EVERY DECISION YOU MAKE MATTERS:
DILEMMA-SOLVING AND THE LIFE COURSE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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In the current study, I propose a reiterative dilemma-solving model to illustrate how social actors create the fate of social movements. The reiterative dilemma-solving model is built on three theoretic pillars: strategic dilemmas, strategic action fields, and path-dependency. In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, first, the problems that social actors encounter constitute strategic dilemmas, which means that there is no perfect solution for the problems. Every strategic choice has a trade-off. Second, the reiterative dilemma-solving model assumes that the social movement is a strategic field embedded in the broad field environment. The social movement’s identity establishes the local order in the movement and negotiates the relationship between the movement and the broad field environment. Third, the reiterative dilemma-solving model assumes the path-dependency of strategic choices: previous strategic choices constrain future strategic choices. Built on these three theoretical pillars, the reiterative dilemma-solving model provides a dynamic picture of the life course of social movements. Social actors strategically build movement identities, which facilitate the formation and operation of the social movement. This identity work in turn creates the initial structural constraints that
shape the movement’s future moves. The trade-offs from these strategic choices reconfigure the initial structural constraints, which go on to shape future strategic choices. This process repeats throughout the life course of the social movement until its decline. To demonstrate my argument, I analyze the development of three social movements in Taiwan: the blue camp’s post-election protest in 2004 (a partisan movement), the Reds in 2006 (a civic movement), and the Wild Strawberries in 2008 (a student movement). Drawing on interviews and media reports, I show how the leaders’ strategic choices articulated and rearticulated the relationships among the participants and the relationships between the movements and their environments. The comparison of these cases can demonstrate that the fate of the social movement is not determined by structures, but constructed through a series of choices of social actors.
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Chapter 1
Dilemma-Solving and the Fate of Social Movements

Strategy is a growing field in social movement research. Two reasons explain why strategy has garnered more and more interest among researchers. First, scholars want to know how strategies influence the outcomes of social movements. Developing strategy is a common job for the leaders of social movements. Leaders devise strategy to mobilize, operate, and sustain their movements; and frequently, the strategies that the social movement adopts account for its success or failure. If leaders can adopt the right strategies to deal with problems, they of course have a better chance of achieving their goals. In contrast, when leaders choose the wrong strategies, even a resourceful movement may fail to reach its goals (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979; Ganz 2000). Deriving from this interest, scholars have investigated how the characteristics of movement leaders (Ganz 2000; Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001; Nepstad and Bob 2006) and the structures of social movement organizations (Schwartz and Paul 1992; Ganz 2000) shape the strategic choices that movement leaders make.

Second, scholars want to bring human agency to social movement studies by investigating how strategies shape the development of social movements. Scholars have criticized the structural bias in the dominant social movement studies that put political structures in the primary position and assume the performances of social actors are an adaptation to these political structures (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra

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1 One example of this intention is the debate over the effects between disruptive and moderate strategies (Giugni 1999). Some scholars have argued that disruptive strategies are more helpful than moderate strategies because disruption is the only weapon for people without resources and power. If poor people’s movements choose to cooperate with an authoritative group, the power of their movements is absorbed into the dominant group’s structure (Piven and Cloward 1979). However, some scholars have argued that moderate strategies are more effective than disruptive strategies (Gamson 1975). Although social movement scholars have not reached a consensus, the debate reflects researchers’ intention to identify the “right” strategies.
Related to this, critics argue that this structural-oriented approach neglects the complexity of the social world. The critics point out that the “political opportunity” and “political process” paradigms are ambitious for building a universal theory that identifies the invariant relationship between political opportunity and the development of social movements. However, in many cases we can see that social movements emerge without identifiable political opportunity. Therefore, although lumping different social movements together can reveal general patterns in the rise and fall of social movements, the developmental paths of different social movements are not predictable based on objective conditions. To explain the diverse paths of social movements, we should investigate strategizing in social movements and the interaction between strategy and the environment (Goldstone 2004; Jasper 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012).

The research interests in the impact of strategy and the role of human agency demand that social movement researchers develop a new approach to understand social movements. This research approach should be strategy-centered and balance the impacts of agency and structure on social movements. The goal of the current

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2 The popular concept of “repertoire” is an example that highlights the isomorphism among social movement strategies. This concept highlights “the habitual, taken-for-granted, slow-changing natures of forms of resistance considered appropriate to particular actors and contexts” (Mische 2011:247). Scholars have ascribed the emergence and change of social movement repertoires to the adaptation to the rise of democratic institutions (Tilly 2008) rather than social actors’ moves.

3 Political opportunity theory argues that people’s struggles are encouraged and discouraged by political factors. The factors that encourage people to engage in collective actions are termed political opportunities; the factors that discourage people are called political constraints (Tarrow 1998:19-20). One example of political opportunity theory is Tarrow’s research. Tarrow (1998) argued that increasing political access, instability of political alignment, dividing elites, and obtaining influential allies are four major political opportunities that assist the emergence of social movements. The political process model defines the emergence of social movements as a political process (McAdam 1982). The common process is: broad social/economic situations changing, which expands political opportunities and provides indigenous organizations with the chance to mobilize people. Then the expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations liberate people’s recognition; this lets people recognize their collective interests and social injustice. In the end, people depart their regular life and join the social movement (McAdam 1982:36-50).

4 For example, in his study on the Iranian revolution of 1979, Kurzman (1997) argued that people participated not because of the objective existence of political opportunity but because of people’s perception of political opportunity. In this case, people joined the movement because they believed the revolution would be successful even if the state structure was still steady.
study is to fulfill this demand. Building on previous studies on strategic dilemmas (Jasper 2004, 2005), field theory (Martin 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012), and path-dependency (Haydu 1998; Mahoney 2000), I propose a dilemma-solving model to explain the development of social movements. In this model, I focus on the interaction between agency and structure as well as the interaction among strategic choices.

I argue that the fate of the social movement is determined through a series of dilemma-solving episodes of social actors. The strategic choices produce the collective identity that binds the activists together (Snow et al. 1997; Snow and McAdam 2000). The collective identity then shapes the strategizing of the movement because it provides worldviews to the activists and defines who can join the movement (Friedman and McAdam 1992; Clemens 1996; Polletta 1998; Ganz 2000). In other words, the collective identity becomes the foundation of the social order in the movement (Fligstein 2001). In addition, the movement identity negotiates the relationship between the movement and the environment. Drawing on field theory (Martin 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2011), I argue that the so-called “environment” should be defined as a collection of fields. The fields have independent logics and connect to other fields in different ways. The movement identity articulates the relationships between the social movement and the fields in the environment. In this way, the social movement localizes the impact of the environment and builds its own structural constraints.

Strategic choices not only localize the impact of the environment but also re-localize this impact. Since social actors face multiple problems and develop multiple strategies, the strategic choices may change worldviews in the movement and the relationships between the movement and the environment. In other words, the localization of the impact of the environment is an ongoing process. Future strategies
may partially adjust or even totally redefine the internal relationships to the activists and the external relationships to the environment. This ongoing process demonstrates the logic of path-dependency in strategizing: Strategic choices in the past create structural constraints for the strategic choices in the future (Mahoney 2000). I argue that the fate of the social movement is the outcome of a reiterative dilemma-solving process. The interweaving of strategic choices constitutes the developmental path of the movement.

To demonstrate my argument, I analyze the development of three social movements in Taiwan: the blue camp’s post-election protest in 2004 (a partisan movement), the Reds in 2006 (a civic movement), and the Wild Strawberries in 2008 (a student movement). Although the demands and the scales of these movements differed, they all demonstrated the characteristics of a social movement: people with commitment who take enduring action to achieve shared goals. Different types of movement identities provide a basis to compare these three movements. The comparison will show how the leaders’ strategic choices articulated and rearticulated the relationships among the participants and the relationships between the movements and their environments. In addition to illustrate my theoretical concerns, these three cases pose an empirical puzzle: why do social movements that share the same environment not have the same developmental paths? The comparison of these cases can demonstrate that the fate of the social movement is not determined by structures, but constructed through a series of choices of social actors.

In this chapter, I introduce the analytic framework and the three cases. In the section on the analytic framework, I discuss how I integrate the theories to which I

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5 For example, Tarrow (1998:4) defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” Similarly, Tilly (2008) uses WUNC - worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment - to define social movements.
refer to build my arguments. In the introduction to the cases, I provide the general stories of each movement to provide readers with background information and to facilitate their understanding of the connection between the cases and my arguments. In the last section, I discuss the data I used and the arrangement of the following chapters.

**Strategic Dilemma: Every Decision Has Its Price**

Developing strategy involves purpose and choice: “Individuals and groups must initiate or pursue one flow of action rather than another, respond in one way to events rather than in others” (Jasper 2004: 2). The range of responses in making purposive choices is wide. The responses can rely on making a decision after deep research or may be just a quick decision without much consideration. Social actors may calculate costs and benefits before making a decision, or just take the decision for granted. In other words, developing strategy can be on an explicit or implicit level in a complicated or simple process (Jasper 2006). In addition, a choice is ambiguous and multivalent that might keep multiple choices open (Mishe 2007).

Although strategy helps social actors deal with the challenges they confront, strategy does not work like magic to solve every challenge without leaving a mark. Jasper (2004, 2006) indicates that most challenges that social movements face involve strategic dilemmas. Jasper (2006:1) defined a strategic dilemma as a problem with “two or more options, each with a long list of risks, costs, and potential benefits. Much of the time, there is simply no single right answer.” Therefore, no strategy is perfect. Every strategic choice has its price. Successful or not, the strategy always leaves a legacy for the environment of the movement and the movement itself. As Jasper (2004) suggested, the concept of strategic dilemmas helps bring agency back into social movement studies. The fate of social movements is not simply
determined by structure. When the leaders of a social movement make a strategic choice, the trade-offs in the choice shape the movement’s development. Therefore, focusing on movement leaders’ strategic choices can reveal how humans’ actions, not only the movement structure, influence the social movement’s fate.

The concept of strategic dilemma offers an appropriate start to building a strategy-centered theory. First, it highlights the role of human agency in the development of social movements. Social actors make decisions that affect the performances of social movements. For example, it is social actors’ choices to decide how the movements start, how the movements are sustained, and how the movements end. After all, objective structure cannot make decision for social actors. Second, it turns the focus from how structural constraints shape the leaders’ strategic choices to the interaction between strategic choice and structural constraint. Because every choice comes with a trade-off, every strategy leaves its traces. When social actors adopt a strategic choice, the outcomes of the strategy definitely involve the reproduction or transformation of the internal worldview and the external conditions of the movement.

While the concept of strategic dilemma reminds us of the importance of human agency and the interaction between strategic choices and structural constraints, the next task is to clarify why and how strategic choices construct the structural constraints of a social movement. To this end, I connect the concept of strategic dilemma to field theory, especially Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of strategic action fields (2011, 2012).

**Social Movement as a Strategic Action Field**

From the perspective of organization theory, Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) suggested that a social movement should be understood as a strategic action field. A
field is a construction with social order (Fligstein 2001:107). The local logic in the field not only makes the field independent of the global environment but also patterns the interactions among social actors. The isomorphism among the social actors in a field is an example to illustrate this characteristic (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).6

Field theory usually focuses on the relationship between individual actors and the fields in which the individual actors locate. The positions and cultural capacity of social actors determine their life chance in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). To connect field theory to social movement studies, Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) indicated that we need to insert collective actors, which they termed strategic action fields, in between individual actors and the environment. According to Fligstein and McAdam (2011:3), “[a] strategic action field is a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rule.”

Since a social movement is a strategic action field that includes individual activists (and internal strategic action fields) and is embedded and nested in a broad field environment that is composed of other strategic action fields, the social movement needs a twofold mission to build its local order. On the one hand, the movement needs to create collective consciousness among the activists; on the other, the movement has to negotiate the relationship between the movement and the environment. Therefore, the movement leaders must build a movement identity to bring together the participants and to articulate the relationship between the movement and the field environment. In other words, the strategic actions of social

6 These are what DiMaggio and Powell (1991:67) called coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism.
actors regarding identity-building not only form the local order in the movement but also build qualitatively different connections to other strategic action fields.

Although interaction in any field is ordered, “a field is simultaneously a space of conflict and competition” (Wacquant 1992: 17). Since a social movement is a combination of people, people may have different expectations of the movement. The different expectations may result in disputes among the participants. While the movement identity can suppress disputes temporarily, the decisions of social actors in response to other dilemmas may bring the disputes back. The decisions may awaken the dissatisfaction of some participants with egad to the meaning of the movement identity that in turn drives them to challenge the movement identity. Their challenge may adjust or change the meaning of the movement identity. However, once the meaning of the movement is partially or totally rekeyed (Goffman 1974), the quality of the connections between the movement and the fields in the environment are also changed.

Defining a social movement as a strategic action field has several benefits for facilitating our understanding of how strategic choices shape the development of a social movement. First, the movement identity is an outcome of strategic choices. Melucci (1998: 4) argued that collective identity is not a datum or an essence but “the outcome of exchanges, negotiations, decisions, and conflicts among actors.” Multiple relationships exist among the movement participants. To build a movement identity, the movement leaders have to perform as “skilled actors” (Fligstein 2001) and “mediators” (Mische 2007) exploiting communication skills to persuade people to accept one relationship and suppress others.

Second, the choice of movement identity shapes the internal structure of the movement. The movement identity channels the strategic orientation of the

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7 For convenience, I use “strategic action field” and “field” interchangeably.
movement (Jasper 1997). A movement identity represents a kind of normative expectation regarding the movement’s performance. The participants need to perform in expected ways to sustain the boundary between “we” and “they” (Taylor and Whittier 1992). In other words, the movement identity brings with it a set of worldviews, commitments, rules for behavior, and tactical repertoires for participants in the social movement (Friedman and McAdam 1992). Therefore, the movement identity cues movement leaders as to what choices are appropriate or not and hence constrains the dilemma-solving process in the movement. For example, a civic movement such as the Reds tends to design inclusive strategies to justify itself as a civic movement, and a student movement like the Wild Strawberries may refer to other model student movements to organize its protests. The movement identity also constrains the strategic capacity of the movement (Ganz 2000). The strategic capacity is highly determined by the composition of the participants. The movement identity illustrates who the participants should be. Therefore, the movement identity constrains the participants’ biography, social networks, and knowledge of collective action as well as how the leaders make decisions (Schwartz and Paul 1995; Clemens 1996; Ganz 2000; Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001; Nepstad and Bob 2006).

Third, the choices about movement identity affect the external constraints of the movement. Instead of regarding the “environment” as a totality, field theory defines it as a collection of fields. Therefore, different social movements may face different environmental constraints, even though they are located in the same objective conditions because they connect to other fields in different ways. According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012), three features determine the qualities of these connections. The first feature of the connection is distance. Some fields are

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8 The factors that influence the distance between a social movement and a field include resource dependence, mutually beneficial interactions, sharing of power, information flows, and legitimacy between the movement and the field.
close to the social movement and some are far away. Proximate fields have more influence on the movement than distant fields. The second feature is authority. Some proximate fields have formal authority within or over the movement. This means that a movement can seldom avoid or ignore what occurs in those fields. Fligstein and McAdam also suggested that the connection to government is usually important because the government has legitimate power to influence the movement. The movement identity plays a role to localize the influence of environment and determine the qualities of the connections.

Fourth, regarding the social movement as a field benefits us in understanding the interaction between agency and structure. From the theory of strategic action fields, movement identity is a tentative agreement among dominant groups and dominated groups in the movement (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012) that favors the dominant groups. Although the dominated groups may want to change this situation, their challenges usually fail because the dominant groups have greater resources and an enhanced cultural ability to impose their own version of movement identity. However, while change is difficult, when the dominated groups adopt innovative strategies or huge changes occur in fields that are close to the movement, the local order of the social movement will be renegotiated. In both conditions, the movement identity may be totally transformed or only partially modified. When the movement identity is changed or modified, the internal constraints (strategic orientation and capacity) and external constraints (connections to other fields) may be changed or modified, too. In other words, strategic choices not only create and maintain a movement’s own structures but also change those structures.

In summary, this perspective builds on Melucci’s (1996: 70) statement that “collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or groups at a more complex level) concerning the orientations of their
action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place.” I argue that those constraints are made in the first place through the building of the movement identity. The relationship between agency and structure should be understood as interactive rather than static. Each strategic choice is constrained by the structure that was created by previous strategic choices and creates the structure that constrains future strategic choices. This interaction pattern demonstrates that the dilemma-solving episodes are path-dependent.

**The Path-Dependence of Strategic Choices**

During the life course of a social movement, its leaders do not face just one strategic dilemma or make just one strategic choice. Since any choice persistently shapes and reshapes the social movement, any strategy constrains future strategic choices. Choices can reconstruct the set of internal constraints. Strategic choices may change social actors’ understanding of common interests and the meaning of future issues (Slez and Martin 2007) and therefore change the strategic orientation of the movement. Strategic choices may reorganize the leaders and participants by awakening disputes that were suppressed previously and result in conflicts between different groups within the movement (Koopmans 1997). The reorganization of participants changes the strategic capacity of the movement. Strategic choices may also reconstruct the external structures. These choices may change the connections between the movement and the broad field environment.

This interactional characteristic of strategic choices reveals the path-dependent relationships among strategic choices: Previous strategic choices influence future strategic choices (Mahoney 2000). I will discuss this concept more thoroughly in the next sections. What I want to emphasize here is the interaction among strategic choices. I argue that the life course of a social movement depends on the sequence
of strategic choices. The sequence of strategic choices of a particular social movement demonstrates how social actors’ moves interact with structure and constrain future choices.

Building on the concept of strategic dilemma, the theory of strategic action fields, and the perspective of path-dependency, I propose a dilemma-solving approach to explain the development of social movements. I argue that the structural constraints that a movement faces are the outcome of the movement’s strategic choices, especially the choices about movement identity; since the movement confronts other dilemmas in later stages and the decisions always carry a legacy; decisions that the movement makes partially or completely rearticulate the structural constraints. Therefore, I argue that the life course of a social movement is made up of a sequence of dilemma-solving episodes that account for the fate of the movement. In next sections, I will articulate my arguments.

The Sources of Structural Constraints

In current study, I categorize the structural constraints that a social movement confronts into three levels: individual, organizational, and environmental. In sociology, structure refers to the things that constrain human action. Instead of regarding structure and agency as opposed, Sewell (1992) argued that both in fact presuppose each other: Structure not only constrains human action but also enables social actors to enact structure. Based on the interdependence between structure and agency, he identified two kinds of structure: schemas (structures in people’s heads) and resource distribution that leads social actors to their own different power (structures outside people). These two sources pattern people’s performance from inside and outside. When we apply Sewell’s argument to a social movement, we need to be aware that the social movement is an organization, a collective actor.
Therefore, in addition to the sources at the individual and environmental levels, we need to add the structural constraints at the organization level, the constraints between the individual and the environment.

At the individual level, the *movement imagination* of the participants shapes the strategic choices the movement may make. In his study on civic life of America, Perrin (2006: 3) argued that people’s democratic imagination influences their interpretation of public problems and the solutions to solve those problems. By the same token, what activists decide to do is based largely on what they can imagine doing: what is possible, important, right, and feasible. In other words, the movement imagination becomes a normative source to regulate the movement’s strategic choices.

At the organizational level, the *strategic capacity* of the movement influences its strategic choices (Ganz 2000). Strategic capacity refers to the ability that a movement possesses to develop strategies. If a movement has high strategic capacity, it is more likely to develop effective strategies to achieve its goal. According to Ganz (2000: 1005), the volume of strategic capacity is determined by the degree of leaders’ “access [to] the salient information about the environment, heuristic use they made of this information, and their motivation.” Ganz (2000) provided two sources of strategic capacity: leadership and organization. The former source includes leaders’ biographies, social networks, and knowledge of collective action repertoires; the latter includes deliberative structure, resource flows, and the accountability of the organization. Therefore, if movement leaders are also involved in other fields and transplant their tactical repertoires to the movement, we will see a creative movement (Clemens 1996). In addition, if movement leaders make decisions through deliberation rather than top-down styles, the leaders are more likely to access important and abundant information (Schwartz and Paul 1992).
The broad field environment in which the social movement is involved is the third level of structure that social movements face. I use ‘field environment’ to comprehensively refer to the constraints outside the movement. Examples of environmental constraints are political institutions (Tilly 2008), economic and social change (Piven and Cloward 1978), cultural frames (Snow and Benford 1992), and the reactions of authorities to the movements (McAdam 1982). As Goldstone summarized the impact of the field environment, “they (social movements) need to be situated in a dynamic relational field in which the ongoing actions and interests of state actors, allied and anti-movement groups, and the public at large all influence social movement emergence, activity, and outcomes” (Goldstone 2004: 333).

I argue that the dilemma-solving process shapes and reshapes structures at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels of the movement, and is in turn constrained by the structures that the movement creates. I argue that social movements may face different structural constraints when they make a choice about the collective identities that buttress the movements. The other dilemma-solving episodes may reconfigure the initial structures by rearticulating the meaning of the movements and reallocating material resources that can affect subsequent opportunities. Therefore, the dilemma-solving episodes are path-dependent and the development of the social movements can be approximated by the sequence of strategic choices. Thus, instead of judging and predicting the actions of social movements according to the existence or non-existence of objective conditions, we should use a path-dependent logic to explain why social movements favor some strategies and disfavor other available strategy options, even when the strategies are “wrong” strategies from an outsider’s perspective (Jasper 1997).
Building Collective Identity and Creating Structural Constraints

As Fligstein (2001) argued, collective identity is a significant source of local order in a strategic field. Collective identity provides the social actors with a shared meaning and understanding of the pattern of interaction in the field. In other words, identity-building is a necessary process for the formation of a field.

Although movement identity is a necessity for any social movement, it should not be treated as given and essential. From the perspective of relational sociology, a social movement can be defined in multiple ways because the meanings of a movement are inherently multivocal, unstable, and ambiguous (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Mische 2007). This feature gives social actors the opportunity to strategically build the movement identity. The leaders can exploit diverse framings and conversational skills to complete the identity-building process (Snow et al. 1997; McLean 1998; Snow and McAdam 2000; Mische 2003). By highlighting some relationships among the participants and putting others in the background, leaders can actively construct the movement identity.

The identity of the social movement contributes to the formation of structures at different levels. At the individual level, the movement identity shapes the movement imagination of the participants. The movement identity also indicates who the participants of the movement are. Therefore, different movement identities draw different types of participants. Different types of participants represent different life experiences and social networks that lead to different movement imaginations. When the movements are bound with different movement identities, the participants have a different stock of tactical repertoires and perceptions of what strategies are right strategies (Ganz 2000; Perrin 2005).

Movement identities also affect structures at the organizational level. Different movement identities bring different strategic capacities to social movements because
they shape the background of the movement’s leaders and organizational structure. For example, Clemens (1996) ascribed different models in American labor history to collective identity. She argued that “these models implied quite different constructions of identity and orientations to political institutions and opportunity” (1996: 225).

Finally, movement identity localizes the impact of the field environment. The social movement’s identity determines the distance between the movement and other fields as well as determines which fields have authority to regulate the movement. For example, university life highly influenced the rise and fall of the Wild Strawberries because the student identity put it close to the university. However, instead of being affected by university life, the blue camp’s post-election protest and the Reds struggled more with political fields. Even with social movements linked to the same field, different movement identities shape the qualities of the connections. The movement identity shapes the distance between the movement and the broad field environment.

Social movement scholars have indicated that the actions of social movements can create political opportunities that facilitate their emergence and operation (McAdam 1983; Kurzman 1997; Tarrow 1996). However, this is just one side. The strategic choices of social movements create structural constraints, too. The strategic action of identity-building shapes the structural constraints at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels. Taking a social constructionist approach to understand structural constraints explains why some constraints matter to the movement and others do not. Of course, the attempts to build movement identity are not always successful. Due to a lack of social skills or the rival identity work of opponents, a social movement may not achieve the movement identity that the social actors originally wanted. However, a failed attempt to build movement identity
still represents the actions of social actors who are involved in the creation of structural constraints.

**Strategic Choices and Reconfiguration of Structural Constraints**

Strategic choices not only create the initial structural constraints of the social movement but also change them. Since the social movement faces multiple problems and most problems represent dilemmas, the trade-off in strategic choices may change the shared meaning of the movement and the relationships between the movement and the broad field environment. While the influence of the trade-off does not always change because of the reproductive mechanism in the social movement, some strategic choices do change the structural constraints.

This change can occur on individual, organizational, and environmental levels of structural constraints. First, a strategic choice may alter constraints at the individual level, by shaping social actors’ movement imagination. The outcome of the strategic choice may reshape social actors’ projection of the development of the social movement.

Second, the strategic choice may change the strategic capacity, the structural constraint at the organizational level. The trade-off of the strategic choices may enact the suppressed disputes between different sub-groups in the movement. An awakening of disputes not only leads to internal conflicts but also to the reorganization of the movement’s leaders. The leaders who lose may leave the movement.

Finally, on the environmental level, the strategic choice may reshape the relationships between the social movement and the surrounding fields that constitute the movement’s political and cultural contexts. For example, Stephen Ellingson (1997) suggested a dialectical relationship between discourse and events.
In his study of the abolition movement in Cincinnati in the 1830s, the discourse of anti-abolitionists received widespread public support. The idea that “abolitionism threatened the city’s trade with the south, as well as the security of the city and the nation” prevailed in the city (1997: 268). However, after the mob action of anti-abolitionists throughout the summer of 1835 and into the early months of 1836, abolitionists contended that anti-abolitionism threatened the political and economic security of the city and city residents agreed because they witnessed the destruction caused by the anger mob. Therefore, using violence to suppress abolitionism was not a strategy available to the anti-abolitionists. In the end, “abolitionism gained publicity, new constituents, and tacit permission to continue its activities in the city” (1997: 276).

Social Movements and the Reiterative Dilemma-Solving Process

Since the strategic choice unavoidably reshapes the structural constraints that the social movement faces, every strategic choice should be regarded as a connected rather than isolated event. As Haydu (1998:354) indicated, “[s]olutions may embody contradictions that generate later crises, and they bequeath tools and understandings with which later actors confront those crises.” We can say that past strategic choices constrain future strategic choices. This characteristic of strategic choices reveals the path-dependent relationships among them.

In a loose definition, path-dependency means that past events influence future events (Mahoney 2000). Figure 1 illustrates the loose meaning of path-dependency in dilemma-solving episodes.
In figure 1, the rise and fall of a social movement are linked by a strategy sequence. The structural constraints at time 1 shape the strategy the movement adopts to solve the first dilemma. The outcomes of the strategy reconfigure the previous structural constraints at time 2. The reconfigured structural constraints then constrain the strategic choice for the second dilemma at time 2. The same processes recur at later points in time and until the movement demobilizes.

In addition to the loose meaning of path-dependency, Mahoney (2000) identified two kinds of path-dependency sequences in the research of historical sociology. The first is the self-reinforcing sequence. This sequence emphasizes that the initial event creates a lock-in effect on future events. The lock-in effect means that “initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse the direction” (Mahoney 2000:512). The second type of sequence is termed the reactive
sequence. “In a reactive sequence, each event in the sequence is both a reaction to an antecedent event and a cause of subsequent events” (Mahoney 2000:526). The logic of the reactive sequence is that the initial event A leads to event B, event B leads to event C, and event C leads to the ending event D. Reactive sequences are characterized by “backlash processes that transform and perhaps reverse early events” (Mahoney 2000:526).

Mahoney’s categorization of temporal sequences indicates two major logics in existing studies of path-dependency. The first is reproduction logic, which focuses on how social actors’ choices reproduce existing patterns. The second considers that a social actor’s decision is a turning point that can transform existing patterns. While Mahoney argued that these two logics are incompatible, I argue that the strategy sequences of social movements demonstrate both logics.

To integrate the reproduction and turning point logics, I distinguish between two types of strategic dilemmas. The first type I call contingent dilemmas, which are produced by historical accidents. Because contingent dilemmas are closely related to historical context, the social movement only faces them at specific points in time. The second type I term recurring dilemmas, which are embedded in the fundamental contradictions in the field in which the social movement engages. In this situation, recurring dilemmas are unresolvable and entangle the movement.

The dilemma-solving processes of these two types of strategies demonstrate different logics of path-dependency. The dilemma-solving in contingent dilemmas illustrates turning point logic: Earlier decisions account for the strategic dilemmas and choices at future points in time. The dilemma-solving in recurring dilemmas demonstrates reproduction logic. The dilemma-solving process of recurring dilemmas is what Haydu (1998) called the “reiterative problem-solving process”: The social movement confronts a problem that cannot be permanently solved and that
keeps coming back to the process of strategy-making in the movement. In other words, the strategy can only temporarily push recurring dilemmas into the background. If the social movement makes other moves, recurring dilemmas may return to the foreground.

I argue that the dilemma-solving processes of contingent and recurring dilemmas are interwoven. The recurring dilemma is the thread confining the episodes of contingent dilemma-solving. Although a strategic choice for a contingent dilemma can be a turning point that leads the social movement in a new direction, its recurring dilemma always shadows the choice. Even if the contingent dilemma does not directly relate to the recurring dilemma, the strategic choice for the contingent dilemma is still shaped by the recurring dilemma. Moreover, the solution for the contingent dilemma may awaken a recurring dilemma and bring it back to the foreground. In other words, although social actors can build the developmental path of the social movement, the movement’s recurring problem constrains a degree of freedom in the building. Since movement identity constructs the social order within the social movement and the relationship between the movement and the broad field environment, I argue that the building of movement identity is one recurring dilemma that the social movement must struggle with during its whole life course.

Based on my argument about contingent and recurring dilemmas, I propose the reiterative dilemma-solving model to examine path-dependent relationships among the dilemma-solving processes of contingent and recurring dilemmas. Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of this model.
In this model, the recurring dilemma is a main theme that connects the episodes of contingent dilemma-solving. The contingent dilemmas form a reactive sequence, and the strategic choices in response to the contingent dilemmas produce future strategic dilemmas and choices through reconfiguration of the social movements’ external environment and internal organization. However, rather than following a straight line, the sequence of contingent dilemmas follows a curve that constantly leads the dilemma-solving back to the movement’s recurring dilemma. When social actors want to solve a contingent dilemma, the choice and the outcome of the choice are always shadowed by the recurring dilemma. By distinguishing contingent dilemmas from recurring dilemmas and demonstrating the intertwined relationship between these two types of strategic dilemmas, the reiterative dilemma-solving model not only helps in understanding how the social movement produces its fate but also captures the complicated process in the path-dependency among strategic choices.
The Political Context in Taiwan

To give readers a picture of the developments of the three movements, this section introduces the political context in Taiwan. The political system in Taiwan is composed of two major political party camps. The first is called the “blue” camp and is composed of the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP), and the New Party (NP); the second is termed the “green” camp and includes the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) and the Taiwanese Solidarity Union (TSU). The most significant difference between these two camps involves their stances on national identity. This difference has resulted from the complicated relationship between China and Taiwan. The blue camp claims that Taiwanese is also Chinese and takes a pro-unification position that Taiwanese should re-unite with mainland China. The green camp argues that Taiwanese is not Chinese and takes a pro-independence position (Schubert 2004).

