BUYING INTO CHANGE:
CONSUMER CULTURE AND THE DEPARTMENT STORE
IN THE TRANSFORMATION(S) OF SPAIN, 1939-1982

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Buying Into Change: Consumer Culture and the Department Store in the Transformation(s) of Spain, 1939-1982

by ALEJANDRO JOSE GOMEZ-DEL-MORAL

Dissertation Director:
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This dissertation examines how the development of a mass consumer society during the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (1939-1975) inserted Spain into transnational consumer networks and drove its democratization. As they spread, Spain’s first modern department stores, supermarkets, consumer magazines, and advertising helped create a public sphere when the Franco regime had curtailed opportunities for public life. In these stores, Spanish consumers encountered foreign products and lifestyles that signaled cosmopolitanism and internationalism, undermining the dictatorship’s foundational discourse of Spanish exceptionalism. With these products came subversive ideas on issues like gender equality, which undercut Francoist patriarchy. Despite these emancipatory tendencies, Francoists also used Spain’s new mass consumption politically: premier Spanish department store Galerías Preciados, owned by a conservative Franco supporter, continued to govern its workers according to Francoist precepts well into the 1970s. Yet in the end, the consumer society forged in Spain’s department stores and magazines eroded the integrity of the Franco regime’s sociopolitical project and helped set the stage for the nation’s transition to democracy in the late 1970s and integration into the European Economic Community in the 1980s.
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INTRODUCTION

“The exercise of commerce...is a social function and a public service...” In late October 1934, a little-known Spanish businessman named José Fernández Rodríguez – “Pepín” to friends and acquaintances, “Don José” to past and future employees – announced the launch of his new department store, Sederías Carretas, just steps from Madrid’s central plaza, the Puerta del Sol. In a series of ads and interviews in *A.B.C.*, one of the Spanish capital’s foremost daily newspapers, Pepín Fernández promised *madrileños* “the store they had been waiting for,” a cathedral of consumption. Sederías Carretas deployed the latest retail methods imported from abroad – specifically, American methods from Havana’s prestigious *El Encanto* department store, where Pepín had received his commercial training three decades earlier as a young expatriate from the northern Spanish province of Asturias. On the day of Sederías Carretas’ opening, 2 October 1934, curious crowds had flocked to the store; perhaps flush with this early success, the Asturian declared the store’s founding an event nothing short of “transcendent.”

This and other Spanish department stores’ subsequent trajectories surpassed Pepín Fernández’s specific expectations for Sederías Carretas, and the confines of the commercial realm in which they operated, to broadly shape Spanish society, culture, and politics over the next five decades. The mid-twentieth-century was a politically turbulent time in Spain: Pepín’s store launched against the backdrop of the embattled Second

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Spanish Republic (1931-39), soon toppled during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39); flourished into Galerías Preciados, Spain’s premier retail chain, during the often brutally repressive dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (1939-75); and fell into bankruptcy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Spain transitioned from dictatorship to its present democracy.

Socially and culturally, Spain experienced changes every bit as severe. The 1940s were years of famine, diplomatic isolation, and the peak of Francoist repression, during which the new regime executed thousands, banned virtually all political life, and along with the Spanish Catholic Church, imposed deeply conservative (in the case of women, sixteenth-century) social and moral strictures. The 1950s and 1960s, however, brought diplomatic rehabilitation, a dramatic economic boom (1959-73) during which Spain possessed the world’s second-fastest growing economy, and a flood of foreign (especially American) investment, tourists, and with them, social and cultural alternatives to Francoist orthodoxy. By the mid-1970s and Franco’s death, Spanish society had changed radically: migrations and the boom had swelled the nation’s cities and once-miniscule middle class; women’s legal status had improved, though feminists’ fight had only just begun; exposure to 1960s social movements abroad had emboldened Spain’s own dissidents; and most of all, as historian Sasha Pack has noted, constant contact with European tourists, media, and products encouraged Spaniards to similarly identify with Europe – European democratic traditions included.

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2 For a general description of this process of cultural introduction, see Rafael Abella, La vida cotidiana bajo el régimen de Franco (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, S.A., 1984), 174-183.
This dissertation examines how Spanish department stores like Sederías Carretas and its principal competitor El Corte Inglés, as well as a constellation of other commercial actors including new consumer magazines, foreign-influenced supermarkets that began to spread through Spain in the late 1950s, and the Spanish advertising industry, all contributed to these changes. Initially apolitical, or otherwise aligned with the regime, these enterprises drove the formation of a new Spanish mass consumer society and culture from the 1940s onward through their pursuit of the very goal that Pepín Fernández had espoused in 1934: namely, the modernization of Spanish commerce through the introduction of new, foreign ways of buying and selling. In so doing, they (at times unwittingly) became political. They did so by contributing to popular Spanish adoption of American and Western European consumer ways as well as social and cultural notions – an Americanization and Europeanization of Spanish lifestyles. This undermined Francoism’s social project, especially its patriarchal system of gender relations and foundational discourse of Spanish national exceptionalism. This was not a one-sided process. The regime and its allies sought to coopt Spain’s new consumerism for their own political purposes. Spain’s growing prosperity, Francoists believed, would

política a la legitimitat feminista, les dones en la Barcelona de la transició (Barcelona: Regidora de Dona, 2007); Temma Kaplan, “Luchar por la democracia: formas de organizacion de la mujeres entre los años cincuenta y los anos setenta,” in Mujeres, regulación de conflictos sociales y cultura de la paz, Anna Aguado, ed. (Valencia: Institut Universitari d’Estudis de la Dona – Univeristat de València, 1999), 89-107; and Gloria Nielfa Cristóbal, “El debate feminista durante el franquismo,” in Mujeres y Hombres en la España Franquista: Sociedad, Economía, Política, Cultura, Gloria Nielfa Cristóbal, ed. (Madrid: Complutense, 2003), 269-298. For contemporary feminist tracts, Maria Aurélia Capmany, Carta Abierta al Macho Ibérico (Madrid: Ediciones 99, 1974); Lidia Falcón, Los derechos civiles de la mujer (Barcelona: Nereo, 1963); Lidia Falcón, Los derechos laborales de la mujer (Madrid: Montecorvo, 1964); Lidia Falcón, Mujer y Sociedad: Análisis de un Fenómeno Reaccionario (Barcelona: Fontanella, 1969); Magda Oranich, ¿Qué es el feminismo? (Barcelona: La Gaya Ciencia, 1976); and Vindicación Feminista (1976-1979) Online Archive, Universidad de Zaragoza, accessed 11 Apr. 2010. http://www.unizar.es/gobierno/vr_institucionales/observatorio/vindicacion/index.htm. More than a simple magazine, Vindicación Feminista served as a key point of convergence for feminists in the 1970s, and, during the three years it was publicly for sale (1976-1979), served as the main disseminator of feminist ideas and news to the wider Spanish public.
improve perceptions of the regime in Spain as well as abroad. Yet in the end, I argue, the merchants and media-makers who championed Spain’s new mass-oriented consumer society played a signal role in driving forward changes in Spanish society that prepared the ground for the nation’s democratization.4

As a history of how department stores and other related commercial actors helped set the liberalization of Franco-era Spanish society in motion, this study intervenes in the lively debates about Spain’s remarkably rapid transition to democracy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Scholarship on this transition began to appear in its immediate wake, initially comprised of mostly political accounts and after the mid-1980s, socially and culturally-informed analyses such as Victor Pérez Díaz’s landmark El Retorno de la Sociedad Civil (The Return of Civil Society, 1987).5 Pérez Díaz’ traces the roots of the transition to the emergence of a European-style democratic civil society in 1960s and 1970s Spain; many studies rooted in this thesis have followed. Pamela Radcliff, for


example, finds a source for the democratic discourse underpinning the transition in a rise of women’s associational life after 1964, while as noted above, Sasha Pack argues that foreign tourism led Spaniards to identify as European in ways incompatible with the dictatorship’s survival. Most recently, scholarship on the transition has embraced a multicausal approach that encompasses these and other narratives. Radcliff in particular has advocated for this approach, and Nigel Townson’s recent edited volume on the late Franco dictatorship exemplifies it by combining contributions on the roles that the Catholic Church, changes in Spanish mentalities and political culture, as well as Spain’s developing associational life and tourism, all played in the transition.

This dissertation breaks new ground by taking consumption seriously as an agent of sociopolitical change. It offers a consumption-based explanatory narrative to the current multicausal model of Spain’s transition to democracy. This merits a brief pause: by ‘consumption’, I mean not simply the acquisition of items, but, following Jean Baudrillard, a “systematic manipulation of signs” – that is, the transfer of qualities such as “middle-class,” “modern,” or “European” from products to their consumers. And by ‘consumer society’, I mean a society organized around consumption. Inclusion of mass consumption as one of several important causes of the Spanish transition matters because of its ubiquity – what Guy Debord along with Baudrillard described as consumption’s

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pervasion of every aspect of life in modern society and consequent “totalitarian” inescapability.⁹ And indeed, once consumer products and practices became broadly accessible through a combination of rising prosperity and, as Aurora Morcillo has noted, an increased availability of consumer credit, they pervaded Spanish daily life.¹⁰ Shopping at Spain’s new self-service grocery stores, for instance, was an everyday occurrence for housewives in small-town Yecla (Murcia) as much as in metropolitan Barcelona. These women’s encounters at such stores with foreign (often pre-packaged and frozen) products and similarly foreign efficiency-minded sales methods disseminated notions of a European Spain – the same kinds of cultural encounters that Sasha Pack has found in Spanish tourism, yet far more frequent.

This study revises the dominant periodization of the advent of mass consumption in Spain. Scholars such as Luis Enrique Alonso, Fernando Conde, and José Castillo Castillo have dated this to the 1960s, before which Spaniards simply lacked the buying power to consume en masse, and Inbal Ofer as well as Antonio Cazorla have noted that poverty remained common in Spain into the 1970s. I propose that a socially-transformative imagined mass consumer society formed in Spanish discourse as early as the 1940s and 1950s.¹¹ Politically, the late 1940s and early 1950s brought Spain’s diplomatic rehabilitation, fueled by the advent of the Cold War, the Franco regime’s impeccably anti-Communist record, and the United States’ hunger for allies. This

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¹⁰ Morcillo, True Catholic Womanhood, 56.
culminated in 1953 with the signing of a treaty with the United States, which brought Spain respectability abroad, payment of over $62 million in exchange for the right to build military bases on Spanish soil, and a consequent influx of American military personnel, tourists, and the foreign cultural influences they bore with them.\footnote{Payne, \textit{The Franco Regime}, 417-423.} As the economy improved, department stores like Galerías Preciados built branches in cities across Spain, new consumer magazines such as the women’s journal \textit{Mujer} proliferated, and both stoked a Spanish interest in foreign products and lifestyles, especially the fashions of Paris, London, and Hollywood, as well as American-style home appliances that arrived laden with promises of convenience and modernity.\footnote{For discussion of American appliances and modernity, see for instance Victoria de Grazia, \textit{Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe} (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006), ch. 9; and Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, ed., \textit{Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).} And they courted the few Spaniards who could afford to consume as well as the many more who merely aspired to do so through content aimed at working- as well as middle-class readers, new store credit systems that made consumption more widely accessible, and spectacles such as escalators, then still a foreign novelty in Spain.

In so doing, as Aurora Morcillo has also noted of the women’s press, these retailers and journalists sold consumption to the masses as an activity to which they could freely aspire and through which they could shape their identities – core traits of a mass (as opposed to class-constrained, nineteenth-century, bourgeois) mode of consumption.\footnote{Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, ch. 3. Socially, the change that stores like Galerías Preciados, El Corte Inglés, and their local competitors effected in Spain was the successor to what historian Leora Auslander has described in her analysis of evolving stylistic regimes in modern France, and which Victoria de Grazia has outlined directly: a mid-century shift – already sweeping through much of Western Europe by the time it came to Spain – from a bourgeois mode of consumption featuring socially-imposed classed barriers to consumer behavior, to a mass mode of consumption that treated access to consumer products as a universal right. See Leora Auslander, \textit{Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), especially 20-22, and chs. 1, 7, and Epilogue; Victoria de Grazia, “Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe, 1930-1970: Comparative Perspectives on the Distribution Problem,” in}
Merchants and journalists represented Spanish society to itself as engaged in mass consumption, which readers internalized. These consumers overwhelmed Spanish automaker SEAT with orders for 1957’s new 600 model, despite costing 3.5 times the average Spanish income. The result was an embryonic, imagined Spanish mass consumer society that provided the commercial foundations for its own later realization in the 1960s, when rising incomes at last made material (not simply aspirational) consumption of products accessible to the masses.

This dissertation breaks with the argument, variously posed by Justin Crumbaugh, Alonso, Conde, and Castillo, that this new mass consumption was of an apolitical or depoliticizing nature – a spectacle of unfettered democratic consumption behind which the regime could hide its brutality and a safety valve for Spanish liberalizing aspirations. Instead, I show that store managers, consumer journalists, and regime officials all explicitly politicized consumption. Department stores, magazines, and later, the nation’s new supermarkets sometimes directly served the regime’s sociopolitical agenda. Indeed, an agency within the regime, the Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (Commissary-General for Supply and Transport, henceforth CAT) imported the autoservicio or self-service grocery store – the supermarket, in effect – in 1957-58 as part of a larger effort to project abroad a more modern and prosperous image of Spain.

16 Justin Crumbaugh, Destination Dictatorship: The Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boom and the Reinvention of Difference (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009; Castillo Castillo, “¿Es España sociedad de consumo de masas?,” 7-18; Castillo Castillo, Sociedad de Consumo; Alonso and Conde, 80, 86-87, 147-151.
and the regime. Pepín Fernández, meanwhile, was a longtime Franco supporter; his store’s paternalistic employee code of conduct extended early Francoist attempts at a totalizing control over Spaniards’ private morality by claiming managerial authority over nearly every aspect of employees’ lives. Inasmuch as the regime could pursue a totalizing degree of social control through proxies like Pepín’s department store, this also suggests a qualification to Juan Linz’s argument that Francoist Spain was authoritarian rather than totalitarian because it did not engage in totalitarian forms of social coercion.

And then came the 1960s, and with it the Spanish economic boom, the material realization of Spain’s imagined mass consumer society, and the further Americanization and Europeanization of life in Spain. Foreign investment poured in, invited by a new crop of Spanish technocrats like Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres and Minister of Information and Tourism Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who sought to increase Spanish prosperity and prestige abroad through a modernization – measured in relation to an American and European standard – of the nation’s industry and commerce. Rising incomes, meanwhile, swelled the ranks of the Spanish middle class, which alongside a

\[17\] I use the terms “autoservicio” and “supermarket” somewhat interchangeably, partly following the example of similarly interchangeable Spanish use of the terms in the early 1960s, but also because they were, in fact, mainly only differentiated by size. For concise definitions of and the relationship between autoservicio and supermarkets, see “Preguntas y respuestas sobre el Autoservicio,” SPARCO: Boletín de Enlace de los Sparistas Españoles (henceforth SPARCO), No. 9 (Nov., 1960), 6. For the CAT’s role in introducing the supermarket into Spain, see M.M. Zimmerman, Los Supermercados (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1959), Prologue.

\[18\] See for instance Sederías Carretas’ store windows in mid-1939, which Pepín ordered decorated with posters, Francoist flags, portraits of the victorious general, and other paraphernalia celebrating his victory and new rule. Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 128-130.


new flood of foreign tourists flocked to shop at Spain’s department stores.\(^{21}\)

These retailers, meanwhile, expanded still more aggressively than during the 1950s, building new branches in cities like Barcelona and Valencia, and responded to Spain’s growing focus abroad by laying their own claims to modern, cosmopolitan, European identities as world-class establishments. They staked these claims by articulating them internally and publicly as well as through initiatives like foreign employee exchanges and an embrace of the sleek concrete storefronts and shopping centers of the United States and Northern Europe, which transformed the Spanish urban landscape along foreign lines. Spain’s consumer press, new supermarkets, and advertising industry all joined in this turn abroad. They celebrated Spanish participation in foreign trade shows and conferences, and pursued affiliation with international bodies like the International Public Relations Association (IPRA) and newly-arrived multinationals like the Dutch grocery chain SPAR, part of a larger effort – supported by the Franco regime – to professionalize their trades along once again American and European lines. And as they did so, these stores, ad agencies, and magazines all increasingly exposed Spain’s growing number of active consumers to foreign products and consumer ways. This foreign commercial influx reached its consummation with the 1964 arrival of the quintessentially American department store chain Sears Roebuck & Company. Sears cultivated an international workplace by shuttling company veterans between its many divisions in the Americas and the newly-founded Sears Roebuck de

\(^{21}\) Indeed, Alonso and Conde have noted that the rate at which Spanish consumer spending rose in the 1960s almost exactly matched that of incomes – meaning that Spanish consumers spent virtually all of their newfound wealth on consumer products, rather than saving. See Alonso and Conde, 152-153. For Spain’s equally booming tourist industry, see Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship*. For rising incomes in Spain, see Castillo Castillo, “¿Es España sociedad de consumo...?,” 8; and, Fundación FOESSA, *Informe sociológico sobre la situación social de España, 1966* (Madrid: Fundación FOESSA, 1966), 82-83, 90.
España. The store offered products so foreign that local manufacturers feared they were unsalable,. And the store stressed that employees belonged to a single, fully-integrated, international organization that transcended social and cultural as well as political borders.

This commercial expansion, realization of a Spanish mass consumer society, and concomitant turn of Spanish attention abroad had broad sociopolitical implications, with dire consequences for the Franco regime. Now as in the 1940s and 1950s, the dictatorship encouraged development of Spain’s consumer society, hoping to gain public support as the standard of living rose, or at the very least to defang its increasingly restive domestic opponents – an effort that, as Justin Crumbaugh has noted, met with some success.\textsuperscript{22} Yet the increasingly foreign orientation that Spain’s burgeoning mass consumption displayed – department stores’ cosmopolitan claims, admen’s affiliation with IPRA, and most especially Sears’ arrival – also placed the nation’s merchants and consumers ever more into contact with a larger European and American community of their counterparts. And via these points of cultural exchange, foreign ideas that subverted Francoist social and political orthodoxy began to enter Spain alongside the products that Spanish consumers coveted and the commercial innovations used to sell them.

Specifically, the countercultural, independent-minded youth culture of the 1960s, and the gender-bending unisex fashions of London’s Carnaby Street, began to arrive in the pages of magazines like the new men’s fashion and lifestyle journal \textit{Don} (founded 1962) and among the aisles of new “youth” store departments launched at Galerías Preciados, El Corte Inglés, and Sears during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Among adult Spaniards, tradition, age, and life experience had been part of the dominant masculine ideal into the early 1960s. As the decade progressed, however, the values of youthful

\textsuperscript{22} Crumbaugh; for a more qualified argument to this effect, see Cazorla Sánchez, 150.
inquisitiveness (inquietud), innovation, and “ye-yeismo” soon became fashionable, as did a strain of the same rebellion against conservative paternal authority contemporaneously advancing in late-1960s Europe and the United States – and which in Spain could mean a rejection of Francoist conservatism and political stagnation.24

The consequences for National-Catholic gender relations were similarly marked. Many historians, including several scholars of Spain, have amply attested to the points of dialogue that exist between consumption and shifting notions of gender. David Kuchta’s contribution to Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough’s edited volume The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspectives, for instance, examines the mid-nineteenth-century stabilization of elite British masculinity through a “Great Masculine Renunciation” of overly-creative, “effeminate” fashions; other contributions in this volume alone examine the gendered dimensions of World War I-era food scarcity, turn-of-the-century struggles over use of consumer credit, and cosmetics advertising.25 In the

23 Used at the time to describe practitioners of 1960s popular youth culture, the term ye-yé neatly encapsulated the values of youth (ye-yés were as a rule young themselves), open-mindedness, innovation and, of course, rock and roll. It derives from the “yeah, yeah” exclamations of bands like The Beatles – paragons of the type of pop culture with which ye-yés identified. Paloma Otaola González, “La música pop en la España franquista: rock, ye-ye y beat en la primera mitad de los años 60,” ILCEA: Revue de l’Institut des langues et cultures d’Europe et d’Amérique 16 (2012): 6-8, http://ilcea.revues.org/1421, accessed 17 May 17, 2014.


field of Spanish history, meanwhile, Carmen Muñoz Ruiz has examined the changing models of femininity circulated during and after the Franco dictatorship in women’s consumer magazines, while as noted previously, Aurora Morcillo has analyzed changing messages about consumption in the women’s press.  

However, as Celia Valiente has suggested, Spanish masculinity remains an under-studied area, particularly during the Franco era. This dissertation contributes to this scholarship in showing how Spain’s boom-era influx of foreign consumer ways produced shifts in circulating Spanish discourse on masculinity. In Galerías Preciados and Sears’ new unisex-oriented youth departments, Spanish teenagers had the opportunity to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex as they shopped in the same place for garments whose lack of strong gender markers deemphasized the gender differences and patriarchal structures central to Francoism’s social order. In particular, such contact undermined the misogynistic, conquest-based, brothel-frequenting masculinity that had enjoyed wide currency alongside the official, chaste, and monogamous Catholic masculine sexual ideal during the first half of the dictatorship, and it undercut as well Spanish society’s corresponding division of women into respectable, morally-upright ladies and sexually impure “fallen” women. So too, as the Spanish consumer press embraced 1960s-era foreign fashions’ daring experimentation, which society had stigmatized as feminine and flighty, this stripped patriarchal Francoist discourses of a key somewhat dated) survey of scholarship on gender and consumption, see Mary Louise Roberts, “Gender, Consumption, and Commodity Culture,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (June, 1998): 817-844.


28 Cazorla Sánchez, 145-147; Morcillo, *Seduction*, ch. 3; see also note 66.
sartorial marker of male social stability – a step away from Kuchta’s “masculine renunciation” – and thus superiority. Meanwhile, a few magazines also tested the degree to which they could print risqué, often avant-garde content without incurring the ire of (and stiff fines from) the press censors employed by the regime’s Ministry of Information and Tourism (henceforth MIT), a move that anticipated expansions of sexual expression in the late 1970s, particularly the embrace of cinematic toplessness that came to be known as the Destape or “taking off of tops.”

Most of all, though, as SPAR supermarkets, Galerías Preciados and Sears branches, Spanish consumer magazines, and the Spain’s advertising industry on the one hand exposed consumers to Western European and American products and consumer lifestyles, and on the other increasingly laid claim to cosmopolitan identities and integrated themselves into international professional circles, this produced a shift in discourse on Spanish national identity over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. Spaniards on both sides of the shop counter increasingly not only bought and sold like Western Europeans, but began to think of themselves as such, in the process abandoning any remaining vestiges of early Francoism’s foundational discourse of Spanish national difference; embracing the idea that their nation’s future lay as part of a prosperous, capitalist, and democratic Europe; and thereby establishing a foundation of popular support for the Spanish transition to democracy.

This is the first historical study to examine how department store managers, supermarket advocates and owners, consumer journalists, and advertising executives, working largely independently, but also complementarily and in periodic dialogue, together contributed to the development of a Spanish mass consumer society and with it

29 For the Destape, see Chapter IV, note 166.
to Spain’s insertion into a European and American consumer sphere. Indeed, it is one of only a handful of historical accounts of the department stores and supermarkets that served as the venues for Spain’s mass consumer revolution. For this reason alone, these stores deserve scholarly attention. But they also bear examination because of the central place that the department store has since occupied in Spanish commerce – El Corte Inglés would eventually grow into one of Spain’s most powerful private enterprises – and because the dirigiste fashion in which the Franco regime introduced the supermarket, an approach that was unique in Western Europe but bears intriguing similarities to Yugoslavia’s own experiments with self-service.

Highlighting the paucity of this scholarship is the extensive degree to which the sociopolitical dimensions of the department store and supermarket as well as the spread of American consumerism to postwar Europe have been studied. While Lizabeth Cohen, for instance, has examined how consumption became central to postwar conceptions of American citizenship, in effect turning the United States into a “Consumer’s Republic,” scholars including Victoria de Grazia, Richard Kuisel, and Uta Poiger have examined this consumption’s export to Europe and subsequent struggles to preserve distinct European cultural identities threatened by American “Coca-colonization,” concerns that, as I show,

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would eventually surface in Spain as well as the 1970s opened. Scholarship on the department store, meanwhile, includes Susan Porter Benson’s study of early twentieth-century American department store saleswomen, whose blurring of the division between clerk and customer inspires this dissertation’s combined focus on the experiences of both Spanish consumers and the store clerks who serviced them (and became shoppers in their own right when off-duty). Similarly, Tracey Deutsch’s exploration of the acute, gendered social and political struggles between housewives, food retailers, and government officials that took place in mid-century American supermarkets over ownership of the food distribution process informs this study’s mindfulness of the social power that women could attain as nurturers of the body politic.

This study’s holistic approach, which places multiple commercial sectors in


dialogue, is grounded in Victoria de Grazia’s work. In *Irresistible Empire*, de Grazia argues that the United States exported American consumerism as well as a dense package of closely-associated sociocultural notions to Europe through an at times unwittingly collaborative process in which,

Initially acting solo, even at cross-purposes, at the apogee of American power at the turn of the 1960s, state and civil society operated with the impeccable synchronicity of a movie dance routine, resonating with that enthusiastic unity of purpose called the “national interest” that was the hallmark of the Cold War consensus.35

This model of collaboration in parallel guided by shared aspirations well describes the actions of Spain’s commercial professionals, whose actions were guided by a shared desire to achieved a long-awaited Spanish rise to a European and American modernity – what Sasha Pack has termed the “myth” of modernization.36 Hence, it was at virtually the same moment in time, the early 1960s, that the retailers, admen, and journalists who are the focus of my work began to pursue membership in international groups, as Spanish Public Relations pioneer Joaquín Maestre Morata did with IPRA in 1963-64; to join multinationals, as did the many Spanish grocers – over 4000 of them – who became SPAR affiliates during the early 1960s; or became veritably fixated with Spanish participation in foreign fashion shows.37

In more broadly describing the trajectory that Spanish mass consumption followed during *tardofranquismo* or the latter half of the Franco dictatorship (conventionally, 1959-75), my research adds to the scholarship on this period, which as Nigel Townson notes, has been under-studied by comparison with the early dictatorship.

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37 For Maestre’s affiliation with IPRA, see relevant documents in Archivo General de la Universidad de Navarra/Fondo Joaquín Maestre Morata (henceforth AGUN/144)/490/001, and for specific records, Chapter III, note 128-129.
and the Transition. Townson suggests that, “historians have….tended to disregard the social and cultural transformation of the late Franco regime…[such that] the 1960s and 1970s have been largely ignored.” This dissertation focuses on precisely those transformations and, in so doing, it joins a growing body of work with which it is most closely in dialogue: Sasha Pack’s studies of tourism under Franco; Pamela Radcliff’s work on associational life during this same period; Alonso and Conde’s limited but still-benchmark study of consumption in modern Spain; Antonio Cazorla’s survey of ordinary lives under Francoism; and Aurora Morcillo’s work on gender under Franco. In particular, this dissertation engages, as Morcillo recently has, with the proposition that Francoism – late as well as early – consisted of more than simple political repression and Catholic morality, but also a dense package of ideas that she terms “the baroque,” and which crucially included not just Catholic values, but a semi-mystical conception of Spain as a nation apart, possessed of its own special destiny. It is this concept that made the dictatorship more than just a regime with a strongman at its head, and it is this concept that the advent of foreign mass consumption in Spain undermined.

The Department Store in Spain

This introduction, finally, aims to underscore that Spanish interest in foreign commercial and consumer ways, and more specifically its embrace of the department store, dates to this commercial model’s very beginnings in mid-nineteenth-century Europe and the United States. Pilar Toboso, the sole historical authority on the Spanish department store, has instead argued that the department store only truly arrived in Spain in the 1940s and directly at the hands of Pepín Fernández and his principal competitor, El

38 Nigel Townson, “Introduction,” in Townson, Spain Transformed, 1.
39 Morcillo, Seduction, ch. 1.
Corte Inglés founder (and Pepín’s cousin) Ramón Areces. While this argument has its merits – as this dissertation shows, Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés both contributed signally to the cultivation of a mass consumer society in Spain, and concomitantly, to a foreign-influenced modernization of Spanish retailing – such stores once again did exist and adopted foreign methods decades before either businessman contemplated opening a store in Madrid.

Aristides Boucicaut’s Bon Marché, which opened in Paris in 1852, is generally recognized as the first department store to come into existence, remaining so synonymous with this commercial model in French imaginations decades later that author Émile Zola would in 1883 take the store as the inspiration for his portrait of the fin-de-siécle Paris’ department store, the novel Au Bonheur des Dames (The Ladies’ Paradise). Boucicaut’s innovation quickly spread and evolved throughout Europe and across the Atlantic: the next six decades witnessed the founding of stores such as Galeries Lafayette, Harrods, Selfridge & Co., and Karstadt in Europe; Macy’s and Marshall Field & Company in the United States; and, in Latin America, Havana’s landmark El Encanto department store (1888), as well as Harrods’ sole branch store, Harrods of Buenos Aires (1914). Within these cathedrals of bourgeois consumption, the characteristic features of the department store model took form, including fixed low prices, consequent high sales volume, a wide variety of products sold in dedicated sections spread out across vast square-footage and multiple building floors, and consumer spectacles including fashion shows and eye-

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41 For a survey of the founding of Europe and the United States’ department stores, see John William Ferry, A History of the Department Store (New York: Macmillan), 1960. For a more technical account, see Pasdermadjian, chs. 1-3.
catching window-displays. Zola himself placed special emphasis on this last feature, describing the visually lush displays by which his protagonist, fictional store owner and window-dressing iconoclast Octave Mouret, seduced and “transfixed” Parisian shoppers, including his co-protagonist, provincial shop girl Denise Baudu:

[he took] pieces of material, threw them together, crumpled them, making dazzling combinations with them. Everyone agreed that the governor was the best window-dresser in Paris, a revolutionary window-dresser…who had founded the school of the brutal and gigantic in the art of display. He wanted avalanches…blazing with the most flamboyant colours…He used to say that the customers should have sore eyes by the time they left the shop…‘There!’ exclaimed Mouret when he had finished. ‘Leave it like that…Let me know if it doesn’t attract the women on Monday!’

The first Spanish department stores opened during this same period, with Barcelona’s Almacenes El Siglo (1881), generally considered the pioneer. Despite Spain’s near-total absence from scholarship on the nineteenth-century department store, historian Jesús Cruz has underlined that El Siglo was every bit such an establishment, offering a wide range of products across 19 departments and two stories (later expanded to 29 sections and five floors) along the central Rambla dels Estudis boulevard, as well as the consumer spectacle of an elegant central staircase, cutting-edge gas lighting, and elevators, and an unprecedented eponymously-titled customer newspaper. Other stores soon followed, including the Almacenes El Águila store chain; Almacenes Madrid-Paris, located in the capital; Almacenes Siro Gay of Salamanca, Oviedo’s Almacenes Botas Roldán, and, in Barcelona, Almacenes Jorba, whose palatial five-story structure on the

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highly commercial Portal de l’Angel would become a city icon by the 1950s.\textsuperscript{44} Less-heralded but hardly late-comers, Spain’s first department stores opened even as their famous European counterparts did, and were moreover part of the network of intellectual exchange that led the Bon Marché to inspire Marshall Field’s own commercial innovations, or El Encanto’s Bernardo Solis and Aquilino Entrialgo to embrace the latest American and Parisian methods and products.\textsuperscript{45} El Siglo owners Eduardo Conde and Pablo del Puerto, for instance, adopted American retailing methods to which they had been exposed while working at a store in mid-nineteenth-century Cuba, while during the 1920s, Jorba’s advertising department studied Harrods of Buenos Aires’ ads in \textit{La Nación}, one of the Argentine capital’s leading newspapers.\textsuperscript{46}

It was into this environment of transnational professional exchange that Pepín Fernández and Ramón Areces respectively arrived in 1908 and 1920, when each left Asturias for Cuba, following a well-established nineteenth-century Asturian tradition of emigration in pursuit of the dream of amassing a fortune, or “doing the Americas” (\textit{hacer las Américas}). Both men – neither older than sixteen – soon joined \textit{El Encanto} as \textit{cañoneros} or general-purpose errand-boys, partly thanks to the intervention of top store executive Cesar Rodríguez, cousin to Pepín and Areces’ uncle. During their combined 36 years working for the Havana retailer (1910-1931 and 1920-1935, respectively), the pair


\textsuperscript{45} Cuartas, 94-100; Pasdermadjian, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{46} Cruz, 127-128; for Jorba, see “Almacenes Jorba. Dossieres de Prensa, Recortes de publicidad publicados en el diario \textit{La Nación} de Buenos Aires sobre empresas de la competencia entre agosto de 1919 y octubre de 1922,” in Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid – Fondo Galerías Preciados (henceforth ARCM) 907552/1
internalized _El Encanto_’s often foreign-influenced methods and attention to professional developments abroad, which later indelibly marked their own stores’ principles. These included a paternalistic company ethos that required employees to completely identify with and sacrifice for the good of the store, a stress on customer service and its use as a marketing tool, and the employee rank of _interesado_, a kind of profit-sharing partnership in the store. They included American window-dressing techniques that Gimbel Brothers department store window-dresser Irvin Donnin brought with him to El Encanto in 1922, when the Cuban store hired him away. Pepín in particular embraced the retailer’s modern marketing methods, which later informed ploys like his publicity-generating ads announcing Sederías Carretas’ launch. Both men, finally, were further exposed to American commercial methods during business trips to the United States, most notably the four years (1924-28) that Ramón Areces spent working at El Encanto’s buyer’s office in New York, before each returned to Spain in 1931 and 1934, respectively, and soon thereafter launched Sederías Carretas (1934), and El Corte Inglés (1935) – just in time for the eruption of the Spanish Civil War.

**The Franco Regime: An Overview**

Before proceeding to the body of this dissertation, it is worth examining the political and economic context in which Spain’s mass consumer society took shape, and which it helped transform: namely, the forty-year Franco dictatorship and Spain’s subsequent transition to democracy. As noted previously, a victorious Franco formally established his rule with the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, but for much of the

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47 Toboso, _Pepín Fernández_, 100.
48 Ibid., 122-125.
49 For Donnin, see Cuartas, 103. For Pepín and Areces in the United States, see Cuartas, 104-110; Toboso, _Pepín Fernández_, 86, 90-91. For these stores’ founding, see Toboso, _Pepín Fernández_, 118-127, 168-172; Cuartas.
next decade ruled over a diplomatically isolated nation in economic tatters – a period fittingly known in Spain as the *Años de Hambre* or “Hunger Years.”

Thousands starved and disease spread in the immediate postwar, driven by food shortages and rampant black-marketeering that flouted government efforts to ration Spain’s inadequate food supply. Agrarian wages plunged below subsistence levels, where they remained into the early 1950s, as did rationing, which only ended in 1952. Franco’s embrace of autarky – a policy of economic self-reliance based around import restrictions and promotion of domestic industry, borrowed from his two main foreign allies, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy – only compounded these problems.

So did these nations’ defeat in 1945, after which Franco’s Spain found itself diplomatically ostracized as a fascist holdover and excluded from bodies and programs like the newly formed United Nations (founded 1948) and the United States’ European Recovery Program (1947).

Politically and socially, meanwhile, these were the peak years of Francoist moralism and repression. Authorities persecuted former Republican civil servants and political militants as well as veterans from the defeated camp, deemed guilty of having served a morally decadent, parliamentary-liberal, Jewish, Masonic, and Communist “Anti-Spain” that was ultimately responsible for Spain’s decline from its former imperial glories. By December 1939, Spanish jails housed 270,719 political prisoners, counting neither the thousands who were summarily executed nor the many who faced civil

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50 Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, “Hunger and the Consolidation of the Francoist Regime (1939-1951),” *European History Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (July, 2010): 458-483.

51 Castillo Castillo, 54; Cazorla Sánchez, 9-12, 61, 72; Abella, *Vida Cotidiana bajo…Franco*, 52, 122-123.

52 Julio Crespo MacLennan has noted that Spanish postwar isolation was never as complete as has been popularly believed, but also that the nation did not substantially profit from the limited trade it plied due to exclusion from European trade agreements being forged at the time. Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-1985* (Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave, 2000), 14-20. See also Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936-1975* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 355-359, 361, 382-383.
consequences up to and including exile. A climate of fear reigned.

