THE EFFECT OF TRUSTWORTHINESS ON SUPPLY CHAIN INTERNAL INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

The Effect of Trustworthiness on Supply Chain Internal Integration

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Information sharing plays a crucial role in internal integration because it helps interaction and collaboration. Activities can be effectively and efficiently coordinated to lower supply chain cost by decreasing operational waste and redundancies (Stank et al., 2001a; Rodrigues et al., 2004; Gimenez & Ventura, 2005; Forza, 1996; Vargas et al., 2000). In this research, we are interested in the effect of trustworthiness on people's intention to share information between departments in an organization. Davis et al. (1995) found that trustworthiness is related to the trustee's ability, benevolence, and integrity. I hypothesized that the extent to which a department shows high information sharing toward its partners (the other departments) depends upon how much the department believes that their partners are trustworthy. The research was conducted in both Bangkok, Thailand, and in New Jersey, USA, with the aim at examining whether culture plays an important role in people's information sharing behavior. Factor analysis and multiple regression were used to examine the hypotheses. We found that Integrity trustworthiness was a powerful predictor of information sharing behavior of the participants in both New Jersey and Bangkok. By contrast, Benevolence trustworthiness positively but poorly predicted information sharing behavior in both countries. Finally, Ability trustworthiness was a positive and strong determinant of intention to share information in New Jersey,

but it was a negative and weak predictor of intention to share information in Bangkok. These findings show that integrity is the most crucial part of trustworthiness when people engage in social exchanges. Counterparties with a low level of integrity may be perceived as dishonest or unreliable, and as likely to engage in undesirable or disruptive behaviors. Managerial implications and trustworthiness literatures are discussed.

Keywords: Benevolence trustworthiness, Integrity trustworthiness, Ability trustworthiness, and Information sharing

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Global trade between countries in various parts of the World has been increasing enormously in recent decades, and nothing indicates that these business and market exchanges will decelerate soon. China and many Asian countries are now the largest trading partners of America, and many US firms have established some parts of their companies in Asia as part of their supply chain strategies in order to gain new opportunities and enhance their competitive advantages. However, this is apparently not an easy way to prolong the progressively tense relationship between parties from different cultures. Fang (2012, p. 1) pointed out for some problems arise in doing business in Asia as the follows:

> There are many more failures and struggles in these cross-border business interactions than successes. Although this is probably true in the business world as a whole, the vast differences between the U.S. and Asia certainly play a major role in these struggles and failures. Understanding and adapting to these differences, while not a guarantee of one's success, can make the venture a little easier and more likely to be successful. Cultural differences often reflect on business behaviors. For example, Confucianism, which was developed by Confucius between 500 BC and 400 BC, teaches that people live their lives within parameters firmly established by heaven, a purposeful supreme being, and its fixed cycles and patterns. In other words, every person has his "proper position" in this world and this society. Confucianism emphasizes personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity. This philosophy explains, at least partially, why there is usually a strong sense of hierarchy within a Chinese entity or organization. Authorities are clearly delineated internally, and proper respect appropriate for each position is expected.

It is very interesting to explore the factors that influence the cross-border business interactions. The integration of supply chain has been a topic of noteworthy discussion for many decades. The concept of supply chain integration is not new, but its importance has been increasing over decades (Steven, 1998; Bowersox, 1998; Narishma & Kim, 2001; Fawcette & Magnan, 2002; Rodrigues et al., 2004). Mentzer et al. (2001) pointed out that the integration of supply chain is the most important part of supply chain management. Before the integration of supply chain is proposed, the most initial stage of the formation of business interaction is open market negotiation. Speakman et al. (1998) identified a stage of transition from open market negotiation to collaboration. He proposed that businesses move from open market negotiation to co-operation, to co-ordination, and to collaboration. Cooperation is where the supply chain management begins with a low amount of business, and market exchange, and there are a few long-term contracts between suppliers and customers. For coordination, businesses may make a transition to the next advanced step by making seamless connections among the parties and their counterparts. Collaboration is the final stage where businesses engage their counterparties in joint design, business planning, research and development, long-term strategy, and the integration of supply chain.

Supply chain integration can be categorized into two broad extensive kinds of integration. Internal integration is the ability to link internal activities to endorse customer requirement at the lowest cost, and this can be fulfilled by connecting business operations into a seamless, coordinated, and synchronized operational flow across internal functions (Stank et al., 2001a). Achieving integration is very crucial across internal operations, customers, and suppliers. External integration has widely been categorized into supplier

and customer integration. Both intra- and inter-business coordination are important because they help reduce redundancies, and help leverage separated main capabilities in logistics operations. Due to time and resources constraints, this research focuses only on internal supply chain integration.

Internal integration can be defined as a cross-functional process of integration within a firm (Alcian & Demsetz, 1972) and as the ability to internally orchestrate shared operational activities between each department in the firm (Mayer, 1995). Internal integration can be seen in several forms: information sharing, technical assistance, and mutual investment between departments within a firm. Kramer (1999) pointed out that internal integration provides great benefits to the supply chain because it can lead to inventory reductions, better lead time, enhanced customer satisfaction, and improved planning. Such benefits are generated from effective and efficient logistics management which can reduce the cost of stocking. A higher level of responsiveness, customer satisfaction and improved logistics performance can be achieved as the result of better internal integration.

From the supply chain internal integration point of view, information sharing plays an important role for active internal integration. Cross functional collaboration is seemingly impossible in the situation that has no effective sharing of operational information. As Fawcett and Magnan (2002) mentioned, the firm should develop ability to activate information sharing behavior across departments within the firm. A department may cooperate, collaborate, or provide some assistance for other departments within the firm in order to prolong a good relationship with others. In this study, we measure information sharing behavior in the dimension of intention to share information.

Information sharing plays a crucial role in internal integration because it helps interaction and collaboration of a number of activities to effectively and efficiently increase the capabilities of services at a lower supply chain cost by decreasing operational waste and redundancies (Stank et al., 2001a; Rodrigues et al., 2004; Gimenez & Ventura, 2005; Forza, 1996; Vargas et al., 2000), and can accordingly lead to efficiency improvement and competitiveness advantages.

Krarner (1999) and Williams (2001) indicated that there is significant risk frequently involving interactions among the departments in the supply chain. The evolution from open market negotiations to cooperation, coordination, and collaboration require the trust of trustors and trustworthiness of trustees. Trust can be regarded as the indispensable part of any business, market, and information exchanges. Without trust, business and market exchanges can scarcely be generated. Trustworthiness is the measure of the degree to which the other party is to be trusted. Hence, the relationship between the department and its partners has to be mutually managed properly so as to gain the advantages of the good relationship. In other words, the benefits a department can reap depend on the quality of relationship management. I hypothesized in this study that the level of information sharing that a department will exhibit towards its partners (the other departments) will be determined by the level of trustworthiness that a department believes his/her partners are perceived to hold.

There are several reasons to believe that a department will share important and valuable information if and only if they trust their partners. The main hypotheses of this dissertation are grounded on a study suggesting that there are three core perceptions of trustworthiness: the trustee's benevolence, integrity, and ability (Mayer et al., 1995). This

research has focused on better understanding the influence of counterparties' three facets of trustworthiness on information sharing behavior in the supply chain. The low integrity counterparties are apparently perceived as untruthful, corrupt, unfair, or insincere and they are likely to provide undesirable outcomes because of their disruptive behaviors. Therefore, Integrity trustworthiness is expected to be the most important aspects among the three. Furthermore, socio-economic factors, personality traits, and binding and individualizing moral foundation modules (Haidt, 2012) are also hypothesized to play an important role as part of the internal motivation of each manager/coordinator that determines the degree of intention to share information with his/her partners given their perceived trustworthiness.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Overview and Hypotheses

Ring and Van de Ven (1992) argued that there is a risk in transactions, so managers must take the trustworthiness of the other party into their consideration. This rationale leads us to consider attributes of the trustee as a crucial factor for a given party to have a greater or lesser amount of trust for the counterparts. Many authors have put their efforts into explaining and giving various definitions of trustworthiness (Collon, 1994; Bond, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Buchan et al., 2002). Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) conducted some of the earliest research on characteristics of the trustee on communication and attitude change. They found that credibility was affected by two main elements: expertise and trustworthiness. Trustworthiness was evaluated as the stimulus to tell a lie. In this study, the respondents (trustees) would be considered as less trustworthy when they gain some benefits by lying. In more recent work, Good (1988) proposed that trust is developed on expectations of how the trustee will perform, based on the trustee's previous and current perceived characteristics.

2.1 Trustworthiness: The Concept of Trustee's Characteristics

Mayer el al. (1995, p. 712) defined trust as "The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party." Therefore, trustworthiness can be viewed as the degree of trust which a trustor is willing to offer to the trustee due to the trustee's physical and

psychological incentives and skills to perform in a trustworthy manner mode. Furthermore, Mayer et al. categorized trustworthiness into three main types: Benevolence trustworthiness, Integrity trustworthiness, and Ability trustworthiness.

We can define Ability trustworthiness as the degree of trust that the trustor has in the trustees' competencies, knowledge and skills. We can also define it as the degree of trust that the trustor gives to the other party because the trustor perceives that the trustee has a high potential of performing in a trustworthy manner due to the trustee's competencies, knowledge, and skills. According to Zhao (2011, p. 21), "Just because trustees are motivated to behave in a trustworthy fashion does not mean that they will do so; they need to have the requisite ability to carry out the behavior."

Moreover, benevolence and integrity are described in a similar manner as the trustor's belief that the trustee has an interest to perform in a trustworthy manner. However, the properties of benevolence and integrity trustworthiness are very different from one other. From Mayer el al. (1995, p. 718) point of view, benevolence is "the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor." Integrity, on the other hand, is defined by Mayer et al. (1995, p. 719) as "the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable." Therefore, benevolence signifies cooperation and a cordial relationship between both parties. Stank et al. (2005) described benevolence as a supply chain relationship where your supply chain members understand your circumstances and support you and your department. They never take advantage of you and your department because they care about your welfare. They expect that the relationship will endure in the long run. When they make decisions, they show their respect towards you and consider the impact of the decision upon you. You can

definitely count on them. Hence, benevolence can be defined as a department's belief that its supply chain members are concerned about the department's welfare (Rousseau et al., 1993), are happy to deal with short-term problem (Baumeister et al., 1995), and never bring any undesirable outcome to your department (Bies et al., 1986).

By contrast, integrity is not based on a cordial relationship. Rather, it is related to the degree of honesty or reliability that the trustor perceives that the trustee has in order to do the right thing and behave in the right way/manner. Benevolence is about the previous personal relationship between both parties and the degree to which they care about and feel affection for each other. However, integrity is not related to such relationship. It is all about the belief towards the trustees that they will perform in the honest and reliable manner. Therefore, benevolence and integrity are different. We might see a negative relationship between benevolence and integrity, e.g. a trustor may be confident that their partners are highly benevolent but also see them as unreliable. A trustor may also perceive that their partners have a low level of benevolence (they do not care about my goals and my welfare) but that they are highly honest and reliable (they are trustworthy in their principles). Hence, these two constructs demonstrate the different views of trustworthiness and may lead to different information sharing behavior.

Trustees with a high level of integrity tend to perform in a trustworthy manner, whereas trustees with a low level of integrity are not likely to do so. Hence, trustors can be expected share less information with counterparties with a low level of integrity trustworthiness so as to force the alignment between both parties. Moreover, trustees with a high level of ability but a low level of integrity may be perceived as a threat. In other words, there is a significant desire to avoid sharing information with low levels of

integrity but high levels of ability. As Burger (1990) proposed, the interaction effect between Ability trustworthiness and Integrity trustworthiness signifies the department's need to control their counterparty. As the result of the forgoing review, I raised two basic research questions:

Question1: Do Benevolence trustworthiness (BT), Integrity trustworthiness (IT), and Ability trustworthiness (AT) significantly and positively affect supply chain internal integration (information sharing behavior)?

Question2: Is there an interaction effect between Ability trustworthiness and Integrity trustworthiness?

Another factor affecting the trust one party has for another involves the traits of the trustor. Some parties are more likely to trust than are others. As discussed in this study, several authors have considered trust from the perspective of a person's general willingness to trust others. Among the early trust theorists was Rotter (1967), who defined interpersonal trust as an individual's expectation that his or her partners will stand by their words, and he or she can count on them. Even though his definition seems to signify that he is speaking of trust for a particular standpoint, Rotter casted a focus on a generalized trust relevant to personality trait that an agent would behave differently depending on the situation he/she encounters. For example, typical item in his scale is that people usually perceive that they can count on their parents, but they cannot rely too much on a stranger because they feel uncertain about his or her trustworthiness. Several other authors have discussed trust in similar ways. For example, Dasgupta (1988)'s treatment of trust includes generalized expectations of others; for example, "Would someone help me if I am going to be in a danger?" Similarly, Farris, Senner, and

Butterfield (1973) defined trust as a characteristic of people when they interact with group members in an organization.

