EXPLORING GENDER DEFINITION IN RECENT SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOLARSHIP

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Exploring Gender Definition in Sociological Scholarship

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This dissertation investigates gender definition in recently published peer-reviewed journal articles in the field of sociology. I use content analysis to examine various aspects of gender definition in 37 analytic categories, most notably explicit definition and references to “sex,” “female,” and/or “male.” I apply these codes to two samples of articles about gender. The first sample represents the field of sociology as a whole; it includes 100 randomly selected articles with “gender” in their title, published between 2006 and 2010 in 49 sociology journals with the highest 2010 five-year impact factor scores. The second sample represents the sociological subfield of sociology of gender and comprises 68 articles that include all of those with the word “gender” in their title published in Gender & Society between 2006 and 2010.

I found that gender is relatively infrequently defined explicitly and that the terms “sex,” “female,” and “male” are used frequently. In the general sociology sample, 12% of the articles include an explicit definition of gender and 76% of the articles include references to “sex,” “female,” and/or “male.” In the sociology of gender sample, 26.5% of the articles include an explicit definition of gender and 57.4% include references to “sex,” “female,” and/or “male.” Taken together these findings suggest that both
sociologists who write about gender in non-gender specific journals and sociologists who publish in the subfield of sociology of gender do not explicitly define gender and often use “sex,” “female,” and “male” as identifiers without any intention to invoke biological or reproductive essentialism. My results can be explained primarily by the pervasive, variable, embedded, and taken-for-granted character of gender in the empirical social world that appears to make it difficult for scholars to “see” it clearly. The differences between samples reflect the general orientation of sociology of gender as a subfield towards gender not only as its principal area of study but also as an analytic problem that requires conceptual investigation and explanation. I conclude that gender scholars in sociology might benefit from insights from the concepts literature, gender theory, and other disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields where gender is conceptualized more explicitly.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

My dissertation is about gender definition in sociological scholarship and asks the question, how is gender conceptualized in sociology? It offers an empirical exploration of the types of definitions of gender that appear in recent scholarly literature published in the discipline. I use the technique of content analysis to investigate whether and how gender is defined in both sociological scholarship in general and the subfield of sociology of gender. My analysis draws on gender literature in sociology, gender theory, and a methods-focused subset of the literature about concepts.

This project speaks to several areas of inquiry. To my knowledge, my research is the first to offer a systematic study of the type of gender definition in large, representative samples of scholarly literature published in the field of sociology at large and within the subfield of sociology of gender. As such, it contributes to the discipline of sociology as a whole, to the sociology of gender, and to the work of those who study concepts as part of social science methods. I discuss the contribution my work makes to each of these fields more precisely below. Overall, the research reported here is best located as part of the larger effort of gender scholars in sociology. While the concepts literature adds significantly to my analyses, I believe the insights that emerge are relevant primarily to how gender can be understood as an object of inquiry in the field of sociology. I contribute to this endeavor by providing a heretofore absent empirical assessment of gender definition in sociology and analysis in relation to how sociologists have responded to gender’s taken-for-granted character.
This chapter offers some context for my work and makes an argument for why it matters. First, I provide a short history of my interest in this topic, an explanation of how the project has come to take the form it does here, and introduce the term “gender reduction”. Second, I define the phenomenon I have termed gender reduction and make the case for why this is a useful way to think about the relationship between the study of gender and scholarly gender definition. Third, I argue that the many ways gender has been characterized in sociological scholarship both demonstrate its immense empirical complexity and suggest the usefulness of a study of gender definition. Fourth, I briefly summarize the utility of using a concepts framework to study gender definition in sociology. Fifth, I outline the contributions my research makes to the fields of sociology at large, sociology of gender, and the study of concepts from a methods perspective. Finally, I provide outlines for the rest of the chapters in this dissertation.

History of the Project

My project is about how gender is conceptualized in sociological scholarship. This work emerged out of my dual interests in gender and concepts, which my dissertation brings together in a single project. In my first graduate classes at Rutgers I was captivated by the representation of gender in sociological scholarship, especially in the subfield of sociology of gender. Both of these were mostly new to me as I had come to a sociology program after graduate work in another field. My interest in concepts developed later, in response to seeking a framework for studying gender definition and out of a general concern with the importance of methods in social science.

Reading gender scholarship in sociology over the years, I noticed that gender was rarely – indeed, if ever – defined in clear, substantively meaningful ways. I read many
articles ostensibly about gender but that did not include any definition at all of gender itself. I also read a substantial number of sources from the subfield of sociology of gender and from gender theory where definitions of gender that describe its form or function, rather than its substantive meaning, prevail. Because in sociological scholarship it is common practice to define or operationalize key terms, this absence was particularly notable. Further, given that one of the founding premises of sociological gender scholarship is the separation of biological sex from social gender, along with subsequent reconceptualizations of the sex/gender relationship, it is important that scholars are clear what they mean when they refer to and write about gender, whether they define it as an object, a process or set of processes, or a structure or set of structures. The sources in which I observed a lack of substantive or content-based gender definitions included influential works such as Butler’s *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990), Connell’s *Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics* (1987), *Masculinities* (1995), and *Gender* (2002), and West and Zimmerman’s oft-cited article, “Doing Gender” (1987). These are all sophisticated accounts of what gender is and how it works, yet all seemed to be missing a fundamental component of gender. This initial view that the above-mentioned theories of gender were inadequate in how they defined it set the bar high for my coding of gender definitions in my content analyses (see Chapter 3 for a complete account of the composition of my samples and the codes I used). Although I strived for complete objectivity and neutrality in evaluating the sources I employ to investigate gender definition in contemporary sociological literature, I acknowledge that these early perceptions may have influenced
how I categorized gender definitions insofar as I only classified overt views of gender as explicitly defined.

I then wondered how it could be possible, given the very large volume of scholarship about gender in one way or another, which had been published in the field of sociology, that I had not read what I thought was a substantive definition of gender. I had assumed that even if there were differences in how sociologists who study gender conceive of what it is, the field as a whole included a more or less comprehensive account of what gender is and what it means. Yet this did not seem to be the case and in fact it seemed as though gender’s taken-for-grantedness had permeated the very scholarship intended to explain it. My dissertation emerged out of this original observation that explicit definitions of gender appeared to be missing in the sociological gender literature.

In earlier formulations of the project, I thought about the disconnect I saw in the literature in several ways. First, I decided that the framework of form versus content might be a good way to understand it. Was gender in fact being defined in scholarship only in terms of its shapes or outlines but never in terms of the content that enlivened these? I took gender’s content to be various types and manifestations of femininities and masculinities, and while there seemed to be many implicit references to these concepts they were rarely described explicitly. Then I wondered if perhaps I might better explain the lack of explicit substantive definitions of gender in sociological scholarship in terms of the relationship between what I conceived of as empirical gender, or gender as it appears in the social world, and conceptual gender, or the way gender is defined in sociological scholarship. In this formulation, the former’s complexity and intuitive
character defeated the definition of the latter. Though I think both of these ways of thinking about the topic of this research may have been analytically fruitful, I noticed that both hinged on explaining a phenomenon that I had observed anecdotally but not yet established definitively or systematically.

This dissertation thus focuses on exploring the original definitional enigma that caught my attention when I first began studying gender. Instead of assuming it is present in the sociological gender scholarship however, I take a step back and consider whether it is in fact the case that gender is either ill-defined or not defined at all in the sources that ostensibly address it directly. I began the project with an entirely open mind about what to expect in terms of whether and how scholars define gender. I offer a systematic examination of the degree to which it is the case that gender is rarely defined substantively or explicitly across recent sociological scholarship as a whole, as well as whether or not this is true of recent publications in the subfield of sociology of gender. I chose to frame my study of gender’s definition in sociology in relation to conceptualization for the intuitive reason that concepts can legitimately be expected to provide the clearest and most useful definitions of key objects of study. From a methodological perspective, the concept offers the promise of a lucidity that can substantially sharpen the scholar’s analytic eye. I wondered if sociologists who study gender take advantage of this feature of the concept. To the best of my knowledge, the social science methods literature on concepts has not been methodically applied to the problem of gender. In part, my dissertation takes up this project.
Gender Reduction

I propose the term “gender reduction” to describe a particular feature of the way the word gender is used, which I observed in my initial analyses of gender-focused sociological literature. As the term suggests, this feature involves a perceived diminishing of gender or a diminishing of some characteristic of or related to gender. I intend it to describe the limiting or reducing of gender’s empirical complexity in scholarship by the way it is – or is not – defined in scholarly sociological sources about gender. By “gender” in gender reduction, I refer to analytical accounts of gender as they appear in the sociology literature.

Generally, scholars appear to use the term gender in at least two ways. The first is to refer to empirical reality, intending to point to or describe a phenomenon or phenomena in the social world. The second is to promote analysis, where gender is used in conceptual, analytical, and/or theoretical ways, which may or may not directly correspond to the empirical object(s) under study. In this project I mostly use gender in the second way, to refer to its conceptual meaning. Some overlap in the two uses is unavoidable, however.

The “reduction” in gender reduction represents two things: the limiting of both conceptual or analytical understanding of gender in scholarly sources, and the possible consequent diminishing of scholars’ capability to capture and analyze the full variety of the empirical phenomena that make up gender. Gender’s immense empirical complexity, which I discuss in the next section, may be reduced in scholarship because of the restriction of the analytical complexity of gender as a conceptual tool. It is also possible that the opposite is true: the empirical complexity of gender makes it especially difficult
for scholars to analyze it as fully as they might, as Salzinger (2003) suggests in her account of gendering of workers on the shop floor of Mexico’s maquiladoras. While my project cannot speak directly to these questions, it does allow me to see whether sociologists who study and write about gender define, conceptualize, or explain it analytically in their work. This research is thus a first step towards investigating the relationship between the character of gender as a set of social phenomena and its scholarly treatment in sociology. In subsequent chapters I also consider as an explanation for the results of my content analyses the theory that the pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness of gender in social life conceal it even from scholars of gender.

In one sense, then, my research serves as an empirical test of gender reduction in recently published sociology sources. While I use the term gender reduction to describe the pattern I expect to find, it is best understood as shorthand for a proposal about the way gender is treated analytically in the contemporary scholarly sociological literature rather than a definitive empirical outcome or an already-argued case. Further, while I gather data about whether the sources I study include explicit definitions of gender or not, I also collect information about implicit and other types of use of gender, so as to systematically investigate other possible patterns of gender definitions.

**Gender’s Empirical Complexity**

Gender is a vastly complicated, interrelated, often enigmatic, set of empirical phenomena, (Connell 2002; Ferree 2010; Lorber 1996; Risman 2004) including “perhaps the most pervasive, fundamentally, and universally accepted way we separate and characterize human beings” (Meadow 2010:815). The many different aspects of gender that have been documented and the ways gender has been characterized attest both to this
immense complexity as it appears in the real social world and to gender researchers’ dedication to capturing it accurately in their scholarship. Though I go about it in a different way, my work also looks to explore and identify the true empirical complexity of gender and gendered phenomena in the same way as the scholars whose work I cite. The research reported here thus contributes to the larger collective sociological project of representing gender as it operates in the real world as faithfully as possible in scholarship. Finally, although I identify different elements of gender that scholars have taken up, I recognize that there is much overlap both in the perspectives themselves and in the scholarly work I use to illustrate them. This is especially true in terms of micro or individual-level and macro or structural-level views, which are the ways gender has most commonly been addressed.

Gender has been much addressed as an individual and interactional phenomenon in which individuals produce and are accountable for their productions of gender. These theories often incorporate structural understandings of gender as well. The best known version is West and Zimmerman’s (1987) “Doing Gender” and subsequent follow-ups (these include, but are not limited to, Fenstermaker and West 2002; Jurik and Siemsen 2009; Risman 2008; West and Fenstermaker 1995; West and Zimmerman 2009). They build on Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) earlier, book-length treatment of the same subject, which incorporates an ethnomethodological perspective, particularly the role of the natural attitude (Garfinkel 1967), in explaining the social production of the apparent naturalness of “two, and only two” genders (Kessler and McKenna 1978:3). More recent reference to gender as an interactional, accountable phenomenon can be found in
Meadow’s (2011) research about how parents make sense of gender variation in their children.

Another notable account of gender that focuses on individual manifestations as a reflection of structural character is Butler’s (1990) work on gender as performative identity. Gender operates as performances that cite previous performances, which create citational accounts that shape subsequent gender performances. Gender seems natural, consistent, and identity-based because of this citational character, which contributes to its institutionalization. Thorne (1993) similarly links individual and structural levels in her explanation of how children learn, reproduce, and maintain gender norms and boundaries in school. Here kids’ gendered behavior is understood as a social process that reinforces gender differences as kids enact gender norms in same- and between-gendered groups.

Gender has also frequently been understood from a structural and/or institutional perspective (Connell 1987, 1995, 2002; Martin 2004; Ridgeway 2009, 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Risman 1998, 2004), where it is generally conceptualized as a set of macro-level arrangements that disadvantage women and advantage men (McCall 2001). Connell (1987, 1995, 2002) argues that social practices shape social structures but are also possibly transformative of those structures. Understanding gender requires a theory of practice because it is enacted through emergent practices that produce its enduring institutional dimension. Risman (2004) advances a view of gender as a social structure that is rooted in individual, interactional, and institutional dimensions of social life and perpetuates inequality simultaneously within each of them. Ridgeway (2009, 2011) contends that gender inequality persists because contemporary contexts are framed by dated ideas about gender that incorporate inequality. These bring new inequality to
situations that might otherwise not reproduce it, or reproduce it so robustly, thus perpetuating “older” inequality based on membership in gender categories.

Scholars have also studied gender include as an institutional phenomenon in gendered organizations (Acker 1990, 2007; Britton 2000, 2003; Kanter 1977; Martin 2003) and as an element of culture (Ridgeway 2009, 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). While these understandings are perhaps less common than individual-institutional views, they still appear frequently in sociological gender scholarship. Many gender scholars (Ferree 2010; Ferree, Lorber, and Hess 2000; Lorber 1996; Risman 2004), including most of those discussed above, explicitly address gender at multiple levels of social life and analysis, advancing the recognition that gender as a set of empirical social phenomena functions in diverse ways at several levels of analysis simultaneously.

Two themes that pervade accounts of gender are a strong focus on inequality and persistent attention to the role of sex and sex categorization in what gender means and how it operates. Many scholars theorize gender at least partly as a mechanism of inequality between women and men (Butler 2004; Connell 1987, 2002; England 2010; Hill Collins 1990; Lorber 2005; McCall 2001; Ridgeway 2009, 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmerman 1987; West and Fenstermaker 1995). These views seek to understand the persistent and wide-ranging superiority of masculinity and inferiority of femininity in terms of the ways gender as an individual phenomenon and structural arrangement produces a gender hierarchy in most, if not all, areas of social life. Intersectional theory or intersectionality advances another approach to gender inequality by proposing that gender differences and inequalities are mutually constituted by other forms of difference and inequality, such as race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and age,
among others (Cho, Williams, and McCall 2013; Crenshaw 1991, 1997; Hill Collins 1990; McCall 2005). In contextualizing gender in relation to other inequalities intersectional theory seeks to promote the scholarly view of gender as a concept that must be understood as inextricably intertwined with other elements of difference and identity.

Gender scholarship has also sought to explore and explain the relationship between sex, sex category, and gender (Butler 1993; Connell 1987, 2002; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Halberstam 1998; Harrison and Hood-Williams 2002; Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Zimmerman 1987). As gender meanings at all level of social life and analysis are conventionally connected to meanings of sex, it is clear that gender also references sex in some way, though scholars disagree about exactly how this is so. The project of disentangling the biological from the social – and vice versa (Fausto-Sterling 2000) – has long preoccupied gender scholars, partly as a result of the way lay understandings of gender seem to unavoidably incorporate biology and reproduction.

A Concepts Lens

My research also draws on the social science literature that takes concepts to be methodologically useful. While I provide a detailed review of this scholarship in the next chapter, here I summarize the benefits of using a concepts framework to study gender definition in sociology. As the scholarly site of explicit definition, the concept serves to offer scholars’ clearest, most direct, best definitions of the elements of their research. As a result it makes sense to look at concepts in seeking to study gender definition generally and further investigate the idea of gender reduction. Gender reduction might also be understood as conceptual collapse, but what this really means cannot be understood
without a preliminary understanding of what concepts are and what they do for social science scholars.

Concepts have received little attention as part of social scientific methods (Gerring 1999; Gerring and Baressi 2003; Goertz 2006), yet they offer significant insight-producing potential for scholars. Consistent with the methods-focused concepts literature, I understand the concept to be an analytical device intended to produce scholarly insight. Scholars can use the concept to do this because of its capacity to deepen observation and strengthen specification. Concepts are especially appropriate to use in studying gender because it is such a complex and often opaque subject. Further, as the previous section demonstrates, gender is not a single entity but rather a large constellation of empirically diverse phenomena. Given these challenges, sociological study of gender might benefit from an overtly concepts-oriented approach.

Contributions

The research reported in this dissertation makes contributions to three areas of scholarship: the field of sociology as a whole, the subfield of sociology of gender, and the methods-focused concepts literature. First, to the field of sociology my work offers a systematic empirical account of how gender is defined in recent scholarship published in sociology journals. To my knowledge, my project is the first investigation of this topic in a representative sample of peer-reviewed journal articles. It also offers two distinct interpretive explanations for my results, one based in the gender literature and one in the concepts literature.

Second, this project contributes to the subfield of sociology of gender. My research provides a meta-analysis of the way gender is defined in a field that is arguably
devoted to full and accurate conceptual definition of gender. Because I content analyze representative samples of both the field of sociology as a whole and the subfield of sociology of gender, I am able to compare several aspects of gender definition across my samples. Identifying similarities and variation in patterns of definition in both of these areas of literature gives sociologists who study gender valuable information about the state of knowledge in their field and subfield. My work is most comfortably located as part of the sociology of gender because of its central focus on how gender is defined, which is one of the key interests of sociologists of gender, even though I do not seek to offer a definition of gender myself. Because my purpose in this project is not to evaluate individual definitions of gender but rather to explore patterns of gender definition in sociological scholarship, developing my own definition is beyond the scope of this research.

Third, this work also contributes to the methods-focused concepts literature. It offers an empirical case that to the best of my knowledge has not been examined in relation to the methods-focused concepts scholarship I survey in Chapter 2. My results allow me to draw preliminary conclusions about whether the concept is a useful analytic device for studying gender in the way that those who consider the concept methodologically propose. As I suggest above, gender is a special case for conceptualization insofar as its pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness in social life hide it from scholars’ collective analytic eye. Gender is also possibly different from other phenomena in terms of conceptualization because of the substantial variety of empirically distinct though related phenomena that are captured by a single term.
Chapter Outline

This dissertation includes four additional substantive chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 provides a concepts framework for studying gender definition. I review the relevant social science literature on concepts, develop a methods-oriented approach for thinking about the concept, and offer a set of queries or questions to use in considering gender definition among the sources in my samples. My questions for analysis are based on four themes that emerge in the concepts literature. These are: essential contestation, concept formation and definition, scientific versus ordinary language, and concept evaluation. I also list my expectations in relation to each set of queries for my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample.

Chapter 3 describes the sampling procedures I employ to gather the two samples I use and the analytic techniques I use to evaluate them. My two samples represent the field of sociology as a whole and the sociological subfield of sociology of gender. I examine these areas of scholarship separately because I expect to see more explicit and possibly more sophisticated gender definition in sources published within the subfield because it is oriented towards conceptualizing gender in a way that the discipline of sociology as a whole is not. Doing so allows me to evaluate whether gender is treated differently analytically in the discipline of sociology as a whole and the subfield devoted to its study. My general sociology sample of 100 articles is drawn from a larger population of sociology journal articles that have “gender” in the title, published between 2006 and 2010. My sociology of gender sample is made up of the 68 articles in the journal Gender & Society with “gender” in the title, also published between 2006 and 2010. Though I describe the latter set of articles as a “sample” so that it is comparable to
the terminology I use is discussing my general sociology sample, in fact the Gender & Society articles form a total population during the study period. I opted to use articles only from Gender & Society because this journal arguably both represents and forms the core of sociology of gender scholarship. I use the method of content analysis to examine various aspects of conceptualization of gender in the articles in each sample. This chapter also includes a complete account of the categories I used for coding all articles in both samples.

Chapters 4 and 5 comprise my analyses. Chapter 4 reports the results of the content analyses for both my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample. I describe quantitative and qualitative results separately for each sample. Chapter 5 offers analysis of the results of the content analyses of both samples. I seek to explain my findings in terms of the sociological gender scholarship and the concepts literature I review in Chapter 2. First, I locate my findings in the sociological scholarship that takes gender as its primary subject; this work tends to fall in the sociological subfield of sociology of gender and the interdisciplinary area of gender theory. Second, I apply the conceptualization queries developed in Chapter 2 to the definitions of gender I find in both samples. I also include a comparative assessment of the differences I found between my general sociology sample and sociology of gender sample.

My conclusions summarize my findings, consider implications of the outcomes, and suggest directions for future research. I also offer a broader framing of the results of my work and proposals for improved gender conceptualization in sociology.
Chapter 2: A Concepts Framework

Introduction

This chapter develops a framework for thinking about the methodological purpose of the concept as an analytic tool. I argue that such a view of concepts can be fruitfully applied to investigate gender definitions in sociological scholarship. First, I discuss the various definitions of the concept in social science literature, including methods-based, cognitive, and philosophical approaches. Next, I review the social science literature on concepts and identify four themes that are relevant for my project, followed by an exploration of ideal types in relation to studying gender. I contend that the concept as a methodological device has much to offer sociologists who study gender. Finally, I outline a set of considerations about concepts to use in analyzing sociological scholars’ gender conceptualizations.

Concepts lie at the heart of social research. All scholars use them, even if they never define their key terms or refer to them explicitly as concepts. I begin with the premise that by virtue of inclusion in academic work, key words and their definitions used to describe empirical or theoretical objects/elements count as concepts. Scholars are not engaged in the work of offering dictionary definitions because they use precise terms and define them (or not) in an analytic context with the expectation, explicit or implicit, that their terms do analytic work – even if that work is only definition. In this understanding, the scholarly context marks concepts as analytic devices, even if this function is not literally put into practice, rather than simply terms that have been, or might be, defined. Further, in a more general way concepts build on and contribute to schools of thought and intellectual traditions or practices. As a result, I consider
definitional enterprises in scholarly literature as conceptual ones, and focus here on developing a framework to consider the way this definitional enterprise operates for gender.

To answer the question of how gender is conceptualized in sociology, I need to understand what concepts are and do in terms of the scholarly research enterprise. My main purpose in this chapter is to articulate an approach for considering the concept in social research that captures its methodological role, rather than its classificatory, categorizing, or cognitive roles. By methodological I mean what scholars do with concepts and how they use them in the research process to facilitate and generate insights into a particular aspect of the social world through an analytic process. Analytic here refers broadly to an interpretive approach involving detailed attention to the components of a given phenomenon. These definitions describe what almost every sociologist does in her research, but I specify them to further distinguish between a methods-based understanding of the concept and a classificatory or cognitive one. I am thus interested in concepts as tools of social research, although I make no claim that definitions of concepts not used in an explicitly methodological way are inadequate. Rather, I argue that the concept can be fruitfully understood as part of the overall series of rules and mechanisms that comprise sociological methods, and that this view can be useful in investigating gender definition in sociology. The process of defining concepts is especially relevant to gender research because of the subtlety, complexity, and taken-for-granted character of gender.

Given the variety of meanings that have been attributed to the concept, a note on terms, meanings, and language is appropriate to begin this chapter. As a general
understanding, my use of the term “concept” follows Merton’s definition: “. . . a concept is a general idea which, once having been defined, tagged, substantially generalized, and explicated can effectively guide inquiry into seemingly diverse phenomena” (1984:267). Essentially, a concept is an analytically-oriented definition of an object under study, empirically or theoretically. I distinguish between the scholarly uses of concepts and those people commonly use in everyday life. The former is intended to produce insight while the latter is intended primarily for identification. This distinction is not steadfast, however, because this feature of a concept is related to the intent of its use, which is not necessarily captured in the definition of a concept itself. For the purpose of studying how gender has been conceptualized in sociological scholarship, a definition of gender does not need to be self-consciously conceptual to qualify as a conceptual definition. This use also more or less follows the use of the term in the literature I employ.

Some authors use the terms “conception” and “conceptualization” to refer to what I call a concept, and although I maintain these uses as they appear in direct quotations, I assume them to be generally interchangeable with the term concept. I use the term conceptualization to mean the process of producing or defining a concept as such. This term is less common in the literatures on concepts and tends to be most prevalent in formal explanations of social scientific research methods, most often in textbooks (for example, Babbie 2013:122-5; Chambliss and Schutt 2013:61). I use it to describe the procedure by which a concept is defined explicitly as such.

What is a Concept?

There has been surprisingly little written about concepts from a distinctly sociological or indeed methodologically substantive perspective (Gerring 1999:358;
Goertz 2006), despite the important role concepts occupy in an empirically oriented field such as sociology. Exceptions include case studies of particular concepts, such as “value” (Adler 1956), “commitment” (Becker 1960), “paradigm” (Eckberg and Hill, Jr. 1979), and “socially expected duration” (Merton 1984), although these do not offer comprehensive accounts of concept use or formation beyond the individual concepts each examines. Even undergraduate social research methods textbooks, which could be expected to provide clear and straightforward methods-based definitions of the concept define concepts as mental images instead. Babbie’s well-known social research textbook, *The Practice of Social Research*, describes concepts as “abstract elements representing classes of phenomena within the field of study” (2013:43). More accessibly, he states that concepts are “constructs derived by mutual agreement from mental images (conceptions),” where constructs are not real or observable in themselves but “have a definite relationship to things that *are* real and observable” (124, original emphasis). Babbie’s point that definitions of objects are arbitrary, and must be discussed among scholars to ensure consensus, is well taken. Yet, this view of the concept tells us little about the purpose of concepts in relation to sociological methods beyond their importance in keeping co-authors on the same page – arguably a function already served by simple definitions.

In another popular undergraduate textbook, *Making Sense of the Social World*, Chambliss and Schutt define a concept as “a mental image that summarizes a set of similar observations, feelings, or ideas” (2013:319), but “not a simple object” (2013:52). This understanding of the concept is similar to Babbie’s, indicating that concepts are important in social research for providing scholars a shared understanding of the precise
meanings of complex terms. Nonetheless, it also fails to capture the concept’s role as part of the methods social researchers actively use to advance their projects.