In place of the defeated “Anti-Spain,” the Franco regime and the closely-allied Spanish Catholic Church imposed a new, yet also conservative and traditional Spanish social order. The regime banned all political parties save for its own Movimiento Nacional (“National Movement”), with the fascist Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S. (“Spanish Phalanx,” henceforth Falange), at its core. Franco and his ecclesiastical allies similarly made a new and nationalistic brand of Catholicism known as National-Catholicism the official and sole permitted religion, a creed that became largely synonymous with Spanish national identity. In tandem, the Franco regime and National-Catholic authorities imposed a patriarchal system of gender relations that set men above women and severely regulated gender roles and sexual behavior, as well as stressing a dogmatic respect for paternal authority that was inscribed into the very structure of the Francoist State, with Franco himself cast as sire of Spain’s new order. Women lost the right to the vote, to divorce, and to work outside the home after marrying, and faced new pronatalist policies by which the regime sought to recoup Spain’s wartime population losses. Meanwhile, as Carmen Martín Gaite has noted,

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53 Rafael Abella, *Vida Cotidiana bajo...Franco*, 26; Cazorla Sánchez, 30-31, 8.
54 Juan Eslava Galán, *Los Años del Miedo* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 2010); for more on the use of fear by the Franco regime, see in particular Cazorla Sánchez, ch. 1.
57 Abella, *Vida Cotidiana bajo...Franco*, 213-214.
58 In fact, the regime stripped married women of their legal right to freely secure work as early as 1938, via the Spanish Labor Charter (*Fuero del Trabajo*) and the Law for Family Subsidies (*Ley de Subsidio Familiar*), both passed that year. “Fuero del Trabajo de 1938,” Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, accessed 20 Dec. 2011, http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/08149629022036195209079/p0000001.htm; Alonso Tejada, 31. For the gain of these rights under the Second Republic, see Stanley G.
society stigmatized women with professional ambitions or a disinterest in marriage as bound for spinsterhood, and instead celebrated a patriotic, obedient, self-sacrificing, and chaste ideal, drawn in great part from Catholic sources like the sixteenth-century women’s manual *La Perfecta Casada* (“The Perfect Married Lady,” 1583), which Aurora Morcillo has fittingly termed “True Catholic Womanhood.”

Yet despite this well-earned moniker, it was a political rather than religious organization, the Women’s Section of the Falange, or *Sección Femenina*, that most visibly championed this ideal. Founded in 1934 by Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister to the Falange’s founder, the *Sección Femenina* enshrined the principles of “True Catholic Womanhood” in its 18-point creed, which similarly stressed meek obedience to husbandly and paternal authority. And after 1939, Primo de Rivera’s organization took on the task of instructing women in the docile domesticity they were now expected to embrace through new didactic periodicals as well as programs like the Falangist Spanish University Syndicate (*Sindicato Español Universitario*) and compulsory Social Service (counterpart to the military service required of men), which trained participants in household management.

Men, meanwhile, certainly enjoyed a privileged position in this gender hierarchy, but also had to conform to a strict conservative model of proper masculinity. Socially

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59 Martin Gaite, 37-41, 44, 46. For Catholicism and femininity, see Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*, ch. 1, especially 36-39, 40-41; Abella, *Vida Cotidiana bajo…Franco*, 160-161; Alonso Tejada, 32-34.


61 Ibid., 102-103.

62 Among these perks, for instance, was a complete monopoly on all positions of importance in Pamplona’s yearly San Fermín festival. Clotilde Puertolas, “Masculinity Versus Femininity: The Sanfermines: 1939-
and legally, they were women’s unquestioned superiors, and controlled women’s access to the public sphere, as married women who wished to work, open a business or bank account, or even take a trip of any length could only do so with their husbands’ permission, but with this came obligations, too. They bore responsibility for ensuring wives’ and daughters’ moral conduct – and thereby, the stability of Spanish society. They were ostensibly expected to similarly discipline their own sexual urges, though scholars have amply shown that through the mid-1950s, recourse to prostitutes was widely tolerated as a necessary release for men’s (still sinful) sexual voracity. Falangist masculinity, finally, expected of men a virile “desire to dominate, to conquer, to compete and to achieve extraordinary feats,” to be “hombres-guerreros” (Man-Warriors).

Particularly with regard to sexual morality, the Franco regime devoted considerable resources to enforcing public observance of National-Catholicism’s moral demands. Catholic authorities deemed prolonged interaction between the sexes an invitation to sin; consequently, the regime abolished coeducation after the age of six, and monitored adults carefully, especially on Spain’s beaches, where patrolling police detained and fined bathers whom they deemed immodestly attired. Press censorship was


63 Ibid., 36; John Hooper, The New Spaniards, 2nd Ed. (London, New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 126; Francoist education policy reinforced this hierarchy, preparing “girls especially for the home and for domestic crafts and industries,” and men to be soldiers and scholars. The Spanish Catholic Church similarly opined that “the welfare of the family and the proper unity and stability of the household” hinged upon gender inequality. See Morcillo, 33, 69, 40, 44, 42.


66 Abella, Vida Cotidiana bajo…Franco, 216; Folguera, “El Franquismo,” 529, 531.

67 Abella, Vida Cotidiana bajo…Franco, 106, 111; Alonso Tejada.
an integral part of this coercive system, for under the restrictive Press Law of 1938, the regime’s Ministry of Information exerted near-total control over the press, subjecting every published word circulating in Spain to prior censorship, and vigorously prosecuting those who offended “public morality.”

Spain’s early-1950s diplomatic rehabilitation brought with it an initial wave of economic growth, but only limited social and political reforms that the regime made largely to placate its new foreign allies. In 1951, Franco reshuffled his cabinet in a bid to present a more palatable liberalizing image of Spain abroad. On the one hand, new Commerce Minister Manuel Arburúa subsequently instituted economic reforms that boosted foreign investment; heavy investment by the newly-merged Ministry of Information and Tourism (henceforth MIT) doubled foreign tourist visits between 1951 and 1956; industrial production similarly doubled by 1958; and average Spanish incomes at last returned to pre-Civil War levels in 1955. And while an elite minority retained most of this wealth, ads for products like Coca-Cola, rising access to credit, and measures like radio contests made its trappings at least somewhat widely available. On the other hand, however, Franco’s sociopolitical reforms consisted mostly of minimizing the fascist Falange’s presence in his cabinets after 1951, and a revision of the Spanish Civil Code in 1958 that sought to reconcile Francoism’s “True Catholic” womanly ideal with

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68 The 1938 law also required and requiring all journalists and publications active in Spain to first register with the government, which consequently became the press’ gatekeeper. See Manuel Fernández Areal, *La Libertad de Prensa en España, 1938-71* (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo S.A., 1968), 35-41.


70 Castillo, *Sociedad de consumo*, 54; Castillo, “¿Es España…?,” 14-16; Alonso and Conde, 132-133; Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*, 56-64.
new messages about femininity entering from abroad by granting women improved legal status while also reiterating their subordination to male authority. Wives still required spousal permission to work, and the new Ministry of Information and Tourism’s censors remained active.\textsuperscript{71} Even autarky lingered, and in 1956 began to produce serious economic dysfunctions that brought the decade’s tenuous growth to a halt, and drove inflation – at its lowest point since the Civil War – skyward.\textsuperscript{72}

This was a primary catalyst for the Spanish economic boom, for the tensions it sparked ultimately drove Franco to again reshuffle his cabinet in 1957, placing a new group of technocrats – the boom’s architects – in key ministries. Three of them, Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres, Finance Minister Mariano Navarro Rubio, and Laureano López Rodó of the President’s office, together enacted a series of reforms over the next two years that opened the economy to foreign investment, ending autarky and bringing Spanish economic policy in line with the European trend toward international cooperation that in 1957 spawned the European Economic Community (henceforth EEC or “Common Market”). This culminated with the Stabilization Plan of 1959, which alongside other factors such as a growing population, rising foreign tourism fueled by a larger Western European economic upswing, and a series of three national economic development plans spearheaded by López Rodó, set in motion Spain’s economic boom, which would last through 1973.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71}Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, 55, 66-70; Cazorla Sánchez, 422-423.
The resulting economic, social, and political changes were dramatic. Economically, Spain’s gross national product grew between 1961 and 1964 at a rate of 8.7 percent per year, or more than double the average for the previous 25 years; tourist revenues soared from an already hefty $71.6 million in 1958 to $3.091 billion in 1973; and Spain rose by 1975 to become the world’s eleventh-largest industrial power, a transformation sometimes termed the “Spanish Miracle.” Spanish diplomatic fortunes rose in time with foreign (especially American) investment: in 1959, Dwight Eisenhower became the first American president to visit Franco’s Spain, which the loyal Galerías Preciados celebrated in its store bulletin, and in February 1962, Spain applied to join the EEC, with which Franco finally secured a preferential trade agreement in 1970. Regime efforts to cultivate a palatably moderate, modern image abroad, meanwhile, received a further boost in 1962 with the appointment of new Minister of Information and Tourism Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who spearheaded the highly successful 1964 “Spain is Different”
and “25 Years of Peace” campaigns that promoted Spain as both a culturally exotic tourist destination and a respectable and modern European state.\footnote{For efforts to present the regime in a more appealing light, see for instance National Movement Secretary-General José Solís Ruiz’s outreach to various European political figures over the course of 1961, including Berlin’s Social-Democratic mayor and future German chancellor Willy Brandt, noted in Crespo Maclennan, Spain and the Process of European Integration, 51. For an analysis of “Spain is Different,” see Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, 68-72, 149-152. For the “25 Years of Peace” campaign, see for instance, Abella, Vida Cotidiana bajo...Franco, 191-193; Payne, The Franco Regime, 508; Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, 140; and, Crumbaugh, 55.}

Finally, as noted previously, Spain’s economic upturn transformed ordinary Spanish lifestyles. Religious authorities reacted with alarm at the plummeting religious observance and sexual libertinage they perceived to be rampant on Spain’s tourist coasts.\footnote{Abella, Vida cotidiana bajo...Franco, ch. 15; Cazorla Sánchez, 164-165, 170-172.} Victoria de Grazia has described the advanced of a “Model Mrs. Consumer” feminine ideal in mid-century Western Europe; just so, as the Spanish urban middle and upper class grew – from 26 percent of the population in 1960 to 41 percent in 1975, by one estimate – so did consumption of modernity-laden goods like refrigerators, which 87 percent of households owned in 1975, by contrast with just four percent in 1960.\footnote{De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, ch. 9; Payne, The Franco Regime, 485, 488; Fundación FOESSA, Informe sociológico...1966, 74-80.} Meanwhile, with this spreading American consumerism and rising Spanish standard of living, traditional Spanish anti-American sentiment entered a nadir that lasted through the mid-1960s.\footnote{Seregni, 180-182.}

Yet serious social problems had also begun to fester. Censorship remained heavy, despite Fraga’s introduction of a new and ostensibly more liberal press code in 1966, for while it freed publishers to print what they wished, the new code also harshly and aggressively penalized politically or morally offensive content, leading many journalists
Spain’s new prosperity, moreover, remained far from universal. Incomes did not rise in most of Spain as they did in its largest cities, and resulting mass migration to these urban centers produced housing crises, swelled outlying neighborhoods like Orcasitas (Madrid), and contributed to the poverty and crime that reigned there well into the 1970s. For those whose lot improved but not by enough to consume as shown in the media, the results were raised benchmarks for the so-called ‘good life’, and consequent frustration. Among them, factory workers across Spain formed the first chapters of Comisiones Obreras (“Worker’s Commissions” or CC.OO.), the late Franco era’s most powerful clandestine labor syndicates, in response to grievances including demands for wages that would allow workers to reap the benefits of the consumer society their work fueled, and outrage at the en masse retributive firing of striking workers. Illegal strikes proliferated, some motivated by political grievances like the 1970 trial of six members of the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) – the most extreme but far from sole product of similarly rising tensions between Spain’s Castilian center and its long-persecuted minority regional cultures.

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82 Ofer, 223; and, Cazorla Sánchez, 95-96, 115-122, 154-155.

83 For example, while 72 percent of upper-class households owned a television in 1966, 71 percent of working-class families did not. Fundación FOESSA, Informe sociológico...1966, 74-80. For more on boom-era inequalities, see Payne, The Franco Regime, 491; Cazorla Sánchez, 127-132; and, FOESSA, Efectos sociales queridos y no queridos en el desarrollo español (Madrid: Fundación FOESSA, 1967), 54-56.


85 For instance, members of Catalonia’s Nova Cançó music movement, including songwriters Lluís Llach, Joan Manuel Serrat, Raimón, and María del Mar Bonet, worked from 1961 onward to both normalize public use of the previously stigmatized Catalan language and to more generally denounce the regime’s injustices. See Carlos Aragüez Rubio, “La Nova Cançó catalana: Génesis, desarrollo y trascendencia de un
the regime’s political and social immobility within the once dependably Francoist Spanish clergy, which only increased after the 1965 conclusion of the liberalizing Second Vatican Council, further compounded these troubles.86

Tensions continued to mount through Franco’s death in 1975, contributing significantly to his political system’s subsequent collapse. Fraga was an early casualty, swept out along with several other reformist ministers in 1969, following the largest financial scandal of the Franco years. In 1973, Franco’s second-in-command Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco became another, assassinated in an ETA bombing attack, and months later the ‘Spanish Miracle’ met its own end as a result of the 1973-1974 global oil crisis, which sunk Spain into a recession that would last through the rest of the decade.87 The ailing Franco had hoped Carrero Blanco would ensure that Prince Juan Carlos of Spain, the dictator’s designated successor, would remain faithful to his political principles; to replace his lost lieutenant, Franco named the conservative but inexperienced Carlos Arias Navarro, who faced a stalling Spanish economy, continued labor strikes as well as ETA attacks, the (to hardliners, alarming) collapse of neighboring Portugal’s own long-lived dictatorship, and soon a plunging international reputation due to his attempts to quell this unrest by dint of police batons.88 Meanwhile, pressure for reform mounted within Spanish civil (and especially housewives’) associations; at Spain’s universities, home to frequent student protests; among an increasingly

86 For a fuller analysis of the Spanish clergy’s criticism of the regime during the 1960s, see Callahan, ch. 4.
87 During the recession, for instance, inflation briefly climbed as high as 35 percent (1977), and in 1978, 250,000 individuals found themselves newly unemployed. Payne, The Franco Regime, 491; Lieberman, 152, 177, 183.
88 Cazorla Sánchez, 210; Payne, The Franco Regime, 557-560, 592-598.
outspokenly critical intelligentsia; and within Spanish Catholic Church, which definitively broke ties with the regime in 1974-1975.89

Finally, Franco’s death on 20 November 1975 freed the new King Juan Carlos I (r. 1975-2014) to pursue the political reforms that the Spanish public desired. In July 1976, he replaced Arias Navarro with National Movement Secretary-General Adolfo Suárez.90 Months of negotiation with the still-illegal socialist and communist opposition as well as the increasingly nervous Francoist diehards in the Spanish Parliament followed amid a crescendo of strikes, culminating with the passing of an unprecedented Law of Political Reform by which the legislative body dissolved itself, established the framework for a new bicameral legislature, and called for new elections. On 15 June 1977, after more negotiations and the controversial legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), those elections took place: Adolfo Suárez emerged the winner, the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) led the opposition, and with a new democratic system in place, Francoism as a political system could at last be considered to have fallen in Spain, a transition to democracy consummated one year later with the passing of a new Spanish constitution in July 1978 and its ratification by popular referendum that December.91

Chapter Outline

This dissertation explores the role that consumption played in these upheavals over the course of four chapters. The present introductory section prefaces this analysis with a brief examination of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century origins of the department store and consumer literature in Spain, emphasizing the emergence of an

90 Carr and Fusi, 195-206, ch. 10.
91 Carr and Fusi, ch. 10; Gilmour, chs. 8-10.
internationally-oriented Spanish bourgeois consumer culture that served as a foundation for Spain’s mass consumer revolution. It notes that Spanish interest in foreign products and commercial methods long predated Spain’s mid-century turn abroad. Most especially, it shows that even the nation’s first department stores were party to the network of relationships by which professional knowledge flowed multidirectionally between the first great North American, Latin American, and European department stores, as it later flowed between stores like Macy’s, El Encanto, and Galerías Preciados.

Chapter One examines the initial development of a mass consumer society in Franco-era Spain by considering the trajectory and shape that its department stores, which Rosalind Williams has numbered among mass consumption’s telltale features, took as they spread during the early dictatorship.\(^9^2\) Taking Franco’s consolidation of power in 1939 as its starting point, this chapter shows how as these stores grew, they shaped the venues in which the mass consumption of the 1960s would take place, as well as patriarchal and paternalistic institutional cultures that at Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés bordered on totalitarian. This chapter argues that this process was profoundly political: most especially, these retailers’ patriarchal and totalizing workplace cultures extended regime efforts to impose and enforce a National-Catholic moral and gendered order. At the same time, it concludes, Spanish commercial modernization had already begun to display a marked international orientation that would soon pose an even stronger sociopolitical challenge to the regime.

Chapter Two considers this same process from the other side of the shop counter, through the lens of the Spanish consumer press, which it shows drove forward the

discursive construction of mid-century Spain’s first, imagined mass consumer society. During the 1940s and 1950s, the number of magazines published in Spain rose sharply. This chapter argues that as they multiplied, these periodicals encouraged readers to consume products like American home appliances, to perform middle-class identities thereby, and most importantly, to imagine themselves as part of a society in which all could aspire to this – that is, a mass consumer society.

It shows that, as at Spain’s department stores, the products and lifestyles that these magazines promoted were often of foreign and especially American origin, the result of a foreign focus that marked these magazines, and Spain’s turn toward mass consumption, from their 1940s beginnings. And, this chapter emphasizes, the sociopolitical consequences of this journalistic turn abroad were similarly pronounced. Initially, magazines like Mujer actively promoted National-Catholicism’s conservative feminine model. The arrival of American consumerism, however, challenged this model’s domestic and self-abnegating feminine ideal, as some Spanish magazines began to encourage housewives to consume for their own pleasure and pursue careers, while others fought a rearguard effort against these changes, stressing women’s traditional duty to home and family. Most of all, though, the Spanish consumer press’ 1950s embrace of foreign consumer culture, in tandem with Spanish department stores’ own outreach, advanced Spain’s integration into an international network of American and European merchants, fashion professionals, consumers, and more broadly, of nations – which in this last instance would soon gain a measure of formal political reality in the guise of the European Economic Community.

Chapters Three and Four explore the culmination of these processes during the
years of the Spanish economic boom, Franco’s own death, and the subsequent transition to democracy, or roughly from 1956 through 1980.

Chapter Three uses the late 1950s arrival of the supermarket in Spain and the contemporaneous professionalization of the Spanish advertising industry as case studies by which to examine how this consumption-mediated international integration dramatically accelerated during the first years of the Spanish economic boom. Between 1956, when the Spanish Ministry of Commerce first contacted its U.S. counterpart for information about supermarkets, and the 1966 IPRA annual meeting, hosted in Barcelona by Spanish public relations pioneer Joaquín Maestre Morata, both the food distribution and advertising industries expanded at nothing short of breakneck pace. They did so, this chapter argues, driven by the same motivation that fueled Spanish department stores’ foreign outreach: concern over the economic challenge that the European Economic Community posed, and a consequent fixation on achieving their own as well as a Spanish national rise to modernity through professionalization of their trade. And, it shows, both sectors, unlike Spain’s department stores and consumer press, undertook this process of concentrated expansion in close dialogue with the Franco regime, which wielded an often heavily regulatory hand and sought to harness the supermarket’s spread especially to its goal of promoting national prosperity and with it a rise in Spanish international prestige. The result, this chapter concludes, was a new, especially strong penetration of foreign products and lifestyles into rural as well as urban Spanish consumers’ lives, and a growing perception there as well as among Spain’s food retailing and advertising professionals of Spain’s place as part of a larger European and Western community of nations.
Chapter Four, finally, shifts back to the nation’s department stores and consumer press, examining how the dramatic social upheavals of the dictatorship’s last fifteen years (1960-75) unfolded there, focusing especially on shifting gender roles and conceptions of Spanish national identity. Over a longer span of time than among SPAR’s supermarkets or at Joaquín Maestre public relations agency, these stores and magazines helped develop Spain’s mass consumer society and hastened its insertion into a larger international community. This chapter examines Galerías Preciados’ and other Spanish department stores’ spread during the nation’s economic boom, as well as their efforts to gain world-class, cosmopolitan reputations, but also the challenges that the changing times posed to their carefully-constructed institutional cultures. It shows how one of these changes – a shift in gender norms and women’s place in society, coupled with the contemporaneous rise of 1960s youth culture – played out dramatically in Spain’s consumer press, particularly its men’s magazines, and how these ultimately reinforced the same fixation with foreign lifestyles and international affiliation that coursed through the Spanish food distribution and advertising professions. And it follows these trends as they culminated during the 1970s and through the end of the dictatorship in the form of not just a foreign-influenced store, but a true Spanish-American enterprise, Sears Roebuck of Spain. Aided by its parent company’s multinational structure, this store thrust its employees and customers into the most extensive international commercial network they had yet experienced, a remarkably fluid international flow of personnel and ideas that, as one contemporary put it, caused borders – and notions of Spanish social and political difference – to cease to exist.
CHAPTER I
The Department Store and the Formation of a Spanish Mass Consumer Society Under the Early Dictatorship, 1939-1957

On 15 November 1941, Francisco Casares, Secretary of the Spanish National Federation of Press Associations and an official within the newly-established Franco regime, crossed Central Madrid to deliver a speech at Sederías Carretas, an up-and-coming Spanish department store that had just founded its first branch location in the Spanish-Moroccan city of Tangier.1 Standing before the store’s assembled staff, Casares emphasized that, true to founder Pepín Fernández’s well-known maxim that “commerce is a social function.” Stores like Sederías were important for providing people “what they need to live, to reward their senses, or to lead more elegant lives…” Commerce, Casares added, “is as useful and noble [a task] as that of the public official, the human instrument of the State.”2

Both Casares and Pepín were correct – at least in attributing a sociocultural and political power to retail commerce as it developed in Spain under the early Franco dictatorship. Between 1939 and 1957, Spain passed from an initial period of postwar diplomatic isolation, severe domestic scarcity, and famine to a partial resurgence of economic prosperity and the reintegration of Spain into the international diplomatic community during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Francoism’s first two decades also witnessed the initial development of a Spanish mass consumer society, a society in which more and more of the Spanish masses lived lives steeped in advertising charged with a variety of hidden meanings. An imported designer dress and an automobile, particularly

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1 Manuel Zafra Aragón, Méritos, errores, ilusiones y personajes de Galerías Preciados (Madrid: Ediciones Académicas, 2006), 35.
2 Francisco Casares, Conferencia que el secretario de la Asociacion de la Prensa D. Francisco Casares ha dado al personal de Sederias Carretas, S.L el 15 de Noviembre de 1941 (N.P.), 7.
in the 1950s, were not just a dress and an automobile – they were tokens of having ‘arrived,’ of having achieved consumer respectability.³

Yet scholarship on the rise of mass consumption in Spain, most notably the benchmark work of sociologists Luis Enrique Alonso, Fernando Conde, and José Castillo Castillo, has by contrast traditionally argued that, though Spain’s initial, tepid economic recovery would eventually help precipitate a far greater barrage of economic reforms and subsequent consumer growth in the 1960s, its initial effects were limited. They argue that consumer society first began taking shape during the 1960s, especially in the latter half of that decade, when a significant group of Spaniards finally gained the buying power necessary to support mass consumption.⁴

This chapter breaks with this tradition and examines how Spanish mass consumer society first formed under the early dictatorship as well as the role Spain’s new, rapidly-growing, and mass-oriented department stores played in shaping and driving this process forward. During the eighteen years between 1939, which brought the end of the Spanish Civil War and the consolidation of General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, and the 1957 cabinet reshuffling that ushered in broad economic and political reforms, stores like Sederías Carretas (as part of the Galerías Preciados department store chain), Ramón Areces’ El Corte Inglés, Almacenes Botas of Asturias, and Salamanca’s Almacenes Siro Gay all achieved unprecedented success and influence over Spanish commerce and consumer life. They expanded into a host of major and mid-sized cities in Spain and Spanish Morocco, and Areces’ and Pepín’s stores soon gained the ability to reach the rest

³ Aurora Morcillo, for example, examines the effects that spreading notions of a desirable, respectable mass consumer prosperity had on dominant gender norms in 1950s Spain. See Morcillo, True Catholic Womanhood, ch. 3. See also Chapters Three and Five of this dissertation.
⁴ José Castillo Castillo, “¿Es España?,” 15-18; José Castillo Castillo, Sociedad de Consumo; and Alonso and Conde, 80, 86-87, 147-151.
of Spain through a busy catalog and mail-order business.

As they expanded, these stores shaped the development of a distinctive Spanish mass consumer society in several ways. They provided new, modern, purposely built venues for this mass-oriented commerce. Store managers, early trade specialists, and entrepreneurs like Pepín Fernández helped professionalize Spanish retail commerce by introducing training programs, trade journals, and employee bulletins that advanced employee knowledge and held store chains’ expanding networks of branches together. These changes were not universally shared, but the larger shift toward a technical, professional view of commerce was. These workplace cultures served as the backdrop against which shoppers and store clerks later experienced the sociocultural upheavals of the 1960s.

While the Franco regime pursued diplomatic acceptance during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Spain’s new department stores began adopting specifically foreign commercial methods as they professionalized their trade, nurtured existing links to foreign retailers like Havana’s *El Encanto*, and pursued affiliation with international retailing organizations like the Intercontinental Group of Department Stores (IGDS), which Galerías Preciados first joined in 1951 and, after a short-lived exit from the group, rejoined in 1958. The result was a restating of existing commercial ties between Spain and other nations and Spain’s further reinsertion into a larger international commercial community. This in turn helped shift Spanish national identity away from early Francoist notions of Spanish exceptionalism, and toward self-identification as a cosmopolitan, prosperous member of the capitalist West.

These were political consequences, and this chapter argues that the mass retail
commerce that emerged under the early Franco dictatorship was often politicized, particularly by the Franco regime and its supporters within Spanish retailing. For after 1939, stores like Galerías Preciados aligned themselves with the new regime, imposing Francoist values, particularly Francoist gender norms, on their employees through official store codes of conduct and other internal policies instituted during the 1940s and early 1950s. These measures shaped official store workplace cultures in which managers aggressively regulated employees’ private moral conduct and even their choices as consumers. In so doing, these stores extended Francoist moral authorities’ ability to control Spaniards’ private lives, and thus contributed to the early Franco regime’s efforts to attain totalitarian control over Spanish society and public morality.

This chapter examines how the development of modern, mass-oriented department stores in the 1940s and 1950s Spain laid the groundwork for the consumer boom of the 1960s, a dimension of the story that is lost when the advent of mass consumption in Spain is dated to the late 1960s. It also suggests that, because of the foreign innovations on which they drew, both Spanish department stores’ efforts to expand physically and their new management policies helped build pathways through which other foreign products, consumer practices, lifestyles and subversive sociopolitical notions entered Spain during the tumultuous 1960s. The focus of this chapter is on understanding the roots of these relationships.

**The Spanish Department Store Begins to Spread**

The modern department stores of the Franco era began to develop almost immediately after the dictatorship established itself. Yet at first, the economic disarray of the Spanish postwar period and the absence of any appreciably-sized middle class – even
in Madrid – made this far from easy. Revenue was so low that Sederías Carretas had to cut back on advertising, one of the cornerstones of the store’s message-oriented commercial philosophy. In addition, stores like Sederías Carretas found virtually every aspect of running a department store beset with obstacles. During 1941 and 1942, the years of greatest shortage in Spain, scarcity translated into an ongoing struggle to even fill shelves. In 1941, for example, Sederías Carretas’ merchandise buyer’s office in Barcelona found itself unable to procure stockings, a popular product, as well as semi-luxurious fabrics like Scottish wool. In a similar vein, government rationing of textiles proved yet another obstacle, as their sale required a special government license that Pepín Fernández still struggled to secure in 1948.

Spain’s economically hard times also circumscribed these stores’ clienteles. Per-capita incomes in Spain dropped sharply during the 1940s, and the majority of Spaniards barely earned enough to subsist – much less shop for pleasure – in part because the Franco regime kept worker wages artificially depressed. A pair of factors mitigated the effects of this lack of buying power. First, stores like Sederías Carretas initially traded mainly in textiles; particularly the lengths of unfinished cloth needed by Spanish housewives who sewed or had a seamstress sew their families’ clothes rather than buying off the rack. And second, these stores operated in Spain’s principal and wealthiest cities. Here they could sell to postwar Spain’s small upper class and nouveau riche making

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5 The one exception was the conservative monarchist Madrid daily A.B.C., one of Spain’s largest newspapers, with which Galerías had negotiated special rates. Ibid., 140-141, 152.
6 Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 138-139.
7 Ibid., 152-154, 448.
8 Alonso and Conde, 132-133; Cazorla Sánchez, 72; Abella, Vida Cotidiana bajo...Franco, 52.
9 See for instance the example of Catalan bourgeois housewife Maria Freixas i Bru, who throughout the 1940s purchased bolts of cloth that a seamstress turned into dresses for Freixas i Bru herself and her daughters. See Chapter II, note 48. Alonso and Conde have noted that such autoproducción, or ‘self-production’ of clothes, persisted into the 1960s, preserving the sewing machine’s importance among other more recently added home appliances like refrigerators and televisions. Alonso and Conde, 177-178.
fortunes in the black market, as well as to working-class city-dwellers who, as Civil War chronicler Gerald Brenan observed on a return visit to Madrid in 1949, faced pressure to dress well in order to remain employable, despite having to live on one meal a day. The result was the first germ of an imagined consumer society in Spain, as these department stores advertised to a Spanish public that for the most part could only aspire to consume.

Despite the hard times, two of Madrid’s newest retailers, Sederías Carretas and El Corte Inglés (founded 1934 and 1935, respectively), as well as older stores like Almacenes Siro Gay, soon began to expand across Spain. As they enlarged existing stores and constructed branches in new cities, they hired a flood of employees, and introduced foreign technical innovations like Spain’s first escalators and professionally-designed window-displays. These stores drove the modernization of Spanish retail commerce. They provided Spain’s cities with spaces in which a new Spanish mass commerce could take place and introduced the chains, entrepreneurs, and legions of ordinary sales clerks who would ply that trade. Finally, as these department stores turned their attention to foreign commercial methods, they exposed Spaniards to these new ways of buying and selling and began to integrate Spain into international European and American retailing circles.

These processes unfolded most markedly at Sederías Carretas. In 1941, Sederías built its first branch in Tangier. In 1943, the retailer opened a second branch under the name “Galerías Preciados” in Madrid’s city center, on a stretch of street between the commercially important Puerta del Sol and Callao plazas (henceforth Galerías-Callao). In 1943-44, the store chain created a mail-order department, enabling the store to reach

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11 Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 143-152.
customers throughout Spain. Then, the rechristened Galerías Preciados began to spread rapidly: between 1947 and 1956, the store built six branches; expanded its flagship store; and opened a textile factory in Madrid, Talleres Coppelia, to cope with the shortages of the 1940s (see Figure 1.1). In 1953, Galerías also moved its Tangier location to a larger space on the Boulevard Pasteur, a broad commercial thoroughfare that served as the heart of Tangier’s prosperous new district, where an eclectic mix of Spaniards, Britons, and Frenchmen drank in cafés, perused the shelves at French publisher Gallimard’s bookstore, and strolled down the boulevard each evening.

Yet, the case of Galerías Preciados was not unique. In 1940, El Corte Inglés opened its flagship branch on Puerta del Sol, where it remains today. The branch expanded in 1946; added a branch of its own in Tangier as well as a manufacturing

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12 Ibid., 152; Zafra Aragón, 39.
13 Cuartas, 244-245, Toboso, Pepin Fernández, 177-178.
division, *Industrias y Confecciones* (INDUYCO), two years later; gained corporate status in 1952; and expanded its flagship store again in 1954.¹⁵ It was to El Corte Inglés as well as *Galerías Preciados* that the 1956/57 Annual Guide to Industry and Commerce in Madrid likely referred when it noted that “some…department stores manage to sell daily articles worth more than one million pesetas.”¹⁶ Beyond the capital, meanwhile, *Almacenes Siro Gay* of Salamanca expanded even more quickly than *Galerías*, adding a new branch every two years between 1942 and 1952, and in Oviedo, capital of Pepín’s native Asturias, *Almacenes Botas* underwent a series of relocations and expansions that by 1945 had gained it a national reputation for visual splendor.¹⁷ Finally, a constellation of smaller, local department stores flourished, including Barcelona’s *Almacenes Jorba* and Madrid’s *Almacenes Simeón*, as well as a host of bargain-oriented department stores that flooded Barcelona’s local newspapers with ads promising deep savings during the hard-scrabble 1940s, and did so well in Madrid that between 1940 and 1954 they helped increase total yearly sales in the capital by three or four times.¹⁸

This expansion fueled a similarly rapid upsurge in employment, which included foreign-trained specialists who, by applying their imported expertise, began to integrate Spain’s commercial sector into the larger international retailing community. *Almacenes Botas*, for instance, took on a steady flow of new employees like Rafael Álvarez.

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¹⁵ Cuartas, 240-243, 245-248; Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 178-179, 181. Incorporation allowed El Corte Inglés to expand the range of products it could legally sell to include products like furniture and perfume.
¹⁸ See for instance an ad from El Barato/La Casa de la Economía (The Cheap One/The House of Thrift), which declared: “‘In the household that does not save, things cannot go well. By contrast, housewives who buy everything at El Barato always come out ahead, [going] from success to success. This week, Progressive Sales…” See, “Ad for El Barato, 11 Nov. 1945,” *Almacenes Jorba – Newspaper Advertisement Clippings*, 1945-58, ARCM 296582/2. For retailing in Madrid, see note 13.
Fernández, who rose from clerk in the textiles department in 1940 to head of the menswear section in 1955, as well as American-trained Luis Botas Rezola, son of the store’s founder, who joined Botas in 1944 and spearheaded modernizing professional development initiatives during the next two decades.\footnote{Quién es Quién,” Boletín de Botas, No. 24 Year III (Nov., 1964), 5.} At Galerías Preciados, payroll grew from 12 employees in 1934 to, 830 in 1948, 1000 in 1951, and triple that by 1957.\footnote{See Zafra Aragón, 30, 39; “Editorial: Somos más de mil,” Boletín de Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados, No. 9, Year II (Jan., 1951), 1, reproduced in “Páginas Antológicas” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 236, Year XXV (Dec., 1973), 15.} Among these new hires were Paris-based merchandise buyer José Corominas (hired in 1941) formerly of El Encanto, who brought his foreign contacts with him to Galerías in 1941; Pepín’s firstborn José Manuel, hired in 1948 after working at several American stores, patterned the store’s new employee bulletin on a counterpart circulating at Macy’s; and Head of Accounting Ramón Granda Lanzarot (hired in 1956), standardized the store’s accounting practices and oversaw the creation of a teletype network that connected Galerías’ branches.\footnote{Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 138, 160, 165; Zafra Aragón, 41, 51-52, 58, 61}

Expansion drove these stores to import other technical advancements, too, which exposed Spanish consumers to new foreign commercial experiences. During the early and mid-1940s, modern foreign store window-dressing techniques – a staple of commercial advertising during Spain’s 1960s mass consumer boom – came to Spain. Early in the 1940s, Spanish department stores began to abandon their traditionally cluttered, amateur window-displays in favor of the larger, well-lit, professional ones pioneered at stores like Macy’s in the 1910s and 1920s In 1940, for example, El Corte Inglés featured a display that, in lieu of merchandise, simply offered a series of placards listing the store’s many services and long hours. In 1943, the newly-opened Galerías Preciados similarly marked
the line between old and new when it commissioned a pair of attention-grabbing displays from cutting-edge foreign-trained window-dressers Aycuens and Domenech.22 And in April 1945, the Spanish window-dresser’s profession got its first dedicated trade journal, Escaparate.23 As historian Chris Hosgood has noted of late nineteenth-century English and American window-drappers’ journals, Escaparate shaped the Spanish window-draiper’s profession, spreading principles of good (often foreign) design, and arguing for the trade’s legitimacy by identifying successful Spanish members.24 In one article, for example, the magazine created a legitimating narrative of past success for the profession by citing the prize that Aycuens, now Galerias Preciados’ Artistic Director, had won in 1939, and by quoting his claim that Spanish displays had much improved since.25

Other foreign innovations followed. Physically, Galerías Preciados, Almacenes Jorba, and other stores continued to evolve. The escalator, an early 20th century American invention designed to maximize customer flow in department stores, had first been exhibited in Spain in 1929, and was first installed at the bargain-price retailer SEPU (Spanish Fixed-Price Society) in 1935. By the late 1950s, the invention had become

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22 For window displays in the United States, see Porter Benson, 18, 102; and Whitaker, 109-129, especially 110-113. For pre-1940s displays, see “Escaparatistas Españoles – Al habla con Aycuens, primer premio en el concurso de Escaparates madrileños 1939,” Escaparate: Revista del arte decorativo comercial (henceforth Escaparate), No. 2, Year I (May, 1945); and, for examples of older-style displays, see “Almacenes Siro Gay y Filiales,” in Cincuenta Años de Almacenes Siro Gay; Venero, “Escaparatases Sintéticos,” Escaparate, No. 3 Year I (June, 1945); Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 150; and “Dos Escaparates de Arte en Galerías Preciados,” A.B.C., 16 Oct., 1943.

