IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION:

INSTITUTIONS, GROUPS, AND INTER-ETHNIC CONTEXT

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Immigrant Political Incorporation:

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This dissertation examines the processes of immigrant political incorporation by focusing on Turkish immigrants and their organizations in Germany and France. The primary research concern is to explain variations in the degree and the trajectory of political incorporation across immigrant groups and host countries. The existing literature prioritizes either group-based (i.e. migrants' socio-economic status, ethno-cultural identities, strength of their ethnic organizational networks, or size and geographic concentration) or institutional factors (i.e. national citizenship policies, multicultural policy frameworks, electoral regimes, or minority incorporation structures) as determinants of immigrant political incorporation. While the existing theoretical frameworks provide rich accounts on internal and external political opportunities that are available to immigrant groups, they share the common weakness of explaining when and how immigrant groups take the advantage of these political opportunities and become

active participants in their host country politics. This dissertation contributes to the current literature by demonstrating that immigrant groups' perception of their group position in their host country's inter-ethnic context influences the extent to which they seek to integrate into the politics of their host country. In this respect, immigrant groups who see themselves as holding a disadvantaged position in their host country's ethno-racial hierarchy are more willing to become politically active and improve their perceived disadvantaged position compared to other groups. On the other hand, immigrant groups who perceive themselves to occupy a higher position in host country ethno-racial context feel less of an incentive to become politically active, and instead prefer to maintain their distinction from the lower status immigrant groups who tend to mobilize politically.

The empirical findings in this research are drawn on my fieldwork research in Germany and France, which was undertaken in two rounds between 2010 and 2012. To develop my framework, I used a wide breadth of sources ranging from in-depth elite interviews to census and mass-surveys, from documentary materials to fieldwork observations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This dissertation has not only been a product of a long, challenging and stimulating intellectual journey, but also of numerous actual journeys within and across Europe and the US that not only introduced me to the topic of immigrants' politics but also turned myself into an immigrant in various host countries. This research would not have been possible without the generous help and encouragement of many faculty members, colleagues, friends, and family members.

To start with, I have been very fortunate to have such a wonderful dissertation committee. I owe my deep gratitude to my supervisor Dan Kelemen for his guidance and support throughout my research. His comments and suggestions have enriched my thought, sharpened my arguments, and brought my work into focus. Thanks to our meetings via Skype, I could continuously get his advice during my fieldwork research and dissertation-writing process in Europe. I am very grateful to Robert Kaufman for his insightful feedback and sharp analyses that helped me disentangle and elaborate my theoretical argument. His advice will keep on illuminating my future work. I owe a big intellectual debt to Jan Kubik who introduced me to the field of Social Movements and helped me theorize "culture" as one of the key driving forces in political phenomena. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen has been much more than an external reader to me. She kindly hosted me as a visiting graduate student at the Political Science Department of the *Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona*, which provided me a great intellectual environment during writing my dissertation. Her enthusiasm about my research and her meticulous comments on each of every draft of my chapters has enormously contributed to this work.

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One of the best parts of this whole experience was to understand how good friends matter in tough times. The list is so long that I cannot acknowledge all by name. But I would like to send my special thanks to Bahar Demirdirek, Gökçe Baykal, Erman

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DEDICATION

To *Raul Viedma*

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INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1980s, the issues of immigration and integration have been at the center of heated public debates in Europe. Although migrants and their children are at the very locus of these political contentions, the questions related to political mobilization, participation and representation of migrant-origin people in their host country politics have been away from the focus of policymakers and scholars until recently. Right-wing political actors have either perceived immigrants as temporary settlers that do not require political rights in their host country or considered migrant political integration as the last phase of incorporation process, which must be preceded by socio-economical integration and cultural adaptation. On the other hand, academic circles have prioritized social, economic, and cultural dimensions of migrants' incorporation process into their host societies. The political dimension of immigration has been primarily studied as a question of political institutions and policy-making processes, border controls and state sovereignty, and public opinion towards immigrants and anti-immigrant right-wing backlash.

Despite the initial silence, the importance of migrants' political incorporation into their host country politics is largely acknowledged today. Normatively speaking, there is a widespread consensus on the necessity of including the new outsiders into their host country politics in order to sustain the legitimacy of democratic governance. From a pragmatic point of view, it is argued that immigrants' higher level of political incorporation provides them a direct voice in their host country politics, reinforces their

influence on policies directed to themselves, increases perceived legitimacy of host country political institutions, and therefore paves the way for immigrants' increasing sense of belonging and commitment to their host societies.[1] As a result, for healthy functioning of democratic systems, it becomes crucial to understand which factors lead to immigrant-origin people's increased participation and representation in host country politics and which factors hamper these participatory processes.

1. Statement of the Problem and Hypotheses

This dissertation is about processes through which immigrants become a part of their host country's politics as individuals and/or as groups. The primary research concern is to inquire why some migrant groups attain a firmer political consciousness, mobilize into political engagement, participate in host country political processes at higher levels and therefore achieve a stronger political presence in their host country politics at individual and collective levels compared to other migrant groups. To gain analytical leverage on these questions, this dissertation examines the causes of different levels and trajectories of migrants' political incorporation by focusing on multiple immigrant groups in one host country context and a single immigrant group in multiple host country contexts.

Today, there is a growing literature that examines the factors shaping participatory patterns of migrant groups. While there is no consensus among scholars about the causes of variation in the levels and the trajectories of migrants' political incorporation, two competing analytical perspectives prevail in the scholarship. Some scholars prioritize internal *group-based* factors as the major determinants of migrants'

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[1] For instance, European Commission's reports on *European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals* (2005 and 2011) emphasize the importance of migrants' participation in democratic processes for facilitating their overall integration in their host countries.

participatory processes. In this respect, migrants' socio-economic status, ethno-cultural identities, the scope and the strength of their ethnic organizational networks, the attributes brought from their home countries, and the other factors related to their immigration experience such as the mode of exit from the home country, the length of stay in the host country, the size and the geographical distribution of group members, and the socio-cultural distance from the host society become the key factors that explain variations among immigrants' patterns of political incorporation. While group-based perspectives provide insightful accounts about the variation among multiple groups in a single host country context, they often fall short of explaining why similar immigrant groups develop diverse levels and patterns of political participation across different host country national contexts.

Some other scholars prioritize external *institutional* factors as the determinants of migrants' political incorporation. In this perspective, host country's institutional and political arrangements such as national citizenship regimes, multicultural policy frameworks, the structure of state-society relations, the structure of political parties, and electoral systems are perceived as the key factors that explain different levels and trajectories of migrants' political mobilization and participation. Yet, the institutional approach has been criticized for overlooking migrants' diverse levels and patterns of political incorporation within a single institutional context as well as their transnational political ties and resources that go beyond nationally bounded host country political context. Despite scholars' call for bridging multiple approaches to have a comprehensive view of immigrant politics, there is still a need for developing a theoretical framework

that accounts for how multiple factors interact with each other in the formation of immigrants' politics.

In this dissertation, I argue that national, transnational, and group-based opportunities define the availability of political resources that make immigrants' political engagement viable. Yet, the availability of political resources cannot determine whether and how immigrant groups would take the advantage of these political resources and become active participants in host country politics. In other words, the existence of political opportunities does not necessarily guarantee the emergence of political mobilization and participation. I propose that subjective factors i.e. migrants' perception of their group's position in host country ethno-racial hierarchy and their incentive to improve their perceived disadvantaged position vis-à-vis other immigrant groups become a crucial link between political opportunities and political action. Therefore, the inter-ethnic context of the host country and migrant groups' perception of their status within this context rises as a third factor that shapes the level and the trajectory of immigrants' political incorporation. In this dissertation, I inquire the mechanism through which host country political context, migrants' (nationally or transnationally available) group-based resources, and their perceived status in host country ethno-racial hierarchy interact with each other and lead to variances in immigrants' politics.

I hypothesize that immigrants' collective dissatisfaction about their group's relative position in host country ethno-racial context paves the way for a stronger political consciousness and motivation aimed at improving group position vis-à-vis other minority groups. Yet, immigrants' collective perception of group's relative deprivation does not by itself result in their increased political participation and mobilization. In some

cases, the hostile context of reception leads to “reactive ethnicity” in which immigrant groups are retreated into their ethnic groups and take an adversarial stance against the majority society (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). I propose that the existence of vigorous network of immigrant organizations and ethnic/political entrepreneurs have a crucial role in transforming collective grievances into collective political claims, vocalizing these claims in host country public sphere, informing and politically socializing members of immigrant community and organizing the line of political action. Therefore, immigrant groups who perceive relatively deprived position in their host country inter-ethnic context, along with their collective organizations and ethnic leadership, strive to increase their presence in host country politics and develop an unexpected trajectory towards political incorporation. During this process, the host country political context becomes crucial both in shaping the inter-ethnic group hierarchy by privileging certain immigrant groups over others as well as in determining the legitimate paths for immigrant groups’ political action.

On the other hand, I argue that if a migrant group perceives itself to be in a better position in the host-country ethno-racial context, they would be less willing to engage in political action to improve their status. I expect that the primary political strategy of such an immigrant group would include maintaining their distinction from the lower segments of host country’s ethno-racial context. Therefore, they would be less willing to engage in inter-ethnic alliance and political cooperation with the immigrant-origin groups who supposedly stand at the lower ends of perceived ethno-racial hierarchy.

Figure 1: Factors explaining immigrant political incorporation.

Factors	Areas	Indicators
Institutionalist Factors	Host Country Political Opportunity Structures	1- Citizenship regime: liberal/restrictive 2- Accommodation of differences: multiculturalist/republican 3- Structure of interest mediation: corporatist/statist
Group-Based Factors	Immigrant Groups' National and Transnational Resources	1- Socio-economical status 2- Ethno-cultural identity, homeland traits, ethnic organizational structures 3- Immigration related factors: exit and reception conditions
Subjective Factors	Host Country Inter-Ethnic Context	Perception of disadvantaged or better-off position in host country ethno-racial hierarchy

2. Empirical Puzzles: Political Incorporation of Turks in Germany and France

This study explains the process of migrants' political incorporation into their host countries by focusing on Turkish immigrants[2] and their organizations in Germany and France. Comparative studies in migration scholarship have often depicted Germany and France as two opposing political contexts that produce strikingly different outcomes of migrants' political identification, mobilization, and participation (Soysal 1994; Ireland 2000; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Odmalm 2005; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010). In the case of Germany, the ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood and the exclusionist citizenship regime until the 2000 German nationality reform have been considered as the major handicaps against migrants' political incorporation at individual and collective levels. The restrictive nature of citizenship regime and political discourse in Germany, not only deprived foreign residents and their children from attaining basic political rights, but also undermined their collective interest in German politics and

[2] In this research, the term "Turkish immigrants" refers to those people who originated from the Turkish Republic. It includes first generation immigrants and their offspring. Therefore, the way that the term "Turkish" is used in this research does not indicate an ethnically homogeneous category, but includes people from diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds.

reinforced their ties and engagements with their home country politics. On the other hand, Germany's corporatist model of interest mediation structures and relatively higher proximity to multicultural policy frameworks compared to the case of France have supported migrants' group-based identities and their ethno-cultural organizational structures and eventually paved the way for migrant organizations' structured dialogue with host country public authorities. Therefore, while German political structures have been undermining immigrant political incorporation in many respects, the same political context has provided some formal political channels for immigrants' group-based politics.

On the other hand, in the case of France, historically liberal citizenship regime and inclusive definition of French nationhood are thought to make the French case a fertile soil for immigrants' political incorporation. While the inclusive citizenship regime in France allowed foreigners' and their children's inclusion into the political society, the political discourse rising in this setting paved the way for immigrants' increasing identification with and interest in French politics. On the other hand, the difference-blind nature of republican regime and the official disavowal of multiculturalist policy frameworks have undermined the development of ethnic politics and its organizational relations with host country public institutions. Therefore, in the case of France, immigrants' political mobilization has been in the form of extra-institutional socio-political movements.

In this research, I argue that despite the path breaking reforms in German migrant integration policies in the post-2000 era -including the 2000 citizenship reform and official acknowledgement of Germany as a country of immigration-, Germany and

France still exhibit substantially different immigrant integration regimes at the national level. Particularly, the existence of "material and symbolic barriers" in German citizenship laws such as the restriction of dual-citizenship (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012) as well as the "restrictive backlash" in the mid-2000s such as language and civic knowledge tests for naturalization (Howard 2009; Howard 2012) have curtailed the liberal intentions of the 2000 citizenship reform in Germany and contributed to the gap between French and German immigrant integration policies.

As I show in the following chapters, different immigrant integration regimes in Germany and France are, to a great extent, translated into immigrants' strikingly different levels and trajectories of political incorporation. Immigrants in France tend to have higher levels of political integration at the individual level than their counterparts in Germany. In other words, census data and survey studies show that immigrants in France have higher naturalization rates, higher level of political interest in host country politics, higher rates of electoral participation, and higher number of representatives at the local levels than their counterparts in Germany. On the other hand, immigrants pursue qualitatively different strategies of collective politics in these two national contexts. While the case of France is a home of extensive collective political mobilization of immigrant-origin groups in extra-parliamentary forms such as marches of *Beurs* or movements of undocumented immigrants; in Germany, migrants' collective politics follows a corporatist pattern of negotiations between immigrants' organizations and the German government through state-supported platforms of interest mediation.

The central puzzle of this dissertation is concerned about the process of political incorporation of Turkish-origin people in Germany and France. Turks are the most

numerous third-country immigrant group in the EU. Besides their significant numbers, the fact that Turkish immigrants lack former colonial ties with any of countries in Europe makes them a compelling group for cross-country comparison. Empirical findings presented in the following chapters illustrate that Turks in these two national contexts differ from each other as well as from other major immigrant groups in their host countries in terms of levels and trajectories of their political incorporation. In short, Turks in Germany have exceeded expectations in terms of political integration: Turkish immigrants have politically integrated to a greater extent than existing group-based or institutionalist theories would have led one to expect. By contrast, Turks in France have fallen short of expectations, integrating into French politics less than one would have expected based on existing theories. These variations cannot be fully explained by either group-based nor institutionalist approaches. Therefore, this dissertation aims to explain three empirical puzzles: (1) Why do Turkish-origin people achieve higher level of presence in German politics both at individual and collective levels compared to other labor migrant groups in Germany, while their lower socio-economical performance would make us to expect the reverse? (2) Why are Turkish-origin people in France largely absent from French politics both at individual and at collective levels, despite the fact that French institutions are widely considered conducive to migrants' individual level political integration and group-level extra-parliamentary political mobilization? (3) What factors explain German-Turks' relatively successful political incorporation compared to their counterparts in France?

2.1. Political achievements of Turkish immigrants in Germany compared to other labor immigrant groups

There is a broad consensus among the researchers that Turks are the least socio-economically integrated immigrant-origin group in Germany. Empirical analyses document that Turkish-origin population constitutes the lower tiers of highly selective German education system as well as encounter more challenges than other immigrant groups in the German labor market (Alba, Handl, and Mueller 1994; Worbs 2003; Thränhardt 2004; Kristen and Granato 2007; Below 2007). Again, empirical findings indicate that Turks are less accepted socially, have less native contacts, and have the largest cultural gap with the host society (Klink and Wagner 1999; Haug 2003; Steinbach 2003). Although critics emphasize that a process towards integration is taking place over time (Diehl and Schnell 2006), still the image of Turks as less socio-economically integrated immigrant-originated group in Germany dominates the scholarship.[3]

On the contrary, the empirical evidence that I present in the following chapters shows that Turkish-origin people achieve greater political incorporation in German politics compared to other labor immigrant groups, who also arrived in Germany in the 1960s as guest workers. When we consider lower socio-economical and cultural integration of Turkish immigrants into German society, their success in political terms becomes further puzzling. Despite all the hurdles in German citizenship laws that particularly affect Turkish-origin people such as the ban on dual-citizenship, Turkish

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[3] A recent study conducted by the "Berlin Institute for Population and Development" has once more confirmed that Turks are the least integrated immigrant group into German society in socio-economical and cultural terms. It is a minor but symbolically important note that while the original report was titled as "Unused Potential: The Current State of Integration in Germany", the news sources opted for putting Turkish immigrants under spot and preferred the heading of "Turkish Immigrants Least Integrated in Germany". See: http://www.dw.de/study-shows-turkish-immigrants-least-integrated-in-germany/a-3975683 (last visited on September 06, 2013)

people in Germany tend to have higher naturalization rates than other labor migrants coming from Italy, Spain, Greece, and former Yugoslavia (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Hochman 2011). According to the 2012 census, while 40.7% of Turkish-originated people hold German citizenship, this is only 32.6% among former Yugoslavians (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). A population survey in Berlin that was conducted in collaboration with the Center of Turkish Studies and Integration Research (ZfTI) in 2001 illustrates that Turks (83.6%) have the highest intention to vote in state elections after native Germans (86.2%) (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2002, 11–12). While the same survey demonstrates that Turks are less interested in German political issues than other immigrant groups, the lower interest in host country politics does not undermine Turkish presence in German representative institutions. My findings show that both at the Bundestag and at the state level parliaments,[4] Turkish-origin people achieve strikingly higher level of representation compared to other labor immigrants in Germany (even after we control for their proportion in the German population).

At the collective levels, Turkish-migrant organizations in Germany, despite their predominant interest in home country politics during the initial phases of Turkish migration (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Ögelman 2003), have become prominent actors in German immigration and integration politics. My fieldwork on the major Turkish umbrella organizations in Germany demonstrates that regardless of their interest in home country politics, all of the major Turkish umbrella organizations endeavor to raise Turkish immigrants' collective concerns in German public sphere. The major claims include equal political rights including the access to dual-citizenship and local voting

[4] In my analysis, state-level parliaments of Germany include 11 states (including Berlin) in the former West Germany where labour migrants initially settled down.

rights for foreign residents, easing the restrictions on family unification, right for mother language education in public schools, and recognition of Islamic organizations as corporations under public law status. Therefore, “equal rights” framework constitutes the chief pillar of collective political mobilization and participation of Turkish-origin people in Germany.

As it is expected, the strategies of collective political mobilization and participation are highly determined by organizational sources and capacities. Turkish immigrant organizations, which are better plugged into German institutions, find more opportunities to raise the collective claims of Turkish immigrants in formal political arenas. Whereas, the outsiders tend to mobilize their grassroots support and seek public visibility in extra-institutional spheres. Yet, regardless of these diverse participatory paths chosen by organizations, my research argues that Turkish immigrants demonstrate a puzzling case of political incorporation at individual and collective levels that could not be predicted by their socio-economical status.

2.2. “Turkish Exception” in France?

France hosts the second-largest Turkish-origin population in Europe after Germany. Migrants from former French colonies are the predominant ethnic minority groups in France. Turks constitute approximately 7% of immigrant-origin Muslims in France (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2000, 26). Therefore, they are the minority within the minority.

In terms of level of political incorporation, Turks in France present a diametrically opposing case compared to their counterparts in Germany. While German-Turks achieve a striking political success both at individual and at collective levels compared to the other labor migrant groups in Germany, French-Turks’ political

incorporation lags behind of the other major ethnic migrant groups in France, particularly Maghrebians and their children. At the individual level, Turkish immigrants have lower rates of naturalization than other non-European immigrant groups. While 42% of immigrants from Algeria held French citizenship in 2008, this was only 29% among immigrants from Turkey (INSEE 2012, 113). The Trajectories of Origin Survey, which was conducted by INED and INSEE in 2008, shows that Turkish-origin people have lower interest in French politics and lower tendency to register for French elections than Maghrebian-origin immigrants (Tiberj and Simon 2012). While children of Turkish immigrants show an increasing trend of political incorporation compared to their parents, they still fall behind of descendants of Maghrebians. Consequently, French-Turks are almost completely absent from higher levels of elected bodies in France. Apart from the startling Turkish representation in the German case, all other European countries with a history of migration from Turkey (such as Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden) have at least one Turkish-origin MP at their national parliaments with the exception of France. So far, Turks in France have a tiny political representation only at the municipality level.

At the collective level, the politics of Turkish-origin people in France presents even further puzzling trends. My fieldwork research on Turkish immigrant organizations in France confirms the arguments that French-Turks and their organizations have been, to a great extent, invisible at the national level of politics in France (Petek 2008; Akgönül 2013). Turkish migrant organizations in France, until their politicization in the wake of homeland issues, have mostly focused on local-scale activities with the purpose of catering towards socio-cultural needs of Turkish immigrant community and developed

minimum contact with host country political actors. On the contrary, since the early 1980s, immigrants and their children in France, particularly Maghrebian-origin people, have engaged in large-scale grassroots level political movements that either defended their cultural rights under the rubric of "right to be different" or claimed equal rights and anti-discrimination. Turkish immigrant organizations, except some of the left-wing organizations with a limited constituency, have been deliberately distant to such mobilizations. When we consider the fact that Turkish immigrants and their children encounter similar socio-economic and cultural challenges with other non-European immigrant groups in France, their reluctance to join such cross-ethnic alliances becomes even further surprising situation. What is more, the lesser number of Turkish-origin people living in France and their possibly weaker group resources cannot satisfactorily explain this situation. Despite their lesser numbers, Turkish immigrants and their organizations in France have recently demonstrated that they can politically mobilize and become visible collective actors in the French public sphere, when the national interest of Turkey is at the stake. In the mid-2000s, the diplomatic crises between Turkey and France -including France's strict opposition to Turkey's EU bid and French legislation that recognizes the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 (during the late Ottoman era) as a genocide and denial of it as a crime- resulted in higher levels of political mobilization and participation of Turkish-origin people at individual and at collective levels.

2.3. Turks in Germany and France in comparative perspective

The cross ethnic group analyses that compare Turkish-origin people vis-à-vis other major immigrant-origin groups in Germany and France provide empirical evidence for German-Turks' success and French-Turks' under-achievement in terms of their political

incorporation at individual and collective levels. In this research, I argue that neither group-based perspectives nor institutionalist theories can adequately explain this cross-national variation of Turkish immigrant politics. Therefore, two main questions inform the puzzle of cross-national variations in Turkish immigrants' politics: (1) why do Turkish immigrant groups coming from the same country of origin develop different levels and trajectories of political incorporation across their host country national contexts? (2) Why do observed cross-national divergences in Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France not fit into the expectations of institutionalist approaches?

To start with, immigrants originating from Turkey do not constitute a homogeneous group but are highly divided in ethnic, religious, linguistic, and political lines. However, Turkish immigrant communities in Germany and France share the similar lines of community divisions. In other words, both in Germany and in France (also in other European cases with Turkish migration history), Turkish migrants are divided into ethnic (Turkish versus Kurdish), religious (Sunnis versus Alevis, Islamists versus secularists, and official Islam versus political Islam), and political (left versus right wing) lines. Apart from their similar lines of diversity, Turkish immigrants in Germany and France, to a great extent, share a common trajectory of immigration that includes labor immigration in the 1960s, family unification in the 1970s, political immigration as asylum seekers and refugees in the 1980s and in the 1990s; similar socio-economical status; similar ethno-cultural gap from the host societies; and considerable concentration in urban cities. Despite all these commonly shared group aspects, Turkish-origin people develop different levels and patterns of political incorporation in Germany and France.

Cross-national divergence of Turkish immigrants' political incorporation calls for attention to the institutional factors as the primary causes of such variation. Yet, a closer analysis shows that the cross-national patterns of Turkish immigrants' politics do not fully fit into institutionalist expectations (see: Figure 2). Firstly, institutionalist analyses portray Germany as an unfavorable context for immigrants' individual level political integration, due to restrictive elements in national citizenship laws and lingering effects of ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood (Soysal 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Howard 2009). On the other hand, France is usually depicted as fertile soil for individual level political integration, due to her historically liberal citizenship laws and inclusive ideology of the republican regime (Schnapper, Krief, and Peignard 2003). By contrast, empirical findings illustrate a quite opposite situation, in which German-Turks have higher interest in host country politics, higher electoral participation rates, and startling success in political representation, compared to the French-Turks.

Secondly, the existing political claims analyses portray Germany as a primary case of immigrants' transnational political engagements compared to France (Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). In Germany, the significant portion of immigrants' political claims is related to the politics of their home country, not to issues in German politics. However, my research demonstrated that while Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany have been directly or indirectly involved in their home country politics, they have also achieved a substantial interest and presence in their host country politics.

Thirdly, the existing literature argues that immigrants' collective mobilization and participation in France is primarily oriented towards host country (French) political issues

and institutions. Due to the difference-blind political structures of the French republic, such mobilizations in France take extra-parliamentary forms (Ireland 1994; Bousetta 1997; Odmalm 2005). However, French-Turks and their organizations have deliberately avoided taking a part in these socio-political movements of immigrants. What is more, to the extent French-Turks' interest in French politics has increased in recent years, this has been driven not by truly domestic "French" issues but by transnational political issues, such as France's relations with Turkey.

Figure 2: The puzzling aspects of Turkish immigrant politics in Germany and France

Countries	National Immigrant Integration Policies	Existing Literature on Immigrant Politics	The case of Turkish immigrants and their organizations
Germany	• Restricted citizenship regime • Corporatist interest mediation • Limited multiculturalism	• Limited individual-level political integration • Limited collective presence in host country politics • Primacy of transnational political issues/engagements • Corporatist paths for group-based political participation	• Strong individual level political integration • Strong collective presence in host country politics • Dual-organizational agenda: National and transnational political issues • Corporatist patterns of political participation
France	• Inclusive citizenship regime • State/Individual interest mediation • Official disavowal of multiculturalism	• Strong individual-level political integration • Strong collective presence via extra-institutional means • Strong interest in host country political issues • Low interest in home country politics	• Weak individual level of political integration • Weak collective presence in host country politics • Weak interest in home country politics • Strong interest in home country politics

3. The Argument: The Role of Perceived Group Position in Host Country Ethno-Racial Hierarchy

This dissertation argues that immigrant groups' perception of their group position in their host country's inter-ethnic context influences the extent to which they seek to integrate into the politics of their host country. Ethnic migrant groups who see themselves as holding a disadvantaged position in their host country's ethno-racial hierarchy are more willing to become politically active and improve their perceived disadvantaged position compared to other groups. On the other hand, migrant groups who perceive themselves to occupy a higher position integrate into politics less. They feel less of an incentive to become politically active to combat social disadvantage and instead prefer to maintain their distinction from the lower status immigrant groups who tend to mobilize politically.

The comparative analysis of Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany and France provides significant evidence for the effects of perceived group position in host country ethno-racial hierarchy on political mobilization and participation in host country politics at individual and collective levels. In the case of Germany, the perceived disadvantaged position in German society and the perceived group-based discrimination give stronger motivation to the Turkish minority to become politically active and change their disadvantaged status. Turkish migrant organizations and political elite in this context play a significant role in transforming collective discontent and feelings of injustice into political claims, vocalizing these claims in host country public sphere, and coordinating political action toward host country authorities. On the contrary, in France, Maghrebian-originated populations are primarily targeted in the integration debates. Turks in France, by identifying Maghrebian groups with lower segments of the society, develop a perception of having a better status in ethno-racial hierarchy in France.

Therefore, it becomes politically crucial to keep their distinction from Arab-originated people.

Figure 3: Proposed theoretical framework of immigrant political incorporation



4. Conceptual Framework: Defining Immigrant Political Incorporation

Despite the rising number of studies on immigrant political incorporation, the concept still lacks clarity. The fact that the concept of "incorporation" is often used interchangeably with "integration", "inclusion", and "assimilation" makes the field further fuzzier. Recently, scholars have paid special attention on conceptualizing different forms, levels, and components of immigrant political incorporation (Jones-Correa 2005; Bloemraad 2007; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a; Minnite 2009; Morales 2011; Hochschild et al. 2013a). Depending on the particular research focus, immigrant political integration might take place at individual as well as at collective levels; include electoral,

extra-parliamentary and protest action strategies; and manifest itself as participatory activities of immigrants or as responsiveness of the political system to the interests of newcomers.

In this dissertation, I define *immigrant political incorporation* as a process in which immigrant-origin social collectivities become a part of political processes and decision-making mechanisms of their host countries either through attaining similar participatory behaviors and political attitudes with the majority society and/or through articulating, claiming, and representing their distinct group-interest in host country political arena. This definition allows me to have an "inclusive" yet "precise" conception of immigrant political incorporation (see the discussion of Hochschild et al. 2013a).

First of all, immigrant political incorporation in this research primarily focuses on "social collectivities" i.e. immigrant origin ethnic minority groups and traces their political presence in host country politics either through aggregate individual-level outcomes and/or through group-based political mobilizations and claims making processes.[5] In this respect, this research refers to both individual and group-level dimensions of immigrant political incorporation. The individual-level dimension traces immigrant groups' diverging and converging aggregated individual-level outcomes in terms of their naturalization rates, electoral turnout, political interest, and political representation. I compare groups from different national origins with each other and with the majority society where it is possible. The group-level dimension of immigrant political incorporation entails political mobilization and participation of immigrant groups (mostly through their organizations) and their endeavors to articulate and

[5] For a distinction between individual-level political assimilation and group-level political incorporation, see: Bloemraad (2007), Minnite (2009), and Ramakrishnan (2013).

represent their distinct group interest in host country political sphere. I study group-level political incorporation through exploring organizational activities of immigrants. I inquire the extent to which immigrant organizations become active participants in host country public spheres, raise immigrants' collective demands, and target host country public authorities with the purpose of shaping policy making processes. Therefore, the empirical analyses presented in the following chapters include both individual-level political patterns that are aggregated at the group level as well as institutional processes that entail the relationship between immigrants' organizations and host country political institutions (see: Ramakrishnan 2013). In order to keep the conceptual clarity, I use the term of "individual-level political integration" to describe the individual-level dimension and "collective-level political incorporation" to illustrate collective, group-based dimension of immigrant political incorporation

Second, immigrant political incorporation in this research encompasses various forms of political activities that range from electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation. Immigrants, by definition, lack host country citizenship at their entry. Therefore, naturalization is the first step towards inclusion to host country political societies. After the naturalization process, immigrants attain the right to vote in host country elections and to run for political offices.[6] Yet, immigrants' political activities are not limited to the electoral politics. In many cases, non-electoral forms of political participation such as demonstrations, protest activities, signature campaigns, interest group politics and attendance in host country advisory platforms permit immigrants to

[6] It must be noted that EU citizens with legal resident status have the active and passive voting rights at the local and European-level elections. Yet, legal residents from third-countries cannot enjoy these voting rights, unless they naturalize in their host countries.

have a presence in host country politics. When the channels for electoral politics are closed for immigrants' access, non-electoral forms become the only viable means of pursuing political engagement in host country politics. In other cases, both electoral and non-electoral forms of politics might concurrently appear and reinforce each other.

Third, immigrant political incorporation in this research is conceptualized as a "process" rather than "a particular moment or threshold" (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a, 16). Therefore, as opposed to "a simple dichotomy between incorporation and its absence" (ibid.), this research aims to trace the processes through which immigrant groups become more or less incorporated in their host country politics or qualitatively differ from each other in terms of their forms of political engagements. Furthermore, instead of having a snap-shot picture of peak politicization moments, this research focuses on immigrants' "sustained" political efforts over time (ibid. 16–17).

Fourth, while I adopt an inclusive definition of political incorporation in many respects; in order to ensure conceptual parsimony, I clearly distinguish immigrant political incorporation from other related phenomena. In this research, immigrant political incorporation is related, but not determined by immigrants' social and economic incorporation in their host societies. In other words, immigrants' political incorporation might vary independently from their social and economic status. Moreover, in this research, immigrant politics primarily takes place in the public sphere of their host country politics. Therefore, political processes, which occur outside of the collective public sphere, are out of this research's focus.

Individual and Collective Dimensions of Political Incorporation:

Distinguishing individual and collective dimensions of immigrant political incorporation touches on some fundamental issues in the definition and the measurement of political incorporation. The distinction between individual and collective levels often alludes to two distinct and often conflictive perspectives on immigrant politics: The first one emphasizes the process of *assimilation* in which individual immigrants become more and more similar and ultimately indistinguishable from the majority society in terms of their political attitudes and behaviors; whereas the second one stresses the process of *inclusion* in which immigrant groups incorporate their distinct interests and claims into host country political arena (see: Bloemraad 2007; Minnite 2009). The first perspective often takes the individual level as the basis of analysis. Individual-level survey data and censuses are the key empirical sources in this perspective. The successful process of political integration implies that as immigrants interact with the host society, they lose their "separate existence" and "merge into" the host country's political system (Minnite 2009, 49). On the other hand, the second perspective takes immigrant groups as the starting point and analyzes migrants' politics at the collective level. Empirical data are drawn from migrants' organizational activities, their collective political engagements, and protest event analyses. In contrast with the idea of absorption of differences, the process of migrants' political incorporation includes proliferation of political groups in host country politics and their demands (ibid.). Therefore, in this perspective, immigrants' political incorporation is defined as a process in which immigrant groups' mobilize upon their ethno-cultural differences, participate in host country politics as

collective actors, and effectively convey their group-based claims and demands in host country political arena.

Moreover, the distinction between individual and collective levels of migrant political incorporation brings up the question of how these two processes are related to each other. The existing research illustrates that migrant groups follow different trajectories of political incorporation into their host societies and therefore exhibit various configurations of individual/collective level integration processes. Despite the diversity of political experiences of immigrant groups, scholars come up with a compelling argument that the initial political socialization of immigrants and their first step into host country politics takes place at a collective level. Bloemraad emphasizes the "social nature" of immigrants' political incorporation and demonstrates how "social networks, community organizations, and ethnic leadership play critical role" in the process of "political learning and mobilization" of the new comers (Bloemraad 2006, 9). In the same line, Portes et. al. (2008, 1058) emphasize the importance of ethnic political organizations as "the requisite first step of incorporation" and argue that "immigrants and their offspring learned to become Americans by first being 'ethnics'" (also see: Dahl 1961; Rosenblum 1973). In this research, I also start with the premise that the process of immigrants' political incorporation starts from the collective level. Later, depending on group-based and institutional factors, collective and individual paths to political incorporation takes different configurations (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Trajectories of immigrant political incorporation

		Collective-level political incorporation (Immigrant groups' collective political mobilization and organizational presence in host politics)	
Individual-level political integration (Individual immigrants' participatory behaviors and civic attitudes)		**High**	**Low**
	High	Simultaneous existence of group-based ethnic politics and individual-level political adaptation	Individual-level political integration prevails over ethnic-based collective politics.
	Low	The primacy of collective mobilization and participation around group-based differences	Low incorporation

Drawing on migrant groups' diverse experiences in the US case, Figure 4 illustrates different combinations of individual and collective level political incorporation. European-origin immigrants who arrived in the US during the mid-19th century illustrate one of the clearest examples for the transition from collective level political mobilization to individual-level political integration. As documented by Dahl's renowned study of *Who Governs?* (1961), European-origin immigrants and their descendants in the US first stepped into local American politics by pursuing "ethnic politics" that emphasized their distinctive characteristics as newcomers. Yet, as individual immigrants got assimilated into the mainstream society, the necessity for inserting distinct ethnic-group interests withered away. As a result, ethnic identification ceased to be the basis of collective political mobilization, but took the form of "symbolic ethnicity" (Gans 1979).

On the other hand, some other immigrant communities achieve individual-level political integration while maintaining their group-based politics. The simultaneous

existence of individual and collective levels of political incorporation demonstrates that there is no inevitable tradeoff between these two levels. The Jewish community in the US presents a case in which both individual and collective levels of political integration simultaneously exist. Studies show that Russian Jewish immigrants in the US, who arrived as political refugees in the post-1980 era, adopt a civic-political assimilation pattern at the individual level, while maintaining their collective diaspora identity at the group level politics (Morawska 2004; Remennick 2007). Moreover, Cuban immigrants in Miami have an exceptionally higher level of political integration at the individual level (i.e. higher naturalization and electoral participation rates) compared to other immigrant groups from Latin America (Portes and Mozo 1985; Ramakrishnan 2005). Yet, they preserve their distinct identity and organize collectively to shape the US foreign policy (García 1997).

Lastly, in the case of some other immigrant groups, collective level mobilizations constitute primary access to host country politics. This does not necessarily mean that collective politics undermine immigrants' individual-level political integration. On the contrary, this situation can be interpreted as a case in which collective-level politics compensates individual-level disadvantages (such as immigrants' lower degree of human capital) and provides a stronger political presence (Bloemraad 2013a). Mexican immigrants in the US can be considered in this category. Despite their lower rates of naturalization and electoral participation compared to other Spanish-speaking communities in the US (Ramakrishnan 2005; Junn and Matto 2008), Mexican immigrants still demonstrate their political presence through their collective organizations and engage in civic/political activities in the US (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008).

5. Research Design and Methodology

The theoretical controversies in the study of immigration and ethnic relations often stem from disagreements about the possibility of engaging in theory building/evaluation without giving up rich empirical local knowledge.[7] On the one hand, anthropological approaches in migration studies produce Geertzian "thick descriptions" (Geertz 1973) that prioritize interpretation of structures of meanings and constructions of social life rather than abstractions and generalizations. On the other hand, as migration related statistical sources have become more and more available, "variable-oriented" large-*N* studies have become widespread with the promise of yielding generalizable propositions. Yet, the correlational approach in statistical analyses is often criticized for failing to depict causal mechanisms that produce certain migration phenomena.[8]

Beyond these two approaches at the opposite end of methodological spectrum, comparative research designs promise generating middle-level theories and evaluating the existing explanations without necessarily overlooking multi-level empirical complexities and configurations. When theoretically informed and strategically organized, comparative case-based studies enhance our understanding of migration processes through "de-center(ing) what is taken for granted in a particular time or place", "foster(ing) concept-building", and permitting "process-tracing and the identification of

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[7] It should be stated that until recently, the major theoretical and methodological debates in migration studies have overwhelmingly reflected field specific problems such as the issues of methodological nationalism, the bounded conception of ethnic lenses, or the problem of defining and measuring the second generation. Yet, as broader range of data resources has become available for migration scholars, the central controversy concerning to the qualitative/quantitative divide in social sciences has also started shaping the debates in migration studies (see among others: Iosifides 2011; Castles 2012; Gamlen 2012). For a broader comparison of qualitative and quantitative research traditions, see: Ragin (1987); King, Keohane, and Verba (1994); Brady and Collier (2004); and Mahoney and Goertz (2006).

[8] For a criticism of the statistical-strand in migration studies, see FitzGerald (2012). For a broader discussion on the issue of causation in quantitative research, see: Ragin (1987), and the review essay of Mahoney (2001).

causal mechanisms" (Bloemraad 2013b, 29). In this regard, comparative case studies go beyond mere descriptions of social phenomena that are anchored in time and place and seek to depict general patterns evident across cases. On the other hand, comparative case studies provide an advantage over standard statistical analyses by going beyond the analysis of co-variation of variables and engaging in inquiries on "causal pathways and processes with detailed evidence from multiple sites" (FitzGerald 2012, 1729). While comparative research designs have a potential for providing "quasi-experimental" methodological tools that enable theory-generating/evaluating endeavors of social scientists (Przeworski and Teune 1970), all these promises highly depend on the extent of which the selected cases and preferred comparative logics are theoretically informed and are designed to inquire the major questions in a given research. Below, I will discuss the comparative research design that informs my dissertation.

5.1. The Logic of Case Selection and Comparative Strategy

In this dissertation, I engage in multiple comparative research strategies in order to evaluate different perspectives on immigrant political incorporation. In other words, by employing cross-country and cross-group comparisons side by side, I aim to question institutionalist and group-based explanations to migrants' politics. Firstly, I engage in a cross-national analysis in order to inquire whether and to what extent variations at the level of countries' policies, institutions, and national ideologies produce divergences in migrants' political incorporation processes into their host countries. I focus on Germany and France as national cases that highly diverge from each other in terms of their migration-related policies, institutions, and political ideologies. Secondly, I open the box of national cases and inquire how different immigrant groups within the same national

context develop divergent levels and patterns of political incorporation. In each national context, I focus on Turkish immigrants and their children and compare them with other major immigrant groups in their host country i.e. labor immigrant groups (particularly with ex-Yugoslavians) in Germany and with Maghrebian-groups in France. Thirdly, I engage in cross-national comparison of a single immigrant group. I compare Turkish immigrants in Germany and France in terms of their political incorporation at individual and at collective levels.

The evidence drawn from these multiple comparative research strategies suggests an empirical puzzle that is contrary to the prior theoretical expectations: As opposed to the group-based theoretical perspectives, Turkish-origin groups in Germany and France, who share a common national origin, similar immigration trajectory, similar lines of ethnic, religious, linguistic divisions, and similar ethno-cultural differences from their host societies, substantially diverge from each other in terms of levels and patterns of political incorporation. Both at individual and at collective levels, Turkish minority in Germany demonstrates higher level of political incorporation compared to Turks in France. Yet, institutionalist perspectives on migrants' politics cannot adequately explain this cross-national variation of Turks in Germany and France. My empirical findings call for an alternative theoretical perspective to account for the puzzling situation of Turks in Germany and France. Through in-depth analysis of each national context, I reach the conclusion that a theoretical framework that accounts for immigrant groups' perception of their group status in host ethno-racial hierarchy provides necessary analytical tools to explain the relative success of German-Turks and under-achievement of French-Turks in terms of their political incorporation into their host country politics.

The comparative case study method adopted in this research allows me to highlight the underlying causal story in Turkish immigrants' political incorporation process in Germany and France and to present convincing empirical evidence that supports my main arguments. It is beyond the focus of this dissertation to explore the generalizability of these observed patterns across different contexts and groups and empirically demonstrate the breadth of the argument. Yet, as I will discuss in the conclusion chapter, there is some preliminary evidence that shows that the importance of "perception of group's position in ethno-racial hierarchy" also holds for other groups in other national contexts. Therefore, the theoretical perspective developed in this dissertation has the potential for explaining some puzzling cases in the literature such as why West Indian (Afro-Caribbean) immigrants in the US avoid forming political alliances with native born Blacks; why Asian-Americans have lower levels of political presence in the US politics, despite their higher socio-economic status compared to other immigrant groups; and why Muslim-Americans have gained increasing level of interest in the US politics after the perception of discrimination against their group. Therefore, future research will show the extent to which the argument developed in this research can be applied to these other cases.

Selection of the national cases: Why to compare Germany and France?

Scholars that engage in most-different case studies tend to classify certain national cases as manifestations of (Weberian) ideal-types (Bloemraad 2013b, 40) that reflect certain national immigration/integration models.[9] In these studies, the selection of national cases

[9] Della Porta (2008) compares and contrasts Durkheim's and Weber's research approaches. She defines Weberian ideal-types as "abstract models, with an internal logic, against which real, complex cases can be

seeks to sharpen the distinctions among the countries in terms of their national policy frameworks, institutions, and official discourses in the fields of immigrant integration. In migration scholarship, scholars often depict Germany and France as two contrasting models of immigrant integration and expect migrants to develop diverging patterns of political identification, mobilization and participation in these two national cases (see among others: Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Ireland 2000; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Odmalm 2005; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010).

In this dissertation, I compare the cases of Germany and France by focusing on three policy fields: citizenship policies (individual access to political rights), multicultural policies (accommodation of distinct cultural needs), and state-ethnic minority relations (structure of interest mediation). As I discuss in detail in the following chapters, my research shows that despite internal complexities within each case as well as processes of policy convergence across the EU, prominent cross-national differences exist between Germany and France in terms of management of ethnic diversity and immigrant integration. Therefore, in my research, Germany and France becomes ideal cases to inquire whether and how differences in national policy levels produce varying outcomes in terms of immigrant political incorporation. Moreover, my qualitative research within each case challenges any mechanical relationship between national policies and immigrant incorporation outcomes. Therefore, it shows how certain immigrant integration regimes provide certain kinds of political opportunities for migrants and their children; but cannot deterministically shape the emergence and development of migrant politics.

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measured." (p. 206). Moreover, see George and Bennett (2004, chapter 11), for a discussion on ideal-types and typological theories.

In the case of citizenship policies, the path breaking citizenship reform in Germany in 2000 has been a significant step towards closing the gap between Germany and France. Despite the historical importance of this reform, the new German citizenship law of 2000 only partially liberalized citizenship policies in Germany (Howard 2009; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012). Due to the maintenance of the dual-citizenship ban as well as the introduction of comparatively more demanding language and civic knowledge tests as requirements for foreigners' naturalization in Germany, German citizenship regime is still more restrictive than the French one. As stated by Howard (Howard 2009, 119): "it may still be too early to categorically reject the 'spirit' of Brubaker's assessment".

In terms of multicultural policy frameworks, neither Germany nor France can be classified as officially acknowledged multicultural countries with a strong commitment to cultural pluralism. However, both in Germany and in France, it is possible to find traces of "applied multiculturalism" that serves to pragmatic management of ethnic diversity (Kastoryano 2002). I argue that the major difference between Germany and France becomes evident in their national responses to the idea of multiculturalism as a public governance philosophy. While the official discourse in France vocally opposes the idea of multiculturalist governance and perceives it as a threat against republican integration regime (Simon and Sala Pala 2010); such a strong objection never takes place in Germany. On the contrary, the ethno-cultural conception of German nation and the segregation of foreigners from the German society until the recent policy reforms have ironically provided a basis for preservation of minority cultures, and therefore kept the doors open for multiculturalist policy frameworks (see: von Dirke 1994). While during

the early period of labor immigration to Germany, the policy measures to preserve immigrants' cultures were designed to facilitate immigrants' ultimate return to their home countries; after Germany officially acknowledged being "a country of immigration", these policies have been re-interpreted as the basis of German multiculturalism (Koopmans et al. 2005, 62).

Lastly, in terms of state-ethnic minority relations, Germany demonstrates corporatist patterns in its interest mediation structures. Contrary to classical corporatist countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, Germany does not officially recognize its ethnic minorities and assign permanent institutional status. Yet, advisory bodies and intermediary platforms constitute an important part of German immigrant integration policies. In Germany, the prominent migrant organizations are often appointed as dialogue partners and practically serve as community representatives vis-à-vis the German state. Whereas France adopts a statist model and establishes direct links with individual immigrants without relegating much authority to intermediary institutions (Soysal 1994).

Selection of immigrant groups: Why to focus on Turkish immigrants?

Migrants from Turkey are the most numerous third-country nationals in the EU. While Turkish origin people are highly concentrated in Germany, France follows Germany with the second largest Turkish-origin population in Europe.[10] Apart from their demographic significance, there are other factors that make Turkish-origin people a compelling group

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[10] According to the 2012 census, there are approximately 3 million Turkish-origin people living in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). Since the French state does not collect official data on ethnic and religious background of her population, the number of people with a Turkish migration background in France highly varies in various sources. According to the report of the HCI (*Haut Conseil* à l'*intégration*) (2000), the number of Turks in France is 341.000. According to the numbers of Turkish embassy in Paris, 517.000 Turkish originated people are living in France (author's interview # 47).

for a cross-country research in Europe. Firstly, Turkish immigration to Europe has a similar historical trajectory across receiving European countries. In the 1960s, Turks started migrating to European countries as guest workers through bi-lateral intergovernmental agreements.[11] Following the economic recession in the 1970s, many Western European countries stopped importing foreign workers. However, the permission for family unification resulted in unintended immigration of family members to European host countries. Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, political instabilities in Turkey (the 1980 military coup and the Kurdish conflict) caused the flow of political refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey into Europe. This relatively long migration history also makes Turkish migrants an ideal case for evaluating the different phases of incorporation into host societies.

Secondly, the absence of preceding colonial ties between Turkey and European countries makes Turkish origin migrants an appealing case for cross-country comparison. Unlike post-colonial migrants e.g. Algerians in France, Pakistanis in the UK, and Surinames in the Netherlands, European space is "undifferentiated" for Turkish immigrants (Kastoryano 2003). Since Turkish migrants in Europe do not share any preceding political, cultural, and linguistic ties with any of the European countries, they become an ideal group for cross-country studies. Thirdly, Turkish-origin migrants in Europe do not constitute a homogeneous community and are highly divided along their political, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. Since similar lines of diversity exist in all European cases with a Turkish presence, this within-group heterogeneity is not a handicap for conducting cross-national research on Turkish immigrants in Europe. As a

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[11] Turkish labour migration agreements with Germany were signed in 1961 and 1964; with France in 1966 (Kaya and Kentel 2005).

result, Turkish immigrants and their children in Europe provide a significant analytical leverage to evaluate the impacts of national level variations.

National, sub-national, and transnational levels?

Migration scholars' dissatisfaction with the "nation-state" as the level of analysis has paved the way for emerging interest in sub-national and transnational levels of analysis. On the one hand, especially in Europe, the city-level analysis has become prevalent in immigrant integration research.[12] Due to the concentration of immigrants in urban spaces as well as the availability of rich empirical data on the relationship between local political structures and immigrant-originated political actors/groups, city-level has become highly popular among studies on immigrant political incorporation (see: Penninx et al. 2004; Garbaye 2005; Bousetta 2010; Michon 2011a; Cinalli and Giugni 2011). On the other hand, scholars, who are critical of the "container" view of the nation-state, highlight the fact that processes of immigrant incorporation are not bounded within the territorial and institutional borders of the national contexts, and therefore, call for the "methodological transnationalism" (Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Pries 2008; Amelina and Faist 2012). The transnational level of analysis reveals migrants' cross-border ties and resources that shape trajectories of migrants' politics in their host countries (see among others: Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Ögelman 2003; Mügge 2010).

Despite the changing popularity of national, sub-national, and transnational levels of analyses throughout the history of ethnic relations and migration research in Europe,

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[12] Morawska (2008) points out the visible presence of inter-city research in European studies on immigration and ethnic research compared to their American counterparts. She argues that the greater integration of urban geography into the European immigration scholarship as well as the better availability of the city-level data as opposed to the difficulty of obtaining nation-level data on immigrants result in such a primacy of city-level research in Europe.

there is a common agreement that different research questions might require different levels of analysis. In other words, the ideal level of analysis depends on the scope of the question we are pursuing. While accounting for the interaction and interdependence of multiple levels, the analyses in this dissertation primarily focus on the national-level. There are two primary reasons for this choice: First, I inquire the effects of national policies and institutions (i.e. citizenship, multiculturalism, and interest mediation structures) that go beyond the city-level and demonstrate enough consistency that distinguish general patterns across national cases. This starting point does not oppose the idea that national policies and institutional arrangements vary at the local levels. We already know that foreigners' naturalization rates change across German *Länder*. In Germany, multicultural accommodations as well as local consultation structures highly depend on liberal or conservative profile of local governments.[13] In France, the regions of Alsace and Lorraine are immune from the 1905 law on "the separation of church and state", and therefore could accommodate religious claims of their Muslim residents at a higher degree than other regions in France. Yet, despite all these local diversities, I assume that Germany and France constitute two loosely defined, yet evidently coherent national political regimes towards immigrants.

Second, by drawing on census data and national surveys, I depict the general patterns of individual immigrants' political participation in Germany and France. Again, this analysis does not deny the fact that certain localities within Germany and France provide more opportunities for immigrants' political incorporation than others (for example see Garbaye's research (2005)). Yet, a national-level comparison of immigrants'

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[13] For a discussion on progressive policies the city-level in conservative Southern states of Germany, see: Ireland (2004) and Schmitter-Heisler (2008).

naturalization rates, electoral registration and turnout, and representation provides analytical advantage to assess the impacts of macro-level processes on immigrants' political incorporation.

While the evidence on Turkish immigrants' individual-level political integration comes from (when available) national statistical sources, my analysis on Turkish migrants' collective politics is primarily based on my qualitative field research in Berlin and Paris. While I do not claim that Turkish experiences in Berlin and Paris are representative for Turks in Germany and in France as a whole, I still argue for the specific advantages of focusing on capital cities that would not be available in other local contexts. Throughout my research, I observed that capital cities provide a ground through which scholars can observe how immigrant groups navigate through local, national, and transnational levels in their pursuit of host country politics. For instance, Turkish migrant organizations located in Berlin not only aim to shape Berlin's local policies, but also endeavor to influence the national level politics. What is more, Berlin's multicultural political tradition that has been supportive for migrants' collective organizations indirectly sustains migrant groups' engagement in national level politics.

5.2. Empirical Sources and Challenges of Collecting Comparative Data

The empirical evidence in this research comes from a wide breadth of sources ranging from in-depth elite interviews to census data and mass-surveys, from documentary materials to fieldwork observations. To start with, the findings on immigrants' individual-level political integration come from descriptive analysis of available census data and national and cross-national representative surveys. I use census data to compare naturalization rates of immigrant groups. I primarily refer to the findings of the existing

studies in order to evaluate immigrants' level of political interest in their host country politics and their tendency to register for and vote in host country elections. In the case of Germany, the study of Müssig and Worbs (2012) that draws on the surveys of ESS German sub-study (2002-2004) and GLES (2009) has been guiding. In the case of France, I have mainly referred to the findings of Trajectories of Origin survey, which was conducted by INED and INSEE in 2008.

While census data and immigrant-targeted national surveys provided significant empirical evidence to compare individual-level political integration of Turkish immigrants with other major immigrant groups within their host countries, they were inadequate to provide a cross-national analysis on Turkish immigrants in Germany and France. Since each national survey uses different standards to define the targeted immigrant population (such as foreigners, foreign-born citizens, or children of immigrants), it became untenable to compare German and French-based surveys to evaluate the political tendencies of Turkish-origin people cross-nationally. Therefore, I referred to the cross-national surveys that included Turkish immigrant groups in Germany and France as their target population. In this respect, I primarily used the survey findings of Kaya and Kentel (2005) as well as Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011).

In order to understand the processes of Turkish migrants' collective mobilization and on-going causal mechanisms, I turn to my in-depth interviews, fieldwork observations, and documentary materials. I conducted two rounds of fieldwork research in Berlin and Paris between 2010 and 2012. Throughout my fieldwork, I also had a short visit to Strasbourg (France) and contacted some of the Turkish organizations in Cologne (Germany) via telephone calls. I conducted 51 semi-structured in-depth elite interviews

with leaders of Turkish immigrant organizations, host country public officers, Turkish diplomatic agents, and host country parliamentarians and political party leaders with a Turkish-origin (see the appendix part for the list of the interviewees and the questionnaire).

In order to account for collective politics of Turkish immigrants, I primarily focused on political engagements of Turkish migrant organizations. My fieldwork included in-depth interviews with presidents (and/or vice-presidents/general secretaries) of 24 Turkish migrant federations, umbrella organizations, and associations located in Berlin, Paris and Strasbourg. During my research, I selected the chief Turkish migrant organizations in Germany and France that have an explicit political agenda at the national level with respect to their host country's politics. With this purpose, I excluded Turkish migrant organizations -such as hometown organizations or sports clubs- that do not explicitly engage in political claims making in their host country's public sphere. Moreover, in order to focus on the key actors in the organizational sphere I had to exclude small-scale, mostly extremist political organizations that lack a higher public visibility. More importantly, I had to exclude Kurdish organizations founded by Kurdish people who migrated from Turkey in order to minimize the effects of Turkish migrants' ethno-cultural diversity and to avoid the influence of ongoing international issues in the Middle East.