Trust can be considered as a trait that results in an expectation about the trustworthiness of counter parties. In this model this trait is considered as the propensity to trust. Propensity to trust is referred to as the likelihood the party will trust others. Individuals have different degree of their propensity to trust. According to Hofstede (1980), experiences, family backgrounds, personality traits, and inherent culture are major factors affecting individuals' propensity to trust.

As the result, I believe that culture can play an important role in determining the trust propensity due to the different characteristics of people across cultures. I think it is plausible that Thai and American people may have different level of trust propensity. With that in mind, we raise another question:

Question 3: Do Easterners and Westerners have different levels of trust propensity in response to supply chain internal integration?

2.2 Trustworthiness and Information Sharing Behavior in Supply Chain Internal Integration

Supply chain internal integration can be shown in many forms such as information sharing and mutual investment between departments within a firm. This research focuses on understanding how perceptions of counterparties' Benevolence, Integrity, and Ability trustworthiness influence information sharing behavior, and how people in Asia and in America may differ in regard to their intention to share information given these three main facets of trustworthiness of the trustees.

Many studies (Chen et al., 2009; Fiske, 1992; Flynn, 2005) on social exchange theory suggest that the norm of reciprocity is very essential in decision making strategies because of the expected mutual benefits between both parties. The trustors tend to exhibit more information sharing when they perceive that their counterparties care about their welfare and their goals. Benevolence can be described as how a department believes that their partners care about the department's welfare and have the department's best interests at heart. Zhao (2011, p. 26) indicated as the follows:

> By cultivating and maintaining positive relationships with a group of direct cooperative reports high in benevolence, a department may accomplish their task-oriented goals (i.e. benevolent partners are likely to act in the department's best interests) and their relationship-oriented goals (e.g. having positive relationships with benevolent partners that will satisfy a department's need for positive relations).

Benevolence trustworthiness is likely to be a relational or cordial relationship because it depends on mutual care/welfare and it is focused directly towards a specific department that the party has a good relationship with. A department may expect that their highly benevolent partners will give information back in return. Therefore, we believe that a department will share more information with a group of partners whom they believe have a higher degree of Benevolence trustworthiness. Therefore, I propose:

H1: A department will share more information with partners they believe have a higher degree of Benevolence trustworthiness.

On the one hand, counterparties with a low level of integrity are perceived as dishonest or unreliable. As a result, the trustors feel that they cannot count on such parties because of their unacceptable and inappropriate sets of value. The trustors may perceive

that they must be aware of low integrity counterparties because low integrity partners may end up gaming or engaging in undesirable or disruptive behaviors (Rousseau & Parks, 1993; McKenna, 1994). According to Katz and Kahn (1978) and Daft (2009), one measure to control adversarial or disruptive behavior is not to engage with bad partners (e.g. not to share information or share information as little as possible) in order to avoid adverse effects of a low integrity partner group.

On the other hand, a department is likely to feel that counterparts with a high level of integrity are honest and reliable. Consequently, the department can depend on them and expect that they will behave in a consistent and desirable manner in return. The department may treat the high integrity party better by sharing important and valuable information with them. Moreover, a department must spend a lot of time and effort as well as sacrifice a significant amount of resources in order to obtain important and valuable business information because valuable information is not free. As a result, a department is likely to share such business information with counterparties that the department believes will respond positively and perform in an acceptable way or with integrity. Integrity trustworthiness is less specific than the benevolent one. It tends to be more universalistic since it specifically stems from trustees' personal nature. Hence, if a department perceives that its counterparts have a high level of integrity trustworthiness by their nature, a department may be more likely to expect to see a reciprocal behavior that their counterparts will share information back in return. Therefore, I believe that a department will share more information with a group of partners whom they believe have a higher degree of Integrity trustworthiness. Consequently, I hypothesize:

H2: A department will share more information with partners they believe have a higher degree of Integrity trustworthiness.

Ability trustworthiness can be defined as the degree of trust that the trustor is confident in the trustees' competencies, knowledge and skills. It is the degree of trust that the trustor gives to the other party because the trustor perceives that the trustee has a high potential of performing in a trustworthy manner due to the trustee's competencies, knowledge, and skills. Mayer (1995) pointed out that it is important that trustees must have the required ability in order to pursue their tasks because the motivation to perform in a trustworthy mode by itself is not a sufficient condition. Hence, I conjecture:

H3: A department will share more information with partners they believe have a higher degree of Ability trustworthiness.

When ability is involved, the department's partners' ability should moderate the relationships between benevolence and ability as well as integrity and ability. The degree of information sharing that the department is expected to exhibit should be stronger when the department perceives that their partners have a high level of benevolence and a high level of ability. Furthermore, the department is predicted to exhibit more information sharing behavior with high integrity partners and information sharing behavior should be intensified when their partners have a higher level of perceived ability.

In the case of benevolence, there is a good reason to believe that the department should be advised to share more information with high benevolent partners who have welfare at heart because the department can expect to gain some benefits from positive relationship in return. When the high benevolent partners also have a higher level of Ability trustworthiness, it means that the department's counterparts are more likely to

succeed and fulfill the department's goals. Hence, I suggest that the department should be more willing to share important information with high benevolent and high ability partners. In other words, the degree of information sharing is expected to be more pronounced when high benevolent partners are perceived relatively higher in ability. We may say that the department tends to believe that it can achieve its goals by keeping good relationships with a group of partners which is not only driven (benevolence) but also capable (ability) to perform in a trustworthiness manner.

In addition, the norm of reciprocity may play a crucial role in maintaining the great positive relationships between two parties. The department may see a need to reciprocate more for a high benevolent group and the reciprocation should be stronger for the benevolent parties with higher ability. The high ability group may contribute more to the success of the department in the past; therefore, the department tends to see that its task oriented goals are more likely to be fulfilled from the ability group in the future. I suggest that high level of benevolence leads to better relationships and high level of ability brings about the achievement of a department's goals. It is wiser to be able to achieve not only the department's task but also its department's goals by performing more information sharing behavior to a more benevolent group of partners, especially those that have been perceived as a higher level of ability. I conjecture:

H4a: Information sharing is higher when the benevolent group is perceived as stronger in ability.

In addition, Gillespie and Greenberg (2005), Colquitt and Greenberg (2002), and Turillo et al. (2000) suggested that there may be a case that managers have altruism motivation to make a decision based on a merit system without any concern about mutual

relationships and the department's goals. In other words, some managers would virtuously give their information or resources with no interest in their previous relationship, loyalty, or self-interest goals because it is a good thing to do or it is the virtuous decision in order to escape from the feelings of guilt. Moreover, according to Colquitt and Greenberg (2002), some managers may have a high degree of virtuous value, feelings of guilt, and they would make a decision based on a merit system even though they see opportunity and the benefits to abuse their counterpart. In such case, the level of integrity of a department's partners plays an important role as the main determinant of the degree of information sharing that the department will exhibit towards its counterparts. We expect the positive relationship between partners' integrity and a department's motivation to act towards the group with more information sharing was significant when ability was high. In other words, there is a positive relationship between the partners' integrity and the participants' motivation to exhibit information sharing that would be stronger when their counterparts are relatively high in ability. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

H4b: Information sharing is intensified when the high integrity partner is perceived as stronger in ability.

However, I am convinced that, in the case of integrity, a department may share less and less important information to its counterparts low in integrity but high in ability in order to avoid their potential disturbance, to minimize undesirable threats or to maintain the department's negotiation power (keeping information as much as possible and releasing it as little as possible). However, a department may share more important information with partners high in integrity (with both low and high in ability) because of

their loyalty and reliability. Hence, a department may exhibit limited information sharing behavior as a good strategy toward their partners with low integrity but high ability because the department implicitly needs more positive mutual goal alignment in an attempt to stay away from their disruptive behavior. If it is an accurate reason, then a department may be more likely to have a need to control those relatively low in integrity but relatively high in ability. Such a group of parties with relatively more capable but relatively dishonest or unreliable tends to have more potential to ruin the department's goals, derail the department's performance, and generate the disruptive interference. As a consequence, a department may see lower integrity and higher ability partners as a trouble group with a need to control or to stay away from their conceivable shirking and poaching behaviors. Low information sharing exhibition may be seen as a good strategy to avoid these adversarial behaviors. Hence, I also propose:

H4c: Information sharing is lower when the low integrity group is perceived as stronger in ability.

2.3 Individualist and Sociocentric Cultures

We may have to distinguish between the facts and the perceptions (the antecedent of action) because we can have the same facts, but we have different points of view towards such facts. Asians and Westerners may have different perceptions towards the same facts; therefore, they react to the same things differently. The reactions are determined by the intentions and our intentions are affected by our perceptions. Different cultures have different "metaphysics" of grounded beliefs about the World's nature.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) studied various construals of the self that have a strong impact upon cognition, motivation, and emotion. They found that Westerners seem to have independent construal that can later give rise to self-actualization and the progress of diverse individual prospective; whereas, Easterners seem to have interdependent construal that can generate sociocentric, relational, collective/holistic characteristics, and high contextual culture. Ego-focused emotional people are much more likely to show their own requirements directly and regularly substantiate independence while other-focused emotional ones are more likely to behave thoughtfully, favor reciprocal exchanges, avoid conflict, and prefer interdependence. In Western culture, self–related motives that include self-verification and self-enhancement play a very important role while interdependent motives, including affiliation and deference, stand out in eastern culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

In addition, Edward T. Hall, an anthropologist, categorizes society into low-context and high-context. Low context society tends to express a person having characteristics without referring to conditions/situations or interpersonal relations. Many Chinese and Japanese words are context-specific meaning. The easterners seem to identify themselves "connected, fluid, and conditional", so they tend to trust in-group (in-group favoritism), rather than out group members (out-group disfavoring) due to the perception of similarity and attachment.

Bond and Smith (1996) also stated that external-distal and internal-proximal constraints may essentially affect human behavior. Locus-of-control belief can generate an accurate prediction in human behavior. Moreover, social cognitions (e.g. self-actualization, self-esteem, emotional reaction, attribution development), interpersonal

behaviors (e.g. interpersonal perception, social attraction, fairness), group processes (e.g. governance, cooperation), and organizational behavior (e.g. work incentive, group behavior) are the interesting parts of cross-cultural social and organizational psychology. They found that people in individualist cultures are more cooperative to out-groups than those in sociocentric cultures. In addition, people in a collectivist cultures are more likely to prefer equality value; whereas, people in individualist cultures favor equity value to equality. Compared to US students, Hong Kong students are more likely to cooperate and collaborate with in-group members than out-group members while students in the US and Europe are less likely to collaborate with in-group members and tend to be risk takers. Therefore, I believe that "Individualism-collectivism" difference between Eastern and Western respondents that relate to group ties may play an important role in the way people perceive trustworthiness in their counterparts.

When we compare trust propensity between people in the Asia and people in the West, we have more interesting results**.** Fukuyama (1995) argued that people in various cultures have different levels of trust and trustworthiness towards different members of society owing to different levels of spontaneous sociability. He also claimed that Chinese are much less likely to extend their trust towards strangers than American are. Moreover, Chinese seem to trust the family group much more than a nonfamily one in comparison to American. According to Fukuyama, businesses in America have the capability to develop large in scale and sustain flexibility because of their ability to hiring non-kin professional managers. Progress of the traditional Chinese business, by contrast, is obstructed by the size of the owner's family; the unwillingness of non-related to rely on one another

prevents the employing of non-kin professional managers and inhibits the rise of large-scale firms.

Ostrom (2003) proposed that norms can influence actions and expectations; norms are a kind of heuristics that people develop from a moral perspective and norms can guide us to make a decision or behave properly to the situation. Therefore, norms of behavior lead to actions and expectation of actions. Buchan et al. (2003) conducted a trust game and found the influence of norms on people's behavior. After senders sent some money to the other parties and the senders were asked the question, "How much money do you expect to receive back?" They found that, in the United States, actions were highly and significantly associated with expectations (r = .79 and P < .01); however, the correlation between both factors was very low and not significant (r = .34 and P < .09). Moreover, Bond and Hwang (1995) suggests that sociocentric culture provides stricter norms as important heuristics influencing a people's behavior through different actions and expectations in differing context, and people in a sociocentric culture tend to strictly adhere to a relatively narrow variety of norms.

Haidt (2012) indicated that most sociocentric cultures place the importance of groups, and organizations as the first priority and place that of individuals as the second, while individualist cultures highly value the needs of individuals and the needs of groups and institutions may come in second place. Individualistic societies are likely to accept the moral modules that place emphasis on individual rights, such as fairness, care and freedom modules. By contrast, sociocentric societies place the essence of the group cohesion as a priority. They are likely to embrace sanctity, loyalty, and authority modules. In collectivist orientation cultures**,** people perceive that they are born into and

they belong to the specific group that can protect and nurture them in exchange for loyalty. With that in mind, we expect that in sociocentric cultures a perception of benevolence on the part of counterparty may drive people to more internal information sharing behavior than in individualistic societies. Furthermore, we expect that the need to belong plays a more crucial role in sociocentric societies than in individualistic societies. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:

H5a: In an East Asian population as opposed to a U.S. population, there is a significant and positive relationship between a partner's high benevolence and the level of information sharing between departments in an organization.