The perspective that underlies Babbie’s and Chambliss and Schutt’s definitions of the concept is the most common, “classical” (Adcock 2005) scholarly understanding of concepts. I label this understanding the cognitive view. Here, the concept is understood as a mental entity, and includes definitions of concepts as mental images, mental representations, and mental categories (Laurence and Margolis 1999; Murphy 2002; Zerubavel 1991, 1997). The concept is essentially a classificatory device used in mental sorting. While this view is especially prevalent in psychological research, it is also evident in sociology and philosophy. The cognitive view further underlies several definitions of the concept that might otherwise be considered non-cognitive (Adcock 2005; Sartori 1984), an indication of both its pervasiveness and powerful academic influence.

The cognitive view recognizes concepts as mental representations of objects that enable both classification and basic thought. Margolis and Laurence define concepts as “mental particulars” (1999:5), noting that while other intellectual traditions such as philosophy classify concepts as abstract entities, they “see no reason why concepts can’t be mental representations” (1999:8). In the cognitive view, concepts can be understood as knowledge: “Concepts are a kind of mental glue . . . because the concepts themselves are connected to our larger knowledge structures. Our concepts embody much of our knowledge of the world, telling us what things there are and what properties they have” (Murphy 2002:1). Concepts also come to mean the categories themselves that mental representations occupy. Properly, concepts are “mental representations of classes of
things, and *categories* [are] the classes themselves,” however because “the two go together” (Murphy 2002:5, original emphasis) they are often conflated.

The cognitive view thus uses the term concept for two main purposes. First, the concept references the fact of mental representation and explains its role in cognitive processes. Second, the concept serves to describe more specific cognitive categories used to sort specific empirical objects and instances into mental classes. Although this very brief summary necessarily simplifies the cognitive view of the concept these basic features form the core of the definitions that psychologists, philosophers, and sociologists who adopt the cognitive view advance. Interestingly, the cognitive view of concepts pervades other fields besides psychology and cognitive strands of philosophy and sociology, as the examples of undergraduate social research methods textbooks described above demonstrate. Even Giovanni Sartori, one of the foundational thinkers in the social science tradition of considering concepts methodologically rather than cognitively, states as his first provision that concepts are mental entities (Sartori 1975). He then outlines his methodological tenets for concepts analysis, none of which relates to concepts’ cognitive capacity.

Unlike the cognitive view, my social scientific methods-based definition of the concept for this project is entirely extra-mental, that is, it does not involve a cognitive or mental classificatory component. It is worth repeating that cognitive understandings of the concept form the taken-for-granted, default approach to defining, understanding, and analyzing concepts, and tend to pervade other fields even when they are inappropriate to the context or task at hand. While some of the literature I use to develop a methods-based framework to study gender concepts includes a cognitive component, my own goal
for this project lies entirely in understanding concepts as devices of social science methods, that is, as tools, instruments, and resources that aid scholars in studying, investigating, and theorizing their objects of inquiry through conscious application. I do not further develop a view of concepts as mental entities.

Philosophical approaches to the concept overlap with cognitive ones, although generally philosophically defined concepts are intended for different purposes than cognitively defined ones. Most philosophers’ definitions of concepts are essentially cognitive (Prinz 2002; Winch 1958). For example, Prinz, working in the philosophical tradition, argues that “without concepts, there would be no thoughts. Concepts are the basic timber of our mental lives” (2002:1). His central concern, though, is with developing an empirically and perceptually based theory of concepts. Similarly, for Winch (1958) a concept is the combination of a word and the image-in-mind that it evokes or represents, a definition he uses to link actual social research with philosophical considerations of the properties of objects. Peacocke is interested in the concept only insofar as “concepts as I am delineating them form a subject of proper philosophical interest,” (1992:3) which he finds in determining criteria that stipulate concepts’ distinctiveness from one another. Overall, philosophical views of the concept are not useful for understanding how gender is conceptualized in sociology, due to both their basis in mental understandings, and their focus on using definitions of concepts to address foundational questions of philosophy, theory, and thought. While these concerns are important, they nevertheless do not help me understand conceptualization from a methodological perspective.
The distinctions I make among methods-based, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to concepts are not definitive. Different types of definitions of the concept overlap with one another, and do not fall neatly into one category or another, as the above review suggests. Yet underlying views of the concept’s purpose matter because what a concept is in a given field – even if this understanding is not articulated or formally agreed upon – largely determines what use and analysis of concepts mean to scholars working within that field. The relatively scarcity of method-based definitions of the concept in the social sciences suggests that concepts tend not to be understood in a methodologically-informed way in these fields, although I do not evaluate whether this is the case. In subsequent sections of this chapter I draw on key sociology sources (particularly Goertz 2006) and political science literature to provide a strong basis for the development of a set of queries about the concept to use in analyzing sociologists’ gender conceptualizations. These appear in the final section of this chapter, below.

Concepts as Method: Sartori’s Influence

Many of the scholars of concepts whose work I use to construct a framework to examine gender conceptualization in sociology take Sartori’s seminal work on concepts in the discipline of political science as their starting point. Much of the scholarship I use below falls into a particularly concepts-focused literature where debates over definitions of key terms such as democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Sartori 1962, 1987) have developed to become detailed discussions of what a concept is and does. Those writing in this tradition (for example, Adcock 2005; Collier and Mahon 1993; Gerring 1999, 2001; Goertz 2006; Sartori 1984) take the concept to be an integral part of the social research enterprise, focusing specifically on concepts’ importance in social science
methods. I have found this literature most useful for thinking about what concepts can do from a methods perspective because of its detailed attention to practical concerns in developing and using concepts. In this section I outline Sartori’s foundational contributions to understanding concepts methodologically. In the next section I review the relevant literature about the concept that builds on his work, including four themes relevant to investigating gender conceptualization that emerge from this body of work.

Sartori’s attention to bridging the gap between theories and philosophies of concepts and their actual use in social research (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1975, 1984) brought a new perspective to the study of concepts. In “Guidelines for Concept Analysis” (1984) he formalizes previous insights (1970, 1975) and articulates a list of rules that forms the basis for an approach to developing and using concepts that others have subsequently developed and that I draw on here. Sartori’s key contributions amove away from focusing on “seizing the object,” (1984:27) and contribute an explicit description of the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1975, 1984).

Sartori’s first major addition to the study of concepts is an active shift away from a cognitive view of the concept. Although Sartori maintains an interest in the relationship between words and concepts, he contends that this is not the hub of concept formation or use, and should not be the root criterion for judging concepts. “Concept analysis,” by Sartori’s definition, requires logical analysis, with “two major areas of concern, or application: (a) the logical systematizing of ensembles, and (b) the logical treatment of single concepts, or of discrete conceptual clusters” (1975:16). The work of concept analysis lies in ordering the components of a concept in relation to one another and in ordering concepts in relation to other concepts. Neither of these goals directs itself
to consider concepts’ success in capturing empirical objects. Both focus on the use of
corcepts to help sort out the complications and confusions of empirical objects under
study.

Yet, Sartori also notes that it matters what scholars call things because words are
always already related to certain meanings. “Rebaptizing an object” can lead to new
interpretations and result in a kind of semantic disorder or chaos in the field of meanings
to which objects belong (1975:14). To clarify, Sartori offers the following set of
definitions:

1. Idea is a mental image, a meaning.
2. Conception is a set of ideas associated with, or elicited by, a given word.
3. Concept is a conception treated according to logical rules.
4. Terms are words which unambiguously refer to concepts. (Sartori 1975:12,
original emphasis).

Words are key to concept analysis because they demarcate the meaning of terms – a word
Sartori uses synonymously with concept. However in scientific rather than common
discourse the words of interest are really terms. Words themselves are connected to
concepts only insofar as they take the form of terms that point to concepts. As Sartori
expresses this feature, “words are symbols to be allocated in the most economical and
unequivocal fashion to carry ideas, i.e., to ‘serve’ . . . the concept” (1975:13, original
emphasis).

Thus, words, and the empirical objects they represent, do not take center stage in
Sartori’s understanding of the concept. He assumes that the meanings of words in
common discourse form a sufficient basis for establishing concepts, which must then be
defined according to the rules he advances, which I outline below. Concept analysis thus
involves building individual concepts and networks of concepts using principles of logic, rather than evaluating the degree to which any concept relates to its empirical referent.

Sartori’s second major contribution to the study of concepts is his explanation of the importance of the ladder of abstraction to understanding what concepts can do. The ladder of abstraction describes the relationship between a concept’s extension and its intension. The extension is the “class of [real] things to which [the concept] applies,” while the intension is the “collection of properties which determine the things included in the concept” (1975:17) or the internal content of a concept. More general or abstract concepts are more inclusive in their extensions, with a single concept covering many empirical instances. Conversely, when the number of attributes or properties of a concept increases, it becomes less abstract, and thus less inclusive. Moving up the ladder of abstraction in defining and applying a concept involves decreasing its attributes, while moving down the ladder of abstraction necessitates increasing its attributes. Concepts high on the ladder cover more real things than concepts low on the ladder.

According to Sartori, misunderstanding the ladder of abstraction, or the association between intension and extension, leads to conceptual stretching. Conceptual stretching is “augmenting the extension (inclusiveness) of a concept without reducing its properties [or intension]” (1975:17). This problem further results in trouble linking theory and empirical research, and thus in cumulating knowledge:

We rightly complain that our categories are too general (and much too vague) when they are theories, and too minute and descriptive when they are not. This happens because we leap from observational findings all the way to universal categories (and vice versa), bypassing as it were the rules of ladder climbing (and descending). Indeed, most of the time we do not even identify the level of abstraction with which we are dealing, and the argument develops randomly all the way up to the macro-level, and all the way down to the micro-level. (Sartori 1975:17-18)
Concepts developed without regard for the principles of the ladder of abstraction create confusion in scholars’ claims of both specific findings and subsequent generalizations. Scholars are thus unable to directly link their findings and generalizations to those of others scholars.

For Sartori, then, concepts are central to the basic goals of empirical analysis and knowledge production in academic work and thus necessary tools of social research. Any argument scholars make rest on their ability to define key concepts in a way that is logically consistent with the empirical cases they wish to explain. Further, the accurate definition and application of concepts are necessary for comprehension and knowledge accumulation within a field (Gerring 2001; Gerring and Barresi 2003; Sartori 1975) because any correspondence among different scholars’ arguments rests on the logical similarity or sameness of key concepts in the analysis. When a central concept in a given field is defined at different levels of abstraction by various scholars, and both the level of abstraction and the differences among them are unacknowledged, it becomes difficult for scholars working in the same field to relate their findings and build knowledge cumulatively.

A Methods-Based View of the Concept

I have identified four themes in the literature relevant to my project that address concepts methodologically. These topics capture the main concerns of those writing about concepts with a view to their importance in social science methods. Together, the insights I gather provide a strong basis for considering what concepts are and what they do in social science more generally, from a specifically methodological perspective. The four themes are: essential contestation, concept formation and definition, scientific versus
ordinary language, and concept evaluation. I subsequently use these themes to present a
more or less comprehensive account of central considerations for methodologically
informed concept analysis, which appear in the form of queries below. Although I
discuss each topic separately in the service of analytical clarity, in the literature they are
related and overlapping.

Essential Contestation

The term “essential contestation” is borrowed from Gallie’s influential essay
entitled “Essentially Contested Concepts” (1956). Gallie contends that key evaluative,
rather than purely descriptive, concepts are impossible to define conclusively. He gives
several examples, including social justice, democracy, and art, of essentially contested
concepts that can never be defined universally. However, Gallie is not pessimistic about
this state of social science concepts for he goes on to propose that scholars should replace
the goal of seeking singular, conclusive definitions of concepts with one that offers
justifications for their particular choices of interpretation over others. Essentially
contested concepts are thus unavoidable but entirely possible to use productively.

The more general idea that most conceptual definitions are rarely transparent and
cannot be pinned down definitively has permeated contemporary writing about concepts.
Gould, for example, uses the term “conflicting imperatives” to describe “interdependent
but contradictory goals, priorities, or motivations that underlie many social and political
relationships” (1999:1). Although he acknowledges that it makes for more difficult
concept formation, he claims that these oppositional empirical conditions should be at the
center of defining complex concepts. Adcock attributes the “slipperiness” of the concept
on “the wide range of ordinary use [of the term concept that] presents a fundamental
tension that any attempt to offer a coherent framework for specialized use of ‘concept’ must wrestle with” (2005:17). He argues that attempts to define what a concept is more narrowly are likely to conflict with use of the term concept in ordinary discourse. I discuss the issue of ordinary language further below.

For Gerring (1999, 2001) the problem of essential contestation lies in the competing demands of concept formation. He lists eight criteria: coherence, operationalization, validity, field utility, resonance, contextual range, parsimony, and analytic/empirical utility. To produce good concepts, all eight must be successfully balanced. Gerring describes the process of concept formation as one of making tradeoffs, because the criteria are often in conflict with one another (2001:23). He also argues that the problem of the specific applicability of universal definitions can be solved by two types of definitions: general and contextual (Gerring 2001; Gerring and Barresi 2003). General definitions describe a combination of a minimal definition – what the concept “really” means – and a maximal, or ideal-typical, definition (Gerring 2001:78-90, original emphasis). Contestation at the general level is resolved by adding specificity at the contextual level. However, the necessity for scholars of making tradeoffs in concept formation remains due to the impossibility of meeting all criteria perfectly.

The problem of essential contestation shows that even at the level of initial definition, concept delineation is never simple or unproblematic. Scholars have basic disagreement about both what a concept is (technical tool versus ordinary language definition, for example), and how particular concepts should be minimally understood. This feature of the concept also indicates that concepts are complex analytic devices, rather than dictionary definitions or easy, relativistic understandings. Fundamental
understandings of concepts themselves would not be debated if the concept were not important— even if only intuitively so— to the research process.

Concept Formation

I use the terms “concept formation” and “concept definition” interchangeably, even though very few concepts are genuinely formed for the first time as scholars define them for use in their particular work. Yet, defining concepts involves a complex process of revising previous definitions, operationalizing empirical phenomena, and fitting the concept to the context of the research. In this sense, the production of every conceptual definition involves forming a new concept. I use both “concept formation” and “concept definition” to refer to the development and statement of an explicit definition for a key term and/or empirical element of the analysis. This understanding is consistent with use of these terms in the literature I discuss. This section overlaps with other sections of this chapter because initial concept creation is often analytically indistinguishable from concept structure in concepts scholars’ accounts.

The process of concept formation is at the center of definition and use of concepts in social research. Even if they never define their key terms or refer to them explicitly as concepts, all scholars use concepts in some way or another. As noted above, I contend that by virtue of inclusion in academic work as part of the scholarly research enterprise, key theoretical terms or words and their definitions— or lack thereof— to describe empirical objects/elements count as concepts. Otherwise, they would be dictionary-type definitions; they are not because researchers do not have the goal of replicating everyday, dominant understandings of key terms. Rather, their terms are intended to do some type of analytic work, even if that work is only the definition of terms. A scholarly context
makes concepts analytic devices, even if this function is not exploited or acknowledged. Concepts are not simply terms that have been or could be defined because the end goal of scholarly endeavors is generally not definition. As a result, I consider definitional enterprises in scholarly literature as conceptual ones, and treat terms and their definitions as concepts.

There is no standard account of concept formation among social scientists and interestingly, no coherent attention to how concepts intended for methodological use are created initially. Despite the robust literature on how concepts can be structured most usefully for analysis discussed above, few scholars address the entry of a concept as a concept into the scholarly research enterprise. This concern is especially relevant for thinking about gender definition because gender as an empirical phenomenon is unavoidably pervasive in social life (Kessler and McKenna 1978). Scholars who study gender are thus challenged to differentiate between conventional, everyday meanings and analytical meanings – and must necessarily shift gender’s meaning from lay to scholarly, whether intentionally or not. I also discuss this issue below in relation to ordinary language. It is nonetheless possible to draw out several views of initial concept formation, as I do here.

Goertz (2006) and Gerring (1999, 2001; see also Gerring and Barresi 2003) offer the most comprehensive approaches to concept formation and structure. Goertz’s (2006) book-length treatise about what concepts are and how to use them begins with a basic characterization of the concept:

I propose a causal, ontological, and realist view of concepts. It is an ontological view because it focuses on what constitutes a phenomenon. It is causal because it identifies ontological attributes that play a key role in causal hypotheses,
explanations, and mechanisms. It is realist because it involves an empirical
analysis of the phenomenon. (Goertz 2006:5)

Here a concept emerges from a network of criteria related directly to its empirical or real
location and qualities. Concepts are analytical descriptions of empirical rather than
theoretical phenomena that directly reference the real world. For a word or term or thing
to enter into conceptualization it must meet these standards.

At slightly more remove from the concept’s relation to the real world, Gerring’s
(1999, 2001) set of criteria for understanding concept formation, listed above in their
entirety, suggest a more basic criterion for concept formation: whether a term may be
subject to these criteria at all. For example, would-be concepts which do not resonate –
meet the criterion of resonance, to “ring” (1999:367) or produce a “cognitive click”
(1999:370) – perhaps because they overflow the chosen term or identify a previously
unnamed phenomenon, cannot become concepts at all. Gerring’s work also includes the
idea of a minimal definition that captures what a concept “really” means (2001:78-90,
original emphasis) suggesting the view that concepts may have a core meaning upon
which various elements of the concept can be added. Finally, Gerring acknowledges the
ordinary-language approach, which contends that many concepts are formed by
“[relying] upon established usage (as defined by dictionary lexicons or more extended
etymological study)” (1999:362). The latter approach seems most relevant to studying
the definition of gender because of the large volume of established meanings and uses
that gender has. Perhaps gender concepts are most commonly formed through scholarly
borrowing of both the term gender and its layperson’s meaning, as I investigate in
Chapter 5.
At the beginning of the chapter I identified three broad approaches to concepts – cognitive, philosophical, and methods-based – and noted that the cognitive or classical view underlies other views of concepts, even as they explicitly disassociate with such a view. While generally unarticulated, the cognitive view of concepts includes in it a theory of concept formation in the philosophical and methods-based views. In the cognitive view a concept is identified as a mental entity. Desire for its use as a concept philosophically or methodologically prompts explicit definition and structuring, but the initial shift from thought-entity to analytic term involves carrying the original mental entity into a new context. It may be the case that all concepts are formed as mental entities and they remain so unless – or perhaps even if – they are subject to self-conscious conceptual definition and structuring of the type Gerring (1999, 2001) or Goertz (2006) describe.

*Scientific Versus Ordinary Language*

As it sounds, the problem of ordinary language in scholarship is the “deeply felt confusion” (Adcock 2005:31) that emerges when lay or non-scientific meanings of words and scientific meanings of the same words are jumbled together. This problem may be likened to the problem of misunderstanding the ladder of abstraction in concept formation, discussed above, in that it describes a similar lack of clarity in a conceptual definition. However, it is rather a more basic and difficult issue of word selection, signification, and implication. In the social sciences, the use of words that have lay meanings in conceptual definition is unavoidable due to the focus of these disciplines, including sociology, on aspects of social life that are already named. So-called lay terms identify empirical objects that would often be unrecognizable if renamed conceptually.
The conceptual problem this creates comes up frequently for concepts scholars (for example, Adcock 2005; Gerring and Barresi 2003; Sartori 1975), though without effective suggestions to solve it. Indeed, despite Sartori’s exhortation that words should “carry ideas” to “serve” concepts (1975:13), it is hard to imagine how this could work since concepts themselves are defined in words.

The obvious, though not easy, solution to this problem lies in clear, self-consciously conceptual definitions of key terms. Among the difficulties with implementing this approach is that it may not be possible to define an ordinary language term conceptually because a term located in a system of lay language includes elements that scholars cannot “see” or cannot articulate. The embeddedness of meanings within words may make their translation to conceptual terms difficult or incomplete. The problem of ordinary language is further compounded by the identification of an “ordinary-language approach” to concept formation (Gerring 1999), that is, an affirmative method to develop concepts by using dictionary definitions or studying the history of lay use of words. If concepts are created and developed by identifying ordinary language terms that refer to objects scholars want to study, the question of how these will subsequently be effectively defined conceptually comes to the fore. Even using the detailed conceptual structures that scholars such as Gerring (1999, 2001) and Goertz (2006) have developed may not overcome the embeddedness of ordinary language terms in meaning networks that cannot be fully drawn out and formalized. This situation is clearly the case with gender, where the ordinary language meaning always risks overriding the conceptual meaning.
Concept Evaluation

How do scholars know if their concepts are valuable or useful? Despite substantial criticism about the ways and reasons concepts fail (Adcock 2005; Collier and Adcock 1999; Gerring 1999, 2001; Gerring and Barresi 2003; Goertz 2006; Sartori 1984, 1987), there is little discussion of explicit criteria for evaluating concepts. The idea that concepts should be subject to some evaluative criteria to resolve the failures that many critics point out is common, but without significant discussion of what, exactly, those criteria should be. Gerring’s work (1999, 2001), especially an article titled “What Makes a Concept Good?” (1999) is the major exception. He argues that his criterial framework for concept formation which outlines the eight aforementioned criteria also needs to serve as an evaluative framework. The adequacy of concepts can be judged by whether or not they successfully meet the eight criteria. Gerring fully acknowledges that this is a difficult task but maintains that “[j]uggling these criteria is the art of forming good concepts” (2001:20).

Sartori’s (1975, 1984) original emphasis on the earlier mentioned ladder of abstraction leads to the implicit evaluative criteria of how well a concept’s extension – the empirical things it refers to – and intension – the list of properties included in the concept, or its definition proper – are balanced. When a concept’s intension and extension are not balanced, the problem of conceptual stretching occurs. In this case, concepts are understood to include more empirical instances than their definitions can accommodate; the concept is stretched beyond its legitimate use, which results in analytical problems in connecting the real-world referents of concepts and the theory into which concepts are integrated. The solution, according to Sartori, is explicit recognition
of the way the ladder of abstraction works so that scholars do not seek to make their concepts do more empirical work than they are able.

While Goertz (2006) similarly does not offer a definitive list of evaluative criteria for concepts, a set of criteria can be deduced from the normative suggestions for “the concept-builder” that he includes irregularly throughout his book. These suggest that there are more and less analytically effective ways to create and use concepts. The following serve as illustrative examples:

- Do not just list dimensions of the concept.
- Be explicit about the necessary conditions, if any.
- Give sufficiency criteria. This is true for both necessary and sufficient condition and family resemblance structures.
- Do not force the reader to guess at structure from the discussion of examples or the mathematics of a quantitative measure. (Goertz 2006:39)

Clearly examine the causal relationships between indicators and secondary- and basic-level factors. Identify clearly those indicators which are the effects of the phenomenon or cues that signal the presence of the phenomenon. (Goertz 2006:58, original emphasis)

As a whole these suggestions are appropriate for those defining concepts as Goertz acknowledges. The evaluative criteria that may be derived from these directives require fully explicated concepts to produce valuable outcomes; as this is less often the case with gender concepts they are not particularly useful for considering gender conceptualization (see Chapter 5). Goertz’s advice for concept-builders is nevertheless worth mentioning here to demonstrate a set of evaluative criteria for concepts, albeit implicit.

Using insights from the literature reviewed in this chapter, I create my own quasi-evaluative framework in the set of queries I list below. I use “quasi” here to qualify the term “evaluative” because my analytical intent in this project is exploratory rather than evaluative. Due to my orientation towards discovery rather than assessment, I frame the
tenets of concept investigation I have developed here as queries. I use these in Chapter 5 to map the conceptual definition of gender in recent sociology literature.

**Ideal Types: A Special Case**

Weber’s ideal type is a special kind of concept that appears frequently in sociological literature, although it has been the subject of little contemporary methodological discussion (Goertz 2006:10-11). According to Weber (1949, 1968), concepts

... can be formed as ideal types through abstraction and exaggeration of certain conceptually essential elements. In practice this is indeed a particularly frequent and important instance of the application of ideal-typical concepts, and every *individual* ideal type comprises conceptual *elements* which are ideal-typically constructed. (Weber 1949:100, original emphasis)

Ideal types are theoretical renderings of empirical objects, processes, or events that intentionally do not try to capture empirical character accurately or entirely (Watkins 1952). While ideal types are derived from empirical reality (Burger 1987), they are intended to provide insight into real-world instances in their comparison with an intentionally non-real description. In the language of concepts introduced above, ideal types have an extension of zero, that is, there are no empirical instances that match an ideal type’s intension, or properties included in a concept’s definition proper (Gerring and Barresi 2003; Goertz 2006).

Ideal types can be incorporated into more complex approaches to concepts as Gerring and Barresi (2003) do successfully in their discussion of a min-max, or general-contextual, strategy of concept definition. In this approach, concepts are defined in both minimal or least-common-denominator, and maximal or most complete, ways, which together make up the conceptual definition. Here, the ideal type forms an important but
relatively minor part of a concept as it is formed in the three steps of the min-max strategy of general definition:

1. Sample (sample representative usages and definitions within a linguistic context)
2. Typologize (arrange non-idiosyncratic attributes in a single typology)
3. Define
   a. Minimal (identify those few attributes that all non-idiosyncratic uses of the term have in common)
   b. Ideal-type (identify those attributes that define a term in its purest, most ‘ideal,’ form)  (Gerring and Barresi 2003:205)

These are worth quoting at length to show that while the ideal type may be useful in the context of a larger concept formation strategy, it is only part of what is required for a fully formed concept, by one account at least.

Using the ideal typical model of concept formation has the substantial advantage of avoiding a debate about the relationship between concepts and their empirical referents. Weber posits the impossibility of one-to-one correspondence between object and concept, and develops his approach accordingly. His methodological clarity in stipulating how ideal types are created and designed to be used is also valuable in guiding users through an ideal typical analysis. However, the ideal type is also limited in its usefulness because of this narrow intended purpose.

By itself, the ideal type does not offer a meaningful attempt to grapple with the problem of accuracy and specificity in empirical description – nor is it designed to. Rather, ideal typical analysis is its own type of concept analysis, intended to develop empirical insight by drawing out differences between the construct and the object. This is legitimate, sophisticated conceptual analysis (Heckman 1983), even though it does not require attempting to capture empirical reality or balancing a concept’s intension and extension. For those who study gender, ideal typical analysis may be useful as a strategy
to draw out the complexity of empirical manifestations, though it may also be true that the difficult for scholars of getting their hands on exactly what they are studying (see below) makes ideal typical analysis impractical.

There is the additional problem among social science scholars of referencing the ideal type as shorthand to say that their concepts do not match the empirical phenomenon they are studying, rather than using the ideal type method as concept analysis in the way Weber originally intended (Weber 1949; see Sherman 2009 for an example). This brand of invocation of the ideal type allows scholars to avoid the struggle of giving as complete, accurate, and specific a definition of their key terms as they can. This issue, even if not widespread, points to a difficulty that scholars can encounter in ideal typical concept use.

