SOCIAL MIX IN U.S. SUBURBS: ORGANIZED AND INFORMAL
INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO BLACK SETTLEMENT

by

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This project considers the political, social, and cultural geography of black settlement in the inner suburbs of Newark between approximately 1970 and 2010. While the period just after the Newark riots of 1967 saw the most dramatic changes in population in both the city of Newark itself and in its immediate suburbs (mainly population loss of all races), racial transition from white to black continued in inner suburbs into the 1990s and beyond. The responses of white residents to new black neighbors ranged from welcoming to violent and encompassed both formal interventions by municipal governments through an integration maintenance group that monitored the extent of black settlement and sought to educate whites as well as informal interventions such as aggressive policing and an anonymous campaign in the 1980s to vandalize the homes of black residents. In theoretical terms, how do we think about these reactions; additionally, how do we think about the outcomes? Foucault’s notion of governmentality, how local actors reinforce existing norms through a pattern of daily practices that are
acted out, sometimes deliberately, but more often just below the surface of consciousness, was crucial in explaining the felt experience of daily life in the communities under study. The methods used in the study were analysis of Census data, archival data, focus groups, and interviews. Interventions in response to black settlement changed as black numbers, and so black agency, grew. Blacks acted successfully to check interventions designed to keep them from accessing the crucial advantages of suburbs, particularly in the schools and the safety of good policing.
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Finally, I could not have wished for more support from my family in this endeavor, particularly my parents, Thomas and Maura Seeley, and from my husband, Joseph Pangallozzi. I dedicate this to him and to our children, Jessica, Teresa, and Jared, for all of whom I wish an engaged education.
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Introduction

This dissertation treats African American suburbanization and white responses in the western suburbs of Newark in the period after the riots of 1967. It focuses in particular on two case studies, the suburbs of South Orange and Maplewood, that border Newark. The city of Newark itself was in most respects an example of a port city undergoing structural deindustrialization in a manner like other second cities in the United States, such as Oakland or Baltimore, as well as other port cities in the developed world. But the riots converted Newark into a hyper-example of decline, made obvious not just in the city itself but also its immediate environs. In focusing on Maplewood and South Orange, which possess a mixture of wealthy, middle class, and working class neighborhoods, the study brings together trends seen broadly across the region. After the riots, home values in these suburbs continued in the western portions of the towns to track the more affluent parts of the area but dropped sharply near the city on the eastern border of the suburbs. The physical state of the housing in the towns did not necessarily express the fortunes of the people living inside but rather was an indicator of the responses of the community to changes in the urban landscape.

Apart from the comparison of the portions of the suburbs that are near to and distant from the city, a separate and equally important comparison for this study is between the two towns themselves because this comparison allows a study of how class differences played a role in black suburbanization. South Orange possessed neighborhoods that housed people who often worked as owners and executives in the manufacturing base in Newark and the surrounding region; Maplewood, by contrast, with the exception of a comparatively small neighborhood, housed those who worked in subordinate roles in the declining industrial economy, i.e., the increasingly pressed working class, mainly white, but over time an increasing black presence.
South Orange, the more affluent town, saw black settlement first, with blacks playing a greater role in civic life than in Maplewood. These differences set off a dynamic between the towns that played itself out in the communities as they responded to growing black settlement in the coming years. The formal, organized responses to black suburban settlement include integration management, also known as social mixing strategies, but the dissertation treats less formal strategies, i.e., the practices of everyday life that hinder societal change.

*Methods*

The primary methods for the dissertation were archival work in local, regional, and national newspapers, collection of government records, and pursuit of interviews and focus groups. The interviews were conducted primarily between 2006 and 2009, although a few were conducted more recently in 2012 and 2013. Initially, I held individual interviews with members of the South Orange and Maplewood communities. The other main source was focus groups in order to understand the perspective of the community on the felt experience of living in a biracial community as it underwent rapid change.

*Focus groups*

The first focus group was with African American homeowners, the second with African American renters, the third with white renters, and the fourth with members of the Hilton neighborhood in Maplewood, the importance of which I discuss in Chapter Four. For the first two groups, I asked prominent community members to supply names of people who might be
willing to participate. Potential participants were sent a letter that included an offer of payment ($100) for participation. The focus groups composed of black participants who were told that I was white, but the group interview itself was conducted by black facilitators with experience conducting focus groups for marketing research. The third group, white renters, I recruited from my own community contacts. The fourth group, residents of the Hilton neighborhood, was biracial, and was recruited by placing a letter in the mailboxes of homes within the boundaries of the neighborhood. In the dissertation, quotations drawn from the focus groups are identified in such a way as to distinguish them from ordinary interviews.

**Chosen case studies: Specificity v. generalizability**

The case study method, such as employed here, is frequently criticized along a number of dimensions. Perhaps the most salient criticisms are that case studies allow too much scope for subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher because they tend to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions. As importantly, it is said that case studies are in their specificity not generalizable and so not useful for theory building (Flyvbjerg 2006). Both issues deserve brief consideration in light of the topic here.

Subjectivism is a problem not just for case studies but for all methods. The distance from contextual clues in large-N studies removes sensitivity to the data under study and in many ways makes it easier to confirm the researcher's assumptions about a topic at the beginning of research. Flyvbjerg (2006) invokes the principle of falsification, e.g., finding one non-white swan to disprove the hypothesis that all swans are white, as an instance in which case study research possesses, with its attention to detail, an advantage over large-N studies in terms of overturning a false hypothesis. In this study, knowing that the municipalities that form the case
studies acted to prevent blacks from becoming a majority population shows that market forces were not the sole determinants of racial settlement patterns in a way Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data cannot. Important contextual data cannot be gleaned from large data sets. In this sense, the specificity of the cases chosen is a strength of the study rather than a limitation. Elements in the political histories of South Orange and Maplewood counter sweeping generalizations that economics is the sole factor driving or impeding black suburbanization.

At the same time, the choice of case matters: Is the case rich in detail? Does it bring together themes grounded in a broader topic so as to illuminate the subject more broadly? Significant and aptly chosen case studies more readily lend themselves to generalizability than cases that have limited relevance to the topic at hand. A case chosen for its paradigmatic value, as an exemplar, can yield rich insight about the phenomena under study. Such assumptions about cases are perhaps more common in history, sociology, and anthropology than in other branches of the social sciences. La Roy Ladurie’s study of the village of Montaillou in southern France between 1294 and 1324 as a reflection of the late medieval inquisition made an important statement about early modernity (La Roy Ladurie 1978). Similarly, Foucault’s examination of European prisons and Bentham’s Panopticon have had enormous influence for the past three decades on our understanding of the modern social order (Foucault 1995). South Orange and Maplewood as towns that house fewer than 50,000 people in a metropolitan area of many millions may initially seem insignificant. But, because they border a majority black city, they are suburbs with a history, like a number of other metropolitan areas such as Chicago, Cleveland, Atlanta, and Detroit, where white-black relations have particular importance in the dynamics of racial settlement patterns. Because of the location of the cases used in the dissertation and their proximity to Newark, the suburbs of South Orange and Maplewood have both specificity as
components in important events in the deindustrialization in a crucial port city and
generalizability because they make larger statements about how biracial suburbs function in the
long and vexed history of American racial relations. From a consideration of South Orange and
Maplewood, it is clear that suburbs continue to work as class filters even as they undergo racial
change and that racial change continues to meet resistance, both organized and conscious, ad hoc
and subconscious, as the new century begins. For example, knowing that some of the black
victims of a spate racial vandalism incidents in the 1980s (they had racial epithets painted on
their houses) subsequently moved away as a result tells us that systematic white violence, while
by no means the norm, did have the effect of reducing black in-movement that had already
occurred, even if it is hard to estimate the extent to which it reduced further settlement. The
limitations of focusing on two cases are those generally ascribed to case studies as are the
strengths.

My position as researcher living in area of study

My choice of case study was made, in a sense, before I began research in that my family
and I chose to live in South Orange and later Maplewood ten years before I began research. A
long standing interest in the urban planning issues pertaining to the loss of manufacturing jobs,
as well as desire to live in a racially diverse community in close proximity to Manhattan, drew
me to the region west of Newark, where housing is relatively more affordable than in the city of
New York. First, we were renters in a condominium complex in the center of South Orange and
later homeowners in one of the more affluent neighborhoods of Maplewood. We arrived in South
Orange in January of 1995, in the middle of the decade during which both towns were
experiencing the dramatic uptick in the black population, the greatest unease among whites
already present, and the first efforts on the part of the towns to present an organized effort to
slow black settlement in order to maintain "integration." A couple realtors warned us not to purchase in either South Orange or Maplewood stating, euphemistically, that the towns were changing in ways that would make them a poor investment in the coming years. This was both illegal on their part and incorrect as an estimate of how housing values would go. The installation of a new train switch in 1996 that allowed passengers to ride directly into Manhattan rather than wait to transfer at Hoboken made the two towns an investment that probably outdid the rest of the region in returns on housing ownership.

Being a resident of the towns before beginning research was sometimes an impediment to research but more often an advantage. Because I was fairly active in the schools and sometimes in school board politics, I knew a number of potential interviewees who were involved in the community organizations because the schools often act as feeders for other community groups. My political views, which are moderately left-leaning, were thus known in advance, and this may have made for reluctance on the part of some people to be interviewed; in the text, a few instances where this occurred are noted. But knowing me personally probably made interviewing in general easier. I was also aware, before beginning research, of the Community Coalition on Race and participated in a committee to analyze statistically the demographic changes of the towns. Because my participation in the committee pre-dated formal research, I have not included observations about the work of the committee in the dissertation. As interviewing proceeded, my critical views of certain aspects of the organized municipal interventions to slow black settlement became a little too obvious. At that point, it might have been easier, had I not been living in town, to secure interviews with key individuals. At the same, because I was living in town, knowledge of how a particular activity might be portrayed in a dissertation may also have had an
effect on local activities. This is hard to gauge but I make note of one instance of such possible influence in the text.

Overview of this Work

Chapter One presents an theoretical analysis of suburbanization and concludes with discussion of Foucault’s notion of governmentality and its value for a community study. Chapter Two situates South Orange and Maplewood in its regional and local context in terms of their regional, historical, and socio-economic context. The role of policing and community aggression in response to the attempt of African Americans to assert their right to live in a suburb are the subject of Chapter Three. The role of housing policy at the Federal, state, and local levels in the social construction of the inner suburb by race is explained in Chapter Four. Chapter Five covers both the demographic changes that the inner suburbs of Newark started to undergo in the 1970s as well as the beginning of concerted municipal efforts to limit black arrival. Finally, Chapter Six briefly treats the organized intervention to slow black settlement and white flight as well as the legal history of such efforts in the United States.

Problem Statement

A perennial question asked by many scholars of the city has been why black suburbanization, along with racial integration, has proceeded so slowly by comparison with
Initial expectations (Galster 1991; Logan 2004) after the Civil Rights movement. Certainly, it has gone slowly in South Orange and Maplewood even as industry, jobs, and people fled Newark. The dissertation asks two layers of questions. Most of the discussion covers the specific processes that impeded black suburbanization: What were these? How did they operate over the period in question (roughly the past 40 years)? But a broader philosophical question also comes into play and should remain in the background throughout: Do these impediments always act to disadvantage blacks, or any out-group, or are there ways in which the out-group, via group clustering and forms of social bridging, can retain autonomy and power nonetheless in situations in which integration does not proceed fully? The two layers of questions—how did resistance to black suburbanization happen, how do we think about the outcomes?—are both worthy of consideration.

By the mid-1990s, black settlement in South Orange and Maplewood had picked up pace, and went fairly quickly in the late 1990s, but still encountered significant resistance and slowed down after 2000. It is tempting to see organized, conscious and systematic political action as the main cause of impediments to black suburbanization with populations in relatively affluent communities such as South Orange and Maplewood sending overt signals to potential minority homebuyers that they were not welcome. But a fuller explanation also looks to more subtle forms of resistance, both via institutions that may have otherwise opposed racism and via community and individual habit that made white privilege a norm that did not always come into consciousness but was simply part of the fabric of daily life.

**Governmentality**
Throughout the dissertation a crucial idea is that local level participation and decisions shape reality. Against assertions that lived experience of any social phenomenon is a matter of finding a single cause up the scale at the national or global level, the project considers throughout how local actors make their own experience in the wider context of law and history. Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” is of particular value here, explaining how local actors step into and reinforce existing norms through a pattern of daily practices that are acted out, sometimes deliberately, but more often just below the surface of consciousness: “Governance . . . is not about individuals in positions of power who exert direct, sovereign, and coercive control over a territory but rather how it is that norms of a population are unconsciously produced and reproduced by citizen-subjects, thereby making governance at a distance possible” (Ettlinger 2011: 538). At the same time, if on-the-ground practices explain the persistence of segregation, racism, and majority-minority power relations that perpetuate disadvantage in municipal government, in schools and in the workplace, then local actors also hold the key to an amelioration of those same problems.

Integration, Working Definition of

The organized strategies that the towns pursued in the face of black settlement, as well as the expressed desire of many residents, had to do with a desire for integration. But what does this mean, exactly? The primary meaning of the word “integration” refers to the composition of a whole, especially of the self, but the sociological definition is not far behind in use. The current
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives the third definition of *integration* as the bringing into equal membership of a common society those groups or persons previously discriminated against on racial or cultural grounds and puts the historical origin of this use of the term in South Africa in the 1940s and 1950s. From its origin in sub-Saharan Africa came the application of the term in the United States in the mid-1950s and, especially 1960s, where the term more or less meant assimilation. Integration as assimilation, the OED entry suggests, meant conformity of the minority group to majority norms but in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.

The word, *integration*, is used throughout the dissertation, most commonly to describe groups that talk about *integration management* or *integration maintenance* or *intentional integration*. It is also used, in a more philosophical sense, in Chapter One in the discussion of Iris Marion Young and her critique of an *ideal of integration*. Groups that use the word *integration* for efforts to fight white flight, which in an area with fixed housing stock tends to have the same effect as limiting black settlement, are doing so in a fashion often has that little to do with what is emancipatory in the meaning of the word. More troubling are the tradeoffs expected of out-groups in the process of integration, an issue that Young’s work lays out. By contrast, the community of South Orange, as discussed here, comes closer to a *common society* with *equal membership* racially integrated in the limited sense of where people live (whites and blacks next to each other) but also integrated in the more important sense of a *equal membership* in a community with fewer tradeoffs for the out group than elsewhere. These outcomes have to do with power relations, the ability of blacks in South Orange to bridge race and especially class boundaries, and choices blacks make about how to structure their everyday lives and their role in the community.
Chapter One: Frameworks: Governmentality, Differentiated Solidarity, Relational Autonomy and the New Suburban History

Why are things the way they are? The question to which there is no answer . . .

Philip Roth, American Pastoral (1997)

Organized formal responses to racial change, as well as less formal responses, require a theoretical framework for analysis. Integration management in suburbs that ring the U.S. inner city occurs within housing markets driven by global financial capital and a history of segregation by race. The intertwined inequalities of class and culture, categories that are socially constructed, shape, in turn, the geography of the Ŧbourgeois utopias Ŧof urban dispersal (Fishman 1987). But discussion of integration management both outside academia and within has valorized the preferences of the local elites who implement integration management. As a result, many scholars accept uncritically the insistence that Ŧintegration, Ŧas local officials use the term, means that integration management embraces the settlement of minorities rather than seeks to limit it. The urban planning and sociology literatures have largely avoided acknowledgment of exclusion in integration management schemes (Saltman 1990; Keating 1994). Part but not all of the issue is an instability in the meaning of the word Ŧintegration Ŧthat has accompanied a hollowing out of the rhetoric and aims of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. When local officials advocate integration management what they mean is less welcoming blacks but introducing whites back into neighborhoods that have transitioned to black, a use of the term Ŧintegration Ŧthat is quite different from the dictionary
meaning of working toward a common society. Similarly, the core work of integration management in the Newark suburbs under study is the practice of affirmative marketing another term with a seemingly progressive provenance dating to the Civil Rights era that actually means marketing a town to whites in which black numbers are growing. This is a rhetorical shift with concrete implications in local practice that represents rupture rather than continuity with the social movements of the 1960s.

_Foucault's Governmentality, Young's Deliberative Democracy, and the New Suburban History_

This chapter discusses the three frameworks used in the dissertation to develop an alternative view of integration management and its suburban economic cultural political context. The primary framework derives from the idea of governmentality as geographers have sought to translate it from the philosophical sociology of Foucault to spatial concerns. Grounded in the methodological collectivism of Continental philosophy, governmentality is the idea that the positive, formal mechanisms of government law, public officialdom, law enforcement are but a small part of how society works to govern itself. The \( conduct \) of conduct is the term Foucault applied to societal self-governance, and the phrase sought to capture the material ways that the daily, often unconscious practices of \( \text{citizen-subjects} (\text{Ettlinger 2011}) \) reproduce the repressive norms of the modern neoliberal state. The specific \( \text{techniques of power} \) or \( \text{technologies} \) that reproduce things as they are, as with integration management and affirmative marketing, shift perpetually. But norms in a human population such as class and racial segregation show remarkable stability in large measure because they
are *collectively* reproduced rather than imposed in top-down fashion (Foucault 2007; Ettlinger 2010; Elden 2007; Elden 2010a; Elden 2010b; Elden 2010c). In describing how a human ūpopulationū self-polices the norms that benefit only a few in any given time and place, Foucault himself had little comment on the relation between space and society, even though the title of the lecture series on governmentality, *Security, Territory, and Population* (2007), would have seemed to invite speculation on the subject. Still, recent extensions of thinking on ūgovernmentalityū into human geography have sought to explain how the concept and its related depiction of social life operates according to scale and space (most importantly in Ettlinger 2010). The act of observing how the same behavior plays out in one place versus another ūe.g., police treatment of minorities in a town with a robust black civic life versus policing in a town without itū can uncover the power dynamics that perpetuate the status quo. This is necessarily the first step in opening up transformational possibilities.

The second framework for the dissertation is the ūdeliberative democracyū of Iris Marion Young and others. Youngūs critique of social mixing policies and her development of the idea of ūdifferentiated solidarityū in the context of regional governance has immediate relevance for the topic (Young 1990; Cohen 1996; Young 1996; Young 1998; Frug 1980; Frug 1993; Frug 1996; Frug 1999; Frug 2006; Young 2000; Kymlicka 2007). Young was accused with some truth of racial essentialism with regard to her early work (Young 1990), but her later writing, especially *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), synthesizes her understanding of the contingent nature of the state with a similar understanding of the socially contingent nature of race.
Finally, I look at two radically different explanations of the political geography of the suburbs. What do neo-Marxist theory in geography (Walker 1977; Walker 1981; Cox and Jonas 1993) and, by sharp contrast, the New Suburban History (Jackson 1972; Fishman 1987; Jackson 1987; Self 2003; Kruse 2005; Kruse and Sugrue 2006; Lassiter 2006), say about why suburbs exist and the implications for minority in-movement? What are the limitations of their divergent understandings of suburban political advantage and how it operates? Specifically, how do race and class matter in suburban settlement, and what is the role of local politics in both theoretical formulations? What version of metropolitan development offers the most adequate understanding of suburbanization? What, in the end, do these theoretical and historical takes on suburbanization say about the topic at hand? local social mixing policy, i.e., integration management of race?

Note on race and class

The contingency of racial categories—the way they are constructed rather than given as biological imperatives (Omi Winant 2004)—presents a conundrum for those who write about race in empirical terms. Throughout this work, reference is made to people who are black or white, but my clear understanding is that those categories are not fixed but imposed under prevailing norms accepted by nearly all in the communities and in contemporary society. Social definitions, even those we wish to displace or make less dominant, operate with the full force of objective facts to which all individuals and institutions necessarily respond and they are deeply implicated in
processes of social reproduction (Harvey 1990). Part of the point of writing about race is to understand the question posed above by Philip Roth while rejecting his conclusion that understanding is impossible; in such a project, it is difficult to avoid lapsing into discussion of people with reference to the received social definitions under which they live out their lives. Nonetheless, one of the central aims of the project, as I hope to show, is to identify how and when individual and collective action overcomes the “full force” of racial labeling that reinforces disadvantage.

Throughout this work, I present social life in my area of study as a matter of black and white, which is both a limitation to the study and true. The communities of Maplewood and South Orange in New Jersey are composed largely of people who identify as either black or white. People of mixed race heritage have long lived in Newark and its surrounding region, and the proportion of people who identify openly as being of mixed race heritage is growing somewhat, in part because the Federal government has now acknowledged their existence by collecting data on them (Snipp 2003; McDermott 2005). Direct immigration of Latinos to suburbs (Frey 2001), which South Orange and Maplewood are experiencing, although mainly from immigration from the Caribbean, especially Haiti, is growing, and this has increased the number of mixed race households in the communities. Still, the numbers of people who both know of their mixed heritage and who are willing to report it to Census officials remains small. In 2010, the most recent Census, there were 3.8% people reporting mixed race heritage in Newark, against a population that reported 26.3% white alone and 52.4% African American alone. Similarly, Census data indicates that people who call themselves Latino alone or Asian

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1 Harvey was talking here about time and space rather than race, but the observations could apply equal well to race were he inclined to make the argument.
alone, the two other main racial categorizations used by the Census after black and white, constitute a small percentage of the population in South Orange and Maplewood. In 2010, Asians and Latinos together were 6.7% of the population of Maplewood, while whites were 56.3% and blacks 35.3%; South Orange was very similar with Asians and Latinos at 6.2% combined, whites at 60.2%, and blacks at 28.7% (Bureau of the Census 2010). To a large degree, the towns divide socially along black-white lines with people who appear black being considered to be such, even if they are of mixed race parentage.

Moreover, the continuing drive to monitor and to limit suburban settlement by race, as in the inner suburbs of Newark, shows that the reified category of race remains a factor in the understanding of suburban form and how it developed for the privileged. Suburban location and class commonalities between whites and blacks who reside in the inner suburbs do as important as they are do not trump the notion of a coherent black community that dedicates itself to solidarity in the face of adversity, despite internal class differences that have grown with the rise of the black middle class (Lacy 2007). This dissertation develops the idea that class and race remain, in the U.S. inner suburban setting, categories that overlap and that are experienced as most real by those on the short end of the stick (Omi Winant 2004; Pattillo 1999; Pattillo-McCoy 2000; Heflin Pattillo 2002; Pattillo 2003; Pattilo 2005; Pattillo 2007). One recent large study indicates that 40 percent of middle-class blacks have a sibling who is poor, compared to 16 percent of whites, and 1/3 of middle-class blacks grew up poor themselves (Heflin and Pattillo 2006; Pattillo 2007: 96). If nothing else, such statistics suggest that conflict theory on class and social justice frameworks on race are not adversarial positions in the U.S. context, even though they derive from social movements with a different history and
The European and urban democratic revolutions of 1848—the spirit of which Marx formalized intellectually and the abolitionist movement that had fullest expression in the rural United States before the Civil War (Cross 1950) continue to shape the way we discuss class and race, respectively, in the academy today. The scientific socialism of Marx and the exalted preaching of the abolitionists and their heirs in the Civil Rights movement do not mix easily, but neither do they misrepresent the related injustices on which they focus. Most simply, both traditions emphasize collective consciousness and action among the disadvantaged. This work considers how a cohesive minority community in the inner suburbs of Newark, one experiencing new class divisions but retaining a shared culture and experience of oppression, negotiates its way around concerted effort by the privileged to deny access to the advantages of the suburbs. The most stringent battles over black settlement take place along city-suburban borders not just because whites draw a line there but because cohesive black communities insist on their right to be present.

Foucault’s Governmentality and How Everyday Practices Drive Segregation

The idea of governmentality in Foucault’s work stems from a lecture series given late in his life and remained one of the least developed arcs of his theory of social life. Not translated into English until six years ago (Foucault 2007), Foucault’s thought has relatively recently been adapted for use in the realm of urban and political geography. Foucault himself seems to have given spatial concerns relatively little weight in his analyses of modern life despite the mention of “territory” in the title of the lecture series,
but geographers have inferred importance of space from elements of his work (Huxley 2006; Huxley 2007; Dean 2010; Crampton and Elden 2007). The inductive method that Foucault used in his own empirical work typically began with a striking event or series of events—early modern public execution, for example, depicted in extreme detail (Foucault 1995)—and moved on to speculation about the wider social and historical context of the empirical description. The goal was to describe \textit{why things are the way they are}—a Durkheimian question at one level but one for which Foucault sought an answer that would lead to the ability to understand effective ways to implement change (Foucault 2007). Governmentality as a concept is important for geographers because the concept encourages seeking an answer for the embeddedness of repressive social norms, such as racial discrimination in housing, not in a straight read of formal law or policy but in an inquiry into why law and policy exist in the first place (what prevailing social practice, for example, was a law passed to prevent?) and how geographic context changes implementation of formally prescribed norms. Further, if community studies such as the one I am about to present typically suffer from the \textit{bug under a microscope} problem and fail to provide context in terms of political economy and culture (Zukin 2007), the work of Foucault showed how discrete local practices could be studied comparatively across time and place to reveal assumptions (\textit{mentalities}) that cannot be detected without comparative reference to other geographic scales, time periods, or locations. The idea of governmentality uses comparison to grasp the assumptions behind the practices by which a community regulates itself.
How a community engages in the "conduct of conduct" is perhaps most evident in communities, such as the one under study, that are bifurcated in some way, as by race. A community (population in Foucault’s parlance) where the social fault lines are white and black offers ample data for comparison of the same practices in different racial contexts in such a way that they reveal underlying mentalities. The Community Coalition on Race discussed in Chapter Six, for example, had its origins in a group that fought racial steering or block-busting, i.e., marketing a neighborhood to blacks. It sought a solution to the issue not just by opposing steering as a threat to the community but by introducing the new practice of affirmative marketing, i.e., marketing the same neighborhoods to whites. The practice of marketing by race, especially when to blacks, was vilified by most homeowners in the towns, including many blacks, and community groups that sought to combat it had legal means to do so via the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity program within the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that made racial "steering" to blacks illegal. By contrast, the integration management group that marketed the same neighborhoods to whites claimed the mantle of the Civil Rights movement and received funding from the local governments. The same discriminatory governmentality, in other words, appears in practices that initially appear different or even progressive.

Another aspect of the governmentality by which populations regulate themselves appears in different treatment of the same people in different contexts. Marketing materials, for example, for South Orange and Maplewood that are sent to primarily white urban neighborhoods contain photos of black children in group shots where they are

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2 I am indebted throughout the discussion of governmentality to Ettlinger’s 2010 article on the topic but particularly here.
presented as a minority among white school children (Figures 1, 2, and 3), although the student population of the local high school is actually majority students of color. The idea is to appeal to urban whites who are reluctant to move to the unhip suburbs on the idea that they will be more tolerant about living near blacks. The marketing plan dovetails with Richard Florida’s notion of the creative class and with New York Times articles, repeated with a fair degree of frequency, about the new class of hipster suburbanites (Florida 2002; Williams 2013). Leon Wynter argues that transracial marketing, such as is used in Maplewood South Orange, and the use of black celebrities to market products to whites, marks a departure from the racial politics of old (Wynter 2002). This is a viewpoint that many came to echo with the election of Barack Obama in 2008 where the Democratic Party marketed a black candidate to white voters in a national election. Yet, in 2013, when actual black schoolchildren go to register for school in the South Orange Maplewood school district, their parents are subject to stringent screening for residency that is designed to catch and expel children, who are almost always black and from Newark or Irvington, whose parents do not reside within municipal boundaries. Racial diversity is unproblematic when it attracts whites, the subject of formal policing when it does not.

The method of exposing the way the details of daily life indicate underlying mentalities is intended to specify techniques of resistance (Ettlinger 2010). Resistance was not the norm, certainly, over the period 1970 to 2010 in the inner suburbs of Newark, partly because the suburbs are by design less likely to serve as sites of resistance, partly because even the adjoining city had at best an attenuated history of protest in public spaces (Mumford 2007). Still, the Community Coalition on Race, the organization
responsible for marketing the towns also initiated, in 2007 under a new executive
director, a campaign to end classroom segregation in local schools. This form of
resistance, supported by some progressive whites and some black parents, nearly cost the
Coalition its funding from the towns and led to a drop in its donations from local
homeowners; the campaign was sustained and pursued in the face of substantial local
opposition. Similarly, South Orange, as discussed in Chapter Five, had a comparatively
robust black civic life, and the presence there of a group that functioned for a time as an
urban-suburban bridging group, the South Orange Civic Association, and helped to give
the town greater responsiveness to black concerns about policing and threats of violence
from whites.

*Young: The “Harms of Segregation” and Young’s Critique of the “Ideal of Integration”*

The idea of “differentiated solidarity” among divergent ethnic and racial groups,
advanced by Iris Marion Young, provides a theoretical grounding for the evaluation of
social mixing schemes. Her work is unusual in the degree to which it blends philosophy
and detailed commentary on policy like social mixing, so it is worth considering here.

