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theses

In Getting Things Done, I develop and defend a new theory of achievement. An achievement, as I use the term, is the crown performance of a cognitive or practical domain. In the perceptual domain, the achievement is perceiving things as they are; in the epistemic domain, it is knowing that p; in the practical domain, it is intentionally accomplishing what one intends. In each of these domains there are corresponding cases of failure that deviate from achievements in interesting ways, and that also deserve explanation. These include hallucinations, perceptual illusions, cases of justified false belief, and cases where we fail to do what we try to do. Traditionally, theorists have supposed that achievements and their corresponding failures may both be explained in terms of neutral performances---mental states or actions that may obtain both in cases of achievement and in cases of failure---and non-personal (non-mental, non-agential) conditions. For example, visually representing, believing, and intending have all been posited as neutral common factors that help to explain the achievements and corresponding failures in their respective domains. In my dissertation, I argue against this approach and develop an achievement-first alternative. In "Achievements and Exercises'', I argue against the traditional common factor approach to competences, and propose an achievement-first theory---the dual exercise account. According to it, there are no neutral exercises of competence; exercises are either constitutively achievements or constitutively failures. In "Competence to Know'', I apply the dual exercise account to the epistemic domain, and propose a direct virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is a manifestation of a competence to know, not to believe truly. In "A Virtue Aistheology'', I apply the dual exercise account to the perceptual domain. In these three chapters, I provide a new framework for theorizing about mental phenomena. I show how an achievement-first virtue-theoretic approach can be an explanatory rival of the traditional common factor approach. It makes progress both in answering questions that arise on any achievement-first approach, such as what it is for achievements to be mental states in their own right, as well as traditional problems, such as how achievements are related to corresponding failures.

ETD_5417

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Lisa Miracchi

doi:10.7282/T36M355M

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.