Overall, the goal of conceptual definition is not to establish a one-to-one correspondence with an empirical object and its related concept, as Sartori notes explicitly (1984). Nevertheless, an approach to concept formation that does not include an attempt to capture the empirical in a comprehensive, meaningful way seems inappropriate for studying gender because of its taken-for-granted empirical character. As a result, ideal typical concepts may or may not be useful to gender scholars as a general analytic strategy. To answer this question, I include queries related to ideal types in my analytical considerations below to better understand whether, and if so how, gender is defined ideal typically.

Challenges to Defining Gender Conceptually and the Usefulness of the Concept

The empirical phenomena of gender present several challenges to thinking about gender as a concept, and defining gender in a self-consciously conceptual form. Although what follows is not a definitive list, it captures the key elements of gender as
they are manifested in social life that may inhibit scholarly conceptualization. The primary challenge is gender’s utter pervasiveness in social life. Gender is literally everywhere, as evidenced by the unmet challenge to think of an area or instance of social life where gender does not matter (Gerson 2002, 2005; Gerson and Peiss 1985). Gerring’s (2001) stipulation that all concepts require both general and contextual definitions helps this problem by allowing gender scholars to differentiate between an umbrella type of description, which by definition would not include every specific instance of gender, and a particular, contextually relevant description. However, the challenge remains how to adequately capture gender in a definition limited even substantially by context. How do scholars decide which of the often many manifestations of gender in any context to describe?

The second, related challenge is gender’s variability in social life. Gender takes practically infinite forms, partly as a result of its pervasiveness. Gender is situationally specific and hence different in many complex and diverse ways both across and within contexts. These variations further overlap with one another in any given situation, context, or structure. While a scholar’s research goals, questions, and hypotheses direct her choice of which aspect of gender to address conceptually, gender’s variability often overflows attempts to narrow it within these parameters without offering a definition so broad as to be conceptually useless. This diversity includes qualitative variation of kind or type of gender manifestation and quantitative variation of intensity, salience, amount, and reach – among others (Gerson 2002, 2005; Gerson and Peiss 1985).

The third challenge is gender’s intuitiveness (Salzinger 2003) or embeddedness in social life. The character of gender often makes it difficult for scholars to “see” it with a
clear analytic eye. Salzinger (2003) argues that this hidden quality comes from gender’s subtlety and deep integration into social life. As a result, laypeople’s knowledge of gender tends to emerge intuitively and to be taken-for-granted – features that can carry over into scholarship. In this sense, gender, or aspects of it, may be formally unavailable to scholars for analysis. Although gender knowledge is common among both academics and non-academics, an epistemological analysis is often hidden or buried, which makes explicit and rigorous definition difficult.

These challenges force scholars of gender to make numerous difficult, often problematic, choices about conceptual definition. While other social phenomena may act in similar ways – social class, race, and the economy are examples with similar complexity – gender is arguably one of the most difficult empirical phenomena to conceptualize adequately due to its high degree of pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness in social life. A self-consciously concepts-oriented approach to defining gender has much to offer the difficulties it presents for empirical study. The literature reviewed above shows there are several ways concepts may be formed, all including an explicit focus on clearly and actively defining key terms. While it may not be possible to define gender so that it meets the requirements of any of these approaches, it seems clear that attempting to do so would be beneficial for scholars in gender and gender scholars in particular.

The queries outlined below for use in my analysis of gender definitions in recent sociology literature speak to how gender definition may be understood in conceptual terms. In asking these questions of gender definition in my samples I seek to reflect on the degree to which a concepts framework is productive for scholars. I also ask a more
basic, hypothetical question about whether (more) explicit or comprehensive conceptual
definitions of gender would strengthen scholars’ insights about gender. While it is, of
course, difficult to answer a counterfactual question, I argue for its usefulness in this
context in service of offering another analytic tool to gender scholars to capture this often
cryptic and abstruse aspect of social life.

Considerations for Analysis

I end this chapter with a list of several sets of queries or framing questions for use
in my analysis of recent gender definitions in my general sociology sample and my
sociology of gender sample (see Chapter 5 for both). These emerge from my review of
the main themes in the social sciences concepts literature, above, and serve as a
framework to organize my analysis. I use them in reference both to individual gender
definitions and to the field or distribution of definitions as a whole in both my general
sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample. These questions are intended to
invoke qualitative and interpretive responses, rather than simple yes/no answers. They
are also designed to explore gender definition by applying a self-consciously concepts
focused approach to definitions of gender in the field of sociology. Overall, I seek to
apply all queries to all definitions where possible, although the questions about the ladder
of abstraction and conceptual stretching apply more to explicitly stated gender definitions
than implicit ones. My queries for analysis appear in the section immediately below; in
the following section I describe my expectations for my analyses as they differ for my
general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample.
Queries about Gender Definitions

The queries listed here derive from my application of the concepts literature to produce sets of framing questions for considering gender definition from a concepts perspective. First, are gender definitions in recent sociological literature primarily cognitive, philosophical, or methods-based? Do the definitions I found in both of my samples show an understanding of the ladder of abstraction, in which more abstract concepts “cover” a greater number of empirical instances and more specific concepts are limited to explaining a smaller number of empirical instances? Are there instances of conceptual stretching, where the real-world set of phenomena explained by the concept of gender is “too big” for the concept, thus making the conceptual definition useless to link empirical instances with theory?

Second, is there is evidence that gender is an essentially contested concept? Can I conclude that it is impossible to define gender conclusively? Are there a sufficient number of gender definitions to assess this? These queries are especially interesting given the pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness of gender in social life. I seek to determine whether gender definitions overall correspond to the richness and variety of empirical gender(ed) phenomena.

Third, how are gender concepts formed, if I am able to identify formation patterns in the gender literatures I examine as they may not be obvious or inferable? Are there instances of ordinary-language concept formation and if so, are they identified as such? Are there instances of structured concept formation like the types promoted by Gerring and Goertz and if so, are they identified as such? This set of queries is intended both to
explore the genesis of gender concepts and to determine whether gender scholars reference concepts scholarship in defining gender.

Fourth, do gender scholars encounter the problem of ordinary language in their gender definition? In making this inquiry of my sources I also ask how I know whether it is the case – or not – that gender scholars experience the problem of ordinary language. Further, what lay meanings of gender, if any, enter into gender scholarship? Do I see any instances in which an ordinary language definition and a sophisticated conceptual analysis are both present in the same article?

Fifth, do gender scholars evaluate their gender concepts? Are there any instances in which scholars actively define gender as well as offer an assessment of the validity and/or usefulness the definition? Can I identify a set of minimal criteria by which to evaluate whether conceptual definitions of gender are valuable, effective, or analytically useful? These queries are intended as a contribution towards establishing general evaluative criteria for gender concepts.

Last, are there any ideal typical instances of gender definition in my samples? If yes, how is the ideal type used? If no, might the method of ideal types be useful for conceptual clarity in defining gender? Though ideal types are one of the earliest kinds of concepts they seem to have been little used in relation to gender. I ask whether this is true in representative samples of general sociology literature and sociology of gender scholarship, and if gender definition could benefit from ideal typical analysis.

Empirical Expectations

As I describe in Chapter 3, I selected two samples of journal articles in which to examine gender definition. One represents the field of sociology at large and one
represents the subfield of sociology of gender. I opted to study these separately, using two empirically distinct samples because I hypothesize that gender is conceptualized differently in a subfield that makes gender as its primary subject, compared to how it is conceptualized in other sociological sources that address gender but do not take it as their central topic or problematic. Here I describe these expectations in relation to the concepts framework developed in this chapter.

For both samples my research question is, how is gender conceptualized? The queries above help me to explore this by providing several sets of investigative questions to apply to the gender definitions in my two samples. I describe my findings in relation to my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I provide a short section that presents a comparative table and summary of my comparative findings, and in Chapter 5 a longer section that offers a more detailed assessment of the similarities and differences I found between my samples in relation to the concepts concerns outlined in this chapter.

Overall, I expect to find better conceptualized definitions of gender in my sociology of gender sample than in my general sociology sample for the reason stated above. The subfield of sociology of gender is oriented towards gender not only as its principal area of study but also as an analytic problem that requires investigation and explanation. Because of this focus, which is not found with the same intensity in the field of sociology as a whole – and, I would argue, is not found at all in some sociological subfields – I expect the articles I coded from Gender & Society to have more explicitly defined descriptions of gender and for these definitions to be more extensive compared to those in the articles in my general sociology sample. I also expect to find fewer explicit
definitions in my general sociology sample than in my sociology of gender sample. Specific expectations for both samples in the six areas of inquiry identified above follow immediately below.

First, I expect to find few or no methods-based definitions of gender in both samples, although possibly more in the sociology of gender articles because of the greater interest in general in this subfield in explicating gender as a problematic. I also expect to find a substantial proportion of cognitive definitions in both samples, although generally manifested in implicit rather than explicit definitions, as the cognitive conceptual definition seems most common in the social sciences – even underlying ostensibly methods-based definitions of the concept. In keeping with these expectations, I anticipate finding few definitions of gender that demonstrate an understanding of the ladder of abstraction and the related problem of conceptual stretching, in which the phenomena explained by the concept exceed the conceptual definition. In terms of my codes, listed fully in Chapter 3, I think this pattern may be manifested as a limited or nonexistent explicit definition in an article in combination with a more sophisticated, complex implicit definition.

Second, I expect to find strong evidence that gender is an essentially contested concept. Because I do not anticipate finding many explicit definitions in either sample – although more in my sociology of gender sample than my general sociology sample – it is unlikely that I will be able to assess whether gender is an essentially contested concept by considering a large array of explicitly defined gender concepts. However I do expect to find enough explicit and implicit definitions combined to make this determination. Further, I hope to be able to differentiate between whether gender is an essentially
contested concept and whether gender definitions overall correspond to the diversity of empirical gender phenomena. I expect that fundamental differences in the way gender is defined in sociological scholarship will characterize the former whereas a broad variety of definitions of gender that are not essentially in conflict with one another will characterize the latter.

Third, I anticipate finding that more gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample are formed through quotation and/or citation of other sources than in my general sociology sample. I apply this category relatively loosely to mean that a discussion of what gender is or means is accompanied by a direct quotation from another source intended to explicate the understanding of gender. Sometimes scholars include citations but not direct quotations, and sometimes they include both. I think this will be the case because I expect those who publish in the sociology of gender subfield are generally more attentive to gender as a complex entity that requires explicit definition, rather than a self-evident phenomenon. Overall, I do not expect to find many or any instances of structured concept formation like the types discussed by Gerring and Goertz or any instances of ordinary-language concept formation that are identified as such. This expectation is shaped by my observation that there is a relative lack of focus on concepts as methodologically useful in the field of sociology.

Fourth, I do expect my findings in both samples to illustrate the problem of ordinary language in gender definition even though, as noted above, I do not anticipate scholars will identify this explicitly. In relation to my framework of gender reduction, explained fully in the Introduction, I expect to see significant gender reduction in the form of the problem of ordinary language, with more instances in my general sociology
sample and fewer instances in my sociology of gender sample. Given gender’s taken-for-granted character, I also expect to find ordinary language definitions of gender with corresponding sophisticated gender analyses in the same article. I expect to find more of these in my general sociology sample than in my sociology of gender sample.

Fifth, I do not anticipate finding many – or possibly any – articles in either sample that include evaluations of the gender concepts presented, although perhaps I can expect to find more in my sociology of gender sample. While I expect to be able to offer a set of minimal criteria for use in evaluating conceptual definitions of gender in terms of their value, effectiveness, and/or analytical usefulness, I do not anticipate that these criteria will emerge from an evaluative focus on gender concepts in the articles in either my general sociology or sociology of gender samples. Rather, I expect to be able to devise evaluative principles for gender concepts based on my review of the concepts literature in this chapter.

Finally, I have no specific expectations for whether there will be many, few, or no ideal typical instances of gender definition in either of my samples. On the one hand, the ideal type seems to be relatively well-known and appears frequently in the field of sociology yet on the other, ideal types seem to have been little used in relation to gender. Whether gender definition could benefit from ideal typical analysis may depend on whether gender is an essentially contested concept. If so, I expect that using an ideal type of gender as Weber (1949) originally intended – as an analytically oriented “ideal” version to compare to empirical instances – may lead not to further conceptual or empirical insight but only to the well-established conclusion that gender takes many forms and is entirely pervasive of social life.
Chapter 3: Methods

Introduction

This chapter describes the sources I use to address my research question, my sampling strategies for selecting them, and the analytic techniques I use to evaluate them. My research investigates gender conceptualization in contemporary sociological literature in two areas: first, sociology scholarship about gender at large and second, the subfield of sociology of gender. To examine the sociology literature, I drew a sample from a larger population of sociology articles that used “gender” in the title, published between 2006 and 2010, rather than from a population of all articles published in the field during that time. To examine the sociology of gender, I selected all of the articles published in *Gender & Society* with “gender” in the title, published between 2006 and 2010. I refer to the former as my “general sociology sample” or “gender-focused sociology sample” and the latter as my “sociology of gender sample”. Although sociology of gender is included in sociology at large, I study it separately because I expect that gender is conceptualized differently in a subfield that takes gender as its primary subject, compared to how it is conceptualized in other sociological sources that address gender, but do not take it as their central topic or problematic. I use two distinct, rather than overlapping, samples to consider gender conceptualization in sociology. For each area of literature, I ask: how is gender conceptualized? To investigate this question, I examine various aspects of conceptualization in scholarly articles published in sociology journals during the time period 2006–2010.

Sociology offers one of the best and most comprehensive scholarly frameworks for studying gender. Overall, the discipline is oriented towards identifying and analyzing
both large- and small-scale patterns and impacts of social life that are often not obvious to the people living them (Giddens et al. 2009; Witt 2011:4). These features make it especially appropriate to use in describing, analyzing, and understanding a set of social phenomena that are perhaps one of the most complex, embedded, and taken-for-granted in social life. The ubiquity of gender in everyday life further complicates it as a subject of scholarly inquiry – a challenge sociology is well equipped to tackle. Because sociology is particularly well-suited to the study of gender as a result of its overall focus on unnoticed social phenomena and patterns in social life, using sociological literature about gender provides a relatively strict “test” of gender conceptualization. Yet, despite this marriage seemingly made in heaven, discussion of gender’s substantive meaning has often been marginalized in sociological literature, even as gender is directly examined and discussed, as I described in the Introduction and discuss more fully in Chapter 5. Indeed, gender is a frequently examined topic in sociological scholarship, but may not often be defined explicitly, even by those who study it directly. This paradoxical feature of the way gender has been treated in sociological scholarship makes sociology an appropriate field in which to study whether, and to what degree, gender is hidden in plain sight, as sociologists specialize in elucidating and clarifying precisely those aspects of social life that often go unnoticed.

The question of gender conceptualization is also an important one to consider in sociological scholarship because of its methodological implications. Despite the large volume of excellent sociological scholarship that addresses gender (see Introduction and Chapter 5), it has not to my knowledge been studied through the lens of the concept. Concepts are methodological tools that offer the promise of insight and accuracy (see
Chapter 2). How does the concept as a methodological device stand up to the empirical difficulty of gender? How do sociology scholars and gender scholars working in sociology use it – if they do at all? I flesh out a concepts-oriented framework for investigating gender definition in sociology in Chapter 2 and address these questions in the analyses of both my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample (see Chapter 5).

Sources and Sampling

For examining these questions in both sociology as a whole and the subfield of sociology of gender, I analyze articles published in sociology journals in English during the five-year period between 2006 and 2010. I limit my sources to scholarly journal articles and do not include scholarly books in my analysis for several reasons. First, books tend to take a wider-ranging approach to their topics than articles, making it more difficult to isolate gender conceptualizations. Second, as a result, books can be more difficult than articles to classify disciplinarily. They often traverse several disciplines or touch on many disciplines. Third, articles are more current as books generally have a longer lead time to publication; articles are thus better for my intention to explore gender definition in current sociological scholarship. Finally, there are important merits of concentrating on a single publishing format. Articles generally have a more clearly articulated form, whereas, as noted above, books can be quite expansive. Using only articles also provides a stronger test of my research question because they are generally a more disciplined format. Books often have multiple audiences, which might lead their authors to justifiably marginalize, conceal, or subsume some of their conceptual rigor to attract a wider readership. For these reasons, I analyze articles and not books. While I
speculate that books may include more explicit and extensive definitions of gender, I do not investigate this question here.

To assess the current state of sociological literature in relation to gender conceptualization, I focus on relatively recent literature about gender. I am most interested in current work because I would like to consider gender scholarship in sociology at a time when its study is a commonplace in sociology, rather than a novelty. The American Sociological Association’s well-established sex and gender section, gender studies as a concentration in many sociology graduate programs, and the strong presence of Gender & Society in the field – currently a top-ranked journal – offer robust evidence of the institutionalization of gender as an accepted and legitimate area of inquiry in sociology. Another indication of gender’s mainstreaming in sociology is the inclusion by Thomson Reuters’s Journal Citation Reports¹ of “gender studies” as one of the areas covered in the field of sociology that is worth mentioning by name (Thomson Reuters 2012b). Practically, for sampling articles from both the field of sociology as a whole and the sociology of gender subfield I use the five-year time period of published articles between 2006 and 2010. I do not use any years beyond 2010 to avoid the issue of embargos preventing access to journal articles through online search engines. Although easy access to sources is not my primary consideration, the relatively large size of my sampling frame (see below) made gathering a large number of articles in print form prohibitive if I had needed to photocopy them individually from journals rather than print them from online databases.

¹ Journal Citation Reports produces, compiles, and computes citational data for scholarly and technical journals in the sciences, social sciences, and technology fields.
Sampling Gender-Focused Sociology

I used different approaches to gather sources for my sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample. I discuss my sampling strategy for the general sociology sources in this section and my sampling strategy for the sociology of gender sources in the next section. To consider how gender is conceptualized in the field of sociology as a whole, I selected a sample of 100 articles from a target population of 399 articles with the word “gender,” “gendered,” or “gendering” in the title, published in the period 2006 to 2010 in peer-reviewed sociology journals. The population of articles was drawn from 49 sociology journals with the highest 2010 five-year Impact Factor scores, as identified by Thomson Reuters. I discuss my procedure and rationale for creating the population of articles, and selecting my sample from it, more fully below. I chose the sample size of articles initially based on both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, 100 articles made sense as a large enough number to draw meaningful conclusions about patterns of gender conceptualization. Practically, many of my analytic categories are interpretive, therefore coding involved not only identifying and transcribing information from each article into my categories, but also considering, synthesizing, and characterizing. These processes often took a substantial amount of time, with an article that included a complex gender analysis taking about two hours to code. As I coded, I was open to the possibility that I may need to expand my sample beyond 100 articles if I continued to see new types of uses of gender or of gender conceptualizations – or lack thereof – as I coded articles at the “end” my sample. I estimate that I reached saturation about half way through coding. After that point, most of the articles I coded fit into patterns of use and definition of gender that I had already seen previously.
To gather my sample, I first used the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Report’s (JCR) five-year Impact Factor (IF) measure to select journals from which to choose articles for my analysis. Impact Factor is a field-specific measure, calculated by journal, of the frequency of citation in a field for articles published in a journal in that field. JCR defines IF as “the average number of times articles from the journal published in the past two years has been cited in the JCR year,” (Thomson Reuters 2012a) where JCR year refers to the year for which the IF has been determined. The term Impact Factor is generally used to refer to a 2-year IF score, which is calculated by:

\[
\text{IF} = \frac{\text{Number of citations in the JCR year}}{\text{Total number of articles published in the two previous years}}
\]

An Impact Factor of 1.0 means that, on average, the articles published one or two years ago have been cited one time. An Impact Factor of 2.5 means that, on average, the articles published one or two years ago have been cited two and a half times. Citing articles may be from the same journal; most citing articles are from different journals. (JCR site, extracted April 3, 2011, original emphasis)

Five-year impact factor is the average number of times articles from the journal published in the past five years have been cited in the JCR year in all journals in the field to which that journal belongs. It is calculated similarly to 2-year IF scores, by dividing the number of citations in the JCR year by the total number of articles published in a journal in the five previous years. Because my sample spans five years, I employ the five-year IF scores to gather the journals from which I select articles to use in my analyses. I used the JCR’s website to sort sociology journals by 2010 five-year impact factor from highest to lowest. JCR identifies 132 journals in its sociology category. I took the 49 journals with the highest 2010 five-year impact factor, excluding Gender & Society, as I explain fully below; these are listed in Appendix A. I used 2010 five-year
impact factor rather than 2011 because I am collecting articles published in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. 2010 impact factor scores include a count of citations in 2010 for all of these years, plus one additional year of publication, 2005, which I do not use in my analysis.

My final list of journals from which I selected articles with gender in the title to create my sampling frame included 49 journals rather than the 50 I had originally planned because I omitted Gender & Society, which has a five-year 2010 IF score of 7. I initially opted to include Gender & Society in both samples as it is both a specialty gender journal and a mainstream sociology journal but subsequently realized that I would not be able to draw valid conclusions with empirically overlapping samples. As I had already created my sampling frame and randomly selected 100 articles when I made this decision I elected to eliminate the articles from Gender & Society from my sample and replace them with additional articles randomly selected from the original sampling frame to make up 100. As a result, my general sociology sample includes 100 articles randomly selected from a sampling frame drawn from 49 journals with five-year 2010 IF scores in the top 50.

I originally chose to include 50 journals in my selection process, rather than all 132 journals that the JCR includes in the sociology category, for two reasons. First, using all sociology journals would have created an unwieldy number from which to select articles published over five years with the term gender in the title. Second, 50 journals is a large enough number to provide substantial coverage of the field. By selecting journals with higher impact factors I ensured that my coverage of the field included a relatively large swath, including the most visible journals, but that it was not entirely biased
towards the top journals as it would have been had I only used journals with the highest IF scores. All journals from which articles are included in my analysis are peer-reviewed sociology journals. Appendix A also lists each journal’s country of origin.

I initially created a sampling frame from which to select articles by listing all articles from the top 50 journals, including *Gender & Society*, with the term gender, or any variation including the term gender, in the title published between and including the years 2006 and 2010. I used Thomson Reuters’s Web of Science database to make this list. When I entered “gender” in the title field, the database automatically found titles with the term gender, gender-based terms such as gendering and gendered, and terms with hyphens and slashes, such as gender-typical and gender/ethnicity. I chose to operationalize whether an article is *about* gender – or gender-focused – or not by whether or not it included the term gender in the title of the article because it makes sense that terms used in the title of an article describe the main topic(s) of that article. I assumed that terms such as gendered and gendering also reflect a main focus on gender. While this is not a failsafe against articles that appear to address gender but do not in fact do so, it does provide a logical and straightforward way to select articles about gender. It also allows me to analyze the degree to which, at least in terms of sociology articles with gender and related terms in the title, words in the title of an article reflect its substantive topic(s).

After I decided to eliminate *Gender & Society* from the journals that make up my sampling frame, I removed all *Gender & Society* articles from my sampling frame. All top 49 2010 five-year IF scoring journals, excluding *Gender & Society*, are searchable in Web of Science. Following the process described above yielded a sampling frame that
included 399 articles. Appendix B lists all articles in my sampling frame. Articles were listed in order by journal in which they were published, from highest five-year IF score to lowest, and then by year published, from oldest to most recent. I used simple random sampling to select 100 articles from the 399 articles in my sampling frame. As noted above I did this in two stages: first, I selected 100 articles from my sampling frame when it included articles with gender in the title found in *Gender & Society*; second, after I removed these from both my general sociology sample and my sampling frame I subsequently selected additional articles to add up to 100. First, I numbered all articles from one to 399. I then used a table of random numbers (http://www.wifcon.com/pubs/ofppp411.gif), matching random numbers to the previously numbered articles, until I had chosen 100 articles. After I removed *Gender & Society* articles from the original sampling frame I returned to the table of random numbers to add additional articles to my sample. Appendix C lists all 100 articles in this sample. This group of articles makes up my sources representing the general field of sociology as it addresses gender.

**Sampling Sociology of Gender**

I gathered sources for my sociology of gender subfield sample from the journal *Gender & Society*. This journal is arguably the single journal that both forms the core of, and best represents, the sociology of gender. My sample of sociology of gender articles includes all those with the term gender in the title, published in *Gender & Society* between and including the years 2006 and 2010. I limited my search to articles with gender in the title to make my general sociology and sociology of gender samples as similar as possible. It might be argued that all articles published in *Gender & Society* are
about gender, and I could thus have gathered the articles representing the sociology of
gender subfield by randomly selecting a sample of 100 articles from a sampling frame of
all articles published in *Gender & Society* between 2006 and 2010. Nevertheless I
maintain the use of gender in the title to identify articles for my sociology of gender
sample. Even though all of the sources that constitute this sample are published in the
premier American sociology gender journal, they may be less likely to address gender
substantively if they do not include gender in their titles.

Initially, I used ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection² (ProQuest)
database to find all articles with the word gender in the title, published in *Gender &
Society* between 2006 and 2010. When I entered “gender” in the title field, the database
automatically found titles with the term gender in them, including articles in which
gender was part of a term in the title, such as gendering and gendered, and terms with
hyphens and slashes, such as gender-typical or gender/ethnicity. Using ProQuest, I found
79 articles. I double-checked this finding by performing an identical search in Web of
Science, which also automatically found title words with the term gender in them
(gendered, gendering), along with gender itself. Using Web of Science, I found 68
articles. I then compared my results from the two databases to determine the source of
the 11-article discrepancy between them. ProQuest listed eight sources that are part of a
special issue of *Gender & Society* about West and Zimmerman’s (1987) “Doing Gender.”
None of these are research articles, and as a result I did not include them in my sociology
of gender sample. It also listed three sources that were duplicates of articles already
included. Thus, my sociology of gender sample is made up of 68 articles, published in

² ProQuest is a database of titles from scholarly journals, trade publications, magazines, and newspapers
across many subjects, including social science.
the five-year period 2006-2010, in *Gender & Society*, which include gender, gendered, or gendering in their titles.

Although I often use the term “sample” to describe this set of articles so that it is comparable to the terminology I use in discussing my general sociology sample, in fact they form a total population. The articles included are listed in Appendix D. I produced a content analysis of these articles using the same analytical categories as I used to code the articles that make up my sample representing the field of sociology as a whole (see below).