Young begins her discussion of social mix with a critique of the idea of
integration that echoes, in certain respects, left-structuralist opposition in the 1970s to
policy that would hinder central cities in the U.S. from becoming majority black and
lower class (Piven and Cloward 1973; for more recent versions of the argument,
specifically about housing, see Venkatesh 2000 and Goetz 2003a). The advantage of
poor neighborhoods for the poor, Young and others argue, is that they enable the
disadvantaged to develop self-preserving networks, to participate in civic life, and to
organize politically against elites. But the chief problem with accepting poverty and/or
minority concentration lies in its implications for urban planning. The paucity of services available to urban residents who must rely on an impoverished local tax base for the high costs of public and assisted housing, city management, economic development, and K-12 education with little help from suburban users of the central city constitute, for some (Galster 1992; Rosenbaum 1995; Galster and Tatian et al. 2003; Goering 2005; Rosenbaum, DeLuca et al. 2005), an argument for encouraging minority settlement in suburbs with substantial white and affluent populations.

To answer this practical problem in the case for leaving poor and minority enclaves intact, Young borrows the idea of "relational autonomy" for local governments, as argued in Gerald Frug's work, and applies it to racial and ethnic geographical clusters that often, as in my area of study, spill over political boundaries (Frug 1999; Blomley, Delaney et al. 2001; Frug, Ford et al. 2001; Frug 2006). "Relational autonomy," as Frug and Young develop the concept would not eliminate but instead relax the geographical boundaries that constrain "majority minority" localities and, by extension, segregated groups. As a result, the latter could employ an expanded understanding of local governmental powers. Such powers hold the promise to counteract the harms of segregation enforced by the majority without sacrificing the benefits of voluntary minority/poor group cohesion (Young 2000: 220-1).

After developing the concepts of solidarity and autonomy for disadvantaged areas, Young goes on to advocate the Belfast Peace Agreement of 1998 as a model for majority-minority relations. Below, I describe more fully the ideas of "differentiated solidarity" and "relational autonomy" and their implications for life on the urban-
suburban boundary. Next, I explore the implications of the Belfast model for white and African-American relations on the racial borders of U.S. metropolitan areas.

The approach of Young to rectifying class and racial injustice in modern democratic societies begins with enumerating the "harms of segregation" of both race and class (Young 2000: 204). With respect to race, the work of Massey and Denton, Young argues, shows conclusively that "income cannot entirely account for patterns of racial concentration" (Young 2000: 199). The literature supporting this point is large, however much disagreement remains on the degree to which class and race respectively influence segregation. Young goes on to specify the harms of racial segregation to "deliberative democracy," her ideal of democratic practice that derives with modification from the communicative rationality of Jurgen Habermas. Segregation wrongly limits choice, according to Young, by leaving people of color with "little alternative but to reside in less desirable neighborhoods" (Young 2000: 205). It reproduces structures of privilege and disadvantage that subject minorities to meager housing stock, weak local schools, poor transportation systems, and thin or distant job markets. Where whites and the better off are concerned, segregation obscures the privilege it creates by insulating the advantaged from conditions in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Finally, involuntary racial clustering impedes political communication across races and so democracy itself.

Young also enumerates the problems of residential class segregation, or homogenization of neighborhoods by household assets and income. Separate municipal jurisdictions; gated communities; zoning laws that shut out low- and moderately-priced

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4 Chiefly, Young questions the idea of a necessary rationality to democracy and instead emphasizes affective ties as the true "motivational basis for accepting the outcomes of democratic process" (Young 2000: 21).
housing and rental and multi-family dwellings; police and neighborhood watch groups that make lower-class visitors unwelcome; signs announcing that "public" facilities may only be used by residents of a suburban locality; streets and railroad tracks designed to block the flow of traffic from urban to suburban areas; all these constitute active harms to the excluded and were enshrined in American law not merely since the acceptance of zoning by the Supreme Court in the Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co in 1926 but long before (Feagin 1989; Rabin 1989).

But, chiefly, for Young, the core hurt of class segregation and race is to democracy itself because it prevents the sharing of physical space that leads to shared understanding. Parks, streets, squares, plazas, libraries, and municipal buildings are the cornerstone of a cohesive and just society because they provide the space where democracy unfolds:

If people suffer injustices, the first step in redressing them is being able to make claims upon others in a shared public forum that together they should take action to address these problems . . . The very processes of segregation that produce structural privileges for many white people, however, also impede the establishment of such inclusive political fora. The conditions of segregation impede the emergence of both civic and state-sponsored sites where differentiated groups come together to debate whether there are injustices and, if so, what should be done about them (Young 2000: 209).

Here she might have alluded to the literature in critical geography on the "right to the city" as the site of vigorous protest (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]; Mitchell 1995; Smith 1996; Mitchell 1997; Mitchell 2003; Mitchell and Staeheli 2005). But the style of her thinking is more that of Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1989 [1962]). In that work, omitted from Young's reference list and discussion, public space in the century prior to the rise of industrialized capitalism in the
mid-19th century provided such a forum where an increasingly educated public could come together to discuss the rudiments of nascent democracy. No doubt, the fragmented public spaces of the post-modern city, including their ethnically segregated neighborhoods, impedes such coffee house democracy today—not a small matter for the development of discursive democracy.

Even so, having laid out the hardships of both racial and class segregation, and the impediments it presents to democracy, Young goes on to deny that these wrongs mean all group clustering is involuntary or undesirable, particularly for the disadvantaged. She appeals to the felt experience of many who live in poor and racially homogenous neighborhoods and who feel made uncomfortable by a discourse that focuses exclusively on the harms of segregation:

[Residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods] often experience life in these neighborhoods as personally supportive, lively, and neighborly, with culturally distinct institutions and strong civic networks. Certain attempts to implement an ideal of integration fail to recognize the positive contribution such clustering makes to some people's lives (Young 2000: 207).

In the United States calls for policies of housing integration often sound to African Americans or Latinos like a condemnation of the neighborhoods they have loved and tried to improve, where they have experienced strong churches and civic institutions, and good times socializing. For some of these people the policies promoting integration amount to removing individuals from their sources of solidarity and isolating them, further disempowering them (Young 2000: 218).

The idea that the affective ties of place and community life are, if anything, stronger in poor and minority neighborhoods than elsewhere (Venkatesh 2000) echoes the sun-down to sun-up hypothesis advanced by the historian Eugene Genovese and others in the 1970s. In interpreting the lives of American slaves, Genovese argued that, as difficult as the daytime lives of slaves were, their construction of a vibrant and restorative
community life in slave quarters after sun-down made slaves the primary actors in their own lives in a way that historians were wrong to miss (Genovese 1976). Similarly, Young begins her critique of integration as an ideal with the recognition of the value of cohesive community life and self-actualizing purpose among the disadvantaged.

Integration, by this thinking, problematizes separation at the risk of missing another problem—economic inequality. Many critics of racial segregation, Young observes, are guided by a notion of integration in which spatial group differentiation itself is a problem and residential mixing is the solution (Young 2000: 216). This summarizes the logic of social mixing policies like integration management. When integration management groups, whether acting as civic groups or as arms of the local government, monitor the racial composition of neighborhoods, for example, they obsess on racial patterning rather than on more central issues of privilege and disadvantage (Young 2000: 216). This is also true of the literature of urban geography, particularly studies based on the segregation index (Massey 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Wong 1999; Massey and Fischer 2003; Briggs 2005) that minutely document the geometrics of racial distribution. To be sure, place can be a factor in disadvantage, particularly in access to jobs (Kain 1992). But sound longitudinal evidence for the idea that simply moving the poor to wealthier areas renders them better off as a whole is difficult to find, as a number of studies on the Gautreaux and MTO experiments suggest (Ellen and Turner 2003; Small and Stark 2005; Galster and Santiago 2006; Galster and Booza 2007; Atkinson 2008; Briggs, Ferryman et al. 2008; Ludwig, Liebman et al. 2008; McClure 2008; Sharkey 2008; Swanstrom, Ryan et al. 2008; Jackson, Langille et al. 2009). No doubt the intentions of those who forced the Gautreaux dispersal in the courts and
implemented MTO experiment were good (Polikoff 2006). But the lesson from these experiments so far seems to be that implementation of integration for those experimented upon, even when it does confer benefits, swaps one set of problems for another.

The logic of social mixing strategies, i.e., the notion of integration as “fixing” spatial group differentiation, bears a number of costs for the poor and minorities. Young frames the objections as follows. First, she argues, “attempts to bring about integration tend to leave the dominant group undisturbed while requiring significant changes from members of the excluded groups” (Young 2000: 216). This has been true for urban dispersal initiatives sponsored at the Federal level — Gautreaux, MTO, Section 8 vouchering out and, most egregiously, public housing demolition (Goetz 2000; Goetz 2003a; Goetz 2003b; Goetz 2004). In suburban settings in the U.S., as in the suburbs of Newark, but also Cleveland (Shaker Heights), and Chicago (Oak Park) social mixing groups seek to prevent minority and poor settlement rather than make existing residents move. Young also critiques an ideal of integration that neglects the legitimacy of the desire to “live and associate with others for whom [one] feels particular affinity,” whether of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or language (Young 2000: 216). Although she does not raise the issue, integration of housing or across political boundaries that renders the poor and/or people of color a numerical minority in a political jurisdiction also sharply restricts participation in the institutions of formal, representative democracy. So, living near others with similar interests and characteristics, Young argues, is not in itself wrong if such groups work to forge “inclusive democratic institutions” for the broader society (217).
Most importantly, however, the ideal of integration puts the wrong issue front and center, according to Young. By framing the harm of segregation as the existence of groups that are spatially and institutionally distinguishable, those who argue for an ideal of integration neglect the true hurt of residential segregation: the reinforcement of material privilege and disadvantage (218). The spatial mismatch of jobs and poor residents, buttressed by weak public transportation for poor neighborhoods (Pucher 1981; Pucher 1996) and the shielding of the privileged in a way that reifies their sense of entitlement, all these make growing economic inequality invisible, or at least more palatable, for the powerful. Inclusive democratic practice, by contrast, distinguishes between economic opportunity and political inclusion, on the one hand, and the forced mixing of residential neighborhoods.

To put this in a way that Young does not, integration as an ideal should be expressed less in housing markets where clustering can confer benefits to the disadvantaged than in labor markets where it is less likely. Rather than being a problem, as some have argued (Katznelson 1981), the historical separation of the housing and labor movements in the U.S. derives from the need to address separate harms. Policy on separation and integration should diverge where their founding social movements did.

Young: “Differentiated Solidarity” and “Relational Autonomy”

From her critique of residential integration, Young develops an ideal of social and political inclusion that she terms differentiated solidarity (Young 2000: 221). As with her notion of deliberative democracy, differentiated solidarity owes much to Habermas, particularly to his concept of constitutional patriotism that seeks to unify members of
a political community but allow for the persistence of cultural differences (Young 2000: 222, ft. 39). By *solidarity*, Young means a sense of commitment and justice owed to people but precisely not on the basis of fellow feeling or mutual identification (Young 2000: 222). By *differentiation*, she means acceptance of group difference that goes beyond mere tolerance to affirmation and celebration by society at large. Simply put, society should both include all groups but, at the same time, not seek to stamp out particularist and local self-affirmation especially when expressed through residential clustering (Young 2000: 221). Her ideal of solidarity is both universalist and particularist at once, a position she develops in response to David Harvey’s assertion that only working-class movements are genuinely universal:

In his political diagnosis, Harvey opposes the supposed universality of class to the supposed particularism of social movements. [But] one of the reasons for the rise of second-wave feminism and separatist black economic organizing was a failure of the supposedly universalist left to be inclusive and to understand the working-class situation of women or people of color. The suggestion that feminism or environmentalism is more particularist than a working-class interest-based movement seems odd. Women are everywhere, at least as universal a category as workers. Environmentalism is certainly universalist in its impulses. Movements against colonial legacies and racism appeal to universal values of non-domination. Like working-class movements, each of these movements is universalist at the same time that it exposes divisions of interest based in structural social relations (Young 1998).

Group clustering in poor and working class neighborhoods is little different from group clustering by race (Kefalas 2003). Both deserve support in policy and practice.

But the argument that neighborhoods that are cohesive by race and class offer considerable advantages to their otherwise struggling inhabitants raises planning issues. What about the problems mentioned earlier that poor neighborhoods face—deteriorated housing stock, non-existent or inadequate transportation systems, inferior and unsafe
schools, and, most importantly, thin and distant job markets? All these issues in the U.S. are exacerbated by the proliferation of small municipalities around the urban core, particularly in the Northeast, that are able to use jurisdictional boundaries to hoard resources cities and poor inner suburbs lack (Dreier, Mollenkopf et al. 2001). The distribution of property taxes, for example, only to those within the borders of Short Hills, NJ, the wealthy suburb next to my area of study, emboldens the town to post signs that their parks and library are open only to residents and so to ignore the substantial Federal subsidy, paid by urban and suburban residents alike, that the town receives for building its facilities through the home mortgage interest tax deduction.

To address these issues, Young turns to the work of legal scholar Gerald Frug (Frug 1999; Frug, Ford et al. 2001; Frug 2006) who advocates increasing “relational autonomy” among local jurisdictions. Relational autonomy, as Young describes it, originates in feminist theory (Young 2000: 231). But it more distantly comes from Marxian understandings of the state, particularly state derivation approaches. In the formulations of Habermas and Offe, the state is not merely a function of capitalism but serves either labor or capital depending on what is most expedient in order to preserve the existing social formation. The state favors labor and capital as needed; it is autonomous only to the extent necessary to preserve existing class relations (Altvater and Hoffmann 1990). As it goes for the state generally, so it goes for the local state. Suburban municipalities are particularly keen to preserve property values (Fischel 2007), while cities struggle to hang onto the businesses that drive rents, wages, and accumulation in the Central Business District (Stone 1989). Young and Frug, by contrast, place far more emphasis on the potential implicit even in critical state derivation approaches at least
some of the time for a constructive role for the local state with respect to the disadvantaged.

Frug expresses this dynamic via a discussion of Anglo-American legal history. According to him, the weak position of cities in the U.S. vis-à-vis suburbs and by extension the disadvantaged who inhabit cities is based in the split in the legal understanding of the corporation into public and private spheres. Under English law since the late medieval period, cities were understood as corporations that enjoyed the right to autonomy and defense of property and community life. But, in the late 19th century, U.S. courts developed a detailed legal framework for cities that was distinct from European law and that disadvantaged American cities in a number of ways. Judge John Dillon, a forerunner of the Progressive Movement, wrote in 1872 an influential treatise on municipal law that drew a stringent distinction between private and public corporations in order to check municipal corruption. In addition to stripping cities of powers, such as building municipal railroads, that now were now characterized as private enterprise, Dillon’s Rule, as his statement of the law came to be known, made cities wards of the state (Frug 1999). In large measure although Frug plays down the reality Dillon’s rule represented the beginning of the push to wield state law to limit the power of cities increasingly inhabited by the poor, immigrants, and people of color. Even though, technically, suburbs, as public corporations, should have faced the same legal restrictions as cities, they did not. They were able to sidestep restrictions on their autonomy by convincing courts and legislatures that, unlike cities, their primary purpose was the defense of property rights, home and family (Frug 1999). Indeed, in practice, as
the split between public and private corporations hardened, suburbs functioned more and more as private rather than public corporations.

The privatized understanding of wealthy localities, according to Frug, needs to be replaced by an "ageographical" understanding of the right to municipal services. The law should reject the idea that property and services based within a jurisdiction belong solely to residents (Frug 1999: 102). So far, court decisions have carved out a limited right to "local" public goods such as beaches and, in some states, municipal parks and libraries. But the idea needs to be taken much further. Why, Frug asks, should a locality be allowed to exclude non-residents from its schools but not its beaches (Frug, Ford et al. 2001: 360)?

The distinction under law, however, between private and public corporation is not going away. Instead, Frug advocates a rigorously public conception of inter-locality relations that would encompass not just the city but the suburb as well. This is the idea that Young believes would empower localities, and affinity clusterings, to exercise "relational autonomy."

Where people desire to cluster according to affinities of religion, culture, or way of life, this model of local government would design institutions of political participation and decision-making to correspond to such groupings, but would also discourage exclusion and encourage many diverse and hybrid locales (Young 2000: 233).

Local government, in other words, would work not only to negotiate among affinity clusterings but also to support socially mixed areas. What it would not do as a matter of policy is to obsess about the numbers of a particular race in a given census block group and whether they should move.
Frug, as a legal scholar rather than a philosopher, is specific about how this should be achieved. In *City Making*, he argues for empowering all municipalities to negotiate the aid they receive from new regional governments of the kind long urged by regional planners (Orfield 1997, for example). More recently, Frug seems to have taken into account the very minor implementation of regional governance in the U.S. and looks to state governments to provide incentives for local governments to collaborate among themselves. In the Northeast, state governments are probably more effective on balance at getting local governments to cooperate in regional agreements (Popper 1992; Barron, Frug et al. 2004). His ideas, unfortunately, are best developed as cooperation within cities rather than suburbs. He supports expanded municipal ownership of certain services: community banks and other financial services; cable television; multi-family dwellings; cooperative grocery stores; regional sports teams. But it is far from clear in this scheme how wealthy suburbs can be encouraged to give up the privileges they enjoy over cities, particularly if one looks to historically conservative state governments to offer the incentives. In reality, incentives for wealthy communities to cooperate on sharing services with less affluent localities would probably have to come from the Federal level and involve a threat to the mortgage interest deduction.

*The Belfast Peace Agreement of 1998 as a Model for Management of Majority-Minority Conflict*

The final component of Young’s work that is relevant for the interpretation of social mixing tactics is her analysis of the Belfast Peace agreement of 1998 and its
meaning for local class and ethnic conflicts elsewhere. Young interprets the peace accord as one of the rare instances of concretely implemented relational autonomy for a subjugated group. The great value of remaining in sizeable territories for impoverished ethnic groups is the potential access to redistribution that they enjoy when participating in an economy that includes the affluent. Thus, it is important to distinguish, Young argues, between self-determination as relational autonomy, on the one hand, and the right to separate territory whether for African-Americans settling in inner-suburbs of the U.S. or Catholics in Northern Ireland on the grounds of what is best for the disadvantaged (Young 2000: 252). The core justice principle underlying relational autonomy and genuine self-determination is not separate territory which would in reality be territory controlled by elites within the subgroups but freedom from domination and economic exploitation (Young 2000: 261).

The Belfast accord, known in Northern Ireland as the Good Friday agreement, is unusual in that it renders all residents capable of enjoying the basic rights of citizenship by building dual governance structures for the same territory. The agreement, Young observes, recalls for governance institutions linking Northern Ireland both to the United Kingdom and to the Republic of Ireland (Young 2000: 263). Separate commissions recognize both Protestant and Catholic claims on governance structures. More importantly, a strong commitment to basic human rights also encompasses those e.g., new immigrants from the global South, non-Christians who do not affiliate strongly with either warring group. Unlike prior efforts by the United Kingdom to ameliorate violent conflict between religious groups, most notably the partition of India in 1947, or social mixing efforts in Europe and the United States for that matter, the costs the
disadvantaged paid for peace in Northern Ireland did not involve moving to different
territory or foregoing the benefits of access to a sound economy:

The institutional design of the 1998 agreement offers a good example of relational autonomy. The agreement recognizes all the inhabitants of the territory known as Northern Ireland as a self-determining people with their own government. It also recognizes that there are two main groups with historic relations to that territory and whose fates have been intertwined for centuries and gives each of them special rights in the governance structure, on terms that aim to recognize a 'parity of esteem' between them. The agreement calls for additional governance institutions linking Northern Ireland both to the United Kingdom and to the Republic of Ireland (Young 2000: 262-3).

No doubt, conflicts remain in Northern Ireland, most notably over the organization and ethnic composition of the police. But the peace accord is with justice seen as a functional working out of a vicious conflict and, in Frug and Young's terms, a success for discursive democracy.

What relevance does an agreement crafted for Belfast and its environs have for a study of racial policy in the inner suburbs of Newark? To be sure, there are many differences, both institutional and economic, between the two cities, and the ethnic-religious histories play out in different local contexts. Northern Ireland possessed a labor party that rejected an ideology of organizing along ethnic lines and that played an important role in shaping local politics. Still, both Belfast and Newark are ports that play an important role in national defense and in their respective regional economies, and both serve as nodes in the global economy. Both were also sites of violent conflict driven by de-industrialization. Both, finally, are situations in which tolerance of group clustering has allowed the disadvantaged to start to build access to education and jobs as well as self-sustaining, separate neighborhoods in which to live.
Integration Management and the New Suburban History

The question of whether local social mixing policy is just is grounded not only in urban theory but in the history of suburbanization as well. Interpretation of the suburbs in U.S. urban geography has derived recently from historians and their understanding of what suburbs are. The work of Kenneth Jackson and Robert Fishman from the 1980s continues to define the contours of the discussion but a new cluster of works, termed the New Suburban History, has added a wealth of empirical data to our understanding of the role of the suburbs in structural changes since 1970. In reading these works, does one adopt a sympathetic view that sees the Levittowns of the post-World War II period as the archetypal suburb that brought us "affordable homes for the common man [sic]" (Jackson 1987: 116)? Or does one take a critical view, like Fishman, who argued that the "classic suburb" of the nineteenth century was built on the "general contradictions in bourgeois civilization" and that its main purpose was to insulate the elite from the teeming industrial city (Fishman 1987: 135)? Here I lay out the tradition of scholarship that has descended from these two books and consider the relevance to suburban racial integration.

The Postwar Suburb as the Geography of the Common Man Who Hates Big Government (Jackson)

The placement of the middle class on the urban periphery of the U.S. can, for Jackson, be explained primarily by governmental action. The decline of municipal annexation; the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 that paved the path to the suburbs; the ghettoization of public housing; all of these, he says, helped foster the development of the
metropolitan periphery. But Jackson goes so far as to make one agency of the Federal
government the prime mover of suburbanization: “No agency of the United States
government has had a more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people over
the past half-century than the Federal Housing Administration” (Jackson 1987: 203).
Housing policy via FHA and VA loans and the mortgage interest deduction made the
suburbs.

But governmental action cannot hold up as a complete explanation of
suburbanization because it overemphasizes explanations that can be readily substantiated.
Evidence from the archives of the Federal government is accessible to historians, but this
does not make government action the full explanation of suburban growth, or even the
central one. The focus on the wrong-doing of the state was itself an expression of the
period in which Jackson wrote—the late 1980s, the Reagan era when both the left and
the right critiqued the role of big government in shaping the American economy, politics,
society, and culture. Clearly, the role of the Federal government in suburbanization is a
crucial part of the story, but only part of the story.

Where Jackson is critical of postwar suburbanization, against the dominant note
of his argument, he focuses on suburban exclusion by race. This, too, he lays at the door
of an FHA that "exhorted segregation and enshrined it as public policy" (Jackson 1987:
213). FHA programs, he argues, hastened the decay of inner-city neighborhoods by
stripping them of their middle-class constituency. As do other historians who focus on
race and the suburbs, Jackson emphasizes how urban renewal, slum clearance, and public

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5 The loss of the middle class from inner-city neighborhoods, particularly among minorities, is an idea that
drives the current "geography of opportunity" or housing dispersal policy, in the present day U.S. See
housing all worked as a \textit{Federally sponsored social centrifuge} that anchored the poorest blacks in the central city as middle class whites left (Hirsch 1983; Hirsch 2007: 36). The treatment of social housing is for Jackson and like-minded historians about how it segregated by race rather than how it provided affordable housing. With the creation of the suburbs too, Jackson's argument downplays economic considerations beyond governmental intervention in markets. However, in emphasizing race, the book created the groundwork for studies of the contested history of black suburbanization.

\textbf{The Railroad Suburb of the Nineteenth Century as the Bourgeois Utopia (Fishman)}

The economic logic of capital particularly industrial capital but also developers is for Fishman, by contrast, the main explanation of the separation of city and suburb, and suburbanization is mainly harmful to cities. Suburbanization, Fishman allows, has had some good effects, such as aiding the industrial districts of the city by concentrating factories (although it is not clear this is what happened). But his essential take on the suburbs is not positive but critical. As do most writers working in the political economy tradition, Fishman focuses on the effect of suburbanization on the urban core and decries the outcome.

The development of the suburbs is, from this perspective, a negative for the city and particularly for the disadvantaged. Decentralization is not the means by which the \textit{common man} experiences the \textit{machine in the garden} technological freedom in a pastoral setting as Frank Lloyd Wright had hoped (Marx 1964). Instead, the American commitment to the pastoral ideal, as made concrete in the suburbs, upends the day-to-day reality of the inner city: \textit{Decentralization has been a social and economic disaster for the}
old city and for the poor, who have been increasingly relegated to its crowded, decayed zones. It has segregated American society into an affluent outer city and an indigent poorer city (Fishman 1987: 198). Somehow, the economic logic of capitalism requires suburban separation in the Anglo-American context.

The sin of the suburbs, then, is less race than class exclusion, as one would expect given the roots of his thinking in Marxist political economy. By this mode of argument, the intrinsic tendency of capitalism to class segregation explains British as well as U.S. suburban affluence by comparison to the center city. Indeed, Fishman echoes Engels as he describes "the growing uneasiness at close contact between the classes; the rejection of neighborhoods that make such contacts inevitable; and the search for class-segregated bourgeois residential neighborhoods as the prelude to suburbanization (Engels 1845; Fishman 1987: 105). But, as for many interpretive frameworks in the political economy tradition, the assertion relies on evidence not presented such as the private decisions of manufacturers or developers because these are not readily accessible (unlike Jackson who confines his argument to only concluding what evidence will show). It also it a very top-down explanation of suburbanization. Fishman discounts the role of agency on the part of newly middle class homeowners in making the suburbs.

The cultural effect of suburbanization for Fishman is that, as the suburbs house a higher and higher percentage of the American people, its mores come to determine American culture. The homogeneity of the suburbs, the "crass conformity," the lack of a "critical mass for a minority high culture" that Whyte and Reisman had described in the suburbia of the 1950s (Whyte 1956; Riesman 1958) assumes greater importance and creates a "crucial loss of texture in modern society" as suburban culture becomes
American culture (Fishman 1987: 200-1). To be sure, the bucolic setting might bring the technoburb to the word for what he terms the new city of suburbia the aesthetic fusion of nature and community for which Wright had hoped. But optimism about the ability of the new suburbanites to forge an equitable or interesting culture is largely absent.

This skeptical stance toward suburban culture remains the dominant one in urban political economy. Rather than argue, as might have been the case, that the mass culture of postwar suburbia conferred status on those just up from the working class (or those still in the working class as many suburbs are working class) or that it legitimately expressed the concerns of postwar suburbanites many of whom were the children and grandchildren of the European industrial working class that Marx championed this line of argument refuses sympathy for suburbs and their residents. Fishman applies the picture of the suburb of the 19th century as bourgeois utopia to the postwar suburb.

Despite the ideological differences, however, important commonalities characterize the divergent histories by Jackson and Fishman of the metropolitan fringe. Fishman chooses the late nineteenth century as the archetypal Anglo-American suburb, a period when it excluded the masses and fit the idea of suburb as bourgeois utopia that he wants to advance. Jackson is more sanguine about suburbs but for a reason similar to the one over which Fishman is critical, i.e., their effect on the majority, or the common man:

At every previous time in American history, and indeed for the 1980s as well, the successful acquisition of a family home required savings and effort of a major order. After World War II, however, because of mass-production techniques, government financing, high wages, and low interest rates, it was quite simply cheaper to buy new housing in the suburbs than it was to reinvest in central city properties or to rent at the market price (Jackson 1987: 241).
The common man, or the masses, however expressed, remains the ethical concern on which both narratives turn.

The New Suburban History: The Critique of the Role of Government and of the Working Class in the Racial Politics of the Suburbs

The emphasis of Jackson on the role of the government in shaping suburbia, especially on race, informs much of the work of the New Suburban History (NSH). The liberals among these historians focus on political and social explanation of suburbanization and cite Jackson (Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006). The important book, American Babylon (2003), by Robert Self, sometimes classed with the NSH but not easily so, uses insights from urban political economy to talk about race in the industrial suburb of Oakland and deserves thorough consideration beyond the scope of this work.

The New Suburban History, as practiced by those who follow Jackson, looks not just at the Federal government but also at state and local institutions and social movements. It demonstrates conclusively that the rise of the conservative movement after 1970 came at the grassroots level not merely as a top-down Republican political strategy and grew directly out of the construction of the suburbs. In this conclusion, we hear the echoes of Foucault’s insistence that social norms become entrenched only because they are collectively enforced. National politicians certainly recognized that “sprawl is where the voters are” (Lassiter 2006: 321). But they did so because voters had already organized around the crucial suburban issues of homeowner, taxpayer, and

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schoolparent status and especially in opposition to desegregation of public facilities (McGirr 2001; Lassiter 2006: 8). Moreover, this conservative movement mirrored the rights-based claims that blacks employed to argue for civil rights but flipped the meaning to support a narrative of white victimization at the hands of the Big Government. From the suburban reaction against the potential suburbanization of minorities and their growing political and social equality came the tax revolt of 1978 (Self 2003). The suburbs, in other words, made the Reagan Revolution.

The New Suburban History covers a variety of geographies but emphasis is on regions outside the Rustbelt such as the South and California that have seen high population growth. Both Kruse and Lassiter, who have published significant books, study urban government in Atlanta; Lassiter also examines Charlotte, NC. Where Kruse looks at metropolitan government and citizen action broadly, Lassiter treats schools and the success of a plan in Charlotte that that achieved partial but stable racial change by integrating by class as well as race.

But, as much as they treat social movements, the historians retain the emphasis on state action in constructing the suburbs and geographic racial exclusion. Kruse, for example, rails against public policies favoring suburbs (Kruse 2005: 244), and Lassiter asserts that state financed suburbanization promoted state sponsored residential segregation (Lassiter 2006: 4). Institutions here municipal and state as well as Federal continue to dominate the explanation of the suburbs over other factors. The state, especially Big Government, is given sharply critical analysis.