23 For Venero, see M. de Valcarcel, “Un Título Bien Merecido,” Boletín de Botas, No. 15 Year II (Dec., 1963), 12. Specifically, this was Spain’s first professional window-draper’s journal, as opposed to earlier, non-specialist commercial literature. See, for comparison, Butlletí Portaveu Mensual del “Centro de Dependientes del Comercio y de la Industria, No. 1 Year 1 (Apr., 1927), Diputació de Barcelona Digitized Local Periodicals Collection, accessed 17 Jan., 2013, http://www.diba.es/xbcx/default.htm.


25 ESCAPARATE, “La necesidad de un buen escaparat,” Escaparate, No. 2 Year I (May, 1945); “Escaparatistas Españoles,” Escaparate, No. 2 Year I (May, 1945); for the magazine’s mission statement, see Arturo Castilla, “Nueva Vision – El Escaparte – Importancia y valor del palco escenico comercial” Escaparate, No. 1 Year I (Apr., 1945).
synonymous with modernity and national progress in Spain, and both Galerías-Callao and Jorba had linked most (in the former case, all ten) of their shop floors with escalators. Tellingly, Pepín Fernández justified the exorbitantly expensive project by calling it necessary if Galerías was to be world-class, while the Spanish public’s fascination with the escalator that Siro Gay installed at its new Valencia branch in 1961 further pointed to its symbolic importance.26

Finally, Almacenes Jorba introduced two other notable innovations during the mid-1950s, new and at the time rare customer services that both cultivated public goodwill and boosted sales. First, in 1953 the store launched Revista Jorba, a fashion and women’s magazine that served as a platform for ads, publicized store events, and, more generally, let Jorba insinuate itself further into customers’ lives. The magazine was different from any previous store publication, for unlike earlier store magazines, aimed at customers, it offered attractive images and graphic ads for household items, a color-illustrated cover, and articles on fashion and child-rearing, as well as short stories, all targeted at a new mass audience, while its one contemporary, Galerías Preciados’ bulletin, was a professional journal.27

Beyond the sheer fact of its novelty – and its popularity, for the magazine enjoyed a sizeable circulation of 25,000-30,000 copies per issue during its time in print, and had readers throughout Spain as well as abroad – Revista Jorba’s appearance represented a


27 For the earlier store publication El Siglo see Introduction, note 44. For Galerías’ bulletin see Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 165-166.
significant development in the trajectory of Spanish consumer culture. It actively participated in the various liberalizing and conservative currents in motion within Spanish consumer discourse throughout the 1950s. In several of its recurring columns, for instance, the magazine presented content that reinforced traditional notions of proper femininity against the challenge that new, more liberal models of feminine behavior posed, a struggle that historian María del Carmen Muñoz Ruiz has shown to have pervaded women’s magazines’ advice columns during the 1960s. The magazine also served as an early example of a phenomenon that would eventually become commonplace in other sectors of Spanish commerce: the store-published consumer magazine. In 1959, Galerías Preciados experimented with such a periodical, a short-lived women’s magazine titled Galerías. At least one supermarket chain, once supermarkets arrived in Spain in the late 1950s, published a magazine directed to its housewife customers, one that was separate from its internal company bulletin. And much later, in the late 1980s, Galerías again experimented with the genre, publishing a glossy full-color fashion magazine titled “Galerías Marcando Estilo” (Galerías Setting Fashion). But such customer-oriented magazines remained rare for the time being – department stores more commonly incorporated elements from traditional consumer periodicals, such as fashion columns and serialized stories, into their employee bulletins, a practice that Galerías, El Corte Inglés, Almacenes Botas, Siro Gay, and, when it arrived in the late 1960s, Sears Roebuck would all to varying degrees exercise. Revista Jorba was the first

28 For a more detailed exploration of Revista Jorba’s content, see Chapter 3. For Muñoz Ruiz’s analysis, see María del Carmen Muñoz Ruiz, “La construcción de las relaciones de género en el franquismo y sus conflictos: los consultorios sentimentales,” Arenal: Revista de Historia de las Mujeres, 10:2 (July-Dec., 2003), 219-239.
29 For Galerías, see Galerías, No. 2 (Spring, 1959); for supermarket-sponsored magazines, see Chapters Three and Four; for Galerías 1980s fashion magazine, see for example, Galerías Marcando Estilo, (Spring-Summer Issue, Mar., 1986), ARCM 903247/2.
modern example of store magazine published specifically for customers, and may have even inspired the short-lived *Galerías*.

Jorba’s second innovation, which debuted in 1955, was a consumer credit system of payment by installments, which the store publicized especially to housewives.\textsuperscript{30} The significance of this measure should not be underestimated. To begin with, as Aurora Morcillo has noted, availability of consumer credit was a key factor in the initial emergence of a mid-century Spanish consumer sector. While the comparatively prosperous residents of Madrid and Barcelona’s city centers shopped at stores like Jorba, most Spaniards – including many in these cities’ peripheries – continued to starve and lacked basic services like running water. In between these two extremes lay urban populations whose incomes rose somewhat amid Spain’s first, mid-1950s economic upturn, and who wished to consume but could not quite afford to do so. For them, credit made shopping possible and added some reality to the mass consumption in which ordinary Spaniards had begun to imagine themselves engaging.\textsuperscript{31}

In adding this service, Jorba also preceded its larger Madrid counterparts, Galerías and El Corte Inglés, by well over a decade. Pepín Fernández and Ramón Areces showed a marked suspicion of and reticence to adopt installment payment services as late as 1964, when by their own admission establishing a credit service had become all but inevitable.\textsuperscript{32} This was, moreover, an innovation that major department foreign department stores like Macys and El Encanto had introduced decades earlier, an example that Jorba


\textsuperscript{31} For Morcillo and credit, see Introduction, notes 10, 70. For more on Spain’s continuing economic struggles, see Introduction, notes 50-52; Chapter II, note 38-39, and Cazorla Sánchez, chs. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{32} Cuartas, 578-579.
likely followed, especially given Jorba’s longstanding awareness of foreign stores’ methods, and credit’s extensive impact abroad. Indeed, by the time that Jorba introduced its installment program in 1955, consumer spending on credit in the United States had grown so extensive that it had begun to provoke public anxiety over credit’s influence in private consumer debt, then steeply on the rise.③³

By the middle of the 1950s, then, Spanish department stores had developed the nation’s first commercial infrastructure devised to serve a mass market. Twenty years earlier, Madrid, Barcelona, and a handful of other Spanish cities had possessed an assortment of bargain stores, outlets of purely local appeal and of unremarkable quality, as well as a few establishments of a bourgeois, nineteenth-century character, such as Barcelona’s El Siglo and Jorba. The period roughly spanning 1940-1956, however, saw stores like Galerías Preciados found branches in an impressive list of Spanish cities, including 11 provincial capitals, expand employment (from 43 workers in 1939 at Sederías Carretas, to 3000 in 1957), in the process introducing some of the key names in 1960s Spanish retail, and incorporate foreign technical and technological innovations laden with notions of modernity.③⁴ Yet this was only half of the sea change taking place in the culture of Spanish retail commerce – alongside this physical, infrastructural, “external” expansion there took place another, and perhaps still more transformative “internal,” management-oriented one.

Internal Expansion, Evolving Labor Cultures, Professionalization, and International Influences in Spain’s Developing Department Stores

During these same years (1939-1956), El Corte Inglés, Almacenes Botas, and especially Galerías Preciados, also implemented a series of internal, personnel-oriented

③³ For credit at Macy’s, see Whitaker, 233; for credit anxiety, see Cohen, 123-124.
③⁴ See note 17
policies and programs including employee codes of conduct, store bulletins, and professional education departments. Such measures, again often of foreign and specifically Cuban and American origin, profoundly shaped these stores’ company values, policies, bureaucratic structures and myriad daily idiosyncrasies – in short, the workplace cultures - through which clerks at these stores experienced and contributed to the birth of a Spanish mass consumer society during the 1950s, and would later experience the dramatic economic growth and sociocultural turmoil of the 1960s. These measures drove forward a professionalization of Spanish department store retailing that not only contributed to the development of mass commerce in mid twentieth-century Spain, but functioned as a site for the politicization of that commerce, which at Galerías Preciados especially, meant alignment with rather than against the Franco regime and its sociopolitical project. Finally, those measures adopted from foreign retailers also established precedent for a further importation of foreign commercial methods, products, and consumer ways in the boom years of the 1960s, all of which arrived accompanied by associated (and to Francoist eyes, subversive) notions that would in time have significant sociocultural consequences for Francoist society and the Franco regime itself.

The first, and typically the most fundamental, of these policies were these stores’ codes of conduct, what Galerías Preciados and Almacenes Botas termed their “Normas,” and which also existed, if not under the same name, at El Corte Inglés. Galerías Preciados was here again in the vanguard, first circulating its code, which Pepín personally penned, shortly after the opening of the first Galerías Preciados in 1943. Almost immediately, it became standard-issue to all new hires and a cornerstone of the store’s culture – the Galerías employee’s bible – eventually entering a second, expanded edition in 1951. In
1943, meanwhile, El Corte Inglés introduced a handbook of its own, an American sales manual translated and adapted expressly for the store that appeared under the title “El Arte de Vender (The Art of Selling),” and which may have been the first in the series of handbooks, including several editions of a code similar to the “Normas,” that the store published from the 1940s on. Almacenes Botas’ own “Normas” followed soon after as well at the hands of Luis Botas Rezola, son of the store’s founder, who joined Botas in 1944.  

Over the course of the late 1940s and early 1950s, various other management initiatives also began to take form. By the late 1940s, professional education programs had sprung up at Galerías and Botas, and, given the similarities between El Corte Inglés and Pepín’s store, it is likely that some form of similar program was operating there as well. Initially modest – menswear department head Jesús Méndez González would later recall having gone through Botas’ program in 1950 seated not in a classroom but on the same counters they used to sell merchandise – these programs gradually expanded, such that a decade later, in 1960, Galerías was running a broad assortment of courses at its smaller stores on the Spanish periphery as well as at its core Madrid stores. These included a series of colloquia on Economics at the newly-founded Bilbao branch and a sales course specifically for saleswomen at its equally new (and equally small) Murcia store. The programs also coincided with another influx of new employees, this time a

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35 Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 212-217; for examples of the various and easily-accessible different editions of the *Normas*, see, for example, [No Author], *Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados – Normas* (Madrid: Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados), 1953, available at the Spanish National Library in Madrid, as well as two editions of the *Normas*, now simply titled *Galerias Preciados – Normas*, in ARCM 124661/8. For *El Arte de Vender*, see *El Arte de Vender* (Madrid: El Corte Inglés, 1943), also held at the Spanish National Library. For references to the *Normas de Botas*, see for example, M. “En el Sitio mas Inverosimil surge la Idea. No la deje Marchar. Dele Forma y Espere Los Resultados. Habra Servido a la Comunidad y Obtendra un Premio,” *Boletín de Botas*, No. 11, Year II (June-July, 1963), 10.
crop of young, university-trained budding technocrats, popularly termed “los universitarios” (the university men) – men such as José Luis Botas Rodríguez, who arrived already possessing unprecedentedly high amounts of professional knowledge, and who embraced the latest, modern techniques being pioneered abroad.  

With this growing emphasis on employee education came a contemporaneous embrace of constant personal self-improvement and professionalization of the retail trade as core institutional values, nowhere more apparent than in Galerías’ employee bulletin, the Boletín de Galerías Preciados. The bulletin, launched in 1948 at the hands of the recently-retumed José Manuel Fernández, soon became management’s main means of communicating with the staff at the store’s many branches, communication of an often didactic character. It was the first and, until the late 1950s, the only publication of its kind in Spain, as Revista Jorba catered to customers rather than staff, and was also one of the store’s most notable early foreign imports, alongside with the Normas. Pepín based his store’s handbook from another he had penned for El Encanto in 1926, itself based on ones in use at Lord & Taylor and Wanamaker’s; similarly, it was an employee bulletin at Macy’s that inspired José Manuel to found the Boletín.  

Throughout the Boletín’s print run, which would last through the 1970s and the end of the dictatorship, its first pages featured columns that placed heavy emphasis on the need for the store workforce to become more technically sophisticated in the name of dedication to perfecting their craft and to the service ideal at its core – in short, to engage

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37 Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 165-166; Cuartas, 595-596.
in professionalization, as formulated by sociologist Harold Wilensky, among others. In an article submitted to the bulletin for a contest in 1953, for instance, employee Alejandro Soto declared, “…to be a good salesperson one needs preparation [professional education], art, and hard work. This is no less true to be a good merchandise buyer,” and another argued that, “there is nothing further from the true salesperson than the anachronistic clerk lacking adequate training and knowledge about his customers and products.” A succession of other columns held up clerks’ constant struggle for self-perfection as a safeguard against the store’s moral and commercial degeneration, a way to shore up both Galerías’ and one’s own personal fortunes, and portrayed the absence of interest in the technical aspects of retailing as the surest sign of a bad salesperson. All the while, Normas and similar manuals at Botas and El Corte Inglés also sought to exert didactic influence over their employee readerships. Indeed, in 1957, the Boletín would point to the Normas’ longstanding insistence on professional self-improvement as a source of store pride, boasting that it proved Galerías, “to have been the vanguard….the standard bearer of progress…and the transformation of commercial methods in the Spanish capital…”

Finally, beginning in the early 1950s, Galerías Preciados established a system of employee social clubs, the Club de Galerías Preciados, through which the store organized cultural and social activities available to members during off-work hours.

40 “La psicología en la venta,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 73 Year VIII (June, 1957), 3.
Some club chapters also offered a physical location, such as the Madrid club’s headquarters, which by 1953 maintained a space in a building a few minutes’ walk from the flagship Callao store, where club members could play board games, hear musical acts like the group Los Tres Chispitas, or drink at a cheap but full bar that the club maintained on premises and that, underscoring the Club’s integration into the store’s larger structure, future Cafeteria Department head Rafael Molina Santander first tended.41

Galerías’ social club, along with measures like the Boletín and employee handbooks, displayed a didactic impulse akin to the disciplinary, training, and employee social programs – the last sometimes termed ‘welfare work’ – that Susan Porter Benson has shown turn-of-the-century American department stores used to improve clerks’ morale and professional preparation, producing better customer service. Employee handbooks – ancestors of the Normas – had achieved currency at these stores by the late 1920s.42 Their latter-day Spanish counterparts as well as other such measures similarly sought to preserve a high quality of customer service that, at Galerías especially, managers feared would soon decline. They feared this decline both because the chain’s swelling ranks were increasingly filled with untested novices to the trade, and because Spain’s still-dire economic straits made it difficult for the store’s often uneducated and poorly-dressed employees to meet the store’s exacting professional standards.43 Meanwhile, amid this climate of economic uncertainty the prospect of earning a steady salary, to say nothing of possible pay raises, made working at a store like Galerías

42 Porter Benson, 124-126, 142-145.
43 It was specifically to manage this growth that Galerías created a dedicated personnel department early on, in 1942. See Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 135.
Preciados worth enduring managers’ pedagogical zeal and close supervision.\textsuperscript{44}

In response to these concerns, these various management initiatives evinced a heavy-handed brand of paternalism that sought to regulate every aspect of the workplace. Store handbooks including Galerías’ \textit{Normas} and its counterpart at El Corte Inglés were encyclopedic and transparent in their intent to exert the maximum control possible over salespersons’ conduct, for reasons similar to those noted by Susan Porter Benson. They sought, for instance, to ensure that saleswomen were neither over- nor under-dressed, both of which could put customers off and hurt sales.\textsuperscript{45} The \textit{Normas de Galerías Preciados} in particular included rules governing employee behavior in virtually every conceivable workplace situation, including how employees ate lunch in the company café – alone, to avoid time-wasting conversation – how often they bathed and changed underclothes, and how they greeted clients. In response to the generally bad state of oral hygiene in Spain – again due largely to the material hardships that remained a reality for most Spaniards – the employee code even ruled with painstaking specificity:

The mouth requires…very special attention. There are people who….cannot stand to be near someone who has bad breath. We must, then, take on the task of oral hygiene with maximum rigor. At least twice a day, when getting up and going to bed, the mouth must be washed meticulously and patiently for a few minutes’ time. When the toothbrush has softened, it must be replaced. One must brush both inside and out, leaving not one tooth untouched by the brush and paste. Cavities appear frequently….therefore, it is essential to visit the dentist at least once a year, even if free of symptoms. Cavities caught in time are easily treated, while those that are ignored become more serious later on and can infect other, healthy teeth. Such small details…have many times decided one’s fate in life…\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 208.

\textsuperscript{45}See, \textit{Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados – Normas} (Madrid: Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados, 1953), 15; Porter Benson, 130. El Corte Inglés’ code, for instance, required employees to “strictly observe standards of personal hygiene and cleanliness,” “avoid language open to interpretation,” and to “seek maximum elegance in their outward appearance,” which for female employees, who unlike their male colleagues wore uniforms, meant keeping these clean and pressed. See Cuartas, 752-753.

Employee training programs similarly aimed to build on employees’ often sparse formal schooling, making them more capable workers and especially better able to serve foreign customers,\(^47\) while the Club echoed American welfare work initiatives in providing employees, whose private moral conduct was of acute concern to Pepín, with store-sanctioned, wholesome, and often educational leisure activities that at the same time bound their loyalties more tightly to the store.\(^48\) Indeed, making this debt all but explicit, Pepín Fernández would in 1971 cite El Encanto – an avid student of American store methods in its day – as having inspired the creation of the Club.\(^49\)

These measures also had the vital purpose of preventing the atomization of the chain into a collection of disjointed, geographically disparate branches - another peril of an expansion that by the late 1950s left the Madrid-based chain with outposts as far away as Tenerife, and even, after Moroccan independence in 1957, beyond Spain’s political borders. Beginning in the mid-1950s, a handful of columns in each Boletín issue offered news from the store’s many branches, coverage of recent births, nuptials, and deaths within its ranks, and profiles of departing well-known employees, all in an effort to preserve a sense that every branch and employee belonged, notwithstanding the distances separating them, to a single Galerías family. Thus, in a 1953 article on the store’s Tangier branch, bulletin regular Agustín Olivera wrote of branch head Luis García,

As all or nearly all of us know, he is in charge of our branch [there]. He does not, I assure you, wear a turban nor have a snake dancing about his feet. Despite his

\(^{47}\) Camino, “A mis compañeros,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 93 Year X (June, 1958), 12; Luis Esteban Sanz, “El Arte Dificil,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 93 Year X (June, 1958), 12.

\(^{48}\) For Pepín’s interest in his employees’ moral conduct as these found expression in the store’s Normas and the Boletín de Galerías Preciados, see notes 53-56. For an example of the educational programming the club offered, see “Actividades del Club – Cinematografía,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 90 Year X (Mar., 1958), 12.

\(^{49}\) “Al habla con nuestro presidente – clubs, llaveros y medallas,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 213 Year XXIII (June, 1971), 3.
years [in Morocco] García seems as if he never left Madrid. He has neither a camel, nor a blonde with the look of a spy and the gaze of a Marilyn Monroe…

Lying just underneath the levity was Olivera’s true, more pressing point: that García and his far-away branch were still recognizably part of Galerías, a point that García himself underlined in the subsequent interview, noting that their clientele was for the most part Spanish, that their policies and methods were “a little piece of Galerías, brought over to Morocco…[such that one] enters and thinks oneself in Madrid,” and requesting that the Boletín report on them, “so that [in Madrid] they’ll remember us and know we exist.”

Yet the ambitions underlying these initiatives ran still deeper. Both Ramón Areces and Pepín Fernández, and later, other retailers like Luis Botas Roldán, saw their stores as more than just a place to work or buy goods. This perception was rooted in Areces and Fernández’s own experiences at El Encanto in early twentieth-century Havana, where the store’s errand-boys had slept overnight on the counters they worked at during the day, received an allowance and board in lieu of pay, and had little time off – perhaps a single afternoon per week. The Cuban store had demanded that employees devote their lives almost completely to the store. As Areces and Fernández crafted their own stores’ internal politics and oversaw the stores’ physical expansions, both men sought thereby not only to manage the growing number of employees this expansion generated, but to similarly absorb their growing employee ranks further and further into the company, centering these workers’ lives around the store.

To that end, measures like the Normas sought to control aspects of employees’ lives only loosely related to the store. The Club de Galerías Preciados, as an attempt by

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51 Cuartas, 565-567.
the store to involve itself in its employees’ leisure time, represented one such effort, albeit one still limited in scope, and participation in which, importantly, remained voluntary. Not so for the Normas: though already forbidden from wearing any employee paraphernalia outside the workplace, both Galerías and El Corte Inglés’s handbooks warned readers that their conduct reflected back on the store at all times, and that they were consequently expected to adhere to the stores’ high standards of conduct in their private as well as work lives and to internalize the store’s culture of self-discipline. Areces’ handbook claimed exclusive rights to employees’ work lives, forbidding any outside work, even self-employed labor.\(^\text{52}\) Pepín’s code, meanwhile, sought to police what workers read, and how and with whom they spent their free time, calling on them especially to avoid morally corrosive friendships and pastimes, and instead “care for their spiritual lives.” Ominously, the Normas followed the last of these commands with a thinly-veiled threat aimed at those who dared disregard these moralistic instructions: “How many youths, having given in to such stimulations, have lost their jobs [emphasis mine] and have been unable to put their lives back together!”\(^\text{53}\) And in fact, on one occasion, a recent hire at Sederías Carretas nearly lost a salary raise simply for smoking on the street after work, because the store manager who discovered him considered it an ugly habit.\(^\text{54}\)

Most ambitious was the store’s injunction against what Pepín termed Traición a la Casa, or treason against the store, which numbered among the cardinal sins an employee at Galerías could commit. The act was seemingly commonplace, consisting of nothing more than purchasing from a competitor a product also available at Galerías

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 747-748

\(^{53}\) Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados – Normas, 16-18.

\(^{54}\) Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 213.
Preciados. Yet the *Normas* considered such “treason” deeply serious, terming it a “sabotag[ing]” of the store’s reputation, a betrayal of trust, and a failure to fulfill the fundamental duty of always helping and never harming the store’s interests – in short, a trangression against morality, not just store policy. Its severity was visually underscored by the black border that surrounded the bylaw’s text in the *Normas*, a distinction reserved for the store’s most important, absolute principles (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: “Treason Against the [Commercial] House”

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

*Source: ARCM 124661/8.*

Given the comprehensiveness of Galerías’ inventory, which ranged from textiles to religious paraphernalia to automobiles, this policy effectively claimed for the store control over its employees’ lives and choices as consumers, just as the *Normas* and El Corte Inglés’ code elsewhere laid claim to workers’ private morality and professional

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55 See, for example, *Galerías Preciados – Normas* (Madrid: Galerías Preciados, Undated Post-1966) in ARCM 124661/8, as well as note 76. This black border appears four times in the *Normas*, always around fundamental parts of Pepín’s doctrine of unfailing customer service and jealous protection of the company’s reputation: first, surrounding the code’s policy on employee “treason”; second, around the store’s call for constant moral discipline; third, a passage that proclaimed all customers and visitors “benefactor[s]” and “friend[s]” to the store who were to always be warmly welcomed; and fourth, the commandment that idle promises never be made, and all promises made to clients be scrupulously kept.
lives, respectively. There was little a Galerías employee might want that they could not buy from their employer, and so there were few purchases an employee could make not subject to this policy, and thus, to the store’s control. This was especially so because both stores’ policies, including Galerías’ rule on professional “treason,” had real teeth. Managers at Galerías Preciados, including Pepín himself, were manifestly willing to carry out the consequences threatened in the handbook, firing one female employee, for example, for immoral behavior in March 1958. Ramon Areces shared this reputation for strictness, even if he was more forgiving toward minor offenders.56

Notwithstanding the Normas’ Cuban-American pedigree, this portion of the store code—its policy on commercial treason—also represented a significant departure from the store’s emulation and adaptation of the personnel practices of its American counterparts. For, as historians like Jackson Lears, Roland Marchand, and Charles McGovern have noted, the metaphor for consumption that quickly achieved predominance in the emerging mass consumer culture of the postwar United States, “structur[ing] and defin[ing] [that] experience, by limiting the number of ways for relating [it],” was an electoral and civic one. Under this metaphor’s logic, a citizen-consumer’s freedom of choice, like their freedom in exercising the franchise, constituted a cornerstone of what it meant to be American and a citizen of a liberal democratic society.57 Put into these terms, Galerías’ ‘treason’ policy amounted by contrast to a disenfranchisement at one stroke of an entire category of consumers—the store’s rapidly-growing corps of employees—that was all the more striking for two reasons. First,

56 “Vigilancia Moral,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 90 Year X (Mar., 1958), 7; Cuartas, 592-593.
because it took place only a few decades after America’s own enshrinement of consumer choice, of which the Havana-trained Pepín had to unquestionably be aware. And, second, because it came even as Galerías itself was taking pains to remind those same clerks that the store’s ordinary customers possessed, and if treated poorly would exercise, precisely this right, voting with their feet and pocketbooks by shopping elsewhere. The Normas themselves, for instance, emphasized in one of the text’s other black-bordered fundamental tenets (which the handbook self-professedly borrowed from Selfridges of London) that, “[the client] does us a favor in giving us the opportunity to serve him,” and warned that giving customers inexact information about items would anger clients by wasting their time, “caus[ing] them to leave…resolved never to return.”

58 Though these two policies – one an imported sacralization of consumer choice, the other a homegrown blanket barring of Galerías’ clerks from exercising that choice – seem contradictory, their juxtaposition followed naturally from that store’s characteristic paternalism. The Normas’ policy on treason couched the livelihoods of the store and its employees as “so intertwined as to be one and the same, physically and spiritually”; by this logic, Galerías’ policy did not deny employees their rights as consumers so much as it protected their material best interests by ensuring the store’s continued profitability, concluding with the question,

“This [intertwined nature of the store and employees’ livelihoods] being the case…is it not our fundamental, natural duty to do everything in our power to benefit the store and do nothing that could materially or morally harm it?”

59 Ibid., 11.
discourse, and in particular from what the Normas meant when it spoke of “the customer.” Extending the American metaphor of the citizen-consumer, Galerías clerks’ position vis-à-vis the store-going public as manifest in the store’s official discourse was akin to that of military servicemen and civilians: like soldiers (or priests), the store’s clerks surrendered certain basic freedoms – namely, consumer freedom of choice – in the line of duty. Galerías’ service ideal, epitomized by Pepín’s long-standing (if admittedly also self-serving) doctrine that, “commerce is a social function,” could also be compared to the soldier’s altruistic service to the nation. Indeed, another fundamental tenet of the Normas, a fascism-stated call for employees to always privilege the store’s more important interests over their own, claimed justification by likening these interests to the high interests of the State.  

In fact, the Boletín de Galerías Preciados explicitly glorified the military and indulged in comparisons between store clerks’ duties and military service in articles spanning the latter half of the 1950s and the early 1960s. Columns regularly appeared in early issues of the bulletin that celebrated male clerks temporarily leaving the store to serve in the “mili,” the compulsory two-year period of active military service required at the time of every adult male Spaniard (see Figure 1.3), or, in one notable instance in 1956, reported on a former Galerías worker serving in the French Foreign Legion.  

Half a decade later, Boletín contributor José Javier Aleixandre liberally employed military language to describe clerks’ efforts to prepare Galerías’ first Bilbao branch for its 1960

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60 Ibid., 5-6. For Pepín’s truism, see note 1.
61 See, for instance, A.F., "4 reclutas, 4, se despiden" Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 61 Year VII (Apr., 1956), 6; and, “Nuestro Legionario,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 61 Year VII (Apr., 1956), 10. In truth, it should also be noted, not all adult Spaniards had to serve, as both legal and illegal ways of avoiding military service existed, nor was the service period always two years long. For a detailed study of the mili through 1960, see J. Fidel Molina Luque, “Quintas y servicio militar: Aspectos sociológicos y antropológicos de la conscripción (Lleida, 1878-1960)” (Ph.D diss., University of Lleida, 1996).
opening, language that, according to Aleixandre, was not of his but rather the store staff’s invention. In his militaristically titled article, “Fuerzas de Choque” (“Shock Troops”), Aleixandre lauded the branch’s staff – the titular “shock troops,” a sobriquet he claimed the clerks had devised themselves – for their preparatory work over the days preceding the unveiling, or as he put it, for “taking Bilbao without a single casualty in this bloodless, loving rather than bellicose campaign to conquer strongholds.”

American valuations of consumer choice rested on a metaphorical link between that choice and an individual franchise cherished in that political culture, in Francoist Spain the vote was not only not valued, but in fact did not exist. To the contrary, the regime promoted an idealization of military service to the Spanish nation that found resonance in the Boletín de Galerías Preciados’ own discourse. Policies such as Galerías’ ban on commercial treason and El Corte Inglés’ attempts to insert themselves into employees’ private lives were entirely in line, then, with the political tone of the regime.

Indeed, during the Franco dictatorship’s initial fascist phase, these codes could be directly political. The demands that these codes made on workers represented a colonization of their lives by the stores that issued them, rendering the resulting work cultures at Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, for which the stores’ Normas functioned as foundational texts, in a sense totalizing – that is, systems characterized by the desire to construct model employee-citizens wholly defined by, and committed to, their service to the store, what El Corte Inglés would call a “Persona Cortty.”

These aspirations to total citizenship not only resonated with, but fit directly within, the Franco dictatorship’s larger sociopolitical project. During the late 1930s and the early 1940s, myriad voices within and around the new regime proclaimed it totalitarian, in keeping with the Falange’s 26-point creed, which declared the new Spanish state, “a totalitarian instrument in the service of the integrity of the Patria [Fatherland].” Sociologist Juan Linz has argued that this totalitarianism, as defined by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1956, was short-lived in Francoist Spain, which he argues transitioned after 1945 to a “stabilized authoritarian regime”

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63 See, for example, Cuartas, 604-606.
64 Payne, Fascism in Spain, 128
characterized by a lack of a concrete political ideology or of extensive political mobilization, and with its exercise of power through ill-defined yet predictable channels. Yet in Spain this totalitarianism was never truly total. The Franco regime’s goal was to centralize political power as a means of harnessing public obedience toward the Francoist State’s *raison d’être*, a project of Spanish national renewal. It never intended, for example, to take over the Spanish Catholic Church, or to harness that obedience for the construction of the State as an end in itself. Rather than assume direct control over every aspect of life, this “subjective[ly] totalitarian” Spanish state, as Jesuit theorist of Spanish corporatism Joaquín Azpiazu termed it in 1937, took on a “directive” role, aiding rather than absorbing the Spanish Catholic Church and its mission of saving souls, for example, and working together to disseminate a politicized, Francoist brand of Catholicism termed National-Catholicism – engaging, in other words, in a kind of delegated totalitarianism.

In its will to control, El Corte Inglés and Galerias Preciados – especially the latter – existed in a relationship to the early Franco regime that was analogous to the Church’s. In her study of the Coros y Danzas, a folkloric dance troupe run by the Women’s Section or *Sección Femenina* of the Falange, historian Pilar Amador Carretero has noted that states transmit ideology both through official mechanisms, but also through “accidental…agents…with their own distinct aims but which ultimately also serve as

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66 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 271-272, 366, 388-389. Totalitarian discourse within the regime was especially prevalent during this, the regime’s “blue” period, it is worth noting, in part because it was then that the Francoist state contained the largest number of Falangist ministers it would ever employ at one time, including Franco’s cousin and first Minister of Propaganda, Ramón Serrano Súñer. For Azpiazu, see Ibid., 285-286.
Galerías Preciados functioned, and on occasion the regime instrumentalized it, as just such a private, separate, yet ideologically-aligned and at times explicit arm of Francoist “subjective totalitarianism.” It worked in this case not to inculcate National-Catholicism among the Spanish (though the store was public in its official Catholic fervor), but in parallel with the regime to advance Francoism’s vision of a unified, corporatist reorganization of Spanish society and, most especially, of labor and commerce at the service of Spanish national greatness.

It was in just such terms that, in his 15 November 1941 speech at Sederías Carretas, Secretary Francisco Casares of the capital’s press association described the role he believed Pepin’s store and Normas to be playing in Franco’s New Spain. Here, he held the handbook up as both paragon and champion of the regime’s ideology. Galerías’ code, Casares declared in Falangist and National-Catholic terms, had established a model for how organizations could develop a fraternal, collaborative workplace ethos that cut across internal hierarchies and rooted itself in the shared experience of daily labor toward a common goal. This “honest, Christian worldview,” as he termed it, embraced early Francoism’s conception of work as bearing an intrinsic moral significance and holding the key to the regime’s goal of achieving national greatness. This was possible when “those working in the same place, fus[ed] their wills, intelligence, and physical efforts together toward one shared end,” establishing just the sort of spiritual communion that Galerías had cultivated. Or, as a later edition of the Normas phrased it,

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68 The store, for instance, routinely hosted visits by prominent clergymen, including a Lenten religious lecture series organized by Galerías’ employee social services department (“Asistencia Social”) in 1958, and delivered by Dominican priest Jesús María Vázquez. See R.S.B., “Charlas Cuaresmales,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 92 Year X (May, 1958), 4.
A firm like Sederías Carretas…which requires the collaboration of many spirits, cannot reach a high grade of efficiency if everyone is not governed by the same obligations. [These are] duties from which no-one can be exempted. The well-being of the company and the prestige of our name demand it.\textsuperscript{69}

Galerías particularly shared a mission – commerce – that Casares ranked with the Church and the Spanish military as one of the central pillars of Spanish society, calling it the primary medium through which societies operated. Anticipating José Aleixandre by two decades, and echoing the Falange’s call for the new Spanish man to be “half soldier and half monk,” at once intrepid and pious, he argued that Galerías’ clerks bore just as much a duty to the nation as did Spain’s soldiers. Then going still further, he naturalized the handbook’s totalizing expectation that employees identify completely with trade and store by comparing this to soldiers’ and priests’ absorption into military and clerical life.\textsuperscript{70} Casares likened the store’s handbook to a breviary, sacralizing its contents much as the store’s own Normas-fetishizing discourse did. “This collection of precepts,” the press secretary declared

“one could term your breviary, or to take a more mystical, but to my mind not exaggerated tone, your book of hours….for this store’s personnel, it is more a reminder of conduct than a new, never-before-seen law. We who are [Catholic] believers pray the same prayers every day, not to discover some moral obligation of which we were previously ignorant, but rather for the discipline of restating a [moral] purpose and renewing a devotion daily. There is, then, a renewal…of your own proper daily conduct in this group of norms that have been given to you….there is a spiritual commerce, which is that of treating others well, that is far greater interest to your managers than that other one that consists of the simple mechanism of selling, counting, weighing, and measuring.”\textsuperscript{71}

In short, as Casares’ speech reveals, Galerías and its handbook were and could at times be made by agents of the Franco regime to serve its purposes as an example in microcosm of precisely the corporatism that the early regime sought to implement in

\textsuperscript{69} Casares.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
Spain both at the time and, in specific cases such as the introduction of the supermarket in the late 1950s, would continue to promote much later. Tellingly, Casares, who elsewhere compared the store’s philosophy to that of Falange founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera, closed by counseling above all obedience to the store’s management and its code, “as the truest way to feel oneself to be Spanish.”

Casares, it could be argued, had on this occasion chosen to impose a political reading of his choosing on the contents of a store’s otherwise apolitical work culture – yet this was not the case. His credentials certainly pointed to Francoist allegiances: by 1941, Casares had already founded a Catholic and Anti-Marxist press syndicate under the Second Republic, had been appointed to his current secretaryship not in Republican Madrid but in Nationalist-occupied San Sebastián, and would over the next three decades hold several other government posts, including an unbroken, four-decade tenure as Madrid and National Press Association Secretary. But Casares spoke that day at the invitation of Sederías Carretas’ famously controlling owner, Pepín Fernández, and the personal views Casares offered fit with both Sederias’ militaristic discourse and with its founder’s well-known Francoist leanings. By the time of Casares’ visit in 1941, in fact,

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72 In fact, the store handbook even aligned, or could be made to align in discourse, with the regime in the latter’s indictment of the new Spain’s great ideological foe, Marxism, which Casares in this instance used the Normas to condemn for its misrepresentation of work as a “yoke...an infamous servitude,” and, in stripping work of spiritual content, its materialistic “mechanization” of workers’ lives. See Casares. For early regime efforts to implement corporatism, see for instance, Payne, Fascism in Spain, 405-406.