My research also included participant observation in Turkish migrants' organizational activities, analysis of organizational publications, pamphlets, press releases, and website content. I regularly surveyed home and host country news sources. In order to account for official perspectives on immigrants and immigration policies, I

used annual reports of related government offices and other documentary materials (see the appendix for details of my fieldwork).

6. Organization of the Dissertation

Chapter two reviews the existing approaches to immigrant political incorporation and introduces the theoretical framework that guides this research. I start the chapter by elaborating two competing frameworks in the literature: group-based and institutionalist approaches to immigrant political incorporation. I identify their relative strengths and weaknesses. I argue that a scholarly emphasis on immigrant groups' perception of their status in host country inter-ethnic context provides us important analytical tools to understand variations in immigrant political incorporation.

In chapter three, I review the history of post-Second World War ethnic migration to Germany and France and subsequent political and institutional responses to the rising ethnic diversity. This chapter argues that Germany and France provide strikingly different historical contexts, institutional structures, and political opportunities for immigrant political incorporation.

Chapter four examines immigrants' individual-level political integration in Germany and France. Empirical findings show that immigrants in France have higher levels of political integration at the individual level compared to their counterparts in Germany. Yet, empirical evidence on Turkish immigrants contradicts these general patterns. While Turks in Germany demonstrate a successful case of political integration at the individual level, Turks in France often stand out due to their lower levels of political inclusion.

Chapter five focuses on immigrants' collective level politics by examining their organizational political engagements and claims making. The first part of the chapter provides a background on general trends of immigrants' organizational politics and collective claims making processes. My research demonstrates that national institutional differences are, to a great extent, translated into qualitatively different patterns of immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France. In the second part, I focus on Turkish immigrants' collective politics in these two contexts and analyse the extent to which the case of Turks fits into these cross-national patterns. The chapter highlights contradictory aspects of Turkish immigrants' collective politics that cannot be explained by group-based and institutional approaches.

Chapter six reconsiders the existing explanations of immigrant political incorporation in the light of empirical findings drawn on the case of Turks in Germany and France. It demonstrates that neither institutionalist nor group-based approaches can provide adequate explanations to German-Turks' success and French-Turks under-achievement in terms of their political incorporation. The chapter concludes that the impact of migrants' collective perception of their group's status in host country inter-ethnic context becomes crucial to understand Turkish immigrants' political incorporation in Germany and France. The final chapter reviews the major arguments and the main findings of the dissertation. It discusses broader research implications and future research agenda.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION

In Europe, studies on immigrant political incorporation do not have a long history. Up until the late 1970s, the thesis of migrants' *political quiescence* was quiet widespread in Europe (Ireland 2000, 234; Martiniello 2009, 35–37). The issue of immigrant political incorporation has become an important part of the European-based migration scholarship as a result of the broadened definition of politics that included both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation, the widespread acknowledgement that immigrants are here to stay, the extension of voting rights to foreign residents in some national contexts, and the liberalization of nationality laws in others.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the issue of immigrant political incorporation had an earlier debut in the US-based immigration studies compared to Europe. Yet, due to the predominance of the Chicago School of Sociology that viewed immigrants' experience in the US through the lens of "assimilation" into American life, immigrants' political incorporation has been viewed as a product of overtime adaptation process (see: Handlin 1951; Gordon 1964). Therefore, the scholarship on immigrant political incorporation as a relatively autonomous process from socio-cultural assimilation has a recent history in the US-based migration studies as well.

Today, the research on immigrant political incorporation in Europe as well as in the US has been growing exponentially.[14] Scholars document that levels and trajectories of immigrant political incorporation vary across different immigrant groups within a country (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Maxwell 2010; Michon and Vermeulen 2013; see also for the case of the US: Junn 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001), across generations of immigrants (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Maxwell 2010a), and across different national contexts (Bousetta 1997; Ireland 2000; Giugni and Passy 2004). While these wide-range of variations break the hopes for developing a "comprehensive theory of immigrant political incorporation" (Messina 2007, 220–221), two analytical perspectives prevail in the scholarship on immigrant politics. The first perspective focuses on characteristics of immigrant groups and explains the political variation through *group-based factors* such as socio-economic status, ethno-cultural factors, demographic resources, country of origin, timing and mode of immigration, or the structure of ethnic-civic organizations. The second perspective prioritizes the external *institutional factors* and perceives host countries' institutional and political context –such as citizenship regimes, multicultural arrangements, electoral systems, political party structures- as ultimate determinants of immigrant politics. I argue that both group-based and institutional perspectives provide rich theoretical and empirical accounts on immigrant political incorporation. Yet, both perspectives fail to give due attention to the significance of the host country inter-ethnic context and the way that immigrant groups perceive their

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[14] In their introduction to the edited volume of *Outsiders No More?*, Hochschild et. al. (2013b) show that the number of articles in the JSTOR and the Social Science Citation Index that primarily address the issues of immigration and politics has exponentially increased from 1990 to 2011. Moreover, increasing number of edited volumes started particularly focusing on the issue of immigrant political incorporation. See among others: Gerstle and Mollenkopf (2001),Wolbrecht and Hero (2005), Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009b), Hochschild et. al. (2013b).

status there. Therefore, while the existing theoretical frameworks depict group-based and institutional political opportunities that are available to immigrants, they share the common weakness of explaining when and how immigrant groups mobilize on the available political opportunities and become active participants in their host country political arenas.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on immigrant political incorporation by focusing on subjective factors as intermediaries between available political sources and opportunities on the one side and immigrant groups' political action on the other side. I argue that immigrants' collective perception of their group status in host country's *ethno-racial hierarchy* plays a significant role in immigrant political incorporation. Immigrants' collective discontent regarding their group's status in host society might paradoxically lead to the emergence of participatory actions such as voting, lobbying, participating in state's advisory boards, or demonstrating to improve their disadvantaged position. During this process, immigrant group leaders and ethnic entrepreneurs play a crucial role in converting common grievances into public claims and creating a collective consciousness that seeks for a remedy within host country political system. On the other hand, immigrant groups that perceive themselves in a better social position compared to other minority groups tend to engage in political strategies to maintain the existing social relations and to secure the permanence of their better-off position.

I start the chapter by reviewing group-based and institutional perspectives to immigrant political incorporation. I identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of each perspective. I argue that both perspectives fall short of providing an adequate theoretical link between available political opportunities and immigrants' political actions. I

conclude that a scholarly attention to host country inter-ethnic context and immigrants' collective perception of their relative status in host country context provides us an important theoretical framework to understand the dynamics of immigrant political incorporation.

1. Internal Factors: Group-Based Explanations

The group-based perspective to immigrant politics includes a wide-range of diverse accounts that commonly prioritize internal, immigrant-group related factors as the major determinants of immigrant political incorporation. Below, I identify three variants within the group-based perspective that put the emphasis on the role of immigrants' socio-economic class, their ethno-cultural identities, and the exit and reception conditions that immigrant groups encounter with during their immigration experience.

1.1. Socio-Economic Approaches

Socio-economic approaches to immigrant politics take immigrants' socio-economic status as the primary factor that causes divergences in their rates of political participation. The classical studies in political science have already provided rich empirical accounts on the relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Studies show that people with higher level of SES -particularly longer years of formal education and higher family income- tend to participate in politics at higher rates. Especially in the US-based literature, the SES model of political participation has highly informed studies on minority and ethnic group political incorporation. In this perspective, socio-economic sources available to different ethnic and minority groups are considered as a major cause of groups' diverging levels of political participation.

Yet, recent studies on immigrants' and ethnic/racial minorities' political participation illustrate that the SES model is either incomplete and needs to be complemented with other factors or it is misleading and not generalizable to minority groups' political behaviors. Verba and Nie (1972) show that after controlling for the SES factors, African Americans in the US tend to participate in politics at higher rates than white individuals (also see: Olsen 1970; Nelson 1979; Shingles 1981). Their findings imply that the SES model must be complemented with racial factors. Dawson (1995) takes a step further and argues that despite the emerging socio-economic diversity within the African American community, race remains as the primary factor that commonly shapes African Americans' political behavior. That is to say that race triumphs over class-based factors in the case of Black politics in the US. Moreover, findings on Asian Americans illustrate that higher levels of SES do not always lead to higher degrees of political participation (Tam Cho 1999; Junn 1999; Freedman 2000). To sum up, recent studies either complement or challenge the SES-based explanations to immigrant political incorporation by showing the effects of racialized group consciousness (Chong and Rogers 2005; Sanchez 2008; Junn and Masuoka 2008; McClain et al. 2009), policy threats (Ramakrishnan 2005; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Wu 2006), and civic skills through associational membership (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001).

In Europe, the scholarship on the role of socio-economic factors in immigrant politics developed more macro-level and structuralist accounts as opposed to individual-level SES explanations in the case of the US-based scholarship. Initial works on immigrant politics in Europe emphasized migrants' working class identity (Castles and

Kosack 1973; Castles 1986). The main argument of this approach was: “the immigrants’ common class identity ultimately determines the nature of their participation” (Ireland 2000, 234). Scholars in this approach examined the labor migration to Western Europe in “the historical context of international capitalist system” (Castles and Kosack 1973, 7). It was argued that immigrant workers allow for the upward mobility of indigenous working class by accepting the least desirable jobs and forming the lowest stratum of the working class. While the weak legal position of immigrant workers in Europe hampered their initial participation in working class activities; they have become highly involved in trade union politics shortly after their arrival. Besides their trade union activism, immigrant workers have also become active participants in the political parties of their host countries and formed their own political associations (Martin and Miller 1980). Yet, class-based perspectives studied all these political engagements primarily as a result of immigrants’ commonly shared socio-economic class.

After the mid-1980s, class-based explanations to migrant politics started declining. While previous studies perceived immigrants’ race, ethnicity, and religion as factors that divide the working class unity, recent studies started emphasizing that these cultural elements actively shape political identification and participation of migrants. Observation of different patterns of political participation between migrant and autochthonous workers also contributed to these critical stances against class-based perspectives. Moreover, the process of family unification and the emergence of small/medium size business owner migrants made it harder to argue for a common class interest of migrants in Europe. The result was growing scholarly emphasis on ethno-cultural identities as main determinants of migrants’ politics.

1.2. Ethno-Cultural Approaches

The underlying assumption in ethno-cultural strand of group-based theories is that ethnic, religious, and cultural characteristics of migrant groups determine their political interests and the ways that they participate in politics. The main argument asserts that "each ethnic (or racial or religious) group's own distinctive mode of political participation has developed from group socialization processes and in response to discrimination" (Ireland 1994, 7). Therefore, the racial identity for African-Americans (Dawson 1995) or the common religion for Muslims in Europe (Safran 1986) play autonomous role in determining the nature of their political participation. Contrary to native minority groups, immigrant political participation is also shaped by the traits brought from their country of origin, as called as "homeland hangover" by Ireland (1994, 8).

Ethno-cultural approaches to immigrant political incorporation expect that migrants coming from the same country of origin would have similar patterns of political participation across different contexts. By contrast, migrants coming from different national origins would develop highly distinctive patterns of political participation, even though they live in the same institutional context. Studies in various European cases provide rich empirical examples that illustrate how immigrants' ethno-cultural identities shape their political participation. Ögelman (2000) argues that the variation of national-origin plays a crucial role in the development of diverging organizational behaviors by Turkish, ex-Yugoslavian, Italian, and Greek communities in Germany. Moreover, he shows that Turkish groups, across different German states, exhibit similar patterns of organizational participation. Mügge (2010) compares Turkish and Surinamese immigrants and their children in Netherlands and reaches the conclusion that differences in sending countries' "ideologies of nationhood" pave the way for variations in

immigrant groups' transnational political participation. Kaya (2009) argues that as immigrant-origin groups -particularly the Muslims- in Europe are more and more discriminated against because of their ethno-cultural identity and difference, their political presence in their host countries increasingly exhibits similar patterns of collective political mobilization. Therefore, no matter how host countries differ from each other in terms of their citizenship and integration regimes, Muslims in Europe pursue similar political strategies that emphasize their ethno-religious identities.

The major critics of ethno-cultural approaches highlight the central role of institutions "in shaping group definition and delineation" (Hero and Wolbrecht 2005, 10). For instance, Koopmans et. al. (2005) documented that collective identities of immigrant groups in public claims making strikingly vary across national cases with different citizenship regimes. While immigrant groups in France tend to make their claims through their policy-identities (i.e. foreigners, immigrants, asylum seekers, and undocumented/*sans-papiers*), they pursue their public visibility in Germany through their ethno-national identities (Koopmans et al. 2005, 118–119). On the other hand, some other studies demonstrate that immigrants' ethno-cultural identities are not entirely over-determined by their institutional environments. For example, Ersanilli and her collaborators show that the level of ethnic identification among Turkish immigrants and their children is high in all three cases (Germany, France, and Netherlands) that they study (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; Ersanilli and Saharso 2011). Hence, their findings support the argument that immigrants' ethno-cultural identification is a relatively autonomous process from their surrounding institutional contexts. However, the argument of the relative autonomy of ethno-cultural identities from their institutional

environment brings back the questions of where ethno-cultural identities come from and how they change in time. Therefore, immigration scholarship still needs better conceptual tools to study immigrants' ethno-cultural identities without reifying them as ingrained in groups or without perceiving them as ultimate products of institutional environment.

In recent years, there have been several theoretical developments in ethno-cultural approaches to immigrant politics. Rather than investigating internal constitution of immigrants' ethno-cultural identities, scholars have increasingly become interested in either understanding inter-group dynamics and boundaries or analyzing organizational reflections of immigrants' ethno-cultural identities. In the case of the first development, the social anthropologist Fredrik Barth's conception of an ethnic group, which is constructed by "ethnic boundaries" rather than "the cultural stuff it encloses" (1969, 15), has been very influential. The Barthian approach of "ethnic boundaries" enabled immigration scholars to move away from primordialist and culturally static views of migrants' ethnicity toward a dynamic view that focuses on interactions and negotiations within a social system.

Scholars inspired by the concept of "boundaries" produced extensive theoretical accounts on the nature of social and symbolic boundaries, their persistence and change, their variation across contexts, and their consequences on immigrants' integration into their host societies (Michele Lamont and Molnar 2002; Wimmer 2008). Bauböck (1994) and Zolberg and Long (1999) theorized how cultural boundaries between the majority society and immigrant-originated minority groups are negotiated and altered. In their typology, boundary-change occurs through (1) "individual boundary-crossing" in which individual migrants leave their ethnic group affiliations and acquire attributes of host

society; (2) “boundary blurring”, which takes place when the fault lines between majority and minority groups become ambiguous through public policies such as bilingualism, allowance of dual-nationality, or institutionalization of minority religions; (3) “boundary shifting” which is about re-location of a boundary and a new demarcation of insiders and outsiders (Zolberg and Long 1999, 8–9). On the other hand, Alba (2005) explored how the nature of social boundaries changes across different integration models. His work showed that the sites of religion and to some extent citizenship in Germany and France constitute “bright boundaries” i.e. unambiguous distinctions between the majority society and the major immigrant groups. In these national contexts, Turks in Germany and Maghrebians in France have been separated from the majority society with “bright boundaries”. While the race is still the major fault line in the case of the US, Alba notes that the boundary around the mainstream is getting “blurred” for the light-skinned (Mexican) immigrants. Therefore, studies inspired by the boundary approach provided rich theoretical insights on when and how newcomers are included to the majority society and when and how “bright boundaries” hamper immigrants’ integration into their host societies.

While the boundary framework has been productive for understanding the dynamics of socio-cultural inclusion of immigrants into their host society, studies in this line of research have been relatively silent on the issue of immigrant political incorporation. The boundary research has mostly reduced the actions of immigrants to the process of “individual boundary crossing” and to a large extent underestimated the role of collective political mobilization of immigrants (and their children) in boundary-changing processes. In this respect, boundary literature does not pay much attention on collective

mobilization of Turkish immigrant groups against restrictive citizenship regime in Germany as well as movements of second-generation Maghrebians in France that raise the claims of "right to be different" in a republican national setting. Furthermore, an over-focus on the negotiations between the majority society on the one hand and minority groups on the other shadowed processes of inter-ethnic cooperation and conflict among different immigrant groups. Therefore, we still lack a clear understanding on how the existence of "bright boundaries" paves the way for collective mobilization and participation of minority groups as well as cooperation or conflict among minority groups during the contestation of the existing social and symbolic barriers in the society.

Another theoretical development in ethno-cultural approaches to immigrant political incorporation has taken place through the renewed interest in ethnic-civic organizations. Classical studies in political science -from Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* to Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963)- emphasized the importance of civic culture for robust democratic institutions. In this respect, engagement in civic organizations is thought to provide citizens with civic skills and political information that facilitate their political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In the same vein, immigration scholars argue for a causal link between immigrants' civic life and their propensity for political participation (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Tillie and Slijper 2007). It is contended that that those migrant communities with higher level of organizational density and higher number of interlocking directorates have higher level of host country political participation and political trust compared to the others. For instance, Fennema and Tillie (1999; 2001) examined the effects of ethnic organizations on the level of political

participation and political trust by focusing on four immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans) in Amsterdam. Their finding indicated a correlation between the network of ethnic organizations on the one side and the level of political participation/trust on the other side. In this respect, Turks, who have the highest degree of "civic community"[15], demonstrate the highest levels of political participation and trust in host country political institutions compared to the other immigrant groups in Amsterdam.

A focus on immigrants' ethnic-civic organizations provided important theoretical insights about how immigrants' associational membership shapes their political attitudes and participatory behavior as well as how immigrant organizations themselves become relevant political actors in host country politics. Yet, this ethnic-civic community perspective has been criticized on multiple grounds: The first criticism is the absence of theorizing diverging effects of different migrant organizations on migrants' political integration. Despite the arguments for democratic contributions of even non-democratic ethnic organizations (see: Fennema and Tillie 2001, 38), some other scholars contended that not all types of associations reinforce political trust and therefore political participation (Putnam and Goss 2002; Paxton 2007; Paxton 2002). Some other critics challenged the ethnic-civic community perspective by showing that organizational life and political participation are not related in the same way for different migrant groups (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Togeby 2004). Moreover, cross-country analyses showed that the arguments of ethnic-civic community approach does not hold for all national contexts (Jacobs, Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2006). Therefore, the current

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[15] Fennema and Tillie (1999) measured the level of civic-community based on five indicators: (1) organizational density; (2) the number of interlocking directorates; (3) the number of organizations in network analysis; (4) the number of isolated organizations; and (5) the use of mass communication.

literature needs further theoretical refinement on the role of ethnic-civic organizations during the process of immigrant political incorporation.

1.3. Factors Specific to the Immigration Experience

Besides the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors, which have already constituted the core of traditional models of political participation in social sciences, immigration scholars have started considering the effects of other factors that specifically related to immigration experience (Ramakrishnan 2005, Chapter 5). In this respect, studies on immigrant integration have emphasized the role of migrants' size, geographic distribution, length of stay, condition of exit from their home countries, and socio-cultural distance vis-à-vis the host society (José Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Morawska 2003; Wald 2008; Wong and Pantoja 2009). Yet, the literature lacks a consensus on how these immigrant-related factors affect the process of immigrant political incorporation.

To start with the *time-based factors*, classical theories on immigrant assimilation assumed a linear relationship between immigrant's duration of stay and their tendency to participate in host country politics (Handlin 1951; Gordon 1964). With respect to the first generation immigrants, it is widely accepted that as immigrants spend more time in their host country, they tend to participate in host country politics at higher rates than recently arrived immigrants. In terms of the legal requirements, newcomers have to fulfill the minimum period of residency condition in order to apply for naturalization in their host country. Therefore, in order to enjoy electoral rights, recently arrived non-citizens have to wait to qualify for citizenship application. In terms of political socialization, longer duration of stay enables immigrants to acquire host country language and gain politically

relevant information. Moreover, over time, immigrants become more familiar with host country's political institutions and develop a sense of stake in the political system.

On the other hand, over-time political integration of the first generation immigrants does not imply that political participation increases across-generations. While the linear assimilation theories assume that children of immigrants would be more integrated into host country politics than their parents, many recent studies challenge this assumption. In the case of the US, Ramakrishnan (2005) shows that intergenerational differences in terms of voting tendencies change across racial groups. According to his findings, only Asian-Americans demonstrate a linearly increasing political participation pattern across generations. While children of Latinos tend to vote at a lower degree than their parents, there is no significant relationship between generation of Black immigrants and their level of political participation. In the case of Germany, Schönwälder and Kofri (2010) find out the striking success of foreign-born immigrant candidates in local elections. Their finding demonstrates that participation in local politics does not necessarily require "an adjustment process over generations". Moreover, their research proposes to account for the role of "transnational political socialization" for first generation immigrants' political incorporation in local politics. On the other hand, Akgönül (2008; 2013) coins a concept of "perpetual first generation". He argues that continuous flows of co-ethnic newcomers through family unification (and through other means) sustain ethno-cultural loyalties among already settled immigrants and their children. Therefore, continuous contact with home countries and co-ethnics blur the effects of time-based factors on immigrant political incorporation.

Secondly, scholars have examined the role of *immigrant group size and distribution* on their political incorporation. The pluralist view of politics assumes that political parties strive to increase their constituencies and therefore would be interested in incorporating newcomers when they constitute a significant demographic concentration (see: Dahl 1961). In this respect, higher concentration of immigrant groups in their residential place is considered to facilitate their political incorporation into host country politics. Yet, in the case of the US, recent studies have shown that political parties do not always endeavor to mobilize residentially concentrated immigrant groups. Erie (1988) argues that the "party machines" are interested in recruiting potential voters only until they establish the control of a particular electoral district. Once they secure the control of a district, political parties have only little incentive to spend their limited resources to mobilize new groups (Erie 1988; also see: Jones-Correa 1998). Besides, socio-political conditions in immigrant neighborhoods are not always conducive for political incorporation. For instance, immigrants' concentration in disadvantaged neighborhoods with higher level of poverty, lower level of education, higher portion of non-citizens, and low proficiency in host country language might hamper the process of political incorporation. Unless immigrant groups living in disadvantaged neighborhoods develop strong organizational networks that could politically mobilize group members despite the socio-economic disadvantages, immigrants' concentration in such neighborhoods could only bring about ghettoization without effective means for political incorporation (see: Maxwell 2010b).

Thirdly, immigrants' *country of origin* and their *mode of immigration* are considered as important factors in shaping immigrant political incorporation. Immigrants

might come from those countries with authoritarian or liberal-democratic regimes, with ongoing civil war or widespread political stability, with restrictive emigration policies or rights for dual-citizenship endowment for their emigrants. Immigrants might exit their home country voluntarily as economic migrants or involuntarily as political refugees or asylum seekers. While the factors stemming from country of origin and the mode of immigration are crucial especially for the first generation migrants, there is no clear evidence on how they shape immigrant political incorporation.

Bueker (2005) shows that immigrants coming from authoritarian regimes with no easy return option naturalize at higher rates in the US than those originating from democracies. Yet, his findings show a reverse situation for voting patterns: immigrants from democratic regimes tend to participate in elections in the US more than those coming from authoritarian regimes. Moreover, political refugees are expected to be more active in politics than economic migrants. Yet, refugees' preoccupation with homeland political issues might take their limited resources away from host country political engagement and hamper their political incorporation into host country. Or just the opposite, such transnational political engagements might reinforce political incorporation by encouraging immigrants to contact their host country institutions to lobby for their transnational causes. For example, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b, 777) mentions the situation of Kurds in London, who work in low-paid jobs for long hours. When they mobilize around the homeland political issues, these transnational engagements make it untenable for them to participate in host country politics to improve the economic and social conditions of asylum seekers in the UK. On the other hand, she notes that transnational political engagements might also empower immigrants by providing them a

political orientation. In this sense, transnational politics constitutes a political platform through which collective actors of immigrants might have a standing in host country politics.

It is also unclear in which ways preceding colonial ties between sending and receiving countries affect immigrant political incorporation. On the one hand, immigrants coming from ex-colonial territories tend to be more fluent in host country language and more familiar with host country society, culture, and public institutions than those who lack such colonial ties. In this respect, migrants from ex-colonies are expected to have higher levels of socio-cultural integration into their host societies that potentially facilitate their political incorporation. On the other hand, colonial legacies might come with resentment and mistrust on the side of ex-colonial migrants and discriminatory and exclusive reactions on the side of the host society. Therefore, preceding colonial ties might work against immigrant political incorporation. In addition, as Maxwell (2012) argues that socio-cultural proximity to the host society do not always promise a better political incorporation. In some cases, socio-cultural integration might reduce the likelihood of political integration by reducing immigrants' incentive and capacity for community networks and organizations.

To sum up, group-based theories provide solid analyses on immigrant groups' political resources that stem from their socio-economic, ethno-cultural, or other immigration-related characteristics, which could be harnessed for political incorporation into their host countries. In this perspective, migrant groups, who diverge from each other in terms of their group-based characteristics, are expected to develop strikingly different patterns of political participation. On the other hand, migrant groups with a shared set of group-

based characteristics are assumed to exhibit common patterns of political participation, even though they live in different institutional contexts. Yet, group-based analyses become limited when empirical evidence demonstrates cross-national differences of the same migrant group. The group-based perspective to immigrant politics cannot account for why Turkish immigrants are organized as "ethnicized collective identities" in Netherland but not in France and Germany (Soysal 1994); why Moroccans mobilize based on their ethnicity in Netherlands but not in France (Bousetta 1997); why migrants' claims making include "universalistic and hyphenated identities" in France but "primordial ethnic" identities in Germany (Koopmans et al. 2005). Moreover, to a great extent, group-based perspectives heavily focus on internal dynamics of immigrant groups and cannot account for inter-group cooperation, competition, and conflict. In this respect, ecological factors are largely under-studied. At this point, analyses that focus on external factors become crucial to understand dynamics of immigrant political incorporation.

2. External Factors: Institutional Perspectives

Institutional perspectives prioritize external political conditions to explain divergences in immigrants' politics. Rather than intrinsically defined ethno-cultural identities or class status, configurations of institutional factors –such as citizenship regimes, multicultural policies, structures for minority interest mediation, and openness of institutional channels for minorities- are considered to be more effective in shaping immigrants' political mobilization and participation. Therefore, institutional approaches avoid socio-economic and cultural determinism that was a contested issue in group-based theories (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 30).

2.1. Adoption of the 'Political Opportunity Structures' Framework in Immigration Research

While earlier studies heavily focused on the effects of formal institutional structures on the patterns of migrants' political participation e.g. Ireland (1994) and his "institutional channeling theory"; later, scholars seek the ways of combining public discourse, symbolic order and cultural frameworks with formal institutional factors (see: Soysal 1994; Bousetta 1997; Favell 1998). It was with the adoption of the concept of *political opportunity structures* (POS), migration scholars could further develop the theoretical link among political institutions, public ideology and discourse, and interaction among political actors at various levels (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 31–32).

The concept of POS originates from neo-institutionist school and social movements literature. Neo-institutionalism, even though it does not constitute a unified body of thought, emphasizes the relatively independent role of institutions in terms of affecting individuals' strategic interactions, having a bearing on power relations, and shaping dominant norms, routines, and worldviews (see: Hall and Taylor 1996). Building on the conception of institutions as explanatory variables, scholars of social movements focus on how certain configuration of political environment encourage or restrain the emergence of collective mobilization of people. Tarrow defines POS as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (Tarrow 1994, 18). As opposed to resource mobilization theory, which emphasizes internal resources of groups to mobilize, the concept of POS refers to the external factors to the group. While the POS framework in social movements literature was initially adopted by *diachronic* studies that explored the effects of changing opportunity structures on the development of

social movements (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989); later, especially European-based researchers brought *cross-sectional* analyses to the study of POS to explore cross-national divergence of social movements (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; also see McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996 for a review of developments of POS studies in social movements literature).

2.2. POS Analyses and National Models of Immigrant Integration

POS-based institutional approaches to migrants' politics are in close connection with the immigration scholarship working on national integration models. While the latter explains the emergence and the development of distinct national models of immigration, integration and citizenship; the earlier explores how these models pave the way for differences in migrants' political mobilization and participation. Scholars examining the origins and the development of diverse cross-national political responses to immigration and ethnic diversity have come up with various explanatory factors such as "cultural idioms" of nationhood (Brubaker 1992); distinct types of nationhood and experiences of migration (Joppke 1999); electoral dynamics and the politicization of immigrant issues (Schain 2008). Although actual national integration regimes are much more complicated than the ideal-types, it has been argued that some countries represent highly divergent national models of integration from each other. Brubaker (1992) distinguished between "state-centered and assimilationist" model of citizenship in France from "ethnocultural and 'differentialist'" model in Germany. Later, scholars came up with a three-fold conception of national integration models: (1) ethnic, exclusionist, guest-worker models; (2) republican, assimilationist models; and (3) multiculturalist and pluralist models (Castles and Miller 1993; Castles 1995; Todd 1994). Recently, Koopmans and his

colleagues (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005) went beyond the three-fold typology by placing the national models in a two-dimensional conceptual space that includes civic-territorial/ethnic basis of individual access on the one axis and cultural monism/pluralism of group rights on the other. Therefore, they came up with a typology of citizenship models that includes assimilationism, segregationism, universalism, and multiculturalism.

Institutional approaches to migrants' political participation explore the effects of national institutional and political structures on the patterns of migrants' political participation. Depending on inclusiveness of citizenship laws, accommodation of minority cultures, national structures of interest mediation, or institutional channels for minority political representation, migrant groups find themselves in a set of institutional opportunities and restraints that highly shape when, how, and around which issues they can participate in politics. Soysal's comparative study (1994) shows how the membership and incorporation models of host countries shape the collective organization of migrants. In corporatist models (like Netherlands and Sweden and to some extent Germany), membership in a public life is organized around "legally recognized corporate groups". "Official ethnicities" are organized by the state. Immigrant incorporation takes place in the form of "collective interchange and centralized organizational activity" (Soysal 1994, 4). On the other hand, in statist models (like France), migrants are incorporated as individuals. In this model, there is no place for intermediary, collective structures that mediate state and society relations. Therefore, in statist models, immigrants do not (or cannot) represent their political interest through collectively organized and officially recognized bodies.

Some other scholars prioritize models of citizenship in host countries and examine the ways that different citizenship regimes shape immigrants' collective identities, political issues, strategies of mobilization/participation, and political outcomes (Bousetta 1997; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). Bousetta (1997) argues that different political citizenship models in Netherlands and France result in differential patterns of collective identity formation and ethnic mobilization of Moroccans at the local level. In the Dutch case, the local policy framework prioritizes the institutional participation of ethnic minorities through municipal advisory boards. Ethnic organizations based on "Moroccan ethnic identity" have been the crucial part of collective Moroccan mobilization. On the contrary, the republican philosophy in France does not promote political mobilization based on ethnic identities. Therefore, Moroccan collective political actions, to a large extent, take place in multi-ethnic Maghrebian frameworks. As a result, different models of citizenship regimes in France and Netherlands result in different trajectories of political incorporation. In the Dutch case, the institutional incorporation of Moroccan ethnic organizations attenuates their political autonomy and moves them toward the area of social work. By contrast, the absence of such an institutional incorporation in the French case brings about protest actions of ethnic organizations.

The case study method of Bousetta enables him to depict the complex relationship between political integration regimes and immigrants' collective politics. His analysis leaves a room for immigrant organizations that adopt different political strategies in the same institutional setting. Yet, as he points out, the costs associated with different political actions change in each political context. On the other hand, recent institutional

studies have shifted their emphasis from immigrants' collective identity formation and political mobilization to their patterns of claims making. The focus on immigrant claims making as well as the adoption of media content analysis as the primary data collection method have enabled researchers to increase their national cases through academic collaborations. The seminal work of Koopmans and his colleagues (2005) explores the relationship between institutional and discursive opportunity structures provided by different models of citizenship on the one side and immigrants' patterns of collective claims making on the other side. Their research examines five national cases and highlights striking cross-country variations of immigrant collective identities, issues expressed in the public sphere, and forms of immigrants' claims making. In this respect, they argue that the exclusionist integration model in Germany indirectly buttresses immigrants' national and ethnic identities and promotes their transnational political engagements. On the contrary, the assimilationist French integration regime encourages claims making of policy-status identities i.e. immigrants, foreigners, undocumented people. The overwhelming majority of immigrants' claims in France are concerned with national/local issues. In this sense, immigrants' collective identities and their claims are, to a large extent, perceived as the products of national configurations of citizenship models.

2.3. Electoral Politics in Immigrant Political Incorporation Research

As the share of immigrant-origin citizens has been increasing in national populations, factors related to electoral politics –such as election systems, candidate nomination procedures, organization of electoral districts, party structures, and campaign funding- have attracted attention of immigration scholars (see: Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011).

Previous studies have already demonstrated the importance of electoral rules on political participation and representation of women, national minorities, and working classes (among others: Lijphart 1984; Saggar 2000; Norris 2004). Yet, recent research on immigrant political incorporation proved the need of extending and revising the existing models by considering specific characteristics of immigrants. For instance, the literature on women's political representation, to a large extent, agrees on the advantages of proportional representation (PR) to have a greater inclusion of women into electoral bodies. However, immigration scholars need to test these well-established proposals, since immigrant-origin people, contrary to women, are usually residentially concentrated and might profit from majoritarian systems (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013, 570).

Today, immigration scholars have taken important steps in including formal electoral factors into their analyses. Studies show that election systems matter in representation of immigrant-origin people. Michon (2011b) illustrates how different election systems at national, regional, and local levels of the French government provide strikingly different opportunities for immigrant-origin candidates. Togeby (2008) and Schönwälder (2013) show that immigrant-origin candidates can use the system of "personal votes" for their own advantages. Besides the election systems, party structures and procedures of candidate nomination matter significantly for inclusion of immigrant-origin people to elective offices. By comparing the cases in France and Britain, Garbaye (2005) and Dancygier (2010) show that the hierarchical structure of French political parties and the primacy of French party elites in candidate nomination, to a large extent, block the access of immigrant-origin people to party lists (Brouard and Tiberj 2011a). On the other hand, in the case of Britain, local party members (often with immigration

background) have an important role in the process of candidate nomination at the local level.

Electoral factors, like other institutional explanations, are incomplete without a consideration of group-based factors. While different electoral rules make a difference in terms of incorporation of immigrant-origin minorities into their host country politics, it is also empirically proven that different immigrant groups within the same country make a different use of these existing electoral rules. Maxwell (2012) illustrates that Caribbeans in Britain and France consistently have a lower level of success in the electoral politics of their host countries. He argues that the absence of adequate organizational resources and community ties result in Caribbean under-achievement in electoral politics. On the contrary, immigrants from Turkey have been spotted as one of the most successful immigrant groups in terms of electoral participation and representation in their host countries (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Togeby 1999; Schönwälder 2013; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). The organizational capacity of Turkish immigrants in Europe is considered as an important factor that facilitates their political mobilization and therefore political incorporation. These findings prove that electoral institutions interact with group-based factors (Dancygier 2013; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Therefore, electoral analysis of immigrant political incorporation must take the factors related to immigrant groups' identification, organization, and mobilization seriously.

2.4. Criticism of Institutional Approaches

Institutionalist approaches, more particularly the framework of "political opportunity structures", have been highly popular in cross-national comparative migration research. Yet, they have been criticized on multiple grounds. Below, I will discuss three main

issues that critics have raised about institutionalist literature in migration scholarship: country-based integration typologies, institution-participation nexus, and the issue of transnationalism.

Country-based typologies as "straightjackets"?

To start with, institutional approaches in migration studies provide solid analyses for cross-country differences. Yet, cross-country typologies developed or adopted by migration scholars (e.g. labeling Germany with ethnic exclusionism, France with republican assimilation, and Netherlands with multiculturalism) have received wide-range of criticisms. The critics highlight the issue of internal diversity and complexity within each country/model. Entzinger (2000) argues that country-based typologies put the integration models into "straightjackets" and fail to understand change in time and differential treatment of immigrants within cases. Instead, he proposes a typology of approaches that cover six options for integration policies. In the same vein, Freeman (2004) argues that typologies of incorporation regimes "oversimplify extremely messy reality" and offers a conception of "multisectoral framework" that analyzes integration in four different domains of society – state, market, welfare, and culture. Moreover, Bertossi (2011) argues that national models of integration suffer from "normative and theoretical misconceptions". Bertossi and Duyvendak warns the scholars of national integration models about "a confusion between scholarly ideal-types and political stereotypes" (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 241).

Some other scholars challenge country-based integration typologies by arguing that cross-national differences in liberal democracies fade away over time. Earlier studies emphasized the role of "post-national" forces -i.e. transnational structures and discourses

to protect human rights and personhood- in making citizenship regimes less relevant for immigrants' basic rights and liberties (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997). Recently, scholars widely acknowledge the importance of national citizenship regimes for immigrants' status in their host country. Yet, some studies show a converging trend across national citizenship regimes of liberal democracies due to their shared principles and international conventions (Brubaker 2003; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Joppke 2007). The convergence argument implies that the boundaries among different integration models are withering away.

On the other hand, the proponents of national integration models either empirically prove the persistence of cross-national differences (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012) or theoretically point out "the heuristic potential of models of citizenship and immigrant integration" (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). Koopmans and his colleagues (2012) trace immigrant citizenship policies in ten European countries from 1980-2008. They conclude that even though in some cases countries move in the same direction, this does not mean that their policies are getting closer. On the contrary, they find that cross-national differences in citizenship policies became larger from 1980 to 2008. Moreover, Finotelli and Michalowski (2012) emphasize the difficulty of "construct(ing) a theoretical comparison in the social sciences without referring to some sort of typology" (p. 235). Despite the pitfalls of the national models as being "too static", "too simplistic" and "too normative", they still carry heuristic importance to "reduce unstructured complexity in a controlled and reflexive way", to explore "some minimal internal coherence", and to "demonstrate … linkages, mechanisms, and trends" (ibid. p. 235).

Institutions-Participation Nexus: A Model of Structural Determinism?

The second point of criticism highlights the danger of considering institutional factors as ultimate determinants of immigrants' politics and leaving no room for immigrants' political agency. Initially, the institutional approach to migration studies has been considered as a major theoretical development that has the potential to overcome structurally determinist accounts of class and ethnicity theories. The depiction of migrants' politics as a dynamical process that interacts with its institutional setting has been appealing to many researchers. Yet, recently, scholars argue that the over-emphasis on institutions has turned out to be another structurally deterministic account that cannot grasp the diversity and change of political engagements within a single institutional setting (Pero and Solomos 2010). Therefore, scholars call for the necessity of theorizing the link between institutional frameworks and immigrant politics.

Research on multiple immigrant groups in a single institutional context provides significant empirical evidence on how group-based factors mediate institutional opportunities and restraints. For instance, the immigration literature in the US provides significant theoretical and empirical accounts on how group-based psychological factors i.e. group solidarity, identification, consciousness, perceived group-discrimination and a sense of linked fate matter in immigrant groups' political incorporation (Miller et al. 1981; Dawson 1995; Chong and Rogers 2005; Junn and Masuoka 2008; McClain et al. 2009). These studies prove that immigrant groups, even though they live in the same institutional environment, develop diverging levels and trajectories of political incorporation. Yet, the absence of cross-national perspective limits analyses based on

"single country multiple groups" in terms of evaluating how different institutional settings shape group-based psychological factors.

Nationally-Bounded Frameworks and the Issue of Transnationalism

The third point of criticism comes from transnational migration scholarship that challenges nationally bounded frameworks of institutional approaches. It is argued that when institutional analyses primarily focus on host country political context, they fail to account for transnational political ties and sources of migrants. As a solution, some scholars revised institutional accounts by including home country POS and analyze the effects of home and host POS simultaneously. Ögelman (2003) calls this matrix as Transnational Political Opportunity Structure (TPOS). More critical accounts looked at migrants' transnational ties and networks across national-contexts and analyzed how migrant politics is shaped by factors coming from transnational sources on which host institutions have either weak or no control at all (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Therefore, immigrant groups, as opposed to native minorities, do not only draw on locally available political resources. On the contrary, transnational networks and resources become important factors that shape immigrants' politics.

To conclude, institutional perspectives to immigrant politics provide significant accounts on how institutional opportunities and restraints shape immigrant political mobilization and participation. Scholars in this literature demonstrate that immigrant groups do not hold immutable and innate political characteristics. On the contrary, immigrants' political engagements take different forms, highlight different issues, and follow diverging patterns of participatory strategies depending on the institutional environment. The host country institutional setting shapes but does not determine immigrants' political

activities. In other words, the existing political and discursive opportunity structures define the availability of formal and informal channels of political participation; yet, they cannot guarantee whether and how immigrant groups harness these political opportunities to pursue their collective politics. Therefore, scholars in institutionalist tradition cannot provide adequate explanations to why certain immigrant groups in a certain context raise a stronger group consciousness and participate in politics at higher levels than other immigrant groups or deliberately avoid active political engagements despite the availability of institutional opportunities. In this respect, this dissertation proposes the significance of host country's ethno-racial context as an important part of immigrants' political mobilization and participation process. Collective perception of group status in host country's ethno-racial context becomes a crucial factor that explains why some immigrant groups become active participants in host country politics and not others. Below, I will elucidate this third perspective to immigrant political incorporation further.

3. Linking Political Opportunities and Political Participation: The Role of Subjective Factors

Scholars of immigrant political incorporation either implicitly or explicitly have been dealing with the problem of theorizing the relationship between immigrants' political agency and the structural context around them (see: Bousetta 2000; Kastoryano 2002; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; E. Morawska 2011). Morawska (2011), by drawing on sociological debates on structure/agency, voluntarism/determinism, and free will/necessity (see among others: Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992; Emirbayer and Mische 1998), applies "the theory of structuration" to the field of immigration studies. The theory of structuration proposes that macro-structural factors (such as economic and political systems) constitute "dynamic limits" that enable or restrain people's actions. On the other

hand, “individuals and groups evaluate their situations, define purposes, and undertake their actions”. As a consequence, these individual and collective activities, intentionally or unintentionally, affect (either sustain or change) local and later macro level structural factors. Therefore, Morawska (2011, 5) points out that “(im)migrants’ activities are neither simply the products of structures nor their agentic volitions but of the time- and place-specific contexts of the interactions between two”.

I argue that the model of structuration provides an important step toward theorizing immigrant political incorporation into their host countries. Yet, without considering specific processes that immigrant-originated groups encounter with, a general structure-agency model cannot provide much help to immigration scholars. It is important to remember that immigrants do not live as isolated groups, but reside in an ethnically diverse context. Neither the formal institutional actors -such as government agencies and political parties- nor general public opinion are indifferent to this ethnic diversity. While some immigrant groups are privileged among others as so called “model minorities”, some others are berated and put to the center of immigrant integration debates. In other words, while some immigrant groups perceive themselves a better social status in host country inter-ethnic context vis-à-vis the other ethnic minority groups, some others confront higher levels of discrimination and prejudice and therefore perceive themselves as a deprived group. Therefore, not every immigrant groups have the same level of motivation to politically mobilize and engage in political activities to improve their relative status in host country ethno-racial hierarchy. In this respect, migrant groups’ collective perception of their group status in their host country’s ethno-racial context as well as collective attribution of their relatively deprived status to systemic causes rise as

crucial factors in immigrants' political mobilization and participation. Below, I will discuss how subjective factors related to immigrants' collective perception of their group status in host country context contribute to the existing explanations to immigrant political incorporation.

3.1. Perception of Discrimination and Ethnic Group Identification

Much of the existing research on how perceived discrimination affects collective identity formation of minority groups has been conceptualized within the framework of the Social Identity Theory (SIT). The SIT proposes that "individuals strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity" (Tajfel and Turner 1986). The underlying assumption of the SIT is that people would favor in-group as opposed to the out-group to enhance their self-image. Scholars studying identity formation in multi-ethnic societies demonstrate that if members of minority groups perceive collective discrimination and stigmatization from the mainstream society, they tend to develop higher identification with their in-group and strengthen the boundary that separates them from the threatening out-group. If the option of moving upward and away from the devalued group is not viable, then stronger identification with in-group and appreciation of group-based distinctiveness remain as the only strategy for minority groups to cope with the unfavorable social setting around them. Studies show that the relationship between perceived discrimination and minority group identification exists for many groups in many diverse contexts i.e. African Americans (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999), Latinos (Quintana and Scull 2009), women (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996), Muslims in Europe (Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Kunst et al. 2012; Holtz, Dahinden, and Wagner 2013), and Turks in Germany (Skrobanek 2009).

The SIT framework has been particularly strong about explaining the psychological processes of ethnic identity formation in the face of perceived discrimination. Yet, there are at least two issues that remain unanswered by social psychology theories. First, ethnic identity formation cannot be reduced to psychological processes of perceived discrimination. As Lamont and Mizrachi (2012, 368) argue national contexts, cultural repertoires, and available rhetoric mediate the relationship between perceived discrimination and identification processes. Therefore, the discrimination-identification nexus takes place in a socio-cultural and political fabric, which is often glossed over by social psychological analyses. In this respect, Cornell and Hartmann's (2007) constructivist approach to ethnic and racial identities provides an analytical leverage. Different from the circumstantialist account that perceives ethnic and racial identities as products of external circumstances such as structured inequality or societal conflicts, the constructivist approach underlines interactions between circumstances and groups at the heart of identity construction processes. Cornell and Hartmann (2007) propose that ethnic and racial groups go beyond the limitations posed by the circumstances and may (re)shape their identities by drawing on "the raw materials of history, cultural practice, and preexisting identities to fashion their own distinctive notions of who they are" (p. 81).

Secondly, a sole-focus on socio-psychological dimension of identity formation cannot account for intricate relationship among perceived discrimination, group identification, and political participation. An inquiry on when perceived discrimination paves the way for increased political participation or when it does result in depoliticization of stigmatized groups requires a keen attention to groups' organizational

underpinnings, their available political repertoire, and the broader socio-political context that they are living in. Hence, in this research, the examination of immigrants' perceived status in host country ethno-racial context and its political consequences is informed by, but not based on, social-psychological theories of identity formation. On the contrary, I examine politicization of a disadvantaged immigrant group in the face of perceived discrimination through considering the role of their collective organizations, ethnic political entrepreneurs, and prevailing political framing and discourse.

3.2. Group Consciousness and Political Participation

The research on the discrimination-identity link does not necessarily consider the political consequences of collective identity formation. On the other hand, there is a long tradition of scholarship -particularly based in the US- that examines the link between group identity and group politics (Lee 2008). Particularly the developments in the US during the Civil Rights era of the 1960s brought about an inevitable scholarly attention to group-based sources of African American politics. Many scholars demonstrated that a sense of racial consciousness constitutes a key group-based resource that explains higher rates of political participation of African American compared to white Americans of similar socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972; Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1981; Dawson 1995). Along with the changing ethno-racial landscape in the US, emerging studies also tested the effects of group consciousness on political participation of Latinos and Asian Americans (Stokes 2003; Junn and Masuoka 2008). Yet, recent contradictory evidence on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation led researchers to further clarify the concept of group consciousness and refine the tools of measurement.

The theoretical framework in this literature clearly distinguishes "group consciousness" from "group identification" (Miller et al. 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005; McClain et al. 2009). *Group identification* refers to "a psychological sense of belonging or attachment to a social group". On the other hand, *group consciousness* is "in-group identification *politicized* by a set of ideological beliefs about one's groups' social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (McClain et al. 2009, 476). For the purposes of my research, the distinction between group identity and consciousness provides an important analytical leverage to explain why an immigrant group coming from the same country of origin develops stronger political presence in some host country contexts but not in others without necessarily reducing immigrants' politics to institutionalist factors. As Miller *et. al*. (1981, 495) points out "there is no theoretical reason to expect a simple direct relationship between group identification and political participation". The transformation from group identification to group consciousness requires a collective perception of group's disadvantaged position in the society along with a political awareness that holds the systemic causes, but not group members' failings, responsible for group's relatively deprived position. This point shows that immigrant groups with similar ethnic group identification might develop different levels of group consciousness in different settings.

An analytical distinction between group identification and group consciousness becomes crucial to understand the politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France. Recent survey studies show that Turkish immigrants have a strong tendency for ethnic retention both in the cases of Germany and France (Ersanilli 2010; Ersanilli and

Koopmans 2011; Ersanilli and Saharso 2011). In other words, Turks in both cases identify themselves primarily as Turkish, are fluent in their home language, and have a predominantly Turkish social circle. However, a strong ethnic retention does not necessarily mean that their ethnic group identity is similarly *politicized* in these two national contexts. To put differently, Turkish immigrants in Germany and France might still diverge from each other in terms of their collective dissatisfaction with their group's relative status in their host countries as well as their commitment to collective action to realize their group-based interest. In most of the cases, the objective deprivation or disadvantaged position does not automatically bring about a politicized group consciousness. To understand underpinnings of politicized group consciousness, we need to consider the role of immigrant organizations and the power of ethnic leaders in framing group-based grievances and coordinating collective politics.

3.3. Ethnic Organizations: Framing the Collective Grievances and Organizing Collective Action

Immigrant organizations play a key role in immigrants' collective politics. There are multiple ways that immigrant organizations contribute to immigrant political incorporation. They provide the members with civic skills and political knowledge that are crucial for individual level political participation. They are attractive sites for political parties to appeal new voters. They work as semi-formal channels through which immigrants collectively interact with their host country public authorities and pursue politics of recognition and representation. In some cases, immigrant organizations themselves become active political participants in advisory platforms and corporatist structures. Besides all these functions, I argue that immigrant organizations also play a crucial role in articulating a collective awareness about the group's grievances, deprived

position, and possible political remedies to overcome this disadvantaged position. In this respect, immigrant organizations and their organizational elite are particularly significant for the emergence of politicized group consciousness.

The cultural strand in social movements literature has previously showed that "the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction" mediate between political opportunity and political action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 2). According to this perspective, political opportunities and means of mobilization (mobilizing structures) provide structural potentials for political action; but these structural potentials are insufficient to explain the emergence and development of collective actions. It is only through shared meanings and collective attributions that structural opportunities can be perceived as opportunities and acted on. Snow and his colleagues, by drawing on the conception of Goffman (1974), called this ideational side of social movements as *frame alignment* or *framing processes* (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000).

The conception of "frame alignment" becomes crucial to understand how immigrant organizations turn collective grievances into political claims and actions. Empirical evidence provided by the following chapters demonstrates that not only the objective existence of material deprivation, but collective awareness of it paves the way for political action. In this vein, immigrant organizations have a crucial role of raising the collective consciousness about the deprived status of the immigrant group. Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany commonly call for attention on unfair and discriminatory nature of German immigration and integration policies against the Turkish minority. Therefore, they frame the collective grievances of Turkish immigrants in a way

that holds German institutional and political structures responsible for the deprived group status. Hence, proposed political actions to alleviate these collective grievances include mobilization towards German political institutions. On the contrary, such a framing process does not take place among Turkish immigrant organizations in France. The following chapters will discuss this issue in detail.

4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to review the existing theoretical frameworks to immigrant political incorporation, identify their relative strengths and weaknesses, and bring up an alternative theoretical perspective that could address to the current problems in the literature on immigrant political incorporation. I argued that two analytical perspectives have prevailed in the scholarship on immigrant politics: The first perspective focuses on characteristics of immigrant groups and explains the political variation through group-based factors. The second perspective prioritizes the external institutional factors and perceives host countries' institutional and political context as ultimate determinants of immigrant politics. While the existing theoretical frameworks provide rigorous analyses on group-based and institutional political opportunities that are available to immigrants, they share the common weakness in terms of explaining when and how immigrant groups mobilize on the available political opportunities and become active participants in their host country political arenas. This chapter contributes to the current explanations to immigrant political incorporation by focusing on subjective factors as intermediaries between available political sources and opportunities on the one side and immigrant groups' political action on the other side. Collective perception of group status in host country's ethno-racial context becomes a crucial factor that explains why some

immigrant groups become active participants in host country politics and not others. During this process, immigrant organizations and organizational elite play a crucial role in turning common grievances into public claims and creating a collective consciousness that seeks for a remedy within host country political system.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF ETHNIC MIGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES IN GERMANY AND FRANCE

This chapter reviews the history of ethnic migration and subsequent institutional and political responses to rising ethnic diversity in Germany and France. The main objective is to evaluate whether and to what extent Germany and France provide diverging historical contexts, institutional and political opportunities for the development of immigrant political incorporation. I start the chapter with tracing the history of migration to Germany and France. In this section, I particularly discuss similarities and differences of Turkish immigration history in these two national contexts. Second, I analyze national institutional arrangements to manage the rising ethnic diversity in Germany and France. I compare and contrast these two national cases in terms of their citizenship regimes, multicultural policy frameworks, and minority interest mediation structures. In this section, I argue that along with internal complexities and a trend of policy convergence, prominent cross-national differences exist between Germany and France in terms of available political institutional opportunities for migrant political incorporation. Third, I review the debates on the relationship between integration regimes and migrant political incorporation.

I conclude the chapter by arguing that contrasting historical backgrounds and diverging political institutional opportunities are expected to produce a significantly different picture of immigrant political incorporation in Germany and France. While the case of France is often considered as a fertile soil for political integration of individual immigrants, due to its historically liberal citizenship regime, civic-territorial definition of

nationhood, and republican assimilationist policies; long-term segregationist policies in Germany that excluded non-ethnic German migrants from the political society are thought to curtail migrants' political integration in general. On the other hand, while modest multicultural policy frameworks and corporatist interest mediation arrangements in Germany provide formalized channels for migrants' group based politics, the republican integration framework in France is expected to result in extra-parliamentary forms of immigrants' group-based collective movements.

1. History of Ethnic Immigration to Germany and France

1.1. Germany: Between Emigration and Immigration

Since the early modern period, German-speaking territories have gone through continuous movement of people either in the form of inflowing religious refugees and economically motivated people from other parts of Europe or transatlantic emigration of Germans.[16] The geographic position of Germany resulted in a history of migration in which "not only people have moved across borders, but borders have also moved over people – minorities became majorities, majorities turned into minorities, and natives into strangers in their own land" (Bade and Oltmer 2011, 65). Despite this long history of migration, many people consider that German history of migration starts with the post

[16] The Thirty Year's War (1618-48) resulted in big depopulation in the German-speaking territories. For some centuries, these areas had been the primary destination of immigration in the central Europe especially by religious refugees and economically motivated people (Bade and Oltmer 2011, 56). Population expansion was followed by continental and later transatlantic emigration movements between the 18th and the late 19th century. Philadelphia was the chief destination place for German migrants. Between 1816 and 1914, around 5.5 million Germans emigrated to the USA, which was followed by another 2 million later on. During this era, German migrants were the second largest minority group in the US after the Irish (ibid. 69).