But, if they continue to follow the contours of Jackson work, the New Suburban Historians say something original about the means by which residential segregation
persisted into the waning years of the twentieth century. Lassiter is particularly important here. He documents the process by which racial discrimination in housing and education—the technically forbidden under Federal civil rights statutes after 1968—perpetuated itself via a shift to a class-based rhetoric of individual rights that claimed to be race-neutral and, on this ground, was allowed by the courts.

The increasingly centrifugal settlement patterns of metropolitan areas reified the shift in legal rhetoric by multiplying political boundaries that could be used to segregate by class. As Lassiter shows, the landmark Supreme Court decisions that mandated the end of *de jure* segregation in the South were quickly undermined by decisions that allowed the continuation of the pattern of *de facto* segregation that had long prevailed in regions outside the South. Racial segregation in the South would be perpetuated under the rubric of legal class segregation, as it was in the rest of the country. Indeed, Richard Nixon explicitly argued that suburban neighborhoods had a right not to be "destabilized" with a "flow of low-income families" (Lassiter 2006: 306). This turn to class-based justification of segregation was a function of increasing Southern integration into national economic life, a point Lassiter underplays.

Indeed, the labor market analogs of the class-based justification of segregation are generally not treated by the liberal historians. The development of open class-based discrimination signaled the beginning of a new era marked by the decline of labor and retrenchment at the national level. Thus, the origin of the social changes after the early 1970s, the era of most importance to my study, is described by the New Suburban History in a way narrowly restricted to housing policy. The close of the period coincides with what Harvey and others call the end of high modernism and the beginning of
postmodernism or post-Fordism (Harvey 1989; Amin 1994; Jessop 2002). The hollowing out of the Keynesian welfare state, particularly where it protected the interests of workers, was one layer of this “sea change” as was the shift to class-based discrimination. As Harvey and others show, this series of shifts—economic, political, social, and cultural—rippled through society as a whole. The main weakness of the liberal version of the New Suburban History is that the connections among these are rarely mentioned, let alone engaged. It is the problem, as for Jackson, of evidentiary standards that impede adequate explanation.

Similarly, the approach to social movements on race—both black and white—ignores the large body of social science on their interpretation. The issue of white working class opposition to desegregation, for example, in Atlanta is made much of by Kruse. The moderate coalition led by Mayor Hartsfield that developed in Atlanta in order to allow the smooth functioning of business as desegregation proceeded never incorporated working class whites because they were too opposed to black presence in public institutions. In the minds of the allies of the mayor, working class whites were the “really bigoted vote” (Kruse 2005: 40), a formulation with which Kruse himself sometimes seems to agree. This simple equation of “working class” and “racist” is contested by Lassiter who talks about an alliance of working class whites and blacks in Charlotte.

But, because neither writer treats labor markets, even through reference to standard works, they miss commonalities that underlay opposing white and black protests of the period. This is the strength of Self’s work, by contrast, who deliberately poses the Black Panthers against the Silent Majority. As Self points out, the Black Panthers, had an
anti-tax platform that portrayed heavy taxation as being in the interests of Big Business; the Panthers saw high taxes as “reproduction of racial disadvantage by other means” (Self 2003: 256). This was the inverted, mirror image of the white suburban anti-tax movement that blamed Big Government. More importantly, both social movements as a whole stemmed from frustrations to social mobility black and white as those frustrations increased with the recession of the early 1970s. As did Jackson, the liberal New Suburban Historians do not look up from the evidence in hand to ask questions about a more complete explanation of suburbanization and its effects, particularly with regard to economic retrenchment. Such analysis, however, is necessary to understand many of the commonalities among black and white suburbanites after 1970.

The Suburbs and Progressive Turns of Argument Not Taken

Ironically, Kenneth Jackson’s argument could have been given a progressive turn that dovetailed with David Harvey’s argument, published just two years later, that characterized the immediate post-World War II period as the apotheosis of the common man (Harvey 1989). An understanding of the process by which capitalist development drives suburbanization had been laid out by Richard Walker in a long dissertation on The Suburban Solution under the supervision of Harvey that was published only in brief form (Walker 1977; Walker 1981). Walker described in detailed empirical terms the way that the boom-and-bust nature of rent-seeking in capitalist markets drives suburbanization via waves of expansion that stave off accumulation crises. The argument is not especially critical of suburbanization, despite being the origin of the idea of the suburban solution as spatial fix later picked up by Beauregard (2006). Moreover, like Jackson and Harvey,
Walker sees the immediate postwar period, when Levittowns were built (Gans 1967) as one of relative success for redistributive governmental efforts. This political economy take on suburbanization credits the importance of the phenomenon for the masses, a view that Self echoes at points. By this logic, racial and class exclusion from the suburbs matters because suburban residential location confers benefits not just asset allocation but social, political and cultural advantages for those who would otherwise be disadvantaged.

Conclusion

The New Suburban History has its roots most closely in the work of Jackson and approaches to history that for the most part eschew discussion of labor markets and the economics of housing markets with the exception of the work of Self (2003). Still, the case studies that form the backbone of the NSH literature are vital to understanding the way suburbanization proceeded in South Orange and Maplewood. Lassiter’s understanding of the way open and unalloyed class discrimination what he terms the color-blind discourse of suburban innocence (Lassiter 2006: 1) when it comes to white responses to black settlement replaced technically illegal racial discrimination is particularly important in understanding the way that resistance to black suburbanization proceeded. The understanding in the work of the New Suburban Historians that the conservative turn of national politics in the 1980s rose up from the ground make concrete and specific the ways in which that the migration of more than half of the American population to suburbs as of 2000 (Hobbs Stoops 2002) reshaped national politics.
Grasping the texture of daily life in the suburbs, then, is part of the history of the progressive struggle of the past century. By contrast to both the urban political economy view of the suburb and to the New Suburban History, the notion of governmentality helps explain how power operates not just at higher scales but in the mundane activity of ordinary people:

Governance . . . is not about individuals in positions of power who exert direct, sovereign, and coercive control over a territory but rather how it is that norms of a population are unconsciously produced and reproduced by citizen-subjects, thereby making governance at a distance possible (Ettlinger 2011: 538).

The suburbs are made by the people who reside in them even if global networks of power structure and constrain the choices they face. The use of local government to police movement by perceived outsiders within the territory of suburbs (Chapter Four) and the use of the legal authority of local government to exclude low income housing (Chapter Four) are the obvious ways government works to resist settlement by African Americans. Governmentality is seen in the daily lives of residents and in the operations of informal social life such as selective enforcement of rules on the basis of race at the community pool and on property upkeep codes, the emphasis on a perceived racial achievement gap in the schools even as test scores began to converge, and in the differential treatment of treatment of black and white children in parks, libraries and elsewhere (Chapters Five and Six). It is through the "norms and everyday practices" and the "conduct of conduct" that is "associated with normalization" the stuff of everyday of life why African-American suburbanization in suburbs on the borders of a majority black city losing population at the dramatic pace that the city did in the decades immediately after 1967 proceeded at such a glacial pace.
Chapter Two: The Physical and Human Geography of Maplewood and South Orange

The physical and human geography of Maplewood and South Orange inhabits a regional and local space with a specific history and socio-economic context. From its place in the Piedmont region of the Atlantic Coast of the United States, the Newark area, of which Maplewood and South Orange are a part, has a landscape, weather and climate, and water supply that distinguish it from surrounding regions and that continue to affect the human geography of the area as urbanization advances in the twenty-first century. Similarly, the history of human settlement in the towns and region, beginning with occasional movement of aboriginal peoples (usually called Lenni Lenape, who spoke an Algonquian language) through the territory before the arrival of the Europeans in the seventeenth century, is one of increasing complexity as the region becomes more or less steadily part of a globalized market for manufactured goods, both produced and consumed. The towns themselves have a political history as a part of Newark, then as an independent entity, a single suburb known as South Orange, then as separate towns or suburbs, one the more affluent space that included residences of Newark factory owners, still known as South Orange, and the other, known as Maplewood after 1922 (Snyder 1969), an area with more middle class and blue collar housing, both towns being developed and built out rapidly after the First World War. The history of contested settlement along racial lines in South Orange and Maplewood takes place in a region with a highly specific physical and human geography.
Physical Geography of the Piedmont Region of New Jersey

Landscape and Land Use

The Piedmont ("foot of the mountains") where the suburbs of Newark sit is a low undulating plain, broken up by crests, between the Atlantic Coastal Plain and a province known in New Jersey as the Highlands. The Piedmont province, also known as the Newark Basin, unlike the Piedmont in places south of the state, where crystalline rock prevails, is composed of soft sedimentary rock interrupted by basalt ridges such as the First and Second Watchung Mountains (ridges) on which the more affluent neighborhoods of Maplewood and South Orange rest. The medium brown and reddish sedimentary shales and sandstones of the Watchungs dating to the Triassic-Jurassic period have been extensively quarried, as discussed in more detail later, to form the facades of Victorian townhouses in the cities of New York, New Jersey, and eastern Pennsylvania, while the traprock (basalts and diabases) of the same ridges have been crushed to form concrete for highways and buildings throughout the region (Stansfield 1998: 18-19; Kelland and Kelland 1978; Pope 2011). The quarrying has been so extensive that the remaining ridges such as the Palisades are effectively false fronts that are in places empty of interior material, making it easy to drive extensions of interstate highways such as I-280 and I-78 in the past two decades that hook New Jersey more closely into the New York metropolis (Pope 2011). The Piedmont region lies just east of the Ramapo fault, a system of faults spanning over 175 miles through New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York. The fault is perhaps most famous for running past the Indian Point nuclear plant near Peekskill, New York (Aggarwal and Sykes 1978; Kafka et al 1985). The degree to which earthquakes threaten the plant and whether the Ramapo fault plays a particular role remain a matter of debate.
The Piedmont region ranges from farmland to urban. The counties within or overlapping the Piedmont include a county, Hunterdon, that in 2013 had 42.0% of its land registered as farmland as well as Union and Hudson counties with only 0.05% and 0.000% registered as farmland for tax purposes, respectively (Farmland 2013). Essex County, where South Orange and Maplewood are, has a mere 0.13% farmland. There are no reported farms in Newark, partly because the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964 which generates the available data on farms confers tax benefits for plots of five acres or more. But in recent years projects to reclaim land abandoned under deindustrialization have resulted in Newark businesses that use urban plots for horticulture, including one that employs recently released prisoners to transition them back into the labor market by growing food for local restaurants, most of which are suburban. Still, the predominant use of land in the region is for residential housing with agricultural, forest uses, and forested wetland rapidly giving way (Coutros et al 2002) to residential urban land. Essex County, of which South Orange and Maplewood are a part, is almost entirely urban in its uses.

Climate and Weather in the Piedmont

Under the Köppen-Geiger system, the climate of New Jersey is classified as Humid Continental (Dfb/Cfb). In other words, the prevalence of the winds in all seasons is from the west so that the state draws its climate patterns from activity on the continent rather than the ocean (Kelland and Kelland 1978: 28). Thus the state is said to have a continental more than a marine climate despite its long coastline. Because there is no high mountain obstacle running north-south or east-west in New Jersey, the state is subject to the cold winds that prevail from the northwest in the winter and the southwest in the summer (Kelland and Kelland 1978). Occasionally, as occurred in late 2013 and early 2014, continental arctic winds (cA) descend into
New Jersey causing bouts of extreme cold only slightly moderated by proximity to the ocean. All of this is as true for the Piedmont region as for the rest of the state. Increased urbanization in the northern part of the region has meant higher temperatures in summer because pavement and buildings retain and generate heat. Dense settlement also brings greater flooding during heavy rains as runoff is restricted from seeping into the zone of aeration and the water table, particularly when an elaborate road network interferes with natural stream systems for carrying runoff. For the inner suburbs of Newark, this means occasional flash flooding, especially along ridges of the Watchungs. Often, the low lying areas of the region such as Newark that are the most impoverished are most subject to flooding. But gentrification in areas such as Hoboken and Jersey City as well as flooding in long settled but affluent areas such as Millburn is also common because of the presence of multiple smaller waterways.

Water Supply for Residential and Commercial Use

Access to water in the northern portion of the Piedmont region is a point of conflict in which urban-suburban inequalities play out, particularly where Newark and its immediate suburbs are concerned. Water supply is composed of surface water, accessed through reservoirs and drainage basins, and groundwater held in the water table, which can rest quite deep in the rocks of northern NJ and remains limited as a source of water (Kelland and Kelland 1978: 43).

Background issues. Maplewood and South Orange lie near the Wisconsinan recessional ice margin. The northern region of the Piedmont has a complex drainage basin with flow to the Atlantic determined by glacial action dating to the late Wisconsinan (Stanford 2007). The Rahway River, which empties ultimately into the Arthur Kill dividing New Jersey from Staten Island and which has a branch that runs through South Orange and Maplewood, possesses a
narrow collection basin and supplies little water to the population settled along its course. By contrast, the Passaic River, which has a meandering drainage basin that covers nearly a thousand square miles, is the most densely populated watershed in the country (Kelland and Kelland 1978: 38). The power generating potential of the river as it plummeted over the Great Falls in Paterson was obvious to early European settlers and later colonists. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton chose the falls as the center for his idea of creating a major industrial base for the country (Brydon 1974) and the region developed as Hamilton envisioned it initially because of its water supply. The course of the river loops around the western inner suburbs of Newark then enters the city through the northeast. The river supplements reservoir and groundwater supplies for the population of the area, and when a water purification station for the river is compromised, as happened during Hurricane Sandy, potable water for portions of the Newark region becomes unavailable. Pollution from industrial sources and flooding have historically been the most pressing issues for the Passaic watershed. Problems in water quality in South Orange and corruption in management of the non-profit that has responsibility for the Newark watershed have been recent issues.

History of the Human Settlement of Maplewood and South Orange

The course of human habitation of New Jersey begins sometime before 6,000 B.C.E. with the very light presence of the hunter gather culture of the Lenni Lenape. With arrival in the seventeenth century of expeditions from England, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the human population expands steadily after the seventeenth century. Maplewood and South Orange, however, only begin to become thickly settled after the First World War as streets are laid in a grid system for both towns with the exception of a few curvilinear streets in wealthier neighborhoods in South Orange. A portion of South Orange (the Newstead section) above the
ridge that overlooks Manhattan was built after the Second World War and scattered houses, as well as the development built in Kernan's quarry, were built later. But for the most part the housing stock of South Orange and Maplewood dates to the early 1920s.

*Place of Maplewood and South Orange in New Jersey*

The people within South Orange and Maplewood have incomes that tend to track the regional average as do their housing values. Within New York-New Jersey region, Maplewood and South Orange hover around the average housing value (see map 3 and graph 1). Unlike two more working class suburbs that also border Newark, Irvington and East Orange, that transitioned fully to a black population comparatively early after the Newark riots, South Orange and Maplewood did not see dramatic declines in either income or housing value over the forty year period after the riots. Rather their income and housing value profiles stayed relatively stable, including under racial transition, perhaps because racial transition began at the same time a new train line was opened.
Chapter Three: Policing as an Informal Intervention in Response to Black Settlement

Municipal government is shaped by the idea of the suburb as a private rather than public corporation under law. With theory and the regional context of the towns in the background, we turn to the legal geography of informal intervention in response to black settlement in the inner suburbs of Newark in the aftermath of the riots of 1967. This chapter discusses municipal- and state-level action that has deflected poor and minority settlement in the suburbs and sets the stage for Chapter Four where state and Federal programs governing minority settlement in suburbs are discussed. The suburbanization of the police culture of Newark continued a habit of aggressive policing with exclusionary effect that made the suburbs hostile territory for minorities in certain places. The idea of the suburb as a private citadel for homeowners plays out in the Newark region in the way suburban governments use policing to fight the encroachment of the city and its residents on suburban life.

The topic of police enforcement and the security culture responsible for most of the deaths in the Newark riots of 1967 has received popular (Porambo 2006; Booker 2007) and scholarly scrutiny. Indeed, the violence that engulfed the city began at the 4th Precinct Station House in Newark (figure 1) with citizen protest against a police beating of a man in custody (Mumford 2007). But less attention has been paid to the suburbanization of surveillance and how it functions as an impediment to minority settlement. The attitudes of suburban residents about local government tend to converge on most issues such as taxation, school finance, and land-use, as well as formal integration management, and this remains true across races. South Orange and
Figure 1: Map of Newark Region
Maplewood had homeownership rates of 72.1.0% and 78.0%, respectively, versus the national average of 66.2% and 25.3% for neighboring Newark (Bureau of the Census 2007-2011; Bureau of the Census 2010). Homeowners will, at the local level, adopt the mix of policies that maximizes the value of their primary asset, i.e. their home (Fischel 2001: 6), and the cohesion encouraged by homeownership operates across races.\(^1\) African-American homeowners who were already resident in the area of study were almost as likely as whites to support marketing neighborhoods to whites.

But policing is one aspect of suburban governance on which black and white suburbanites often differ because African-Americans are more likely to perceive law enforcement as hostile and even dangerous. (Another split that is clearly racial about local government centers on school integration, classroom integration, and placement of children in advanced classes; it is beyond the scope of this work except for brief discussion in Chapter Six.\(^2\)) As a result, attitudes toward the police, unlike most other aspects of local government, vary by race among suburban residents, including among homeowners. But even here, the cohesive effects of and power conferred by suburban homeownership alter the dynamics of interaction between blacks and police. The suburban political boundaries that were constructed socially by the needs of capital a century and a half ago have come to acquire independent, causal significance in explaining social interactions in a regional setting.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Fischel\’s positive observations accord with mine; I do not agree with the norms that he adopts.

\(^2\) For a brief discussion of equity and the South Orange and Maplewood schools, see the excellent book on the aftermath of the Abbott decision, Yaffe (2007).

\(^3\) A long line of work in urban geography either directly argues or assumes that suburban governments lack such significance. See, for example, Cox and Jonas (1993) and Walker (1981). For an early argument against this view from a left perspective, see Hoch (1979).
Such racial differences as exist in attitude toward local government come out most clearly when the police employ force against a black citizen. As the African-African population in South Orange and Maplewood rose from 6.5% in 1980 to an estimated 30% in 2009 and the police force remained predominately white, conflict about the dynamics of law enforcement and police expenditures grew more frequent (Bureau of the Census 1980; Bureau of the Census 2005-2011). Non-violent crime, as measured by car theft, went up over the period until declining sharply as the result of new automobile ignition technology after 2005. The murder rate remained relatively low in both towns, especially by comparison to the neighboring inner suburb of Irvington, the place Maplewood residents often fear their town will become (in most years, there are no murders in Maplewood, although there are muggings\(^4\)). By comparison with neighboring areas to the east, South Orange and Maplewood suffered few problems with crime.

Historically, the two towns had divergent reputations on policing, with South Orange regarded generally as more equitable in treatment of black and white citizens.\(^5\) For a focus group of African American homeowners, one respondent described the differing natures of policing responses in the towns in response to a question on why she had settled in South Orange rather than Maplewood and attributed her choice at least in part to policing:

*Facilitator: [W]hat was your reason for moving to this area?*

*Respondent: I could say that when I first came around to the South Orange area I definitely felt that there was a greater comfort level in South Orange versus Maplewood . . .

\(^4\) Kenneth Jackson argues that the only consistent historical measures of crime are car thefts and murders because only they have concrete documentation (a car title and a body). Other crimes are more open to interpretation and the definitions change over time. See Jackson (2006).

\(^5\) This has changed in recent years with a police chief in Maplewood regarded as more responsive to community concerns.
I know my brothers that were in the area, if they drove their car in Maplewood, they would get stopped in Maplewood, they wouldn’t get stopped in South Orange. Just driving from Union to South Orange and going through Maplewood several times they would get stopped at night.

It was just, it was sort of a feeling that in Maplewood so in South Orange you are given a little more leeway. . . I personally felt that it was a more blue collar mentality in Maplewood where in South Orange it wasn’t.

Clearly, perception of how easy it would be to get around town without undue interference from police could affect the decision on where to settle.

The use of force by police also remained a concern for black citizens. Over the period from 1999 to 2009, when there were three officially designated murders in Maplewood, there were also two deaths for which police were responsible, both shootings where officers fired fatal shots at a black man (Division of State Police 2000-2010; Alba 1993). Indeed, the argument by conflict theorists (Chambliss 1982) that social divisions obstruct consensus about fair operation of the law and policing receives nearly as much support via study among blacks in suburbs as among city dwellers. But the expression of those concerns, and the ability to influence future outcomes, is specifically suburban. African-Americans in South Orange and Maplewood shaped the discussion about community treatment by police not through street protest but through their access to state and local government power.

Peachtree Road Incident and the Right (?) to the Suburb

The shooting death of a schizophrenic African-American man in June 2007 by the Maplewood police prompted divergent responses from whites and blacks not unlike those expressed in urban settings. The sister of Omar Perry, 31, of Peachtree Road (figure 2)
Figure 2: Map of Inner Suburbs of Newark
near the Newark and Irvington borders of Maplewood, had called police for assistance because her brother was cutting himself, and she wanted him returned to the mental ward that had recently released him. When two white officers arrived at the scene, Perry was in the middle of the street and ran at them with a claw hammer.

r, and the officers fired as they retreated. Perry died at the scene, and local spokesmen for the town and the county defended the shooting, despite knowing that one of the shooters had also been responsible in 2004 for the shooting death of 14 year black boy in a car theft episode (Wang 2005a). The county prosecutor's office at the conclusion of the investigation that cleared the officers of wrongdoing, asserted the necessity of police action: "He was a very large man. It took several shots to stop him" (Kleinknecht 2007b). But his niece, a high school student and witness to the shooting, objected that Perry had no history of violence against others: "This could've been prevented. I believe the police were intimidated by my uncle's size . . . . I know for a fact my uncle would never hurt a fly" (Qarooni 2007). Indeed, the mental hospital that had treated Perry called him a "calm, alert and cooperative" patient (Qarooni 2007; Durando 2007). According to a witness at the scene, the sister of the man shot kept repeating her sense of how badly she erred in involving the police: "I should never have called the police" (Maplewoodonline 2007a). At the time, New Jersey was the only state in the country to prohibit Taser use by police, and many decried the ban because, they argued, it might have prevented Perry's death (Hepp 2007) if police had been allowed to use electric shock. Others questioned why psychological tactics such as speaking calmly rather than shouting at the victim and not beginning the encounter with weapons drawn (Kleinknecht 2007a) were not employed first.
Among local residents, white responses to the shooting were generally either supportive of the police or, for the most part, not directly critical. A discussion started on the day of the shooting on a local message board captured these differences succinctly. A producer at Fox News and future town committee candidate represented the most extreme white response as he celebrated the outcome on a local community message board⁶:

The police officers are heroes. The suspect was on the verge of killing someone (Maplewoodonline 2007b).

A mentally ill man attempts to attack police officers with a weapon and police respond by protecting themselves . . . Thanks to both the officers for risking their lives to protect the rest of us (Maplewoodonline 2007b).

A postal carrier who was profiled in the New York Times a month later for his service to the elderly of the community (Kelley 2007) felt similarly. He defined the police as the people of Maplewood and the dead man as an unspecified something else:

The police are here to protect the people of Maplewood. Since they ARE people and they were IN Maplewood at the time, I think they were doing their job. This whole case is a no brainer. The cops were acting within the law and were forced into a self-defense mode. I am very happy that the officers made it out without any physical injuries. As for the ‘victim’ Can his family look anybody in the eye and say that they were surprised? (Maplewoodonline 2007b).

A more moderate response from a white resident came from a woman who posted frequently. As did several other commentators, she focused on a lack of proper training for the police:

This is tragic and one wonders if it could have been avoided. There are so many red flags here which if addressed at some time in the past could have prevented what happened but none did . . . We need to mourn for this man and his family and friends, but we also need to take a look at the conditions which lead to this⁶

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⁶ The message board cited is a public and read by thousands of people per year; the owners of the board are white as are most but not all writers. Posters generally, although not always, use invented screen names to cloak their identity. Regular posters are often not anonymous to regular readers, and town officials post under their own names. The people posting under the names Strawberry, Letters, and Crystal are known to me to be white. I did not seek consent for citation because it would skew observations and because the comments were archival when I read them. This accords with the comparatively high ethical standards used for Internet research in public health. See Sixsmith (2001) and Hine (2003).
and see if such future tragedy can be lessened or prevented in the future (Maplewoodonline 2007a).

There were also whites who protested police action:

Well, if it was my brother, or someone else I loved, I know now that I had better try to disarm him myself before calling the Maplewood Police to resolve the situation. I'm saddened that the guy's family had to learn this the hard way. This guy wasn't homicidal, or even suicidal - he was just off his meds. And, I'm sure the officer who shot him isn't any happier about it than the family is. I don't think he should be blamed - I just don't think he should be celebrated. As far as I'm concerned, the police failed here. If this incident really did prompt them to revise their procedures for dealing with situations like this, then presumably they'd agree that they failed. It was a tragedy all around (Maplewoodonline 2007b).

[Another white man with biracial children in response to an assertion that the lives of the officers were threatened:] Doesn't sound to me like the officer's life was threatened.

White responses to the police shooting varied and tended to be shaped by experience, the mental illness of a friend or family member, or by ideology.

Blacks who discussed the incident were much quicker to blame the police, and their responses were perhaps more uniform. The Community Coalition on Race had not protested the shooting death of a fourteen-year-old car thief by one of the same officers in the Perry shooting, as had the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the CCR issued no statement on the Perry case, where there was less popular support for police action, in part because white and black members were divided on a response. A black man who was a member of the Community Coalition professed shock at the shooting, even if he refused to talk about the incident as explicitly racial. This was true despite his belief that local police were generally responsive about complaints about mistreatment of juveniles. The CCR member described, by contrast, his own response to the shooting of the mentally ill man and the response of the family of the victim:
I guess the greatest tragedy was that the family had only lived there [in Maplewood] for a month. And they came from Irvington and the sister thought her daughter was going to start at Columbia [High School] and have, you know, this wonderful experience, and they moved immediately back to Irvington. And the sister did not harbor ill feelings, it was more she just could not figure out how it happened, what happened . . . I walked away not understanding clearly what happened.

Police action, in other words, had caused a black family to move out of a comparatively privileged suburb with a good school district back to a disadvantaged one with one of the highest crime rates in the state (Koblin 2006). In addition to this, the man was struck by the lack of community response to the outcome:

The whole circumstance was just a tragedy, and it was a new family so there were no neighbors coming out [to console them]. The silence is what struck [me], that there wasn’t more outrage.

The link between government action and displacement of the disadvantaged—a phenomenon seen also in public housing teardowns in neighboring Newark (Newman 2004; Newman 2006)—took the form in the inner suburbs of aggressive policing. The ʻdeath-dealing displacement of differenceʼ (Gilmore 2002) across territories operated to enforce racial boundaries through terrorizing a vulnerable population. Suburban policing can be a potent threat that sends a warning likely to reverberate in neighboring, disadvantaged communities and to limit black settlement.

Local governments defend police actions, partly because of the threat of legal action, partly because policing is the primary role, as well as the primary cost, for suburban town government after schools. In a sense, suburban municipal government is about two endeavors: 1.) education and 2.) surveillance, and sometimes both at the same time. In a biracial environment, the two facets of government are constantly in tension, as another policing incident illustrates. The more conservative members of the town
committee, silent in the Perry case, usually vigorously defended the police when force was used. In response to an incident two years before the shooting of Perry, three black high school students, one of whom was tackled and arrested at gunpoint, were detained while attempting to visit their former middle school science teacher. The parents of the arrested boys immediately protested their treatment, as did a school board member. But the Maplewood mayor effectively labeled the students criminals and defended the police: “The police target criminals, and that’s what we want them to do . . . Evidence also indicates that police acted appropriately on the scene” (Clarke 2005b). Because policing in Maplewood is the largest component of the town budget (Maplewood Township 2013), the police and government operate as the same unit much of the time.

The Peachtree Road incident might have, in an urban setting, generated collective pressure from the neighborhood or, on occasion, street protest. After an incident a year later in Newark in which a suspect wielding two knives who had been arrested several times before slashed a neighbor and was shot and killed by a responding officer, there were no demonstrations. Newark has little in the way of a tradition of public protest, outside of the community protest against police brutality that set off the Newark riots and that seems to have condemned Newark citizens to hiding indoors at night (Mumford 2007). But many posters to the main community message board for the city, Newark Speaks, were vigorously critical of the police, even as others claiming to be members of the Newark force posted messages to defend the officer responsible (Schuppe 2008; Newark Speaks 2008). Among the posters who criticized the police, many questioned why another method was not used:
I thought the police dept came up with a better way to deal with the mentally disturb, other then using excessive force. Why couldnt they just put on protective gear and tackle the man and get the knife (Newark Speaks 2008 [karimah]).

[In response to a remark that the police Ňare not obligated to use force less than a knife wielding suspectŊ: Ňtrue, no obligation exists . . . but they also shoot folks wielding wallets and candy bars, so the ŇweaponŊthey are faced with does not seem to play a role in the decision to pull the trigger (Newark Speaks 2008 [newarkismyhome]).

Others pointed to the difference between how black and white adolescents who are arrested are treated (although the dead man in this case was not an adolescent):

There are more black kids who are thrown in jail for committing the same types of crimes as white kids. Can you tell me why that is?

