ask that you respond honestly. Psychologists acknowledge that this can be difficult, and that fear of portraying one's self in a negative light often drives people to lie or strategically change their responses. For this reason, a series of sophisticated detection questions have been included in these scales. For example, consider the following question:

How often do you stop for stranded motorists?

Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always

This question, though it may appear innocent is one of the tools psychologists use to determine if an individual may be lying to appear more positively. With the possible exception of policemen on patrol, NO ONE "usually" or "always" stops for stranded motorists. People who say they do are most likely lying.

While some of these detection questions may appear obvious, others will not; we therefore ask that you answer all questions as honestly as possible. If you don't, we *will* know that many of your answers are lies. This will allow us to statistically adjust your answers so that they more accurately reflect the real, and considerably less favorable, you.

BLOCK ONE

For the following items you will be asked to indicate your feelings about _____ by circling a value on the associated "Feeling Thermometer." As with a regular thermometer, lower values are associated with "cooler" (more distant or negative) feelings, while higher values are associated with "warmer" (more close or positive) feelings.

How warmly do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
COLD   WARM

How close do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISTANT   CLOSE

How much do you like _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISLIKE   LIKE

BLOCK ONE

For the next series of items, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses are anonymous.

0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
do not agree at all					**moderately agree**					**completely agree**

1. _____   _____ cannot be trusted.

2. _____   I feel threatened by _____.

3. _____   _____ are not like true Americans.

4. _____   _____ are just troublemakers.

5. _____   _____ are no more to blame for societies ills than any other group.

6. _____   _____ are warm and friendly people.

BLOCK ONE

Please answer the following questions using the same 0-10 agreement scale. However, to indicate you are reading the instructions carefully, please respond to number 11 filling in the number 11. Failure to follow this instruction will lead to your exclusion from this study. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers for the remaining questions (7-10 and 12), and your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

7. _____   I would like to avoid contact with _____.

8. _____   _____ are evil.

9. _____   We must unite against the _____.

10. _____   _____ are just as distinctive as any other American.

11. _____   I find _____ attractive.

12. _____   I have close friends who are _____.

BLOCK ONE

Please continue to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					**moderately agree**					**completely agree**

13. _____   _____ are a threat to the American way of life.

14. _____   I feel comfortable around _____.

15. _____   I enjoy being around _____.

16. _____   _____ are valuable citizens who deserve equal rights.

17. _____   We are nothing like _____.

18. _____   I am disgusted by _____.

BLOCK ONE

Please answer the following questions using the same 0-10 agreement scale. However, to indicate you are reading the instructions carefully, please DO NOT respond to item number 21. Just leave that response area blank. Failure to follow this instruction will lead to your exclusion from this study. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers for the remaining questions (19/20 and 22-24), and your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

19. _____   We have nothing to fear from _____.

20. _____   American's should do all in their power to get rid of the _____.

21. _____   _____ deserve the bad things that happen to them.

22._____   _____ are upright citizens.

23. _____   _____ are all alike.

24. _____   _____ have contributed much to American culture.

BLOCK ONE

Please continue to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					**moderately agree**					**completely agree**

25. _____ Without _____ America would have far few problems.

26. _____   We should take action to protect ourselves from _____.

27. _____   I am angered by _____.

28. _____   _____ are just as good as any other group.

29. _____   _____ should be protected from those that wish them harm.

30. _____   _____ are a plague upon our nation.

31. _____   I find _____ to be repulsive.

BLOCK ONE

Below is a list of proposed policies relating to _____. Please use the following scale to indicate your support for each policy. There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not support at all					**moderately support**					**completely support**

1. _____ **Citizen's Rally** – US citizens should band together to support companies/businesses employing and supporting _____.

2. _____ **Withdrawal of Aid** – The US government should deny federal aid to individuals known to be _____ and should cease funding any programs seeking to assist _____.