Second World War era.[17] During this period, there have been three major flows of immigration to Germany: (1) arrival of guest workers through bilateral labor recruitment agreements; (2) flow of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and (3) flow of refugees and asylum seekers especially after the civil conflict in South East Europe. Below, I will discuss these different immigration flows to Germany.

Post-War Labor Immigration and the Arrival of Turks:

The economic boom and the rapid industrialization process in the postwar Germany resulted in a major labor shortage problem. To fill this labor shortage, Germany signed labor recruitment agreements with various South European and Mediterranean countries: Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. The guest workers (*gastarbeiters*) were recruited on a rotational basis. It was designed in a way that a worker works in Germany for a year and then goes back to her country. However, there was no enforcement for rotation and so this rotational scheme was only partially applied (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 96; Abadan-Unat 2006, 60). On the one hand, employers wanted to keep already socialized and trained foreign workers without the rotation. On the other hand, workers kept on postponing their return with the purpose of increasing their savings (Heckmann 2003, 52).

Turkish labor immigration to Germany was already taking place in small numbers through private initiatives in the mid-1950s, just before the bilateral agreements between Germany and Turkey (Abadan-Unat 2006, 55–57). Yet, some key events in the early

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[17] Joppke argues that although Germany, like France, had a long immigration history before the World War II, this history has been "conveniently" forgotten along with destructive wars and regime changes (Joppke 1999, 62).

1960s constituted a turning point in Turkish immigration history to Germany. On the side of Germany, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 abruptly cut the flow of workers coming from East Germany. Since it was no more possible to receive German workers from the Eastern part, recruiting foreign labor became inevitable. On the side of Turkey, the period of the 1960s also brought some significant changes. In 1961, Turkey removed the constitutional barriers for Turkish citizens to travel abroad. In 1962, Turkish state planners accepted the "export of surplus labor" as one of the objectives of the first "five-year development program" of Turkey (Abadan-Unat 2006, 59). The objective was to increase skill level of the national workforce through labor rotation agreements with Western European countries. Germany was the first country that Turkey signed the bilateral labor agreement and was followed by Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France, and Sweden.

In the case of Germany, Turkish workers were recruited through employment offices of Germany (*Deutsche Verbindungsstelle*) and of Turkey (Turkish Employment Office). Prospective workers were applying to the Turkish Employment Office. Turkish Employment Office, in collaboration with its German counterpart, was selecting the workers from application lists. Involvement of the formal employment offices during the selection process brought about an "anonymous" recruitment and to a large extent obstructed a "chain migration" i.e. flow of workers from the same village (Abadan-Unat 2006, 59; Kaya and Kentel 2005, 13).

The first empirical study on Turkish workers in Germany, which was conducted in 1963, showed that the initial wave of Turkish labor immigration to Germany included people with relatively higher level of education and occupational status (see: Abadan-

Unat 2006, 111–136). Later, the portion of unskilled workers with a rural background increased rapidly. Therefore, many Turkish workers immigrated to Germany from rural areas of Turkey without having an urban life experience in their country of origin. The Turkish labor force in Germany was mostly employed in the sectors of metal production, building construction, and other manufacturing industries (Castles and Kosack 1973, 71). The concentration of Turkish labor force in large factories was welcomed by German employers, since it reduced the cost of communication and the need for interpreters (Wilpert 2013, 113).

During the labor recruitment era, there was no provision for providing German language education for foreign workers. The majority of Turkish workers lived in collective dormitories (called as *heim*), had minimum contact with the local society, and mainly followed homeland press (Abadan-Unat 2006, 117, 124–126). Since both the German state and Turkish workers perceived Turkish presence in Germany as a temporary process, the social, economic, and cultural segregation of Turkish workers from the German society was viewed as normal. However, this initial structural segregation, later on, had important consequences on Turkish immigrants' and their children's integration into the German society.

Germany, like many other European countries, stopped recruiting foreign labor after the oil crisis in 1973. Yet, the halt of the labor rotation and the permanent closure of German borders to foreign workers brought about a significant unintended consequence: family unification. Although the number of foreign workers started decreasing after the

recruitment ban, the number of foreigners in Germany kept on increasing.[18] As the re-entry doors were closed, Turkish workers sought the ways for bringing their families and became permanent settlers in Germany. Consequently, the number of Turkish-origin people in Germany kept on rising (see: Table 1).

Table 1: Germany's foreign population and Turkish minority in selected years.

Year	Foreigners	Turkish citizens	% of Turks among foreigners
1961	686,200	6,700	0.98
1970	2,600,600	429,400	16.51
1973	3,966,200	893,600	22.53
1976	3,948,300	1,079,300	27.34
1978	3,981,100	1,165,100	29.27
1983	4,534,900	1,552,300	34.23
1988	4,489,100	1,523,700	33.94
1990	5,241,800	1,675,900	31.97
1995	7,173,900	2,014,300	28.08
2000	7,296,800	1,998,500	27.39
2005	6,755,800	1,764,000	26.11
2010	6,753,621	1,629,480	24.13

Source: The Federal Statistical Office, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1963-2012. Note 1: The numbers between 1961-1990 refer to the Federal Republic of Germany including West Berlin. The numbers after 1991 reflect the situation after the unification. Note 2: Decreasing number of Turkish citizens in Germany after the mid-1990s indicates increasing numbers of naturalization among Turkish minority.

The arrival of family members in the 1970s had a major impact on the composition of Turks in Germany and their problems. In this period, the Turkish population in Germany was no more predominantly composed of adult-males, but included women and children. Consequently, the problems faced by the Turkish

[18] The number of employed foreign workers dropped from 2.6 million in 1973 to 1.8 million in 1976. On the contrary, the foreign residential population in Germany rose from 3.9 million in 1973 to 4.14 million in 1976 and to 4.9 million in 1989 (Bade et al. 2011, 76).

immigrants were no longer limited to the economic sphere, but started including social, cultural, and religious issues. One of the earliest problems was the housing issue. Particularly in Berlin, the shortage of cheap housing as well as discrimination and social exclusion against Turkish families brought about the ethnic concentration in traditional working class neighborhoods. While the current economic and social conditions had the primary role in this ethnic settlement, later on, this situation is interpreted "as self-made ghettos and … as 'parallel' societies" (Wilpert 2013, 114). The other urgent issue was about the education of foreign children. The ethnic settlement in poor parts of urban neighborhoods led to the concentration of foreign students in disadvantaged schools that could not match the national educational standards. Over time, the issue of Islam and its contested place in the German society became a part of the political debates on Turkish immigrants. As I will demonstrate in the following parts, Germany's reluctance to acknowledge the permanent settlement of Turks in Germany until the late 1990s delayed any substantive provisions to encounter these rising problems.

The Flow of Ethnic Germans from the Eastern Bloc Countries:

The Second World War ended up with a divided Germany and a high number of German people scattered in East Europe and the Soviet Union. The West Germany prioritized the return of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from communist regimes by entitling them automatic German citizenship and by providing extensive measures of integration. Article 116 of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*-GG)[19] in connection with the Expellees Act

[19] Article 116 of the Basic Law states: "Unless otherwise provided by a law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of December 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person." (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0720, last visited December 17, 2012)

granted German repatriates the constitutional right to obtain full German citizenship (Hailbronner 2010, 4). Between 1950 and 2007, around 4.5 million *Aussiedler* came to the Federal Republic. The big majority of them (around 3 million) arrived after 1987 along with the opening of the iron curtain (Bade et al. 2011, 79).

Joppke argues that the Second World War resulted in the Federal Republic's self definition "as a vicarious, incomplete nation-state" whose mission was "the recovery of national unity" (Joppke 1999, 63). Therefore, Germany privileged the naturalization and integration of ethnic Germans from the eastern bloc over other immigrants. According to Joppke, this sense of incompleteness had important consequences in terms of exclusion of foreigners from German citizenship. Along with the idea that such an inclusion of foreigners to the German nation would dilute the mission of national re-unity and national identification, German citizenship laws maintained their ethno-cultural principles for a long time.

After the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the mission of re-unifying Germans came to an end. Therefore, exclusion of foreigners from nationality lost its legitimacy (Joppke 1999, 200). Hence, the post-Cold War period brought about important consequences for ethnic relations in Germany. On the one hand, the flow of ethnic Germans from the East Germany as well as from Eastern Europe and former Soviet territories illustrated the contradictions in German citizenship policies. While non-German immigrants, who have been living in Germany for almost three generations, were deprived of the right of naturalization, ethnic German newcomers, some of whom even lacked the fluency in German language, were granted automatic citizenship and extensive

social benefits. In Joppke's words: "*de facto* foreigners automatically classified as Germans and … *de facto* Germans still classified as foreigners" (ibid).

On the other hand, national reunification of Germany resulted in increasing contentions over national identity, which were followed by the rise of xenophobia and far-right political movements (Kanstroom 1993). On the one hand, the unification slogan of *Wir sind ein Volk* (we are one nation) could not ease the tension between Germans from the eastern and the western parts of Germany. On the other hand, Turkish minority, as the largest non-German immigrant community, became one of the primary victims of identity contentions in the post-unified Germany (Abadan-Unat 2006, 80). In the 1990s, rising anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner rhetoric in Germany accompanied escalating crimes against foreigners, including lethal attacks of arson.[20]

Germany responded the post-unification social problems by curtailing some of the rights of ethnic German resettlers. In 1993, "Law Dealing with Late Consequences of the Second World War" (*Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz*) was accepted. According to this law, only *Spätaussiedler,*[21] who were born before 1993, could file an application for repatriation (Bade and Oltmer 2011, 80). This is considered as a precursor that Germany was transforming from ethnic-priority migration to a general migration (Joppke 1999, 96). Moreover, since 2005, it is required for ethnic German resettlers to prove basic

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[20] Between 1992-2003, the number of hate-crimes peaked in Germany. 110,000 criminal cases conducted against foreigners during these years (Keskin 2011, 94). During the early 1990s, especially Turkish families were at the target of radical right-wing attacks. In 1992, Neo Nazi groups fire attacked two houses occupied by Turkish families in Mölln. In 1993, another arson attack killed five members of a Turkish family in Solingen (Abadan-Unat 2006, 81). Therefore, Turkish migrant population became the scapegoat of the social and economical problems encountered in the post-unification period.

[21] *Spätaussiedler* (late emigrant) is a term created after 1993 to replace *Aussiedler*. Different from early emigrants, *Spätaussiedler* had to prove their expulsion status in their countries of settlement due to their ethnic affiliation (Bolaffi et al. 2003, 313).

knowledge of German language (see: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees website).

Flow of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:

Along with the arrival of guest workers' family members and ethnic German resettlers, flows of asylum seekers and refugees have been another important source of immigration in Germany. Germany, until the constitutional amendment in 1993, had uniquely liberal asylum laws. Following the bitter experience of the Nazi regime, the Federal Republic kept the Article 16 of the Basic Law (GG), which granted constitutional right to asylum regardless of applicants' nationality. Until the reforms in the 1990s, Germany had the most liberal asylum laws in Western Europe through which asylum seekers enjoyed right of entry and constitutional protection even before the authorities made a decision about their application (Joppke 1999, 85–94). Therefore, Germany became a magnate for refugees and asylum seekers with increasing numbers every year. According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the number of 260,000 asylum applications in 1991 was reached to 440,000 in 1992. This sharp increase in the numbers of asylum seekers resulted in the 1993 constitutional amendment that highly restricted asylum right policies in Germany. In 2007, through the acceptance of EU directives about asylum policies, Germany could match the asylum standards of other European countries.[22]

Germany's liberal asylum policies have also been decisive for Turkish immigration to Germany. Germany has been the primary destination for Turkish political refugees since the 1970s. During the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, there was a tremendous

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[22] Joppke (1999, 85) argues that Germany recovered its national sovereignty over asylum policies through political integration into EU. While the political conflicts, burden of the Nazi past, and diverse asylum applications across the German states prevented a substantial reform in asylum policies, adoption of EU standards ironically enabled Germany to gain its central authority over asylum policies.

increase in the numbers of asylum applications from Turkey to Germany (see Table 2). Moreover, during the peak of Turkey's Kurdish conflict in the early 1990s, Germany encountered another flow of political refugees from Turkey. Arrival of politically active people from Turkey had important consequences for Turkish migrant politics in Germany. First, the new waves of migration to Germany through asylum channels reinforced homeland ties of Turkish migrants who arrived to Germany in the 1960s. Second, these refugees continued their homeland related political activities from Germany and therefore shaped the political agenda of Turkish migrant organizations towards the direction of homeland politics. Following chapters will discuss the effects of refugee flows from Turkey on Turkish immigrant politics in Germany in more detail.

Table 2: Numbers of asylum applications from Turkey to Germany.

Years	Asylum applications from Turkey
1980	57,913
1985	7,528
1986	8,693
1987	11,426
1988	14,873
1989	20,020
1990	22,062
1991	23,877
1992	28,327
1995	25,514
2000	8,968
2005	2,958
2010	1,340

Source: The Federal Statistical Office, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1980-2011.

To sum up, while the official political rhetoric kept on reiterating that "Germany is not an immigration country" until recently, *de facto* immigration to Germany has a long history. Different sources of immigration resulted in increasing ethnic diversity in Germany. Yet, up until the late 1990s, Germany did not implement a substantive policy for immigrant integration. Today, Germany is a home for around seven million foreigners. Turkish immigrants constitute the largest non-German ethnic minority (see: Table 3). While Turkish migration to Germany is traced back as early as the 1950s, still the majority of the Turkish minority in Germany lacks citizenship rights, encounters socio-economic problems, and is often perceived at the center of integration debates in Germany.

Table 3: Distribution of foreigners in Germany, 2011.

	Numbers	**%**
Europe	5,509,282	79.5
Greece	283,684	4.1
Italy	520,159	7.5
Poland	468,481	6.8
Turkey	1,607,161	23.1
Africa	276,070	4.0
America	223,675	3.2
Asia	854,957	12.3
Australia and Oceania	13,077	0.19
Others	53,835	0.8
Total	6,930,896	100

Source: Central Register of Foreigners. (www.destatis.de, last visited on October 25, 2012).

1.2. France: Ebbs and Tides of Immigration

France, as one of the early industrial powers in Europe, has a long history of immigration, which can be traced back to the mid-19th century. Noiriel (1988), renowned French historian, conceptualizes French history of immigration in cycles that include periods of stability followed by increased mobility. While low birthrates and subsequent population

deficit and labor shortage resulted in welcoming immigrants to France; wars, economic depression, increasing unemployment and social conflicts led to restrictive immigration policies and hostility towards foreigners. There are three major waves of immigration to France that brought about the current diversity of the French population: (1) Post-Industrial Revolution era in the late 19th century; (2) post-Great War era in the 1920s; and (3) the post-Second World War period of 1945-1975 (Moch 2011).

The rapid industrialization process in the 19th century brought about domestic labor shortage in France. During this period, employers mostly recruited European labor force (initially from Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany and later from Poland).[23] However, the economic downturn during the late 19th resulted in rising xenophobia against the European-origin foreign workers. During this era, Italian workers became the primary target of anti-foreign sentiments in Southern France (Hargreaves 2007, 16). Eventually, the outbreak of the First World War ruptured the initial period of immigration to France.

After the war, France started welcoming foreign labor once more in order to fill the labor gap in the sectors of mining, metallurgy, and agriculture (Moch 2011, 57). During the inter-war period, immigration of Russians and Armenians also rose sharply due to the military conflicts in the area (Noiriel 1995). Later on, the concentration of Armenian immigrants in France, even though they constitute a small percentage of the immigrant population in France, became highly influential in the formation of Turkish migrant politics in France.

The 1930s came with a deep economic recession in France and in other parts of the world. The economic recession in France was once more followed by increased

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[23] The first immigration from Algeria (the Kabyles) also took place during this period.

racism and xenophobia against foreigners. During this period, France tightened its immigration and citizenship policies. Yet, the economic growth and the recovery in the post-Second World War era once more produced the need for foreign labor. The period between 1945 and 1975 (until the halt of foreign labor recruitment) was called as *Les Trente Glorieuses* (thirty glorious years). Different from the previous waves of immigration, the French state endeavored to have a stronger control over the postwar labor recruitment process (Hollifield 1992, 54). With this purpose, the National Immigration Office (ONI) was founded in 1945 to deal with the entry and the stay of foreigners in France.[24] As opposed these endeavors, employers largely kept their dominance over the labor recruitment process, as it was the case before 1945 (Bommes, Castles, and Wihtol de Wenden 1999, 47). Even after the foundation of the ONI, the majority of foreign workers entered the country illegally. The French state kept on "regularizing" the status of undocumented workers by issuing residence and work permits (Hargreaves 2007, 16). Initially, labor migrants came from European countries. Although there was no ethnic quota as it was the case in the US, the ONI endeavored the recruit foreign labor from European countries, particularly from Italy. Yet, not enough number of European workers showed interest in immigrating to France. As a result, immigration to France, later on, gained a big geographical, racial, ethnic, and religious diversity that included migration from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and from French (ex)colonies in Sub Sahara and in the Caribbean (Moch 2011). Over time, the share of Europeans within France's immigrant population dropped dramatically.

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[24] Later this office firstly became the OMI (*Office des Migrations Internationales*-The Office of International Migrations) and then it is turned into the ANAEM (*L'Agence Nationale de l'Accueil des Étrangers et des Migrations* – The National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migrations) (Wihtol de Wenden 2011).

Among all these immigrant groups, Algerians have a special place in the history of immigration in France. Until the independence of Algeria in 1962, Algerians could travel to and settle in the metropolitan France. The independence of Algeria, not only ceased the period of free movement of Algerians into the mainland of France, also brought about high number of people fleeing from Algeria into France. During this period, around one million Algerian-born French people (*Piednoirs*) came back to the mainland and mostly settled in South France. Moreover, a hundred thousand of Algerians (*harkis*), who were on the side of the French government during the Algerian war, fled to France. While in 1954, only 2.3% of France's foreign population was from North Africa, this proportion rose up to 23.6% in 1975 and 38.7% in 1990 (Hargreaves 2007, 18)

The heritage of colonial rule and the Algerian independence war resulted in anti-Arab hostility on the side of the French as well as resentment and mistrust on the side of Algerian origin people in France. Blanc-Chaléard (2006) argues that the racism that Algerians face in France has been distinct from the old French xenophobia that had targeted previous immigrant groups. In the case of previous immigrant groups (like Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese), some sort of social acceptance was achieved over time. However, Algerians (who are usually lumped together with other North African immigrants into the category of "Maghrebi") have been marked as *inassimilable,* because of their distinct ethno-cultural and religious characteristics (Blanc-Chaléard 2006, 53–54). Today, young French people with North African origin suffer from the problems of unemployment, lower educational achievement, residential segregation, and discrimination in employment and housing more than many other immigrant groups.

In 1974, along with the OPEC oil crisis, rising unemployment, and increasing hostility towards foreigners, France stopped the foreign labor recruitment. As it was the case in other European cases, the halt of labor migration in France brought about some unexpected consequences: Firstly, foreign workers became permanent settlers and brought their family members, as the re-entry doors were closed after 1974. While the French government attempted to restrict family unification, the *Conseil d'État* (the highest administrative court) ruled that such a ban is unconstitutional. Secondly, ongoing demand for labor in some industries (such as construction, textile, and domestic services) resulted in increasing number of illegal foreign workers (Bommes, Castles, and Wihtol de Wenden 1999, 47). Thirdly, as in the case of Germany, family reunification brought about diversification of immigrant populations in France and their problems. The mjor concerns of immigrant populations started including socio-economic problems among the second-generation immigrants, suburban segregation and concentration of poverty, and the rise of extreme right wing politics in France.

Between 1977 and 1981, the government took some actions to reduce the number of immigrants in France. Although it was not officially stated, the non-European immigrants were at the target. Initially, financial incentives were offered for voluntary repatriation under the system known as *l'aide au retour* (return assistance) (Hargreaves 2007, 26). Mainly Portuguese and Spanish immigrants, who were already making the plans of return, accepted this offer. In this respect, the policy could not fulfill its objectives, since a few Maghrebians returned their home in this way. Later, the government used the tools of mass expulsion as a tool to reduce the number of immigrants. However, such forceful tactics, to great extent, failed to serve the objectives.

As French immigration policies became stricter, the result was permanent stay of previously rotating foreign workers, increase in the numbers of asylum applications, and inflows of undocumented immigrants (ibid.).

The 1980s came with the increased politicization of the issue of immigration in France. The emergence of the National Front (an anti-immigrant far right political movement) profoundly affected politics of immigration in France. The debates on whether immigrants are economical burdens, threats to the social order, and challenges to the national identity vocalized during this era. To a large extent, a left-right wing consensus was reached on the objectives of controlling the borders, integrating immigrants, and ensuring the social order and security (Bommes, Castles, and Wihtol de Wenden 1999, 46). However, starting from the 1980s, shifting governments resulted in a series of legislations on immigration that swing between left and right wing politics. While between 1945-80, governments dealt with the issue of immigration in an informal way without formal legislation and public debate (mostly through ministerial circulars, calls, notes etc.); between 1980-2006, twelve different laws on the entry and the stay of immigrants were voted (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 68–69).

In 1981, through the election of Mitterrand as the president, the left came to the power. The most important reform of this era was the extension of “the right to establish associations” to foreigners. This law opened the channels for migrants’ self-organization and expression of their claims through these new platforms. However, along with the success of the far right National Front in the 1983 local elections, the immigration issue became an important card in the political competition. Between 1983 and 1997, successive right-wing governments implemented restricting reforms in immigration and

nationality laws i.e. the Pasqua Laws in 1986 and in 1993 and the Debré Law in 1997. In 1993, the Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, announced the objective of "zero immigration". The 1997 Debré Law, which aimed to bring strong restrictions on undocumented immigrants, was never implemented because of the government change. In 1997, the left returned to power. Chevènement, the Minister of the Interior, introduced a series of reforms to reverse some of the restrictive measures taken by the right wing governments. Patrick Weil, French historian and political scientists, chaired a commission that prepared a report to guide government's reforms on migration and nationality laws (Weil 1997).

In 2002, the right wing came back to the power. Nicholas Sarkozy, initially as the Minister of the Interior and later as the President, launched a new era in migration policy-making in France. One of the most important developments during this era was the replacement of "zero immigration" objective with "selective immigration policy". To catch up with global competition, high skilled immigration was welcomed, while policies on family unification and asylum kept on being restrictive. The slogan of this new era was: "Yes to chosen immigration (*immigration choisie*), no to unasked-for immigration (*immigration subie*)" (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 65). In 2012, the left once more came to power under the Presidency of François Hollande. The Interior Minister Manuel Valls criticized Sarkozy's immigration and integration policies as "random and discriminatory" and signaled a change towards adoption of more objective criteria for naturalization.[25]

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[25] For the interview with Valls, see: http://www.france24.com/en/20120727-new-french-immigration-initiatives-signal-break-sarkozy-policies-france-manuel-valls-interior-minister (last accessed on January 15, 2013).

Table 4: Distribution of foreigners in France (in 1000).

	1982	**1990**	**1999**	**2009** (in 1000 and %)	
Spaniards	327	216	162	128	3,4
Italians	340	253	202	174	4,6
Portuguese	767	650	554	493	13,1
Algerians	805	614	478	468	12,4
Moroccans	442	573	504	440	11,7
Tunisians	191	206	114	144	3,8
Turks	122	198	208	222	5,9
Total				3 771	100

Source: INSEE, censuses 1982, 1990, 1999, and 2009.[26] (These numbers do not include naturalized immigrants)

Turkish Immigration to France:

Turkish immigration to France started with the bi-lateral labor contract that was signed between Turkey and France in 1965 (Abadan-Unat 2006, 58). As the German labor market became saturated, workers in the waiting list of the Turkish Employment Institute (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) were allocated to the French labor market (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 13). While in Germany, Turkish labor recruitment took place in an anonymous way through the Turkish Employment Institute; in the case of France, entrepreneurs mostly recruited Turkish workers through private invitations (*nominal recruitment*), which later on resulted in "chain migration" of Turkish workers coming from the same towns/villages and even the same families (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 13).

The major flow of Turkish migration to France took place in the 1970s. Especially, the number of Turkish migrants started increasing through family unification after the ban of foreign labor recruitment. Initially, Turkish migrants settled in Paris/ Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes, and Alsace and Lorraine. Starting from the 1980s, especially

[26] Note that the 1999 census was the last time that the entire population was counted through a questionnaire. Since 2004, population data are provided through sample research annually. See: http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm (last accessed on January 15, 2013).

the regions of Bretagne, Auvergne, Limousin, Bourgogne, and Aquitaine (Gironde) received high numbers of Turkish migrants (Petek-Şalom 1998, 14). After the mid-1980s, political refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey started arriving to France. France has been the second most preferred destination for Turkish political refugees after Germany (Mohseni 2002 cited by (Danış and Üstel 2008, 17).

The number of people with Turkish migration background in France varies in different sources. One of the main reasons behind this discrepancy in the numbers is that France does not collect data on ethnic and religious background of her population. Three broad categories are used in census of INSEE (the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies): Foreigners, immigrants, and citizens (by naturalization or by birth).[27]

[27] According to the definition adopted by HCI (the High Council for Integration) an immigrant (*immigré*) is a person who was born outside of France with a foreign nationality. People but who were born abroad with a foreign nationality, regardless of whether they currently hold French nationality or not, are considered as immigrants. This status in permanent and cannot be altered as the status of foreigner. On the other hand, a foreigner (*étranger*) is someone who lives in France and does not have French nationality. The people with French nationality, even though they hold another nationality (or more) are considered to be French. A foreigner might be born in France. A person is considered as foreigner as long as s/he does not hold French citizenship. Unlike the status of immigrant, the status of foreigner might not persist throughout life. It can be ceased through becoming French by acquisition (Source: INSEE, Définitions 2012).

Table 5: Number of Turkish-origin people in France in various resources.

Category	In thousands	%	Source
Foreigners holding Turkish nationality [a]	222	5.9 (among 3,771foreigners)	INSEE, census 2009
Immigrants who were born in Turkey [b]	242	4.5 (among 5,325 immigrants)	INSEE, census 2009
Second-generation with Turkish immigration background [c]	80	2 (among 4,480 immigrant descendants)	INED-INSEE survey, Trajectories of Origin 2008
Turkish Muslims	314	7.5 (among 4,155 Muslims)	(Haut Conseil à l'Intégration 2000)
Total population with Turkish migration background	517	-	The Embassy of Turkish Republic in Paris (author's interview #41)

[a] The number of Turkish citizens in France: This number includes Turks holding dual nationality with Turkey and France, but excludes naturalized or second generation Turkish origin people who only hold French citizenship.
[b] The number of Turkish origin people who were born in Turkey with a foreign nationality at their birth. Naturalized and unnaturalized Turkish origin people are included as long as their birth place is in Turkey. Second-generation Turkish origin people are not included.
[c] The number of second-generation Turkish immigrants whose at least one of the parents was born in Turkey.

Historical trajectory of Turkish migration to France and to Germany shares many common aspects. In both cases: immigration started as a result of bi-lateral labor contracts; initially recruited Turkish workers did not have a permanent settlement intention; the halt of labor recruitment unexpectedly resulted in the inflow of family members; and the political conflicts in Turkey brought about increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in the 1980s and the early 1990s. On the other hand, there are significant differences between two cases: Firstly, while Turkish migrants in Germany constitute the major non-German minority group in Germany; Turks in France have constituted a small percentage compared to the Maghrebian populations in France. As a result, while the problem of migration and integration in Germany is usually defined with the reference to Turks, Turkish migrants are relatively invisible in French

integration debates. Secondly, while the labor contracts in both cases took place in similar years, major Turkish immigration wave to France took place once German labor market was saturated. Therefore, in terms of timing of the settlement, Turkish migrants in Germany are the oldest ones in Europe. Because of higher number of Turks living in Germany and their longer duration of stay, Turkish migrant organizations in Germany have a leading role for Turkish migrants in other parts of Europe. The headquarters of Turkish transnational networks are almost always located in Germany. Moreover, Turkish migrants in Germany could raise a group of political actors, who are active members of German political establishment. In this sense, Turkish migrants' politics in Germany constitutes an example for other Turkish migrant groups in Europe including France.

2. National Institutional Responses to Ethnic Diversity

One of the primary objectives of comparative migration studies is to develop a comparative framework that can explain diverging and converging national policy responses to ethnic diversity. Three different approaches in the literature provide competing frameworks to understand trends in migrant integration policies: The first approach argues that countries develop strikingly different policy responses to their rising ethnic diversity either because of their deeply rooted historical experiences and political culture (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995) or because of different configurations of electoral power (Schain 2008; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). The arguments of cross-national differences often end up with theoretical endeavors to classify different national models of migrant integration. In this literature, the cases of Germany and

France are classified as different models with respect to their citizenship policies as well as their policies towards ethnic groups.

The second approach emphasizes cross-national policy convergence either in the form of liberalization or increasing restrictionism. The argument is national policy responses towards immigrant integration are becoming more and more similar either through "postnational" forces such as international organizations, conventions, and norms or through domestic enforcement of liberal and/or restrictive policies towards immigrants (Soysal 2000; Brubaker 2001; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Joppke 2007).

The third approach criticizes both theories of cross-national divergence and convergence by emphasizing the internal national complexities. In this literature, national immigration policies are considered as multifaceted, changing over time, and are contested by multiple political actors. Therefore, scholars in this literature argue that national immigration policies cannot be reduced to cross-nationally comparable coherent models (Bertossi 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Bertossi 2012).

Despite the elements of cross-national policy convergence and internal national complexities, in this section, I demonstrate that there are striking cross-national differences between Germany and France in terms of their migrant integration policies. Despite the recent citizenship reforms in Germany, France still has more liberal citizenship policies with higher naturalization rates than Germany (Howard 2009). In terms of recognition of ethnic groups and accommodation of cultural diversity, Germany is one step further of the republican France. In terms of state-ethnic minority relations, Germany demonstrates corporatist patterns in its interest mediation structures, whereas France establishes direct links with individual immigrants without relegating much

authority to intermediary institutions, therefore is closer to a statist model (see: Soysal 1994). In the following parts, I will further elaborate national institutional responses to the rising ethnic diversity in Germany and France by focusing on these three distinct policy fields: citizenship policies (individual access to political rights); multicultural policies (accommodation distinct cultural needs); and state-ethnic group relations (structure of interest mediation).

2.1. Germany: Between Restrictive Individual Access and Semi-Corporatist Group Incorporation

Immigrant integration policies of Germany have been one of the most debated ones in Europe. Firstly, despite receiving high numbers of immigrants (even more than many other classical immigration countries), up until the 2000s, Germany officially denied immigration and defined itself with the principle of "not an immigration country" (*kein einwanderungsland*).[28] Secondly, until the 2000 reform, German citizenship laws were the most reproached ones in Europe, due to their reliance on descend-based principles (*jus sanguinis*). While the 2000 citizenship reform and the 2005 Immigration Act elevated the German case to one of the prime examples of prevailing liberal principles, this liberal euphoria was soon curtailed by restrictive backlashes (Howard 2009). Restrictions on dual citizenship, adoption of highly demanding language and civic education tests as requirements for naturalization, and increasing hindrances on family unification illustrated that it is still early to define Germany as a liberal citizenship regime. On the other hand, the available corporatist interest mediation structures in Germany, which were originally designed to regulate the relationship between different

[28] Between 1945 and 1989, more than 18 million people immigrated to Germany. During the same period, this number was 16 million in the US, which is considered to be a classical immigration country (Faist 1994, 50).

segments of the German society and the German state, have provided alternative paths of immigrant incorporation in Germany. Labor immigrants were included to the German welfare system upon their arrival. Moreover, their country of origin was taken as the major category in the distribution of social security services among labor immigrants. Below, I will discuss German policies of citizenship, multiculturalism, and state-migrant groups relations in detail.

German Citizenship Policies: Restrictive Regime despite Major Liberalizations

Up until the citizenship reform in 2000, the 1913 Nationality Law of the German *Reich* had defined the basic principles of German citizenship regime. In the postwar era, the major constitutional reforms were introduced through the adoption of the Basic Law (GG). However, the citizenship laws, after cancelling the revisions in the Nazi period, were mostly kept intact. Therefore, the principle of acquiring German nationality by descent stayed as the basis of German citizenship laws during this era.

While foreign guest workers were included to the German social security system upon their arrival and enjoyed socio-economical benefits of the welfare state (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 96), they were excluded from German citizenship and therefore deprived of the basic political rights. In the 1990s, descent-based citizenship laws resulted in an ironical situation: while ethnic Germans coming from Eastern Europe and former Soviet territories, some of whom had very distant ties with German land and culture, were granted automatic right to German citizenship; second and third generations of non-German immigrants, who were raised and educated in Germany, were deprived of the right to German citizenship. Moreover, increasing racist violence against foreigners, even

though some of them were native-born, signaled an urgent need to introduce series of citizenship reforms.

In the late 1980s, foreigners' electoral rights became a contentious issue in Germany. While some states endeavored to pass local electoral rights for non-citizen residents, the Federal Constitutional court struck down such efforts by referring to the Article 20 (2) of the constitution that says "All state authority emanates from the people" (Joppke 1999, 194–195). However, few years later, Germany had to grant local voting rights to EU nationals as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, since 1992, EU citizens have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament elections in Germany. However, third-country nationals do not have such electoral rights, unless they obtain German citizenship.

In 1990, Germany took the first step towards liberalizing the German citizenship acquisition for young foreigners by introducing a reform in the "Foreigners Act" (*Ausländergesetz*). In 1993, a further measure was taken by recognizing naturalization as an individual right of foreigners fulfilling the necessary requirements (Hailbronner 2010, 4). While these reforms had significant consequences on increasing naturalization numbers in Germany, still the majority of the foreign population was deprived of their electoral rights. Foreigners' commissions (*Ausländerbeirat*)[29] at the municipality and state/city levels provided a limited opportunity to third-country citizens in Germany to participate in some sort of an electoral process. Yet, these commissions could not substitute the role of substantive political representation, since they only had advisory powers (Miera 2009).

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[29] Later, these commissions are replaced by "integration commissions" (*Integrationbeirat*).

During the mid-1990s, political parties reached a general consensus about the necessity of integrating foreigners into the political system. Yet, there was a major disagreement between the right and the left wing about the role of citizenship acquisition in this immigrant integration process. On the one hand, the conservative parties (CDU and CSU) perceived naturalization as "a final step of a successful integration process" (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 99). On the other hand, the left wing (SPD and Greens) viewed liberalized naturalization policies as a tool for reinforcing immigrant integration. Initially, the electoral power was on the side of the left wing. When the Social Democrats and the Greens formed the coalition government in 1998, they prepared a proposal for the new citizenship law. This proposal, not only included the principle of *jus soli* for children of immigrants, but also allowed for maintaining country of origin citizenship. However, the proposal was attacked by the right wing with the arguments that dual-nationality would cause competing loyalties. The CDU launched a signature campaign against the allowance of dual-nationality in Hesse and mobilized over 500,000 signatures. When the SPD/Greens coalition lost the majority in the second chamber (*Bundesrat*), a curtailed version of the initial proposal was approved and became effective.

The Nationality Law of 2000 granted German citizenship to children who were born in Germany, depending on the status of their parents. This was a major step towards liberalization of German citizenship regime. Yet, the restrictions on dual-citizenship shadowed this liberal exuberance (Howard 2009; Triadafilopoulos 2012; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012; Howard 2012). The new law brought the highly disputed "option model" to handle the issue of dual citizenship. According to this model, immigrants' children would be allowed to hold dual-citizenship until the age of 23. They

must choose one of their citizenships and quit from the other between the ages of 18 and 23. If they fail to make a choice between their multiple citizenships, they would lose their German nationality.

The effects of dual-citizenship restrictions on naturalization of foreigners are not still very clear. One reason of such ambiguity is the wide range of exceptions to dual-nationality restrictions. Between 2000-2007, 47% of all naturalizations allowed for maintenance of multiple citizenships (Miera 2009).[30] Turkish immigrants, the major ethnic minority in Germany, cannot benefit from these exceptions. When we look at the over-time naturalization trends of Turkish minority in Germany, an interesting picture appears. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of naturalized Turks in Germany went up significantly due to the introduction of initial liberalization reforms in the "Foreigners Act". However, paradoxically, the introduction of the highly celebrated citizenship law in 2000 resulted in a decreasing trend of nationalization among Turks.[31] What is more puzzling is the fact that the 2000 citizenship reform led to increasing trend of naturalizations for other immigrant groups such as Italians, Poles, and Romanians.[32]

Recent requirements of language (since 2007) and citizenship (since 2008) tests further challenged foreigners' access to German citizenship. Today, language and civic

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[30] Dual citizenship is allowed for the following cases: (Spät)Aussiedler; citizens of countries with reciprocal tacit conventions (mostly EU countries and other individual cases such as Germans who were born in the US and immigrated to Germany); EU-citizens (since 2007); citizens of the countries that do not let their nationals to withdraw from their country of origin citizenship (such as Afghanistan, Algeria and Eritrea); and other cases that create humanitarian hardship (Miera 2009). Therefore, Miera (2009) argues that the denial of dual citizenship mostly affects the Turkish minority in Germany.

[31] According to the numbers of the Federal Statistical Office, naturalization numbers among Turkish immigrants kept on increasing each year (except a slight decrease in 1997) until the peak point in 1999. While in 1999, 102,900 Turkish immigrants were naturalized, in 2000 (the year of the citizenship reform), this number fell down to 82,861 and kept on decreasing in the following years. Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1987-2011.

[32] The new citizenship reform resulted in sharp increase in naturalizations of the following groups: Italians from 1,185 (1999) to 4,773(2000); Poles from 2,865 (1999) to 5,673 (2000); and Romanians 3,835 (1999) to 5,008 (2000). (Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2001 and 2002)

knowledge examinations are widely adopted as requirements for acquisition of national citizenships in Europe. However, it has been pointed out that the tests for German citizenship acquisition have a higher difficulty level than many others that are adopted in Europe. German language test requires a minimum B1 level, which is one of the highest standard of language assessment in the EU, after Denmark, Finland, Czech Republic and Estonia. France requires an A1 level, which is a basic language knowledge level (Goodman 2010). Moreover, the content and the level of difficulty of the citizenship test in Germany are also scrutinized. Left wing parties and pro-immigrant civil society organizations argued that some of the questions in the citizenship test require very specific and high-level knowledge about German politics and German history. Even many of German citizens cannot answer these questions correctly.[33] Consequently, despite the path-breaking liberalization reform in 2000, German citizenship regime still contains significant restrictions and obstacles for foreigners' naturalization when compared to those countries such as France and Britain that are identified with liberal citizenship policies.

German Multiculturalism: Unintended and Limited but Present

While Germany has never officially acknowledged its adoption of multicultural policies at the federal level, it was one of the first countries in Europe that officially declared the failure of multiculturalism in Germany.[34] Banting and Kymlicka define multicultural policies as the ones that "go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights

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[33] See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/quizzing-foreigners-germany-to-introduce-controversial-new-citizenship-test-a-559021.html (last accessed on December 5, 2013).

[34] In October 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that German multiculturalism had "utterly failed". See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed (last accessed on December 30, 2012). This was a striking announcement, since Germany has never been classified as a country with official multiculturalist policies like the UK and the Netherlands.

guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state, to also extend some level of public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices" (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 1). With respect to this definition, scholars agree that Germany has never adopted an explicit multicultural policy program at the national level. Yet, it is possible to find some elements of multicultural policies in Germany (Kraus and Schönwälder 2006; Schönwälder 2010).

Despite the lack of an explicit multicultural policy agenda, debates of multiculturalism occupy an important place in the formation of German politics. Multiculturalism debates in Germany are more about defining a "collective identity" either as an ethnically homogeneous one that is based on common culture, history, and descent or as a political one that is based on a shared loyalty to the constitution (von Dirke 1994). However, along with the official acknowledgement of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, public discussions on the extent of group-based rights and public accommodations also became a part of multiculturalism debates.

From the 1950s until the 1990s, the thrust of German multiculturalism debate was about acknowledging the emergence of ethnic and cultural pluralism in Germany. During this period, the official discourse denied that Germany is becoming a multicultural country. This discourse of negation brought about important political consequences on immigrant integration and multiculturalism policies in Germany. Firstly, the rhetoric of "Germany is not an immigration country" resulted in the absence of a comprehensive political agenda at the federal level to manage ethnic diversity and to integrate new comers in Germany (Faist 1994; Kraus and Schönwälder 2006). While in 1978, the Office of "Commissioner for the Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and

their Families" was founded under the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Germany's migration policies were defined by "defensive and restrictive measures" and lacked "a comprehensive integration policy" (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 97–98). In 1979, the first commissioner, Heinz Kühn published a memorandum that urges the government to offer immigrants "unconditional and permanent integration" into the German society (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 243). The Kühn memorandum included an action plan that suggested naturalization opportunities, improved legal status, and local voting rights for foreigners. However, this action plan was too early for its era and it took more than twenty years for Germany to accomplish some of the items in this memorandum. In the early 1980s, the conservative government in Germany was still looking for the ways to encourage the foreign populations' return to their home countries. In 1983, the law for "promoting the repatriation of foreigners" subsidized migrants permanently leaving Germany.[35] Therefore, during this period, "assimilation" into the German society or "return" to home country became the two pronounced strategies offered for immigrants in Germany (Faist 1994, 52).

Secondly, the absence of a comprehensive integration program at the federal level resulted in development of "innovative" integration projects and measures at the local level (Miera 2009, 6; Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 120). *De facto* multiculturalism, especially in the big cities, compelled the local governments to develop strategies to deal with ethno-cultural plurality within their borders. Despite the silence at the federal level, several local governments launched their multicultural (or intercultural) policies that

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[35] The promotion of repatriation law could not meet the expectations of the government. Under this law, only about 250,000 immigrants left Germany. It was understood that some of these returning immigrants were already planning their permanent departure from Germany (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 98).

included measures of promotion of language acquisition by foreigners, introduction of multicultural sensitivities to school curricula, promotion of anti-discrimination, development of intercultural dialogue and tolerance projects, and support of migrant organizations that contribute to the promotion of these multicultural objectives (Kraus and Schönwälder 2006, 208).

Berlin provides one of the prime examples of local immigrant integration and multicultural policies. The flux of immigrants in the 1970s and the following socio-economic of high unemployment and low educational success among foreigners, residential segregation, and increasing social conflicts and racial violence led Berlin state to pursue active policies of immigrant integration much more earlier than the Federal level. With this purpose, the Office of "the Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin" was founded in 1981.[36] The main duty of the commissioner is to execute the integration policies formulated by the Berlin Senate and coordinate the actions among other administrations. After its foundation, the office adopted a progressive stance with respect to immigrant integration. As opposed to Germany's national policy of the era, the office actively pursued promotion of naturalization among foreigners as well as supporting migrants' ethnic organizations (Vermeulen and Stotijn 2010, 117). Today, the office works on the issues of promoting legal and social equal opportunities for immigrants, providing consultations to immigrants on legal and social matters, supervising the anti-discrimination measures, organizing events and public campaigns to raise the public consciousness on the issues of immigration and integration,

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[36] The office was previously called as 'the Commissioner of Foreigners' (*Ausländerbeauftragte*). The first representative was Barbara John, a moderate CDU politician, who shaped the city's integration and multicultural policies for more than twenty years.

and incorporating migrant representatives into “the State Advisory Board for Integration and Migration Issues” (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2006). The example of Berlin shows us that the federal structure in Germany gives more room to local governments to coin their own policies of immigrant integration and multiculturalism, which are in some cases at odds with national level policies.

Thirdly, the denial of the rising ethnic plurality in Germany resulted in ambiguous policies at national level with respect to immigrants’ integration: On the one hand, foreign workers were fully integrated into the German welfare system. In this sense, there was no distinction between native and foreign workers. On the other hand, the denial of immigrants’ permanent stay in Germany led to policies of segregation at socio-cultural level. In order to facilitate foreigners’ return, preservation of migrants’ distinct cultural identity received a special attention. Therefore, many measures such as promotion of mother language classes at public schools and radio broadcastings in migrants’ languages were not originally set up as a part of a multicultural program, but designed to facilitate migrants’ return and their integration process back into their home countries (Koopmans et al. 2005, 62; Kraus and Schönwälder 2006, 206). However, after Germany officially acknowledged the permanent stay of her foreign populations, these segregationist policies were reinterpreted along with a discourse of multiculturalism and minority rights framework (Koopmans et al. 2005). Moreover, today, these measures constitute an important part in Germany’s multicultural policies.

In the late 1990s, cultural plurality became a widely recognized situation in Germany. In 2001, Otto Schily, the Federal Minister of the Interior, appointed an independent commission on migration to work out concrete recommendations for future

immigration policy in Germany. In their report, the commission acknowledged that Germany is “de facto a country of immigrants” and structuring of immigration and integration policies in Germany will be “one of the most important political tasks over the next few decades” (The Independent Commission on Migration to Germany 2001). However, Germany’s endeavors to launch a national level immigration and integration program has overlapped with a period in which multiculturalism as an intellectual paradigm and as a public policy framework was in world-wide decline (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Therefore, in congruence with the general trends in Western Europe, Germany emphasized individual migrants’ civic integration over accommodation of migrant groups’ cultural differences. The notion of “supporting and demanding” became the basic principle of the Federal government’s integration policy (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2007). In this framework, the federal government is responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure for migrants’ integration such as providing integration courses, language support, advisory services, and community focused projects. In return, immigrants are expected to learn German and comply with laws and social order of their receiving country.

Despite Germany’s increasing attention on individual migrants’ integration into German society, some important elements of a multicultural policy framework exist in Germany. According to “Multicultural Policy Index” prepared by Banting and Kymlicka, Germany scores higher than many other European countries (Tolley 2011). Two historical situations result in higher opportunities for multicultural policies in Germany: Firstly, conservative ethno-cultural (*völkische*) conception of German society ironically promoted the idea of co-existence of different cultures (but without mixing into each

other) and provided a basis for preservation of minority cultures (von Dirke 1994, 522–523). Therefore, as I stated earlier, many multiculturalist measures in Germany have a legacy of ethno-cultural perception of the German society. Secondly, a high degree of religious tolerance in Germany (Schönwälder 2010, 162) as well as close links between churches and German state organizations (Fetzer and Soper 2004) resulted in accommodation of minorities' religious practices.

Today, mother language education for immigrant groups does exist in Germany, but varies across regions. Accommodation of religious holidays and lunches with Islamic dietary at public schools are provided (Tolley 2011). Since Muslim groups, with the exception of the Ahmadiyya community in the state of Hesse since 2013, are not granted the status of "corporations under public law" (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*), they cannot benefit from a number of legal privileges such levying church taxes and controlling religious curricula in public schools. On the other hand, since the structure of state-church relations in Germany, as opposed to a strict separation model in France, provides the opportunity for the collaboration of public and religious organizations, this model encourages Muslim groups to struggle for getting public recognition and establishing social welfare institutions of their own (Fetzer and Soper 2004, 19). Islamic religious instructions are offered in public schools depending on *länder* governments (Hofhansel 2010). The German state at different levels provides public funding for immigrant organizations. Along with the development of national level integration policies, migrant organizations are discovered as useful actors to implement integration strategies more effectively than other institutions (Schönwälder 2010, 161). Last but not

least, migrant organizations are incorporated into consultative platforms as representatives of their communities at national and local levels.

The German State-Ethnic Group Relations: Corporatist Patterns

The institutional arrangements of interest representation, conflict resolution, and legitimate forms of membership in a polity highly shape the ways that host countries incorporate their migrant communities into the political system. It is a common practice in political sociology to distinguish corporatist forms of interest representation from the pluralist ones. However, these both models are based on some sort of group-based constituent units that either "suggest spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and competitive interaction" as in the case of the pluralist model or "advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence" as in the case of corporatist model (Schmitter 1974, 97). To understand the ways that immigrant groups participate in host country policymaking, we need to clarify whether the host country recognizes immigrants as members of particular corporate groups (such as race, ethnicity, religion) or endeavors to incorporate them into the system as individuals without referring to any collective identity. In this respect, Soysal's categorization of "membership models" becomes useful (Soysal 1994). She distinguishes three major membership models in Europe on the basis of "locus of action and authority" (state or society) and "organizational configuration" (centralized or decentralized public space). *Corporatist models* (e.g. Sweden and Netherlands) include actions of collectively oriented corporate groups in a centrally

organized public space. Migrants are incorporated as collective bodies.[37] In *statist models* (e.g. France), the state as the bureaucratic unit constitutes the locus of action. Migrants are incorporated as individuals without referring to any mediating collective category. In *liberal models* (Britain and Switzerland), individuals are the source of action and their activities take place in a decentralized public space.

Germany, in terms of its relations with its migrant groups, constitutes a semi-corporatist system (or as called by Soysal a mixed system since it incorporates some elements from the statist model). As opposed to the statist French system that incorporates its immigrant populations as individuals, Germany gives privileged access to ethnically and religiously based collective groups. Unlike classical corporatist countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, Germany does not officially recognize migrant groups as "official minorities". In this respect, immigrant groups in Germany do not have an official institutional status and structural support for their community organizations. However, in many areas, collective identity categories shape the policy making in Germany. One of the important examples of formal recognition of group identities can be found in the German welfare structure. Upon their arrival, guest workers were distributed among semi-public and highly centralized welfare agencies according to religion and national origin. The workers coming from Italy, Spain and Portugal were assigned to the *Caritas* that is affiliated with the Catholic Church. Protestant Church's *Diakonisches*

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[37] Here, it is important to note that Schmitter and Soysal conceptualize the term 'corporatism' different from each other. By corporatism, Schmitter particularly refers to a system of interest representation (Schmitter 1974, 93–94). On the other hand, Soysal broadens the concept and defines it as a kind of relationship between the state, society, and individuals in which the organization of the membership is based on corporate groups (Soysal 1994, 193–194).

Werk took the responsibility of the Greeks. non-church related *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* (AWO) became responsible from the Turks, Moroccans, and Tunisians (Joppke 1999, 210).

Moreover, the German state, both at the federal and at the local levels, increasingly collaborates with migrants' civil society organizations through appointing them as dialogue partners. Different other corporatist countries, migrant organizations in Germany are not officially granted a permanent public status or are not sponsored by the central state. However, some of the immigrant organizations practically function as community representatives vis-à-vis the German state. The recently founded national level platforms- the Integration Summit (*Integrationsgipfel*) and the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*-DIK)- indicate how the German federal government collaborates with migrants' organizations as representatives of migrant communities.

In 2006, the Federal Chancellor Merkel hosted the first Integration Summit. The summit includes the Federal government, the state and local governments as well as representatives of migrants and their organizations. The objective is to jointly establish a nation-wide integration policy. The structured dialogue between the state institutions and migrant community organizations has the key role in this process. The "National Integration Plan" was adopted in 2007. To expedite the implementation of the integration goals, the fifth Integration Summit in 2012 came up with the "National Action Plan for Integration". For the first time, the goal of increasing diversity in public services was included in this report.

The Integration Summit provides an important platform through which state officers and representatives of immigrant groups come together and negotiate the terms

of integration policy in Germany. Like in other neo-corporatist arrangements, the German state grants an implicit public status and recognition to the selected migrant organizations. In exchange, immigrant groups are expected to support and implement the integration programs. The Integration Summit has been criticized for the government's active role in choosing the dialogue partners as well as consultation topics. There are no explicit and formal criteria for the selection procedure of migrant organizations. Moreover, migrants cannot shape the selection of policy issues, but they are only asked for their opinion on the existing topics.[38] No financial support exists for participating migrant organizations (Musch 2012). Therefore, migrant organizations endeavor to realize the policy implementation goals with their already exiting means.

Along with the Integration Summit, in 2006, the first German Islam Conference (DIK) was organized by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) with the purpose of building a structured dialogue with Muslim communities in Germany as well as working on security-related concerns. The first round composed of fifteen Muslim representatives (five largest Muslim umbrella organizations and ten individuals) and fifteen government representatives from all levels. In the second round, the membership of IRD (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany – *Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V.*) was suspended, because of the investigations on radical activities of IGMG, which is the largest member of the IRD. The ZMD (Central Council of Muslims in Germany - *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V*), which is the multi-ethnic

[38] In 2007, four key Turkish migrant organizations protested increasing restrictions in immigration policy by boycotting the second Integration Summit (See: http://www.dw.de/merkel-hails-integration-milestone-hits-back-at-critics/a-2680461, last visited on January 6, 2013). The conflict made it explicit that migrant organizations are unhappy with their symbolic presence in the summit and their inability to shape policy-making in Germany.

Muslim organization, withdrew its membership until a further notice.[39] Currently, along with the government representatives, six Muslim organizations and ten individuals participate in the DIK.

Laurence (2009) argues that Muslim councils across Europe function as "a double bind" in which underrepresented groups in parliamentary politics secure national government's recognition and in exchange the national governments secure groups' compliance on rule of law and order. The DIK is not an exception in this regard. However, as opposed to many of its European counterparts, the DIK is less institutionalized, lacks "corresponding legal regulation", includes higher number of participants, and relatively homogeneous in regard to Muslims' country of origin (the majority originates from Turkey) (Musch 2012, 81–84). The DIK has been criticized about its working agenda, informal selection process of its participants, and its advisory nature that lacks policy-making power (Laurence and Strum 2008). Despite these criticisms, the presence of such intermediary platforms points out the corporatist features in interest mediation arrangements between the German state and immigrant groups.

2.2. France: Republican Assimilation in the face of *De Facto* Multiculturalism

The French Republican model of integration has been one of the most explicitly defined integration models in Europe (Schain 2010). According to Heckmann and Schnapper (2003, 16), republican universalism "ensure(s) that all people, regardless of their origins or beliefs, are likely to be 'unified to' (rattaches) political society, if they receive national curriculum education, through which individuals from diverse backgrounds become

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[39] Source: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Verfassung/Deutsche-Islam-Konferenz/arbeitsprogramm-struktur/arbeitsprogramm-struktur_node.html, last visited on January 6, 2013.