Blue and green refer not only to different political players but also to a restrictive master frame that shapes how the Taiwanese people recognize, interpret, and evaluate public issues (Goffman 1974; Snow and Benford 1992). I have termed this frame the “either blue or green” frame. This frame is referred to as the master frame because it dominates the Taiwanese people’s interpretation of public issues. It is restrictive because it highlights rather than bridges the differences between the blue and the green camps: Once a social movement is treated as a blue movement, it loses support from the green camp; by the same token, supporters of the blue camp are unlikely to attend the protests and demonstrations of the green camp (Chao 2006).

The reason that the “either blue or green” frame has becomes such a dominant frame has its roots in Taiwanese history. The KMT retreated to Taiwan after it lost China to the Chinese Communist Party (which established the People’s Republic of
China) in 1949 and started its single ruling party governance. To claim its authority to govern China, the KMT took several actions to maintain its control. For example, the KMT froze the National Assembly by the law of “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion.” Therefore, the structure of the National Assembly still corresponded to pre-revolutionary governance in China, since 670 representatives in this organization were elected in China in the late 1940s. The legitimacy of the KMT began to be challenged in 1980s. The first oppositional party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established in 1986. The DPP not only condemned the Taiwanese political system as anachronistic, but also mobilized by ethnicity. The opposition forces criticized the political system in Taiwan for still being dominated by Chinese Mainlanders who had taken power over the island more than four decades earlier (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan 1990:2). Islanders, who constituted a large part of Taiwanese society, did not have a voice in political decisions. To counter the DPP, Chinese Mainlanders became the die-hard supporters of the KMT. To win elections, both parties iteratively mobilized by ethnicity and therefore deepened the gap between Mainlanders and Islanders. After long-term practices of political conflict and opposition, people in Taiwan were imbued with the different meanings of the colors blue and color green. Therefore, the “either blue or green” is a powerful frame that is hard to shake off for Taiwanese in interpreting political issues.

The “either blue or green” frame poses a critical difficulty for social movements in Taiwan. To counter any social movement that challenges them, both the blue and the green camps strategically and constantly label the movement as helping the opposing camp. When a social movement is labeled as a blue or a green movement, the legitimacy of the movement decreases because the movement is not a “social” movement anymore but a “political” movement. The three social movements I
selected all faced this restrictive master frame in different ways: The blue camp’s post-election protest fell completely into a confrontation between the blue and the green camp; the Reds strategically framed itself as a civic movement that obtained support from both the blue and the green camps; the Wild Strawberries highlighted itself as a student movement to put the conflicts of the blue and the green camps in the background.

Apart from the general political cultures, social movements in Taiwan face the same legal regulation. Protests and demonstrations in Taiwan are regulated by the Assembly and Parade Law. According to that law, any protest must receive approval a week in advance, and local governments have the authority to approve or disapprove protest applications. While the local governments usually approve the applications, the law gives the local government a legal basis for disapproving the applications or even dispelling the assembly. The Assembly and Parade Law means that the local government is an important player that interacts with social movements. The relationships between social movements and local government shape how the local government enforces the law. The local government may enforce the law aggressively or passively. Moreover, it may change its original attitude if the social movements reconfigure the relationships between them and the local government. If we combine the “either blue or green” frame with the role of the local government, the picture becomes more complicated. For example, the Reds defined its campaign as a civic movement to keep from being labeled a partisan movement. However, since the Reds’ target, President Shui-bian Chen, was from the green camp, the green camp continually labeled the Reds as a blue movement. At the same time, the mayor of the Taipei City government, Ying-jeou Ma, was a political super star of the blue camp. In this situation, the relationship between the Reds and the Taipei City government became very tricky. On the one hand, they had the same enemy; on the
other, having the same enemy might easily connect the Reds to the blue camp. As I will show in the next chapters, this tricky relationship with the blue camp influenced how the Reds solved the contingent and recurring dilemmas that the movement faced.

Although the social movements operated in the same political context, as I will show, their different strategic choices constructed and reconstructed the structural constraints they encountered. Their strategic choices formed different strategy sequences that explain why these three movements demonstrated different developmental paths.

**Introduction of the Cases**

Before entering into discussion of the building of my model, I will give readers a general picture of the background and the development of these three movements. The first case is the blue camp’s post-election protest. In March 2004, the blue camp claimed that the outcome of the presidential election was unfair because of several suspicious actions by the ruling party during the election. To urge the Central Election Commission to seize and seal all ballot boxes for a recount, the candidates of the blue camp, Chan Lien and James Song, and the supporters of the blue camp occupied the plaza on Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the presidential office. The protest lasted for one week; the leaders wanted to frame their protest as for the public good. However, the attempt was not successful. The protest was regarded as a campaign for the party interests of the blue camp because the leaders and participants were the politicians and supporters of the blue camp. In the protest, the leaders and participants clearly displayed their political identity. This composition of leaders and participants made the protest appear as a standard blue camp activity and influenced how other players, such as the green camp and the general public,
interacted with the protest.

The second case consists of the Reds in 2006. The Reds consisted of a civic anti-corruption movement to impeach President Shui-bian Chen in reaction to his family’s scandals over alleged misuse of the presidential office's special state funds and insider trading on the stock market. Ming-teh Shih, the founder and most important leader of this anti-corruption movement, asked the participants to wear red clothing to demonstrate their discontent and to participate in the campaign, which resulted in the movement being called the Reds. The Reds movement occurred from August through October 2006. Reds’ leaders announced the plan to launch a protest against President Shui-bian Chen on August 15. After half a month’s preparation, the movement formally went to the streets in September 9. The Reds movement ended after a gigantic protest on October 10. The Reds successfully established themselves as a civic movement in the beginning stage, distancing themselves from the political conflicts between the blue and the green camps and therefore obtaining support from the public. The civic identity also shaped the strategic capacity and preference of the Reds. To convince people that the Reds movement was for the public good and not for party interests, the Reds recruited non-politicians and social movement novices into the leadership team. With this composition of the leaders, the Reds tended to adopt innovative, legal strategies. However, as I will show, the successful establishment of the civic identity paradoxically resulted in the breakdown of that civic identity and rekeyed the meaning of the Reds into a political protest organized by the blue camp. This situation frustrated Reds’ leaders. They realized the difficulty of maintaining the Reds as a civic movement and therefore decided to end the protest.

The third case consists of the Wild Strawberries. The Wild Strawberries was a student movement occurring in 2008 between October and November. The origin of
the Wild Strawberries was discontent with the government’s undemocratic performance during the visit of the Chinese emissary, Yu-lin Chen. Since the leaders of the Wild Strawberries defined the movement as a student movement, most of the leaders and participants were students. This movement identity not only shaped the structural constraints of the Wild Strawberries but also accounted for why its development diverged from the leaders’ original plan. Because the social base of the Wild Strawberries consisted of students who did not have much social movement experience, the participants held a romantic image of their protest and hoped that they could reach the same achievement as the model student movements they knew, such as the Wild Lily movement in 1990. Therefore, although the launchers of the Wild Strawberries planned the protest to end after one day, the atmosphere at the site of protest compelled them to continue the protest. The student identity connected the development of the Wild Strawberries to university life, which in turn influenced the rise and fall of the Wild Strawberries.

**Why These Three Social Movements?**

I chose to compare these three movements for two reasons. First, they built quite different movement identities, allowing me to examine how movement identity constructs and changes the structural constraints of social movements. The blue camp’s post-presidential election was recognized as a partisan movement, the Reds were defined as a civic movement, and the Wild Strawberries were framed as a student movement. Through comparison of these three movements, we can see how different movement identities lead to different structural constraints. Second, to highlight the influence of strategic choices on the development of social movements, it is better to decrease the environmental diversity of social movements. The social movements I selected occurred in a short time span, which meant the three cases
faced a similar environment. Therefore, how the reiterative dilemma-solving process produces different shapes in social movements becomes clear.

Data

I draw upon two types of data in the current study, interviews and media reports. For the first component, I interviewed 7 leaders from the Reds and 16 leaders from the Wild Strawberries. The Reds had a close leadership team and I was able to reach almost all its leaders. However, the Wild Strawberries had a loose leadership team with numerous leaders. I used snowball sampling to choose the interviewees. In every interview, I asked the interviewees to recall and identify the challenges they faced, the strategies they adopted to deal with the challenges, and the reasons for making their strategic choices. Because some interviewees of the Wild Strawberries wanted to keep their information confidential, I have used letters to represent them when I refer to their opinions. The interviewees of the Reds had no such concern, so I have used their real names when I cite their interviews.

The second type of data that I used consisted of media reports. These data supplement the interviews of the leaders in three ways. First, media reports provide a general picture of the developments of my cases. Second, the media conducted intensive interviews with the leaders of my cases. These newspaper interviews provide important data to illustrate the strategy-making of the Reds, especially the interviews conducted with the leaders I did not reach. Third, the in-depth interview data may have problems with retrospection, since they are filtered through memory and post-hoc account-making. The media reports are important to balance this

9 Unfortunately, I could not interview the leaders of the blue camp’s post-election protest. Because all the leaders were in high positions in the blue camp or in the legislative department, they did not have time or the motivation to be interviewed. Therefore, I used secondary data to investigate the relationship between strategy and the development of the blue camp’s post-election protest.
problem because they suggest what the leaders were considering when the Reds
movement was still developing. Because I could not interview the leaders of the blue
camp’s post-election protest, I used this case as a secondary case.

Chapter Arrangement

Following this introduction, four chapters present my arguments. In the second
chapter, I discuss how the strategic choices of the social movements created their
movement identities. I especially focus on the strategy of building initial movement
identity. In the third chapter, I discuss how a movement identity shapes the
movement imagination, strategic capacity and environmental constraint. Since
movement identity is a significant source of the local order in social movements,
focusing on the process of identity building can clearly show how social movements
create the structural constraints they confront. The fourth chapter focuses on how
these social movements reconfigured their structural constraints through their
strategic actions. If a movement identity is a necessity to mobilize and form a social
movement, we can regard the structural constraints that are established through the
strategic choices on movement identity as the movement’s initial structural
constraints. The following strategic choices may reconfigure those initial structural
constraints. Because every strategic choice carries a trade-off, every strategic action
of the social movement may wittingly or unwittingly change the initial structural
constraints. Since the structural constraints are not fixed but continuously
constructed through the social movement’s actions, early strategic choices shape the
strategic choices at later points in time. To demonstrate the path-dependency
between strategic choices, I propose the reiterative dilemma-solving model and use
the cases to illustrate the model. I will demonstrate that the fates of the social
movements can be explained through the movement’s strategy sequences. In the
concluding Chapter, I discuss the contribution of the current study.
In the dilemma-solving approach, the collective identity of the social movement plays an important role in shaping the structural constraints that the movement encounters. On the one hand, the movement identity is the source of the shared meaning among the activists that shapes their movement imagination and the movement organization (Clemens 1996; Fligstein 2001). On the other hand, the movement identity mediates the relationships between the movement and the broad field environment (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012). Moreover, movement identity is not given but constructed by the strategic actions of social actors. Since the relationships among people can be multiple and ambiguous, social actors can take this opportunity to install the movement identity they prefer in order to buttress the movement through identity work (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Snow and McAdam 2000; Mische 2007). Therefore, the building of the movement identity is an appropriate starting point to investigate how social actors’ strategic actions create their own structural constraints.

To demonstrate my arguments, I compare three social movements in Taiwan between 2004 and 2008. Each strategically built its movement identity. The protest of the blue camp after the presidential election also adopted an exclusive identity that presented itself as a partisan protest. The Reds adopted an inclusive identity and framed the movement as a civic movement. The Wild Strawberries adopted an exclusive identity that limited participants to students. Comparison of the identity-building in the three cases demonstrates how social actors’ choices regarding movement identity produce the structural constraints they encounter.

This chapter has three sections. The first describes the identity-building work in
these three movements. I focus on why the leaders chose particular identities to buttress the movements and what strategies they exploited to create the movement identities. The second section shows the structural constraints that the movements confronted and the causal relations between the movement identity and constraints. I focus on how trade-offs in strategic choices in movement identity influenced the creation of structural constraints. The concluding section focuses on the relationships among agency, structure, and strategic action fields.

Identity Work: Partisan, People’s, or Student Movement?

As Snow and McAdam (2000: 47) indicated, a social movement faces three problems when it conducts identity work: “(1) the construction of collective identity through the creation of symbolic resources and boundaries constitutive of collective identity; (2) the problem of identity correspondence; and (3) the maintenance of both collective identity and the correspondence of the personal with the collective.” In this section, I will discuss how the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries solved these problems to build their movement identities.

The blue camp’s protest: A partisan movement

The post presidential-election protest of the blue camp resulted from losing the 2004 presidential election by a narrow margin of 29,518 votes. The candidates for president and vice president from the blue camp, Chan Lien (KMT) and James Soong (PFP), accused President Shui-bian Chen, who was running for re-election, of manipulating the election, which resulted in the defeat of the blue camp. The blue camp especially focused on the shooting of President Shui-bian Chen and Vice President Annette Liu when they were campaigning just one day before the voting
The blue camp suspected the shooting was staged by the green camp in order to encourage potential supporters of the green camp to vote for President Chen and Vice President Annette Liu on March 20.\(^{10}\)

The protest was never in the blue camp’s plan because the blue camp was very confident that the team of Chan Lien and James Soong would win the election by a large margin. This confident attitude stemmed from the integration of the blue camp. In the previous presidential election in 2000, the blue camp had fragmented and Shui-bian Chen took advantage of this division to win the presidential office. This optimistic anticipation was supported by polls. All the polls revealed that the blue camp would easily win back the regime. Therefore, when the campaign headquarters of the blue camp faced the unexpected loss, the blue camp only hastily discussed what Chan Lien and James Soong should do to deal with the defeat.

While Ying-jeou Ma, the campaign manager and the mayor of Taipei City, suggested that Chan Lien and James Soong should admit the loss, let the supporters go home, and solve the dispute through legal channels, both of them disagreed. Their strong emotions made them refuse to acknowledge the loss. After this short discussion, Chan Lien spoke to the angry blue supporters in front of the blue camp’s campaign headquarters. Chan Lien angrily said:

Such a thin margin is the result of the uncertainties left by yesterday’s gunshots, the truth of which has yet to be clarified... It was an unfair election. Therefore, we will file a lawsuit against the election result. We demand that the CEC (Central Election Commission) seal all ballot boxes nationwide immediately and wait for the authorities to recount the ballots (Taipei Times, March 23, 2004).

\(^{10}\) For example, Chan Lien and James Soong asked to examine President Chen’s gunshot wound after they lost the election. James Soong even said “all of a sudden everything was turned around because of a mysterious shooting that happened on the eve of the election” (Taipei Times, March 23, 2004).
Chan Lien and James Soong stayed with supporters in front of the campaign headquarters until the early morning of March 21. Then Chan Lien led the one thousand plus supporters to Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office and started the protest.\footnote{Taipei Times, March 22, 2004.}

Although the protest was not well planned, the blue camp still made a quick choice to build a movement identity for the protest. Even though the protest resulted from the frustration in the blue camp regarding the outcome of the election and anger at the green camp’s manipulation, the blue camp wanted to frame the protest as a civic movement for the public good. For example, after insisting that the result of the election should be declared invalid, Soong told the supporters:

Taiwan’s democracy is the most effective weapon to resist the Chinese Communist Party. If we Taiwanese destroy this weapon on our own, what other defensive weapons do we have? The unfair election was full of doubtful points. The unfair election let us see clearly the political manipulations from the very beginning to the end of the election… The unjust election will not bring the people of Taiwan a stable life. Only when we Taiwanese tell the world that we want a true democracy will the world respect us (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).

This speech emphasized that the anger of the blue camp was not because Chan Lien and James Soong lost the election but because the manipulations of the green camp harmed the most valuable asset of Taiwan, that is, democracy. In other words, the
blue camp’s protest was for the public good, not partisan interests. To convince people of this intention, the blue camp pointed toward what they claimed were several Democratic Progress Party (DPP) cheating practices. First, the blue camp strongly suggested that the shooting was staged. The goal of this staged shooting was to bond green supporters together and obtain compassion votes. Second, the blue camp argued that the outcome of the presidential election was biased because the DPP bundled the election with a critical referendum. The blue camp argued that the referendum was against the law and further alleged that the referendum was also an important factor that might affect the result of the election since it had nothing to do with the presidential poll. Third, the blue camp accused the DPP of vote-stuffing. For example, the KMT listed several problematic ballots in Kaohsiung City (the mayor was from the DPP). The problems included the mistaken counting of votes, missing votes, and counting the presidential votes and referendum votes simultaneously. Fourth, the blue camp claimed that the Ministry of National Defense ordered 200,000 military and police personnel to stay at their posts instead of going home to vote because of the staged shooting. Since the military was an ironclad supporter of the blue camp, the blue camp complained that the Ministry of National Defense’s decision was part of the staged shooting that intentionally led the blue camp to lose the vote.

While the blue camp wanted to frame the protest as a civic movement, that

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12 In the referendum, voters were asked to vote yes or no on two questions. First: The Taiwan people demand that the cross-strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should mainland China refuse to dismantle the missiles targeting Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, do you agree that the government should purchase more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities? Second: Do you agree that our government should undertake negotiations with mainland China on the basis of a "peace and stability" framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples of both sides? (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).
13 Taipei Times, March 24, 2004
attempt failed. Since the protest was not pre-planned, the blue camp had no time to coordinate the reactions of blue politicians and supporters to the loss nationwide. The extreme reactions were led by the blue figures. For example, after the supporters of the blue camp learned the result of the election, they rioted at the prosecutors’ offices in Taichung and Kaohsiung. The legislators of KMT and PFP led those riots.\textsuperscript{16} The blue camp also did not have time to conduct appropriate impression management for its protest. At the site of the protest, Taipei City, KMT and PFP politicians talked to the crowd in turns. Moreover, the blue camp did not regulate the clothing or the flags that participants wore and held in the protest. Therefore, the protesters in front of the Presidential Office waved national flags and campaign flags and cried out campaign slogans.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, the protest looked like a blue camp activity. The same scene occurred on March 22 with 20 blue camp legislators in the Central Election Commission. Protestors demanded that the commission postpone the presentation of a certificate to the winner of the presidential election.\textsuperscript{18} These examples show that without proper symbolic regulation, the protest of the blue camp looked like a repeat of the blue camp’s campaign.

The case of the blue camp’s post-presidential election demonstrates the importance in ambiguity to identity-building. James Soong’s speech attempted to blur the difference between the colors and led people to focus on the DPP’s undemocratic performance. Therefore, he urged, people might put their different political stances in brackets and work together to protect the operation of the democratic system. However, due to weak coordination, some performances brought

\textsuperscript{16} The riot in Taichung was led by Chih-hui Shen, the legislator of the PFP. Yi Chiu, the PFP legislator, led the riot in Kaohsiung (Taipei Times, March 22, 2004).
\textsuperscript{17} Taipei Times, March 23, 2004.
\textsuperscript{18} Taipei Times, March 23, 2004.
the party line to the table. The confrontation between different political camps was not ambiguous any more. In this situation, both the public and the protesters still defined the protest as a part of the election campaign. The protest was seen as being in the interests of the blue camp, not for the public good.

*The Reds: A Civic Movement*

The Reds started with the anger of the green figures toward President Shui-bian Chen’s scandals over alleged misuse of the presidential office's special state funds and insider trading on the stock market. The leader of the Reds, Ming-teh Shih, the former DPP chairman, convened people to demand that he resign. This movement was later called the “Reds” because the movement asked participants to wear red clothing when they joined in the protest.

Some green figures felt angry because President Chen deviated from the ideals of the green camp and his scandal significantly damaged the public image of the green camp, which argued that Taiwan is not a part of China. For example, James Jian (former DPP legislator) talked about why he joined the movement:

Shui-bian Chen’s corruption was an injury to the green regime. When the independent camp finally led Taiwan to a corrupt country, how could we let people believe that the DPP was a clean and loving Taiwan political party? It represented huge harm to the ideal of Taiwan independence (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

John Wei (an attorney with a deep relationship with the green camp) had a similar comment when he talked about his feeling toward President Chen:
I was very frustrated and upset with President Chen’s corruption. I have joined social movements for many years. We always critically judge the KMT’s every move. So we should critically judge everything in Taiwan, too… I had a deep relationship with the DPP. I constantly helped the DPP after I became a lawyer. My uncle was a DPP legislator. Therefore, I looked for advice from some seniors in social movements and the green camp. I asked them if we step should out. Several of them encouraged me. They said we are different from the blue camp. We couldn’t let A-bian (President Chen’s nickname) shame us. We could not tolerate his wrongdoing just because A-bian was a Taiwanese and we love Taiwan (Date of interview: 8/23/2011).

Some green figures were dissatisfied with A-bian because he transformed the DPP into an autocratic party. For example, Li-ping Wang (former DPP legislator) complained about President Chen in an interview:

We did our best in A-bian’s first presidential election campaign in 2000. We hoped the DPP could do better than the KMT regime. However, the situation was a constant mess even in 2004… the DPP was a decentralized organization with different intra-party factions. Its culture was looking for the balance among these factions. But when A-bian became the chairman, everything was controlled by him and his “Bian” gang. The “Bian” faction was very arrogant in the DPP. I felt this situation was bad for the DPP (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

To transform anger to action, Ming-teh Shih (a historic democracy and pro-independence activist with ties to the green camp) decided to activate a civic
movement to press President Chen to resign. Ming-teh Shih wanted a movement that bridged the blue and the green. Ming-teh Shih’s intention was demonstrated in his speech at the launching press conference on August 12. He condemned President Chen and said that he could “give Taiwanese dreams and hopes”; he argued that he launched the campaign because “I (Ming-teh Shih) love Taiwan, justice, and integrity.” In his speech, Ming-teh Shih emphasized that the campaign was intended to promote democracy and the public good, not to promote any political party’s interests. This main theme was also reflected in other leaders’ words. For example, several interviewees confirmed this intention in interviews:

Po-yun Hsu (director of a culture organization and an adviser in Reds campaign): “We didn’t fight the blue or the green. We fought corruption. Everyone who hated corruption was welcome to participate in this movement” (Date of interview: 8/17/2011).

Nan-chi Chang (professor of National Yang-Ming University): “I think that the Reds were a real civic movement. It was our self-expectation. Corruption was a public issue. The Reds gave people a chance to do something” (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Fu-chung Chang (former DPP director of organization affairs): “The Reds were a movement across blue and green. It was our initial expectation, goal, and a wish. In the beginning, we just focused on the president’s corruption, his family’s corruption, and his trusted followers’ corruption. The strong reaction to corruption was not about blue and green” (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

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To convince people that the Reds movement was a real civic movement, Ming-teh Shih and Reds’ leaders employed several strategies. First, they wanted a gigantic movement. From the perspective of the Reds’ leaders, a huge movement was definitely a civic movement because no political party had such mobilization capacity. To demonstrate the strong social base of the Reds, Ming-teh Shih called on a million people in Taiwan to each make a donation of NTD$100 (US$3) to fund the anti-corruption movement. Once the movement received donations from one million people, it would formally start. In the official news note, Ming-teh Shih explained the meaning of the donation:

First, this one hundred dollar is a commitment. Donors commit that they will use any way they can to join this “anti-corruption and anti-Bian” movement until the movement succeeds. Second, this one hundred dollar is an authorization. People authorize us to fight against corruption and A-bian (Shih 2009: 63).

The donations served two functions for the Reds. First, the donations redrew the boundary among Taiwanese. The donations categorized people into those who were against corruption (if they donated) and people who supported corruption (if they did not donate). In this situation, the party line was blurred and the civic identity was in the spotlight. Second, the act of donating produced a bond and commitment among the donors. For example, “have you donated 100 dollars?” became a popular greeting for people in that period. The prevalence of this greeting indicated that people assumed that everyone donated and we all were a part of the anti-corruption campaign.
According to the interviewees, the donation was Ming-teh Shih’s idea. Some of the interviewees did worry about this activity because they feared that the donation might give the green camp a chance to discredit the intentions of the anti-corruption movement. For example, James Jian worried that “people might doubt and scrutinize where the money went because we were an anti-corruption movement.” However, the donation plan was a big hit. The speed of donation receipt was surprisingly fast, faster than Shih Ming-teh and other leaders expected. The movement received more than 130 million Taiwanese dollars by August 15 (Shih 2009: 45). The leaders even had to close the bank account one week later to avoid receiving too much in donations. The enthusiastic donations helped the Reds movement demonstrate its enormous social base and convince people that it was a civic rather than a partisan movement.

The second strategy that Ming-teh Shih exploited was to create a leadership system that could persuade people that the Reds movement was not for private interests but for the public good. First, Ming-teh Shih wanted a leadership system without active politicians. John Wei mentioned this principle in an interview I conducted with him:

Me, Mr. Shih and other leaders…we didn’t occupy any political position at that time. We were not legislators or party leaders. We strongly discouraged active politicians from entering the leadership system (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

This principle aimed to distinguish the Reds from political activities because the campaign was not led by active politicians who were looking out for their political interests. Next, Ming-teh Shih planned to invite people with green backgrounds into the leadership team and exclude people with blue backgrounds from it. By applying
this principle, Ming-teh Shih wanted to present the anti-corruption movement as a reaction of the green camp to President Chen’s scandal rather than an instrumental tactic of the blue camp.\textsuperscript{20} Nan-chi Chang talked about the composition of the leaders:

In the leadership system of the Reds, many people were green, including chairman Shih himself. Many people who participated in decision-making were old green (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Fu-chung Chang not only confirmed this intention but also ascribed the success of the Reds to this strategy in the interview:

Because of his life experience, Ming-teh Shih was not only well known but also admired in Taiwan. And he was the chairman of the DPP. Although he had left the DPP by that time, people still perceived that he was a part of the green camp. People still perceived that the movement led by Shih represented the self-reflection of the green camp. Therefore, people agreed more with the demands of the Reds and joined the Reds (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

In addition, Ming-teh Shih wanted to recruit public figures without salient political colors into the leadership team. This principle helped the Reds frame the movement as a civic movement rather a political activity because not all leaders were political figures. Po-yun Hsu (director of a culture organization and an adviser in Reds campaign) talked about the difference between him and the green leaders in an interview:

\textsuperscript{20} However, due to the confrontation between the blue and green camps, no mainstream political figures of the green camp formally joined the leadership system. Hence, Ming-teh Shih could only recruit marginal figures from the green camp.
If you want to use colors to categorize, more core leaders were green. Almost 80% was green. Ming-teh Shih, Li-ping Wang, Fu-chung Chang, Yao-chang Chen, and Yao-Chian Wei were all green. They were DPP members. Some of them even experienced the birth of the DPP. But I am not. They wanted me to join probably because I did not belong to any color. Gu-fang Lin and me, we did not have colors because we are cultural men (Date of interview: 8/16/2011).

The association of these marginal figures and non-politicians still drew a clear line between a civic movement and a political conflict.21 This association symbolized the Reds as a reaction of the green camp and the public to a corrupt president rather than a tool to obtain political interests.

The third strategy involved symbolic work. This strategy can be divided into passive and active approaches. On the passive side, the leaders suppressed the symbols that might connect the Reds to any political camp. The leaders forbade any political symbol or slogan in the activities of the Reds. One problem that the Reds confronted was the impact of the “either blue or green” frame. Under this cultural frame, blue politicians and supporters were more motivated than green politicians and supporters to participate in Reds activities. If this situation was overtly apparent in the Reds, the Reds would be more easily to be labeled as a blue movement. When I asked how they dealt with this problem, Fu-chung Chang simply said: “No political flags and symbols were allowed in Reds activities. We strongly prohibited them.” Po-yun Hsu’s words reflected the consideration of the Reds’ leaders:

Obviously, blue people took a big part. I estimated 60% of participants were

21 John Wei, James Jain, Po-yun Hsu, and Li-ping Wang mentioned this point in the interviews.
blue people in the beginning. Then Orange (PFP’s symbolic color) and Yellow (NP’s symbolic color) joined. Both parties claimed they were real blue. (To deal with this problem), we did not allow any political flags and slogans to exist in the Reds (Date of interview: 8/16/2011).

John Wei talked about this solution further in the interview:

Mr. Shih’s original plan was recruiting green people first. However, green people were afraid of joining. Yes, I agree that the blue camp wanted to get some interest from the Reds. However, we had some constraints. If the blue people could follow the rules, of course, they could stay in the campaign (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

Li-ping Wang provided an example to illustrate that they did enforce the rule:

Lon-bin Hao was the KMT candidate for the next Taipei City mayor. He came to distribute breakfast. His people held his campaign flags. We asked them to clean up the flags. We emphasized to them that the Reds were an anti-corruption movement! (Date of interview: 6/19/2011)

The Reds’ leaders also wanted the blue politicians to hide their political identity when they joined the Reds. For example, when the journalist asked him about whether Ying-jeou Ma (the chairman of the KMT) and James Soong (the chairman of the PFP) could join the Reds, Ming-teh Shih answered, “Mr. Ma and Soong are welcome to donate, but chairmen Ma and Soong are not. If the KMT and the PFP mobilize their constituents, the anti-corruption movement will give rise to conflicts
between blue and green, reunified and independent.”22 Actually, many blue politicians, including Ying-jeou Ma, donated 100 dollars to the movement. When they endorsed the donation, they just added their names without any political or party positions.23 Jerry Fan, the Reds spokesman, repeated this point in a newspaper interview. He said that “[t]he campaign would not welcome people with specific political goals to participate, but it would welcome anyone whose intention is to make Taiwan a better country.”24 Li-ping Wang summarized the necessity to prohibit any political symbol in the interview:

We wanted to maximize the number of participants. Therefore, we had to let people agree with us. Give them motivation to leave their homes and offices and join us. So we decided to get rid of all political symbols, including symbols of political parties and symbols of ethnic groups. We prohibited any noise that might contaminate our goal. Our only demand was anti-corruption (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

On the active level, the Reds wanted to create symbols to distinguish the movement from political parties. To form the Reds as a field that was independent of conventional political activities, the Reds’ leaders adopted some different symbols. First was the color, which represented the anti-corruption movement. The leaders decided to adopt red. According to Jerry Fan (director of a commercial agency and a core member of the leadership team who proposed several actions that were unusually seen in Taiwanese social movements), the proposer of this decision, red symbolized people’s anger toward President Chen’s scandal, and Reds’ leaders

23 UDN, August 16, 2006.
encouraged participants to wear red clothing. Nan-chi Chang explained the meaning of red further in the interview:

Red referred to the hot blood in our hearts. We all wanted a better country and we were passionate to join the movement and to show our anger. Our passion would never die. So it was good to use red to represent the anti-corruption movement. It was the right color. It meant we were passionate (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

This decision came with some noise; some leaders were uncomfortable because red was traditionally perceived as the color of the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan’s official foe for the past sixty years. Some male leaders just felt red was a female color. Nevertheless, the choice was successful. The scenes of the Reds activities were full of red. Li-ping Wang recalled the scenes of the Reds:

About 60% to 70% participants wore red clothing on the first day (September 1). On September 9, the date that the movement formally activated, all wore red clothing. In the “siege” on September 15, all you could see on the streets was red (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Jerry Fan also introduced the “Nazca line” to the Reds. The Nazca line was an entirely unknown symbol in Taiwan. Jerry Fan claimed it was a symbol in Peruvian culture. He argued that the Nazca line symbolized miraculous power for the local people in Peru. Jerry Fan drew Nazca lines at the site of the Reds activities and asked participants to march along the lines at regular intervals to show people’s discontent with President Chen. In addition to bringing symbols that were unusual in traditional
protests, the leaders encouraged people to cooperate by highlighting important values in Taiwan. Po-yun Hsu talked about this consideration in the interview:

Our goal was not producing conflict but looking for mutual understanding because we did want to fight the blue and the green camps. We fought corruption. Once this idea was clear, our job was to determine how to let blue and green people all support us and how to bring excellent people together. Therefore, first, we prohibited any political flags. Moreover, besides being “anti-corruption” and “anti-Bian,” we also had a slogan of “propriety (li, 禮), righteousness (yi, 義), honesty (lian, 廉) and shame (chi, 恥).” We wanted to let people know we wanted A-bian to step down because he was a person without propriety, righteousness, honesty, and shame (Date of interview: 8/16/2011).