H5b: In both an East Asian and a U.S. population, there is a significant and positive relationship between a partner's high integrity and the level of information sharing between departments in an organization.

H5c: In both an East Asian and a U.S. population, there is a significant and positive relationship between a partner's ability and the level of information sharing between departments in an organization.

Moreover, moral foundations may be an important factor determining participants' information sharing behaviors. Haidt (2012) categorized moral foundations into six types; care, authority, fairness, liberty, loyalty, and sanctity. Care, fairness, and liberty can be broadly grouped into "individualizing" moral foundations. Loyalty, authority, and sanctity can be generally pooled into a group of "binding" moral foundations. This research investigates the possibility that within both a sociocentric culture and an individualistic culture, there is a higher propensity to trust among individuals who are high in valuing the "individualizing" moral foundations of fairness,

care, and liberty (Haidt, 2012), and a lower propensity to trust among individuals who are high in valuing the "binding" or socio-centric moral foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity/sacredness (Haidt, 2012). I conjectured that managers with higher valuation of individualizing moral foundations relative to binding moral foundations are more likely to trust and share more information with their partners. Moreover, I hypothesized that moral foundations may positively moderate the relationship between perceived trustworthiness of the trustees and participants' intention to share information. I propose:

H6a: Moral foundations will moderate the positive relationship between the perceived benevolence of the counterparties and managers' intention to share information, such that the predicted effect set forth in Hypothesis 1 will be intensified for managers with higher valuation of individualizing moral foundations relative to binding moral foundations.

H6b: Moral foundations will moderate the positive relationship between the perceived integrity of the counterparties and managers' intention to share information, such that the predicted effect set forth in Hypothesis 2 will be intensified for managers with higher valuation of individualizing moral foundations relative to binding moral foundations.

H6c: Moral foundations will moderate the positive relationship between the perceived ability of the counterparties and managers' intention to share information, such that the predicted effect set forth in Hypothesis 3 will be intensified for managers with higher valuation of individualizing moral foundations relative to binding moral foundations.

In this study, a set of control variables consisting of gender, age, generosity, risk attraction, and moral foundations is also proposed. Gender and age are considered two of the most frequently studied contextual variables. Our other main composite constructs, such as generosity, risk attraction will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Scenario Study

3.1 Research Design

Descriptive research describes the characteristics of a population or phenomena (Zikmund, 2003). This research is descriptive research with the objective of investigating the relationship between three facets of trustworthiness and information sharing behavior in the supply chain. The scenario study was proposed based on the literature review, the previous research findings, and the research questions discussed in the previous chapter.

Design. Twelve scenarios were created in the context of a pharmaceutical company in the US based on twelve dimensions of the experimental design that were composed of 2 (benevolence: high and low) * 2 (Integrity: high and low) scenarios, 2 (benevolence: high and low) * 2 (ability: high and low) scenarios, and 2 (integrity: high and low) * 2 (ability: high and low) scenarios. A total of 450 undergraduate students at a large public university in Bangkok, Thailand and 493 undergraduate students at a large university in New Jersey, the United States participated in this research.

Participants were told to read the instructions and the given scenario carefully. They were told that there was no right or wrong answer and to evaluate the scenario to the best of their ability. All data were kept confidential and anonymous.

The background language adjusted from Zhao (2011, p. 34) that preceded the manipulations went as follows:

American Medical Instrument Manufacturing (AMIM) is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in America. AMIM works closely with international pharmaceutical giants such as Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer, providing technological support and after-sale services for medical instruments sold in the American market. AMIM has more than 5,000 employees and has offices all over the United States. Imagine that you are the vice-president of AMIM's research and development department, and you actively work with 10 other departments in the company. Your department is responsible for technology standardization, integration of medical software, and the in-house development of instrument parts.

Trends in health care reform have resulted in positive changes for AMIM and the contracts AMIM has won have increased substantially. As a result of health care reform, international pharmaceutical companies have proposed a new contract with AMIM, offering technological support for new medical instrument products and their supporting services. Additionally, the recent (U.S.) national health care reform has assured AMIM's company's long term business prospects but has also increased the challenges you, as a vice president, can expect to encounter. However, like all successful companies, you have been planning budgets, organizing operations, and finding potential partners within the firm to cooperate with in order to build a new development team that will help coordinate and handle the new products and services that the global pharmaceutical companies are asking you to oversee.

Due to the need for drastically increased cooperation with international pharmaceutical companies, your department has been chosen as an initial team leader and you have been authorized you to carry out a new pharmaceutical products and services project. Your individual department is expected to increase the business by two-thirds and you now have to find a few potential departments to collaborate with in order to pursue this new project.

To set this new products and services project in motion, you as a project leader would like to share a lot of valuable information with your tentative partners. However, you cannot cooperate with all departments because you need only a few partners. All previous partners that you cooperated with are all potential partners. However, this information is very valuable and is not free. In order to gain valuable information, a department has to devote time, mental, and physical efforts, and other scarce resources to compile and extract a large amount of data (Zhao, 2011, p. 34).

Manipulation. I manipulated this study under three facets of trustworthiness and adjusted the manipulation from Mayer and Davis (1999) and Zhao (2011) as follows:

In the high benevolence condition, participants were informed:

In addition, your department partners are very concerned about your department's needs and desires. They care about your welfare and your department's needs and go out of their way to help you and your department. They also look out for what is important to you and your department. What they do in the company generally is beneficial for you and your department (Zhao, 2011, p. 36).

In the low benevolence condition, participants were informed:

Moreover, your department partners are not concerned about you and your department's needs and desires in the workplace. They do not care about your welfare and your departmental goal and seldom help you and your department benevolently. They never bother to concern themselves with what's important for you and your department in work. What they do in the company generally is not beneficial for you and your department's prestige and position at all (Zhao, 2011, p. 36).

In the high integrity condition, participants were informed:

You trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You never worry about whether they will keep their promises or whether they will be honest (Mayer & Davis, 1999, p.136).

In the low integrity condition, participants were informed:

You do not trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they do not use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You worry about whether they will keep their promises and whether they are honest (Mayer & Davis, 1999, p.136).

In the high ability condition, participants were informed:

> Before you draw your new project plan, you realize the following characteristics of your department partners. Generally speaking, your department partners are very capable of performing their jobs. They have much information about work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to be successful at all the things they are doing, and they have the specialized capabilities to do the jobs. Thus, you are very confident about your department partners' work skill (Zhao, 2011, p. 35).

In the low ability condition, participants were informed:

> Before you draw your new project plan, you realize the following characteristics of your department partners. Generally speaking, your department partners are not capable of performing their jobs. They do not have the necessary information about the work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to perform poorly at the things they are doing, and they do not have the specialized capabilities to do their jobs. Thus, you are not confident about your department partners' work skills (Zhao, 2011, p. 35).

3.2 Variables and Measures

A questionnaire was developed based on the measurement items of all the constructs involved in the model. The first section of the questionnaire included the instructions and all information about the scenario. The second section aimed to collect information regarding information sharing behaviors, generosity, risk attraction, and moral foundations of the participants. The respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement provided based on the seven-point Likert scale ranging from "extremely disagree" or "not at all" (1) to "extremely agree" or "very much" (7). The last section contained questions related to the respondent, such as gender and age. The

questionnaire was developed in both languages (English and Thai). The questionnaire was firstly written in English and then it was translated to Thai by a professional, who is an excellent bilingual speaker. It was then translated back to English in order to generate back-to-back translation because this technique has been generally and efficiently used with a good result (Davis & Cozensa, 1993; Zikmund, 1996).

Dependent Variables. Information sharing plays a very critical role for the effective internal integration. Information sharing can be a form of inter-department helpfulness, cooperation and collaboration. Information sharing behavior is the dependent variable in this study. We measured information sharing behavior by asking their intention to share information.

Independent Variables. Davis and Schoorman (1995) found that trustworthiness was related to the trustee's ability, benevolence, and integrity. These three facets of trustworthiness are the major independent variables in this study. We also used participants' gender (0 = male vs. 1 = female), age (continuous number), generosity (7-Likert scale), and risk attraction (7-Likert scale) as control variables. Moreover, factor analysis and multiple regression were used to evaluate the data in this study.

Manipulation Checks. To check for regulatory manipulations, participants were asked for the intensity level that they feel about the ability, benevolence, or integrity of their partners in the study. For the benevolence check, participants were asked, "To what extent do your partners care about your welfare and your departments' interests?" For the integrity check, participants were asked, "To what extent can you trust that your partners are honest?" The question to check on ability manipulation was, "To what extent can you trust your partners' ability?" The respondents were asked whether they agreed with the

statement provided based on the seven-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (7).

3.3 Survey Research Tool

In this research, it is very important to develop a measurement for the four main constructs; information sharing behavior, risk attraction, generosity, and moral foundations. The following is the discussion on the measurement development of these four constructs.

Information sharing stands out as the most active and effective form of supply chain internal integration. Beneficial cross functional collaboration seems to be impossible without effective sharing of operational information. In this study, the items used to measure intention to share information were derived and modified from Teh et al. (2011). The three main measurement items representing intention to share information are shown in Table 3.1.

In addition, people are different in the way they make a decision that involve risk and uncertainty. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we can describe these differences as differences in risk attitude. In the expected utility theory, risk attitude is modeled by utility functions that vary in shapes and degrees of concavity. Individuals may be risk averse or risk taking people because they have different concavity or convexity in their utility functions (Pratt, 1964). Risk attitude is generally considered as an individual personality trait (Weber, 2002). In my point of view, I perceive risk attitude as an important personal psychological factor of human beings. Hence, it can be classified as a kind of personality trait.

Some empirical studies have found systematic individual, group, and cultural differences in people' perceptions of perceived risks and benefits (Bontempo et al., 1997; Weber, 2002; Johnson et al., 2004). Weber (2002) pointed out that a people's perceived-risk attitude can be defines in this study as a department's willingness to incur a risk in exchange for receiving something in a return. Different people usually perceive risk differently, and expect a return benefit from the same situation differently. Therefore, a manager in a department may have a different attitude towards perceived risk, and a different value on perceived benefit in the same situation. Moreover, the degree to which a department is willing to take risk (undesirable outcomes) in order to gain some possible benefits differs across situations. Such characteristics can be classified as an important psychological factor that determines information sharing behavior. Hence, I believe that risk attitude affects supply chain integration in a form of information sharing behavior. Social-Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale proposed by Weber, Blais and Betz (2002) was used as a control variable because risk-averse participants are expected to share less information than risk-preferring people. The measurement items for risk-taking behavior are demonstrated in table 3.2.

Generosity is the habit of giving and not expecting anything back from the recipients. Generous people always offer time, assets or talents to help somebody in need. Generosity is generally described in society as a desirable trait and charity is always accepted in society as a virtue. Generosity is not relevant to individual's economic status, but instead, it is based on individual's pure intentions of scarifying one's time, assets, or talents for someone else in the society with elevated heart. Generous people are more likely to look out for society's common goods with an offer that exceeds the minimum

amount required for acceptance. In economic exchange games, generosity is quantitatively important in predicting the amount of assets respondents intended to give to their counterparties. Hence, there are reasons to believe that generosity can influence supply chain integration in a form of information sharing. The Interpersonal Generosity (IG) scale of Smith and Hill (2009) was used as a main control variable in this study. We proposed participants' generosity as one of the control variables because generous people are presumably more likely to share more information than less generous people are. The details of the measurement items for generosity can be seen in table 3.3.

Finally, moral foundations may be a factor determining participants' information sharing behaviors. This research investigates the possibility that within both a sociocentric/collectivist culture and an individualistic culture, there is a higher propensity to trust among individuals who are high in valuing the "individualizing" moral foundations of fairness, care, and liberty (Haidt, 2012), and a lower propensity to trust among individuals who are high in valuing the "binding" or sociocentric moral foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity/sacredness/sanctity (Haidt, 2012). Moreover, I hypothesized that moral foundations may positively moderate the relationship between perceived trustworthiness of the trustees and participants' intention to share information. The details of the measurement items for generosity can be seen in table 3.4.

Chapter 4

Results and Discussion

4.1 General Results

This research used 37 variable names to represent the measurement items; 3 items for manipulation checks, 3 items for intention to share information, 6 items for risk attraction, 6 items for generosity, 16 items for moral foundations, and 3 items for socio-economic. For the research conducted in America, US experiment 1 (2 (Benevolence: high and low) * 2 (Integrity: high and low)) and US experiment 3 (2 (Integrity: high and low) * 2 (Ability: high and low)) were conducted at the behavioral laboratory at the north-eastern large public university in February and in October 2013, respectively. Due to time and laboratory resource constraints, US experiment 2 (2 (Benevolence: high and low) * 2 (Ability: high and low)) was done online on Amazon MTURK in November 2013. For the research done in Bangkok, Thailand (TH), all three experiments (TH experiment 1-3) were conducted in three separate large classes.