Pepín had also become an active collaborator in Foreign Minister Ramón Serrano Súñer’s signature project to ease Spain’s diplomatic isolation, a *Consejo de la Hispanidad* (Hispanic Council) meant to cultivate the nation’s ties with Latin America, and had begun tying the store ever more closely to the regime through personal friendships he cultivated with top figures in the regime, including Serrano Súñer and the Spanish First Lady, Carmen Polo. It is worth noting that this emphasis on *Hispanidad*, the notion of a shared cultural bond between Spain and its former colonies, would remain a priority of both the regime and Pepín’s own retail empire in the decades to come, and in this instance, Pepín contributed to it, and to locating Spain within a larger, transatlantic commercial community when he recruited to the *Consejo de la Hispanidad* project several of his former colleagues in Havana. In sum, whatever Casares’ politics, his speech clearly reflected where Pepín Fernández’s store stood during the Franco dictatorship’s earliest days, which was willingly and decidedly at the regime’s service.

It is unclear and even unlikely that this same sort of explicit politicization of work achieved currency at other stores – El Corte Inglés, by comparison, was apolitical. Excerpts from Botas’ own employee code are largely devoid of the ambitions to control that the capital’s two retail giants displayed, instead simply enjoining clerks to “always be ready to serve,” regardless of the time clock. And the closest another major retailer came to the political honors and sustained, personal alignment with the regime that Pepín achieved was Siro Gay, founder of the eponymous store chain, who received the Silver

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75 Ibid., 166-168.
76 Casares’ speech, notably, was necessarily about one of the earliest versions of the *Normas*, seemingly a preliminary edition – one lacking even its formal title of “Normas,” which the press association secretary never used, despite repeatedly referring to the code directly. This, and Casares’ references to totalizing tendencies well-marked in later editions of the *Normas*, only serves to underscore the degree to which these were present at Galerías from early on.

Yet by the end of the 1950s, Galerías Preciados’ example was widely admired and emulated by Spain’s other department stores – with the notable exception of El Corte Inglés, whose various similarities to Galerías were the product of their shared Cuban parentage. Botas in particular frequently voiced its admiration for Galerías, its methods, and its founder, whose Asturian background it celebrated on numerous occasions. The store’s handbook, the Normas de Botas, bore the same name as Galerías’ code – El Corte Inglés’ manual, by contrast, did not – and Botas’ official discourse paid it the same kind of reverence that Galerías’ Normas received, citing the handbook as the basis for the store’s success.\footnote{For expressions of admiration for Galerías and its founder, see for example, Jesús Val, “Pepín Fernández, creador del más importante complejo comercial de Madrid: Galerías Preciados-Sederías Carretas, habla para “Gay”,” “Gay,” No. 9 Year II (Aug.-Sept., 1960), 27-31; “Galerías Preciados: Ocho Pisos llenos de “Muchachas de Azul”,” “Gay,” No. 9 Year II (Aug.-Sept., 1960), 32; “Galerías Preciados, Parque de Atracciones,” Boletín de Botas, No. 8 Year II (Mar., 1963), 15; Manuel Sarmiento and Alberto Delgado, “Grandes Figuras: Pepín Fernández,” No. 10 Year II (May 1963). For reverence toward the Normas, see for instance, “Las “Normas” y su Espiritualidad,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 103 Year XI (June, 1960), 3; “Las “Normas” y su Interpretación,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 106 Year XI (Nov. 1960), 9; and, at Botas, “A modo de consigna: Servir es mas que Amar,” Boletín de Botas, No. 16, Year II (Jan., 1964), 16; and, “Nuestra fiesta,” Boletín de Botas, No. 18 Year III (Mar.-Apr., 1964), 3.} Finally, through its own Club de Botas (founded 1958), the Oviedo-based store could at least aspire to colonize its employees’ leisure time as Galerías Preciados did.\footnote{For Botas’ Club, see “V Aniversario del Botas Club,” Boletín de Botas, No. 17, Year III (Feb., 1964, 2.}

**Discipline and Daily Life**

At the level of employees’ daily lived experience, the result of this culture of control, particularly at but not exclusive to Galerías and El Corte Inglés, was the
development of distinctive workplace rhythms of life and practices whose tone and specific policies were largely conservative and reflective of the early regime’s own social values.

Rigid discipline and an emphasis on hierarchy reigned within the workplace cultures at both Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, following naturally from the formative example of El Encanto. At Galerías, potential hires faced a scrupulous and systematic evaluation process involving presentation of an employment application, an entrance exam, a 15-day trial under close observation, and a barrage of psychological evaluations, any of which could doom a candidacy. Once hired and situated within these stores’ extensive and rigid hierarchies, new employees faced long work hours, were frequently called upon by superiors to work well beyond their allotted shifts, and became subject to exacting standards of conduct, with even the lightest infractions punishable with stiff penalties. These demands were based in the Normas’ expectations of “entrega total” (complete employee identification and self-sacrifice), which the Boletín de Galerías Preciados romanticized in columns such as José Javier Aleixandre’s tribute to the overtime work done by Galerías-Bilbao’s “shock troops.”

Managerial authority was autocratic, obedience total, and the penalties for disobedience were severe. In the mid-1950s, for instance, manager Valeriano Rojo forced store accountant Manuel Zafra to undo a reform he had been authorized to make to the store’s bookkeeping practices purely because Rojo himself had not personally approved

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81 At Galerías, there existed 36 distinct positions in 1948 (grown to 86 by 1959), each of which possessed of its own base salary, promotion criteria, and pay raise schedule. See Sederías Carretas, S.L., “Reglamento de Régimen Interior,” 1948, ARCM 124661/6; “Reglamento de Régimen Interior de Galerías Preciados, S.A.,” 1959, Galerías Preciados Collection, Archivo Histórico del Trabajo, Fundación 1o de Mayo, Comisiones Obreras, Madrid (henceforth AHT-GP), Folder 26/004; Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados – Normas, 12-13; Cuartas, 594; note 62.
it.\footnote{Zafra Aragón, 42.} Zafra dared not complain, for insubordination could get one suspended or fired. So too could the seemingly harmless act of accepting a tip from a customer, which was expressly forbidden at both Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés.\footnote{By contrast, tips were a common and accepted practice at Siro Gay. See for instance, “Entrevistas: Nicolas Gil,” “Gay,” No. 9 Year II (Aug.-Sept., 1958), 15. For discipline at Galerías and El Corte Inglés, see Zafra Aragón, 5-6; “Reglamento de Régimen Interior de Galerías Preciados, S.A.,” 1959, AHT-GP 26/004; El Corte Inglés, 
*Reglamento de Régimen Interior* (Madrid: El Corte Inglés, 1977), 57; and Cuartas, 592-593.} Nor were all such infractions obvious or even codified, as witnessed by the Galerías Preciados clerk who nearly lost his raise because a manager objected to his smoking habit.\footnote{See note 85.} And attracting such unwanted attention from not just any ordinary manager, but the store founder himself, was a daily possibility.\footnote{Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 194; Cuartas, 592.} Both Pepín Fernández and Ramón Areces made a habit of regularly inspecting their stores – visits that inspired considerable fear.\footnote{See note 85.}

Humor columns in the *Boletín* that gently poked fun at various managers’ idiosyncracies only reinforced this control by serving as a store-sanctioned safety valve for the tensions this autocratic management style could engender. The humor deployed in the *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*’ humor pages – tellingly titled “Humor and a Bit of Controversy” – also served as a means of airing problems generally akin to, if usually less serious than Manuel Zafra’s frustrations with Valeriano Rojo. Several columns to this effect appeared in each issue of the bulletin: using the pseudonyms “Boliche” and “Dorotea,” the names of the Interior Design Studio’s cats, Advertising Department artist Agustín Mencía Sanz penned at least two, one a recurring comic strip that gently mocked salespersons’ bad habits (see Figure 1.4), while the other, “¡¡Veinte al Bote!!” (roughly translated as “Twenty in the Tip Jar!”) debuted circa 1953), often worked in reverse, offering a list of 20 observations, suggestions or even complaints about store policies and
the foibles of Galerías’ managers, whose authority otherwise protected them, as in Rojo’s case, from criticism from below. Thus, for instance, the column’s first edition took Jesús Liñeira of the Stationery Department to task for refusing the Catalog division permission to use one of his saleswomen as a model; criticized the Annex’s management for placing a store bar where employees smoked next to the Mail-Order Department’s baskets full of outgoing merchandise, which Mencía deemed a fire hazard; and, as it would happen, teased Valeriano Rojo for ambushing put-upon salespersons with accounting minutiae. Another edition criticized management for so restricting employees’ movements that they remained ignorant of where departments on other floors were located, despite internal memos to exactly that end.

Figure 1.4: Comic Strip, “Boliche, El Gato del Estudio” (“Boliche, the Studio’s Cat”)88

Source: Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 50 Year VI (Undated, ca. 1954), 2.

86 Other humor page regulars included “Benjamín,” who offered short, comically over-simplified truisms, and Agustín Olivera, “El Protestón” (“The Moaner”), who Manuel Zafra recalled as the Boletín’s foremost contributor in 1950 for his frequent observations about problems at the store. For Olivera, see Zafra Aragón, 41; for an example of “Benjamín”’s work, see B., “Benjamínadas,” Boletín de Galerías, No. 61 Year VII (Apr., 1956), 6.


88 The first panel reads, “Give me three centimeters of that!,” while panels three and four read, respectively, “Give me three hundred meters of that!!” and, “What did the gentleman say??,” by which the salespersons, now interested in doing business, placed themselves at Boliche’s service. The unstated moral of the satirical episode, one of the Normas’ central tenets, which is that the customer must always be welcomed regardless of whether or how much they buy. See Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados – Normas (Madrid: Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados, 1953), 19.
Boliche’s pointed cattiness was ultimately meant to be prophylactic, stabilizing, even functioning as a vehicle for reasserting aspects of the store’s institutional culture. Mencía’s comic strip (see above) obliquely underlined a tenet from the *Normas*, that every customer’s business was important, no matter how small. And the inaugural “¡Veinte al Bote!!” followed its comment on Liñeira by condemning, “whoever it was who spread the false rumor that employees were being tape-recorded during their annual performance reviews,” both because it was false, but also, it may be inferred, because such behavior, particularly inasmuch as it threatened store discipline, violated Galerías’ core values of devotion and obedience, by contrast with Mencía’s own more measured and loyalist critique.89

*Boletín de Galerías Preciados* contributors, meanwhile, also used humor to continue the bulletin’s and *Club*’s work of cultivating among readers the notion that a warm, intimate camaraderie still tied the store’s increasingly far-flung members together into a single “great family,” a sense that the bulletin also frequently sought to conjure through the use of descriptors like “entrañable” (situationally translating as “dear,” “fond,” or “close”), and “íntimo” (“intimate”).90 Agustín Olivera’s initial, joking tone in his 1953 report on Galerías’ Tangier branch represented one such deployment of humor.91 An especially rich instance was “La Mampara de Jacometrezo,” a long, comically exaggerated account of the decision making process to install a room partition at the store’s Calle de Jacometrezo office in late 1959. The pseudonymous author, “Don

90 For the “great family,” see Zafra Aragón, 59; for deployment of “entrañable,” see, for example, “Despedida a José Blanco,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 127, Year XIII (Dec., 1962) 8.
91 See note 81.
Nuño,” described the discussion as “a dialectical bombardment that dwarfed what neutrons and protons undergo [in a nuclear explosion]” while caricaturing a succession of Galerías notables including Ramón Granda and store co-founder Adolfo Pérez Piqueras, a veteran of the chain’s expansion projects. Of Piqueras, the author wrote,

On hearing the words “division” and “partition” he did not let us finish. He picked up the phone and called Mr. Sabio to tell him to prepare fifteen squads of construction workers, three bulldozers, twelve garbage trucks and an explosives team in case some load-bearing wall should offer unexpected resistance. When he finished…and we continued explaining the project, he gave us a look of such hypnotic force that we ran out of his office. It was then that we realized our mistake in going to Mr. Piqueras, who had spent almost thirty years [living and] breathing lime, plaster, cement, and iron, about a humble wooden screen…

Good-natured rather than malicious, the net effect of the caricatures was endearing and bred a sense of familiarity with these figures. This was especially important for employees in far-off Tenerife and Tangier, who had quite possibly never met these leaders of the firm.

Finally, many of the comic strips and humor columns published in the Boletín de Galerías Preciados, as well as the entire humor page in “Gay,” an employee bulletin that Almacenes Siro Gay launched in 1958, aimed not to engage in internal critique or proselytism, but simply to amuse. Yet even such comparatively unpolemical content also reflected and reaffirmed the regime’s social discourse and reveals how these stores’ organizational and disciplinary infrastructures shaped their workplace cultures, particularly as regarded notions of gender and the gendering of social roles in Franco-era

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93 For an earlier example, see for instance Mencia, “Usted “No” Es Así – El Señor Rojo,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 74 Year VIII (July, 1957), 8.
94 Indeed, both of the subtitles to the Boletín’s humor page, “One can also laugh [while] buying and selling,” and, “After work, a joke feels good,” spoke to this aim, as did a February 1962 editorial in “Gay,” which counseled readers to not only read the bulletin as a means of professional communication, but also of “instruct[ion] and distract[ion].” See, Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 74 Year VIII (July, 1957), 8-9, and, “Como hay que leer nuestra revista,” “Gay,” (Feb., 1962).
Spanish society, a subject on which much of this frequently patriarchal and misogynistic humor hinged.

For, just as Franco-era social orthodoxy displayed an acute concern over gendered domesticity, management of the household, and obedience to husbandly authority as women’s rightful destiny, several of Spain’s premier department stores placed a similar importance on gender difference. These stores produced and circulated a canon of notions concerning women in their roles as shoppers, as well as gendered divisions within their own ranks. In myriad articles, interviews, and, most especially, humor columns and cartoons, both “Gay” and the consumer-oriented Revista Jorba painted a picture of women as at once painstaking shoppers and profligate spenders.95 A pair of cartoons published in early issues of “Gay” dealt in well-worn stereotypes of women as henpecking viragos and spendthrifts (see Figures 1.5 and 1.6), while several years earlier, a similarly acute concern over gender difference permeated these stores’ policies concerning their saleswomen, reproducing the deep gendered divisions that existed in Franco-era Spanish society as a whole. At Galerías, notwithstanding levels of female employment that by the end of the 1950s bordered on 70 percent of the workforce, the perception that women’s work was second-rate reigned, reaching up the store’s hierarchy as high as the founder himself. In a 1960 interview printed in “Gay,” Pepín explained:

With women there is a strange phenomenon. All of them, up to a certain age, are enchanted with…marrying, and this keeps them somewhat distant from the firm; it is as if they do not entirely identify with it, because, “since they’re going to get married…” But then, when they turn 27, for example, it isn’t that they lose the desire to marry, but they tend to think more of the store as a career, and this makes them feel more responsible, they take more of an interest. I could tell you

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of many who now occupy positions of responsibility.\textsuperscript{96}

Figure 1.5: “No, Mama, nobody’s here; Pepito and I are playing house”

Yet, as Pilar Toboso has shown, the number of female managers, particularly at the highest levels, was low throughout this period. During the late 1940s, Sederías Carretas’ three department heads were all male, as were six of the store’s seven most senior salespersons, while over a decade later, in 1962, not one of the chain’s 104 top management-level positions, from the chain’s General Secretary through to its Heads of Advertising, was filled by a woman. Instead, women abounded within the store’s rank and file, Pepín even going so far as to personally recruit the daughters of well-respected local families prior to opening his flagship store in 1943, swaying their parents with the promise of the strict moral vigilance enshrined in his \textit{Normas}.\textsuperscript{98}

And, just so, the perception – indeed, the expectation – similarly persisted at both


\textsuperscript{97} In this cartoon, two lines – one male, one female – stretch from a bank’s deposits (“\textit{ingresos}”) and payments or withdrawals (“\textit{pagos}”) windows, respectively, juxtaposing the women’s cheerful financial profligacy with the contrasting bourgeois sobriety of their put-upon husbands, one of whom, the second to last in line, in fact offers the women a nervous look.

\textsuperscript{98} Toboso, 202.
Galerías Preciados and Siro Gay that “shop girls,” destined for marriage rather than management, could mainly be counted on to leave the store in short order. Official store policy at Pepín’s store, echoing contemporary legal restrictions on women’s right to work enshrined this belief. Both Sederías Carretas’ 1948 internal regulatory code and a second, chain-wide code that went into effect in 1959, mandated the automatic dismissal of, and grant of a dote or dowry payment to, female employees who married, with exemptions restricted to women who were heads of households. The former code – but notably, not the latter, which specified equal pay for equal work – also expressed this wariness toward women’s work in explicit, financial terms, paying female employees only 80 percent of what their male counterparts made.99 “Gay”’s editors, meanwhile, revealed similar preconceived notions regarding women’s work in a March 1962 editorial reacting to the the 1961 Women’s Political, Professional, and Labor Rights Law, which mandated greater pay parity between male and female workers. Equal pay was fine, the editorial grudgingly warned the store’s shop girls, but it also meant that they would henceforth have to work as hard as their male colleagues – the clear implication being that this had not previously been the case.100

The notion that employment at a department store was something Spanish women only did until they could find a husband even penetrated the public consciousness, as evidenced by the feature film Las Muchachas de Azul (“The Girls in Blue,” 1957). The movie, which starred three of mid-century Spanish cinema’s stars, Analía Gadé, Tony Leblanc, and Spanish film legend Fernando Fernán Gómez, launched an entire genre of

lighthearted Spanish comedies. It followed a trio of blue-uniformed Galerías Preciados shop girls as they worked to offer excellent service and, more importantly, to land husbands, including the film’s male lead, sales clerk Juan Ferrándis. Leaving no question as to the film’s base assumption, common in Spanish society at the time, that these and all women’s ultimate aim was marriage, screenwriters Noél Clarasó and Juan Dibildos opened the film with a voice-over sequence featuring images of an idyllic urban Madrid of cafés, bustling pedestrians, stylish automobiles, and, finally, a groom waiting nervously in front of a church, and a male narrator declaring,

With regard to the admiration [that women have] for men, we need not say anything…it is infinite. They admire him so much that one look will not do – they want to admire him comfortably, for a lifetime. And to better show him their admiration, they dress him in the husband’s uniform, the glorious and heroic morning coat,” going on to warn that, “it is not so easy to get that morning coat on a man,” and, at the end of the film, concluding, “…and all of this [the film’s events] had to take place so that [the saleswomen’s new husbands] might wear the marvelous morning coat.  

Even the movie’s poster pushed this message, showing Ferrándis running away from the three shop girls, each wielding a net with which to catch him in marriage (see Figure 1.7). 

In other stores and on other questions, such assertions and deployments of gender difference also abounded. Thus, for instance, in “Gay”’s August 1961 issue, well-known Siro Gay manager María Begoña announced her coming marriage and departure in a farewell letter, wishing her female coworkers luck, happiness, and the chance to similarly marry their beloveds soon.  

Myriad columns in the Boletín de Galerías Preciados, Botas’ bulletin, and “Gay,” which devoted much of each issue to femenine-gendered

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102 This assertion of domesticity as women’s primary destiny echoed similar missives by departing brides that were commonly printed in the Boletín de Galerías Preciados. See María Begoña, “Cara abierta a mis compañeras – un saludo para todas y una despedida a la vez,” “Gay,” (Aug., 1961); and, “Una Carta Conmovedora,” Boletín de Sederías Carretas y Galerías Preciados, No. 46, Year V (undated), 5.
content that reproduced stereotypes of feminine flightiness, workplace moodiness resulting from private, often romantic troubles, and even a tendency toward immorality. Thus, for instance, one July 1960 “Gay” article presented readers with a cautionary fictional exchange in which a saleswoman, irritable because of personal troubles with her beau Pepe, brushed off a customer who wanted to exchange a pair of stockings and nearly lost the store a customer before another, more sensible female colleague rushed in to save the sale and deliver a small lecture about leaving her personal problems at home.103

Figure 1.7: Las Muchachas de Azul, Movie Poster (1957)

Figure 1.7: Las Muchachas de Azul, Movie Poster (1957)


Official store policies too could reflect this instability, just as they did with regards to marriage. Galerias’ and El Corte Inglés’ employee rulebooks required female employees to wear uniforms – the blue dresses that gave Las Muchachas de Azul its title - but did not require it of their male counterparts. Following arguments such as Jennifer

Paff Ogle and Mary Lynn Damhorst’s contention that men’s business suits reproduce the hegemony of white male businessmen, we can read this policy as more than a simple visual representation of gender difference. Rather, it was also underpinned by a perceived need at these stores to impose discipline on female employees’ bodies, something unnecessary in the case of their male colleagues because men’s conservative fashions had already accomplished this. Under this logic, donning these uniforms became an act that made these women stable and reliable enough to represent the company on the shop floor. Indeed, concern remained so high at Galerías over maintaining uniformity in saleswomen’s attire, and most especially over the sexual danger posed by insufficiently high uniform necklines and slips peeking out from under skirt hems, that in 1960, Agustín Mencía Sanz, as “Boliche” in “¡Veinte al Bote!!,” called for that winter’s seasonal uniforms to button up to the neck, or alternatively to include a uniform sweater. These efforts, moreover, faced little resistance from Galerías Preciados’ and El Corte Inglés’ saleswomen, who had internalized their employers’ rivalry and cultures of store pride, and for whom these uniforms represented not an imposition, but a status

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104 Jennifer Paff Ogle and Mary Lynn Damhorst, “Dress for Success in the Popular Press,” in Appearance and Power, ed. Kim K.P. Johnson and Sharron J. Lennon (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 80-81; donning the suit, Ogle and Damhorst’s Foucauldian argument runs, ‘disciplines’ the male body, making it better capable of accomplishing “the serious work of business for modern society” and “reaffirm[s] the hegemony and legitimize[s] the power of its wearers.” In this same vein, Alison Lurie argues for fashion’s patriarchal potential, pointing to articles like high heels and heavy Victorian undergarments as hobbling mechanisms that rendered women dependent on men, and, long before either of these interventions (or indeed Foucault’s work), James Laver argued that male dress “perpetually crystalliz[es] into a uniform,” one that defined men first by their professions, and only then as persons, and set their public roles forth as more important than their domestic ones. See Alison Lurie, The Language of Clothes, 2nd ed (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), 220-221, 226-228, and, James Laver, Taste and Fashion from the French Revolution until To-day (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938), 234.

105 Galerías Preciados, Galerías Preciados – Normas (Madrid: Galerías Preciados, undated), 15, in ARCM 124661/8; Cuartas, 752. Notably, Galerías added another such requirement, that saleswomen care for their uniforms, as dirty or damaged ones would reflect badly on the store’s reputation, after the Normas’ 1953 printing. While a concrete reason for this addition is not known, the lack of a similar ruling on salesmen’s attire suggests that it too was motivated by perceptions of a gendered difference in stability of temperament. El Corte Inglés’ code made similar demands of its female personnel, while only requiring male employees to maintain “maximum elegance and distinction in their appearance.”

symbol. In fact, in Madrid they often remained in uniform when they left for lunch, revelling in the public display of their ties to the capital’s leading retailers and in the rivalry they felt when they encountered the competition.107

**Intern(ation)al Expansion**

Finally, this growing internal organization at Spain’s premier department stores increasingly exposed these stores to foreign commercial practices, and with them the notion that Spain was and should aspire to be part of a larger international commercial community. It was, in other words, the beginnings of the internationalization of Spanish mass retail commerce in the Franco era. The innovations that these stores introduced over the course of the 1940s and 1950s were overwhelmingly foreign in origin, and often arrived having specifically followed a roughly triangular path that led from United States through Latin America (especially Havana) to Spain, as in the case of Galerías Preciados’ *Normas* and *Club*, both derived from Cuban models that were themselves previously patterned off North American ones, and which later inspired counterparts at Botas.108

Such measures also included El Corte Inglés’ adapted American sales manuals; the *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, which José Manuel Fernández modelled after a newsletter

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107 Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 202-203; both this assimilation of store pride, and the store’s ongoing desire to sartorially discipline female employees’ bodies through the imposition of both a uniform and the duty of caring for it, were such that “Os Habla Graciela” (“Graciela Speaks”), a women’s column that debuted in the *Boletín* in 1957, devoted its first edition to commenting on both these phenomena and in particular offered readers detailed instructions on how to care for their uniforms, including methods (brushing and washing, even specifying the recipe for the detergent) and frequency. “Os Habla Graciela,” *Boletín de Galerías*, No. 73 Year VIII (June, 1957), 13.

108 Notably, the last of these ties, linking Galerías and Botas, was a deeply rooted and personal in origin. It derived in part from Asturian pride – Botas celebrated Galerías’ accomplishments as the successes of a retailer that through Pepín Fernández shared Botas’ regional roots. As Javier Cuartas has shown, the stores’ ties to one another also stemmed from the presence of Botas family members’ among Galerías’ top managers, as well as ties between the Fernández and Botas families that dated back to the turn of the century. See “Gentileza de una casa paterna,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 134 Year XIV (July, 1963), 8; Diego de Salcedo, “Galerías Preciados, Parque de Atracciones,” *Boletín de Botas*, No. 8 Year II (Mar., 1963), 15; Manuel Sarmiento and Alberto Delgado, “Grandes Figuras: Pepín Fernández,” No. 10 Year II (May 1963); Cuartas, 572.
circulating at Macy's; and one of the foundational features of both Madrid retail giants’ internal hierarchies, the rank of *interesado*, original to El Encanto. And, epitomizing this early process of linkage, in 1951 Galerías Preciados joined the Intercontinental Group of Department Stores (IGDS), a group of mostly Western European department stores that pooled their expertise and ordered inventory collectively in order to bolster their international competitiveness.\(^{109}\) Meanwhile, the *Boletín*, and after 1958, “Gay,” printed a steady and insistent stream of articles that praised the experience of shopping in Europe’s great capitals and called for further foreign-inspired advances in areas such as advertising. For instance, in 1956 *Boletín* editor Alfredo Marquerie called for Galerías to modernize its publicity after the example of Italy’s *La Rinascente* department store.\(^{110}\)

To these managers’ and the Spanish public’s eyes, what was at stake was nothing less than achievement of a foreign modernity in which lay Spain’s future. In 1934, this ambition had underpinned Pepin’s 1934 declaration that Sederías Carretas was the store that Madrid, *as a world-class commercial city*, had been waiting for; now, it drove Spanish retailers’ adoption of the escalator, and the Spanish public’s enthusiastic reception thereof, an enthusiasm that in 1960 led working-class Almerian E. Chacón to include a stop at the flagship Galerías Preciados branch during a family trip to the capital.\(^{111}\) And thus Alfredo Marquerie’s insistence in 1956 on the need for Galerías to bring its advertising up to a foreign standard, warning that, “in Spain, where we look too

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\(^{111}\) “Cartas que alientan y obligan,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 98 Year XI (Jan., 1960), 6.
often inward, modern [commercial] art cannot seem to lay down strong roots, because our gaze never roams far enough.\textsuperscript{112}

**Conclusions**

Department store commerce in Spain at the close of the 1950s looked radically different from what it had resembled two decades earlier, just as the Franco regime did. Between 1939 and 1957, the regime had moved from the openly fascist posturings and embrace of autarky of its first years toward an increasingly internationally-integrated market economy and an equally open, if also largely empty avowal of the regime’s democratic nature. The transformation at Spain’s department stores was equally radical: from a single neighborhood store, Sederías Carretas grew into a national chain with locations even in Spanish Morocco (and in the process gained a new store name), and underwent an internal complexification to match, developing an employee club structure, professional development programs, an internal bulletin, and a set of rigid principles, its *Normas*, which would after their introduction in the early 1940s serve as the store’s bible – all measures that Sederías’ (now Galerías Preciados’) competitors undertook to varying degrees as well.

One consequence of this expansion was that, as these stores opened branches in Spanish provincial capitals as well as towns such as Eibar and Don Benito, they provided these places with modern department stores in which the consumer revolution of the 1950s and 1960s could unfold. Crowds in Valencia could now marvel at Siro Gay’s escalator, for instance, or take advantage of Jorba’s new sale by credit system in Barcelona. Meanwhile, as Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés developed internal policies that – reflecting the early Franco regime’s own totalizing impulses – increasingly

\textsuperscript{112} A.M. “La propaganda en los almacenes *La Rinascente*”. 
sought to bring employees’ lives completely under their purview, these stores established the workplace cultures through which their salespersons would experience the mass consumer revolution and social upheavals of Spain’s tumultuous 1960s.

And in this same vein, these measures had a profound impact on current and future politics of national identity in Spain, at times in keeping with the regime’s agenda, but also, crucially and increasingly, in ways that undermined Francoist orthodoxy on this question. As foreign innovations like cutting-edge window-dressing methods arrived in Spain and Galerías Preciados joined the IGDS, these measures rendered Spain more commercially similar to other nations and fostered a sense of connection between Spanish retailing and its American as well as Western European counterparts that would only continue to grow from the 1960s onward. In the meantime, the Franco regime could still insist on Spain’s national social and cultural as well as political difference, but viewed from the perspective of commerce, Spain was beginning to seem less and less different from its Western democratic trading partners.
CHAPTER II

In November 1955, with the launch of the men’s fashion and lifestyle magazine *Señor: La Revista del Hombre* (Sir: The Men’s Magazine), its founder and editor-in-chief, Spanish National Fashion Show Director Segismundo de Anta, declared in an introductory editorial, “Our publication does not intend to fill any kind of gap, nor to create anything new. The editors wish [only] to do profound and practical constructive work in the field of menswear and complementary industries.”1 Yet, despite his perhaps disingenuously humble tone, what Anta launched late in 1955 was in actuality a radically new publication. It was Francoist Spain’s first consumer magazine aimed primarily toward men. And it formed a part of a larger, similarly novel, transformation, a rapid expansion in the Spanish consumer press during General Francisco Franco’s first two decades in power that contributed to the cultivation of a mass consumer culture in mid-century Spain.

Much like the nation’s department stores, Spain’s consumer press underwent a period of unprecedented growth during the early dictatorship, particularly in the 1950s, with an assortment of Francoist Spain’s most familiar titles first appearing in those years. Beginning in 1940, the number of periodicals being published in Spain quickly shot upward, so much so that advertising executive, pioneer, and chronicler Francisco García Ruéscas would later consider that year the beginning of Spain’s most prolific period in magazine publishing. He calculated that four times as many new magazines were launched in the 1940s as during the previous decade, a ratio that only grew more

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1 Segismundo de Anta, “[Untitled Introductory Editorial Article],” *Señor: La Revista del Hombre*, No. 1 Year I (Nov. 1955)
imbalanced in the 1950s and 1960s.²

These earliest consumer magazines of the Franco era retained a bourgeois, elite character typical of the nineteenth-century Spanish fashion press, even as most of the Spanish populace struggled for subsistence.³ During the late 1940s, the worst of Spain’s “Hunger Years,” inadequate food rations drove black-market prices for staple foods skyward, which in combination with plummeting wages produced a nearly four-fold rise in the cost of living between 1936 and 1949.⁴ Meanwhile, new magazines like Mujer (Woman) and Alta Costura (Haute Couture) reported on the latest work by foreign designers like Dior; the Sección Femenina women’s magazine Medina similarly directed itself toward a privileged readership as scholars Carmen Carrión and Javier Hernando have argued; and charged as much as five to ten pesetas per issue when day-laborers in Minorca earned a mere 300 pesetas per month – half of the minimum needed to support a family.⁵

² Francisco García Ruescas, Historia de la Publicidad (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1971), 120. Though not all of these magazines were primarily consumer-oriented, this does not mean they lacked any consumer content. Religious publications like a 1924 Almacenes Jorba catalog devoted to religious supplies (objetos de culto), for instance, show that Catholicism possessed its own consumer-oriented aspects. See “Catalogo Especial para Objetos de Culto,” ARCM 296582/4.

³ For the nineteenth-century women’s and fashion press in Spain, see Cruz, ch. 4.


⁵ Ginard, 1112. For magazine prices, see “A Nuestras Lectoras,” Mujer, No. 122 (Aug., 1947); Medina, (2 Dec., 1945), and, Alta Costura, No. 26 Year IV (Jan., 1946). For Medina’s readership, see, Carmen Carrión Jiménez and Javier Hernando Carrasco, “‘Medina’, prototipo de la prensa femenina de postguerra,”
Even as they targeted elite audiences, these magazines also sold fantasies of consumption to the larger Spanish public. Historian Alfonso Pinilla García, for instance, has argued that notwithstanding its elite positioning, *Medina* also had comparatively poor readers for whom the magazine served as escapist literature. As the decade advanced, these magazines also began to consciously broaden their appeal, including content that catered to working-class women’s need for thrift, such as ads for courses to become seamstresses that promised readers savings and the ability to supplement family incomes.

This strategy worked, and the Spanish consumer press prospered: by the end of the 1950s the number of consumer magazines in Spain had so proliferated that they ran the gamut of legal content and audiences. There were unisex fashion- and lifestyle-oriented magazines, broader-conceived cultural and society journals (often also containing a section on fashion), and also more targeted publications that catered, for example, to women in general, or, like 1952’s *Funcionarias: Revista para la Mujer* (Civil Servant: Magazine for Women), served a narrower cross-section of the feminine market. Several long-standing, traditional consumer publications returned from wartime hiatuses, such as the over thirty-year-old home and fashion journal *El Hogar y la Moda* (Home and Fashion), which resumed publication in 1941. As noted previously, a series of department store publications and trade journals that catered to advertisers, window-dressers, and other professionals of the new mass commerce also proliferated during this period. And, of course, there was also *Señor*.

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*7* See note 46-47.
The launching of these new magazines shaped Spain’s embryonic consumer society in several ways. These new periodicals drove the formation of a Spanish mass consumer society by offering visions of prosperous, upwardly-mobile, middle class lifestyles defined by the possession of consumer products such as fashionable clothing and home goods to which all could aspire, regardless of social standing. These magazines promoted both the act of consumption itself and, through it, performance of middle-class identity – a drive that, as Luis Enrique Alonso and Fernando Conde have shown, underpinned Spain’s mass consumer revolution of the 1950s and 1960s as much as its American counterpart. And they did so en masse, suggesting that in this instance, notwithstanding historian Leonore Davidoff’s warning that periodical literature should not always be regarded as a reliable mouthpiece for mainstream opinion, the commentary that these periodicals offered concerning consumption in Spain ought to be taken seriously. A series of retail trade journals and department store employee bulletins that developed contemporaneously, meanwhile, advanced the professionalization of these trades and thus development of a retail infrastructure able to play host to Spain’s nascent mass consumer culture. They also extended this professionalizing ideal to the nation’s housewives, whose craft these periodicals and Spanish society as a whole increasingly treated as a profession, and of whom they expected a similar commitment to self-development and technical sophistication.

For class identity and consumption in Spain, see Luis Enrique Alonso and Fernando Conde 137-143, 194-196. The centrality of class performance to mass consumption in the United States has been recognized – not always happily – by scholars of consumption dating back as far as Thorstein Veblen’s watershed The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). For a survey of scholarship on this see Cohen, 10-11, 412-413. For more on perspectives on the rise of mass consumption in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century United States, see Daniel Horowitz, “Consumption and Its Discontents: Simon N. Patten, Thorstein Veblen, and George Gunton,” Journal of American History 67, no. 2 (Sept., 1980): 301-317; and for its postwar counterpart, see Cohen, 55-56; 101-102; 152-167.

For Davidoff on periodical literature, see Breward, 42.
As the new consumer magazines of the early Franco dictatorship drove Spain’s transformation into a society increasingly oriented around and defined by consumption by the masses – a mass consumer society – they influenced society in other ways as well. Vocal in their support of the Franco regime during the late 1930s and early 1940s, these publications retained this politicized quality into the 1950s, reorienting their efforts toward reconciling mainstays of Francoism’s conservative social project – especially its patriarchal gender hierarchy – with changes in social practices precipitated by Spain’s transition to mass consumption, and at times by these magazines themselves.

For the American and Western European character of the fashions, home appliances, and popular culture featured in these magazines imparted the same foreign character to the new Spanish consumer culture taking shape. Readers in Spain began to desire these products and lifestyles, but as in the United States, a growing reliance on credit in 1950s Spain, which increased the public’s access to these goods, also strained existing gender norms, leading to the marginalization of women as consumers and threatening the existing marital division of labor.10 While some magazines supported Spanish women’s growing pursuit of extra-domestic work, even after marrying, others underscored that a wife’s place was in the home. And though, as Aurora Morcillo has shown, ads for foreign products like Pond’s Cold Cream printed in Spanish women’s magazines increasingly granted readers leave to consume for their own pleasure, other ads shifted agency as consumers back to their husbands and families, warning readers to use a particular brand of hair-dye, for example, or risk their husbands’ anger.