Highlighting these traditional values produced an impact of culture resonance that connected the Reds discourse with people’s own daily experiences (Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 1992).

In addition, the Reds created a new style of protest. This new style helped the Reds draw a boundary between the Reds and other political activities. One example is the music repertoire played at Reds activities. Conventionally, the blue camp’s activities usually played patriotic songs in the Chinese language to show that the blue camp was the protector of the “Republic of China” (the official national name of Taiwan); in contrast, the green camp usually played folk songs in the Taiwanese language to show its pro-independence position. In other words, when people approached a political activity, they understood which camp the activity belonged to by listening to the language used in the activity. However, the Reds’ leaders did not
use Chinese patriotic songs or Taiwanese folk songs. Instead, they used Western symphonies. Po-yun Hsu talked about the symphonies used and why he chose them:

I chose Beethoven’s “Fate,” “Finlandia,” “A Hymn to My Country,” and “Formosa” and played them at the site of the sit-in. Let me explain why I chose these repertoires to you. The meaning of “Fate” to the Reds was direct. We were knocking on a gate of fate. I wanted to remind people of this through the strong opening of “Fate.” “Finlandia” was interesting. Russia defeated Finland. Seven years after the defeat, the composer wrote this song. The song touched Peter the Great. Therefore, Russia returned some lands to Finland. So, Finland, this country, could continue. “A Hymn to My Country” told people not to let corruption destroy our beautiful country. “Formosa” describes how our ancestors cultivated Taiwan. I suggested that these four songs could represent our symbolic power (Date of interview: 8/16/2011).

Although “Formosa” was a Chinese song, the other three were Western. This made it difficult for people to judge the color of the anti-corruption movement.

The strategies that Reds’ leaders adopted helped the Reds build the movement as a civic movement and create distance from the confrontation between the blue and the green camps. Joining or supporting the Reds became a nationwide fashion and being against A-bian was taken for granted. The media constantly reported that laypeople and public figures eagerly went to banks and transferred $100 to the Reds account. This fashion actually transformed into real action. According to the estimation of Taipei City Police Department’s Zhongzheng First District, around
100,000 protestors joined the first protest of the Reds on September 9. The number went up to 200,000 at the first siege on September 15. Nan-chi Chang indicated that the Reds were really a civic movement because:

The Reds were really across party lines. The participants were from different political parties. The demographic characteristics were diverse. You could see children, old men, women, and even housewives (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Kun-li Liu (the daily coordinator and trainer of the picketers) described strong support from society:

People automatically brought resources to the Reds. Many famous restaurants in Taipei City sent their food to the site. Once I forgot to turn off the microphone and I said that I did not see the dumplings from a particular restaurant. That afternoon, the restaurant brought five hundred rice dumplings to the site! (Date of interview: 6/19/2011)

All these strategies represented efforts to create ambiguity in the activities of the Reds that put partisanship in the background. Since it was difficult to obtain objective evidence (like an ID card) to judge people’s political standings, what people did in the protest became the only source by which to identify the supporters of the blue camp versus the supporters of the green camp. When a person had an official connection to the blue camp (e.g., a legislator of the blue camp), wore blue clothes,

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26 Taipei Times, September 16.
held the national flag, or spoke in the blue tone (e.g., “Taiwan is not an independent country”), that person could be identified as a supporter of the blue camp. If a movement is full of politicians from the blue camp, blue clothes, the national flag, and a blue tone, the movement can definitely be recognized as a part of the blue camp. However, all this information in the Reds was ambiguous: The Reds received support from more than one million people; the leadership team was without political figures from the blue camp; and the participants wore red, did not hold the national flag, and did not speak in the blue tone. Due to this ambiguity, the Reds were hard to connect to political camps, especially the blue camp.

The Wild Strawberries: A student movement

The story of the Wild Strawberries started with the visit to Taiwan of Yunlin Chen, the chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) of the Chinese government. He came to Taiwan to sign four agreements that enhanced cooperation between Taiwan and China in crime, economics, and postal services. When Yulin Chen arrived in Taiwan, the pro-independence groups, including the DPP and the anti-Chinese Communist Party groups like Falun Gong (Chinese spiritual practice, founded in 1992), organized protests. While people agreed that the police should protect Yunlin Chen’s safety, the police response was criticized as excessive and inappropriate. Examples that contributed to the anger of students included that fact that the police expropriated any symbols that the protesters carried, even the national flag, the protesters were excluded from the hotel where Yunlin Chen stayed, and a record store near the hotel that broadcast songs of Taiwan independence was forced to shut off the music. Discontented with the police over-response, hundreds of college professors and students launched a campaign to protest the government’s improper performance. Through a vote, the students chose the campaign’s name,
the “Wild Strawberries.”

Several interviewees explained that the government’s protection of Yulin Chen violated human rights and for this reason they joined the movement. Interviewee C talked about her experience in the Regent Hotel, where Yulin Chen met several important blue figures:

When I arrived at the Regent Hotel, I could not believe what I saw. I had never seen so many policemen in my life. I entered the hotel and then left. Then I moved around the hotel. When I moved around, I found that the activists concentrated in front of the hotel. Actually, the number of activists was not as many as I expected. However, the police surrounded the people. You could see a complex formation. They held big shields. I really felt weird and unrealistic because the number of policemen was overwhelmingly more than the number of activists (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

This experience made interviewee C decide to join the Wild Strawberries in front of the square at the building of Executive Yuan (the highest level of the executive branch, customarily translated as the Executive Yuan) to protest the government’s excessive reactions to people’s protest. Interviewee D also talked about how his personal experience motivated him to join the Wild Strawberries:

To me, the story did not begin about the evening of November 5 but November 3. TV reported that the government of Ying-jeou Ma prohibited

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27 The student movement was entitled “Wild Strawberries” on November 9, two days after being reconvened in Liberty Square (UDN, November 10, 2008). The name “Wild Strawberries” was determined by all the students through a vote. According to the interviewees, other candidates included “Taiwanese Black Bears” and “Black Craws.”
people from holding the national flag in the places that Yulin Chen passed or stayed. I never dreamed of it. I never dreamed that the KMT would prohibit people from holding the flag that the KMT loved very much. Of course, I did not love the flag. I just wanted to produce collision. Just wanted to know if the news was true or not (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

So my friends and I met in front of the College of Social Science at National Taiwan University. We ride motorcycles, several motorcycles. One motorcycle for two people. One rode and the other one took pictures or videos. We wanted to get pictures and videos to prove that the government removing the national flags did happen. You can see the video on Youtube. The police pulled us over in the place on Zhongshan N. Road around the Taipei Fine Art Museum (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

I remember that the police stopped us. One of my friends knew the law. He told me that the police had authority to seize our motorcycles. According to the Assembly and Parade Law, the police could make a consideration about collective riding. I did not want to lose my motorcycle. Yulin Chen had not left yet! I wanted to ride my motorcycle and do the same thing tomorrow! So we kept our bargain with the police. The police continuously asked us to leave the motorcycles to them but we just did not want to obey their order (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).  

28 In a news interview, one student used the same perspective to explain why she joined the Wild Strawberries: “When I saw on TV that protesters were being treated violently by the police, I felt really confused. How can the police be violent toward people who haven’t even broken the law and are just carrying the national flag?” (Taipei Times, November 7, 2008).
In addition to the dissatisfaction, the students argued that the government could not abuse the country’s esteem. The police performance that limited people’s freedom was another reason to motivate the students to activate a protest. Interviewee H talked about this when he explained why he joined the Wild Strawberries in his interview with me:

I joined the Wild Strawberries because some news reports made me dissatisfied with the government. For example, the most influential report was about a person who wanted to tape Yulin Chen. He saw Yulin Chen in the Grand Hotel and he used his camera to tape him. Then the police stopped him and wanted to check his ID. Some conflicts arose between the person and the police. In the end, the person was arrested and brought to a police station. It was really difficult for me to comprehend that we could not use a camera to tape a Chinese officer. I also saw many people on the internet say that they were going to the Regent Hotel to protest Yulin Chen. However, the police blocked them when they were far from the hotel. I felt these cases were all unreasonable and we needed to step out to protest (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

Because of these experiences, some students discussed the circumstances with their professors to see what moves they could make to show their dissatisfaction to the government. Interviewee E talked about this process in the interview:

I watched D’s video on the internet. I felt that the police did not just make a show but really wanted to block all protests. So I discussed it with Professor Ming-Tsung Li to evaluate the opportunity to activate a protest. We also
discussed this idea in my student club to see other people’s opinions (Date of interview: 6/30/2011).

A group of college professors and students met on November 5. At this meeting, the participants decided to convene a sit-in in front of the Executive Yuan to protest the police over-reaction to previous protests (Ho 2009). What kind of collective identity the sit-in should enact received a quick answer. While the organizers were professors and students, they took a “student” movement for granted. However, even though “student” seemed a natural movement identity, the organizers were still conscious of the advantages of enacting this collective identity. For example, interviewee D, a student who participated in the design of the Wild Strawberries, talked about the advantages of being a student movement:

I was cunning in that moment. Honestly speaking, compared to other kinds of social movements, I felt that it was better to use ‘student movement’ to launch the protest. ‘Student movement’ means purity and ideal-chasing in the Chinese tradition. It was the legacy of the May Fourth Movement (Chinese national renewal movement that started with the May 4, 1919, protest against the Treaty of Versailles), a social expectation to intellectuals. I think this legacy is very different from American student movements. So I thought that using a ‘student movement’ to promote our demands was best (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

In other words, although the organizers did not evaluate the benefits and costs of enacting a student identity, they did intentionally choose this solution to build the movement.
To build the Wild Strawberries as a student movement, the leaders adopted several strategies to convince the public and the participants. In the same period, the DPP and the Taiwanese Solidarity Union (TSU) also protested the government’s performance during the visit of Yunlin Chen. The leaders of the Wild Strawberries needed to keep their protest from mixing with these protests or they were taking a chance to be labeled as a green movement. The first safeguard was that the movement allowed only students to join the activities of the Wild Strawberries. Any non-students were turned away from the protest. The idea behind this strategy was simple: If all participants were students, of course it was a student movement. Therefore, the leaders mobilized through PTT (the most popular electronic board that university students used in Taiwan). Because most PTT users were students, it was an effective tool for the leaders to recruit “student” participants. Another move that the leaders adopted was the picket line. The students established a picket line around the sit-in area to distinguish the students and non-students. Since the ruling party at that time was the KMT, green supporters were motivated to join the students’ protest based on the logic of “either blue or green.” Although the students could not ban green supporters from coming, the green supporters were excluded from the sit-in area. In other words, the picket line functioned as a fine line that distinguished the student protest from other protests.

Although the students did not check the ID of everyone who wanted to attend the sit-in area, they did try to exclude people who were not students. For example, the minister of the Ministry of Education was at the site of the sit-in to show his concern for the students. However, the students who were attending the picket line stopped him and asked him to identify himself because he looked older.²⁹ The picket line let the students feel that the Wild Strawberries movement was indeed a student

²⁹ Upaper, November 11, 2008.
movement. Interviewee D talked about this feeling in the interview:

> I think that we needed the picket line to make the campaign look like a student movement and for the media to define us as a student movement. Therefore, we could have our influence even though our number was small. When we drew a boundary, the meaning as a student movement would be clear even if we actually had some non-student participants (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

The second strategy that students adopted was symbolic work. As in the case of the Reds, the Wild Strawberries suppressed debates over pro-reunification vs. pro-independence and highlighted their own symbols. To avoid having the movement perceived as a conflict between the blue and the green camps, the college professors and students who launched the campaign intentionally avoided any demand that might link the campaign to any political camp. Interviewee D recalled this consideration in the interview:

> When we discussed launching a campaign, I felt the passions of the blue and the green were strong in that moment. Therefore, I suggested that the campaign should not focus on Ying-jeou Ma (the president after 2008)… We didn’t want to be defined as an anti-Ma movement. We didn’t want to blur our goals. So we didn’t want to see slogans such as “Ying-jeou Ma Step Down” (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

This worry of being labeled as a political conflict between the blue and green camps was reflected in the official goals of the Wild Strawberries. The goals focused more on the protection of human rights and freedom of speech than national identity and
In the same period, the main theme of the protests of the green camp was that President Ma was selling Taiwan to China. The different main themes clearly distinguished the Wild Strawberries from the other protesters.

In addition to banning political symbols, the students also created symbols for the Wild Strawberries. First, as the Reds did, the leaders set a dress code for the participants. The participants were asked to wear black clothes and masks with a red cross on them to join the sit-in. According to the interviewees, black symbolized the power of silence and the mask with a red cross meant violation of the government’s performance on freedom of speech. Nevertheless, the black clothes and the masks with a red cross created a scene that differentiated the Wild Strawberries from the activities of the blue and green camps and made them independent of political conflicts. Second, the leaders tried to compare their protest to a model student movement in Taiwan, that is, the Wild Lily. The Wild Lily was a student movement in March 1990 that successfully pushed for political reforms, including the termination of the period of mobilization for the suppression of communism, and abolished the Non-Reelection Congress in Taiwan. After its one-week sit-in, the Wild Lily eventually drew hundreds of thousands calling for political reforms, including the abolition of the National Assembly.

The idea behind this comparison was simple: If the Wild Strawberries looked like the previous famous student movement, the movement was definitely a student movement. One example of this comparison was the name of the protest. Wild Strawberries had two meanings. First, the word “wild” was used to commemorate

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30 The Wild Strawberries had three official goals: that President Ying-jeou Ma and Premier Chao-shiun Liu apologize for the use of excessive force by police, that National Security Bureau Director Chao-ming Tsai steps down, and that the government scraps the Assembly and Parade Law (Taipei Times, November 7, 2008).

31 For example, the DPP and other pro-independence groups launched a campaign called “Siege of Boai District,” the place that President Ma and Yunlin Chen planned to meet on November 7 (Taipei Times, November 6, 2008).
the Wild Lily student movement; second, the word “strawberries” made ironic use of the term “strawberry generation” that had been broadly used in Taiwanese society to pejoratively describe the youngest generation (especially youths who were born after the 1980s) as “spoiled,” “soft,” lacking a sense of reality, and not caring about public issues. Combining these two words, the student participants wanted to express a message: While they were the youngest generation, they were not strawberries that are planted and protected in a greenhouse and they were the heir of the Wild Lily.

Another example was the structure of decision-making process within the Wild Strawberries movement. After the protest commenced, some professors who became involved in the operation of the Wild Strawberries were Wild Lily leaders. At their suggestion, the Wild Strawberries used group deliberation and direct democracy to make decisions. Interviewee E recalled that “Professor Rwei-ren Wu (a significant leader of the Wild Lily) made this suggestion. He wanted to let the students and the participants run this protest by themselves.” The students at the sit-in site were gathered into twenty-two groups. Every group had approximately ten participants. Interviewee N talked about how the system worked on November 6, the first day of the protest, in the interview:

The basic process was like this. Someone proposed a question. The group members voted in each group. So every group had a consensus. After each group made a consensus, the group leaders came together and voted the option the group preferred…Simply speaking, a question might have different solutions and each group chose the option they thought doable. For example, we discussed where we should go after the police evicted us.

This rule was clear and people followed the rule to make decisions. Because it
was the very beginning of the protest, people concentrated on the site. So, the number of groups increased from twenty-two to twenty-three, even twenty-four groups. Every group had one vote. Of course, people felt tired two or three days after. The number of groups shrank. (Date of interview: 8/8/2011)

Interviewee C was a group leader. She recalled how she and other group leaders discussed the issue of reassembly in the interview:

In the first group leader discussion, the problem that was most impressive to me was how we should carry on the protest when we were evicted and where we should reassemble. Should we come back to the square in front of the Executive Yuan or reassemble at Liberty Square or another place. We not only discussed this problem but also thought about how to deal with it. The mode of discussion on that day was what we (group leaders) discussed first. We had some problems. Then each leader went back to his or her group and described the problems to the group members. After the group members drew their conclusion, the group leaders publicly reported the conclusions of each group to everyone (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

Theoretically, every decision of the protest should have been approved by all participants. However, the situation changed fast and general discussion among all participants was not an available option. The group leaders might make decisions without general discussion. Interviewee C talked about this situation:

In the leader meeting, we made a decision that every group should record the contact information of the group members. My group enforced this decision
very well. We also decided that the group leaders should contact their group members after the eviction. Make sure they were safe and tell them where they should reassemble (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

The symbolic work of the Wild Strawberries successfully built this movement as a student movement. First, the “student” identity overcame the logic of “either blue or green.” Interviewee A talked about the color composition in the Wild Strawberries in the interview:

My observation was that most participants were green. They either thought from the perspective of Taiwanese or joined Taiwan-oriented organizations...I knew some people who wanted to use this opportunity to force Ying-jeou Ma to step down (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

This observation was interesting because interviewee A was a mainlander and from a deep blue family. Therefore, I asked him why he joined a green movement. He replied:

It was because we all wanted to fix some problems in Taiwan and we had a shared language. In the Wild Strawberries, you could tease Ying-jeou Ma or Shui-bian Chen if you liked. Although those people were green, they knew the problems of the DPP government (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

In other words, although the students had different political stances, the “student” identity made the political identities ambiguous, or at least placed them in the background. They were students who cared about the same issues of the public good
and wanted to protect human rights and freedom of speech. When they faced political debates, they dealt with them through teasing. In addition, being a “student” movement was why the participants joined the Wild Strawberries. Interviewee H talked about this in the interview:

I just felt it was a site of students and professors. Being a student, I should join. I also thought this (the government’s performance) was excessive and agreed with their (the students’) demands. So I joined them and stayed in this movement (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

In addition to binding the participants together, the “student” identity also distinguished the Wild Strawberries from other protests. For example, interviewee C explained why she chose to join the Wild Strawberries instead of the green camp’s protest:

I thought that I should join the student sit-in. After all, I was a student. Moreover, I did not believe that their (the green camp) messy parades could bring any influence. So I chose the student side. I sat down and never left (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

The identity work of the Wild Strawberries made the movement more “rational” and more appropriate for students to join than the green camp’s protests.\textsuperscript{32} In summary, in the case of the Wild Strawberries, movement identity was a strategic choice. The leaders believed that framing their protest could bring advantages to them.

\textsuperscript{32} The green camp’s protest actually resulted in an extreme conflict between the police and the protesters. The police estimated that more than 200 police and protesters were wounded in this conflict.
symbolic work helped the leaders build a student movement: The leaders avoided highlighting the political colors in their demands; they adopted black to distinguish them from the blue and green camps; they emphasized the power of silence not disruption; they established a picket line that excluded non-students in the protest area; they made decisions through the Wild Lily model. All these actions bound the participants together and made the Wild Strawberries independent of other protests.

Conclusion

A collective identity is a necessity in a social movement. The collective identity unites the protesters, identifies the people who are responsible for the problems and have the power to resolve them by acting differently in some fashion, and shows the proper means for the protesters to challenge these people (Gamson 1995). However, collective identity is not given but built. The multiple possible social relationships among people give movement leaders an opportunity to build a movement identity that buttresses the movement. Through identity work, the leaders draw a boundary between the social movement and the environment, let people identify with the movement, and obtain people’s support.

In the cases of the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries, we can see how a collective identity is built. All of these movements implicitly or explicitly, carefully planned or hastily determined the collective identity that they wanted to present in public. To counter the logic of “either blue or green,” these movements did not want to be defined as political conflicts between the blue and green camps: The blue camp and the Reds wanted to frame their protests as civic movements; the Wild Strawberries defined the movement as a student movement. Nevertheless, due to differing identity work, the movements’ outcomes in identity-
building also differed. The Reds and the Wild Strawberries banned political symbols, created their own symbols, and established ambiguity in political stances to unite people from different political camps. These actions are a kind of robust action that created ambiguous attributes of the Reds and the Wild Strawberries that increased the difficulty of labeling them by their political goals and thus limited the opportunity of others to judge them in partisan terms (Padgett and Ansell 1993). However, although the blue camp also wanted to create this ambiguity by emphasizing that democracy was the common asset for all Taiwanese, the blue camp did not generate resonance with the protesters and the public: The blue camp did not ban political symbols, the blue politicians led every activity of the protest, and the blue camp did not create new symbols or name their protest. Therefore, the party line was still apparent and their protest was categorized as a blue movement.

Regardless of success or failure, social actors are involved in a construction of the movement’s identity. This identity is beneficial to the social movement; at a minimum it makes the movement possible. However, as a strategic choice, identity work always comes with trade-offs. The movement identity leads the social movement to face its own structural constraints on individual, organizational, and environmental levels, thus deeply shaping the movement’s fate. The relationship between strategic choice about movement identity and structural constraints is the next topic I will explore.
A movement identity is critical to the formation of the structural constraints that social movements face. On the one hand, movement identity builds the social order within the social movement and therefore shapes the protesters’ movement imagination and the organizational structure in the movement. On the other hand, movement identity articulates the relationship between the social movement and the broad field environment through localizing the impact of the environment on the movement. When social movements build different movement identities, the movement identities produce different movement imaginations, strategic capacities, and connections to the environment that constrain their development. In my reiterative dilemma-solving model, movement identity is a strategic product. Social actors strategically build movement identity to facilitate the mobilization of social movements. However, social actors produce structural constraints at the same time.

In the current chapter, I connect movement identity and structural constraints. I argue that protesters’ identity work creates the structural constraints that they confront. While social actors strategically create the movement identity to make a social movement possible, the trade-off is the structural constraints that constrain the future of the movement. Based on my discussion of the strategic identity-building in the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries, I explore how different movement identities – partisan, civic, and student – explain the structural constraints that these three movements faced. I focus on how the movement identities produce structural constraints at the individual, organizational, and environmental level, as discussed theoretically in Chapter 1. In each case, I discuss the constraining effects of identities on the movement imaginations, on their
strategic capacities, and on the surrounding field environments.

**The blue camp’s post-election protest**

Although the blue leaders wanted to frame their protest as being for the public good, their uncoordinated identity work put the protest into the logic of “either blue or green.” When the protest was defined as a blue protest, this definition shaped the structural constraints at different levels that the blue camp faced.

**Movement Imagination: the extension of the campaign**

Since the blue camp reproduced the logic of “either blue or green,” this logic formed the protesters’ movement imagination regarding the blue camp’s protest. The blue protesters defined the protest as an overtime game of the presidential election. For example, the goal of the protest was to get back the regime from the hands of a cheating president. In a news conference, Jian Lien denounced President Shui-bian Chen and the DPP, suggesting that they stole the government and the country. This accusation implied that President Shui-bian Chen and the DPP government should return the regime to the people who were the real winners of the election. The protest gave the blue politicians and supporters hope to win back the election.

**Strategic Capacity: repeat the logic of “either blue or green” and be afraid of protest**

Because the protest was defined as an extension of the presidential election, the boundary between the blue and green camps was firm. Therefore, the blue camp still built its actions on the logic of “either blue or green.” One classical example was the blue camp’s reaction to the green camp’s friendly proposal to amend the law in

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order to let the court recount the ballots immediately. To change the outcome of the
election, the blue camp filed two lawsuits to suspend President Shui-bian Chen and
Vice President Annette Lu’s re-election and to declare the balloting a fraud. One suit
asked for an immediately recount of the controversial ballots. However, according to
the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and Recall Law, the court can make a
decision about the recount only after it collects sufficient evidence. In other words,
under the existing law, an immediate recount was impossible. To deal with this
deadlock, Premier Shyi-kun Yu (a DPPPer) announced that the cabinet had completed
draft amendments to the law. While this revision was helpful for the blue camp to
overcome the law constraint, the blue legislators refused to accept the revision. Shyi-
kun Yu complained about the blue camp’s decision to the media:

It really baffles us exactly what the opposition alliance wants as they keep
changing their appeals. Now even the blue-dominated legislature refuses to
take up the case of the legal revision. On the one hand, they are crying foul
and demanding an immediate recount of the ballots, but, on the other hand,
they boycott the legal revision allowing the CEC (Central Election Commission)
to do so, which would be more efficient and take up less time (Taipei Times,
March 24, 2004).

This example shows that the blue camp still fell into the logic of “either blue or
green.” The blue camp refused to cooperate with the green camp even though the
cooperation might have been a good solution to its demand. Another characteristic
of the strategic orientation was the tendency to avoid mass movement. Traditionally,
the blue camp did not favor using mass movement as a means to achieve its goals.
The KMT was an authoritarian regime and, in the transition to democracy, it faced
many challenges in the form of mass movements. Therefore, the blue camp was mentally distant from social movements (Ho 2005). Because of this antipathy, the blue camp lacked knowledge about organizing a social movement. In other words, the protest brought the blue camp to an awkward situation: It did not favor protest but it was protesting.

*Environment: resistance from the blue camp and less tolerant government*

The partisan identity of the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest shaped the relationship between this protest and the broad field environment. One crucial player with which the blue camp interacted was the green camp. Since the party line was highlighted in this protest, the green camp also followed the logic of “either blue or green” to weaken the protest. For example, the green camp complained that the protest supported the political interests of the blue camp. The green camp also condemned the blue camp’s protest as seriously harming the social order and the international image of Taiwan.\(^{34}\) To restore the social order and international image, the DPP urged the blue camp to seek a legal solution instead of staying in the streets.\(^{35}\)

Another important player was the Taipei City government. Since the blue camp used the protest as an attempt to achieve their demands, the Taipei City government had the authority to regulate this protest according to the Assembly and Parade Law. The blue camp’s protest was against this law. The Assembly and Parade Law demands that people who want to activate a protest must apply to the local government one

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\(^{34}\) For example, Tseng-chang Su, the campaign manager of the DPP, also condemned the blue camp for focusing only on its political interests and ignoring the peace and unity of Taiwan (Taipei Times, March 23, 2004).

\(^{35}\) For example, Premier Shyi-kun Yu commented that the protest was “barking up the wrong tree… the case is now in the hands of the court, and the High Court has ordered that all ballot boxes be sealed.” Therefore, protesting in front of the Presidential Office was meaningless (Taipei Times, March 22, 2004).
week before the protest. The blue camp’s protest violated this rule since it was a more or less spontaneous incident. Therefore, the Taipei City government could enforce the rule and terminate the protest. This situation created a problem for Ying-jeou Ma, the mayor of Taipei City and the campaign manager of the blue camp. On the one hand, he needed to dispel the protest because he was the mayor and had to enforce the law; on the other hand, he was from the political camp of the protests. Enforcing the law might hurt his reputation in the blue camp, especially because he was the hot candidate in the blue camp for the next presidential election. To deal with this problem, the Taipei City government adopted a compromise position. It did not evict the protesters, but granted them quick permission. However, Ying-jeou Ma went to the protest several times and urged the protesters to “go home as early as possible and return to a normal life.”36 The protesters also felt that Ying-jeou Ma intentionally kept his distance from the protest.37 The solution of the Taipei City government demonstrated that although Ying-jeou Ma wanted to facilitate the protest, the partisan identity of the protest meant that he could not strongly support it.

The Reds

The Reds built the movement as a civic movement by receiving extensive popular support, excluding political figures of the blue camp from their leadership, and drawing a symbolic line between the Reds and political parties. This movement identity shaped the structural constraints of the Reds on individual, organizational, and environmental levels.

Movement Imagination: It should be an inclusive, nonviolent, and legal movement

The civic identity constrained the leader’s imagination about the Reds in several ways. First, the leaders believed that the Reds should be an inclusive movement. Since it was a movement against corruption, the Reds’ leaders welcomed everyone who held the same belief. For example, Li-ping Wang repeated this main theme in the interview:

We were an anti-corruption and anti-Bian movement. These two were our premises. However, we worried that “anti-Bian” might result in green people’s bounce. Therefore, we downplayed “anti-Bian.” We used “anti-corruption movement” in all paperwork because anti-corruption was a civic value and a universal value. It was our main theme and never changed (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

This belief was reflected in the leaders’ speeches to the participants. James Jian said that people could have their distinct political beliefs, but they needed to understand that the common goal was anti-corruption:

When I made a speech, I told people that I supported Taiwan independence. I did not hide my political beliefs to please people. I told them that we were protesters and protesters should be honest. You disliked my political beliefs. It was totally fine. However, I told them, although we had different political beliefs, we had the same goal; that is, to let a corrupt president step down. We could cooperate even if we belonged to different political parties. “Anti-corruption” was the source of our mutual trust. It was why we were here. When I finished, people applauded! (Date of interview: 5/20/2011)
The civic identity also shaped the leaders’ imagination on the characteristics of the participants. Kun-li Liu recalled how the Reds brought him a new image of “protestor”:

I was simulating the situations that might occur in the protest with other people. After the simulation, Chong-hua Ni (a senior in the music field) and Da-wei Sun (a senior in the commercial advertisement field who was called the godfather of the commercial in Taiwan) asked me, “Kun-li, can you describe the types of people in the protests you organized?” I directly answered with the shape of typical DPP supporters because the protests I joined were all DPP protests. I told them that they were male, low class, wearing sneakers, smoking, drinking, and chewing betel nuts. And they always used filthy language in conversation. When I finished, they seriously reminded me that what I said was not completely true. There were lots of people who did not fit my description. These people had jobs and families. Our participants are this kind of people, are many dressed-up women wearing high heels. So the riot control police will not take the same action as they did in DPP protests. So, you need to learn how to organize this kind of people from different angles (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

This conversation indicated that the Reds’ leaders imagined that Reds supporters were different from DPP or KMT supporters. The Reds supporters were upper middle class, elegant, and mild. This image influenced how the leaders projected the progress of the movement. Although Kun-li Liu simulated what the Reds should do when riot control police went to evict them, other leaders, especially the leaders
without social movement experience, felt this simulation was unnecessary because the Reds movement was identified as a civic movement not a political protest. Fuchen Chang indicated that this imagining of participants did influence the strategy-making of the Reds in the interview:

Because of the characteristics of our crowd, we realized that the Reds were different from the protests we saw in the beginning. Their participant structures were different. We could feel that the Reds would not be the same as past social movements. People in the past protests expected confrontation. But Reds participants wanted to express their anger and had no choice (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

The imagination of the participants reminded the leaders that using traditional ways to organize the Reds was not viable. They needed to adopt an appropriate alternative to mobilize the Reds.