French citizens just as much as autochthonous persons". In principle, the republican model adopts a color-blind position towards all group-based differences. Therefore, no official recognition, public support or special privileges are offered to collective identities in public policy making. All the group-based differences are relegated into the private sphere. On the other hand, the French integration model faces the gaps and tensions between neatly defined republican principles and political realities (Kastoryano 2002; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Kaya 2009; Wihtol de Wenden 2011). *De facto* multicultural reality pushes France to execute policies on the ground that depart from ideal principles of the republican model. The development of special education programs in problematic places (ZEP- *Zone* d'*Education Prioritaire*) and the establishment of an Islamic council (CFCM- *Le Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*) can be seen as some examples of deviation from guiding principles of the French Republic.

Despite the contradictory relationship between republican principles and local-level practices, France has been one of the key cases of comparative studies that inquire integration policies in Europe. After Brubaker (1992)'s seminal study, it has become a common practice to compare and contrast politically defined French national society and inclusive citizenship regime in France with ethno-culturally defined German national society and exclusive citizenship regime in Germany. In terms of accommodation of cultural differences, neither Germany nor France officially adopts multicultural policy frameworks. Yet, as opposed to Germany, France officially disavows multiculturalism and perceives it as a threat against republican integration regime (Simon and Sala Pala 2010). In terms of state-ethnic minority relations, as opposed to German-style corporatism, France adopts a statist model and establishes direct links with individual

immigrants without relegating much authority to intermediary institutions (Soysal 1994). In the following parts, I will elaborate these French immigrant integration policies further.

French Citizenship Policies: Individual Inclusion as the Basis of the Republic

The French citizenship regime, with its principle of *jus soli*, is considered as one of the most liberal and inclusive citizenship model in Europe (Howard 2009). But historical analyses show that French citizenship laws have been subjected to many transformations. For instance, in the beginning of the twentieth century, French citizenship laws still carried some elements of racial and gender discriminations.[40] It was in the 1970s that these discriminatory measures could be eliminated to a large extent. In the post-1980 period, the French citizenship regime has become a highly politicized issue between left and right wing politics. Therefore, even though it is a common practice to consider the French naturalization regime as the historically liberal one, it is possible to observe various liberalizations and restrictive turns over-time.

As opposed to many scholarly accounts, French nationality laws have not been historically based on the *jus soli* principle. While in the 18th century *jus sanguinis* was the dominant principle, the population and military needs starting from the mid-19th century resulted in increasing presence of *jus soli* principle in French nationality laws (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012, 3). After a series of debates, the 1889 Nationality Law granted automatic citizenship for second and third generation of immigrants who were born in

[40] Up to 1927, French women used to lose their French citizenship if they marry a foreigner. Until 1944, French women did not have the full citizenship rights such as voting and running for political offices. Until 1978, newly naturalized people could not vote for five years and up to1983, could not be eligible for political assemblies for ten years (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012).

France and therefore constituted the basis of today's citizenship legislation. The contemporary citizenship regime in France includes automatic *double jus soli* for the third generation immigrants (a French-born child whose at least one of the parents is a French-born person can automatically become French at birth); automatic *jus soli* for the second-generation immigrants (a French-born child of foreign parents can become a French citizen upon reaching the age of eighteen); five year residency requirement for immigrants to apply for naturalization; and full dual citizenship rights (Howard 2009, 149–150).

The French citizenship has been an important tool to integrate minority populations into the French society. It has been argued that France has never adopted integration policies that target specific minority groups; on the contrary, "the legal transformation of immigrants and their children into French citizens" has been the guiding principle of integration policy in France (Schnapper, Krief, and Peignard 2003, 18). In this respect, the conditions of national belonging, as opposed to the German case until the 2000 German Nationality Law, have not been based on biological/ethnocultural principles. On the contrary, national belonging in France required "cultural belonging" i.e. internalization of French values and "individual's political will" to become French (Schnapper, Krief, and Peignard 2003, 15).

After the 1980s, along with the rise of extreme right wing politics, the issue of citizenship has become highly politicized. The automatic *jus soli* principle has been attacked by right wing political parties. The National Front, the extreme right wing party, brought back the concept of "*le Français de papier*" (the French on the paper) and argued that people must earn to be French (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 78). In 1993, the Pasqua

Laws restricted the principle of automatic jus soli and tied it to bureaucratic procedures. In 1998, a commission headed by Patrick Weil, French historian and political scientists, introduced a set of reforms to restore the liberal character of the French citizenship regime. Although the 1998 reforms eliminated some of the restrictions of the Pasqua Laws, the initial *jus soli* rule could not be totally restored (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 66). In the post-2000 period, the emphasis on civic-assimilation of immigrants has been reinforced through mandatory language and civic knowledge tests and integration contract (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012).

Despite these periods of liberalizations and restrictive turns over time, French citizenship policies can be contrasted with the German ones at least with respect to two major aspects. First, despite actual racial discriminations and unequal treatment of colonial subjects throughout the history of France,[41] at the discursive level, prevailing political debates on the French national identity were less focused on ethnic/racial demarcations, but more on the issues of cultural assimilation, acculturation, social contract, and individual's political will to become French. This kind of inclusive political framing of the French citizenship facilitated immigrants' identification with the French identity (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 78). On the other hand, ethnic definition of the German national identity, despite the recent transformations, resulted in lingering effects on immigrants' avoidance to identify themselves with the German society. While ethno-culturally segregationist provisions of the German citizenship regime are, to a great extent, eliminated through the 2000 reform, formal arrangements could not immediately reshape prevailing identifications and sources of belonging.

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[41] For a detailed discussion of the questions of immigration and racism in France, see: Silverman (1992).

Secondly, the allowance of dual-citizenship in France eased the emotional burden of migrants during their naturalization process. Today, 55% of Turkish immigrants in France hold their Turkish citizenship (Simon 2010, 118). On the other hand, as I stated earlier, restrictions on dual citizenship in Germany carry significant negative effects on the naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants. The requirement to drop the passport of the country of origin in order to naturalize in Germany brings about at least emotional burdens on the side of immigrants.

Multicultural Policies: Official Disavowal but de facto Application

Although France has been *de facto* a multicultural society that is built on internal diversity (Wihtol de Wenden 2003), it has never officially defined itself in such a way (Simon and Sala Pala 2010). In the French political discourse, multiculturalism as a public policy framework that officially recognizes and supports collective identities and cultural differences is scrutinized as a potential threat to the national identity and republican principles of equality and universalism. In this negative view, multiculturalism is perceived as a perpetuator of "communitarianism" and the "balkanization" of the society (Simon and Sala Pala 2010, 92). On the other hand, the French integration model is defined as a process that includes individuals' participation in the society. Any other intermediary structures between the individual citizens and the French state i.e. ethnic, racial, and religious communities are not officially recognized.

While the ideal depiction of the republican integration model repudiates multicultural policies, institutional and political arrangements on the ground swing

between "soft" republicanism and "applied multiculturalism".[42] Therefore, on the policymaking level, it is possible to observe measures of multicultural policy framework in France, even though such a connection is not officially recognized. There are three main challenging issues that French policymakers endeavor to find a solution through balancing republicanism and multiculturalism: The first issue is the question of Islam in a public sphere defined by *laïcité* and the accommodation of rising needs of Muslim populations; the second issue is to deal with urban unrest without targeting specific ethnic and religious groups; and the third issue is to carry on anti-discrimination measures in the absence of collecting data on ethnic minorities.

The French policy on the management of religious communities is governed by the 1905 law on separation of the Churches and the State.[43] In this framework, established churches belong to the private sphere and the French state does not involve in religious affairs. Today, France hosts the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. Starting from the 1980s, the presence of Muslim populations gained an increasing visibility in many spheres of public life. As a result, rising demands for accommodation of Muslim religious practices (such as burial places, ritual slaughter, public funding for Islamic schools, Islamic courses in the national curriculum, and Islamic dress code in public schools) started challenging French state's religious neutrality. Among all, the conflict on allowing the Islamic headscarf in public schools has been the most controversial issue that revealed the uneasy relationship among republican identity,

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[42] Kastoryano (2002, 10) adopts the concept of "applied multiculturalism" that refers to applied policies to pragmatically manage diversity.

[43] Since Alsace-Lorraine belonged to Germany in 1905, this region is exempted from the French law on the separation of the Churches and the State. In Alsace and Lorraine, religion is ruled by an agreement (the "Concordat" of 1801) between the state and three faiths (Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews) (Wihtol de Wenden 2003, 83). Therefore, authorities recognize religious identities and accommodate religious practices to some extent.

integration of Muslims, and religious freedom. The headscarf conflict started in 1989 when a secondary school director excluded three Muslim girls from the school with the argument that the Islamic headscarf undermines the principle of *laïcité*. Initially, *Conseil d' Etat* annulled the exclusion of these three girls and stated that the principle of *laïcité* protects "the freedom of conscience on the part of the students" (Joppke 2009, 38). In the period of 2003-2004, the headscarf issue once more became the major controversy, which resulted in the 2004 anti-headscarf law.

The French headscarf ban is often depicted as a benchmark of the Republican model (Fetzer and Soper 2004). However, the management of Muslim populations in France includes a much more complicated process of interpretation and application of the principle of *laïcité*. The French state's involvement in funding the mosques (either through supporting non-religious associations that practically serve as mosques or through aiding religious organizations under the law of 1905), establishment of Muslim sections in cemeteries, and searching for official interlocutors to manage the relationship with Muslim populations illustrate the complications of state-Islam relations in France (Bowen 2007). In this respect, the establishment of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) to construct a structural dialogue with Muslim populations exemplifies how much the republican principles can be pushed towards multicultural applications to find solutions to pressing problems.

Secondly, the management of problematic urban areas with high concentration of poverty, unemployment, school-dropouts and social conflicts poses important challenges to French policymakers. Since 1981, a program called "Educational Priority Zone" (ZEP-*Zones d'Education Prioritaires*) carries on a sort of implicit positive discrimination

scheme by providing additional sources to the schools located in problematic areas. According to the 2011 report of the National Observatory of Critical Urban Zones (ONZUS- *l'Observatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles*), 4.4 million inhabitants are living in the Critical Urban Zones (ZUS- *Zones Urbaines Sensibles*) of which 52.6% are either immigrants or people with immigration background. Since the republican approach does not permit adoption of a group-targeted policy framework, a "territorial approach" is chosen to deal with socio-economical problems (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 82). According to Schain, "the Republican model had molded the way that groups are targeted, but has not prevented the implementation of special program" (2010, 209).

Moreover, civic associations also play an important role in French state's communication with migrant groups and management of social problems in problematical areas. The 2012 report of the HCI (The High Council on Integration), titled as "Invest in Associations for Successful Integration" (*Investir dans les associations pour réussir l'intégration*), shows how integration/multiculturalism and republicanism/communitarianism interact with each other on the ground.

Thirdly, as the anti-discrimination framework becomes the guiding principle of the EU, France struggles to incorporate European anti-discrimination measures into its republican integration model. But the process is not an easy one in France, since the acknowledgement of ethno-racial discrimination evokes the problem of officially recognizing minority categories and measuring their socio-economical status (Streiff-Fénart 2012). On the other hand, the influence of republican ideology on social sciences reinforces marginalization of migration, ethnic and racial studies in France (Amiraux and Simon 2006). Therefore, the analytical categories such as race, ethnicity, and minority,

which are necessary to measure and alleviate discrimination, are controversial issues both in French public discourses and in the French academia. In line with its republican ideology, France does not collect ethnic data on official basis. Therefore, the fear of "ethnicisation of statistics" (Simon and Sala Pala 2010, 103) prevents France to have a comprehensive knowledge on socio-economic status of its ethnic minorities.

On the other hand, recently some important steps are being taken. Since 2006, data on country of birth and citizenship are collected in French censuses (Simon 2012). In 2004, the office of High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE - *Haute Autorité pour la lutte contre les discriminations et l'égalité)* is established. Moreover, the recent surveys (such as "Trajectories of Origin" conducted by INSEE and INED in 2008) inform public debates on the issues of population diversity and existing discrimination in France.

State-Ethnic Group Relations: The French Statist Tradition

In contrast with corporatist arrangements of interest mediation, the French Republic does not recognize any intermediary institutions between the state and its migrant populations. As Soysal (1994) pointed out France constitutes a *statist* integration model in which migrants are defined as individuals and migration issues are mainly organized and executed by central state agencies.

The High Council on Integration (HCI) very well represents this statist model. The members of the HCI are appointed by the government based on their expertise on diverse aspects of immigration and integration. It is important to note that they do not represent ethnic or religious communities or advocate community-based interests. Therefore, HCI is not a platform where the government, public agencies and

representatives of migrant communities come together and reach a consensus on the issues of migration and integration, as it is the case in the German Integration Summit. By contrast, the HCI is an elite-based institution that works as an advisory council of experts.

On the other hand, it is possible to find some traces of corporatist interest mediation in the French Council for the Muslim Faith (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* – CFCM) (Laurence 2009). The CFCM is founded as a dialogue partner of the French state to solve challenging issues related to the practice of Muslim faith. Yet, two important points differentiate the CFCM from its German counterpart DIK: First, in the case of German Islam Conference (DIK), the participants are appointed by the government. Not all the Muslim associations are included or invited to the platform. The composition of the DIK shows which Muslim associations are preferred by the German state as dialogue partners and which associations are excluded from this process. Therefore, this selection process results in contestations by the excluded groups. On the other hand, ¾ of the members of the CFCM general assembly are elected by mosque organizations. The number of seats allocated for each association is determined by the square meter of their prayer room (The Muslim Faith in France 2007). The French government is only involved in the process during the appointment of the president and the vice-president of the CFCM. Therefore, the composition of the CFCM does not reflect the preferred dialogue partners chosen by the French state. Only the largest Muslim organizations, depending on the total size of their prayer rooms, can manage to send members to the general assembly of CFCM. Secondly, the German government is a party in the DIK. Therefore, Muslim organizations find an opportunity to directly

communicate with representatives of the local and federal state institutions through DIK. In France, the government is not a participant in the CFCM; but only has an observatory or technical and legal assistance role.

3. Implications of National Integration Policies on Immigrant Political Incorporation

The institutionalist school in immigration studies contends that national institutions and integration policies have enduring impacts on immigrant political incorporation. In the previous section, I demonstrated that the cases of Germany and France, despite their changing characteristics over time and the existence of internal complexities and contradictions, have developed diverging institutional responses to the rising ethnic diversity within their borders. In this respect, it is reasonable to expect diverging levels and patterns of immigrant political incorporation in these two national contexts. Below, I will review the debates on how citizenship regimes, multicultural policies, and structures of interest mediation affect migrants' individual and group-level political incorporation into their host country politics.

National citizenship policies:

To start with, migrants' access to national citizenship determines a substantial portion of their ability to participate in host countries' electoral politics.[44] Recent findings show that acquisition of host country citizenship not only reinforces migrants' formal political participation (Messina 2007, 197–199), but also increases their tendency to participate in non-electoral forms of political participation (Just and Anderson 2012). Critics either

[44] It should be noted that in some countries, qualifying non-citizen residents are granted with the voting rights in local elections. In Germany and France, only EU citizens, who fulfil the residence requirement can benefit from local voting rights for foreign residents. Third-country nationals, regardless of the duration of their stay, cannot participate in local elections.

emphasize decreasing relevancy of national citizenship for migrants' incorporation into their host societies along with the rise of post-national forms of belonging (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997) or perceive migrants' naturalization only a limited form of participation, since it does not guarantee any further form of political participation. However, today, citizenship rights constitute a major component of research on migrants' political integration, since acquisition of host country citizenship not only endow migrants with legal/political rights and protection, but also provides full access to welfare programs, economic benefits, sense of belonging, and psychological source for civic duty (Bueker 2005; Just and Anderson 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

It is not surprising to expect a high correlation between inclusiveness of citizenship regimes and rates of migrants' naturalization. Therefore, countries with liberal nationality laws set the institutional ground in which immigrants could naturalize more, than countries with restrictive naturalization policies (see: Janoski 2010). As I discussed earlier, until the 2000 citizenship reform, Germany constituted one of the cases with the lowest migrant naturalization rates in Europe. The 2000 reform in German citizenship policies lowered the barriers for migrants' naturalization and narrowed the gap between France and Germany in terms of their citizenship policies. Yet, the restrictive turn in the post-2000 era curtailed the inclusiveness of German citizenship laws. Howard (2009) demonstrates the striking variation of citizenship laws in Germany and France through the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) (see: Table 6). Therefore, despite the significant liberalization in German citizenship laws, the institutionalist school still expects to find higher naturalization rates in France than in Germany. In the next chapter, I will analyze migrants' average naturalization rates in Germany and France over time. Suffice it to say

that the empirical evidence provided by the next chapter shows that immigrants tend to naturalize at higher rates in France than in Germany and therefore, confirms institutionalist expectations in this respect.

Table 6: Citizenship Policy Index for Germany and France in the 1980s and in 2008.

Country	Years	Category	*Jus Soli* (0-2)	Naturalization Requirements (0-2)	Dual Citizenship (0-2)	CPI Score (0-6)
Germany	1980s	Restrictive	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	2008	Medium	0.75	0.54	0.75	2.04
France	1980s	Liberal	1.50	1.22	1.50	4.22
	2008	Liberal	1.50	1.47	2.00	4.97

Source: Howard 2009.

Multicultural policies:

While there is a general consensus about the relationship between citizenship policies and migrants' access to political rights, the effects of multicultural policies on immigrant political incorporation are controversial. The critics of multiculturalism argue that official promotion of cultural pluralism reinforces particularistic identities and group boundaries; undermines sense of collectivity and common values; and breaks down social relations and social trust (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). In this perspective, multiculturalism is blamed for reinforcing the failure of migrant integration programs. On the other hand, proponents of multiculturalism argue that policies recognizing and accommodating cultural plurality increase minority groups' connection to host society, decrease their frustration, and facilitate their engagement in host country polity (among others, see: Kymlicka 1996; Parekh 2002). Moreover, proponents of multiculturalism contend that multiculturalism as a political theory as well as a policy framework is not much concerned with the issues related to minorities' socio-economical integration, but it

mainly focuses on the area of "common membership and political community" (Wright and Bloemraad 2012, 78). In this sense, it is expected that migrants would develop higher identification with and higher political participation in host societies with multicultural policy frameworks.

Empirical evidence shows that migrants have higher interest in politics, higher social and political trust, and stronger feeling of inclusion into the host society in countries combining multiculturalism with open citizenship policies, (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). In terms of migrants' political mobilization and participation, the effects of multiculturalism become equivocal. On the one hand, there is a common consensus that multicultural policy frameworks support collective identities of migrants and facilitate their political mobilization and participation on the basis of their group identities. For instance, in her comparison of the US and Canada, Bloemraad (2006) argues that multicultural policies facilitate migrants' collective mobilization and political participation. On the other hand, Koopmans and his colleagues find a curvilinear relationship between multicultural policies and migrants' political participation: "when cultural differences are emphasized so strongly … the effect is that migrant communities turn inward and that their identities and activities are channeled away from the common public sphere" (Koopmans et al. 2005, 80). Cinalli and Giugni (2011, 57) also confirms the existence of a curvilinear relationship between openness of the political context in terms of cultural rights and migrants' political participation at the individual level. Therefore, while the institutionalist school in the migration scholarship expects a linear relationship between openness of the citizenship regimes and migrants' political

participation, multicultural policies support migrants' individual and collective political participation only until a certain point.[45]

Since neither Germany nor France is officially acknowledged multicultural countries with strong policies towards cultural pluralism, they do not constitute an ideal comparative pair to evaluate the relationship between multiculturalism and immigrant political incorporation. But if we consider the fact that France officially perceives multiculturalism as a threat against republican integration regime (Sala Pala and Simon 2008) and Germany does not engage in such a strong official position against the idea of multiculturalism, it becomes reasonable to expect that group-based differences have more public recognition in Germany than in France. The Multiculturalism Policy Index developed by Banting and Kymlicka also shows that Germany scores slightly higher than France in 2010 in terms of its multicultural policy measures (see: Tolley 2011). Even though it is hard to decide how much Germany's multicultural policies support migrants' political integration, it is at least reasonable to expect that Germany would provide more fertile soil for migrants' group-based political mobilization and participation than France.

Structures of Interest Mediation:

Another controversial issue is whether or not intermediary political structures between immigrant groups and host states facilitate immigrant political incorporation into their host countries. In order to deal with the problems of immigration, some countries established consultative institutions. At the first glance, these consultative bodies not only

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[45] The argument of curvilinear relationship between multicultural policies and migrants' political participation is in the same line with the findings of social movements literature. Kitschelt finds a curvilinear relationship between openness of political regimes and social movements "which shows that very closed regimes repress social movements, that very open and responsive ones assimilate them, and that moderately repressive ones allow for their broad articulation" (1986, 62).

provide political channels for migrants to voice their concerns and claims, but also function as interlocutors through which host country governments could reach out to minority groups. However, most of the time, these consultative bodies do not have any binding power and only have an advisory role. Therefore, consultative bodies have been criticized by political scientists with the idea that "they lead to a further marginalisation of immigrants while at the same time giving them the illusion of direct political participation" (Martiniello 2005, 11).

The relationship between the existence of strong consultative bodies for immigrants and immigrants' political integration is complicated. To start with, it is argued that consultative bodies for minorities take place when minority interests are systematically underrepresented in parliamentary politics (Laurence 2009). In other words, consultative bodies are considered to serve as suboptimal solutions to the "democratic deficit" in immigrant-receiving countries. In this line, Czada (2010) finds a negative correlation between formal immigrant consultation bodies established by host country governments and migrants' naturalization rates. That is to say that countries with higher migrant naturalization rates do not need intermediary consultative bodies as much as the countries with higher handicaps for migrants' naturalization. In the countries with liberal citizenship policies, migrants can easily attain the political rights and represent their own interests through electoral politics. On the other hand, some other scholars argue that consultative bodies provide structured dialogue between immigrant groups and governments and therefore stimulates political participation and mutual understanding

(Huddleston 2010, 5). Therefore, depending on the structure of consultative bodies,[46] they can function as stepping stone for immigrant groups to make their voices heard by their host governments.

As I argued earlier in this chapter, the state-ethnic minority relations in Germany follow a corporatist pattern, whereas France establishes direct links with individual members of minority groups without relegating political power to intermediary institutions. This argument is also confirmed by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which demonstrates that Germany scores higher than France in terms of having "strong and independent advisory bodies" for foreign residents (Huddleston 2010, 6). While the effects of corporatist bodies on the degree of migrants' political participation are unclear, there is a common consensus that such structures significantly affect the ways that migrants get organized and engage in collective political participation. Soysal (1994) argues that in corporatist models, corporate groups (defined by occupational, ethnic, religious, or gender identity) are the source of action. Individuals subscribe to these collective groups to pursue their claims. Therefore, when it is compared to France, Germany becomes a much more fertile soil for migrants' self-organization and participation in politics through their self-organizations. Moreover, consultative political bodies in Germany provide more opportunities for migrant organizations to take active roles in decision-making processes.

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[46] MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) evaluates the strength of consultative bodies for foreign residents according to five criteria: (1) structural vs. ad hoc consultation of foreign residents; (2) election vs. appointment of members (3) leadership of body; (4) institutionalization (rights to initiate reports, recommendations, and responses); and (5) representativeness (of diversity of foreign residents) (Huddleston 2010, 2).

4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to evaluate whether and to what extent Germany and France provide different historical contexts, institutional structures, and political opportunities for the development of immigrant political incorporation. I started the chapter by tracing history of immigration to Germany and France. Secondly, I evaluated the institutional responses in the face of rising ethnic diversity in Germany and France. Despite the changing characteristics over time and the existence of internal complexities and contradictions, I argued that prominent cross-national differences exist between Germany and France in terms of available institutional opportunities and policy frameworks for migrant political incorporation. Thirdly, I visited the debates on the relationship between immigrant incorporation regimes and immigrant political incorporation. The institutionalist school contends the existing institutional and political structures profoundly shape the level and the pattern of immigrant political incorporation. In the case of France, historically liberal citizenship regime, civic-territorial definition of nationhood, and republican assimilationist policies are often considered as major determinants of migrants' higher naturalization rates, higher participation in electoral politics, and higher identification with host country society. On the contrary, Germany's restrictive nature of citizenship regime despite the 2000 reform as well as long-term segregationist policies are viewed as main handicaps against migrants' naturalization, electoral participation and identification with the host society. In this respect, the institutionalist school expects France to provide a fertile soil for immigrants' individual level political integration. On the other hand, while modest multicultural policy frameworks and corporatist interest mediation arrangements in Germany provide formalized channels for migrants' group based

politics, the republican integration framework in France is expected to bring about extra-parliamentary forms of group-based collective movements.

CHAPTER 4

IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INTEGRATION AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: GENERAL TRENDS AND THE CASE OF TURKS

In chapter three, I argued that prominent cross-national differences exist between Germany and France in terms of management of ethnic diversity and immigrant integration. In chapter four, I examine the ways in which cross-national differences in immigrant integration regimes produce varying outcomes in immigrants' and their children's political integration into their host country politics at the individual level. The objective of chapter four is twofold: First, I inquire general trends of immigrant political integration in Germany and France. In this respect, I take immigrant-origin people as a single category and compare their average levels of political integration into their host country cross-nationally. Second, I particularly focus on Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany and France. I inquire whether Turks in Germany and France differ from each other in terms of their levels of political integration into their host country politics; if so, whether the cross-national variance of Turkish political integration is in coherence with the general patterns of immigrant integration in Germany and France.

In this chapter, I conduct three types of comparisons: First, I compare average levels of immigrant political integration in Germany and France by inquiring immigrants' (and their children's) naturalization rates, voting turnouts in host country's elections, interest in host country politics, and level of political representation in legislative bodies. The objective is to assess which of these two national contexts carries out a higher level of immigrant political integration at the individual level. Second, I study multiple immigrant groups within each national case. In this part, I compare the level of political

integration of Turks with other major immigrant groups in their host countries. I aim to evaluate Turkish immigrants' individual level participatory tendencies vis-à-vis other immigrant-originated groups in the same national context. Third, I compare level of political integration of Turkish immigrants and their children cross-nationally. I inquire whether Turks in Germany or in France achieve a higher individual level political integration into their host countries.

The empirical findings in chapter four demonstrate that profound cross-national differences exist between Germany and France in terms of general trends of immigrant political integration. As expected by the institutional school in immigration scholarship, France provides a more favorable national context for immigrant political integration at the individual level than the case of Germany. Immigrant-origin people in France have higher naturalization rates, higher rates of electoral participation, and higher numbers of migrant-origin representatives at the local levels than immigrant-origin people in Germany.[47] On the other hand, the empirical evidence on Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany and France shows a quite contradictory trend. Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany constitute a successful case of political integration with their higher naturalization rates, higher level of electoral political participation and stronger political representation at national and state-level parliaments compared to other major immigrant-originated groups in Germany. On the contrary, Turks in France are often berated due to their lower tendencies to naturalize, participate in electoral politics,

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[47] It is reasonable to expect that high numbers of Turkish-origin people in Germany and Maghrebian-origin people (particularly the ones originating from Algeria) in France skew the average levels of immigrant political integration in these two national contexts. Despite its limitations, the category of immigrant-origin people still provides an analytical leverage to assess cross-national differences in terms of levels of immigrant political integration in these two national contexts.

and claim political offices in legislative institutions compared to other immigrant groups, particularly Maghrebians, in France. A cross-country comparison of Turkish minority also confirms the argument that German-Turks are better integrated into their host country politics at the individual level than their counterparts in France.

Chapter four concludes that neither group-based nor institutional approaches can adequately explain German-Turks' exemplary success and French-Turks' underachievement in terms of political integration into their host country politics at the individual. The presence of profound cross-national differences of Turkish immigrants' political integration in Germany and France challenges group-based explanations, which expect similar political behaviors from the similar immigrant groups. On the other hand, the existing cross-national differences in Turkish immigrants' political integration do not fully fit into institutionalist approaches, which perceive France as a fertile soil and Germany as a restricted opportunity structure for immigrants' individual level political inclusion. Hence, chapter four demonstrates the necessity for developing an alternative theoretical approach to explain the dynamics of Turkish immigrants' political integration into their host country politics.

I start the chapter by inquiring general trends of immigrant political integration in Germany and France. I evaluate the cross-national patterns of immigrants' rates of naturalization, electoral participation, and political representation. In the second part, I focus on Turkish-origin people in Germany and France. In this part, I compare their relative level of political integration.

1. Immigrant Political Integration at Individual Level: Comparison of General Trends in Germany and France

In this part, I compare general trends of immigrant political integration at the individual level in Germany and France. The concept of immigrants' individual level political integration is measured by immigrants' and their children's naturalization rates, electoral participation, and political representation at local and national levels. By drawing on national census data, available survey studies and documentation on political representation, my research shows that migrant-origin people in Germany have lower naturalization rates, lower shares in national/local electorates vis-à-vis their proportion in national population, lower rates of electoral participation, and lower numbers of migrant-origin representatives at the local levels than immigrant-origin people in France. Therefore, this section confirms the arguments of the institutionalist school, which contends that Germany provides fewer opportunities for immigrants' individual-level political integration than France.

1.1. Naturalization

Table 7 presents data on immigrants' naturalization rates in Germany and France between 1970 and 2010. The empirical evidence demonstrates that France has consistently had higher immigrant naturalization rates than Germany. Until the 2000 citizenship reform, Germany had been the prime example of ethno-cultural definition of nationhood and high barriers of naturalization of foreigners (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999). On the contrary, France has been considered as one of the most liberal citizenship regimes in Europe (Howard 2009; Janoski 2010). In this respect, it is reasonable to observe a high cross-national gap in the rates of naturalizations during the period of 1970 and 2000. However, Table 7 also shows that the cross-national substantial difference in naturalization rates

stays intact in the post-2000 period. Although the 2000 citizenship reform in Germany had a significant effect on immigrants' naturalization rates by almost doubling them when compared to the 1995-99 period, it could not close the gap between Germany and France. Therefore, Table 7 provides important empirical evidence that supports the argument that Germany and France, despite the recent changes in German citizenship policies, still provide different opportunities for migrants' access to national citizenship.

Table 7: Naturalization rates from 1970 to 2010 in Germany and France.

	1970-74	**1975-79**	**1980-84**	**1985-89**	**1990-95**	**1995-99**	**2000-05**	**2006-10**
Germany	268	331	314	489	489	1,344	2,642	1,581
France	2,959	2,815	2,818	2,670	2,851	3,492	4,889	3,792
Ratio	**1/11**	**1/8.5**	**1/8.9**	**1/5.4**	**1/5.8**	**1/2.5**	**1/1.8**	**1/2.2**

Note: Per 100,000 foreigners.
Source: Between 1970 and 2005 from Janoski (2010, 34). Between 2006 and 2010, my own compilation from The Federal Statistical Office, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2007-2011; INSEE population census; and Eurostat.

Why does Germany, despite its path breaking citizenship reform in 2000, have lower level of immigrant naturalization compared to France? According to Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos, "a combination of material/procedural impediments … and symbolic cues addressed to immigrants by members of the host society" results in lower naturalization rates in Germany (2012, 57). In terms of material impediments, the formal rejection of dual-citizenship is the most referred and politically contested one. Since 2000, children of immigrants can hold multiple citizenships until a certain age. However, they must make a decision between the German and their parents' citizenship between

the ages of 18 and 23.[48] This "option model" (*optionsmodell*) is criticized for being "unfair, potentially unconstitutional and likely unworkable in administrative terms" (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012, 52). Therefore, the restriction on dual citizenship is perceived as a handicap that curtails inclusiveness of German citizenship regime.

Moreover, "restrictive backlash" (Howard 2009; Howard 2012) in the post-2000 period highly curtails the liberal spirit of the 2000 citizenship reform. Recent requirements of language (since 2007) and citizenship (since 2008) tests further challenge immigrants' naturalization in Germany. As noted in the previous chapter, language and civic knowledge examinations in Germany are considered to impose higher standards of assessments compared to other European cases. Apart from the existing material handicaps to naturalization, it can also be argued that long-term exclusion from political citizenship has created a path dependent pattern in which migrants are reluctant to naturalize, even after the ethno-cultural basis of the German citizenship is mostly abandoned. In other words, migrants' willingness to incorporate into host society and host society's acceptance of migrants as equal members of the society are long-term processes that cannot be secured right away by profound legal reforms.

On the other hand, France historically tolerates adoption of multiple citizenships, despite the absence of an official ruling on this issue. Considering the fact that France has lesser material handicaps in naturalization procedures and adopts a symbolically open

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[48] In 2013, the first cohort of the "option model" reached to the age of 23. According to the initial results, among 3,316 children of immigrants who were born in 1990, 2,369 opted for German citizenship, 32 chose their parents' nationality, and 756 did not take any action. http://ha-ber.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21701&Itemid=0 (last visited on March 3, 2013).

definition of the French nationhood, it becomes natural to expect immigrants in France would have higher rates as opposed to the case of Germany. On the other hand, it must also be pointed out that France does not constitute the highest rate for immigrant naturalization in Europe. Volatile citizenship policies in France have resulted in decreasing naturalization rates in certain periods. Janoski (2010, 58) notes that while France and the UK historically adopted liberal nationality policies toward their immigrants, French naturalization rates are lower than the British rate. But this does not change the fact that France consistently provides more opportunities for migrants' access to national citizenship and therefore basic electoral rights for migrants, when it is compared to Germany.

1.2. Electoral Participation

The existing research indicates that migrants in Europe overall have lower levels of political participation than their host societies (Messina 2007), even though they catch up natives in some forms of political participation such as trade union membership (Aleksynska 2011). Diverse national political contexts in Europe allow researchers to evaluate how host country political setting shapes the level of migrants' electoral participation in their host country politics. In this case, the gap between migrants' and natives' political participation varies across countries depending on the legal framework of naturalization, political party structures, election systems, and ideological/discursive environment. Below, I will discuss migrants' electoral participation in national/local political institutions in Germany and France.

To start with, cross-national differences in naturalization policies have direct effects on the shares of migrant electorates in Germany and France. Both in Germany and

France, migrants' shares in national/local electorates are far from matching the actual proportion of migration-origin people in the national population. According to the Eurostat documentation (2011), the share of people with migration background within the national population aged between 25 and 54 is 26.6% in France and 21.9% in Germany. On the other hand, migrants' share in national electorates is 9.9% in France and 2.8% in Germany (for estimated percentages of immigrant-origin people within the national electorates, see: Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012, Appendix).

While migrants are under-represented in national/local electorates in both countries, the gap is much bigger in Germany due to its historically restrictive naturalization regime. Consequently, migrants in Germany could only recently become an appealing group for political parties' electoral strategies. On the other hand, significant shares of immigrant-origin people with national/local voting rights in France do not mean that political parties play the card of mobilizing ethnic votes of migrants. Firstly the difference-blind ideology of the republican regime, and secondly increasing competitiveness of far-right wing political parties make mobilization of ethnic votes less viable and less appealing in France (Tiberj 2011, 28). Yet, immigrant-origin electorate in France, due to their higher numbers, have more chances to influence the results of national and local elections than immigrant-origin people in Germany.

It is important to acknowledge that immigrants' shares in national/local electorates do not directly indicate their tendency to participate in electoral politics. In other words, not all migrants who attain full electoral rights actually vote in local and national elections. On the other hand, comparing migrants' electoral participation across national contexts is a challenging task. Firstly, data on migrants' political attitudes and

rates of political participation are scarce especially in European contexts, even though the number of survey studies on these issues is increasing recently. Secondly, differences in the levels of political participation (i.e. supranational/the EU, national, and local levels) and the categories of people (i.e. people with migration origin, naturalized citizens, registered voters with migration background) make it harder to have common standards for cross-national comparative data. Thirdly, apart from the larger political structures such as citizenship and integration regimes, some other procedural differences in terms of registration, voting, and party outreach make cross-national comparison of migrants' turnout a challenging job even further.

To start with the German case, studies show that people with immigration background are less interested in politics (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Wüst 2004), less knowledgeable about politicians and political parties (Wüst 2000; Wüst 2004), less likely to participate in electoral politics than native citizens (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2002; Wüst 2004; Diehl and Wüst 2011), and when they participate, they -with the exception of ethnic-German resettlers (*Aussiedler*)- favor left-wing parties (Wüst 2000; Wüst 2004; Messina 2007). Wüst (2004), by analyzing Politbarometer surveys of 2001 and 2002, finds that naturalized citizens (including *Aussiedler*) have lower degrees of political interest and political knowledge about parties and politicians than German-born citizens. While 46% of German-born citizens are strongly interested in politics, this number is 28% for naturalized citizens. Moreover, while 92-95% of German-born people are knowledgeable about parties and politicians, this is 80-88% for naturalized citizens. However, in terms of electoral participation, Wüst finds that self-reported likeliness to

vote in national elections among naturalized citizens (82%) is only slightly lower than their German-born counterparts (87%).

The results of ESS (2002-2008) and GLES (German Longitudinal Election Study) (2009) illustrate that migrant-origin citizens vote less than native-citizens at national level elections (see: Table 8). While 73% of citizens with migration background voted at the 2002 federal election, this number is 86% for native-citizens. The 2005 federal election presents an electoral mobilization of migrant-origin citizens. Their turnout rate goes up to 80% and almost catches the participation rate of native-citizens (83%). Heightened public debates along with the 2005 immigration law possibly explain such a sharp increase in migrants' electoral participation in the 2005 election. However, during the 2009 federal election, the turnout gap between natives and migrant-origin citizens becomes once more significant and reaches 9% (Müssig and Worbs 2012).

Table 8: Voter turnout rates of immigrant-origin and native citizens at German federal elections of 2002, 2005, and 2009 (in percentages).

Bundestag election years	2002	2005	2009
Immigrant-origin	73.8	80.8	72.3
First Generation	64.7	77.2	n<20
Second Generation	81.8	83.7	72.7
Natives	86.2	83.0	81.5

Notes: (1) The 2002 election is from ESS 2002-2004, German sub-study; the 2005 election is from ESS 2006-2008, German sub-study; and the 2009 election is from GLES 2009.
(2) The sample is based on people who were at least 18 years old at the time of survey and German citizens.
Source: Müssig and Worbs (2012, 31–32).

Furthermore, a generational distinction shows that lower turnout rates at national level elections are more relevant to first-generation migrants than the second-generation. Table 8 illustrates that second-generation-migrant-origin citizens participate in national

elections at higher rates than their parents. They even exceeded the turnout rate of native citizens at the 2005 federal election. However, in the next election of 2009, the second-generation's participation rate sharply decreased even under the score in 2002. Apart from their rates of electoral participation, second-generation-migrant-origin people are more interested in politics (19.6% very interested) than their parents (12.8%) and than native-citizens (18%) (Müssig and Worbs 2012, 22). They also score higher than their parents and catch up with natives in terms of their political efficacy (Müssig and Worbs 2012, 24–25). As a result, second-generation-migrant-origin people present a promising trend for the future of ethnic minorities' political participation in Germany.

Political party preference of people with migration background reflects the ethnic cleavage between ethnic-German- and non-ethnic-German-origin immigrants. When migrants and their descendants are studied as a unified group, they do not differ from native-citizens in terms of their political party preferences. ESS 2002-2008 surveys show that almost equal shares of migrant-origin and native citizens voted for SPD and CDU/CSU at the 2004 national election (Müssig and Worbs 2012, 35). However, when we distinguish migrant-origin people in terms of their country of origin, striking differences across ethnic groups in terms of their political party support become visible. According to Politbarometer surveys (2001-2002), while 62% of Turkish-origin German citizens intend to vote for SPD, this number is only 23% for German-citizens originating from the former Soviet Union and its successor states. On the contrary, while 11% of the former intends to vote for CDU/CSU, this is 73% for the latter group (Wüst 2004, 351). These findings once more prove that even though ethnic-German re-settlers (*Aussiedler*),

foreign workers, and their descendants are all combined into the category of *migrants* in Germany, they highly differ from each other in terms of their political preferences.

In the case of France, the *jus soli* principle for the second generation and the relatively easier naturalization process for the first generation make immigrant-origin population an important component of the French electorate. However, France is not an exception in terms of generally observed lower political participation rates of migrant-origin people compared to natives. Studies show that migrants and their descendants in France register at lower rates for elections (Richard 1998, 161; Tiberj 2011; Brouard and Tiberj 2011b) and have lower voter turnout rates at elections (Maxwell 2010b) compared to native citizens. On the other hand, counter-intuitively, recent surveys show that migrant-origin people have higher levels of interest in French politics than natives (Tiberj and Simon 2012).

Maxwell (2010b) conducts the first quantitative study that compares actual voter turnout rates among multiple immigrant groups in French elections in 2004.[49] He finds out that non-European-origin citizens (Maghrebians and Caribbeans) consistently have lower turnout rates than European-origin citizens as well as native French metropolitans. The turnout gap between non-European origin migrants and natives becomes bigger at the 2004 European Parliament election (9.7%) and narrows down at the first round of regional elections (7.9%). In his conclusion, Maxwell argues that non-European-origin migrants tend to vote at lower rates than natives, because they are more likely to live in economically disadvantaged and socially sensitive urban neighborhoods. The underlying

[49] Different from survey studies, Maxwell (2010b) analyzes the 2003 Permanent Demographic Sample (EDP) and the 2004 Electoral Participation Study (EPS). His analysis includes European Parliament election in 2004 as well as the first and the second rounds of 2004 regional elections.

causality is the following one: Since the French republican framework restricts the opportunities for ethnic-community networks and political mobilization through ethnic-identities, migrants in France become more vulnerable to de-mobilizing effects of socio-economical segregation (Maxwell 2010b, 437).

Tiberj (2011) replicates Maxwell's study through analyzing data from the 2007 post-presidential election survey. His findings show that after controlling for age, education, and employment status, the Maghrebian- and African-origin French people do not differ from native-origin population or from European-origin citizens. He concludes: "ethnicity cannot be added to the list of 'usual suspects' that tend to distort the social composition of the public voting" in France (Tiberj 2011, 29).

More recently, the Trajectories and Origin survey (2008), conducted by INED and INSEE, provides data on migrants' and their descendants' electoral participation in France. Table 9 shows that participation rates in France (except the municipal election) follow the standard pattern in which natives have at the highest participation rates and second-generation immigrants follow them. First-generation immigrants participate less than their children; but the difference is not as dramatic as the one in Germany. Another important point that Table 9 illustrates is the higher turnout rates for the first round of the 2007 presidential election. It must be noted that the 2007 presidential elections in France, which ended up with the victory of Nicholas Sarkozy, took place in a politically contentious atmosphere and therefore mobilized voters from all origins. Studies show that NGOs' mobilization during the 2007-presidential elections resulted in 24% increase in registration rates in disadvantage areas in France (Escafré- Dublet and Simon 2009).

Table 9: Registration and voter turnout rates of immigrants, their descendants, and native-citizens in France (in percentages).

	Registration rate	Voter turnout at the 2008 municipal election	Voter turnout at the 2007 presidential election, first round.
First generation immigrants	80.5	79.5	84.5
Descendants of immigrants	86	75	85.5
Natives	89.5	81	89.5

Note: The sample is based on people who are French citizens and between 18 and 50 years old.
Source: Survey Trajectories and Origin, INED-INSEE, 2008. Tiberj and Simon (2012, 17).

Another important information provided by the Trajectories and Origin survey (2008) is immigrants' high level of interest in French politics.[50] In contrast with the case in Germany, the survey results illustrate that migrants (49%) and their descendants (51%) are more interested in French politics than natives (46%) (Tiberj and Simon 2012, 12). What is more, migrant groups who are less visible in French integration debates (such as Spaniards, Italians, Portugueses, South Asians, and to some extent Turks) have lower interest in French politics than those migrant groups (such as Maghrebians and sub-Saharan Africans) who are highly contested in national integration debates. While this finding gives us some hints about the relationship between experience of discrimination and higher political interest in host country politics, such a conclusion requires further analyses. According to Tiberj and Simon, experiences of discrimination and

[50] It must also be noted that RAPFI survey (*Rapport au politique des Français issus de l'immigration*) (2005) shows that new French citizens (immigrants from Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey and their children) are slightly less interested in politics than the majority society (47% and 53% respectively). However, Brouard and Tiberj concludes that traditional variables such as age, education, and gender, rather than ethnic origin, shape level of political interest (Brouard and Tiberj 2011b, 33).

"ethnicization" (returning back to ethno-cultural origin) might influence migrants' political interest in two ways: such experiences might either lead to the development of increased political consciousness and therefore higher interest in host country politics or undermine political interest by reducing migrants' identification with the French society (Tiberj and Simon 2012, 13).

In terms of political positioning, survey studies show that non-European origin immigrants in France are more aligned with the left wing than native citizens and EU 27-origin migrants. RAPRI survey (2005) illustrates that 63% of "the new French" (naturalized immigrants from Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey and their children) carry left-wing political orientation, whereas only 37% of the general population is oriented toward political left (Brouard and Tiberj 2011b, 37). Moreover, the same survey shows that "the new French" support left-wing political parties at higher rates than the general population. On the other hand, Trajectories of Origin survey (2008) furthers the findings by demonstrating that descendants of non-European origin immigrants have higher left-wing orientation than their parents. In this sense, the most left-leaning groups in France includes descendants of Africans, Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians (Tiberj and Simon 2010, 112).

What does empirical evidence tell us about relative electoral participation of migrants and their children in Germany and France? We should note that while national surveys and statistical analyses provide us rich accounts about migrants' political participatory situation in particular national contexts, the absence of common standards for cross-national research make these sources highly restricted for international comparative analyses. As a solution, cross-national surveys become very crucial, since

they provide standard, comparable data across countries. Recently, there is a rise of cross-national survey studies targeting immigrant populations and particularly focusing on immigration-related issues.[51] Immigrant Citizens Survey 2012 (ICS) aims to analyze how immigrants experience integration by targeting the population of non-EU born immigrants in seven EU member states.[52] ICS data show that non-EU origin migrants in Germany show much less interest in voting in host country elections than their counterparts in France (see: Table 10). 50.5% of those who are not willing to vote in Germany explain their abstention by 'not being interested in politics in general'.

Table 10: Non-EU origin migrants' willingness to vote in host country elections in France and Germany.

Interest in voting	France	Germany
Yes, I would vote	91.9%	56.6%
No, I would not vote	8.1%	43.4%
N	959	1093

Note: Based on the question: "Would you vote if there was a general election tomorrow, if you could?"
Source: Immigrant Citizenship Survey, 2012. My own calculation.

In sum, while a certain degree of a turnout gap exists between host society and immigrants in both German and French national contexts, immigrants in Germany seem to have lower rates of electoral participation than their counterparts in France. One explanation for migrants' lower tendency to vote in Germany would be demobilizing effects of long-term exclusion from political citizenship. In this respect, two points can be

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[51] Some examples of immigration-specific survey studies include: EU-MIDIS that is conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and the LOCALMULTIDEM project that is funded by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Program.

[52] ECS 2012 is conducted through the collaboration of the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group. It covers 15 cities in 7 EU member states including Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart) and France (Paris and Lyon). The targeted population includes legal resident non-EU foreigners and naturalized citizens. For further information, visit: www.immigrantsurvey.org (last accessed on March 10, 2013).

made: Firstly, despite the 2000 citizenship reform, which liberalized foreigners' access to German citizenship, naturalization rates in Germany are still lower than many other countries with liberal citizenship policies including France (Table 7). As a result, the proportion of migrant-citizens with full voting rights in Germany is lower than France. That is to say that embedded material and symbolic barriers to naturalization in Germany still deprive a substantial portion of immigrants from the basic electoral rights. Secondly, after controlling for the electoral rights, immigrants in Germany still show lower tendency to participate in electoral politics than their counterparts in France (Table 10). In this case, rather than availability of equal political rights, lingering effects of segregationist discourse of the guest worker system in Germany explain migrants' lower participation rates. In other words, the official negation of immigrants' permanent settlement in Germany and the denial of their equal access to German society along with the ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood have produced long-term demobilizing effects on the part of immigrants, that have kept on shaping the German politics even after the structural reforms. Yet, it must also be pointed out that migrants in Germany are getting engaged in formal politics at increasing rates. The second generation of immigrants in Germany has higher interest in politics and higher rates of political efficacy than their parents (Müssig and Worbs 2012). While exclusionist nature of previous policies keep on shadowing the current politics to some extent, promising changes along with new generation of immigrants are taking place in Germany.

1.3. Political Representation

Rates of naturalization and electoral participation are important indicators to inquire immigrants' participation in host country political society; yet, an analysis on migrants'

political integration would be incomplete without analyzing the output component: formal representation of immigrants at legislative bodies. The concept of political representation has been a highly discussed issue among the scholars. The debate mainly centers on the question of whether *descriptive* representation (when elected officers reflect the group-based composition of the population) or *substantive* representation (when elected officers actively advance political preferences of the groups that they are representing) better serve for ideal democratic governance. The contemporary debate of political representation goes back to the writings of Hanna Pitkin (1967). In *The Concept of Representation*, she classifies four models of representation and defends the form of substantive representation as opposed to a mirror-image descriptive model. On the other hand, Anna Philips (1995) responds to the debate by arguing for the importance of "politics of presence" and minorities' descriptive representation for democratic deliberation (Also see Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst (2011) for an overview of debates on political representation).

Beyond these theoretical discussions, scholars agree that migrants' representation in elected offices play a crucial role, not only in providing an access to decision making processes, but also increasing the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of migrant groups (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Apart from migrants' resources and mobilization strategies, many structural factors related to host country's political system –for example naturalization regime, party systems and candidate nomination procedures, and ideological/discursive environment- affect the extent of migrants' representation.[53]

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[53] Recently, there has been an increase in the scholarly attention on the issue of migrants' and migration-origin ethnic minorities' political representation. Some major works include: Alba and Foner 2009; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; Givens and Maxwell 2012; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013.

Germany and France are both scrutinized because of low numbers of immigrant-origin people in their representative institutions, despite the presence of large proportions of immigrant-origin citizens in their populations.[54] Yet, my research, in agreement with previous studies, shows that there are some important cross-national differences in terms of incorporation of immigrant-origin people into German and French legislative bodies. Below, I will briefly compare the rates of migrants' political representation in Germany and France.

To start with Germany, the representation of ethnic minorities in legislative bodies has historically been limited, due to foreigners' limited access to political citizenship until recently. Yet, after the reform of citizenship law and the official affirmation that "Germany is a country of immigration", rates of ethnic minority representation in legislative bodies have started increasing continuously. Figure 5 illustrates the increasing number of immigration-origin parliamentarians at national, state, and EU level parliaments.

Figure 5: Members of Parliament with a migration background in Bundestag, in state parliaments of Germany, and of European Parliament members elected in Germany (N).



Source: Wüst 2011, 254

[54] For a cross-country comparison of minority representation, see the representation index in (Bloemraad 2013a, 660)

Empirical analyses show that there are important variances in terms of party-specific opportunity structures for political representation of migrants. The political left parties i.e. the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Socialists (die Linke) have higher proportion of politicians with migration background than the central-right parties, which are the Christian Democrats (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Liberal Party (FDP). In 2008, among 12 MPs with migration background at the Bundestag, 10 were the members of the left wing political parties (SPD: three, the Greens: four, the Linke: three) and only two of them were members of the central-right wing (CDU/CSU: two) (Wüst 2011, 255). Furthermore, different strands of political competition among the parties affect their flexibility to incorporate candidates with migration background and mobilize minority voters. Claro da Fonseca (2011) shows that incorporation of migration-origin members is more risky for the Social Democrats than the Greens, since the former (SPD) competes with the central-right and cannot jeopardize alienating their conservatively-leaning native voters. While the Greens has greater flexibility than the Social Democrats in terms of mobilizing minority votes and incorporating minority candidates, their advantageous position is challenged by the Socialists (die Linke) who also tap on migrant-origin voters.

Moreover, there are important differences in migrants' political representation across different parliamentary levels. Wüst (2011, 256) shows that there are higher shares of migrant-origin MPs among the members of the European Parliament (MEP) elected from Germany, compared to other MPs at national and regional levels. In 2008, 12.1% of Germany's MEPs had a migration background, whereas this share was only 2.0% for the Bundestag and 2.3% for the state-level parliaments. According to Wüst, the main reasons

for a higher share of migrant representation at the EU level are: First, EU-origin legal residents in Germany, regardless of their naturalization status, are eligible to vote and stand as candidates in the EP elections. This increases the number of migrant voters and candidates. Second, lower competition among political parties for the EP elections gives higher opportunities for migrant-origin candidates.

Despite the increasing numbers of migrant-origin representation at the federal level in recent years, Donovan (2007) argues that minority representation at the state level (with the exception of some big cities such as Berlin) is “small and stagnant” in Germany. Schönwälder (2013) documents the striking variation across German states in terms of incorporation of migrant-origin representatives into the state parliaments. After the March 2011 regional elections, there were 53 members of state parliaments with a migration background (2.8% of 1,860 total state-level MPs). 32 of those (60% of total immigrant-origin state-level MPs) were elected from three city-states (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen). On the other hand, large territorial states, despite their high concentration of immigrant-origin populations, incorporate much lower numbers of immigrant-origin members into their parliaments. For instance, North Rheine-Westphalia, the state with the highest number of immigrant-origin people, did not have any immigrant origin MP at the regional parliament between the 2005-2010 electoral period. Therefore, concentration of immigrant population by itself cannot explain higher political representation of immigrant-origin populations. According to Schönwälder (2013), composition of migrant-origin populations (existence of highly mobilized groups), rules of electoral systems (option for personal votes, seat/vote ratio), and political and socio-cultural dynamics all interact and create state-level variances of immigrant representation.

At the local level, big cities provide higher opportunities for migrant-origin candidates. In 2008, 5.2% of local-councilors of 25 biggest German cities had a migration background (Wüst 2011, 255). This number is higher than the average share of migrant-origin local-councilors in Germany as a whole. Moreover, Wüst (2011, 256–257) argues that the gap between left and right-wing parties in terms of their nomination of migration-origin candidates becomes narrower at the city level. This shows that center-right parties are also willing to benefit from high concentration of migrant-origin populations in certain cities.

On the other hand, the representation of minority groups in French politics is also a highly contested issue. It has been argued that "French political elite is exceptionally homogeneous in terms of gender, age, education, social class and ethnicity" (Brouard and Tiberj 2011a, 165). In 2002, French MPs at the national level were male (87.5%), white, aged (58 years of average), and university educated (82% compared to 17.5 % of the general population). (Sineau and Tiberj 2007 cited by Brouard and Tiberj 2011). In this context, France has poor records of migrants' political representation at the national level.