Yet the arrival of an American-style consumerism via the Spanish consumer press ultimately integrated Spanish journalists, retailers, and readers into a larger international

10 For reliance on consumer credit in the United States, see Cohen, 123-124; note 135.
community of merchants and consumers. Magazines like the women’s magazines *Alta Costura* and *Mujer* featured content that preserved, built upon, and naturalized an existing Spanish interest in American fashions and the Hollywood stars who wore them, wearing away at the early Franco dictatorship’s discourse emphasizing Spanish national exceptionalism and isolation. Late in the period, particularly with the arrival of *Señor*, these magazines also began to suggest that Spaniards could be more than passive members of this international network. Instead of being simply enthralled by the latest clothing from London, Paris, and New York, for example, magazines claimed that Spaniards now had worthwhile designs of their own to contribute – claims that would only grow more frequent during the next decades. In cultivating a growing familiarity among the Spanish public with foreign products, lifestyles, and popular culture, these magazines rendered America and Western Europe more immediate, less truly foreign and increasingly sold Spaniards on the idea that they were part of a capitalist West.

This chapter, then, shows that the Spanish consumer press, much like the department stores featured in the previous chapter, experienced the late 1940s and 1950s as a time of tension as well as of growth and reorientation toward a mass audience. The nascent consumer society that these periodicals helped construct, notwithstanding a limited consumer credit-fueled growth in real consumption among the Spanish populace, still remained in great part imagined, existing in an increasingly widespread aspiration, and expectation of access, to greater material prosperity. Despite its fragility, aspirations to consumer society were nevertheless real, and in increasing desire for new products with a foreign tinge, the Spanish consumer press helped situate Spain as part of the democratic capitalist world of Western Europe and the United States.
Politics, Class, and Consumer Messaging in Early Franco-era Women’s Magazines

Among the earliest and most influential consumer periodicals to appear during the Franco era were a series of women’s magazines. They included what may have been the very first new consumer publication to appear under the dictatorship, the remarkably long-lived women’s home and fashion monthly Mujer: Revista Mensual del Hogar y de la Moda (Woman: Monthly Home and Fashion Magazine), which first circulated out of the Basque city of San Sebastián in June 1937, less than a year into the Civil War and just nine months after the city’s capture by Franco’s forces in September 1936. Mujer was soon joined by a number of other women’s magazines, some with direct ties to the regime: the Sección Femenina, the Falange’s women’s organization (henceforth Sección Femenina, Women’s Section, or SF, interchangeably), alone published two such magazines between 1938 and 1946, Y: Revista de la Mujer Nacional-Sindicalista (Y: The National-Syndicalist Woman’s Magazine, 1938-46) and Medina (1941-46). Both were succeeded in 1946 by another Sección Femenina journal, Ventanal. And while some of these new magazines were not consumer-oriented per se, instead focusing primarily on the promotion of Francoist ideology, many did display a consumer orientation, including Mujer; El Hogar y la Moda; the similarly long-lived Alta Costura, founded by the politically-connected brothers Santiago and Segismundo de Anta in 1943; and, to a degree, Medina as well.

11 See Mujer, No. 1 Year I (June, 1937). The reader should note that this refers specifically to consumer publications, defined here as primarily focused on consumer products and consumed lifestyles, such as fashion magazines, rather than focused mainly on promoting a particular political ideology.
12 For a more exhaustive catalogue of the women’s press under the Franco dictatorship, see María F. Sánchez Hernández, “Evolución de las publicaciones femeninas en España. Localización y análisis,” Documentación de las Ciencias de Información 32 (2009), 217-244.
13 The Anta brothers, were already noteworthy figures in the early 1940s: Santiago had worked with the regime’s official press syndicates since 1939, while in 1941, Segismundo de Anta founded Spain’s National Fashion Show, an annual affair for decades thereafter. For Santiago de Anta, see “Don Ramón
Such early forays into a Franco-era women’s consumer press were traditional in content, as historian Carmen Muñoz Ruiz has noted, and these publications were no exception, offering models of femininity that were conservative and compatible with (when not purposely advancing) official, National-Catholic notions of proper feminine behavior.¹⁴ Like older (even much older) women’s illustrated magazines such as the nineteenth-century *La Moda Elegante*, these new magazines reported primarily on subjects that Spanish society coded feminine, including coverage of the latest Parisian fashions and tips on home décor as well as short stories that focused on love and marriage.¹⁵ In 1937, for instance, *Mujer* published a short story, “La Tapia,” in which protagonist Margarita first rejected her handsome military pilot suitor Alberto, deeming herself unworthy, only to accept him after he returned blind.¹⁶ *Medina* and *Alta Costura* both offered similar content, along with, in the latter magazine’s case, images of outfits by Spanish fashion designers such as Asunción Bastida and El Dique Flotante, which represented their work as elegant, sober, and respectable, rather than frivolous or immoral.¹⁷

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¹⁵ For *La Moda Elegante*, see note 3, and for an example, see *La Moda Elegante: Periódico de las Familias*, No. 2, Year I (10 Jan., 1961).


¹⁷ The linking of fashion to acceptable femininity is evident in plates like two that appeared in this issue of *Alta Costura*, titled “Modelos Juveniles” ([clothing] models for youths) and “Modelos infantiles” (Children’s models), which showed sketched designs for outfits for young women, presumably the reader’s adolescent daughters, and for younger children, respectively, invoking the accepted feminine role of motherhood. See “Modelos juveniles” and “Modelos infantiles” in *Alta Costura*, No. 26 Year IV (Jan., 1946). For *Medina*, see Carrión Jiménez and Hernando Carrasco, 165.
Indeed, women who appeared in Mujer and Alta Costura were not just well-dressed and well-coiffed, but were well-dressed brides, wives, and properly submissive daughters. Stories like “La Tapia,” along with columns such as “Women’s Hands in History’s Threads,” which celebrated historical figures like Marie Thérèse of France, King Louis XVI’s daughter, for their adherence to normative feminine roles, not only catered to an existing interest in marriage, but further entrenched marriage’s place in Francoist Spanish society as the supreme feminine goal. In its 1946 biographical sketch of Marie Thérèse, for example, Alta Costura offered the princess, who had just escaped imprisonment in Revolutionary France, as a model of femininity both for greeting her uncle, the future Louis XVIII, with the plea, “Be my father!,” and for her subsequent introduction and quick marriage to the Duke of Angouleme. In other words, the article praised her for resuming the roles of wife and daughter as soon as it was possible. Other articles focused on similarly domestic subjects such as home décor, or how to be a properly meek wife. Mujer, meanwhile, took pains to emphasize that “in Spain, a woman has one great part to play, that of creating inviting homes.”

These magazines also presented a series of more specific characteristics that the proper Spanish woman was to have, which again conformed to the National Movement’s dicta. This woman was religious: Mujer’s second issue featured a poem by M.
Fernández Palacios titled “Virgen de la Esperanza” (Virgin of Hope), in which a woman called on the Virgin Mary to help her, “be always good, as she wishes to be…and never offend…[Jesus]” – a display of quotidian religious fervor that was at once characteristic of Francoist notions of femininity and a far cry from Republic-era secularism.\footnote{Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, 36-39. “La mujer y los libros”, \textit{Mujer}, No. 18, Year II (Nov., 1938), 29.} And she was submissive. In another, more subtle text published in November 1938, “La Mujer y los libros” (Woman and Books), \textit{Mujer} took readers on a guided tour of a woman’s personal library and recommended \textit{Don Quixote} and \textit{La Perfecta Casada}, (The Perfect Married Lady), a women’s manual first published by Fray Luis de León in 1583. This comprehensive marital handbook, which called on wives to submit completely to their husbands and other male authorities, was one of the ideological cornerstones of Francoist gender politics and became a traditional bridal gift after 1939.\footnote{See Ibid., ch. 2.} \textit{Mujer}’s recommendation, then, represented an early case of a push toward what Aurora Morcillo terms a “recovery of tradition” in the realm of religion, authoritative texts, and gender politics, and a symptom of the dictatorship’s stance on religion and gender.\footnote{See Ibid., ch. 2.}

At the same time, the regime’s policies regarding the place of women in society left some room for women to act in the public sphere.\footnote{Aurora Morcillo is among these scholars – see Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, 25-26 – as is Sofia Rodríguez López, who has offered an overview of contributions to this body of scholarship. See Sofia Rodríguez López, “La Falange Femenina y Construcción de la Identidad de Género durante el Franquismo” in \textit{Actas de IV Simposio de Historia Actual}, Logroño, 17-19 de octubre de 2002, Carlos Navajas Zubeldia, ed. (Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2004), 488-492.} This room was mainly to be

\textit{Sección Femenina} and femininity, see, for example, Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, ch. 5, especially 102-109.

\footnote{M. Fernández Palacios, “Virgen de la Esperanza,” \textit{Mujer}, No. 2 Year I (July, 1937). The poem’s invocation of the Virgin as female paragon is telling, for according to Aurora Morcillo, the Catholic tracts on which the Franco regime built its gender ideology envisioned the Virgin in this same role. Here too, \textit{Mujer} and the regime’s National-Catholicism appear to have been of the same mind. For Francoism and the Virgin mary, see Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, 40. For Franco-era femininity and public Catholicism, see Eslava Galán, \textit{Los Años del Miedo}, 59, 63.}
found in the Falange’s *Sección Femenina* and its *Auxilio Social* social aid program, modeled after the Nazi *Frauenschaft* women’s organization and its *Winterhilfe* aid program. On the one hand, the Falangist feminine ideal, as typified by the female leadership of the Women’s Section, embraced domesticity and subservience. Founder Pilar Primo de Rivera declared, for instance, that creating a family was a woman’s “only goal to achieve in life.” Yet, through initiatives such as the *Auxilio Social* social aid program, the Women’s Section also provided women with what Stanley Payne calls “a conservative social and moral framework for female activism,” or, put differently, venues in which women could interact with Spain’s otherwise inaccessible political public sphere, if only in normatively feminine areas such as charity and home economics. Indeed, wartime legislation made such domesticity-infused public service a legal requirement for all unmarried women in Spain.

The female editors at many women’s periodicals of the early Franco era, including *Mujer* and the illustrated women’s magazine *La Ilustración Femenina*, took this opportunity for public action one step further, carving out decades-long careers that included prominent turns writing for a women’s press that otherwise promoted marriage and domesticity as women’s proper destiny. Carmen Nonell, for example, regularly wrote for *Mujer*, *La Ilustración Femenina*, and the Sección Femenina women’s magazine *Teresa* during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and in 1957 became the Berlin correspondent for the newspaper “Pueblo” as well as the first Spanish journalist to earn

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27 Quoted in Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 324. The creed of the Women’s Section enshrined these same principles, referring to the education of one’s children as a woman’s “mission,” and encouraging women to be obedient, and to view others – men – as true agents and patriots, eschewing all personal ambition in themselves. See Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*, 25.
28 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 301.
press credentials in the postwar German *Presserverband*. 29 Sección Femenina publications in particular served as platforms for many of mid-century Spain’s most prominent female journalists to act publicly, most notably jurist Mercedes Formica (a long-standing Falange member), who after a brief turn as *Medina*’s editor-in-chief began writing for *A.B.C.*, where she penned the watershed 1953 domestic abuse exposé “El Domicilio Conyugal.” This article alone helped initiate the push to reform women’s legal status in Spain that culminated in the 1958 reform of the Spanish Civil Code, the first expansion of Spanish women’s legal rights under the dictatorship. 30 The exposé so shattered the illusion of marital idyll that otherwise reigned in Spanish society, outlining how Spain’s existing legal code made it nearly impossible for battered women to leave their abusers, that readers sent the newspaper hundreds of responses per day, many of which worked to reaffirm the domestic character of women’s role in Spanish society. 31

This cautious admission of women into a closely-circumscribed public life, as well as the intense, early Franco-era politicization of daily life that underpinned this call to feminine public action, found echo in a series of parallel discourses on femininity that emerged in *Mujer*’s and other Spanish women’s magazines’ pages during the early 1940s. *Medina*, for instance, which declared itself “mouthpiece of the new [Falangist] political theory of the Spanish State,” and proclaimed its primary mission to be the political formation of the new Spanish woman, offered a model of feminine behavior that

was at once nationalist, and service-oriented, but also conservative and traditional in its domesticity. This model woman engaged in gender-appropriate public service, such as participating in the Women’s Section’s regional song and dance troupe, the *Coros y Danzas*, but, at the same time, was ultimately grooming herself to be a housewife and mother.\(^{32}\) Similarly, early issues of *Mujer* declared the periodical,

> [able to] compete with counterparts edited abroad...[and] a thoroughly national magazine, conceived and created for women [who are] the ornament and hope of the new Spain, [that would] dedicate the very important question of Spanish fashion the attention...that this excellent and patriotic idea deserve[d].\(^{33}\)

These were strategic claims: by claiming the ability to compete with foreign counterparts, a “thoroughly national” editorial philosophy, and engagement in “patriotic” work, *Mujer*’s editors aligned themselves with the Franco regime’s cultural and imperial project, which rejected foreign influences and sought to reestablish Spanish global prominence.\(^{34}\) Articles in *Mujer*’s wartime issues – which, like *Medina*, coincided with the regime’s earliest and most fascist period – similarly positioned the magazine in support of the Falange and the public feminine roles that the Sección Femenina later promoted. In 1937, for example, *Mujer* lauded a Sección Femenina-run children’s soup kitchen for safeguarding the “seed of the New Spain,” and for serving as an example of “every Spanish woman’s duty” as maternal caregiver.\(^{35}\) And, in 1938, an article series entitled “Mujeres Fascistas” praised Italian Fascism for encouraging this same combination of traditional domesticity and public action toward the goal of raising Italy’s

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\(^{32}\) Carrión Jiménez and Hernando Carrasco, 164-165, 167, 169-173.

\(^{33}\) [Untitled], *Mujer*, No. 6 Year I (Nov. 1937).

\(^{34}\) These aims were codified in Point Three of the Falange’s 26 fundamental points, another ideological cornerstone of the early dictatorship, which read, “We reclaim for Spain a preeminent place in Europe. We support neither international isolation nor foreign influence,” and in declarations Franco himself made, such as, “we do not want a liberal, capitalist, bourgeois, Jewish, protestant, atheist and masonic progress. We prefer Spanish backwardness.” See Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis Conversaciones Privadas con Franco*, 99, cited in Eslava Galán, *Los Años del Miedo*, 57-58.

\(^{35}\) “La Nueva España: en los comedores del auxilio social,” *Mujer*, No. 6 (Nov., 1937).
next generation of Fascists.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Mujer} was not just an early example of a politicized consumer magazine; rather, the magazine engaged in a blending of consumption and politics that would become common in later decades. On the one hand, \textit{Mujer} mobilized consumption – readers’ consumption of the publication itself, as well as the spectacle of consumed lifestyles depicted in its pages – for political ends. Hence, the magazine’s profiles of the \textit{Auxilio Social} kitchens, intended to sow public support for the \textit{Sección Femenina}’s work. Hence too Carlos de Llorente’s more explicitly political articles on Fascist women, both of which, like counterparts published in \textit{Medina}, disseminated the gender ideology promoted by Francoist moral authorities like Pilar Primo de Rivera, as well as by the famously moralistic Cardinal Pedro Segura.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, \textit{Mujer}’s quick appearance after the Nationalist capture of San Sebastián, combined with its mission of guiding women as “Spain…renew[ed] its traditional essence,” suggest that the magazine formed to help the regime and Church successfully indoctrinate the women of that city and Spain as a whole with National-Catholic models of femininity and consumption.\textsuperscript{38} Nor was this the sum of \textit{Mujer}’s political content: the magazine also supported the regime’s early postwar campaign to promote a patriotic, economy-stimulating domestic tourism by publishing travel itineraries, which, “[like] all of Spain’s [tourist] routes [could] compete [with foreign counterparts] in all types of beauty and evocative stimuli.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36}Carlos de Llorente, “Mujeres Fascistas,” \textit{Mujer}, No. 8 Year II (Jan., 1938), 17, 24, and Carlos de Llorente, “Mujeres Fascistas,” \textit{Mujer}, No. 9 Year II (Feb., 1938), 20.

\textsuperscript{37}For Segura’s and other National-Catholic moral authorities’ moralism, see for example Martin Gaite, 118-120; and Alonso Tejada, especially chs. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid.; as well as Martin Gaite, chs. 2-3; Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{39}“Itinerario,” \textit{Mujer}, No. 27 Year of Victory (Aug., 1939). For the regime and postwar domestic tourism, see Pack, \textit{Tourism and Dictatorship}, 33-34. Pack has noted the economic motivations behind the Spanish government’s own tourism push; \textit{Mujer}’s call “¡Viajad por España!” (“Travel through Spain!”) immediately following the assertion that Spain would achieve, “total reconstruction…along the path of a
At the same time, *Mujer* and other Civil War-era commercial entities also exploited the war, Franco’s movement, and Nationalist wartime rhetoric for commercial ends by using the conflict as a source of engaging material by which to appeal to readers and consequently sell more magazine issues and the products advertised therein. In *Mujer*’s case, this manifested principally in the feature articles the magazine published. Stories like “*La Tapia,*” or “*Una Mujer Especial,*” the tale of a bereaved woman whose unfaithful but beloved husband died on the warfront before they could make peace, used the drama of the Civil War to grip readers.\(^{40}\) When, by the magazine’s account, soldiers discovered the diary of a woman named Adela-María abandoned in a house on the outskirts of Madrid, the magazine deemed this material of interest and published it as well.\(^{41}\) Advertisers, meanwhile, also used *Mujer* as a venue to conduct war-related trade. One ad published in October 1937 by the San Sebastián haberdasher Casa Vilar announced that it specialized in Falangist, Requeté (Carlist) and Army shirts.\(^{42}\)

Socioeconomically, the middle and end of the 1940s represented a turning point for Spain’s consumer magazines. During the first half of the decade, *Mujer* and *Alta Costura* had depicted upper-class scenes in which women wore fashionable clothing while playing golf or sailing or casually referenced other luxuries like wet-nurses or evening make-up appropriate for the opera.\(^{43}\) And *Alta Costura*’s steep 10-peseta price

\(^{40}\) P. Vila San-Juan, “*Una Mujer Especial,*” *Mujer,* No. 12 (May, 1938), 10-11.
\(^{41}\) “Untitled Article on Diary of Adela-María,” *Mujer,* No. 17 (Oct., 1938), 52-53. Whether Adela-María and her diary were real or *Mujer* invented the story is, ultimately, of little importance here: either way, *Mujer* used the drama of the Civil War to sell issues.
\(^{42}\) “Ad for Casa Vilar,” *Mujer,* No. 5 (Oct., 1937).
\(^{43}\) For Paris fashion, see for example, Fred, “*Crónica de la Moda,*” *Mujer,* No. 2 Year I (July, 1937). For sailing, golf, and attire, see, “*Vestidos de Sport,*” *Mujer,* No. 2 Year I (July, 1937). For class and sailing in Spain, see Gregorio Méndez de la Muela, “Evolución del turismo náutico en España en los últimos treinta años: recreación o status social, una aproximación a la sociología del turismo náutico” (Ph.D. diss.,
made the magazine a luxury item in itself.\textsuperscript{44} However, as Spanish economic fortunes plummeted, \textit{Mujer} began to court a less wealthy class of woman who, though still comparatively well-off, felt the effects of the struggling Spanish economy. Ads printed in the magazine during the late 1940s, for example, reflected this broadening class readership. Alongside its reports on Parisian and London fashion, by 1947 \textit{Mujer} also ran ads courting thrift-minded women with promises of savings, suggesting that such women now numbered among the magazine’s readers. These ads were commonly for correspondence courses to become seamstresses, such as one, printed in \textit{Mujer}’s February 1947 issue, that featured a 100-peseta bill as a backdrop to a woman mending her daughter’s dress and read:

\begin{quote}
Be Practical and Modern and you will save much money. Besides [being] a joy, the thrift it represents for your household, madam, [and] the possibility of creating your little ones’ dresses, perfecting your innate ability with technical instruction…is a factor to consider.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

Another ad reminded housewives of the “contribution [they] could provide, reducing the family budget through a few daily minutes of work [spent] creating an infinite assortment of garments,” while still another targeted single girls, offering the chance to “quickly credential themselves as [sewing] teachers, earning 300 pesetas per month.”\textsuperscript{46} Such promises were no doubt appealing to, and advertisers likely intended them for, postwar

\textsuperscript{44} See note 15.
Spain’s financially struggling housewives, rather than for Mujer’s traditional wealthier readers, who were more likely to hire a seamstress than seek to become one. Haute-bourgeois Barcelona housewife María Freixas i Bru, for example, made steady use of a seamstress throughout the 1940s, including occasional large commissions such as a brown suit she ordered in April 1947 for 207 pesetas. Ordinary urban Spaniards meanwhile faced the dilemma of needing to dress increasingly well to remain employable as sartorial standards rose, even though wages remained so low that these same people often had to live on a single daily meal.

Paradoxically, when Mujer’s editors hiked the magazine’s price from 3.5 to a sizeable five pesetas in August 1947, Mujer used this to publicly identify as a thrift-oriented publication for frugal women. In that month’s issue, a special editorial apologized for the price hike, assured readers that prices would drop again as soon as possible, and stressed that Mujer had kept its per-issue price at 3.5 pesetas long after other journals had raised theirs, and only increased prices when so forced by rising graphic design prices and a national paper shortage. These statements introduced several claims into the magazine’s discourse. First, it presented Mujer as sensitive to readers’ need to save money and, to bolster this assertion, claimed a history of such behavior. It established Mujer’s competitors, by contrast, as less friendly to thrift-minded women, because they, unlike Mujer, raised prices before circumstances had forced them

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47 “20 Sept. 1943,” “27 Sept. 1943,” and, “19 Apr. 1947,” MFiB. Moreover, though Freixas also frequently bought fabric – perhaps to work with herself, perhaps to send out for seamstressing – these purchases were not thrifty. That same month, she spent over 1000 pesetas on material. Myriad ready-made clothing purchases also peppered her budgets, including 55 pesetas spent on 26 March for a belt for herself, and 40 pesetas spent on 21 March for two blouses. In short, a woman with Freixas’ means did not have to sew her own clothes. See “19 Apr. 1947,” “22 Apr. 1947,” “2 Apr. 1947,” “26 Mar. 1947,” and “21 Mar. 1947,” MFiB.
48 Brenan, 23.
49 In fact, this shortage was so severe that Ventanal was temporarily forced to suspend publication as a result. “A Nuestras Lectoras,” Mujer, No. 122 (Aug., 1947), 5; Roig Castellanos, 107.
to. Most of all, it portrayed Mujer’s price hike as proof that the magazine was not just for frugal women, but was itself similarly frugal because it was willing to make necessary hard financial choices – in this case, raising prices – when its budget demanded.

This shift was not universal. Alta Costura gave no evidence of thrift-mindedness or of possessing a readership for whom ways of saving money might be as interesting as were the latest foreign fashions. To the contrary, articles devoted to aspects and problems of elite lifestyles, such as how to attractively decorate the exterior of the furnace in one’s country home and ads for expensive products such as champagne and Parisian perfumes, abounded in the fashion magazine, to the complete exclusion of thrift-oriented content such as that which appeared in Mujer. Nor was Alta Costura alone. Both the interior design magazine Arte en el Hogar, launched in 1943, and the women’s magazine Astra: Revista moderna para la mujer, first printed in 1950, shared Alta Costura’s elevated price and haute-bourgeois content. The former magazine devoted the bulk of its pages to profiling villas, artist studios, and other upper-class spaces; the latter featured articles on English furniture and Parisian bolero jackets, as well as ads for perfumes, nail polish, and radios, rather than sewing courses like those Mujer promoted.

Still, Mujer’s apparent service to a cross-class audience was not an isolated phenomenon. Its claims regarding competitors’ higher prices ignored the fact that the comparatively pricey, but also more specialized interior design magazine Arte en el Hogar, was a different kind of publication from Mujer, much as the American women’s

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50 For such content in Alta Costura, see, for example, “Advertisement for Legrain Perfumes,” Alta Costura, No. 55 Year VI (June, 1948); “Ad for Champaña “Coquet” Mestres,” Alta Costura, No. 55, Year VI (June, 1948); and A y Marinel-lo, “La Casa y Su Estilo – Estufas de Cerámica,” Alta Costura, No. 55, Year VI (June, 1948).

and interior design magazine *Better Homes and Gardens* differed from *McCall’s Magazine*, which included a greater amount of literary and fashion-oriented content.\(^5^2\) It also failed to consider that many Spanish women’s magazines remained cheaper than *Mujer*. *Ventanal*, the successor to *Sección Femenina’s Medina*, for example, cost just 1.50 pesetas in 1946, while the popular celebrity news magazines *Lecturas* and *¡Hola!*, the women’s digest *Meridiano Femenino*, and the adolescent girls’ magazine *Chicas* all cost 3.5 pesetas or less.\(^5^3\)

This placed these magazines within the financial reach of a larger pool of women. As *Mujer* did after 1947, the women’s journal *Para Nosotras*, published by the Catholic lay organization *Acción Católica* (“Catholic Action,” first founded in the 1920s) also tailored its content to a working-class audience. Thus, Acción Católica’s Women’s Press Secretariat later rejected a proposal in 1958 to merge *Para Nosotras* with the more exclusive *Senda*, citing the former’s ability to reach a culturally and materially poorer, “popular” readership.\(^5^4\) Meanwhile, other women’s magazines that by contrast continued to offer largely patrician content at plebeian prices – including *Mujer*, before 1947 – could serve as aspirational literature for readers able to occasionally afford to buy these magazines, if not the haute couture they depicted. Publication figures for these magazines suggest that they circulated broadly: in the mid-1940s, *Mujer* and *El Hogar y la Moda*

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\(^5^2\) The same was true of the hair and beauty magazine *Creaciones*, which was more expensive, but also a more technical publication, than *Mujer*. For *Creaciones*, as well as a summary of *Arte en el Hogar* and *Mujer’s* different content, see, *Anuario de la Prensa Española*, Year II (Madrid: Delegación Nacional de Prensa, 1945-46), 482-483, 488. For descriptions of the women’s press in the early-to-mid twentieth-century United States, see Nancy A. Walker, *Shaping Our Mothers’ World: American Women’s Magazines* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000).

\(^5^3\) Specifically, *¡Hola!* and *Chicas* sold for 2 pesetas per issue, *Meridiano Femenino* for 3, and Lecturas, the most expensive, for Mujer’s pre-1947 hike price of 3.5 pesetas per issue. For *¡Hola!* see “Tres generaciones al frente de <<¡Hola!>>,“ *A.B.C.* (Sevilla), 15 July, 2010.

\(^5^4\) Feliciano Montero García, “Las Publicaciones Periódicas de Acción Católica durante el Franquismo,” in *Catolicismo y comunicación en la historia contemporánea*, José Leonardo Ruiz Sánchez, ed. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2005), 35-36.
both printed an average of 45,000 copies of each issue, which in the latter case rose to as many as 80,000 copies in 1954, while *Mujer* and other titles like *¡Hola!* and *La Ilustración Femenina* posted editions of 25,000 copies.\textsuperscript{55} Given an average real distribution rate of 75-80 percent of each edition and a 1950 adult female population of 6,847,000 living in the Spanish urban and semi-urban areas where these magazines were mostly consumed, this meant that at least one of every 100 women bought a copy.\textsuperscript{56} And the real rate was almost certainly higher.\textsuperscript{57}

**Echoes and Harbingers of Spain’s Initial Rapprochement with the West, 1946-1950**

The end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s also brought a shift in the content that Spain’s women’s magazines offered their growing audience. Increasingly, and despite the Franco regime’s still-frosty relationship with the United States and its allies, these magazines stoked a rising popular interest in foreign, and especially American fashions and lifestyles.

Fascination with Hollywood and its star system was one form this emphasis on foreign popular culture and fashion took. In itself, this interest was nothing new: by the late 1930s, *Mujer* had regularly covered Hollywood fashion, profiling stylish Hollywood leading ladies such as Ann Rutherford and Lucille Ball, and offering male idols like Clark Gable and Johnny Weissmuller to readers’ husbands as examples of the confidence


\textsuperscript{56} For historic magazine dissemination rates, see Muñoz Ruiz, “Mujer Mítica,” 231. For these magazines’ largely urban audience, see Muñoz Ruiz, “Mujer Mítica,” 49. For the adult female population in Spanish urban and semi-urban areas in 1950, see “Censo de 1950. Clasificaciones de habitantes de Hecho por grupos de edad.”

\textsuperscript{57} The rate of one magazine for every 100 women corresponds specifically to *El Hogar y la Moda*’s dissemination. Given the likelihood that some women who did not buy this magazine bought others like *¡Hola!* or *Meridiano Femenino*, the portion of the female populace reading a women’s magazine of some kind was, as noted above, almost certainly higher.
and sobriety that women sought in men.⁵⁸

This interest in Hollywood and American fashion continued undiminished through the late 1940s, notwithstanding Spain’s trade and diplomatic pariah status. In 1946, *Alta Costura* regularly ran photospreads of Hollywood’s famous women and their outfits under the title “*Alta Costura en Hollywood.*” Between 1948 and 1950, issues featured interviews with heartthrobs like Gregory Peck and Tyrone Power, or with famous recent brides, such as actresses Greer Garson and Lana Turner. Meanwhile, in 1947 alone, *Mujer* turned to stars including Lucille Ball for guidance on lounge-wear, touted actress Marguerite Chapman as an example of a woman who found fulfillment in housework, and even covered a special fashion show that took place aboard a yacht in Florida.⁵⁹

This content, though seemingly innocuous, held potential for real subversion. Victoria de Grazia has noted that Hollywood fashion in particular and foreign fashions in general, appealed to Italian Fascism’s iconoclasm and notions of modernity because these styles transcended Italy’s traditional social class system; but foreign fashion also worried Fascist leaders, who feared the corruption of Italian gender roles and the undermining of their autarkic calls to buy only Italian-made clothes.⁶⁰

Spanish magazines’ portrayals of Hollywood and Franco’s visions for his New

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⁵⁹ See, for example, “*Alta Costura en Hollywood.*** *Alta Costura*, No. 28 Year IV (Mar., 1946); also, Juan del Sarto, “Hablan los ídolos acerca de qué es más agradable en la mujer: si el talento o la belleza – Opiniones de Cary Grant, Gregory Peck, Tyrone Power y Gary Cooper,” *Alta Costura*, No. 55 Year VI (June, 1948); “Emociones de Mujer – Merle Oberon, Greer Garson, Lana Turner y Linda Darnell evocan la impresión de su puesta de largo,” *Alta Costura*, No. 63 Year VII (Feb, 1949); “El arte del vestido de interior,” *Mujer*, No. 116 (Feb., 1947); S.V., “En todo se puede poner un poco de belleza,” *Mujer*, No. 121 (July, 1947); “La moda viaja,” *Mujer*, No. 118 (Apr., 1947).
Spain were similarly in tension. Mujer and other women’s magazines humanized stars, rendering Hollywood’s glamour at once enticingly exotic and familiar, and, despite the Franco regime’s official national exceptionalism, generally treated Spain as part of rather than separate from the rest of fashion-producing Western Europe and America. Thus, though many of *Alta Costura*’s photospreads highlighted Spanish designers’ work, many others showcased the latest London and Parisian designs, while *Mujer* even devoted a special issue in 1947 to foreign designers like Paris’ Alice Belier.\(^{61}\) Indeed, as early as October 1938, an editorial in *Mujer* defended this focus, reasoning that Spanish interest in – or, as author Vera de Alzate put it, “servile obedience to” – foreign fashion trends was long-standing, natural, and therefore not worth challenging. At the same time, de Alzate’s article also displayed the tensions already brewing between the interest in foreign fashion that it defended and early Francoism’s vigorous Spanish nationalism, with which the Nationalist-aligned *Mujer* sympathized. De Alzate’s acceptance of what she termed a Spanish sartorial servility was grudging and quickly followed with patriotic boasts about Spain’s own national genius in the decorative arts.\(^{62}\) The result was that, as for shoppers at department stores like Galerías Preciados, foreign fashions and popular culture retained currency among Spanish women’s magazine readers. And as such, when publications circulating during the 1950s and 1960s began reporting on new, subversive Western European and American fashions, these reports did not emerge *ex nihilo*. Rather, they followed in the journalistic footsteps of these earlier columns.

Meanwhile, a few of these magazines also specifically echoed a disregard that

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Italian consumers had shown toward Mussolini’s attempts to restrict consumption of foreign fashions. These periodicals regularly printed ads for imported beauty products like French perfumes or Philips radios, which similarly disregarded the Franco regime’s import restrictions and calls for female modesty. Class privilege helped make this possible. Victoria de Grazia has noted that the Italian women who flouted Mussolini’s autarky by seeking out Hollywood fashions were wealthy and bourgeois; just so, it was the pricey and unapologetically upper-class *Alta Costura* that ran many of these ads. A single issue of *Alta Costura* from 1947, for instance, advertised Vitamol revitalising skin crème, manufactured by a subsidiary of Switzerland’s Hamol company; French Bardinet liqueur; American-made Bella Aurora facial soap; and, of course, Legrain perfumes.

Some of these companies, *Alta Costura*’s ads also reveal, made their way into Spain via loopholes in Franco’s import restriction policies by working through domestic subsidiaries or by offering products imported through Spanish concessionaires. Hamol, for instance, which produced Vitamol through Hamol-Spain, was among the former, while the Stillman Company, producers of Bella Aurora, numbered among the latter.

Domestically, Galerías Preciados similarly circumvented import restrictions in the late 1940s by securing foreign fabric swatches through the Cuban department store *El Encanto*, and producing its own, non-imported versions of fashionable but scarce French-

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63 For Italian resistance to Fascist promotion of domestic fashions, see de Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women*, 221-222. For ads in Spanish women’s magazines, see for instance “Ad for Bride au Vent Perfume, Legrain, Paris,” *Alta Costura*, No. 61 Year VI (Dec., 1948); “Ad for ‘el Perfume de Paris de Raphael’,” *Astra*, No. 3 Year I (June, 1950); and, “Ad for Philips Radios,” *Astra*, No. 8 Year I (Nov., 1950).

64 Moreover, the magazine’s pricing for ad space, 2000 pesetas per page, was among the highest of any Spanish women’s magazine, making it an expensive option as well for smaller domestic brands looking to advertise. Only the extensively-read *El Hogar y la Moda* charged more, at 2650 pesetas per page. By contrast, *Mujer* as well as several other magazines charged 1400 pesetas per page, and the women’s home magazine *Menaje*, which later became *La Ilustración Femenina*, charged just 500 pesetas. See *Anuario de la Prensa Española*, 1945-46, 481-490. For bourgeois Italian women and autarky, see de Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women*, 221-222.

65 See *Alta Costura*, No. 43, Year V (June, 1947).

66 Ibid.
and American-style printed textiles.\textsuperscript{67} As a result, Spanish consumers remained attuned to foreign products and lifestyles.

This was especially so for \textit{Alta Costura}. National-Catholic moral authorities like Cardinals Pedro Segura and Enrique Plá y Deniel condemned beauty products of the kind that the magazine advertised as vain and sinful, and indeed, these ads posed an immediate, if still narrowly elite, challenge to National-Catholicism’s prescribed modesty. In so doing, they also anticipated a more widespread subversion of orthodox Francoist feminine norms that the shopping culture of the 1950s and 1960s brought about, which Aurora Morcillo has described thusly:

Spanish women were exposed to the advertisements for makeup, perfume, fashion, and luxury products appearing in Spanish magazines such as \textit{Blanco y Negro} in the 1950s and 1960s, and the consumption of luxury articles such as watches, Chanel perfume, and high-fashion clothing became more common by the end of the 1950s. The colorful ads appealed to women’s search for eternal youth and beauty….the message of such advertisements contradicted the treatises from the 1500s that had been promoted by Franco’s regime…The new ads…urged Spanish women to remake themselves…[to] purchase a new identity, a sense of self-worth based on physical appearance rather than spiritual value.\textsuperscript{68}

Many of \textit{Alta Costura}’s ads for beauty product ads contained this same kind of discourse as early as the mid-1940s. In 1957, makeup producer Dermiluz would proclaim, “Being young and pretty is marvelous!” and a year later, an ad for Pond’s Cold Cream would show a beautiful woman who had “enhanced her charms [with Pond’s].”\textsuperscript{69} Both ads, Morcillo has argued, promised not just make-up, but youth, beauty and, most importantly, the ability to remake oneself – to reconfigure one’s subjectivity. Similarly,

\textsuperscript{67} This again paralleled the case of Fascist Italy, where, “autarchic silks” – domestically-produced fashions in the Hollywood style – had similarly straddled the line between the nationalized fashion that the Fascist government pursued and the foreign garments that Italian women saw in theaters and coveted. For Galerias, see Toboso, \textit{Pepin Fernández}, 138-139. For Italy, see De Grazia, \textit{How Fascism Ruled Women}, 221-222.