Related to the image of the Reds activists, the civic movement identity cued the leaders that the protest should proceed in a legal way. Kun-li Liu’s discussion of the relationship between the Reds and the Assembly and Parade Law in the interview demonstrated this tendency. According to the law, any protest must apply to the local government seven days before the protest and the local government has the authority to allow or disallow the protest:

In past protests, we never thought about the law. I always thought that our protests were legitimate. Applying or not did not matter. We would start the protests even if the government did not permit it. But the consideration of the Reds was different. Frankly speaking, I learned something from my Reds
experience that I did not know in past twenty years, including obeying the law.

One day a crowd of Reds supporters asked me why the Reds were so legitimate but did not want submit an application to the government? This question totally changed my mind (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

When the Reds actions seemed not “legal,” the leaders tried their best to make the action “legal.” John Wei provided an example in the interview:

Actually, social movements usually make the decision first and then look for theory to support the decision. When we decided to use red to represent the anti-corruption movement, some people worried because red is traditionally associated with the Chinese Communist Party. To deal with this concern, I did a lot of research, like Watergate and other cases of corruption...finally, I found that the UN also used red in the United Nations Convention against Corruption! (Date of interview: 8/10/2011)

When the Reds movement presented itself as a civic movement, the civic identity structured the leaders’ expectations of the Reds. The leaders believed that the Reds should be an inclusive, nonviolent, and legal movement. As I will discuss in next chapter, these images constrained the strategic choices that the leaders made.

Strategic Capacity: Action-Oriented, Creative and Shih-Centered Leadership

The civic movement identity explained the strategic capacity of the Reds. As Ganz (2000) suggested, the backgrounds of the leaders and the organizational structure are sources of strategic capacity of the movement. In this case, the civic identity shaped the strategies that the Reds preferred and how the Reds made
decisions. As mentioned earlier, the Reds’ leaders could be categorized into two groups. The first consisted of the marginal green figures, while the second group consisted of the public figures without a salient color. These two groups had different merits and tasks. The marginal green figures were familiar with the process of social movements because they had abundant experience in democratic movements. Therefore, their tasks were organizing and operating the Reds. James Jian recalled the reason he joined:

I joined the Reds because Wen-hsien Chen, Ming-teh Shih’s friend, called me. She worried that if there was no experienced person in the leadership team, the Reds would become a mob. Those people (novice leaders) didn’t know how to control people’s anger. They didn’t know how to organize a nonviolent protest, but I know.

The core members included John Wei, he was a lawyer, and Yao-chang Chen, he was a doctor. They were not people of social movements. Even Ming-teh Shih did not know what a social movement was. You should not assume that Ming-teh Shih was a person full of action just because he joined the Formosa Magazine Incident. Actually, he did not join the social movement (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

In the interview, James Jian emphasized his background in social movements and his training in non-violent resistance. He contended that his experiences helped the operation of the Reds. Fu-chung Chang also showed a similar point of view in the interview:

I was not in the Reds when Ming-teh Shih announced launching the protest.
However, they could not handle this enormous work. The speed of the donation was too fast. Therefore, they were forced to activate the Reds in a short time... It was very difficult for them. In this situation, Ming-teh Shih invited me to help them. I didn’t promise him instantly but went to the meeting of the Reds. I observed their discussion but didn’t join it. I felt worried for these novice leaders. Most of them did not have experience in organizing a mass movement. They were very enthusiastic but didn’t know how to practice... So I decided to join the leadership team. The first thing I did was to select official spokesmen. Before I established this system, the situation was very messy. Everyone wanted to express his or her opinion before the media. It made the pace of the Reds chaotic (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

Kun-li Liu highlighted that they were well-trained movement organizers in the interview:

We were well-prepared organizers who did not need training. We knew what we should do when we stepped in. We didn’t make mistakes (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Because the green leaders knew their role in the Reds, they preferred action over talk when they made decisions. For example, Kun-li Liu argued that an action orientation was the key to success for the Reds:

The Democratic Action Alliance (another anti-Bian movement) did not have achievements because people in this movement studied too hard. I joined their discussion once. People in the Democratic Action Alliance were all PhDs.
No people were without a PhD diploma. I was just a PhD candidate, just a sidekick who bought cigarettes for them. I told them you are more erudite than I but I have twenty years’ social movement experience… Their discussion was a like an academic conference. One said, “I know your discourse” and another one said, “it was a theory of what school.” I felt that they would not have an effective movement even if they discussed it N times… Action was more important. No action, no movement (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Li-ping Wang’s comments on the successful mobilization of the Reds illustrate the action orientation of the leaders with social movement experience:

If you want to activate a social movement, first is that you need clear targets, demands, and action guidelines. For example, we told people if you hate a corrupt president and support our movement, please go to the bank and transfer 100 dollars to us to show your resolution and your agreement with our movement. Then we decided to close the accounts because we received one million people’s donation. The amount was over 140 million. We asked people not to donate anymore. Then we decided to formally activate the protest on September 9. We also designed many slogans… after all, you need simple actions and symbols (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Li-ping Wang also talked about the Reds projecting a political blueprint that reduced people’s worries:

People might worry about the political stability after A-bian stepped down. We promised people that the political order would be fine after A-bian leaving. We...
had a Constitution. We had a vice president and the president of Legislative Yuan. We provided institutional solutions to political order. It was very different from the Democratic Action Alliance (another anti-Bian movement). People in that organization emphasized moral requests. We were very different from them (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

While the green leaders provided the energy and the future plans of action for the Reds, another type of leader, the leader without movement experience, instilled creative symbolic work into the Reds. When I asked the experienced leaders why several unusual symbols appeared such as the use of the color red, “Nazca lines,” and using Western symphonies in Reds activities, they proudly ascribed these symbols to the novice leaders. Li-ping Wang talked about this in the interview:

We had people who were very good in this part but they were not in the spotlight. These people include Da-wei Sun and Chong-hwa Ni (the director of a music record). They were experts in commercial advertisement. Their thoughts were that they did not like traditional protest activates like hunger strikes and collision. They wanted to protect the Reds participants. They wanted to produce big pressure on the Shui-bian Chen regime (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Kun-li Liu also made a similar comment:

Da-wei Sun and Chong-Hwa Ni should get the credit. They were responsible for the part of symbols. Other people included Po-yun Hsu and Gu-Fang Lin; they were in the fields of music, art, and culture. Their support was important. They
were very good in the fields of music, art, and culture (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

The non-movement background of the novice leaders led the Reds to adopt symbols not seen in conventional political protests. In his interview, Fu-chung Chang talked about his observation:

My observation is this. We had many advertising men and music men. We (the experienced leaders) and they (the novice leaders) all knew how to handle an assembly with more than thousands of people. However, we used social movement styles and they used concert styles to organize the people. Let me explain. Several important advertising men like Jerry Fan and Da-wei Sun. To them, the Reds participants were not social movement activists who prepared for conflict but another type of crowd because they did not have social movement experience (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

The novice leaders not only brought new ideas of what a social movement should look like, they also brought new material resources to the Reds. Kun-li Liu partially described the Reds as an orderly movement because of the equipment that the novice leaders brought:

I wanted to make one more point. Maybe no other people have mentioned this point. The reasons that the Reds crowd was so orderly was not only because of self-disciplined people but also because we had very good microphones and audio systems. This equipment was the best I have even seen in the past twenty years—Those music men and art men told me that the
system was designed for big theaters. Unlike the system we used before, the sounds of this system were very clear. It was easy for me to maintain order since everyone could hear what I said very clearly. They (the novice leaders) also told me that they never thought their theater-level system would be used in crowd movements (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

In addition to new ideas and new resources, the novice leaders were not constrained by political traditions. Take adopting red as the symbolic color, for example. Fu-chung Chang recalled this choice in the interview:

It was Jerry Fan's idea. Several advertising men suggested that the movement needed a representative color. To Jerry Fan, red was a very appropriate choice. Red was bright. His consideration was the visual impact, not the political impact. Anyone who thought from political consideration would not pick red as the symbolic color because red was taboo. It meant the Chinese Communist Party. It meant communism. It was a very common thought associated with the color red. However, it was not a problem to Jerry Fan and those advertising men. They were not constrained by the political tradition. What they wanted was to create a shocking visual impact... However, although I was totally fine with this suggestion, some people were unhappy about using red as the symbolic color (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

Because the novice leaders had no political burden, they were not constrained by political common sense. Therefore, the novice leaders could make decisions that were unusual in conventional protests. As Clemens (1997) suggested, overlapping social networks is a source of innovation in social movement. The leaders without
social movement experience brought new ideas and resources to the Reds and intentionally or unconsciously challenged the political traditions. Therefore, they made the Reds look different from other protests.

Apart from the background of the leaders, the decision-making process of the Reds also explained the strategies that the Reds adopted in the future. Theoretically, the Reds made decisions through discussion among the leaders. People who joined the discussion were not fixed. Basically, the core leaders (the decision-making committee) attended the discussion. Sometimes, marginal leaders or other people showed up and expressed their opinions. However, the authority was held by the core leaders. When the leaders had different ideas, they voted on decisions. Nevertheless, the practical process of decision making did not usually work in this way. Fu-chung Chang talked about why the ideal in decision making was hard to realize:

The leaders were a very occasional collection. This so-called “leadership,” these core leaders, had never cooperated with each other before. They did not even know each other. They never worked together. The decision-making committee was in name only. It was just a unit. The experience of cooperation was zero. The experience of working together was zero. The experience of facing such gigantic crowds was zero. How do you discuss under these conditions? Theoretically, yes. Practically, only several people made judgments. You could not discuss. How could you let people discuss? The discussion would be fruitless because no one had experience (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

When I asked further how they dealt with internal conflicts, Li-ping Wang put it directly: “Chairman Shih was the final arbiter.” Nan-chi Chang described Ming-teh
Shih’s role in decision-making:

I think that the most important person in decision-making was chairman Shih. When people had different ideas and no one wanted to concede, we waited for chairman Shih to make the decision. Once chairman Shih made the decision, people just obeyed it and took action. I felt that Chairman Shih taking over was good… We could see that some conflicts occurred during the decision-making. Some people were war hawks and some were dovish. However, the final decision was made by Chairman Shih (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Ming-teh Shih’s superior position was confirmed in the planning period of the Reds. The process of decision-making about whether to activate the activity of one million people making a donation is an example. Li-ping Wang recalled that Ming-teh Shih strongly approved this activity even though some people opposed it:

Po-yun Hsu was also the vice director of the Ming-teh Shih Foundation. Po-yun Hsu directly told Chairman Shih that no one would join if he asked people to donate in the discussion. However, Chairman Shih explained and approved the donation activity. So, I said the Reds had an unspoken rule, that is, Ming-teh Shih owned the final authority to make decisions and veto other proposals (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Another example was impeaching green legislators. Some Reds’ leaders indicated that this activity was inappropriate because it might put the Reds and the blue camp in the same position and the green leaders actually did not want to harm their
friends in the green camp. However, Ming-teh Shih made this decision to impeach the green legislators. John Wei complained about it:

Ming-teh Shih, Chairman Shih said, we were going to impeach the legislators who opposed the Reds. He announced this decision in a public setting without discussion. But since he had publicly announced it, our boss said we were going to do it; what we could do was obey his decision (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

Therefore, the decision-making in the Reds was centered around Ming-teh Shih. Because of his superior position, Ming-teh Shih not only made the suggestions he preferred but also overthrew decisions that had been made. For example, James Jian mentioned in the interview that “in fact he sometimes overthrew the decision we made. He did anything he wanted!”

Ming-teh Shih’s superior position stemmed from several sources. The first was his political reputation as a courageous, statesman-like leader, which made some leaders admire him in their heart. Li-ping Wang showed her admiration of Ming-teh Shih in the interview:

First, Ming-teh Shih was a victim of the Formosa Incident 32 years ago. Even before the Formosa Incident, he was a political prisoner before he was 20 years old because of his pro-independence stand. Second, after Ming-teh Shih left prison, he was elected as the DPP’s chairman. He even had a chance to win the presidential office. He promoted the big reconciliation movement in the Legislative Yuan. The background of this movement was that few DPP leaders such as Ming-teh Shih and Sin-Liang Su realized that the ethnic issue would be
a big problem to make Taiwan a normal country. Another problem was the issue between Taiwan and China. These two problems were must-do issues to political leaders. So, Ming-teh Shih invited the NP (so-called the “authentic blue” in the blue camp) chairman to have coffee in 1993. He asked the pro-reunification leaders to have a “great reconciliation coffee.” This history explains why so many people followed him when he activated the Reds (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

Because of their admiration, the Reds’ leaders were willing to let Ming-teh Shih make the final decisions. Nan-chi Chang also addressed the great reconciliation coffee in his evaluation of Ming-teh Shih in the interview:

He had the reconciliation coffee for mainlanders. This action really shocked me and was impressive to me. I always loved Taiwan. I did not have any relation to the conflict between mainlanders and islanders in the past. I should reconcile with islanders. In a political party that promoted Taiwan independence, such as the DPP, I believed that he had guts. He dared to take this action in this situation (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Being a mainlander, Nan-chi Chang understood the confrontation between mainlanders and islanders. However, Ming-teh Shih took action because he believed people can be friends even if they are in different ethnic groups.

In addition to the admiration of Ming-teh Shih, some Reds’ leaders accepted his

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38 “Mainlanders” refers to people or their parents who moved to Taiwan after 1949. Their political stance is usually close to the blue camp. “Islanders” refers to people or their ancients who already settled in Taiwan before 1949. Islanders were more likely to support the green camp’s stance on national identity.
lead because Ming-teh Shih controlled hidden information channels. These channels provided insider information that the Reds’ leaders did not have. Therefore, they let Ming-teh Shih make decisions because he often knew something they did not know. John Wei talked about why Taipei City government unusually approved the Reds’ around-all-day sit-in:

I was responsible for the legal part. On the political part, Ming-teh Shih contacted Ying-jeou Ma. We did not know this during the Reds. We did not know the relationship between Ming-teh Shih and the blue camp. Ming-the Shih himself had private advisers like Wen-hsien Chen, Jerry Fan, and Po-yun Hsu. They might be on the decision-making committee or not. But their advice was the key to Ming-teh Shih’s decisions (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

While the Reds’ leaders endowed Ming-teh Shih with the authority to make decisions, it did not mean that they completely agreed with his decisions. Some leaders complained about those decisions in the interviews. From these complaints, we can see the strategic orientation of Ming-teh Shih’s decision-making. First, Ming-teh Shih’s decision-making reflected a strong Don Quixote style; Nan-chi Chang used this term to describe Ming-teh Shih in the interview. Nan-chi Chang indicated that Ming-teh Shih was an optimist with strong beliefs who tended to do something that people thought impossible. In addition to the example of the great reconciliation coffee, another example that Nan-chi Chang indicated was the one million people donation:

We never thought we could obtain such a huge donation. Everyone was excited. Just in one week. It was a miracle. So much money poured in. People
asked each other, “Did you transfer?” Ming-teh Shih (he was a Christian) for the first time felt the miracle of God (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

However, the negative characteristics of Don Quixote were heroism and bigotry. For example, James Jian complained that Ming-teh Shih tended to make decisions that would attract the spotlight to him. James Jian talked about this observation when he complained in the interview that Ming-teh Shih missed the best timing to force President Shui-bian Chen to step down:

The movement was unnecessarily extended. The protests on September 9 and September 15 were good. I do not know why the movement needed to extend to October 10. Ming-teh Shih even brought people to move around Taiwan between September 21 and October 10. It was really an unreasonable decision. A-bian was in Taipei City. Why bring people to other places? Ming-teh Shih really did not know how to operate a movement. He just wanted to show up (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

John Wei complained about Ming-teh Shih’s conservative tendency. He mentioned that Ming-teh Shih had “bourgeois taste” that made him avoid any disruptive action. He indicated that because Ming-teh Shih already had realized some achievements, he did not favor the strategies that might change the existing social order.

In summary, the civic identity endowed the Reds with the strategic capacity to operate such a huge movement. Because of the civic identity, the Reds’ leaders included a combination of experienced leaders and novice leaders. The former contributed social movement experience and the latter contributed new ideas and
resources. John Wei’s words nicely summarize this combination:

> Sometimes I joked that we had green Reds, blue Reds, and commercial Reds, who wanted to get commercial benefit from the Reds… The Reds’ leaders were the best experts in different fields. Although Ming-teh Shih had left the DPP and was not in the core of politics, he was still a famous figure. James Jian was the best organizer of social movements. I am a first-class labor and human rights lawyer. Jerry Fan had experience and ideas on campaign literature. The Reds collected many people with different expertise (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

However, since the experienced and the novice leaders had a different strategic orientation, conflicts between the two groups were unavoidable. When conflicts occurred, Ming-teh Shih’s attitude became the key to the solution. Because of the Ming-teh Shih-centered decision-making structure and Ming-teh Shih’s personality, as I will show in next chapter, the final decisions usually favored the novice leaders.

*Environment: Distant blue camp, divided green camp, and tolerant government*

In addition to the movement imagination and strategic capacity, the civic movement identity shaped the connection between the Reds and the broad field environment. Since the Reds movement was a political movement, the Reds had to negotiate the relationships with three important players – the blue camp, the green camp, and the government – in political fields. Let us start with the blue camp’s reactions to the Reds.

From the perspective of the blue camp, the Reds were a help. Since the blue camp and the Reds shared the same enemy, they should have had a positive attitude
toward each other because of the “enemy’s enemy is my friend” principle. However, the blue camp intentionally kept its distance from the Reds. The blue camp formally declared that it would not provide any help to the Reds. Take the response of the blue leaders, for example. The chairmen of the KMT and FPF, Ying-Jeou Ma and James Soong, respectively, claimed that neither of the political parties would be involved in Reds operations. Ma even mentioned, “If the KMT helps Shih, people may think that it’s the KMT again.” The blue camp also restrained its political figures from joining the Reds with a partisan identity. The blue camp encouraged its supporters to join the Reds with individual identity and asked the supporters to obey the Reds’ rule prohibiting political symbols. This declaration indicated that the blue camp did not treat the Reds as its tool, at least on an explicit level. The conversation between Kun-li Liu and several KMT female Taipei City counselors illustrates the KMT’s ambiguous attitude toward the Reds. On the one hand, the Reds movement provided an opportunity for the blue politicians to make political gains; on the other hand, they knew that Reds power was based on the civic movement identity and they should not contaminate the identity. Kun-li Liu recalled this conversation:

Several KMT female Taipei City counselors like Yu-mei Chen and Yi-hua Lin expressed appreciation of me in person. I asked, ‘Why you people thank me?’ They said because I helped them operate the movement. I replied: ‘sorry, but you were mistaken. The Reds movement was not your movement.’ They were embarrassed and said sorry. They explained that sometimes they just unwittingly said this (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

To counter the Reds, the green camp reproduced the “either blue or green” principle.
logic: The protests that were against the green camp were blue protests. Fu-chung Chang simply said, “The green camp defined the Reds as a conflict between blue and green in the very beginning.” The green camp started to criticize Ming-teh Shih’s personal character and political standing. For example, Ming-teh Shih recalled that the green camp characterized him as a “political gigolo” (implying that Ming-teh Shih obtained political and material interests from the blue camp) and “a dying politician,” to describe him; he was also described as “greedy and lascivious” and involved in “the brave selling of Taiwan” (challenging Ming-teh Shih’s pro-independence public image) (Shih 2009: 82-83). A DPP legislator even invited Ming-teh Shih’s ex-wife to condemn him as a heartless person because he abandoned her and their daughter. Li-ping Wang mentioned that labeling the Reds as a blue movement was the easiest way for the green camp to protect its regime. She recalled the green camp’s actions:

The DPP overwhelmingly humiliated and defamed Ming-teh Shih, this person in that time…The green camp just kept looking for evidence to show that Ming-teh Shih was bought over by Ying-jeou Ma. They said that Ming-teh Shih wanted to be Ying-jeou Ma’s vice president…Or they said that Ming-teh Shih hated A-bian because he wanted a governmental office but A-bian refused. The green camp always did this (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

However, although the green camp wanted to define the Reds as a blue movement, the Reds actually divided the green camp. While some green politicians constantly challenged the Reds’ civic image, some DPP legislators showed their compassion for the Reds. The compassion was both a reflection of Shui-bian Chen’s scandal and a sign of the affection for Ming-teh Shih. For example, DPP legislator

40 UDN, August 23, 2006.
Wen-chung Li told the press that "although I do not support his campaign, I feel ashamed about what the first family has done, I feel even more ashamed about the way my colleagues have responded to Shih. If they (green people) want to respond, they must respond with dignity and consider the public reaction. Defensive or defamatory remarks will only further disappoint our supporters." DPP legislator Chi-chang Hung and former DPP legislator Yi-kang Tuan also suggested that the DPP should tolerate Ming-teh Shih and his supporters and listen to their opinions rather than reacting against them.

As Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) suggest, government is a player with which social movements cannot avoid interacting. The Reds movement was not the exception. Two activists of the Reds related to governments and laws. In the case of the Reds, the central government was under the green camp’s control and the local government was under the blue camp’s authority. The first activity was the one million people donation, which related to the central government. According to the Department of Civil Affairs, only a group or an organization (the Statute Governing Donations for Public Interest Purposes) or a candidate in any election (the Political Donations Law) could launch fundraisers. Since the Reds movement was not a group or an organization and Ming-teh Shih was not a candidate for any election, the donation activity could be defined as “illegal.” Therefore, the DPP legislators took this opportunity to ask the Department of Civil Affairs to enforce the law. They urged the department to pronounce the donation as an illegal activity that should be terminated. However, although the laws were the weapon for the green camp to counter the Reds, the central government never took substantial action to stop the

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41 Taipei Times, August 16, 2006.
42 Taipei Times, August 26, 2006.
43 For example, DPP legislator Charles Chiang urged Ming-teh to abide by the statute (Taipei Times August 14, 2006).
fundraising because of the overwhelming support from society for the Reds.

The tolerance of the local Taipei City government, was reflected in the unusual approval of the Reds’ application for a long-run, around-the-clock sit-in. According to the Assembly and Parade Law, any campaign or protest must apply to the local government and obtain approval. Usually, the application is approved. However, in the case of the Reds, the leaders’ application was unprecedented because campaigns and protests usually started at 10:00 a.m. and ended at 6:00 p.m. However, the Taipei City government approved the application. This approval resulted in criticism from the green camp.\(^{44}\) Ying-jeou Ma, the mayor and chairman of the KMT, justified the approval by referring to the Reds as a civic movement. He said that “the deadline is set by the police to ensure quality of life for local residents…The rights to assembly and parade are protected by the Constitution, and the city government is responsible for protecting the protesters if the rally is approved.”\(^{45}\) The tolerance of the central and local government demonstrates the impact of a civic movement identity. Because the Reds movement was an anti-corruption movement that blurred party lines and highlighted a broader movement identity, the central government and the local government of a democratic country had to take a more tolerant position in relation to interaction with the Reds, even though some actions of the Reds could be considered illegal.

\(^{44}\) The green politicians pointed out that this approval was a special “Ming-teh Shih Clause” and interpreted this permission as support from Ma.

\(^{45}\) Taipei Times, August 18, 2006. Here I do not mean that the civic movement identity was the only reason that the Taipei City government approved the Reds’ unusual application. Since Ying-jeou Ma played a double role in this movement (he was the mayor of Taipei City and the chairman of the KMT), he definitely considered his political interests. I will discuss this in more depth in the next chapters. However, the successful installment of the civic movement identity gave Ying-jeou Ma a convincing reason to persuade the public that the decision was fine. In another case, the protest of the blue camp that highlighted the party lines did not receive the same treatment even though Ying-jeou Ma played the same role in that period.
**The Wild Strawberries**

To exploit the traditional compassion in society for students, the Wild Strawberries’ leaders deliberately presented the movement as a student movement. They allowed only students to join the protest, organized a picket line to separate students and non-students, highlighted human rights as the common goal, and compared themselves with the model student movement. Through these strategic actions, not only the participants but also the bystanders defined the Wild Strawberries as a student movement, even though some of the leaders and participants actually were not students. This successful identity-building constructed the structural constraints of the Wild Strawberries.

*Movement Imagination: the phantom of the Wild Lily and romantic anticipation*

Since the protest had started, the phantom of the Wild Lily entangled the Wild Strawberries’ leaders and participants. Some leaders and participants tended to copy the Wild Lily experience. Three reasons explained this tendency. First, the Wild Strawberries’ leaders and participants needed a model by which to structure their protest. In the past two decades, student movements had been underdeveloped in Taiwan. The number of contentious student associations went down and the associations became inactive. Therefore, the Wild Strawberries protesters lacked the skills and experience to organize the operation of this movement (Shie 2009). To deal with this situation, the Wild Lily movement became a significant source of information for the Wild strawberries’ leaders in organizing their protests. For example, as in the Wild Lily movement, the student leaders looked for an autonomous movement. Hence, they preferred direct democracy in order to make decisions. Another example, shown in the last chapter, is that when the sit-in continued and the participants began to feel bored, the leaders took action to
maintain the morale of the participants and kill time; the leaders asked the participants to form a group and each group to generate a leader to facilitate the group discussion. This was also a legacy of the Wild Lily. In other words, the Wild Lily constituted the strategy toolkit that confined the Wild strawberries’ leaders’ strategic choices when they faced problems.

Second, in addition to the instrumental influence, the Wild Lily had strong moral meaning for the students; the students wanted the Wild Strawberries to be the next Wild Lily. As interviewee F indicated, because student movements were underdeveloped in past years, the students’ memory of student movements was limited. To Taiwanese students, the most impressive images of student movement were either the Tiananmen movement or the Wild Lily. Since the Wild Lily was a Taiwanese case, the Wild Lily became the case that the students used to imagine a student movement. Moreover, the Wild Lily was a perfect paradigm of the student movement for Wild Strawberries students making the latter want to copy the Wild Lily experience. Interviewee P talked about this in the interview:

Some Wild Strawberries participants wanted to copy the Wild Lily. They even used a purely beautiful student movement to describe the Wild Lily… their imagination on the student movement was the Wild Lily. We made the Wild Lily itself a perfect symbol. In national education, the student movement was the Wild Lily. In the textbooks for elementary and high schools, the Wild Lily was sacredly described (Date of interview: 5/15/2011).

The halo of the Wild Lily especially worked for the students without movement experience. Interviewee O used “the political virgins’ sexual fantasy” to tease the students who had joined a student movement for the first time and wanted to be
another Wild Lily. This indicated that when inexperienced students joined a protest, they wanted to use the most positive case to project the future of the protest. Interviewee I talked about this situation:

Too many people wanted to reproduce the Wild Lily experience. They wanted to be leaders like Yun Fan and Rwei-ren Wu (both were important student leaders in the Wild Lily)! (Date of interview: 7/26/2011)

Interviewee B addressed the atmosphere that looked for the next Wild Lily in the Wild Strawberries:

They cared very, very much about the public image of the Wild Strawberries and worried about being perceived as a partisan activity. They claimed their protest went across the blue and green. I agree. In most situations, I agree that the protest was over blue and green. However, they really cared that the media labeled them as a green movement. Nevertheless, they (the students) cared about the commentators, newspaper, and media questioning the intention of this movement. They cared about people questioning whether it was a pure student movement. I felt this concern resulted from wanting to have a student movement as pure as the Wild Lily (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

The third reason was the direct genealogical connection between the Wild Lily and the Wild Strawberries. Some Wild Lily leaders and participants became university professors. When they saw the Wild Strawberries germinating, they urged their students to participate. They not only encouraged the students but also used
personal channels to bring the students to the Wild Strawberries. Interviewee M recalled why she stayed in the Wild Strawberries so long:

In the second day of the protest, many professors of the Wild Lily generation came to the site of the sit-in. The organizers even actively invited Rwei-ren Wu to make a speech. He influenced the development of the Wild Strawberries very much...I felt that the Wild Lily generation reunited and kept telling us their movement experience (Date of interview: 6/2/2011).

(I was Rwei-ren Wu’s research assistant). I was complaining that the student leaders on the stage were clumsy in organizing the protest. I was complaining to Rwei-ren Wu. He just replied, “OK, how about you do this job?” Because of his reaction, I was afraid of leaving. I thought that he tried to tell me to stop complaining. He wanted to me to participate in the Wild Strawberries more deeply (Date of interview: 6/2/2011).

The unequal relationship between teacher and student made room for the Wild Lily generation to urge students to join the Wild Strawberries. The teacher-student relationship also allowed the Wild Lily generation to impose their idea of a student movement on the Wild Strawberries. Interviewee N talked about how the professors implicitly influenced the operation of the Wild Strawberries:

We used several ways to make decisions. The first was communication. You told me why you preferred an option and I told you why I had a different thought. The second was negotiation. Frankly speaking, the teachers were behind the students. They were the students of the professors or very familiar
with the professors. Voting was the last means of making a decision... Although we had a seven-leader committee to be the highest leadership, the professors were behind the leaders. Those professors were people who really influenced the Wild Strawberries (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

In other words, the professors realized that the Wild Strawberries should be operated by students to present the movement as a student movement. However, they wanted to influence the movement. The compromise was that they influenced the Wild Strawberries through agents, that is, their students.