White kids are offered these types of services [pleading out]; Black kids are thrown in jail. Why? (Newark Speaks 2008 [Diamond]).

One poster appealed to the serious budget woes of Newark to say the fault lay with a city that sent a single officer rather than a team to deal with the assailant/victim. Another objected to a poster, claiming to be a retired police officer, who likened the Newark police to a paramilitary organization with the obligation to shoot:

As for the Police Officer and Military Officers, each group respond differently and with a different task/motive in place. Three of my siblings where in the military and they don't compare themselves to being a police officer, just like police officer don't like to be compare with correction officers or armed security guards (Newark Speaks 2008 [karimah]).

There were, to be sure, participants on the message board who ardently defended police action, but they were fewer as a percentage than for the Perry incident in Maplewood, and there was far more criticism of the use of force, despite a situation where the dangers involved to the officer made it more justifiable. The history of dissent against policing actions, and the development of a legal tradition to manage and to control the spatial
expression of such protest (Mitchell 1995; Mitchell and Staeheli 2005; Mitchell 2003), have been an important component of citizen action in many urban settings, including Newark.

In Maplewood, by contrast, there was little openly expressed community opposition so little need for surveillance of protest. This is not to say, however, that the Perry shooting generated no reaction among African American and government representatives from Maplewood. But open, democratic protest was replaced by an effort that avoided direct confrontation with local powers and that worked the levers of representative government at higher scales of government for a less visible but far more influential outcome. A set of black homeowners used civil society in the form of the CCR as well as the African-American presence in county and state government in order to pressure a recalcitrant, white, suburban government to enter discussions with the grieving family. The man from the CCR explained their role:

First we asked the mayor [one of the founders of the CCR, who is white,] if he could give us a handle on what happened because there were a lot of gag orders— I don’t know if that is what you would call them, if you can’t speak about a particular issue and we contacted the police chief and he said he couldn’t talk about it and the mayor couldn’t talk about it. But we had a trustee who had personal contact with the sister of the young man. And as the whole thing rolled out what became very clear was that there were a lot of issues that had to do with the handling of the mentally ill.

We did reach out to the family. And what we did was, because the sister agreed to do this, because it happened on Peachtree, we set up a meeting for Peachtree residents to come together for the mayor, for the police with the family of the young man who had been shot.

7 The story looks different for K-12 education in South Orange and Maplewood where the high school has a history of graduating future protestors, later terrorist, Mark Rudd, one of the leaders of the Columbia University protest in 1969, and of tolerating student protest about issues in the high school. There have been two widely reported student walkouts in the past ten years, one about classroom segregation and the other about state budget cuts.
More visibly to the town at large and to the press, black homeowners got state regulations changed to allow the use of stun guns, also known as Tasers or conducted energy devices, on violent mental patients. Paula Dow, then the Essex County Prosecutor and later the Attorney General for New Jersey, lived a few blocks from the shooting and was instrumental in getting a state commission appointed to reconsider the ban on Tasers (Megerian 2010a and 2010b). Irvington and Newark police had, it was rumored, been using them in defiance of state restrictions. Many questioned why such "less-lethal" choices for restraining suspects were not available to the Maplewood police.

After a year of work, the state commission recommended that officers be allowed to use stun guns as well as rubber bullets. Anne Milgram, the attorney general under a Democratic governor, then issued a policy allowing the use of Tasers under circumstances so restricted that their use was essentially prevented (Attorney General’s Advisory Group 2008; Milgram 2009). This was at variance with national trends where in 2007 about 75% of local police forces were allowed to use conducted energy devices (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007). But, in late 2010, Dow, by then Attorney General under the new Republican governor, Chris Christie, a former Federal prosecutor, announced loosened restrictions that allowed police to use Tasers (Megerian 2010b). This was a response to the shooting in her own neighborhood of residence that worked the levers of power.

As an alternative to firing live bullets, stun guns and rubber bullets possess advantages as weapons in that their use is not necessarily fatal. But, in addition to such uses, they have often been deployed to torment and even kill citizens who present little
real threat in situations such as Northern Ireland and elsewhere in the United States (Amnesty International 2008). Both the American Civil Liberties Union and Amnesty International had accordingly lodged objections to the implementation of both rubber bullets and Tasers. A spokeswoman for the latter group argued that stun guns “should be treated much like deadly weapons” because since June 2001 at least 439 people [nationally] have died after being struck by police Tasers (Megerian 2010a; Gau 2010). New Jersey had resisted use of stun guns in large measure because the son of the general counsel for the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, based in Newark, had been murdered by police in Florida with a Taser. Vivian Sanks-King, a Newark resident, had, in the wake of the death of her son, who was electrocuted over the space of several minutes by a Taser wielded by a cop during a traffic stop, campaigned against the use of such devices (King 2006; Noonan 2003; Sundin 2003). But Sanks-King lost her job at the medical school during a corruption investigation in 2009 and faced a possible Federal indictment (Margolin 2009), and her opposition to Tasers lost political backing, particularly as a Republican governor came on the scene.

The death of Omar Perry was thus made to legitimate of the use of Tasers. The result was not more enlightened policing for disturbed patients. Even the observation that the Maplewood police did not follow their own procedures got little play either in the press or in community discussion (Kleinknecht 2007b). The way things worked in local governance served to deflect attention from an officer who had fatally shot two black men within five years and was either incompetent or worse.

Organized protest that might have raised awareness of the different options for how to respond to incidents of aggressive policing did not happen in South Orange and
Maplewood and rarely happens in U.S. suburbs. The suburban advantage over the city—personified in a suburban advocate for stun guns who won out over an urban opponent of them—trumped other variables. In the end, the adoption of policing as an exclusionary method in inner suburbs such as South Orange-Maplewood was a result consistent with the history of policing in the Newark region.

*Anti-Gang Ordinance*

Unlike many other practical aspects of local governance, then, policing tends to elicit differing responses by race (Brunson 2007). The differing responses were evident in the initial reactions to the Perry shooting and in another police issue at the time, an anti-gang initiative. Within the town government, two men who served as mayors, one white and one the first black mayor of Maplewood, epitomized the tendency for attitudes toward policing to split by race. Throughout 2005 and early 2006, just before the Perry shooting, a mayor at the time, who was white, had vigorously promoted an anti-gang ordinance at the behest of the police chief. The police chief, in turn, sought monies for the anti-gang initiative, the domestic extension of the War on Terror, announced by President George W. Bush in his 2005 State of the Nation address. The ordinance proposed the installation of surveillance cameras and re-writing of the disorderly conduct ordinance to specify fighting, entering parks and school grounds after dusk, trampling of lawns and use of coarse language and gestures as grounds for arrest. The proposed law sought to prevent gang activity from spreading to Maplewood from Irvington and Newark, even though the evidence for gang activity was slight. Indeed, in making his
case for the new ordinance, the police chief did not claim an uptick in gang activity, merely the prospect of it: ‘At this point, it’s low-level activity that seems to be establishing a territory . . . We’ve seen a couple of incidents. That’s enough to raise the radar’ (Clarke 2005a). Certainly, it is true that gang-related shootings occasionally take place in the suburbs of Newark because drug dealers live there and serve markets there. One focus group participant who worked in health care reported having seen victims of gang-related shootings from Maplewood and Livingston (both predominantly white and middle class suburbs) as well as from the majority black suburb of East Orange. But drug-related shootings in the more affluent inner suburbs are rare, and the assertion that gangs were establishing territory in Maplewood was a paranoid fantasy based in fears stemming from September 11th.

The future first black mayor of Maplewood, who lived near the Newark border, constituted the only open opposition to the anti-gang initiative on the town council. He worked in finance in New York and was otherwise ideologically conservative; indeed, as discussed in Chapter Five, he had been the principal organizer behind a successful effort to install Oscar Newman-style traffic barriers between Newark and Maplewood that resulted in national media attention. Yet, he challenged the anti-gang ordinance at town council meetings as overreach and implied that, when given the opportunity, the Maplewood police mistreated citizens: ‘Are we giving the police more ability to harass?’ (Clarke 2005a; Clarke 2005c). The predominance of whites in town government in Maplewood meant that the police were rarely challenged in such a fashion, but in this instance the challenge was effective and the ordinance tabled.
As much as race was important in driving the reaction to the anti-gang initiative, not all blacks in Maplewood shared Pettis’s concerns. In contrast to the challenge issued by Pettis to expanded police powers, Paula Dow, who was at the same time serving on a commission on gangs appointed by the governor, gave a wildly exaggerated description of the role of gangs in both inner suburbs and ex-urbs, perhaps in an effort to give the two geographies common cause: “Gangs are traumatizing communities, not only in Newark or Paterson or Camden, but in suburban areas such as Maplewood, Short Hills, and Princeton” (Juri 2005). Indeed, a white member of the CCR described with some accuracy how many blacks favor a greater police presence in their neighborhoods as she generalized about black responses to the proposed anti-gang ordinance (and overlooked the opposition of Pettis to the law):

As a matter of fact most recently there was an ordinance under consideration. Was it loitering or some kind of quality of life thing, and there was all this that it’s going to unfairly target children of color. But, then, when you really dig, you say where are more of these violations? More of these violations in Maplewood were in the Hilton neighborhood[, a neighborhood undergoing racial transition near the Irvington border].

So who is really disadvantaged? Who really feeling like they can’t come out of their houses safely. Well, it’s the community of color. So you know it was really interesting when there were more white liberals who were saying, oh, this ordinance is going to unfairly target the kids of color. When it was the adults of color who were saying you got to help us out here . . . So sometimes it a matter of really asking people what they want and the adults of color in the Hilton neighborhood were saying, yeah, we don’t want to be afraid to walk outside of our houses, so we want [the ordinance].

Indeed, a black focus group participant, a homeowner from the Hilton neighborhood, recognized the value of policing for property protection and recalled no negative attention from police with regard to herself. But her support for augmented police presence was tempered with realism about how careful black men need to be in the presence of police:
I just wanted to say my husband is [from the islands], . . . and he has been stopped by the police here in Maplewood and South Orange. He used to not drive, so he would be riding his bike to work and they would be, like, [what are you up to?]. And he would have he does general contracting work so he would have tools and they would be like, [what are you doing]?

Because he is very assertive so he would be like, [What the f do you want] to the cops. I don't like, [I don't] talk to the cops like that. Basically don't harass the cop. [Tell them] I'm not doing anything, and tell them to beat it, and they pretty much do.

I find it incredible that he never had a problem, but he definitely has been approached by police. I have never been approached by police here about anything except when my Dad cracked my car. I never have had any interaction with them that weren't positive. We had to file a police report about something, they came, they dealt with it. Our house alarm goes off. It went off the other day. No one was home. I got a note on my door. [Your garage door was open, from The Police] [Laughter]. It was locked when we got back . . .

For a black male, I think there certainly is more targeting. No matter what. At the same time [my husband] knows a lot of the police in town and talks to them and they are like [I know you from what, I don't know].

It would be hard to find a black resident of South Orange and Maplewood who would not agree with the conclusion that, even, or especially, in the suburbs, black men need to be careful around the police.

*Regionalization of Newark Policing*

South Orange and Maplewood both share a border with Newark and the culture of policing in the towns grows from that of the city. When Ronald Porambo wrote the book, *No Cause for Indictment*, that documented the responsibility of the National Guard and Newark police for most of the deaths in the 1967 riot, he detailed a police culture in which connections to the Mafia were rampant and clientalism governed day-to-day decision-making at the top levels (Porambo, 2006 [1971]; Parks 2007; Miller 2006). In the book, the writer Amiri Baraka recounted being arrested along with two friends and
how a Newark police officer used a baton to break the arm of one of the friends, who was being held by other officers. The baton-wielding officer concluded his assault with a rhetorical question: “Nigger, don’t you know the Mafia runs this town?” (Porambo 2006 [1971]: 272). After the riots, the ACLU steadily called for Federal intervention in the Newark Police Department. But not until 34 years later did the Department of Justice intervene, citing the department’s structural inability to pursue misconduct allegations that included seven deaths in custody in 2009 and 2010 under the mayor, Cory Booker, who had run on a reformist platform (Author unknown 2011). Meanwhile, in the suburbs, as Newark lost population after the riots and its black and white populations both suburbanized, so did the mob and the associated organizational culture of policing.

Gerardo Catena, the head from 1957 to 1972 of the Genovese crime family, on which the family in the movie The Godfather was based, lived in South Orange during the 1970s. In 1989 (Guy 1989 1992a 1992b 2006), a South Orange and Maplewood police officer was arrested and later convicted for working as a courier for his father-in-law, an associate of the Bruno-Scarfo crime family. Organized crime and the police had suburbanized together.

More than direct mob influence on policing, however, the real problem was that the line between policing and criminality was thin. A relative of Dominick Spina, the Newark police director during the riots who was convicted in 1968 of turning a blind eye to mob-related gambling (Porambo 2006 [1971]), became the mayor of West Orange in the late 1970s and appointed his son, Robert, as police chief in 1994. The latter was charged in 1996 with domestic violence and with tipping off a suspect to a drug raid. The son was subsequently sentenced to 9 months in jail for the tip-off incident, and both
father and son were forced from office (Dilworth 1998). Corruption thus remained a problem for policing in the inner suburbs, and, as Porambo had found, police corruption and poor treatment of African-Americans were intertwined. But the most common way that police behavior serves as an impediment to black settlement is less corruption, or overt violence as discussed above, than harassment and a failure to protect under circumstances where white suburban homeowners would assume the police support them.

Sociological theory and observation on deviance usually focuses on those formally designated as criminals. Under law, the police are not charged with punishing offenders in order to inhibit crime but instead with working within the guidelines of due process. But the law-and-order perspective, often heard in the local media of South Orange and Maplewood, urges the police to "get tough" on youth, especially black youth, even though the perspective invites official law-breaking. The resulting problem of "police deviance" (Chambliss 1982) is thus a product both of police action, and inaction, and community support among whites.

*Racist Graffiti on Houses, 1980s*

The most striking instance of police deviance in South Orange and Maplewood occurred between 1983 and 1986 when the towns were the site of more than 70 separate incidents of racial and anti-Semitic vandalism. In an opinion piece in the New York Times, the head of the New Jersey chapter of B’nai B’rith listed the South Orange and Maplewood cases as among the most serious in the region in a decade (Maas 1988). The F.B.I. assigned fifteen agents to the case, and the head of the investigation remarked on
the relative rarity of such events in New Jersey during the time period: "We can't recall anything like this in the New Jersey area in years . . . We've had some isolated incidents of cross burnings and vandalism against blacks, but nothing like this" (Gately 1986a and b). Typically, victims had their tires slashed or their houses spray-painted with racist slogans or both; at least one family had a cross burned on its lawn and others had windows shattered. The vandals would strike a handful of houses each night and then lapse into inactivity, sometimes for several months. The vast majority of the targets were blacks, who were at the time about 10% of the population (Gately 1986 and b). One family, for example, had tires punctured and "beat it, pig" and "nigger" spray-painted on their house. When the family later openly supported a black candidate for the board of education, their tires were slashed again (Page 1985). An African-American man, Albert Calloway, who headed a local racial awareness group known as SOMAC (South Orange Maplewood Awareness Committee) and appeared on a cable television show about the attacks, had "nigger pig get lost" written on his front door shortly after the appearance. Another black family was threatened with arson: "We're going to burn you out" (Page 1985). When several Jewish community leaders spoke out against the attacks and against police failure to capture the perpetrators, the vandals turned their sights on them. Ellen Greenfield, who was the head of a mixed race group known as Maplewood Friends and did publicity for the towns for the CCR, had a swastika and graffiti painted on her house: "Kike trash, you live with niggers, we won't" (Ibid.). She spoke of the climate of fear that the attacks created: "We had a feeling that it could happen, because we were very outspoken . . . A lot of the victims are scared for themselves and about the uncertainty of what might happen to their children" (Ibid.). Most of the incidents occurred in
Maplewood with some in South Orange. Albert Calloway, the victim who had appeared on television, held a meeting for 45 of the victims at his house, and they collectively resolved to sue the towns for failure to protect (Ibid). As the number of incidents mounted, a community meeting called at a Presbyterian church in South Orange and attended by an estimated 500 people was interrupted by a bomb threat that was called in during the middle of the meeting. The Maplewood police chief at the time, Frank Torre, said that he thought the perpetrators were not high school students but young adults with access to a car, and he stated his concern that the vandals would step up their activities to torching houses. Moreover, the vandals seemed to operate from a detailed knowledge of local politics.

Eventually, two graduates of the local high school went to officials about the incidents. They told prosecutors that a former friend of theirs, now a college student, had told them that, in 1983, he spray-painted a house on three sides and slashed the tires of a black family in Maplewood (Narvaez 1987). The defendant lived about a block away from the victim’s former residence. During court proceedings, the victims of the incident testified that the vandalism had made them “fear for their lives” and adopt a deep suspicion of their neighbors under which they came to suspect all around them of the crime. They set up shifts to guard the house: “We didn’t sleep for many nights. My husband and I took turns to try and see who was coming to do this. We were afraid they would cut the brakes of the car or put fire to the house” (Ibid; Tunney 1987a and b). As with the family of Omar Perry, simple fear for the physical safety of one’s family was a powerful deterrent to continued residence in the town, and the family sold the house and left town (Narvaez 1987). The twenty-one year old suspect was tried, convicted and
sentenced to a year in jail as well as to lengthy post-release community service cleaning graffiti (Author unknown 1987a). Town officials declared the incidents over.

But more assailants were clearly involved and the police and local residents with knowledge had not brought them forward. Victims, including one I interviewed in 2011, reported hearing several voices outside their houses during the attacks, and the family of the convicted college student claimed he was being scapegoated but did not furnish names, seemingly because he had agreed to remain silent. A few days after the student was sentenced, someone slashed the tires of seven cars at the houses of the main witnesses at the trial. No one else was ever charged for the crimes (Tunney 1987; Author unknown, 1987b), and the effort to intimidate witnesses was apparently successful.

In South Orange and Maplewood today, many white long-time residents simply prefer to forget what had happened. When I attempted to interview residents who had lived in South Orange and Maplewood at the time about the vandalism incidents in 2009, two white respondents claimed not to remember the incidents but, when pushed, were able to supply a surprising amount of detail about where they had happened. Indeed, one woman, who initially claimed not to remember anything, eventually allowed that she had gone to church with the mother of the jailed college student for a number of years. Another potential interviewee, who by virtue of her social position had a high probability of knowing the perpetrators, exhibited extreme nervousness about being asked about the vandals and refused to be interviewed. Others, including a white victim of the vandalism, were quick to assert that the town had completely changed in its attitudes toward African-American in-movement as a result of the crimes. But a white magazine editor, who had grown up in South Orange and knew some of the victims, saw the incidents as marking
the moment when the size of the black population had grown large enough to pose a threat to white residents.

What explains the different outcomes of the Peachtree Road incident in 2007 and the earlier outbreak of racial vandalism in the 1980s? The rise over the period of black incomes, fueled in large part by black employment in state and Federal government, had granted suburban black residents a measure of power (Patillo-McCoy 1999; Pattillo 2007; Wiese 2004) even though the divergence between white and black asset levels, derived primarily from investment in a home for most Americans, remained high (Martin 2009; Conley 2001). By the 2000s, when New Jersey Attorney General Dow was able intervene in an incident in her neighborhood of residence, blacks had become 30% of the population of South Orange and Maplewood, most of them homeowners (Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2005-2011) and a number of them attorneys, including not just the state attorney general but at one point the head of the Garden State Bar Association, the main association of black lawyers in the state (Coscarelli 2005). Blacks in Maplewood remained underrepresented in municipal government, where whites tended to select and to manage the few black candidates willing to run for office, and town employees remained predominantly white. But blacks had acquired power in civil society and, more importantly, upper levels of Federal and state government. The power exercised was of a specifically suburban and conservative nature. But it was real nonetheless and was sometimes used to more progressive effect in other contexts. Some of the participants in the Peachtree Road incident, for example, including black members of the Coalition, have pressed successfully in recent years to ameliorate classroom segregation in the schools.
Black power of this conservative and suburban nature was not fixed and permanent necessarily. In the period immediately after the vandalism cases, the police leadership in both towns was replaced and the towns made a stab at community policing. Members of the Maplewood police, by the mid-1990s, had received at least some training from the Community Policing Program at Yale’s Child Study Center. But the growing fear of settlement of blacks in the neighborhoods near the borders of Irvington and Newark in the towns eventually brought an end to these efforts, and a progressive police director was forced out in 1997. Afterward, in 1999, a conservative majority on the town committee in Maplewood allowed at least one officer to go for training with Blackwater, the corporation that, in addition to providing mercenaries for the war in Iraq, trained local police forces across the country. The decision generated minor controversy when the patch of the Maplewood officer appeared in a picture for a Washington Post story on Blackwater a decade later (Madsen 2007a and b; Keres 2007; O’Harrow Hedgpeth 2007; Maplewoodonline 2007c). Meanwhile, in the school district, efforts to expel non-resident students, who were usually from black families who lived in Newark or Irvington, were stepped up via the use of private detectives who pounded on the doors of the claimed residences of the students in the early morning and demand to be admitted and shown proof that the children were living there. I witnessed one of these incidents in the apartment above mine in South Orange in 1996. A lawsuit later stopped the district from demanding admittance, but private detectives continue their visits today and parents whose children are caught potentially face heavy fines (Bloom 2005). The towns also began making a major capital investment in a new police station near racially transitioning neighborhoods.
The Maplewood Police Station: Property Development As Racial Boundary

In 2004, after years of debate, the town committee (TC) committed to building a new police station in the eastern portion of town. The building was to replace an older facility located near the western, more affluent, side of town with a much larger structure closer to the borders with Newark and Irvington. Partly, this was driven by the implementation of budget caps imposed by the state of New Jersey that forced municipalities to limit increases in the operating budgets of towns to 2% per year. The state exempted capital expenditures from the restrictions as well as the operating expenses related to debt service on capital improvements. This led to a boom in building and street construction in New Jersey municipalities, with encouragement from a Federal government that saw policing as the domestic component of the War on Terror. If local politicians were forced now to announce further and further cutbacks to expenditures on wages and benefits for the municipal labor force—police, fire, and teachers—they could still appeal to voters with major investments in new buildings and rehabilitation programs for older buildings. Thus Maplewood decided to build the police station, the largest capital expenditure by the town in 50 years, and to combine court services with South Orange.

The decision tripped a contentious argument over the site selection of the new station. The town committee floated several proposals, including the idea of rebuilding on the existing site, but it seemed to have already decided by the time the issue came up for public debate on a site along Springfield Avenue in Maplewood at the point where neighborhoods in the town were transitioning to black residence, about a quarter-mile
from the Irvington border. Springfield Avenue, as the local extension of the street along which riots in Newark in 1967 had played out, had particular resonance with the long-time residents who were the leading supporters of the station among homeowners. Indeed, the new station (see figures 1 and 2) was 3.4 miles from the 4th Precinct station house in Newark where a protest over a police beating set off the civil disturbances of 1967.

The new police station was to be located within a redevelopment or special improvement district (SID) in Maplewood. The SID, run by an organization of business owners called the Springfield Avenue Partnership, had successfully attracted a number of small businesses and restaurants after the state ceded control of the portion of the avenue that ran through Maplewood to the town in the 1990s. The redevelopment district had become one of the town’s most attractive streetscapes through the use of New Urbanist principles of streetscape revitalization. Traffic calming through bump outs that slowed cars; wider sidewalks; the burial of utility lines; subsidies for attractive signs; and an annual street fair in May that drew visitors from surrounding suburbs as well as Irvington and Newark had transformed a formerly gritty area marred by empty storefronts. In 1998, the town had issued a bond ordinance for $2 million to begin funding a $10 million plan drawn up by the Project for Public Spaces (Coscarelli 1998; Project for Public Spaces 2013; Ellin 1996). The group selected to help plan the streetscape was a non-profit organization begun in 1975 by William Whyte, author of The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces, and one of the founders of postmodern urbanism.

A substantial share, about 30%, of the Springfield Avenue Partnership consisted of black-owned businesses. The chief supporter of the Partnership on the town
committee, Vic DeLuca, was a white resident of the Hilton Neighborhood, the racially transitioning area abutting Springfield to the south and east, and the member of the TC farthest to the left ideologically. After several unsuccessful attempts to win a seat on the municipal council in Newark, DeLuca had moved to Maplewood in order to catalyze a career in state politics, and the Partnership both served the neighborhood and helped DeLuca organize his political base. The chief rival to the partnership was the CCR, supported by the most conservative member of the TC, Fred Profeta, a former Republican who had switched parties after several unsuccessful attempts to get elected. Although the Partnership protected the interests of local businesses and the CCR served homeowners, the two groups had in many respects similar goals: reversing perceived neighborhood decline. The membership in both groups supported for the most part the construction of the police station.

Opponents of the new station advanced a number of reasons for not building. Cost was most frequently cited, and the project eventually came in at over $21 million for a town of 23,000. But the planned sale of the old police building, resulting loss of public space, and the displacement of residents and businesses at the initial site the TC picked were also concerns. Some residents also pointed to racial dynamics as a factor:

"It is the site that creates the highest amount of displaced residents and businesses," said Kevin Harris, a resident who lives less than a mile from the site. Harris said the township committee also is making a statement by placing the station in a predominantly black neighborhood. "I would never accuse them of racism, but we are sending the wrong signal about race relations by placing a police station between Maplewood and Irvington," Harris said (Wang 2004).

Despite the opposition, the town committee rejected the initial site and selected a site slightly closer to the Irvington border.
The police station, in addition to being positioned at the boundary between working class and middle class Maplewood stood out for its hostile architecture. Where the former station, built in the 1920s, stood near the town center and was easily accessible to pedestrians because it backed up to the train station and fronted a park, the new station had four foot steel fences around the perimeter of the property and required entrants to be buzzed in (Figure 3). The neighborhood surrounding the new station on Springfield Avenue, while the location of the occasional mugging, was nonetheless widely considered safe during the day. The Maplewood Police force, although burdened with increases in the crime rate over the prior two decades, remained about the same size relative to population as suburbs to the more affluent west. Indeed, one of the objections to the station was that money would be better spent to expand the force than on large infrastructure expenditures. The interior of the new building boasted 37,000 feet of space, a gym, stone flooring and mahogany paneling, a video conferencing center, jail cells for men and women, and a firing range open to police forces throughout the county. In order to make the expense of the building more palatable to the newer, more progressive residents who opposed it, the town built it to strict environmental standards that included solar panels, maximized natural light, and a computer controlled heating and cooling system that together added 5% to the $21 million cost of the building (Roberts 2007). The planning of the station thus arose less out of need than out of distorted incentives by the state of New Jersey to invest in buildings over labor, a general trend toward enhanced security for public buildings in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and, it would seem, a desire to send a message to pedestrian and automobile travelers from Irvington and Newark.
Figure 3: Photograph of Maplewood Police Station
Whether one opposed or supported the police station was dependent on a number of factors but class, race, and duration of residency were the most important. The station was most popular with longtime white residents up the hill, who had historically tended to vote Republican and still retained strong connections in municipal politics despite a Democratic takeover of the town committee in the 1990s, and with blue-collar white residents in the eastern part of town who often identified with the police. By contrast, Ken Pettis, then a member of the town committee, was for a time the lone opponent of the station, although he later changed his vote. Among residents who had arrived after 1990, a group that constituted 72.5% of the population by 2010, the station tended to be unpopular. This cohort was relatively disengaged from municipal politics and more likely to be black and to vote Democratic. Among opponents, jokes abounded about the scale of the station. One local journalist nicknamed it the “Taj Mapal” and another suggested, in lieu of the expense of construction, that the town simply station cops along the border with paint ball guns to fire at cars from Irvington and Newark. The irony of allocating such ample resources for a public building that most of the public was keen to avoid was not lost on one poster to the community message board:

As it stands, the only way you get to enjoy the most beautiful building in town, our brand new police station, is if you've done something wrong.

You've double-parked, stolen a stereo, beaten your wife, robbed a bank... sit back and relax in our beautiful, environmentally sound building on Springfield Ave. Relax even more if you don't have to pay our property taxes.

Meanwhile, our main library has a ventilation system that has not been cleaned for two decades, faded carpets, a radically slashed book budget... and too few librarians.
The town, in other words, had elected to replace investment in labor with property development at considerable cost.

Opponents of the police station were probably the majority of residents in the town, but this did not mean suburban attitudes were inherently anti-police. Even if black residents often complained about the frequency with which the police are called on black youth, about being pulled over for the “crime” of DWB (driving while black), and about aggressive actions by cops during specific incidents, they too wanted protection from crime. Indeed, both whites and blacks often complained about the insufficient police presence in their neighborhoods, particularly on the eastern borders of the towns.