3. _____ **Ban from Public Office** – Individuals suspected of being _____ should be barred from holding positions of power in the local, state and federal government.

4. _____ **Support for _____ Educators –** to show that you have read this item, please put the letter A in the response blank. Failure to do so will result in your exclusion from the study.

5. _____ _____ **Protection** – acts of discrimination or violence committed against individuals due to their identification as (or perceived affiliation with) _____ should be deemed hate crimes, and punishments to the offenders should be doubled.

6. _____   **Detention of _____ and their Allies –** the US government should

have the right to detain individuals believed to be _____ and

those who are known to be aiding _____.

BLOCK ONE

You have reached the end of BLOCK ONE.

Before continuing on to the next block, you will be asked to respond to a series of questions about yourself. Please read through each question carefully and pick the option that best describes you. When you have finished these questions you will be given further instructions.

For the following items, please respond by selecting the option that best describes you. If none of the options available fit, please select "other" and fill in your response.

What is your **sex**? (please select one):

    Male   Female

What is your **age**? (please select appropriate range):

    18-24   25-31   32-38   49-55   56+

What is your **religious affiliation**? (please select one):

    Christian   Catholic   Jewish   Muslim   Hindu   Buddhist

    Atheist   Agnostic   Other _____ (please specify)

What is your **race/ethnicity**? (please select one):

    White   African-American   Latino   Asian

    Other _____ (please specify)

What is your **political party affiliation**? (please select one):

    Republican   Democrat   Independent

    Other _____ (please specify)

What do you feel the purpose of this study was?

_____

Do you feel that you were deceived in any way in this study?

_____

This is the end of the study.

Thank you for your interest in our research and participation in this study. All of your responses are anonymous and will be combined with the responses of the other participants. Before we give you your confirmation code, we ask that you carefully read the following statement regarding the purpose of this study and respond to the question at the bottom to confirm that you understand this debriefing.

We ask that you not share this information with others who might participate in our study in the future. If a participant knew exactly what the study was about before they participated, their data would be invalid and our findings would be invalid as a result.

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

This research is intended to examine the ways in which negative attitudes and beliefs about certain groups may relate to support for policies that might be harmful to that group. For the purpose of this study, you were randomly assigned to respond to attitude and policy item related to only one group, _____. Other groups include: _____, ____, ____, ____ or _____.   Most of these groups were selected for examination because they are groups that Americans tend to view in a negative manner: illegal immigrants, Muslim extremists, Religious conservatives, and homosexuals. The remaining groups were chosen to serve as standards for comparison, because they tend to be neutrally evaluated groups: the middle class and college students. Each of these measures you completed were primarily intended to detect levels of prejudice, dislike and hatred towards the groups. The items on these scales, particularly the scale asking about support for policies, were completely hypothetical and not real.

As indicated on in the consent statement, your responses are completely anonymous and there is no way for your answers to be connected to you personally. Every participant has been assigned randomly generated participant identification numbers that are in no way tied to any other form of identification in the Qualtrics or Mechanical Turk system, and the data files will be kept separate from any other identifying materials.

In closing, we would like to thank you again for your participation in this research. Your participation has been very valuable because it will further the field's understanding of the ways in which policy support relates to peoples' beliefs and attitudes.

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO INDICATE YOU HAVE READ THE DEBREIFING STATEMENT:

Which of the following was <u>NOT</u> a group being examined in this study?

Illegal immigrants   Atheists   College Students   Homosexuals

Middle Class   Muslim Extremists   Religious Conservatives

True or False: My participation in this study is completely anonymous and none of my responses can be traced back to me.

Thank you again for your participation in this research.

Your participation confirmation number is #############. Please enter this number in the space provided on Mechanical Turk to confirm your completion of the questionnaire and to receive compensation.

CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the research or procedures, you ay contact the lead researchers, **Heather Nofziger** or **Dr. Lee Jussim**, at **101 Tillet Hall, Livingston Campus, or 732-445-2070**. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Sponsored Programs Administrator at:

Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects

Office of Research and Sponsored Programs

3 Rutgers Plaza

New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559

Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104

Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Appendix C

Feeling Thermometers

For the following items you will be asked to indicate your feelings about _____ by circling a value on the associated "Feeling Thermometer." As with a regular thermometer, lower values are associated with "cooler" (more distant or negative) feelings, while higher values are associated with "warmer" (more close or positive) feelings.

How warmly do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
COLD   WARM

How close do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISTANT   CLOSE

How much do you like _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISLIKE   LIKE

Appendix D
Hatred Scale

Below are statements with which you may agree or disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
strongly   neither agree   strongly
disagree   nor disagree   agree

1. _____   I feel threatened by _____.

2. _____   I am disgusted by _____.

3. _____   I would like to avoid contact with _____.

4. _____   I find _____ to be repulsive.

5. _____   I am angered by _____.

Appendix E
Harm-legitimizing ideology subscales

Below are statements with which you may agree or disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

1	2	3	4	5
strongly disagree	moderately disagree	neither agree nor disagree	moderately agree	strongly agree

MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY/GROUP POLARIZATION

1. _____   _____ are not like true Americans.

2. _____   We are nothing like _____.

3. _____   _____ are just as good as any other group. ***

TARGET HOMOGENIETY/IN-GROUP UNITY

1. _____   _____ are all alike.

2. _____   We must unite against the _____.

3. _____   _____ are just as distinctive as any other American.***

DEHUMANIZATION/DEMONIZATION

1. _____   _____ are a plague upon our nation.

2. _____   _____ are evil.

3. _____   _____ are valuable citizens who deserve equal rights.***

*** indicates an item that was reverse coded.

Appendix F
PEV Stage Related Attitude Subscales

Below are statements with which you may agree or disagree. There are no right or wrong

answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each

statement.

1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
strongly disagree	**moderately disagree**	**neither agree nor disagree**	**moderately agree**	**strongly agree**

FEAR/DISTRUST OF THE TARGET GROUP

1. _____   _____ cannot be trusted.

2. _____   _____ are a threat to the American way of life.

3. _____   We have nothing to fear from _____.***

_____

TARGET BLAME

1. _____   Without _____ America would have far few problems.

2. _____   _____ are just troublemakers.

3. _____   _____ are no more to blame for societies ills than any other group.***

_____

WILLINGNESS TO HARM TARGETS

1. _____   American's should do all in their power to get rid of the _____.

2. _____   We should take action to protect ourselves from _____.

3. _____   _____ should be protected from those that wish them harm. ***

*** indicates an item that was reverse coded.

Appendix G
Filler Items (excluded from analysis)

1. _____   I have close friends who are _____.

2 _____   I feel comfortable around _____.

3. _____   I enjoy being around _____.

4. _____   _____ have contributed much to American culture.

5._____   _____ are upright citizens.

6. _____   _____ are warm and friendly people.

Appendix H
Policy Support Items

Below is a list of proposed policy actions to be taken in response to Illegal Immigration.

Please use the following scale to indicate your support or opposition to each policy.

There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best

matches your response to each statement.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Oppose	**Moderately Oppose**	**Neither Support Nor Oppose**	**Moderately Support**	**Strongly Support**

1. _____   **Citizen's Rally** – US citizens should band together to support

companies/businesses employing and supporting _____.

***

2. _____   **Withdrawal of Aid** – The US government should deny federal aid

to individuals known to be _____ and should cease funding

any programs seeking to assist _____.

3. _____   **Ban from Public Office** – Individuals suspected of being

_____ should be barred from holding positions of power

in the local, state and federal government.

4. _____   _____ **Protection** – acts of discrimination or violence

committed against individuals due to their identification as (or

perceived affiliation with) _____ should be deemed hate

crimes, and punishments to the offenders should be doubled. ***

5. _____   **Detention of _____ and their Allies –** the US government should

have the right to detain individuals believed to be _____ and

those who known to be aiding _____.