In 2007, three out of 555 MPs (0.5%) at the National Parliament and five out of 305 Senators (1.6%) at the Senate had an immigration background (Michon 2011b). In 2012, the situation of immigrant-origin representation slightly improved in the National Parliament with seven MPs with a migration background (five of Maghrebian origin, one of Chadian origin, and one of Iranian origin) (Tiberj and Michon 2013, 584). Despite this improvement, France is still way behind of many Western European countries such as

Netherlands and the UK.[55] On the other hand, studies show that despite the strikingly low representation rates at the national level, migrants in France have promisingly higher representation at the regional and the local levels. Michon (2011b) demonstrates that ethnic minorities achieve 5.2% representation rate at regional councils after the 2010 elections. Migrants and their descendants have better representation rates in more urbanized and populated regions such as Ile-de-France (the region of Paris, 14.4%), Provence-Alpes-Cote-d'Azur (the region of Marseille, 7.3%) and Rhone-Alpes (the region of Lyon, 5.7%). Moreover, in the ten largest cities, representation of ethnic minority councilors is as high as 9%.

What are the reasons for low rates of inclusion of migrants and their descendants to the representative bodies in France? What is more, why are migrants and their children better represented at local levels than the national level? The majority of answers point out the difference-blind ideology of the French republic as the reason for representational deficit. Alba and Foner (2009, 292) argue that "strong assimilationist principles" of the republican regime that "(do) not even officially recognize the ethnic groups and (have) been loathe to accept group-specific approaches… provide a basis for objecting to the very notion that immigrant-origin politicians are needed to include the views and interests of these constituencies". On the other hand, political party structures and election systems are considered to be additional barriers to migrants' political representation in France. Brouard and Tiberj (2011a) conducted an experimental study to inquire the causes of lower political representation of ethnic minorities in France. Their findings do not support the commonly stated argument that low minority representation stems from

[55] In Netherlands, 11% of the MPs at the Dutch Second Chamber had an immigration background (2011 elections). In the UK, 4% of the MPs are non-white (2010 elections) (Michon 2011b, 35).

mainstream political parties' fear from far-right wing backlash. On the contrary, Brouard and Tiberj's findings show that French voters widely support diversity of candidates. Therefore, rather than concerning about losing votes to far-right parties, the structure of mainstream political parties in France is one of the main handicaps against the ethnic representation. Furthermore, Michon (2011b) contends that the election system at the national level (two-round election with single member district) is unfavorable for minority-group candidates, since only one person who gets the majority of the votes is elected in each district. On the other hand, at the regional and local elections, party lists compete. Therefore, minority groups have higher opportunities to win offices at these levels.

When we compare migrants' political participation in Germany and France, the picture is not an easy one to interpret. To start with, both national contexts suffer from low representation rates of migrants and their descendants, when they are compared to the countries with official multicultural policies i.e. the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada. Moreover, empirical findings show an opposite situation of migrants' political representation in Germany and France at national and local levels. While Germany slightly does better at the national level in terms of migrants' political representation, France has the biggest representation gap at the national level. On the other hand, while Germany is under the spot for its low and stagnant migrant representation at the local level, France provides promising migrant representation at the lower levels. Table 11 illustrates rates of migrants' political representation in Germany and France at different levels.

Table 11: Immigrant political representation in Germany and France at national, regional, and local levels.

	Political unit	Immigrant representation (%)
Germany	National parliament, 2008	2.0 % N= 12 out of 614 seats
	Regional parliaments, 2011	2.8 % N= 53
	Local parliaments in 25 largest cities, 2008	5.2% N=117
France	National parliament, 2012	1.2 % N= 7 out of 555
	Regional councils, 2010	5.2% N= 90 out of 1,722
	Local councils in 10 largest cities, 2008	9% N=68 out of 792

***Sources*:** Germany (Wüst 2011; Schönwälder 2013); France (Michon 2011b; Tiberj and Michon 2013)

To sum up, many of comparative studies on migrants' political representation conclude that Germany provides fewer opportunities to become MPs with a migration background than France (Alba and Foner 2009; Wüst and Saalfeld 2010). Empirical findings on migrants' political representation rates support these arguments except the national level. On the other hand, it is also important to highlight the recent promising changes towards better inclusion of migrants into democratic bodies in both contexts. In Germany, the liberalization of non-ethnic migrants' access to political citizenship resulted in increasing number of elected politicians with a migration background. In France, president Sarkozy's appointment of a minister of Justice and two secretaries of state with migration backgrounds in 2007 carried symbolical importance for encouraging political parties to open their candidacy lists for immigrants and their descends (Michon 2011b).

In summary, empirical findings presented in this section show that migrants and their descendants in France overall have higher levels of political integration at individual level than their counterparts in Germany. More specifically, migrant-origin people in

Germany have lower naturalization rates, lower shares in national/local electorates vis-à-vis their proportion in national population, lower rates of electoral participation, and lower numbers of migrant-origin representatives at the local levels than migrant-origin people in France. One of the main reasons for migrants' lower degree of individual-level political integration in Germany is the existence of material and symbolic barriers to acquisition of national citizenship, despite the major citizenship law reform in 2000. Second, lingering effects of previous exclusionist institutional policies and political discourses are also depicted as factors undermining migrants' individual-level political integration in Germany. On the other hand, overtime studies also indicate an optimistic change in Germany as the second-generation is becoming predominant in the immigrant society. The cross-national gap in terms of migrants' individual-level political integration in Germany and France, at least in quantitative sense, is narrowing down.

2. Turkish Immigrants' Political Integration: Divergence from General Trends in Germany and France

In this part, I present the comparative empirical findings on Turkish migrants' political integration at the individual level in Germany and France. My research documents that Turkish immigrants develop profoundly different levels of political integration into German and French politics. Yet, these cross-national differences in the case of Turkish immigrants contradict with the general trends of immigrant political integration in Germany and France. As opposed to the empirical evidence presented in the previous section, German-Turks are more successfully integrated into the host country electoral politics (in terms of voter turnout rates and political representation) than their counterparts in France. French-Turks score slightly higher in terms of their naturalization

rates than German-Turks. Yet, they still fall short of conveying these political sources into electoral and representational successes in France.

2.1. Naturalization

Earlier in this chapter, I have demonstrated that Germany, despite its path-breaking citizenship reform in 2000, still contains higher barriers to foreigners' acquisition of German citizenship than the case of France. These material and symbolic barriers to acquisition of German citizenship become even more salient in the case of Turkish minority in Germany. Firstly, the restriction on dual-citizenship constitutes a major handicap against naturalization of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Indeed, a wide range of exemptions enables many immigrant groups to hold multiple citizenships in Germany including (Spät)Aussiedler, EU citizens (since 2007), citizens of the countries with reciprocal conventions, and citizens of the countries, which do not allow de-naturalization for their citizens (Miera 2009). Yet, Turkish immigrants and their children cannot benefit from these exemptions. What is more, before the new Nationality Law in 2000, grey zones in the legislation were letting Turkish immigrants to maintain both Turkish and German citizenships. The procedure included renunciation of the Turkish nationality, naturalization as German citizens, and re-acquisition of the Turkish nationality (Hailbronner 2010, 22). During this process, Turkish authorities facilitated the procedure of de-naturalization and re-naturalization in Turkey. Yet, the 2000 citizenship reform strictly closed the doors for holding multiple citizenships for Turkish-origin immigrants. (Re-)acquisition of a second nationality became a reason for withdrawal of the German citizenship.

Secondly, recent requirements of language (since 2007) and citizenship (since 2008) tests further challenge Turkish immigrants' access to German citizenship. German language and citizenship tests as requirements for naturalization are already scrutinized because of their higher difficulty level compared to many other European contexts (see my discussion in the previous chapter). Such obligations especially hamper the naturalization process of the first generation Turkish immigrants in Germany. Previously, the logic of guest worker system in Germany did not provide any encouragements for foreign workers' German language acquisition. On the contrary, mother tongue education was officially supported to facilitate the return of foreign workers and their children. Considering this historical background, demanding a high level of German language proficiency and civic knowledge particularly obstructs Turkish naturalization process in Germany.

Figure 6 depicts how processes of liberalization and restriction of citizenship policies affect naturalization trends among Turks in Germany. In the years of 1990 and 1993, Germany introduced a set of important reforms in the "Foreigners Act" (*Ausländergesetz)* that liberalized foreigners' (especially young generations') acquisition of German citizenship. Therefore, naturalization rates of Turkish minority had a steadily increasing trend in the 1990s and reached the peak point in 1999 (one year before the execution of the new Nationality Law). Paradoxically, the new Nationality Law of 2000 initiated a decreasing trend of naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants.[56] Figure 6

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[56] It should be noted that even though the new Nationality Law brought about decreasing rates of naturalization among Turkish immigrants, it granted the right to automatic citizenship (*jus soli* rights) to children of immigrants who were born after 1990. Although this automatic access to German citizenship depends on renunciation of home-country citizenship before the age of 23 (so called "option model"), in the long run, it will have significant consequences on Turkish minority's access to German citizenship.

also demonstrates the negative effects of the language and citizenship tests in the years of 2007 and 2008.

Figure 6: Naturalization trend among Turkish minority in Germany (in numbers).



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1987-2011.

Despite all these hurdles, Turkish immigrants in Germany tend to have higher naturalization rates compared to other "labor migrants" from Italy, Spain, Greece, and former Yugoslavia (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Hochman 2011). This is a puzzling situation, since Turkish immigrants in Germany particularly have lower levels of education, unskilled jobs, less social contacts in host society, are less socially accepted and tend to experience discrimination at higher rates (Diehl and Blohm 2003, 137). Table 12 presents proportion of German citizens among "labor migrant" groups in Germany. While 40% of Turkish immigrants and their descendants hold German citizenship, much lower proportions of other labor migrants opt to naturalize in Germany.

One difficulty of such a comparison is the fact that immigrants from the EU countries can benefit from a wide-range of rights provided by the EU citizenship and

therefore they might not be as motivated to naturalize in Germany as third-country immigrants (such as Turks). Yet, a comparison of naturalization rates among labor migrants still has some important advantages: First, the majority of migrants from former-Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) do not come from the EU countries. Yet, ex-Yugoslavian immigrants still have a lower naturalization rate compared to Turkish immigrants. Therefore, after controlling the effect of the EU citizenship, Turkish immigrants tend to naturalize more than other labor migrants. Second, a comparison of labor migrants controls for the different legal standards of naturalization. Labor migrants, in contrast with ethnic-German re-settlers (*Aussiedler*) from Poland and former Soviet Union, do not benefit from special privileges during their access to German citizenship. Third, a focus on labor immigrants enables us to control for "duration of stay" in Germany. The labor immigration to Germany mainly started in the 1960s. Therefore, the majority of labor immigrants have been to Germany for more than 20 years (see: Babka von Gostomski 2010).[57]

Table 12: Proportion of German citizens among 'labor' immigrant groups.

Country of Origin	People with migration background[a] (in 1000)	Proportion of German citizens (%)
Greece	395	17.9
Italy	776	23.2
Former Yugoslavia	1,496	32.6
Turkey	2,985	40.7

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2012)

[a] People with migration background include foreigners born abroad, foreigners born in Germany, naturalized citizens who have themselves immigrated, and their children who have no direct experience of immigration.

[57] According to the study of "Selected Groups of Migrants in Germany 2006/2007" (RAM 2006/2007), which was commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, more than 30% of Turks and former Yugoslavians and more than 40% of Italians and Greeks entered Germany before 1973. Contrary to other groups, there was an increase in former Yugoslavian immigration to Germany between the years of 1990 and 1993, due to the civil war in the region (see: Babka von Gostomski 2010, 59). Yet, this does not change the fact that all four immigrant groups have considerably long durations of stay in Germany.

As opposed to Germany, France constitutes one of the most liberal and inclusive citizenship regimes in Europe. The citizenship policy indices demonstrate that the French citizenship regime has been much closer to liberal/civic-territorial end of the scale than Germany (Koopmans et al. 2005; Howard 2009). As a result of these liberal institutional arrangements, France historically has higher naturalization rates among her foreign populations than Germany (Janoski 2010). In this respect, it would be reasonable to expect higher rates of naturalization among Turkish migrants in France compared to their counterparts in Germany.

Despite the existence of material and discursive opportunities that facilitate migrants' acquisition of French citizenship, Turkish migrant community in France stands out for their reluctance to naturalize. One of the earliest comparative data across immigrant groups come from a survey conducted by INED in 1992 (*Mobilité géographique et insertion sociale*). Tribalat (1995), by drawing on this survey, argues that Turks and Algerians have the lowest naturalization rates compared to other immigrant groups in France. Population censuses conducted in 1999 and in 2008 demonstrate that while Algerians started naturalizing in France with significant numbers, Turks still have the lowest naturalization rate among other non-European immigrant groups in France (see Table 13). Simon's analysis shows that even after controlling the age of arrival, immigrants coming from Turkey have lower rates of naturalization than other non-EU migrant groups (Simon 2010, 116–117). While in 1999, 15% of Turkish immigrants (born in Turkey) held French citizenship, this rate increased to 29% in 2008

(INSEE 2012). When we include the descendants of Turkish immigrants, the proportion of French citizens among Turkish minority in France rises up to 46%.[58]

Table 13: Proportion of French nationals among immigrant groups by country of origin (in percentages).

Country of Origin	1999	2008
Algeria	27	42
Morocco	26	43
Tunisia	40	48
Other African Countries	36	43
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	68	77
Turkey	15	29
Total	36	41

Source: INSEE, population census of 1999 and 2008 (INSEE 2012, 113).
Interpretation: 29% of immigrants from Turkey have French citizenship in 2008. Overall, 41% of immigrants (foreign-born) held French citizenship in 2008.

Besides their reluctance to naturalize, Turkish immigrants in France have a higher tendency to pass their country of origin citizenship to their children compared to other immigrant groups. According to the *Trajectories of Origin* survey (2008), descendants of Turkish immigrants have the highest level of dual-nationality among other second-generation migrant groups in France. While one third of descendants of Maghrebian immigrants are bi-national, around half of Turkish descendants hold dual-citizenship (Simon 2010, 118).

Country-based empirical findings on migrant groups' naturalization trends demonstrate a contrary situation of the Turkish minority in Germany and France vis-à-vis the other major immigrant groups in their host countries: While Turkish immigrants in

[58] In 2008, there are 239 thousand Turkish immigrants (born in Turkey) and 80 thousand descendants of Turkish immigrants (age between 18-50). 30% of Turkish immigrants and 95% of their descendants are French citizens. Therefore, we can conclude that 46% of Turkish origin people hold French citizenship. Sources: INSEE census 2008; *Trajectories of Origin Survey* 2008

Germany are more likely to naturalize than other labor migrant groups, Turkish immigrants in France show strikingly lower naturalization rates compared to other non-European immigrant groups. A cross-country comparison of Turkish immigrants' naturalization trends further demonstrates the intricate aspects of naturalization patterns. Table 14 compares the naturalization rates of Turkish immigrants in European countries. According to this table, Turks in France are more likely to naturalize than Turks in Germany. Therefore, France-Germany comparison confirms institutional expectations that inclusive citizenship regime in France results in a higher rate of naturalization among Turks in France compared to their counterparts in Germany. Yet, Table 14 also demonstrates that Turkish-origin naturalization in France is substantially weak compared to other European countries with inclusive citizenship laws.[59] For instance, Turks in Belgium and Sweden naturalize two and three times more compared to Turks in France. Recently, Turks in the Netherlands as well started having higher naturalization rates than Turks in France. Therefore, I argue that even though Turkish-origin naturalization rates in France are higher than Germany, Turks in France do not constitute an ideal example of higher naturalization trends across Europe. When compared to other European cases with inclusive citizenship laws, Turks in France fall behind in terms of their naturalization rates.

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[59] For a ranking of citizenship policies in Europe in terms of their liberal/restrictive dimensions, see the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) developed by Howard (2009). According to their CPI scores, Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Belgium belong to the category of "liberal" citizenship regimes; whereas, Germany is located in the "medium" category between liberal and restrictive citizenship regimes.

Table 14: Naturalization rates of Turkish immigrants in European countries.

	2003-2005	2006-2008	2009-2011
Germany	245	168	161
France	520	460	329
Belgium	1045	765	657
Netherlands	371	366	523
Sweden	1166	1682	1090
Cross-country ratios			
France/Germany	2.12	2.73	2.04
Belgium/France	2	1.66	1.99
Netherland/France	0.71	0.79	1.58
Sweden/France	2.23	3.65	3.30

Note: Per 10,000 Turkish citizens.
Sources: Eurostat; Statistisches Bundesamt; INSEE; Secrétariat général à l'immigration et à l'intégration. (My own calculation)

To sum up, comparative findings on Turkish immigrants' naturalization rates call for revising the existing explanations for immigrant naturalization. Firstly, striking cross-national divergences in Turkish-origin naturalization rates in Europe challenges group-based approaches that predict similar political behavior of ethnic groups across national cases. In this sense, Turkish immigrants' naturalization tendencies highly vary across European countries. Secondly, the existing cross-national differences cannot be fully accounted by institutional approaches that emphasize the role of citizenship regimes. While Turks in France have higher naturalization rates than in Germany, they still fall short of catching up Turkish-origin naturalization rates in other European contexts with liberal citizenship laws. Consequently, I argue that despite the existence of striking divergences in German and French citizenship regimes, Turkish immigrants in both national contexts demonstrate lower levels of naturalization. Only less than half of Turkish-origin people in Germany (40%) and in France (46%) hold passport of their host countries. The proportions of Turkish origin people holding their host countries'

citizenship are 81% in Sweden, 73% in the Netherlands and in 69% Belgium (Sen 2007, 108).

2.2. Electoral Participation

Both in the cases of Germany and France, Turkish immigrants and their descendants are required to hold host country citizenship to obtain active and passive voting rights at local, national, and the EU level elections. Yet, the adoption of host country citizenship does not guarantee migrants' interest in host country politics and their exercise of the basic political rights. Cross-country findings (that I discussed in the previous chapter) demonstrate that immigrant-origin people in France are more likely to participate in electoral politics than their counterparts in Germany. Below, I will discuss the extent of which this observation is also valid for Turkish immigrants and their descendants in Germany and France.

To start with the German case, after the reforms that liberalized foreigners' access to German citizenship, political interest and participation of Turkish immigrants and their descendants has gained a special attention. Increasing numbers of Turkish-origin German citizens have demonstrated that Turkish minority in Germany has the potential to shape not only the local election results in the regions with high concentration of Turkish-origin people but also the results of national elections in Germany.[60]

Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans (2002; 2004) conducted a population survey in Berlin between November 2001 and January 2002 in collaboration with the Center of Turkish Studies and Integration Research (ZfTI). Their findings show substantial

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[60] In the 2002 national elections, the difference between the Socialists (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) was less than 10,000 votes. Therefore, it was concluded that the votes of the Turkish minority in support of the SPD resulted in the electoral victory of Socialists (Aktürk 2010, 73).

differences in political participation patterns of different groups with immigration background.[61] Turkish-origin people (83.6%) have the highest intention to vote in state elections after native-Germans (86.2%). Turks are followed by Italians (78.5%), and Russians (63.0%) (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2002, 11–12). The distribution of voting intentions at local elections also shows the same rank order with slightly lower percentages.

The Berlin survey highlights an interesting paradox of migrants' political participation in Germany. Migrants' involvement in ethnic organizations does increase their political activities in German politics (as expected by social capital literature); but does not contribute to their interest in German politics. In other words, being active in German politics does not always guarantee a higher interest in German politics. This situation shows that ethnic organizations mobilize their members on migration-related themes of German politics e.g. integration politics or status of Islam, but do not necessarily reinforce their interest in general issues of German politics such as unemployment or German foreign policy (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004, 505). In this respect, the case of Turkish-origin people in Berlin demonstrates the complicated aspects of migrants' political participation in Germany. According to the Berlin survey in 2002, Turks not only have the highest intention to vote in German local and state elections, but they also highly engage in non-electoral forms of political activities (slightly behind Italians but much more than Russians). On the other hand, the same survey also shows that Turks have the lowest interest in German politics in general than other immigrant-origin groups. Moreover, Turks are more likely to engage in political

[61] The Berlin survey in 2002 included immigrants and their descendants from Turkey, Italy, and Russia (mostly Jews and *Aussiedlers*).

activities towards their country of origin than other migrant-origin groups. Yet, their interest in home country politics does not undermine their activities towards Berlin/German politics.

The case of France illustrates a quite contrary situation of Turkish-origin migrants in terms of their electoral participation in host country politics. The Trajectories and Origin Survey (2008) shows that Turkish immigrants and their children have the lowest rate of electoral registration among other major migrant-origin groups. While 73% of Turkish-origin French citizens register to vote at elections, this rate is 81% for Maghrebian-origin French citizens (see Table 15). Once they are registered for elections, the electoral turnouts of Turkish immigrants and their descendants are only slightly lower than North African groups. But still the current data delineate a contrasting picture of Turkish-origin people in Germany and in France in terms of their tendency for electoral participation.

Table 15: Proportion of electoral political participation among immigrants and their descendants in France.

Countries of immigrants and their descendants	Electoral registration rates (%)	Voter turnout at 2008 municipal election (%)	Voter turnout at 2007 presidential election, first tour (%)
Turkey	73	74	81
Algeria	81	75	82
Morocco and Tunisia	81	78	86
Natives	89.5	81	89.5

Source: Trajectories and Origin, INED-INSEE, 2008.
Note: The sample is based on people who are French citizens and between 18 and 50 years old.

In terms of their interest in host and home country politics, French-Turks follow a similar pattern with their counterparts in Germany. According to the Trajectories and Origin survey, only 36% of Turkish immigrants and 41% of Turkish descendants are

interested in French politics. On the other hand, more than half of Maghrebian immigrants and their children express their interest in French politics. In terms of homeland politics, Turkish immigrants (first generation) have the highest interest level (42%) among other immigrant groups in France. Yet, children of Turkish immigrants are primarily interested in French and international politics. Only 14% of them are interested in Turkish politics.

Cross-national surveys on Turkish-origin people confirm the distinction between the Turkish minority in Germany and France. Kaya and Kentel (2005) conducted a survey study on Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany and France. According to their findings, 73% of German-Turks who are eligible for electoral participation voted in local or general elections in Germany; this number is 44.5% for the French-Turks. Therefore, their study also supports that German-Turks have a higher tendency to participate in electoral politics of their host country than French-Turks.

To summarize, while immigrant-origin people in general have higher tendency for electoral participation in France than in Germany, the reverse is true for Turkish immigrants and their children. Turkish immigrants and their descendants in Germany demonstrate a higher interest in host country electoral politics than their counterparts in France. In terms of interest in home country politics, both cases show a similar pattern. In other words, both in Germany and France, Turkish immigrants are more interested in their home country politics than other immigrant groups. However, the second-generation Turkish-origin people are less interested in politics of Turkey compared to their parents.

2.3. Political Representation

The large discrepancy in the numbers of Turkish-origin people living in Germany and France limits the comparison of Turkish-origin political representation in these two national contexts. Germany is the home to the largest number of Turkish-origin people in Europe. According to the 2010 census data, 2.9 million Turkish-origin people live in Germany. Turkish-origin people constitute 19% of overall people with migration background in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012) On the other hand, while the second largest Turkish minority in Europe lives in France, their size is way lower than the case of Germany. It is estimated that approximately 350 thousand Turkish-origin people are settled in France.[62] In this respect, only 5% of immigrants in France come from Turkey (Trajectories and Origin, INED-INSEE, 2008). Since the Turkish minority in Germany, with its numerical significance, constitutes an appealing constituency for mainstream political parties, it is reasonable to expect higher political representation of Turkish-origin people in Germany than other countries of Europe. While the size of the migrant-origin population is one of the key factors for accessing political offices, recent research has also shown that numerical significance does not always guarantee higher levels of political representation (Michon 2011b; Schönwälder 2013). For instance, ethnic German origin immigrants (Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler) in Germany constitute the highest proportion of immigrant-origin population. Yet, they have little political mobilization and substantially low rates of political representation, despite their shared problems of socio-economical integration in Germany (Wüst 2011, 253; Schönwälder 2013, 642).

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[62] Please see the previous chapter for my discussion on the number of Turkish-origin people living in France. Since the republican regime in France does not allow collecting census data on ethnic and religious background of the population, the size of minority groups is often contested. In this respect, the estimated number of Turkish minority varies largely in different sources.

Therefore, highly mobilized and organized immigrant groups might compensate their small size and achieve a strong representation.

The Turkish-origin political representation in Germany:

While Turkish migration to Germany goes back to the 1960s, Turkish representation at German parliaments is a recent phenomenon. It was in 1987 when the first Turkish-origin MP, Sevim Çelebi, was elected to the Berlin Parliament. Two years later, Leyla Onur from the SPD was elected to the European Parliament. In 1994, the German National Parliament (*Bundestag*) had the first Turkish-origin MPs (Leyla Onur and Cem Özdemir).[63] Apart from these symbolic (yet historically important) achievements of Turkish-origin politicians, more substantive presence of Turkish-origin minority at German legislative institutions has begun in the late 1990s, after the liberalization of the German nationality law. As of May 2013, there are five MPs with a Turkish background at the 17th legislative period of the National Parliament (*Bundestag*), nine at the Berlin House of Representatives (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) and 32 in all state parliaments (see: Table 16).

How strong is the Turkish-origin political representation in Germany? To start with, there is a striking gap between Turkish-origin people's proportion to the general population and their relative presence at the national and state-level parliaments. While Turkish-origin people constitute 3.6% of the German population (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012), Turkish-origin MPs constitute only 0.8% of the Bundestag (2013) and 1% of the state-level parliaments in former West Germany regions (Table 16). In this sense, Turkish-origin immigrants are highly under-represented in German legislative

[63] For a brief chronology of Turkish political representation in Germany, see: http://www.dw.de/alman-siyasetinde-t%C3%BCrk-k%C3%B6kenliler/a-15481848 (last accessed on May 29, 2013).

institutions. On the other hand, this pessimistic picture changes when we focus on the proportion of Turkish-origin German citizens in the German population. More than half of Turkish-origin people in Germany do not hold German citizenship and therefore cannot vote at neither national nor local elections. The number of Turkish-origin German citizens with voting rights is approximately 800 thousand, which corresponds to only 1% of voting age population in Germany.[64] In this respect, the proportion of Turkish-origin MPs at the Bundestag and the state parliaments matches the proportion of German-citizens with Turkish background in the general population (also see: Aktürk 2010).

When we compare the political representation of Turkish-origin people with other immigrant-origin groups in Germany, the over-achievement of Turks becomes even more striking. Turkish-origin people constitute 19% of Germany's population with an immigration background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012). Yet, Table 16 presents that Turkish-origin MPs constitute 30% of all immigrant-origin MPs at the Bundestag as well as 60% of all immigrant-origin MPs at the Berlin Parliament and regional parliaments in former West Germany states. Therefore, this empirical evidence demonstrates that Turks are over represented in German legislative institutions vis-à-vis other immigrant-origin minority groups.[65]

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[64] For voting age population data in Germany, visit: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=DE (last accessed on December 24, 2013)

[65] Also Cyrus (2005), Schönwälder and Kofri (2010), and Wüst (2011) provide empirical evidence for over-representation of the Turkish minority in German legislative institutions at various level.

Table 16: Turkish-origin political representation in Germany.

	Total MPs	MPs with immigration background	MPs with Turkish immigration background	Proportion of Turkish-origin representation to total MPs (%)	Proportion of Turkish-origin representation to immigrant-origin MPs (%)
Bundestag[a]	622	16	5	.8%	31%
Berlin Parliament[b]	149	15	9	6%	60%
State Parliaments[c]	1860	53	32	1%	60%

[a] The numbers for the Bundestag belong to the 17th legislative period (since 2009). The number of MPs with immigration background from (Donovan 2012); the number of MPs with Turkish background, my calculation.
[b] The numbers for Berlin Parliament belong to the 16th legislative period (since 2011). The number of MPs with immigration background from Schönwälder 2013; the number of MPs with Turkish background, my calculation.
[c] State parliaments include 11 states (including Berlin) in the former West Germany. The number of MPs with immigration background from Schönwälder 2013; the number of MPs with Turkish background from my interview with the president of Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (interview #22).

The Turkish minority in German politics predominantly supports the left wing political parties (Wüst 2004). During the early period of the labor migration, labor unions were the first platforms through which Turkish immigrants could indirectly engage in politics. Through the labor unions affiliated with the SPD, Turkish immigrants had the first political presence within the Social Democratic Party. Therefore, the SPD is considered as the first German political party that welcomed immigrant-origin people. However, the SPD's unwillingness to open higher party ranks to migration-origin members as well as their relative unresponsiveness to migrants' concerns resulted in Turkish-origin political elite's disappointment with the party.[66] In the 1980s, the Greens emerged as an appealing political power for immigrant-origin voters. Turkish-origin

[66] Recently, the SPD was put under spot, when Thilo Sarrazin (a SPD politician and a former executive member of the German central bank) published a book (*Germany Is Doing Away With Itself*) in 2010, which included his controversial anti-immigrants and anti-immigration views. While the book became a bestseller in Germany, it ignited a wave of criticism against SPD's ambivalent approach towards immigrants.

politicians obtained higher party positions within the Greens. In 1994, one of the first Turkish-origin MPs at the Bundestag came from the Greens. Moreover, since 2004, Cem Özdemir[67] is serving as the co-president of the Green Party.

In the post-2000 period, the Turkish-origin representation in German politics has further diversified and got fragmented. Aktürk (2010) argues that three concurrent processes resulted in this diversification of Turkish-origin representation. First, the disappointment with the SPD-Greens coalition during their legislation of the new citizenship law reinforced Turkish-origin politicians' quest for a new political party to represent their interests. Second, the further fragmentation of the German left along with the emergence of the Left Party (*die Linke*)[68] as a new actor provided more options for Turkish-origin politicians. Third, the diversification of Turkish-origin immigrants in terms of their social class and economic status appealed parties on the right to recruit Turkish-origin politicians. Especially, the emergence of Turkish entrepreneurial class and immigrant-origin small business owners has resulted in a small presence of Turkish-origin people within the liberal FDP (the Free Democratic Party).[69]

Indeed, the representation of Turkish immigrants and their children through left-wing political parties in Germany is a paradoxical situation. The Turkish-origin people in Germany overwhelmingly identify themselves with right-wing values, carry conservative social attitudes (Aktürk 2010, 71–72) as well as affiliate themselves with conservative parties in their homeland politics (Kaya and Kentel 2005). Not only in Germany but also

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[67] Özdemir was born in Germany as a son of an immigrant family from Turkey.
[68] The Left Party is the convergence of western German leftist groups and the successor party of the former East German Socialist Unity Party.
[69] At the 17th legislative period, Serkan Töre was elected as the first Turkish-origin MP at the Bundestag from the FDP.

in other European countries as well, conservative immigrant-origin electorates support left-wing political parties because of two main reasons: First, the parties of the left have historically showed more attention to issues of immigration, multiculturalism, social equality and anti-discrimination. Second, right-wing political parties including the most mainstream ones have pursued anti-immigrant discourses and practices by objecting flows of newcomers, requiring assimilation of already-settled immigrants, and overlooking issues of discrimination and racism. Consequently, an uneasy alliance between conservative immigrant-origin electorate and the left-wing political parties persists in Germany and in Europe.

While left-wing political parties in Germany overwhelmingly control immigrant political representation, recent developments also show that the mainstream right wing parties slowly quit their exclusive approach and search for the ways of incorporating immigrant-origin electorates and their political figures. Until recently, the Christian Democratic Political Parties in Germany have pursued anti-immigrant profile and showed little incentive to appeal immigrant-origin electorate. Yet, after the CDU became the leading government party in 2005, they smoothened their anti-immigrant discourse and practices (Schönwälder 2013, 638). They prioritized the agenda of immigrant integration[70] as well as recruited a number of Turkish-origin people into important party positions[71]. In 2010, the CDU appointed the first Turkish-origin state-level minister,

[70] For instance, the Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference were launched during Angela Merkel's rule.
[71] Emine Demirbüken, the former Berlin MP and the member of the CDU's federal leadership, illustrates an important example to Turkish-origin political figures within CDU.

Aygül Özkan (Minister for Social Affairs in Lower-Saxony) earlier than left-wing parties.[72]

The incongruence between conservative Turkish-origin electorates and their left-liberal representatives has also brought about the emergence of a new pro-immigrant conservative party, called as BIG Partei (*Bündnis für Innovation & Gerechtigkeit*). The BIG Party was officially founded in February 2011. While the founders emphasize that they are neither a Turkish nor an immigrant but a German political party, the executive committee includes many members with Turkish background. Despite their tiny electoral presence, the BIG party appears to fill an important political gap by combining left-wing egalitarian, multicultural, and anti-racist discourses with right-wing sensitivity over family and religious values. One of the Turkish-origin BIG Party leaders says:

> "I do not believe the current Turkish-origin MPs represent or could represent us. In order to become a member at the existing political parties, they need to satisfy certain criteria. At least, they must be assimilated (into German society). When you analyze the profile of Turkish-origin MPs in Germany, you see that only people originating from certain parts of Turkey and holding certain worldviews/religious views are allowed. This situation has bothered us". (BIG Party, the Chair of Berlin Branch, author's interview #25)

The over-representation of the Turkish minority in German legislative bodies vis-à-vis other immigrant originated groups is a puzzling situation. Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany are often singled out for their low levels of socio-economic integration as well as cultural distinctiveness. What could explain the relative success of Turkish-origin people in terms of their political representation? I argue that the case of Turkish-origin political representation in Germany demonstrates two main conclusions: First, socio-cultural integration of an immigrant-origin group into host society does not

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[72] As of June 2013, there are three Turkish-origin ministers at state parliaments: Aygül Özkan in Lower Saxony, Bilkay Önay in Baden-Württemberg, and Dilek Kolat in Berlin.

guarantee their political inclusion into host country legislative bodies. In some cases, socio-cultural integration might be at odds with group-based political mobilization and representation. The case of ethnic-German immigrants exemplifies the situation in which proximity to host society in cultural terms, despite their socio-economic problems, curtails group-based politics. Wüst (2011, 253) argues that the absence of collective identity among ethnic-German immigrants obstructs political mobilization and results in lower levels of representation in legislative bodies in Germany.

The second conclusion is that flaws in socio-cultural integration do not always undermine political integration into host country institutions. In some cases, when deficiency in socio-cultural integration is combined with strong community organizations, group-consciousness, and highly mobilized group members, then it would be possible to observe a relatively successful political representation. The case of Turkish minority in Germany illustrates this point. The research of Schönwälder and Kofri (2010) on city-level immigrant political representation in North Rhine Westphalia also supports this argument. Schönwälder and Kofri present four factors to explain over-representation of Turkish-origin people in Germany. First, Turks in Germany have strong community measures that enable collective political mobilization (as also illustrated by Amsterdam researchers, see: Fennema and Tillie 2001; Vermeulen and Berger 2008). Second, Turks are highly politicized group that has “a pool of potential activists in German politics”. Third, disadvantaged position and experience of discrimination give stronger motivation to the Turkish minority to become politically active. Fourth, German political parties are more interested in recruiting Turkish-origin candidates, because they have an electoral constituency with stronger group-consciousness.

The Turkish-origin political representation in France:

The success story of Turkish-origin political representation is not unique to Germany. In many other countries in Europe, Turkish immigrant groups achieve a significant political representation in host country political institutions. In the Netherlands, after the 2006 municipal elections, half of the immigrant-origin councilors were with a Turkish background (Michon 2011a, 15). In Amsterdam, Turks have consistently had more numbers of city councilors than Moroccans between 1990 and 2006, despite their lower share [73] in Amsterdam's population (Michon and Vermeulen 2013). Strong over-representation of Turks is also observed in Denmark. After the 2001 Danish municipal elections, half of the ethnic minority representatives had a Turkish background (Togeby 2008, 337). Moreover, all of the European counties who have been the major receivers of Turkish immigrants have at least one Turkish-origin MP at their national parliament with the exception of France (see: Table 17).

Despite these striking success stories in Europe, Turkish-origin politicians are not present at higher levels of elected bodies in France. When we consider the fact that France is the second country after Germany that hosts the largest Turkish-minority in Europe, the absence of Turkish-origin politicians in French legislative institutions becomes even further puzzling. Neither the French National Assembly nor the Senate has ever had a Turkish-origin member. At the regional level, there is only one Turkish-origin member of regional council among 1,719 total regional councilors (as of June 2013).[74]

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[73] While Moroccans represent 9% of Amsterdam's population, Turkish-origin people constitute 5% (Michon and Vermeulen 2013, 600).

[74] This information comes from my research on 22 regional councils of Metropolitan France. I visited the official websites of regional councils (*conseil régional*) and perused for the Turkish-origin names in the

There is only a tiny Turkish-origin presence at the municipal level in France, which is far from having any political visibility.[75] We already know that the under-representation of migrant populations in host countries' political institutions is a widespread phenomenon in Europe. However, the case of political representation of Turkish-origin people in France requires a close scholarly attention, since it goes beyond a situation of under-representation and signals almost complete absence of Turkish-origin people from elected offices (except a small number of seats at municipal councils).

The inexistence of Turkish-origin politicians at the French legislative bodies is often explained either by demographic characteristics of Turkish minority in France or by already homogeneous profile of French political institutions. To start with, the Turkish minority in France relatively constitutes a tiny proportion of the French population (0.5%) and a small portion of immigrant-origin people (5%). Therefore, the small proportion of the Turkish minority in France is usually considered as the main reason for the absence of Turkish political representation in French legislative institutions. However, as argued by the previous research, the concentration of immigrant community cannot fully account for higher or lower representation of immigrant-origin people (Michon 2011b; Schönwälder 2013). Michon (2011b, 33) demonstrates that the distribution of immigrant-origin regional councilors in France do not follow the pattern of concentration of immigrant-origin population. Therefore, demographic figures cannot entirely explain the absence of Turkish-origin political representation in France.

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lists of elected regional councillors. Among 1,719 regional councillors in Metropolitan France, there is only one Turkish-origin councillor (Zübeyda Coşkun) in the region of Auvergne.

[75] According to the information gathered by the Turkish Consulate in Paris, after the 2008 local elections, 91 Turkish-origin people are elected as local councillors at the municipality level. While the emerging interest of Turkish-origin people in running elections at the local level is an important step toward political integration, the current presence is far from having any political visibility when we think that there are around 36,000 municipalities in France.

Second, scholars have already pointed out the exceptional homogeneity of French political elite in terms of gender, age group, social class, education, and ethnicity (Brouard and Tiberj 2011a, 165). The "difference blind" republican discourse, illegitimacy of identity-based politics, and the electoral and party systems that curtail the access of minority groups are seen as major factors that lead to under-representation of minority groups in French political bodies. In this respect, the absence of Turkish-origin politicians from French elected bodies can be seen reasonable, since the overall political structure in France is not already conducive to ethnic-based political diversity. On the other hand, while the French political bodies at the national level are exceptionally homogeneous, a greater diversity is found at the lower levels. 5.2 % of the regional councilors and 9% of local councilors in ten largest cities have a migration background (Michon 2011b). While more opportunities for political diversity exist at regional and local political levels in France, Turkish-origin people make little use of these opportunities. Even at lower levels, Turkish-origin immigrants are highly under-represented compared to other immigrant-origin groups.

Third, as opposed to Maghrebian-origin migrants, Turks in France do not share any preceding social and cultural ties with the French society and institutions. It is already known that preceding colonial ties bring about socio-cultural familiarity on the side of immigrant communities. Therefore, the absence of a colonial heritage with France results in Turkish immigrants' weaker proficiency in French language and lower familiarity with political processes in France. Yet, the relationship between colonial heritage and immigrant political incorporation is a contested issue. As argued by Maxwell (2012), in some cases, immigrants' preceding colonial heritage and therefore

higher level of socio-cultural integration into the host society might hamper the process of political incorporation, since such socio-cultural affinity undermines collective organization process of immigrants. In this respect, the absence of preceding colonial ties cannot provide satisfying explanations to the case of Turkish political representation in France.

Table 17: Turkish-origin political representation in Europe (as of June 2013)

	National population (in millions)	Turkish-origin population (in thousands and in %)	Turkish-origin MPs at National Parliaments
Germany	82	2,985 (3.6%)	5 (out of 620, 0.8%)
France	64.3	319 (0.5%)	- (out of 577)
Netherlands	16.4	270 (1%)	5 (out of 150, 3.3%)
Austria	8.3	200 (2%)	1 (out of 183, 0.5%)
Belgium	10.7	110 (1%)	3 (out of 178, 1.6%)
Denmark	5.5	53 (0.9%)	2 (out of 179, 1.1%)
Sweden	9.2	37 (0.4%)	6 (out of 349, 1.7%)
European Parliament	499.4 (EU 27)	3,800 (0.7%)	2 (out of 754, 0.2%)

Sources: Information on national populations is from Eurostat (2011); numbers of Turkish-origin population are from Statistisches Bundesamt (2012) for Germany, INSEE census 2008 and Trajectories of Origin Survey 2008 for France, and "Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey" for other countries and the EU; numbers of Turkish-origin MPs[76] are my own compilation from the official websites of national parliaments and the European Parliament (visited on June 7-8, 2013)

To sum up, while Turkish-origin immigrants and their children exemplify an over-achievement case of political representation in Germany, they are scrutinized for their absence from elective offices in the case of France. Neither the difference in numbers of Turkish-origin people living in Germany and France nor political structures can fully account for this divergence of Turkish-origin political representation in Germany and France. As I will elaborate in the following chapters, this dissertation

[76] It is important to note that the term "Turkish-origin MPs" does not refer to a homogeneous ethnic, religious, linguistic, political, or a cultural group. The MPs who were born within the borders of Turkey or whose at least one of the parents was born in Turkey are defined as "Turkish-origin MPs". Therefore, the category of Turkish-origin MPs includes a wide diversity in terms of ethnicity (Turkish, Kurdish, and Assyrian), religion (Sunni, Alevi, and Syrian-Orthodox), and political position (right and left wing).

highlights that in the case of Germany, politicized group-consciousness of the Turkish minority and their strong community organizations pave the way for collective political mobilization, higher engagement in host country politics, and therefore better political representation. On the other hand, in the case of France, the Turkish minority is less politically mobilized and therefore less active in electoral politics when compared to the case of Germany. Consequently, Turkish immigrants in France are less represented in political bodies compared to many other European countries.

3. Conclusion

Comparative findings on individual-level political integration of immigrant populations in Germany France illustrate prominent cross-country variations: migrant-origin people in Germany have lower levels of political integration at the individual level than their migrant-origin people in France. In other words, people with migration background in Germany have lower naturalization rates, lower rates of electoral participation, lower numbers of migrant-origin representatives at the local levels, and lower degree of identification with their host society than their counterparts in France. On the other hand, chapter four also shows that German and French Turks do not follow these general patterns of migrant political integration in Germany and France. Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany represent a successful case of political integration with their higher naturalization rates (despite significant institutional restraints), more electoral participation, and stronger political representation at the national and local levels compared to the other immigrant-origin groups in Germany. By contrast, Turks in France often stand out due to their lower tendencies of acquiring French citizenship, participating in electoral politics, and engaging in group-based endeavors for political

representation in French institutions. While French-Turks are more likely to naturalize than German-Turks, they fall short of conveying these political sources into electoral and representational outcomes. On the other hand, the political success of Turkish-origin immigrants and their children in German politics constitutes an exemplar for other migrant-origin minority groups. Neither group-based nor institutional approaches can provide satisfactory explanations to German-Turks' success and French-Turks' relative under-achievement in terms of their individual level political integration. In this respect, chapter four has demonstrated the necessity of developing an alternative approach that considers immigrant groups' political tendencies within a context of inter-ethnic relations.

CHAPTER 5

IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION AT THE GROUP LEVEL: ORGANIZING PROCESSES AND COLLECTIVE POLITICS

The process of migrants' inclusion into their host country politics is not only based on individual immigrants' integration into existing political systems, but also includes migrants' incorporation into host country's political arena as collective groups. Chapter five focuses on the processes of migrants' collective-level political incorporation in Germany and France. In this chapter, I define migrants' collective-level political incorporation as a process in which migrant groups, with the help of their collective organizations, endeavor to re-shape host country political structures and public discourses in the direction of their collective interests through employing diverse political means that range from conventional engagements within institutional frameworks to socio-political movements outside of the formal political sphere.

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, migrants' individual-level integration is based on the assumption that the more immigrants and their children resemble their host society in terms of their political attitudes and behaviors, the more they are politically integrated into their host society. On the other hand, migrants' collective-level political incorporation focuses on migrants' collective ability of raising their group-based claims and interests in host society public sphere rather than individual immigrants' similarity with their host society. Such an analysis requires a key attention on the politics of immigrants' collective organizations. Considering the fact that immigrants are often originated from culturally, linguistically, and religiously distinct communities, their group-based political agenda tends to vary from the issues raised by local civil society

actors. Therefore, immigrants' collective organizations emerge as new political actors in host country politics that strive to transform the existing political structures and discourses toward more inclusive direction.

The objective of chapter five is twofold: Firstly, I aim to inquire how diverging immigrant integration regimes in Germany and France produce varying outcomes in terms of immigrants' organizational politics and collective claims making in their host country politics. In this part, I analyze the cross-national patterns of immigrants' collective politics by focusing on immigrants' organizational structures, their structured relationship with public authorities, and dynamics of their collective claims making. Secondly, I turn to Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France. Through an over-time analysis, I inquire the extent of which Turkish immigrants and their organizations have been able to translate their presence into political power in their host countries.

My research demonstrates that national institutional arrangements and discursive frameworks in Germany and France contribute to the emergence of *qualitatively* different patterns of immigrants' collective politics. Therefore, rather than ranking the degree of immigrants' collective political incorporation in Germany and France, chapter five elucidates strikingly diverse processes and pathways that connect national integration regimes and immigrants' collective politics. The case of Germany represents a double-edged sword in terms of immigrants' collective politics. On the one hand, Germany's relatively higher proximity to multiculturalist integration regimes and corporatist models of interest mediation compared to the case of France have facilitated the development of migrants' organizational life based on their ethnic and religious identities and migrant

organizations' structured relationship with the public authorities. On the other hand, lingering effects of ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood, restrictive aspects of German citizenship regime, and segregationist public discourses have, at least until recently, reinforced immigrants' transnational political engagements (see: Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Ögelman 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005). In other words, while Germany has been a fertile soil for immigrants' self-organizing process compared to the French case, the exclusive nature of German citizenship regime has weakened immigrants' collective interest in their host country politics and paved the way for immigrants' enduring political preoccupation with homeland politics.

Contrary to Germany, in the case of France, state-centric and individual-based integration arrangements as well as difference-blind and universalist nature of republican discourse have, to a great extent, undermined the development of ethnic politics and its organizational relations with public authorities. In this respect, the French state has attributed immigrant organizations the role of perpetuating republican traditions among immigrant communities rather than serving as interlocutors between public institutions and immigrants (see: Kastoryano 1995). On the other hand, inclusive nature of the French republican regime has paved the way for immigrants' strong interest in host country politics. Since the institutional channels have been, to large extent, closed to ethnic-based politics, migrants and their children in France opted for extra-parliamentary socio-political movements to voice their group-based claims.

On the other hand, recent findings on collective politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France contradict previous wisdoms that view Germany as a primary case of immigrants' transnational politics and France as a case with immigrants' higher

involvement with their host country politics through extra-parliamentary socio-political movements. My research demonstrates that Turkish immigrant groups and their organizations in Germany, particularly in the post-2000 period, have become prominent political actors in German immigration and integration politics, achieved a substantial public recognition and representation in public institutions for interest mediation, and engaged in serious efforts to reshape their host country politics in the direction of their collective interests. On the contrary, despite the extensive collective political mobilization of migrant-origin people in France, French-Turks and their organizations have been mostly out of the sight at the national level politics in France. Turkish immigrant organizations in France have generally focused on local-scale activities with the purpose of providing services in immigrant neighborhood and avoided engagements in national-level politics, unless the national interest of their home country is at the stake.

In the following sections, I will provide a brief overview of emergence and development of immigrants' collective organizations and their collective claims in Germany and France. I will particularly evaluate the link between integration regimes and immigrants' organizing and claims making processes in these two countries. Secondly, I will focus on Turkish immigrants and their collective organizations in Germany and France. Through an over-time analysis, I will compare and contrast patterns of Turkish collective politics in these two national contexts.

1. General Patterns of Immigrants' Collective Politics

The relationship between migrants' organizational structures and their participation in host country politics has been a highly researched topic. Numerous studies have inquired the role of immigrant organizations in political interest and participation of immigrant

groups (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Tillie and Slijper 2007; Eggert and Giugni 2010). On the other hand, some other scholars have focused on the role of immigrant organizations in collective-level political participation and claims-making processes. In this perspective, immigrant organizations go beyond serving as "school(s) of democracy" and become actual political actors in host country politics (Hooghe 2005; Predelli 2008; Bousetta 2010). The existing research illustrates that immigrant organizations have the potential for becoming active participants in host country politics through negotiating with host country political authorities, organizing public demonstrations and protest movements, informing host country's public opinion about immigrants' issues and so many other ways. Moreover, immigrant organizations constitute "attractive sites for politicians" to reach immigrant communities and mobilize their political support (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008, 18). As a result, immigrant organizations appear as crucial units of analysis for understanding dynamics of immigrants' collective politics.

Comparative research shows that immigrants' organizing process and therefore the strength and the scope of their organizations highly vary across cases with diverging national/local political arrangements (Schmitter 1980; Bloemraad 2005; Vermeulen 2006; Maxwell 2008; Eggert 2011). Migrant organizations increase their political clout in multicultural policy frameworks that officially support immigrants' collective identities, subsidize their collective organizations, and recognize these organizations as interlocutors between the state and migrants. On the contrary, assimilationist integration regimes tend to shun organizational expressions of ethnic and religious identities as well as provide weaker opportunities for the mediating role of immigrant organizations between

immigrant communities and the host states. Neither Germany nor France formally pursues multicultural policies, officially recognizes ethno-cultural identities, and structurally supports the migrants' collective organizations. Yet, as it was discussed in the earlier chapters, immigrant integration regimes in these two national contexts carry substantial differences and therefore are expected to produce varying outcomes in terms of migrants' collective organizing and claims making processes. Despite the recent reforms in German citizenship laws, Germany still provides fewer opportunities for immigrants' individual level access to German political society than the case of France. On the other hand, German corporatism produces a more favorable setting for immigrants' self-organizations and their structured dialogue with public authorities than the republican France. In the following part, I will evaluate how different national political institutions and public discourses have been translated into varying outcomes of immigrants' organizational politics in Germany and France.

1.1. Immigrant Organizations and Collective Politics in Germany

The German Civil Code (*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*-BGB), which was enacted in 1896 and was ratified in 1906, structures the organizational life in Germany (Ögelman 2000, 42). While the German Civil Code does not explicitly guarantee resident-foreigners' right to establish and become members of self-help community organizations, foreigners can circumvent legal restrictions by relying on their guaranteed human rights and "strongly embedded customs and norms" (Ögelman 2000, 47–48). Therefore, since the beginning

of immigration flows in the 1960s, immigrants have enjoyed freedom of assembly and established their own organizations.[77]

In the 1980s, the major debate on immigrants' organizations in Germany revolved around the question of whether these community organizations obstruct or facilitate migrants' social integration and participation in host society (Esser 1980; Elwert 1982; Schoeneberg 1985). The positive view emphasized the intermediary role of ethnic organizations between immigrant groups and host society. In this sense, migrant organizations facilitate migrants' integration into host society by providing stepping-stones to host country's social and political life. On the other hand, the negative view argued that ethnic organizations reduce the contact between immigrant groups and the native society and therefore perpetuate segregation and exclusion. In this view, immigrants' organizations, rather than functioning as "intermediary" institutions, reinforce "parallel" societies.

This binary picture of ethnic organizations in Germany later on left its place to more nuanced studies that elaborated the complicated relationship between ethnic organizations and immigrants' integration. Initial efforts focused on distinguishing the effects of different types of organizations on migrants' integration (Schoeneberg 1985). Later, scholars illustrated how the relationship between associational participation and socio-political integration varies across different immigrant groups (Thränhardt 1989;

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[77] It must be noted that different regulations are applied to different types of organizations. While registered organizations (*eingetragene Verein, e.V.*) must register at the district court and enroll at least seven people during the foundation; non-registered organizations are not required to register at the district court and need only two people to be established (Ögelman 2000, 43–44). Moreover, foreigners' organizations are subjected to special restrictive clauses. For instance their political activities are strictly prohibited, if the security of the state is threatened. Upon the demand, foreigners' organizations must inform public authorities about their activities, members, and resources (Cyrus 2005, 18). Therefore, foreigners' associations can be banned easier than Germans' associations (Miera 2009).

Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004). The current research agenda on immigrant organizations tends to place the ethnic organizations/integration nexus into a cross-national and over-time comparative perspective and analyzes diverging effects of national/local political context on functioning of ethnic organizations in a time sensitive fashion (Doomernik 1995; Vermeulen 2006; Vermeulen and Berger 2008; Yukleyen 2010).

Facing the Periods of Indifference, Suspicion, and Selective Cooperation:

Since the beginning of labor migration to Germany, formal approaches and policies toward migrant organizations have significantly changed over time. Three successive phases –indifference, suspicion, and selective cooperation- have identified changing official perception of migrant organizations in Germany. During the early years of foreign workers' arrival, Germany, to a great extent, ignored the emergence of ethnic and religious organizations founded by newcomers (Thränhardt 1989). During this period, issues of immigrant integration were largely relegated to "paternalistic caring and counseling monopolies of the social welfare associations" (Puskeppeleit and Thränhardt 1990 cited by Cyrus 2005, 18). Moreover, weak structure of early immigrant organizations as well as expectation of foreign workers' temporary stay in Germany reinforced formal *indifference* toward emerging alternative civil society.

In the late 1970s, the permanent settlement of once called "guest-workers" and their families became clear. The absence of coherent immigrant integration policies went hand in hand with worsening socio-economic conditions and integration problems of immigrants. It was no more possible to ignore the emergence of migrants' alternative civil society, since immigrants' organizational structures already achieved a higher level

of consolidation and expansion. In this era, an approach of *suspicion* identified German state's reaction toward immigrants' organizations. Immigrant organizations were perceived as possible threats to public order and perpetuators of socio-cultural segregation. As opposed to the case of France and Maghrebian organizations' political mobilizations, immigrant organizations' collective politics in Germany did not primarily target German immigration and integration politics during this era.[78] On the contrary, German soil became the site of violent homeland conflicts among politically opposing immigrant groups. Starting from the 1970s, immigrant organizations were closely watched by the German Interior Ministry. While confrontational activities conducted by immigrant groups did not directly target the German state, intra-community violent clashes over the homeland politics were considered as a danger to country's security (Dancygier 2010, 241). Initially, Palestinian, Armenian, and Croatian radical groups, and later, Turkish and Kurdish extremist organizations conducted confrontational campaigns and illegal activities in Germany to influence their homeland politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 71–73). Consequently, the German government either closed down these extremist immigrant organizations or highly restricted their activities.