**Qualifications and Other Considerations**

Because part of my sampling strategy uses a citation-based measure, it is worth noting that the usefulness of citation counts have been strongly questioned on several fronts, not least as a measure of research quality, validity, and importance (Bornmann and Daniel 2008; Bornmann, Mutz, and Daniel 2008; Lindsey 1989; Najman and Jewitt 2003). Journals with more frequently cited articles do not necessarily produce “better” research than those with less frequently cited articles. It is also possible that some articles are frequently cited only because they are published in well-read and well-regarded journals, rather than as a result of their own research merit. Citation counts, particularly IF, seem to be a best understood as a measure of a combination of journal prestige and visibility in a particular field. Since I am interested in how gender is defined and discussed in mainstream sociological literature, IF is an appropriate ranking system to use for selecting sources for my analysis. I make no claims or assumptions about the quality, validity, or importance of any research based on the citational rank of the journal in which it was published.
Citation counts have also been criticized for tracking citations in journal articles but not books, thus leaving out a large swath of citation data that would raise the various types of citation-based or impact scores (Jacobs 2009). Although I only use journal articles in my analysis, this problem means that my sample of articles from sociology journals may be biased towards those articles that are cited most frequently in other articles, at the expense of articles that are cited more frequently in books. Caution should thus be taken in generalizing my findings to articles cited in books, and articles published in journals that do not have top 50 2010 five-year IF scores.

Further, citations can represent both affirmations of scholars’ work, or challenges and disputes; citation counts do not differentiate between frequent citing of a source as a result of far-reaching influence and acceptance or of extensive critique. However, this potential problem does not affect my use of IF as a tool to gather my sample because I am seeking to examine gender conceptualization using a body of literature that represents the mainstream of its field. Whether a source is frequently cited as a result of affirmation or criticism does not impact my use of it in this research.

The sampling method described above produces a more or less representative sample of recently published scholarly sociology journal articles and thus serves as an appropriate selection strategy for this project. An approach that captures conventional, well-read scholarship is suitable for drawing conclusions about mainstream conceptualization in sociological scholarship. Because I sample gender-focused articles published in journals with top rather than median 2010 five-year IF scores, my sample is biased towards journals whose articles are more frequently cited. However, the inclusion of such a large number of journals reduces this bias overall. I chose to select the top 50
journals, rather than to use the median 50 journals, so as to include good coverage in my sample of both the “average” articles and of the most cited articles. This was important to capture the most read and/or most visible (Jacobs 2010) articles, which, precisely because they are the most cited – and, thus, presumably most read – may do a better job of representing mainstream sociology than those with median IF scores.

Finally, a few words about how the field of sociology is defined for my research are appropriate here. By selecting journals using JCR’s Impact Factor measure, I am de facto using the JCR’s definition of what is classified as a sociology journal. The JCR includes in its sociology category journals that are:

. . . resources that focus on the study of human society, social structure, and social change as well as human behavior as it is shaped by social forces. Areas covered in this category include community studies, socio-ethnic problems, rural sociology, sociobiology, social deviance, gender studies, the sociology of law, the sociology of religion, and comparative sociology. (Thomson Reuters 2012b)

These parameters fit an intuitive understanding of what sociology includes. As I mentioned above, it should also be noted that the JCR considers “gender studies” to be one of the areas covered in the field of sociology that is worth mentioning.

More broadly, sociology can be understood as both a field and a discipline, and I use these terms interchangeably. Generally, a field is a collection of academic work that shares a guiding purpose, however broad or vaguely defined. A discipline, by contrast, is the academic institutionalization of a field (Halliday 1992; see Craig 2003, 2008, and Turner 2007 as examples of sources that employ these uses). By this understanding, a discipline is more or less defined by the academic departments that share its name, although using this definition does not entirely eliminate ambiguity about how work in specific fields is defined (Najiman and Hewitt 2003:65). Because sociology is such a
diverse field when taken as a whole (Abbott 2001; Halliday 1992; Zald 1991), it is de
facto established as a discipline by the scholars who work in sociology departments and
publish in sociology journals (Crane and Small 1992), even though they may have
doctoral degrees in subjects other than sociology. As a discipline, sociology is bound,
albeit broadly, by a shared focus on the “reciprocal relationship of individuals and
societies as they influence and shape each other” (Kuipers and Sell 2008:660).
Sociologists have produced a body of knowledge that shares this defining purpose.
Although understanding sociology to be bounded in this way risks reifying the field
(Craig 2003, 2008), and I do so with the full recognition that the term suggests a
comprehensiveness that likely does not exist in the field; sociology nevertheless includes
an overarching emphasis on the social world that establishes its borders. By this
definition the articles in both my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender
sample are engaged in the sociology enterprise writ large.

Analytic Technique: Content Analysis

I produced two content analyses to evaluate my sources and answer my research
question. As noted above, I used the analytic techniques associated with the content
analysis method for both my sociology sample of 100 articles and my sociology of
gender sample of 68 articles. In this section, I describe the method of content analysis,
along with the analytic categories I used in my coding, including a discussion of both
quantitative and qualitative aspects. Given the subjective, interpretive nature of this
work, I include a brief ethnographic account of the processes of coding and analysis
below.
Content analysis is a type of research that uses systematic coding to assess various characteristics of messages in written or visual texts (Holsti 1969; Krippendorf 2004; Neuendorf 2002). It involves the use of “a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber 1991:9), relying on a theoretical foundation and the scientific method to achieve legitimate, replicable results (Neuendorf 2002). I applied it here to the conceptual messages about gender in recent gender-focused scholarship in sociology at large and in the subfield of sociology of gender. Content analysis may proceed entirely deductively, or both deductively and inductively (Neuendorf 2002). I took the latter approach, establishing analytic categories – described fully below – prior to my formal analysis, based on previous reading in gender studies as described in my Introduction and the main focus of this project on exploring gender definition in sociology. I then revised and added categories as my analysis proceeded. When I revised or added a category, I revisited the articles I had already coded to see if the coding I had already recorded required revision or if entries needed to be made in the new category. All revisions and additions of analytic categories occurred during the coding of the first 10 articles in my sociology sample. I sought validity in my analysis by careful reading of all articles and double-checking coding in more interpretive categories, such as those about implicit definitions of gender (see below). I ensured reliability by coding all articles myself within a five-month period, with no breaks from coding that lasted longer than a week. Doing so avoided potential problems resulting from inconsistent coding by different research workers or unintentional changes in my own application of analytic category definitions over time.
I use content analysis as both a quantitative method (Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele 2012:338-9) and a qualitative method (Patton 2002:453) to evaluate the conceptual features of gender-focused sociology and sociology of gender articles. My quantitative results include descriptive statistics where appropriate for the analytic categories, calculated and analyzed separately for my general sociology and sociology of gender samples. My qualitative results include interpretive accounts of: the content of each analytic category in both the sociological and sociology of gender samples; the relationship between the same categories in the sociology and sociology of gender samples; and the relationship among categories within each sample. As coding in these analytic categories included interpretation, assessment, and synthesis, my qualitative analysis forms a type of meta-analysis. I also take a grounded theory approach, developing theoretical conclusions inductively from the comments in my analytic categories that form my data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998).

In practice, the process of content analysis occurs in two steps: coding and analysis of codes. Due to the inductive, qualitative nature of my topic, my content analyses involved interpretation at both the coding and analysis stages. In categorizing scholars’ use of gender as taking the form of explicit or implicit definitions, and identifying the meaning of those uses, I provided interpretive readings across several different analytic categories. I sought to stay as true to the meanings of gender in each article as I could by reading carefully and thoroughly, and providing quotations in support of my assessments. Nonetheless, it bears repeating that much of the information in my analytic categories is interpretive, and in this sense, the analyses I present in Chapter 5 could be considered meta-analyses of my own original explanations. Further,
my coding and analysis phases overlapped. As I coded the articles in both of my samples, I made notes in a separate file for use in writing my analysis and also included cumulative analytic comments in the coding sheets themselves as I went along. The latter appeared mostly in the “other notes” category. I thus built up the theories I develop to explain my findings in the processes of both coding and analyzing my codes.

I coded each article using 37 descriptive and substantive analytic categories which appear below in their entirety. Many of the categories I included were not applicable for a substantial number of articles in both samples. However, I coded all articles in all categories, even though this meant that about half of my codes were “n/a” for some articles, to ensure comparability across all articles in both of my samples. I also sought to capture as many possible aspects of gender conceptualization that existed, and tried to avoid missing key, subtle elements of gender definition, along with differences across articles in these elements. As a result of these careful procedures, I was able to produce a more or less comprehensive account of gender conceptualization in the articles I coded. Further, I expected, as turned out to be the case, that the articles in my sociology of gender sample would include information in more categories overall than the articles in my gender-focused sociology sample overall; I thus used a more comprehensive set of categories for all articles to allow comparison across all categories for all articles in both samples.

The complete list of analytic categories follows in Table 3.1:

TABLE 3.1: Analytic Categories for Content Analyses

| Article Number (my numbering): |
| Complete Citation: |
| Author(s): |
| Publication Year: |
Journal:
Journal’s 2010 five-year IF ranking:
Research Question(s), first mention (not in abstract):
Article Section of Research Question(s), first mention:
Number of Research Questions:

Expressed/explicit definition of gender
Expressed/explicit definition of gender present? Y/N:
If yes, what is it? (direct quotation, pg. #):
First/only mention in what section of article?
Is it derivative (borrowed or cited)? Y/N:
If yes, source?
If yes, field/specialty? How do I know (bibliography)?
If yes, generic or in relation to topic (more or less)?
If yes, is definition only defined in terms of topic studied?

Additional expressed/explicit definition(s) of gender
More than one expressed/explicit definition of gender? Y/N:
If yes, what is it? (direct quotation, pg. #):
First/only mention in what section of article? n/a
Is it derivative (borrowed or cited)? Y/N:
If yes, source?:
If yes, field/specialty? How do I know (bibliography)?
If yes, generic or in relation to topic (more or less)?
If yes, is definition only defined in terms of topic studied?

Implicit definition(s) of gender
Implicit definition of gender? Y/N:
If yes, what is it? (direct quotation, pg. #):
If yes, first/only mention in what section of article?
Implicit understanding of gender?

References to sex (male/female)\(^3\)
Any reference to sex and/or male/female?
If yes, how is it defined (if at all)?
If yes, how used (if at all, beyond a reference)?

\(^3\) I chose to code for an article’s use of “sex” and “female/male” in a single code. Some may object to the collapsing of these terms because female/male can be understood to be used interchangeably with women/men with no meaning beyond that making them synonymous with the latter. Sex, however, can more clearly be taken to suggest the invocation of essentialism, biology, and/or reproduction. As a result, examining the concurrent use of gender and sex in recently published sociology articles would be a more rigorous test of scholars’ possible contradictory use of gender as a reference to the socially constructed nature of masculinities and femininities. Future research might investigate whether articles with gender in the title that include references to sex differ in any way from articles with gender in the title that include references to female/male but do not include references to sex.
Larger knowledge context
“Citational footholds,” if not covered in other categories:
What assumptions are made about what the reader knows? As the assumptions of
this knowledge vary by journal, and by particular fields/subfields.
Is gender “written into” the article? Perhaps there is no expressed/explicit
definition, but a sophisticated gender analysis is integrated into the article.
Is the article *about* gender (in some major/important way) even if the term gender
is not used?

Larger contributions
Does the article make a contribution to the larger gender literature?

Other notes
Although some categories are self-evident, others require additional explanation of their
operationalizations, which I provide here.

*Research question(s)*: I operationalized research question(s) as the authors’
expressed purpose(s) of their research. I opted not to use any research questions that I
may have found in article abstracts for two reasons. First, some abstracts do not include
any research questions at all; whether this is the case seems to be determined by
conventions of particular journals. Second, an abstract can be used by the author(s) of an
article to frame the research in the context of the journal’s theoretical orientation, and as a
result may not be an accurate source for the question(s) that guide the research that is
discussed in the article itself. To code for the presence one of more research questions, I
did not require an article to identify them as such. I generally found research questions in
the introductory paragraphs of an article, and coded for the section of the article where it
appeared. Many articles did not include research questions per se, although I was
generally able to find one or several sentences that stated the intention or argument of the
research; when this was the case, I included these statements in the research question
category.

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4 Thanks to Judith Gerson for suggesting this term.
Expressed/explicit definition of gender: I operationalized an expressed or explicit definition of gender as a description of gender in any section of the article. I did not require that authors self-consciously note that they were defining gender, or defining it conceptually. I read the articles in both the sociology and sociology of gender samples liberally in seeking definitions of gender; if there was any account of gender’s meaning that was expressed explicitly in words, I coded it as an explicit definition. I also included explicit definitions in this category that were cited and/or quoted from other sources. In practice, coding in this category involved a third possibility: almost explicit or “kind of” explicit definitions that I incorporated as an option as I coded. I did not create a separate category for almost explicit definitions but rather noted the presence of an almost explicit definition in the explicit definition category, and provided additional details in the implicit definition category. When I found articles that included an explicit definition of gender and implicit uses that indicated understandings of gender that differed from the explicit definition, I coded the relevant information in both the explicit and implicit definition categories.

The other categories under this heading – first/only mention in what section of article, field or specialty, whether definition is derivative (borrowed or cited), whether definition is generic or defined in relation to the topic of the article, and if gender is only defined in terms of the topic – provide information for contextual information for understanding how authors use explicit gender definitions, when they do.

Implicit definition(s) of gender: These categories were operationalized as gender’s embedded or underlying meaning, based on a careful reading of the entire article. To illustrate one type of implicit definition, I found that some authors did not define gender
explicitly at all, but a close reading showed that gender references reflected an understanding of gender as sex (female/male). As noted above, I coded in these categories for an article even if I had already coded in the expressed/explicit categories to be able to compare explicit definitions, when present, with implicit definitions. In this section, I also differentiated between implicit definitions and implicit understandings of gender. While there is overlap between these categories, I wanted to distinguish between those articles in which the author(s) used a definition of gender that was relatively straightforward and used it only in one way, from those articles whose author(s) incorporated a more sophisticated, multi-faceted view of gender. In both cases, the meaning(s) of gender are not defined or explained explicitly.

I also included the category, for implicit definitions, “If yes [article includes an implicit definition], first/only mention in what section of article?” even though most of my codes for this category for articles with implicit definitions were “n/a.” As I coded articles with implicit definitions of gender, it often did not make sense to record the section of the article in which I found the first/only mention because the term gender was used throughout the article, with the same meaning each time. Gender’s implicit meaning in these cases underlay the work throughout the article.

In coding in the implicit definition categories, I also noted passages that included references to both gender and sex, female, or male. I use the phrase “sex terms” to refer to “female” and “male,” as distinct from the term “sex” itself. I recorded these passages in the explicit definition, implicit definition, and/or references to sex categories, with a note that identified them as instances of this pattern.
Although most of my analytic categories include a subjective component and rely on my own assessments and judgments rather than a simple identification and recording of information, I found this to be most true of the implicit definitions categories. To code in these categories, I reflected carefully on all uses of gender in each article, including those in the discussion and conclusion sections of an article, to identify the prevailing if unarticulated underlying view of gender. If I found that more than one implicit understanding of gender, I included all in these categories. While I believe this care and thoroughness produced accurate, insightful information about authors’ assumptions of gender’s meaning and scope – sometimes articulated and acknowledged, often not – I recognize that the descriptions in these categories may be biased by my own implicit views of gender or assumptive approach. I discuss this possibility more fully below.

Further, the very idea of implicit understandings of gender raises an unwieldy and pervasive issue in sociology: to what degree do scholars rely on readers’ already-existing knowledge and to what degree are they obliged to offer their own clear, context-specific definitions of key terms? This matter is especially relevant in the field of sociology because sociologists often research and write about objects, ideas, and topics about which readers – and, indeed, scholars – have “lay” understandings and definitions (see section on ordinary language in Chapter 2). Although this is an important problem, it is nevertheless beyond the immediate scope of my project as a primary consideration. I address the implications of my research for implicit definitions and intuitive understandings in sociological scholarship about gender in Chapter 5.

References to sex: Although my project is about gender, I included these categories so as to be able to investigate authors’ use of sex in relation to their use of
gender. I was also interested in whether articles with gender in the title contained references to sex or sex terms at all. In this section, I coded for whether the article included any references to “sex” or to “female” or “male.” I identified whether there were references only to sex, to female, and/or to male in each article. If there was a reference to sex or female or male, I identified whether the term(s) were defined, and how they were used. In the latter category, as with the implicit definition of gender categories, I offered a summary interpretive statement of how sex or sex terms were used, ad provided quotations in support of my assessment in my codes. I generally provided at least three quotations to show author(s)’ uses of sex and sex terms, to avoid capturing an atypical use in a single passage.

*Larger knowledge context:* These categories captured the scholarly context of each article as a way to recognize the general contextuality of sociological knowledge and to understand gender definition and use as it is located within particular subfields and “circles” of citational activity. I gathered information for the first two categories – citational footholds\(^5\) and assumptions about reader knowledge – from the bibliography of each article. Looking at the names of journals and books listed in each article’s bibliography gave me a strong sense of its subdisciplinary, or interdisciplinary, location(s). I coded the third and fourth categories – whether gender is written into the article and whether the article is about gender even if the term gender is not used or defined explicitly – as assessments of each article’s underlying focus on and orientation towards gender. Although there is overlap in these two categories, I coded them separately in recognition of the analytical distinction between gender as a frame(work)

\(^5\) I use this term to refer to central and/or key citations about gender. Generally these are sources that are cited more than once, and possibly discussed in the text, and that indicate an author’s or set of authors’ main ideas about gender.
for an article that is so primary or basic that it is not discussed explicitly, and gender as a fundamental analytical category about which conclusions are drawn, even if this is not made obvious.

_Larger contributions to gender literature:_ This category evaluated whether the article offered a new finding about gender in particular, even if it offered new findings about other topics. This category can be understood in relation to the last category – whether the article is about gender in some fundamental way – under the previous heading, “larger knowledge context,” in the sense that only articles about gender as such make a contribution to the gender literature. Articles that use gender as a term to refer to sex, or to reference social constructionism as a general social process, do not make a contribution to the larger gender literature, as these uses are already documented and discussed. I was generous in assessing contributions in this category to avoid assuming no larger contribution to the gender literature if an article was not explicitly orientated in that way.

It also bears noting that my coding in this category was rarely comprehensive, as this information related to other analytic categories, such as whether the article was about gender, or whether gender was “written into” the article. I often made reference to my coding in these and other categories in my comments about an article’s larger contribution to the gender literature. Although some of the analytic categories I employed in my content analyses can stand alone, most are better understood in relation to one another, and this is how I treated both sets of articles as I coded and in my analyses.
Other notes: Under the “other notes” heading, I included any additional points that I believed to be relevant to an article’s treatment of gender that had not been previously coded. It also includes summary comments on an article, when I felt those were necessary, as was sometimes the case with particularly detailed and/or gender-oriented articles. After I had coded about the first 15 articles in my gender-focused sociology sample, I also used this category for notes towards my analysis, identifying patterns of gender definition and use as they emerged, and cumulating my thoughts and observations as I went along. I coded in this category for most, although not all, articles in both of my samples.

Coding and Analysis: An Ethnographic Account

As noted, the project I undertake here is an inductive and interpretive qualitative study. I use the method of content analysis because it is an appropriate way to collect data that provides insight towards my research question. Because content analysis is typically associated to a greater degree with quantitative outcomes (counting occurrences in categories) that are subsequently interpreted after the content has been collected, than in the qualitative way I use it here, some comments about the coding process as an endeavor in assessment and interpretation are appropriate. In both of my content analyses the information that forms the codes in several of my key analytic categories is itself interpretive. I sought to offer as clear and objective an assessment of how the authors of the articles I coded used the term gender, but with the full recognition that ultimately many of my codes are at least partly subjective. I am sure that my own history of reading and thinking about gender, which falls primarily into the areas of gender theory and the sociology of gender, has informed both coding and analysis. As a result of
this particular background, explicated in the Introduction, I did have to actively adopt an attitude of exploration, rather than one of evaluation, as I read many articles in both sociology at large and the sociology of gender subfield that did not include explicit definitions of gender.

Occasionally I found that the analytic categories I used were not entirely sufficient, especially as they related to one another. The most problematic case was coding in the larger knowledge context category, “Is gender ‘written into’ the article? Perhaps there is no expressed/explicit definition, but a sophisticated gender analysis is integrated into the article,” for articles that included an implicit definition of gender, but an explicit gender analysis. In these cases, I coded in this category with the observation that gender would be better characterized to be “written out into” the article, as an indication that it was possible for an author to use gender implicitly, while also offering a very explicit gender analysis.

The “other notes” category provided a space to record my more general impressions and to document patterns as I saw them emerging. In writing my analysis in Chapter 5, I considered analysis not only of the codes I recorded in the other categories, but also of the evolution of my thoughts about the process of coding and the shape of the literatures as I cumulated them from the first article I coded to the last. I used these notes not only to create my analysis of the articles, but also as a part of it. The inductive quality of my coding and analytic process reflect my focus on a little discussed, as yet undefined issue, that has developed as I investigate it.
Chapter 4: Results of General Sociology and Sociology of Gender Samples Content Analyses

Introduction

This chapter reports the results of the content analyses of my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample. I report both quantitative and qualitative findings for both samples. I begin with quantitative results reported individually for my general sociology sample and sociology of gender sample, followed by comparative quantitative results. I then report qualitative results for my general sociology and sociology of gender samples. Quantitative findings include the proportions of articles that contain explicit conceptual definitions of gender, that contain implicit definitions, and that mention the term sex or sex terms (female and male). Qualitative findings include general characterizations of types of explicit and implicit definitions in my sample, typical uses of each, and accounts of uses of sex and sex terms. In the following chapter, I explain my findings in two ways: first, in terms of the empirical character of gender and the way gender itself and previous sociological gender studies frame current scholarship, and second, in terms of the concepts queries presented in Chapter 2.

Quantitative Results

I begin with a word about the scope of the quantitative analysis in both of my samples. When I started the project I anticipated being able to calculate descriptive statistics for substantially more analytic categories than I subsequently discovered I could once I had completed coding. Although I coded in many categories in an effort to capture as much nuance as I could in the literature I was evaluating, I found substantial variation within most of my categories, particularly those related to citational patterns in derivative explicit and implicit gender definitions. As a result, any further quantification
based on a priori assumptions about the homogeneity of my analytical categories would lead to data without meaningful substantive interpretations. This problem was further compounded by small numbers of articles in each category of gender scholar cited or quoted, as well as insignificant numerical differences between them. As a consequence, I do not calculate or report descriptive statistics for any additional categories beyond those in Table 4.1, which appears below in the comparative quantitative findings subsection. Finally, while the results reported in the comparative subsection repeat some individually reported results for my general sociology and sociology of gender samples, they are included again in service of a full comparative description of the quantitative findings in both samples.

**General Sociology Sample Findings**

In my general sociology sample, I found that 12% of the articles I coded included an explicit definition of gender. This statistic includes one article that contained two explicit definitions and two articles with both an explicit and an implicit definition of gender. Eighty-seven percent included only an implicit definition. One percent, or only one article, did not include any definition of gender at all, even an implicit one. I opted to keep it in a separate category to maintain the integrity of the explicit and implicit categories rather than collapsing the no definition category into one of the others. Overall, 37% of both the explicit and implicit gender definitions were derivative of another source by citation or quotation. Eighty-three percent of the explicit definitions and 31% of the implicit definitions of gender were derivative. Finally, 76% of my general sociology sample is made up of articles that include references to sex or sex terms.
Sociology of Gender Sample Findings

In my sociology of gender sample, I found that 26.5% of the articles included an explicit definition of gender. This statistic includes four articles that included both an explicit and implicit definition of gender and two articles that had two explicit definitions. 72.5% of my sample is made up of articles with only an implicit definition. A single article (1.5% of the sample) did not include a definition of gender, explicit or implicit. Rather than collapsing it into the implicit definition category I maintained it in its own category to avoid adding further variation to the implicit category. Overall, 72.1% of both the explicit and implicit gender definitions were derivative of another source. Of the explicit definitions, 94.4% cited or quoted another source, compared to 65.3% of the implicit definitions. Finally, 57.4% of my sample contains references to sex or sex terms.

Comparative Findings

Table 4.1 below shows quantitative results calculated for the major categories of my content analysis for both my general sociology sample and sociology of gender sample. The table shows key differences between my samples – most notably in explicit definition, implicit definition, and reference to sex and sex terms categories – as well as an overall pattern in both samples of frequent appearance of implicit definitions and infrequent appearance of explicit definitions. Of the articles in my general sociology sample, 12% percent include an explicit definition of gender, compared to 26.5% of the articles in my sociology of gender sample. While there is a significant gap of 14.5 percentage points between my general sociology and sociology of gender samples in explicit definition, it is equally important to note that in both samples just over one
quarter or less of the articles include an explicit definition of gender. I also found that a substantial majority of articles in both samples include only an implicit definition of gender. This is true for 87% of articles in my general sociology sample and 72.1% of the articles in my sociology of gender sample. Further, more than half of the articles in both samples include references to sex or sex terms, with 76% of those in my general sociology sample making reference to sex or sex terms compared to 57.4% of those in my sociology of gender sample.

In terms of derivative definitions I find that only 37% of gender definitions in my general sociology sample quote or cite another source, compared to 72.1% of definitions in my sociology of gender sample. The proportion of derivative definitions in my sociology of gender sample is almost double that in my general sociology sample. Finally, it is worth noting that only 39% of my general sociology sample either includes directly or in the form of citation or quotation, points to an implicit definition of gender. This 39% includes the 12% of articles in my sample with an explicit definition and the 27% of articles with implicit derivative definitions. To compare, in my sociology of gender sample 73.6% of the articles either include directly or point to an explicit definition of gender. This 73.5% includes the 26.5% of articles with an explicit definition and the 47.1% of articles with implicit derivative definitions. The proportion of articles in my sociology of gender sample that provides or refers to an explicit gender definition is close to double the proportion that does so in my general sociology sample. These statistics suggest a greater attentiveness towards gender definition among those who publish in the subfield of sociology of gender compared to those who publish in non-gender-focused sociology journals, as I discuss further below.
### TABLE 4.1: Gender Definition in General Sociology and Sociology of Gender Samples (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General Sociology Sample</th>
<th>Sociology of Gender Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with explicit definition</td>
<td>12.0*</td>
<td>26.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with only implicit definition</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with no definition</td>
<td>1.0***</td>
<td>1.5****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with definition derivative of another source</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with explicit definition where definition is derivative of another source</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Subset of articles with explicit definitions)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with implicit definition where definition is derivative of another source</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Subset of articles with implicit definitions)</td>
<td>(87)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent articles with references to sex terms</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes one article with two explicit definitions of gender and two articles with both explicit and implicit definitions of gender.  
** Includes four articles with two explicit definitions of gender and two articles with both explicit and implicit definitions of gender.  
*** The single article that I did not characterize as including an explicit or implicit definition of gender used the term gender very infrequently and was not in fact about gender.  
**** The single article that I did not characterize as including an explicit or implicit definition of gender has the word gender as a reference to *Gender & Society*.