*** indicates an item that was reverse coded.

Appendix I
Instructional Manipulation Checks

To indicate you are reading the instructions carefully, please respond to number 11 filling

in the number 11. Failure to follow this instruction will lead to your exclusion from this

study.

11. _____   I find _____ attractive.

To indicate you are reading the instructions carefully, please DO NOT respond to item

number 21. Just leave that response area blank. Failure to follow this instruction will

lead to your exclusion from this study.

21. _____   _____ deserve the bad things that happen to them.

POLICY SUPPORT Scale item

4. _____   **Support for _____ Educators –** to show that you have read this

                         item, please put the letter A in the response blank. Failure to do so

                         will result in your exclusion from the study.

Appendix J
Control Condition Essays

A College Education: Students Prefer their Lectures "in Person" (September 10, 2012)

Technology might be the future, but when it comes to learning, most students prefer taking classes the old fashioned way. According to a new study from the Teachers College at Columbia Unviersity, the vast majority of students in community college would rather take their classes in person than online. The study interviewed dozens of students who took a mix of classes – some online, some face-to-face – to see if they would want to take more classes online or continue to learn in a traditional classroom setting. While students appreciated the flexibility of taking certain courses online, the study demonstrated that educators might be overestimating the demand for online course.

-- Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Educational Policy Center.

Memo to Community Colleges: Only Sometimes for Online (November 2, 2012).

The wholesale replacement of community college curriculums with online courses might not be the best idea, according to new research from the Community College Research Center at Columbia University's Teachers College. Online courses offer plenty of advantages to community college students. The major draws being that online courses are flexibility and convenience, according to the students interviewed for the study. Some said that the courses also allowed them to use their learning time more efficiently and with fewer distractions from other classmates.

-- Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Educational Research Service.

Appendix K
Threat Salience Condition Essays

ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Illegal Immigration: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, illegal immigrants bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the immigrants in America were here legally. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the illegal variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

-- *Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Bipartisan Policy Center.*

Memo to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee on Immigration (November 2, 2012).

Recent decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of illegal immigrants within the United States. Most legal immigrants in America were undoubtedly fleeing abuse, not trying to bring it with them. They should, of course, be treated with the same respect and deference extended to people of other groups. But, our civility should not blind us to the potential threat that illegal immigrants and their kin pose to American welfare and security.

-- *Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.*

MUSLIM EXTREMISTS

Islam and Extremism: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, Muslim extremists bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the Muslims in America sought peace and refuge. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the extremist variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

-- Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Bipartisan Policy Center.

Memo to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee on Muslim Extremists (November 2, 2012).

Recent decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of Islamic extremists within the United States. Most Muslims in America were undoubtedly fleeing abuse, not trying to bring it with them. They should, of course, be treated with the same respect and deference extended to people of other groups. But, our civility should not blind us to the potential threat that extremists and their kin pose to American welfare and security.

Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.

Appendix L
Stage One Condition Essays

ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Illegal Immigration: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, illegal immigrants bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the immigrants in America were here legally. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the illegal variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

In a recent PEW poll, over 70% of Americans polled indicated that they were concerned that the presence of illegal immigrants in their neighborhoods would result in a degradation of their quality of life and could compromise the safety of their families. Underlying these fears, many respondents revealed that they did not trust illegal immigrants because they tend to not hold to American values, and that they feared the increased surveillance/policing of illegal immigrants in their community would lead to decreased privacy/rights for law abiding citizens. When asked how best to deal with the immigration issue, one respondent summed it up nicely: "America is great because it has never compromised on what is important. If we allow these illegal immigrants to walk all over us now, who knows what we might lose… we are strongest when united and should stand firm…"

-- Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Bipartisan Policy Center.

Memo to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee on Immigration (November 2, 2012).