Middle class blacks, moreover, could be stringently critical of black youth who committed crime and supportive of police in curbing bad behavior. A man in his 40s who participated in a focus group for black homeowners insisted that aggressive policing was a necessary component of living with whites: “Sometimes in order to achieve stable integration you have to be willing to violate a few civil rights.” The aftermath, similarly, of the murders of four black college students on the playground of Mount Vernon School in the Vailsburg section of Newark, just over the border from South Orange, provided a hyper-example of this. African-Americans in South Orange tend, more so than in Maplewood, to be middle and upper class and are, in the aggregate, more affluent than local whites in terms of income (Bureau of the Census 2010). The reaction to the shootings among this group of black parents was perhaps the angriest of all local reactions; it is difficult to understate how much fear and anger the murders, which received national press, provoked among the mainly black middle class residents of the
surrounding neighborhoods. Many middle class blacks reviled the working class murderers, who were of mixed race, because blacks in the towns identified with the victims and feared for their own college-bound children. Subsequent calls in response to the incident for more extensive policing on the eastern borders of the towns came more from black residents of South Orange and Maplewood than from whites, who were less aware how close the site of the murders was and who tend to see Newark as a large undifferentiated space (Gould White 1974) where crime always happens anyway. One participant in the white renter focus group described the portion of South Orange east of Scotland Road (a major street running north south near the Newark border) not as a landscape of neighborhoods but as another planet:

It seems when I drive to my games I almost all of them have to take Scotland Road and there’s like the dividing line. You have South Orange and then Orange and it’s like you hit the light. Wow, and like I’ve done the stretch so many times. It’s like you are just entering the twilight zone. It’s like you know there might as well be an invisible force shield there.

The mentality whereby whites see Newark as a twilight zone can have the ironic effect of allowing them to feel safe in situations they probably should not.

What, then, do we make of intra-racial class differences in inner suburbs on issues such as policing and youth behavior? One recent book argues that middle class black criticism of poorer minorities, including black middle class support for stringent police treatment of black youths, is an instance of status differentiation within the black community that can lead to cooperation among middle class whites and blacks that is beneficial in declining neighborhoods (Woldoff 2011). Certainly, common cause on fighting crime, as well as securing resources from the local government, can function to increase neighborhood cohesion across racial lines. But there are other dynamics at work
as well, particularly the interaction effects of race and class. Fear of racial discrimination among blacks often exacerbates class divisions within the black community on questions of policing and community behavior that, in the end, decreases in-group social cohesion.

A member of the CCR summed up the dynamic nicely by explaining the way in which fear of white perceptions about black criminality, particularly by the police, exacerbated inter-class tensions among blacks:

Nobody wants the Crips and the Bloods living on their block. And believe me, the Crips and the Bloods mothers don’t want them living on the block. But the question is, do the police, including [those in] Maplewood and South Orange, can they distinguish between the Crips and the Bloods, and some kid at the high school who dresses hip-hop and is bound for Harvard?

One of the greatest fears of African-American families here is that their kids will be mistaken for something they are not. Because you know the way kids dress and act is in order to cause people to be shocked more. But you see a blue-haired white kid with all kinds of piercings and everything, and you don’t assume that he’s a gang banger. You think they’re just a stupid white kid, maybe doing drugs.

The CCR member quoted was white, but her explanation of the interaction between race and class on policing was echoed by a number of middle class African-American respondents in interviews and focus groups about how blacks feel pressure to distinguish themselves from criminals. Moreover, blacks often blame whites for the need to assert their class status in order to counter racial discrimination:

When I moved in, I didn’t know what to expect, honest to God. Because I moved from East Orange where I lived in a nice community. All these stores [in South Orange] weren’t bad back then. I moved for the school. It was all about school.

So I didn’t know what to expect. But I can always remember the first week we were there [in the 1980s] when some teenage kids drove by and hollered, ”Nigger, go home.” And my son said, ”Dad, I know who it is.” So I went over to the house, around the corner, went to the front door. I told the father, ”If your son comes around again, I’ll whip him and you.”

They called me a drug dealer, and I was very upset. I mean I worked hard to go to college. I went at night when I had my kids, after I got out of the military, after
my kids were born. Things like that. I worked hard to do and then to have people say that I must be doing something illegal.

Why is it that way with all black people that are successful in something? When whites are successful they say now that is a smart man. But when we do it, we have done something wrong or else we play sports. [Vocal affirmations from other members of the focus group.] We don’t go to school, we don’t learn like other folks.

What motivates such assertions of class differentiation is less class snobbery, or a desire to bond with middle class whites, than fear. In another era, more open to the discussion of the psychological effects of discrimination on the disadvantaged, Allport termed such a response an ŕego defense that deployed, for self-preservation, strategies such as generalized aggression, denial of membership in one’s outgroup, passivity, clowning, cunning, self-hate, and, more positively, sympathy with others who are persecuted and, as in the above instance, fighting back (Allport 1954). All these responses to varying degrees were on display in the focus groups.

One of the changes in the past decade and a half for South Orange and Maplewood has been an increase in mixed race couples, partly because of the perception, encouraged by the towns (discussed in Chapter 4) that, by comparison with other suburbs, the towns are progressive and tolerant. Mixed race couples enjoy, in some ways, a moral authority that can effective in winning concessions for better treatment from local officials. A white parent who advocates for her mixed race child with the police, for example, may be less readily dismissed than many black parents. Indeed, one of the longest-term members of the Community Coalition on Race, and one of its most active ŕblack participants, is the son of an African American father and a white mother. His efforts to negotiate fair treatment for black public school children by police have seen some success, partly because he openly speaks about his white mother.
But being part of a mixed race couple can also put the black member of the couple under close scrutiny in encounters with the police when family members are present. A middle class black man in his 30s who was renting an apartment in South Orange with his wife and children described two contentious encounters with police as he went to pick up his daughter at her bus stop. In one of them, the police implicitly accused him of kidnapping his mixed race son. The incident indicates both a clear liability to cross-racial social participation for a black person but also a benefit in that the man felt he could resist police demands to a point, probably because his son was part white:

I must tell you, my two children they are mixed because their mother is European. There have been a couple of instances that happened. One time I was about to pick up my daughter from school. When I arrived at the bus stop I saw like four or five police cars running. I thought what was going on? The police officer was asking me if I was chasing a little boy. He asked me about this child [gesturing to indicate his son].

And I said I don’t understand your question and he kept asking me who is this child. I said I don’t understand your question. He re-formed the question and said is this child related to you? I said he is my son. And then they asked me if I was chasing him.

I am like you must have gotten the wrong guy. They said it was somebody wearing a red sweater. So, I said, what’s the problem? And then, I picked up my daughter [from the bus] and [I said] why am I in trouble? I could see what was coming so I said I came to get my daughter from the bus. And then they asked me for ID, and I had nothing to be afraid of.

In the long run, the introduction of mixed race families into the community will probably work to ameliorate the worst police practices, particularly as the police departments move to integrate their work forces and blacks consolidate participation in upper levels of government. But the history of a corrupt and violent police culture in the area slows down efforts to make police conform to the rule of law in treatment of minorities.
Conclusion

Policing and the siting of a new police station were among the informal methods of slowing black in-migration used by the two communities. What is the evidence that the expectation of police misbehavior in fact slowed black in-migration to South Orange or Maplewood? Because research is conducted in the place which people have avoided, it is customarily difficult to show systematically when people of a particular race, ethnicity, or class did not move to a place because they were made to feel unwelcome by a behavior of residents already there or by officials. However, the focus group participant cited above who felt more comfortable in South Orange because police behavior was less aggressive there than in Maplewood offers evidence on her part and refers to at least two others who felt similarly. Separately, two instances of out-migration, which involves a more difficult decision to uproot a household, also occurred in response to police behavior (or failure to protect): The family that testified at trial about having their house vandalized moved as a result, saying they could no longer trust their neighbors, as did the family of the mentally ill man. Violence frightens people, even when it comes from official sources, to the point that if affects decision to move.

Blacks, as I discuss in Chapter Five, often support many aspects of organized responses to black settlement if they are homeowners because having balanced numbers of whites and blacks in a community protects property values. But when such efforts take the form of policing, the reaction is different, as the shooting of a mentally ill man, racial vandalism, and police station examples show. African-Americans remain more suspicious of the police than whites, even in the suburbs. Still, suburban geography, a
marker for relative advantage in geographic terms, shapes black responses and mutes open protest to perceived injustices. The suburb as a private citadel for homeowners reinforces, probably more than it would in an urban setting, the process of government at a distance (Ettlinger 2011), or governmentality, whereby social norms are reified from below.
Chapter Four: Organized Responses to Black Settlement via Housing Policy

Local governments, then, can impede black suburbanization in part via policing that intimidates both existing black residents and potential in-movers. Another method of response that inner suburbs use to constrain black and, especially, poor settlement is to ensure that little housing for low-income households exists within their boundaries. Suburbs, at the behest of homeowners, either zone out multi-family dwellings or find other ways to make it difficult to build such housing (Rabin 1989; Schmidt and Paulsen 2009) so that even households with moderate incomes struggle to find rentals. Maplewood homeowners, for example, fought in 2010 a proposed apartment building in the town center that would have risen only to five floors but contained one-bedroom and studio apartments. The town planning board chair decried the threat of "oversize" development, and another resident protested "high-density, multifamily apartment use in a residential area" as though the planned apartments would not be residences (Khavkine 2010). The proposal was nonetheless eventually approved by the Maplewood town board. But a similar push in the 1980s and 1990s, as I discuss in detail below, to exclude rental units from a large development on the site of an old quarry in South Orange proved successful.

Suburbs also manage to exclude multi-family dwellings using Federal or state funds. South Orange, for example, in the property boom that peaked in 2006, used Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and New Jersey Department of Transportation funds to help the developer Cary Heller finance a transit-oriented development (TOD) in its downtown that replaced inexpensive rental units built in the
first part of the 20th century with upscale condominiums, even as it sidestepped its state- 
mandated obligation to build low-income housing (Dilworth 1994; Lueck 1995). Where 
zoning allows construction of rental apartments, the need for building permits and other 
forms of municipal approvals make it easy for suburbs to discourage rental apartments of 
any kind. Even if township officials are inclined to allow building in order to augment the 
tax base, as did Maplewood, they often face hostile groups of homeowners who argue 
against construction.

*Federal Housing Policy in the Suburbs*

Community opposition to private construction of rental units, however, is not the 
most important component of class exclusion in the suburban housing market. The 
private market in the U.S. provides little to no new rental housing, whether rehabilitated 
units or new construction, for low-income families. Instead, Federal government 
programs and, in New Jersey, a state level program, are responsible for new units. At the 
Federal level, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, initiated under the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, accounted for one-third of all multi-family rental construction 
between 1987 and 2006 (Eriksen and Rosenthal 2010) and virtually all construction for 
low-income households. The LIHTC program for assisted housing has become, 
effectively, the only source of new rental housing for low-income families in an era when 
public housing units, i.e., those directly owned by a government, have decreased 
dramatically, particularly in Newark. The core of U.S. housing provision for low-income 
households remains the Housing Choice Voucher (formerly Section 8) program at a cost 
of $21 billion in 2006 compared to $4.9 billion in tax expenditures for the LIHTC 
program (Hughes 1987; Hughes Vandoren 1990; Hughes McGuire 1991; Olsen 2003;
Sard 2001). But, in middle- and upper-class suburbs, where low-income rentals are scarce, both programs must operate in order to provide low-income housing. Thus, exclusion of LIHTC units serves as a proxy for the exclusion of low-income housing as a whole.

The siting of LIHTC units in the suburbs of Newark tracks class lines more than race. To be sure, in a city to suburb comparison with Newark, it is hard to disaggregate race and class factors to explain the siting of low-income housing. Newark provides fully 3.1% of its housing units in the form of assisted housing; this is in addition to existing, older public units and non-assisted, private units where the landlords accept vouchers. Most of these units go to impoverished families who are also classified as minorities. The same limitation on analysis, however, does not adhere when suburbs are considered against other suburbs. South Orange and Maplewood, although both about 30% non-Hispanic Black, have income levels midway between those of Newark and the wealthy suburb of Millburn-Short Hills. Yet, neither town contained a single unit of LIHTC housing as of 2007 (table 1). In Orange, by contrast, where the population is 73% black and poor, assisted units are 2.6% of the total housing stock, or nearly the level of Newark; in East Orange, 87.6% black and poor, assisted housing is 0.4% of the total stock. So, despite a sizeable minority population, South Orange and Maplewood resemble the more affluent and whiter suburbs of the outer suburban ring than the city of Newark or its predominately black and poor suburbs in terms of low-income housing provision.

The exclusion of the poorest of the poor from middle- and upper-income suburbs is related to but distinct from sorting by class in suburbs. But, even here, the housing market largely tracks the geography of class re-inforced by municipal boundaries.
Table 1  
LIHTC Units in Newark and Suburbs in 2007 with 2005-2009 Population and Household Income Estimates, Ranked by % of Total Units  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Hshld Inc</th>
<th>Non-Hisp Blk (%)</th>
<th>Housing Units</th>
<th>LIHTC Units</th>
<th>LIHTC Units (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>278,154</td>
<td>35,507</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>109,520</td>
<td>3390</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>31,030</td>
<td>40,981</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>13,264</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Orange</td>
<td>65,152</td>
<td>39,116</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>30,675</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Orange</td>
<td>46,207</td>
<td>89,034</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>16,448</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvington</td>
<td>56,107</td>
<td>44,016</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>24,410</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillside</td>
<td>21,747</td>
<td>60,602</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>11,645</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston</td>
<td>27,584</td>
<td>124,936</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>9136</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maplewood</td>
<td>21,985</td>
<td>101,912</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>8022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Orange</td>
<td>16,018</td>
<td>116,607</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>5507</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millburn</td>
<td>18,547</td>
<td>169,678</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>6623</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>53,671</td>
<td>72,181</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>19,304</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minority suburbanization over the past 30 years has had, despite some early predictions, little effect on the role of suburbs as class filters in the Newark region. One way of seeing the persistence of the class structure of the suburbs is to analyze the change in median family incomes in different suburban geographies. How high or low are the incomes of residents of a suburb in relation to residents of surrounding areas?; and, how have relative incomes changed over time? A longitudinal comparison of median family income in Newark and its surrounding suburbs from 1970 to 2000 (figure 4) indicates both change and striking persistence in class patterns (Myers 1992). In the comparison, inflation was controlled by comparing all geographies against changes in the broader New York metropolitan region. In keeping with the rise in income inequality generally in the United States over the period and urban de-industrialization, the residents of Newark have gotten poorer and those of the affluent suburbs of Summit, Millburn, Montclair, and Glen Ridge have gotten richer in terms of family income. Poverty has also suburbanized to a degree as the downward trend in incomes in Irvington, East Orange, and Orange suburbs that border Newark indicate. As for wealthy suburbs, this change can be partly explained by the rise in inequality over period. But the direct settlement of new immigrants in the suburbs (Carpio 2011; Katz 2010; Clark 2009; Fischer 2004) and the dramatic exodus of whites and blacks from Newark after the 1967 riots are also factors. The persistence of suburban class patterns, however, is also striking, particularly for the belt of relatively affluent inner suburbs. This geography, where almost no LIHTC

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1 A recent novel for young adults, set in a fictionalized version of Maplewood, treated the interaction of new immigrants to the suburbs, particularly Latinos, and older sets of immigrants. A New York Times review of the book characteristically missed the class stratification among both types of immigrants and depicted the book as a tale in which race and class were the same (Budhos 2011; Hoffman 2010).
Figure 4: Map of Median Family Income Change, 1970 to 2000
units have been built since 1986, has remained largely unchanged in terms of family income since 1970 despite the increase in black suburbanization (see maps 4-7 in appendix). The picture here of suburban racial population change accompanied by income stasis is consistent with studies that find overall persistence in suburban-central city disparities (Ellen 2000: 196), and it complicates dramatic description of the ‘plight’ of inner suburbs under minority suburbanization (Orfield 1997; Orfield 2002). To be sure, Irvington, Orange, and East Orange—the most densely populated inner suburbs in the Newark region—have ‘urbanized’ in the sense that their physical infrastructure and local institutions like schools, libraries, and parks have declined as relative property values and thus the local tax base dropped, and their public facilities exhibit the ills the metropolitics literature decries. But the wedge of inner suburbs that have significant black populations and higher incomes fare differently. The high percentage of recent foreclosures in black neighborhoods in MapSo suggests that black asset levels, the understudied component of class stratification, continue to lag income growth in such areas (Oliver 2006). But the income stability of these suburbs supports the argument that the Black middle class is beginning to attain the same status that newly-middle class Italians and Jews—the world of novelist Philip Roth (Roth 1959)—enjoyed in the same geographies in the 1950s and 1960s. The picture of universally ailing inner suburbs, in other words, has been overdrawn.

Minority suburbanization into affluent areas around Newark, then, has meant little change in income levels and no change in the approach to providing low-income housing. With respect to housing provision for the poor, minority suburbanization has not yet meant greater democratization of civic life (Jones-Correa 2006) in the sense of greater
tolerance on the part of middle-income residents, either white or black, for living with poorer residents. Other aspects of citizen life, though, have changed. Black suburbanization both sharpens white surveillance via policing but also, when middle-class blacks assert governmental power over recalcitrant local officials, can limit anti-democratic abuse of policing powers. Similar conflicts appear in other aspects of civic life, e.g., over access to resources such as good teachers and demanding classes in public schools, and their outcome remains indeterminate in the area of study. The stringencies of class inequality, however, remain in place with their predictable effect on physical exclusion of the poor from residence.

*Kernan’s Quarry and the Failure of Mount Laurel*

The 18-year battle over a new housing development in South Orange brings into relief the tactics municipalities in New Jersey use to exclude low-income residents. South Orange, in this case, used a method under the body of New Jersey court decisions, known as Mount Laurel I and II, and subsequent legislation that had originally been designed to force suburbs to include poorer residents. But, after prolonged legal and bureaucratic resistance on the part of the township and residents, the result was the reduction of a proposed development of 900 apartment units, 20% of them low-income, to 69 units of luxury condominiums and semi-detached houses, one of them rented by the R & B singer Lauryn Hill, and no low-income units at all.
Whether U.S. law treats suburbanization of the disadvantaged as a race or a class issue depends on the scale of governance. Federal law and case history, based in the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its 1988 amendments, frames the issue of publicly financed housing in racial terms (Rubinowitz 2000). The original 1968 law was an attempt to stave off further urban rioting in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King so that Congress enshrined in the act the conclusions of the Kerner Commission report that had been published just weeks before King’s death: “Federal housing programs must be given a new thrust aimed at overcoming the prevailing patterns of racial segregation” (emphasis mine; Polikoff 2006; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disturbances 1968). Moreover, a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1973, *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*, specifically excluded the economic status of a plaintiff as the basis for challenge to restrictive zoning ordinances under the equal protection clause (Haar 1996). The main remedies proposed under Federal law and policy thus ascribe city-suburban segregation to discrimination by race. Accordingly, the long-running *Gautreaux* case in metropolitan Chicago and the Moving to Opportunity demonstration project that grew out of *Gautreaux* justified the effort to suburbanize the poor on the basis of convincing evidence (Hirsch 1983; Hirsch 2007) that officials put public housing predominantly in black neighborhoods (Darden 1998b). Similarly, the solution in two cases in Federal court about Yonkers where local, state, and Federal officials were subsequently found guilty of deliberate racial discrimination in the location of assisted housing (Haynes 2001) required the construction of assisted housing in white neighborhoods and paid scant attention to the income levels of those neighborhoods.
(Darden 1998c; Rowe 2001). Thus, in Federal law and case history, the main impetus for action is seen as historical discrimination by race and its cumulative effects.

Housing law in New Jersey, by contrast, has emphasized income over race in justifying public provision of housing in order to expand support for contested policy. The Mount Laurel decisions sought to counter the effects of upzoning, or raising the minimum size of a lot, in order to restrict creation of low-income housing (Jackson 1987). They did this by making municipalities liable for the outcome of upzoning and giving builders a writ to sue a township if it prevented housing construction, under what became known as the "builder's remedy." To do so, the courts cast assisted housing as a low-income rather than a racial issue. In large measure, the tactic was designed to mute opposition among the white population (Castano 2008) to the construction of low-income housing, especially in suburban areas. Justice Frederick Hall, the author of the majority opinion in what came to be known as Mount Laurel I, sidestepped using the word "race" even though the plaintiffs were local chapters of the NAACP and the Congress on Racial Equality. Hall allowed that the suit sought redress for "minority group poor" but immediately asserted that "they are not the only category of persons barred" (Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel). When addressing inequality in housing between majority black Camden and its suburbs, Hall did not even mention race (Castano 2008; Haar 1996), nor did Justice Robert Wilentz in Mount Laurel II, as he sought to fortify implementation of the original court decision, use the word.

The Mount Laurel decisions made housing law and, for a brief time, housing provision in New Jersey a national anomaly. Hall and Wilentz shielded their rulings from review in Federal courts, where they almost certainly would have been overturned, by
grounding their arguments in the N.J. constitution. Thus protected from Federal precedent that denied the validity of a basis in economic discrimination for scrutiny of zoning and other municipal action, the judges also, more radically, side-stepped the distinction made by the U.S. Supreme Court between intent and effect in considering whether municipal actions are discriminatory (Haar 1996). The distinction made by Federal courts had frequently been used, if hard evidence of discriminatory intent were not available, to rationalize a discriminatory result in education and the workplace as well as housing. By contrast, the New Jersey justices, in effect, acknowledged the existence of structural discrimination and held local governments responsible for addressing it.

The Mount Laurel decisions, however, had been eviscerated by the state legislature by the late 1980s when a developer proposed the new housing development of 900 units in an abandoned quarry in South Orange. The New Jersey State Legislature, responding to outcry about the court’s infringement of the principal of home rule, passed the ironically titled Fair Housing Act of 1985 that robbed the court decisions of their power and urgency. The act set up an administrative agency, the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), that now ran parallel to the courts in determining the obligations localities would face to provide low-income housing in new developments (Haar 1996). The act thus granted power over fair housing implementation to a state government apparatus so notorious for entrenched corruption and inefficiency that one researcher dubbed it the "Louisiana of the North" (Gale 1996). COAH began to administer what are known as regional contribution agreements (RCAs). RCAs allowed a town in practice always a more affluent one to offload up to half its fair housing obligation by paying another locality in practice always a poorer one to build low-
income units within its borders. Such units as were built in suburbs typically did not go to former urban residents, and developers preferred to sell units rather than rent, which meant that they served a largely middle class audience (Kirp 1995; Castano 2008; Calavita 1997; Chambers 2005). The intention, however muted, of Mount Laurel had been in part to mitigate racial segregation, and Mount Laurel had has little effect.

Moreover, COAH supported the desire of suburbs to reduce the number of units provided and aided towns in delaying as long as possible implementation of their low-income housing obligations. In 2007, a N.J. Superior Court appellate panel, in a suit filed by builders of low-income units, found that COAH had underestimated the number of units mandated under the Mount Laurel decisions by as much as 100,000 (Smothers 2007). After years of continued wrangling between the plaintiffs and the state apparatus over the correct number of low-income units (DeFalco 2011), the state Supreme Court agreed in 2011 to re-visit the Mount Laurel decisions.

Court intervention in New Jersey has historically worked to increase provision of assisted housing. Indeed, the court’s decision to re-visit the earlier Mount Laurel rulings put on hold an effort by the State Assembly, serving the interest of suburbs, to change the formulas for provision. Under the proposed law, municipalities with between 50 and 80 percent of school children qualifying for free and reduced student lunches would have been required to make 8 percent of their housing affordable (Ahearn 2011). In other words, already disadvantaged towns and cities would be responsible for siting more low-income housing, an outcome the court seems to oppose. Moreover, in the same year, the Republican governor, Chris Christie, moved the operations of COAH to another department (DeMarco 2011) and so sidelined the agency that was at once the major
bureaucratic mechanism for thwarting construction of low-income units and the only way they could be approved. In early 2014, a New Jersey appeals court panel threatened COAH with contempt charges for failing to adopt new rules for distributing “fair share” housing among New Jersey municipalities, a more or less deliberate non-action that had been in place for three years, but COAH was later given an extension by the Supreme Court for an additional half year (LaVecchia 2014). Still, as of this writing, the ultimate fate of assisted housing provision under Mount Laurel is very much up in the air.

*Kernan’s Quarry and the Failure of Mount Laurel*

The disposition of the Kernan quarry site in South Orange exemplifies the parlous state of the Mount Laurel framework under RCAs and the 1985 legislation. The quarry, in an area of historical significance, was a gravel pit that had ceased operation in 1989 and occupied a large tract in the Watchung Mountains into which the western portions of the inner suburbs of Newark, including South Orange, are built (Williams 2002). Quarries in the ridges of the Watchungs had provided building stone, including bluestone for sidewalks in New York City; the softer rock in the valleys gave up red and chocolate sandstone used to face brownstones in the cities of the region during the Victorian period as well as red and green shale used for suburban patios and walkways (Stansfield 1998; Pope 2011; figure 5). Kernan’s quarry itself supplied the gravel for the Meadowlands sports complex. The mountains that surround the quarry rise 800 feet at their highest point near Paterson, N.J., and are basalt ridges that represent the last upland, until the
Figure 5: Topography of Newark Region
Palisades farther to the north, before the terrain descends into the Newark Basin and the coastal plain on which New York City sits. The exact manner in which the Watchungs formed remains a matter of some debate among physical geographers (Pope 2011). But the ridges of the chain fall in the piedmont that parallels the Appalachians in the western part of the state and are unmistakably the first rise above the coastal plain due west from Newark and Manhattan (figure 5). During the Revolutionary War, the perspective from the Watchungs eastward toward the plains below provided Washington’s troops with a clear view of the British. In the 19th century, the same perspective shaped the work of Hudson River School painter and Maplewood resident, Asher Durand, as he rendered the first landscape paintings of the Newark Basin and Hudson River watershed (Durand 1970; Bedell 2002; Ferber 2007; figures 6 and 7). Through the landscape paintings of Durand and others that were viewed by thousands at exhibitions, an incipient national consciousness gained visual coherence (Miller 1993; Cosgrove 2001). The Romanticism of the Hudson River School idealized the pastoral just as the nation was beginning to industrialize and needing to deny the new, inequitable social relations of the city below.

As Newark grew into a manufacturing hub, the farms to the immediate west of the city had economic and political interests that increasingly diverged from the city. In a move that would have profound consequences later for the fiscal health of the city, the farmland that was once part of Newark, about 2/3 of its land area, incorporated as separate municipalities that would go on to become the advantaged suburbs of the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Tuttle 2009: 34). But the exalted view of the city from the wooded Watchungs changed little as homes were built into the slopes in the 1920s and the area suburbanized. In 1895, a 2000 acre reservation abutting the quarry, the South
Figure 6: Asher Durand, Boonton Falls, 1833
Figure 7: Asher Durand, Sunday Morning (1860)
Mountain Reservation, had been set aside and a park plan drawn up by the firm of Frederick Law Olmstead (Rybczynski 1999). The Civilian Conservation Corps completed the park infrastructure during the Depression, and the part of the mountain ridge covered by the park has remained free of development since (Department of Parks Recreation Cultural Affairs 2012). As a result, the mountains gave local residents unobstructed views of the fires in Newark during the riots in 1967 and, more recently, of the implosion of the Twin Towers. The suburban heights provided refuge, real and perceived, and sufficient distance to make the view of the city below less threatening.

By the late 20th century, suburban residents and their governments fought the encroachment of the city to the degree that virtually all new building, especially quarries as the last developable land, provoked controversy. As was common, the quarriers at Kernan’s were Irish immigrants until the mid-20th century, and the pit was owned by Irish immigrants and their descendents (Cummings 2000). As a young man, William J. Brennan Sr. worked a gravel train that supplied cities in the region from similar quarries. The rise of Brennan Sr. in Newark politics, and the progressive commitments of his son, who became a New Jersey and later U.S. Supreme Court justice, stemmed in part from sympathy for those who performed the rough work of splitting stone (Haar, Kayden, Brennan 1989; Stern Wermiel 2010). As residential land costs rose with the commodification of housing in the late 20th century, quarry sites that had been considered too difficult to develop were gradually sold off and provided land for malls, parks, an expansion site for Montclair State University (Pope 2011), and especially housing including luxury condos on a bluestone vein elsewhere in South Orange (Strehl 1988 1990). Kernan’s quarry itself was, at the beginning of the contest over its use, a
refuge for local teenaged pot-smokers. It also served as the location for a scene in a film by a South Orange native, Zach Braff, that sought to capture the zeitgeist of his generation and of South Orange and Maplewood as the urbanite’s idea of a suburb (figure 8). The quarry site had, then, a history of local, regional, and national associations in physiographic and cultural terms. For a time, it also promised to be the largest concentration of low-income housing in an affluent suburb in the state, a concrete manifestation of the principles of Mount Laurel.

The initial proposal for building at the quarry in the mid-1980s came from a firm that epitomized the urban political machine and its potential for suburban expansion. The company that proposed development, Pondview of Lyndhurst, was owned by a Newark resident of some prominence and notoriety. Louis Turco had been a personal injury lawyer, a long-time East Ward boss in Newark, lieutenant of the Democratic machine, and a former Newark city council president. A better-educated version of the classic machine politician, Turco had been a protege of Hugh Addonizio, mayor of the city during the 1967 riots, and aspired to become mayor himself under the Italian-American political regime that prevailed in the city until the riots and the mass exodus of whites in the early 1970s (Mumford 2007). But, while he was serving as council president in 1973, Federal authorities charged him with defrauding clients and tax evasion, and conviction on the charges ended his aspirations to the mayoralty (Author unknown 1973; Author unknown 1974), a fate that had also befallen his mentor. After six months in prison, Turco turned his energy and considerable connections in the city to real estate development, and he continued to operate a political fiefdom in the East Ward. He threw his support behind the African-American future mayor of Newark, Sharpe James.
Figure 8: *Garden State* (2004)
(Warshaw 1994) and began acquiring property in Newark and the surrounding area (Carter 1990). James later went to Federal prison too for selling city properties to friends for a fraction of their true cost (Feuer 2010). Turco, for his part, served as a member of the Essex County Planning Board (Warshaw 1994) while the quarry development was being proposed. No doubt, he would have had considerable influence over the planning approvals for such a large site.