While a huge proportion of the Wild Strawberries protesters wanted to mimic the Wild Lily, some leaders and participants stood in opposition. For example, some people opposed the existence of movement stars. Interviewee I mentioned:

Some people wittingly opposed the formation of the decision-making committee or the general directors. I thought it was a reaction to the Wild Lily because the Wild Lily had a decision-making committees and a general director (Date of interview: 7/26/2011).

The reaction to the Wild Lily resulted from people’s dissatisfaction with the Wild Lily leaders’ performance after the movement. Some Wild Lily leaders became green political figures. This fact resulted in some students’ discontent because they believed these leaders were betrayers of social movements and monopolized the reputation of the Wild Lily to promote their political careers. Interviewee D talked about his feelings with regard to movement stars:

It seemed that we had a consensus. Of course, no one had authority to decide
there would be no movement stars. I felt it was a consensus—the connection between movement stars and politicians disgusted people (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

Several interviewees observed that some Wild strawberries’ leaders wanted to be the focus of the movement and monopolize its reputation. They even identified the same person (also my interviewee) who wanted to lay claim to the achievement of the Wild Strawberries. Therefore, interviewee D argued:

I wanted to let the public see a group of people not just one person. That was my thought. I really did not like us to repeat the path of movement stars (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

Whether admirers of or reactors to the Wild Strawberries, the movement imagination was haunted by the model student movement, that is, by the Wild Lily. The Wild Lily became a reference point for the Wild Strawberries protesters to project the development of the Wild Strawberries.

Related to the phantom of the Wild Lily, the Wild Strawberries protesters had a romantic imagination of the future of the Wild Strawberries: Once following the path of the Wild Lily, the government would agree with our demands. This optimistic imagination stood even though the government continued to ignore the students’ demands. Interviewee I described this atmosphere:

The atmosphere I felt and the talk I heard was that people thought once we insisted like the Wild Lily, more people would join and then the government would listen to us (Date of interview: 7/26/2011).
Interviewee H recalled how the romantic imagination was broken after the end of the Wild Strawberries:

In the beginning, we were naïve. We thought that since our movement and demands were legitimate, it should not be difficult for the government to respond. However, it turned out to be the case that the government did not respond and did not do anything about our demands (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

I will discuss more about how the romantic imagination influenced the development of the Wild Strawberries in the next chapter. What I want to demonstrate here is that the romantic imaginings did exist and were rooted in the phantom of the Wild Strawberries. As interviewee D concluded, the Wild Strawberries movement was inevitably connected to the Wild Lily, although he did not foresee this situation in the initial stage:

These people just could not get rid of the Wild Lily. The Wild Lily shadowed them too much. We made the Wild Strawberries a student movement and then they (the leaders and participants) inevitably connected it to the Wild Lily. So they chose to reassemble in Liberty Square (the same place that the Wild Lily assembled). I never thought the protest would develop in this way (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

While the Wild Strawberries protesters all defined this movement as a student movement, their different ideas about what a student movement should look like
became a source of tension that might have changed the tentative agreement on the movement identity. In addition to the movement imaginings, the student identity also shaped the strategic capacity of the Wild Strawberries.

Strategic Capacity: student-teacher leadership, decentralization and low coordination

Since the Wild Strawberries movement was defined as a student movement, theoretically, the leaders should have been students. However, in fact, the Wild Strawberries’ leaders were students and professors. For example, both the student leaders and the professors joined the meeting on November 5th where it was decided to organize a protest of the government’s performance. Interviewee D talked about the cooperation between him and Professor Ming-tseng Lee:

In this movement, we had three demands. Professor Ming-tseng Lee and I, we worked together to make these demands (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

The professors not only influenced the goals of the Wild Strawberries, they also designed the details of the protest. Interviewee D recalled:

Wearing black clothes and masks were his (Ming-tseng Lee) idea. He also suggested that the square in front of the Executive Yuan was a good place for our protest. I did not have a preference on place. Since he suggested in front of the Executive Yuan, I was fine because I thought the Executive Yuan was the highest executive institute; police would come quickly and remove us! (Date of interview: 6/16/2011)

Even after the protest started, the professors were involved in the practical process
of the protest. One example is the group discussion mentioned earlier. In addition, several interviewees talked about the leadership role of the professors on the site of the protest:

Interviewee D: The protest was led by two professors. From my perspective, you could hear other people’s voices but one of their voices was the main voice (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

Interviewee E: After we sat in front of the Executive Yuan, the professor made a speech to announce our demands. He cried out that we would not leave if we did not reach our goals (Date of interview: 6/30/2011).

Interviewee F: One professor leader constantly ignited students’ emotion. He used strong moral language like “we will not leave or give up if the government does not agree with our demands!” (Date of interview: 5/23/2011)

While the professors played an important role in the operation of the Wild Strawberries, this did not mean that student leaders lost their positions. For example, one participant described what she saw on the site of the protest:

In the square in front of the Executive Yuan, some professors and students held the protest. They taught us the safety guidelines. Then they grouped the participants and asked each group to elect a group leader. These group leaders became the members of the decision-making committee. They started to organize people who did not know each other to work together (Shu 2009: 298).
The combination of the student and professor leadership shaped the strategic orientation of the Wild Strawberries. One example is that the life experiences of the students and professors cued them to look for non-violent strategies rather than disruptive strategies. Interviewee K explained why disruptive strategies were never in the scope of their radar:

The professors played an important role in strategy selection. They passed the imagination of peace to the students…they input their will into the movement. Moreover, most students were born after 1980. The life experience of this generation was more peaceful than the last generations. Their life quality was better than the last generations. So they were incapable and not prepared for any sharp physical conflict…so the movement was destined to be a non-violent movement. (Date of interview: 6/16/2011)

Interviewee I also used the same perspective to explain why the Wild Strawberries never considered taking disruptive actions:

I felt that most students grew up in an easy and comfortable environment. They could do a sit-in. However, if you wanted them to conflict with police or take this kind of action, I thought that only a few students owned such great resolution. Most students would think, Would the university penalize me or would I face lawsuits? (Date of interview: 7/26/2011)

Some interviewees linked the use of direct democracy for making decisions to the student identity. Interview H explained why the students preferred direct democracy
in making decisions:

I thought it (making a decision through a general vote) was an intuitive means. Some people compared the Wild Strawberries general meeting to the class meeting we had in school. I thought that we all shared the experience of class meeting and were familiar with it. Since the Wild Strawberries focused on democracy and human rights, we naturally connected democracy to general voting (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

In addition to a non-violent strategic orientation and using direct democracy, the student identity contributed to the decision to stick to a sit-in instead of other actions to push the government to respond to their demands. Interviewee A’s conversation reflected this situation:

I did not have social movement experience and never organized a movement. I did not know what strategies could be used to achieve our goals. So we stayed in the square. What we knew how to do was sit in and wait for the government to talk to us (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

Another characteristic of the Wild Strawberries was the high fluidity of the participants (Hsiao 2011). Not all participants stayed in the protest at every moment. Most participants in the Wild Strawberries went back and forth. When they had something to do, they temporarily left; when they had time or felt something important, they came back. Interviewee C described this situation:

When the general meeting had important issues to discuss, you could see so
many people. When the general meeting was going to start, the number of people went up dramatically. When the meeting ended, everyone was gone. Only a few people came in the daytime (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

Interviewee A connected this high fluidity to the life style of the students and the problem of internet mobilization:

The problem of internet mobilization was the character of the internet. It meant that people could go if they wanted. You could log out any time. The Wild Strawberries was just like an internet forum. You could log on any time and argue with people. When you felt unhappy, you left. You either left forever or came back later. Everyone had little responsibility to show up (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

Since the internet was popular among university students, the Wild strawberries’ leaders mobilized students through the electronic bulletin board that most students used. However, this strategy resulted in participants who felt little responsibility toward the protest and high fluidity among participants.

In addition to the composition of the protesters, organizational structure is another factor that shapes the strategic capacity of a movement. Here I turn to the organizational structure of the Wild Strawberries. The Wild Strawberries movement had a decentralized structure without a dominant leadership. These two characteristics were reactions to the Wild Lily. Some admired the Wild Lily and wanted to copy it and some disliked the Wild Lily and wanted to avoid its shadow. When the protest commenced, under the suggestion of the Wild Lily generation, the leaders decided to group the participants and elect group leaders. These group
leaders became the bridge between the participants and the entire movement. Authority was not concentrated in a few leaders’ hands but shared with the general participants. Any decision was made by all participants. This organizational method reflected the Wild Lily style. In the Wild Lily, the group leaders finally developed into a decision-making committee composed of seven student leaders. However, in the case of the Wild Strawberries, the same evolution did not occur because the reactors to the Wild Lily prevented it. As mentioned, these reactors were unsatisfied with some Wild Lily leaders because they used the Wild Lily as their political capital to obtain political positions. Therefore, they did not want to see any movement star in the Wild Strawberries. To these reactors, the formation of a decision-making committee meant the birth of movement stars. Interviewee I explained why the Wild Strawberries preferred a weak leadership:

We knew there was a dominant leadership in the Wild Lily. However, we felt that kind of style was inappropriate in the Wild Strawberries. So we not only avoided repeating their style but also prevented the movement from producing stars (Date of interview: 7/26/2011).

The weak leadership is demonstrated in the leaders’ self-description of their role. They defined themselves as the engine and gears of the Wild Strawberries, who carried on the movement but under the guidance of all participants (Hsieh 2009; Hsiao 2011). In other words, they did not assume that they were dominant leaders. This self-presentation was reflected in some interviewees’ feeling toward the leaders. For example, interviewee B (who made a documentary video for the Wild Strawberries but was not a so-called leader) described the leadership he saw:
(When I first came to the site) I could identify people who were responsible for making decisions. I did not see so-called leadership. However, after I stayed two or three nights, because people discussed and voted every night, you knew there were some opinion leaders who wanted to persuade people to agree with their ideas and strategies (Date of interview: 6/19/2011).

The outcomes of the decentralized authority structure and weak leadership were inefficiency in the decision-making process and low coordination of the protest activities. These two outcomes were not clear in the initial stage of the Wild Strawberries. However, these situations became problems when the movement carried on. I will discuss this more deeply in next chapter. Here I just provide examples. Interviewee H indicated that making decisions through the general meeting was dangerous for the Wild Strawberries:

It (the general meeting) was a very dangerous thing. People made decisions without any responsibility. People who carried out the decisions were separated from people who made decisions. (If you wanted people to take more responsibility, they replied:) “Why can’t I express my opinion just because I do not come to the protest every day?” or “Why can’t I express my opinion through the internet?” (Date of interview: 6/28/2011)

When all participants officially shared the authority of making decisions and the movement was without dominant leadership, the decisions lost their legitimacy and consistency. People kept challenging the decisions made previously and made the decision-making an endless process. Interviewee J complained about this situation:
Today we made a decision but people who came to the meeting tomorrow were completely different. Then you needed to tell these people that the decisions were made yesterday. Then these people might have different opinions and want to overturn the decision we made yesterday. So the decision-making on the same issue went back and forth (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

The endless decision-making process made the students feel bored and tired. Therefore, the students gradually lost the motivation to hold the general meeting.

Interviewee A described this situation:

People felt the meeting was too copious and too complicated… So some people thought they should take action rather than being trapped in the meeting. People did what they wanted to do (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

When people could do what they wanted to do, the activities of the Wild Strawberries were not well coordinated. In the Wild Strawberries, the students formed many sub-organizations that were responsible for different jobs. However, the connections between these sub-organizations were weak. Interviewee A gave me an example:

We designed the activities of our team. Actually, other teams did not know what we were doing… a group called the “anchor team.” This group broadcast the operations of the Wild Strawberries to the public in real time. Two female anchors were there. Let me call them anchor A and anchor B. Anchor A asked Anchor B, “Do you know what activities we have after 9:00 AM?” Anchor B
said, “I don’t know. No one told me.” So you could see there was no strong leadership and communication in the Wild Strawberries. Actually, the order and the communication were in a mess (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

Interviewee D also mentioned the mess in coordination:

The situation became that you could do whatever you wanted. You made a proposal in the general meeting and you could go for this proposal. Some people wanted to go back to the square in front of the Executive Yuan. So we had an “Executive Yuan team” and its job was to protest in front of the Executive Yuan. Some people built a tower on Liberty Square because they believed this action was more provocative (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

Environment: tolerant government, friendly political camps, and campus routines

Like the civic movement identity of the Reds and the partisan identity of the blue camp’s protest, the “student” identity articulated the relationships between the Wild Strawberries and the broader field environment.

First, the student identity made the government adopt a tolerant attitude toward the Wild Strawberries. In the case of the Wild Strawberries, both the ruling party of the central government and the local government (Taipei City government) were KMT. Since the Wild Strawberries focused on the KMT government’s inappropriate performance, it should have been defined as a green movement according to the logic of “either blue or green.” Therefore, Taipei City government could use the authority that the Assembly and Parade Law endowed to weaken or even dispel the Wild Strawberries. Moreover, the Wild Strawberries protesters intentionally refused to obey the Assembly and Parade Law. The protesters refused
to get permission from the government to highlight the nonsensical nature of the law. Hence, the KMT government had sufficient reasons to terminate the Wild Strawberries.

However, while the Taipei City government evicted the students from in front of the Executive Yuan on November 7, the city government tolerated the students when the movement reassembled in Liberty Square. Although the protest in Liberty Square was still illegal, the Taipei City government just arranged for several policemen to watch the movement rather than evicting this illegal assembly. In other words, the attitude of the Taipei City government toward the Wild Strawberries turned to tolerance after the movement restarted in Liberty Square. A newspaper report described the reaction of the police:

According to Taipei City Zhongzheng First Precinct, the professors and students turned to Liberty Square to continue the sit-in after the eviction. The police warned the protesters that their behavior was illegal and collected information on the illegal assembly. However, because the sit-in carried no concerns about interrupting traffic or generating noise, the police temporarily did not evict them.46

The public even urged the police to protect the safety of the students. For example, the chief secretary of National Taiwan University urged that the students’ protest should be rational and peaceful and hoped that the police would give the students appropriate protection.47 The attitude of the Taipei City government was clear: The Wild Strawberries movement is illegal but we tolerate it. The tolerant attitude of the

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47 UDN, November 8, 2008.
government was also evident in the negotiation between the police and the students on the time to dismiss the protest. Interviewee B recalled this negotiation:

My documentary video includes this case. I thought that some protesters hoped to terminate the protest and wanted to leave Liberty Square. One person said to the people that the police came to negotiate the termination of the protest. According to this person, the police would let the protest continue until December 7. The police hoped that the protesters could self-dismiss after the parade on December 7. The person said if we refused and wanted to carry on after December 7, the police would take action in no time (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

This case demonstrates that the police did not want to directly confront the protesters. Instead of just enforcing the authority, the police tolerated the illegal activities of the Wild Strawberries and actively looked for a compromise.

Second, the student identity neutralized the logic of “either blue or green.” Theoretically, on one hand, the blue camp should have labeled the Wild Strawberries as a green movement to weaken the legitimacy of this movement; on the other hand, the green camp should have exploited the Wild Strawberries to challenge the KMT government. However, both camps unusually had the same attitude toward the Wild Strawberries. The legislators in both the blue and green camps expressed that they supported the desire of the students to scrap the Assembly and Parade Law.48

Third, although both political camps officially supported the demands of the students, some of their supporters kept following the logic of “either blue or green.” For example, some KMT student supporters came to the site of the Wild

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48 Taipei Times, November 12, 2008.
Strawberries. They claimed they were “blueberries” to contrast to the “greenberries" disguised as “Wild Strawberries.” The green supporters also convened on the site of the Wild Strawberries. They not only donated resources and money to the students but also inspired the students to continue the protest. While these green supporters were outside the picket line, the students gradually developed an emotional tie with these people. As I will show in the next chapter, this emotional tie was one reason that the Wild Strawberries carried on even though the number of participants dropped sharply.

Fourth, the student identity connected the Wild Strawberries to university routines. To build the Wild Strawberries as a student movement, only students were allowed to join the protest. Since the social base of the Wild Strawberries was students, the development of this movement was inevitably influenced by what happened in universities. The influence of university routines was not serious in the initial stage. However, when the protest carried on, university routines gradually affected the Wild Strawberries as I will discuss in the next chapter. Here I want to show how the student identity influenced the mobilization of the Wild Strawberries. After the sit-in was moved to Liberty Square, the number of participants dropped sharply. The reason behind the sharp drop was that mid-term exams week was approaching and many students returned to school for mid-terms. In the extreme case, only a single-digit number of students sat in the sit-in area.49 The students gossiped that the government might encourage the colleges to urge the students to stop the campaign by imposing demerits or even forcing the students to drop out. Although the Ministry of Education Affairs denied the content of the gossip, the gossip made the parents worry about the students’ schoolwork and ask the students to leave the Wild Strawberries movement. Interviewee C recalled her mother’s

49 Taipei Times, November 15, 2008.
reaction when her mother learned she had not taken the mid-terms:

My mom was upset when she learned I didn’t take the mid-term exams. She immediately came to Taipei from Tainan (a city in southern Taiwan) to meet me. She gave me two choices. One was that I temporarily suspend my schoolwork. Another one was that I beg the professors to give me a chance to take makeup exams. I chose the second option and my mom and aunt brought me to beg the professors (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

The university routines also influenced the coordination of the task teams of the Wild Strawberries. Interviewee A used the university routine to explain why his task team became less and less organized:

The task of my team was arranging the daily activities of the Wild Strawberries. We did well in the beginning. However, we started to leave the schedule blank when the movement continued because we were tired and needed to prepare for final exams (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

From the perspective of the theory of strategic action fields, the student identity turned the universities into a proximate field for the Wild Strawberries. The local order in this proximate field deeply influenced the mobilization and coordination of the Wild Strawberries. Although the impact of university life was not obvious in the initial stage, the student identity did open the door for the interference of university routines.
Conclusion

Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) suggest that collective identity is an important resource for constructing the local order in a social movement and negotiating the relationship between the social movement and the broad field environment. Building on this suggestion, the current study demonstrates how strategic choices about movement identity produce structural constraints on different levels. I argue that although social actors strategically build a movement identity to make a social movement possible, the building process of the movement identity generates structural constraints that the movement confronts.

On the individual level, the movement identity accounts for the protesters’ imaginings of the social movement. The movement identity provides the worldview to interpret the problem as well as the solution to deal with the problem. As we have seen, the partisan identity made the blue camp interpret the loss of the election as a result of the DPP’s fraud, and the protest was the means with which to win back the election. The civic identity made the Reds interpret the movement as a battle between a corrupt president and all Taiwanese, and let the Reds to adopt inclusive strategies to organize the movement. The student identity made the Wild Strawberries students believe that following a previous legendary student movement was a doable way to demand that the government listen to their voices.

On the organizational level, the process of building in movement identity explains the strategic capacity of the movement. The movement identity defines the movement’s protesters. Different kinds of protesters have different toolkits for operating social movements and therefore bring different abilities to develop strategies. The blue politicians and supporters dominated the blue camp’s post-election protest. This composition resulted in the protesters repeating the logic of “either blue or green” to arrange the protest. The Reds’ leadership was diverse. The
leaders without social movement experience became the catalyst for designing creative activities and challenging political clichés. However, they did not favor illegal or disruptive strategies. The Wild strawberries participants were students without movement experience. Therefore, they referred back to the Wild Lily to organize their protest.

On the environmental level, the movement identity connects the social movement to other fields and players in varying ways. The blue camp’s protest encountered the counter-action from the green camp because the protest was another confrontation between the blue and green camps. The local government showed less tolerance toward the protest because it was interpreted as a protest favoring party interests. In the case of the Reds, the blue camp officially banned its partisans from joining the Reds with a blue identity, because the Reds movement was a civic movement. While the green camp kept labeling the Reds as a blue movement, some green politicians showed sympathy for the Reds since corruption violated a general value in people’s minds. The Reds also obtained tolerance and implicit assistance from the government. The central government did not dare to stop the “illegal” donations and the local government helped the Reds overcome the regulations concerning protest. These reactions resulted from the strong mobilization of the Reds, which was based on the civic identity. The Wild Strawberries obtained friendly responses from both blue and green camps. The local government did not dispel the students’ illegal protest and even negotiated with the students to look for a compromise. All these reactions reflected the purity of the student movement in Taiwan.

Through exploring the relationship between movement identity and structural constraints, we can see how social actors’ strategic choices about movement identity create the structural constraints that they face. However, these structural constraints
are not fixed. Future strategic choices regarding other strategic dilemmas may redefine the movement’s meaning and therefore result in reconfiguration of the structural constraints. To illustrate this ongoing construction of structural constraints, I turn to the reiterative dilemma-solving process in social movements. I will discuss how choices in response to a recurring dilemmas and contingent dilemmas intertwine to reconfigure the structural constraints and therefore shape the development of social movements.
Chapter 4

Reiterative Dilemma-Solving Process and Life Course of Social Movements

In previous chapters, I demonstrated that movement identity is a product of social actors’ strategic choices and that these strategic choices create the structural constraints the social movement encounters. In the current chapter, I turn the focus to the interaction among strategic choices and how this interaction explains the life course of social movements. Since movement identity is a tentative agreement that temporarily unites people with different stands within the social movement and connects the movement to the broad field environment, future strategic choices may challenge the meaning of the movement identity and therefore result in reconfiguration of the structural constraints. The reconfigured structural constraints limit the social movement’s next strategic choices. This process repeats during the development of the social movement.

To explain the process by which social actors continuously reconfiguring the structural constraints and therefore actively constructing the fate of the social movement, I propose a reiterative dilemma-solving model that incorporates the complicated patterns of interaction among strategic choices. I argue that the developmental path of the social movement is produced by a series of social actors’ strategic choices. In this model, I not only focus on previous choices constraining later choices but also the intriguing interactions between different types of dilemmas.

In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, the strategic choices are constrained by two kinds of dilemmas. The first I call contingent dilemmas, which occur at particular points in time. The second I term recurring dilemmas; these are rooted in political and cultural contexts and therefore shadow the development of the social
movement. The sequence of dilemma-solving for contingent dilemmas reflects the characteristics of what Mahoney (2000) called the “reactive sequence”: Social actors’ strategic choices in dilemma A create a path that leads the social actors to dilemma B and the strategic choices in dilemma B lead the social actors to dilemma C. This sequence indicates that social actors encounter different dilemmas at different points in time. Once social actors solve these dilemmas, they are less likely to face the same dilemmas because their timing has passed. The sequence of dilemma-solving in recurring dilemmas demonstrates the traits of what Mahoney (2000) called the “self-reinforcing sequence”: Social actors’ strategic choices lock in the sequence in a particular direction that is difficult to reverse. In this situation, social actors encounter what Haydu (1998) termed the “reiterative problem-solving” process: Although social actors can temporarily solve the dilemma, the dilemma reappears at later points in time. In my model, recurring dilemmas can be a contingent dilemma because social actors must take action to deal with the recurring dilemma at specific points in time. However, differing from contingent dilemmas, the recurring dilemma does not just disappear from the life of the social movement. Instead, solutions for contingent dilemmas may change the balance that is produced by the solution for the recurring dilemma and therefore awaken the sleeping recurring dilemma.

Building on categorization of strategic dilemmas, I argue that the developmental path of a social movement is produced through a dilemma-solving process that intertwines the sequences of contingent and recurring dilemma-solving. I argue that this intertwined sequence demonstrates the tension between agency and structure: While social actors can shape their future by making choices, the sequence of choices may lead the social movement back to face its most significant obstacle multiple times.

In the current chapter, I use the development of the post-election protest of the
blue camp, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries to illustrate the reiterative dilemma-solving model. This chapter has three sections. In the first, I identify the recurring dilemma in each case based on interviews and media reports. Recurring dilemma in these cases means a major obstacle that influences the social movement repeatedly over time. Then I illustrate how the sequence of contingent dilemmas intertwines with the recurring dilemmas in the three movements and apply the reiterative dilemma-solving model to explain the different trajectories of the movements. At the end, I discuss the contributions of the reiterative dilemma-solving model to the life course of the social movements and path-dependency.

The Recurring Dilemmas

The blue camp’s post-presidential election protest: institutional or extra-institutional means

The recurring dilemma of the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest was whether the blue camp should pursue its goal using judicial and political means such as institutional means to solve the controversy or challenge the electoral outcome by extra-institutional means such as a mass movement. Although forming a mass movement can be an option for a political party to reach its goal (Goldstone 2004), the choice to protest brought tension into the blue camp. First, the blue camp did not favor using a mass movement as a means to achieve its goal. The Kuomintang (KMT) was an authoritarian regime. In the transition to democracy, the KMT faced many challenges in the form of mass movements. Therefore, the blue camp has traditionally been anti-social movement (Ho 2005). Because of this antipathy, the blue camp lacked knowledge about organizing a social movement and connecting to other civic groups. Second, the KMT was the major party in the legislative department at the time. Hence, the KMT had an advantage in solving the controversy
by means of institutional politics, including judicial and political means.

While the blue camp traditionally was opposed to and inexperienced in using the form of mass movement to achieve its goals, the candidates for president and vice president of the blue camp, Chan Lien (KMT) and James Soong (People First Party; PFP), unexpectedly activated such a protest. Therefore, the blue camp faced a problem. On the one hand, the blue camp disliked using mass movement as a means; on the other, the protest had already been activated. In this situation, the question became whether to stay in the streets or go back to the institutional channel. I will show how this consideration continuously intertwined with contingent dilemmas that the blue camp faced.

**Reds: The difficulty of sustaining the movement as a civic movement**

The recurring dilemma that shadowed the Reds during the movement’s life course was the difficulty of sustaining the movement as a civic movement instead of a political conflict and moreover, sustaining this public image. This difficulty arose from the logic of “either blue or green.” When a social movement is labeled as a blue or a green movement, the legitimacy of the movement decreases because the movement is not a “social” movement anymore but a “political” movement. This difficulty is demonstrated in the effort to maintain distance between the Reds and the political camps.

The logic of “either blue or green” determined the relationships between the Reds and two major political camps. To the green camp, the simplest way to decrease the legitimacy of the Reds was labeling the Reds as a helper of the blue camp. As I mentioned in the second chapter, the green camp launched several actions to connect the Reds to the blue camp. To the blue camp, the Reds represented an alliance since they had the same enemy. Therefore, people in the blue camp were
motivated to join the Reds. As I mentioned, the blue camp realized that the power of the Reds came from the movement’s civic identity and therefore officially restrained its partisans from joining the Reds with a partisan identity. However, the blue politicians and supporters implicitly regarded the Reds as their tool to achieve their political interests.\footnote{One example to demonstrate this attitude of the blue camp is the conversation among Kun-li Liu (a daily coordinator) and several female Taipei City councilors. Kun-li Liu mentioned that these councilors expressed appreciation for his help in operating the Reds for the blue camp. Kun-li Liu corrected them instantly, saying that theirs was a civic movement not a blue movement; this example shows that the blue camp treated the Reds as an ally.} In other words, the Reds faced the problem that the green camp constantly labeled the Reds as a blue movement and the strongly motivated blue adherents provided evidence for the green camp to convince people that the Reds movement actually was a blue movement. John Wei talked about this difficulty in his interview:

> I felt that Taiwanese kept using color to make judgments. It was a disease in the entire Taiwan. Nobody reflected on A-bian’s corruption...blue and green, the Reds became a blue movement. Actually, we were always trying to prevent the Reds from becoming a blue movement (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

Moreover, the Reds movement was described as a “green head and blue body.” This meant that the Reds were composed of blue supporters but led by green leaders. As I will show, this combination of leadership and social base continuously created problems for the Reds. On the one hand, the Reds needed to constantly resist the attempt of the green camp to define the Reds as an ally of the blue camp; on the other hand, the Reds could not regulate every action of the blue crowd that might risk the Reds being labeled as a blue movement.

The Reds constantly faced the problem of sustaining identity. While the Reds
successfully created a civic image in the initial stages, the movement could not eliminate the entanglement of this problem. To protect its political interests, the green camp kept labeling the Reds as a blue movement. The green camp seized any chance to bring the Reds trouble in sustaining the movement’s “civic” image. Similarly, since the blue camp and the Reds had the same goal, the blue camp wanted to stand closer and closer with the Reds. If the Reds could not maintain an appropriate distance from the blue camp, the Reds took the chance of being regarded as a part of the blue camp. The Reds’ identity work could only produce a temporary balance between the Reds and other political camps. The strategic choices for other contingent dilemmas revived this issue.

*The Wild Strawberries: The romantic imagination as it relates to student movements*

The recurring dilemma that entangled the Wild Strawberries was the participants’ romantic imagination of student movements. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, due to the shrinking of student movements over the past 20 years, most students involved in the Wild Strawberries were inexperienced with student movements. In this situation, they compared the Wild Strawberries to the Wild Lily, the most famous student movement in Taiwan. The Wild Lily became an idealized model for the Wild Strawberries. The students’ knowledge of the Wild Lily was simple: Wild Lily students sat in and the government responded to their demands. Therefore, the students forming the Wild Strawberries wanted to follow the same pattern: We sit there and the government responds to our demands and we have a happy ending. Interviewee C’s regretful reflection on her Wild Strawberries experience reveals this romantic imagination:

*We were too silly and naïve in that moment. We believed that if we kept sitting*
in Liberty Square, we definitely could generate pressure on the government. I believed, at least, as long as we sat there, we could demonstrate what we wanted (Date of interview: 8/21/2011).

This romantic imagination compelled the students to want to achieve something that could be compared to the significant precedents. Some students even linked the failure of the Wild Strawberries to their own failure. Therefore, they insisted that the protest make the happy ending come true because a dismissal not only meant that the Wild Strawberries could not achieve their goals but it also hurt the self-image of the students. For example, when I asked H why he and other participants did not just leave the movement when they faced several unfavorable conditions, he replied:

It was because we were still holding on. It was the prevailing atmosphere. It was hard to say what the achievement that we wanted was. The government kept ignoring our requests and did not contact us. This situation made us feel bad…Yes, we could just leave but we felt that we had to stay. So, we didn’t want to dismiss the sit-in (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

Interviewee M made a similar comment in his interview. He said:

We felt that we needed to achieve something or why did we join the Wild Strawberries? (Date of interview: 6/2/2011)

The romantic image of the student movement shadowed the strategic choices of the Wild Strawberries. As I will show in the next section, this romantic imagination shaped the movement’s choices about where the protest should be held, what
activities the students should conduct, and when the protest should end.

**The Reiterative Dilemma-Solving Processes**

*The blue camp’s post-presidential election protest*

Based on the media reports, I identified three contingent dilemmas that were crucial in the developmental path of the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest. Although the life course of this protest was only one week, we still can see the intertwining relationship between the contingent and recurring dilemmas.