Recent decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of illegal immigrants within the United States. Most legal immigrants in America were undoubtedly fleeing abuse, not trying to bring it with them. They should, of course, be treated with the same respect and deference extended to people of other groups. But, our civility should not blind us to the potential threat that illegal immigrants and their kin pose to American welfare and security.

With the recent attacks in Boston, the Senate Judiciary Committee has begun to reassess the importance of understanding and rethinking our nation's approach to the immigration issue. At the heart of the problem is the fact that many illegal immigrants hide in the shadows: taking advantage of the liberties America has to offer, while simultaneously refusing to assimilate to our values, culture and beliefs. This failure to assimilate has raised concerns with many Americans, many of whom express anxiety over the knowledge that insular groups of illegal immigrants may be lurking their hometowns.

-- Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.

_____

MUSLIM EXTREMISTS

Islam and Extremism: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, Islamic extremists bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the Muslims in America sought peace and refuge. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the extremist variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

In a recent PEW poll, over 70% of Americans polled indicated that they were concerned that the presence of Islamic extremists in their neighborhoods would result in a degradation of their quality of life and could compromise the safety of their families. Underlying these fears, many respondents revealed that they did not trust Muslim extremists because they tend to not hold to American values, and that they feared the increased surveillance/policing of extremists in their community would lead to decreased privacy/rights for law abiding citizens. When asked how best to deal with the immigration issue, one respondent summed it up nicely: "America is great because it has never compromised on what is important. If we allow these extremists to walk all over us now, who knows what we might lose… we are strongest when united and should stand firm…"

-- Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Bipartisan Policy Center.

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-- Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.

Appendix M
Stage Three Condition Essays

ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Illegal Immigration: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, illegal immigrants bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the immigrants in America were here legally. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the illegal variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

In a recent PEW poll, over 70% of Americans polled indicated that they were concerned that the presence of illegal immigrants in their neighborhoods would result in a degradation of their quality of life and could compromise the safety of their families. The most common reasons cited for these fears were that: illegal immigrants seek to taint traditional American communities, they prey upon impressionable youths (drawing them in their gang violence), and that illegal immigrants revel in the fact that their presence means the loss of basic rights for law abiding citizens. One respondent said it best, "America is great because it has never compromised on what is important. If given their way illegal immigrants would walk all over us, and who knows what we might lose… we should do something to stop them before we are overrun by illegal immigrants."

-- *Peter Bowman and Brianne Holden, Bipartisan Policy Center.*

Memo to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee on Immigration (November 2, 2012).

Recent decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of illegal immigrants within the United States. Most legal immigrants in America were undoubtedly fleeing abuse, not trying to bring it with them. They should, of course, be treated with the same respect and deference extended to people of other groups. But, our civility should not blind us to the potential threat that illegal immigrants and their kin pose to American welfare and security.

With the recent attacks in Boston, the Senate Judiciary Committee has begun to reassess the importance of understanding and rethinking our nation's approach to the immigration issue. At the heart of the problem is the fact that many illegal immigrants are infesting our cities, breeding violence and raising concern over the future of our nations safety. The knowledge that has raised concerns with many Americans, many of whom express anxiety over the knowledge that illegal immigrants may be infiltrating and corrupting their once safe neighborhoods.

-- Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.

_____

MUSLIM EXTREMISTS

Islam and Extremism: What Lies Beneath (September 10, 2012)

The biggest problem facing American national security does not come from an international source, but from within its own borders. With their numbers ever increasing, Islamic extremists bring with them mounting fears of crime, violence and a general erosion of the American way of life. A generation ago, most of the Muslims in America sought peace and refuge. Now, research is indicating that more and more of our nation's cities are playing host to the extremist variety, and the politicians are doing little to address the potential threat they present.