\textsuperscript{68} Morcillo, 40-41, 54; need to confirm Pla y Deniel and Segura – check L. Alonso Tejada, check too Martin Gaite.

\textsuperscript{69} Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood}, 55-56.
in 1946, ads for Dana perfumes, Bella Aurora beauty products, and Tintolax-brand hair products promised readers “grace and success in perfume form”; to “better [their] appearance [in] Society”; or told them to, “ask for this quality brand if [they] want[ed] youth, beauty, and freshness.” Like Morcillo’s latter-day counterparts, these early ads offered women the promise of youth, beauty, and social approval, and more importantly, granted them permission to shop for their own pleasure, not just their families’ benefit.

Finally, as in the case of Bella Aurora Soaps, these products on occasion bore one more label of increasing popularity: “Product of the USA,” which would prove a key influence in the consumer culture of 1950s and 1960s Spain. Indeed, other products of purely Spanish origin, such as the skin creme Lactocrema Gran Dama or the hair product Marinalba, appropriated this American vogue by using the images of Hollywood stars like Shirley Johns and Marilyn Maxwell, whose smooth skin and beautiful hair they promised to consumers (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). This type of ad not only courted Spanish customers by appealing to their taste for things American, but reinforced it.

*Alta Costura* was far from unique in encouraging women to consume beauty products, but its ads were distinguished in that they anticipated changes to popular Spanish notions of femininity by nearly a decade – specifically, the message that women could buy such products purely for their own enjoyment. Conversely, *Mujer* consistently championed the self-abnegating ideal that women should beautify themselves solely to make their families happier, a notion rooted in the Sección Femenina’s tenet of self-

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70 “Ad for Perfumes Dana,” “Ad for Bella Aurora,” and, “Ad for Tintolax,” in *Alta Costura*, No. 26, Year IV (Jan., 1946).
71 The full label in Bella Aurora’s ads prominently proclaimed, “Product of the Stillman Co., Aurora, Illinois USA.” See “Ad for Bella Aurora,” *Alta Costura*, No. 55 Year VI (June, 1948).
sacrifice for the sake of spousal and familial needs.\textsuperscript{72} In a February 1947 article on dressing gowns, for example, the magazine declared, “Being beautiful for one’s family is

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{“Un cutis terso y nacarado…[como] Shirley Johns”}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{“Para poner el pelo como Marilyn Maxwell…use siempre Marinalba”}
\end{figure}

at all times a woman’s primordial duty! The home will seem to smile and will sustain your loved ones if you are its principal adornment.” In another, Mujer encouraged readers to indulge themselves by setting aside space for a small vanity table, from which they could better manage their households and maintain the sunny dispositions required of them.\textsuperscript{73} This echoed statements the magazine had printed almost a decade earlier, as in January 1939, when Mujer assured readers that:

The woman who cares for her beauty is not because of that vain…[but rather] she who does not think she needs to…exalt her physical and moral assets…is vain] because no woman should ignore that one’s fathers, brothers, fiancée, husband, and sons delight in life beside a creature who cultivates her beauty like a garden.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} For examples of this argument as presented in Medina, see Pinilla Garcia, 171-174. This stands in contrast to the Sección Femenina’s content from the 1950s, for many of Morcillo’s ads ran in the Women’s Section’s own Teresa. See Morcillo, True Catholic Womanhood, 55-56.

\textsuperscript{73} “Boudoir,” Mujer, No. 116 (Feb., 1947); “El Arte del Vestido de Interior,” Mujer, No. 116 (Feb., 1947).

\textsuperscript{74} Marcelle Auclair, “Entre Nosotras,” Mujer, No. 20 Year II (Jan., 1939), 9.
By contrast, the manner of ads that *Alta Costura* displayed and anticipated marked a change in discourse regarding feminine beauty precisely because they represented a departure from this other-centered rationale for cultivation of the feminine self.

This is not, however, to say that *Mujer*’s interest in America began and ended with Hollywood, or that this represented the whole of the magazine’s contribution to Spain’s developing women’s consumerism. As the 1940s drew to a close, Spanish women’s magazines like *Mujer* and *Alta Costura* began hinting that Spain would soon achieve an American standard of living defined by a mass consumption that, these magazines hoped, would vitiate traditional European class differences. Mujer gave especially pronounced evidence of this in 1947, when it ran a column, “Una sonrisa para ir a la compra” (A Smile When Going Shopping), that championed a cornerstone of the prosperous and modern American way of life: home appliances, especially the refrigerator. In this article, the magazine contrasted the stress that middle-class

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75 This represented one of the United States’ primary cultural exports to postwar Europe. For the American standard of living in Europe, see de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, ch. 2, especially 75-78, 93-95. For the arrival of the concept of the “American way of life” to Spain, see Alonso and Conde, 137.

76 *Alta Costura*, meanwhile, ran ads that displayed a similar preoccupation with modern, technologically-driven convenience, promoting products like hybrid clothes/dish-washing machines, DDT-infused insect-repellants, and special detergents that promised to clean the family’s clothes while housewives went to the movies – a genre of goods that Victoria de Grazia has identified as staples of American consumer capitalism’s efforts to spread the American model household abroad. As many scholars have noted, the appliance-filled, modern “miracle kitchen” represented the heart of this Cold-War era household, and crystallized core postwar capitalist American values such as freedom of consumer choice, modernity, and convenience. The refrigerator, for instance, promised women freedom from daily visits to the butcher and grocer. As such, the modern kitchen occupied a central place in the United States’ political struggle with the Soviet Union and, more specifically, efforts to spread an American, consumerist brand of democracy abroad, culminating with the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow, which included a series of model kitchens meant to sell Soviet citizens on the superiority of free enterprise. For *Alta Costura*, see “Ad for máquina de lavar ropa y platos Turnix-Berrens, offered by Casa Edison,” *Alta Costura*, No. 77, Year VIII (Apr., 1950); “Ad for Fogo,” *Alta Costura*, No. 54, Year VI (May, 1948); “Ad for Libel Detergent,” *Alta Costura*, No. 69 Year VII (Aug., 1949). For the American kitchen in Europe, see de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 418-419, 425-427; and various contributions in Oldenziel and Zachmann, *Cold War Kitchens*, including Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, “Kitchens as Technology and Politics: An Introduction,” 2-3; Greg Castillo, “The American “Fat Kitchen” in Europe: Postwar Domestic Modernity and Marshall Plan Strategies of Enchantment,” 48; Hamilton, 142-143, 147-148; and Irene Cieraad, “The Radiant American Kitchen: Domesticating Dutch Nuclear Energy,” 113-136.
European housewives faced when their servants were away and they were forced to prepare dinner themselves with the convenience their American counterparts enjoyed by using canned and pre-packaged refrigerated foods for help with dinner. This reliance on their Frigidaire refrigerators, the article argued, kept American women free from Europeans’ premature wrinkles and gray hair, and kept American men skinny and “ready to be Hollywood stars.” And the fault for this sad state of affairs, the article added, belonged to European men, self-styled gourmets who were unwilling to accept the ‘can-and-refrigerator’ meals that American husbands routinely ate. The solution, Mujer’s column finally suggested, was for European women to emulate American housewives and turn to refrigerators, canned vegetables, and cold cuts for culinary help.

This advocacy was bold, foreshadowing changes on the horizon for Spain and Europe as a whole, while still remaining subject to certain limits. To suggest that housewives were unhappy with their domestic lot and to blame their spouses for this was unusual this early into the Franco era. In 1947, the Sección Femenina, with its call for women to always yield to husbandly opinions and seek to aid others rather than themselves, still wielded extensive moral authority over millions of Spanish women whose mandatory civil service the Falangist organization oversaw. This remained the Spain where, according to Carmen Martín Gaite, “It was certainly taken for granted that no woman could cherish a more beautiful dream than submission to a man; if she said otherwise, she was lying.” And the marital advice that women’s magazines like Mujer offered – even decades later – followed this same vein, stressing patience, forgiveness of indiscretions much more serious than a tendency toward epicureanism, and stoicism.

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78 Martín Gaite, 44.
when husbands meddled in wives’ household management. Mujer’s column, by contrast, ran directly counter to this model of femininity both inasmuch as it called for men to think of their wives’ convenience, and not the reverse, and treated the household toil these women faced not as a badge of honor, to be borne in ennobling silence, but as a problem in need of solving.

At the same time, Mujer’s column highlights some of the limits on discourse still present as Spain began the transition from material hardship and conservatism of the early Franco period to the economic growth, mass consumption, and shifting gender relations characteristic of tardofranquismo. First, the magazine’s column referred generally to “Europeans,” not Spaniards, blunting both the article’s critique and its potential to offend. It also offered no challenge to the notion that a woman’s place was exclusively in the home – the push for married women’s right to work outside the home was still several years away. Even the problem that Mujer tackled marked it as traditionally European, and bourgeois rather than mass-oriented and American character. For while upper middle-class housewife María Freixas i Bru may have nodded as she read this column, thinking about the times her maid went on vacation or her own family’s summer retreats to nearby Reus, ordinary Spanish households in the late 1940’s could hardly afford servants, or, for that matter, a fridge.

Its limitations notwithstanding, Mujer’s championing of the American kitchen, and with it American modernity, was part of a burgeoning, transformative moment. At

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80 See note 95.
81 Indeed, over a decade later, in 1960, only four percent of the Spanish population owned a refrigerator, with the overwhelming majority of these concentrated in urban centers. For Freixas and servants, see for example “6 July, 1947,” MFiB. For appliance ownership, see Fundación FOESSA, Informe sociológico...1966, 75-76.
this time, American agents used this appliance-filled kitchen to promote notions of a modern and democratic American way of life laden with promises of futuristic household convenience and national progress. Over the course of the late 1940s and 1950s, Paris’ Salon of Household Arts, a home technology showcase that American makers had dominated since its opening in the 1920s, made the standard American battery of kitchen appliances equally standard in France, aided by a rapidly-expanding French women’s press that drove up demand, foreign competition that drove down prices, and increasingly available consumer credit. At the West Berlin Industrial Fair of 1950, as at the American National Exhibition in Moscow nine years later, the U.S. State Department offered visitors the spectacle of a fully-stocked model American kitchen. And, in 1957, at an international trade fair held in communist Zagreb, Yugoslavia, the U.S. Department of Commerce mounted a, similarly-minded exhibit titled “Supermarket USA,” which they hoped would convince onlookers of the advantages of the American consumer way of life.

In addition to the increasing visibility of products promising more leisured, consumption-driven lifestyles, the possibility of a more prosperous future created by rationalized diets and household management also underlay Spain’s embrace of American home technology. Responding to postwar Spain’s rampant shortages, the Franco regime and food retailing trade took steps toward creating a more efficient food distribution network. One of the earliest steps was the 1939 creation of a government agency dedicated to this issue, the CAT. Another was the founding in 1945 of a professional journal for the Spanish food distribution and grocery trade, *ICA: Industria y

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84 See Introduction, note 31.
Comercio de Alimentación (“Food Industry and Commerce,” henceforth ICA). This soon became one of the industry’s most important forums, in which Spaniards debated measures like the establishment of a uniform code regulating food quality.85

Beyond its contributions to the food trade, ICA was also symptomatic of a wider-ranging movement encompassing the arrival of American marvels like the Frigidaire: a push toward technical sophistication in every discipline – homemaking included – that Castilian Spanish neatly titled técnica. This push toward técnica unfolded in various retailing professions’ trade journals like ICA Advertising and the commercial display arts in particular provided examples: 1945 saw not only ICA’s founding, but the launch of the window-dressing trade’s Escaparate, as well as the advertising journal Arte Comercial. Galerías Preciados’ internal store bulletin, which similarly embraced the cause of professional development arrived just three years later.

For Spanish housewives, the increasing valuation of técnica manifested itself in magazine articles that encouraged readers to gain more technical proficiency in the kitchen, home decoration, and even self-beautification, as they believed American women had done. Mujer’s piece on American appliances was one example of this trend. Others appeared in publications like Funcionarias: Revista para la mujer (Functionaries: Women’s Magazine), a new women’s journal launched in 1952. This publication offered readers a series of on-going instructional columns devoted to beauty, dancing, cooking, and home décor, presented by contributors boasting professional titles like “Doctor” and

85 Whereas other magazines catering to the food distribution industry, such as the CAT’s own publication, Alimentación Nacional: Publicación de la Sección de Información de la Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (1941-1955) eventually disappeared, ICA’s importance is attested to by its long print run, which lasted from 1945 through the end of the dictatorship, to 1977. The magazine’s prominent position as print organ of the grocery trade would be further borne out once private supermarket chains began appearing in Spain in the early 1960s, as these chains sent copies of their own internal bulletins for ICA editors’ perusal. See “Hemeroteca,” ICA: Industria y Comercio de Alimentación (henceforth ICA), No. 130-131-132 (July-Aug.-Sept., 1961), 48.
“Professor” and permeated with the aim of developing a technical mastery in readers. Thus, for instance, Dr. S. Vanó’s “Beauty Course,” which in its second installment subdivided beauty into its physical and ‘psychic’ components and offered a detailed table of body measurements it termed ‘harmonious’ and therefore beautiful (see Figure 2.3).86

Thus also a home décor column that lauded the clean lines of the furniture and harmonious aesthetic in an American country house concluded suggestively, “once more it is clear how the home reflects and synthesizes the culture, customs, and well-being of a people.”87

Figure 2.3: Table of Ideal Female Proportions, Funcionarias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Talla</th>
<th>Busto</th>
<th>Cintura</th>
<th>Caderas</th>
<th>Peso - Kilos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.83</td>
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<td>0.85</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.87</td>
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<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>59.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dr. S. Vanó, “Curso de Belleza, Lección 2.a, ” Funcionarias: revista para la mujer, No. 3, Year I (Sept., 1952), 16.

By the end of the decade, these shifts had so pronounced an effect on Spanish officials’ views regarding food distribution that two years after the Yugoslav trade fair of 1957, Supermarket USA would reopen in Barcelona to a warm welcome from the Spanish Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry had by then become convinced that the supermarket, along with the more efficient American-style household management they believed it would promote among housewives, held the key to Spanish national

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87 “Decoración,” Funcionarias, No. 1, Year I (Feb., 1952).
The supermarket itself, which began to spread throughout Spain in the decade’s closing years, would in turn only intensify these trends, particularly calls by government officials, trade journals like *ICA*, and women’s magazines like *Mujer* for housewives to manage their households with greater technical proficiency.

This moment of rapid change remained the better part of a decade away, but the series of gradual changes that would build to it had begun. On the one hand, *Alta Costura* and *Mujer*’s profiles of female public figures like actress Marguerite Chapman stressed their embrace of conventional domesticity when at home, and *Mujer*’s coverage of American kitchens only reinforced this domesticity’s cultural primacy. Yet, on the other hand, Spanish magazines’ coverage of foreign figures and fashions served as the latest step in a process that established cities like London, Paris, New York and Hollywood as popular-cultural reference-points for a growing cross-section of the Spanish populace, particularly with regard to the kinds of consumed lifestyles to which Spanish housewives aspired. And if coverage of Hollywood stars reinforced the reigning Spanish (and American) domestic ideal, the glamorization of Hollywood style and American products in Spain’s women’s consumer press nevertheless also helped undermine the early dictatorship’s moral and autarkic economic projects. Ads for products such as American-made Bella Aurora facial soap offered the first post-Civil War era suggestions that women could and should consume for their own benefit and sought to keep these foreign products present and desirable in Spanish minds at a time when official government...

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88 See “Documents relating to Supermercado USA pavilion, XXVII International Trade Fair, Barcelona, 1-20 June, 1959,” AGA-CAT 29607 Folder 2; and, Chapter IV, note 76.

89 This hegemonizing impulse bears comparison to how French authorities were able to reconcile *fin-de-siècle* Frenchwomen’s embrace of leisurely shopping in public with the normative domesticity this otherwise violated. They did so, historian Lisa Tiersten has shown, by discursively casting this female consumer in the traditionally feminine role of caretaker – caring, in this instance, for French taste. See Lisa Tiersten, *Marianne in the Market: Envisioning Consumer Society in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
policy was to restrict imports and encourage strictly domestic consumption. American appliance culture, an important vector for the ideological package of modernity, prosperity, and democracy that the United States had begun to export across Europe, started to make its first inroads into the Spanish consumer landscape. Victoria de Grazia has detailed the spread across Europe of a “Model Mrs. Consumer”: a consumer-homemaker of American creation who, as consumption became increasingly gendered and appliances became _de rigueur_, managed her family’s consumer choices, as well as caring for the household and her battery of kitchen gadgets.\(^{90}\) Here, the first hints of this new domestic aesthetic’s development in Spain were visible. Finally, such coverage contributed to bridging the chasm of national difference that early Francoist thinking posited and promoted as separating Spain from the decadent democracies of the West, a rapprochement contemporaneously also taking place at the level of diplomacy and international trade, as officials within the regime, including Franco himself, realized the dangers of Spain’s postwar international isolation.

**Consumer Magazines and Messaging during Spain’s First Recovery, 1950-1956**

The landscape of Spain’s popular consumer press began to change with the advent of the Franco regime’s second decade in power. Growth continued. As Francisco García Ruéscas later pointed out, the number of new magazines in 1950s Spain outstripped those launched during the 1940s even more dramatically than that figure had exceeded previous decades’ totals.\(^{91}\) Among this proliferation of new magazines were some that introduced new notions about consumption as well as the changing values and range of lifestyles acceptable in Spain.

\(^{90}\) De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 419-420, 446-448.

\(^{91}\) García Ruéscas, *Historia de la Publicidad*, 120.
Many of these belonged to the women’s press, and in particular the women’s fashion and lifestyle press. Mainstays of the previous decade, including *Mujer* and *Alta Costura*, were joined by an assortment of new titles, covering a widening range of possible activities for women. 1950 saw the launch of *Astra*, whose subtitle, “Revista moderna de la Mujer,” or “Modern Magazine for Women,” was symptomatic of an increasing acceptance within Spanish society of ‘modern woman’: an affluent, cosmopolitan and fashionable, though still domestic and family-minded, figure that *Mujer* and others had ridiculed as flighty and shallow during the 1940s. *Funcionarias*, which began circulating in 1952, catered to female workers and, remarkably, focused on the legal and practical problems of married workingwomen, at that time still unorthodox figures given Francoist gender norms. Almacenes Jorba’s store-sponsored consumer magazine *Revista Jorba*, which primarily targeted a married female readership, appeared in 1953. And in 1954, the Sección Feminina launched its latest consumer magazine, *Teresa: Revista para todas las mujeres* (*Teresa: Magazine for All Women*).  

During the 1950s, such women-oriented consumer magazines began to give notice of an expanded range of possibilities for women, particularly as regarded consumption of goods like makeup and soft drinks for purely personal benefit, as well as feminine ambitions toward work in the public sphere. The Sección Femenina was a notable participant in this discursive shift. Beginning in 1954, *Teresa* included a section

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92 In a 1939 cartoon by *Mujer* director Baldrich, for instance, the magazine showed one of these modern women grandly proclaiming, in defense of the choice to drive rather than walk, that while walking was better for one’s ‘line’ – one’s figure - cars had such lovely lines; that, “Aquatic sports are lovely, but so tiring!”; showed a pair of these women musing about which one of their hats – both of them of ridiculous design – would be fashionable next season; or, most telling, depicted an exchange between a modern woman and a bookseller, in which the woman requested “well-edited books, with lots of pictures, wide margins and large print,” to which the bookseller witheringly responded, “Might you not prefer one of these that looks like a book but is actually a little box?”

93 For *Teresa*, see Morcillo, ch. 3.
titled “Las Mujeres Quieren Trabajar” (Women Want to Work), which covered an assortment of careers suitably consonant with traditional notions of the feminine character, including nursing and journalism. Some measure of precedent existed for this, such as Mujer contributor Elsa Kiepura’s articles profiling Hollywood script girls and other women’s jobs, printed in 1939. However, where columns like Kiepura’s had been careful to note that in Spain these were jobs for single rather than married women, part of their spiritual development as they awaited their true destiny – marriage – Teresa’s articles made no such distinction. This marked a subtle step toward a fuller inclusion of women in public life and the workplace, and echoed a similar shift that former Medina editor Mercedes Formica had helped initiate a year earlier with the publication of El Domicilio Conyugal.

Funcionarias went still further. Its content aimed to legitimize married women’s careers not as stopgap measures for shoring up their families’ budgets, but as a licit means for them to fulfill professional vocations. In addition to the consumption- and domesticity-oriented fare typical of other women’s magazines of the time, each issue of Funcionarias featured an interview with a working woman, often already married, centered around whether she considered extra-domestic work an obstacle to marriage – the response usually some version of “no.” The first interview subject, married government functionary Ernestina Caldevilla, responded with special force: “Not in the least,” she told the magazine, adding, “to the contrary, because we already have our financial situation resolved, we are free to marry exclusively when moved by true love.

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94 Morcillo, True Catholic Womanhood, 73-74.
95 Ibid. For Mercedes Formica, see note 30.
So too, I consider housework and office work perfectly compatible.”96 In other recurring columns, Funcionarias offered readers ongoing analysis of Spanish legislation that affected women, especially in the areas of property ownership and working rights, again with a view toward helping women to secure legal work outside the home.97 These columns, and indeed the magazine as a whole, were moreover not the work of amateur or fringe figures, as their unorthodox content might suggest, but of well-placed government officials like Ignacio Zarzalejos Altares, a Secretary for Judicial Affairs at the powerful Ministry of Labor, and respected journalists like José Luis Barceló, founder of the successful financial daily El Mundo Financiero.98

More generally, Funcionarias adopted a position on women’s innate abilities and their rightful place in society that could cautiously be termed feminist, but for the fact that in Francoist Spain the word was often equated with the wholesale destruction of family values. Under the headline “science proclaims women superior to men,” one article reported on an emerging school of biologists who considered women to be biologically and evolutionarily superior to men, citing a supposed greater resistance to pain, to disease, and an increased feminization of modern urban males’ physical features as they grew more civilized – all, importantly, without parlaying this into traditional biological-determinist arguments that proclaimed a female predisposition for motherhood

97 See, for example, Ignacio Zarzalejos Altares, “Panorama Legislativo Español Sobre la Mujer,” Funcionarias, No. 1, Year I (Feb., 1952); MYN, “Legislación: La mujer, la funcionarias y sus problemas jurídicos, Vestibulo,” Funcionarias, No. 2, Year I (Apr., 1952).
98 See, for example, Zarzalejos Altares, above, and also José Luis Barceló, “La mujer en el actual sistema de trabajo,” Funcionarias, No. 2, Year I (Apr., 1952), and José Luis Barceló, “Sacerdotisas Católicas,” Funcionarias, No. 6, Year I (Dec., 1952).
and domesticity. Another told the story of a woman who, raised to rely on male
gallantry and believe herself part of a supposed weaker sex, rose above her upbringing
during wartime, discovering that she was as strong as the men on whom she had
depended, and that she could support herself by working as an auxiliary firefighter or in a
gas-mask factory. This story appeared on *Funcionarias*’ humor pages, but the
magazine’s words were no joke – under a thin mask of levity, the periodical was serious.

No more so than because such words sounded claims similar to ones that avowed
radical Spanish feminists such as Maria Aurelia Capmany would voice later, in the early
1970s, when Spain’s feminist movement began to acquire strength. *Funcionarias*’
story about the woman who in wartime became strong was a thinly veiled critique of the
patriarchal practice of teaching women that they were weak and should be passive,
submissive, and deferential toward men. Its implicit moral was that if only women were
allowed to develop their own abilities, they would find that they did not need to rely on
men. This foreshadowed the argument of an early 1970s tract by Capmany, in which the
Spanish feminist author, through the proxy of a fictional bourgeois lady, proclaims
herself similarly hobbled by patriarchy, deprived in this case not of strength but of the
ability to earn and manage her own money and of the chance to have a relationship to her
society’s means of production through work. In short, Capmany’s lady was stripped of
her economic agency, an agency that *Funcionarias*’ wartime woman recovered through

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100 “Pagina de Humor – El Complejo del Sexo Debil,” *Funcionarias*, No. 6, Year I (Dec., 1952).
101 For a series of interviews offering firsthand accounts of Spanish feminism as it coalesced in the late 1960s and 1970s, see Linda Gould Levine and Gloria Feiman Waldman, ed. Feminismo ante el Franquismo: Entrevistas con feminismas de España (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1980).
employment and physical empowerment. Notably, *Funcionarias* touted this message, along with other content aiding women who wished to work outside the home, two years before *Teresa* appeared on newsstands and a decade before sections devoted to jobs and careers for women became a common feature in other Spanish women’s magazines.

Still, *Funcionarias* was an unusual case of limited scope. No issues survive past 1953, though the magazine remained on the government’s official press registry in 1954, and its circulation remained at just 4000 copies per issue, nearly half of which went to subscribers, not newsstands. By comparison, this was only a little less than *Senda*, itself distinguished by limited readership; was dwarfed by the 25,000 copies per issue that *¡Hola!* printed; and was equal to what society magazine *Garbo* (total circulation: 65,000 copies per issue) sold just by subscription. Also, while consumer magazines in 1950s Spain acknowledged and even contributed to the growth of spaces for women’s action and self-expression, women’s roles in society, and in particular, within the family, remained highly gendered and located within a patriarchal hierarchy. Women’s consumer magazines, like Galerías Preciados’ patriarchal and on occasion misogynistic attitude toward its female employees, most often served to reinforce these trends. If cautiously emancipating ads like those described by Morcillo circulated, many also appeared in the same magazines reinforcing the idea that a woman’s efforts and purchases – whether focused on beautifying herself through makeup, or cleaning more efficiently with the aid of, for example, a dishwasher – were properly made exclusively

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103 For the appearance of such columns in the Spanish women’s press, which María del Carmen Muñoz Ruiz dates to 1961, see Muñoz Ruiz, “Mujer Mítica,” 219-220.
104 *Anuario de la Prensa Española*, Year III, 675.
105 Ibid., 675-676.
for the benefit of her family and especially her husband, and not for herself.

*Mujer* in particular featured ads of this character. Carasa Laboratories, makers of the hair-dye company Komol, for example, ran one in the magazine’s January 1954 issue. It exhorted female readers to buy its product by suggesting that their husbands found their hair unattractive because it was poorly dyed, a situation that Komol promised to fix (see Figure 2.4). The ad did not acknowledge that a woman might want to dye her hair purely for her own pleasure. Similarly, another of the issue’s articles, this one by the tailoring correspondence course agency Academia Femenina CCC, led with the tagline, “Men prefer women…elegant!,” and explained that to achieve elegance (and thereby, the admiration of men), readers had to keep up with fashion’s vagaries, which seamstress training could make cheaper.

Figure 2.4: “Your Husband Does Not Dare Tell You…”

*Mujer* was hardly unique in this respect. *Revista Jorba*, for instance, featured a large number of product advertisements for children’s food, clothing, and toys, or for

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106 Another ad for Komol similarly warned readers that, if they were to allow their grey hair to show, their husbands “wouldn’t forgive them for it.” See “Ad – Komol,” *Mujer*, No. 209 (Nov., 1954), 3.
suits and other dress articles for their husbands – in other words, for products not directly consumable by the magazine’s female readers.\textsuperscript{108} The magazine also ran a series of Nestlé Company–sponsored sweepstakes featuring prizes like appliances, coffeemakers, radios, and footballs – that is, products for use in the home, or by family members.\textsuperscript{109}

On the one hand, this state of affairs arose from the reality that women in early 1950s Spain were charged with managing the family household and with making the family’s necessary purchases, not just their own.\textsuperscript{110} Companies advertised products such as “Pelele Kid,” a full-body children’s pyjama set, or Fosfatina Falieres-brand baby food, because these were products that their readers needed to buy.\textsuperscript{111} Yet a message of self-abnegation may also be found in this uneven distribution of advertising space, particularly given the magazine’s female readership. This message echoed the self-denying doctrines of the Sección Femenina, and was only reinforced by juxtaposition with articles that more explicitly emphasized a woman’s duty to her family. For example, in at least two editions of his ongoing column “Puericultura” for Revista Jorba, which covered subjects in the eponymous discipline of child-rearing, Dr. José Roig Raventós declared that mothers “belong[ed] to [their] child[ren],” deployed terrifying, browbeating rhetoric to place a heavy moral responsibility on readers to sacrifice and spare no effort in raising their children, and took special care to condemn women who, for reasons he

\textsuperscript{108} That the magazine had and expected a primarily female readership, for all that it also contained male-oriented, is made clear by the presence of recurring features such as “Ideas para Ud. Señora” (Ideas for you, Madam) and was even acknowledged by the magazine itself on at least one occasion. See, “Para Usted, Caballero,” Revista Jorba, No. 3 (Oct.-Nov., 1953).

\textsuperscript{109} See “Ad for Chocolates Nestlé,” Revista Jorba, No. 4 (Special Christmas-New Year’s-Three King’s Issue, 1953-54); and “Ad – Todavía más de 10.000 premios, Chocolates Nestlé,” Revista Jorba, No. 7 (Mar.-Apr., 1954).


\textsuperscript{111} For examples of such product ads, see “Ad – Pelele Kid,” Revista Jorba, No. 5, Year II, (Jan., 1954); and, “Ad – Fosfatina Falieres,” Revista Jorba, No. 13, Year III (Feb., 1955).
surmised could only be indefensibly nefarious, failed to breastfeed.112 Another column – really a promotion for Almacenes Jorba that straddled the line between article and ad – narrated a couple’s discussion of where to send their children to school and how to pay for it. It showed the wife, who had bought the children’s school supplies cheaply at Jorba, handing her husband a receipt to both secure his approval of her purchases and boast about what a good housewife she was.113 Once again, mass consumption appeared gendered feminine, and more specifically, as an act by which women could meet their families’ rather than their own needs, and thereby find fulfillment – an embryonic Model Mrs. Consumer with a Franco-era Spanish tinge.

Even Funcionarias, with its otherwise radical message, rendered a measure of obeisance to traditional female domesticity. The sum of the magazine’s contents marked out a model of womanhood that provided for the possibility and even the right of married as well as single women to work outside the home, but also assumed as a matter of fact that these women, if married, would also continue to be the primary caretaker for their families and households – the same ‘double burden’ that married workingwomen in the postwar United States were encountering.114 Thus, alongside columns analyzing the legal hurdles women faced in securing work, Funcionarias offered recipes that readers could

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112 Notably, Dr. Roig Raventós’ preferred explanation for this reticence to breastfeed centered around socioeconomic class. The physician assumed that it was poor, desperate women who worked as wet-nurses, and wealthy women who hired them, accusing the former – who he described using the socioeconomically-loaded insult, “gypsies” – of resorting in their desperation to carrying “false papers” and taking illicit medications to force lactation, and chastising the latter for caring more about buying the latest fashions than their infants. See José Roig Raventós, “Puericultura,” Revista Jorba, No. 8 (May, 1954).


follow to prepare their families’ dinners, and columns, like its profile of an American
country home, on the similarly traditional feminine duty of decorating the home. Thus
too, even the magazine’s interviewees most forcefully in favor of women’s right to secure
extradomestic work, like Ernestina Caldevilla, considered it “perfectly compatible” with
housework, and assumed that readers would shoulder both. Still, the working-women’s
journal did not quite reach Mujer and Revista Jorba’s self-abnegatory lengths. Where ads
for Komol hair dye and Almacenes Jorba’s low prices emphasized feminine consumption
as a primarily other-centered act, the beauty course that Dr. S. Vanó penned for
Funcionarias, like Alta Costura’s late-1940s ads for Bella Aurora soaps, aimed to
beautify women as much for their own pleasure as others’, and also to help them make
the best possible impression as they ventured into the male-dominated workplace.

As such, all of these magazines – Mujer included – had by the mid-1950s entered
a state of tension, which continued into the following decade and was symptomatic of
what Aurora Morcillo, following Homi Bhabha, has termed an “in between moment”
during which the Franco regime sought to shore up its conservative Catholic moral codes
against the corrosive, liberalizing effects of Spain’s nascent foreign-born consumerism.

These magazines were, as Funcionarias’ first issue described itself, “a little bit classic
and a little bit modern,” seeking to reconcile Francoist gender norms with changes in
gender relations that Spain’s shifting and increasingly foreign-oriented consumer culture
had helped catalyze, rather than seeking to fully embrace new notions of femininity.

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115 “Cocina por Ella,” Funcionarias, No. 3, Year I (Sept., 1952); and, note 87.
116 See note 96.
117 This was also a far cry from Mujer, which in one issue counselled women to speak when spoken to,
avoid ostentatious dress, make their homes into sanctuaries for their husbands, and indulge their spouses’
whims – values practically lifted from the Sección Femenina’s creed. See M.S. Vanó, “Curso de Belleza –
Presentación y justificación,” Funcionarias, No. 2, Year 1 (Apr., 1952); “Qué Chino Tan Sabio!,” Mujer,
118 Morcillo, Seduction, 14.
entering Spain. Indeed, as María del Carmen Muñoz Ruiz has noted, many of these magazines used their consultorios sentimentales or advice columns, a mainstay of the genre, to further fight this battle. These columns counseled female readers to, for example, abandon open flirting with and bold declarations of sentiment to love interests, from whom women should more properly receive such attention and declarations; and to cease viewing summer vacations, an increasingly popular consumer luxury, as an opportunity for romance. Moreover, these columns’ opinions were not just consonant with morality espoused by the Franco regime. At magazines like Teresa, published by the Sección Femenina, they came from an editorial staff directly in the regime’s employ.

For the times were quickly changing: fascination with foreign lifestyles that had quickened in Spain at the close of the previous decade now continued and intensified in the mid-1950s. And Spanish women’s magazines catered to this fascination with a wide assortment of new content. Mujer especially changed with the times, dropping both its politicized postwar tone and the thriftmindedness and financial empathy it had cultivated during the late 1940s. It replaced this with copy that represented consumption as a right accessible to the masses, touted a specifically American consumerism – and its totem, the modern home appliance – more strongly than ever before, and embraced the conviction that, through this consumerism, prosperity was on its way to Spain.

120 The latter of these problems, admittedly, was not addressed in the form of a consultorio sentimental, but in a feature on how to behave while on vacation by Mujer’s advice columnist, Lidia Dupont, and thus bears some measure of kinship with her regular column. See Lidia Dupont, “Si sales de vacaciones…,” Mujer, No. 216 (June, 1955); for Muñoz Ruiz, see Muñoz Ruiz, “Los consultorios sentimentales,” 219-239. For examples of consultorios, see Ibid., 227, and Macrina, “Consultorio Femenino,” Revista Jorba, No. 15, Year III (Apr., 1955).
121 María del Carmen Muñoz Ruiz argues this very point of both Teresa and a growing number of similarly government-aligned and -sponsored women’s magazines that would follow in the 1960s, from groups such as the Catholic lay organization Opus Dei, or the Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (Commissary-General for Supply and Transport), an agency within the Ministry of Commerce. See Muñoz Ruiz, “consultorios sentimentales,” 223.
Facilitated by the normalization of Spain’s relations with nations such as the United Kingdom and the United States, articles and ads featuring foreign products pervaded *Mujer*’s pages in the mid-1950s. In April 1954 Shirley’s Institute of Barcelona advertised its bustline-firming cream by declaring it, “patented throughout the world,” and, “[a] new and safe AMERICAN procedure [emphasis original]”; two months earlier, makeup company Danamask similarly appealed to readers with slogan, “make yourself up like they do in North America!” So too, “Curso Fémina CCC,” the seamstress course that had peppered *Mujer*’s pages with ads during the magazine’s thrift-conscious period in the late 1940s, now ran ads that promised elegance rather than savings, the ability to more easily follow the vicissitudes of the changing seasons’ fashions by sewing one’s clothes oneself, and, above all, a better chance of attracting a man. And not just any man – the ad included a picture of the sort of man a CCC-trained woman, a “cececista,” could and should aspire to attract: none other than American Hollywood star Robert Taylor. Meanwhile, both *Mujer* and *Alta Costura*’s coverage of foreign fashion remained as extensive as ever. Throughout 1954, for example, *Mujer* regularly featured columns devoted to London, Hollywood, and Parisian fashions, such as a photospread in the magazine’s February issue showing the work of six British fashion designers.