Along with the transformation of German national policies towards immigration and integration in the 2000s, the official perception of migrant organizations has substantially changed. After Germany recognized itself as "a country of immigration", political measures for carrying out immigrant integration programs gained a special importance. As public officers discovered civic potentials of immigrant organization in

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[78] Thränhardt (2004) demonstrates that not only Turkish immigrants but also immigrants originating from European countries such as Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, and (ex-)Yugoslavians had some sort of organizational involvement in their host country politics during this era.

terms of reaching out immigrant communities and implementing integration policies, predominant approach of suspicion was replaced by *selective cooperation* with immigrant organizations. In other words, Germany, by expanding the already existing corporatist tradition to its relation with immigrant groups, endeavored to incorporate selected immigrant organizations into public institutions and establish a structured cooperation on the issues of immigrant integration and management of diversity in Germany. Therefore, as opposed to the case of France that has prioritized the state's direct conduct of individual immigrants, immigrant organizations in Germany have acquired an implicit status of interlocutors between the German state and immigrant communities.

In addition to previous sporadic funding opportunities, in 1998, immigrant organizations that are associated with welfare organizations became eligible for public funds for counseling services for immigrants (Cyrus 2005, 34). In the 2000s, many states (such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt and Berlin) initiated projects to promote partnerships between German public/civil organizations and immigrant associations. For instance, since 2006, the Berlin Senate has initiated a special program to fund joint-projects with the objective of promoting wider cooperation in immigrant integration issues (Hunger and Metzger 2011, 9). As a result, migrant organizations acquired an active role in executing integration policies at local levels.

At the national level, the establishment of two consultation bodies in 2006 –the Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference- demonstrated shifting German policies towards cooperating with immigrant organizations. These new bodies are designed to function as institutions of interest representation and mediation between the government and migrant groups. Therefore, for the first time in German history, migrants

and their associations are formally included in a structured dialogue with the Federal government (Musch 2012, 75). Incorporation of migrant organizations into consultation processes at the federal level indicated government's implicit recognition of immigrant organizations as both experts of integration issues and representatives of migrants' interests (Musch 2012, 87). The first "National Integration Plan", which was developed through consecutive meetings of the Integration Summit and turned into an action plan in 2012, officially recognized immigrant organizations as dialogue partners of the German state:

> "Successful integration calls for dialogue – and that means talking with migrants, not about them. In all areas of public life the organizations representing our migrant communities have assumed new responsibility for fostering integration. … These organizations need to be strong not only to serve the interests of the migrant communities themselves but also as a channel of communication between policy-makers and society at large." (Die Beauftragte 2008, 2)

The development of cooperation and partnership with immigrant organizations has at least three important consequences for migrants' collective political incorporation into German politics: First, by including leaders of immigrant organizations to formal platforms of consultation, policies of cooperation have opened the channels for immigrant groups to communicate their collective claims to host country formal bodies. In other words, extra-institutional means of political participation ceased to be the only way of raising the group-based claims; and therefore, migrants' collective politics became a part of formal political processes in Germany. Second, the inclusion of migrants' collective politics into formal political sphere did not take place in an unrestrained way. The federal state has kept its dominant position in the dialogue process through selecting the insiders, demarcating the outsiders, and setting up the agenda of

consultation. Therefore, opening the channels of formal politics for immigrant actors brought about the effects of moderation on the part of immigrants' collective politics either through the privileged access of already moderate immigrant actors or through the restriction of issues in the consultation agenda. Third, increasing partnership opportunities with the German state reinforced the already tense relationship among ideologically conflicting organizations within immigrant communities. The selective cooperation strategy of the Germany state provided privileged access to consultation bodies and public funding opportunities for some immigrant organizations, while others, to a great extent, deprived from these increasing opportunities. As we will see in the case of Turkish immigrant organizations, such an incorporation strategy reinforced the competition among organizational actors and resulted in increasing resentment on the side of the outsiders.

Opportunities and Constraints for Immigrant Collective Politics:

After briefly reviewing the history of political responses towards immigrant organizations, the next crucial issue is to evaluate the extent of which immigrant organizations in Germany could become effective political actors and communicate immigrants' collective claims to public authorities. In other words, to what extent immigrants in Germany could mobilize on the basis of their self-organizations and pursue their collective interests in German politics through their organizations? To begin with the limitations of migrants' collective politics in Germany, some scholars argued that strong welfare institutions in Germany attenuated migrants' capacity for ethnic self-structuring and political mobilization through their self-organizations (Thränhardt 1989; Joppke 1999). Foreign workers upon their arrival were distributed among the three big

welfare organizations (*Wohlfahrtsverbände*) -Catholic Church's *Caritas*, Protestant Church's *Diakonisches Werk*, and non-church related *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* (AWO)- according to their national origin and religious background. Joppke (1999, 211–212) argued that the German approach to immigrant ethnicity has been paradoxical: while the welfare system in Germany reinforced ethnic identities through categorizing guest-workers on the basis of their national and religious origin; the same welfare system also "undermined political articulation of this ethnicity" by keeping immigrants as "passive clients".

Secondly, some other scholars pointed out that ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood and consequently restrictive nature of the citizenship regime in Germany have had long term effects on immigrants' lower identification with the German society and their maintenance of strong social, economical, and political ties with their home countries. Migrants' ties with home country politics are scrutinized for dividing the internal cohesion of immigrant groups along with homeland contentions and deviating migrants' organizational sources away from German politics. In this vein, internal factions and fragmentations stemming from home country politics are considered as main handicaps against immigrants' collective mobilization towards host country politics. As I will discuss in the following parts, Turks in Germany have been considered as the prime example of the factional organizational landscape as a result of homeland politics (Faist 2000; Ögelman 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a).

Apart from these challenges against collective politics, migrants in Germany hold important organizational resources to engage in German politics at collective levels. I argue that not only the transformation of the German political structures toward an

inclusive direction (i.e. the 2000 citizenship reform and self-acknowledgement of being an immigration country) but also unintended consequences of previously existing barriers against migrants' collective-level political incorporation contributed to these organizational sources. To start with, the paternalistic nature of German welfare organizations has been considered as a barrier against the process of migrants' self-organization. Yet, it is also documented that these welfare organizations played an important role in employing and training a number of immigrant-origin social workers who later on acquired significant leadership roles in immigrant organizations (Schmitter 1980, 186).

Secondly, Germany's initial reluctance to recognize migrant organizations as ethnic interlocutors has been criticized for delaying the emergence of migrants' organizations as important political actors in German politics. On the other hand, it can be argued that Germany's delayed policies of cooperation and partnership with immigrant organizations unintentionally contributed to the development of relatively autonomous structure of migrants' organizations. As opposed to the French case, migrant organizations did not emerge and develop under the supervision of the host country's central authority. In the 2000s, when Germany initiated its active integration programs and its efforts to collaborate with migrants' organizations, there have already been well-consolidated and relatively autonomous networks of migrant organizations that have been working at local and national levels. This situation facilitated the conduct of migrant organizations with the federal authorities and their bargaining power to some extent.

Thirdly, migrant organizations' engagement in homeland politics is often considered as a handicap against migrants' collective-level political incorporation. The

institutional strand of the migration scholarship tends to establish a link between Germany's previous reluctance to initiate migrant integration policies and higher transnational inclination of immigrant groups in Germany. Today, there are two major developments that oblige us to revise our previous knowledge: First, as I will discuss later in this chapter, Turkish organizations, which were previously portrayed as prime cases of transnational politics, have changed their predominant political orientation from homeland to host-country politics. Second, increasing empirical evidence from Germany has demonstrated that migrants' transnational political engagements do not necessarily undermine their integration process in Germany; on the contrary, under certain conditions, such transnational engagement might co-exist with and even reinforce migrants' political incorporation in Germany (see among others: Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Amelina and Faist 2011; Pries 2013).

To conclude, immigrant political incorporation in Germany at the collective level displays contradictory nature of German policies towards its immigrant populations. On the one hand, previous corporatist structures as well as modest application of multiculturalist policies provide a favorable environment for immigrants' self-organizing process and their structured dialogue with German authorities through their collective organizations. In this respect, in contrast with the French case, immigrants' have more opportunities to represent their collective interests and communicate their group-based claims to public authorities through the formal political channels. On the other hand, previous exclusionist definition of German nationhood, restrictive citizenship policies, and their lingering effects make Germany a fertile soil for transnational political engagements of immigrant communities. The politics of immigrants' collective

organizations is a contested issue in Germany, since it is unclear whether immigrants' collective organizations target German political institutions with the purpose of improving the lives of immigrant communities in their new countries or with the purpose of lobbying for their countries of origin. The most probable answer is they do both. Yet, as I discuss the case of Turkish organizations in Germany, I will illustrate changing dynamics of immigrants' politics further.

1.2. Immigrant Organizations and Collective Politics in France

In France, the law of 1 July 1901 defines and regulates the associational life of French citizens.[79] Along with the rise of xenophobia and anti-Semitism during the early years of the Second World War, the right to found associations was suspended for foreigners in 1939 (Moch 2011, 58). Until the 1980s, foreigners' right to establish voluntary associations had been highly restricted and subjected to the authorization from the Ministry of the Interior. When the 1981 elections resulted in the victory of the Socialist Party, liberalizing foreigners' right to associate became a priority. The law of 9 October 1981 lifted all the restrictions on foreigners' right to associate. After this law, foreigners were incorporated into the common law of associations of 1901 (Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, 7).

The liberalization of foreigners' right to associate has been a significant step towards political incorporation of migrant groups into French politics. First, migrant

[79] It must be noted that the religious associations in France have been subjected to a different body of legislation and regulated by the 1905 law on the separations of the Churches and the State. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of Islamic associations in France have been founded under the title of the 1901 law, as opposed to the law of 1905. By registering under the law of 1901, many Islamic associations could circumvent the restrictions on funding for religious associations as well as the restrictions on non-religious activities in the same physical space (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, 85–86).

associations, which rose sharply in number during the early 1980s[80], served as stepping-stones for migrant leaders' entry into French politics. Especially, Maghrebian-origin association leaders acquired the role of "cultural intermediaries" (*intermédiaires culture*) between immigrant groups and the French public institutions (Bommes, Castles, and Wihtol de Wenden 1999, 60). Secondly, migrant associations contributed to the emergence of socio-political movements of migrants in the early 1980s. Migrant associations actively supported the *Beur*[81] marches between 1983 and 1984. Therefore, migrants' organizational life has significantly contributed to the vocalization of migrants' political claims in France.

Periods of Migrants' Organizing Process

Migrants' socio-political mobilizations as well as the role of migrant organizations in migrants' collective politics have gone through different phases in France. Withol de Wenden, in her writings, periodizes the history of migrants' collective politics and their associations into three phases: (1) immigrants as foreigners and as workers in the 1970s; (2) immigrants as "mediators of socio-political traditions" in the 1980s; and (3) the children of immigrants as local political actors in the 1990s (Wihtol de Wenden 1988; Wihtol de Wenden 1994; Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001). To start with, migrant workers in France first organized in trade unions, as it was also the case in other labor-importing countries. Foreign workers acquired voting rights for "work committees" in

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[80] By 1985, more than 4,000 migrant organizations were established. Among them, 850 were founded by Arabs, 350 by Turks, 200 by South Saharan Africans, and 250 by refugees from South-East Asia (Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001).

[81] *Beur* is a slang term to designate second-generation Maghrebian-origin immigrants in France. The term comes from inversion of syllables of the word *Arabe* (Arab in English). *Beurgeoisie*, which refers to Maghrebian-origin immigrants of higher socio-economical status, is a combination of the terms "Beur" and "Bourgeoisie".

1972 and for trade union elections in 1975. During these years, the major demand of migrants from the French government was concerned about improvements in migrant workers' working and living conditions. Famous hostel/rent strikes between 1974 and 1978 exemplified the claims of migrant workers to improve their housing conditions. On the other hand, during this era, migrant workers' had strong ties with their homeland. Their primary political interest was concerned with the politics of their home countries. Sending remittances back to home country was widespread.

The 1980s came with the major changes in leading actors, issues and strategies in migrants' politics in France. Migrants' socio-economic demands gained a political dimension in the 1980s. What is more, along with the rise of second-generation as well as the arrival of middle-class migrants mostly as students, migrants themselves became the key political actors in migrants' politics (Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001). The election of socialist Mitterrand to the presidency in 1981 and the liberalization of foreigners' right to associate in the same year paved the way for migrants' collective socio-political movements. In 1983, the first "March Against Racism and for Equality" (*Marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme* or as popularly called by the media *Marche des Beurs*) took place from Marseille to Paris. The main issues included fighting against racism and asking for "the right to difference" (*le droit á la difference*). Therefore, the first nation-wide political movement of second-generation immigrants in France directly targeted the French political institutions and the predominant republican discourse of universalism by asking for multicultural citizenship, right to pluralism, and anti-racism. Yet, migrants were not the only new actors in French immigration and integration politics in the early 1980s. The unexpected electoral success of the National Front in the 1983

local elections signaled that far-right movements will be following migrants' emerging collective politics. Paradoxically, migrants' claims for "right to difference" empowered the arguments of the National Front about the inassimilable nature of Islam. Therefore, during the second *Marche des Beurs* in 1984, the major claim shifted from "right to be different" to "right to indifference" (*le droit á l'indifference*) (Wihtol de Wenden 2003, 82).

The *beur* movements in the 1980s produced two nation-wide migrant associations: *SOS-Racisme* and *France-Plus*. SOS-Racisme was founded in 1984. It has sought to achieve an inter-ethnic cooperation under the common cause of anti-racism. Rather than putting forward distinctive ethno-religious claims, SOS-Racisme pursued an integrationist agenda, which could only be assured in the absence of racism and discrimination (Poinsot 1993, 82). SOS-Racisme has made many of the conventional lobbying strategies available for migrants' interests: such as appealing the headscarf decision of the public school in 1989 or collecting petitions for local voting rights of foreign residents (Hargreaves 1995, 125 & 167). Moreover, SOS-Racisme has functioned as an intermediary platform for the entry of migrant leaders into the French politics. Many members of the association became the high-ranking politicians at the Socialist Party. [82] While some leftist groups criticized SOS-Racisme for being a puppet organization of the Socialist Party, conservative migrant groups expressed their suspicions about association's collaboration with Jewish anti-racists (Hargreaves 1995, 144).

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[82] Harlem Désir, the first president of the SOS-Racisme between the years of 1984 and 1992, has been serving as a member of European Parliament from the French Socialist Party since 1999. Malek Boutih, who chaired the association between 1999 and 2003, is currently serving as the national secretary of the Socialist Party.

On the other hand, France-Plus was founded in 1985. In contrast with cross-ethnic agenda of SOS-Racisme, France-Plus worked as an ethnic lobby organization that primarily aim the electoral mobilization of young Maghrebians (Poinsot 1993, 82; Hargreaves 1995, 144). France-Plus actively worked on persuading the political parties to select Maghrebian-origin migrants as candidates. The efforts started giving its fruits in the 1989 local elections. Around a thousand Maghrebian-origin migrants were nominated as candidates and several hundreds of them won the offices (Hargreaves 1995, 145). Therefore, in the mid-1980s, a group of immigrant leaders emerged as professional political actors in the French politics and were perceived as precursors of migrants' access to traditional political institutions.

While the phase of the 1980s brought the winds of hope through the proliferation of migrant associations, the development of migrants' collective political movements, and the emergence of migrants' political elites; the 1990s have disappointed many of these hopes. To start with, migrant organizations' claims for equal citizenship, anti-racism and anti-discrimination have left their place to the withdrawal into private sphere through localization of the issues i.e. cleaning neighborhoods from drugs, maintaining solidarity with the hometowns, monitoring the schools, fighting against everyday discrimination and organizing cultural activities (Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, 116). Since 1985, public funding has been available for migrant associations.[83] In order to benefit from public funding, migrant organizations have adjusted their activities

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[83] Initially, FAS (*Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les Travailleurs Musulmans d'Algérie en Métropole et pour leur Famille*), which was founded in 1959 to support Algerian workers and their families, provided public funding to migrant associations. In 2002, FAS renamed as FASILD (*Fonds d'Action et de Soutien pour l'Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations*). In 2006, FASILD was replaced by the ACSÉ (*l'Agence Nationale pour la Cohésion Sociale et l'Égalité des Chances*).

accordingly and have opted for implementation of local integration policies and/or organizing activities around cultural identities. On the other hand, public authorities' partnership with migrant organizations in sensitive urban areas has resulted in French state's increasing control over migrants' associational life rather than formation of structured dialogues and interest mediation systems as it was the case in Germany. Scholars argue that public authorities' cooperation with migrant associations and their leaders has been inspired by colonial model of management of ethnic relations through delegation of competence to cultural intermediaries (Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, 11; Wihtol de Wenden 2003, 85; Loch 2009)

While in the 1980s, migrant associations functioned as intermediary platforms for migrant associative elites' entry to French politics; in the 1990s, they mainly served as "route to entrepreneurship and gentrification" (Wihtol de Wenden 1994, 107). Therefore, migrant associations led to the emergence of ethnic and religious businesses such as halal food businesses, Islamic textile, Islamic bookstores, ethnic restaurants, community press and radio. On the other hand, the immigrant political elite that emerged along with the associational movement of the 1980s has not brought tangible benefits to immigrant communities. As this elite moved up in the socio-economical ladder, the gap between migrant representatives and migrant constituents kept on growing (Hargreaves 1995, 145). Therefore, when France faced with violent urban riots in the mid-2000s, there were no true intermediary bodies that could mediate the relation between public authorities and disadvantaged migrant-origin youth (see: Loch 2009).

Opportunities and Constraints for Immigrant Collective Politics:

What are the organizational resources and limitations of migrants in France to raise their collective claims in the French public sphere? How do these opportunities and restrictions of migrants' collective politics resemble or differ from the case of Germany? To start with, the state-centric and individual-based migrant incorporation model in France provides fewer opportunities for migrants' self-organizing process and structured dialogue of migrant organizations with public authorities in France. As I stated earlier, migrant organizations do not function as partners of the French state in integration policy making. By contrast, the relationship between the French state and migrant organizations and minority elite demonstrates important parallelism with colonial management of minorities as well as clientalistic control mechanisms. In this sense, rather than supporting an independent minority civil society, state authorities in France endeavor to have a control on immigrant organizations to carry out official integration policies. Since there is a narrow space for immigrants' involvement in a structured dialogue with the French state, immigrants raise their claims through less formal channels, mostly in the forms of marches, demonstrations, and protest movements. Therefore, political movement of migrants in France challenges the discourse and practice of the French state (Soysal 1994, 106–107).

The absence of intermediary structures between the state and immigrant communities in France creates a contrasting situation with the case of Germany. This contrasting feature becomes evident when we consider the existence of violent urban uprisings in France and their absence in Germany. Loch (2009) compares the situations of marginalized youth in France and in Germany and inquires why the situation in France

resulted in violent protests; whereas there have been no such violent riots in Germany. Among other factors, Loch's analysis points out that migrants' integration into "relatively stable (para-)political bodies, such as trade unions and other interest groups" and the existence of "autonomous ethnic infrastructure" of migrants reduce the chances of violent riots in Germany. On the contrary, Maghrebian-origin people in France, to a great extent, face the large gap between higher expectations for equal treatment in a difference-blind republican setting and the existing social reality. When high frustration of young people of Maghrebian origin in France meets with the strong central state, weak mediating structures, and the co-opted immigrant elite in a "post-colonial clientele-building" fashion, the result is violent protests directed at the French state and its institutions.

Since neither pluralist forms of ethnic lobbying strategies nor corporatist interest mediation structures prevail in the case of France, migrant organizations find fewer chances to communicate their collective claims through institutionalized channels to the French public institutions. While this observation demonstrates the lower degrees of institutional relationship between immigrant groups and the French public authorities, it does not indicate the lower degrees of immigrants' collective politics in France. On the contrary, in a way paradoxically, migrant originated people in France have constituted one of the most active socio-political movement cases in Europe i.e. migrant workers' hostel strikes in the 1970s, second-generation immigrants' marches for anti-racism and equality in the 1980s, and the movements of *sans-papiers* (undocumented) in the 1990s (see: Guiraudon 2000, 82). As documented by the previous studies, immigrants' action repertoire in France more often takes extra-institutional forms than other European cases. The political claims analysis of Koopmans and his colleagues (2005, 137) points out that

extra-institutional protests among host-country oriented claims are strikingly more frequent in France (46%) than the case of Germany (29%).

On the other hand, while republican-assimilationist political structures in France have restrained immigrant organizations' structured dialogue with the French state, the same structures have provided greater opportunities for immigrants' higher identification with and engagement in French politics. In this respect, as opposed to the case of Germany with strong immigrant transnationalism, France has been portrayed as a prime case of migrants' preoccupation with host country politics. In other words, immigrant-origin people and their organizations in France have often intervened in the French public sphere with the claims of equality and anti-discrimination (see: Giugni and Passy 2004). In the next part, I will further elaborate cross-national difference between migrants' claims making in Germany and France.

1.3. Migrants' Political Claims Making in Germany and France

Starting from the 1990s, increasing number of studies has inquired the relationship between immigrant integration regimes in host countries and immigrants' collective claims making (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Giugni and Passy 2004; Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Carol and Koopmans 2013). Scholars have defined "political claims" as "public expressions of the will to (resist) social change in the form of demands, criticisms and policy proposals" (Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2005, 51). Therefore, political claims making is perceived "as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere", which "consists of *the purposive and public articulation of political demands, call to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or*

potentially affect the interest or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors" (original italics) (Koopmans et al. 2005, 24).

The primary argument in this literature is that institutional (integration and citizenship regimes) and discursive (conception of national identity and cultural differences) opportunity structures shape the dynamics of political claims making in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship, and immigration. In other words, models of minority integration and public discourses around it, to a great extent, determine the main *actors* (dominant claimants), *content* (substantive issues) and *means* (action repertoires) of claims making in immigration field. Comparative scholarship contends that inclusive models of immigrant integration (in terms of both individual and group rights dimensions) tend to provide more opportunities for public visibility of immigrant groups, their preoccupation with host country's political issues, and their conventional means of participation. On the contrary, exclusionary models of immigrant integration pave the way for state actors' dominance in immigration related public debates, immigrants' preoccupation with their home countries' political issues, and immigrants' adoption of radical action repertoires to communicate their claims in their host countries.

One of the most comprehensive cross-national empirical studies on political claims making in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship, and immigration is conducted by Koopmans and his colleagues (2005). With the purpose of explaining the "striking cross-national differences in contention over immigration and cultural diversity", they conducted a large-scale media content analysis in five European countries (Netherlands, Britain, Germany, France, and Switzerland) between 1992 and 1998. The study provides empirical evidence that demonstrates how national institutional and discursive

opportunities "facilitate the mobilization of some collective actors with certain types of collective identity and specific types of demands while constraining the mobilization of other actors and the expression of other identities and demands" (Koopmans et al. 2005, 6).

Table 18: Distribution of political claims in the field of immigration and ethnic relations in Germany and France.

		Germany	France
Among overall claims			
Actors	State/Political Parties	57.3%	50.6%
	Migrants/Minorities	6.5%	10.2%
	Anti-Racist/Pro-Minority Groups	8.3%	11.3%
Content	Immigration, Asylum and Alien Politics	40.2%	36.9%
	Minority Integration Politics	11.0%	18.2%
	N	2,388	6,432
Among migrants' Claims			
Identities	Policy-Status identities	10.7%	41.3%
	Religious identities	2.7%	22.4%
	Ethnic/National Identities	67.2%	16.7
Issues	Host country politics	53.5%	90.7%
	Home country politics	46.4%	9.4%
Means	Conventional	51.5%	54.6%
	Extra-institutional	45.4%	48.4%
	N	921	313

Source: Koopmans et al. 2005.

The empirical findings demonstrate that Germany and France highly depart from each other in terms of prevailing patterns of political claims making in the field of immigration and integration (see Table 18). To start with, in Germany, state actors (government, legislatives, judiciary, executive agencies) and the political parties appear as the major figures in the public discourse on immigration and ethnic. Migrants and minority groups in Germany have the least visibility (after the share of judiciary) in the public contention over immigrant-related issues. On the other hand, the distribution of

collective actors in immigration and ethnic politics is quite different in France. While the key actors still belong to the domain of the state and political parties, migrants and minority groups have a considerable presence (10.2%) in the French public discourse. Moreover, the share of anti-racist and pro-minority groups in France (11.3%) is also higher than the German case (8.3%). These findings prove that the more inclusive the citizenship model is, the more visibility minority groups and their supporters have in the public debates. In this sense, France gives better chances for immigrant groups and their supporters to intervene in public debates (Koopmans et al. 2005, 78).

Second, Germany and France differ from each other in terms of substantive issues raised in political claims over immigration and ethnic relations politics. In Germany, claims related to immigration politics (issues of entry, exit, residence and work permit) are 3.7 times more than the claims on integration politics (socio-political and cultural rights, anti-discrimination, and equality). On the contrary, in France, claims on integration politics are twice more than the issues on immigration politics. This point demonstrates that in Germany, since immigrants are either legally or symbolically perceived as foreigners, the public debates on immigration mostly revolve around the conditions of entry, exit, and stay. On the contrary, in France, due to the inclusive aspects of integration regime, issues of integration triumph over the issues of immigration (Koopmans et al. 2005, 88).

Third, when we particularly focus on migrants' political claims, the cross-national variances become even further clear. Immigrant claimants in Germany are more likely to identify themselves with their national and ethnic identities (67.2%). In other words, immigrants in Germany tend to raise their political claims as Turks, Kurds, or other

ethnic/national groups. On the other hand, the share of ethnic/national identities is the lowest one (16.7%) among immigrant claimants in France. Migrants in France mostly identify themselves with official policy categories i.e. immigrants and undocumented immigrants (*sans-papiers*).

Fourth, migrants in Germany and France also strikingly diverge from each other in terms of their national and transnational orientations. As expected by institutionalist accounts, migrants in France overwhelmingly raise the issues related to host country politics (90.7%). In this national context, homeland related transnational claims have a marginal place (9.4%) among immigrants' political claims. On the contrary, migrants' homeland related claims (46.4%) hold a stronger hold in Germany. This observation once more empirically proves that Germany is a fertile soil for immigrants' political transnationalism compared to the case of France.

Last but not least, immigrants' action repertoires in Germany and France do not show a significant variation at the first sight, despite the fact that institutional theory expects more extra-institutional protest action in France. Koopmans *et. al* (2005, 136–7) explain this situation with the predominance of homeland-related political claims in Germany, which have been usually raised through extra-institutional means. When we only focus on immigrants' host country-related claims, the cross-national variance in action-repertoires become conspicuous. While 46% of host country related immigrants' claims in France are raised through extra-institutional means, this is only 29% in Germany.

It must be remembered that Koopmans and his colleagues conducted this political claims analysis during the period between 1992 and 1998, before the breakthrough

reforms in German citizenship and integration politics. Therefore, it would be reasonable to anticipate some major changes in German public discourse in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Therefore, I suppose that in the post-2000 period, immigrant groups have increased their visibility in German public discourse; there has been a shift from immigration politics to integration politics; immigrants have less identified themselves with their ethnic and national origins; and immigrants have more and more become interested in German politics, when compared to the previous periods in Germany. Yet, despite these major changes in German political structures, as I argued earlier, institutional and discursive cross-national differences still persist between Germany and France. In this respect, it would also be reasonable to expect maintenance of these cross-natural differences pointed out by Koopmans *et. al*. (2005) in the post-2000 period. Moreover, Carol and Koopmans (2013), in their recent political claims analysis on Muslim rights in Europe, show that many of the findings of the 2005 research still hold true.

2. The Case of Turkish Immigrants and their Collective Politics

As I have documented in the previous part, collective participatory patterns of immigrant-origin groups in Germany and France highly differ from each other. While the extension of German corporatist logic to the field of immigrant politics facilitates immigrants' structured dialogue with host country institutions, lingering effects of exclusionist German nationhood and restrictive nature of German citizenship regime hamper immigrants' interest in and engagement with host country politics. On the contrary, the republican model of immigrant integration in France shuns mobilization around ethnic politics through institutional channels and paves the way for immigrants' extra-

institutional socio-political mobilizations. Meanwhile, the same republican integration policies in France reinforce immigrants' identification with and engagement in host country's political issues, as opposed to their transnational political participation. In this part, I focus on Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France and inquire the extent of which the Turkish immigrants' case fits into these cross-national patterns.

My qualitative analysis indicates that despite the existence of important cross-national similarities between Turkish immigrant groups in Germany and France, they significantly differ from each other in terms of their tendency to mobilize around their host country politics. Especially in the post-2000 period, cross-national differences in Turkish migrants' collective politics have become quite evident. While Turkish migrant organizations in Germany have become prominent political actors in German immigration and integration politics, achieved a substantial public recognition and representation in public institutions for interest mediation, and raised their claims for equal rights, equal treatment, and cultural accommodation; French-Turks and their organizations have been mostly invisible at the national level politics in France, mostly focused on local-scale activities with the purpose of providing services in immigrant neighborhoods, and developed minimum contact with host country public authorities. Therefore, in this part, I demonstrate that as expected by the institutionalist school, there are striking cross-national differences in the patterns of Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France. Yet, these cross-national differences contradict with the general patterns of immigrant collective politics observed in Germany and France.

In the following sections, by starting from the early years of Turkish immigration to Germany and France, I will compare and contrast the processes in which Turkish immigrants and their children get organized in their own associations, seek for public recognition and representation, and engage in collective political action in their host countries. In each period, I will discuss the main characteristics of Turkish organizational landscapes, their primary political concerns, and their strategies to communicate their political claims to host society and public authorities.

2.1. The Emergence and Development of Turkish Migrants' Organizational Life

Turkish immigration to Germany and France has, to a great extent, pursued similar historical trajectories, which in return resulted in parallel organizing processes of Turkish immigrants in two national contexts. In both countries, Turkish migration goes back to the bi-lateral labor contracts signed with Turkey in the early 1960s.[84] Germany received the initial flow of Turkish guest workers. As the German labor market became saturated, workers in the waiting list of the Turkish Employment Institute (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) were allocated to the French labor market (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 13). Therefore, while the large-scale arrival of Turkish migrants in Germany took place in the mid-1960s, the major flow of Turkish immigrants to France occurred in the mid-1970s with a 10-year lag from the German case. The second wave of Turkish immigration started when the foreign labor recruitment was halted in many European countries after the OPEC crisis in 1973. Family members of already recruited Turkish workers arrived in large numbers in Germany and France. The third wave of Turkish migration took place

[84] The first labor contract was signed with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 and with France in 1965 (Abadan-Unat 2006, 58).

after the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the subsequent brutal repression of political groups in the country. Due to their tolerant asylum laws, Germany and France had been the main destinations of Turkish political refugees during this era (Danış and Üstel 2008, 17).

The emergence and development of Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany and France have been highly shaped by changing socio-political conditions along with these different waves of Turkish immigration to Europe. In the 1960s, Turkish guest workers in Germany and France founded the first prototypes of migrant organizations. Since Turkish workers perceived their stay as temporary during the early period of migration, the first examples of their organizations were very loosely organized and distant from any structural political activity. These cultural spaces mainly served for basic social and religious needs of the Turkish workers and helped them deal with longing for their homeland.

Germany, contrary to the case of France, first made the acquaintance of Islam with the arrival of Turkish workers in the 1960s. Neither the Turkish state nor German authorities initially provided religious services for Turkish guest workers. Upon their arrival in Germany, Turkish workers demanded allocation of some rooms in their collective dormitories (which were called as *Heime*) for their religious practices. Therefore, the first examples mosque-associations in Germany emerged in an informal fashion and were called as “backyard mosques” (*Hinterhofmoscheen*).

On the contrary, Islam has a longer history and an early official recognition in France. The colonial expansion in the North Africa in the 19th century resulted in an early exposure to Islam and Muslim populations. Starting from 1870 and until its independence

in 1962, Algeria was officially a part of the mainland France. In 1926, the Great Mosque of Paris (GMP), a significant symbol of the relationship between the French state and Islam, was inaugurated as a gratitude for colonial Muslim soldiers who died for France during the First World War (Bruce 2010, 53). Therefore, when Turkish workers arrived in France, there were already traces of public visibility of Islam and its institutions. However, contrary to other Muslim immigrants in France, Turkish workers did not have any preceding historical ties with France and were not fluent either in French or in Arabic languages. Therefore, they sought to establish their own prayer places, rather than the ones established by/for Maghrebian-origin Muslims (interview #35). According to Bowen (2010, 17), Turks developed "the most ethnic specific set of religious institutions" in France.

The early Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany and France were non-political and organized for temporary needs of guest workers during their stay. On the other hand, Turkish student organizations in Germany and France were highly politicized during this era. The ATÖF (Turkish Student Federation in Germany) was founded in Germany in 1962. In France, the FTÖB (Turkish Student Union in France)[85] was already actively working in the 1960s. The major political orientation of these student organizations was towards homeland politics. The president of the ATÖF during the 1968 youth movement in Germany and who later was elected as a Turkish-origin deputy in the German Bundestag described these years in the following way:

> "During those years, we were mostly interested in Turkish politics. Our major concern was about how to rescue Turkey from the cycles of underdevelopment. …

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[85] In 1974, the name of the FTÖB was changed from "Turkish Student Union in France" to "Union of Students from Turkey in France" (*Fransa Türkiyeli Öğrenciler Birliği*) to avoid any ethno-centric biases (Özkök 2004).

> We had never thought that we would permanently stay here and engage in German politics" (interview #28)

1970s: The Period of Settlement and Politicization

In the 1970s, the flow of family members deeply affected Turkish migrants' organizing process in Germany and France. There were two major consequences: The first consequence was the increasing heterogeneity of Turkish immigrant populations both in Germany and in France. Along with the arrival of women and children, problems and needs of Turkish immigrants were extremely diversified. The second consequence was the transition from temporary stay to permanent settlement of Turkish immigrants in their European host countries. After the halt of foreign labor recruitments, families of Turkish immigrant workers kept on arriving in European destinations and consequently constituted a permanent ethnic minority in their host countries.

As Turkish immigrants and their families permanently settled in Europe, they became appealing to political parties and movements from Turkey. Both in Germany and in France, Turkish migrants' organizations in the 1970s overwhelmingly reflected the political landscape of Turkey. The political activists, escaping from the political repression after the 1971 military memorandum in Turkey, joined Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe and maintained their political struggles remotely. Germany and France, along with other European host countries, became safe heavens for politically persecuted people in Turkey. Moreover, Turkish immigrant communities in Europe provided alternative financial sources to support political movements back in their homeland (for the case of Germany, see: Thränhardt 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The political cleavage between the left and the right wing groups determined the major dynamics of Turkish immigrants' organizational life during this era.

Many diverse political fractions of Turkish politics had the chance of flourishing in Turkish immigrant civil society in Europe. In the case of Germany, not only the entire spectrum of Turkish political and religious landscape was represented, but also some Turkish organizations, which would have been forbidden in their home country's political context, made their first debut in Germany (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987, 107). Starting from the 1970s, the major leftist movements of Turkey and their revolutionary fractions, the conservative nationalist movements, the Kemalists, the conservative liberals, the Sunni Muslim movements, the Kurdish political groups, and relatively later Alevis have constituted their organizational structures in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 49–63). In France, although not as institutionalized as in Germany, homeland political movements also predominantly defined migrants' organizational life in this period. The home country originated political groups, while keeping their headquarters in Germany, have established extensive transnational networks across European countries including France (see: Table 19).

During this period, homeland-originated religious groups became highly active in constructing "mosque associations" or incorporating the already existing ones into their networks. Initially in Germany and later in France, scattered religious associations were organized into more centralized structures religious organizations. The emerging religious associations started catering to three basic needs of observant Turkish immigrants: The first service was to provide prayer places and religious leaders (*imams*) for Muslims to practice their worship rituals; the second was to organize Quran courses for children of immigrants to provide religious and moral education; and the third service was to create ethnic retail stores that sell *halal* food and other non-food religious items.

The Turkish state and its religious institutions were mostly absent from the European destinations during the 1970s. Therefore, the religious life of immigrants during this era was primarily organized by politically dissident religious movements coming of Turkey.

In Germany, a Sunni Sufi order stemming from Turkey, known as *Süleymancılar*, established the first Turkish Islamic organization, called as "the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers" (VIKZ - Der Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren) in 1973 in Cologne. Soon after, the *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook), which was an offshoot of the homeland-originated Islamist political movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan, established their organization in 1977 in Kerpen.[86] A Turkish conservative nationalist group known as *Ülkücüler* (Idealists), that has links with Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey, established their federation called as ATÜDF (Federation for the Turkish Idealists' Association in Europe) in 1978 in Frankfurt.

In the late 1970s, all of these homeland-originated Turkish groups have also been actively organizing in France. The first *Ülkücü* associations in France were established in 1978 (interview # 51)[87]. The first *Milli Görüş* mosque association - 64 Cami (64 Mosque)- was founded in 1979 in Paris and later served as the center for the *Communauté Islamique Milli Görüş France* (Islamic Community *Milli Görüş* France). *Süleymancılar* organized under the name of *Centre Culturel Islamique Turc* (Turkish Islamic Cultural Center) and established their first organization in 1979 in Metz (Caymaz

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[86] Since its foundation Milli Görüş organizations acquired different names such as 'Turkish Union', 'Turkish Islamic Union', 'Islamic Union'. In 1985, it got the name of European Milli Görüş Organization (AMGT-Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı). In 1994, they introduced the word Islam and re-named the organization as Islamic Community of Milli Görüş (IGMG - Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş). Source: Interview with Yavuz Çelik Karahan (the president of IGMG), published in http://www.dunyabulteni.net on February 19, 2011. (Last visited: July 07, 2013)

[87] The centralized federation of *Ülkücü* movement in France - Fransa Türk Federasyon (Turkish Federation in France)- was founded in 1995.

2003, 139). As opposed to the German case, these migrant organizations gained a legal footing in France only after the liberalization of foreigners' right to found associations in 1981. Therefore, with some time lag from the German case, homeland-originated migrant organizations also centralized into federations in France.

Table 19: Homeland originated Turkish immigrant organizational networks in Germany and France

	Germany	**France**
Milli Görüş	1977: First organization in Kerpen (NRW). Currently, 15 regional organizations with 323 mosques.	1979: First mosque association in Paris (64 Cami). Currently, 5 regional organizations with 52 mosques.
Süleymancıs	1973: First mosque association in Cologne.	1979: First mosque association in Metz.
DITIB	1984: First associations throughout Germany; the headquarter is in Cologne. Currently, 896 affiliated associations.	1986: First associations in Paris and Lyon. Currently, 92 affiliated associations.
Türk Federasyon	1974: First association in Frankfurt. 1978: Centralized organization.	1978: First associations in South East of France. 1995: Centralized organization.
Alevis	1991: The foundation of the Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany (AABF). Currently, 130 local organizations.	1994: The foundation of the Federation of Alevi Unions in France (FUAF). Currently, 31 local organizations.

The 1980s: Dual Political Agenda of Turkish Immigrant Organizations

The 1980s came with two important developments that deeply transformed Turkish immigrants' organizational life in Europe, but somehow in paradoxical ways. While the first examples of organizational engagements in host country politics emerged in the 1980s, the 1980 military coup in Turkey, which was followed by the flow of political refugees from Turkey into European countries, reinforced the interest in home country politics among Turkish immigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 47–48). Therefore, the period starting with the 1980s up until the late 1990s was identified with the dual-

political agendas of Turkish migrant organizations: improving Turkish migrants' status in their host country and engaging in politics of home country by either directly helping out the homeland political groups or indirectly lobbying host country governments (ibid).

To start with, after two decades of the first wave of immigration, Turkish migrants and their organizational leaders started acknowledging their permanent stay in their host countries. As the idea of ultimately returning to homeland left its place to the permanent settlement in host countries, increasing numbers of migrant organizations started turning their faces towards host country politics in the 1980s. Both in Germany and France, immigrants' issues such as claiming equal treatment and protection, fighting against discrimination and racism, and asking for cultural rights were, for the first time, included to the Turkish immigrants' organizational agendas during this era.

In the 1980s, immigration became a highly politicized issue across many European countries. In Germany, in contrast with the case of France, immigration debate was centered on "the foreigner problem" and more particularly on the Turkish immigrants. In 1982, the Christian Democratic Parties (CDU/CSU) formed the government and Helmut Kohl became the Chancellor.[88] The political doctrine of "not an immigration country" (*kein Einwanderungsland*) was coined during this era. The leading political strategy of the conservative government was centered on either "assimilation" of foreigners into the German society or their "return" to their home countries (Faist 1994,

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[88] Although numerous studies have already documented the negative perception of Turks in Germany in the early 1980s, the recently unsealed confidential British documents once more revealed German politicians' unwelcoming views towards Turkish immigrants during the era. The minutes of the meeting with the British Prime Minister, Thatcher, outlined how the Chancellor Kohl intended to reduce the size of Turks in Germany by 50 percent. According to the document, Kohl said that while Germany does not have a problem with many other immigrant groups, Turks come from very different culture and did not integrate well. (See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/secret-minutes-chancellor-kohl-wanted-half-of-turks-out-of-germany-a-914376.html, last accessed on January 12, 2014)

52). Not all foreigners were equally targeted in these immigration debates. Some politicians argued that Germany had "not a problem of foreigners, but of Turks" (*kein Ausländerproblem, sondern nur ein Türkenproblem*) (Thränhardt 1989, 12–13). The media became an important factor that reinforced social prejudice against the Turks in Germany. Moreover, differential treatments of guest workers at the policy level marked the structural dimension of discrimination against the Turks. In 1981, the family union of Turkish adolescents over fifteen years old was denied. This policy increased the perception of discrimination among Turkish immigrants in comparison with other EU countries (Wilpert 2013, 115).

In such an unwelcoming environment, Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany had no other option other than addressing to the problems related to their lives in Germany. As Turkish immigrants, to a great extent, abandoned the myth of ultimate return to the homeland and realized their permanent stay in Germany, the issues such as equal political rights, anti-discrimination, and cultural accommodation- gained vital importance. Due to the blood-based, exclusionist citizenship regime in Germany during the time, Turkish migrants had no direct political means, other than their voluntary organizations, to raise their claims in German public sphere. Therefore, as opposed to the French case, in which immigrant-origin populations could become an electoral force as early as the 1980s, Turkish immigrants in Germany had to use "compensatory" strategies through their voluntary organizations to exert political pressure on public authorities (Kastoryano 2010, 86).

As opposed to the dominance of homeland politics among Turkish immigrant groups in the 1970s, the 1980s came with the surge in the number of "local collective

action" organizations established by Turkish immigrants in Germany (Ögelman 2000, 106–109). One of the important symbolic events in this direction was the foundation of *Initiative for Equal Rights and Social Integration* (IGI -Initiative Gleichberechtigung 'Integration') in 1981 (Interviews #9 and #28). The initiative aimed to construct a platform through which migrants could communicate their major concerns to German policymakers and transform their status from being sole objects of policy debates to active participants in policy-making. The report prepared by the IGI pinned down the basic claims of Turkish immigrants into five headings: 1- Legal equality and political participation; 2- Labor market and employment problems; 3- Educational and youth problems; 4- Housing problems; and 5- Cultural and religious issues (Initiative Gleichberechtigung "Integration" 1981). Therefore, this initiative set up the basic agenda of immigrant politics in Germany for the next decades. Yet, as in the case of many other collective initiatives of Turkish immigrants, this platform also suffered from political fragmentations and ideological contestations originating from the homeland politics.

The 1980s marked a profound transition from class-based political struggles to ethno-cultural-religious concerns in Turkish organizational life (Yurdakul 2009). The ethno-cultural turn was sharper in the case of Germany, because Turkish immigrants had more public space to engage in ethnic politics compared to the case of France. The overwhelming majority of both homeland originated and local action oriented organizations prioritized ethno-cultural frames rather than class politics (Ögelman 2000, 109). During this period, Turkish Islamic organizations in Germany transformed themselves into centralized federations and increased their public visibility. In 1981, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB), which is known with its proximity to the Milli Görüş

movement, was founded. Soon after its foundation, IFB started a legal struggle in Berlin to obtain the authorization for delivering Islamic instructions in German public schools. The Milli Görüş movement in Germany structured itself into a centralized cross-country federation and became one of the largest Islamic networks in Europe. In the same way, the organization of Süleymancı movement (VIKZ) was also transformed into a federation in 1983 (Abadan-Unat 2006, 259) and spread its branches in other European countries with Turkish immigrants.

One of the most important developments regarding the Turkish Islam in Europe was the foundation of the Turkish state supported "Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs" (DITIB) in 1984 in Cologne (and two years later in Paris). Since 1978, the Turkish state had been providing religious services (*Din Hizmetleri Müşavirliği*) through the Turkish embassy and consulates in Germany (Adıgüzel 2011, 79). Yet, as the dissident religious networks became dominant in the Turkish immigrants' organizing process, the Turkish state endeavored to take the control of the Turkish religious "market" and promote the Turkish-version of moderate Islam. While the administrators of the DITIB usually deny the direct links with the Turkish state and its religious institution (The Directorate of Religious Affairs, hereafter the *Diyanet*), their connection is self-evident. For example, *Diyanet*-appointed Counselors for Religious Services at the Turkish embassies and consulates almost always serve as the chairs of DITIB organizations in European host countries. The religious personnel of DITIB-related mosques are sent, supervised, and funded by the *Diyanet* of the Turkish state. On the one hand Turkish state's support, on the other hand host countries' endorsement of its tolerant

version of Islam have turned the DITIB into the largest Turkish Islamic network and the biggest competitor of previous Turkish Islamic organizations in Germany and in France.

In the case of France, the 1980s also marked a turning point in politicization of immigrant groups towards their host countries. The liberation of the law of associations for foreigners in 1981 resulted in an unprecedented growth in the number of immigrant organizations (Kastoryano 2002, 99). The proliferation of immigrant organizations in the 1980s paved the way for extensive protest movements of the second-generation Maghrebian immigrants (as popularly called as *Beurs*) who claim for equal rights, equal treatment, and cultural accommodation from the French authorities. Between 1983 and 1985, France became the center of massive national demonstrations of Maghrebian-origin immigrants: The March Against Racism and for Equal Rights in 1983, Convergence 84 in 1984, and March for Civil Rights in 1985 (Poinsot 1993, 80). Between 1986 and 1989, the emphasis was shifted from protest movements to electoral participation. Collective organizations of immigrants (particularly the Maghrebians) initiated voter registration campaigns and lobbied political parties to include immigrant-origin people in their lists (Hargreaves 1991).

As in the case of Germany, for the first time in the 1980s, Turkish immigrant organizations in France also started including host country political issues into their agendas. Yet, in contrast with Turks in Germany and Maghrebians in France, French-Turks' collective engagement in host country politics was limited to some small-scale left wing organizations. On the other hand, Islamist and ethno-nationalist organizations of Turkish immigrants were, to a large extent, absent from the political stage of France. Despite the fact that the major political claims of Maghrebians (i.e. equal rights, equal

treatment, and public recognition for their ethno-cultural and religious differences) also addressed to the concerns of Turkish immigrants, there was no collective mobilization on the side of French-Turks during this period. On the contrary, Turkish organizations in France focused on providing religious and educational services to their immigrant constituents and limited their interaction with the local public authorities to their search of locations for their associational activities.

The case of l'ACORT (Assembly of Citizens Originated from Turkey) demonstrated how Turkish immigrants' collective participation in immigrant politics in France took place at the margins of organizational life. L'ACORT was originally called as the ATT (the Association of Workers from Turkey) and founded as a homeland-originated organization, which was linked to the Turkish leftist movement DEV-YOL (Revolutionary Path). In 1985, the ATT held a congress in order to decide future political agenda of the organization. People supporting the idea of ceasing the ties with the homeland movement and focusing on French politics were successful at the end of the congress. Therefore, the ATT, which was renamed as l'ACORT in 2001, became primarily interested in immigration and integration politics in France and undertook an active role in immigrant movements.

The other historical development that deeply shaped the Turkish migrants' organizational landscape in the 1980s was the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the subsequent flow of political refugees from Turkey to the countries in Europe. The 1980 coup in Turkey unleashed a wave of brutal repression on freedom of speech, closure of political parties, civil society organizations, and trade unions, and arrest of hundreds of

thousands of people.[89] Germany and France were the main destinations for Turkish political refugees, due to their liberal asylum laws (Danış and Üstel 2008, 17). Between 1985-2005, more than half million people from Turkey sought asylum in European countries. While Germany was the most preferred destination for asylum seekers from Turkey (304 thousand), France was the second close one (99 thousand) to Germany (Grojean 2008, 121). While Germany received higher number of refugees from Turkey, it is reasonable to argue that the flow of political refugees in this era affected the profile of Turkish community in France more deeply, since the proportion of political refugees to the existing Turkish immigrant community was much more significant in this context. Hence, France has become one of the key destinations for Kurdish political and cultural activism in the post-1980 period.

The repression on political expressions in Turkey resulted in the reinforcement of "Turkish civil society outside of Turkish national boundaries" (Argun 2003, 6). Political groups in opposition to the political developments in Turkey could only find opportunities to raise their voices abroad. Easy access to the homeland media from abroad was another factor that facilitated immigrant political actors' engagement in homeland politics. Therefore, the reinvigoration of homeland politics among Turkish immigrants in Germany and France took place at a period that marked a significant change of orientation of Turkish immigrant groups towards host country political issues.

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[89] For a brief summary of the results of the 1980 coup, see: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/1980-coup-facts.aspx?pageID=238&nid=17628 (last visited July 19, 2013).

The 1990s: Institutionalization of Political Fragmentations and Transnational Linkages

While the bi-polar division between right and left wing politics defined the Turkish immigrant political landscape in the 1970s, the 1980s came with the rapid multiplication of Turkish immigrant organizations along multiple lines (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987). Starting from the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, ethnic, religious, cultural, and political differences among Turkish immigrants are deeply institutionalized through the establishment of ideologically conflicting and politically competing networks of Turkish organizations in Europe. The main lines of cleavages in Turkish immigrants' organizational life in Germany and France have included the political (left wing versus right wing), ethno-cultural (Turks versus Kurds), religio-cultural (Sunnis versus Alevis; Islamists versus secularists; and official Islam versus political Islam) ones.

Multiple factors have contributed to the emergence and reinforcement of political antagonisms among Turkish immigrant groups. Firstly, some key developments/events in Turkey have had considerable impacts on cleavages among Turkish immigrants. The 1980 military coup, the spread of Turkish-Islam synthesis as the official ideology, the rise of cultural claims of minority groups and politics of difference, and tragic events of violence and acts of repression against ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey had deep reflections on Turkish immigrant groups' relationship with each other. For instance, the case of Kurdish immigrants from Turkey illustrates how homeland developments have shaped cleavages in immigrant politics. In the 1970s, the Kurdish movement in Turkey was, to a great extent, embedded within the "urban-based leftist class struggle" (Mc.Dowall 1994, 247). In the same vein, Turkish and Kurdish-originated politically active immigrants were working together in the leftist, class struggle-based immigrant

organizations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Yet, the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the subsequent armed struggle of the Kurdish political groups, notably the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers Party), against the Turkish state brought about a turning point in Kurdish immigrants' political history in Europe. In this period, Kurdish political activists established their own Kurdish identity based organizational networks across Europe and rarely engaged in cross-ethnic alliances with Turkish immigrants' organizations. Therefore, the emergence of Kurdish immigrants' political organizations deeply fractured the organizational landscape of immigrants originating from Turkey.

The organizational process of Alevi immigrants from Turkey has also been highly shaped by the developments in Turkey. Alevis from Turkey started arriving in Germany and France along with the migration flow from Turkey in the 1960s. Up until the late 1980s, collective politics of Alevis was, to a great extent, nonexistent both at home and in abroad. Alevi immigrants were mostly aligned either with moderate social democratic organizations or with radical left-wing groups (Sökefeld 2008, 49). In the post-1980 period, the developments in Turkey, including the 1980 military coup, official promotion of Sunni-version of Islam (especially through mandatory religious courses at schools), the rise of Kurdish movement, and the emergence of politics of identity and difference highly contributed to the politicization of Alevi identity both at home and in abroad (Rigoni 2003; Poyraz 2005). Moreover, in the beginning of the 1990s, the tragic events in Turkey against Alevi people including "the Sivas massacre"[90] and "the riots in Gaziosmanpaşa

[90] In 1993, 33 intellectuals who gathered for a festival on Alevi poet Pir Sultan Abdal murdered at the Madımak Hotel in Sivas, when a radical Islamist mob ransomed the building. This tragic event constituted a fundamental turning point in Alevi politics in Europe and resulted in large-scale mobilizations and protest movements (Rigoni 2003).

neighborhood"[91] reinforced the politicization of Alevi organizations in Europe. For the first time, Alevi immigrants from Turkey became visible in the European public spheres through their massive demonstrations against the developments in Turkey. After the Sivas event, Alevi organizations in Germany organized a protest march in Cologne and brought together 60,000 people (Rigoni 2003, 163). Since then, it became a common practice for Alevi immigrants in Europe to organize mass demonstrations through their transnational networks in order to protest developments in Turkish politics and claim their cultural rights from the Turkish governments.

Secondly, internal dynamics and competition among Turkish immigrant groups highly contributed to the fragmented nature of Turkish organizational landscape. Therefore, apart from the effects of Turkish politics, "dynamics of mobilization 'take on a life of their own' within the groups of migrants and refugees abroad" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 65). In this respect, subsequent mobilizations and counter-mobilizations of competing groups have largely shaped the Turkish organizational landscape in Europe. For instance, in the 1980s, the emergence of Kurdish immigrants' political organizations in European public spaces stirred the backlash of ultranationalist Turkish immigrant groups. In the same vein, the rise of Turkish-Sunni groups in Europe and their active engagements in host countries' public sphere in the 1980s fastened the institutionalization of Alevi groups. On the other hand, Islamist organizations of Turkish immigrants have been far from being united. The growing strength and influence of political Islamist

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[91] In 1995, three cafes and a patisserie were gunned-attacked by unanimous assassins in Gaziosmanpaşa neighborhood (a quarter populated by Alevi people). The attacks soon triggered massive spontaneous demonstrations against the police, who was blamed of continuously harassing Alevi people and refusing to protect them (Sökefeld 2008). The demonstration was brutally repressed by the armed forces that left 23 people dead and more than hundred people wounded.

groups, particularly the *Milli Görüş* movement in Europe, resulted in out-reaching policies of the Turkish state to contain the clout of political Islam among Turkish emigrants in Europe. As I noted earlier, the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey (*Diyanet*) started establishing the federations across Europe in the 1980s.