**Boundary-drawing dilemma: A blue movement**

The first dilemma for the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest was the boundary-drawing dilemma. This dilemma refers to how social movements use symbolic resources to define potential participants to recruit (Lamont and Molnar 2002). The strategic choice for this dilemma indicates that it is part of identity work: what kind of participants the movement wants to have and what kind of public image the movement wants to present. This dilemma was both a contingent and recurring dilemma. It was a contingent dilemma because identity-building was a common task for a social movement in the initial stages. It was a recurring dilemma because the players in the broad field environment kept challenging the solutions for this dilemma and brought this dilemma back to the foreground.

Although the protest was not in the blue camp’s plan because the blue camp never thought it would lose the election, the leaders still wanted to present the protest as a civic movement. Leaders such as Chan Lien and James Soong emphasized that the protest was for the public good, not for party interests. Their speeches highlighted the importance of a clean election to democracy and
suppressed the intention to reverse the outcome of the election.\textsuperscript{51} However, this identity-building failed because of the weak coordination of the actions of the blue politicians and supporters.

The KMT and PFP legislators led the angry blue supporters to riot near prosecutors’ offices in the main cities. They accused the green camp of manipulating the election, fought with the police, and asked for an immediate recount of the ballots. When blue legislators led the protest, when blue supporters became the base of the protest, and when blue tones and symbols dominated the protest, the protest was difficult to define as a protest for all people. In other words, the identity-building did not develop as the blue camp projected. The blue camp’s post-presidential election activities were presented as an expression of the blue movement. In this situation, the protest became an extension of the presidential election campaign and blue politicians escalated the confrontation between the blue and the green camps by condemning the green camp’s manipulation in the election.

The partisan identity had some benefits for the protest. The blue identity highlighted values that were worthy of chasing, identified common goals, indicated available means, and united people to work together. However, the blue identity drew the blue camp to become involved in the confrontation with the green camp. Moreover, since the blue camp traditionally opposed using the mass movement to realize its goals, the blue camp needed to take action to deal with this unplanned protest.

\textbf{How to solve the dispute: Using both institutional and extra-institutional means}

After the blue camp began the protest, it made two moves to challenge the outcome of the presidential election. First, in the institution, the blue camp filed

\textsuperscript{51} For details of the strategies, see Chapter 2.
papers with the high court to suspend President Shui-bian Chen and Vice President Annette Lu’s re-election on the grounds of fraud. Second, outside of conventional action, the blue camp complained publically that the green camp had used dishonest tricks to win the election. As I mentioned, the tricks that the blue camp referred to include accusations that the shooting of President Chen on March 19 was staged by the green camp to help President Chen obtain sympathy votes, that the Ministry of National Defense prevented troops from returning to their hometown to cast votes after the shooting, and that the election involved vote-stuffing.

In sum, the blue camp chose to solve its dispute through both institutional and extra-institutional means at the same time. Its blue identity explained this choice. The blue identity induced the strong emotions of the blue leaders and supporters in response to the outcome of the election. In addition, the political resources attached to the blue identity allowed the blue camp to be capable of using institutional means to achieve its goal. Therefore, we can see that the blue camp chased its goal through both institutional and extra-institutional means.

The end of the protest: Being dispersed without any attempt to renovate

Because the blue camp filed appeals and accused the green camp of corruption, the court and the green camp took actions to respond to the blue camp’s moves. As to the appeals, although it granted the appeals and sealed the ballots, the court indicated that the appeals would not be settled quickly. According to the Public Officials Election and Recall Law, the court had six months to make its judgment and the blue camp had to provide evidence to convince the court that the green camp had cheated in the election. To solve the dispute, the green camp not only declared that it would agree to an immediate recount but also suggested that the blue and

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green camps cooperate to amend the law.\textsuperscript{53} Then the court could recount the ballots immediately. However, the blue camp rejected this suggestion.\textsuperscript{54}

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government and the DPP also responded to every blue camp concern about the election. In response to the complaint that the shooting was a staged incident, the president’s office made public the pictures and the video of President Shui-bian Chen and Vice President Annette Lu’s hospitalization shortly after the incident and said the incident was impossible to fake. The Criminal Investigation Bureau also ruled out the possibility of the assassination attempt being staged on March 23.\textsuperscript{55} As to the accusation that the Ministry of National Defense limited soldiers from casting votes after the shooting occurred, the ministry ensured that this accusation was not true by clarifying the on-duty situation in the period of the election.\textsuperscript{56} While the blue camp complained that the “evidence” provided was all fake, the issue became a political struggle that would not end in a short time.

When the struggle could not be solved through either institutional or non-institutional channels in a short time, the protest became an encumbrance to the blue camp. The protest was framed as an activity that intentionally influenced judicial neutrality, broke social harmony, and harmed the international image of Taiwan. For example, Taeng-chang Su, Taipei County commissioner and the DPP’s campaign manager, claimed that the blue camp’s protest was evidence that the blue

\textsuperscript{53} For example, President Shui-bian Chen defended himself, saying that “neither I nor my administration, not to mention those 20,000 staff members who took charge of the votes-counting process on March 20, would cheat in the election.” He also expressed that he supported the recount: “Since I did not conduct any vote-rigging, I welcome and support a public vote recount, the results of which I will 100 percent accept, no matter the outcome” (Taipei Times, March 24, 2004). Premier Shyi-kun, a DPPer, also announced that the Cabinet had completed draft amendments to the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and Recall Law to allow the Central Election Commission to immediately recount (Taipei Times, March 24, 2004).

\textsuperscript{54} Taipei Times, March 25, 2004.

\textsuperscript{55} Taipei Times, March 24, 2004.

\textsuperscript{56} Taipei Times, March 24, 2004.
camp had manipulated the people in an attempt to influence the recount process. He told the media that “everyone should respect the country’s legal system and the court’s decision, instead of resorting to emotional tactics and using the public to tell the courts what to do.”57 In addition to the green camp, famous figures in academic fields also called on the blue camp to end the mass protest. For example, Academia Sinica president and Nobel laureate Yuan-tseh Lee supported the recount and urged the blue camp to terminate the protest because “what counts now is how to make the country move forward, rather than focusing on who was elected.”58 The green politicians condemned the protest for fostering the blue camp’s interests and warned that the blue camp’s protest could damage the international image of Taiwan.

Therefore, the blue camp needed to consider the necessity of the protest. Since the public and even the green camp were willing to use judicial means to solve the dispute, the blue camp’s protest became unnecessary. Moreover, the protest might have harmed the reputation of the blue camp because people might have interpreted the protest as supporting the interests of the blue camp at the cost of unstable political and social situations. Because the protest gradually became negative equity for the blue camp and the blue camp was traditionally distant from mass movements, the blue politicians had no motivation to sustain the protest. Although the blue camp did not officially declare an end to the protest, it let the protest die “naturally.” On March 27, the blue camp held a mass rally. The police estimated that more than 400,000 people joined. After the rally, all the blue camp figures left the site of the protest. However, hundreds of blue supporters occupied the square in front of the presidential office. In the early morning of March 28, the Taipei City government sent the police to “softly” remove the protesters from the

57 Taipei Times, March 23, 2004
square. The square was clear by 5:25 a.m. In the process of dispersion, no blue figures were at the site to lead the protestors or take action to continue the protest, so the police just removed the protesters.\textsuperscript{59} After the dispersion, the blue camp did not take actions to refresh the protest but kept focusing on court judgments.

In summary, while the blue camp activated the protest to express its fury about the outcome of the presidential election, the blue identity led the blue camp to reconsider the necessity to maintain the protest. Because the blue camp traditionally did not favor using a mass movement to achieve its goals and actually owned other methods to struggle with the green camp, the blue camp terminated the protest when it shift the focus from the protest to adopting political and juridical strategies.

\textit{The Reds}

Based on interviews and media reports, I identified three contingent dilemmas that were crucial in the developmental path of the Reds. The strategies for these contingent dilemmas not only formed a reactive sequence but also brought the recurring dilemma – the “either blue or green” frame – back into the strategy sequence.

\textbf{Boundary-drawing dilemma: A civic movement}

The first contingent dilemma for the Reds was also the boundary-drawing dilemma. As I described in Chapter 2, the choice that the Reds adopted to deal with this dilemma was to build the Reds as a civic movement. The leaders drew a loose boundary between the participants and non-participants. The Reds welcomed everyone who was dissatisfied with President Shui-bian Chen. The Reds’ leaders strategically created ambiguity that highlighted civic identity and put partisan

\textsuperscript{59} Taipei Times, March 28, 2004.
identity into the background. The Reds demonstrated the movement’s mobilization capacity and established independent financial resources by launching a gigantic fundraising activity. They conducted symbolic work to distinguish the Reds from the blue and green camps, and built a leadership team without the political figures of the blue camp.60

The civic movement identity had several positive effects on the Reds. First, the civic identity helped the Reds resist the logic of “either blue or green.” As usual, the green camp tried to label the Reds as a helper of the blue camp and to bring the Reds back into the logic of “either blue or green.” However, after the Reds successfully built the movement as a civic movement, this identity made the counter-activities of the green camp lose their impact because connecting the Reds to the blue camp became difficult. At the same time, the blue camp also understood that the strength of the Reds was built on a civic identity and therefore officially banned blue politicians from joining the movement with partisan identity. Through this successful identity-work, the Reds could keep the movement’s autonomous image and not be mixed with any political camp.

Second, the civic identity provided the Reds with a leadership that differed from the traditional political movement in which the leaders are usually political figures. The leadership of the Reds was composed of two groups that contribute the development of the Reds in two different ways. The experienced group derived the Reds and the novice group introduced innovative ideas and resources.

Although the civic movement identity benefited the formation of the Reds, the trade-offs of this strategic product sowed the seeds of two future crises for the Reds. The first was the conflict between the veteran and novice leaders. While the civic movement identity tentatively suppressed the differences between these two

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60 For details of the identity work of the Reds, refer to Chapter 2.
groups, their future strategic choices put the differences back on the table. The conflicts between the groups eventually reconfigured the structural constraints that were produced through their identity-work. Second, while the civic identity benefited the Reds in preventing the movement from mixing with conventional political conflicts, it provided an opportunity for infiltration from the blue camp. Some blue politicians thought that their presence during Reds activities could enhance their political reputation. Although the Reds asked them not to display any political symbol, it was difficult for the Reds to completely enforce this rule. The blue politicians might shift their identity between partisan and civic identity. This trade-off in the civic movement identity actually increased the difficulty of the Reds in sustaining the movement’s neutral status.

“Innovation or convention” dilemma: Innovative repertoires

After the Reds successfully built the movement as a civic movement and won gigantic support from society, the next dilemma arising was how to organize the movement. Since the Reds’ leaders were both veterans and novices of social movements, the Reds could either reproduce the conventional repertoires of social movements or transplant different repertoires from other fields. Each choice came with a trade-off. On the one hand, innovative strategies are more effective than conventional strategies because opponents do not know how to deal with them (McAdam 1983); on the other hand, innovative strategies carry more uncertainty than conventional strategies for activists because it is difficult to calculate and

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61 The official stance of the blue camp was not to engage in the operations of the Reds. For example, the chairmen of the KMT and the FPF, Ying-jeou Ma and James Song, respectively, claimed that neither of the political parties would be involved in the operations of the Reds (China Times, 8/13/2006). Ying-jeou Ma even mentioned in a KMT meeting, “If the KMT helps Ming-teh Shih, people may think that it’s the KMT again” (UDN, 8/13/2006). However, some blue politicians still wanted to join the Reds to obtain political benefits.
evaluate the outcomes of innovative strategies (Jasper 2006).

The Reds’ choice in responding to this dilemma was to adopt innovative repertoires. The Reds made several strategic moves that had seldom been seen in conventional movements. The first example is the round-the-clock sit-in by turns. Unlike past sit-in activities where all the protesters sat for a long time, Reds participants took turns sitting in. Every three hours, several hundred sit-in participants would alternate. The second example is the Nazca Line that was drawn on the Reds site. Because no one knew what this symbol was, Jerry Fan explained that it was from Peruvian culture. He claimed that the Nazca Line symbolized miraculous power for the local people in Peru. Jerry Fan asked participants to march along the line at regular intervals to show people’s discontent with President Shui-bian Chen. The third example is that the Reds even played Western symphonies at the sit-in site. The repertoires the Reds performed included “Fate,” “Finlandia,” and “A Hymn to My Country.” Conventional political movements play either Mandarin or Taiwanese songs to signify their political stands. Playing Western symphonies on the site of social movement was rare in Taiwan.

Why did the Reds favor innovative strategies? Two reasons produced by the Reds’ identity-work explain this choice. The first is the composition of the leaders. Because the Reds intentionally recruited non-political figures to be the leaders, the Reds’ leadership demonstrated a creative orientation. While these non-political figures knew a little about the operation of social movements, they were less constrained by political common sense. They either unwittingly used the repertoires with which they were familiar to organize the Reds activities or intentionally challenged political taboos. Fu-chung Chang described this situation in his interview:

We had many advertising men and music men. They had abundant experience
with holding concerts and making creative advertisements. Their work experiences let them know how to handle a huge event for the Reds, but they used the concert as the model to organize the Reds instead of traditional models (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

These movement freshmen also brought resources that differed from those of more common social movements in Taiwan. The high-quality audio system that the non-political figures had brought that I mentioned was an example. Because of the identity work involving civic movement identity, the novices of the social movements had an opportunity to enter into the leadership. These freshmen became the sources of innovation in the Reds movement. They not only recontextualized their local knowledge and applied it to organize Reds activities, but they also provided resources that were not frequently seen in conventional movements.

The second reason for favoring innovative strategies involves the organizational structure of the Reds. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, although officially the decisions of the Reds were made through discussion among core leaders, Ming-teh Shih owned the authority to make the final decision. In this situation, Ming-teh Shih’s preference was critical with regard to whether the Reds adopted conventional or innovative repertoires. According to the interviewees, Ming-teh Shih favored the novice leaders’ ideas rather than those of the veteran leaders. For example, when I asked James Jain why Ming-teh Shih usually preferred novice leaders like Jerry Fan and neglected the opinions of veteran leaders, he complained:

Because Jerry Fan’s suggestions let Ming-teh Shih become the focus of the media. Jerry Fan’s suggestions had selling points. The media would follow his
suggestion and Ming-teh Shih had a stage to show himself. Ming-teh Shih cared about his performances (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

John Wei also observed the connection between Ming-teh Shih and the novice leaders. In the interview, he ascribed this connection to their similar structural positions. Because of their similar positions, they shared “bourgeois taste” in strategy selection. He defined “bourgeois taste” as an orientation of “avoiding any radical and illegal actions.” He suggested that they shared this taste because Ming-teh Shih and the novice leaders had all obtained some kind of success in different fields, such as art, music, politics, and commerce. If the Reds challenge had changed the existing institutions, the freshmen leaders might have lost what they already had. Although John Wei might not use the term “bourgeois taste” as accurately as scholars, he did point out his observation that Ming-teh Shih tended to agree with the novice leaders.

While the veteran leaders followed the innovative strategies even if they did not entirely agree with them, conflicts between the veteran and novice leaders grew as the Reds carried on. Some novice leaders’ suggestions made other leaders feel uncomfortable and they decided to fade out of the decision-making processes of the Reds. One example is the adoption of the representative color. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the novice leaders like Jerry Fan suggested using the color red to represent the anti-corruption movement. Red was taboo in political activity because it was easily connected to China and labeled as a Chinese or blue camp color. In other words, this choice might risk tarnishing the identity of the anti-corruption movement as a civic movement, since the color red might highlight the difference between the national identities. Some leaders like De-fen Ho shared this worry. She also complained that this choice made the anti-corruption movement become a
commercial activity, because every participant had to buy red clothes. In the end, De-fen Ho left the position of spokeswoman. Although Po-yun Hsu and Ming-teh Shih visited her and invited her to come back, De-fen Ho refused.

Another example is the debate about whether to launch a national strike. Worrying that the longer the Reds stayed in the street, the less likely the Reds were to achieve their goals, in mid-September some veteran leaders like James Jian proposed launching a nationwide strike to generate more pressure on the DPP government. James Jian talked about his considerations regarding this question:

My consideration was that we could not sustain the movement and the morale forever. Once the movement continued for a long period, the morale of the people would be depleted. You cannot just use money to sustain a movement. You need to sustain the morale. So, taking promptly action was the best way for the Reds to make A-bian step down (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

James Jain’s words reflected the fact that the veteran leaders wanted to achieve a substantive goal: They wanted to make President Shui-bian Chen resign. James Jain’s proposal obtained support from veteran leaders like John Wei. To John Wei, a strike was a standard way to generate more pressure on the government. He said in the interview:

I remember that a strike was James Jain’s idea. I agreed with his idea. (I asked “why”). I was a labor movement lawyer and James and I were old friends. I

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62 De-fen Ho was a representative figure of the veterans. She opposed the flexible model because she believed that social movements were supposed to involve serious and somber activities so as to demonstrate the activists’ resolution. She argued that the flexible model could not achieve this goal and that it commercialized the whole movement.
thought a strike was okay, not a big deal. But Mr. Shih and Yao-chang Chen (a doctor) were opposed. I thought they demonstrated the capitalist consideration. Of course, I was from a capitalist family but I participated in NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and the labor movement. So, I felt that a strike was okay. A strike would not bring any serious problems. But James and I, we were in the minority (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

While the veteran leaders thought a nationwide strike was doable, the novice leaders did not agree. Instead of focusing on how to compel President Shui-bian Chen to resign, the novice leaders cared more about bringing honesty back into politics. To them, President Chen stepping down or not was not the most important thing. The most important thing was to remind people that corruption is wrong. Po-yun Hsu’s comment on a strike reflected this point:

I don’t think that the change in political institution or reality is the only standard by which to judge whether the Reds succeeded or failed. The influence of the Reds on social values in Taiwan was also important… I believed the Reds were successful because they let the Taiwanese know that corruption is wrong (Date of interview: 8/16/2011).

Moreover, the novice leaders believed that a national strike would not help to connect people in different classes and might even risk the stability of society. For example, Po-yun Hsu explained why he opposed a strike in the interview. He said he worried that a nationwide strike would disrupt the social order and generate unnecessary confrontational positions between capitalists and workers. In addition, he argued that the proposal for a national strike was wrong because the Reds
movement was an anti-corruption movement, not a revolution or anti-government movement.

The debate ended with the rejection of the strike. Due to Ming-teh Shih’s decision, the proposal for a strike was defeated. James Jian complained:

Ming-teh Shih said he respected our people’s decision. It was bullshit. He only verbally respected it. We almost decided to launch a strike and discussed the details. He just overthrew our decision (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

This decision hurt some veteran leaders, especially James Jian, the person who made the proposal. In the interview, James Jian emphasized that his strike plan would not have brought any trouble to society:

My strike plan was soft. The employees could ask for leave or the employers could just let the employees leave. The entire country asked for one day of leave. Just one day. My plan did not need unions or any legal procedure. No one was in the market in that day. No buses. Because all bus drivers were off duty. Even no taxis. If we could achieve this, the pressure on the government would be gigantic (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

Although he tried to explain his plan, “they (the novice leaders) just did not want to listen because they were too afraid of a strike.” After the rejection of the strike, James Jian decided to fade out the Reds. He mentioned his feeling at that time:

(Ming-teh Shih wanted me to help with the protest on October 10.) I passively replied, “Okay, I will help.” After September 28, I seldom went to their
meetings. Only occasionally went back to the Reds and took a look (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

On the question of how to organize the Reds activities, we can see how social actors’ previous decisions constrained future decisions. The reasons that the Reds preferred innovative strategies were the product of the Reds’ identity work: The non-political leaders without movement experience were the source of the innovative strategies and the Shih-centered organizational structure meant the conventional strategies were usually abandoned. While adopting innovative strategies was the outcome of the Reds’ previous strategies, this decision also produced the outcome that could shape the future strategy-making. The conflict between the novice and veteran leaders resulted in the departure of the veteran leaders. The reorganized leadership reconfigured the strategic capacity in the social movement. The novice leaders’ strategic orientation, such as avoiding radical and illegal actions and looking for cultural effect, became the main theme of Reds activities. This consequence accounted for how the Reds dealt with reactions from the green camp in later stages.

One or more target dilemmas: Keeping the focus on President Chen’s scandal

After the dilemma about the design of Reds’ activities, the green camp’s counterattack brought the Reds’ next contingent dilemma, which I have called the “one or more target” dilemma. To decrease the Reds’ legitimacy, in mid-September, the green camp accused Ying-jeou Ma, the political star of the blue camp and mayor of Taipei City at the time, of being involved in using the mayor’s office special city fund for his private needs (Shih 2009). The green camp urged the Reds to use the same standard to examine Ying-jeou Ma and force him to resign because Ying-Jeou Ma was also a corrupt politician. In this situation, the Reds faced a dilemma: Should
they focus on one (only President Shui-bian Chen) or two targets (both President Shui-bian Chen and Ying-jeou Ma)?

The purpose of the green camp was straightforward: If the Reds did not use the same criteria to judge the case of Ying-jeou Ma, it meant that the Reds’ movement was just a blue movement. In other words, the green camp revived the “either blue or green” logic and forced the Reds to face this recurring dilemma again. While several leaders indicated in interviews that they knew it was a trap set by the green camp, the Reds still kept focus only on President Chen. When I asked the interviewees whether they discussed this issue formally, all of them replied that this issue had never been on the agenda.

From the perspective of an outsider, this reaction was hard to understand. The Reds’ leaders knew the trick of the green camp; why did they not discuss the issue? Moreover, the Reds’ leaders were working hard to sustain their civic image, why did they continuously focus on President Chen’s scandal even though they knew this action might destroy the public image of the Reds that they had managed so tightly? I argue that the solutions to previous dilemmas account for the Reds’ reaction to the green camp’s challenge.

The first reason for this was the civic movement identity – the solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma – that opened a window for the blue politicians and supporters to infiltrate Reds activities. Under the logic of “either blue or green,” the blue politicians and supporters were more motivated than people of the green camp to join the Reds. This tendency created a challenge to the Reds’ identity work: If most Reds participants were from the blue camp, how could the Reds be perceived as a civic movement? The Reds’ leaders realized this situation and took action to hide the political identity of the participants. The Reds prohibited any political symbols on the site of Reds activities. The intention was to create ambiguity that made it difficult for
other players to label the political stance of the Reds. However, this rule was an ideal design but undoable in practice. When talking about this rule, James Jain simply said:

This rule was destined to fail. There was no way to enforce this rule. Because it was impossible to move those participants away! (Date of interview: 5/20/2011)

In his interview, Fu-chung Chang analyzed how the difficulty arose:

Because the green camp defined the Reds as a conflict between the blue and the green camps, many people who were in the green camp could not join the Reds... We also recognized that many KMT politicians were eager to participate... It was hard for us to exclude these blue politicians and supporters because they were also against corruption. As time went on, you could find that it looked like a blue movement. No people were from the green camp, and people who belonged to the blue camp had motivation to join. The Reds looked like a part of the conflict between the two political camps (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

Fu-chung Chang’s observation demonstrates the influence of the “either blue or green” logic on the mobilization of the Reds: The green camp (DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)) banned its politicians from participating in the Reds movement and people belonging to the blue camp were motivated to join. When the Reds needed help to coordinate several gigantic protests, they could only get help from the blue camp. For example, on October 9, the Reds announced the 49 deputy coordinators for the third demonstration on October 10, the national day of
celebration in Taiwan. Almost all of these coordinators were legislators and city councilors of the blue camp (Shih 2009:357). In addition, the ambiguity the Reds produced to frame the movement as a civic movement had a negative effect. The blue politicians and supporters could exploit this ambiguity to move back and forth between their partisan identity and civic identity. As James Jian and Fu-chung Chang mentioned, the Reds could not kick out the people who violated the rule of no political symbols because they could be people who would be against corruption in the subsequent minute. In this situation, the Reds movement could not just shift its goal to target a political star of the blue camp (Ying-jeou Ma) and, therefore, was trapped by the green camp’s reactive action.63

The second reason that previous solutions shaped the response to the dilemma was the preference for legal actions, the outcome of the identity work in the recruitment of non-political figures. Among the veteran leaders, this tendency prevailed. Since the Assembly and Parade Law gave the Taipei City government the legal base to regulate the Reds, the Reds needed to negotiate with the government to ensure that their activities were legal, especially activities like the round-the-clock sit-in, which had never occurred before. Conventionally, any protest would end before 10 p.m. The mayor was Ying-jeou Ma at that time. To make the sit-in legal, the Reds’ leaders not only searched for every possible case to justify their sit-in but also contacted Ying-jeou Ma himself. For example, John Wei tried his best to find cases in Taiwan or other countries to make the sit-in legal. He mentioned that the Reds also contacted Ying-jeou Ma:

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63 Some leaders criticized the “bluelization” of the Reds and ascribed it as the main reason for the movement’s failure. For example, Chaung Yen, a leader in the initial stage who left the leadership team later, even directly accused the group of the “bluelization” of the movement in a media interview. He recalled that starting from the middle stages, the campaign became a stage for politicians from the blue camp. This situation changed the nature of the campaign and damaged the neutral image of the campaign (E-Sun Weekly, August 2009).
Actually, we were not aware of the contact between Ming-teh Shih and the 
blue camp. But Ming-teh Shih himself was a big mouth. He told people that he 
met Ying-jeou Ma privately. I knew this news after they met. In that meeting, 
Ying-jeou Ma asked him if he wanted to launch a campaign for presidential 
office. Ming-teh Shih said no. It seemed that they achieved some implicit 
agreement (Date of interview: 8/10/2011).

James Jain described the relationship between Ming-teh Shih and Ying-
jeou Ma:

I did not know the details. But I knew when the Reds faced troubles such as the 
application being disapproved or the conflict with police, he might make a call 
to Ying-jeou Ma, to discuss it with Ying-jeou Ma(Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

In his memoir on the Reds, Ming-teh Shih (2009) publicly admitted that he met Ying-
jeou Ma twice before the sit-in began and made several promises to him in exchange 
for his implicit support for the Reds (Shih 2009:43). In the end, the Taipei City 
government conditionally approved the round-the-clock sit-in. Since the Reds 
needed Ying-jeou Ma’s assistance to legalize their activities, it was difficult for them 
to include Ying-jeou Ma in a target.

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64 These compromises included that the demonstration would be peaceful and that Ming-teh Shih 
would not participate in the presidential election of 2008.
65 In the press conference, Ying-jeou Ma explained that this decision did not violate the Assembly and 
Parade Law and argued that people had the right to express their opinions through demonstrations. 
He said, “The deadline of the demonstration is set by the police to ensure quality of life for local 
residents. The rights to assembly and parade are protected by the Constitution, and the city 
government is responsible for protecting the protesters if the rally is approved.” However, he also 
confirmed that the approval was conditional. Once the activities of the Reds violated the law or 
disturbed people’s daily life, the approval would be canceled (Taipei Times 2006/8/18).
The green camp’s accusation toward Ying-jeou Ma generated a contingent dilemma because it occurred at a specific point of time. However, this challenge brought back the problem of identity work: Because the participants displayed more and more blue characteristics and the activities needed some degree of cooperation with the blue government, the original identity work might have lost its function. Although excluding Ying-jeou Ma from the target could sustain the social base of the Reds and block participants from activities being labeled as illegal, this choice increased the difficulty of maintaining the Reds as a civic movement. It gave the green camp convincing evidence to link the Reds to the blue camp. For example, after the round-the-clock sit-in was approved, green camp politicians criticized the unusual approval as a special “Ming-the Shih clause” and interpreted this permission as a conspiracy between the Reds and the green camp.

Although the reaction of the Reds was appeared problematic in the outsiders’ eyes, it becomes reasonable once path-dependence in the decision-making is considered. The previous strategies that the Reds adopted produced leadership with a preference for legal actions, and made it difficult to dispel participants who demonstrated their political stance in the Reds. Therefore, the Reds more or less intentionally ignored the green camp’s counter action in the decision-making process. While the Reds did not make a clear decision about how to deal with Ying-jeou’s similar scandal, participants actually chose to focus on President Shui-bian Chen’s scandal.

**Collapse of the Reds: A dramatic decline**

The Reds operated a protest called the “siege” on October 10, the national holiday. The goal of this protest was to surround the national day ceremony. The siege was a successful mobilization. The Reds claimed that more than one million
people participated. However, just after the demonstration, the leaders, including Fu-chung Chang and Jerry Fan, announced a scaling back of the Reds on October 12. No activities in the streets would be scheduled. While decline is inevitable in most social movements, this decision was too dramatic. The protest on October 10 showed that the Reds were still energetic. According to resource mobilization theory, the Reds definitely could carry on. Moreover, President Chen was still in office. Why did the Reds terminate their activities even though they were still energetic and the target still existed?

Decline is unavoidable in social movements, and the forms decline takes are multiple. The social movement may be dismissed or it can develop the structure that Taylor (1997) called the “abeyance structure” to continue its influence when the environment turns hostile or institutionalizes the movement. However, Reds’ leaders chose to end the movement dramatically even though it was still capable of carrying on. When I asked the leaders, especially Fu-chung Chang – the person who announced the scaling back of the Reds – why they made this decision, they replied that they lost the motivation to continue the Reds.

The leaders lost the motivation for several reasons that were produced by their solutions to previous dilemmas. First, the preference for legal actions led the leaders to terminate Reds activities because the Taipei City government revoked the Reds’ application for a sit-in on October 14 due to the movement’s illegal performance on October 10.66 Since the strategic orientation of the Reds was to avoid illegal protests, it was reasonable for the leaders to choose to retreat from the streets after the

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66 Ying-jeou Ma explained the revocation in the press conference. Ma said the police department revoked the campaign's permit because it had failed to follow the conditions required by the city government during its illegal protest on October 10 (Taipei Time 10/14/2006). In the protest, the Reds tried to block officials, pan-green legislators, and foreign guests from entering or leaving the Double Tenth National Day ceremony in front of the presidential office building, changed the rally route for which the Reds had applied, and left many policemen hurt (Taipei Times 10/11/2006).
Taipei City government’s revocation.

Second, and most importantly, the image of the Reds shifting from a civic movement to a blue movement caused the leaders to lose motivation to maintain the movement after the demonstration on October 10. This shift resulted in the logic of “either blue or green” and dismantled the civic movement identity of the Reds. Here we can see an interesting fact; that is, a successful choice in the initial stages may account for the decline of the social movement. While the civic movement identity facilitated the formation of the Reds, the outcome of the identity work brought back the problem of “either blue or green.”