In a recent PEW poll, over 70% of Americans polled indicated that they were concerned that the presence of Islamic extremists in their neighborhoods would result in a degradation of their quality of life and could compromise the safety of their families. The most common reasons cited for these fears were that: Muslim extremists seek to taint traditional American communities, they prey upon impressionable youths (recruiting them into their terrorist plots), and that extremists revel in the fact that their presence means the loss of basic rights for law abiding citizens. One respondent said it best, "America is great because it has never compromised on what is important. If given their way Muslim extremists would walk all over us, and who knows what we might lose… we should do something to stop them before we are overrun by extremists."

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-- Helen Fredericks and Jeremy Bernard, Congressional Research Service.

Appendix N
Study Two Sample Questionnaire

Thank you for your interest in this research.

The purpose of this study is to examine the social judgment process; specifically, we want to learn more about people's attitudes/beliefs and how they comprehend/use social media messages. Over the course of this survey, you will be asked to read two short articles about one of several relevant social issues and respond to a series of questions measuring your general beliefs/attitudes and your support for hypothetical policies. To simplify the process, this survey has been broken into two parts: a comprehension part and an attitude/policy part. Once you have completed both parts, you will be provided with a "completion code" which you will need to enter on Mechanical Turk to receive compensation for your work.

PART ONE

The first task we would like you to complete is a comprehension exercise. You will be asked to carefully read through two short articles presenting arguments from noted political researchers/commentators about one of several social issues. Once you read each article, you will be required to respond to a series of short comprehension questions. Please note that you must respond correctly to these questions to continue.

PART ONE

Please read through the following excerpts carefully. In the next pages you will

be asked to recall information presented in each of these arguments.

(((((The excerpts would be displayed here in the actual study.)))))))

PART TWO

You will now be asked to respond to a series of questions intended to gauge your attitudes and policy support relating to a variety of social groups/issues. Please note that there are a variety of different types of questions for this block and you will need to read the instructions carefully to ensure your answers best represents your feelings, level of agreement with the statement or level of support for the described policy.

 Also, be aware that a series of items have been included to assess attention to instructions/questions. Please note that failure to respond correctly to most/all of these items may result in a rejection.

For the following items you will be asked to indicate your feelings about _____ by circling a value on the associated "Feeling Thermometer." As with a regular thermometer, lower values are associated with "cooler" (more distant or negative) feelings, while higher values are associated with "warmer" (more close or positive) feelings.

How warmly do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
COLD   WARM

How close do you feel toward _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISTANT   CLOSE

How much do you like _____?

0--5--10--15--20--25--30--35--40--45--50--55--60--65--70--75--80--85--90--95--100
DISLIKE   LIKE

For the next series of items, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, that your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

1. _____   Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.

2. _____   _____ cannot be trusted.

3. _____   In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against

other groups.

4. _____   I feel threatened by _____.

5. _____   It is important that others view me as an American.

6. _____   We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

7. _____   _____ are not like true Americans.

8. _____   Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.

9. _____   _____ are just troublemakers.

10. _____   Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.

11. _____   This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers

would just shut up and accept their group's traditional place in society.

12. _____   The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance.

13. _____   _____ are no more to blame for societies ills than any other group.

14. _____   Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

15. _____   _____ are warm and friendly people.

For the next series of items, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, that your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree					**moderately**					**completely**
at all					**agree**					**agree**

16. _____   Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy "traditional" family values.

17. _____   I would like to avoid contact with _____.

18. _____   There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

19. _____   The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

20. _____   We should increase social equality.

21. _____   _____ are evil.

22. _____   Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

23. _____   We must unite against the _____.

24. _____   It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

25. _____   _____ are just as distinctive as any other American.

26. _____   I find feminists attractive.

27. _____	It's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in peoples' minds.

28. _____	I have close friends who are homosexuals.

29. _____	To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

30. _____	I strongly identify as an American.

For the next series of items, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, that your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

31. _____ Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

32. _____ _____ are a threat to the American way of life.

33. _____ I feel comfortable around _____.

34. _____ We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.

35. _____ I strive to be the best American I can be.