As a third factor of the contentious politics among Turkish immigrant groups, the role of host countries and their differential treatments towards different groups within Turkish immigrant minority can be pointed out. Particularly in the case of Germany, the corporatist arrangements between state and society, such as the availability of public law status for religious communities or the emergence of platforms of structured dialogue between immigrants and the German state, have incited struggles among different groups to represent the Turkish minority in Germany vis-à-vis the German state. In some cases, exclusion of some organizations from corporatist arrangements resulted in backlash of excluded groups in the form of vocally criticizing German integration policies as well as publicly challenging those migrant groups who are incorporated into these host country corporatist bodies.[92] In some cases, the struggle over the host country resources is fueled by personal ambition and rivalry among the leaders of Turkish migrant organizations.[93]

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[92] For instance, increasing vocal criticism of the *Milli Görüş* organization in Germany (IGMG) against the German integration politicies after the suspension of their participation in the German Islam Conference exemplifies this situation.

[93] One of the recent examples of such a confrontation took place between the TGB (*Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*) and the TBB (*Türkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg)*, two local action originated Turkish migrant organizations in Berlin. In 2011, Dilek Kolat, who was the wife of the TBB's president at that time, was appointed as the Berlin Senator for Labour, Integration and Women´s issues. The TGB not only put the pressure on the TBB to change their president but also sent a letter to Klaus Wowereit (the head of the state government in Berlin) and expressed their concerns for personal connections between the Berlin government and the TBB and possible biased allocation of the state-funds among Turkish immigrant organizations (See: http://www.sabah.de/kolattan-tgbye-mahcup-ziyaret.html, last accessed on August 06, 2013).

On the other hand, among Turkish immigrant organizations in France such an inter-group rivalry over host country's resources is not as common as the German case. While the same lines of internal fragmentations among Turkish migrant organizations are also present in France, this internal contention is not usually reinforced by the selective cooperation of the French state. One of the primary reasons of this situation is the fact that the institutional context of the republican regime in France does not privilege any of immigrant organizations as recognized interlocutors of their community vis-à-vis the French state. Immigrants' organizational elite in France is perceived as mediators between immigrants and the French authorities who undertake an active role in prevailing the republican values among immigrant populations and integrating them into the French society. Therefore, the French official policies do not support the conglomeration of immigrant organizations under a unified structure to represent the immigrant community's interest as in the case of German corporatism, but reinforce the proliferation of immigrant organizations to better manage the integration of the immigrant populations (Kastoryano 1995, 106). Consequently, immigrant organizations in France, at least until the foundation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) in 2003, did not strive to secure a position in a corporatist-like interest mediation system, as in the case of Germany.

Secondly, Turkish immigrant groups in France have been less eager to have a strong presence in their host country's political arena compared to Maghrebian-originated people in France and Turks in Germany. When the French state was pressing the Muslim groups to come up with an official representation of the French-Islam in the early 2000, Turkish Muslim groups in France did not pay much attention to these endeavors and

thought that this was an issue between the French state and Arabs in France (Akgönül 2013, 145). As a result, Turkish Muslim groups in France have rarely competed with each other over the opportunities provided by the French state. However, recently, it is possible to observe a changing trend, as a result of increasing interest of Turkish religious organizations in councils of Islam in France. After 2007, DITIB, Milli Görüş, and Süleymancı organizations started sending their representatives to the Regional Councils of Muslim Faith (CRCMs) at the local and the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM) at the national level. During this process, DITIB portrayed itself "as the only acceptable and legitimate organization to represent the Turkish community in France" (Citak 2010, 628). In return, Milli Görüş allied with other Arab-origin Islamic organizations[94] in order to secure seats at the CFCM for its members (ibid. 629).

The fragmentation of the Turkish immigrant society both in Germany and in France brought about two significant and to some extent paradoxical consequences for Turkish migrants' political participation in the 1990s. On the one hand, as many scholars have already argued that internal fragmentations of Turkish immigrant groups along their ethnic, religious, and political identities have obstructed the formation of stable and effective initiatives towards migrant politics, which could effectively voice the problems of Turkish immigrants in their host countries (Ögelman 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Both in Germany and in France, Turkish immigrant groups have engaged in several attempts to go beyond political and personal strife and to unite under the common interest of the Turkish immigrant community. Yet, many of these attempts failed to

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[94] During the 2003 and 2005 elections for the CFCM, Milli Görüş allied with UOIF (Union des Organizations Islamique de France), which is supported by Moroccan groups in France and known as a pro-Muslim Brotherhood organization.

evolve into stable and long-term initiatives. For instance, in the mid-1990s, Turkish and Kurdish umbrella organizations endeavored to come together and form an anti-racism forum in Germany. Yet, the initiative was abandoned after the three meetings, since two sides could not agree on the definition of racism (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 67–68). In the same way, an inter-organizational platform -CFAIT (*Conseil Français des Associations d'Immigrés de Turquie*)- in France aimed to bring Turkish immigrant organizations together with the purpose of "initiating a common movement of immigrants from Turkey, despite their differences in homeland politics" (author's interview with the president of ACORT, #1). Yet, the initiative could not evolve into a larger collective movement.

On the other hand, these internal fragmentations, while dividing up Turkish immigrant communities within the national borders of host countries, have also led to the formation of transnational linkages and solidarities across Europe. Therefore, Turkish immigrants in Europe, who share common religious, ethno-cultural, and political references, have come together through the transnational networks of immigrant associations. According to Kastoryano (2003, 196), "the conflictual relations or internal rivalries" of Turkish immigrant groups "paradoxically reinforce interwoven bonds of solidarity and encourage identification with the 'transnational community'".

Consequently, the *modus operandi* of the current Turkish immigrant organizational networks in Germany and France has been, to a great extent, defined in the 1990s. The solidification of internal community fragmentations within the host country national borders have gone hand in hand with the institutionalization of transnational solidarities of Turkish immigrants across Europe. The Turkish organizations in Germany,

with the advantage of having the longest history and the largest number of Turkish immigrants within the host country borders, have gained a leadership position over the transnational networks of Turkish immigrant organizations across Europe. On the other hand, throughout the 1990s, Turkish immigrant organizations in France have illustrated a low-profile approach in their political engagements.

2.2. Post-2000: Diverging Collective Politics of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and France

While the development of Turkish migrants' organizations in Germany and France, to a great extent, followed a parallel trajectory up until the late 1990s, the post-2000 period marked the crystallization of structural differences between Turkish immigrant organizational landscapes in these two national contexts. In this period, Turkish migrant organizations in Germany have become prominent political actors in German immigration and integration politics, achieved a substantial public recognition and representation in German institutions for interest mediation. On the other hand, French-Turks and their organizations have been mostly invisible at the national level politics in France. Turkish immigrant organizations in France started having a collective political presence in the public sphere in France, only after the advent of international political conflicts between France and Turkey during the mid-2000s i.e. France's strong opposition to Turkey's EU bid and French legislations on the official recognition of Armenian killings during the late Ottoman era as "genocide" and the denial of it a crime.

To start with the case of Germany: Multiple factors have contributed to the increasing presence of Turkish migrant organizations in German political stage. Firstly, the substantial transformation of German policies towards immigrants from an exclusionist one under the "guest worker" framework to an integrationist one has

changed the terms of the relationship between the German state and its Turkish minority. The official acknowledgement of permanent ethno-cultural diversity in Germany, the citizenship reform in 2000, and the foundation of national-level platforms for immigrant interest representation including the German Islam Conference and the Integration Summit in 2006 have altogether paved way for greater public recognition of Turkish migrant groups and their effective representation in German public institutions.

However, the structural transformations of German integration policies and institutions cannot entirely account for political mobilization of Turkish immigrants through their organizations. To put it simply, while the emerging political and discursive opportunities in German national context opened the participatory channels for all of the immigrant groups, the Turkish minority has shown a particular success in self-organization and engagement with German public authorities. This point obliges us to consider a second set of factors that includes group consciousness and motivations for collective action to explain growing presence of Turkish immigrant organizations in German politics. As opposed to the case of France, up until the citizenship reform in 2000, Germany had delineated a highly impermeable boundary between its nationals and foreigners. Such a segregationist framework contributed to the reinforcement of group identity among minority communities in Germany. Turks, in contrast with other groups, have constituted the largest ethnic minority in Germany. When the numerical visibility coincided with a high socio-economic, ethno-cultural and religious difference from the host society, the Turkish minority has been one of the main targets of integration debates, anti-immigrant opinion, and right-wing derision. These unwelcoming circumstances have led the Turkish minority to develop extensive networks of self-organizations, which have

even further strengthened group consciousness and internal solidarity bonds. Consequently, when the German immigrant integration regime took an inclusive shift after the 2000s, the Turkish immigrant community was already mobilized around her group identity, developed her own political organizations, and accumulated enough motivation to shape German public policies and practices. In the next chapter, I will analyze the causes of Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany further.

Today, the largest Turkish migrant organizations in Germany are organized as either *umbrella* organizations that bring together diverse and distinct organizations together or as *federations* that link local and regional branches to the central organization.[95] Therefore, despite the failure of various efforts to unify the Turkish minority in Germany under an overarching organization, a great deal of centralization of Turkish organizations is achieved through these organizational networks. It must be noted that these organizational networks still compete and clash with each other over acquiring greater public recognition and authorization to represent the Turkish community in Germany. Yet, as the lines of internal community divisions have become consolidated and acknowledged by the community actors themselves, more opportunities for collective action and cooperation seem to be emerging.

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[95] It must be highlighted that Turkish migrant organizations in France, as opposed to their German counterparts, are substantially less formalized and less centralized. The higher level of institutionalization of the major Turkish organizations in Germany is demonstrated by their proper organizational buildings and office spaces, larger professional organizational cadres including general secretaries specialized in public relations, extensive organizational websites and online presence, and published organizational pamphlets and brochures ready for visitors. In the case of France, Turkish immigrant organizations, even the major ones, have a less formalized structures and are more dependent on voluntary work of their personnel. While Turkish immigrants' umbrella organizations, which bring smaller and independent associations under a common roof, are very common in Germany, such a centralization process is largely absent in the case of France.

The foundation of a common platform by the four largest Islamic organizations in Germany in 2007 exemplifies such an emerging collectivity of Turkish immigrant groups in the post-2000 period. After various unsuccessful attempts of Sunni organizations to establish a common platform in Germany in the 1990s (see: Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 58), these previously conflicting Islamic networks managed to come together under the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Der Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* - KRM) in 2007 in order to create a single negotiating partner for the German state on the issues related to Muslims in Germany. The KRM brought together the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the Islamic Council of Germany (IR), the Central Council of Muslims (ZMD), and the Association of Islamic Culture Centers (VIKZ).[96] Although the German state has not recognized the KRM as the official interlocutor of Muslims in Germany,[97] the initiative itself is an important step toward having a collective presence in German politics. After its foundation, the KRM focused on fighting against neo-racist and islamophobic movements in Germany. In 2012, the KRM released a report concerning to right-wing terrorist activities committed by the National Socialist Underground organization (*Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund*

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[96] DITIB was founded in 1982 and has been linked to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish state. Today, it is the largest Islamic organization in Germany with 896 member associations (see: http://www.ditib.de, last accessed on August 20, 2013). The IR (*Islamrat*) was founded in 1986 by the VIKZ, the Jama'at Un-Nur and later included the Milli Görüş (IGMG). The founding member VIKZ left the IR and founded ZMD, since they did not want to be in the same organization with the Milli Görüş (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 58). ZMD (*Zentralrat*) was founded in 1994. Today, the ZMD has a multi-ethnic profile including some Shiite groups (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 168). The VIKZ (known as Süleymancı community) was founded in 1973. Its members follow the teachings of Turkish religious leader Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who died in Turkey in 1959. It represents a Sunni Sufi (mystic) order with approximately 300 mosques in Germany.

[97] The German public authorities often state two main reasons for not recognizing the KRM as the negotiating partner of Muslims in Germany. Firstly, the KRM does not represent all Muslim groups in Germany including the Alevi minority and unorganized Muslims that do not belong to any of these religious organizations. Secondly, the official membership of these Islamic umbrella organizations is much more lower than their actual followers. This gap stems from the structure of Islam, which does not require believers to formally subscribe any of the mosque organization (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 170).

– NSU), which killed ten people (8 Turkish-origin, 1 Greek-origin immigrants and a policewoman) between 2000 and 2006 and enumerated the demands from the German state. Recently, they call attention to increasing hate-crimes against Muslims and their prayer places in Germany (see: http://koordinationsrat.de, last accessed on August 20, 2013).

Another remarkable example of cooperation among Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany in the post-2000 era took place when the four leading Turkish organizations –DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), TGD (The Turkish Society in Germany), FÖTED (The Federation of Turkish Parenthood Associations in Germany), and RTS (The Council of Turkish Citizens in Germany)- boycotted the second Integration Summit in 2007 in order to protest against the tightening measures introduced to the 2005 immigration law. Despite the boycott, the second Integration Summit took place as it was scheduled and the German government did not revoke the tightening changes in the immigration law. Yet, the protesting Turkish organizations managed to receive international media coverage to their concerns. Moreover, as the protesting organizations requested,[98] the German government agreed to create a permanent advisory council of integration (*Integrationsbeirat*) at the federal level that provides consultancy to the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. Consequently, the post-2000 period indicates a rising collective presence of Turkish immigrants in German political sphere and their increasing pressure on German public authorities.

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[98] In 2008, just before the meeting of the third Integration Summit, six Turkish organizations released a press statement that enumerated their demands from the German state. The basic claims included: local electoral rights for foreign residents, allowance of double-nationality for Turkish-origin people, facilitation of the naturalization procedure in Germany, re-structuration of the schooling system to provide multicultural education, and the formation of an advisory council at the Federal that would provide a permanent communication between the government and migrants' organizations (TGD 2010, 59).

In the case of France, Turkish migrant organizations have been largely invisible from the national level public discussions on immigrant integration. Even during the renowned headscarf conflict between the French state and Muslim students, which started as early as 1989 and kept on occupying the political discussions in the 1990s and the early 2000s, Turkish migrant organizations were, to a great extent, out of the public stage (Petek 2008, 86). The process of politicization of French-Turks and their organizations could only take place when anti-Turkish discourse became evident after a series of conflicts between Turkey and France.

The first conflict was about Turkey's accession to the EU. The staunch opposition of France in the mid-2000s against Turkey's EU membership reinforced the negative image of Turks in France as not belonging the European community. It was not a coincidence that during this era, there was a sharp increase in the number of Turkish-origin people running for elective offices in France. According to the report prepared by the Turkish embassy, there were approximately 200 Turkish-origin French citizens running for the 2008 local elections. 91 of them were elected as members of municipal councils or vice-majors. Secondly, the French legislations on the recognition of mass-killings of Armenians in the late Ottoman era as genocide (the law in 2001) and the denial of it as a crime (law proposal in 2011 and 2012) resulted in diplomatic crises between Turkey and France. The international contention led to large-scale mobilizations of Turkish organizations in France and their protest movements against France's legal actions concerning to the Armenian issue.

Why are French-Turks and their organizations largely invisible from the French political arena, while other immigrant groups, particularly the Maghrebian-origin ones,

mobilize around immigrants' rights and claim for equality, anti-racism, and cultural accommodation? Why and how do French-Turks become politically mobilized and visible in the French political sphere, when the issues related to their homeland politics are at stake? This striking variation in French-Turks' collective politics demonstrates that immigrants' political mobilization and participation cannot be reduced to their institutional surrounding or group-based resources. Neither the French-republican context nor French-Turks' lesser political resources can adequately explain this situation. The next chapter will be discussing about causes of these divergences in Turkish immigrants' politics in greater detail.

3. Conclusion

In chapter five, I inquired cross-national patterns of immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France by focusing on immigrants' organizational structures, their structured relationship with public authorities, and dynamics of their collective claims making. Firstly, I aimed to delineate general patterns of immigrants' organizational politics and collective claims making in Germany and France. Secondly, I turned to Turkish immigrants' collective politics in these two national contexts and analyzed the extent of which the case of Turkish immigrants fits into these cross-national patterns.

In the first part, I provided a background on general trends of immigrants' organizing process and collective political claims making in Germany and France. My research demonstrated that differences in immigrant integration regimes and prevailing discursive frameworks pave the way for *qualitatively* different patterns of immigrants' collective politics in these two national contexts. While German corporatism facilitates immigrants' structured dialogue with host country institutions, exclusive elements in

German citizenship and public discourse hamper immigrants' interest in and engagement with host country politics. On the contrary, republican assimilationism in France does not recognize immigrant organizations as dialogue partners on immigrant-related issues. Therefore, France becomes a prime case for extra-institutional mobilization of immigrants. Contrary to the German case, immigrants' collective mobilization in France is primarily directed to host country political issues and institutions. Consequently, this part demonstrated that differences in national political institutions and discursive frameworks are, to a great extent, translated into diverging patterns of immigrants' collective politics.

In the second part, I demonstrated that collective politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France have gone through different phases in different points of their immigration history. Up until the 1990s, political engagements of Turkish migrant organizations in Germany and France followed similar patterns. While there was little political mobilization in the 1960s, starting from the 1970s and until the late 1980s, political developments in Turkey have been the main determinant of Turkish immigrants' collective political activities in Germany and France. The main lines of divergence in collective politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France started taking place, as the pursuit of immigrant political issues became the primary concern in the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Starting from the 1980s, many Turkish migrant organizations in Germany hold dual political agendas: one related to their homeland and the other concerned about improving their lives in their host countries. In the post-2000 era, Turkish migrant organizations in Germany have become prominent political actors in German immigration and integration politics, achieved a substantial public recognition

and representation in public institutions. On the contrary, French-Turks and their organizations have been mostly invisible at the national level politics in France, mostly focused on local-scale activities with the purpose of providing services in immigrant neighborhoods, and developed minimum contact with host country public authorities. It was only with the rise of Turkish national issues in French politics i.e. Turkey's EU bid and French legislations on the contested Armenian "genocide" in 1915, French-Turks started demonstrating collective interest in their host country politics.

Chapter five concludes that recent findings on collective politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France contradict previous wisdoms that view Germany as a primary case of immigrants' transnational politics and France as a case with immigrants' higher involvement with their host country politics through extra-parliamentary socio-political movements. In the German case, while Turkish immigrant organizations have been directly or indirectly involved in homeland politics, they also achieved a substantial interest and presence in their host country politics. In the case of France, the majority of Turkish immigrants and their organizations have not shown a collective interest in immigrant political issues or taken part in cross-ethnic immigrant movements in France. Yet, paradoxically, transnational political issues paved the way for French-Turks' collective political mobilization in France and their increasing intervention in French politics. In the next chapter, I will discuss causes of these cross-national differences in collective politics of Turkish immigrants.

CHAPTER 6

TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE TO IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION

In chapter four and five, I demonstrated that profound cross-national differences exist between Turkish immigrants' political incorporation in Germany and France. Both at the individual and the collective levels, the Turkish minority in Germany is more present in their host country politics than the Turkish minority in France. Chapter six investigates the causes of such cross-national divergences of the same immigrant group. I evaluate the extent to which existing group-based and institutional theoretical perspectives in migration studies can account for the cross-national divergence in Turkish immigrants' political mobilization and participation in Germany and France. After re-visiting the existing explanations, I argue for the necessity of a new approach to migrants' politics that takes the role of subjective factors, including migrant groups' perception of collective discrimination, unequal treatment and feeling of injustices, into account.

Chapter six illustrates that neither group-based nor institutional explanations can adequately explain German-Turks' success and French-Turks' underachievement in terms of political incorporation into their host country politics. The presence of cross-national differences between Turkish immigrant groups' politics in Germany and France challenges group-based explanations, which expect similar patterns of political participation from similar immigrant groups. On the other hand, the existing cross-national differences do not fully fit into the institutionalist perspective, which portrays France as a fertile soil for migrants' individual-level political integration and extra-institutional collective movements and Germany as a home for migrants' weaker

integration into host country politics and strong transnational political attachments. Therefore, my research demonstrates the necessity of a third approach. My approach emphasizes the impact of migrants' perception of their group's position in their host country ethno-racial hierarchy. While the existing group sources and institutional opportunities define the horizon of possible political actions within host country politics, neither group sources nor institutional opportunities guarantee whether migrant groups would use these available political sources and mobilize politically. In this respect, subjective dimensions such as collective perception of discrimination, unequal treatment, and being at the target of right-wing politics become crucial for understanding the emergence of collective political mobilization.

The relationship between migrants' collective perception of discrimination and the process of political mobilization and participation is not a straightforward one. While not all collectively discriminated and rejected immigrant-originated groups emerge as political actors in host society politics, in some cases, group-based discrimination and rejection by the host society pave way to "reactive ethnicity" (see: Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). At this point, migrants' organizational networks and political leaders play a significant role in framing collective grievances and feelings of injustice into collective political claims and coordinating political action towards host country political institutions.

My research shows that due to the configuration of various factors such as lingering effects of exclusionist definition of German nationhood, differentialist nature of German integration policies, the large and conspicuous size of Turks in Germany, and their negative perception in German public and political discourses, the Turkish minority

in Germany has a higher perception of discrimination, unequal treatment, and having a disadvantaged position in their host society than the Turks in France. Turkish migrant organizations and Turkish-origin political leaders in Germany play a crucial role in transforming collective discontent into political claims, raising these political claims in host country public sphere and coordinating the line of political action that would remedy the problems of Turkish-origin people in Germany. As a result, German-Turks have a stronger incentive and capacity to become active participants in German politics and secure better political representation and recognition than their counterparts in France.

On the other hand, Turks in France, even though they are not better off than other major immigrant groups in social and economic terms, develop a perception of having a better status in ethno-racial hierarchy in France by placing themselves vis-à-vis the Maghrebian-originated groups. Because Turkish immigrants in France are not the primary targets of right-wing xenophobic politics or of societal discrimination more generally, they have not developed a level of political consciousness that motivates them to collectively mobilize to make claims against the French state. Moreover, their reluctance to participate in broader immigrants' movements towards the French state – mostly headed by Maghrebian-origin people- emerges as an implicit political strategy of Turkish-origin groups in France to maintain the Arab-Turk distinction in the eyes of the French public. Therefore, the primary political strategy of Turkish migrant organizations in France centers on differentiating themselves from the lower ranks of the society (read it as the Maghrebian-origin population), rather than improving their status as immigrants as in the case of their counterparts in Germany.

In this chapter, I start with re-visiting the existing theoretical perspectives to immigrants' politics. I evaluate the extent to which group-based and institutional perspectives could explain cross-national differences in Turkish immigrants' political incorporation in Germany and France. Secondly, I elaborate how a scholarly attention to host country social context and immigrants' collective perception of their group's status in this inter-ethnic context explain cross-national differences in Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France. I articulate the role of perceived group status in host country's ethno-racial hierarchy by discussing Turkish immigrant organizations' political engagements in Germany and France.

1. Revisiting the Existing Explanations to Immigrant Political Incorporation

1.1. Group-Based Explanations

The group-based perspectives commonly emphasize internal, group-related factors as the main determinants to immigrant political incorporation. In this perspective, differences in Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France are attributed to divergence of these two groups in terms of their socio-economic class, ethno-cultural identities, and exit and reception conditions during their immigration process. Below, I will elaborate the extent to which these group-based factors can explain the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France.

Socio-Economic Factors:

Socio-economical approaches to immigrant politics argue that immigrant groups with higher socio-economical resources (i.e. higher income, occupational status, and educational attainment) tend to participate in politics at higher rates. In this research paradigm, German-Turks' success and French-Turks' underachievement in terms of their

political incorporation into their host country politics are expected to be caused by differences in available socio-economic sources. Yet, the existing empirical findings do not support this argument. Considering the fact that the Turkish presence in Germany and France shares common trajectories of immigration (i.e. arrival of guest workers, family members, refugees and asylum seekers), there are not enough compelling reasons to think that Turks in Germany and France originate from different socio-economic classes before their arrival. In terms of the current status of Turkish minority in Germany and France, the existing survey studies point out a slight difference but in a flip side way. The Euro-Turks survey, conducted in 2004, highlights that French-Turks slightly do better than German-Turks in their socio-economic performance (Kaya and Kentel 2005). According to the survey findings, while Turks in France are generally happy with their current socio-economic situation, Turks in Germany are more concerned with their current status and view their prosperity in decline (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 28). Therefore, socio-economic factors cannot explain the differences in Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France.

Ethno-Cultural Explanations:

Ethno-cultural approaches to immigrant politics assume that immigrant groups' ethnic, cultural, religious, and homeland identities determine the nature of their political mobilization and participation. Turkish minorities in Germany and France, despite their internal diversity, constitute a parallel ethno-cultural profile. Similar lines of identity divisions (for example between Turks and Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis, secularists and Islamists) exist in both cases. Therefore, ethno-cultural accounts fall short of explaining cross-national divergence of Turkish migrants' political incorporation in Germany and

France. References to ethno-cultural identities gain analytical value in explaining the emergence of transnational networks of Turkish migrant groups (for example Alevi, political Islamists, (ultra)nationalist networks of Turkish immigrants across Europe).

On the other hand, ethnic civic community perspective assumes a causal link between social capital of immigrants and their tendency to mobilize and participate in host country politics. Scholars in this perspective demonstrate that migrant communities develop higher levels of political integration when they have higher density of associational networks with higher number of cross-associational ties. In this respect, it is reasonable to derive German-Turks' political success and French-Turks' underachievement from possibly different level of social capital between Turks in Germany and France.

As I previously argued, Turkish migrant organizations in Germany have highly contributed to Turkish-origin people's political mobilization and participation in host country politics. Up until the 2000 citizenship reform, migrant organizations were the only available political means for Turkish immigrants to collectively raise their voice. Turkish immigrants' umbrella organizations in Germany, not only endeavor to represent Turkish community interest in public sphere, but also function as schools for German politics for many Turkish-origin German politicians. On the other hand, Turkish immigrant organizations in France have been smaller in numbers, less institutionalized and less centralized compared to their counterparts in Germany. Rather than representing immigrant community interest in host public sphere, Turkish immigrant organizations in France have been mostly catering community services at the local level.

Despite differences in density, institutionalization, and centralization of Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany and France, my research challenges the argument that Turkish immigrants' different level of political incorporation in these two national contexts primarily stems from their different levels of social capital. Firstly, the organizational landscapes of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France are, to a great extent, linked to each other through transnational organizational networks. In this respect, French-Turks have greater access to organizational sources (i.e. human and financial capital) than the ones that are immediately available within the borders of France. Secondly, French-Turks' membership rates in immigrant organizations are at par with other Maghrebian-origin groups in France (Tiberj and Simon 2012, 7). Considering the fact that Maghrebian-origin immigrants have been active actors in immigrant politics in France since the 1980s, organizational membership cannot explain French-Turks' relative apathy towards immigrant politics in France. Thirdly, recent organizational mobilization of French-Turks around the legislations of contested Armenian "genocide" by the French parliament demonstrates that when certain issues are at stake, French-Turks have enough organizational capacity to politically mobilize and seek for public presence.

Factors Specific to Immigration Experience:

Besides the socio-economical and ethno-cultural factors, some other studies prioritize the role of immigrant groups' mode of exit, duration of stay, size and geographic distribution, and cultural distance from the host society as the key factors affecting immigrants' political experiences. To start with, Turkish minorities in Germany and France have many of these factors in common. They share a similar immigration history, similar

duration of stay, considerable concentration in urban cities;[99] and similar ethno-cultural gap from their host societies. It needs to be noted that even though the Turkish labor migration to Germany and France started around the same years (the former in 1961 and the latter in 1965), the major flow of Turkish immigrants to France took place with a 10-year delay than to Germany. Yet, my research shows that this small time lag in the Turkish immigration flow to Germany and France is not the principle determinant of diverging politics of Turkish immigrants in these two national contexts. The fact that Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France followed a similar pattern during the early years of migration and cross-national divergences became particularly visible in recent periods challenges time-based arguments that attribute variances in Turkish immigrant politics in Germany and France to their different durations of stay.

On the other hand, in terms of the size of the Turkish community, there is a remarkable difference between Germany and France. Germany is a home for the largest Turkish-originated population (approximately 2,9 million) in Europe. France comes second after Germany with an estimation of 500 thousand Turkish-origin people, according to Turkish diplomatic sources (interview #47). It is beyond any doubt that the considerable discrepancy between the numbers of Turkish-originated people in Germany and France profoundly shapes Turkish immigrants' visibility in the host public sphere, perception by the host society, community sources, and strategies of political participation. Demographic capacity is crucial for affecting political processes, particularly election results. On the other hand, the relationship between demographic

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[99] While the urban residential segregation of Turks in Germany has been a long established fact, studies also confirm that Turks in France have higher segregation level than other immigrant groups (Pan Ké Shon 2011).

capacity and political presence is not always a clear-cut one. While big numbers do not always guarantee large-scale political mobilization and participation in receiving country (as in the case of *Aussiedler* in Germany), small numbers do not always come with political invisibility (e.g. the Armenian diaspora in France). In other words, large size immigrant communities without proper political consciousness might not have much effect on politics of their host countries. In this respect, I argue that while the size of the Turkish-originated community highly matters in shaping the extent and forms of political mobilization and participation, the community size, by itself, cannot entirely explain cross-national difference of Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France.

1.2. Institutionalist Explanations

Institutional approaches to immigrant politics focus on host country institutional and political structures as key factors that determine immigrants' politics. The institutionalist framework provides significant insights for understanding cross-national divergences of Turkish-origin immigrants' political incorporation in Germany and France. National policy frameworks, to a great extent, tailor the structure of Turkish collective organizations, the content of their political claims towards their host country, and their relationship with public authorities. In Germany, exclusionist policies towards immigrants have brought about Turkish migrants' mobilization around "equal political rights". Therefore, as opposed to the case of France, Turkish migrants in Germany strongly claim for liberalized access to German citizenship, allowance of dual-nationality, and local voting rights for foreign residents. On the other hand, inclusive nature of republican regime preempts such strong claims for equal political rights. In France, immigrant-origin people, mostly Maghrebian-originated groups, initiated their political

mobilization in the 1980s around the claim of “right to be different”, which later evolved into the claims of “right to be indifferent”, equality and anti-discrimination. Yet, Turkish-origin immigrants in France neither mobilize around equal political rights like their counterparts in Germany, nor around claims of equality and anti- discrimination as Maghrebian-origin people in France.

The imprints of national integration regimes in Germany and France are also present on the structure of collective organization of Turkish immigrants and their relationship with host country public authorities. The German corporatism encourages ethno-religious minorities to self-organize around their community interests and to form a unified organizational body that would serve as an interlocutor in state-minority relations. Therefore, German political context has been more supportive for the centralization of Turkish immigrant organizations and their structured dialogue with German public authorities than the French case. In the French case, immigrant organizations are also encouraged to serve as intermediaries between the state and immigrant community. Yet, the political logic is quite different than the German one. The French state, rather than supporting unification of immigrant organizations, encourages the proliferation of immigrant organizations. As argued by Kastoryano, migrant organizations in Germany intermediate between the state and immigrant communities with the purpose of representing community interest vis-à-vis the German state; by contrast, migrant organizations in France are encouraged to intermediate with the purpose of prevailing republican values among immigrant populations rather than negotiating with the French state (Kastoryano 1995, 106). The proliferation of immigrant organizations facilitates French state’s reach to immigrant neighborhoods. Therefore, the political framework in

France encourages Turkish immigrant organizations to serve as local-service providers rather than to represent particularistic community interests in "difference-blind" republican politics.

While the institutionalist perspective provides a rigorous analytical framework to explore many aspects of Turkish immigrants' politics in Germany and France, it falls short of explaining some contradictory findings related to Turkish immigrants in these two national contexts. First, while institutionalist presumptions portray Germany as an unfavorable political context and France as a fertile soil for individual level political integration of immigrants, empirical evidence demonstrates a quite opposite situation for Turkish immigrant-origin people in these two national contexts. German-Turks, despite all institutional constraints, have higher interest in host country politics and higher electoral participation rates than their French counterparts. Secondly, while the institutionalist perspective perceives the French case as a prominent context for migrants' extra-institutional social movements, it cannot account for French-Turks' avoidance from such collective immigrant mobilizations in France. In this respect, the institutionalist perspective cannot answer why Turkish immigrants in France have been, to a great extent, absent from cross-ethnic group collective movements, that are particularly headed by Maghrebian-origin immigrants.

1.3. Towards a New Perspective: Perceived Group Position in Host Country Ethno-Racial Hierarchy

While existing approaches to immigrants' politics provide significant accounts about immigrant political incorporation, they fall short of explaining German-Turks' successful and French-Turks' under-achieved processes of political incorporation. In this research, I argue that host country's interethnic context and immigrants' collective perception of

their group's status within this context emerges as a crucial factor that explains diverging patterns in immigrants' politics. The comparative analysis of Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany and France provides significant evidence for the effects of perceived group position in host country ethno-racial hierarchy on collective political mobilization and participation in host country politics. In the case of Germany, the perceived disadvantaged position in German society and group discrimination give stronger motivation to the Turkish minority to become politically active and change their status. Turkish migrant organizations and political elite in this context play a significant role in framing collective discontent and feelings of injustice into political claims, vocalizing these claims in host country public sphere, and coordinating political action toward host country authorities. On the contrary, in France, Maghrebian populations are primarily targeted in the integration debates. Turks in France, by identifying Maghrebian-originated groups with lower segments of the society, develop a perception of having a better status in ethno-racial hierarchy in France. Therefore, it becomes politically crucial to keep their distinction from Arab-originated people. In the following parts, I will discuss politics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France in greater detail.

2. Turks in Germany: When Unfavorable Conditions Become Favorable for Immigrants' Politics

As Kastoryano argues, the "problem of immigration" in Germany has been specifically defined as a "Turkish problem" (*Türkenproblem*) (Kastoryano 2002, 17). Turkish origin people constitute the largest ethnic minority in Germany. Less than half of Turkish-originated people are German citizens. They have lower levels of education, higher unemployment rates, and higher attainment of low-skill jobs than the mainstream society and other immigrant groups in Germany. Yet, it is not only the high number of Turks in

Germany and their lower socio-economic status; but the conception of Turks in German political discourses and collective imagination reinforces the negative Turkish image through which nationhood, culture, and challenges of immigration are negotiated.

Turkish immigrants and their children have been at the very heart of immigration and integration debates in Germany. Particularly right wing political parties but also some left wing political figures often rebuke the Turkish community in Germany for their "reluctance" to integrate into the German society. The main concerns about the Turkish minority in German political discourse include the transformation of Turkish residential segregation into ethnic "ghettos",[100] the emergence of "parallel societies" that lack common norms and values, inadequate German-language fluency among children of immigrants, rising influence of Islam among Turkish communities and increasing presence of extremist movements.

The German public opinion is more suspicious of Turkish-origin people than other immigrant groups in Germany. The perceived level of social distance and lifestyle difference is highest with the Turks (Steinbach 2003). Turks are the most frequently blamed ethnic group for the neighborhood problems (Schaeffer 2013, 14). German public demonstrates a high level of anti-Muslim sentiments. According to the PEW survey research conducted in 2006, 59% of German people oppose immigration from Muslim countries and 40% of them are concerned about Islamic extremism (The Pew Global Attitutes Project 2006).

Apart from their negative image in public opinion and in political discourses, Turkish-originated people are most frequently subjected to xenophobic attacks (Rühl and

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[100] See Caglar (2001) for an analysis of the metaphor of "ghetto" in German political culture.

Will 2004, 27). Far right wing extremism against Turks in Germany dramatically increased after the unification of East and West Germany. Between 1990 and 1992, brutal arson attacks by right wing extremists killed a number of Turkish residents in various German cities. While extreme right criminal offences decreased in the mid-1990s along with the rising Turkish and German sensitivity against racism, they started increasing again after 1997.[101] More recently, an underground Neo-Nazi cell (the NSU – National Socialist Underground) killed 10 people (8 were Turkish origin) between 2000-2007. Not only the resurgence of far right violence, but also the ways that public authorities investigated the incidents caused resentment and distrust of Turkish-origin people against German security offices.[102]

When already existing problems within the German political regime (including restrictions on German citizenship acquisition, the absence of local voting rights for non-EU foreign residents, and legal handicaps for family unification) coincide with negative Turkish image in political discourses and in public opinion, and the existence of xenophobic violence that particularly targets Turkish-originated members in the society, Turkish immigrants and their children develop stronger perception of group-based discrimination and unequal treatment in Germany. According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) in 2008,[103] Turks in Germany have

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[101] For the details of monitoring extreme right wing offences, see the RAXEN project report by Rühl and Will (2004).

[102] During the course of the killings, investigators suspected that the killings were the acts of Turkish mafia and internal community revenge. The incidents appeared in the German media as "*döner* murders" (referring to the famous Turkish fast food dish). After the disclosure of the NSU killings, Turkish organizational leaders lamented "institutional racism" within the German police and government authorities. See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish-community-alleges-institutional-racism-in-murder-probe-a-919056.html (last accessed on September 9, 2013).

[103] EU-MIDIS surveyed 23,500 immigrant and ethnic minority people face-to-face in all 27 EU member states during 2008.

the highest perception of discrimination (52%) on the basis of "ethnic and immigrant origin" in their host country compared to ex-Yugoslavians (%46) in Germany. Moreover, the Center of Turkish Studies and Integration Research (ZfTI) annually surveys the situation of people of Turkish origin in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). According to the 2010 survey, 81% of Turkish-origin people living in NRW claimed that they experience discrimination based on their ethnicity (Sauer 2011, 144).

The current studies demonstrate that perceived group discrimination profoundly affects Turkish immigrants' integration process into the German society. The relationship between group-discrimination and socio-economic integration constitutes a vicious circle: lower socio-economic status of Turkish-origin people reinforces their negative image in German society and the negative image of Turks further hampers already limited opportunities for Turkish-origin people's socio-economic integration. Kaas and Manger (2010) show that people with Turkish-sounding names systematically receive lower callbacks in German labor market.[104] Dill and Jirjahn (2011) demonstrate that residential segregation of Turkish immigrants and their children is mainly caused by the discrimination in the housing market rather than self-selection of community members. Moreover, recent studies claim that threat of stereotypes not only curtail self-esteem of people but also their cognitive abilities in education (Uslucan and Yalcin, 30–33).

On the other hand, group-based discrimination plays a crucial role in the formation of minority group identity. Scholars working on Turkish-origin people's identity formation process in Germany demonstrate that perceived-group rejection results

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[104] They study ethnic discrimination in Germany's labour market through a correspondence test (based on 528 advertisements for student internships). They find that applicants with Turkish sounding names have 14% lower chance of receiving call-back than German applicants.

in Turkish people's strengthening identification with their ethnic and religious group and their weakening identification with the host society (Skrobanek 2009; Kunst et al. 2012; Holtz, Dahinden, and Wagner 2013; see for the case of Turks in the Netherlands Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007;). Skrobanek (2009), by analyzing longitudinal "Transitions to Work" survey data of the German Youth Institute (*Deutsches Jugendinstitut*), concludes that perceived discrimination (on personal and group levels) increases the perception of non-permeability of the group boundaries, which in return strengthens Turkish ethnic identity and the process of (re-) ethnicization (i.e. valorization of in-group specific properties) to (re)gain group value. The focus group study of Holtz et. al. (2013) as well as the survey research of Kunst et. al. (2012) reach similar conclusions that perceived religious stigma and discrimination reinforce Islamic affiliation of Turkish-origin Muslims in Germany. Yet, the current literature overlooks the effects of perceived group-based discrimination on political mobilization and participation of Turkish immigrants and their children in their host country politics. Therefore, existing studies are unable to explain how come Turkish-origin people in Germany, despite their grave socio-economical problems and perceived group rejection, attain a higher level of political integration compared to other ethnic minority groups in Germany and Turkish-originated groups in France.

My argument starts with the assumption that immigrants' perceived group discrimination and subsequently strengthened ethno-religious identity create an opportunity structure through which immigrants' political mobilization and participation take place. Yet, not all cases of perceived group-discrimination and strong ethno-

religious identification pave way to increased presence in host country politics.[105] In this respect, immigrants' organizational networks and political leaders gain a crucial role in defining the issues, informing the immigrant community, raising the issues in host country public sphere, and coordinating the line of political action. Therefore, not only the existence of perceived disadvantaged position but also "strategic framing of injustice and grievances" (See: Zald 1996 and other scholars in the culturalist strand of Social Movements literature) by immigrants' organizational and political leaders serve to heighten political mobilization and participation.

Below, I will demonstrate how perceived group-based discrimination paves the way for Turkish immigrant groups' politicization in Germany by discussing two major issues: Claiming for the right of dual-citizenship and the status of "corporation under public law" for Islam. In each issue, I will analyze the existence of perceived group discrimination against the Turkish minority, the ways that Turkish migrant organizations and political leaders frame the issue, the identification of the relevant institutional targets, and the coordination of political action.

Claiming Dual Citizenship:

In Germany, the possession of multiple citizenships is not allowed as a rule. Before the German Citizenship Law Reform in 2000, Turkish immigrants could maintain both Turkish and German nationalities by taking the advantage of the grey zones in the citizenship legislation. The procedure included renunciation of the Turkish nationality,

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[105] For instance, in the case of Amsterdam, Moroccan immigrants constitute a larger community than Turkish immigrants and are often portrayed as the most problematical minority group in public debates. However, Turks have higher turnout rates in local elections and better political representation in the city council than Moroccans. Michon and Vermeulen (2013) explain political success of Turkish immigrants in electoral politics of Amsterdam through Turkish community's stronger group-based resources (strong ethnic networks and a strong sense of ethnic belonging).

naturalization as German citizens, and re-acquisition of the Turkish nationality (Hailbronner 2010, 22). The citizenship reform in 2000 introduced two path-breaking – and to some extent contradictory- changes in Germany (see: Gerdes, Faist, and Rieple 2007): First, one of the most extensive *jus soli* right in Europe was devised to replace the blood-based principle of the old German citizenship law. Second, after a political contention between the right-wing and the left-wing political parties, the new reform strictly closed the doors for holding multiple citizenships for immigrants and introduced the "option model" [106] for the children of immigrants. (Re-)acquisition of a second nationality became a reason for withdrawal of the German citizenship. When the legislation changed in 2000, around 40,000 Turkish immigrants who were following the common practice of getting naturalized as German citizens and re-acquiring the Turkish nationality lost their German citizenship as well as their residency permit in Germany (Hailbronner 2010).

On the other hand, the heightened scrutiny about the possession of dual-citizenship went hand-in-hand with the extension of exemptions from the dual-citizenship ban. Ethnic German re-settlers and their children, EU citizens (since 2007), citizens of the countries with reciprocal conventions, and citizens of the countries, which make renunciation of nationality for their citizens impossible or based on unreasonable demands (such as Morocco, Iran, Syria) are allowed to carry German passports along with their country of origin nationality (Gerdes, Faist, and Rieple 2007, 47). It is reported that between 2000 and 2008, approximately 47% of all naturalizations in Germany were

[106] Children of immigrants are allowed to hold multiple citizenships until the age of 23; yet, they have to choose one nationality between the ages of 18 and 23. If they fail to choose one of their nationalities, their German citizenship is withdrawn.

allowed to carry multiple citizenships (Miera 2009, 2). Therefore, the denial of dual-citizenship in Germany particularly affects Turkish immigrants and their children.

Despite the existence of a wide range of exemptions, the strict denial of dual-citizenship for Turkish-originated people has resulted in a collective perception that citizenship arrangements in Germany are crafted in a way that brings about differential treatment of Turkish-originated populations. In other words, the idea that the dual-citizenship restriction was particularly designed to cut the ties of Turkish-origin people with their homeland has become a widespread belief among members of Turkish community in Germany. The annual surveys of ZfTI on Turkish-origin people in NRW demonstrate that the dual-citizenship ban in Germany is an important factor in Turkish immigrants' reluctance to naturalize in Germany. The ZfTI survey in 2006 found out that 56% of Turkish people without the German nationality did not want to give up their Turkish citizenship for emotional purposes and therefore did not naturalize in Germany (Sauer 2012, 103). Moreover, the Naturalization Study of 2011,[107] which was conducted by the BAMF in order to analyze the effects of "option model" in Germany, also demonstrated that the restriction of dual-citizenship has an important effect on immigrants' reluctance to naturalize in Germany (Weinmann, Becher, and Babka von Gostomski 2012).

The Turkish-origin organizational and political leaders, despite their political differences in many other areas, share a common position against the restriction of dual-citizenship in Germany. They often consider the dual-citizenship restriction in Germany

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[107] The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) carried out the 2011 Naturalization Study on behalf of the German Interior Affairs Ministry (BMI). The first part of the study included quantitative survey on 1,534 immigrant-origin people. The second part was a qualitative study on the effects of option model that included semi-structured interviews with 27 young persons.

as a human right violation that deprives Turkish-origin individuals from their basic social and political rights; as a source of injustice and group-based discrimination that causes unduly emotional burden on the part of Turkish-originated community; and as a handicap to the naturalization process of Turkish people in Germany and therefore a serious threat against their integration process. The president of the Turkish Council in Germany (ATK) explains the current situation in the following way:

> "The children who were born in 1990 are currently 22 years old. If these children do not make a choice among their nationalities in one year, their German citizenship will be withdrawn. But since these children have been German citizens, they might be working as a police officer, as a civil servant, or serving in the military in Germany. If they do not make a decision, are you going to tell them that their German citizenship is dismissed? How can such thing be possible? Here, many French people hold multiple citizenships. Many Germans have dozens of citizenships. They (German authorities) do not do anything to these people, but exclude those (Turkish) children who were born and grew up here. This situation violates human rights." (author's interview #12)

Many of the Turkish organizational leaders raise their suspicions against the internationally acclaimed German citizenship reform in 2000. During their evaluation of the 2000 citizenship reform, they commonly point out the fact that the naturalization trend among Turkish immigrants was increasing between 1991 and 2000, made a peak in 1999 (just one year before the 2000 reform), and kept on dropping after the 2000 citizenship law. Some of my interviewees claimed that the process of naturalization in Germany was much more easier in the 1990s under the amended version of the previous citizenship law (the 1913 Nationality Act). As opposed to the current situation, the naturalization fee was as low as 100 DM (currently, it is 250 Euros); there was neither language nor citizenship tests; naturalization was recognized as a right protected by law; and the dual-citizenship was implicitly allowed. Despite the path-breaking *jus soli*

component, the 2000 citizenship reform is called as a “deform” by one of my interviewees (author’s interview with the former-speaker of the TBB, interview #9).

During their discussion on the citizenship issue in Germany, some Turkish organization leaders and politicians interestingly associated the situation of Turkish people with the Jewish case in Germany before the Second World War. In the Turkish political discourse in Germany, the reference to the Jewish case serves to multiple purposes: First, in order to fight against xenophobia in Germany, the importance of acquiring German citizenship and attaining political power is explained through the Jewish case. One of the Turkish-originated MPs from the Green Party at the Bundestag, during his speech at the launch of the signature campaign for the right of dual-citizenship, expressed the importance of acquisition of German citizenship in order not to become victims of Neo-Nazi terrorism. He referred to the fact that Nazis, before committing the Holocaust, dismissed Jewish people’s German citizenship in order to politically weaken them. Secondly, the Jewish example is used to justify Turkish people’s desire to maintain their country of origin nationality. The existence of a strong country of origin is either perceived as a guarantor of the security of immigrants in their country of residence or as a safe home in case of a possible violence escalation. The public relations officer of the Milli Görüş in Berlin claimed that if there had been a strong home country behind the Jewish people in the 1930s, the Nazi regime could not conduct violent crimes that easily (interview #11). On the other hand, a Turkish-originated MP at the Berlin parliament encouraged naturalization of Turkish people in Germany, even though they need to give up their Turkish citizenship. Yet, he added that the emotional ties of Turkish-originated people with Turkey are understandable: since Turkish-origin people are subjected to

everyday racism, discrimination, and exclusion, they want to keep the option of re-settlement in Turkey open with the fear that one day, they might become the new Jews in Germany (interview #23).

The political mobilization of Turkish-originated people to attain the right of dual-citizenship in Germany primarily targets the German political authorities. Legally speaking, there are two alternative ways to attain the right of dual-citizenship in Germany. The first option is to put the pressure on the German Federal Parliament to amend the German Nationality Law of 2000. The second option is to put the pressure on the Turkish parliament to make the renunciation of Turkish citizenship impossible or based on unreasonable demands. The clear majority of Turkish political mobilization in Germany opts for the first option and endeavors to influence German policymakers.

Despite the widespread consensus on the issue of dual-citizenship, Turkish migrant organizations do not come together under a single platform to claim for the right of dual-citizenship. Instead, some alliances are built among ideologically closer immigrant organizations. It would be misleading to interpret the multiple -and sometimes competitive- axes of political mobilization towards the same issue simply as a legacy of political divisions inherited from the homeland politics. The fact that local-originated Turkish migrant organizations with minimum organic ties with homeland political actors also mobilize in a separate but parallel fashion suggests that homeland political conflicts play a minor role. On the other hand, it is more persuasive to claim that the multiple and competitive political mobilizations of Turkish immigrant organizations in this issue stem from Turkish organizations' political struggle among each other to attain further

recognition and representation in the eyes of Turkish community and German public authorities.

Depending on the availability of resources, Turkish migrant organizations pursue various political strategies to raise their claims of dual-citizenship rights for the Turkish community in Germany. The conservative Turkish organizations, which are less plugged into German institutions, opt for signature campaigns and press releases to raise their claims. On March 2012, the conservatively oriented TGB (*Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*) initiated a signature campaign for the dual-citizenship right and managed to collect over a hundred thousand signatures.[108] The campaign was supported by Islamist organizations including the Milli Görüş and the DITIB who were effective in gathering grassroots support in their mosques. On the other hand, the secular-left leaning TGD (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*) pursues political action within German institutions through mobilizing their connections with German authorities. In 2013, the TGD drafted an "Equal Rights Law", which included the major claims of Turkish community in Germany such as dual-citizenship, local voting rights for foreign residents, and the right for family union without the obligatory German knowledge of the spouse. The TGD submitted the law proposal to the German authorities during the 6th Integration Summit[109] and endeavored to shape the political campaigns before the September 2013 federal election.

> "For the first time in German history, as a migrant organization, we are preparing a proposal for 'Equal Rights Law'. For the first time, a migrant organization is drafting a law proposal on how immigrants want Germany to be. We know that it is not going

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[108] See: https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft (last accessed on September 15, 2013)

[109] "Göçmenlere Eşitlik Talebi" (Requesting Equality for Immigrants" in *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, May 27, 2013, available at http://dw.de/p/18ehW (last accessed on September 15, 2013).

> to be accepted right now. Politics is a long-term process. We target the next ten years. We want to open the future for the next generations. We want to create a political discussion just before the September 2013 federal elections. For sure, either the SPD or the Greens or the Left (die Linke) will consider including this proposal into their party programs. Then, we will be one step closer for its execution. What I mean: we are leaving behind a reactionary way of making politics towards an action-oriented politics." (The President of the TGD, author's interview #22)

Claiming the Status of 'Corporation Under Public Law' for Islam:

The other political issue that results in mobilization of Turkish-origin people is the legal status of Islam in Germany. The German model of separation of church and state, in contrast with the French *laïcité*, secures the partnership between religious institutions and the German state in various policy areas including education and social welfare (Fetzer and Soper 2004, 105). The religious communities that are recognized as "corporation(s) under public law" (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*) are entitled to special privileges i.e. to have the government collect the "church tax" from the (church) members to be used in religious, social welfare, and educational services of the religious communities; to provide chaplaincy services in the army, in hospitals, in prisons, or in other public institutions; to carry out religious instruction courses in public schools; and to have the right for free broadcasting in public television and radio (Doğan 2008). After the Second World War, the new constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (the Basic Law, 1949) incorporated several extracts from the old Weimar Constitution (1919) and restored the previous church and state relationship (Henkel 2006, 309). While the Roman-Catholic Church, the Protestant Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), and the Jewish community maintained their status of "corporation(s) under public law", the Basic Law confirmed that "other religious societies shall be granted the same rights upon application, if their constitution and the number of their members give assurance of their

permanency" (Article 140). Since then various Christian and Jewish groups received the status of public corporation. Yet, until the recognition of the Ahmadiyya community (a heterodox Muslim group) as a corporate body under public law in the state of Hesse in June 2013,[110] none of the Muslim groups could receive the equal recognition to the Christian and Jewish communities.

Germany is a home to approximately 4 million Muslims. Almost two-thirds of German Muslims have a Turkish origin (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009, 11–12). Muslim associations in Germany operate as "registered association(s)" (*eingetragener Verein*). Since the 1980s, various Muslim organizations, mostly headed by Turkish Muslims, have been seeking to receive an official recognition equivalent to the Christian churches and the Jewish community. Yet, the applications of Muslims have been denied on the basis that they did not meet the constitutional requirements for the "status of corporation under public law". Primarily, the issues of the fragmented nature of Muslim organizations and the small numbers of their registered members (as opposed to their high numbers of actual followers) have been pointed out as the obstacles to representation of German Muslims. Yet, there is a common belief among German Muslims that German states' reluctance to recognize Muslim organizations stems from the bias against Islam (also see: Fetzer and Soper 2004, 108). Turkish organizational leaders and Turkish-originated politicians tend to perceive the lack of formal recognition of Islamic organizations as a

[110] It must be noted that the recognition of the Ahmadiyya community as a corporate body under public law in the state of Hesse has received criticisms from other Muslim groups. The Pakistani-origin Ahmadiyya community is a small Muslim group in Germany with approximately 35 thousand members within more than 4 million Muslims in Germany. The religious doctrine of Ahmadiyya Muslims differs from the mainstream interpretation of Islam and therefore the community has a contested relationship with other Muslim groups.

reflection of an unequal treatment. As stated by a Turkish-origin MP at the Berlin Parliament:

> "They (the German authorities) sit on a table with other religious groups and negotiate their rights, legal status, and other things. So these religious groups find a place for themselves within the German society. But our religion, language, and culture are not seen in equal footing to other groups. They did not want to recognize the cultural baggage that Turkish immigrants brought with them from Turkey. We were perceived as foreigners and our cultural baggage did not find a place in the German society. That's why we have problems in Germany" (author's interview #23)

The political mobilization around the legal status of Islam and its relationship with public authorities takes various forms. The primary political strategy includes exhausting all available institutional channels to receive further rights and recognition for Muslim groups. Since the issue of Islam-state relations is essentially a legal one, the state level courts become the primary site of mobilization. Muslim organizations, primarily under the leadership of German-Turkish Muslims, pursue legal action to receive the right to carry out Islamic instruction courses at public schools, to decide about the construction of mosques in urban sites, to provide chaplaincy services in public institutions, and eventually to receive the status of "corporation under public law" to take advantage of the tax-collecting authority of the government. One of the most remarkable examples of Muslim organizations' legal action took place in Berlin. In 1980, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) applied to obtain authorization for delivering Islamic religious education in Berlin public schools. The initial and subsequent applications of the IFB were rejected on the basis that the IFB is not recognized as a corporation under public law. After a lengthy legal struggle, in 1998, the Berlin's Administrative Appeal Court decided that the IFB could provide religious instructions at public schools under the supervision of state authorities. Since the IFB is known to have close ties with the Milli Görüş organization

(IGMG) in Germany, which is listed as a possible threat to the German democracy by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Berlin court's decision caused uproar among German authorities and the secular-wing of Turkish immigrant community. Barbara John, Berlin's Commissioner for Foreigners during the time, admitted that their failure to come up with an earlier solution to the problem of offering Islamic courses at public schools resulted in the unfortunate decision of the court to identify a fundamentalist-leaning organization as the provider.[111] Therefore, the Berlin case became a cornerstone in opening of Islamic instruction courses in other states. Many German states including NRW, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria started working on offering Islamic religious education in German language without going through a court process as in the Berlin case.