For the manipulation checks, Table 4.1 shows that participants in the high benevolence condition perceived their partners as more benevolent than did those in low benevolence condition in all scenarios in both the USA and Thailand. Moreover, participants in the high integrity condition perceived their partners as higher in integrity than did their counterparts in the low integrity condition. Finally, participants in the high ability condition viewed their partners as significantly more able than those in low ability condition. Table 4.2 shows average score values of intention to share information in both countries.

A threshold eigenvalue of one was specified in the factor analysis to assess the appropriate number of factors extracted. Only factors with eigenvalue exceeding one were considered significant and were included in the analysis. In addition, factor loading values less than 0.5 were considered insignificant and were rejected. The factor analysis indicated that there were two factors with important relationships that were therefore, retained. The retained factors were interpreted as risk attraction factor, and generosity factor. According to Hair et al. (1998), factor scores can be generated by computing factor loadings. These new composite variables are a powerful indicator of the impact of their responses to the elements included in that factor. These score will be used in our multiple regression model to analyze the relationship between intention to share information and independent factors.

I generated the Kraiser-Mayer Olkin's (KMO) values of sampling adequacy test and Bartlett's test of sphericity in order to evaluate the appropriateness of the survey data for the factor analysis (Hair et al., 1998). The values of the KMO sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test signify that my survey data are suitable for the factor analysis. All KMO values exceed 0.6 and the Bartlett tests are very significant ($p < .001$). Principal component analysis and Varimax rotation as parts of factor analysis was then conducted to group all independent factors into two main factors. Table 4.3 shows factor analysis of the two main composite independent variables.

Since this research uses measures of multi-items to decrease the likelihood that a single item may be misunderstood (Tallman et al., 1997), these items are based on a process of purification as proposed by Churchill (1999). Thus, it is important to investigate construct reliability so as to assure the quality of measures to the study. The

constructs were initially assessed with evaluation of their means and standard deviation. Then the test of internal consistency was applied to assess the reliability of multi-item scales. Internal consistency can be defined as the homogeneity of a bunch of items that rests on the reason that items in a scale should perform in the same manner (Churchill, 1999). Coefficient alpha (Cronbach's alpha) and item-to-total statistics were computed using SPSS software to evaluate the internal consistency of multi-item scales.

In this research, I evaluated the reliability of the questionnaire by computing item-to-total-correlation and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient values should be greater than 0.7, or the threshold value (Nunnally, 1978). The result suggested that there was an acceptable degree of internal consistency for all key constructs in the questionnaire. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients of all except one of the constructs were greater than the minimum threshold value, as shown in table 4.4. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients, for all dimensions of each key construct were classified as acceptable, with the values ranging from .703 to .958.

4.2 Experimental Results

4.2(a) Study 1: BT*IT

In order to examine the characteristics of the participants in America and Thailand for experiment 1, BT*IT, the descriptive statistics of participants were done based on 164 sets of complete online questionnaires, and on 151 sets of paper questionnaires from February to November 2013. All of the participants were randomly recruited; they were between 18 and 25 years of age. The tables 4.5-4.7 show that male respondents tended to

share more information than did female respondents. The older respondents were more likely to share information than the younger respondents in both countries. Risk attraction and generosity were positively correlated to respondents' intention to share information.

Moreover, I conjectured that respondents with higher valuation of binding moral foundations (sanctity, loyalty, and authority) relative to individualizing moral foundations (liberty, fairness, and care), represented by net binding and individualizing moral foundations (Haidt_Col_Ind_Dif or Haidt_Dif), are less likely to trust the other parties (e.g. less likely to share information with the other parties). However, I found that the moral foundations variable was not significantly associated with information sharing behavior. Respondents with higher valuation of binding moral foundations (sanctity, loyalty, and authority) relative to individualizing moral foundations (fairness, liberty, and care) were directionally less likely to share information in all scenarios, but the results were non-significant. As predicted, culture was highly and negatively correlated with age, risk attraction, and generosity because Thai students were younger, less risk taking, less generous with the strangers (other departments) than American students were. Culture was highly and positively correlated with the net binding moral foundations variable (Haidt_Dif), in accordance with the expectation that individuals in a sociocentric/collectivist culture would view binding moral foundations as more important than respondents in an individualistic culture.

Tables 4.8-4.9, summarizing study 1 for Thailand and New Jersey, provided some interesting results. As predicted, participants in both countries were significantly more likely to share information with partners whom they believed had a higher degree of integrity trustworthiness (supported H2 & H5b). Interestingly, participants in both

countries did not intend to share information with partners whom they perceived had a higher degree of benevolence trustworthiness (rejected H1 & H5a). In addition, information sharing was not higher when the benevolent counterparts were perceived as stronger in integrity. Some control variables, such as age, risk attitude, and generosity, highly determined the participants' intention to share information in America, but only age played a significant role in determining information sharing behavior for participants in Thailand.

For table 4.10, the pooled-data results for Study 1 show some interesting outcomes. Culture was very significant in determining information sharing behavior in the simple models (model 1&2). Interestingly, though, it turned out to be insignificant when the control variables were added to the model. To the extent culture had an effect, it was through New Jersey respondents having higher levels of generosity and risk propensity, not directly. Moral foundations did not moderate the effects of Benevolence trustworthiness on information sharing behaviors (rejected H6a). However, this individual moral variable highly and positively moderated the effects of Integrity trustworthiness on the intention to share information, such that these effects were more positively intensified (supported H6b). In other words, respondents who valued binding moral foundations more highly were significantly more likely to value integrity more highly.

4.2(b) Study 2: BT*AT

In order to examine the characteristics of the participants in America and Thailand for experiment 2, BT*AT, the descriptive statistics of participants were done based on 160 sets of complete online questionnaires and on 150 sets of paper questionnaires from

February to November 2013. All of the participants were randomly recruited and they were between 18 and 30 years of age. Participants in America were older than those in Thailand on average because American participants were recruited to do the online questionnaires on Amazon MTURK due to time and resource constraints.

The tables 4.11-4.13 show that male respondents were likely to share more information than did female respondents. The older respondents tended to share information than the younger respondents in both countries. Risk attraction and generosity were positively correlated to respondents' intention to share information. Moreover, the moral foundations variable was not significantly associated with information sharing behavior. As predicted, culture was highly and negatively correlated with age and risk attraction because Thai students were younger and less risk taking than American students were. As hypothesized and as found in Study 1 as well, culture was highly and positively correlated with the net binding moral foundations variable (Haidt_Dif), supporting the idea that binding moral foundations are valued more in Thailand than in the United States.

Tables 4.14-4.16, summarizing Study 2 for New Jersy and Thailand, provided some interesting results that both confirmed and rejected my hypotheses. As predicted, participants in America were significantly likely to share information with partners whom they believed had a higher degree of ability trustworthiness (supported H3). But contrary to prediction, those in Thailand were not (rejected H3 & H5c). Interestingly, participants in both countries did not intend to share information with partners whom they perceived had a higher degree of benevolence trustworthiness (rejected H1 & H5a). In addition, information sharing was not higher when the benevolent counterparts were perceived as

stronger in ability. Age, risk attitude, and generosity highly determined the participants' intention to share information in both countries and in the pooled data case. Individual moral foundations variable was a weak predictor of information sharing behavior in all cases. In addition, moral foundations did not moderate the effects of Benevolence trustworthiness nor the Ability trustworthiness on information sharing behaviors (rejected H6a & H6c).

The results seen in the pooled data results for Study 2 parallel those found for Study 1. In particular, culture was very significant in determining information sharing behavior in the simple models. However, it was not significant in other, more complicated models because it mediated participant's information sharing behavior through the control variables, notably generosity and risk propensity.

4.2(c) Study 3: IT*AT

In order to examine the characteristics of the participants in America and Thailand for experiment 3, IT*AT, the descriptive statistics of participants were done, based on 169 sets of complete online questionnaires and on 149 sets of paper questionnaires from February to November 2013. All of the participants were randomly recruited and they were between 18 and 25 years of age.

The tables 4.17-4.19 show that male respondents tended to share more information than did female respondents. The older respondents were more likely to share information than the younger respondents in both countries. Risk attraction and generosity were positively correlated to the respondents' intention to share information. These relationships were the same in most scenarios in both countries and a dummy culture variable was highly correlated with various control variables. In addition, the

individual moral foundations variable was not significantly associated with the intention to share information. As predicted, culture was highly and negatively associated with age and generosity because Thai students were younger and more risk averse than American students were. Consistently, culture was highly and positively associated with net binding moral foundations variable (Haidt_Dif) due to their sociocentric/collectivist culture. In nearly all these regards, the results for Study 3 thus paralleled the results previously described for Studies 1 and 2.

As shown in tables 4.20-4.22 and as predicted, participants in both countries intended to share information significantly more with partners whom they believed had a higher degree of integrity trustworthiness (supported H2 & H5b). As predicted, participants in America were significantly more likely to share information with partners whom they believed had a higher degree of ability trustworthiness (supported H3). But those in Thailand were not (rejected H3 & H5c). Surprisingly, information sharing was not lower when the low integrity counterparts were perceived as stronger in ability. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that all participants in both countries were very young students, and most of them had no work experience. Therefore, they were possibly too innocent to be sensitized to threat from a high ability-low integrity partner, and hence did not perceive their partners with low integrity and high ability as a threat.

In addition, age, risk attitude, and generosity highly determined participants' intention to share information in most cases. Surprisingly, respondents with higher valuation of binding moral foundations (sanctity, loyalty, and authority) relative to individualizing moral foundations (fairness, liberty, and care) were directionally more likely (though insignificantly) to share information. Furthermore, individual moral

foundations did not moderate both the effects of Integrity trustworthiness and Ability trustworthiness on information sharing behaviors (rejected H6b & H6c). Similar to the pooled-data results of experiment 1 (BT*IT) and experiment 2 (BT*AT), culture was very significant in determining the participant's intention to share information in only two simple models, but it was not significant in other more complicated models with control variables because of the mediation effects of generosity and risk propensity in particular.

4.3 Conclusion

First, I will summarize my results relating to the characteristics of the participants. In general, some of the main hypotheses of my research model were supported. Risk-averse participants were less likely to share information with their partners than risk-taking people were. Generous participants were more likely to share information with their partners. Age as one of the control variables seems to play an important role in determining the likelihood of the participants to share information, i.e. the older participants tended to share information much more than the younger ones did. However, people with higher valuation of individualizing moral foundations relative to binding moral foundations were not significantly more likely to share information with their counterparts. For pooled data results, culture (sociocentric=1) seems to play an important role in determining the participants' intention to share information in two simple models. However, it was not significant in other more complicated models with control variables; culture to the extent it matters in willingness to share information was mediated through control variables, notably generosity and risk propensity.

The key results of this research relate to the characteristics of the trustee, to which I will now turn. Integrity trustworthiness was significantly associated with the extent to which the participant shares information with their partners in both American and Thai groups (supported H2 & H5b). However, only American participants perceived that ability trustworthiness of their partners was a positive factor in intention to share information. Thai participants did not care about ability (partially supported H3 & rejected H5c). Interestingly, the benevolence trustworthiness of a partner was not significant in either group (rejected H1 & H5a). The moderation effect between net binding and individualizing moral foundations and trustworthiness was not supported (rejected H6a, H6b, & H6c). In addition, I also found no significant interaction between each facet of trustworthiness (rejected H4a, H4b, & H4c).

Participants in America were likely to share more information with partners whom they believed had a higher degree of integrity and ability trustworthiness rather than benevolence trustworthiness. However, participants in Thailand tended to share information with a group of counterparts whom they perceived had a higher level of integrity trustworthiness, instead of ability and benevolence trustworthiness. Participants in both countries seem to evaluate low integrity and high ability partners as dangerous people to share information with even though the results were not significant. These findings show that integrity is the most crucial part of trustworthiness when people are going to deal with social exchanges.

Chapter Five

Discussion and Conclusion

5.1 Discussion

In both countries, the socioeconomic factor (e.g. age) and the psychological factors (e.g. risk attraction and generosity) played an important role in determining respondents' intention to share information in most cases. The magnitudes of respondents' intention to share information in America were higher than those of in Thailand. However, moral foundation factor was not a significant factor in determining information sharing behavior as we predicted. Moreover, it did not moderate the effects of Trustworthiness on information sharing behaviors in either culture.

Integrity trustworthiness was a powerful predictor of information sharing behavior of the respondents in both America and Thailand. It did positively and significantly determine the respondents' intention to share information in both countries. In contrast, Benevolence trustworthiness positively, but poorly predicted information sharing behavior in both countries. Surprisingly, ability trustworthiness was a positive and strong determinant of intention to share information in America but it was a negative and weak predictor of intention to share information in Thailand. In other words, respondents in America were likely to take integrity and ability as positive signs when they shared information with their partners. However, respondents in Thailand were likely to consider only integrity characteristics of their partners.