### Qualitative Results

This section reports comparative qualitative results. These take the form of general summaries that characterize the types of definitions and examples to demonstrate typical uses. In the respective discussions of both samples I address, in the following order, explicit definitions of gender, implicit definitions of gender, and references to sex and sex terms. I include examples of derivative and non-derivative definitions. Due to
the substantial variation among both explicit and implicit gender definitions in both
samples I offer the caveat that although my examples serve to illustrate each analytical
category they cannot be taken as definitive representations of any type of definition. I
provide several examples of each type of definition to illustrate the differences in kind
that are included each category.

**General Sociology Sample Findings**

Despite their small number, the explicit definitions in my general sociology
sample show variation in length, complexity, and type. Most explicit definitions were
quite direct, such as this example from Charles and Bradley’s (2009) article about cross-
national sex segregation by field of study, which argues

\[
\text{. . . that conventional evolutionary models of women’s status cannot provide a}
\text{satisfactory account of cross-national and historical variability in sex segregation}
\text{by field of study because they underestimate the enduring cultural force of}
\text{gender-essentialist logic (i.e., cultural beliefs in fundamental and innate gender}
\text{differences), which has proven to be extremely influential in shaping life}
\text{experiences, expectations, and aspirations, even in the most liberal egalitarian}
\text{societies (Fenstermaker and West 2002; Charles and Grusky 2004; Correll 2004;}
\text{Ridgeway 2006).} \text{ (Charles and Bradley 2009:925)}
\]

Their definition of gender includes a direct quotation from a well- and broadly-cited
sociologist of gender: “In Ridgeway’s (2006) terms, gender serves as ‘a primary framing
device for social relations,’ even in societies where egalitarian principles are widely
endorsed (see also Bem 1993)” (Charles and Bradley 2009:927). This definition is also
an example of an explicit definition that is derivative of or cites another source.

Another example of an explicit definition that is similarly short and direct, but the
author’s own, is Penner’s (2008) explanation of his use of the term gender over sex in his
study of international differences in extreme mathematical achievement. While this
definition appears in a footnote and the definition itself is in parentheses I nonetheless
count it as an explicit definition. Penner writes: “While some make a distinction between sex (biological) and gender (social), I do not believe that this is particularly useful in this context, given the inextricable nature of the link between sex and gender here. Thus, I use the term gender throughout the article” (pg. S140, original emphasis). I coded this as an explicit definition because I presumed Penner meant that gender is social, despite lack of identification of what exactly is social or how it is so. He may also have meant that gender means sex/gender, where biological and social components cannot be separated.

My sample also included lengthier and less direct definitions that I categorized as explicit by virtue of their detailed explanation of the gender component of a gendered or gender-related phenomenon. For example, in their article about how social differences become status distinctions Ridgeway et al. (2009) discuss “cultural beliefs about gender” (47) in such a way that their meaning of gender is overt:

Cultural beliefs about gender (i.e., gender stereotypes) carry not only descriptive information about how men and women are culturally assumed to be, but prescriptive information about how they should be (Fiske 1998). The principal prescriptive requirement for women is that they appear communal in interpersonal relations (Cancian 1987; Eagly and Karau 2002). Women are expected to appear relatively kind, helpful, concerned about others, and generally ‘nice.’ The difficulty is that this requirement to be communal is culturally perceived to conflict with the assertion of superiority or dominance. As Rudman and Glick (2001) show, the assertion of superiority is perceived as ‘not being nice’ and thus as a violation of prescriptive gender expectations for women. As a result, unless a woman’s right to do so is clearly legitimated in a particular situation, her assertion of influence over another can provide a negative ‘backlash’ reaction from others of both sexes (Rudman and Glick 2001).” (Ridgeway et al. 2009:47)

This passage also demonstrates a longer and less direct explicit definition of gender that includes citations in the explanation but does not involve a direct quotation expressing the meaning of gender.
In the following quotation from Wierda-Boer, Gerris, and Vermulst (2008), “gender ideology” is sufficiently overt to be considered an explicit definition of gender, similar to the “cultural beliefs about gender” discussed above (Ridgeway et al. 2009). The authors investigate whether work-family balance is predicted by what they term adaptive strategies and gender ideology. Wierda-Boer et al. (2008) define gender ideology in the following sentence: “In this study we . . . explore the role of gender ideology, that is, masculine and feminine traits, in explaining work-family balance,” (2008:1005) and then go on to immediately define masculinity and femininity:

Masculinity refers to an individual’s identification with stereotypical masculine roles. Traits associate with masculine roles are agentic and instrumental. Femininity, on the other hand, refers to an individual’s identification with stereotypical feminine roles. Feminine traits are communal and expressive (Bem, 1974). Masculinity and femininity are embedded within the social context and are socially reinforced (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). They are not opposite ends of a single continuum; instead, individuals can possess both masculine and feminine traits. Integration and relatively high identification with both masculine and feminine traits is referred to as androgyny (Bem, 1974). (Wierda-Boer, Gerris, and Vermulst 2008:1005)

This explicit definition is one of the more comprehensive conceptualizations of gender among the explicit definitions. It is also a derivative definition, including two citations.

The following explicit definition, like many others, references West and Zimmerman’s (1987) seminal and well-cited article, “Doing Gender.” Tibbals (2007) includes their title phrase in the title of her own article, “Doing Gender as Resistance: Waitresses and Servers in Contemporary Table Service,” which “comparatively examines experiences of doing gender as a waitress in a traditional restaurant setting and doing gender as a server in a routinized restaurant setting to explore the possibility of persons doing normative gender as resistance” (Tibbals 2007:732). Her article includes an
explicit, derivative definition of gender in which she cites both West and Zimmerman (1987) and Connell (1987):

Based on the work of Candace West and Don Zimmerman (1987), it can be said that gender emerges out of social interactions and is therefore a socially organized achievement, rather than a ‘natural’ occurrence. Additionally, according to R. W. Connell (1987), in any historical setting, gender and consequent gender presentations are guided by the idealized concepts of hegemonic masculinity for men and emphasized femininities for women. (Tibbals 2007:732)

Like the article discussed immediately above, this definition does not quote other sources directly but uses citations to reference the concepts of key gender theorists. It is also one of the more direct explicit definitions in my general sociology sample.

My final example of explicit definitions of gender is the single article I found with more than one explicit definition, Ferree’s (2010) review of gender perspectives in the literature on families. There were no other articles in my sample that included the breadth of gender definition of this one, likely explained in part by its status as a comprehensive review of theoretical views of gender in the family scholarship rather than a report of original research. Nonetheless, I include it here to illustrate the less common types of explicit definition. The following passages are worth quoting at length to demonstrate many explicit gender definitions both presented and evaluated:

A loose definition of gender as a variable distinguishing women and men as individuals or as defining relationships located within the context of the family is omnipresent. Studies fitting this definition often have employed the theoretically disconcerting language of ‘gender role,’ which either encapsulates gender within a single institution or turns role into a synonym for cultural stereotype. Far fewer studies have applied the feminist-inspired and theoretically rigorous definition of gender as a relationship of power connected to institutional process organizing – and changing – families. (Ferree 2010:422-3)

And:

A gender perspective has also been called gender relations theory, gender as a social structure, gender as an institution, and an intersectional gender analysis
At its core, the gender perspective rejects gender as a static norm or ideal (the so-called *gender role*), and instead defines gender as a social relation characterized by power inequalities that hierarchically produce, organize, and evaluate masculinities and femininities through the contested but controlling practices of individuals, organizations, and societies. The differences between women and men are thus not only seen as socially constructed but also as politically meaningful. Individual gendering activities are situated in larger structures that have their own institutionalized gender practices and meanings (P. Y. Martin, 2003a). The macro-micro dynamic is integral to this theoretical perspective (Anderson, 2005). (Ferree 2010:424)

This purpose of this article as a review of the literature about gender in relation to families explains why it includes so many different definitions of gender and also assesses them. It serves as a good illustration of many different types of explicit derivative gender definitions.

The implicit gender definitions in my sample are similarly varied. Implicit definitions of gender ranged from straightforward to complex. Generally, I identified two types of implicit uses of the term: gender as a stand-in for women and men, and gender as a reference to a social force or social structure. In the first type, gender is used as a summary term to mean both of the terms women and men and/or differences between women and men. I refer to these uses of gender as “women-and-men” and “differences-between-women-and-men” to capture the meaning of gender as a summary, shortcut, or stand-in for both women and men or girls and boys, or differences between them, rather than only one of each pair. In the second use, gender means a social force that exists outside of individuals and creates an impact on individuals, groups, or society or culture in general. Many articles include both uses. I further differentiated between an implicit *definition* and an implicit *understanding*. I coded in the definition category when the covert meaning of gender was clear and it was only used in one way; definitions that meant only women-and-men are the most common in this category. I coded in the
understanding category when I discerned that the covert meaning of gender included a more substantive and/or multifaceted view.

Jerby, Semyonov, and Lewin-Epstein’s (2006) article titled “On Measures of Gender Occupational Segregation: Statistical and Conceptual Considerations (A Response to Grusky and Levanon)” includes only an implicit definition of gender where gender is used to mean women-and-men. The following passage demonstrates this type of use: “. . . gender occupational segregation becomes more pronounced and more evident as the occupational classification becomes more detailed. Likewise, occupations tend to become more gender-typed . . .” (Jerby, Semyonov, and Lewin-Epstein 2006:576). The following excerpt from the same article also shows a use of gender meaning women-and-men:

Since the critique put forward by GL [Grusky and Levanon] reflects in part disagreement on what segregation indexes should measure, we would like to take this opportunity to suggest, as well, that segregation indices are merely an operational definition of the segregation phenomenon. As such, they serve as measures of the theoretical concept – gender segregation. (Jerby et al. 2007:579)

This implicit definition of gender is also the author’s own and not derivative of another source.

My sample also included some articles where the implicit definition of gender was a reference exclusively, or almost so, to women. This is the case in Yadgar’s (2006) work about religion and feminism among traditional Jewish Israeli women. His description of his research is worth quoting here to show the almost singular focus on women and femininity. Yadgar asks:

. . . how women [Jewish Israeli traditionalists] who choose an identity that refuses to fall into a one-dimensional dichotomy that distinguishes between the category of the ‘secular-modern-feminist’ and that of the ‘religious-traditional-subordinate’ construct and negotiate their feminine identity, while exploring the varying ways
in which this identity-construct interplays with these women’s identity as members of a distinct sociocultural group. More particularly, I explore the ways in which Jewish Israeli traditionalist women construct and negotiate their identities as women, feminists, traditionalists, and Israelis, in a context of predominant binary distinctions that separates the ‘religious’ from the ‘secular,’ the ‘modern’ from the ‘traditional,’ and more implicitly, the ‘feminist’ (and free) from the ‘subordinate.’ (Yadgar 2006:354-5)

This framing of the research means gender can be read as a stand-in for women in the following passage:

An important focal point of this strand of research has dealt with the ways in which religion perpetuates traditional gender roles and inequality (Dhruvarajan 1988; Richardson 1988). The basic premise behind much of this research has been the notion that traditional, conservative religions, which have been historically patriarchal, are immanently contradictory to feminism’s basic premises of gender equality. (Yadgar 2006:354)

And:

A comparison of this article’s argument with that of contemporary evangelical Christians (Gallagher and Smith 1999; Bartkowski and Read 2003) could shed an interesting light on the ways in which the specific case of Jewish Israeli traditionalist women can inform our understanding of gender and religion. (Yadgar 2006:367)

While the author uses citations to support his comments on religion and gender, he does not do so for his references to gender. I thus classified this article as including a non-derivative implicit definition of gender.

The following example includes both an implicit definition and an implicit understanding of gender. In the article “Intentional Families: Fictive Kin Ties Between Cross-Gender, Different Sexual Orientation Friends” (Muaco 2006) the implicit definition of gender as women-and-men can be seen in the following passages: “. . . there existed a gender difference in how participants viewed the transition to old age such that the gay man-straight woman pairings tended to have a more serious and tangible plan for aging together,” (Muaco 2006:1319) and “Another related issue that highlights gender
differences in these friendships was that several straight women in the sample noted a willingness to be a surrogate mother for their gay male friend. In most cases, however, the gay male friend did not express an interest in being a father” (1319). Both quotations show gender standing in for women-and-men. The author also uses gender to identify norms and ideology associated with appropriate behavior for women and men, especially as these relate to marriage and parenthood. For example: “The women’s offers to give birth and to relinquish the child to their gay friend not only challenged traditional gender norms of motherhood but also contested beliefs that gay men make inappropriate parents,” (1321) and “Overall, the data suggest that the behavior within intentional family ties in some ways reinforced and in others challenged normative gender expectations” (1322). Both of these uses are implicit and non-derivative but the latter qualifies as an implicit understanding rather than only a definition because gender is used to invoke a social force that has the ability to shape behavior. In the case of this article, the subjects are acting against a force – normative gender expectations – that the author appears to view as a constraint on others.

My sample also included more overt implicit definitions than the one discussed in the previous paragraph, but implicit nonetheless. For example, Yancey and Kim’s (2008) article, “Racial Diversity, Gender Equality, and SES Diversity in Christian Congregations: Exploring the Connections of Racism, Sexism, and Classism in Multiracial and Nonmultiracial Churches,” provides an example where gender refers to both a structure that incorporates inequality and a set of roles. The following quotation demonstrates the first use and also serves as an example of a derivative implicit definition: “Previous literature postulated an intersectionality of racial, gender, and class
hierarchies that are often cumulative in effect (Almquist 1995; Collins 1990; Levine-Rasky 2002; Lorber 2001)” (Yancey and Kim 2008:103). The implicit meaning of gender as both a structural location and element of personal identity is made clear by the citation of intersectionality and gender scholars. In their use of gender to refer to gender roles, Yancey and Kim incorporate their other related implicit meaning of gender as a force of structural inequality:

... multiracial churches endorsing a conservative biblical interpretation are even more likely to support a restricted gender role for women. The traditional understanding of gender roles that many conservative churches endorse can draw informal social sanctions and charges of sexism. Thus, many conservative churches can be reluctant to openly endorse religious patriarchy. But conservative multiracial churches may be inoculated from charges of racial bigotry, and by extension general bigotry. This may allow conservative multiracial churches more freedom to enforce traditional gender roles. (Yancy and Kim 2008:109)

The use of gender in these passages is typical of many of the articles in my general sociology sample that include implicit definitions and understandings. I found that gender is often used in more than one way, especially when its implicit meanings are more complex.

I offer a last example of an implicit gender understanding that is similar to the one above in that it seems to be at least partly a reference to the theory of intersectionality, but without any direct references, citations, or quotations that confirm this is the case. Together these two examples illustrate the variation in form that implicit meanings of gender can take, even when the intended meaning is more or less the same. In her article about race, class, gender, and mothering, Byrne (2006) uses gender to mean a social construction that is part of a hierarchical social structure, which produces unique identities for individuals based on their race and class category memberships. Her work:
... argues that the activities involved in being mothers and bringing up children can be understood as performative of race, class and gender – that is, that practices of mothering were implicated in repeating and re-inscribing classed and raced discourses. The women, as mothers, were also engaged in gendered – and gendering – work. (Byrne 2006:1001-2)

She concludes that “... at the core of practices of motherhood lies the intersection of race, class and gender, with white middle-classness often functioning as a norm of womanhood. The experience of and practices involved in motherhood are inescapably and irreducibly gendered” (Byrne 2006:1002). The implicit definition here is multifaceted and sophisticated and I thus characterized it as an implicit understanding. It is also nonderivative as there were no direct quotations or citations in relation to gender’s meaning, in the passages above or in the rest of the article.

The articles in my general sociology sample also include frequent reference to “sex” and “female” and “male”; as previously noted I refer to the latter as “sex terms.” I found that almost none of these references seem intended to invoke a reference to biology, reproduction, the body, or women’s and men’s differences in these domains. I also observed that some articles include what could be understood as conventional references to sex, in terms or phrases that form part of the convention in certain subfields. These types of uses seem intended to do the work of linking past and present research through use of the same terms, even if present work may not carry the biological and reproductive meanings that sex terms invoked in their initial uses. For example, the term “sex segregation” is still common to refer to what is also known as occupational gender segregation, as in the following passage from Charles and Bradley’s (2009) article discussed above in the explicit definitions segment: ”... our multivariate analyses reveal important discontinuities between developing/transitional and advanced industrial
societies in the process of generating this form of gender inequality, suggesting that
distinct sex segregation regimes may indeed operate in ‘materialist’ and ‘postmaterialist’
societies” (Charles and Bradley 2009:926). Numerous other articles contain references to
sex and sex terms that are not amenable to this interpretation and generally seem to be
used as identifiers. Many of these also appear in articles with gender analyses, as I show
below.

I begin with an example of the latter. “Connecting the Gendered Door: Women, Violence, and Doorwork” by Hobbs, O’Brien, and Westmarland (2007) offers both a sophisticated gender analysis of women who are bouncers and frequent use of sex terms. This article also contains an implicit derivative definition of gender, with citations of West and Zimmerman (1987) and West and Fenstermaker (1995) appearing close to the end of the article; these references appear in the second quotation below. The following two passages illustrate the authors’ gender analysis with simultaneous use of “female”:

Controlling and governing the ‘unruly behaviours’ of women customers in licensed venues (Day, Gough and McFadden 2003), represents an important gender specialist task, and as Claire reveals here, female staff are sought after by some venues to deal specifically with violent and aggressive women. We examine the gendered processes at play within this aspect of their role elsewhere (O’Brien, Hobbs and Westmarland 2007), but what is evident from Claire’s account here, is that the behaviours and control strategies of female bouncers can be regulated by the rules of masculine violent conduct . . . . Other women we have interviewed, however, appear to be challenging ‘normative’ gendered values and codes that underpin ‘violence work’ in licensed premises. (Hobbs, O’Brien, and Westmarland 2007:30)

And:

In our interviews female bouncers attached status and meaning to being labeled as tough, confident and competent violence experts. When they use violence in conflict situations they are in their terms ‘handling’ violence, and as we have illustrated in this paper, ‘violence work’ is a profoundly gendered form of social action, and females bouncers are ‘doing gender’ when they negotiate violence and aggression in the context of licensed venues. The hyper masculine environments
that these women occupy, nurtures the construction of a range of ‘alternative’
femininities (Messerschmidt 197; Miller 1998, 2001) confirming gender as
situated accomplishment (West and Fenstermaker 1994; West and Zimmerman
1987). (Hobbs et al. 2007:33)

The sex term “female” only appears once in each quotation, but is notable because of its
embeddedness in comments that otherwise indicate that the authors’ understanding that
gender is complex, multidimensional, and includes a social constructionist element. I
consider both uses to be identifiers, designed to indicate to the reader that the authors are
referring to women, but without intent to invoke biology, reproduction, or bodies. This
article also shows use of gender and sex terms in close proximity.

I also found some articles in my sample where sex and sex terms appeared only in
the methods section and no other place in the article, such as Cunningham’s (2008) work
about the relationship between gender ideology and housework allocation on women’s
employment over the course of their lives. Two quotations from his data section
describing the scale he uses to measure gender ideology demonstrate this use: “The items
are coded so that a high score represents lower levels of support for the male
breadwinner, female homeworker family model,” (Cunningham 2008:257) and “The
primary measure of the gendered division of labor assesses the relative participation of
husbands and wives in stereotypically female household tasks based on an ordinal
response scale . . .” (Cunningham 2008:257). The first passage could be understood as a
conventional reference to sex terms, discussed above, as the phrase “male breadwinner,
female homeworker” is often used in scholarship to describe this particular family
arrangement. Cunningham’s article also contains an implicit view of gender, as is
partially visible in a segment in the data section of his article that makes reference to
“female”: “The analyses presented to this point have documented the influences of
women’s gender attitudes and men’s participation in stereotypically female housework on the likelihood that women are employed, and these influences have been shown to operate over long periods of time” (Cunningham 2008:255). Along with the use of a gender ideology scale, the reference to “gender attitudes” suggests that the author understands gender to be a social structure or force that exists outside of the individual and includes some evaluation of appropriate workplace and household behavior for women and men.

Some articles in my general sociology sample included very frequent use of sex terms, such as Hall and Mogyorody’s (2007) article, “Organic Farming, Gender, and the Labor Process.” In this article gender is generally used to refer to women-and-men, although it also includes a quite buried implicit meaning of gender as an ideology in which women are accorded less agency and power than men. Several quotations illustrate all three of these observations:

When we disaggregate the responses and directly compare male and female respondents (in different operations), keeping in mind that this division was based on the self-definition of the ‘main operator,’ the female respondents with male partners were much more likely (64%) than male respondents with female partners (29%) to report that they shared the farm decision-making evenly, while the reported hours of farm work by females were more equivalent to the male contributions. (Hall and Mogyorody 2007:297)

And:

... when looking more directly at female involvement in farm production and decision-making, the findings have been less than promising. For example, Meares (1997) found a persistence in ‘classic’ gendered roles and responsibilities on the farm, in the household, and in the movement itself, with men continuing to dominate, whereas women remained as the less involved movement supporter, the occasional farm worker, and the major player in the household. She also notes that males and females looked at sustainable agriculture in different ways, with males retaining relatively conventional beliefs about the environment, which she argues is partly a reflection of the gendered production roles on the farm and in the movement. (Hall and Mogyorody 2007:291)
And:

A core argument regarding the impact of conventional productivist agriculture on gender relations is that increased farm sizes, specialization, mechanization, and commercialization have separated farm production from household reproduction and shifted women to the more marginalized farm support tasks such as bookkeeping, running errands, and making and transporting meals for their spouses . . . . (Hall and Mogyorody 2007:289)

These passages are worth quoting at length because they illustrate a common pattern of sex term use that I found in many articles in my sample: sex terms are used as identifiers with no discernible intent to appeal even implicitly to biological or reproductive meanings or differences between women and men. The second passage quoted above demonstrates the conflation of sex and gender terms, as the gender terms “women” and “men” are used to describe differences in farm roles and responsibilities in a sentence immediately preceding the use of the sex terms “female” and “male” to describe differences in views about sustainable agriculture. It seems unlikely that the topics in relation to which differences are being identified – farm roles and attitudes about sustainable agriculture – necessitate different gender descriptors. A more likely explanation is that these terms share the same meaning. Use of sex terms in all articles in which I found them is also always concurrent with at least a minimal use of gender as all of the articles in my general sociology sample have the term gender in the title and make some reference to it in the body of the article.

Finally, a last example of use of sex terms in the articles that make up my sociology of gender sample is “Gender in Academic Career Tracks: The Case of Korean Biochemists” (Park 2007). This article also contains frequent references to sex terms and a similar implicit analysis to the article discussed in the previous paragraph. Again, as in
almost all of the articles in this sample use sex terms do not appear to include the intentional invocation of. This article is notably different that most of the other that use sex terms because the use of sex terms “female” and “male” seems to be intended as an ostensibly objective reference in comparison with the subjective gender terms “woman/women” and “man/men.” For example, “A gender perspective suggests that institutionalized rules such as academic productivity, despite isomorphic pressures, affect male and female scientists differently” (Park 2007:455). Similarly: “Subsequent studies on academic productivity and rank advancement examined sex differences and demonstrated that female scientists published less and advanced more slowly than male scientists (Long, 1992; Long and Fox, 1995; Long et al., 1993; National Research Council, 2001; Xie and Shauman, 1998)” (Park 2007:454, original emphasis). Again, the use of the term “male” in the following quotation contrasts with the author’s use of “women”: “Compared with the male majority, women, as a group in the United states, experience a lesser chance of getting a full-time job with high prestige and professional recognition.” (Park 2007:453). While I emphasize that my idea that some authors use sex terms to achieve “objectivity” is only a theory, the quotations listed above give the sense that the author’s use of sex and gender terms are not interchangeable.

The examples in this section provide substantive demonstrations of the types of explicit definitions of gender, implicit definitions of gender, and uses of sex terms I found in the content analysis of my general sociology sample. I also sought to show the substantial variation in each of these categories as it is not captured in my quantitative results.
Sociology of Gender Sample Findings

The explicit definitions in my sociology of gender sample are often clear, sophisticated, and well representative of the empirical complexity of gender. This is also true to a degree of the explicit definitions in my general sociology sample but I found that it is the case to a greater extent than the most explicit gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample. This sample also includes explicit definitions that are less concise, as in my general sociology sample. These explicit definitions also vary in length and complexity as a whole but are overall more homogeneous in terms of being mostly derivative, particularly multiply derivative, compared to the explicit definitions in my general sociology sample. I begin with an example of a clear explicit definition from Meadow’s (2010) article about how the legal system produces and manages gender categories:

Gender is a fiction made real (Robson 1998). Despite copious evidence that a dichotomous sex/gender system (Rubin 1975) obscures the many ways human bodies exhibit both social and biological traits (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Preves 2002; Turner 1999), the law retains a rigidly dichotomous view of gender (Greenberg 1999, 2000; Greenberg and Herald 2005; Kirkland 2003). (Meadow 2010:817)

This definition both offers an overt view of gender and locates the meaning the author intends to use in relation to her topic of study. It is also multiply derivative, with different citations to support various parts of the definition.

One of the few examples of a less overt explicit definition can be found in in Kelly et al.’s article, “Gendered Challenge, Gendered Response: Confronting the Ideal Worker Norm in a White-Collar Organization” (2010). They:

... investigate an innovative initiative, the Results-Only Work Environment (ROWE), as implemented in the corporate headquarters of Best Buy, Inc. We ask two questions: How does this initiative attempt to challenge the ideal worker
norm, which gives primacy to paid work obligations over unpaid family care work? What do women’s and men’s responses reveal about the persistent ways that gender structures both work and family life? (Kelly et al. 2010:281-2)

I include an extended passage to show the authors’ full understanding of gender:

When feminist scholars talk about ‘gendered organizations’ (Acker 1990, 1992; Britton 2000; Ely and Meyerson 2000b), they note that most workplaces are organized as if paid work is the only, or at least the primary, responsibility of employees. White-collar workers – especially managers and professionals – are expected to work long hours, arrange their outside responsibilities around their paid work, and be willing to relocate or travel as requested (Bailyn 1993). These behaviors signal appropriate devotion to one’s work (Blair-Loy 2003) and are expected to continue throughout adulthood (Moen and Roehling 2005). These expectations, sometimes called the ‘ideal worker norm’ (J.C. Williams 2000) reinforce gender inequality in the workplace. Because of differences in men’s and women’s family work (Bianchi et al. 2000) as well as different cultural expectations of mothers and fathers (Hays 1996; Townsend 2002), women, and especially mothers, are less likely to follow the expected pattern of continuous, full-time employment (Hynes and Clarkberg 2005; Stone 2007). Women, and mothers in particular, are less likely to live up to these expectations and less likely to repeat the economic rewards associated with being an ideal worker. (Kelly et al. 2010:282-3)

I consider this an explicit definition because of the detailed explanation of the gender elements of workplaces as gendered organizations. Although it is not the only one of this type, the above definition is also notable for including so many different derivative sources.