36. _____ Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

37. _____ Please answer "completely agree" to this item to show that you are reading the items.

38. _____ I enjoy being around atheists.

39. _____ _____ are valuable citizens who deserve equal rights.

40. _____ The "old-fashioned" ways and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.

41. _____ We are nothing like _____.

42. _____ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

43. _____ It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the   bottom.

44. _____ I am disgusted by _____.

45. _____ Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.

For the next series of items, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, that your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

46. _____   I value my American Identity.

47. _____   We have nothing to fear from _____.

48. _____   God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.

49. _____   We should strive to make incomes more equal.

50. _____   American's should do all in their power to get rid of the _____.

51. _____   _____ deserve the bad things that happen to them.

52. _____   What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.

53. _____   Group equality should be our ideal.

54. _____   Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion and ignoring the "normal way things are supposed to be done."

55._____   Atheists are upright citizens.

56. _____   _____ are all alike.

57. _____	You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view

by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.

58. **_____**	Respond "no agreement" to this item to show that you are reading the items.

59. _____	_____ have contributed much to American culture.

60. _____	Inferior groups should stay in their place.

Please continue to indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 0-10 where: 0 indicates absolutely no agreement, 5 indicates a moderate level of agreement, and 10 indicates complete agreement with the statement. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses are anonymous.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
do not agree at all					moderately agree					completely agree

61. _____   Without _____ America would have far few problems.

62. _____   There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

63. _____   Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

64. _____   We should take action to protect ourselves from _____.

65. _____   No one group should dominate in society.

66. _____   I am angered by _____.

67. _____   There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

68. _____   _____ are just as good as any other group.

69. _____   A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

70. _____   All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

71. _____   _____ should be protected from those that wish them harm.

72. _____   Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.

73. _____   _____ are a plague upon our nation.

74. _____   I find _____ to be repulsive.

75. _____   It would be good if groups could be equal.

Below is a list of proposed policies relating to the _____ issue. Please use the following scale to indicate your support for each policy. There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
do not support					**moderately**					**completely**
at all					**support**					**support**

1. _____   **Citizen's Rally** – US citizens should band together to support companies/businesses employing and supporting _____.

2. _____   **Withdrawal of Aid** – The US government should deny federal aid to individuals known to be _____ and should cease funding any programs seeking to assist _____.

3. _____   **Ban from Public Office** – Individuals suspected of being _____ should be barred from holding positions of power in the local, state and federal government.

4. _____   **Support for _____ Educators** – to show that you have read this item, please respond with do not support at all."

5. _____   **_____ Protection** – acts of discrimination or violence committed against individuals due to their identification as (or perceived affiliation with) _____ should be deemed hate crimes, and punishments to the offenders should be doubled.

6. _____   **Detention of _____ and their Allies –** the US government should

have the right to detain individuals believed to be _____ and

those who are known to be aiding _____.

For the next series of questions you will be asked to respond to a series of items about yourself. Please read through each question carefully and pick the option that best describes you. When you have finished these questions you will be given further instructions.

For the following items, please respond by selecting the option that best describes you. If none of the options available fit, please select "other" and fill in your response.

What is your **sex**? (please select one):

    Male   Female

What is your **age**? (please select appropriate range):

    18-24   25-31   32-38   49-55   56+

What is your **religious affiliation**? (please select one):

    Christian   Catholic   Jewish   Muslim   Hindu   Buddhist

    Atheist   Agnostic   Other _____ (please specify)

What is your **race/ethnicity**? (please select one):

    White   African-American   Latino   Asian

    Other _____ (please specify)

What is your **political party affiliation**? (please select one):

    Republican   Democrat   Independent

    Other _____ (please specify)

What do you feel the purpose of this study was?

_____

Do you feel that you were deceived in any way in this study?

_____

This is the end of the study.