In addition, Thai respondents seem to perceive the ability of their partners as a small threat to share information with (even though it was not significant). In future

research, it would be interesting to explore whether respondents in Thailand or elsewhere in Asia perceive their partners (the other departments) as out-group members to the greater degree than is the case in New Jersey or elsewhere in the United States. On average, Thai respondents exhibited less information sharing behavior than did American respondents in all scenarios because they may perceive the other departments as out-group members. Sociocentric societies usually focus the importance of the group they belong to (Nisbette, 2003). They perceive they are born into and belong to in-groups that help protecting them in exchange for loyalty. Therefore, they are more likely to trust in-groups than out-groups.

I did not find the two-way interaction between benevolence and integrity nor the two-way interaction between integrity and ability to be neither significant in Thailand nor America. An interaction effect can be noticed in factorial experiments. Interaction effect can be generated whenever the effect of an independent variable is influenced by the degree of the other. The reason we did not find any interaction effect in these experimental studies in both countries is that the effect of each facet of trustworthiness is principally the same regardless of the level of the other kind of trustworthiness. We found no interaction of benevolence and integrity because the effect of benevolence on information sharing behavior is essentially the same regardless of the level of integrity, and vice versa. We found no interaction of integrity and ability because the effect of ability on trustworthiness is fundamentally the same irrespective to the level of integrity, and vice versa.

5.2 Theoretical Implications

Nisbett (2003) suggests that there are inter-correlations between the social practices and the worldviews. Our thought processes not only rationalize the worldviews, but also substantiate the social practices. Living in harmony, which can be related to integrity, is a key success factor for all people around the world. In retrospect, if not beforehand, it perhaps therefore makes sense that integrity trustworthiness won out strongly over the other trustworthiness factors. My research provides some interesting results. Integrity played a very vital role in information exchanges in both sociocentric culture (Thailand) and individualist culture (The United States) while benevolence did not. Only participants in an individualist culture perceived that ability was important when they shared information. These cross-cultural contributions generate some beneficial insights in the context of social exchanges. Further research is indicated to investigate whether the central finding here that integrity matters most in both the East and the West can be replicated.

The power of control seems to play a much more important role in Greek inherited cultures or western cultures (Nisbett, 2003). Per Nesbitt, Westerners tend to believe that their success depends on the degree to which they gain control. The higher the degree of control they gain, the more likelihood they will succeed. Hence, it makes sense, in retrospect, that respondents in the US took Ability trustworthiness in to consideration more than did those in Thailand since ability can imply a high degree of control in various situations. According to Sako and Helper (1998), an activity such as technical assistance can improve “competence trust” between suppliers and it can also be considered as an expression of commitment between each other, and may be viewed as

"good-view trust", especially in the case that technical assistance is only partially paid for. They found a positive and significant correlation between the degree of technical assistance and the quality of supply chain integration. In addition, a higher degree of intensive knowledge and skills may refer to a higher potential to be successful and a lower amount of transaction cost. Here as before, further research is called on to verify whether the finding here that American participants perceived "competence trust" or "good-view trust" as important, while Asian participants did not can be replicated.

Hofstede et al. (2010) categorizes society into "low-context" and "high-context." They found that people in individualist cultures are more likely to cooperate with the out-group members than those in sociocentric cultures. This may provide a good explanation for why Bangkok respondents exhibited less information sharing behavior than did Jersey respondents in all scenarios.

Although the higher level of information sharing in New Jersey relative to Thailand is an interesting finding, the central finding of the study is that integrity trustworthiness was the most crucial factor in determining information sharing behavior and the Benevolence trustworthiness was the weakest one. In what follows, I try to explain why integrity might matter more than benevolence as a general proposition.

Webster's Dictionary states opportunism as "the practice of grasping at opportunities without regard for moral considerations or the practice of adjusting one's policy in the light of each new situation as it rises, not according to principle or a plan." In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) indicated that achievement of general prosperity relies on an increase in productivity through the division of labor. Therefore, specialization can unquestionably create general prosperity. Specialization is

unmanageable if there is a lack of transactions. Transactions, indeed, can generate opportunistic abuse. Transaction costs may be driven very high in order to combat opportunistic abuse because some scarce resources tend to be allocated to defend against it. The social transaction cost of opportunism obstructs the intensification of general prosperity. From Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) theory, behavioral uncertainty is usually generated from the problem of foreseeing the actions of the counterparty in the relationship. Poppo and Zenger (1998) indicated that exchange hazards tremendously affect the supply chain integration by generating a higher transaction cost. Hence, a higher degree of exchange hazards can be interpreted as a higher degree of transaction costs.

Trust may be perceived as the belief of supply chain members that the relationship is very important and worthwhile and the relationship will last in the long run. According to Arrow (1972), trust is very crucial in every single commercial transaction because it is based on trust. The high degree of mutual confidence in a society can apparently explain economic prosperity in many countries. Therefore, trust can eliminate or decrease redundant and excessive transaction cost and enhance overall social affluence and economic welfare. Rose (2011, p. 92) indicated that the process of trustworthiness and trust may be described step by step as the follows:

> A self-serving action is considered that will likely bring harm to one or more individuals, Empathizing with the harmed individual or individuals, Feeling of sympathy, Feeling of sympathy and culpability, Involuntary feeling of guilt, Sufficiently strong feelings of guilt, Moral restraint, Moral restraint precludes opportunism, Trustworthiness, and Trust

In addition, Rose (2011, p. 115) has proposed the interesting problem of greater good rationalization that is the idea that "negative moral act is not necessarily immoral if it is undertaken as a means to a positive moral end." Therefore, the greater good rationalization may generate "calculative trust" or "strategic trust". Moreover, it makes unconditional trustworthiness impossible and it supports a shame-based society (I should do, I should not do) rather than a guilt-based society (I must do, I must not do). He also mentioned that duty refers to the deliberate decision to do or not to do regardless of the concern for the greater good rationalization because duty is a core principle. A transition from "should" to "must" is the core of duty. Trust without trustworthiness can invariably harm the expansion of trust. Rose (2011, p. 175) indicated as the follows:

> People who possess moral tastes instantiated by moral beliefs that comport with the moral foundation can be genuinely trusted. This is because moral tastes do not require the possibility of detection to produce a cost in the form of feelings of guilt for behaving opportunistically. Instead, in such cases the person involved can be rationally expected to feel guilty even if the trusting party knows that the trusted party knows he cannot be caught. This produces credible moral restraint even if golden opportunities are likely to arise. Such individuals can be trusted never to engage in opportunism in all circumstances.

Therefore, achieving unconditional trustworthiness requires an ethic of duty-based moral restraint. Here, I believe, Rose's reasoning about duty intersects with integrity, defined as keeping promises and adherence to principles.

Trustworthiness without trust can finally extend the value of trust over time. People in a culture that is optimistic and almost certainly extend trust tend to enjoy higher benefits than those who don't. It is a mistake to believe that trustworthiness is just a

strategic response to manipulate incentives as suggested by interpersonal trust (benevolence). In contrast, it is more believable that it is a rule-based response because the calculative extension of trust is very consistent with duty-based or non-strategic trustworthiness. On the one hand, trust can be generated from the replication of social interaction. This trust takes time and effort to form and it can be identified as particularized trust (benevolence value). On the other hand, trust may be created from general information about characteristics of the agents. The latter is immediate trust and it may be called generalized unconditional rule-based trust (integrity value).

Benevolence trustworthiness is associated with a personal relationship. A party will do good thing to its counterparts with an expectation that its counterparts will do good thing in return. Without a good relationship, benevolence trustworthiness cannot occur. This aspect of trustworthiness relies on a good experience in the past or an optimistic expectation for the future return (expected incentive). Hence, the transaction costs of benevolence trustworthiness are high due to the need for reciprocity and the long time frame. In contrast, integrity trustworthiness places high value on rule-based or duty-based commitment regardless of interpersonal connection. A party will do a good thing to their counterparts on the ground that it is a good thing to do so no matter how well the others have done a good thing to such party in the past, and no matter how valuable the incentives may be to do such a good thing. Therefore, always doing a good thing is a "must", not an option. Integrity trustworthiness can be perceived as an instantaneous generalized trust that requires minimal amount of time and effort to form it. Its transaction cost is much lower than benevolence trustworthiness. That accords with our

findings that participants in both cultures strongly valued integrity trustworthiness as a priority for information exchanges.

5.3 Limitations/Suggestions for Future Research

This experimental study was conducted in the restricted domain of a variety of scenario studies and locations. Therefore, the results may not be suitably generalizable to other populations in the world or even in Asia and America. However, the research can suggest a starting milestone for researchers who are pursuing how trustworthiness affects the supply chain internal integration (i.e. information sharing behavior) in an organization. It may provide any researcher interested in this topic with some initial insights that could be reproduced in other populations around the world.

Future research is needed to assess even further the decision making processes underlying the current findings. Further research should focus on not only how people share information, but also attempt to answer the questions why people perceive the trustworthiness aspect and react to it differently. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), people in relational cultures are more likely to value a good relationship. Hence, they tend to trust members in the group that they belong to. Asian people tend to value relationships much more than do those in America and Europe (Brewer & Chen, 2007). However, the present research indicated that there was no significant relationship between benevolence construct and Thai respondents' intention to share information, which was in contrast with the hypotheses we conjectured. Hence, further studies should be designed to assess more deeply whether the current findings are replicable and to evaluate the underlying mechanisms.

Secondly, even though Asians may have many things in common and collectivism social constraints may play a very vital role in a variety of Asian societies, it would be of interest to consider possible intra-Asian differences in future research. It has been posited that authority is the main social constraint in Thailand and China, while in Japan peer provides the key control mechanism (Nisbett, 2003). In other words, many Asian countries have a collectivist culture in common but they still have some local culture differences which may enable different social constraints on any decision making process. Therefore, the degree of intensity of the constructs of benevolence, integrity, and ability may vary across nationalities. Furthermore, the present studies were done in New Jersey and Bangkok, which are urban area in the United States and Thailand. Hence, it is worthwhile and useful for additional research to be conducted in another part of the United States of America and a rural area of Thailand. In addition, further research can provide greater contribution when it is conducted in Europe, and in some major countries in Asia, such as China and India; people in Europe, China, and India may have different kinds of judgment on perceived Benevolence trustworthiness, Integrity trustworthiness, and Ability trustworthiness in comparison to those of Americans and Thais. Future research should evaluate whether these and other domestic cultures inspire the relationships between each facet of trustworthiness and people's information sharing behaviors we have found in America, in an American MTURK sample, and in Thailand .

Finally, field studies should be designed to build on the interesting results of the scenario study and to help assess the generalizability of the scenario findings. The scenario itself was in a very narrow and specific situation. Hence, it is of great interest to

examine whether the findings of the specific situation study happen when the same hypotheses are tested under a real work situation.

5.4 Conclusion

A manager's trust relies on an employee's trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is an important determinant of sharing information behavior in an organization. We can also say that trustworthiness is one of the main factors in internal supply chain integration. Trustworthiness is composed of three facets: Benevolence, Integrity, and Ability trustworthiness. People in different cultures may perceive the value of each kind of trustworthiness differently. However, we found that undergraduate respondents in the US and those in Bangkok were significantly likely to share more information with a group of partners whom they believed had a higher degree of Integrity trustworthiness rather than Benevolence trustworthiness. These findings show that integrity is the most crucial part of trustworthiness when people are going to deal with social exchanges.

This research has made a contribution centrally by examining for the first time how information sharing behavior is related to three facets of trustworthiness. It is submitted for the consideration of scholars as a starting point for researchers to understand how information sharing behaviors between departments in an organization are conducted and shaped by trustworthiness, and to investigate further whether the strong primacy of Integrity over Ability, and especially Benevolence trustworthiness found in the current study is a general phenomenon.

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Table 3.1 Measurement Items for Intention to Share Information

Dimension	Measurement Items	Modified and Derived from
Intention to Share Information	I will intentionally share information with my partners.	Teh et al. (2011)
	I plan to share information with my partners.	
	I will make an effort to share information with my partners.	

Table 3.2 Measurement Items for Risk-Taking Behavior

Dimension	Measurement Items	Used from
Risk-taking	Betting a day's income at the horse race.	Weber, Blais and Betz (2002)
	Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.	
	Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game.	
	Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.	
	Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event.	
	Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.	

Table 3.3 Measurement Items for Generosity

Dimension	Measurement Items	Used From
Generosity	When one of my loved ones needs my attention, I really try to slow down and give them the time and help they need.	Smith and Hill (2009)
	I am known by family and friends as someone who makes time to pay attention to others' problem.	
	I am a kind of person who is willing to go to the "extra mile" to help take care of my Friends relatives and acquaintances.	
	When friends or family members experience something upsetting or discouraging I make a special point of –being kind to them.	
	When I come to my personal relationships with others, I am a very generous person.	
	It makes me very happy to give to other people I ways that meet their needs.	

Table 3.4 Measurement Items for Moral Foundations

Dimension	Measurement Items	Used From
Moral Foundations	Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.	Haidt (2012)
	Whether or not some people were treated differently than others.	
	Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country.	
	Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority.	
	Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency.	
	Whether or not someone was good at math.	
	Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable.	
	Whether or not someone acted unfairly.	
	Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group.	
	Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.	
	Whether or not some people were treated differently than others.	
	Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society.	
	Whether or not someone did something disgusting.	
	Whether or not someone was cruel.	
	Whether or not someone was denied his or her right.	
	Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty.	