Most of all, *Mujer* as well as other Spanish women’s magazines featured an increasing amount of content and ads devoted to home appliances and appointments, often of American make, which they linked to promises of convenience, modernity, and prosperity. Such products included state-of-the-art spring mattresses – “mattresses like in

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America!...Adopted in half the world and by all social classes...[they] are more hygienic...[and] permit absolute repose,” one ad boasted; Hispano-Suiza brand electric blenders that promised to make housewives’ kitchen worries disappear; and dishwashers, which Revista Jorba fought to convince readers were a genuine, time-saving, modern marvel, rather than a recipe for broken dishes. In fact, in singing the dishwasher’s praises, Revista Jorba contributor Graciela Elizalde invoked the same argument Mujer had used to promote the Frigidaire a decade earlier, portraying the kitchen gadget as the secret behind American housewives’ ability to manage their households, even when they had company and despite lacking the domestic help their European counterparts enjoyed.125

This and Hispano-Suiza’s claim were of a piece with contemporary American discourse that declared the modern kitchen the secret to an easier workload and happier life for European as well as American housewives. Though most visibly championed by American corporate and government actors, especially U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon in his much-publicized “Kitchen Debate” with Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev in 1959, this equation of domestic consumption and marital happiness was, as Elaine Tyler May has shown, also embraced by the American public.126 In Europe, it met with more mixed success: West Germans reacted with enthusiasm to the model home – especially its refrigerator, a much sought-after item in Germany – at the 1952 Marshall Plan-funded Wir bauen ein besseres Leben (We’re building a better life) exhibition in West Berlin, but in the Netherlands and Finland, similar displays produced, at best, an initial enthusiasm that quickly evaporated. Within the pages of Mujer and other Spanish women’s

126 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 2008), ch. 7. For the kitchen debate, see note 76.
magazines, however, this interest appeared more sustained, even if, as in Germany, average real purchasing power remained low enough that in 1960, only four percent of the population actually possessed a refrigerator.\textsuperscript{127}

For, as the slogan, “mattresses like in America!...Adopted in half the world and by all social classes [emphasis added],” suggests, and notwithstanding the only gradual rise in ownership of consumer goods, Spanish women’s magazines of the 1950s continued to give evidence of a shift in how they understood and wished the public to understand consumption. These periodicals increasingly defining consumption not as an act restricted to a traditionally-conceived bourgeoisie, but also rightfully available to the masses.\textsuperscript{128} During the 1940s, magazines asked readers to identify with either images of affluent men and women engaging in exclusive leisure activities like sailing or hunting for sport, as in \textit{Alta Costura} or with images of the hardworking, thrifty housewife, as in Curso Fémia CCC’s original ads in \textit{Mujer}. As Spain’s diplomatic and economic fortunes improved over the course of the 1950s – by 1955, the nation had joined the United Nations and its Gross National Product was among the fastest-growing in the world – the typical Spanish family these magazines portrayed took on a new, prosperously middle-class, yet at the same time accessible and mass character. Thus, for example, \textit{Revista Jorba} ran an ad for its credit service in 1953 that depicted a scene from the life of a purportedly average family, showing a wife, just returned from a pleasant afternoon shopping at Almacenes Jorba, informing her overwrought white-collar

\textsuperscript{127} For the 1952 West German exhibition, see Castillo, “The American “Fat Kitchen’”,44-49. For Dutch reactions to American mass consumer culture, see Cieraad, 113-136. For Finnish reactions, see Kirsi Saarikangas, “What’s New? Women Pioneers and the Finnish State Meet the American Kitchen,” in Oldenziel and Zachmann, 285-311. For Spanish appliance ownership figures, see Fundación FOESSA, \textit{Informe Sociológico...1966}, 74-76.

\textsuperscript{128} For the mattress ad slogan, see note 125. For a fuller, if also differently-focused analysis of the distinctions between a nineteenth-century, bourgeois mode of consumption and the mass consumption that took form during the first half of the twentieth century, see Auslander.
husband, who was busy trying to find space in the family budget, that they could easily afford everything thanks to Jorba’s service (see Figure 2.5). Neither rich nor poor, able to consume freely with a little help from a credit service and, in the husband’s case, clad in the business uniform of white shirt and tie, *Revista Jorba*’s average family was unmistakably middle-class.

Figure 2.5: “Stop Worrying and Doing Numbers, Darling: with Almacenes Jorba’s Credit Service, I’ve Bought Everything We Need This Winter, and We’ll Pay The Regular Retail Price in Comfortable Installments”

They were also debtors. While Spain’s new mass consumer society existed for much of the still largely rural and poor Spanish populace in the form of aspirations and expectations that magazines like *Revista Jorba* had helped cultivate, rather than as real purchases, consumption of goods like televisions, washing machines, and fashionable clothing was much higher in Spain’s urban centers – and, as Aurora Morcillo has noted,
credit was in part responsible for this. At the same time, not every result of this spread in consumer credit was as salutary. In nineteenth-century Britain, rising recourse to traditional forms of store credit by increasingly anonymous female shoppers produced a host of lawsuits when these women’s husbands refused to pay for purchases that they claimed not to have authorized. In the short term, these suits presented a challenge to husbands’ authority as heads of household, and in the long term they left women popularly smeared as profligate spenders. Similarly, almost a year before implementing its own store credit system in late 1955, Almacenes Jorba made reference via *Revista Jorba* to the seemingly common problem of husbands refusing to pay their wives’ store debts, a problem that, the magazine implied, not only carried legal consequences, but threatened the traditional Spanish gendered division of labor and marital harmony between consumer-housewife and breadwinner-husband. In one article, for example, *Revista Jorba* fashion contributor Lisette joked, with some sharpness, that “husbands…who look bitter when it is time to pay” were not a fashionable accessory. In another, a Jorba shopper being interviewed did not even feel the need to spell the issue out, so commonly was it known: “Well, with store bills [and husbands], you know how it is…” And, in still another, Lisette warned husbands to pay their bills, lest they run afoul of the courts and end up “dethroned” – though it is unclear whether this meant an emasculating loss of financial agency to free-spending wives, the humiliation of legal penalties, or both.

Either way, the rising presence of consumer credit in Spain exposed points of

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130 Rappaport, “‘A Husband and His Wife’s Dresses’.”
tension between the increasingly prevalent model of the consumer-housewife who purchased on behalf of her household and the primacy of husbands’ authority over the family’s finances. Convention dictated that husbands should entrust their wives with the running of the household, including its daily finances, while at the same time underscoring that, in the end, male authority trumped everything. While the former trusting practice dovetailed well with the concept of the consumer-housewife, it, as Revista Jorba’s columns show, had the potential when taken in combination with the growing availability of credit to create situations where consumer-housewives engaged in illicit consumption on behalf of their households, producing debts that challenged the financial agency of husbands who found themselves reticent, but obligated, to pay.134

Finally, Revista Jorba’s average Spanish family of the mid-1950s was one thing more: self-consciously not American and liable to harbor remnants of an early twentieth-century European (and Falangist) disdain for a supposed materialist, parvenu American temperament. This, despite the stock that magazines like Revista Jorba and Mujer – and their readers – had placed in American appliance and celebrity culture. It remained so even as longstanding Spanish interest in America gained strength in the wake of Spain’s 1953 treaty with the United States, after which, as Alessandro Seregni has shown, public anti-American sentiment also subsided for over a decade.135

This lingering notion that American values remained foreign and were not always better than Spanish counterparts appeared with special clarity in Revista Jorba

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134 This stands in contrast with the case of the postwar United States, where, as historian Lizabeth Cohen has shown, the rise of credit and the consumer-housewife unfolded in tandem with social and business practices that underscored both the primacy of male authority and the unreliability of women in the making of family financial decisions. This, according to Cohen, produced the so-called “husband-wife dyad,” featuring a male architect of family financial policy paired with a female consumer-housewife who executed rather than developed that plan. See Cohen, 147-148.

135 For Seregni and post-1953 anti-Americanism, see Seregni, 173-182.
contributor C.A. Mantua’s serialized story, “María Teresa dice…,” where it was able to reach the magazine’s 25,000 monthly readers and their families. Mantua’s story was written from the perspective of María Teresa, a fictional fifteen-year-old haute-bourgeois Madrid girl who over the course of a year-and-a-half’s story installments fell for 24-year-old American tourist Dick Davidson while vacationing with her family on the coast. Through this summer romance, Mantua communicated the sense of difference Spaniards felt toward America, for if there was one trait about Dick and his family on which the tale consistently harped, it was his foreignness. A language barrier existed between Dick and “Mari-Tere,” one so thick that she learned his last name only much later and he in turn only called her “Darling,” finding himself unable to pronounce her name.136

But Dick’s – and by extension, America’s – foreign nature extended well beyond language: a gulf in fundamental values also separated the couple as well as their respective societies. Early on, Maria Teresa’s friend Montse warned her that, “Yankee boys just want to have fun,” a danger borne out in Mantua’s very next installment, in which Dick kissed María Teresa casually, only to blame “Spain and the moon” for an act that she had been taught to believe meant love and commitment. The disconnect between her Spanish values and Dick’s American ones only became more apparent to Mantua’s protagonist after her engagement to Dick, an engagement she soon broke off after discovering that while she had since taken care not to flirt or socialize inappropriately, Dick spent Christmas having fun in Havana and never wrote her. Meanwhile, Mantua highlighted the national nature of this difference in values through the presence of a second love interest, Jorge, who like Dick hailed from a respectable family and lived in the United States, but unlike Dick, was Spanish and was presented as virtuous and Mari-

Tere’s ideal future husband. Dick, by contrast, was in the words of María Teresa’s younger brother Nacho, “a second-rate Gregory Peck,” and was in “everything…pretty superficial,” characterized by a gallantry that, though appealing, left little real imprint on Mantua’s title character. In the end, Dick himself confirmed the national difference that separates them, suggesting that María Teresa’s romantic notions of marriage differed from his own because of their Spanish origin.

Read thusly, Mantua’s story becomes a commentary akin to critiques of a materialist early twentieth-century American cultural aesthetic that Victoria de Grazia has found circulating at Rotary International’s Dresden chapter in the late 1920s. Dresden’s Rotarians, de Grazia argues, recognized the promise of American modernism and rejected the pomp of fin-de-siècle bourgeois culture, but at the same time refused to accept the replacement of traditional European aesthetic consumption with the humdrum pragmatism of ordinary American consumer culture.137 Similarly, by the close of the 1950s, the United States had become in the Spanish popular-cultural imaginary a place at once exotic, home to Hollywood’s stars and marvels of home technology, but also familiar and enticingly accessible. Thus, in Mantua’s story, Dick Davidson’s American origin made him not a genuine rarity but merely unusual and even predictable, per Montse’s warning, while at the same time the United States still retained enough foreign glamour to fill younger sister María Rosa’s head with Hollywood-fueled visions of fairytale trips to New York in the wake of María Teresa’s engagement to Dick.138

Yet, as for de Grazia’s Dresdeners, no amount of accessibility combined with

137 De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire.* 45-47. More specifically, de Grazia maintains that what interwar Germany’s Rotarians rejected was the phenomenon that contemporary cultural critics had termed Amerikanismus, a mass culture defined by its informality and exclusive recourse to economic power rather than any kind of cultural capital for legitimacy.

foreign appeal could conceal the shortcomings that some Spanish observers also found in American ways. In Mantua’s narrative this took the form of Montse’s warning and Dick’s charming but ultimately superficial gallantry – easily read as a metaphor for the materially promising but spiritually hollow American way of life. Elsewhere in the Spanish women’s press, similar critiques circulated, albeit not always directed specifically at the United States, but more generally at morally vacant modern lifestyles of foreign origin. In a 1953 short story by *Revista Jorba* writer Lina Font, for instance, protagonist Pepa split with her highly-cultured beau Pablo against her mother’s wishes, because of his lack of interest in modern pastimes like tennis and dancing. She then fell for Blackeney, a gallant foreign diplomat who embodied the modern aesthetic. Like Dick Davidson, he turned out to be only casually interested in her – he was, in fact, married – and broke her heart.\footnote{Lina Font, “Cuento de Verano – El Diplomático,” *Revista Jorba*, No. 1, Year I (June, 1953).} So too, in 1954 Spanish-Hungarian journalist Andrés Révesz embarked on a lecture tour of the United States and Canada hoping to strengthen relations with these nations, but also confront the architects, per early Franco-era discourse, of the West’s spiritual decline: Jews and Freemasons.\footnote{Andrés Revész to Gregorio Marañón Moya, 4 Apr. 1956, AGUN/148/094/001; Andrés Revész to F. Avedillo-Zúñiga, 27 July, 1956, AGUN/148/094/001.}

Taken in sum, the trajectory that Spanish attitudes toward the United States followed over the course of the early and mid-1950s, as reflected in the women’s consumer press, was one that continued shifts begun during the previous decade. Interest in American appliances and the modernity they promised intensified, longstanding Spanish interest in Hollywood stars and fashion continued unabated and, if anything, also grew, while at the same time a discourse characteristic of the early dictatorship that found the North American republic spiritually lacking survived, if in diminished and at times
allegorical form.

This was more generally also true for the sum of the messages, lifestyles, and social realities that these magazines presented over the course of this period. Just as the Spanish press’ evolving depiction of the United States kept pace with Spain’s warming diplomatic relationship with the North American superpower, the women’s magazine *Funcionarias*, founded in 1952, catered to married working women as well as the single women to whom Spanish magazines had traditionally aimed their job-related content, and did so in time with an incipient push to secure work rights for Spanish women. Yet, for all of that, *Funcionarias* ideas seemingly remained an isolated phenomenon, and while the 1950s brought increased latitude for women to consume for their own rather than just their families’ pleasure, ads that peddled beauty products by invoking family members’ sensibilities remained common. Most importantly, the arrival of American consumerism to mid-1950s Spain brought with it similarly American expectations of mass access to consumption, along with consumer credit that helped facilitate this access, but at the same time strained the existing Spanish marital division of labor and gendered social order. As they unfolded in Spain’s women’s magazines, then, the 1950s represented a moment of uneasy transition, as a nascent Spanish mass consumer society took form primarily in the realm of expectations and discourse, but not yet in material consumption, and magazine editors and readers embraced the promise of American consumed modernity, but not always without reservations.

**The Spanish Men’s Magazine Quietly Arrives**

Though located for the most part in female-oriented consumer periodicals like *Mujer* and *Revista Jorba*, these shifts were nevertheless not exclusive to them. Alongside
them, a nascent men’s consumer press, which began to take shape in Spain during the mid-1950s, offered its own contribution to the process by which foreign and especially American consumer practices and products made their way into Spain and were adopted and appropriated by Spaniards.

Until the mid-1950s, menswear and male consumption had not figured greatly in circulating Spanish discourse concerning consumption, particularly by comparison with the place that women occupied therein. In the realm of fashion, as Revista Jorba opined in 1953, “It is uncommon, to be sure, to speak of men’s fashion. The word “fashion” seems to have been created to describe a quintessentially feminine thing.”¹⁴¹ This began to change in 1955, when modern Spain’s first men’s fashion and lifestyle magazine, Señor: Revista del Hombre (Sir: The Man’s Magazine), appeared in Barcelona under the editorial direction of Santiago and Segismundo de Anta, of Alta Costura.

The Anta brothers’ involvement proved indicative of the new magazine’s content. Openly Francoist in their politics – Santiago, the elder sibling, had been sentenced to death in Civil War-era Barcelona for being a Francoist fifth columnist – as well as both publicly prominent and almost certainly wealthy, with Segismundo having by 1956 become Secretary General of the Spanish Haute Couture Cooperative, the pair produced a periodical that was similarly haute-bourgeois and loyal to the regime.¹⁴²

Like Alta Costura, Señor was both expensive – it cost 25-30 pesetas per quarterly issue, or about the same price as a chicken in 1958 – and featured content of a

¹⁴¹ “Para Usted, Caballero,” Revista Jorba, No. 2 (Sept., 1953).
¹⁴² For Santiago de Anta, see “Don Ramón Serrano Súñer, caballero del ideal que redime a España, estudia los problemas de trabajo y de economía de las provincias catalanas,” La Vanguardia Española, 16 June, 1939; for Segismundo de Anta and the Salón de la Moda, see Manuel del Arco, “Mano a Mano – Segismundo de Anta,” La Vanguardia Española, 23 Feb., 1939, and “Inauguración del Primer Salón de la Moda Española,” La Vanguardia Española, 6 Mar., 1941.
socioeconomically elite character, such as photographic spreads showing the latest fashions for skiing, boating, and other traditionally aristocratic activities. The magazine made its political allegiances as clear as any privately published periodical had since Mujer’s postwar years, opening its first issue with an austere full-page image of a bust of General Franco, simply titled “S.E. El Jefe de Estado Generalísimo Franco” (His Excellency the Head of State Generalissimo Franco). And, when Señor began printing profiles of Spain’s most elegant men, the individuals chosen were as a rule wealthy and possessed either a noble title or a powerful office. The Anta brothers’ magazine may have had less-wealthy readers who read it aspirationally, like Alta Costura before it, but, like its sibling, Señor was not a mass-oriented or progressively-minded magazine – this was no Funcionarias, nor even a Mujer or a Revista Jorba.

Señor did, however, stress the social importance of male dress, and like the women’s magazines of the previous decades, focused its gaze steadily abroad. Neither action was prima facie pathbreaking: in the former case, the magazine merely stressed that clothing was as important a factor in achieving personal and professional success as one’s intelligence or professional acumen, a point that myriad Spanish etiquette books had already made and would continue to make. In one 1958 short story, for example,

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146 See, for instance, José Sanchez Moreno Distinción y Etiqueta Moderna, 2nd Ed. (Barcelona: Sociedad General Española de Librería, 1944), 6; and, Celia López Sainz, La Cortesía en la Vida Moderna, 3rd Ed. (Madrid: Editex, 1965), 33-34.
Señor contributor María Pilar de Molina underlined this point by narrating how she initially rejected her future husband Miguel due to his shabby appearance (which she associated with poor character), after which he saw the error of his ways, embraced fashion, and won her heart.\textsuperscript{147} Meanwhile, Señor, like Mujer before it, featured regular reports on the latest developments in London and Parisian fashion, alongside a steady stream of ads for desirable imported products including the Legrain perfumes and Philips radios that Alta Costura had previously advertised, as well as American Camel-brand cigarettes, and Swiss Certina watches.

In both cases, the magazine’s actions set changes in motion. Albeit unintentionally, Señor established a precedent in the new men’s consumer press for treating menswear as a symbolically highly-charged area for a reassertion of, and later, challenge to, normative Spanish masculine identity. In 1958, Señor claimed that “one thing that d[id] make the man…[was] dressing well”; five years later, in 1963, a second, recently-founded Spanish men’s magazine would extend this claim, boasting that following its counsel would reshape the reader’s inner life as well, making him more socially adroit, among other benefits. This symbolic investment in men’s fashion was not yet notably subversive. If anything, these claims dovetailed with the Falangist masculine ideal of the “Man-Warrior” who fought for personal success in peacetime as he did for Spain in time of war.\textsuperscript{148} It would, however, present a challenge to the Francoist status quo once Spanish journalists turned their attention to mod, unisex, and London’s Carnaby Street in the late 1960s, making menswear a cultural battleground. These fashions bore strong links to counter-cultural movements in Spain’s American and British reference-

\textsuperscript{147} María Pilar de Molina, “Confidencia,” Señor, No. 10 (Spring 1958).
points and brought subversive social and political ideas with them as they crossed the Pyrenees. And this foreign focus in the men’s fashion press can be traced back to Señor.

Señor, finally, established men’s fashion and its representation in the Spanish consumer press as a site for the assertion of national aspirations to a prosperity and modernity that the magazine measured against foreign standards, a measure increasingly employed at Spain’s department stores and in its grocery and advertising trades, too. Contributor Petronius triumphantly proclaimed in 1956 that, at long last, the Spanish textile industry had progressed to such a level of sophistication – one already reached abroad – that it was now possible to buy well-tailored clothes off the rack in Spain, and not just from a custom tailor. The magazine’s ads also gave evidence of this way of thinking: in 1955 textile manufacturer Mestre y Ballbé displayed its newest MEYBA-brand clothing lines, which it described as the product of “select[ion] from traditional [Spanish] clothing items [and] compari[son] with those of other countries [emphasis added].” In both instances, the message was that Spain was “arriving” in the world of European menswear, to which it could now contribute ideas, not just receive them. Such references to national sartorial accomplishment remained for the moment relatively subtle, but nevertheless underlined Spain’s growing integration into a larger international community not just of nations, but of fashion professionals and consumers connected across national borders by a shared commitment to elegance.

Conclusions

Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, the consumer press in Spain expanded

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dramatically, keeping pace with the nation’s rapidly growing retail infrastructure, a growth that the spread of department stores like Galerías Preciados and Almacenes Jorba epitomized. In 1943, there existed only fifteen magazines classified as “literatura femenina” – women’s magazines, not all of them devoted to consumption-related subjects such as fashion or home décor; by 1954 the number of women’s magazines published in Spain had swelled to more than forty.\textsuperscript{151} This growth in the Spanish consumer press saw a variety of new women’s magazines join Mujer and fellow early arrivals Alta Costura and Medina: the self-declared but in reality only cautiously modern Astra; Revista Jorba, the first mass-oriented consumer magazine published by a Spanish department store; and the working women’s journal Funcionarias. It also witnessed the arrival of the first men’s fashion and lifestyle journal, Señor (1955), as well as a series of professional journals that advanced consumption-related professions like the advertising and department store retail trades.

As these new magazines filled Spanish newsstands, the content and messages that they offered readers grew more diverse, a change that roughly followed the contours of contemporaneous economic and diplomatic shifts in Francoist Spain’s fortunes. Initially elite in both their content and price, some of postwar Spain’s new women’s magazines – Mujer especially – began to display a perhaps cynical sensitivity to housewives’ hardships as the nation’s economy sank during the mid-to-late 1940s under the weight of the Franco regime’s post-World War II diplomatic isolation.

With the advance of a diplomatic and trade rapprochement between Spain and the United States as well as Western Europe during the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the first germ of a mass consumer society began to take form in Spain – at this point more

\textsuperscript{151} See note 55.
aspirational than reflected in real consumption – filtering into the country primarily from the United States. Both the now well-established magazines launched during the Spanish postwar as well as new titles like *Astra* and *Funcionarias* shifted their tone to match, participating in the construction of this new imagined mass consumer society. Expanding on coverage of American and Western European lifestyles and products that had remained steady in the largely privileged (and therefore, politically sheltered) consumer press of the early postwar period, these magazines began to devote more content to the lives of American Hollywood stars, to American and Western European fashions, and to the first hints of an American appliance culture that was on the brink of arriving in Spain and was accompanied by visions of modern households effortlessly run by increasingly technically proficient consumer-housewives.

Even as they embraced these new foreign consumer ways Spain’s women’s magazines also made a concerted effort to shore up the gendered social order that the regime had enforced after the Civil War, against the challenges that these new ideas could pose. As times changed, Spanish women increasingly sought the right to work, not just to supplement their families’ incomes, to stock their own pocketbooks with the necessary pesetas to consume for their own pleasure.\(^\text{152}\) Some magazines, like *Mujer*, reacted by catering to this interest among unmarried readers, while making clear that only single women could legitimately pursue employment outside the home. Others remained silent on the subject. Only *Funcionarias* defended married women’s work. Like the rest of these magazines, it nevertheless retained the expectation that employed housewives care just as assiduously for their households and families as they had before securing

\(^{152}\) See, for example, “Nuestras Entrevistas: Interesantes declaraciones de Elena Andaluz Recalde,” *Funcionarias*, No. 2, Year I (Apr., 1952).
extra-domestic work.

These trends only intensified as the 1950s progressed, especially after the final normalization of relations between the United States and Spain in 1953. Magazines like *Revista Jorba* and *Mujer* began to feature an ever-greater profusion of ads and articles that treated appliances and other new technological innovations for the home as a normal, desirable staple of a modern middle-class lifestyle to which all Spanish households could aspire, a way of life that these articles often noted was of American origin. Thoroughly politicized in the wake of the Civil War’s end – the regime’s most explicitly Falangist and fascist or “blue” period – several of these women’s magazines now redirected their efforts toward a rearguard political agenda. They used devices such as advice columns to come to terms with and combat unwanted changes in gender relations accelerated by the advent of a Spanish mass consumption, including a destabilization of the traditional Spanish marital division of labor provoked by the spread of consumer credit. This was, paradoxically, the very development that made consumption increasing accessible to the Spanish masses. After 1955, *Señor* added to these efforts its own editorial attempts to situate Spain as an increasingly equal and valuable member of an international community of fashion-producing nations.

These changes crystallized in *Ana María*, another new women’s magazine that began to circulate out of Madrid in 1958. It bore the fingerprints of the transformations and new features that the consumer press had experienced and acquired over the previous fifteen years. Like *Teresa* and *Funcionarias*, *Ana María* offered a recurring column, “Caminos Para La Mujer” or “[Life] Paths for Women,” which profiled long-term careers – not just jobs – available to women; though it did not proclaim outright support for
married women’s right to work, at least it did not explicitly cast such employment as purely a single woman’s pursuit, as Mujer had. True to the transitional nature of the 1950s, the magazine did, however, still expect working women to eagerly fulfill their traditional domestic duties, and emphasized the primacy of domestic life as a woman’s principal path to fulfillment. To this end it offered columns devoted to cooking, entertaining, and other domestic subjects, and featured profiles of stars like Spanish actress and singer Carmen Sevilla or Lucille Ball that emphasized how these otherwise career-minded women considered themselves housewives first.\(^{153}\) That Ana María used an American star like Lucille Ball only underscores the United States’ centrality in the Spanish popular-cultural landscape, as well as magazines’ continued willingness to use this interest, along with the bully pulpit they enjoyed as purveyors of consumer news, in the service of larger sociopolitical aims.

Most of all, this and other Spanish consumer magazines bore witness to a 1950s-era reorientation of Spanish consumption toward the masses, and with it a transformation in what and how ordinary Spaniards bought. Ana María published a column in 1958 that neatly encapsulated this change – and how self-aware both the Spanish press and its readers were about it – under the title, “Today’s needs are not the same as yesterday’s.” Spaniards of the late 1950s, the article argued, dressed better, buying new clothes more often thanks to the increasing prevalence of store sales. Installment credit and the belief that the latest appliances were available to all meant that Spanish women strove to stock their homes with such devices, even at the cost of breaking the family budget. These women were more publicly active: they flirted, joined clubs, and worked outside the

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home. Even Spanish diets had changed, as science revolutionized the field of nutrition.\textsuperscript{154}

In fact, as \textit{Ana María}’s first issue hit newsstands in 1958, another consumer revolution was beginning, one that would further alter Spanish diets, as well as advance a foreign-born mass mode of consumption in Spain’s cities as well as its hinterland, potentially reaching every housewife who bought groceries – the supermarket.

\textsuperscript{154} [No Author], “Las necesidades de hoy no son las de ayer,” \textit{Ana María}, No. 3 (Oct., 1958).
CHAPTER III

In 1961, Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate, president of SPAR Española, the newly-minted Spanish division of SPAR, an international network of affiliated grocery stores and warehouses, exulted over the bright future he believed awaited his organization, his trade, and Spain as a whole. “Spain’s distributive commerce has awakened from its centuries-long lethargy,” he wrote, “we are going to advance more in the next DECADE [emphasis original] than in the whole of the past CENTURY.” Once “the province of small, disorganized, and antiquated investors,” the Canary Islander argued, food distribution in Spain was increasingly falling into the far more capable hands of “the powerful banks [and] the distribution and sales experts.” “The winds [of change],” he concluded, “are coming to Spain.”

Ortíz de Zárate’s jubilant declaration was no exaggeration – winds of change were indeed sweeping through Spain. The late 1950s and early 1960s constituted a moment of especially rapid change in the Spanish consumer sphere, even by comparison with the mid-1950s. This dynamism manifested especially acutely in Spain’s food retailing trade, and also in the Spanish advertising and public relations professions. From late 1957 through the mid-1960s, a new American and Northern European commercial model spread through Spain: the autoservicio or self-service grocery store, and especially the physically largest variety of this store, the supermarket. In small towns like Yecla

1 Antonio Ortíz de Zárate, “Carta del Director - ¡Renovarse...o morir!,” SPARCO, No. 12, (Feb. 1961), 8.
2 Autoservicios formally came in three varieties, defined by their square-footage. The smallest were known as tiendas de autoservicio or simply autoservicios; mid-sized stores earned the title superette, and the largest self-service grocers were known as supermercados – supermarkets. In practice, ‘autoservicio’ and ‘supermarket’ were and should be understood as flexible terms, as in Spain they were often used interchangeably as shorthands for any kind of self-service grocery store. For the formal distinctions
(Murcia) as well as Spain’s major cities, new autoservicios sprang up and existing neighborhood grocers converted to self-service. These shops were characterized by innovations including carefully-staged lighting, open floor plans with shelves that customers could freely browse – the essence of the self-service model – and rationalized management of everything from inventory to signage. These innovations arrived shot through with notions of a coming Spanish rise to modernity and broke sharply with traditional practices.³

The scope of this change and its effects on the daily experiences of ordinary grocers and shoppers were immense. Shopping in an autoservicio bore little resemblance to buying from a traditional grocer. The latter dispatched goods strictly upon request from behind an often dimly lit shop counter, with few attempts at customer service or marketing. By contrast, an autoservicio’s sole counter was often the one supporting the cash register.⁴ The pace of expansion, too, was very quick: by February 1963, five years after its first self-service grocery opened in late 1957, Spain possessed the third largest number of SPAR autoservicios in Europe – more than the Netherlands, the chain’s homeland.⁵ Most of all, these stores accelerated changes in Spanish commerce and consumption set in motion during the late 1940s and 1950s by retailers like Galerías Preciados and magazines like Señor. Well suited to reach poor and rural Spaniards, autoservicios introduced customers to foreign shopping experiences, products, and

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³ “Establishimientos SPAR de Autoservicio,” SPARCO, No. 12, (Feb. 1961), 4-5.
⁴ See, for instance, the floor plans proposed in “Productividad comparativa de tiendas tradicionales y de autoservicio,” SPARCO, No. 9 (Nov., 1960), 1, 4-5; and, Miguel Angel Alonso, “Planificación de Autoservicios,” SPARCO, No. 47 (Dec., 1963), 9.
⁵ In fact, the Spanish SPAR network was nearly twice the size of its Dutch counterpart, with 4120 stores by comparison with the latter’s 2142 and 30 warehouses as opposed to 17. See “SPAR Europa - Los 14 Eslabones de la Cadena SPAR,” SPARCO, No. 37, (Feb. 1963), 12-13.
lifestyles that promised increased prosperity, convenience, and modernity. These same promises led Spanish food retailing professionals to turn abroad for news and guidance, as Galerías, Señor, and others had done, and lured grocers to affiliate with foreign chains like SPAR. The result was the continued Europeanization and Americanization of Spanish consumer lifestyles and a further popular shift in circulating notions of Spanish national identity away from early Francoist exceptionalism and toward Spanish integration into Europe and the western-capitalist community.

For Spain’s advertising executives, these years also represented a professional watershed. New advertising agencies, trade organizations, and journals sprang up in the space of just a few years. The advertising trade gained its first professional charter from the Spanish government, something that Spain’s journalists and food retailers had long possessed, though the latter were trying to reform theirs. The early 1960s, finally, saw Spanish admen adopt an American innovation that was just as novel as the supermarket: the discipline of public relations. Echoing parallel hopes within the Franco regime that self-service would “dignify the [Spanish] grocer’s trade,” these shifts transformed advertising in Spain from a business into a true profession, a craft practiced exclusively by dedicated professionals possessed of a vocation and concern for the advancement of their trade and not just their bottom line.6

This process of professionalization, as in the case of Spain’s self-service grocery stores, quickly displayed a foreign orientation, with consequences that would transcend the bounds of a single profession’s history. As Spanish ad agencies multiplied and

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regulation shaped the advertising profession, Spain’s admen, agencies, and trade organizations quickly began to affiliate internationally. In particular, during the early 1960s some of Spain’s most important agencies built ties with internationally-renowned North American firms, and by 1963 Spanish public relations pioneer Joaquín Maestre had become the first Spaniard to join both the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) and the International Public Relations Association, paving the way for other Spanish admen. Influenced by colleagues abroad, Spanish admen began to adopt foreign practices and professionals views. More broadly, this drove a shift in Spanish admen’s perceptions of Spain’s place in Europe that complemented similar changes at Spain’s autoservicios, and continued the shifts that Galerías Preciados and Señor had started in the 1940s and 1950s. That is, they helped normalize the belief that Spain was European, and that its future lay as a member of a prosperous, Western, capitalist international community.

Ultimately, it is this foreign-oriented shift in Spanish consumer as well as professional perceptions and practices that is this chapter’s subject, rather than histories of mid-century Spanish supermarkets or advertising agencies. This chapter uses these two seemingly unconnected, yet parallel, case studies to explore the expansion of Spain’s mass consumer society and the focusing abroad of Spanish commerce and consumption as American cultural influence grew in Spain after 1953. The years 1956-1966 were key years for the two cases examined here, during which many of the core institutions, leading players, and the terms of subsequent professional debates emerged, while officials, grocers, admen, and consumers together integrated Spain with unprecedented speed into international professional circles in food retailing and advertising, and exposed
consumers to new foods and food ways.7

Finally, the arrival of the autoservicio to Spain is important both to the history of late-Francoist consumer culture and to the broader history of the supermarket because it happened not via private enterprise, as it did in much of Western Europe, but through the state. The state spearheaded self-service’s initial introduction and remained a constant regulatory presence in the industry even after its privatization in the 1960s. In this case as in no other – not even advertising, exhaustively regulated by any other measure – the Franco regime was thoroughly and even principally implicated in the transformation of Spain into a mass consumer society. The Francoist state helped erode the same myths of Spanish exceptionalism that it had championed in previous decades.

American Origins, By Way of Europe

Though all had champions who played crucial parts in introducing these concepts to Spain, the innovations adopted by Spanish admen and food retailers – public relations and the supermarket – were not native to the Iberian Peninsula. All arrived from abroad via the same general path: initial development in the United States, filtration during the middle of the twentieth century to Western Europe, followed finally by adoption in Spain through a combination of private interest and state intervention that took reference from both Western Europe and the United States.

For the supermarket, this global process began in the 1920s.8 Grocery chains such as Kroger emerged after World War I due to a combination of social pressures and an

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7 More concretely, this chapter’s core period stretches from the Spanish government’s first moves to gather information about American supermarkets in 1956, to the celebration of the 1966 IPRA Annual Meeting, arguably the peak of Joaquin Maestre’s involvement, and a high point of early Spanish presence in international professional advertising circles.

8 Technically, similar stores had previously existed, but did not use the term ‘supermarket’, did not transform the trade, and, in cases like that of Piggly Wiggly, had by 1930 already failed. See Zimmerman, Los Supermercados, ch. 2.
inflation-fueled rise in food prices. They quickly transformed the grocer’s trade, introducing innovations such as centralized management, standardized customer service and mass-produced goods, and economies of scale that let them undercut independent grocers. In response, these grocers banded together into new, voluntary store chains of their own, in which they shared a common warehouse store brand, and advertising – and, in so doing, established the model for SPAR. Finally, chains like Piggly Wiggly pioneered the self-service method for selling groceries, in which customers themselves selected purchases from openly accessible store shelves. From the founding of the first supermarkets, New York City’s King Kullen (opened 1930) and New Jersey’s Big Bear markets (opened 1932), self-service was how supermarkets sold.

Both stores experienced what supermarket advocate Max Mandell Zimmerman termed “phenomenal” success, driven by their promises of extreme customer savings, which Depression-era shoppers welcomed. These stores were so successful that alarmed traditional grocers printed pamphlets attacking them – to little effect, for the supermarket spread rapidly, growing from 94 stores in 24 U.S. cities in 1934 to 1200 groceries in 85 cities in 1936. As they spread, these stores evolved, shedding their early emphasis on bargain pricing and carnivalesque spectacle. They instead adopted features such as a focus on customer service, middle class appeal, and the chain structure from the nation’s more upscale chain stores, which they increasingly came to resemble and replace. By 1936, supermarkets had largely taken over the American grocery trade.