Thank you for your interest in our research and participation in this study. All of your responses are anonymous and will be combined with the responses of the other participants. Before we give you your confirmation code, we ask that you carefully read the following statement regarding the purpose of this study and respond to the question at the bottom to confirm that you understand this debriefing.

We ask that you not share this information with others who might participate in our study in the future. If a participant knew exactly what the study was about before they participated, their data would be invalid and our findings would be invalid as a result.

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

This research is intended to examine the ways in which exposure to negative messages about a target group might impact attitudes about the group, and support for policies that would be harmful to the group. Specifically, we were interested in how exposure to these messages might impact people's perceptions of illegal immigrants or Muslim extremists. These groups were selected because they have are salient target groups for many Americans and are often viewed in a negative manner. It is our hypothesis that exposure to negative messages about commonly disliked target groups can lead people to express more negative views about the group, and to support more harmful policies toward the targets.

Please note that for all conditions, the articles and their arguments were fabricated for the purpose of this study and do not reflect the true beliefs of the researchers. These articles were specifically manipulated to contain certain types of common harm-legitimizing beliefs about the groups that range from more benign ("they are different from us") to more extreme ("they are evil or inhuman"). To examine their impact, each of these measures you completed were primarily intended to detect levels of prejudice, dislike and hatred towards the groups. Additionally, the policy scale items were intended to assess reactions to hypothetical (not real) policies directed toward the targets.

As indicated on in the consent statement, your responses are completely anonymous and there is no way for your answers to be connected to you personally. Every participant has been assigned randomly generated participant identification numbers that are in no way tied to any other form of identification in the Qualtrics or

Mechanical Turk system, and the data files will be kept separate from any other identifying materials.

In closing, we would like to thank you again for your participation in this research. Your participation has been very valuable because it will further the field's understanding of the ways in which people use the information they encounter in the media to form opinions and make policy decisions.

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO INDICATE YOU HAVE READ THE DEBREIFING STATEMENT:

What are the two groups being examined in this study? (select the two that apply)

Illegal immigrants   Atheists   College Students   Homosexuals

Middle Class   Muslim Extremists   Religious Conservatives

True or False: My participation in this study is completely anonymous and none of my responses can be traced back to me.

Thank you again for your participation in this research.

Your participation confirmation number is ############. Please enter this number in the space provided on Mechanical Turk to confirm your completion of the questionnaire and to receive compensation.

CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the research or procedures, you ay contact the lead researchers, **Heather Nofziger** or **Dr. Lee Jussim**, at **101 Tillet Hall, Livingston Campus, or 732-445-2070**. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Sponsored Programs Administrator at:

Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects

Office of Research and Sponsored Programs

3 Rutgers Plaza

New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559

Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104

Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Appendix O
Right-wing Authoritarianisim Scale

1. _____The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance.

2. _____Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.

3. _____Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

4. _____Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.

5. _____It's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in peoples' minds.

6. _____Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

7. _____The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

8. _____There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

9. _____Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.

10. ____Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

11. ____Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

12. ____The "old-fashioned" ways and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.

13. ____You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.

14. ____What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.

15. ____Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion and ignoring the "normal way things are supposed to be done."

16. ____God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.

17. ____There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

18. ____A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

19. ____Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.

20. ____There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

21. ____Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy "traditional" family values.

22. ____This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group's traditional place in society.

Appendix P

Social Dominance Orientation Scale

1. ____Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.

2. ____In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

3. ____It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

4. ____To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

5. ____If certain groups stayed in their place we would have fewer problems.

6. ____It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

7. ____Inferior groups should stay in their place.

8. ____Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

9. ____It would be good if groups could be equal.

10. ____Group equality should be our ideal.

11. ____All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

12. ____We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

13. ____We should increase social equality.

14. ____We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.

15. ____We should strive to make incomes more equal.

16. ____No one group should dominate in society.

Appendix Q
Group Identification Scale

1. It is important that other Americans accept me.

2. I strongly identify as an American.

3. I try to be the best American that I can be.

4. I value my American identity.