Table 4.1 Average Values of Trustworthiness (BT, IT, AT)

	Benevolence			Integrity			Ability		
	BT (low)	BT (high)	p	IT (low)	IT (high)	p	AT (low)	AT (high)	p
US 1 (BT*IT)	**2.29**	**5.33**	**.00**	**2.17**	**5.17**	**.00**	**-**	**-**	**-**
US 2 (BT*AT)	**2.50**	**5.66**	**.00**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**2.33**	**5.86**	**.00**
US 3 (IT * AT)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**4.03**	**4.74**	**.001**	**4.06**	**4.61**	**.013**
TH 1 (BT*IT)	**2.35**	**5.14**	**.00**	**2.38**	**5.42**	**.00**	**-**	**-**	**-**
TH 2 (BT*AT)	**2.45**	**5.56**	**.00**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**2.56**	**5.38**	**.00**
TH 3 (IT * AT)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**3.45**	**5.55**	**.00**	**3.63**	**5.26**	**.00**

Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.2 Average Score Values of Intention to Share Information

	Benevolence			Integrity			Ability		
	BT (low)	BT (high)	p	IT (low)	IT (high)	p	AT (low)	AT (high)	p
US 1 (BT*IT)	**4.53**	**4.65**	**.643**	**4.29**	**4.93**	**.008**	**-**	**-**	**-**
US 2 (BT*AT)	**4.94**	**5.16**	**.354**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**4.67**	**5.60**	**.002**
US 3 (IT * AT)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**3.59**	**4.49**	**.00**	**2.95**	**4.94**	**.00**
TH1 (BT*IT)	**4.55**	**4.66**	**.708**	**3.92**	**5.13**	**.00**	**-**	**-**	**-**
TH 2 (BT*AT)	**4.18**	**4.33**	**.582**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**4.45**	**4.10**	**0.45**
TH 3 (IT * AT)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**4.11**	**4.71**	**.046***	**4.40**	**4.34**	**.827**

Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.3 Factor Analysis of the main composite variables

Factors	US 1 (BT*IT)	US 2 (BT*AT)	US 3 (IT*AT)	TH 1 (BT*IT)	TH 2 (BT*AT)	TH 3 (IT*AT)
Risk Attraction						
Betting a day's income at the horse races	.796	.801	.647	.901	.801	.917
Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.	.748	.854	.674	.921	.898	.915
Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game.	.854	.876	.642	.908	.908	.916
Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.	.793	.869	.651	.903	.872	.875
Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event.	.773	.910	.721	.860	.908	.919
Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.	.788	.812	.653	.920	.856	.915
Eigen Value	2.813	3.244	2.614	3.032	3.154	3.319
Percentage Variation	28.750	33.171	27.427	30.212	31.025	32.125
Generosity						
When one of my loved ones needs my attention, I really try to slow down and give them the time and help they need.	0.807	.861	.835	.674	.765	.787
I am known by family and friends as someone who makes time to pay attention to others' problem.	0.828	.888	.851	.792	.804	.874
I am a kind of person who is willing to go the "extra mile" to help take care of my friends relatives, and acquaintances.	0.851	.857	.889	.620	.732	.738
When friends or family members experience something upsetting or discouraging I make a special point of –being kind to them.	0.819	.812	.906	.795	.735	.796
When I comes to my personal relationships with others, I am a very generous person.	0.773	.872	.814	.622	.774	.645
It makes me very happy to give to other people in ways that meet their needs.	0.758	.845	.806	.722	.672	.744
Eigen Value	4.319	4.818	4.622	3.660	4.283	4.451
Percentage Variation	38.792	44.414	40.81	34.40	38.554	39.674
Tests						
KMO Test	.788	.840	.811	.747	.784	.799
Barlett's Test (sig)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

Table 4.4 Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test (Alpha >= 0.7)

Items	US 1 (BT*IT)	US 2 (BT*AT)	US 3 (IT*AT)	TH 1 (BT*IT)	TH 2 (BT*AT)	TH 3 (IT*AT)
Intention to Share Information	.958	.954	.931	.941	.919	.921
I feel it is meaningful to share information with my partners.	.962	.949	.935	.903	.879	.867
I will intentionally share information with my partners.	.917	.915	.859	.897	.893	.857
I plan to share information with my partners.	.935	.933	.924	.940	.879	.932
Risk Attraction	.866	.790	.756	.764	.763	.848
Betting a day's income at the horse races	.846	.749	.709	.768	.750	.831
Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund	.817	.765	.725	.760	.703	.823
Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game	.790	.763	.719	.771	.753	.836
Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock	.799	.685	.712	.763	.701	.797
Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event	.836	.752	.711	.772	.752	.825
Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture	.834	.774	.751	.785	.710	.821
Generosity	.897	.931	.929	.898	.854	.866
When one of my loved ones needs my attention, I really try to slow down and give them the time and help they need.	.878	.918	.919	.823	.823	.849
I am known by family and friends as someone who makes time to pay attention to others' problem.	.877	.917	.918	.794	.819	.823
I am a kind of person who is willing to go the "extra mile" to help take care of my friends, relatives, and acquaintances.	.865	.917	.909	.879	.824	.884
When friends or family members experience something upsetting or discouraging I make a special point of being kind to them.	.878	.922	.910	.805	.834	.842
When I come to my personal relationships with others, I am a very generous person.	.886	.917	.921	.847	.837	.845
It makes me very happy to give to other people in ways that meet their needs.	.886	.920	.923	.814	.843	.850

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in USA

US Experiment 1: BT*IT (N=164)

	BT	IT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
IT	-.057	1						
Gender	.058	-.175*	1					
Age	.087	.016	.149	1				
Risk_L	.060	-.066	-.092	.020	1			
Genero	.048	-.058	.147*	.132	-.037	1		
Infor_S	.053	.203*	-.15*	.152*	.098	.123*	1	
Hai_Dif	.052	-.022	-.046	.020	.073	-.005	-.033	1
Mean	***.48***	***.47***	***.47***	***22.95***	***3.096***	***5.89***	***4.67***	***-.721***
S.D.	***.501***	***.50***	***.501***	***6.09***	***.864***	***.956***	***1.55***	***2.24***

Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in Thailand

TH Experiment 1: BT*IT (N=151)

	BT	IT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
IT	-.19*	1						
Gender	.26**	-.05	1					
Age	.22**	.19*	-.23*	1				
Risk_L	.19*	.056	-.16	.115	1			
Genero	-.07	-.006	-.011	.026	.016	1		
Infor_S	.03	.372**	-.071	.235**	.224**	.056	1	
Hai_Dif	-.122	.082	.138	.081	-.173*	.028	.049	1
Mean	***.58***	***.58***	***.64***	***20.19***	***2.47***	***5.45***	***4.67***	***-.21***
S.D.	***.496***	***.496***	***.48***	***2.13***	***1.07***	***1.01***	***1.63***	***1.91***

Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study Pooled Data

Experiment 1: BT*IT (N=315)

	BT	IT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
IT	-.11	1						
Gender	-.07	-.11	1					
Age	.07	.02	.00	1				
Risk_L	.09	.03	-.12	.09	1			
Genero	-.03	-.05	.08	.15*	.06	1		
Infor_S	-.01	.44**	-.10	.11	.16**	.03	1	
Hai_Dif	-.01	.03	.04	-.01	-.08	-.02	-.01	1
Culture	.01	.11	.07	-.18*	-.31**	-.22**	.00	.12*
Mean	***.53***	***.52***	***.55***	***21.63***	***2.80***	***5.68***	***4.67***	***-.48***
S.D.	***.5***	***.5***	***.50***	***4.83***	***1.02***	***1.00***	***1.62***	***2.11***

Table 4.8a Results of BT*IT Scenario Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.049 (.179)	-.049 (.184)
Age	-	-	.185 (.049)*	.182 (.048)*
Risk-taking	-	-	.253 (.003)**	.251 (.003)**
Generosity	-	-	.521 (.000)***	.520 (.000)***
BT	.312 (.058)	.219 (.098)	.035 (.326)	.027 (.579)
IT	.610 (.000)***	.701 (.000)***	.086 (.016)*	.094 (.042)*
BT * IT	-	.212 (.102)	-	.011 (.807)
F_Test	128.730***	113.972***	236.166	201.224***
R-Square	.614	.680	.900	.900
Adjusted R-Square	.609	.674	.896	.896
N = 164	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.8b Results of BT*IT Scenario Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.049 (.179)	-.050 (.176)	-.044 (.246)	-.043 (.131)
Age	.185 (.049)*	.179 (.043)*	.181 (.046)*	.194 (.043)*
Risk-taking	.259 (.003)**	.241 (.005)**	.232 (.008)**	.256 (.003)**
Generosity	.521 (.000)***	.505 (.000)***	.444 (.000)***	.515 (.000)***
BT	.035 (.326)	.021 (.696)	.048 (.219)	.039 (.321)
IT	.086 (.045)*	.099 (.043)*	.085 (.017)*	.084 (.031)*
Haidt_Dif	-.017 (.522)	-.020 (.681)	-.017 (.522)	-.019 (.290)
BT * IT	-	.020 (.681)	-	-.012 (.800)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.034 (.365)	-.036 (.324)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.035 (.362)	-.036 (.352)
F_Test	201.728***	175.594***	157.259***	140.845***
R-Square	.901	.901	.902	.902
N = 164	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.9a Results of BT*IT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	.036 (.264)	.035 (.278)
Age	-	-	.358 (.002)**	.351 (.003)**
Risk-taking	-	-	.120 (.018)*	.119 (.019)*
Generosity	-	-	.100 (.298)	.095 (.331)
BT	.295 (.042)*	.268 (.055)	.088 (.048)*	.095 (.081)
IT	.777 (.000)***	.702 (.000)***	.373 (.000)***	.388 (.000)***
BT * IT	-	.110 (.245)	-	.017 (.679)
F_Test	543.283***	510.565***	456.687***	389.139***
R-Square	.879	.912	.952	.952
Adjusted R-Square	.878	.910	.950	.949
N = 151	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.9b Results of BT*IT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender(1: female)	.013 (.708)	.013 (.711)	.020 (.554)	.020 (.555)
Age	.491 (.000)***	.495 (.000)***	.456 (.000)***	.465 (.000)***
Risk attraction	.080 (.135)	.080 (.135)	.097 (.070)	.098 (.069)
Generosity	.026 (.746)	.028 (.784)	.026 (.799)	.030 (.768)
BT	.080 (.013)*	.070 (.127)	.085 (.011)*	.070 (.145)
IT	.379 (.000)***	.373 (.000)***	.385 (.009)**	.370 (.000)***
Haidt_Dif	-.006 (.987)	.-001 (.976)	-.014 (.737)	-.020 (.635)
BT * IT	-	.007 (.860)	-	.017 (.673)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	.021 (.497)	-.022 (.479)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	.053 (.081)	-.054 (.079)
F_Test	127.926***	381.034***	304.736***	272.477***
R-Square	.848	.955	.956	.956
N = 151	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.10a Pooled Data Results of BT*IT Scenario Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.006 (.813)	-.006 (.814)
Age	-	-	.229 (.002)**	.233 (.002)**
Risk-taking	-	-	.214 (.000)***	.215 (.000)***
Generosity	-	-	.337 (.000)***	.341 (.000)***
BT	.339 (.053)	.239 (.061)	.006 (.799)	.006 (.860)
IT	.525 (.000)***	.701 (.000)***	.211 (.000)***	.198 (.000)***
BT * IT	-	.245 (.072)	-	.016 (.620)
Culture (1:Thailand)	.177 (.000)***	.113 (.001)**	.044 (.063)	.046 (.057)
F_Test	324.527***	297.919***	455.044***	397.191***
R-Square	.757	.793	.914	.914
Adjusted R-Square	.755	.790	.912	.911
N = 315	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.10b Pooled Data Results of BT*IT Scenario Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.010 (.702)	-.011 (.690)	-.009 (.735)	-.010 (.720)
Age	.241 (.001)**	.248 (.001)**	.234 (.002)**	.242 (.001)**
Risk-taking	.208 (.000)***	.210 (.000)***	.214 (.000)***	.215 (.000)***
Generosity	.331 (.000)***	.337 (.000)***	.316 (.000)***	.322 (.000)***
BT	.008 (.753)	.009 (.798)	.020 (.464)	.001 (.980)
IT	.211 (.000)***	.194 (.000)***	.227 (.000)***	.208 (.000)***
Haidt_Dif	-.004 (.846)	-.001 (.945)	-.051 (.124)	-.049 (.148)
BT * IT	-	.023 (.506)	-	.024 (.476)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.001 (.974)	-.002 (.953)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	.068 (.010)*	.068 (.010)*
Culture (1:Thailand)	.045 (.064)	.047 (.056)	.038 (.111)	.040 (.096)
F_Test	376.171***	333.758***	306.965***	278.629***
R-Square	.912	.913	.914	.915
Adjusted R-Square	.910	.910	.912	.911
N = 315	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.11 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in USA