I also found some explicit definitions in my sociology of gender sample that were shorter and more direct, as in Van Echtelt et al.’s (2009) view of gender, which is an organizational definition as well but takes a different, more direct form than the one immediately above. In examining whether post-Fordist production models “challenge or reproduce the male model of work,” (Van Echtelt et al. 2009:189) the authors offer a succinct, derivative definition of gender: “In the perspective of gendered organizations, ‘gender is a foundational element of organizational structure and work life’ (Britton
2000, 419)” (Van Echtelt et al. 2009:190). It is worth noting that while this definition is explicit it is not substantive as it does not state what it means for gender to be a foundational element of organizational structure.

As in my general sociology sample, this sample included many definitions of gender that cited or quoted West and Zimmerman’s (1987) theory of doing gender. I offer two examples of explicit definitions that do so, the first a less overt explicit definition and the second a more overt explicit definition. In “Undoing Gender,” Deutsch (2007) argues that:

It is time to put the spotlight squarely on the social processes that underlie resistance against conventional gender relations and on how successful change in the power dynamics and inequities between men and women can be accomplished. Namely, we need to shift talk about doing gender to illuminating how we can undo gender. My argument dovetails with those of other feminist theorists who articulate hopeful visions of change and the possibility of gender equality. Lorber’s (2005) notion of ‘degendering’ and Risman’s (1998) conception of ‘gender vertigo’ both speak to the dismantling of gender that will be discussed in this article. (Deutsch 2007:107)

I quote Deutsch’s conceptual agenda at length to show that she locates her work not only in the context of West and Zimmerman’s (1987) understanding of gender but also in relation to other gender scholars’ theories of gender. She defines gender more or less in the following passage: “. . . I propose that we adopt a new convention, namely, that we reserve the phrase ‘doing gender’ to refer to social interactions that reproduce gender difference and use the phrase ‘undoing gender’ to refer to social interactions that reduce gender difference” (Deutsch 2007:122). I count this as an explicit definition because of the explicit discussion of gender around what “doing gender” and “undoing gender” mean, with the recognition that the definition itself can be considered tautological because it uses the term gender to explain what gender itself is.
The second example of an article with an explicit definition that refers to West and Zimmerman’s (1987) theory of gender is also an example of a source with two explicit definitions. In her study of how gender beliefs shape what work means to Okinawan women Schultz (2006) explains:

A doing gender approach to studying women’s employment emphasizes the social construction of gender through work. According to the doing gender perspective, gender is not something that men and women ‘have,’ but rather something they ‘do’ (Foster 1999). Gender is created and redefined through interactions with others (West and Zimmerman 1987). Gender is ‘the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category’ (West and Zimmerman 1987:127). (Schultz 2006:385)

Compared to Deutsch’s (2007) use of West and Zimmerman’s (1987) key phrase “doing gender,” Schultz offers an account that is more detailed and precise, especially in her specific definition of gender that begins “gender is.” Her second explicit definition is of gender boundaries, which I include as an explicit definition because of the clarity of what gender means, under the same logic for classifying a gender definition as explicit that I used above in relation to gendered organizations/workplaces in Kelly et al.’s (2010) article. Schultz writes: “A gender boundary is anything that is used to differentiate men from women (Potuchek 1997). Gender boundaries are interrelated and can take many forms including spatial, occupational, and behavioral” (Schultz 2006:383). Both explicit definitions of gender in this article are derivative.

A final example of an explicit definition comes from Choo’s (2006) article titled “Gendered Modernity and Ethnicized Citizenship: North Korean Settlers in Contemporary South Korea.” This short, direct, derivative definition also occurs frequently in my sociology of gender sample. Here a definition of gender is included with a definition of ethnicity and can be presumed to have the same form as the latter
even if different content: “To explore the regime of incorporation for North Korean settlers in South Korea, I look at gender and ethnicity as ‘ongoing, methodical, and situated accomplishments’ that are experienced through interaction among social members (West and Fenstermaker 1995, 30)” (Choo 2006:580). This derivative definition includes a quotation from West and Fenstermaker’s (1995) article “Doing Difference” but no reference to West and Zimmerman’s (1987) more commonly cited work.

The implicit gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample also vary from straightforward to sophisticated. As in my general sociology sample most of the implicit definitions fall into one of two types. Gender is used to refer to women-and-men and to mean a social force or structure. I identified more uses of gender as references to a social force in this sample than in my general sociology sample, although many articles included both uses simultaneously. Because I used the same analytic categories to code the articles in both samples, I also differentiated between implicit definitions of gender and implicit understandings of gender in this sample. I coded in the former category when the implicit meaning of gender was clear and it was only used in this single way. I coded in the latter category when I saw that the covert meaning of gender was more substantive and/or complex.

One type of implicit definition I found is what I consider an “almost explicit” definition because the meaning of gender is evident but not entirely directly stated. An almost explicit meaning of gender generally goes beyond a strictly situationally specific understanding but does not explicitly link gender as a larger social phenomenon, however it might be defined, with the specific topic or instance under investigation. I found more
of these types of gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample than my general sociology sample. I give two examples of almost explicit definitions, the first derivative and the second the author’s own. First, in examining gender and volunteering in rural communities, Petrzelka and Mannon (2006) use West and Zimmerman’s (1987) “doing gender” to explain why rural women volunteer more than rural men:

By engaging in the helping work associated with volunteerism, then, women fulfill and reinforce existing gender roles. In the worlds of West and Zimmerman (1987), they ‘do gender.’ Thus, many of the women interviewed in this study contended that men did not volunteer because their time was taken up with paid work or because their time was too valuable to volunteer their labor . . .

(Petrzelka and Mannon 2006:245)

While West and Zimmerman’s (1987) well-known term is used to describe women’s volunteer work, the authors do not use it to define gender outside of their analysis of the topic they examine. Nonetheless the phrasing of the passage above, along with the direct quotation from a well-known sociology of gender source, push this implicit definition into the almost explicit category. A quotation that appears subsequently further demonstrates the authors’ use of gender: “Given the lack of resources in rural locales…communities often depend on volunteer efforts in [the] push for tourism. And like most volunteer efforts, these responsibilities commonly fall on the backs of women (Kaminer 1984; Wilson 1990). In part, this is due to the traditional gender division of labor in rural communities (Peter et al. 2000)” (Petrzelka and Mannon 2006:237).

A second example of an almost explicit definition appears in Vespa’s (2009) article, “Gender Ideology Construction: A Life Course and Intersectional Approach.” He gives an explicit definition of gender ideology, which comes close to an explicit definition of gender, although the meaning of gender itself remains implicit. This
definition expresses a general view of gender but without an explicit comment on how it connects with the life course, as can be seen in the following passages:

Although beliefs and attitudes are part of gender ideology, it is broader, encompassing a worldview that perpetuates gender inequality while justifying ‘natural’ or assumed arrangements. Thus, its construction is latent, making it difficult to empirically assess. We can examine dimensions of gender ideology though: For example, by gauging individual support for sharing equally behaviors or roles that are typically sex-typed, such as housework and economic provision. This individual support serves as a proxy for egalitarian ideology. Empirically, this is also easier to measure in survey data sets, such as the one this study uses. (Vespa 2009:364)

And: “. . . gender ideology construction is refined and relational. This finding may apply to gender more broadly. Scholars have conceptualized gender in many ways: as a role, structure, or identity. If gender ideology is dynamic and relational, then gender may be as well” (Vespa 2009:381). This quotation suggests that gender ideology produces, or is at least a precursor to, gender itself. In both quotations, gender can be understood to include a set of social arrangements which are subject to ideology and which involve expectations that differ for women and men. Because of the explicit meaning of gender ideology, I categorized this article to contain an almost implicit understanding of gender; it is also non-derivative.

The following article also demonstrates an implicit understanding of gender but one that is not as overt as the latter two definitions above; I coded it as implicit and not as almost explicit. In “Trading on Heterosexuality: College Women’s Gender Strategies and Homophobia” Hamilton (2007) suggests “that heterosexual women may display homophobia against lesbians as they negotiate status in a gender-inegalitarian erotic market” (Hamilton 2007:146). Her implicit view of gender seems to include a set of normative expectations at the micro level connected to a hierarchical power structure at
the macro level. This power structure appears to include sexuality so that those heterosexual women who use accepted gender strategies gain power over lesbians who generally do not use such strategies. In the passages below the author defines gender strategy and describes the relationship between hegemonic masculinity/femininity and heteronormativity, respectively:

A gender strategy is a course of action that attempts to solve a problem using the cultural concepts of gender available to the individual (Handler 1995; Hochschild 1989). Gender strategies are thus both cognitive and behavioral. They are not, however, always reflexive. In interaction, decisions and actions often occur quickly and nonreflexively. Women may fall into well-established patterns of behavior that pull from available cultural definitions of femininity and masculinity. Consequently, they can engage in gender strategies without awareness of the gendered aspects of their actions (P. Y. Martin 2003). (Hamilton 2007:147)

And:

Depending on the rules governing a particular social field, some gender presentations will garner more social rewards than others will (McCall 1992). As Connell (1995) notes, while political, cultural, and economic practices benefit hegemonic masculinity, they subordinate masculinities that eschew heteronormativity. Many of these practices similarly disadvantage women. However, femininities that conform to heteronormative ideals of feminine charm and beauty can operate as a form of embodied cultural capital (McCall 1992). (Hamilton 2007:147)

The implicit understanding of gender here is also multiply derivative, as is the case for many of the articles in this sample. I categorized this view of gender as implicit rather than explicit because it does not express what gender is, even though the quotations above show that it explains what gender does and how it works. This example does a good job of showing the difficulty I sometimes encountered in placing definitions of gender into explicit or implicit categories. Once I had established my analytic categories, coded several articles using them, and tweaked them accordingly, I continued to code all additional articles within these conventions. Overall this practice worked well, although I
found some articles like the one discussed in this paragraph that did not fit easily in any category. Its placement in the implicit definition category follows the same coding of similar articles though with less explicit discussion of the operation of gender.

A final example of an implicit definition of gender comes from King’s (2008) article, “Generic Womanhood: Gendered Depictions of Cop Action Cinema.” I classified the implicit view of gender in this article as an implicit definition of gender, rather than an implicit understanding. King “tests hypotheses about depictions of women working men’s jobs and frames the patterns as responses, on the part of Hollywood filmmakers, to a gendered labor market” (2008:238). In his use, gender means women-and-men and differences-between-women-and-men, as the following passages demonstrate: “Much of the reported gender difference in characterization manifests in demeanor. For instance, Rafter (2006, 120, 127) observes that men in cop movies indulge in tough talk and gallows humor, whereas women comport themselves with less insult to others” (King 2008:242) and “Because so few films star women, I impose a standard for substantive significance such that the differences in proportion between men and women in any given category of a variable must exceed 10 percent to be notable. (In effect, this means that two more or fewer films starring women would have to fit a particular pattern for a notable gender difference to appear or disappear)” (King 2008:246). Although this article includes some gender analysis, as the first quotation hints, the use of gender itself is limited to standing in for women-and-men.

As in my general sociology sample, I found many articles that made references to sex and sex terms. Again, these uses seemed overwhelmingly intended to identify rather than to invoke biological or reproductive essentialism. I offer several examples that show
the use of sex terms in the articles in my sociology of gender sample. My first example, Anderson’s (2007) “Who Gets Out?: Gender as Structure and the Dissolution of Violent Heterosexual Relationships,” is notable because of the explanation she gives for the relationship between sex and gender and her subsequent use of sex terms. The first quotation below describes the former:

> The symmetry studies [of domestic violence] reflect a distinct and limited view of gender as sex difference. That is, this research proposes that gender is salient only where women and men behave differently – where sex emerges as a statistically significant independent variable. The idea that gender matters only where there are significant differences between women and men largely misses the point that gender is multifaceted – an identity, a performance, and a basis for structural organization (Risman 1998, 2004). (Anderson 2007:174-5)

This passage seems to define sex as “significant differences between women and men” and gender as a “multifaceted” social construction. The following quotations show some of the ways Anderson goes on to use sex terms: “... feminist theories of the connection between gender and partner violence explain that social structures legitimize and fail to prevent men’s violence against female partners ...” (Anderson 2007:175), “The danger of his approach is that it also implies an individualistic approach to gender, initially focusing on sex differences in violent perpetration to define types of violence (Johnson 1995),” (Anderson 2007:176), and:

> The battering literature has explored the internal and external catalysts for leaving violent relationships, but this literature has focused solely on women’s experiences of getting out and has thus been unable to assess whether male victims of partner assault encounter similar barriers to leaving a violent relationship. (Anderson 2007:178)

Although it seems that the author wants to differentiate sex and gender, and does so in the first passage quoted above, the subsequently quoted passages show that her use of the sex terms “female” and “male” after this do not necessarily follow it. It is not clear why sex
and gender terms are used together and seemingly without a sex- or gender-based logic, as in sentences that combined the terms “women” and “male,” and “men” and “female.” This article included perhaps the most confusing combination of implicit and explicit uses of sex and sex terms.

I also observed a different type of use of sex terms, as in England’s (2010) article, “The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled” in which she seeks to understand why some groups and areas of life in the “gender system” have seen change much more than others. The article contains passages where sex and sex terms are used self-consciously because they coincide with a very sophisticated gender analysis, albeit including an implicit definition of gender. I speculate that the use of sex and sex terms may be motivated by a desire to acknowledge that the general social belief in gender essentialism creates, for example, “sex segregated” rather than “gender segregated” jobs, although the article itself does not indicate whether this is England’s motivation. By this interpretation England uses “sex” intentionally to demonstrate her view that jobs are segregated because of social norms that attribute the clustering of women and men in different occupations to persistent beliefs their differing natural affinities, although I reiterate that this analysis is speculative. Some examples of England’s use of sex and sex terms are: “I will argue that there has been little cultural or institutional change in the devaluation of traditionally female activities and jobs, and as a result, women have had more incentive than men to move into gender-nontraditional activities and positions,” (England 2010:150) and “One form the devaluation of traditionally female activities takes is the failure to treat childrearing as a public good and support those who do it with state payments . . . . Without this, women doing child rearing are reliant on the employment of
male partners (if present) or their own employment” (England 2010:151). A final example that may indicate self-conscious use of sex terms in a way that may indicate self-conscious can be found in the following passage: “The devaluation of and underpayment of predominantly female occupations is an important institutional reality that provides incentives for both men and women to choose ‘male’ over ‘female’ occupations and the fields of study that lead to them” (England 2010:153). The use of quotations for the terms male and female implies that England intends them to demonstrate the fact that non-scholarly understanding of occupational gender segregation attributes it to the biological and reproductive differences that non-scholarly use of sex terms references. This article includes very frequent use of sex terms, notable particularly because it also includes – as the quotations above suggest – a strong and overt gender analysis.

Perhaps the most common type of use of sex terms I saw was as identifiers, not integrated into a gender analysis, not defined, and not intended to refer to biological or reproductive essentialism. This is the case in Kmec, McDonald, and Trimble’s (2010) article “Making Gender Fit and ‘Correcting’ Gender Misfits: Sex Segregated Employment and the Nonsearch Process.” This article is notable because it includes both gender and sex in the title. The authors examine the degree to which individuals’ use of informal social networks to find jobs contributes to “work-group gender segregation” (Kmec, Mcdonald, and Trimble 2010:214). The following passages show typical uses of sex and sex terms, some likely conventional and others used as identifiers: “First, to what extent does nonsearching affect workers’ movement into gender-typical work groups (i.e., sex segregation)? Second, does the effect of nonsearching on sex segregation
depend on the sex composition of one’s work group of origin?” (Kmec et al. 2010:215), and:

Just as nonsearching may result in gender-typical employment because job informants want their recruits to be a good gender fit’ with their job, job informants may have an incentive to share job information when they want to ‘correct’ a gender misfit. The combination of a workers’ sex and the sex composition of his or her work group of origin are the main factors in determining a misfit. (Kmec et al. 2010:2010:216)

It may be the case that the authors use sex and sex terms in a self-conscious way, to indicate that beliefs about sex lead to gender segregation in occupation. This is the same type of use I speculatively identified above in England’s (2010) article.

My final example of use of sex and sex terms shows their use only in the article’s methods section, a pattern that was also replicated in other articles. In “Gender, Self-Employment, and Earnings: The Interlocking Structures of Family and Professional Status” Budig (2006) asks “. . . is the impact of self-employment on earnings the same for women and men? If returns do differ by gender, what mechanisms explain this difference?” (2006:726). Sex terms are used as identifiers in her discussion of data and methods, some likely in a conventional way. The following use is likely motivated by convention: “Using three-digit occupational and industrial census codes, I calculate the percentage female in each detailed occupation-by-industry combination from 1990 census data (U.S. Bureau of Census 1993)” (Budig 2006:734-5). The following quotations show uses of sex terms and gender in close proximity where sex term use may also be explained by the fact of the author following general convention among those who write about the same topic:

I include dummy variables for 11 industrial-sector categories (with agriculture, forestry, and fishing as the reference category). A detailed control variable for occupational gender segregation is also included. The percentage female in the
respondent’s job is calculated from 1990 census data. It is the percentage female in the cell formed by cross-tabulation census detailed (three-digit) occupation with detailed industry. (Budig 2006:736)

And:

In results not shown, I tested for interactions among the percentage female of one’s job, gender, and self-employment. Among professionals, the influence of gender segregation does not vary by self-employment status or by gender. However, among nonprofessionals, gender segregation does affect returns to self-employment differently by gender. For every 10 percent increase in the percentage female of one’s job, the return to self-employment for women in nonprofessional occupations decreases by 4 percent. (Budig 2006:747)

In all of these passages the use of sex terms could be interpreted as an invocation of objectivity, distinct from the use of gender terms, although this observation is speculative.

The examples I provide in this section to report the qualitative results of the content analysis of my sociology of gender sample demonstrate types of explicit and implicit definitions of gender and uses of sex and sex terms. In providing several examples of each type, I show the significant variation I found in each category. This is not captured in my quantitative findings, and provides further support for limiting quantitatively calculated results.
Chapter 5: Analysis of General Sociology and Sociology of Gender Samples Content Analyses

Introduction

In this chapter I analyze the results of the content analyses of my general sociology sample and sociology of gender samples. I offer interpretive analyses of my findings, seeking to situate and explain my results in relation first to the cumulative insights of sociology of gender and gender theory, and second to the concepts-related queries I developed in Chapter 2. In part these comments look towards the idea of gender reduction proposed in my Introduction. In both accounts I discuss the dearth of explicit definitions and the high proportion of implicit definitions in my samples. I also seek to explain the significant number of articles that include references to sex or sex terms.

First, I provide a gender-based analysis of the shared results of both my general sociology and sociology of gender samples, followed by a shorter comparative section. I then offer concepts-based analyses of my general sociology sample and sociology of gender sample separately, in relation to the distinct sets of empirical expectations I outlined at the end of Chapter 2.

The first, gender-based account uses the sociological gender literature and gender theory to explain these results in terms of the empirical taken-for-granted character of gender (Kessler and McKenna 1978; Salzinger 2003), gender as a framing device (Ridgeway 2011), and the limitations of the single term gender to refer to such a wide variety of phenomena both empirically and theoretically. My comparative gender-based analysis focuses on the differences between my samples. I seek to explain the factors contributing to low proportions of explicit definition, high proportions of implicit definition, and frequent use of sex and sex terms between my samples. I consider
explanations for the differences I found, especially those of proportion of explicit
definitions and derivative definitions in each sample as these were measures on which I
found large gaps between samples. This account centers on the broad and overt mission
of sociologists of gender to conceptualize gender accurately and fully. The second
account uses the methods-focused concepts literature to consider the role self-conscious
conceptualization has and might play in gender definition in sociology. I also outline a
set of minimal evaluative criteria for conceptual definitions of gender that emerges from
the concepts analysis of both my general sociology and sociology of gender samples.

Gender-Based Analysis of General Sociology and Sociology of Gender Samples

In this section I seek to explain my main findings in my general sociology and
sociology of gender samples using the sociological gender literature and gender theory.
Although I include a comparative analysis below, I offer a single gender-based analysis
for the major findings in both samples because perhaps my most notable result is the lack
of difference between them. I expected to find much higher proportions of explicit
definitions of gender and fewer references to sex terms in the articles in my sociology of
gender sample than I did. I especially anticipated this outcome because all articles in my
sociology of gender sample are published in Gender & Society, which is arguably the
premier site of this subfield’s scholarly institutionalization. While I did observe a
greater rate of explicit definition and a lower rate of use of sex terms in my sociology of
gender sample, the general pattern of relatively few articles with explicit definitions and
relatively many articles that made reference to sex terms prevailed across both samples.

In both this section and the concepts-based analysis section that follows, I
interpret my overall findings in general terms. My comments reflect my cumulative
insights from coding dozens of articles rather than the result of making only one or two observations. This section focuses on the lack of explicit definitions and the high proportion of implicit definitions in my samples, the large percentage point gaps between explicit and implicit derivative definitions of gender, and the significant numbers of articles that include reference to sex or sex terms. My analysis identifies three explanations: the empirical character of gender, particularly its taken-for-grantedness; the way both previous work on gender and ideas and assumptions about gender frame scholars’ understandings of gender; and the challenge gender scholars face in having only one term to refer to a wide variety of qualitatively different entities and processes.

In general, I do not believe that the most accurate or useful interpretation of my results is the conclusion that sociologists who write about gender do not know what they mean by it. Rather, I seek explanations that speak to the particularities of gender scholarship as a unique area of research and literature and the specific challenges that gender scholars face. The low proportion of explicit definition of gender in both my samples, despite variation between them that I discuss more below, suggests that my findings result from a feature of the sociological study of gender itself rather than from a lack of specialization among sociologists who study gender.

Analysis of Common Findings in Both Samples

Gender is a pervasive, variable, and embedded set of social phenomena (Gerson 2002, 2005; Gerson and Peiss 1985; Lorber 1994; Meadow 2010; Salzinger 2003; see the Introduction for an account of the many ways gender has been conceptualized). One compelling explanation for my findings is that gender’s empirical complexity, particularly its taken-for-grantedness, overwhelms gender scholars’ ability to define it
explicitly. Even though sociologists are generally trained to document and explain precisely what the layperson might not otherwise see, it may be that gender is so fully embedded in social life that it escapes even scholarly attempts at explicit definition. As my examples above of articles analyzing gender show, gender scholars are able to provide a gender analysis without also providing an explicit definition. This pattern of gender analysis in the absence of an explicit definition of gender implies that while scholars may be overwhelmed by defining gender explicitly, they are not unaware of the complexity of its meaning(s). The challenge of definition thus appears to be in articulation rather than comprehension. By this account, it is the reality of what gender is and how it operates in the social world that makes it particularly difficult for sociologists to define it explicitly in their work.

Salzinger’s (2003) account of the gendering of factory workers in Mexico documents an example of precisely how gender can operate implicitly in a way that is mirrored in the scholarship that describes it. In relating the gendering process for Mexican women and men workers in the maquiladoras, Salzinger observes that her understanding of gender-neutral dress on the factory floor as a mechanism of degendering workers was incorrect. She argues instead that the subtle way that gender as a social structural force operates at first blinded her to the process of differentiation, and subsequent inequality, among women and men workers in production roles in the factory. Rather than concluding that the factory floor is a site where gender is deemphasized, she argues the very opposite: gender(ed) processes prevail, although in ways that make it almost impossible for them to be challenged – and even identified.
I suggest that a similar dynamic is at work in scholarship about gender in the field of sociology and in the subfield of gender. The subtlety of the way gender operates makes it difficult to see and this difficulty may manifest itself in the dearth of explicit definition in the sociology literature. The process Salzinger describes might also be understood as the empirical “unmarking” (Shapiro 1982) of gender as a meaningful and consequential social category. As the unmarked in social life, gender seems to have become similarly unmarked in sociological scholarship. Again, the presence of gender analyses in articles with no explicit definition indicates that gender has not disappeared as a subject of scholarly analysis but rather seems to have generally – although not entirely, as more than one in ten of the articles in my sample include explicit definitions of gender – become explicitly unmarked. Gender’s embeddedness and taken-for-granted character in the empirical social world may be reflected in sociological literature in the form of few explicit definitions of gender.

Of course the proposition that gender is complex, paradoxical (Lorber 1994), and taken-for-granted is not new. I add to this very important observation that these features of gender as a set of real-world entities and processes make it difficult for even scholars to articulate them fully. I propose that only 12% of my general sociology sample and 26.5% of my sociology of gender sample include explicit definitions of gender because offering a comprehensive explicit definition of gender, even if bounded by the context of the scholar’s research, is truly a challenge. The fact that not a single article in either sample identified defining, conceptualizing, or explaining gender as challenging, confounding, or difficult further supports my argument that the empirical character of gender contributes to its explicit invisibility in scholarship. If gender as an empirical
phenomenon were more obvious to scholars, it makes sense that they might be able to express its subtleties more overtly.

I further explain the low proportion of explicit definitions of gender in my samples by extending Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) insightful and comprehensive argument about gender’s taken-for-granted character to sociological scholars of gender. Kessler and McKenna use Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodological framework to explain why individuals see gender as a natural fact rather than an artifact of social life. They argue that gender is a social construction in the most basic sense, divorced from biological and morphological differences because individuals attribute gender based on assumption rather than examination of genitalia. Gender, they contend, is a function of the natural attitude, or the commonsense view that both allows people to assimilate otherwise strange phenomena into normality and makes natural what is otherwise evidently social. Gender here is twofold: the naturalized, taken-for-granted outcome of social processes and the cultural norms and beliefs that produce a “two, and only two” (Kessler and McKenna 1978:3) system. Although Kessler and McKenna seek to explain the persistence of gender understood as a biological phenomenon among non-scholar individuals, even gender scholars are not immune from the natural attitude. It seems clear that their sociological training provides an analytic perspective that makes gender’s taken-for-grantedness more evident to sociologists who write about gender than they would be to a non-scholar. Yet it may still be the case that the natural attitude impacts sociological gender scholars in terms of the degree to which gender is explicitly defined in their work.
The proposal that gender is infrequently defined explicitly because of the empirical character of gender(ed) phenomena can also explain the relatively low proportion of derivative definitions of gender in my general sociology sample, although not my sociology of gender sample, and the large proportion of articles in both samples that include references to sex or sex terms. Scholars are unlikely to seek out explicit definitions of gender in other scholarly sources to cite or quote if they do not identify a need for an explicit definition. Again, my finding that sophisticated, insightful gender analyses often coexist with implicit, rather than explicit, definitions of gender suggests that the natural attitude operates among gender scholars at least insofar as defining gender explicitly is not taken as an essential task in service of such an analysis.