In 1986, however, Turco’s bid to build 900 units on the 30-acre site with a total of 180 low- and moderate-income units was rejected by the South Orange Planning Board. The board asserted, as was typical in such instances, that its Mount Laurel obligation was an unfair burden on local schools, traffic, and the environment. In 1987, Turco and his firm sued under the builder’s remedy, also a typical move for a developer, and set in motion an elaborate negotiation with Peter B. Cooper, a state superior court judge in Newark. The town hired a planner who suggested reducing the units on the site to 240 with 48 low- to moderate-income units. Residents near the quarry hired another planner who argued that the capacity of the site would not allow for more than 40 units (Author unknown 1989). In 1991, the settlement of the suit before Judge Cooper reduced the total units to be built on the quarry site from 900 to 198 and eliminated the Mount Laurel units. The judge instead allowed the township, via an RCA, to finance the construction of 30 units of low-income housing in another community and to fulfill the remainder of its obligation by upgrading 107 substandard units and permitting the construction of a 65-unit senior citizen building to be built by Bôhai Bôith near the Newark border. Ultimately, the Mount Laurel units were built in Orange, a working class, minority suburb that bordered South Orange (Dilworth 1991a b c d e). As the quarry project was to
begin, however, Turco was again out of formal politics in Essex County as the result of a cocaine arrest, and he died in 1994. The Pondview project, already undermined by the RCA, never got off the ground.

The desire to exclude low-income housing was obvious from the persistence with which the town fought the Pondview project and tried to lure other developers. But South Orange whites were heavily Roman Catholic and Jewish and had long tended to vote Democratic in state and national elections unlike Maplewood where the Republican party prevailed until the mid-1990s (Bureau of the Census 2005-2011). Accordingly, the mayor of South Orange, William Calabrese, who had run on a progressive ticket that opposed the quarry, felt the need to deny that the town sought to exclude the disadvantaged:

At no time was the issue whether the village would or would not permit the construction of low- and moderate-income housing within the village. The issue that bothered the village and its board of trustees was the question of the density and the number of units to be built within the quarry (Dilworth 1991c; Weber Leaf 2003a).

The disjunction between expressed intent and action on assisted housing in the suburbs was precisely the issue the Mount Laurel justices had attempted to address, and their intent was being frustrated.

Despite the demise of the original project, discussion about development of the quarry continued as other builders stepped in with new proposals. The legal negotiations over the site and its Mount Laurel obligations, while not applied to the initial project, shaped the development of subsequent proposals. In exchange for the court’s reduction of the number of low-income units, the planning board in South Orange had agreed to increase the allowed density of any future residential construction from 5 units per acre to
8 (Author unknown 1989). A few years later, however, the township also passed an ordinance making it harder to tear down older houses (Weber-Leaf 2003b). In effect, the proposed density increase, because the town was built out, would mainly apply to the quarry, a site occupied by a tennis club, and to the reduced number of tear-downs or rehabilitations of old houses now allowed. More importantly, the new builder eventually constructing the site, Trammel Crow, had sufficient political muscle, extending well beyond local New Jersey politics, to ensure that a luxury development would replace the original proposal. In 1999, the attorney for South Orange was advising his client that there was little chance of altering the consent decree from the early nineties that guaranteed a percentage of low-income units, however reduced: “I’m confident it would be unsuccessful, because it is contrary to law” (Dilworth 1999). Despite the assurance of the attorney, who had substantial experience with builder remedy negotiations, the proposed quarry development was by 2002 down to 66 apartments, 87 townhouses, and the plans added a swimming pool, a clubhouse, recreation facilities, and a small park. Even this upscale project, much reduced in terms of total units, met with opposition from local residents who argued at public meetings that the new construction would still harm the town. As had the planning board earlier, opponents cited greater usage of the school district, fire and police services, storm water management and other infrastructure and added that construction would require injurious blasting and destroy eight acres of wetlands (Williams 2002). The town government favored revenue via ratables where possible (Fischel 2001). But local residents, especially those living close to the project, saw the issue of taxes more in terms of cost than potential revenue. A new, national
builder with robust political connections agreed with the argument against low-income units but overrode objections to development on environmental and density grounds.

In late 2002, the builder and South Orange township signed a memorandum of understanding that described the project as it would eventually be built. From the original proposal of 900 apartments, the final plans reduced the development to 69 single-family homes on lots of at least 4500 square feet with estimated sales prices between $800,000 and $1 million. The South Orange village administrator praised the lower costs the amended project would spell for schools, traffic, and taxes—the mantra of suburbanization and the presence new ratables (Weber Leaf 2002; Williams 2002; Grasha 2003). The project was built in stages between 2003 and 2006 (figure 8). The rhythm and blues singer, Lauryn Hill, and her family were among the first to move in.

The new builder, in a sign of larger trends in the residential property industry, was a partnership between Mid-Atlantic Northeast Properties and Trammel Crow Residential. The latter was a building company based in Dallas started by F. Trammell Crow in 1948. In contrast to the local stalwarts of the Newark political machine who first proposed development of the quarry, Trammel Crow was a national builder and property owner responsible for not only residential developments but also large commercial projects such as the Dallas Market Center, the Peachtree Center in Atlanta, and the Embarcadero Center in San Francisco. The Wall Street Journal in 1986 termed Crow the biggest landlord in the United States; David Rockefeller and Winthrop Rockefeller were among his financial backers. The Crow family was also a major contributor to the Republican Party, and Trammel Crow himself had been responsible in 1984 for bringing to Dallas the Republican convention that would anoint Ronald Reagan a candidate (Martin 2009). In
1997, the Trammel Crow Company went public. In 2006, just as the quarry development was being completed, the company was sold for $2.2 billion to the CB Richard Ellis group, the Los Angeles real estate services firm that was then the world’s largest commercial real estate services firm (Author unknown 2006).

The commodification of housing in the late 20th century via the linkage of local property markets to large scale capital resources has long been a topic in urban geography and planning. The case studies that comprise the literature, however, tend to treat housing in countries where social democratic, socialist, or communist regimes have transitioned to market or hybrid economies such as French Canada, Northern Ireland, Japan, Taiwan, and China (Huchzermeyer 2001; Li 2003; LaGrange 2004; Wu 2005; Ronald 2009). For the United States, a much smaller body of work treats U.S. local property markets and looks at their increasing linkages upward in geographic scale to major flows of capital. Here, however, the focus is primarily on commercial real estate (Fainstein 2001). The specific topic of gated neighborhoods has attracted attention (Atkinson Blandy 2005; Blakely Snyder 1997; Low 2003). But, apart from the business literature, most work on residential, suburban property markets is light on discussion of the changing structure of the markets for housing supply, property acquisition, and maintenance. Nonetheless, suburban residential projects like the quarry, with its transition from a local developer with shaky finances to a national builder with connections in the world of global finance became increasingly common after 1990 or so.

But Mount Laurel ultimately was undercut not just by the introduction of major flows of capital to residential building markets but first by the N.J. State Assembly and inept (and acquisitive) local governments and local developers. The governmentality of
exclusion operated at all scales to ensure that the suburbs, even as minority suburbanization accelerated, continued to operate as class filters, much as they had since they were built.
Chapter Five: Racial Relations in South Orange Maplewood as Transition Begins

Suburban resistance to the outward spread of the city, then, took the form of *ad hoc* and informal use of policing and regulation of the housing market. Any intention to limit settlement by blacks who were poor was rarely expressed and even denied, especially when it would, as with the opposition to the Mount Laurel site, seem most obvious. If the inner history of modern social life is best written with an eye toward uncovering the function that repression serves, such a function must usually be discerned indirectly by considering multiple events that move social experience in the same direction (Foucault 1995: 23). Formal law and the rhetoric and rules that flow from it often work in the opposite direction of local practice because formal law is often put in place to counter practices, whether morally laudatory or noxious, from below.\(^1\) As such, the study of formal law yields less insight than one would hope into the present reality of black suburbanization (Ashton Lake 2004; Blomley 2001). Instead, analysis of the "utilitarian rationalization of detail in moral accountability and political control" (Foucault 1995: 139)\(^2\) or, to put it more simply, an inductive method that holds daily life as its object has more descriptive power. In South Orange and Maplewood, the threat of racial violence, aggressive policing and the exclusion of low-income housing are all parts of the local landscape in the period after the Newark riots. At the same time, an "intentional integration" group arises that announces its origins in Fair Housing law but whose core purpose and funding derive from an effort to limit black suburbanization.

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\(^1\) For this insight into the tension between formal law and practice, I am grateful for the work of the late legal historian, Elizabeth B. Clark, whose intended book (never published) used Foucault to explore the uses of the body in framing the legal arguments for the abolition of slavery.
Population Loss in the Inner Suburbs of Newark after 1970

The vandalism incidents of the 1980s occurred against the backdrop of dramatic urban and inner suburban population decline in the Newark region. On top of the structural decline caused by deindustrialization (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Mumford 2007), the riots precipitated the loss over the twenty years after 1967 of approximately 1/3 of the population of Newark. The population of the city went from just over 400,000 people in 1967 to 275,000 in 1990 (Tuttle 2009: 235) and dropped further to 273,546 over the 1990s (Bureau of the Census 2000), the period when the urban "growth machine" and its mayor, Sharpe James, had proclaimed Newark in a state of "renaissance".

Certainly, some of the population losses that Newark experienced translated into suburban gains. Many of those leaving Newark during the period of rapid decline went to the surrounding inner suburbs. Moreover, for African Americans, the decline of Newark coincided with a period of sustained comparative income gains for both black men and women, particularly those with at least some college education (Bates 1984; Lacy 2007), and these gains made themselves apparent in the new black middle class that organized itself in South Orange. But both the city of Newark and South Orange and Maplewood, as places, experienced not only direct population loss as a result of the riots but also avoidance on the part of potential in-movers (Ellen 2000) who feared living in proximity to Newark. The combined population for South Orange and Maplewood dropped by 9% between 1970 and 1980, remained stagnant through 1990, and only began to recover after 2000 (Bureau of the Census 2000; table 2). Thus, even though they gained residents...
Table 2

Population Change in Maplewood and South Orange, 1970 to 2000

Source: U.S. Census, www.census.gov; NCDB

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fleeing Newark in the 1970s, the suburbs immediately around the city nonetheless lost population, albeit less dramatically than the city, as potential new renters and homeowners sought places farther west.

Over the thirty year period following the riots, the housing stock and commercial districts in Maplewood and South Orange declined visibly. Homeowners and landlords made fewer improvements to a now aging housing stock dating to the 1920s and, especially in the neighborhoods bordering Newark and Irvington, neglected basic maintenance such as termite prevention and fixes to leaky roofs, steam heating systems, and sidewalks. Many of the substantial suburban mansions of the Montrose section of South Orange that were built with fine materials by owners of factories in Newark were sold and broken up into illegal rentals or neglected. Some reverted to nature as trees grew through floors and windows and owners abandoned unsalable properties. A further discouragement to investment in housing was that municipal taxes sharply rose as a percentage of median home value as the latter remained depressed. Commercial district ratables, never a large percentage of the tax base, were in decline too. A once thriving commercial district along Springfield Avenue in Maplewood, 3.5 miles from the police station in Newark where the riots broke out, lost businesses and saw increasing crime. South Orange Avenue in South Orange, an extension of the avenue running from Newark's central commercial district and the business district for the suburb, had difficulty keeping stores open as buildings deteriorated, shoppers headed for new malls further west, and many affluent residents left town. The physical deterioration of housing in Vailsburg and Ivy Hill, the portion of Newark that juts out into the western inner
suburbs, was in some ways more muted than in the adjoining neighborhoods of South Orange and Maplewood.

*Historical Accounts of Initial Black In-Movement, 1970s and 1980s*

But, as disinvestment in the physical stock of the inner suburbs rose and the population dipped, racial change in South Orange and Maplewood was slow through the 1970s and 1980s. The towns were now increasingly affordable to the less affluent, but crossing the racial divide between central city and suburb remained a formidable impediment for blacks who would potentially move in. South Orange was slightly more urbanized in its appearance and had a larger Jewish population that was probably more at ease living near blacks than either the Irish and Italian working class whites that still dominated the eastern section of Maplewood or the remnant of the Maplewood WASP elite (Baltzell 1987) up the hill. An interviewee who lived South Orange characterized the difference between South Orange and Maplewood in terms of different attitudes toward newcomers:

South Orange, it is a town that has always been aware of the more urban movements out of Newark. In Philip Roth’s novels, when the big brother gets rich, he becomes a gynecologist, he moves to South Orange. So there was a time when the Irish first moved in, and they built our Lady of Sorrows[, a neo-Gothic church in South Orange]. And then the Italians came, at the same time the Jews came. And now you’ve got various black people coming, people from the islands, and African-Americans all these people coming. So South Orange, I don’t want to say it’s welcoming, but the policy has always been that they’re all these new people coming in.

Maplewood, by contrast, was different in that it was more of an old-line WASPy place where change was much more slow in coming. And there was an old WASP guard around longer than in South Orange.
The old guard to which the interviewee referred was heavily Presbyterian and clustered in the uphill section of Maplewood. Some were descendents of the Scots-Irish who had initially settled the area in the seventeenth century and who named the Oranges as South Orange, East Orange, and Orange are collectively known after William of Orange, the king of England and defender of the faith to British Protestants. In the complex dynamics of town politics, they tended to support African-Americans in the occasional flareup over issues such as classroom segregation but were, after the mid-1990s when Maplewood went from Republican to Democratic voting patterns, a declining presence in the towns. In the late 1990s, one of the last bastions of WASP hegemony in Maplewood, a tennis club that had written exclusion of Jews (and implicitly Italians) into its charter in 1916, began to admit both groups in significant numbers as WASPs withdrew. But Maplewood retained its reputation among blacks for greater, openly expressed hostility to their presence.

Even so, any attempt to discern cultural differences among whites as a cause for settlement patterns for blacks immediately runs into the reality that differences among whites on the question were, when they existed at all, matters of degree. Mark Rudd, the leader of the student movement at Columbia University in the 1960s and later a member of the Weather Underground, was born in Irvington, grew up in Maplewood and attended temple in South Orange. In a talk before the New Mexico Jewish Historical Society in 2005, Rudd characterized the responses of his family to living near blacks as unvarnished in their racism:

As a teenager, Congregation Beth El [in South Orange] seemed to me just another aspect of the suburban scene: materialist and hypocritical. This was the time of the civil rights movement, but the lily-white suburbs existed in order to escape the
schvartzes. Jews in my parents' and grandparents' milieu used this derogatory term in exactly the same way southerners used nigger. The schvartze is coming to clean the house. The schvartzes robbed my hardware store in Newark. I had to sell the apartments on Clinton Avenue because schvartzes moved next door. There was no phony liberalism about the race war in Newark and Maplewood, at least not that I could see.

A long list of similar, depressing characterizations of blacks by whites in South Orange and Maplewood, across ethnicities, could easily be compiled. More importantly, generalization along cultural lines tends to obscure class distinctions within groups, even for blacks who had before 1970 a relatively cohesive class status based in the overriding reality of recent descent from slavery.

Whether or not the larger Jewish population of the town was the cause, black settlement began first in South Orange as African-American residents went from 4% to 10% of the population between 1970 and 1980. Black residents of Maplewood, by contrast, remained a barely visible percentage of the population (4%) through 1980. After 1990, however, trends in settlement by race in the towns began to converge (table 3; figures 9, 10, 11, 12). The number of blacks in Maplewood, in particular, climbed sharply. At least some of the blacks who settled initially in South Orange and Maplewood in the 1970s were greeted warmly by whites. One white journalist remembered a block party in South Orange that her parents helped host to welcome new black neighbors. As the numbers of African-American settlers remained small, such racial change as there was presented little in the way of threat to a white population that remained dominant in numbers and in control of town life.
Table 3
Non-Hispanic Black Population and Proportion Black, Suburbs Bordering Newark, NJ, 1970 - 2010

Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1970 to 2000 (SHRBLKN, SHRBLK, SHRD); black alone counts for 2010 from Social Explorer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belleville</td>
<td>1024 (.03)</td>
<td>979 (.03)</td>
<td>1274 (.04)</td>
<td>2053 (.06)</td>
<td>3277 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomfield</td>
<td>855 (.02)</td>
<td>1263 (.03)</td>
<td>1918 (.04)</td>
<td>6024 (.13)</td>
<td>8757 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Orange</td>
<td>597 (.04)</td>
<td>1578 (.10)</td>
<td>3035 (.19)</td>
<td>5642 (.33)</td>
<td>4642 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maplewood</td>
<td>493 (.02)</td>
<td>914 (.04)</td>
<td>2548 (.12)</td>
<td>8323 (.35)</td>
<td>8426 (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>207097 (.54)</td>
<td>192377 (.58)</td>
<td>161563 (.59)</td>
<td>150597 (.55)</td>
<td>145085 (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvington</td>
<td>2695 (.04)</td>
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<td>42308 (.70)</td>
<td>51556 (.85)</td>
<td>46058 (.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Orange</td>
<td>39736 (.53)</td>
<td>64551 (.83)</td>
<td>66382 (.90)</td>
<td>64377 (.92)</td>
<td>56887 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillside</td>
<td>419 (.02)</td>
<td>6377 (.30)</td>
<td>8590 (.41)</td>
<td>10535 (.48)</td>
<td>11384 (.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data not exactly comparable; NCDB had not been updated as of January 2013.
Figure 9
Figure 10

Essex County Black Population in 1980

Legend
Populations by Census Tracts
1 Dot = 100
• Blacks 1980
Figure 11
Figure 12
By the mid-1980s, however, the power dynamic between the two races had shifted as blacks became an increasing presence in town life and in the school system. The numbers of black families remained small, but their presence was enough to set off white paranoia. A black college professor who moved in during the 1980s described the overt hostility her family experienced:

At first when we came here, at first people were what we expected . . . We expected the negative things and we got them . . . They threw rocks through our picture window and knocked down our bird feeder and things like that. All the little annoying things . . . It was not pleasant for us. I would say the first ten years we lived here, people would ride past our door and they would yell the "N" word out the window. It was not pleasant. But I think we were fortunate in that we are a very close knit family.

Another black homeowner, and a victim of the racial vandalism incidents remarked on the irony of white behavior: "How 300 black families can make Maplewood a nigger town is beyond me." (Page 1985). No doubt, for those initial in-movers, especially those who experienced direct intimidation, the decision to move to the suburbs was an act of bravery.

The drama of the racial vandalism and the attention it got in the press, however, hides the way that hostility to growing black settlement usually took more subtle form. Most of the resistance to black settlement lay in the details of daily life, and it encompassed both black behavior and white, even if the latter benefitted far more from status quo arrangements. In other words, local actors working at the "microscale" constructed a "regime of practices." (Foucault
that perpetuated existing power relations about which they were often not fully conscious. Foucault saw the tendency of society to operate this way as requiring a microlevel analysis of the "genealogy" of everyday life: Explaining how an event [such as racial segregation] unfolds is a matter not of finding a single origin or cause but rather of constructing its genealogy, which entails 'numberless beginnings' (Foucault 2000). Thus the broader trend across the United States toward tolerating segregation despite the ringing denouncements of it in the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was no doubt the product of court mandates at the Federal level for example, the Supreme Court decision to forbid metropolitan busing (Lassiter 2006) but just as importantly a product of local, daily action and inaction.

Thus the black college professor quoted above recalled an atmosphere of hostility including threats of violence. But much of her experience of moving to a predominately white suburb was of social isolation and petty harassment:

For a time our daughter could not find a nursery school because they were either too full or for one reason or the other she could not get into it.

Our next door neighbor erected a fence. We lived in a very large property. They erected the fence. The Welcome Woman from the Welcome Wagon lived two doors away from us. She never came to greet us.

When our kids had to have homework with other children usually the parents would have the child they were doing the work with meet them at the front door and give them their work.

---

2 Referenced in line in Ettlinger 2011 but omitted from her bibliography.
Another early black in-mover who lived in the Newstead section of South Orange, an affluent neighborhood up the hill, recalled less overt hostility but felt pressure to conform to white group norms on behavior. She described her experience of moving in:

When I first got here I was just devastated by the lack of diversity. Because in 1989, you walked into a restaurant, there was not another black face in there . . . and if there was, it did not have dreds and it did not have any kind of diversity within our African American culture or a brown tribe culture. And then also it was an awakening to see how closed minded a lot of the community was and little pockets within Maplewood especially can be very, like, it's okay if you are going to assimilate, but if you are willing to assimilate and you want to be yourself, then there's going to be a problem.

The two black respondents quoted above espoused very different ideologies with regard to the role of class in suburban life but concurred on the forms white resistance took. Maplewood and South Orange certainly have a place in the thousands of chronicles of violent resistance to black settlement (e.g., Kruse 2005), as I have shown, but is also important not to miss the softer, suburban character of the way things worked in daily life.

The relative affluence and conservative values of black in-movers, and their ability to express those values, played an important role in blunting overt racial violence. This was particularly apparent in South Orange, where the ability of blacks to take action politically and socially was more robust than in Maplewood. By 2011, in Maplewood, median black household income ($95,559) was about 72% of white income ($131,376). South Orange, by contrast, had a median black household income ($133,913) that was slightly greater (4%) than the white level ($129,408) (Census 2007-2011). But, among many blacks, Maplewood continued to be perceived as the more racially hostile of the
two towns—one focus group participant attributed its reputation to the larger "blue collar" section of town where the police were more likely to detain blacks for "DWB," i.e., driving while black, or to assault black citizens. Indeed, the shooting of the mentally ill man discussed in Chapter Two, an assault by police against a black high school student who was attempting to visit a former teacher at the middle school, and the decision to close the local library after school to prevent mainly black students from using it, discussed below; these were all events that occurred in Maplewood, as was the substantial capital investment in a new police station. Similarly, black civic participation there tended to be more limited and to be, as with the town committee, sponsored and then controlled by whites.

South Orange, by contrast, housed many black professionals—lawyers, doctors, many with positions in the music and media industries in New York—and had a richer civic life run by African-Americans. Indeed, South Orange shares with Prince George's County outside Washington, D.C., the distinction of being one of the few areas in the country in which median family income did not go down in real terms as black settlement grew (Lacy 2007; table 4), and this distinction contributed significantly to civic participation by blacks. The town was home to the South Orange Civic Association, that had historically helped negotiate boundaries between Newark and South Orange for black business people and politicians. Starting in about 1970, it sponsored annual Martin Luther King Day celebrations that alternated each year between South Orange and places in Newark such as Vailsburg, the middle class neighborhood in Newark to the east of the suburb (Stewart 1992, 1993). Later, the celebrations were held in conjunction with the Community Coalition on Race and held in South Orange alone. The group also sponsored
Table 4
Average Income per Family, Newark and Suburbs, NY-Northern NJ MSA as Deflator, 1970-2000
Source: Neighborhood Change Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>NY-Northern NJ MSA</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>183%</td>
<td>225%</td>
<td>246%</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<td>Millburn</td>
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<td>229%</td>
<td>275%</td>
<td>292%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Ridge</td>
<td>159%</td>
<td>165%</td>
<td>193%</td>
<td>196%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montclair</td>
<td>143%</td>
<td>142%</td>
<td>154%</td>
<td>173%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranford</td>
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<td>128%</td>
<td>118%</td>
<td>122%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Orange</td>
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<td>133%</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td>127%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Orange</td>
<td>181%</td>
<td>190%</td>
<td>196%</td>
<td>180%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maplewood</td>
<td>141%</td>
<td>132%</td>
<td>134%</td>
<td>139%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bloomfield</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>132%</td>
<td>131%</td>
<td>135%</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
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<td>Town</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>103%</td>
<td>105%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roselle</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillside</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belleville</td>
<td>90%</td>
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<td>84%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenilworth</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roselle Park</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvington</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Orange</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
other cultural events such as a performance of the poetry of Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston by a New School theater professor (Author unknown 1995) and a show on “The Expressive Black Experience” during black history month (Author unknown 1993).

The origins of the Civic Association were firmly middle class and the core purpose was social. One of the founders, for example, worked for the Swiss pharmaceutical firm Ciba-Geigy, which had an outpost in East Hanover, a suburb west of South Orange (Author unknown 2000), and members included not just local businessmen but the president of Essex County Community College (Author unknown 1994). But the group also took political action on black issues when warranted. The association issued a public statement on the racial vandalism incidents (Page 1985), worked in conjunction with a local Fair Housing Association that conducted testing for discrimination in real estate sales and rentals (Author unknown 2000), and gave its backing to Mila Jasey, a local school and CCR board member, when she ran for the N.J. General Assembly in a district that overlapped South Orange and Maplewood and portions of Newark. Jasey perhaps epitomized the type of person who would support the Association in her sponsorship of legislation (Friedman 2010, D’Amico 2009) for both affordable housing and school choice.

To some degree, the greater ability of South Orange to nurture a black community that displayed the ability for autonomous action was a function of path dependency based in established patterns of toleration of other out-groups. One South Orange resident described what he saw as a history of similar toleration of different groups and contrasted it with Maplewood:
South Orange, it is a town that has always been aware of the more urban movements out of Newark. In Philip Roth’s novels, when the big brother gets rich, he becomes a doctor, he moves to South Orange. So there was a time when the Irish first moved in, and they built our Lady of Sorrows. And then I think the Italians came, at the same time the Jews came. And now you’ve got various black people coming people from the islands, and African-Americans all these people coming. So South Orange, I don’t want to say welcoming, but the policy has always been that they’re all these new people coming in.

Maplewood, by contrast, was different in that it was more of an old-line WASPy place where change was much more slow in coming. And there was an old WASP guard around longer than in South Orange. Some of that is reflected, and it don’t mean to sound like a South Orange partisan a little maybe I am because I live there.

The simple characterization of waves of immigration to South Orange had, to be sure, biases of its own, but it also had a some truth.

In addition to a better developed, independent black civic life, South Orange was also substantially less segregated by race than Maplewood. In 2000, as measured by the dissimilarity index (table 5), South Orange had a segregation index of 0.283 on a scale of 0 to 1 with zero representing perfect integration. By contrast, the indices for Maplewood, Montclair, and Newark all racially mixed towns but where the black population was poorer than the white population were substantially higher at 0.483, 0.595, and 0.687 respectively. The relative affluence of blacks with respect to whites in South Orange certainly did not purchase them immunity from discrimination. The claim of one focus group participant from South Orange that “the color of my money is green” had clear limits. But higher relative income levels for blacks probably blunted white hostility and allowed the nurturing of local black institutions that enjoyed autonomy.
Table 5
Dissimilarity Indices for Maplewood, South Orange, Montclair, and Newark in 2000


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maplewood</th>
<th>South Orange</th>
<th>Montclair</th>
<th>Newark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>0.687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residential segregation. There are roughly 20 measures of residential segregation in common use, but the most popular is still simple reporting of minority proportions as well as the slightly more complex dissimilarity index. The latter measures the departure from even distribution of racial or ethnic groups. The index, D, takes the weighted mean absolute deviation of every areal unit’s minority proportion from a larger minority proportion of which the smaller units form a whole and shows this quantity as a proportion of its theoretical maximum as defined by the larger unit (Massey and Denton 1988). The dissimilarity index may be written as follows:

\[
D = \frac{\sum |t_i|p_i-P}{2TP(1-P)}
\]

- \(t_i\) = total population of areal unit
- \(p_i\) = total population of areal unit
- \(T\) = population size
- \(P\) = minority proportion of the whole city
If Maplewood and South Orange differed sharply in the degree of white dominance in town life, all homeowners in the towns, both white and black, had common cause on the subject of sustaining property values. As the cost of owning a home occupied an increasingly large percentage of household income after 1990 (Schwartz Wilson 2008), the desire to protect property value gave the two groups substantial common cause in high homeownership suburbs. In 2010, owner occupied housing represented 77% of total units in South Orange and 81% for Maplewood v. 28% for Newark (Bureau of Census 2007-2011 American Community Survey). For African-American residents of South Orange and Maplewood, homeownership was a crucial marker of status that differentiated those who had made it from those who had not, and discussion of it echoed similar assertions of difference between the working and non-working poor (Lacy 2007; Newman 1999). Thus blacks too had an interest in preserving housing values, many made the connection between white flight and housing decline as readily as whites did. In a community publication, Robert Marchman, one of the African-American founders of the Community Coalition on Race, recalled overhearing a Maplewood resident describe the town as an irreversible downward spiral in the early 1990s. To Marchman, the problem of community deterioration was not police mistreatment or discrimination against blacks in the housing search but white flight that needed to be reversed (Donat 2011). One South Orange resident, a member of the focus group of black homeowners, who had a good job in education in Newark and lived in an affluent neighborhood in South Orange, explained his attitude toward living in the
suburbs versus the city. He felt both a sense of connection and obligation to the city and its residents but also desire to step away from urban problems when he went home at night and to protect his investment in home:

Respondent: I go all out for kids in Newark.

Another group member: You just don’t want to live in Newark! (Laughter.)