US Experiment 2: BT*AT (N=160)

	BT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
AT	-.001	1						
Gender	-.052	-.024	1					
Age	-.058	-.006	.015	1				
Risk_L	.151	.105	-.17*	-.090	1			
Genero	-.130	-.029	.11	.025	-.129	1		
Infor_S	.074	.24**	-.038	-.004	.058	.115*	1	
Hai_Dif	-.085	.20**	.023	-.023	.056	.128	-.013	1
Mean	***.57***	***.55***	***.36***	***27.98***	***2.881***	***5.519***	***5.069***	***-2.8052***
S.D.	***.497***	***.499***	***.482***	***7.529***	***1.16***	***1.13***	***1.50***	***3.18***

Table 4.12 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in Thailand

TH Experiment 2: BT*AT (N=150)

	BT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
AT	-.001	1						
Gender	.101	.003	1					
Age	-.19*	-.28**	-,22*	1				
Risk_L	-.05	-.12	-.16	.035	1			
Genero	.17*	.086	.05	.034	-.141	1		
Infor_S	.05	-.108	-.18*	.111	.141*	.087	1	
Hai_Dif	-.02	-.079	.03	-.041	.080	.066	.039	1
Mean	***.48***	***.51***	***.59***	***19.90***	***2.57***	***5.33***	***4.25***	***-.18***
S.D.	***.50***	***.49***	***.46***	***1.56***	***1.11***	***1.05***	***1.61***	***2.30***

Table 4.13 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study

Pooled Data Experiment 2: BT*AT (N=310)

	BT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
BT	1							
AT	-.00	1						
Gender	-.01	-.01	1					
Age	.01	-.04	-.11	1				
Risk_L	.07	.00	-.10	.03	1			
Genero	.02	.02	.08	.07	-.07	1		
Infor_S	.08	.07	-.19**	.16**	.07	.12*	1	
Hai_Dif	-.09	.09	.06	-.10	.08	.01	-.12*	1
Culture	-.09	.01	.12	-.19*	-.135*	-.09	-.25**	.15*
Mean	***.52***	***.55***	***.52***	***24.12***	***2.74***	***5.43***	***4.68***	***-1.61***
S.D.	***.50***	***.49***	***.50***	***6.85***	***1.14***	***1.09***	***1.60***	***3.09***

Table 4.14a Results of BT*AT Scenario Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.016 (.592)	-.027 (.371)
Age	-	-	.193 (.013)*	.199 (.009)*
Risk-taking	-	-	.073 (.041)*	.054 (.346)
Generosity	-	-	.565 (.000)***	.519 (.000)***
BT	.256 (.052)	.212 (.087)	.065 (.059)	.089 (.072)
AT	.703 (.000)***	.762 (.000)***	.125 (.000)***	.217 (.000)***
BT * AT	-	.025 (.335)	-	.058 (.134)
F_Test	199.994***	202.845***	284.789***	252.995***
R-Square	.717	.795	.917	.920
Adjusted R-Square	.713	.791	.914	.917
N = 160	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.14b Results of BT*AT Scenario Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.013 (.650)	-.024 (.423)	-.016 (.606)	-.025 (.399)
Age	.169 (.029)*	.177 (.021)*	.106 (.035)*	.169 (.029)*
Risk-taking	.186 (.040)*	.167 (.048)*	.173 (.030)*	.155 (.037)*
Generosity	.536 (.000)***	.495 (.000)***	.527 (.000)***	.477 (.000)***
BT	.063 (.079)	.049 (.084)	.073 (.127)	.077 (.126)
AT	.135 (.000)***	.222 (.000)***	.581 (.001)**	.242 (.000)***
Haidt_Dif	-.060 (.059)	-.055 (.076)	-.093 (.144)	-.104 (.093)
BT * AT	-	.089 (.081)	-	.074 (.088)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.017 (.760)	-.043 (.447)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.028 (.485)	-.020 (.627)
F_Test	248.856***	224.929***	191.826***	178.611***
R-Square	.919	.922	.920	.923
N = 160	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.15a Results of BT*AT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	.092 (.082)	-.089 (.092)
Age	-	-	.667 (.000)***	.676 (.000)***
Risk-taking	-	-	.139 (.060)	.171 (.049)*
Generosity	-	-	.263 (.041)*	.282 (.032)*
BT	.389 (.056)	.326 (.077)	.031 (.458)	.004 (.941)
AT	.417 (.050)	.352 (.068)	-.036 (.404)	-.060 (.315)
BT * AT	-	.098 (.232)	-	.034 (.560)
F_Test	102.027***	89.585***	173.615***	148.146***
R-Square	.585	.651	.884	.884
Adjusted R-Square	.579	.644	.879	.878
N = 150	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.15b Results of BT*AT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender(1: female)	-.098 (.076)	-.096 (.086)	-.100 (.075)	-.106 (.075)
Age	.610 (.001)**	.620 (.001)**	.625 (.001)**	.645 (.001)***
Risk attraction	.171 (.048)*	.176 (.041)*	.166 (.048)*	.166 (.048)*
Generosity	.256 (.027)*	.260 (.022)*	.242 (.042)*	.242 (.042)*
BT	.041 (.365)	.018 (.784)	.018 (.786)	.018 (.786)
AT	-.033 (.484)	-.054 (.400)	-.054 (.403)	-.054 (.403)
Haidt_Dif	.006 (.840)	.031 (.627)	.072 (.232)	.072 (.232)
BT * AT	-	.031 (.627)	-	.030 (.649)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.028 (.619)	-.028 (.619)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.055 (.310)	-.054 (.310)
F_Test	128.830***	112.023***	89.679***	89.679***
R-Square	.879	.879	.881	.881
N = 150	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.16a Pooled Data Results of BT*AT Scenario Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.042 (.145)	-.047 (.112)
Age	-	-	.285 (.000)***	.285 (.000)***
Risk-taking	-	-	.147 (.001)**	.142 (.002)**
Generosity	-	-	.498 (.000)***	.481 (.000)***
BT	.208 (.084)	.251 (.059)	.043 (.114)	.044 (.111)
AT	.614 (.000)***	.621 (.000)***	.048 (.085)	.083 (.036)*
BT * AT	-	.095 (.231)	-	.010 (.412)
Culture (1:Thailand)	.201 (.000)***	.134 (.000)***	.001 (.973)	.000 (.995)
F_Test	222.599***	213.471***	366.903***	321.845***
R-Square	.687	.738	.897	.897
Adjusted R-Square	.684	.735	.894	.894
N = 310	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.16b Pooled Data Results of BT*AT Scenario Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.043 (.145)	-.047 (.111)	-.041 (.160)	-.046 (.122)
Age	.253 (.000)***	.253 (.000)***	.255 (.000)***	.255 (.000)***
Risk-taking	.155 (.001)**	.150 (.002)**	.161 (.001)**	.157 (.001)**
Generosity	.496 (.000)***	.497 (.000)***	.508 (.000)***	.488 (.000)***
BT	.045 (.104)	.052 (.098)	.038 (.224)	.050 (.102)
AT	.053 (.061)	.089 (.029)*	.034 (.284)	.048 (.108)
Haidt_Dif	-.033 (.168)	-.031 (.187)	.007 (.876)	.007 (.877)
BT * AT	-	.011 (.416)	-	.015 (.383)
BT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.017 (.650)	-.012 (.750)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.037 (.203)	-.041 (.160)
Culture (1:Thailand)	.007 (.807)	.007 (.827)	.006 (.852)	.005 (.873)
F_Test	307.518***	274.040***	246.133***	224.545***
R-Square	.897	.897	.898	.898
Adjusted R-Square	.894	.894	.894	.894
N = 310	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.17 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in USA

US Experiment 3: IT*AT (N=169)

	IT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
IT	1							
AT	.035	1						
Gender	-.023	.080	1					
Age	-.069	.091	.040	1				
Risk_L	-.084	-.002	-.15*	-.061	1			
Genero	-.037	-.013	.10	.070	-.070	1		
Infor_S	.25**	.189*	-.163*	.001	.015	.050	1	
Hai_Dif	-.034	-.152*	-.085	-.124	.080	-.094	.002	1
Mean	***.46***	***.54***	***.47***	***23.24***	***3.05***	***5.72***	***4.36***	***-1.17***
S.D.	***.50***	***.50***	***.50***	***5.09***	***1.17***	***1.12***	***1.44***	***2.29***

Table 4.18 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study in Thailand

TH Experiment 3: IT*AT (N=149)

	IT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
IT	1							
AT	-.002	1						
Gender	.03	.011	1					
Age	-.08	-.122	-.36*	1				
Risk_L	-.081	-.012	-.063	-.115	1			
Genero	.12	.035	-.095	.134	-.149	1		
Infor_S	.16*	.018	-.12	.23**	.195*	.219*	1	
Hai_Dif	-.07	.01	-.001	-.045	.095	-.114	-.007	1
Mean	***.51***	***.53***	***.76***	***19.68***	***2.43***	***5.34***	***4.37***	***-.034***
S.D.	***.50***	***.50***	***.55***	***2.32***	***1.23***	***1.08***	***1.61***	***2.09***

Table 4.19 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations Scenario Study Pooled Data

Experiment 3: IT*AT (N=318)

	IT	AT	Gender	Age	Risk_L	Genero	Infor_S	Hai_Dif
IT	1							
AT	.02	1						
Gender	.01	.02	1					
Age	-.09	.03	-.11	1				
Risk_L	-.10	-.00	-.12	.04	1			
Genero	.02	.01	.02	.14*	-.08	1		
Infor_S	.2**	.11	-.15**	.05	.05	.10	1	
Hai_Dif	-.03	-.08	.01	-.11	.026	-.11	-.00	1
Culture	.06	-.00	.12	-.20*	-.25**	-.18**	..01	.16*
Mean	***.48***	***.54***	***.63***	***21.61***	***2.77***	***5.54***	***4.36***	***-.67***
S.D.	***.50***	***.50***	***.56***	***4.42***	***1.24***	***1.12***	***1.52***	***2.27***

Table 4.20a Results of IT*AT Scenario Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.080 (.021)*	.084 (.016)*
Age	-	-	.270 (.004)**	.261 (.006)**
Risk-taking	-	-	.118 (.059)	.116 (.064)
Generosity	-	-	.473 (.000)***	.468 (.000)***
IT	.436 (.000)***	.651 (.000)***	.125 (.000)***	.154 (.001)**
AT	.513 (.000)***	.451 (.004)**	.095 (.007)**	.294 (.010)*
IT * AT	-	-.204 (.062)	-	-.041 (.394)
F_Test	183.266***	156.097***	266.114***	227.831***
R-Square	.682	.734	.906	.906
Adjusted R-Square	.678	.729	.902	.902
N = 169	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.20b Results of IT*AT Study in New Jersey, USA

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.079 (.022)*	-.084 (.017)*	-.078 (.025)*	-.082 (.020)*
Age	.275 (.004)**	.266 (.005)**	.265 (.005)**	.259 (.007)**
Risk-taking	.124 (.048)*	.142 (.034)*	.127 (.049)*	.123 (.048)*
Generosity	.476 (.000)***	.156 (.001)**	.468 (.000)***	.465 (.000)***
IT	.126 (.000)***	.156 (.001)**	.142 (.000)***	.167 (.001)**
AT	.098 (.006)**	.126 (.009)**	.094 (.019)**	.119 (.020)**
Haidt_Dif	.016 (.553)	.018 (.525)	.008 (.578)	.009 (.855)
IT * AT	-	-.043 (.378)	-	-.039 (.433)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	.030 (.405)	.026 (.474)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	.175 (.861)	.010 (.823)
F_Test	227.123***	198.681***	175.50***	157.651***
R-Square	.906	.906	.906	.907
N = 169	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.21a Results of IT*AT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.032 (.466)	-.037 (.402)
Age	-	-	.527 (.000)***	.494 (.001)**
Risk-taking	-	-	.130 (.027)*	.134 (.022)*
Generosity	-	-	.264 (.049)*	.263 (.049)*
IT	.593 (.000)***	.733 (.000)***	.082 (.040)*	.131 (.025)*
AT	.318 (.058)	.258 (.089)	.014 (.717)	.063 (.273)
IT * AT	-	-.111 (.218)	-	-.068 (.245)
F_Test	132.635***	127.964***	206.086***	177.304***
R-Square	.643	.724	.900	.901
Adjusted R-Square	.639	.719	.895	.896
N = 149	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.21b Results of IT*AT Scenario Study in Bangkok, Thailand