Further, the frequent use of sex and sex terms in the articles in both samples may also be the result of the complexity and taken-for-grantedness of gender. An explicit definition of gender in any article may preclude or diminish the use of sex terms by identifying gender – as it is typically understood in a sociological context – as an overtly social and/or cultural phenomenon. It is also possible that the taken-for-granted understanding of gender to include the naturalness of “female” or “male” as the most basic, essential way to identify an individual (Kessler and McKenna 1978) prevails sufficiently to enter into sociological gender scholarship. As virtually none of the references to sex and sex terms seemed intended to invoke biological or reproductive essentialism, it seems unlikely that sociological scholars use sex terms to invoke this meaning. Nonetheless the substantial proportions of my samples that included use of sex and/or sex terms suggest that they are taken to be compatible with a social constructionist
understanding of gender. As I note in the conclusions, this seeming contradiction should be further examined in future research.

My findings can also be explained by applying Ridgeway’s (2011) idea of framing to gender definition in sociology. In seeking to describe how gender inequality persists in the modern world, as the subtitle of her book states, Ridgeway proposes that gender acts as a frame, or “basic tool for organizing social relations” (Ridgeway 2011:7). She argues that:

. . . the use of gender as a framing device spreads gendered meanings, including assumptions about inequality embedded in those meanings, to all spheres of social life that are carried out through social relationships. Through gender’s role in organizing social relations . . . gender inequality in rewritten into new economic and social arrangements as they emerge, preserving their inequality in modified form over socioeconomic transformations. (Ridgeway 2011:7)

I suggest several ways that this idea of framing may be applied to understanding my findings. First, scholars’ approaches to gender are framed by previously published articles about gender that do not contain explicit definitions and that contain frequent use of sex terms. These bring to current scholars’ work a frame in which explicit definitions are relatively rare and use of sex terms is common, and they thus tend to reproduce this same form. Similar to the way Ridgeway notes that gender inequality is not reproduced perfectly by the use of gender as a framing device because social contexts vary across time and place, the frame of gender definition that scholars bring to their work does not exactly replicate the same pattern. The variety of types of implicit definitions in my samples demonstrates this. Still, even as gender scholars in sociology may have new ideas for defining or explaining gender in their work, they are inadvertently limited by the way gender has been defined and discussed in previous scholarly work.
Second, the idea of framing also explains the plethora of references to West and Zimmerman’s (1987) “doing gender” theory of gender in both explicit and implicit definitions in the articles in my samples. Although the derivative definitions in this sample include references to a wide variety of sources, citation and quotation of West and Zimmerman’s (1987) work is most common. Perhaps because the complexity of the original theory is often misunderstood or underestimated (Connell 2010), on its face “doing gender” is an accessible account of how gender norms and inequality are reproduced in interaction. Much of its use suggests that “doing gender” frames scholars’ understanding of gender independently of the phenomena or cases they examine, perhaps in a way that oversimplifies and/or distorts the gender(ed) observations being made. While my point here is very speculative, I suggest that “doing gender” frames many of the definitions of gender in the articles in my samples, especially implicit understandings, with the result that the many qualitatively different elements of the set of empirical phenomena that make up gender are shoehorned into a single form and meaning. Scholars’ ability to capture gender’s empirical complexity may be further compromised by this particular framing.

Ridgeway’s (2011) understanding of framing also applies to the possibility, discussed above, that gender itself as a set of empirical phenomena frames how scholars see and analyze it. To reiterate, I argued that gender’s taken-for-granted character and the unavoidability of the natural attitude even for gender scholars make it particularly hard to define explicitly and even to see that explicit definition might be beneficial. Here I propose that this contention can also be understood in terms of gender itself forming a
frame that shapes the breadth of the analytic eye that scholars (can) bring with them to its study.

A third possible interpretation of my results is that scholars are literally restricted in their ability to define gender explicitly, whether they desire to or not, because of the limitations of the available language to describe it. Gender is a single term that refers to many different phenomena; my brief review in the Introduction shows the multiple ways gender has been understood and conceptualized. Although this may seem like an obvious observation, the availability of a sufficient number of terms to describe social phenomena matters to scholars’ ability to do so. The term gender carries many meanings even in very specific or limited contexts. These built-in confines may be embedded in the way scholars use gender.

An extension of this argument can account for the frequent use of sex terms in my samples. Scholars who write about women and men have only “woman/women” and “man/men” to describe their subjects. Rather than repeating these terms endlessly, some scholars seem to have chosen to substitute “female” and “male” for variety in language. This theory also explains why almost none of the references to sex and sex terms in my samples seem intended to invoke a biological or reproductive essentialism, as well as why sex terms are often interspersed with the gender terms “women” and “men.” Sex terms seem to have become more or less de facto identification terms with the same status as gender terms. This is especially striking because of the overall mandate of sociology as a field to account for social life in social rather than biological terms.

Last, I speak to the large percentage point gap between explicit and implicit derivative definitions of gender. I discuss the difference in overall rates of derivative
definition between my samples in the comparative section below. At just over 52 percentage points for my general sociology sample – and smaller though still notable at just over 29 percentage points for my sociology of gender sample – the explicit definitions in both samples were much more likely to be derivative of another source than the implicit definitions. Scholars who offer explicit definitions may opt to cite or quote other scholars’ explicit definitions in an effort to give a more sophisticated definition than they would otherwise be able to themselves. It could also be the case that the 12% of my general sociology sample and 26.5% of my sociology of gender sample including an explicit definition of gender represent a minority set of sociologists who study gender and are, for a number of possible reasons, more able to “see” gender in the empirical social world than others. They might be more likely to provide derivative definitions in recognition of the value of other gender scholars’ work in explicating their own scholarly contributions. While the aforementioned suggestions are only theories, it makes intuitive sense that articles offering explicit definitions are more likely to include a derivative definition than those with implicit definitions both because they strive for clarity in explaining gender and because they seek to locate their work in relation to other gender scholars’ contributions.

In response to whether the explanations I have presented here suggest evidence for gender reduction, the answer is both yes and no. The lack of explicit definition in my sample could be read as evidence that, on the whole, sociological scholars’ conceptual or analytical understanding of gender is compromised. Subsequently, their ability to capture and analyze the full of variety of the empirical phenomena that make up gender is also limited. This conclusion is further supported by the low proportions of explicit
definitions in both samples as it provides strong support that the potential of gender analysis is reduced in bodies of work that cannot overtly define its central subject.

Alternately, taken together these explanations suggest that gender scholars are legitimately, perhaps even unavoidably, hamstrung in their efforts to explicate gender fully. The empirical workings of gender hide it even from many of the scholars who look directly at it, leading to a replication of its embedded, pervasive, taken-for-granted character in the literature that addresses it. By this account gender reduction is not entirely supported in either my general sociology sample or my sociology of gender sample. Nonetheless, gender remains largely undefined explicitly and it seems unavoidable that this fact reduces its analytical complexity, as I argue in my conclusions.

Comparative Analysis of Differing Findings Between Samples

Here I discuss the main differences between my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample. These are: the higher proportion of explicit definition, derivative definition overall, and derivative implicit definition, and the lower proportion of references to sex and sex terms in my sociology of gender sample compared to my general sociology sample. Given that the sociology of gender as a subfield is directly focused on the study of gender, it is not surprising that I found more than double the rate of explicit definitions in this sample compared to my general sociology sample. This may be the case because sociologists who seek to publish in this area, and particularly in the journal Gender & Society from which all of the articles in my sociology of gender sample are drawn, are more attuned to gender’s taken-for-granted character than sociologists who publish about gender but outside of the subfield. The latter may result from a more focused dialogue within a smaller community of scholars. Yet my results
also show substantial variation in explicit definitions in my sociology of gender sample, especially in terms of their quality. Overall I would characterize the explicit definitions in this sample to be more detailed and comprehensive than those in my general sociology sample, in part because they are more likely to cite or quote another more gender-focused source, although this conclusion should be taken with caution due to the aforementioned variation.

Both the higher proportion of derivative definitions overall and the higher proportion of derivative implicit definitions in my sociology of gender sample compared to my general sociology sample can be similarly explained by the subfield’s attention to gender as a central problematic. Both may be an artifact of gender scholars’ greater attention to sociological gender literature as this is the subfield in which they work. It makes sense that sociologists who publish in either general sociology journals or journals in other sociological subfields may offer more cited and quoted definitions of the key concepts in those subfields. Similar to the way those who publish within the sociology of gender tend to cite and quote understandings of gender, it may be that scholars working in other subfields, such as sociology of race and ethnicity, medical sociology, social psychology, cognitive sociology, and sociology of science, cite and quote understandings of the key terms in their own areas of research.

Although the high rate of references to sex and sex terms is notable in both samples, the fact that over half of the articles in my sociology of gender sample include sex terms is especially intriguing. This finding provides additional evidence that sex and sex terms are devoid of biological or reproductive meaning, as I expect that sociologists publishing in the gender-focused subfield would be most attentive to the possibility that
using the term “female” and “male” especially invokes an essentialist understanding. These forms appear to have become de facto identifiers, often appearing in place of the gender terms “woman/women” and “man/men.” The lower proportion of such references in my sociology of gender sample does imply that overall sociologists of gender have a narrower reading of gender that does not include any unselfconscious references to sex or sex terms, even though it seems this is true in a minority of cases. The very presence of sex terms used unselfconsciously in sociology of gender sources begs the question of what gender means sociologically if writing about gender seems not to preclude using sex terms in this way.

Here I conclude that my results can be interpreted in support of gender reduction. I have suggested the term gender reduction to refer to describe the limiting or reducing or gender’s empirical complexity in scholarship by the way it is, or is not, defined in sociological sources about gender. To argue that my findings indicate that gender reduction is prevalent in the field of sociology and the subfield of sociology of gender, I point to the low rates of explicit gender definition and high rates of reference to sex and sex terms across my samples. Together these results warrant the supposition that scholars’ ability to capture and analyze the full variety of gender as a set of empirical phenomena is limited by lack of clear, explicit conceptual definition. The differences between my general sociology and sociology of gender samples are insufficient to claim that scholars who publish in the gender-focused subfield make up for the absence of explicit definition in the field of sociology as a whole.

Taken together, the differences between my samples also suggest that the articles in my sociology of gender sample show greater awareness of the complexity of gender
and what I might call a greater interest in gender conceptually. I especially take the large disparity in the rates of derivative implicit definition between my samples as an indication that gender scholars who publish in a specialty gender journal are oriented towards accounting for gender’s complexity in ways that those who publish in general sociology journals and journals in other sociological subfields are not. As posited previously, the subfield of sociology of gender could be characterized as interrogating the conceptualization of gender as its central purpose. Those who work within it tend to adopt this intellectual commitment, which can be demonstrated by the differences in the findings between my two samples. On the whole I was surprised not by the differences in my results but by the fact that the differences were not larger. While I believe that sociology of gender can be accurately understood as a subfield that takes gender as its central problematic, my results also suggest that gender is literally overlooked—looked over—in any area of sociology where it is studied.

Concepts-Based Analysis

In this section I use the questions developed in the course of my review of the concepts literature presented in Chapter 2 to interrogate scholars’ definitions of gender in my two samples. Looking at gender definition in the context of conceptualization offers a new perspective from which to think about both how scholars who study gender define it, or do not define it, as a concept and how gender definition might benefit from a self-consciously concepts oriented approach. I analyze my general sociology and sociology of gender samples separately because I laid out distinct empirical expectations for each sample at the end of Chapter 2. While I make comparative comments particularly in my discussion of the sociology of gender sample as it appears after my discussion of the
general sociology sample, I consider each query and evaluate my empirical expectations for each one distinctly for each sample.

I begin by stating overall conclusions. In general I find that sociologists who research and write about gender do not do so overtly in relation to concepts considerations. This is evident both from the small proportion of instances of explicitly defined gender concepts in both samples and from the complete lack of mention in the articles in my sample to definitions of gender as concepts or to conceptualization of gender as an explicit or self-conscious process. This does not mean that the definitions in my general sociology sample cannot be considered as conceptual definitions as indeed, I do so below for both explicit and implicit definitions of gender.

I contend that a concepts framework could be a worthwhile resource for gender scholars to facilitate perhaps more useful explicit definitions of gender. These may benefit gender scholarship by aiding researchers in their efforts to explore and capture the many-faceted empirical phenomena of gender. A concepts framework can complement the valuable work of gender scholars in several ways by addressing precisely the challenges to gender definition that they encounter. This includes the aid of providing additional tools to elucidate the empirical pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness of gender, along with the possibility of developing a broader language around gender analysis in sociology to match the empirical diversity of gender(ed) phenomena.

*Concepts Analysis of General Sociology Sample*

As expected, I found fewer explicit definitions in my general sociology sample (12%) than in my sociology of gender sample (26.5%). Given that the sociology of gender as a subfield could be taken to be devoted to the conceptualization of gender, as
previously noted, this finding is unsurprising. Also as I expected, I did not find any definitions in my general sociology sample that I would identify as methods-based by the definition I gave Chapter 2. However I was incorrect that I would find predominantly cognitive definitions in which gender is understood as a mental entity or the image that comes to mind upon its reference. Rather, in the articles in my general sociology sample the term gender is understood mostly commonly, both explicitly and implicitly, to mean two things: women-and-men and a-social-force. These understandings do not easily fall into any of the methods-based, cognitive, or philosophical types of concepts, although gender used to mean women-and-men might be considered a type of cognitive concept for both explicit and implicit uses. Gender used to mean a-social-force most closely aligns with a methods-based understanding of the concept and, when explicit, could be considered methods-based depending on how it is explained and used.

I also found no conceptual definitions of gender in this sample that show an understanding of the ladder of abstraction, in which more abstract concepts “cover” a greater number of empirical instances and more specific concepts are limited to explaining a smaller number of empirical instances. This conclusion follows from the abovementioned observation that my sample is void of references to conceptualization as a self-conscious process as well as to defining gender as particularly conceptual. Perhaps because of the lack of awareness or acknowledgement of understanding the ladder of abstraction as an important principle of concept formation, I saw many instances of conceptual stretching in my general sociology sample. Conceptual stretching occurs when the set of real-world phenomena explained by the concept of gender is “too big” for
the concept, thus making the conceptual definition useless to link empirical instances with theory.

In the case of gender, it may be that conceptual stretching in unavoidable because of the immense empirical variation and large terrain that gender includes. It might not be possible for scholars to capture gender entirely in a concept because of its empirical embedded and taken-for-granted character, as I argued above. Nevertheless, from the perspective of conceptualization one way to make sense of the pattern of explicit and implicit definition of gender I found is as an instance of conceptual stretching. I found, as predicted, many articles without explicit definitions but that included sophisticated implicit definitions and gender analyses. The gender concept is already outstripped by the empirical instances it might explain because, it could be argued, there is no concept at all. It follows that theories of gender may not develop logically because there are so few gender concepts that are actually linked to empirical gender phenomena. Although gender scholars produce insights intended to further conceptual understanding of gender, the possibilities for knowledge accumulation in sociological gender scholarship are uneven and limited as a result of the dearth of explicit gender definitions.

Contrary to my expectations, I found that gender is not an essentially contested concept. Overall, most or even all of the gender definitions, both explicit and implicit, that I found in this sample are compatible with one another. They apply to different gender(ed) phenomena and are intended to explain gender at different levels of analysis but taken together do not suggest that gender is conceptualized in ways that fundamentally conflict with one another. I expected to find essential contestation among the gender definitions because I thought different scholars would disagree over particular
aspects of gender as essential to its characterization or understanding. Instead I found a much less centralized set of conceptualizations. While many scholars cite other scholars’ views of gender, these derivative accounts are not overtly discussed or contested as accounts of gender in the articles in my sample. This can be explained in part by the large expanse covered by the field of sociology of gender. It also appears that sociologists who study gender generally cite and quote the sources that serve them best and ignore the ones that do not apply. This approach seems to follow the typical pattern of use of others’ scholarly work in one’s own, including in this dissertation; it might be noted that such an arrangement, whether self-consciously supported by fields and disciplines or not, perhaps makes conceptual development slower, more scattered, and less cumulative in a given field.

While I do not conclude that gender is an essentially contested concept, my findings allow me to argue confidently from a concepts perspective that gender definitions overall do not correspond to the diversity of empirical gender phenomena. The lack of explicit definitions of gender and the shallow meanings of many of the implicit definitions offer solid evidence that gender as a set of empirical phenomena is not accurately represented in gender definitions in sociology. However, I would also argue that the gender analyses that appear in many of the articles in my sample do a better job of providing a scholarly accounting of gender than the definitions. One of the patterns of definition I identified is an implicit definition of gender with the presence of a gender analysis, seeming to indicate that gender’s empirical complexity is more the subject of scholars’ analytical comments than their definitions. As I did not focus on
gender analysis as much as gender definition in coding the articles in both of my samples.

I offer this interpretation as a tentative conclusion.

Based on the results of the content analysis of my general sociology sample, I am not able to assess how gender concepts are formed. This is the case both because I found no instances of structured concept formation like the types promoted by Gerring (1999, 2001) and Goertz (2006) and because I found no discussion at all of self-conscious gender concept creation in the articles I coded. I did observe, as predicted, that more gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample are formed (partially, at least) derivatively than in my general sociology sample. This makes sense because those who publish in the sociology of gender subfield are likely more attentive to gender as a complex entity that requires explicit definition, rather than more prone to take it as a self-evident phenomenon. Further, those whose work is published in the journals from which I created the sampling frame for my general sociology sample are also more likely to write about gender as only a part, often minor, of their work rather than as its central focus. Seeing the term gender in the title of a sociology article is generally not an indication that gender is its central topic.

I can, however, comment speculatively about how gender concepts are formed in this sample in relation to ordinary-language concept formation. I saw many instances of ordinary-language concept formation insofar as the word gender and the empirical phenomena it refers to in social life become concepts only by virtue of entering into the scholarly research enterprise. This understanding of the way terms become concepts goes a long way towards explaining why gender is so often understood implicitly. Scholars use the term in both ordinary-language and uniquely analytic ways, perhaps as
suggested above because of the limitations of language to talk about gender. Social scientific scholarly training gives scholars the ability to define their terms conceptually but, it seems, no new language about and around gender with which to accomplish this task. I do not have an easy solution to offer but suggest that a beginning approach might be found in self-consciously conceptual definitions of gender, even in the absence of a specialized social scientific language with which to create these. The recognition that ordinary-language concepts of gender are present in the sociological literature may prompt further study of why this is so often the case and why it so often goes unrecognized, or at least undiscussed.

In terms of how gender concepts are created, I propose that gender concept formation often occurs when there is a shift from how gender is understood in layperson’s terms, or ordinary language, to a scholarly understanding of gender as an object being studied and analyzed, but without a concomitant methodological understanding of how the latter is (now) a concept and might be used as such. This suggestion matches my expectation that I would find many definitions in both of my samples that illustrate the problem of ordinary language, as is the case for many of the implicit and some of the explicit definitions in my general sociology sample. While the meaning of the implicit definitions is not necessarily what might be called an ordinary-language meaning, for example in implicit definitions that refer to gender as-a-social-force, the language used to discuss gender is ordinary insofar as it reflects the available lay language about gender.

Due to my claim that gender’s empirical complexity works against its explicit definition in sociological scholarship, I would not characterize ordinary-language
definitions of gender as definitive evidence of gender reduction. My concepts analysis alone suggests both that gender’s empirical complexity is reduced in its scholarly representations and that scholars’ ability to analyze gender is also compromised by lack of explicit conceptual definitions. But in combination, my gender and concepts analyses indicate the need for further examination of why gender reduction occurs.

As predicted, I found only one article in this sample that included an evaluative component in relation to the gender concepts presented. This is Ferree’s (2010) theoretical review article of conceptual approaches to gender in the subfield of sociology of the family, which incorporates a critical perspective towards the gender definitions it presents. As both a theoretical account and a review of many different gender approaches and theories about families, this article is atypical of those in my sample as all others are reports of research results. Otherwise I found no definitions, explicit or implicit, that suggested any criteria to evaluate whether the conceptualization was valuable, accurate, effective, or analytically useful. I defer discussion of a set of minimal evaluative criteria for conceptual definitions of gender to the end of the next subsection, which offers my concepts analysis of my sociology of gender sample; the evaluative criteria are intended to apply to both areas of sociological literature.

Finally, I found no instances of ideal typical gender definition in my general sociology sample. While this was initially surprising it is also partially explained by the small number of explicit definitions that I found. By virtue of the structured nature of the ideal type I do not believe it is possible to have an implicit ideal type definition of any concept. In light of my comments in the gender-based analysis section above, I am not sure that ideal typical concept formation would be beneficial to sociological scholars who
research and write about gender. The fact of gender’s empirical embeddedness, pervasiveness, and taken-for-granted character suggests that scholars avoid explicit gender definition, whether intentionally or not, for the good reason that they are exceedingly challenged to translate this complexity into clear, useful conceptual definitions. This is not to say that gender is unreachable to sociological scholars but rather explains why so few of the sources in a sample representing contemporary gender scholarship in the field of sociology as a whole lack explicit definition of the subject of their analysis.

*Concepts Analysis of Sociology of Gender Sample*

Overall, as for my general sociology sample, I found that sociologists who study gender and whose work is published in the subfield of sociology of gender appear not to overtly consider concepts or conceptualization in relation to gender. While, as predicted, I found a greater proportion of explicit definitions in this sample than in my general sociology sample – 26.5% compared to 12% – I did not observe any mention of defining gender *as a concept*. Because this was also true in my general sociology sample I attribute the greater proportion of explicit definitions in my sociology of gender sample to a factor other than more attention to conceptualization as an explicit or self-conscious process. I theorize that this finding is explained by the general orientation of the subfield of sociology of gender towards gender not only as its principal area of study but also an analytic problem that requires conceptual investigation and explanation. It is also possible that *Gender & Society*, the journal in which all of the articles in my sociology of gender sample were published, is more likely to accept articles in which gender is defined explicitly because its editors take gender definition to be a central or core problem and
because it is the most visible and highly-ranked journal in the subfield of sociology of
gender. I might find different results if I were to examine gender definition published in
other journals that contain sociological articles, such as *Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society, Sex Roles, and Feminist Studies*.

I also found that, at 72.1%, a substantial proportion of all definitions are
derivative, citing or quoting another source in relation to the meaning and use of gender.
Taken together with the result of a greater proportion of explicit definitions in this sample
compared to my general sociology sample, I would characterize these results to support
my prediction that I would find “better” conceptualized definitions of gender in my
sociology of gender sample. This conclusion is also bolstered by my anticipated
observation of the general trend that the explicit and implicit definitions of gender in the
sociology of gender articles include more extensive definitions of gender. Given the
considerable variation across all definitions of gender in both samples, caution should be
taken in making further assumptions about which sample offers better conceptualizations
of gender.

As expected and similar to my general sociology sample, I did not find any
methods-based definitions in my sociology of gender sample, insofar as methods-based
definitions can be understood as concepts overtly intended for investigation and analysis
(see Chapter 2). I also did not find any cognitive definitions, contrary to my prediction.
Most commonly, gender’s explicit and implicit meaning is women-and-men and a-social-
force. These results mirror my expectations and findings for my general sociology
sample. I reiterate here my proposal that gender used in conjunction with the implicit
meaning of women-and-men could be considered a type of cognitive conceptual
definition and gender to mean a-social-force might be categorized as a methods-based understanding of the concept when presented explicitly, though depending on how it is used in context.

I also did not find any conceptual definitions of gender in this sample that show an understanding of the ladder of abstraction, in which more abstract concepts “cover” a greater number of empirical instances and more specific concepts are limited to explaining a smaller number of empirical instances. Likely as a result, I found many explicit and implicit definitions of gender in my sociology of gender sample that demonstrate conceptual stretching, which occurs when the set of empirical phenomena intended to be explained by the concept of gender exceeds the concept. This prevents conceptual definitions from connecting the empirical instances to which they ostensibly refer to the theory used to explain them. As I advanced in my concepts-based analysis of my general sociology sample in Chapter 4, the results from both samples suggest that conceptual stretching may explain the frequently observed pattern of articles without explicit definitions of gender but including often sophisticated gender analyses. This reality means that gender analyses across scholarship cannot be cumulative because there is no (shared) concept upon which to build theories. While I encountered many insightful gender analyses in the articles in both samples I also observed that overall these did not build on one another.

I did not find any evidence that gender is an essentially contested concept, contrary to my prediction. In my content analysis of the articles in my sociology of gender sample, I did not see fundamental differences or conflicts in the way gender is defined, understood and used. I did observe that gender is understood in a variety of
ways and at several different levels of analysis. Because of the larger proportion of explicit gender definitions in this sample compared to my general sociology sample, and the fact that a much larger proportion are derivative, I am able to observe that the articles in this sample likely represent a greater amount of the diversity of gender than those in my general sociology sample. However I do not believe that the explicit and implicit gender definitions in either sample, taken as a whole, correspond to the diversity and complexity of empirical gender(ed) phenomena. As suggested above, I attribute this conclusion to the finding of low proportion of explicit definitions of gender in both samples and the theory that gender’s embeddedness, pervasiveness, and taken-for-granted character – itself a large part of gender’s complexity – makes it especially difficult to “see” analytically, even for a trained sociologist.

I did find more gender definitions in my sociology of gender sample that are formed through quotation and/or citation of other sources than in my general sociology sample. This result suggests additional support for my expectation that those who publish in the sociology of gender subfield are generally more attentive to gender as a complex entity that requires explicit definition. I did not encounter any instances of structured concept formation or any instances of identified ordinary-language concept formation, also as expected. As in my general sociology sample however I did find the occurrence of ordinary-language gender concepts. Although the concepts literature defines ordinary language use in concept formation as the *problem* of ordinary language, I am reluctant to consider it a problem. As I argued in Chapter 4, the shift from lay understandings of gender to a scholarly context is perhaps better understood as a relic of gender’s empirical character in social life. As noted, in both samples I most commonly
saw the meanings of gender as women-and-men and a-social-force enter into scholarship in implicit definitions of gender. These both qualify as ordinary language meanings.

In this sample I did not find any articles that include evaluative components of the gender concepts presented. This compares to the single article (Ferree 2010) in my general sociology sample that incorporated assessment into a discussion of gender conceptualization. These findings offer additional evidence that gender scholars in the field of sociology do not orient their work in relation to a concepts paradigm.

Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that scholars should be able to assess at least minimally whether any social science concept is valuable, effective, or analytically useful. While Gerring (1999, 2001) and Goertz (2006) both propose evaluative criteria for concepts, these both assume a much more sophisticated explicit definition than perhaps any of the ones I found in my samples, with the possible exception of the single article by Ferree (2010) that includes evaluative criteria for the concepts it presents.