Respondent: We want to live where you are comfortable at. I don’t want to live with rats running around, I’m sorry, I just don’t want to live like that. I lived like that when I was a kid and, you know, when you grow up you say you are going to do better. Well, evidently we did that, we did better, so let’s live like that. I came out of one step above the projects. The only reason I wasn’t there still was because we succeeded, my family, and I don’t want to live like that. But I do go back and give to the community.

Another black homeowner from up the hill in Maplewood (the neighborhood known in jest to residents as Maplegood, as opposed to Maplehood or the eastern neighborhoods) voiced similar sentiments about order in the community during the same focus group. But, when he framed lack of community order as a black problem that inevitably lowered property values, it prompted a contentious discussion about whether this was fair to blacks and realistic about white attitudes. The broader context of his remarks was a question asked by the moderator about whether the strategy of marketing South Orange and Maplewood to whites and thereby limiting black settlement was fair:

The up the hill resident: I want to tell you. I moved into this community and I tell you. To me my property value is important. My property value is important. To me if I see things happening, and my property value is going down, I’m going to do whatever I have to do to secure my property.

A second group member: And that what the white folks said when they saw you moving in.
The up the hill resident: I’m going to sell it. That’s the way it is. If you buy a house for $400,000, it’s like investing in Wall Street. You invest $400,000 on Wall Street, no, let’s say $50,000 on Wall Street and you see your investment go to $40,000.

What are you going to do?

A third group member: I grew up in a very small community. It was so preppy that it is actually listed in the back of the preppy handbook as one of the most preppy towns in the USA. And living in that community, there were the minorities. But in terms of where I lived in town, my neighbors were all minorities. We had maybe two streets over, maybe two houses down, but everybody was minority. Across the street from me and next door on either side were African Americans. And recently I went home and now all my neighbors are white people which is to say that as long as you are maintaining your properties, maintaining your schools, then you don’t really have to worry about who is moving in and who is moving out.

The up the hill resident: Oh, I disagree with that one.

The third group member: You can disagree.

The up the hill resident: I’m just saying if the town goes all black, stand back.

[Erupion of discussion in the room, everyone talking over each other, some amused, others annoyed.]

The third group member: This is exactly what has happened in the community [she grew up in] and I think the key to the reason why it changed, and it changed back, and it changed back and forth is because the mindset of the people there is all the same. Everybody wants the same things. The values are you care about property values and you care about education and you care about low crime [emphasis added]. . .

The up the hill resident: There has been no community in the United States of America that has gone from integrated to being predominately black where the property values have gone up.

The third group member: I think part of the problem is that we see ourselves the same way white folks see us.

Although the moderator for the focus group was black, the participants knew I am white, and some of commentary was certainly made with a white audience in mind. But even the participant (the third group member) who protested the association of race with level of
community upkeep—an implicit criticism of the Community Coalition and its
affirmative marketing practices remained focused on property values, school quality,
and crime. Lassiter, when speaking of suburbanization in the South, criticizes this set of
concerns as the bipartisan political language of private property values, individual
taxpayer rights, children education privileges, family residential security, and white
racial innocence (Lassiter 2006: 304). But these were concerns in which black suburban
homeowners too could participate (Haynes 2001: 107), even if it was more likely to be
qualified by concrete knowledge of poor people and living poor and a greater sense of
empathy for suffering based in inequality.

Signs of Racial Unease in Late 1980s: The Margaret Kelly Michaels Case

If, as the third group member observed, black settlers held the same values
about order in the community as whites, that was not what many whites saw. Racial
relations in the two towns reached their peak of unease with the racial vandalism of the
1980s and the effects rippled across social relations in areas not overtly race-related. In
1988, for example, a teacher who had taught at a nursery school housed in St. George’s
Episcopal Church in Maplegood was convicted of multiple acts of sexual abuse of her
young charges and sentenced to 47 years in prison. The media frenzy surrounding the
trial of Margaret Kelly Michaels, the school teacher, and the crowds of angry
townspople through which she had to pass during her trial verged on communal mob
violence. Kelly was subsequently represented by William Kunstler, the lawyer known for
defending the Black Panthers and the Weather Underground, and exonerated after she
had served five years by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a decision that condemned flagrant violations of due process in the case (Author unknown 1988; Nieves 1994; Kaufman 1993; Rabinowitz 2003). After Kelly’s acquittal, a New York Times opinion writer observed that, although child sexual abuse cases were frequently likened to witch hunts, the Michaels case was unusual because in true witch hunts, the accused were often scapegoats for some calamity . . . [where] in the witch hunts of the 80s, there was no such injury to be avenged or repaired (Talbot 2001). The writer went on to explain the rash of day care child abuse cases as grounded in anxiety about putting children in day care at a time when mothers were entering the work force in unprecedented numbers (ibid.). For the Maplewood case, it was also true that the Michaels case came at a point when many whites in South Orange and Maplewood were experiencing racial transition as a calamity that threatened their community. Michaels was, indeed, a scapegoat of the traditional kind, whose persecution expressed deep unease among whites about changes in the community.

_Beginsing of Municipal Efforts to Limit Black Settlement_

As the towns faced the reality that home purchases by blacks were rising and would likely continue to do so, they took measures to slow housing turnover. The towns used several methods—rent control, limits on real estate signs and marketing, traffic barriers— that were employed not just locally but in other inner suburbs bordering majority black cities, especially Cleveland.
Rent Control against White Flight

In Maplewood, one of the first efforts dated to the early 1970s when the township passed a rent control ordinance for apartment buildings with four or more units that restricted rent increases to a cost of living index (Wang 2005b). The unstated purpose was to slow impending black settlement by reducing turnover in what was then a largely white renter population.³ When implemented in the city of New York during the Second World War, rent control became, when the controls were left in place after the war, a way to provide housing for people in need (Malpezzi 1998). In the suburbs of Newark, the social context turned a potentially progressive policy on its head.

Lawns Signs and the Courts

Efforts to limit turnover in single family homes began during the same period and had wider consequences since the percentage of units that were owner occupied in the towns was larger. Maplewood, in the first of ongoing initiatives, enacted an ordinance in the early 1970s prohibiting the posting of real estate signs on lawns. Neighboring West Orange and South Orange passed similar measures, although the latter towns merely regulated placement and length of time standing for the signs and did not prohibit them. A few years later, a resident of Maplewood, unable to sell his house in the period of disinvestment in the inner suburban ring after the riots, sued the towns, arguing that such prohibitions were unconstitutional on the basis of the First and Fourteenth amendments;

³ Interview with a journalist familiar with why the rent control laws were overturned.
he was joined in his arguments by a local real estate firm, the Berg Agency. Lawyers for the towns, sidestepping direct mention of the issue of white flight, defended the town by arguing that the feared proliferation of signs would be both aesthetically unpleasing and a damper on real estate sales by signaling that many homes were on the market. In its 1978 summary judgment of the case, the New Jersey Superior Court overturned Maplewood’s ordinance but mainly upheld that of South Orange (1978 Berg Agency v. Maplewood).

The court focused on the free speech protections of the First Amendment to find that protections on commercial speech rendered the Maplewood ordinance unconstitutional. The New Jersey court, as had the state Supreme Court in the Mount Laurel rulings, referenced but then ignored plaintiff arguments that directly impinged on the racial dynamics behind the ordinance, specifically those under the Fourteenth Amendment, which had been passed in the nineteenth century to guarantee former slaves equal protection under the law. Instead, the court relied on precedent in a U.S. Supreme Court case decided one year earlier, and found violation of the right to “commercial speech” under the First Amendment as well as the restriction of the free flow of information to buyers, sufficient to vacate the ordinance (1977 Linmark v. Willingboro; Lake Winslow 1981). Even though Maplewood’s law was overturned, one local real estate broker in Maplewood continued into the 1990s to urge residents of Hilton, a neighborhood undergoing rapid racial transition, not to put up signs when selling their houses. Further, many homeowners who chose to sell their homes, as a nod to neighbors anxious about declining property values, voluntarily posted real estate signs parallel to the road so that they were less obvious.

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4 Interview with a trustee of the Community Coalition on Race.
Oscar Newman Traffic Barriers, Sharpe James, and the Media

The town governments, meanwhile, took steps to define more sharply the boundaries between South Orange and Maplewood and Newark. In 1993, the Maplewood township committee secured permission from the State Department of Transportation to install traffic barriers across streets that crossed the Hillcrest neighborhood of Maplewood, on the one hand, and Newark’s Vailsburg section, the formerly Irish and Italian neighborhood that had transitioned to black middle and working class after the riots, on the other (see figures 7 and 8 in appendix for pictures). The idea for the traffic barriers went back to the proposed designs of the architect and urban planner, Oscar Newman, who argued in *Defensible Space* (1972) that crime prevention and neighborhood safety required creating enclosed spaces about which residents felt a sense of territoriality. Newman intended his designs as an alternative to “increased police force” and “firepower” (Newman 1972:1), but his proposed solutions echo the panopticon proposed by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century as a model for prison design and used by Foucault (1995) as a metaphor for modern methods of surveillance and social control:

*Defensible space* is a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms—real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance—that combine to bring an environment under control of its residents. A *defensible space* is a living residential environment which can be employed by inhabitants for the enhancement of their lives, while providing security for their families, neighbors, and friends (Newman 1972: 3).
The notion of governmentality, Foucault’s insight that the repressive characteristics of government under democracy are not just the attempt of the governing to control others but also of the governed to control themselves, is exemplified by the installation of the Newman traffic barriers (Foucault 2007; Dean 2010; Ettlinger 2011). The barriers both made it harder for Newark residents to enter Maplewood and more difficult for Maplewood residents to let themselves enter a Newark perceived as dangerous, a portion of which is nonetheless their neighborhood.

In the 1980s, barriers similar to those in Maplewood had been installed in Shaker Heights, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, that was also experiencing racial change on its urban borders. The city of Cleveland, supported by the NAACP, sued in order to force the barriers to be taken down, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed two lower courts and upheld the placement of the barriers in Shaker Heights (1987 City of Cleveland v. City of Shaker Heights; Keating 1994: 109; Martin 1987). Predictably, the decision to install the gates in Maplewood, first proposed by the Hillcrest neighborhood association and backed by an association leader, Ken Pettis, who would later become the town’s first black mayor, provoked outrage from the political establishment in Newark. The then-mayor of Newark, Sharpe James, fired off an angry letter to the mayor of Maplewood, Robert Grasmere, and the two took the dispute to the television media in New York with appearances on the Today show with Katie Couric and the Phil Donahue show. James, never one to forgo florid rhetoric, likened the barriers to the erection of the Berlin Wall. He also overlooked the use of similar Newman-influenced neighborhood tactics in Newark, where his administration supported tear downs of high-rise public housing projects and their replacement with low-rises with far fewer units along lines that
Newman supported. The defenders of the barriers in Maplewood, for their part, characteristically side-stepped the racial issue. On the Donahue show, Mayor Grasmere argued that the issue was not keeping Newark residents out of Maplewood but preventing "unruly" traffic. On the same show, Pettis objected to appearing with community representatives from Long Beach, California, where a proposed wall between white and Latino neighborhoods was causing controversy: "Racism and elitism do exist . . . [b]ut that's not what we've been about" (Nieves 1993), sentiments that had been echoed by several black homeowners in Shaker Heights a few years earlier. The Long Beach, Shaker Heights, and Maplewood situations were, in fact, quite similar. But the ability to deny that the tactics were exclusionary was easier when those being excluded were African-American and working class.

The supporters of the barriers between Maplewood and Newark, both black and white, defended them in a way that implicitly accepted class exclusion. What Lassiter labels the "color-blind discourse of suburban innocence" (Lassiter 2006: 1) that whites in the Sunbelt South used to justify backlash against the Civil Rights movement a mode of thinking that substituted largely legal class discrimination for technically illegal racial discrimination could be used by both races in certain instances, as we saw in the discussion of black attitudes toward property value protection. But many blacks in the community felt sufficient kinship with the residents of Newark to object to erecting physical barriers to Newark. A black participant in the Community Coalition on Race explained why she felt uncomfortable with the barriers, although other black participants in the group supported them:
[I] don’t want anyone to think we are putting them down. That was one of the issues when one of the gates went up in the community. It became very contentious . . . . So Ron Rice [Sr., a state senator] got involved and said what are you trying to do, keep us out here? [I] do not want to be a part of that perception, that is absolutely not what [the Coalition is] doing. That does come up when we do [marketing] tours [of the towns], because all of the sudden there are these little pockets when you see the gates.

Interviewer: What do you think about the gates?

I’ve been very vocal about the gates, I am not happy about them. You know I understand why neighbors on that street might want them whether it’s because of the traffic, the cars and the speed, what have you, and safety of children. At the end of the day, though, I think you cannot make decisions based on one block and a handful of neighbors that affect the entire community. I do think those kind of decisions . . . send a message and that people are short-sighted.

The overlap of race and class meant that most blacks were partial participants in the turn toward the post-1960s rhetoric of “color-blind,” openly classist discrimination.
South Orange and Maplewood as Component of a Globalizing New York Region

The black-white dynamic grew more complicated through the mid-1990s as the towns became more closely integrated into the New York metropolitan region. Between 1990 and 2000, the black population of Maplewood gained 5,775 people, an increase of 227% in a single decade (table 6) in the black population. At the same time, New Jersey Transit installed a commuter train connection from the suburbs west of Newark into New York that for a relatively small cost, $69 million, converted disused train lines in the Meadowlands that had been acquired from bankrupt private rail companies into a component of the public rail network (figure 13). The construction was part of a large investment in connections between New York and New Jersey funded by the Federal government under The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) that had a six-year funding commitment with bipartisan backing in Congress. Where train passengers from South Orange and Maplewood formerly had to switch to a subway train at Hoboken, they could, as of 1996, ride all the way into Penn Station on the west side of Manhattan from even distant suburbs. The connection was immediately over capacity with 7,000 riders for 6,000 seats (Kannapell 1998). Between 1995 and 2000, far more New Yorkers (206,979) moved to New Jersey than the reverse (97,584) (Census Bureau, quoted in Golway 2005), in part because of the Midtown Direct and other improvements to the regional rail system. The result for South Orange and Maplewood residents was a drop in commuting time to Manhattan from about an hour to 34 minutes and an influx of new neighbors who might otherwise have resided in Brooklyn or Manhattan, or who came from those boroughs.
### Table 6

Non-Hispanic Black Population and Proportion Black, Suburbs Bordering Newark, NJ, 1970 - 2010

Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1970 to 2000 (SHRBLK, SHRBLK, SHRD); black alone counts for 2010 from Social Explorer

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<td>8590 (.41)</td>
<td>10535 (.48)</td>
<td>11384 (.53)</td>
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*Data not exactly comparable; NCDB had not been updated as of January 2013.
Anxieties about Housing Values

The resulting changes in the inner suburbs of Newark pushed the area toward keeping pace with the regional trends on housing values. The new residents probably brought with them an uptick in housing values in certain neighborhoods of South Orange and Maplewood, particularly the more affluent ones near the train station and on the western side of the towns away from Newark, although in the years immediately after the opening of Midtown Direct property values overall in Maplewood and South Orange remained flat when compared to the NY-NJ-CT MSA (table 7). Stagnant housing value in the decades after 1970s had been the main story for the inner suburbs that lay east of the Hobart Gap in the Watchung Mountains at Millburn. The gap provided an opening for the rail and road transportation corridor to suburbs further west where population and home values soared after 1970 with respect to the region (figure 13). East of the gap, closer into Newark, where Maplewood and South Orange were, the riots and the structural effects of deindustrialization certainly affected housing values, but the result was more to stifle the rapid appreciation that most suburbs along the transportation corridor were undergoing rather than absolute decline. Maplewood and South Orange saw, by comparison with the NY-NJ-CT-PA MSA, declines in average housing value of 4% and 6% respectively between 1970 and 2000 (table 7). In Philip Roth’s 1997 novel, American Pastoral, the main protagonist, Swede Levov, buys a large house and property west of Morristown where, according to his father, they [don’t] like the Jews and the
Table 7

Change in Average House Value, Newark and Selected Suburbs, 1970 to 2000
Source: Neighborhood Change Database.
Note: Average housing value computed using specified owner occupied units over same units; median housing value not available before 1990 for municipalities of <50,000

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Italians and the Irish. His father had wanted him to do what many from Weequahic, the largest Jewish neighborhood in Newark, were doing in the 1960s and 1970s, i.e., move to the Newstead section of South Orange where the houses built into the eastern slope of the Watchungs had views of Newark and Manhattan:

The answer was Newstead. In Newstead he would not have the headache of a hundred acres. In Newstead he could live with his family among young Jewish couples, the baby could grow up with Jewish friends, and the commute door-to-door to [the glove factory he owned], taking South Orange Avenue straight in, was half an hour tops . . . Dad, I drive to Morristown in fifteen minutes . . . The 8:28 express gets me to Broad Street 8:56. Stockbrokers take this train to work. Lawyers, businessmen who go into Manhattan. Wealthy people (310)."

The character, Swede, accurately expressed not just where the wealthy were living in the suburbs of the region but where they would increasingly live in the coming decades.

Adherence to the bonds of ethnicity was, in this context, costly in terms of return on investment in housing.

But far worse off in housing terms than South Orange and Maplewood were the working class suburbs that directly bordered Newark and that received significant immigrant populations while retaining working class and poor whites as well. This was true even by comparison with Newark, where housing values merely remained flat against the region, because, among other factors, the catastrophic loss of housing units in the fires of 1967 constrained the supply of units and because Newark, as a majority black city, housed a significant population of members of the new black middle class. The metropolitics literature often verges on characterizing black clustering as a form of pathology, and it conflates the trajectory of the physical infrastructure of inner suburbs with the well-being of residents (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001; Orfield 2002; Rusk 1993; Brenner 2002). In housing value terms, the metropolitics literature receives support from a consideration of the inner suburbs of Newark between 1970 and 2000, but
the picture of the human beings inhabiting the places is more complicated. Suburbs that underwent rapid racial transition included Irvington, East Orange, and Orange—municipalities that transitioned after 1970 to majority black but also working class suburbs that did not fully transition such as Belleville, Bloomfield, Hillside, Kenilworth, Roselle, and Roselle Park. Indeed, some of the worst declines in Essex and Union counties in housing value against the region over the 30 year period after the riots occurred in the working-class suburbs of Hillside, Union, and Roselle, perhaps because these suburbs, which also border Elizabeth, had significant Latino settlement, including direct settlement of new immigrants who were significantly poorer than established U.S. residents. (Latino numbers remained small in South Orange and Maplewood.) Majority black suburbs in the area, as did Newark, housed many who benefitted from the gains in income levels for blacks (Bates 1984; Lacy 2007) over the period.

By contrast to the picture of decline that was variegated by race for the inner suburbs, the wealthy suburbs due west of Maplewood and South Orange along the exurban transportation corridor, Summit and Millburn, saw their property values soar in relation to the region. Real estate values in these highly affluent towns were more volatile, dipping sharply in the property market downturn of the late 1980s, in part because they were more closely tied into New York markets for housing finance (figure 14). Nonetheless, in Millburn, for which Maplewood provides a buffer from Newark and Irvington, housing values went from 60% above the regional average in 1970 to 147% above in 2000; similarly, Summit, which borders Millburn on the west, went from 60%
above the regional average in 1970 to 116%. In large measure, the better fortunes of the real estate markets in these towns were tied to the high percentage of residents who commuted into work in the financial sector in Manhattan. The effects of globalization—deindustrialization and disinvestment in Newark and its immediate environs, a thinning middle class, and soaring fortunes in more distant suburbs plugged into global circuits of capital—are striking when one considers housing value and income in the Newark region in the forty year period after 1967. As went Newark and its suburbs, so went the United States.
Chapter Six: Civil Rights to Anti-Steering to Affirmative Marketing

One of the fears that many long-time residents had about greater integration into the New York region via transit was more settlement by minority people in the towns. The Community Coalition on Race was founded in 1996, the same year that the Midtown Direct connection to Manhattan was brought online, and the formation of the group was both a response to local conditions especially the sharp uptick in black residents in Maplewood over the 1990s and to broader concerns about connection to the diverse universe of the New York region. Midtown Direct also held out the possibility of a surge in property values for all the towns on the train line into New York, and the desire on the part of local "homevoters" (Fischel 2001) to take advantage of the possibility of gentrifying, or at least to see that Maplewood and South Orange did not lose out after years of property value gains that were weak by comparison with suburbs further west.

Origins of Community Coalition on Race

The initial organizers of the Community Coalition were local homeowners who either were already or would become active in town government and civic groups. Their main focus quickly became marketing the towns in local publications in white neighborhoods in areas such as Brooklyn and Hoboken and then conducting tours of interested buyers, who, because they were used to diverse urban environments, were
thought more willing to buy in the neighborhoods near Newark and Irvington that were seeing black settlement, a practice known as “reverse steering.” Greater connection to the New York region, then, instead of undermining white control of the towns was used to ensure its continuance.

The one generalization about initial members of the Coalition is that they were homeowners. Beyond this, they were not clustered in one particular neighborhood—neither the most affluent neighborhoods up the hill, Newstead in South Orange and Jefferson in Maplewood, nor the least affluent, Hilton in Maplewood. In fact, the latter neighborhood, which during the 1990s underwent the most dramatic racial change of any census tract in South Orange and Maplewood during the 40 year period after 1970, going from 12% to 60% black in a single decade (see tract 197 in table 8 and figure 15), contributed few members to the Coalition. Partly, this was because most of the active early participants in the Coalition were white and established in town and, by contrast, many of the residents in Hilton were new residents. Partly, it was also because DeLuca, the politician who lived in the neighborhood, who had moved from Newark to Hilton in the 1980s and served as mayor of Maplewood for part of the period, and constructed an alternative organization in Hilton to support political ambitions that were said to go beyond Maplewood and perhaps include running for governor; his base was primarily working class whites and blacks who were likely to support unions. The early members of the Coalition were, by contrast, more conservative and mostly more affluent. Indeed, for many, the motivation for their participation in the Coalition came from owning houses that were the primary or only financial assets for the household.
Table 8

Black Population in Maplewood and South Orange by Census Tract, 1970 to 2010
Data from Social Explorer

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Early Coalition members also tended to be active in the community across multiple organizations, including both civic groups and town government. The first organizers included the Village President of South Orange; two future mayors of Maplewood; other town committee members; the owner of a local real estate agency; a member of the Citizen’s Budget Advisory Commission, an anti-tax group that tracked town governments expenditures such as copier and toner costs in great detail; the school board president and a future member of the school board of the towns’ joint school system; and others who had multiple ties to the many civic institutions in the towns.¹ The primary impetus for the formation of the group came from whites affiliated with the town governments who then sought, and got, participation by black homeowners, who were, like the whites in group, professionals who were affluent but not wealthy. Two of the early black participants, for example, were men with high status jobs in the governance aspects of the financial sector in Manhattan. In general, participants were the “joiners” of the community for whom affiliation with the Coalition blended with active civic participation in groups where open discussion of “race” was unlikely. Indeed, the Coalition has persistently faced resistance to municipal funding of its marketing efforts from local conservatives who, because of the organization’s name and some of its sponsored activities, such as a Martin Luther King Day celebration, misunderstand the Coalition to be a civil rights group. Instead, the group was very much of a piece with other mainstream, local civic organizations.

¹ This section based on interviews with staff and several trustees of the Coalition, members of the community not affiliated with the group, and materials about the history of the group provided on its website at www.twotowns.org.
The core concern of the group lay in real estate prices and how to position the towns to counteract housing values that were depressed relative to the region. In the background was the conclusion of a tangle of cases that allowed marketing of real estate to whites to go forward. In 1983, the Village of Park Forest, about 30 minutes southwest of Chicago, had asked a real estate agent to market three homes it had purchased in a neighborhood that, like Hilton in Maplewood, had transitioned to majority black residence rapidly. The town and the agent contracted to place advertisements in newspapers with a predominately white circulation and to market to white rental complexes and selected employers who might yield white buyers (Hayes 1990). But, in a move that triggered the series of lawsuits, the Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors refused to include the homes in its multiple-listing service because the Board’s lawyer believed that the agreement between the suburb and the agent violated fair housing law. In the lawsuits that ensued, realtor representatives, including the National Association of Realtors, and civil rights and black real estate agent groups with whom they had historically clashed allied to oppose “affirmative marketing and its attempt to achieve “integration maintenance” through “integration management,” the practices South Orange and Maplewood would later implement. The case that integrated the various challenges was eventually argued before the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, the appellate court long known as a “bastion of conservative thinking” (Lewis 2009) that included two Reagan appointees out of the University of Chicago Law School who were noted for their adherence to the conservative Law and Economics School — Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook. In keeping with the ideological
tendencies of the court before which the case was heard, the outcome was that “affirmative” marketing did not violate the Fair Housing Act because, the argument went, it did not restrict choices for blacks, who would have been interested in the homes anyway. The court underlined its conclusion by emphasizing that no potential black homebuyers who could show harm from affirmative marketing had testified. Indeed, the justices concluded, affirmative marketing fit with the Housing Act’s (inferred) promotion of an ideal of integration (1991 *South Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors and National Association of Realtors*; Keating 1994: 216; Smith 1993; Thomas 1991). The decision of the Seventh Circuit was confirmed by the refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court to hear an appeal on the outcome of a countersuit (1992 *Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors v. City of Blue Island*). Because the case went up to a district court and then the Supreme Court, the decision to allow targeted marketing of houses to whites, has, since 1992, stood.

Affirmative marketing turned civil rights rhetoric on its head and continued to attract controversy. For Park Forest and other towns, including Shaker Heights and Oak Park outside Chicago (Goodwin 1979; 2004 OPEN Conference notes) that implemented similar strategies, advertising meant to attract whites was accompanied by giving encouragement to blacks who sought housing in the towns to look instead in places with smaller black populations. The latter practice attracted two lawsuits for Shaker Heights (Keating 1994). With regard to the South Suburban case, the head of a chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who had a filed a brief in the case opposing affirmative marketing, argued the practice was overtly racist: “Affirmative marketing is a badge of inferiority . . . . There is no effort to manage the
integration of any other group but blacks . . . They're saying African-Americans can ruin communities and no one else can (Hayes 1990). However, the idea of pitching places like Maplewood and South Orange i.e., white suburbs that bordered majority black cities and that were seeing black settlement had backers through a group known as the Fund for an OPEN Society, headed by an advocate, Don DeMarco, who had established the affirmative marketing efforts in Park Forest and in Shaker Heights (Hayes 1990; Keating 1994; Saltman 1990). It was to DeMarco and OPEN that South Orange and Maplewood turned for advice in how to establish its own integration management program.

The Maplewood-South Orange group began as a committee appointed by the town government of Maplewood, known as the Committee to be Named. Soon after, the committee sought participation by the municipal government of South Orange and formed a joint committee, the Intergovernmental Task Force on Racial Balance. Eventually, the towns decided to set up the effort as a public private partnership that would receive funding from both towns as well as private donations (Koebel 1998; Squires 1989). Public-private partnerships are sometimes criticized as a way of socializing costs and privatizing benefits and work in this instance as such. As a homeowner group, the goals of which were to secure protection of home values in a single suburb, the group would use municipal funds to protect homeowners over potential black in-movers, who bore the costs of relative lack of information about available housing but did so in a way that was extremely difficult to challenge in court. The ruling against the challenge to affirmative marketing in the South Suburban case had, indeed, turned in part on the inability of opponents of such marketing to produce testimony from
potential black purchasers who had been harmed. The American system of localism, particularly pronounced in New Jersey, where ‘home rule’ establishes more than 500 municipalities for one of the territorially smallest states, dates to the Articles of Confederation in the eighteenth century and works powerfully to ensure that municipal boundaries serve as social boundaries, both for race and class.

The public-private partnership in South Orange and Maplewood was founded in 1996 and named the Racial Balance Task Force Incorporated; the name was changed to the South Orange-Maplewood Community Coalition on Race shortly after. Its initial budget funded an executive director, advertising efforts, and consulting fees to Don DeMarco and OPEN. One of the early participants in the Coalition characterized its purpose as the ‘next step’ after the Civil Rights movement:

For a lot of as it seemed not as clean as the Civil Rights movement, but it certainly seemed related. It was like the next step.

Because, as you know, certainly academically, housing integration has really gone down the tubes and HUD has not been a help. There's been very little effort to make integration work. At this time, is very little support for communities like this in Montclair and others. There are very few perks to being an integrated community. So it has taken a tremendous amount of money, time, and volunteers energy struggle, an enormous job to make intentional integration work.

But, on balance, most early participants in the Coalition described more pragmatic goals that centered on protecting housing value. One early black participant framed the issue neatly as steering based on race and linked this clearly with hiring DeMarco and OPEN:

The main issue for me was the equity issue in terms of having the sense that people were not having the opportunity to see homes in particular neighborhoods and that it had nothing to do with economics. It seemed to be based more on race.
And at the time I was committed to the town . . . and had a general commitment to the town and the health of the town, the viability of the town.

The concern was that whites weren’t being shown African-American or neighborhoods where the majority were people of color. But the other concern was that perhaps there were people of color that were not being shown homes in white neighborhoods.

As a result of the ad hoc committee, a consultant, Don DeMarco, was hired and the South Orange Maplewood Community Coalition on Race became incorporated and we developed a board of trustees, an executive board, established committees and went to both governmental bodies to ask for funding to support our efforts because we recognized right off that when we were going to anyone, to foundations for grants, that one of the first questions they asked was what kind of support we got from the townships.