Since the Reds could not recruit mainstream green figures to join, the Reds could only obtain help from the blue camp when the Reds needed more recognizable figures to coordinate their activities, such as the siege on October 10. However, once many blue figures participated, the quality and composition of the Reds changed. Fu-chung Chang described this situation in the interview:

They (the blue politicians) didn’t get into the core of decision making.
However, when their names were on the list of coordinators, the Reds were doomed. It basically ended because the Reds had become a part of the conflicts between the blue and the green camps (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

This situation illustrates the phenomenon that Goffman (1974) called “rekeying”: While the social actors still conduct the same acts, the meaning of the acts has changed. Although the Reds still operated, they operated as a partisan movement. The Reds looked like a blue movement under the logic of “either blue or green” because the excess of blue political figures rekeyed the meaning of the Reds. Fu-
chung Chang, who announced the movement’s cutback with Jerry Fan, recalled in the interview this feeling of frustration when the Reds decided to leave the streets:

You can see that many KMT legislators became the focus of the media. This meant that the movement was moving the wrong way. Once the Reds became the stage of KMT politicians, we knew it was unreasonable to maintain this movement because we had nothing to do (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

When the Reds began to be interpreted as part of a conventional conflict between the blue and green camps, the leaders thought it was meaningless to continue the movement. Fu-chung Chang revealed the reasoning in his interview:

During the Reds, the blue politicians gradually occupied the media reports. I knew we had nothing to do to in this situation. To me, the only consideration was how to end this movement. Some leaders like James Jian seldom came to the activities. Of course, we could maintain the Reds, but it would be meaningless. Because you knew you faced the same participants (from the blue camp) and they said the same words (the blue discourse). I knew their performance would be more and more extreme, and more and more meaningless. The movement would lose control if we continued. The only way to avoid this consequence was to disband the movement (Date of interview: 6/21/2011).

Therefore, the Reds declined not because they ran out of objective resources or the window of political opportunity closed, but because the leaders’ decision framework was shaped by their previous decision.
In sum, the rise and fall of the Reds reflects the reiterative dilemma-solving process. The Reds faced the boundary-drawing, innovation, and one or more target dilemmas in order. The strategic choices for each dilemma produced constraints for future strategic choices. For example, the Reds preferred innovative strategies because the civic movement identity (the solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma) brought leaders without social movement experience into the Reds. The Reds kept the focus on President Chen’s scandal and downplayed Ying-jeou Ma’s similar case because the Reds could not stop the participation of the blue people (the trade-off of the civic movement identity) or the preference for legal action (the trade-off of the innovative leadership). In the end, the leaders lost motivation because of the rekeyed meaning of the Reds (the trade-off of the civic identity and the choice to downplay Ying-jeou Ma’s scandal) and the preference for legal action (the trade-off of the innovative leadership). In addition to the connection to contingent dilemma-solving, the solutions for the contingent dilemmas also led to the Reds re-facing the problem of sustaining the civic movement identity. For example, the civic movement identity, the preference for legal action, and the choice to neglect Ying-jeou Ma’s scandal challenged the identity work that the Reds had already done. All these solutions awaked the identity-building problem that the Reds had once settled and increased the difficulty of sustaining the Reds as a civic movement.

The Wild Strawberries

Based on the interviews with the leaders of the Wild Strawberries and on media reports, I have identified several contingent dilemmas that the Wild Strawberries faced. Below, I demonstrate how the connection between these contingent dilemmas intertwined with the romantic image of student movements.
The boundary-drawing dilemma: A student movement

Since the building of movement identity is essential for the formation of a social movement, the Wild Strawberries faced the boundary-drawing dilemma in the initial stages. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the Wild strawberries’ leaders chose to frame this protest as a student movement because they believed that the culture in Taiwan was friendly to student movements. To build the Wild Strawberries as a student movement, the leaders took several actions to distinguish the Wild Strawberries from other protests that also focused on the visit of Yulin Chen, the chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) of the Chinese government. First, they limited the participants to students. The students established a picket line to distinguish students from non-students who wanted to support their protest. Although the students did not check everyone’s student identification in the sit-in area, this rule did highlight the student identity of the protest. Second, they conducted symbolic work. The students prohibited any political symbols in the protest and created movement symbols such as wearing black clothes and masks with a red cross. In the phrasing of demands, the leaders intentionally avoided wording that might result in a confrontation between the blue and green camp. As with the Reds, the identity work successfully created ambiguity that blurred the party line. This ambiguity not only prevented the Wild Strawberries from being labeled as a green movement (the ruling party was KMT) but also united students with different political stances toward the same goals. Meanwhile, as I showed,

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67 For example, interviewee F was not a student but an officer of a union. When I asked why he was not a student but could stay in the sit-in area, he answered, “I thought that my outlook was young, haha, and I didn’t actively mention my job to other students—the students who knew my real job didn’t tell other people either.”

68 For details of the strategies, see Chapter 2.

69 This does not mean that the Wild Strawberries never faced trouble resulting from the logic of “either blue or green.” For example, some blue students, who called themselves the “blueberries,”
both the blue and green camps publicly supported some demands of the Wild Strawberries.

The “student” identity carried some benefits for the formation of the Wild Strawberries. Most importantly, it made the Wild Strawberries possible: it resonated with the people and resisted the logic of “either blue or green.” However, the student identity also brought some trade-offs that constrained the next moves of the Wild Strawberries. As I will show, the romantic imagination and the strategic capacity that accompanied the student identity shaped the decisions that the Wild Strawberries made in response to future dilemmas.

A short or long protest: From a “passive” flash action to an enduring sit-in

The Wild Strawberries’ original plan for the protest was a “passive” flash action. The students and professors believed that not too many students would join in the sit-in in front of the Executive Yuan and that the police would evict them in a short time. Therefore, they did not publicize that the protest would end in a short time because they expected the police to turn the sit-in into a flash action through their reaction. Interviewee D talked about this original plan:

The professor suggested the square in front of the Executive Yuan. I thought it was good. He convinced me because he said that the Executive Yuan was the highest executive organization in the country and if we gathered there we would be removed in no time. So, you know the original plan was a flash action? (Me: Yes.) We wanted to have a passive flash action. We wanted to be removed. It was our consideration. It would be boring if the protest dismissed.

went to the site to accuse the Wild Strawberries of actually being “green berries.” One blue television station also expressed a belief that the leaders of the Wild Strawberries participants actually did cross the party line. However, these counter-actions did not change the meaning of the Wild Strawberries.
because we left. If we were removed, it would be very dramatic. We thought that the participants would not be many and there would be many policemen. Of course, they could remove us. Their number should be much bigger than ours. Every inference made sense (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

However, two historical contingencies spoiled this plan. The first was the unexpected support from students. When the organizing students and professors arrived at the front of the Executive Yuan, they were surprised because hundreds of people wearing black clothes were already there. D recalled his feeling when he saw so many people were already there:

It really scared me, really scared me. We met at a McDonald’s on Linsen S. Road. We were about twenty or thirty people. All were members of our student club. We walked to the Executive Yuan laughing and joking. We stopped laughing and joking when we saw such a huge crowd already gathered (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

The second historical contingency was that the police did not treat the student sit-in as a priority. On the same day, the green camp mobilized people to gather in the Boai district, where President Ying-jeou Ma planned to meet Yulin Chen. The siege turned to the Grand Hotel where Yulin Chen was staying. Green camp supporters had a violent conflict with the police on the night of November 6. Therefore, not many police came to the site of the sit-in because most were busy dealing with the conflict around the Grand Hotel. Interviewee D talked about this situation in his interview:

In fact, after we had started the sit-in for a half hour, I really wanted to know
when the sit-in would finish. I thought that it was time to be removed. Where were the police? (Date of interview: 6/16/2011)

Both historical contingencies made it difficult for the leaders to enforce their original plan. The initial leaders of the protest did not dare to announce the original plan to the passionate participants. One example is a professor who proposed the original plan but said to the sit-in students that “the protest will continue through the night, into tomorrow and through tomorrow...until our three appeals are accepted.” Instead of telling the participants the original plan, the initial leaders chose to wait and hope the police would come in a short time. During the waiting, the leaders arranged activities for the protest. Under the suggestion of a Wild Lily professor, the leaders asked the participants to engage in group discussions about their feelings regarding the government’s performance during Yulin Chen’s visit. Every group recommended one group leader and the group leader shared the opinions of his or her group with all participants. When sharing group opinions, all group leaders emphasized that they should sustain the sit-in in front of the Executive Yuan until the government apologized. Therefore, while the initial leaders still wanted the protest to end in a short time, the sit-in was filled with an atmosphere of long-term war.

However, the police did not come to evict the students and professors on November 6. On the morning of November 7, the police still had not come. D talked about his feeling on that morning:

I complained to myself why the sit-in continued. The meeting between the government and Yulin Chen had ended. It was time for the police to evict us.

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70 Taipei Times, November 7, 2009.
But the police didn’t come. I just did not understand why they didn’t come (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

In this situation, the initial leaders chose to keep waiting. The sit-in students who were not conscious of the original plan became more and more passionate. Moreover, some professors who belonged to the Wild Lily came to the sit-in and made speeches to the students. These professors shared their Wild Lily experiences and used the Wild Lily as an example to encourage the participants. Through these speeches, the Wild Lily was highlighted in the students’ minds and they implicitly linked the protest to the Wild Lily.

On the afternoon of November 7, the atmosphere of having a long-term war was articulated as a question in the general discussion. Someone suggested that the participants discuss where they would reassemble if the police removed them. D was the host at that moment. He recalled this suggestion in his interview:

Someone told me that we should discuss where we should reconvene after the eviction. I thought it was okay because I needed some activities to kill time. I thought they were not serious at that moment. I told the participants this concern and suggested several places to reassemble. I suggested that we go back to the Executive Yuan or reassemble at the main gate of National Taiwan University. I thought in my mind that the police would stay at the Executive Yuan and it would be hard for us to go back to the front of the Executive Yuan, and if we reassembled at National Taiwan University, those students would lose their motivation to continue the sit-in because they would be tired and might want to go back to the dorms to have some rest. However, a participant suddenly shouted “Liberty Square” and all participants echoed this suggestion.
So, Liberty Square became the final decision (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

This decision reflected the Wild Lily’s influence on the students because the Wild Lily had been in the same place, the decision on where to reassemble turned the protest into a long-term sit-in. The decision not only gave the participants a clear place to reassemble but also cued the participants that the protest would be continued in another place. Before being evicted, one student told a news reporter that “the police said we would be sent to different places without public transportation, but no matter where they take us, we will be back and continue our protest at Liberty Square.”

Eventually, on the afternoon of November 7, the police removed the sit-in participants. They put the participants in buses and dropped them in several places far from the Executive Yuan. However, the decision to reassemble made the sit-in continue. The participants did not disperse after being dropped off by the buses, but reassembled at Liberty Square and planned a long-term protest. Moreover, when the protest restarted at Liberty Square, the number of students went up sharply, from several hundred in front of the Executive Yuan to several thousand at Liberty Square.

The eviction made more students angry with the government and they joined the protest to release this anger. Interviewee A was this kind of participant. He did not participate in the sit-in in front of the Executive Yuan but became a core member of the protest after the eviction. He talked about why he joined the protest:

When I saw the police pull out those students one by one and when the

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71 Liberty Square had been called “Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall” and was built to honor the dictator Chiang Kai-shek. The DPP government renamed it “Liberty Square.”
72 Taipei Times, November 8, 2008.
73 The police dropped the students at several locations, including Taipei’s Zhongshan District, National Taiwan University, and Nangang.
camera turned the focus to those students, I saw their pain-filled faces. I started to recall the scenes of authoritarianism in the past. I was agitated and felt strong emotions. I worried that the days of authoritarianism might be back. The students were forcefully removed even though the sit-in was so peaceful. So, I thought that I had to go to Liberty Square (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

In sum, two historical contingencies – the response of the students and the non-eviction by the police – changed the original plan of the Wild Strawberries. These two contingencies made the protest last for a longer period: The police did not dispel the students and the initial leaders did not want to relate the original plan to the students. However, the initial leaders still hoped the sit-in would end with the police evicting the protesters and projected that the police would come soon. Therefore, they designed activities to occupy the protesters as they waited for eviction. However, the story of the Wild Lily compelled the students to want a long-term protest. Announcement of the reassembling location not only informed the participants in the sit-in at the Executive Yuan where to continue the protest, but also let people who were unsatisfied with the police’s eviction know where to show their support for the protest. As a result, the protest deviated from its original plan and re-oriented itself toward a long-term sit-in.

We can see how historical contingencies matter to the development of the social movement in this case. However, no historical contingency could sufficiently explain why the Wild Strawberries made the decision to continue the protest instead of following the original plan. The participants could have chosen just to leave. Here, the student identity played a role. The student movement identity constrained the students’ imagination about of the movement. They used the Wild Lily to project the future of the Wild Strawberries. Moreover, the Wild Strawberries used the general
meeting as the mechanism to make the decision, giving the initial leaders limited room to manipulate or control the direction of the Wild Strawberries. When everyone at the site of the sit-in carried the Wild Lily in their minds, Liberty Square was the only place they could think to reassemble. Interviewee L just said in the interview that “it (the Wild Strawberries) was impossible to be a flash action in this kind of atmosphere!” In other words, although the contingencies caused the deviation from the original plan, it was the connection between student movement identity and the legend of the student movement, the Wild Lily, that recast the Wild Strawberries as “destined” to be a long-term movement.74

How to organize the protest: A decentralized structure

When the Wild Strawberries reassembled at Liberty Square, the students faced another problem: how to organize the protest. The leaders tried to reproduce the activities that they operated in front of the Executive Yuan: group discussion and direct democracy. Interviewees A and D joined the protest after the eviction. They described what they saw when they arrived at Liberty Square:

Interviewee A: No one knew how to do anything. So, okay, let us discuss first since we had so many people. So, we grouped people. Every group held a discussion. We discussed what we should do next. We wanted to keep sit-in? We needed to obey the laws and apply the protest to the government? (Date of interview: 6/15/2011)

74 Another example to show the connection between the student movement and the Wild Lily is the name “Wild” Strawberries. The students selected Wild Strawberries as the name of the protest on November 9, after the protest was reassembled at Liberty Square. I discuss the meaning of the name of the Wild Strawberries and the connection between this name and the Wild Lily in Chapter 2.
Interviewee D: When I arrived at Liberty Square, it was raining. I saw a mess. I saw a group of people who slowly made decisions through deliberative democracy. They were voting. Some people stayed with them outside the picket line. It was raining but many people were still there (Date of interview: 6/16/2011).

These descriptions indicate that the operation of the activities was not as ordered as when the protest was in front of the Executive Yuan. The reason was the reorganization of the leadership. As I mentioned, while the Wild Strawberries were defined as a student movement, some professors actually played leader roles. Because of the imbalanced relationship between teacher and student, sometimes the professors had more influence on the Wild Strawberries. However, when the movement restarted, the professors decided to retreat from the front lines. Interviewee N recalled this situation:

When we reassembled at Liberty Square, the professor told us that we all were matured. It was time to pass the baton to us … He said “passed the baton to you.” He said everybody did well. Okay, a problem came. The problem was there were no people that everyone trusted (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

The consequence of the professors’ retreat was the difficulty in forming a strong leadership. The professors were the core of the leadership. The student leaders knew that they could rely on the professors. The authority of the teacher also suppressed different voices regarding the development of the Wild Strawberries. Once the core left, conflicts among the students appeared. Some students proposed building a seven-person committee to be the highest leading unit of the Wild Strawberries. This
idea was highly influenced by the Wild Lily: The Wild Lily had this unit and even the number was the same. Interviewee A talked about the formation of the seven-person committee.

A “seven-person committee” was recruited from the previous group leaders in front of the Executive Yuan and continuously stayed at Liberty Square. Basically, whether you could be one of the seven leaders depended on your contributions to the movement, like how much time you stayed at the sit-in, and who activated the movement. People reported to them. These seven people were the main platform to lead the movement (Date of interview: 6/15/2011).

However, as I mentioned, although the Wild Lily was a reference point for the students, the students referred to it with different intentions: Some wanted to copy it and some wanted to avoid copying it. Therefore, when some student leaders wanted to build a seven-person committee to be the highest leading unit based on the group leaders who had been visible in front of the Executive Yuan, some students opposed this “Wild Lily-like” activity. Interviewee I talked about the difficulty of having a strong leadership:

I remember in one general meeting one night, people doubted the design of the seven-person committee. They felt the committee was not public and not transparent. They did not want to use this method. So, we used group discussion to make decisions instead of forming a committee. Then the group discussion evolved into having a general meeting every night...When the seven-person committee faded out, there were no so-called “leaders.” We did
have some spokesmen and spokeswomen. Their job was communication with
the media. But what they said was approved by the students. The general
meeting was the focus of decision-making (Date of interview: 7/26/2011).

Interviewee L indicated that some students wanted to copy the Wild Lily because
they were students of Wild Strawberries professors. Interviewee L opposed the
formation of a seven-person committee and judged that the intention to create a
strong leadership was destined to fail. He explained in the interview:

She (one student leader who was viewed as the representative of the Wild Lily
professors) hardly stayed at the square. She met the professors every day.
Those professors did not realize what happened at the square. They just did
not realize. So, if those people wanted to have a decision-making committee,
the students would struggle with this committee immediately! (Date of
interview: 6/9/2011)

Interviewee L argued further that the Wild Strawberries had already nurtured an
atmosphere that did not need movement stars:

The collective emotion in that moment was that we did not like movement
stars. So, although many modes of decision-making were available, we
preferred direct democracy. People accepted this because direct democracy fit
most people’s emotion. So, when all the professors urged us to build a
decision-making committee, no students agreed. Why? It was because they
worried about the birth of movement stars (Date of interview: 6/9/2011).
Without the existence of the professors in the front line, voices that opposed the model of the Wild Lily appeared. In this situation, the student leaders could not strongly lead the Wild Strawberries, but defined themselves as the “gears” or even “servants” of the Wild Strawberries. Of course, this did not mean there were no leaders. As interviewee F observed, the best way to influence the Wild Strawberries was as follows:

On the one hand, you could have some influence; on the other hand, like L, he never admitted he was a leader. But he was a big brother, a Ph.D. student, a hard-working, action-oriented, and well-spoken person. So, people bought his ideas. He was one of the people who actually owned power (Date of interview: 5/23/2011).

Interviewee J expressed the same opinion:

Although everything was crowd-determined on the surface, the organization worked implicitly. Actually, some people were more connected. They implicitly held the power. We called them the “executive group.” (Why didn’t they become the real leaders?) Because it was not fun. No one wanted to be the head! (Date of interview: 5/20/2011)

The trade-off of avoiding a strong leadership and preferring a decentralized structure was the poor coordination of Wild Strawberries activities. After all, the leaders could not explicitly lead the protest. They were still constrained by the general participants through the idea of direct or deliberative democracy. Interviewee J provided examples of the poor coordination:
We had special project teams. They were proposed in the general meeting. Once people echoed and agreed, they went to do their project. It was funny. People arranged speeches on the site of sit-in. For example, I asked a professor to make a speech and the professor arrived at the site on time but no one knew who asked her come and how the speech should proceed (Date of interview: 5/20/2011).

In sum, when the Wild Strawberries restarted, the professors chose to pass the full responsibility to the students. Although some students wanted to rebuild the core of the movement, this plan failed because of other students’ opposition. In the end, the Wild Strawberries became a movement with a decentralized structure and poor coordination. This consequence unquestionably related to the decisions that the students made earlier: The student movement identity brought the model of the Wild Lily into students’ mind. The students had different ideas about the meaning of the Wild Lily. They started to renegotiate what a student movement should look like: with or without a strong leadership. The compromise resulted from this debate was a movement that used direct democracy to make decisions, but with implicit leadership.

When the protest ended: A weak but endless protest

After the decentralized structure and the implicit leadership settled down, the Wild Strawberries students started to discuss substantive issues. According to all of my interviewees, the most frequently discussed issue in the general meeting was when the movement should end. Interviewee C simply said that “we discussed staying or leaving since the first day we turned to Liberty Square.” Of course, it was
not a problem for the students in the beginning of the sit-in since everyone was still angry with the government. However, stay or leave became a problem when the number of the students dropped sharply.

In the first several days after the movement shifted to Liberty Square, the conclusion of this discussion was simple: Stay. Because the students still held agitated emotions regarding the government, stay became a taken-for-granted conclusion. Interview L described this situation:

The media were still talking about this. The things that the police ordered, the record store turning off the music it played and the beating of people, were still hot issues. Do you think that we would choose to disperse? We talked about the dispersing privately. We believed that if the Executive Yuan ignored the students, the movement would disperse naturally because the students had mid-terms and would tired. However, the police evicted the students. You can imagine, the police playing a strong role in the incident of the record store, the conflict in the Grand Hotel, and the eviction of students, what kind of atmosphere we had (Date of interview: 6/9/2011).

Interviewee J’s experience reflected the agitated emotion of the students:

Just several days after the protest was turned into Liberty Square, I told people in the general meeting that the protest would end in the next three or four days. When I was saying this, I could see from their faces that all the participants wanted to kill me! (Date of interview: 5/20/2011)

However, staying became not a taken-for-granted choice one week after the
movement moved to Liberty Square. The number of students had dropped sharply. In the evening, the number was about one hundred. In daytime, the number sometimes dropped to a single-digit number in the sit-in area. The reasons for this situation were that the students encountered mid-terms and pressure from their families. The students had to prepare for and take the mid-terms and their families urged them to focus on their studies instead of participating in the Wild Strawberries. Although she stayed at the protest, interviewee C told me a long story about the pressure the students faced. To stay, the students first tried to persuade their professors to arrange makeup exams for them. However, if the professors did not agree, they had to leave the protest to prepare for and take the exams. She even told me that her grandmother and mother went to Taipei from another county in Taiwan to ask her to leave the Wild Strawberries and accompanied her to visit her professors to ask for makeup exams and an extension of assignment deadlines. Interviewee E described a quarrel with his father that sprang up because his father wanted him to focus on his studies and he insisted on participating in the protest for the public good.

When the Wild Strawberries shrank, the movement seemed to end. However, the students still wanted to carry on the movement. In the general meeting every night, the students discussed this issue and “leaving” was still taboo. Interviewee M’s experience illustrates this situation. She felt the movement was meaningless and proposed a dismissal:

It was about the second week in Liberty Square. I felt that the protest had to end. The protest was not meaningful anymore. It was not the focus of the media and the participants were fewer and fewer. Therefore, I used the name of the leadership team to suggest it was time to leave Liberty Square. I
remember I was verbally attacked that day (Date of interview: 6/2/2011).

Meanwhile, the leadership was reorganized frequently. Some leaders left because they were tired and felt meaningless to the future of the movement. The leadership team had to recruit new leaders. Moreover, because of the decentralized structure and weak leadership, sometimes people did not know who the leaders were or even that there was a leadership. Interview E, who was an original leader and left the leadership in mid-September, recalled his feeling about the leaders after he left:

It was a little hard to understand the seven-person committee and how it operated. Some people at the square knew about the existence of the committee but some people did not. The committee gave people a feeling that it was partially hidden and partially visible. That is, sometimes you felt the committee and sometimes not (Date of interview: 6/30/2011).

From the perspective of outsiders, this decision seems unreasonable. However, I argue this decision makes sense when we consider it the trade-off from the previous decision. The first was the romantic image of the student movement, the trade-off of the student identity. The romantic imagination made the students believe the movement should continue until the government responded. As I mentioned, one interviewee used “silly and naive” to describe students’ performance at that time. They believed that if they persisted, they would succeed. Although only a single-digit number of student stayed at the sit-in area in the daytime, hundreds students gathered in the general meeting every night and urged the movement to continue.

When I asked why they did not just close the movement in such a plight, their answer reflected the shadow of the romantic imagination. For example, in the
interview, interviewee N, who strongly opposed the dismissal, defined the Wild Strawberries as the movement for his generation and said he wanted to devote himself to this movement:

Why did I continuously stay here? Hmm...first, I thought the Wild Strawberries movement was the movement for our generation even if this movement had many flaws that needed improving. Because it was the movement that our generation participated in, I wanted to diligently do my part no matter whether I was on the seven-person committee or just a common participant. I experienced this important historical process in Taiwan. So, I did went. You get it? It was a feeling. This feeling did not mean I had to achieve something, but I could not be absent in this important moment (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Therefore, the students wanted to continue the Wild Strawberries because the Wild Strawberries represented their generation. In this situation, the fates of the Wild Strawberries and the students were tied: The failure of the Wild Strawberries meant the failure of the students. Therefore, they just wanted to carry on the movement even if they faced many troubles. When I asked H why he and other participants did not just leave the movement when the government kept ignoring their demands and the movement shrank, he replied:

It was because we were still holding on. It was the prevailing atmosphere. It was hard to say what the achievement that we wanted was. The government kept ignoring our requests and did not contact us. This situation kept us holding on...Yes, we could just leave. But it seemed just not a right choice to us. So, what we could do was continue. Although staying did not mean we
definitely would get what we want, we would get nothing if we just left (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

Continuing the movement became the only choice for the students because they did not want to have a failed movement and self. Interviewee N mentioned:

Continuing was a kind of hope. Because the movement did not achieve the goals, people felt if the Wild Strawberries were still on the square, if the Wild Strawberries existed, we still had chance (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

Interviewee M made a similar comment:

We felt that we needed to achieve something or why did we join the Wild Strawberries? (Date of interview: 6/2/2011)

Both M and N indicated that the students wanted the Wild Strawberries to have a happy ending just like the story of the Wild Lily. Even when they realized the situation disfavored them, they still refused to leave and kept their hope. Interviewee H summarized the development of the students’ attitude:

Just like investors in the stock market, when people joined and input the cost, they did not want to give up. The investors wanted to hold the stock even when they had already lost money. The case of the Wild Strawberries was comparable to the stock market. Of course, there always people wanting to leave. However, there was always a voice that we should not retreat. If we insisted for more time, maybe we could get some promises from the
The students’ inexperience in social movements produced the romantic imagination. Interviewee F, a staff member in a labor organization, talked about the connection between student movement identity and the romantic imagination:

The key was that this was the first time they had taken to the streets. They were like people who run their first marathon. They did not know how long a person or a movement could continue. I talked to people in my group. Over half of them believed an activist should be like Gandhi. Do hunger strike, protest, and sit-in. People like me knew Gandhi was just an ideal, but the students treated Gandhi as normal. So, when they were exhausted, they did not what to do. They could leave but they felt something in their mind was holding them there. Moreover, student movements did not relate to realistic problems. If you were a worker, you could not sustain your life if you kept staying. But for students, it was fine. They felt that they were devoted to their country and it was okay to fail one or two courses (Date of interview: 5/23/2011).

In addition to the romantic imagination of the student movement, the decentralized structure was another factor that explained why the Wild Strawberries carried on. As I mentioned, the Wild Strawberries made decisions through voting in the general meeting every night. Although some key people implicitly led the Wild Strawberries, they did not have the authority to ask the participants to do anything until the participants voted in the general meeting. Since most students preferred to continue the movement, any proposal to dismiss was unwelcome in the general
meeting. Interviewee J described this situation:

> When we discussed that we would dismiss the next day, people down from the stages shouted, “No. We cannot dismiss. We have to continue!” (Date of interview: 5/20/2011)

Even though some leaders felt exhausted, they chose to leave the movement personally instead of suggesting dismissal. This was because anyone who made this kind of suggestion would be harshly attacked by participants. Some professors suggested the dismissal through the mouths of students with whom they were close. However, their suggestion obtained no support in the general meeting. Interviewee H summarized this atmosphere in the general meeting:

> (The atmosphere was) Who suggested retreat should take the responsibility for the failure of the movement. So, no one would publicly speak this idea. No one dared to take action. Actually, it was possible for one person to suggest leaving and other people to follow this suggestion. However, no one took action because no one wanted to be condemned (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

In sum, when the Wild Strawberries encountered unfavorable situations, stay or leave became a problem for the students. Because of the romantic image of the student movement, stay was the preferred option. Moreover, this option was the legitimate option because the authority of the Wild Strawberries came from the general meeting. Therefore, the Wild Strawberries continued even though the number of participants sharply decreased. Both the romantic imagination and the decentralized structure were created through previous choices of the Wild
Strawberries: The student movement identity instilled the romantic imagination in students’ heads and the struggle between the students with ideas differing from the Wild Lily explained why the Wild Strawberries used a decentralized structure to make decisions rather a strong leadership.

**The end of the Wild Strawberries: A rally without permission**

While the students wanted to continue the movement until they achieved their goals, some newly recruited leaders planned to end the Wild Strawberries. From their perspective, it was impossible to achieve the goals and continuing the movement only wasted people’s energy. Interviewee P, a key person who actively planned the end of the Wild Strawberries, talked about her concern for the future of the Wild Strawberries:

Interviewee P: I made this plan because, according to my experience, the protest was in a deadlock. However, the participants were trapped in strong emotions that made them refuse to dismiss. This refusal actually made everyone suffer…So, I wanted to design a ritual that helped the participants release this emotion. After the ritual, people who wanted to go felt free to go. If you wanted to stay, I would not stop you (Date of interview: 5/15/2011).

The conversation between interviewees O and P in the interview repeated this idea that they had to offer an activity to fulfill students’ desire for a happy ending and therefore overcome the phantom of the romantic image of social movements:

Interviewee O: Honestly speaking, it was hard for them to achieve the original demands. They knew it and felt exhausted but just could not reconcile to this
ending (Date of interview: 5/15/2011).

Interviewee P: So, a social movement needs a breaking point to let the emotions go and let the participants think that their long-term participation was not a waste (Date of interview: 5/15/2011).

Because of this consideration, Interviewees O and P planned to organize a rally without the government’s approval. They believed that although this rally could not achieve the original demands of the Wild Strawberries, it gave the students a feeling that they had challenged this wrong acting government. In other words, this rally was a relief for the students who connected their fates to the outcome of the Wild Strawberries.

Because “dismissal” was a taboo term in the general meeting, P and O implicitly enforced their plan. The exploited the decentralized structure to dodge any possible opposition. Interviewee P talked about it:

We made us just a common team, a “rally” team. Our goal was to have a rally. When our action seemed not to influence the direction of the movement, people accepted our proposal. After all, we were just a team like other teams. They built towers and a hall where a memorial service was held but we planned a rally. (Date of interview: 5/15/2011)

To fulfill their goal, P and O followed the routine in the Wild Strawberries and pretended their team was no different than other teams. This helped them avoid opposition from the students. While they never claimed that the Wild Strawberries would dismiss after the rally, the students implicitly knew the rally meant the end of
the protest. “Dismiss after the rally” became a hidden consensus among the students. Interviewee H talked about the formation of this hidden consensus:

I felt that people had a consensus on the rally on December 7. People held a grudge. People needed to take action to release that grudge. The rally was that action. Although people didn’t put it on the table, people knew that this rally could let them take a break and liberate them from the protest (Date of interview: 6/28/2011).

Interviewee N described the hidden consensus in the Wild Strawberries:

There was an unspoken atmosphere that the protest would end after the rally. Although people didn’t discuss it formally, they knew that (Date of interview: 8/8/2011).