I offer three criteria for the purpose of rudimentary assessment of gender concepts. First, is the concept defined explicitly? Overt definition is important because it allows evaluation and comparability among gender concepts. The absence of explicit gender concepts in both of my samples meant that I was unable to evaluate them, not least because so little of the conceptual information was overt. Second, is the definition of the concept related to the topic or subject of study? This criterion is intended to “match” concepts with the specific context of their application, empirical or theoretical or both, to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching. It does not reject generic conceptual definitions but ensures that they are useful in the particular framework in which they are applied. Third, is the definition oriented towards producing insight, in application either
to empirical phenomena or theory building? This criterion addresses the methodological purpose of concepts and promotes the active use of definitions in social science for investigation and knowledge production. Stated another way, this criterion asks if the conceptual definition does the work of aiding scholars in the process of scholarly knowledge production and accumulation.

Finally, I found no instances of the formal use of ideal types in the articles in my sociology of gender sample. As in my general sociology sample, this result is partly explained by the relative dearth of explicit definitions at only a quarter of the articles in my sample. The use of the ideal type method to define gender conceptually would require scholars to have more explicit information about it than it appears they do. My major finding in this project is the low proportion of explicit definition of gender both in the field of sociology as a whole and within the subfield of the sociology of gender—a result that suggests, for the reasons developed throughout this dissertation, that gender is somehow and to some degree unavailable to most sociological scholars who research and write about it. It may initially seem that ideal typical analysis would help solve this problem. I suggest that may not be the case because the ideal type appears to function more as a methodological device to organize information and knowledge rather than to discover or create it. Most basically if there is a problem in the way gender is conceptualized in sociology I believe it emerges from difficulty gender particularly presents for translation from the empirical world to the specialized domain of scholarship.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

In this project I asked, how is gender conceptualized in sociology? To investigate this question I used two samples of peer-reviewed articles published between 2006 and 2010 in sociology journals, the first representing the field of sociology as a whole and the second representing the sociological subfield of gender. I used the method of content analysis to evaluate my research question and the sociological gender literature and methods-oriented concepts literature to explain my results. In these conclusions I offer comments about the meaningfulness of the use of sex and sex terms in sociological articles about gender, as well as suggestions for improved gender conceptualization. I also seek to contextualize my research in relation to other sociological subfields, disciplines, and interdisciplinary areas where gender is treated differently than in sociology as a whole and the sociological subfield of gender during the period of this investigation.

My research produced two key findings that hold across both samples and areas of scholarship. The first is that gender is infrequently defined explicitly, with almost three quarters of the articles in both my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample lacking explicit conceptual definitions of gender. The second is that a majority of articles in both samples, including fully three quarters of those in my general sociology sample, and 57.4% in my sociology of gender sample, use the terms “sex,” “female,” and/or “male” synonymously with “gender,” “women,” and “men.” These results are genuinely surprising for two reasons. First, the sociology of gender is a subfield primarily devoted to analyzing the meanings, processes, forms, structures, and consequences of gender and particularly to distinguishing gender and sex (Butler 1990,
1993; Rubin 1975; West and Zimmerman 1987). Second, one of the primary foci of contemporary North American sociology as a discipline lies in recognizing and explaining the social construction of phenomena popularly taken to be natural. For these reasons it initially seems counterintuitive that there would be so few articles with explicit definitions of gender and so many with references that conflate sex terms and gender. While I also found differences between my samples, most notably that the sociology of gender articles include more explicit definitions and fewer references to sex and sex terms, I believe the larger patterns of explicit gender conceptualizations and references to sex in both samples are the more consequential findings of this research and it is these that I address here.

The low proportion of explicit definitions and high proportion of references to sex and sex terms in both samples suggests a problematic absence in the field and subfield that might be expected to address gender most clearly and overtly. The frequent use of sex terms may be interpreted to result from the lack of explicit gender definition insofar as scholars – likely unintentionally – revert to sex-based binaries because they are not guided by an explicit anti-essentialist definition of gender. The very term gender suggests, and in fact means I would argue, the opposite of sex in sociological terms. The seemingly interchangeable use of “female” and “woman” and “male” and “man” thus undermines the apparent purpose of the use of gender to invoke a social rather than biological explanation. In a sociological context, particularly a sociological context in which gender is the focus as is the case for the articles in my samples, the use of any terms that have typically included an essentialist meaning is significant and requires explanation. I argue that a tension emerges from the paradox of the simultaneous use of
the term gender, which has generally been intended to include a social constructionist component, and the terms female and male, which have typically been used to suggest a biological meaning. More explicitly defined gender concepts could work to rectify this inconsistent use of gender by likely offering social, non-essentialist views that might preclude the use of sex terms by foregrounding the contradiction in doing so.

However, it is also possible, as I suggested in an earlier footnote, that female/male are not best understood as attributes of sex, as I have done, but as identifiers interchangeable with women/men. There may in fact be nothing “behind” sociologists’ use of female/male beyond classifying individuals or groups and seeking variety to avoid repetition of women/men. It may be that female and male have been mainstreamed in sociology and no longer invoke biology, reproduction, or essentialism and their use in a sociological context is thus insignificant to what gender means and how it is used. While I would argue that recent use of female/male in a strict sociology of gender context represents a shift away from the association of essentialist meanings with these terms, it might be true that female/male never included references to biology or reproduction in the field of sociology at large. In this case, my conclusion that there is a contradiction in the concomitant use of gender and female/male in sociological gender scholarship would be invalid.

Further, examining the concurrent use of the terms sex and gender, rather than female/male and gender, in sociological scholarship may be a better way to get at whether gender’s meaning does or does not preclude essentialist components. The term sex itself seems more likely to include a biological, reproductive, or essentialist meaning than the terms female and male. As noted above, the latter are often used solely as
identifiers, to provide variety for writers, and in following the conventions of English grammar and sentence structure. Scholars who write articles about gender, as indicated by the presence of gender in their titles, and use sex – in the presence of female/male or not – seem more likely to have either consciously opted to do so or to have done so unselfconsciously. In either case, considering sex and gender together would be a stronger test of whether sociologists use gender as a term with an exclusively social meaning.

I did not code independently for the presence of sex in an article, rather using a single code for references to sex and/or to female/male in each article. However, I observed in the process of coding that the articles in both of my samples included female/male more frequently than they included sex. This tentative observation supports the idea that while use of sex and gender together in a single article may indicate a problematic conflation of social and essentialist meanings, use of female/male and gender together does not. I further acknowledge that each of the terms gender, sex, female, and male may have different meanings for different people, including sociologists. While I have interpreted the presence of female/male in the articles in my samples as meaningful in the context of my research because I take them to invoke essentialist meanings, at least to some degree, this interpretation rests on assumptions about the meaning of these terms that are likely not shared among all sociologists who write and read about gender.

The recent scholarly move towards considering sex and gender as the composite concept sex/gender (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 2012; Fujimura 2006; Springer, Stellman, and Jordan-Young 2012) is especially relevant to the above discussion of the distinction or overlap between social and biological meanings. While I have argued that the presence
of the use of sex and female/male in the context of sociological scholarship is significant because it contradicts the apparent social meaning of gender, such a claim assumes that gender and sex are separable both empirically and analytically. There is growing recognition that because they are in fact empirically inseparable a conjoined sex/gender concept should offer scholarly recognition of this entanglement (Springer et al. 2012). Sociologists who encounter the “materiality of nature” (Fujimura 2006) in their study of gender need a conceptual framework that allows for simultaneous recognition of the interrelated and co-constructed nature of gender and sex.

Nonetheless, as none of the articles in either of my samples makes direct reference to even the idea of sex/gender as a composite in empirical or theoretical terms, I maintain that their sociological context makes the use of gender, sex, female/male, and woman/man together a significant finding to explain. Sociology has found its most basic roots in explaining human behavior in social rather than biological or essentialist terms and this has been particularly true for the sociological study of gender. Even as the field has advanced in sophistication and subtlety, I would contend that this basic mandate remains. The very common unselfconscious use of sex and sex terms that I found in both of my samples made up of articles about gender – most notably in my sociology of gender sample – requires explanation and, among the scholars whose work demonstrates this pattern, justification.

Given that gender does not remain undefined in all of the fields and subfields in which it is taken as a subject, my findings also raise a question about why there has not been more cross-fertilization between sociology and other disciplines. This issue is perhaps most relevant to the interdisciplinary gender theory literature, which is largely
outside of sociology yet offers numerous sophisticated explicit conceptualizations of gender. It may be that gender theory has remained interdisciplinary overall because of its roots outside of any one discipline, even though it seems as though it would fit quite well in the field of sociology. Still, those working on gender within the discipline of sociology at large may draw on these resources yet overall have not. It is not clear why, on the whole, sociologists have not delved far into this work. Further, the empirical gender scholarship in sociology has not taken significant advantage of the work being done in other disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields engaged in gender studies. Some work does in fact address gender in a more complex, explicit way, such as the literature that questions the strict biological basis of sex and sex categorization (for example, Lewis 2011; Palazzani 2012; Fausto-Sterling 2000). Despite the apparent availability of these explicit insights to sociological scholars, these ideas seem to have remained within their fields and subfields of origin and beyond the reach of sociological borrowing.

Lack of explicit definitions in sociological scholarship about gender also poses a challenge to how sociologists might address power and inequality. Though not mandatory to sociology, a focus on inequality has long been a tradition among North American sociological scholars. This is particularly true of the study of gender, which one might argue emerged directly out of a desire to understand gender inequality as a means to ameliorating it. The slippage among uses of gender, woman, man, and sex, female, and male, suggests a lack of a comprehensive view of whether the core of inequality between woman and men is rooted in biology or society. If even scholars rely on sex-based binaries, how can they truly tackle the social and cultural definitions that produce the idea that sex terms are automatic identifiers? In this context, the problem of
a default to sex terms can be understood to obscure the privileging of
male/man/masculinity – a process in which girls and women are perpetually
disadvantaged. When this is not only unchallenged but actively maintained in
scholarship, it seems unlikely that scholarly research can contribute to rectifying power
differences and inequality between women and men. While there are, of course, many
exceptions, the overall lack of explicitly defined gender concepts may limit scholars’
ability to apprehend the essentialist assumptions upon which gender inequality is often
established and maintained.

This contention rests on the view that sociologists’ uses of female/male include
essentialist meanings. If this is not true as I have suggested above, it may instead be the
case that the use of these terms in sociology facilitates, rather than impedes, progressive
analysis of inequality. Further, use of women/men in gender analysis can also serve to
promote identification and analysis of gender inequality, regardless of whether sex terms
are present. The use of women/men to acknowledge differential outcomes by gender
where women are disadvantaged in comparison to men has long been the norm for
discussing inequality in a sociological context.

My results may also be interpreted as a turn towards the empirical in sociological
studies of gender. The low proportions of explicit definitions and implicit derivative
definitions of gender in my general sociology sample particularly, suggest a strong focus
on the empirical study of gender at the expense of theoretical explanation. While this
observation may or may not represent a shift, it nonetheless seems to indicate a dearth of
integration of theoretical perspectives on gender with empirical work in recent
sociological literature. I do not wish to diminish the difficulty of relating theory directly
to empirical contexts, measurement, and outcomes (see McCall 2005 for a discussion of studying intersectionality empirically), but rather to point out that while sociology is primarily an empirical discipline, this general orientation of the field need not preclude a theoretical component. Theoretical views of gender can offer empirical gender scholars resources that both enhance their ability to capture gender as a set of empirical objects, processes, and structures, and strengthen their analytical insights in relation to their empirical results. The lack of a strong theoretical presence in relation to gender definition in my general sociology sample could signal that sociologists who study gender are, as a whole, missing a perspective that would deepen their conclusions and expand their knowledge production about gender. This conclusion supports the idea of gender reduction that I outlined in the Introduction.

The methods-focused concepts literature I reviewed in Chapter 2 offers a methodological approach to conceptualization that might be applied to improve definition of gender in sociological scholarship. The type of structured concept formation promoted by Gerring (1999, 2001) and Goertz (2006) could be hugely beneficial to gender definition. Gender’s pervasiveness, variability, and embeddedness in social life make it a perfect candidate for a step-by-step, detail-oriented approach to conceptual definition that would allow scholars to address each element of the gender(ed) phenomenon under study in a systematic manner. In the absence of the use of structured concept formation, as this is a time intensive process, the three criteria I offered above for the purpose of rudimentary assessment of gender concepts might be reformulated as guidelines for concept definition. These are: first, define the concept explicitly; second, ensure the definition of the concept is directly related to the topic or subject of study; and third,  

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6 Generally this appears to be more true in the American context than the Canadian or European contexts.
orient the concept towards insight production (empirical or theoretical, as relevant). These recommendations would contribute to more active and self-conscious use of explicitly defined gender concepts for avoiding the problematic conflation of sex and gender and increasing scholarly knowledge production. They would particularly allow scholars to relate their gender(ed) objects, processes, and structures of study directly to conceptual definitions so as to both broaden empirical insights and sharpen concepts.

Finally, for whom do my results matter? I intend my analysis for scholarly writers and readers in the field of sociology. I believe that the overall absence of explicit gender definitions in the field of sociology and the subfield of sociology of gender is notable for its implications for scholarly knowledge of gender. Whether this absence is interpreted as a problem or not, I suggest that it should be considered in terms of an assessment of the impact of my findings on the shape, limits, and possibilities of sociological gender knowledge production and accumulation in sociology. My basic recommendation calls for an awareness among both scholarly writers and readers of the patterns of gender definition, use of sex and sex terms, and gender analysis. As my comments in these conclusions indicate, I recognize that every reader will not interpret my findings to be problematic in the ways that I do. Regardless, it bears consideration that that lack of explicit definition of gender and frequent use of sex terms in recent sociological scholarship compromises sociology’s mission to explain the empirical world in social terms.

Overall, my research supports the idea of gender reduction presented in the Introduction. Scholars’ ability to articulate, capture, study, and generate scholarly insight about gender is compromised by the shortage of explicit conceptualizations in recent
sociological literature. The use of sex terms as identifiers for women and men further reduces the complexity of gender in scholarship because it implies that sex has no inherent essentialist meaning. Further, the default use of sex terms may stymie solutions to, or even perpetuate, inequality between women and men. In these terms lack of explicit definition and frequent use of sex terms greatly limits the ability of sociology as a discipline to truly represent the empirical phenomena that comprise gender. Indeed, unselconscious use of sex terms in scholarship ostensibly about gender challenges the very premise of the sociological study of gender that it is a social rather than natural phenomenon. Explicitly defined gender concepts would partly address this problem by expanding both the language available and scholars’ conscious awareness of what gender means as an independent concept.

Limitations and Future Directions

The research presented here has several limitations that warrant consideration. First, I used only peer-reviewed journal articles in both of my samples. Because scholars do some of their conceptual work in books I may be underestimating the amount of explicit conceptualization of gender in both the field of sociology as a whole and subfield of sociology of gender. Books offer scholars more space and flexibility than journals, where articles are limited by length and the particular focus of each journal. The sole use of journal articles may also limit the validity of my conclusions because of these constraints in formatting and space for another reason. The reader does not know what is cut from an article due to space limitations and it may be the case that the authors of some or all of the articles in both of my samples had originally included definitions or more substantive discussions of gender’s meaning that were removed due to word limits.
While there is no way to know whether and when this may have been the case, its possibility suggests caution in taking my findings definitively rather than suggestively.

Second, I gathered articles for my sociology of gender sample only from *Gender & Society*. As a result, it is possible that my results for this sample are skewed either towards more or less explicit definition of gender than I might otherwise find if I had selected these articles from a wider base of publications within this subfield. It may be the case that selecting articles from a more expansive sampling frame would have inflated the proportion of explicit definitions of gender in my sample. However it seems more likely the opposite is true since *Gender & Society* is the premier sociological gender journal and thus may, intentionally or not, have higher standards for conceptualization of gender than other sociological journals in which gender-focused articles are published. My sociology of gender sample may thus be skewed towards more explicit gender definitions and fewer unselfconscious references to sex terms than I would find if I had sampled more broadly. If this is the case, I will have overestimated the differences between my sociology of gender and general sociology samples.

Third, it may be that the issue of gender conceptualization in sociology was resolved at an earlier time. My results may reflect the time frame of my sampling, which includes only articles published between 2006 and 2010. In this case, my observations and analysis that gender is largely undefined explicitly in both the field of sociology as a whole and the subfield of gender may be limited in a longer term view and caution should be taken in drawing conclusions beyond the time period 2006-2010.

Finally, I reiterate that the variation I found within the analytical categories I used for my content analyses suggests caution should be taken in drawing conclusions beyond
the results already presented and discussed above. While I coded in many categories to capture as much variation in gender definition in the articles in my samples as I could, upon coding I found that one of my main categories, explicit definition of gender, contained a diverse array of definitions which often shared only the fact of their explicit articulation. This was true for both samples. As a result, it would be unwise to make assumptions beyond the level of analysis of my major categories.

There are several directions for future research that could build on the work presented here. First, future research might confirm the empirical patterns of gender definition I found in my samples in both less and more recently published representative samples of sociology literature. Second, it might also examine gender definition more specifically in other subfields besides the sociology of gender, such as criminology, culture and cognition, demography and the life course, inequality, race and ethnicity, political and economic sociology, environmental sociology, and the study of social networks. Third, as suggested above, future research should replicate my analyses with a focus on sex in gender-focused sociology articles, rather than female/male. Fourth, future research could investigate the conceptualization of other key terms in sociology that permeate the field as a whole, such as race, class, and social structure, to see if similar patterns of explicit and implicit definition exist. Fifth, this research suggests that future scholarship might further investigate gender definition in sociology through interviews with sociologists who study gender. The latter proposal offers the potential for an ethnomethodological analysis (Garfinkel 1963) of how scholars construct and use conceptual meaning(s) for gender in the context of gender’s everyday, intuitive, and taken-for-granted meanings.
Finally, an especially promising area of future research is the relationship between the use of gender as a concept in sociological scholarship and the concomitant use of sex terms. Their frequent coexistence in the articles in both my general sociology sample and my sociology of gender sample strongly suggests that sex terms no longer invoke biological essentialism, or even a reference to any biological identification or difference, in the current sociological context. This area is ripe for much further investigation, not least in how and when this shift occurred in sociology, especially in the sociology of gender, and what it says about gender’s usefulness as an independently meaningful term and concept in sociology.
Appendices

Appendix A: Source Journals for General Sociology Sample Sampling Frame

This appendix lists the sociology journals from which the articles for the general sociology sample sampling frame are selected. These are the 49 journals with the highest 2010 five-year Impact Factor (IF) scores, excluding Gender & Society. They are listed first alphabetically and second ranked by IF score. IF score and country of origin are included in parentheses for all journals in both lists.

Journals Listed Alphabetically
Acta Sociologica (1.360, England)
Agriculture and Human Values (1.466, Netherlands)
American Journal of Sociology (5.113, United States)
American Sociological Review (5.840, United States)
Annals of Tourism Research (3.140, United States)
Annual Review of Law and Social Science (1.652, United States)
Annual Review of Sociology (5.028, United States)
British Journal of Sociology (2.820, England)
Deviant Behavior (1.405, United States)
Discourse & Society (1.658, England)
Economy and Society (2.135, England)
Ethnic and Racial Studies (1.917, England)
European Sociological Review (1.873, England)
Global Networks – A Journal of Transnational Affairs (2.017, England)
Human Ecology (2.249, United States)
International Journal of Intercultural Relations (1.605, United States)
International Political Sociology (2.214, United States)
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1.688, United States)
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography (1.378, United States)
Journal of Leisure Research (1.529, United States)
Journal of Marriage and Family (3.183, United States)
Language in Society (1.843, England)
Law & Society Review (2.080, United States)
Leisure Sciences (1.694, England)
Poetics (2.082, Netherlands)
Politics & Society (1.765, United States)
Population and Development Review (2.381, United States)
Rationality and Society (1.198, England)
Rural Sociology (1.467, United States)
Social Forces (2.507, United States)
Social Indicators Research (1.239, Netherlands)
Social Networks (3.304, Switzerland)

Gender & Society is not included in either list in Appendix A because it is the source of the articles in my sociology of gender sample. I do not include it in the creation of the sampling frame from which to select my general sociology sample so as to maintain two empirically distinct samples, one representing the field of sociology as a whole and the other representing the sociological subfield of the sociology of gender.
Social Problems (2.572, United States)
Social Science Research (2.227, United States)
Society & Natural Resources (1.594, United States)
Sociologia Ruralis (2.132, Netherlands)
Sociological Forum (1.205, United States)
Sociological Methodology (2.000, United States)
Sociological Methods & Research (2.448, United States)
Sociological Quarterly (1.288, United States)
Sociological Theory (1.835, United States)
Sociology of Education (2.418, United States)
Sociology of Health & Illness (2.459, England)
Symbolic Interaction (1.207, United States)
Theory and Society (1.400, Netherlands)
Work and Occupations (1.682, United States)
Work, Employment & Society (1.575, England)
Youth & Society (1.651, United States)

Journals Listed by IF Score Rank
1. American Sociological Review (5.840, United States)
2. American Journal of Sociology (5.113, United States)
3. Annual Review of Sociology (5.028, United States)
4. Social Networks (3.304, Switzerland)
5. Journal of Marriage and Family (3.183, United States)
6. Annals of Tourism Research (3.140, United States)
8. British Journal of Sociology (2.820, England)
9. Social Problems (2.572, United States)
10. Social Forces (2.507, United States)
12. Sociological Methods & Research (2.448, United States)
13. Sociology of Education (2.418, United States)
14. Population and Development Review (2.381, United States)
15. Human Ecology (2.249, United States)
16. Social Science Research (2.227, United States)
17. International Political Sociology (2.144, United States)
18. Economy and Society (2.135, England)
19. Sociologia Ruralis (2.132, Netherlands)
21. Poetics (2.082, Netherlands)
22. Law & Society Review (2.080, United States)
24. Sociological Methodology (2.000, United States)
25. Ethnic and Racial Studies (1.917, England)
27. Language in Society (1.843, England)
28. Sociological Theory (1.835, United States)
29. Politics & Society (1.765, United States)
30. Leisure Sciences (1.694, England)
31. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1.688, United States)
32. Work and Occupations (1.682, United States)
33. Discourse & Society (1.658, England)
34. Annual Review of Law and Social Science (1.652, United States)
35. Youth & Society (1.651, United States)
36. International Journal of Intercultural Relations (1.605, United States)
37. Society & Natural Resources (1.594, United States)
38. Work, Employment & Society (1.575, England)
39. Journal of Leisure Research (1.529, United States)
40. Rural Sociology (1.467, United States)
41. Agriculture and Human Values (1.466, Netherlands)
42. Deviant Behavior (1.405, United States)
43. Theory and Society (1.400, Netherlands)
44. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography (1.378, United States)
45. Acta Sociologica (1.360, England)
46. Sociological Quarterly (1.288, United States)
47. Social Indicators Research (1.239, Netherlands)
48. Symbolic Interaction (1.207, United States)
49. Sociological Forum (1.205, United States)
50. Rationality and Society (1.198, England)
Appendix B: Sampling Frame for General Sociology Sample

This list includes all articles with “gender” in their title, published between 2006 and 2010, in the 49 sociology journals with the highest 2010 five-year IF scores. Articles are listed in order from highest to lowest IF scoring journals, and from most to least recently published for each journal.


Segregation by Field of Study in 44 Countries.” *American Journal of Sociology* 114(4):924-976.


Poortman, Anne-Rigt and Tanja van der Lippe. 2009. “Attitudes toward Housework and
Child Care and the Gendered Division of Labor.” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 71(3):526-541.


Spitze, Glenna and Katherine Trent. 2006. “Gender Differences in Adult Sibling


Zhang, Zhenmei and Mark D. Hayward. 2006. “Gender, the Marital Life Course, and Cardiovascular Disease in Late Midlife.” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 68(3):639-657.


Structural Explanations of Gender Inequality Among Women.” *Social Problems* 57(3):371-397.


Greenman, Emily and Yu Xie. 2008. “Double Jeopardy? The Interaction of Gender and


Pietila, Ilkka and Marja Rytikonen. 2008. “‘Health is not a Man’s Domain’: Lay Accounts of Gender Difference in Life-Expectancy in Russia.” *Sociology of Health & Illness* 30(7):1070-1085.


Krivickas, Kristy M., Laura A. Sanchez, Catherine T. Kenney, and James D. Wright.


Foschi, Martha and Jerilee Valenzuela. 2008. “Selecting Job Applications: Effects from Gender, Self-Presentation, and Decision Type.” *Social Science Research* 37(3):1022-1038.


Brashears, Matthew E. 2008. “Gender and Homophily: Differences in Male and Female Association in Blau Space.” *Social Science Research* 37(2):400-415.


Andres, Lesley, Maria Adamuti-Trache, Ee-Seul Yoon, Michelle Pidgeon, and Jens Peter


Son, Julie S., Deborah L. Kerstetter, and Andrew J. Mowen. 2008. “Do Age and Gender


Kobayashi, Emiko, Susan F. Sharp, and Harold G. Grasmick. 2008. “Gender and
Deviance: A Comparison of College Students in Japan and the United States.”
*Deviant Behavior* 29(5):413-439.


Ryu, Kirak. 2010. “State Policies and Gender Earnings Inequality: A Multilevel Analysis


Appendix C: General Sociology Sample

This list includes 100 articles randomly selected from my sampling frame, listed in Appendix B. All of these articles have “gender” in their title and are published between 2006 and 2010. Articles are listed in order from highest to lowest IF scoring journals, and from most to least recently published for each journal.


Zhang, Zhenmei and Mark D. Hayward. 2006. “Gender, the Marital Life Course, and Cardiovascular Disease in Late Midlife.” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 68(3):639-657.


Calasanti, Toni. 2007. “Bodacious Berry, Potency Wood and the Aging Monster: Gender


Preston, Pamela. 2006. “Marijuana Use as a Coping Response to Psychological Strain:
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences Among Young Adults.” *Deviant Behavior* 27(4):397-421.


Appendix D: Sociology of Gender Sample

This list includes the 68 articles with “gender” in their title published between 2006 and 2010 in *Gender & Society*. Articles are listed from most to least recently published.


Linders, Annulla and Alana Van Gundy-Yoder. 2008. “Gall, Gallantry, and the Gallows:


England, Paula and Su Li. “Desegregation Stalled: The Changing Gender Composition of


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Ferree, Myra Marx, Judith Lorber, and Beth B. Hess, eds. 1999. Revisioning Gender. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.


Lindsey, D. 1989. “Using Citation Counts as a Measure of Quality in Science: Measuring What is Measurable Rather than What’s Valid.” *Scientometrics* 15:189-203.


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