As mainstream as its purpose was, the group did in fact have a history in organizations with a civil rights focus that dated to initial black settlement in South Orange and Maplewood. The changing concerns of local participants in the groups that addressed race in South Orange and Maplewood over the decades after 1970—first community dialog that welcomed blacks, then opposition to efforts that racial vandalism to scare blacks off, then fighting real estate agents who sold declining neighborhoods primarily to blacks, then marketing the towns to whites—mark the transformation of not just the local political landscape under racial transition but of attitudes toward race and the trajectory of social movements across the United States (Lassiter 2006; Self 2003; Kruse Sugrue 2006; Mumford 2007). One early group, South Orange Neighbors, had been started in the 1970s at the Presbyterian Church that later received a bomb threat (see chapter Three) in order to encourage discussion between blacks and whites and to welcome blacks to the community. The groups over time had many of the same individuals. After the racial vandalism incidents, another group formed, Maplewood Friends, and the two groups subsequently merged to become Friends and Neighbors of South Orange–Maplewood, or
FAN. This group had a more conservative cast than the groups that came earlier. Nonetheless, FAN had several members who were active in local politics and acquired a reputation for radicalism that, as with the Coalition, did not mesh with their politics. FAN was, in a tendency the Coalition later repudiated, more of a political action than a civic group and was willing to use confrontational rhetoric to achieve its aims. Most notably, the group attacked local real estate agents that it felt were steering blacks to neighborhoods on the eastern border of the towns. One interviewee, not a member of FAN but later part of the Coalition, regarded FAN as overly moralistic and observed that they went after realtors without ever trying to engage them in conversation. Their tactics, the Coalition member felt, was angry and counterproductive: FAN really set up adversarial relationships with the brokers. They said you're steering. We know you're steering. You're all bad. You're all racist. Moreover, the Coalition member felt, the group itself did not include either more conservative whites or African-Americans:

Interviewee: They were such a homogenous group that they had very little buy-in from people of color. They had very little buy-in from people who were more conservative, and they were going at it from the moral perspective. We should do this, we should think about these issues of steering and racial change from a moral perspective.

Interviewer: Okay, rather than from an economic perspective.

Interviewee: Rather than from any other perspective.

The organizational style of the Coalition was in many senses formed in reaction against what its leaders perceived as the 1960s rhetoric of FAN. By contrast, the Coalition tended to eschew publicity on the more controversial aspects of its work and to cultivate a non-confrontational style that especially avoided using accusations of racism against
One of the rules in the coalition is that you never use the R word (racism) because it stops conversation. A black Coalition member did not frame it as explicitly avoiding racial confrontation but did say the Coalition avoided confrontation in general and especially with realtors:

I think what dominated the discussion when you speak in terms of housing was how to establish a working relationship with the realtors so that we would have more of a partnership than an adversarial relationship.

It is also true that the Coalition avoided accusing others of racism because a certain amount of acceptance about white attitudes toward blacks was central to the way they worked. They were not an organization whose primary goal was combating racism.

Friends and Neighbors had initiated contact with Shaker Heights and then with the consultant Don DeMarco, who had moved on from Shaker Heights to the Fund for an OPEN Society, based in Philadelphia. His participation in developing an integration management group for Maplewood and South Orange continued after FAN folded and the Coalition came on the scene. DeMarco was spoken of as a role model by advocates of integration maintenance in South Orange and Maplewood, but he also had generated controversy over his career of the sort that made some of the more civically-minded members of the Coalition nervous. He also raised hackles among some black coalition members with statements that implied that integration could not always proceed by above the board means. He had initiated the programs in Park Forest that resulted in the South Suburban case discussed above and had left his job as director of community service in Shaker Heights after two black renters filed discrimination complaints against the suburb. Through two non-profits, Shaker Heights provided rental services that steered whites toward increasingly black neighborhoods and encouraged blacks to look outside Shaker
Heights, in part by not providing them listings of rentals in black neighborhoods. The substance of the second, more sustained complaint—the renter in question was represented by the former president of the Cleveland City Council—was that black renters were being discriminated against because they were not given all available listings (Keating 1994). Although the case was settled without requiring alteration of Shaker Heights housing policies, it served as a warning that a case filed in another court system, particularly in New Jersey, a state with a history of progressive legal decisions on housing, might go differently. As a result, when the Coalition formed and began setting its own policies, it avoided efforts to direct blacks outside of South Orange and Maplewood. In the same vein, the Coalition has tended to talk up its community building activities such as support of local art galleries and downplay in public the more controversial marketing efforts, even though these are the main reason that the Coalition receives funding from the towns. The tendency to avoid discussing the core mission of the group among outsiders led to complaints in early years about the secretive nature of the Coalition, but the desire to avoid litigation was important for the success of the group.

As the Coalition progressed toward implementation of its goals in the late 1990s, the marketing strategy took on the greatest importance. Members of the Coalition began by reaching out to real estate agents in order to get them to support rather than oppose what the Coalition intended, as a trustee of the group explained:

I think what dominated the discussion when you speak in terms of housing was how to establish a working relationship with the realtors so that we would have more of a partnership than an adversarial relationship. So that was one of our first initiatives, we had a realtors advisory board.
Another early group member described an effort, ultimately abandoned, to select realtors who demonstrated that they did not steer blacks to neighborhoods near the eastern border. The idea was to designate such agents as "preferred" but the agents reacted angrily and the Coalition backed off:

So the conversation with the brokers was, look, this is our goal. We want to increase demand by people of all races in all neighborhoods in our community. We have a commodity. We have something of value to you. We are advertising and we are giving tours of the community so we know the names of people that want to live in these communities. If you can demonstrate to us that you will show houses in all neighborhoods, we will give you some of our leads. We will give you something that is of value to you, and so that started this Preferred Brokers committee.

Some brokers came right on board and some brokers were angry as anything. How dare you! How dare you accuse us of steering and we are required by law to be color blind and you are asking us to notice race and we can do that... Some of those realtors were so angry that the coalition totally backed away and probably to this day has backed away from the idea of preferred brokers even though it kind of happened in the background. Now it is the realtor advisory committee to the marketing committee; made it very soft.

After this minor encounter with controversy, the Coalition pursued a strategy of engaging all real estate agents by assuming their good will about showing houses to buyers of all races.

A professional publicity campaign, about half of which was funded by the towns, was the next step. The budget for the Coalition by the early 2000s hovered in the neighborhood of $140,000 to $160,000, and the majority of it went to its marketing efforts (South Orange/Maplewood Community Coalition on Race, 2002-2010; 2004 OPEN Conference notes). At their peak participation, the municipalities of Maplewood and South Orange contributed about half of the budget; in 2004, for example, the towns gave $70,637 against total revenues of $158,463, and the rest of expenditures were
covered by private donations and government grants, including one from the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation (South Orange Maplewood Community Coalition on Race, Form 990, 2002-2010). By comparison, the integration management efforts in both Shaker Heights at the height of its funding and the Oak Park Regional Housing Center, had expenditures that ranged between $575,000 and $1,039,414, respectively, and provided services closer to what a private real estate agent might, such as providing listings to individual home seekers (Keating 1994: 104; Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights, Form 990, 2009-2011; Shaker Heights Relocation Services website, 2013; Oak Park Regional Housing Center, Form 990, 2009). In mimicking the efforts of real estate agents, the groups in Shaker Heights and Oak Park risked legal challenges based in a developed body of Fair Housing law.

By contrast, the strategy in South Orange and Maplewood focused much more heavily on marketing efforts in the media and community events that would be written up in print. This played to the proximity of the area to New York media markets and to local residents who could furnish free professional advice on place marketing. A publicist hired by the Coalition began placing articles in newspapers and magazines that depicted the towns as progressive and welcoming. Over the next ten years, articles that treated South Orange and Maplewood or that referenced the community in a positive light appeared in the New York Times and in various community papers in Brooklyn, Jersey City, and Hoboken as well as in Family Circle, Victorian Home Decorating and This Old House magazine. Although working on a smaller budget, their efforts had a greater effect on fate of their communities because they reached a wider audience than did traditional realtor marketing employed in Shaker Heights and Oak Park.
Under the name “Community Coalition of South Orange and Maplewood” rather than Community Coalition on Race, the group placed advertisements for the towns in community newspapers. As a matter of policy, the group usually used the name “Community Coalition” for external communications and the “Community Coalition on Race,” its legal name, mainly internally (2004 Personal Notes). When potential buyers responded, they received a packet that made reference to the black population of South Orange and Maplewood via discussion of jazz events and pictures of black school children with white children (figures 16-18) and referenced “diversity” in the towns in a muted way as a group member involved with publicity explained:

When you market diversity most whites don’t think of themselves as being ingredients of diversity because they don’t think of [themselves] as having a race. So when you market diversity, you’re basically saying we’re not talking to you white people. We’re only talking to you people of color. So the marketing is very clearly not about marketing diversity, but it was about marketing our good schools or telling the stories about our towns about who lives here and what kind of housing stock we have and stressing education and culture and lifestyle—one knows coffee houses, diners, ethnic and gourmet restaurants; [places] for morning coffee and bagels to late night café and latte. You’re creating a picture of a town that you want to become self fulfilling. It wasn’t at the time that we wrote [the marketing materials].

The packet also contains newspaper articles on South Orange and Maplewood, including one that encapsulated the image the Coalition was trying to project for the towns: “A Place to Feel Homey While Staying Hip” (Caldwell 2008). The media buzz about the towns also began to generate more serious coverage that included an article about race relations among children in the school system that went on to win a Pulitzer Prize (Lewin 2000) and talked at length about the process by which white and blacks who live together closely become alienated from each other.
While it might be true, as the Coalition member observed, that direct marketing of "diversity" to whites did not work, articles extolling the "coolness" of South Orange and Maplewood as suburbs made oblique reference to the presence of blacks. The marketing materials that the Community Coalition sent out to potential buyers who responded to their ads featured photos primarily of black children rather than adults. But, clearly, race was still being used to market to progressives in urban neighborhoods for whom the presence of blacks was in some way a positive. Some interpreters, as noted earlier, see this kind of marketing as a positive sign for race relations and for the ability of Americans to live in a "transracial" society (Wynter 2002). In this view, marketing techniques respond to an underlying shift in American values whereby blacks represent "cool" and cool is sufficiently neutral as a value to be not just accepted but embraced by whites. But it is important to distinguish trends in consumer culture and cultural representation from the function they serve. In integration management in South Orange and Maplewood, representations of blacks were being used to market the towns to whites so that whites, rather than blacks, purchase homes there, in a region where good homes in good school districts are a scarce commodity. In such a context, it is hard to see how this is win for a progressive society.

Eventually, the Coalition moved away from a strategy of marketing the towns to gentrifying, mainly white, urban areas. As of 2013, they no longer were using a publicist and instead relying on a passive strategy of using the group's webpage, Facebook account, and Linkedin account to attract those interested in South Orange and Maplewood, which have by now an established reputation as progressive, racially mixed
suburbs. This change may have been a budget driven tactic (the municipal contribution to the Coalition is under perpetual threat) or may have been a result of some of my observations made during interviews about earlier affirmative marketing strategies.

In addition to its marketing strategies, the Community Coalition also set up a touring committee to show potential buyers houses in the area. The integration management programs in Shaker Heights and Park Forest had attracted law suits for treating white and black home seekers differently, and Oak Park, a suburb bordering western Chicago, continued through the Oak Park Regional Housing Center to direct blacks who sought rental units to other suburbs as late as 2004 (2004 Personal Notes). South Orange and Maplewood, by contrast, avoided liability by giving tours to groups of potential home buyers of any race and showing them all the areas of town together. Potential homebuyers were invited to meet volunteer representatives of the Coalition at the train from New York and were taken in cars initially and then later on a bus funded for the towns by NJ Transit. Rather than direct blacks to other towns, the group showed potential homebuyers regardless of race all neighborhoods in both towns. The goal was to provide full information to those homebuyers who physically arrived in South Orange and Maplewood and to avoid the appearance of denying blacks information about the housing market despite marketing intended to bolster demand among whites. Certainly, there was nothing to prevent blacks from seeing the advertisements that the group placed in various magazines, noticing that the photos were of racially mixed residents, and seeking housing in South Orange and Maplewood. One focus group participant, for example, who was black but married to a Latino man recalled seeing Coalition placed ads in the New York Times and Park Slope newspapers and purchased a home in the Hilton
section of Maplewood, where the towns were seeking whites, as a result. Similarly, the Coalition can also claim, with justice, that its marketing efforts have helped attract interracial couples who see their marketing materials as expressive of a community in which they can reside comfortably.

Black Asset Levels and the PRISM Loan Program

Still, the reality of the lag in the asset levels necessary to purchase a home for blacks means that affirmative marketing primarily applied to less affluent neighborhoods. It is far easier to attract white people to more affordable neighborhoods on the border with Newark than to attract blacks to neighborhoods with unobstructed views of Manhattan, even when the latter was expressly desired by Coalition members. The group was most successful in what a black trustee referred to as its "eastern strategy," i.e., attracting whites to neighborhoods undergoing racial transition to black:

We developed an eastern strategy and a western strategy. The eastern strategy was to attract whites, who happened to be the under-represented group in the eastern end of town and for the western strategy, it was attracting persons of color where they were the under-represented group.

With the eastern strategy, it was a multi-pronged approach. And what we did there was, first of all, we had several ads that we placed in different newspapers throughout the New York area—the New York Times, Hoboken, I believe Jersey City, and we focused ads on getting people to come here. Then we had tours that were set up. People were not, it’s not that the strategy was to show them one particular neighborhood, where there was underrepresentation, but to get people to come, do the tour and see ALL of the neighborhoods in the entire community.
The Coalition trustee, who had throughout the interview evinced frustration with the interviewer’s questions about the Coalition’s relative success in less affluent neighborhoods, was no doubt sincere in wanting greater integration in those neighborhoods. But it is nonetheless clear from her description of the “eastern” strategy that the marketing efforts of the Coalition are targeted to neighborhoods near Newark and Irvington that are or threaten to “go black.” Defense of such tactics rests on drawing a bright line between steering allowed under law (whites to black neighborhoods) and steering forbidden under law (blacks to increasingly black neighborhoods). But, in both cases, black neighborhoods are problematized and regarded as something to be eliminated.

Criticism of the Coalition for its strategy of marketing to whites, primarily by black residents, resulted in a several strategies to counter criticism. One of these I encountered when I began interviews of Coalition members only to discover that they had all had “media training” that helped keep them their responses exasperatingly consistent when describing the activities of the Coalition. Another was the development of a loan program, known as the PRISM (Pro-Integrative Supplemental Money) program, designed to prevent what Coalition supporters, following Don DeMarco, call “re-segregation,” i.e., white flight as a result of black settlement, and to blunt accusations that “affirmative” marketing was racist. The program, which is largely in abeyance today, provided home buyer loans in the early years of the group that supplemented a main mortgage with a below market loan on the condition that the purchaser buy in an area in which they were “under-represented” racially. Monies came from the Fund for an Open Society, which provided a $150,000 revolving loan fund, and the towns for a brief period
provided matching loans. The main advocate for the loans, a professor of business at Rutgers-Newark, had argued for including a guarantee in the loan providing some form of forgiveness if the home depreciated more than the regional average over the period of ownership. This feature was not implemented because black trustees of the Coalition termed it "black insurance," or insurance against the idea that blacks would continue to move in at the same rate, and vetoed the entire program as result (Coscarelli 1999a). The program was later approved by the Coalition trustees with the black insurance feature removed, although the program continued to make loans by drawing a distinction between blacks and all other groups, as the mayor of Maplewood explained in an interview describing how loans were allocated by race of home purchaser: initially, Asians and other non-black minorities will be grouped with whites and racially mixed families that include blacks will be grouped with blacks (Coscarelli 1999b). Eventually, the program made about a dozen loans primarily but not exclusively on the eastern side of town and primarily but not exclusively to non-blacks. As with affirmative marketing, though, attempts to justify such programs on equity grounds run into the reality that structural racial differences in the housing market make efforts to push whites toward more affordable neighborhoods much easier than encouraging blacks to buy in affluent ones.

*Arts-based Strategies*

The Community Coalition also embraced strategies, particularly after a decade in operation, that distinguish it from earlier groups in Ohio and Illinois. One of the more successful of these is an arts-based strategy that designated the Hilton neighborhood the "Hilton Arts District" and pitched the town generally as friendly to artists who were
being priced out of Hoboken, Park Slope, and other urban gentrifying neighborhoods (Florida 2002). A Coalition member who claimed responsibility for the strategy described the process of re-inventing the towns, where nightlife still closely resembles Durand's painting of Jefferson Village, as an arts mecca for urban sophisticates who happen to be hunting for a residence larger than 1800 square feet. The core of the strategy was re-branding the Hilton neighborhood, for which changing the racial composition was a primary goal of the Coalition, as the center of town for the arts:

...So the marketing, if you build it, they will come. We were at a marketing meeting one night, and I came up with the idea of calling Hilton the Hilton Arts District. Actually it happened after the meeting. I was driving home, and I had this brainstorm about the Hilton Arts District so I actually went back to the meeting, and we decided to start talking about the Hilton Arts District, and a couple of weeks later, months later, I'm in town, and there's a white woman and a black man, a couple, and they're looking in the window at Robin Hutchin's gallery which used to be down the village. There was the Performers CafŽ was going to be a the Dehart Center, and I was just kind of walking by them, and I heard them, and I said, ÒOh what's going on?Ó And they said, ÒOh yeah this Performers CafŽ you know it's in the new arts district?Ó And I was like, yes, it's caught on.

And, indeed, artists have settled in South Orange and Maplewood in recent years, at least in part because of efforts by the Coalition, particularly after a new executive director took over in the mid-2000s. The presence of gay couples with children in the towns pre-dates the formation of the Coalition, and Coalition marketing materials until recently did not directly address gay families, but their larger presence in the towns probably owes at least something to the strategy of arts-based marketing.

Black Agency and Shifting Goals: A More Progressive Coalition over Time
The Coalition has continued its marketing activities and conducting tours of South Orange and Maplewood neighborhoods. As of 2013, it had added a Facebook page and LinkedIn account to its advertising efforts and largely dropped place targeted advertising as an necessary expense (perhaps because it opened the group to criticism of marketing to whites). The group had always sought to balance its participation in committees and community outreach by race, and it hired an African American executive director who stayed for a period of a few months in 2006, after the white executive director who served from 1996 to 2006 moved to another job. Another white executive director was hired in 2007 and has remained in the post until the present (2013). The current executive director is someone who did not participate in the early years of the Coalition, and her primary role in the community prior to becoming executive director was as a relatively progressive school board member. Her role in the Coalition has been to take it in a somewhat leftward direction, moving it away from the activities that connected directly to the Shaker Heights and Oak Park group. The idea of directing black homeseekers to other towns was not a practice Coalition members generally knew about, although that effort is one of the core functions of the Ohio and Illinois groups and at the heart of the integration management case that went to the Supreme Court. Instead, the Coalition conducts tours, usually that meet potential home buyers at the train station out from New York, and show buyers of all races all neighborhoods. Such differences between the groups are in many ways a function of location: The South Orange and Maplewood group has tended to be more progressive than its Midwestern counterparts. Yet, it is possible in recent years to see a more progressive turn to Coalition endeavors.
Over time, as more black trustees and Coalition members, who remain a minority in the group, have joined and the population of African Americans in South Orange and Maplewood has risen, the group has taken on a role that brought it closer to a civil rights agenda. Saltman (1990) sees this as a sign of failure for a neighborhood stabilization group because such activities she believes alienate whites and bring the group away from its core mission of creating neighborhoods where whites will continue to live as African Americans settle. She describes the example of a Hartford group that became majority black and shifted its concerns to neighborhood crime and other safety issues. But why understand black agency as a negative? Indeed, part of the role of any community group treating race in a genuinely integrated community is precisely to address the concerns of both groups seeking to live in the contested space of the inner suburb.

Most noticeably, the Coalition took an active leadership role, at the behest of its education committee where blacks held the majority, to counter classroom segregation in the schools, with the support of the executive director. Such segregation was based on so-called “ability” grouping, known locally as “leveling.” A progressive school administration had managed to reduce classroom segregation at the elementary schools where, until the late 1990s, even kindergarten classes diverged sharply by race, but was encountering stiff resistance from many white parents about introducing similar measures in the middle and high schools. At the time, the committee within the Coalition on schools was predominately black, and in order to get across the message that “ability” grouping that was segregationist in intent was wrong the black members of the committee reached out to whites who agreed with them. A black Coalition member described the effort and her attitude toward doing so:
With the Schools committee, and we struggled with this for a long time, we had to bring in the underrepresented group, which was white. Do you know what a hard sell that was for me in the African-American community to be able to say that? We really had to be comfortable in terms of what we were doing and why we were doing it. Because at the end of the day, do I have a problem with the school being all black? Absolutely not. Do I think it will get the financial resources it needs if that happens? That is not the norm.

The Coalition took an active role in advocating greater ‘de-leveling’ for social studies and language arts in the middle school and later high school. This effort prompted an uproar in the towns among schoolparents along ideological and racial lines and angry denunciations of the Coalition, even among whites who normally self-identified as progressives. Both towns, who fund the Coalition because of its perceived positive impact on housing values and the tax base, reduced funding to the Coalition and at least one town committee member threatened to withdraw funds entirely. The Coalition eventually backed off full-throated support for deleveling and embraced instead community discussions of the perceived ‘racial achievement gap,’ the Washington think tank policy theme, but it continued to support the progressive school superintendent in his efforts to reduce classroom segregation. In this effort, as constricted as it was, the Coalition had come close to fulfilling the claims by some members, as well as opponents, that it was more than just a branch of local government.
Conclusion

Black settlement in the inner suburbs of Newark in the period of deindustrialization and response to the riots of 1967 provoked a number of changes in the community life of Maplewood and South Orange. The most obvious were the direct responses detailed in Chapters Three and Six: Initially, community efforts to welcome the few and scattered new black settlers, soon followed by anonymous threats of violence; simultaneous efforts to rally the community to oppose vandalism to the homes of African Americans; then organized groups to fight real estate agents who sold houses primarily to blacks in neighborhoods with declining property values; then marketing the towns to whites. More recently, as the black population of the towns has remained relatively steady at approximately 35%, perhaps greater tolerance of black neighbors among whites and easier management of racial issues in the schools.

In addition to its wider range of property values, i.e., the broader class range of its residents, South Orange and Maplewood was distinguished from other nearby suburbs that were also adjacent to Newark such as East Orange and Irvington that became majority black over the same period, by the degree to which its efforts to retain a certain social mix were sustained. Such efforts were, inevitably, exclusionary efforts with regard to African Americans. But as black settlement grew nonetheless black residents increasingly asserted their full rights as citizens via the school system but also through municipal politics. As African Americans became more than a third of the population, local businesses along Springfield Avenue in Maplewood and along South Orange Avenue in South Orange also began to cater to blacks and, increasingly, to be owned by blacks. Although beyond the scope of this project, black ownership of local
businesses, together with "homevoter" status, eventually promised greater access to the right to the suburb on the part of black residents.

The more direct and obvious methods of municipal exclusion of African Americans were accompanied by a range of practices, of governmentalties, that were embedded in daily life. Such daily practices included routine policing that made African Americans more careful of the police than their white neighbors, and sometimes afraid of them. These practices were part of the suburbanization of policing habits of Newark that went back to the arrival of African Americans from the South at the start of the Great Migration in the early part of the twentieth century. An anti-gang ordinance that drew encouragement from post-September 11 security measurements and would have drawing funding from Federal sources with the same concerns was targeted at gangs that remained largely non-existent in the suburbs and constituted another example of the habit of marking suburban territory as white in advance of potential black threat. Similarly, the location of a new police station in Maplewood along Springfield Avenue, with its symbolic reference to the 1967 riots, served as a marker of the point beyond which suburban (white) residents did not wish urban problems that they perceived as black to advance.

Actions up and down the geographic scale also came into play in controlling the social mix of the suburb. Federal housing policy failed throughout the period to provide affordable housing in the suburbs, as evidenced by the lack of LIHTC units. For the area of study, where the overlap of race and class was quite strong, this also meant little impact of the Mount Laurel decision and the failure to build of one of the largest planned affordable housing developments in New Jersey. Such a trajectory was also evident in the governmentalties of daily life in decades after the riots. The various signs of racial unease in social life as blacks began to arrive, particularly the racial vandalism incidents, and the beginnings of the use of government to
control the racial makeup of the towns, including rent control, restrictions on advertising of home sales, and traffic barriers designed to keep urban traffic out; all these contributed to an urban/suburban and black/white divide that proved extraordinarily difficult to break.

At the same time, the role of African Americans in shaping their own space in the suburbs became increasingly important during the period of the study. South Orange, which, long before the appearance of formal integration management, had a relatively well integrated housing stock in racial terms, was the best example of this. The South Civic Association, a long standing, black, urban-suburban bridging group, historically was at least tangentially involved in local political issues on racial subjects, although its role appears to have declined in recent years. Municipal politics in general in South Orange exhibited more racial equality, in contrast to Maplewood where whites tended to control the selection of black candidates and often squelched the independence of black candidates who did run for office. In part, this was a function of the more robust income levels of African Americans vis-a-vis whites in South Orange than in Maplewood.

Foucault’s notion that the positive, formal aspects of government—the expressed goals of policing, housing policy, and municipal government—are but a small part of how society works to govern itself has been an important component of the approach throughout this work. The conduct of conduct of citizen-subjects (Ettlinger 2011) reproduces the repressive norms of the modern neoliberal state. The specific techniques of power that reproduce things as they are shift perpetually. But norms in a human population such as class and racial segregation change very little because we reproduce them over and over again in our daily lives (Foucault 2007; Ettlinger 2010; Elden 2007; Elden 2010a; Elden 2010b; Elden 2010c). In describing how a human population self-polices from below the norms that benefit only a few in any given time
and place, it can be difficult to see how transformative change can occur. Foucault’s approach is, of course, post-modernist, which intellectually allies itself more with anarchistic approaches to change than with those deriving from Marxian frameworks. By this thinking, the way out of the conundrum of how to foster change is not through structured, formal programs. Rather, mutual tolerance is the most important value to cultivate as well as what are, effectively, *ad hoc* approaches to problems as they arise in the community.

The project evolved over time from one focused on integration management strategies exclusively to one that tried to understand more broadly how a community would respond in its daily life to racial change. In the course of detailing my observations, it became clear that controversial subjects such as racial transition do not yield consensus from research subjects on major topics in terms of interpretation or even minor factual details in an interview setting; the role of the researcher is to somehow resolve what are often highly divergent descriptions of what on the surface seem to be the same lived reality. Archival work sometimes yields fuller data, and it can correct interviewees who have a partial view of the situation, but the two need to be used in tandem. In retrospect, I wish that I had left interviewing and the focus groups for far later in the process than I did and let the archival work lay the groundwork more thoroughly for the interviews. As it was, I used more of a dialectical process that sounded good in theory but did not work as well in practice.

Two crucial areas of divergence from my research expectations presented themselves in the course of the project. The first was the nearly complete absence, with the exception of the today declining South Orange Civic Association, of political organization, formal or informal, across the urban-suburban boundary. My early interviews, which included township officials and community activists with experience in various organizations, spent a considerable amount of
time probing for cross-connections between the Newark political structure, on the one hand, and South Orange and Maplewood, on the other, and finding next to nothing. Essex County government, which encompasses both Newark and South Orange and Maplewood, is notoriously dysfunctional and corrupt with two recent officials who served consecutive terms as County Executive, Thomas D'Alessio and James Treffinger, both going to prison. One interviewee with long experience in both Newark and suburban politics laughed when asked about the value of the county for organizing: "Essex County is totally useless. It's a job for people who need pension padding." The relationship between South Orange and Maplewood and Newark was to this official's way of thinking non-existent: "There has really been no relationship over the years with Newark." Indeed, if one were to judge solely by newspaper articles, the primary interaction of South Orange and Maplewood with its urban neighbor to the east over the period of the study would seem to be the construction of and controversy over the traffic barriers between certain streets in the towns and Newark. In light of the lack of concrete manifestations of regional cooperation, it is hard to see how the notion of relational autonomy in the work of Frug and Young can have much practical application in the immediate term with regard to urban-suburban boundaries, however much it may apply within political boundaries.

A second area of divergence from initial expectations was the degree to which the Community Coalition on Race differed from other groups like it. Although the Shaker Heights, OH, and Oak Park, IL, integration maintenance groups were models for the South Orange-Maplewood group, and Don DeMarco, who had worked for Shaker Heights, was a consultant for the South Orange group, the Maplewood group is quite different from the other two. It never sought to differentiate in any way which neighborhoods were shown to people of color (all comers are given tours of all neighborhoods), and it operates more as an influencer of the
community and of potential in-movers rather than as the municipally-funded real estate agent that the Shaker Heights and Oak Park groups have been. In this guise, the Coalition is freer to function both as a maintainer of integration and as a genuine community group, particularly in its interventions in the schools.

A number of areas suggest themselves for further inquiry. The schools are clearly such a large part of the picture in a community study that any full study is incomplete without considering education. This requires evaluation of a much different and large literature, and it was decided early on that such an endeavor was beyond the scope of the project, but it is the first component of research in any wider project. Similarly, a chapter on the development of black and white small businesses along Springfield Avenue and the revitalization of the business district there and the surrounding neighborhood will be another important area of endeavor. Both topics, education and small scale economic development, are crucial components of the story of social mix in these U.S. suburbs.
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