The rally was held in Taipei on December 7, the one-month anniversary of the Wild Strawberries, and featured a mock funeral for the nation’s human rights. The leaders opened the rally to all people, even non-students. The most important feature of the rally was its status as an “illegal” rally. The leaders only reported their planned events to the police instead of seeking approval from law enforcement authorities as required by the Assembly and Parade Law. In this rally, demonstrators dressed in black marched around several governmental units. During the march, the demonstrators reiterative their three demands. The police estimated that 4,000 people joined the rally. The demonstrators returned to Liberty Square and no conflicts occurred during the rally. Then, the leaders declared an end to the sit-in and promised the protest would continue in other formats. The leaders announced that
the Wild Strawberries would turn to the “home of Wild Strawberries” and use these other forums to continue their concern regarding human rights and democracy. While a few students insisted on staying in Liberty Square, most agreed to end the sit-in.

In summary, like the story of the blue camp’s protest and the Reds, the developmental path of the Wild Strawberries reflects the characteristics of the reiterative dilemma-solving process. The sequence of contingent dilemma-solving was clear: The student identity (the solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma) cued the students to use a romantic perspective to project the future of the Wild Strawberries; the romantic image led the students to want to carry on the movement (the choice for a long-term or flash action) and broke the original plan of passive flash action; when the Wild Strawberries reassembled at Liberty Square, the romantic imagination explained why the students used a decentralized structure to make decisions (the solution for how to organize). In the end, the leaders exploited the decentralized structure to operate an illegal rally and therefore overcame the students’ romantic image. However, this sequence was entangled with the romantic imagination of student movements, the reiterative dilemma. Although sometimes the students did not directly deal with the romantic imagination, the romantic imagination shadowed the decisions for the contingent dilemmas. Although the students could temporarily solve the problem of the romantic imagination, the choices for other dilemmas reawakened it. For example, the students’ choice to reassemble at Liberty Square temporarily satisfied their emotion to have a movement with a happy ending. However, when the Wild Strawberries faced several problems and needed to reconsider the existence of the movement, the romantic emotion came back and made the option of leaving a taboo in the activities of the Wild Strawberries.
Conclusion

By investigating the developmental paths of the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries, we can see that while the strategic choices about the movement identities created the initial structural constraints that these movements faced, the other choices reconfigured the initial structural constraints and therefore shaped the future choices. In the case of the blue camp’s protest, those choices led the blue leaders to reconsider the necessity of the protest. The angry blue leaders in the night of counting and announcing the ballots believed that the protest was needed to reverse the outcome of the election. However, when the blue camp chose institutional methods to chase the goal, the protest became an unnecessary burden to the blue camp. In the case of the Reds, the choices about identity reorganized the leadership, changing the meaning of the Reds and altering the reactions of the Taipei City government. In the case of the Wild Strawberries, the choices about identity strengthened the close connection among the Wild Strawberries, college routines, and students’ families.

In addition, we can see how social actors build their fate through the reiterative dilemma-solving process. In the life course of a social movement, social actors face multiple contingent dilemmas. The contingent dilemmas occur at particular points in time in the development of the social movement. However, each solution is not isolated but creates the structural constraints for future solutions. In other words, social movements produce the initial structural constraints, produce the solutions for strategic dilemmas, and finally produce their own development paths. Moreover, the development of the sequences in dilemma-solving is shadowed by the recurring dilemmas, which are fundamental obstacles for the movements. The solutions for contingent dilemmas may reawaken the sleeping recurring dilemmas
and shape the movements’ actions with regard to these central obstacles. In this situation, although the social movements can create their sequence of contingent dilemma-solving, the creation is never completely free. The existence of the recurring dilemmas confines the scope of the sequences of contingent dilemma-solving.
Chapter 5

Every Decision You Make Matters

Making decisions is a continuous job in social movements. Activists, especially movement leaders, must make decisions to address the problems they face. To operate a social movement, the leaders must think about how to mobilize, sustain, and even end the movement. The decisions regarding these problems result in the shapes of the movements we observe: some have a huge number of participants and some have few; some endure and some have a short life; some are well coordinated and some are in a mess; some dramatically decline and some are prolonged even after the activists run out of energy. Instead of viewing a social movement as a given reality that is governed by objective conditions, we should use a more social constructionist perspective to explain how social actors build social movements through their strategic actions. A social movement should be assumed to start as empty. It is social actors’ moves that replace this emptiness with the movement we see.

In the current study, I propose a reiterative dilemma-solving model to illustrate how social actors create the fate of social movements. The reiterative dilemma-solving model is built on three theoretical pillars: strategic dilemmas, strategic action fields, and path-dependency. In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, first, the problems that social actors encounter are strategic dilemmas, which mean that there is no perfect solution for the problems exists. Every strategic choice has a trade-off (Jasper 2004). Second, the reiterative dilemma-solving model assumes that the social movement is a strategic field embedded in the broad field environment. The social movement’s identity establishes the local order in the movement and negotiates the relationship between the movement and the broad field environment (Fligstein
Third, the reiterative dilemma-solving model assumes the path-dependency of strategic choices: previous strategic choices constrain future strategic choices (Mahoney 2000).

Built on these three theoretical pillars, the reiterative dilemma-solving model provides a dynamic picture of the life course of social movements. Social actors strategically build the movement identity. Although the movement identity facilitates the formation and operation of the social movement, the identity work that the social actors conduct creates the initial structural constraints that shape the movement’s future moves. While the initial structural constraints shape the strategic choices in later stages, the trade-offs in these strategic choices reconfigure the initial structural constraints. Then the reconfigured structural constraints shape the future strategic choices. This process repeats throughout the life course of the social movement until its decline.

To illustrate the reiterative dilemma-solving model, I compared the developmental paths of three Taiwanese movements with different movement identities: the blue camps’ post-presidential election protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries. Each was buttressed by a different collective identity: The blue camp’s protest was a partisan movement, the Reds movement was a civic movement, and the Wild Strawberries were a student movement. I show how different movement identities localized the influence of global structures and therefore built their own structural constraints. The strategic choices of these movements are not only shaped and channeled by the structural constraints, but also reconfigure the structural constraints. This interaction between structural constraints and strategic choices formed the developmental path of the social movement. Through the reiterative dilemma-solving process, the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries took different developmental paths. In this concluding chapter, I discuss
the findings and contributions of the current study to social movement research.

**Agency, Structure, and the Reiterative Dilemma-Solving Model**

The reiterative dilemma-solving model provides an analytic tool for researchers to understand how agency and structure work together to shape the developmental paths of social movements. The dominant research paradigms, such as political opportunity theory (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004) and the political process model (McAdam 1983), have been criticized as being structure-biased, which means using objective conditions to explain the development of social movements. The critics argue that this bias not only neglects the role of agency in social movements, but also provides unsuitable explanations for the development of actual social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 1999).

The reiterative dilemma-solving model is a tool to bridge the gap between agency and structure. As Jasper (2006: 175) argued, strategic dilemmas and choices “mediate between the micro and macro level: micro choices have macro effects, and macro conditions shape the micro choices.” The episodes of dilemma-solving connect the influences of agency and structure: social actors make decisions to solve problems, but those decisions create the structure that constrains their next decision. In this situation, agency and structure are not two isolated factors but are bound by social actors’ decisions.

An episode of dilemma-solving is a causal mechanism linking agency and structure. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 24) defined mechanisms as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” They also categorize mechanisms into environmental, cognitive, and relational types. Any change in these kinds of mechanisms triggers social movements to develop in different directions. An episode
of dilemma-solving is a trigger to activate these mechanisms.

In the cases of the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries, for example, we can see how strategic choices play the roles of environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms. On the environmental level, the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries used different movement identities to deal with the logic of “either blue or green,” the master frame in their environment. Because of different identities, these three movements responded to the environment in different ways: The blue camp reproduced the logic, the Reds used a civic movement identity to resist the logic, and the Wild Strawberries highlighted their student identity to prevent the movement from being labeled as a green movement. On the cognitive level, the strategic choices about movement identities influenced the activists’ cognitions regarding these three movements: The blue camp treated the protest as an extension of the election and highlighted the difference between the blue and the green camps; the Reds emphasized the movement as a civic movement and did their best to avoid being labeled as a political activity; the Wild Strawberries were defined as a student movement and were shadowed by the legend of the student movement, the Wild Lily. On the relational level, the blue camp and other players built their interaction on the logic of “either blue or green”; the Reds established their performance of the civic identity, which was the base for other players to interact with the Reds; the Wild Strawberries obtained tolerance and sympathy from other players in the broad field environment because this movement was a “student” movement. The decisions about identity also interfered with the relations within these movements. For example, the decision against a nationwide strike broke the tentative balance between the experienced leaders and the novice leaders of the Reds. The decision split the original alliance into two groups that disliked each other.
Instead of building a universal theory, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 24) suggested that social movement researchers should focus on “small-scale causal mechanisms that recur in different combinations with different aggregate consequences in varying historical settings.” Echoing this suggestion, the reiterative dilemma-solving model demonstrates how to build a middle-range social movement theory on both theoretical and empirical levels. On the theoretical level, researchers can systematically categorize the strategic dilemmas and investigate how different combinations of strategic choices regarding these dilemmas shape the development of the social movement.  

On the empirical level, by investigating the reasons behind the choices and the outcomes of the choices, we can provide a more suitable explanation of a distinctive social movement. Although different social movements may face different dilemmas, the reiterative dilemma-solving model helps us connect every episode of dilemma-solving and use this connection to understand the development of a distinctive social movement.

Structures Are “Situated”

The reiterative dilemma-solving model argues that the influence of structures should be situated rather than universal. In social movement studies, especially studies based on political opportunity theory, scholars have assumed that identical objective conditions have the same influence on different social movements. For example, Tilly (2004) ascribed why French and British social movements originally had different tactical repertoires but gradually converged in the 19th century to the establishment of Parliament and the process of industrialization. He (2004: 87) explained that “differences between France and Britain in the paces of

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75 Jasper (2006) categorized a wide range of strategic dilemmas and identified the trade-off in different solutions to the dilemmas.
parliamentarization and industrialization translated into very different timetables of 
repertoire change.” While Tilly’s explanation indicates the importance of context to 
movement development, what he focused was the general influence of a context on 
social movements.

However, the development of the blue camp’s post-presidential election 
protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries tells a different story. Although they 
faced the same context, the context had unequal influence on their trajectories. For 
example, all of them were regulated by the same law, the Assembly and Parade Law, 
and the same unit, the Taipei City government. All of them violated the law. However, 
the Taipei City government had different reactions to these movements: The Taipei 
City government urged the blue camp to disperse and activated an eviction one week 
after the protest started; it helped the Reds become a legal movement even though 
some Reds activities were unprecedented but also contributed to the disbanding of 
the Reds after the protest at the National Day ceremony; it tolerated and waited for 
the self-dismissal of the Wild Strawberries after the movement restarted in Liberty 
Square.

The stories of these three cases demonstrate that the same context may 
influence different social movements unequally. Rather than thinking that structures 
apply to all social movement equally, the structures should be recognized as situated 
in different social movements. In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, the 
collective identity of the movement is an important source to situate the influence of 
general context. Different movement identities mean different relationships between 
the movements and the players who control the institutions. No institution can act 
by itself; institutions need social actors. Therefore, if the relationship between the 
social movement and the key players cues the key players that it is inappropriate to 
reinforce the institution, the institution has no influence on the movement. In
contrast, if the key players perceive that the social movement should be regulated, they reinforce the institution they control. In other words, movement identity works like a filter that differentiates the impacts of objective conditions. Therefore, when the blue camp’s protest was perceived as a partisan movement, the Taipei City government showed its impatience and enforced the law. However, when the Reds and the Wild Strawberries were interpreted as movements for the public good, the Taipei City government did not rush to enforce the law because enforcement might have resulted in negative reactions from society.

**Bringing a Dynamic View to Social Movement Development**

The reiterative dilemma-solving model provides a dynamic view of social movement development. As Benford (1997) indicated, social movement literature, especially the literature based on framing analysis, shows a static tendency and carries a reification problem. Scholars tend to statically describe the characteristics of a social movement and treat social movements and other players in the broad field environment as things. This tendency is inappropriate if the intent is to capture the dynamic behind the development of social movements and explore the notion that a collective actor is not a thing but a gathering of people.

The reiterative dilemma-solving model brings a dynamic view to explain the direction of a social movement by defining a social movement as a strategic action field embedded in a broad field environment. Therefore, the social movement is not a thing but a tentative balance among the participants. While the participants in the social movement are united under a specific collective identity, their strategic choices may break the balance and require them to renegotiate the local order in the movement and the relationship between the movement and other players. Therefore, the characteristics of social movements and the other players are not
static but dynamic.

Take the Reds, for example. While the leaders had different social movement experiences, this was not a problem at the beginning. They worked together to pressure President Shui-bian Chen to resign under the civic identity. However, the different social movement experiences became problematic when the leaders needed to substantially discuss strategy. The conflicts among the leaders resulted in the experienced leaders fading out. Then the Reds’ strategic orientation changed from partially avoiding illegal actions to looking exclusively for legal actions. The actions of the Reds also renegotiated the relationship between the Reds and the Taipei City government. While the Taipei City government more or less helped the operation of the Reds, the disorderly performance of the Reds at the National Day Ceremony gave the government a reason to cancel the approved application of the Reds and dispel the few Reds supporters who insisted on staying in the streets. Even so, the Reds persuaded some Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) politicians that the goal of the Reds was legitimate. Therefore, not all DPP politicians were eager to stop the Reds; some were sympathetic to the movement.

The Wild Strawberries demonstrated similar situations. The movement was organized in front of the Executive Yuan because the leadership was clear and coordinated. However, when it moved to Liberty Square, the professors left the leadership and the students had trouble rebuilding strong leadership. Therefore, the movement activities became less coordinated. In addition, the students refused to leave Liberty Square even when they had run out of energy because they wanted to leave a mark. However, the students were liberated from this emotion after the rally on December 7 and agreed to retreat from the square. The Taipei City government also showed different reactions to the Wild Strawberries’ protest. Although the Taipei City government evicted the protest from in front of the Executive Yuan, the
government was more tolerant of the Wild Strawberries after the students reassembled at Liberty Square. It was the choice of assembling place that changed the attitude of the Taipei City government. Had the students decided to go back to in front of the Executive Yuan, the Taipei City government might not have been tolerant, but might have evicted them again.

The development of social movements is not given and static. Through the local order within the movement and the relationships between the movement and the broad field environment, strategic moves keep reshaping the local order within the movement and the relationships between the movement and other players. The reiterative dilemma-solving model can provide a dynamic view of social movement development by investigating how social actors’ strategic actions create their own life and focusing on the interaction between the social movement participants and the interaction between the movement and other players.

**The Double Impact of Strategic Choice**

The reiterative dilemma-solving model highlights the double impact of strategic choice: a successful choice may become a hindrance to the movement in later stages or, in contrast, a failed choice may allow the movement to avoid problems in the future. This finding introduces to social movement research a more complicated understanding of the impact of strategy on social movements. After scholars recognized the importance of strategy in social movements’ development, evaluation of the impact of strategies became the next challenge (Gamson 1975). One example is the debate over the choice between disruptive and moderate strategies. As Giugni (1999: xvi) indicated, “one of the prevailing themes in the search on the consequences of social movements is whether disruptive actions are more likely to have an impact, or on the contrary, whether moderate actions are more effective.”
Some scholars, including Piven and Cloward (1979), have argued that disruptive strategies are more likely to generate effective outcomes because the disruption of social order is poor people’s only weapon. However, moderate strategies seem more likely to obtain sympathy from society and reduce the cost of joining the movement. Another example is the research on the influence of organizational structures on the quality of decision-making. Ganz (2000) argued that quality of decision-making is enhanced if the organizational structure of a social movement can facilitate the flow of salient information, increasing leaders’ motivation to lead the movement, and allow activists to make decisions. Schwartz and Paul (1992) also argued that deliberative decision-making within social movements can increase the quality of decisions.

However, in addition to the shaping on the problems that the social movement aims to solve, the trade-off in strategy may bring unforeseen outcomes to the movement. For example, the Reds chose and successfully built the Reds as a civic movement. This identity helped the Reds separate from conventional political activities and increased the movement’s mobilization capacity. However, the civic identity sprouted the seed that resulted in the decline of the Reds. The ambiguity that was produced from the Reds identity work (the inclusive strategies and the diverse composition of the leadership) made it difficult for the Reds to sustain the boundary between a civic movement and an activity of a political party. In the end, the leaders lost motivation to maintain the Reds because the Reds movement was gradually perceived as a blue movement. To the leaders, when the meaning of the Reds was changed to a mere expression of the blue camp, the maintenance of the Reds was unnecessary. The development of the Wild Strawberries also reflected how a successful strategy became problematic for a social movement. The leaders of the Wild Strawberries intentionally designed their protest as a student movement. This
identity helped the Wild Strawberries obtain tolerance and sympathy from the government and society. However, the romantic image of the student movement that accompanied the student identity became an obstacle for the leaders to ending the protest. In contrast, although the blue camp wanted to present its protest as for the public good, it failed and the protest was interpreted as a blue movement. However, this outcome simplified the decision regarding whether the blue camp should carry on the protest. Since the blue camp had alternative methods to employ in struggles and was traditionally distant from mass movements, it passively ended the protest without the internal conflicts that occurred in the Reds and the Wild Strawberries.

The reiterative dilemma-solving model suggests that social movement researchers should notice the double impact of strategy on the development of social movements. Instead of focusing on the effectiveness of strategy for the problem that the strategy aims to solve, researchers should notice that a strategy's influence is not merely in the instant but also in the future.

**From Problem-Solving to Dilemma-Solving**

The reiterative dilemma-solving model solves two persistent puzzles in Haydu's (1998) argument about the sequence of the reiterative problem-solving process. Criticizing on the version of path-dependency theory that depends too much on exogenous factors such as historical contingency and dramatic accidents to explain historical turning points, Haydu argued that we can bring human agency back by defining history as a series of problem-solving episodes. Haydu (1998) suggested a problem-solving approach that “attends to the ways in which outcomes at a given switch point are themselves products of the past rather than historical accidents” (p. 354).
Although Haydu’s reiterative problem-solving approach helps us to understand the role of human agency in historical processes, two puzzles were unsolved in his research. First, he argues that social actors reiteratively solve an enduring problem in different periods of time. However, why do social actors need to reiteratively deal with the same problem? If social actors make a decision to deal with a problem, why can’t that solution work in the future? Second, social movements face multiple types of problems. What is the relationship between the enduring problem and other occasional problems?

The reiterative dilemma-solving model solves these two puzzles by categorizing the dilemmas into recurring and contingent dilemmas and replacing “problem” with “dilemma.” In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, I categorize the strategic dilemmas into recurring dilemmas and contingent dilemmas. Recurring dilemmas refer to Haydu’s enduring problems, stemming from the deep obstacles of the movement. Contingent dilemmas refer to dilemmas that only occur in a particular context. During the life course of the social movement, social actors are involved in two interrelated sequences of dilemma-solving: a sequence for recurring dilemmas and a sequence for contingent dilemmas. In addition to distinguishing contingent dilemmas from recurring dilemmas, the model replaces “dilemma” with “problem” to highlight the trade-off in every solution.

In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, the sequences of recurring dilemmas and contingent dilemmas are intertwined. Since dilemmas are problems without a perfect solution, the strategic choice on the recurring dilemma can only be temporarily suppressed through creating a tentative balance between the social movement and other players. The trade-off in the solution for the recurring dilemma forms the structural constraints for the social movement’s future choices on contingent dilemmas. Although social actors can create a developmental path based
on their choices on the contingent dilemma, this path is still constrained by the recurring dilemma. The trade-offs in the choices responding to contingent dilemmas may break the balance created by the previous solution to the recurring dilemma. When social actors’ choices awaken sleeping recurring dilemmas, social actors must re-face these recurring dilemmas. In short, the reiterative dilemma-solving model considers different kinds of strategic dilemmas and argues that the reason people need to re-deal with the enduring problem is that solutions for contingent dilemmas break the temporary balance produced by the solution for the enduring problem.

The cases of the Reds and the Wild Strawberries demonstrate how the solutions for contingent dilemmas brought back settled recurring dilemmas. The Reds’ identity work successfully built this movement as a civic movement. However, the Reds suffered from the choice involved in maintaining the civic image. The movement’s decisions, such as opening to everyone who hated corruption, activating gigantic protests, and only focusing on President Shui-bian Chen’s scandal, challenged the boundary that the Reds established. The Reds’ leaders had to face the erosion of the civic image and tried to do something to protect this image. A similar situation occurred in the Wild Strawberries. Although the Wild strawberries’ leaders did not suffer from sustaining the movement identity as the Reds’ leaders did, their strategic choices in response to contingent dilemmas were haunted by the romantic image that accompanied the student identity. Where should the movement reassemble? When should the movement end? How should the movement end? All the choices regarding these problems referred to the romantic image produced by the student identity.

Building on the reiterative problem-solving process, the reiterative dilemma-solving model provides a more sophisticated picture of how people’s choices shape the direction of social movements. Some dilemmas are enduring because they are
the central obstacles of the social movements. The reason that social actors must deal with these dilemmas again and again is because the solutions for the contingent dilemmas keep bringing back these central obstacles. The intertwining of the sequences of recurring dilemma-solving and contingent dilemma-solving explain the developmental paths of social movements.

The Plight of the Restrictive Master Frame

The case of Taiwan provides a laboratory to examine the development of social movements in a society with a restrictive master frame. According to Snow and Benford (1992: 139), restrictive master frames are “closed or exclusive ideational systems that do not readily lend themselves to amplification or extension.” Restrictive master frames are disadvantageous to the unity of social movements because they “may cause more intensive competition among movement frames since there is not sufficient ‘space’ for all groups to participate” (Noonan 1997: 265).

In other words, when social movements face restrictive master frames, they need to deal with those frames to make the movements possible. Taiwan is a society with a restrictive master frame – the frame of “either blue or green.” People use colors to punctuate the key points, name (attribute) the people who should take responsibility for wrongs, and articulate the story by selectively highlighting facts. This frame creates trouble for social movement organizations in activating movements across different political camps. In the cases of the blue camp’s post-presidential election protest, the Reds, and Wild Strawberries, social actors built different movement identities to deal with this restrictive frame. However, no matter what movement identities they built, they only obtained limited success.

The blue camp’s protest reproduced the logic of “either blue or green.”
Although the leaders wanted to frame the protest as a civic movement, it was still defined as a blue movement because of the awkward identity work of the blue camp. When the blue camp matched the movement identity with the restrictive frame, the protest quickly lost public support; even the Taipei City government, which was controlled by the blue camp, took action to dispel the protest.

The Reds and the Wild Strawberries tell a different story. Both resisted the logic of “either blue or green” by building different movement identities. The Reds’ leaders tried to bridge the blue and green camps by framing the Reds as a civic movement. This strategy was successful. The Reds not only showed strong mobilization capacity but also separated the movement from political activities of the blue and green camps. As Friedman and Snow (1992) suggested, when the movement identity becomes a selective incentive, people are motivated to join the movement. For example, when the Reds obtained success, being a part of the Reds became a valuable identity for the blue people. The blue politicians showed up to further their political interests and the blue supporters joined the Reds to express their dissatisfaction with the green camp. Unfortunately, the Reds’ leaders could not effectively enforce any appropriate rules to stop the blue people’s oscillation between the Reds and the blue camp. In the end, the overcrowding by blue-identified people in the activities of the Reds rekeyed the meaning of the Reds from a civic movement to a blue movement. Resisting the restrictive master frame with a bridging frame failed.

Instead of connecting everyone in society, the Wild strawberries’ leaders built a narrow movement identity. Only students were supposed to join the Wild Strawberries. This movement identity did prevent the Wild Strawberries from being labeled as a conventional political activity. Both the blue and the green camps showed good intentions toward the Wild Strawberries. The Taipei City government
also tolerated the students’ illegal protest even though the authority that the students challenged was the Kuomintang (KMT) government and the Taipei City government was in the KMT’s hands. However, a narrow movement identity reduced the mobilization potential of the Wild Strawberries. The movement never mobilized protests as gigantic as those of the Reds.

Based on the developmental paths of the blue camp’s protest, the Reds, and the Wild Strawberries, restrictive master frames are difficult for social movements to handle: Reproducing the restrictive master frame just trapped the movement in the frame; resisting with an opening movement identity increased the chance of the restrictive master frame colonizing the movement; and dealing with the restrictive master frame through a narrow movement identity reduced the mobilization capacity of the movement. In this situation, restrictive master frames established a disadvantageous condition for social movements. Regardless of the strategies the movement leaders adopted, restrictive master frames eroded the influence of social movements.

**Reiterative dilemma-solving process in SDS**

The reiterative dilemma-solving process not only occurred in the cases I discuss but also in other significant movements. Consider the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS), the so-called the New Left, which was composed of young lefties and performed an important role in the civil rights and anti-war movements during the 1960s. The SDS started in 1960 with 250 members. Accompanying the success of the SDS in demonstrations, the peak of its membership was 100,000 in 1968’s presidential election. However, after eight months, the SDS split and had lost its significant status by the end of 1969 (Barber 2008). The developmental path of the SDS demonstrated the reiterative dilemma-solving process.
As Polletta (2002) argued, one reason that the SDS expanded so quickly and failed so dramatically was the relationship between the collective identity of SDS members and the SDS’s ideal of “participatory democracy”. How to organize the SDS under the ideal of participatory democracy represents a recurring dilemma. Although participatory democracy can bring solidarity, innovation, and developmental benefits to social movements, it results in the problem of an inefficient decision-making process and ignoring differences among people. To overcome these problems, SDS leaders built their version of participatory democracy on their personal friendships. For example, the leaders treated equality “not by dividing power up equally but by fostering each person’s self-development” (Polletta 2002: 128). Although friendship temporarily solves the tension between the ideal and practice of participatory democracy (for example, equality and strong leadership could coexist in the SDS), the trade-off of building participatory democracy based on friendship was that it constrained the size of the movement; friendship among members was more easily highlighted when people knew each other.

This problem did not bother SDS until the leaders encountered a contingent dilemma, that is, should SDS expand its size? One the one hand, expanding its size could increase SDS’s influence; on the other hand, friendship was hard to manage in a large sized organization, thus harming the operation of participatory democracy. The solution of SDS’s leaders was letting SDS become the leading organization of an antiwar movement and expanding its size in 1965. This decision awakened the recurring dilemma, because friendship could not work as the foundation for the operation of participatory democracy due to the lack of intimacy. In this situation, SDS members needed to renegotiate an appropriate mutual relationship to buttress the operation of participatory democracy. Although the old leaders wanted to continue the old style, the newcomers started to complain about the old leaders
regarding the hypocrisy of an elitist clique of participatory democrats. The relationship among SDS members became more and more of a rivalry that focused on institutionalized procedures to manage the equality of power distribution. In other words, local order of the SDS gradually shifted from cooperation to competition. Finally, the conflicts between the old leaders and newcomers split the SDS and resulted in its decline.

**Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies**

While the reiterative dilemma-solving model suggests that the developmental path is built through the interweaving of solutions to contingent and recurring dilemmas, consensus movements may be free of this process. McCarthy and Wolfson (1992: 274) defined a consensus movement as “a social movement in which the opinions and beliefs of a geographically bounded population supporting its suggested changes approach total consensus.” Because a consensus movement receives very wide support, “it confronts little or no organized opposition.” In this situation, a consensus movement can stabilize the local order in the movement and between the movement and the environment since no strong rival exists. Therefore, a consensus movement may not face numerous contingent dilemmas and recurring dilemmas. Take the citizens’ movement against drunk driving, for example. The leaders of this movement “saw the issue of automobile fatalities almost exclusively within the framework of social control of drinking drivers” and received widespread support (McCarthy and Wolfson 1992: 277). In other words, the leaders of the citizens’ movement against drunk driving did not need to deal with strategic dilemmas as many conflict movements do (i.e., movements supported by minorities or slim majorities of populations that confront fundamental, organized opposition in attempting to bring about social change, such as the cases I discuss in previous
chapters) (McCarthy and Wolfson 1992: 273). Hence, the reiterative dilemma-solving model may not appropriately explain the development of consensus movements.

I have argued that the reiterative dilemma-solving model provides a tool to connect agency and structure, capture the dynamic social movement development, reveal the double impact of strategic choices, and supplement the understanding of path-dependency. However, my work suggests at least two issues that can be investigated further in future work.

The first is to consider a multiple recurring dilemmas situation. In the reiterative dilemma-solving model, I demonstrate the interaction among one recurring dilemma and multiple contingent dilemmas. However, situations in the real world may be more complicated. Some social movements may be entangled by more than two recurring dilemmas. Future research can enrich the reiterative dilemma-solving model by bringing more recurring dilemmas into the model.

Second, researchers can systematically summarize the combination of different dilemmas. Researchers can identify the recurring and contingent dilemmas that social movements may face. Then they can demonstrate the potential solutions for each dilemma and reveal the trade-off in each solution. Social movements may face the same set of strategic dilemmas because they are the same type of movement or they exist in the same context. Eventually, we may find a set of dilemmas that usually come together and articulate the different developmental paths produced by different solutions to this set of dilemmas.
Appendix: Who Are Interviewees?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Reds Interviewees</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Movement Experience</th>
<th>Backgrounds</th>
<th>Roles in the Reds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fu-chung Chang</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Former DPP director of organization affairs</td>
<td>Official speaker and member in decision-making committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan-chi Chang</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A Professor</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po-yun Hsu</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A director of a culture organization.</td>
<td>Chief adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Jian</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Former DPP legislator and a director of an NGO</td>
<td>Major coordinator and trainer of non-violent resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kun-li Liu</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Former DPP director of organization affairs</td>
<td>Daily coordinator and trainer of the picketers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Wei</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>A lawyer</td>
<td>Member in decision-making committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li- ping Wang</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Former DPP legislator</td>
<td>Daily coordinator and official speaker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Wild Strawberries Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A member of a task force. Joined after the movement was removed to Liberty Square.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>An observer and made a documentary video of the Wild Strawberries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A member of seven-person committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>An initiator of the movement and a member of seven-person committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>An initiator of the movement and.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A staff member of a labor organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A chair of a student council in a university. Left after the movement was evicted from the square in front of the Executive Yuan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Joined the movement when the students reassembled at Liberty Square.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Joined the movement when the students reassembled at Liberty Square. An anchor of the anchor team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The person who negotiated with police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>One opinion leader in general participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>One opinion leader in general participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A member of seven-person committee. Faded out in mid-November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A member of seven-person committee. Insisted to stay after the rally on December 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Joined in the early stage. Designed the rally on November 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Joined in the early stage. Designed the rally on November 7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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