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender(1: female)	-.098 (.076)	-.096 (.086)	-.100 (.075)	-.106 (.075)
Age	.610 (.001)**	.620 (.001)**	.625 (.001)**	.645 (.001)***
Risk attraction	.171 (.048)*	.176 (.041)*	.166 (.048)*	.166 (.048)*
Generosity	.256 (.027)*	.260 (.022)*	.242 (.042)*	.242 (.042)*
BT	.041 (.365)	.018 (.784)	.018 (.786)	.018 (.786)
AT	-.033 (.484)	-.054 (.400)	-.054 (.403)	-.054 (.403)
Haidt_Dif	.006 (.840)	.031 (.627)	.072 (.232)	.072 (.232)
IT * AT	-	.031 (.627)	-	.030 (.649)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.028 (.619)	-.028 (.619)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.055 (.310)	-.054 (.310)
F_Test	128.830***	112.023***	89.679***	89.679***
R-Square	.879	.879	.881	.881
N = 150	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.22a Pooled Data Results of IT*AT Scenario Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-	-	-.063 (.022)*	-.068 (.014)*
Age	-	-	.317 (.000)***	.299 (.000)***
Risk-taking	-	-	.136 (.001)**	.137 (.001)**
Generosity	-	-	.381 (.000)***	.374 (.000)***
IT	.368 (.000)***	.585 (.000)***	.107 (.000)***	.149 (.000)***
AT	.392 (.000)***	.581 (.000)***	.054 (.041)*	.094 (.010)*
IT * AT	-	-.245 (.056)	-	-.060 (.109)
Culture (1:Thailand)	.214 (.002)**	.201 (.001)**	.034 (.098)	.033 (.098)
F_Test	260.075***	243.596***	399.494***	351.660***
R-Square	.710	.754	.900	.901
Adjusted R-Square	.707	.751	.898	.899
N = 318	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Table 4.22b Pooled Data Results of IT*AT Study

IV:	DV: Intention to share Information			
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	β	**β**	**β**	**β**
Gender (1: female)	-.067 (.016)*	-.071 (.011)*	-.064 (.021)*	-.068 (.014)*
Age	.322 (.000)***	.305 (.000)***	.321 (.000)***	.303 (.000)***
Risk-taking	.148 (.001)**	.148 (.001)**	.143 (.001)**	.142 (.001)**
Generosity	.374 (.000)***	.369 (.000)***	.384 (.000)***	.379 (.000)***
IT	.118 (.000)***	.157 (.000)***	.116 (.000)***	.157 (.000)***
AT	.035 (.084)	.084 (.025)*	.032 (.243)	.073 (.056)
Haidt_Dif	.008 (.694)	.010 (.630)	.059 (.068)	.061 (.058)
IT * AT	-	-.055 (.149)	-	-.059 (.121)
IT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.017 (.523)	-.019 (.470)
AT * Haidt_Dif	-	-	-.056 (.056)	-.058 (.053)
Culture (1: Thailand)	.035 (.087)	.034 (.085)	.038 (.081)	.036 (.082)
F_Test	340.153***	303.709***	274.788***	251.238***
R-Square	.902	.903	.903	.904
Adjusted R-Square	.899	.900	.900	.901
N = 318	*p<0.05 , **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 () = significant level Haidt_Dif = (sanctity+loyalty+authority)-(fairness+liberty+care)			

Appendix Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to understand how people share information. Please read the instructions and scenario carefully, **there is no right or wrong answer, simply evaluate the scenario given to the best of your ability.** All data will be kept confidential and anonymous.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

Trustworthiness Survey Study

This questionnaire is designed to understand how people share information. Please read the instruction and scenario carefully, then answer the questions by putting √ on your choice. There is no right or wrong answer, simply evaluate the scenario given to the best of your ability. Thank you for your participation. This questionnaire needs approximately 15 minutes to complete. All data will be kept confidential and anonymous.

Take a moment and imagine yourself in the following scenario:

"American Medical Instrument Manufacturing (AMIM) is one of the largest state-owned companies in America. AMIM works closely with international pharmaceutical giants such as Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer, providing technological support and after-sale services for medical instruments sold in the American market. AMIM has more than 5,000 employees and has offices all over the United States.

You are the vice-president of AMIM's research and development department, and you actively work with 10 departments. Your department is responsible for technology standardization, integration of medical software, and the in-house development of instrument parts.

The global health care reform has resulted in positive changes for AMIM and the contracts AMIM has won have increased substantially. As a result of health care reform, international pharmaceutical companies have proposed a new contract with AMIM, offering technological support for new medical instrument products and their supporting services. Additionally, the

recent (American) national health care reform has assured your company's long term business prospects but has also increased the challenges you can expect to encounter. However, like all successful companies, you have been planning budgets; organizing operations, and finding potential partners to cooperate with in order to build a new development team that will help coordinate and handle the new products and services that the global pharmaceutical companies are asking you to oversee.

Due to the need for drastically increased cooperation with international pharmaceutical companies, your department has been chosen as an initial team leader and authorized you to carry out new pharmaceutical products and services project. Your individual department will increased the business by two-third and you now have to find a few potential departments to collaborate with in order to pursue this new project.

To start setting this new products and services project, you as a project leader would like to share a lot of valuable information with your tentative department partners. However, finally you cannot cooperate with all of your department partners because you need only a few of them. All of your previous partners that you cooperate with are all potential partners. In other words, each department has potentiality to be your partners in the new project. However, this information is very valuable and is not free. In order to gain valuable information, a department has to devote time, mental, and physical efforts, and other scare resources to compile and extract a lot of data."

(Type 1: High Benevolence and High Integrity)

"In addition, your department partners are very concerned about your department's needs and desires. They care about your welfare and your department needs and go out of their way to help you and your department. They also look out for what is important to you and your department. What they do in the company generally is beneficial for you and your department. Furthermore, you trust your partners' integrity and like their values. In their work, they use sound principles to guide their behavior. In general, they have a strong sense of justice and try hard to be fair in dealings with others. You never worry about whether they will stick to their words or whether their behavior will be consistent."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							

(Type 2: High Benevolence and Low Integrity)

"In addition, your department partners are very concerned about your department's needs and desires. They care about your welfare and your department needs and go out of their way to help you and your department. They also look out for what is important to you and your department. What they do in the company generally is beneficial for you and your department. Unfortunately, you do not trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they do not use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You worry about whether they will keep their promises and whether they are honest."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							

(Type 3: Low Benevolence and High Integrity)

"Moreover, your department partners are not concerned about you and your department's needs and desires in the workplace. They do not care about your welfare and your departmental goal and seldom help you and your department benevolently. They never bother to concern themselves with what's important for you and your department in work. What they do in the company generally is not beneficial for you and your department's prestige and position at all. You trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You never worry about whether they will keep their promises or whether they will be honest."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							

(Type 4: Low Benevolence and Low Integrity)

"Moreover, your department partners are not concerned about you and your department's needs and desires in the workplace. They do not care about your welfare and your departmental goal and seldom help you and your department benevolently. They never bother to concern themselves with what's important for you and your department in work. What they do in the company generally is not beneficial for you and your department's prestige and position at all. Unfortunately, you do not trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they do not use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You worry about whether they will keep their promises and whether they are honest."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							

(Type 5: High Integrity and High Ability)

"You trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You never worry about whether they will keep their promises or whether they will be honest. Generally speaking, your department partners are very capable of performing their jobs. They have much information about work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to be successful at all the things they are doing, and they have the specialized capabilities to do the jobs. Thus, you are very confident about your department partners' work skill."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 6: High Integrity and Low Ability)

"You trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You never worry about whether they will keep their promises or whether they will be honest. Generally speaking, your department partners are not capable of performing their jobs. They do not have the necessary information about the work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to perform poorly at the things they are doing, and they do not have the specialized capabilities to do their jobs. Thus, you are not confident about your department partners' work skills."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 7: Low Integrity and High Ability)

"Unfortunately, you do not trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they do not use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You worry about whether they will keep their promises and whether they are honest. Generally speaking, your department partners are very capable of performing their jobs. They have much information about work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to be successful at all the things they are doing, and they have the specialized capabilities to do the jobs. Thus, you are very confident about your department partners' work skill."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 8: Low Integrity and Low Ability)

"Unfortunately, you do not trust that your partners are honest. In their work, they do not use sound principles of integrity to guide their behaviors. You worry about whether they will keep their promises and whether they are honest. Generally speaking, your department partners are not capable of performing their jobs. They do not have the necessary information about the work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to perform poorly at the things they are doing, and they do not have the specialized capabilities to do their jobs. Thus, you are not confident about your department partners' work skills."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent you can trust your partners' integrity?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 9: High Benevolence and High Ability)

"In addition, your department partners are very concerned about your department's needs and desires. They care about your welfare and your department needs and go out of their way to help you and your department. They also look out for what is important to you and your department. What they do in the company generally is beneficial for you and your department. Generally speaking, your department partners are very capable of performing their jobs. They have much information about work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to be successful at all the things they are doing, and they have the specialized capabilities to do the jobs. Thus, you are very confident about your department partners' work skill."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 10: High Benevolence and Low Ability)

"In addition, your department partners are very concerned about your department's needs and desires. They care about your welfare and your department needs and go out of their way to help you and your department. They also look out for what is important to you and your department. What they do in the company generally is beneficial for you and your department. Generally speaking, your department partners are not capable of performing their jobs. They do not have the necessary information about the work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to perform poorly at the things they are doing, and they do not have the specialized capabilities to do their jobs. Thus, you are not confident about your department partners' work skills."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 11: Low Benevolence and High Ability)

"Moreover, your department partners are not concerned about you and your department's needs and desires in the workplace. They do not care about your welfare and your departmental goal and seldom help you and your department benevolently. They never bother to concern themselves with what's important for you and your department in work. What they do in the company generally is not beneficial for you and your department's prestige and position at all. Generally speaking, your department partners are very capable of performing their jobs. They have much information about work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to be successful at all the things they are doing, and they have the specialized capabilities to do the jobs. Thus, you are very confident about your department partners' work skill."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions**:**

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

(Type 12: Low Benevolence and Low Ability)

"Moreover, your department partners are not concerned about you and your department's needs and desires in the workplace. They do not care about your welfare and your departmental goal and seldom help you and your department benevolently. They never bother to concern themselves with what's important for you and your department in work. What they do in the company generally is not beneficial for you and your department's prestige and position at all. Generally speaking, your department partners are not capable of performing their jobs. They do not have the necessary information about the work that needs to be done. In fact, they are known throughout the company to perform poorly at the things they are doing, and they do not have the specialized capabilities to do their jobs. Thus, you are not confident about your department partners' work skills."

Based on the scenario you read, please answer the following questions:

Questions	(1) Not at all	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Much
To what extent do your partners really care about your welfare and departments' interests?							
To what extent you can trust your partners' ability?							

Based on the situation described above, please indicate your agreement with the following statements:

Questions	(1) Strongly Disagree	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Strongly Agree
I will intentionally share information with my partners.							
I plan to share information with my partners.							
I will make an effort to share information with my partners.							

For each of the following statements, please allocate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activities or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation (from extremely unlikely to extremely likely).

Statements	(1) Extremely Unlikely	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Extremely Likely
Betting a day's income at the horse race							
Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund							
Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game							
Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock							
Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event							
Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture							

For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would spend yourself (i.e., your attention, time, emotion, energy, etc.) to enhance the well-being of others in interpersonal relationships (from extremely unlikely to extremely likely):

Statements	(1) Extremely Unlikely	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Extremely Likely
When one of my loved ones needs my attention, I really try to slow down and give them the time and help they need.							
I am known by family and friends as someone who makes time to pay attention to others' problem.							
I am a kind of person who is willing to go the "extra mile" to help take care of my friends, relatives, and cousins.							
When friends or family members experience something upsetting or discouraging I make a special point of being kind to them.							
When I comes to my personal relationships with others, I am a very generous person							
It makes me very happy to give to other people in ways that meet their needs.							

To you, when you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

Statements	(1) Not Important	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	6)	(7) Very Important
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.							
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others.							
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country							
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority.							
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency.							
Whether or not someone was good at math.							
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable.							
Whether or not someone acted unfairly.							
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group.							

Statements	(1) Not Important	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Very Important
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society.							
Whether or not someone did something disgusting.							
Whether or not someone was cruel.							
Whether or not someone was denied his or her right.							
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty.							
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder.							
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of.							

Demographic Questions:

I am: ( ) male ( ) female

My age is …….. years old

I am: ( ) freshman ( ) sophomore ( ) junior ( ) senior

What is your yearly household income?

( ) < $ 20,000 ( ) = $20,000–$39,999 ( ) = $40,000–$79,999
( ) = $80,000–$119,999 ( ) > = $120,000

THANK YOU VERY MUCH

Vita

Witaya Siripanwattana

1971	Born on February 22 in Songkhla, Thailand
1988-1992	Attending B.Sc. program at Prince of Songkhla University, Songkhla, Thailand
1992	B.Sc. in mathematics
1992	Teaching assistant, Rajabhat University
1992-1997	M.A. in Economics at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand
1997	Royal Thai Government Scholarship
1997-1999	M.Sc. in Computing at University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
1999-2009	Instructor at Suan Dusit Rajabhat University, Bangkok, Thailand.
2008	Royal Thai Government Scholarship
2009-2014	Attending Ph.D program in Supply chain Management, Rutgers Business School, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
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