Apart from their legal pursuits, Turkish Islamic organizations endeavor to fulfill the requirements to receive the official recognition as corporations under public law. In 2007, with the purpose of creating a single negotiating partner with the German state, four largest Sunni Islam umbrella organizations –DITIB, VIKZ, IR, and ZMD- managed to leave their previous conflicts aside and came together under the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM). Considering the previous failed attempts of Muslim organizations to establish a common platform, we can perceive the foundation of the KRM as an important collective step towards having a greater presence in German politics. Moreover, in 2011, Turkish-state linked DITIB has started the initiative of the

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[111] See: Cohen. 1998. "Long Dispute Ends as Berlin Court Backs Islamic School Lessons." *New York Times*, November 06. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/06/world/long-dispute-ends-as-berlin-court-backs-islamic-school-lessons.html (last visited on September 17, 2013).

"Muslim Community Registry" (*Müslüman Cemaat Kütüğü*)[112] in order to certify the number of actual members of the Muslim community in Germany. Since Islam does not require the believers to register to a religious institution, the initiative of DITIB demonstrates how Muslim organizations are adapting to host country's institutions in order to get further recognition.

The political mobilization of Turkish Muslim organizations does not always include political actions adapted to the German institutional structures. In some cases, Turkish Muslim organizations become harsh critics of the existing institutional arrangements. Especially, the Muslim groups, which are excluded from the institutional resources such as the platforms of structured dialogue between the German state and Muslims, react against the German state policies towards Muslims. The Milli Görüş organization (IGMG), the second largest Turkish-origin Sunni organization in Germany after the DITIB, has scrutinized for its fundamentalist tendencies and closely followed by the German intelligence agency. The Council of Islam (IR), dominated by the Milli Görüş movement, participated the first meeting of the government supported German Islam Conference (DIK). Yet, their participation to the DIK is suspended at the second meeting, since the six officials at the Milli Görüş in Germany was accused of fraud and supporting terrorism. Therefore, the Milli Görüş in Germany represents a hardline against the German integration policies towards Muslims and often raises its critical voice in German public sphere. The leaders of the Milli Görüş perceive the DIK as a project of the German state to keep German Muslims under control. One of the leaders in Berlin Milli Görüş expresses that:

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[112] See: http://www.ditib.de/gemeinderegister/index.php (last accessed on September 17, 2013)

> "Initially, we thought that the German Islam Conference was a very good initiative. Later, we saw that this was a project to contain Muslims into a narrow framework and put them under the control. The representatives of Milli Görüş realized this situation and raised their opposition. The Interior Ministry dismissed the representation of Milli Görüş and started a smear campaign, because we were revealing their hoax and not letting their tricks" (author's interview #11)

3. Turks in France: "We are European-Turks, not Immigrants"

While in Germany, the definition of the "other" has been based on national origin and citizenship; in France, Islam has constituted the demarcation of ethnic boundaries (Kastoryano 2002). Contrary to Germany, the question of Islam in France is not only understood as a religion of immigrants brought from their country of origin, but also perceived through the colonial past and its entanglements. Therefore, while the Turkish minority has been the group in question in Germany, Maghrebians in France have been at the target of the integration debates (see: Alba 2005). In the French eyes: "Muslims/Arabs have been marked as lesser people, incapable of improvement, and so impossible to assimilate to French ways of life" (Scott 2007, 45).

Compared to Maghrebian-originated people, Turks in France have been a less visible immigrant-originated group due to their small numbers,[113] their relative silence during the *banlieu* riots,[114] and the lack of preceding colonial ties with the French society. Interestingly, the relative invisibility of Turkish origin people in French political discourses and public opinion does not imply a successful integration process of Turks

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[113] The number of Turkish-origin people in France differs in various sources, but estimated between 350,000 and 500,000 (see the discussion in chapter three). Therefore, Turks in France constitute only 10-14% of Maghrebian origin populations in France.

[114] During my interview, a diplomat at the Embassy of Turkey in Paris expressed that only handful Turkish-origin people participated in the 2005 riots in French suburbs. According to the Turkish authorities, Turkish-origin people tend to comply with the rules and regulations of France without causing any trouble (author's interview #47).

into the French society. Quite the opposite, compared to Maghrebian-originated groups, Turkish origin people in France have lower levels of integration in socio-economic, cultural, and political domains. This situation was first observed by the famous French demographer Michèle Tribalat in the early 1990s, who demonstrated that none of the ethnic groups in France shows the signs of a closed community (*le repli identitaire*) as immigrants from Turkey (Tribalat 1995, 222). Tribalat coined the term of "the Turkish Exception" (*L'exception turque*), which later on paved the way for a scholarly debate on understanding the historical and contextual reasons of Turkish immigrants' lower levels of adaptation into the French society (see: Rollan and Sourou 2006; Autant-Dorier 2008). The critics of Tribalat argued that Turkish immigrants' socio-economic integration deficit in France is neither voluntary nor inherently rooted in their ethno-cultural identity. On the contrary, the absence of previous colonial ties between Turkey and France as well as path-dependent effects of low-skilled Turkish labor migration are considered as the main causes for Turkish immigrants' lower levels of adaptation into the French society. Apart from these early discussions, recent survey studies also confirm the integration deficit of Turkish origin people in France compared to other North African originated immigrant groups.[115]

Despite all of these integration challenges, Turkish-origin people in France have a lower level of perceived group discrimination than Maghrebian-origin groups. The 2005 survey study on the "New French"[116] demonstrated that Turkish origin people less perceive themselves as victims of racism in France than North Africans and Sub-

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[115] See the findings of the Trajectories of Origin Survey, which was conducted by INSEE and INED in 2008. For the initial survey findings, see: Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon (2010).

[116] The CEVIPOF conducted a representative survey study in 2005 on the "New French" that includes French citizens with Turkish and African origins and their descendants.

Saharans (Brouard and Tiberj 2011b, 105). The 2008 study of Trajectories of Origin further fleshes out the heterogeneity of perception and experience of discrimination among immigrant-origin groups. The study demonstrates a significant gap between "subjective" and "objective" level of discrimination in the case of Turkish-origin people. While Turkish-origin people experience discrimination at similar rates with Maghrebian-origin people, their perceived level of discrimination is lower than the ones perceived by other immigrant groups originating from Africa (Brinbaum, Safi, and Simon 2012, 6–7). In other words, Turkish immigrants are no less discriminated against in their actual lives; yet, they have lower perception of discrimination than other visible immigrant groups in France. 31% of Turkish immigrants report that they have experienced discrimination based on their ethno-racial origins, this is 38% for Maghrebians and 48% for Sub-Saharan Africans. Although the children of Turkish immigrants have higher levels of perceived ethno-racial discrimination than their parents, still Turkish-origin people in general maintain a positive perception of their group status in ethno-racial hierarchy of France.

In this research, I argue that perceived group status in host country ethno-racial hierarchy have important implications for immigrants' politics. In the previous part, I have demonstrated that Turkish-origin people's perception of group-based discrimination in Germany plays a crucial role in their political mobilization and participation. On the other hand, Turkish-origin people in France have a quite positive perception of their group status in the French society, compared to their counterparts in Germany. The overwhelming presence of ex-colonial migrants in France results in Turkish-immigrants and to some extent their children's positive perception of their lives in France.

My research shows that French-Turks' positive perception of their group status in France brings about two significant political consequences: First, French-Turks have fewer incentives to have an impact on immigration and integration politics in France, since they already believe that they have a satisfactory life in France. Second, French-Turks, to a great extent, deliberately avoid engaging in collective actions in the issues of immigrant politics, since such collective movements require cooperation with ex-colonial migrants in France. In other words, in order to keep the Arab/Turk distinction in the eyes of the French society, Turkish-origin immigrants show less interest in the issues -such as equal rights, discrimination, racism, police harassment- that commonly affect immigrant-origin groups in France. On the other hand, French-Turks have become politically mobilized only after a series of international conflicts between Turkey and France and subsequent anti-Turkish discourse in the French public sphere after the mid-2000s.

As a result, the collective politics of French-Turks in the post-2000s can be identified with the following aspects: (1) self-differentiation from the Maghrebian-origin immigrant groups and therefore indifference toward immigrants' political struggles in France; (2) transnational political mobilization along with the international crises between France and Turkey including France's vocal opposition against Turkey's EU bid and French legislations on contested Armenian "genocide" laws; and (3) spillover effects of transnational political mobilization upon increased participation of French-Turks in French politics. Below, I discuss these points in detail.

Turks and Arabs in France and the Politics of "Distinction":

Even though immigrant-originated groups from Turkey and North Africa are generally lumped together into the category of "Muslims in Europe", they highly differ from each

other in historical, cultural, linguistic, and socio-economical terms. Contrary to the Maghrebian-originated populations in France, Turkish immigrants are newer in France; do not have any colonial ties with France; lack preceding cultural and linguistic connections with the French society; and are more prone to become entrepreneurs and to run their independent businesses rather than acquiring salary-based jobs in public or private sector (Akgönül 2005, 91–94). The demarcation between Turks and Arabs becomes further clear in the discourse of Turkish immigrants in France. Among French-Turks and their organizational leaders, it is a common practice to juxtapose the Turkish victory in the Independence War against colonial powers in the early 20th century vis-à-vis the colonial domination of North Africa; the Turkish version of moderate Islam vis-à-vis radical elements in Arabic Islam; and modern democratic structure of the Turkish Republic vis-à-vis problems of underdevelopment in North African.

Contrary to the scholarly accounts that perceive Muslims in France as a single community, Turkish and Arab-origin Muslims organize in a separate but parallel fashion without sharing prayer places, Quran courses, or pilgrimage trips (*Hajj*) to Mecca. Various survey studies on Turkish religious associations in different parts of France document the "voluntary mutual ignorance" between Turkish and Arab-originated people and the absence of relationship between their associations (Akgönül 2005, 92–93). The president of the Milli Görüş in France expressed that the language is one of the primary barriers between Turkish and Arab Muslims to share their prayer places. While Turkish Islamic organizations give a special importance to cater religious services in Turkish, in Arab-origin mosques, French and Arabic are used interchangeably (author's interview #35). Moreover, power struggles between Turkish and Arab-origin Islamic organizations

obstruct possible cooperation in the field of religion. For example, the president of Milli Görüş in France also mentioned a common mosque project that they had initiated with Arab-origin groups in France. In the end, the project was suspended due to the conflicts over which group would be responsible from preachers and pilgrimage trips.

As opposed to the German case, Turks in France do not consider themselves as a disadvantaged or an unfairly treated group in their host country. The Turkish organizational leaders in France often identify themselves (and the Turkish community in France) as "Euro-Turks" rather than "immigrants" or "foreigners". While Turkish immigrant leaders in Germany frequently mention that "no matter what Turks do, they will be permanently seen as foreigners in Germany", such a conception does not exist among Turkish leaders in France. As the chair of l'ACORT puts it: "Turks (in France) never consider themselves as immigrants, but they think that Arabs are the immigrants of France" (author's interview #1). Therefore, the blend of European Turkish identity among French-Turks comes at the cost of downgrading the category of Maghrebian-origin populations. In this respect, maintaining the distinction between Turks and Arabs becomes a crucial strategy for French-Turks to preserve their perceived better-off status in the social context of France.

French-Turks' emphasis on their national identity as a superior trait deeply affects their political life. Turkish migrant organizations in France have not shown a collective presence within immigrants' political movements. While extensive politicization among Maghrebian-origin immigrants took place in the 1980s, only the leftist Turkish organizations with a limited membership profile, such as l'ACORT, participated in cross-ethnic alliances with these groups. On the other hand, Turkish

religious organizations in France, which included larger immigrant constituencies, were largely absent from these immigrant movements. During the highly debated headscarf conflict in France in the 1990s and later again in the first of half of the 2000s, there was no visible Turkish presence in French public sphere (author's interview #38). As Akgönül (2005) argues, the struggle of North African populations in France has been and still is based on gaining acceptance as equal French citizens of the French society; by contrast, the struggle of Turkish-origin people in France primarily includes emphasizing their national distinction and receiving recognition as Turks. As a result, French-Turks have been largely absent from immigrants' collective movements that claim for equal rights, equal treatment, and accommodation of cultural differences.

It must be noted that in the past, internal competition of Turkish Islamic organizations in France resulted in short-term cooperation between some Turkish and Maghrebian groups. During the 2003 and 2005 elections for the CFCM (The French Council of the Muslim Faith), the Milli Görüş in France circumvented the Turkish state's boycott on them by allying with the Moroccan-origin UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) (see: Citak 2010). Therefore, the conflict between the Turkish-state linked DITIB and the Milli Görüş resulted in Milli Görüş's temporary alliance with some Maghrebian groups. Yet, this short-term alliance was far from having a cross-ethnic Muslim alliance in France at the grassroots level.

Political Mobilization of French-Turks along with Transnational Political Issues:

The process of politicization of Turkish-origin immigrants in France could only take place when anti-Turkish discourse in French public sphere became evident after a series of international conflicts between Turkey and France. The initial wave of politicization of

French-Turks emerged during the period of 2005-2007, when Turkey's accession to the EU was highly debated in France. During this period, France set forth her suspicion about Turkey being a part of Europe and became one of the most vocal opponents against Turkey's EU bid.[117] The tightening relationship between France and Turkey paved way for politicization of the Turkish minority in France. While the public opinion in France has been, to a great extent, indifferent to French-Turks (Kastoryano 1995, 103), for the first time during France's opposition to Turkey's EU bid, French-Turks have faced an anti-Turkish discourse in the French political sphere. Therefore, the rise of anti-Turkish discourse in France led to growing group consciousness of Turkish-origin immigrants and their political mobilization toward French politics. One of the indicators of this growing interest in French politics was the fact that different from previous elections, comparatively higher number of Turkish background people started running for the local elections in 2008.[118] As the president of the ACORT puts it:

> "Until the early 2000s, people from Turkey did not perceive themselves as immigrants in France. For them, the immigrants of France were the Maghrebian Arabs who were considered to deserve all those unfriendly laws of immigration. But later when the French public was debating Turkey's accession to the EU, they realized that the host country's perception of Turks is not different from their perception of Arabs. After this point, they became more active in politics." (interview # 33)

The second factor that paved the way for the politicization of the Turkish minority in France was the legislation of Armenian genocide laws in the French parliament. France

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[117] See: Champion. 2010. "Turkey Seeks Support for EU Bid, but France Gives Little." in *Wall Street Journal*, October 13. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703440004575547751406126316.html (last accessed August 25, 2013).

[118] According to the list that is prepared by the Turkish Embassy in Paris (interview # 41), there were around 200 Turkish origin candidates for the 2008 local election of which 91 were elected as members of municipal councils or as vice-majors.

is the home for the second biggest Armenian diaspora after the US. Approximately 500,000 Armenian-origin people are considered to be living in France. The influence of Armenian groups on French politics became visible after the French parliament's recognition of the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 during the late Ottoman era as genocide in 2001. Later on, French legislations on the Armenian issue continued with the passage of a complementary bill that criminalizes the denial of officially recognized Armenian "genocide"[119] (one-year prison sentence and a fine up to €45,000) in the lower house of the French parliament in December 2011 and the approval of the bill by the French Senate in January 2012.[120] The process of legislation on the contested Armenian "genocide" not only revoked a diplomatic crisis between France and Turkey,[121] but also resulted in massive mobilization and protest movement of Turkish migrants and their organizations in France. Two big protests were organized by Turkish migrant organizations in France and were joined by tens of thousands Turks across Europe.[122] French-Turks, for the first time in their migration history, have demonstrated a collective political presence in French public sphere, directly targeting French political institutions.

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[119] It must be noted that the vocabulary related to the Armenian killings in 1915 is a very controversial issue, loaded with emotional and political conflicts. The official discourse of Turkey, while pays a lip service to killings from both Armenian and Turkish sides due to the unfortunate conditions during the First World War, rejects any claims of "genocide" in an absolute manner. Therefore, those who are critical of defining the Armenian killings as "genocide" use a different terminology that includes "the allegedly Armenian genocide", "the 1915 events", "the Armenian issue" or "the Armenian problem".

[120] The proposed bill was struck down by the French Constitutional Court in February 2012 on the ground that the bill violates constitutional protections including the freedom of speech.

[121] After the approval of the contested bill in the lower House of the French Parliament, Turkey briefly called her ambassador in France (Tahsin Burcuoğlu) back to Ankara, suspended military cooperation, bilateral political and economic contracts with France. See: Sayare and Arsu. 2012. "Genocide Bill Angers Turks as It Passes in France." *New York Times*, January 23. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/europe/french-senate-passes-genocide-bill-angering-turks.html (last accessed on August 25, 2013)

[122] See: "Thousands of Turks Gather in Paris to Protest Genocide Bill." *Hurriyet Daily News*, January 21, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thousands-of-turks-gather-in-paris-to-protest-genocide-bill.aspx?pageID=238&nID=11980&NewsCatID=351 and "Turks March in Paris to Denounce Genocide Bill." *Sunday's Zaman*, January 21, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-269228-turks-march-in-paris-to-denounce-genocide-bill.html (last accessed on August 25, 2013).

On the other hand, recent politicization of French-Turks along with French legislation of Armenian "genocide" has produced some important efforts to restructure the Turkish organizational landscape in France. In 2011, the Turkish organizations in France created a coordination council to organize the protest movement against the proposed bill of Armenian genocide. The council brought together previously conflicting homeland-originated Turkish groups such as Milli Görüş, DITIB, Türk Federasyon, and Ataturkist Thought Organizations and local-action originated cultural organizations.[123] Meanwhile, approximately 20 local-action originated Turkish cultural organizations in France, by taking Turkish umbrella organizations in Germany as a model, have founded "the Union of Turkish Cultural Associations in France" (author's interview #37).

While Turkish organizing process in Germany provided an important guidance for Turkish organizational leaders in France during their efforts to form common platforms and construct umbrella organizations, two significant differences from the German case underlined the particular situation of Turkish organizations in France. Firstly, in the German case, efforts of Turkish migrant organizations to create a common platform have been primarily directed to immigrants' concerns and have carried the purpose of creating an immigrant collectivity to fight against racism and discrimination and to demand social and political equality and cultural accommodation. While such platforms have been vulnerable to internal fragmentations and ideological conflicts, they have exemplified the Turkish minority's collective movement towards immigration and integration politics in Germany. On the other hand, in the case of France, recent efforts of Turkish migrant organizations to come together under a common platform primarily carry the purpose of

[123] The Alevi Federation and left wing oriented Turkish organizations such as l'ACORT did not take place in this platform.

creating a Turkish lobby that advocates Turkey's national interest in international area. The founding member of the new Turkish umbrella organization –The Union of Turkish Cultural Organizations in France- highlights their organizational purpose in the following way:

> "Our (Turkish) state became aware of the importance of lobbying activities, after the revival of 'the 1915 events'. Today, it is a fact that Islamophobia is on the rise in France and in Europe. Therefore, you cannot do any lobbying activities under the flag of Islam in France and in other parts of Europe. Although the three Turkish groups in France (Diyanet-related DITIB, Erbakan-related Milli Görüş, and the Nationalist Action Party-related Turkish Federation) are strong and well organized, they carry the flag of Islam. The French people would not even pass by the entrance of these organizations. The reason we are founding the Union of Turkish Cultural Organization in France (as the fourth group) is to conduct lobbying activities. Otherwise, with these other three organizations, you cannot do any lobbying." (interview #37)

Secondly, Turkish diplomatic agencies have been highly involved in Turkish immigrants' collective organizing process in France. The embassy and the chief consulate of Turkey in France actively joined the formation process of "the Union of Turkish Cultural Associations in France". Turkey's ambassador Burcuoğlu in his opening remarks stated that such a union, which brings Turkish cultural organizations together in France, will be a great help for acting collectively in national issues (of Turkey).[124]

From Transnational to Host Country Politics:

French-Turks' political mobilization around Turkey's EU bid and objections against Armenian "genocide" legislations are significant examples of immigrants' transnational political participation. Yet, the case of French-Turks also shows that immigrants' transnational mobilizations go hand in hand with their increasing political interest and

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[124] See: The local news portal of French-Turks, "Fransa Turk Kultur Dernekleri Federasyonu Kuruluyor," available at http://www.hodrimeydan.net/anasayfa/anasayfa-uest/155-fransa-tuerk-kueltuer-dernekleri-federasyonu-kuruluyo.html (last accessed on August 26, 2013).

participation in their host country's politics. A closer look on Turkish immigrants' primary claims pertaining to these transnational political issues demonstrates how the categories of "transnational politics" and "host country politics" in the field of immigration are intertwined with each other. For instance, the support of Turkey's accession to the EU is legitimized on the grounds that Turkey's EU membership would improve the rights of Turkish immigrants in France and in other European countries. Therefore, immigrants' political actions supporting Turkey's EU bid are legitimatized on the ground of "immigrant rights". On the other hand, the opposition to French legislations on Armenian "genocide" takes the discourse of defending freedom of speech and democratic values in France. The vice-president of the Turkish Federation in France articulates the Turkish immigrant mobilization in France concerning the Armenian issue in the following way:

> "Recently Monsieur Sarkozy endeavored to pass a law proposal that punishes people who rejects the 'Armenian massacre'. This proposal conspicuously violated the freedom of speech in France and was in opposition to the democratic roots of the French Republic. … We did not mobilize against this law proposal, because we are Turks and the issue is about Turkey. The majority of us (Turks in France) are French citizens. We objected this law proposal, because we believed that it strikingly undermined the notion of democracy in France" (author's interview #51).

Recent political mobilization of French-Turks and their organizations provides significant evidence on how immigrants' transnational political engagements pave the way for their increased participation in host country politics. As I stated earlier, it is not a coincidence that Turkish immigrants' transnational political mobilization in France takes place simultaneously with their increased interest and participation in host country politics. Increasing number of Turkish-origin candidates running in French local elections since the mid-2000s is an important evidence for this. Moreover, transnational political

engagements of Turkish immigrant organizations in France increase their familiarity with political processes and institutions in France. The term “lobby” has been increasingly becoming a part of Turkish organizational vocabulary in France. In the next decades, we will see whether French-Turks and their organizations’ increasing involvement in French politics around transnational political issues will grow further and expand towards immigrants’ political movements in France.

4. Conclusion

Chapter six investigated the causes of German-Turks’ success and French-Turks’ underachievement in terms of their political incorporation into their host country politics. After revisiting the existing explanations to immigrant politics, I argued that neither group-based nor institutional explanations could adequately explain the cross-national divergence of Turkish immigrants’ politics. My research demonstrated that the impact of migrants’ perception of their group’s position in their host country ethno-racial hierarchy becomes crucial for understanding immigrants’ collective political mobilization and participation. The comparative evidence from Turkish immigrants’ politics in Germany and France has supported this argument. In the case of Germany, the perceived disadvantaged position in German society and group discrimination paves the way for Turkish immigrants’ and their organizations’ stronger motivation to become politically active and change their disadvantaged status. On the contrary, French-Turks perception of a better-off status vis-à-vis the Maghrebian-originated groups, to a great extent, results in their avoidance from immigrants’ collective politics in France.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has presented an analytical framework that explains different levels and trajectories of immigrant political incorporation. The primary research agenda aimed to inquire why some immigrant groups attain a firmer political consciousness, mobilize into political engagement as individuals and as ethnic immigrant groups, participate in host country political processes at higher rates and therefore achieve a stronger presence in their host country politics compared to other migrant groups. I examined processes of immigrant political incorporation by conducting multiple comparisons that included both cross-group and cross-country analyses.

In this dissertation, I particularly addressed the scholarly debate between two competing theoretical perspectives to immigrant political incorporation that focus on either internal group-based resources or external institutional factors as the primary determinants of immigrants' politics. I argue that neither group-based nor institutional perspectives can adequately explain divergences in immigrant political incorporation. While the existing theoretical perspectives provide significant accounts on immigrants' group-based and institutional resources that make political engagement viable, they fall short of explaining why and how immigrant groups take the advantage of these political opportunities and become active participants in their host country politics. This dissertation contributes to the current literature by demonstrating that immigrant groups' perception of their group position in their host country's inter-ethnic context influences the extent to which they seek to integrate into the politics of their host country. On the one hand, immigrant groups who perceive themselves as holding a disadvantaged

position in their host country's ethno-racial hierarchy are more willing to become politically active and improve their perceived disadvantaged position compared to other groups. On the other hand, migrant groups who see themselves to have a better position in host country inter-ethnic context have lower incentives to become politically active to combat social disadvantage. Instead, these groups prefer to maintain their distinction from the lower status immigrant groups who tend to mobilize politically.

Secondly, this dissertation argues that immigrants' perception of having a disadvantaged position in their host country does not automatically result in their increased participation in host country politics. In some cases, perception of discrimination and unequal treatment further marginalizes immigrant groups and pushes them into the peripheries of their host societies. Therefore, not the bare discrimination itself but collective interpretation of the situation as unfair and illegitimate matters in the search of a political remedy (see: Rogers 2006, 31–32). In this respect, I argued that immigrants' strong organizational networks play a key role in the formation of immigrants' politics. Immigrant organizations, not only provide their members with civic skills and political knowledge, but also turn immigrants' collective grievances into political claims, vocalize these political claims in host country public sphere, and organize a line of political action to redress immigrants' concerns. Therefore, immigrant organizations themselves become key actors in immigrants' collective politics.

I examined the dynamics of immigrant political incorporation by focusing on Turkish immigrants and their organizations in Germany and France. My case selection allowed me to explore how and to what extent strikingly different national immigrant integration regimes pave the way for variances in immigrant politics. Moreover, cross-

group analyses within each case questioned the extent to which immigrant groups from different national origins differ from each other in terms of their tendency to integrate in the politics of their host countries. The empirical findings suggested that levels and patterns of immigrant political incorporation vary both across-immigrant groups and across-national cases. In this respect, Turkish immigrants' political incorporation in Germany and France significantly differ from each other and from other major immigrant groups within their host countries. Turkish immigrants in Germany have achieved greater political incorporation compared to other major immigrant groups in Germany and Turks in France. By contrast, Turks in France have been largely absent from French politics. Yet, these variations cannot be fully explained by institutional and group-based frameworks. Therefore, my dissertation demonstrated the necessity of an alternative theoretical framework that considers the role of immigrant groups' perception of their group status in host country ethno-racial hierarchy.

In the following parts, I will start with reviewing the major arguments and empirical findings of the dissertation. Secondly, I will discuss whether and to what extent the main arguments developed by this dissertation can be extended to other cases. Thirdly, I will elucidate the broader theoretical implications of my research. Lastly, I will highlight possible future research agenda that this dissertation suggests.

1. Review of the Arguments and the Empirical Findings

I began the dissertation by reviewing the history of ethnic migration and subsequent political institutional responses to rising ethnic diversity in Germany and France. My discussion demonstrated that Germany and France strikingly differ from each other in terms of their existing institutional and political structures for immigrant political

incorporation. Despite the recent citizenship reforms, Germany still provides restrictive access to German nationality. By contrast, France has been historically pursued a liberal citizenship regime. While France officially opposes to the idea of multicultural governance, such a strong opposition never takes place in Germany. In terms of state-ethnic minority relations, Germany demonstrates corporatist patterns in its relationship with immigrant communities; whereas France predominantly establishes direct relationship with individual immigrants without relegating much authority to intermediary institutions.

After juxtaposing German and French immigrant integration regimes, I explored how these cross-national differences in immigrant integration regimes produce varying outcomes in immigrants' political incorporation at individual and at collective levels. Chapter four focused on the individual level through analyzing immigrants' naturalization rates, level of political interest, electoral turnout, and political representation in legislative institutions. As expected by the institutionalist school, my findings demonstrated that France provides a more favorable national context for immigrant political integration at the individual level compared to the German case. In other words, immigrant-origin people in France have higher naturalization rates, higher rates of electoral participation, and higher numbers of migrant-origin representatives at the local levels compared to their counterparts in Germany. However, the empirical evidence on Turkish immigrants in these two national contexts demonstrates a quite contradictory pattern. My research showed that Turks in Germany are better integrated into their host country politics compared to other immigrant groups in Germany as well as compared to the Turks in France. On the other hand, while the case of France is a

fertile soil for immigrants' individual level political integration, Turks in France clearly stand out due to their under-presence in their host country politics compared to the Maghrebians in France and the Turks in Germany.

In chapter five, I focused on the processes of immigrants' collective-level political incorporation through examining immigrants' organizational structures, their structured relationship with host country authorities, and the dynamics of their collective claims making. First, I examined general patterns of immigrants' collective politics in these two national contexts. My research showed that cross-national differences in immigrant integration, to a large extent, pave the way for qualitatively different patterns of immigrant collective politics. While German corporatism facilitates immigrants' structured dialogue with host country institutions, exclusive elements in German citizenship and public discourse hamper immigrants' interest in and engagement with host country politics. On the other hand, French republicanism supports immigrants' interest in French politics. Yet, the absence of official channels for ethnic politics paves the way for immigrants' extra-institutional political movements.

Second, I focused on Turkish immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France through analyzing their organizational processes. My research demonstrated that the case of Turkish immigrants, to some extent, contradicts with general cross-national patterns of immigrants' collective politics in Germany and France. While Germany has been represented as a prime case of immigrants' political transnationalism, Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany have increasingly turned their faces towards the politics of Germany. In some cases, Turkish groups and their organizations are still highly engaged in their home country politics, but this transnational engagement does not

challenge their orientation towards German politics. On the other hand, while France has hosted extensive socio-political movements of immigrant via extra-institutional means, Turkish immigrants and their organizations have been almost completely absent from these immigrant mobilizations in France. It was only through the rise of Turkish national issues i.e. Turkey's EU bid and French legislations on the contested Armenian "genocide" in 1915, French-Turks and their organizations have shown interest in French political issues. Therefore, the research findings in this chapter highlighted the exemplary success of German-Turks and under-performance of French-Turks in terms of their collective-level politics in their host countries.

In chapter six, I investigated the causes that led to Turkish immigrants' political success in the case of Germany and their underachievement in the case of France. My case studies provided important evidence for the relationship between immigrant groups' perception of their group-based discrimination and disadvantaged status on the one side and their political mobilization and participation on the other side. In the case of Germany, the perceived disadvantaged status has reinforced the political motivation of the Turkish minority to become politically active and improve their group's position. Turkish immigrants' organizational mobilization and participation towards attaining dual-citizenship rights and "public law status" for Islam has indicated that how immigrants' perception of unequal treatment results in increased political action.

In the case of France, Turkish immigrants' collective politics is remarkably different from the German case. Turkish immigrants and their organizations have been largely absent from cross-ethnic coalitions of immigrant groups and their socio-political movements towards French politics. My research showed that French-Turks' perception

of holding a better status in host country' ethno-racial hierarchy has, not only curtailed their motivations to engage in political action towards immigrant politics, but also undermined their cooperation with other major immigrant groups in France (particularly the Maghrebians). Instead, Turks in France opted for keeping their perceived distinction from so-called lower status groups –particularly Maghrebians- who have been politically active. French-Turks and their organizations have only mobilized after a series of international crises between Turkey and France, when anti-Turkish discourse started prevailing in the French public sphere.

2. Application to Other Cases

This dissertation has argued for the effects of immigrants' perception of their group's status on their political incorporation by focusing on the case of Turks in Germany and France. It is beyond the focus of this dissertation to explore the generalizability of these observed patterns across different contexts and groups. Yet, the theoretical framework developed by this dissertation has a potential for providing some analytical insights for other cases as well. While the case of the US has a strikingly different history of immigration and political framework for ethnic diversity compared to the countries in Europe, immigrants' diverse political trajectories in this case allows us to check some of the arguments raised by this dissertation. To start with, West Indian immigrants in the US[125] exemplify a case in which host country's inter-racial context deeply shapes the patterns of immigrant political incorporation. West Indians stated arriving to the US in sizable numbers in the post-1965 era. Today, West Indians constitute the largest foreign-

[125] Black immigrants from English-speaking Caribbean, primarily from Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad, Barbados, and Grenada.

born Black community in the US. Rogers (2006) analyzes how racial minority status affects the process of political incorporation in the US by examining West Indians (he calls them Afro-Caribbeans) in the New York City and comparing them with native-born African-Americans.

The findings on political incorporation of West Indians in the NYC are puzzling in multiple respects. Rogers (2006, 83–84) argues that West Indians have promising predictors for strong political incorporation. They have a lengthy duration of stay (since the 1960s) and a quickly growing population. They are residentially concentrated. Their residential enclaves are on average better educated and more affluent compared to African American neighborhoods in the city. Moreover, they have a shared ethnic identity, which would facilitate collective political action and participation. Despite these group-based resources, West Indians are largely absent from both formal and extra-party politics of the city. The majority of West Indians are not citizens, and therefore cannot vote. They have a very slow pace of naturalization. Their low rates of political participation have prevented West Indians from achieving a significant political influence in their host country politics.

Apart from their absence from the formal politics, as Rogers (2006, Chapter 4) argues, West Indians have not forged a stable race-based alliance with native-born African Americans. This is surprising, because West Indians and native-born African Americans share the same “black” racial category (at least in the White eyes), are subjected to the similar forms of racial discrimination and disadvantages, and have similar political and economic interests. A race-based political coalition between West Indians and native-born African Americans has not taken place, despite the fact that such

a collectivity would reinforce black political power in the city and around the country. While West Indian politicians seek to "rally, mobilize, or acknowledge their coethnics as a distinct constituency", African American politicians are concerned about divisive effects of such efforts that would undermine black politics in the US (Rogers 2006, 128).

The theoretical framework that accounts for immigrants' perception of their group status in the host country ethno-racial hierarchy becomes crucial for understanding West Indian immigrants' politics in the US. As pointed out by Waters (1999), West Indian immigrants perceive a superior status compared to native-born blacks. The fact that West Indians come from the countries, in which black people are the majority, makes them to attach a different meaning to their racial identity. In the US, West Indians emphasize their distinct ethnic identity, e.g. Jamaican Americans or West Indian Americans, to avoid from being confused with and stigmatized as native-born black Americans. From their perspective, "becoming American also entails becoming American black, which they perceive as lower social status than staying a West Indian" (Waters 1999, 93). Cross-country research shows that West Indian immigrants in London do not emphasize their West Indian origins and do not attach such a positive meaning to their ethnic identity as it is the case among the West Indians in New York (Foner 2005). Therefore, the inter-racial context in the US and West Indians' collective perception of their relative status in this context paves the way for lower political presence of West Indians in the host country politics.

While Turks in France and West Indians in the US strikingly differ from each other in many respects, it is still possible to observe some of parallel trajectories in their group politics. In both cases, a perception of a better-off position in host country ethno-

racial hierarchy brings about negative consequences for their political incorporation. The emphasis on their distinct ethnic identity undermines possible alliances with the major minority groups in their host country politics. Neither a shared race in the case of American West Indians nor a common religion in the case of French-Turks can override inter-group differences and bring up a collective alliance towards host country politics.

The case of the US also provides some compelling examples of how perceived disadvantaged status leads to immigrants' political mobilization and increased participation. The situation Muslim Americans[126] before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks exemplifies this situation. Contrary to Muslim minorities in Europe, American Muslims have been quite successful in socio-economical fields (Sinno 2009a). Up until the early 2000s, American Muslims had been largely invisible from the public eyes due to their small numbers and their smooth socio-economical integration into the American middle class. Yet, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent politicization of the issue of Islam in the US had tremendous effects on Muslims' perception of their lives in the US. More than half of American Muslims believe that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US since 9/11 in number of ways (Pew Research Center 2011). In the period, American Muslims perceived that they are increasingly becoming victims of discrimination, religious profiling, and hate crimes.

There are some signals that the unfavorable conditions in the post 9/11 period have paradoxically motivated American Muslims to mobilize and become visible in the

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[126] The estimations about the number of American Muslims vary in different sources. The PEW report (2011) estimates that there are 2.75 million Muslims of all ages living in the US. On the other hand, Muslim organizations' estimations go up to 7 million. American Muslims are highly heterogeneous community with diverse ethnic, racial, and cultural backgrounds. More than a third of them originate from Middle Eastern and North African countries, while about a quarter come from South Asian countries (Pew Research Center 2011).

political stage (Senzai 2012). Representative survey studies point out significant changes in American Muslims' political attitudes in the aftermath of 9/11. The MAPS (Muslims in American Public Square) surveys point out that political participation and civic engagement among American Muslims increased in 2004, compared to the data from early 2001 (Senzai 2012, 23). Moreover, during this era, Muslim organizations in the US such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the American Muslim Alliance (AMA), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Muslim American Society (MAS), and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) have pushed political agenda for Muslim rights and become more visible political actors in the public stage (Sinno 2009b, 83).

It must be noted that increasing political interest and participation of American Muslims does not automatically guarantee their higher level of political representation in American political institutions. On the contrary, when negative public opinion towards Muslims coincides with majoritarian electoral systems with relatively large electoral districts in the case of the US, the result is exceptionally low Muslim representation in American politics (Sinno 2009b). Therefore, Muslims in the US are extremely poorly represented compared to their European counterparts. By contrast, in the case of Germany, increased political mobilization of Turkish Muslims in the face of discrimination can be channeled into better political representation at the federal and the state level, due to proportional electoral systems with preferential voting option. This point illustrates that host countries' national political institutions deeply shape the possible outcomes of immigrants' politics.

3. Broader Implications

One of the primary drawbacks in the existing literature is the tendency to perceive immigrant political incorporation as a function of either host country's institutional environment or group-based aspects. These accounts are less capable of elucidating the interaction among multiple factors that make immigrant political incorporation a dynamical process. In this dissertation, I do not reject the significance of national political institutions or group-based qualities. On the contrary, I show that these factors interact with immigrants' motivations for political actions. Therefore, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation allows for multiple variations: while multiple levels/trajectories of political incorporation are possible within the same institutional setting, the same immigrant groups might follow different patterns of political incorporation in different institutional contexts.

Secondly, this dissertation highlights some counter-intuitive aspects of immigrant political incorporation. It shows that immigrants' socio-economic integration does not always lead to, but sometimes can be at odds with, their political incorporation. This does not mean that only worse-off immigrant groups can politically incorporate. Some immigrant groups (like former European immigrants in the US) follow a more linear path of political incorporation. In this case, immigrants' political incorporation takes place along with their socio-economical inclusion. Likewise, as the immigrant groups become indistinguishable from the host society, individual-level political assimilation can take the place of group-based politics over time. This dissertation does not deny these possible paths to political incorporation. Yet, it highlights a more counter-intuitive path, in which perceived disadvantage status motivates immigrants to become politically active.

Lastly, in this dissertation, host country inter-ethnic context goes beyond the dyadic relation between the majority society and the ethnic minorities, but entails a wide range of relations among host society and various ethnic minority groups. In this respect, this dissertation has shown that immigrant groups, not only interact with the host society, but also are in constant exchange with each other. This perspective especially becomes important for reconsidering the widely used term of "Muslims in Europe". As the findings on Turks and Maghrebians in France have shown that Muslims in Europe do not constitute a single category, but includes a series of inter-group conflicts and frictions.

4. Future research

This dissertation has presented a theoretical framework by focusing on political incorporation of Turkish immigrants in Germany and France. It has been beyond the focus of this dissertation to assess the generalizability of the main arguments developed by this research. The extension of the proposed framework to other national contexts and immigrant groups will allow us to see whether and too what extent similar patterns of political incorporation also hold for other cases.

APPENDIX I: FIELDWORK DETAILS

The empirical findings in this research are drawn on my fieldwork research in Germany and France, which was undertaken in two rounds between 2010 and 2012. During my fieldwork, I had three objectives: The first objective included conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews with the leaders of the chief Turkish migrant organizations, Turkish-migrant origin policy-makers, and public officers in charge with executing migration and integration policies. Through these interviews, I aimed to learn about both formal and informal aspects of migrants' politics. The second objective was to participate in activities organized by the Turkish migrant organizations or for the (Turkish) migrants. Through the methods of participant observation, I aimed to observe how political actors coming from different Turkish migrant groups come together and interact with each other. Moreover, participating in meetings, seminars, exhibitions, and other cultural activities enabled me to learn more about key issues in migrants' political agendas. The third objective was to collect a wide range of written materials by/for/on the (Turkish) migrants in Germany and France. For this purpose, I asked for any published material during my visits to migrant organizations as well as public offices. Moreover, I register in the existing email list-serves and subscribed to newsletters.

During my research, I focused on the chief Turkish migrant organizations in Germany and France that have an explicit political agenda at the national level with respect to host and/or home country politics. With this purpose, I excluded Turkish migrant organizations that do not engage in political claims making in public sphere such as hometown organizations or sports clubs. Moreover, in order to focus on the key actors in the organizational sphere I had to exclude small-scale, mostly extremist, political

organizations that could not have much public visibility. More importantly, in order to minimize the effects of migrants' ethnic diversity as well as ongoing international conflicts, I had to exclude Kurdish organizations founded by Kurdish people migrated from Turkey.

My fieldwork mostly took place in the two capital cities: Berlin and Paris. A focus on capital cities provided me an analytical advantage to examine how city-level political opportunities influence migrant groups' national level political participation. In this sense, the case of Berlin was illuminating. Berlin city, contrary to many other regions of Germany, is famous for its multicultural policies and accommodation for cultural differences. I observed that this migrant-friendly political environment of Berlin facilitated national-level political activities of migrant organizations located in Berlin. In other words, many Turkish migrant organizations, which are funded by the Berlin city, could use these resources to engage in politics at the level of German federal institutions. Another important German city for Turkish immigrant politics is Cologne. During the Cold War, West Berlin was an isolated city within the borders of the East Germany. Therefore, most of the Turkish immigrant political activities used to take place in the other cities of the West Germany. During this period, many of the headquarters of Turkish migrant organizations were established in Cologne and organized their national level activities from this city. Today, as a legacy of this Cold War era, many of the headquarters are still located in Cologne. However, depending on their stake in national German politics, Turkish migrant organizations have a well-established branch in Berlin.

In France, the case of Strasbourg becomes a platform for transnational engagements of immigrant groups at the EU level. Strasbourg, as a home for the many

EU institutions (i.e. European Parliament, Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights), provides a leverage to reach out to many international organizations.

During my fieldwork, I collected written materials mainly from three different sources: Firstly, I collected all sorts of written materials published (in paper or on the web) by the Turkish immigrant organizations. These materials included contents of their websites, reports, press releases, newsletters, pamphlets, periodical journals, and magazines. During this analysis, I had two main objectives: The first one was to understand how the organization portrays itself in the public sphere; and the second objective was to trace the changes in their self-portrayal over time. Secondly, I collected the documents prepared by the public offices related to the issues of migration and integration. In Germany, I particularly focused on documents prepared by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, and the Berlin State Commissioner for Integration and Migration. In France, besides my research on related ministries, I particularly paid attention on document sources provided by the High Council of Integration (HCI).

Thirdly, I collected news materials related to the issues of Turkish migrants, their organizations, and politics of migration and integration in Germany and France. I went through the available online archive of newspaper databases as well as news portals. The main sources included: Hurriyet (Avrupa), Milliyet, Sabah (Avrupa), Radikal, Cumhuriyet, Zaman (Avrupa and France), Yeni Safak, Milli Gazete, Birgun, Evrensel, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, Deutsche Welle, L'Express, Le Figaro, and Le Monde. During my analysis of news materials, I had two

objectives: First, I aimed to validate the factual information that I received during my in-depth interviews i.e. checking for the mentioned events, political activities, and public speeches. Second, I aimed to acquire additional information on public debates on immigration, integration, and ethnic diversity in the countries that I studied.

APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
1	President	L'ACORT	L'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie - Türkiyeli Yurttaşlar Konseyi	The Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey	July 1, 2010	Paris/France
2	President	Le Centre Culturel Anatolie	Le Centre Culturel Anatolie - Anadolu Kültür Merkezi	The Anatolia Cultural Center	July 5, 2010	Paris/France
3	Associated researcher	Plateforme de Paris	Plateforme de Paris	Platform of Paris	July 6, 2010	Paris/France
4	Vice-President	COJEP-International	Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle - International	Council of the Pluralcultural Youth-International	July 8, 2010	Strasbourg/France
5	President	COJEP-International	Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle - International	Council of the Multicultural Youth-International	July 8, 2010	Strasbourg/France
6	Project coordinator	Türkischer Elternverein in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V	Türkischer Elternverein in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V - Berlin-Brandenburg Türk Veliler Birliği	Union of Turkish Parents in Berlin-Brandenburg	July 14, 2010	Berlin/Germany

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
7	Vice-President	Das Türkisch-Deutsche Zentrum e. V.	Das Türkisch-Deutsche Zentrum e. V. (Türk-Alman merkezi)	The Turkish-German Center	July 16, 2010	Berlin/Germany
8	General Secretary	TGD	Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Almanya Türk Toplumu)	Turkish Society in Germany	February 16, 2012	Berlin/Germany
9	Former Spokesperson	TBB	Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (Berlin-Brandenburg Türkiye Toplumu)	Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg	February 22, 2012	Berlin/Germany
10	Vice-President	IGMG-Berlin	Islamischen Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş- Berlin (İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş-Berlin)	Islamic Community National Outlook	February 22, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
11	Public Relations	IGMG-Berlin	Islamischen Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş- Berlin (İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş-Berlin)	Islamic Community National Outlook	February 22, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
12	President	ATK	Zentralrat der Türken in Deutschland e.V (Almanya Türk Konseyi)	Turkish Council in Germany	February 24, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
13	Head of Women's Branch	IGMG-Berlin	Islamischen Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş- Berlin (İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş-Berlin)	Islamic Community National Outlook	February 28, 2012.	Berlin/Germany

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
14	Spokesperson	TBB	Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (Berlin-Brandenburg Türkiye Toplumu)	Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg	February 29, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
15	Berlin VIKZ mosque Imam	VIKZ	Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V (İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği)	Union of Islamic Cultural Centers	March 1, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
16	General Secretary	Müsiad-Berlin	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği-Berlin	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association	March 2, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
17	Executive Board Member	TGB	Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. (Berlin Türk Cemaati)	Berlin Turkish Community	March 6, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
18	Deputy		Mitgliedern-Das Abgeordnetenhaus des Landes Berlin	Green Party Deputy at the Berlin Parliament	March 8, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
19	Deputy		Mitgliedern-Das Abgeordnetenhaus des Landes Berlin	Green Party Deputy at the Berlin Parliament	March 8, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
20	President	TDU	Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (Türk-Alman İşadamları Birliği Berlin-Brandenburg)	Turkish-German Business Association Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.	March 12, 2012.	Berlin/Germany

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
21	Science, Culture, Press Spokesperson	ADD-Berlin	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği Berlin-Brandenburg (Verein zur Förderung der Ideen Atatürks Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.)	Ataturkist Thought Association Berlin-Brandenburg	March 14, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
22	President	TGD	Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland - Almanya Türk Toplumu	Turkish Society in Germany	March 15, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
23	Deputy		Mitgliedern-Das Abgeordnetenhaus des Landes Berlin	SPD Deputy at the Berlin Parliament	March 19, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
24	Public Relations		Beauftragter des Senats für Integration und Migration	Berlin State Commissioner for Integration and Migration	March 20, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
25	Head of Berlin Branch	Big Partei	Bündnis für Innovation & Gerechtigkeit (BIG Partei)	Party of Union of Innovation and Justice	March 20, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
26	Commissioner for Integration for the district of Tempelhof-Schöneberg		Integrationsbeauftragte Bezirksamt Tempelhof-Schöneberg von Berlin	Commissioner for Integration of the district Tempelhof-Schöneberg	March 20, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
27	President	TGB	Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. (Berlin Türk Cemaati)	Berlin Turkish Community	March 20, 2012.	Berlin/Germany

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
28	Former president of the TGD; former deputy at the Bundestag from the Left party (Die Linke).	TGD	Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland - Almanya Türk Toplumu	Turkish Society in Germany	March 21, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
29	President	ADD-Berlin	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği Berlin-Brandenburg (Verein zur Förderung der Ideen Atatürks Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.)	Ataturkist Thought Association Berlin-Brandenburg	March 22, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
30	Consul General		Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Berlin Başkonsolosluğu	Consulate General of Turkey in Berlin	March 23, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
31	Berlin Representative	UETD	Union of European Turkish Democrats	Union of European Turkish Democrats	March 23, 2012.	Berlin/Germany
32	Chair		Berlin, Gleichbehandlung, Diskriminierun, Integration, Antidiskriminierungsstelle (Berlin Senatosu Ayrımcılıkla Mücadele Dairesi Başkanı)	Berlin Equal Treatment and Anti-Discrimination Office	March 26, 2012.	Berlin/Germany

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
33	President	L'ACORT	L'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie - Türkiyeli Yurttaşlar Konseyi	The Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey	June 6, 2012	Paris/France
34	Executive Committee Member; The Acting President	DITIB-France	Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği-Fransa	Religious Affairs Turkish Islam Union-France	June 8, 2012	Paris/France
35	The President of the Paris Branch	CIMG-Paris	Communauté Islamique du Milli Görüş de France- Paris (İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş-Paris)	Islamic Community National Outlook	June 11, 2012	Paris/France
36	The Head of Women's Branch in Paris	CIMG-Paris	Communauté Islamique du Milli Görüş de France- Paris (İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş-Paris)	Islamic Community National Outlook	June 11, 2012	Paris/France
37	President	Le Centre Culturel Anatolie	Le Centre Culturel Anatolie - Anadolu Kültür Merkezi	The Anatolia Cultural Center	June 15, 2012	Paris/France
38	President. The member of the High Council on Integration.	ELELE	ELELE-Migrations et Cultures de Turque (Ceased association)	ELELE-Migrations and Cultures of Turkey	June 15, 2012	Paris/France

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
39	The representative of the UETD Paris Branch. The representative of CCMTF in CFCM (The Islam Council).	UETD	Union of European Turkish Democrats	Union of European Turkish Democrats	June 16, 2012	Paris/France
40	President	AKM-Paris	Paris Alevi Kültür Merkezi	Paris Alevi Cultural Center	June 16, 2012	Paris/France
41	Editor	ELELE	ELELE-Migrations et Cultures de Turque (Ceased association)	ELELE-Migrations and Cultures of Turkey	June 17, 2012	Paris/France
42	The Secretary of Consul General		Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Paris Başkonsolosluğu	Consulate General of Turkey in Paris	June 19, 2012	Paris/France
43	Vice-consul		Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Paris Başkonsolosluğu	Consulate General of Turkey in Paris	June 19, 2012	Paris/France
44	President	UNATGO	Union des Associations Turques du Grande Quest - (Batı Fransa Türk Dernekler Birliği)	Union of Western France Turkish Associations	June 19, 2012	Paris/France
45	Cultural Activities Organizer	L'ACORT	L'Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie - Türkiyeli Yurttaşlar Konseyi	The Assembly of Citizens Originating from Turkey	June 19, 2012	Paris/France
46	Paris Branch Representative	ADD-Paris	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği Paris	Ataturkist Thought Association Paris	June 20, 2012	Paris/France

Interview Number	Position	Assoc. abbreviation	Assoc. in original	Assoc. in English	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
47	Counselor		Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Paris Büyükelçiliği	The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Paris	June 22, 2012	Paris/France
48	Paris Representative		Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Paris Temsilcisi	Cumhuriyet (Turkish daily newspaper)	June 22, 2012	Paris/France
49	The President of the Gagny Branch		Fransa Türk Federasyon - Gagny	Turkish Federation in France-Gagny branch	June 22, 2012	Paris/France
50	Vice-President	FUAF	La Fédération de l' Union des Alevis en France (Fransa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu)	The Federation of the Union of Alevis in France	June 25, 2012	Paris/France
51	Vice-President		Fransa Türk Federasyon	Turkish Federation in France	June 26, 2012	Paris/France

APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire for the Leaders of Turkish Migrant Organizations:

1- **Origin of organization:** When /how /with what purpose was it founded? Who were the founders? What were their main objectives during the foundation? How was the organizational structure during the foundation? What was the membership profile during the foundation? How was it financed? What was the relationship with Turkish politics/political actors and German (French) politics/political actors during the foundation?

2- **Change in time**: How did the organization change in time? Changes in objectives, main targeted issues, profile of executive members, organizational structure, membership profile. Changes in the ties with Turkish politics/political actors, German (French) politics/political actors.

3- **Current activities and organizational importance:** What are the major activities? Social service and political representation activities? To whom the activities are directed? How are they financed? How do you evaluate the position of your organization among the other Turkish migrant organizations? How is it different? Why is it important?

4- **Representation and political participation:** What are the major means that Turkish people raise their claims/problems in Berlin/Germany (Paris/France)? Who represent the interest of Turkish minority in Germany/Berlin (Paris/France)? What is the role of political parties, German (French) civil society, Turkish migrant organizations, and consultative agencies in this process? What are the major problems of representation of Turkish community in German politics? Do you thing city-level politics offer more channels of participation than national level of politics? Why? How?

5- **Effects of political transnationalism on integration**: Are you in touch with political groups/parties/actors in Turkey? Do Turkish political actors visit your organization? Do you visit political organizations in Turkey? Do you make public statements about Turkish politics? What is the attitude of German (French) state about organizational ties with homeland politics?

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