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9 Deutsch, 50-53. This was also the source of early complaints from independent grocers, who called the chains monopolistic. See Zimmerman, Los Supermercados, 21-24.
10 Ibid., 33-35. For SPAR’s founding, see notes 14, 15, and 17.
11 Deutsch, 53-54; Zimmerman, Los Supermercados, 58.
12 Zimmerman, Los Supermercados, 61-63. By 1935, this number would rise to fifteen stores.
13 Deutsch, 145; Zimmerman, Los Supermercados, 41, 69-70.
Self-service and the supermarket arrived in Europe in the mid-to-late 1940s, after World War II. Voluntary chains of traditional groceries – that is, not self-service stores – had begun to form in the Netherlands in the 1930s, most notably SPAR, which Dutch businessman Adriaan van Well founded in 1932 inspired by America’s chains.\textsuperscript{14} After war’s end, SPAR and other Dutch chains like Verkoops Gemeenschaap (VéGé) began to spread beyond Holland, beginning with Belgium in 1947; delegations from European retailing groups such as Migros of Zurich toured American supermarkets and adopted the innovations they witnessed; and by 1948, two of Europe’s most powerful nations, Britain and France, both had self-service grocery stores. The next decade brought still more growth: beginning in 1951, SPAR spread to Germany, Denmark, Austria, France, and Britain, and in 1955, the Rockefeller-funded International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC) launched Italy’s first supermarket, \textit{Supermarkets Italiani}, in Rome.\textsuperscript{15} By the end of the decade, self-service grocery stores – most were not yet large enough to formally qualify as supermarkets – were to be found in most of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{16} And in late 1957, they came to Spain as well.

Spain’s adoption of self-service stands out for three reasons. First, because there has to date been little historical scholarship on the subject, unlike the British, French, and, of course, American cases.\textsuperscript{17} Second, this introduction took place a decade after self-service first arrived in Europe, and the Spanish retailers and officials who drove it forward acted with an awareness of self-service’s previous trajectory in Europe and the

\textsuperscript{14} Maixé-Altes, “Interpreting,” 12, 24 n. 33.
\textsuperscript{17} For existing work on Spanish autoservicios, see Maixé-Altes, “Interpreting”; Maixé-Altes, “La modernización”; and Grandío and Maixé-Altés.
United States. Therefore the Spanish story illuminates the impact of intraeuropean developments and exchanges on consumer culture. And, finally, the adoption of the supermarket in Spain happened not through entrepreneurial action, as with Big Bear, King Kullen, SPAR, and myriad other American and Western European examples, but through the direct action of a dictatorship, the Francoist state.

This process of adoption began on 26 June, 1956, when José Ruiz Morales, a diplomatic attaché at the Spanish embassy in Washington, requested technical literature on American supermarkets from the U.S. Department of Commerce. From the outset, Spanish officials thought of the supermarket very much as an American phenomenon, though they did tacitly acknowledge Europe’s embrace of and contributions to self-service when they wrote of its expansion as taking place “abroad” rather than specifically in the United States. Intrigued by this spread, the Comisaría de Abastecimientos y Transportes (CAT)–which had managed postwar Spain’s food rationing program–began to monitor the American trade and popular press for news about foreign supermarkets.

Then, in October 1957, at the behest of Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres, the CAT opened Spain’s first self-service grocery store inside Madrid’s Barceló market. Underscoring the foreign and specifically European influence that remained at play, the diminutive test store sold only frozen meats produced by Danish frozen foods company Danegoods, CAT’s partner in the venture, which was a resounding success. Within

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18 Letter from Robert J. Bond to José M. Ruiz-Morales, 2 July, 1956, AGA-CAT 29605 Folder 1 Subfolder 7; for language on supermarkets, see for example, “El Ministro de Comercio Inaugura, en Nombre del Jefe del Estado, la XXVI Feria Internacional de Muestras de Barcelona,” ABC (Madrid), (3 June, 1958), 34.

months, the agency set *Operación Supermercados*, or “Operation Supermarkets” in motion. The Comisaría opened new test stores in Bilbao, San Sebastián, Gijón, and La Coruña; founded two subagencies to regulate Spain’s autoservicios, the Compañía Auxiliar de Abastecimientos (CABSA), and the Organización Supermercados; drafted an ambitious plan to create a national network of 496 state-run self-service stores; and developed an official structure to regulate privately-owned ones – all by the summer of 1959.\(^{20}\) The autoservicio had begun to secure a place in the Spanish grocery trade and had done so by the government’s hand.

By contrast, though public relations and the development of a professionalized, mass-oriented advertising industry arrived in Spain at roughly this same time and had a similarly American origin, they emerged earlier. The advertising trade began to form with the appearance of the first professional admen and agencies in the United States during the 1850s and 1860s.\(^{21}\) It came to Europe relatively soon after: Germany’s first admen in the 1880s and 1890s embraced Anglo-American advertising methods, which they held in high esteem, while British agencies also emulated their American counterparts. Spain’s first advertising agency, Roldós, S.A. (first formed in 1857), remained a presence in Spanish advertising through the 1960s.\(^{22}\)

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Despite its spread, this was not yet modern advertising – in America, historians Jackson Lears and Stephen Fox have noted, advertising remained an unregulated, abuse-ridden, and mistrusted profession. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American and European advertising continued to spread and evolve toward greater mass appeal and more formal structure.\(^{23}\) Between the 1860s and the 1890s, American pioneers like George P. Rowell won advertising increasing recognition as a legitimate, ethics-bound business, the trade gained technical sophistication through psychologist Walter Dill Scott’s marketing research in the early twentieth century, and in the 1920s, public relations developed as a discipline at the hands of public relations counselors (and bitter rivals) Ivy Ledbetter Lee and Edward R. Bernays.\(^{24}\) Meanwhile, in Britain, British advertising underwent what historian T.R. Nevett has termed a “Great Expansion” between 1851 and 1914, which produced the first modern British ad agencies; adopted Dill Scott’s methods after World War I, and began to professionalize with the creation of the Association of British Advertising Agencies in 1917 and the first attempts at a legal regulation of ad content.\(^{25}\)

Across the Pyrenees, these advances were not lost on Spain’s early twentieth
century admen; nor was their American pedigree. In 1911, Pedro Prat Gaballi, the father of modern, technical Spanish advertising, first encountered America’s new advertising methods through a series of trade magazines as well as the newly published work of early marketing researchers like Dill Scott. Inspired, he began calling during the interwar years for measures that, once implemented in the early 1960s, drove the professionalization of the trade in Spain.\(^{26}\) At around the time the first modern ad agencies began to appear in Spain circa 1925, he also founded his own agency, Fama, created Spain’s first professional advertisers’ association, the Club de Publicidad de Barcelona, and began to publish a steady stream of work on the new, imported, technically-sophisticated advertising he had embraced. This emerging expertise and field gained popularity and influence in the 1940s, by which time many of Spain’s most important agencies had formed, including Helios (1918), Alas (1931), Cid (1945), Ruéscas (1948), and the future cradle of the public relations discipline in Spain, DANIS (1953). Meanwhile, foreign agencies also moved into Spain, including Switzerland’s Haasenstein & Volger, which opened a branch in Madrid in 1922 under the name Publicitas, and quickly established influential relationships with Helios and Prat Gaballi’s Fama.\(^{27}\)

Finally, as Spain’s economically lean 1940s came to a close, and material conditions began to slowly improve, Spanish advertising experienced one more change. This was the arrival of a new generation of admen who spent the 1950s working with cutting-edge foreign techniques at innovative agencies like Ruéscas – home of Spain’s first market-research department – and later oversaw their trade’s professionalization in

\(^{26}\) These included, for instance, the creation of a national advertisers’ syndicate, finally created in 1964. Javier María Pascual, “Prat Gaballi, Pionero y Maestro,” \textit{I.P.}, No. 2 (Feb., 1963), 10.

the 1960s. They were young, university-educated, and bourgeois. They hailed from fields like art, sales, law, and broadcasting, and from Spain’s wealthiest and most touristed areas – Madrid, the Mediterranean coast, and the Basque north. Manuel de Eléxpuru was one such adman. A Bilbao native, Eléxpuru initially studied Architecture in Madrid. He left that program in 1954, joined the Clarín ad agency the following year as a draftsman, and quickly rose through its ranks to become head of the agency in 1962. Another newcomer, Joan Fontcuberta, founded DANIS under the influence of Spain’s leading proponent of technically sophisticated advertising, Pedro Prat Gaballi. And in 1956, Fontcuberta in turn hired still another of these young professionals, Joaquín Maestre Morata. Two years later, in 1958, Maestre was exposed to the public relations field when he coincided with IPRA’s annual meeting while traveling on DANIS business. And two years after that, he introduced the new discipline to Spain, founding the nation’s first specialized PR agency.

The Supermarket’s State-led Spread: Meanings Sought and Measures Taken

By 1959, as Joaquín Maestre discovered his new vocation, self-service appeared well-established in Spain. Yet much remained undecided. If self-service had achieved

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30 For Ruescas and Market-Research, see Francisco García Ruescas, *Historia de la Publicidad*, 273; for DANIS, Fontcuberta, and Maestre, see Rodríguez Salcedo, 285-286.
near-ubiquity in the United States, in Spain it remained a limited phenomenon, still open to challenge by defenders of the older way of selling groceries. And, perhaps, more importantly, the meaning of self-service – what it represented, promised, or even threatened to Spain’s various interested parties – remained ambiguous, unfixed. Over the next few years, as the new commercial model expanded across Spain, this struggle for meaning would remain a constant theme.

Firstly, in the CAT’s eyes, the supermarket remained an area that legitimately and even primarily belonged to the State. Prima facie, during the last two years of the 1950s private enterprise appeared to be taking over the Spanish self-service grocery trade. In May 1958 – six months after the opening the first autoservicio – the CAT abandoned its plan for a national network of state-run supermarkets, preserving only the twelve stores already in operation or being built. And Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, the agency’s newly-appointed head, spent the rest of 1958 giving interviews in which he reiterated his agency’s commitment to this new plan and to a privately-owned self-service sector.

Yet in keeping with the CAT’s original postwar mission, the policies and regulations that this agency and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior established between May 1958 and December 1959 formalized the CAT’s authority to credential and police Spain’s privately-owned self-service grocery stores.31 Between July 1958 and early 1959, the CAT developed a program whereby private self-service grocers could affiliate with the Organización Supermercados, gaining powerful privileges like a 50 percent tax rate reduction in exchange for adhering to the CAT’s stringent product quality standards, agreeing to public health inspections, and purchasing their wares from (cheap)

government suppliers. Contemporaneously, the agency promised to not build any new autoservicios, but in the same breath reasserted its authority, reserving the right to open new ones when private enterprise failed to do so, in order to ensure “lower prices, [better] food quality, and [serve] the nation’s neediest classes, the middle class and workers.”

Finally, a May 1959 Interior Ministry decree required all private parties seeking a license to open an autoservicio had to first secure CAT approval.

Public reaction to the newly-arrived autoservicio model and the CAT’s efforts to spread it was largely favorable, with a few exceptions. For myriad ordinary Spanish businessmen and grocers, the autoservio’s spread was cause for excitement, speaking to a range of individual hopes and desires, particularly once the CAT put its affiliate program in motion. By early 1959, letters poured into the agency’s Madrid offices from across the country filled with requests. For ordinary working- and middle-class Spaniards, the CAT’s autoservicios represented the chance at a job – and a government job at that. Thus, in September 1958. Civil War Veterans Delegation member Tomás García Rebull successfully requested,

[for] Miss Rogelia Astorga Alda, [a] veteran of our War of Liberation… an Administrative Assistant position in the Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, since it seems that new personnel are being hired to manage those Services [the Organización Supermercados] that this Organization has recently created....

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34 Astorga Alda’s working- or at best middle-class status is suggested by García Rebull’s assertion that she “needed to work,” her entry into the job market in 1949 – hardly an upper-class pursuit – and that her subsequent unemployment was neither by choice nor due to marriage. Letter from Tomás García Rebull to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, 30 Sept 1958, AGA-CAT 29608/6; Comisario General to Secretary of the Minister of Commerce, Solicitud de la Srta Rogelia Astorga Alda, de ser admitida como auxiliar de esta
As a single woman, the eldest of three siblings, the primary caretaker for her blind father, and an unemployed, former CAT employee between 1949 and 1952, Astorga leapt at the chance to return to the security of government work. Meanwhile, for others, supermarkets were a business opportunity. In April 1959, attorney Enrique Ribalta wrote Antonio Pérez-Ruiz to request affiliate status for the supermarket that self-service grocer SURESA’s planned to build.\textsuperscript{35} And for still others it represented a new field where a little ingenuity could lead to personal advancement. Such was the case for industrial engineer Antonio García Fernández, who in April 1958 sent Alberto Ullastres a proposal for a privately-run, vertically-integrated store that would sell produce at below-market price.\textsuperscript{36} In each instance, the common thread was a belief that the supermarket would soon transform Spaniards’ lives, and the writer’s in particular.

This was just as true of the supermarket’s opponents, for in Spain as in the United States, the new commercial model immediately gained bitter enemies as well as friends. King Kullen and Big Bear had in early 1930s America faced opposition from the chain stores they threatened to replace. Similarly, in late 1950s and early 1960s Spain the CAT encountered resistance and attacks from Spanish grocers’ official government syndicates. The National Food Warehousers’ Federation, for instance, condemned the CAT’s

\textsuperscript{35} Letter from Enrique J. Ribalta to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, 4 Apr. 1959, AGA-CAT 29608/1; For other types of requests, see for instance Letter from Manuel Llonís Romero to Personal Secretary to the Comisario General Lázaro Gómez, 16 Mar. 1959, AGA-CAT 29608/6, which on behalf of plaintiff Antonio Muñoz Chao requests affiliate status for an autoservicio in the basque city of Eibar previously denied that status because of its proximity to another store already affiliated with CAT, but which Muñoz Chao claims has never been built.

\textsuperscript{36} Antonio García Fernández to Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Comercio, Letter and Project Summary for a Private Commercial Organization to Sell Produce, 21 May 1958, AGA-CAT 29608/2. Significantly, along with his proposal, García Fernández also offered his own services to implement it and oversee the resulting business’ subsequent operations.
intention to keep running any stores whatsoever, deeming anything but complete privatization a “completely unacceptable” state of affairs. Francisco Olmedo, head of the Madrid Grocers’ Guild, took a more extreme position in a bravado-filled September 1960 editorial. Boasting that Madrid’s traditional grocers had nothing to fear or learn from the supermarket, Olmedo nevertheless also warned that Spain’s autoservicios enjoyed unfair advantages that would allow them to undercut traditional Spanish grocers’ prices and drive them out of business. King Kullen, Big Bear, and other store chains before them had faced similar complaints during the early 20th century. In Spain, they had grown so common by 1960 that Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo described such griping as “an inveterate custom.” Olmedo’s own unease about the supermarket’s transformative potential was so great that, even as he penned his boast that all was well, he had already begun looking into adapting his store to self-service.

Olmedo could hardly be faulted for his fears and attempts to discredit self-service, given the speed with which the autoservicio spread through Spain, and the hopes that officials, grocers, and the Spanish public attached to the new commercial model. Though by 1959 CAT kept its word and halted further moves to open more of its state-run autoservicios, the number of privately-owned self-service stores shot upward. This growth included both still-familiar names such as Barcelona’s Caprabo, as well as long-

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39 With that said, not everyone was so charitable. One CAT affiliate, for instance, described Olmedo’s editorial as little more than a cynical bid to retain his guild presidency. Letter from Autoservicios San Bartolomé to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, 14 Oct., 1960, AGA-CAT 29605/1, Subfolder 2.
forgotten ones like Superma and Minimax. By June 1960, Spain boasted 145 autoservicios large enough to formally qualify as supermarkets, with another 194 CAT-affiliated ones planned. The total number of autoservicios was double the former figure, and while most still serviced Spain’s more prosperous areas, especially Madrid and Barcelona, poorer areas like Granada had some and were scheduled to receive more. Meanwhile, the CAT and private chains like SPAR stoked Spaniards’ high hopes for the supermarket by frequently declaring that self-service would soon transform Spain’s grocery trade and standard of living – a future from which traditional grocers were absent. In 1961, SPAR head Antonio Ortíz de Zárate gloated that self-service would soon cause “thousands” of “antiquated…traditional… “know-it-all”…[and] inefficient grocers” to “disappear.” The CAT similarly asserted that self-service would do no less than “dignify the grocer’s trade,” “totally change [Spain’s] nutritional panorama,” and raise the Spanish grocery trade to heights reached abroad. And it made these claims where thousands of Spanish housewives could see them, in an early 1960 issue of the women’s magazine *AMA*. Faced with this, Olmedo could hardly help but worry.

The Comisaría’s dissemination of these claims via *AMA* was part of a larger, concerted campaign to boost sales while also propagating the CAT’s preferred notions of what self-service meant for Spain and its citizens. This campaign, rolled out between

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41 See note 1.

42 See note 3.
1960 and 1962, was designed to reach Spanish women through press like AMA as well as radio and television.43 AMA’s very existence bore witness to this: the CAT launched the magazine in December 1959 with Pilar Salcedo, the CAT head’s own sister, as a prominent member of its editorial staff.44 So did the magazine’s primary purpose, which was to provide Spain’s housewives with the dedicated periodical they had never before had, and which for the first time treated their job with the professionalism it merited. Indeed, AMA, the magazine proclaimed in its first issue, aimed to foment a professional esprit de corps among Spain’s housewives – a sentiment that echoed the growing emphasis on technical sophistication at department stores like Galerías Preciados and at ad agencies like Ruescas and DANIS.45 The magazine also had a second, tacit, related purpose: to promote CAT’s policies among its readership and to familiarize them with and encourage them to shop at the nation’s growing number of autoservicios. AMA considered these stores, along with readers’ own kitchens, to be the home venues for housewives’ newly-defined profession and the exercise of their technical expertise.46

This second mission and its centrality to the new magazine were in evidence from the time of AMA’s first issue. When, on 19 December 1959, the CAT announced the launch of its new magazine in the press, the agency promised readers that AMA would provide, “the most complete information about SUPERMARKETS [emphasis

44 For Pilar Salcedo, Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, and AMA, see “Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo to Pilar Salcedo,” 30 Dec., 1960, AGA-CAT 29669/1; and “María del Pilar Corvera de Cocero to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo,” 11 Dec., 1961, AGA-CAT 29669/2, Subfolder 1.
46 Ibid.
CAT then distributed 100,000 free copies of the first issue through Madrid autoservicios and supermarkets, including the five stores that the CAT itself operated. Finally, *AMA* featured several recurring, prominently-placed columns its first year of publication that familiarized readers with, and encouraged them to shop in, supermarkets. Foremost among these was an article series *Los Supermercados a Rayos X* (Supermarkets X-Rayed), which promised to equip readers with “everything...[they]... need[ed] to know about the supermarket.” Since supermarkets were a new phenomenon in Spain, such columns outlined supermarkets’ prior history abroad and highlighted the advantages and conveniences they offered. In particular, these articles worked to promote self-service’s most off-putting features, such as a seeming lack of personal attention from store staff or the sale of meat in frozen, pre-packaged form. *AMA* explained the reasons for these changes, and how they actually helped housewives by making them savvier shoppers, by forcing grocers to improve product quality and lower prices, and in the case of frozen foods, by eliminating wasteful spoilage.

**Professionalizing Housewives**

More than just promoting self-service, the CAT used *AMA* to advance its original and overarching motive for introducing the supermarket: namely, to improve food distribution in Spain through its rationalization. The agency retained the right to open supermarkets when private parties failed to, as well as to regulate those private markets

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50 Ibid., “Los Supermercados a Rayos X: Todo los que a las Amas de Casa les Interesa Sobre Este Nuevo Sistema de Venta,” *AMA*, No. 2 (1 Feb., 1960), 14-15; “Los Supermercados a Rayos X: Todo lo que tienen que saber las amas de casa,” *AMA*, No. 6 (1 Apr., 1960), 12-13.
that did open, in order to ensure self-service’s controlled and systematic spread. It also
wanted to ensure that shoppers made best use of the supermarket, promoting a more
coordinated, rational purchase and use of groceries by the nation’s housewives.

*AMA* worked toward these ends through three article series: the *Prognóstico para
la Despensa* (Pantry Forecast), the *Charla de Don Antonio* (Don Antonio’s Chat), and
*Con La Historieta del Día, Aprenda Usted Economía* (Learn Economics with the Story of
the Day). The first of these, the *Prognóstico*, featured a 15-day calendar that offered
housewives notice of changing food prices, planning grocery lists and family meals based
around foods going on sale. Antonio Pérez-Ruiz himself penned the second column,
which complemented the Prognóstico by explaining why food prices fluctuated, a subject
of frequent housewifely complaint.51 Together, these articles sought to rationalize
Spanish diets, improving nutrition standards and optimizing families’ household budgets.
In this same vein, they sought to convince housewives that they belonged to an important
profession that these women had a responsibility to carry out correctly – that is, by
following *AMA’s* rationalized guidelines, which were often explicit in their service to the
CAT’s historical mission of “assuring an adequate supply [of food] for the nation”52

The magazine’s third column, *Con La Historieta Del Día, Aprenda Usted Economía*, represented another attempt to professionalize Spanish housewives through
technical education, as Prat Gaballi had done in the advertising realm. Using a
combination of text and cartoon illustrations that “Don Antonio’s Chat” also employed

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(see Figures 3.1 and 3.2), each Historieta told housewives a story that illustrated a technical point in economics, home economics, or how food distribution systems worked. Over time, the columns aimed to cultivate in its readers a more technical and professional understanding of these subjects, with which they could then make better use of tools like the Prognóstico to improve their families’ diets. For example, a series of Historietas from July and August 1960 offered a detailed description of how and why food distributors froze certain products, including an explanation of the cellular effects of freezing on meat and the scientific reasons why improperly defrosted meat suffered a sharp drop in quality. This aimed to produce informed housewives who understood the importance of following CAT instructions on how to defrost frozen goods. These articles also sought to reassure housewives wary of frozen meat, and thus to promote their use of Spain’s autoservicios and their cooperation in streamlining Spanish food distribution.  

Figure 3.1: “Don Antonio’s Chat”  

Source: AMA, No. 12 (1 July, 1960), 5.  

Figure 3.2: “Learn Economics with the Story of the Day”  

Source: AMA, No. 12 (1 July, 1960), 7.  

53 See Figure 3.2; and “Con la Historieta del Día, Aprenda Usted Economía,” AMA, No. 14 (1 Aug., 1960), 6.
This push to train Spanish housewives into professionalized household managers and to persuade them to make use of Spain’s supermarkets also reveals the effect that the arrival of the autoservico and the CAT’s push to rationalize food distribution had on the place of women in Spain, imbuing the role of the housewife with increased importance. CAT discourse cast housewives as key contributors to boom-era Spanish prosperity. In part, this rested on the notion that by feeding their families, housewives also fed the nation as a whole. Thus, the magazine termed the housewife her family’s “minister of finance,” and in 1960, Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo declared housewives, “the pillar on which Spain’s most valuable asset, the Spanish family, rests.”54 The CAT also considered them a pillar of Spanish financial health, for by cutting expenses, AMA asserted, housewives could render the nation more solvent, and similarly, by following CAT’s directives to buy more or less of a given product, they could bolster struggling sectors of Spanish agriculture or support CAT export campaigns. The Comisaría frequently issued such calls to action: in February 1960, “Don Antonio” called on housewives to patriotically consume more rice, eggs, and chicken, as over-production of these staples had caused prices to plummet and threatened Spanish farmers’ livelihoods; the following November, in response to housewives’ dissatisfaction with olive oil shortages caused by a government oil export campaign, Pérez-Ruiz reminded readers:

It is through shared effort that...we will achieve the maximum level of welfare...when you get on the tram, or go to the movies, or buy a medicine...know that [they] contain something imported, and thanks to our exports the country will progress. And when this progress is achieved...our

buying power will be greater, and we will not have to export goods like oil….\textsuperscript{55}

With that said, these messages did not present a challenge to the domesticity- and motherhood-centered feminine gender roles that Francoism imposed. Rather, as it emphasized the importance of Spanish homemakers becoming better informed and technically proficient at budgeting, shopping, and cooking, the CAT asked these women to perform more sophisticatedly their normatively feminine roles. Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo’s frequent condescension in his Charlas - sarcastically telling readers to stop complaining about pasteurization, “unless [they] like[d] the flavor of bacteria” – evoked the patriarchal power imbalance that existed between the male CAT head and his female readers.\textsuperscript{56} So too, his calls to a patriotic feminine volunteerism had precedent in postwar Spanish pronatalist policies and indeed, the Sección Femenina itself.\textsuperscript{57} Like the women’s magazines of the 1950s, AMA used interviews with well-known Spanish actresses to underscore how these publicly prominent women were actually more fulfilled by their lives as homemakers than their careers, and also actively encouraged women toward values, such as meekness, obedience to one’s spouse, and sacrifice, that the Sección Femenina coded feminine. In a December 1960 editorial, for example, the magazine counseled, “happiness is born almost always of sacrifice…live[d] in a thousand small details: the roast that is never done, enduring relatives’ impertinent comments… you will feel [our acclaim] when you can still smile at everyone.”\textsuperscript{58}


\textsuperscript{56} A. Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo, “Charla de DON ANTONIO con las AMAS DE CASA,” \textit{AMA}, No. 16 (1 Sept., 1960), 5.

\textsuperscript{57} See Introduction, notes 61, 63-64.

\textsuperscript{58} This is also comparable to how, as Pamela Radcliff has shown, Spanish women’s growing involvement in civic action through Homemakers’ Associations in the late 1960s ultimately only won them a marginalized voice on traditionally feminine issues. See Radcliff, \textit{Making Democratic Citizens}, 109-11. For
Even so, the importance that officials, food retailing authorities, and ordinary Spaniards began ascribing to homemakers in the late 1950s represented a shift in thinking that was both widespread and reached the highest levels of the regime. Underscoring the widespread nature of the shift, SPAR valued housewives highly enough that in January 1960 it too launched a homemakers’ magazine, La Familia SPAR (The SPAR Family), which like AMA sought to enlist housewives’ help in serving Spain’ families and making special sales successful, and also argued that homemakers actually worked harder than their husbands. By May 1963 the regime’s own regard was obvious: Minister of Commerce Ullastres so valued housewives’ cooperation that he delivered a televised address in which he answered homemakers’ concerns about fluctuating food prices, warned about further changes likely to result from the influence of the European Common Market, and, most especially, asked women yet again to heed the CAT’s guidance. His speech was subsequently printed in AMA as well as the trade journal ICA; the importance he granted housewives had such staying power that it could be found in ICA’s pages a decade later.59

Self-service, finally, contributed to a larger contemporaneous redefinition of women’s status in Franco’s Spain. In 1961, as legal reforms made it easier for Spanish women to secure employment, La Familia SPAR accepted married women’s work in naturalizing, if also grudging terms, and the CAT facilitated jobs in the public sphere – at

\[AMA, \text{ see Josefina Figueras, “Nuria Esper: “Somos una familia burguesa y feliz,” }AMA, \text{ No. 18 (1 Oct., 1960), 29; “Las Artistas en la Cocina - Maria Mahor y las Tortillas Rellenas,” }AMA, \text{ No. 20 (1 Nov., 1960); Ama, “Carta al Ama de Casa,” }AMA, \text{ No. 23 (15 Dec., 1960), 3. For the Sección Femenina’s feminine canon, see Morcillo, True Catholic Womanhood, 25-26.} \]

\[59 \text{ “Ullastres, en los hogares españoles,” }ICA, \text{ No. 139 (May, 1962), 6-7; Antonio Ortiz de Zárate, La Familia SPAR: revista para el ama de casa y la familia (henceforth La Familia SPAR), No. 3 (Aug., 1960), 1; “Mi Mujer No Trabaja,” }La Familia SPAR, \text{ No. 6 (Nov., 1960), 6; “El Ama de Casa Puede Adelgazar Fácilmente,” }La Familia SPAR, \text{ No. 15 (Sept., 1961), 4; Jorge de la Riva, “Las Buenas Amas de Casa,” }ICA, \text{ No. 289 (Apr., 1975), 37.} \]
its supermarkets – to women like Rogelia Astorga. Meanwhile *AMA*, which was a full women’s magazine rather than just a grocery-buying guide, featured content that encouraged women to shop for pleasure. This continued the social shift that Aurora Morcillo has found in the 1950s emergence of the Spanish consumer-housewife who bought fashionable clothes not for her family’s pleasure, as National-Catholic norms demanded, but for herself. Thus, in 1960, *AMA* fashion columnist Pilar Amillo reported on the latest trends in sporty clothing and furs, while ads from stocking-maker Sanllehi (produced by DANIS) or for the elasticized “Gom” bathing suit, promised attractiveness, or in the latter case, a rare foreign innovation. Such advertising grew so casual that in 1962 *Club AMA*, a televised version of the magazine, fell afoul of Spanish National Television (RTVE) officials for inadvertently promoting several brands like the Dior fashion label, which had not paid the requisite fees for such publicity.

**The Autoservicio and Francoist Spain’s Rise to Modernity**

Perhaps most of all, though, and especially after 1960, the autoservicio fundamentally represented a Spanish modernity and national progress to be measured against other nations’ socioeconomic achievements. Comparisons between Spain, its neighbors, and trading partners like the United States, arose early on in the process of

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63 Notably, Viewers also criticized the ads, but only because they could not afford the brands shown, not because they disagreed with the kind of shopping depicted. See V.A. Cortél de Echevarría (Palencia) to Club Ama, n.d, AGA-CAT 29669/2, Subfolder 1. For the incident, see Hernando Calleja, Televisión Española, to Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 27 Jan., 1962, AGA-CAT 29669/2, Subfolder 1. For a *Club AMA* episode described, see José Fernández Alava, “Club Ama” Factura de gastos correspondientes a emisión de 17-Octubre (1a em),” 26 Oct., 1961, AGA-CAT 29669/2, Subfolder 1.
introducing self-service, reaching near-ubiquity in CAT files relating to the autoservicio’s initial spread between 1958 and 1960. In these years, CAT officials were fixated on winning Spain prestige abroad by using supermarkets to raise the nation to a foreign standard of living. Indeed, an August 1958 Comisaría report titled, “Report on impressions from trip to U.S.A., concerning food distribution and the formula for Spain’s future,” argued exactly this: that the key to this future lay in achieving an American standard of living via the supermarket.64 Similarly, in one “Supermarkets X-Rayed” column, AMA declared that by adopting the autoservicio, “Spain ha[d] taken – and [was] taking – a great step toward reaching the same heights that food commerce has abroad.”65

Yet it was the autoservicios themselves that were most implicated in this constant referencing of foreign practices. They, along with the agencies that opened them, were by 1960 beginning to function as pathways for exposing traditional grocers who had converted to self-service, as well as housewives who shopped there, to unfamiliar foreign grocery practices that were shot through with notions of modernity. For consumers, such experiences included the aforementioned purchase of frozen, pre-packaged meat, or the comparatively impersonal treatment that they received in an autoservicio. Of the latter, AMA assured its readers this treatment was not actually impersonal, simply more efficient for both shopper and store clerk. Letters to AMA’s “Pregunte Usted Lo Que Quiera” (Ask What You Like) column reveal other ways in which self-service exposed shoppers to

64 Abelardo Cervera Martínez, “Informe de la [sic] impresiones recogidas con motivo del viaje a los EE.UU. de America, sobre la distribución de alimentos, y fórmula para el futuro en España,” Aug., 1958, AGA-CAT 29608/7.
65 Other such declarations abounded, such as a series of pamphlets by the National Cash Register Company, one of the major figures in the American grocery trade, which in Spain promoted the supermarket as a prosperity-bringing American innovation. See The National Cash-Register Company, “Super Market Merchandising: The True Look of the Super Market Industry 1959,” AGA-CAT 29605; and, National Cash-Register Company, “El Autoservicio tiene éxito en negocios de tipos tan variados como los que aquí se ilustran…en todo el mundo!,” AGA-CAT 29610. For AMA’s declaration, see “Los Supermercados a Rayos X: Todo los que a las Amas de Casa les Interesa,” AMA, No. 1 (Jan., 1960), 14-15.
foreign, often confusing practices. In March 1960, for example, reader Adelaida Cebrián wrote to express shock at finding shoes being sold by self-service in her neighborhood supermarket; *AMA* responded by lauding German supermarkets’ similar, efficient sale of men’s shirts using standardized measurements. For readers of *AMA*, these experiences did not exist in isolation. Instead, they took place against the common backdrop of the CAT’s insistence that “Spanish autoservicios still need to improve greatly with relation to other countries.” In other words, Spaniards were continually reminded of their nation’s need to modernize and reach a foreign standard of self-service and prosperity. The overall message was clear – what shoppers experienced when they went to their new neighborhood supermarkets was Spain’s future, a convergence with Europe.

It extended to grocers as well, who similarly experienced the spread of self-service as an at times uncomfortable, foreign-seeming, but modernity-tinged change. In 1959, for example, the CAT reached an agreement with the United States’ National Association of Food Chains (NACF), which had just run a “Supermarkets USA” pavilion at Barcelona’s International Trade Fair, to acquire the display’s supermarket equipment – scarce in Spain – which the CAT then donated to Spanish grocers. The text of this agreement was triumphant, declaring that the supermarket would bring “innumerable benefits…to the Spanish economy” and strengthen ties between Spain and the United States. Yet grocers did not always know what to do with these new machines or even how to run their still-unfamiliar stores. The CAT-NACF agreement seemingly recognized

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68 “Supermarkets USA” is notable both as another display of the supermarket’s American origin and promise to export prosperity to Europe, and because the exhibition had visited communist Yugoslavia in 1957, where it spearheaded the supermarket’s arrival – a potential point of comparison with Spain. See Introduction, note 33. For the CAT-NACF agreement, see, “Agreement between the National Association of Food Chains and the Comisaría de Abastecimientos y Transportes,” 16 June, 1959, AGA-CAT 29607/2.
this, providing for a six-week supermarket management program in the United States for Spanish store managers.^{69}\footnote{Ibid; Álvaro Ortiz de Zárate, “Autoservicio y Supermercados,” ICA, No. 110 (Jul., 1959), 10-12; J. de los Cobos, “Colaboración: Algunos aspectos del libre servicio,” ICA, No. 111 (Aug., 1959), 24.} And at the CAT’s supermarkets, inexperience generated a host of problems as store personnel struggled to adopt new, rationalized methods. These problems included inconsistencies in price-marking; issues with new machines such as one Madrid store’s broken automatic olive oil dispenser; a lack of trained administrative personnel; and, at the CAT’s pilot store, space constraints and stymied business stemming from the originally experimental store’s intentionally small size.^{70}\footnote{“Visita Inspección Supermercado del Ejército de Tierra,” 6 May, 1960; “Visita Inspección Supermercado Núm. 6, Calle de Embajadores,” 20 May, 1960; “Visita Inspección Supermercado del Ministerio del Aire,” 1 Apr., 1960; and, “Visita Inspección Supermercado 00,” 25 May, 1960; all in AGA-CAT 29605/1, Subfolder 1.} By 1960, CAT stores accounted for just one-quarter of Spain’s approximately 50 autoservicios, yet Spain’s privately-owned self-service grocery stores and store chains – the other 75 percent – were if anything still more extreme examples of this push toward a foreign commercial modernity.^{71}\footnote{“Grafico porcentaje CAT y privados (2 colores),” n.d. [three pie graphs appear, labeled Aug.-Sept. 1958, Oct., 1958, and Sept. 1959], AGA-CAT 29605; this estimate is based on the above percentage, and a total of 11 CAT supermarkets on record in July-August, 1959. See “Resumen de ventas de todos los supermercatos, Meses: Julio – Agosto [1959],” n.d., AGA-CAT 29610/5. For the opening of the CAT’s military supermarket, by which this otherwise undated report can be placed in 1959, see “Supermercado Militar,” A.B.C., 23 July, 1959.} They were fast becoming quasi-foreign commercial outposts, and some were actually foreign stores.\footnote{Exemplifying the latter, in January 1960, the American supermarket chain Market Basket tried to enter the Spanish market, writing Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo’s agency for leave to open branches in Spain, though the CAT’s response to this request leaves its outcome unclear. See Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo to F.C. Thomas, Inc, 7 Mar., 1960, AGA-CAT 29605/1, Subfolder 4.} Between 1959 and 1961 the Dutch voluntary cooperative grocery chains SPAR and VéGé entered Spain, and, as Spanish grocers flocked to affiliate with them, quickly became the country’s largest food retailers.

These chains brought with them modern foreign business practices that advanced the CAT’s aim to professionalize food retailing. They also began to change how Spaniards
perceived their, and their nation’s, place within a larger international community.\textsuperscript{73}

Nowhere was this more the case than at SPAR’s Spanish division (SPAR Española) which according to historian Joan Carles Maixé-Altés, “revolutionized the [Spanish] small business market.” SPAR Española founder and president Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate embraced the cause of bringing self-service to Spain well before joining SPAR, after encountering American supermarkets while studying at the Yale School of Drama in the early 1950s. Convinced that that he could best serve Spain by introducing the supermarket there, he studied the self-service model in Germany, where he discovered SPAR; by 1958, he was lecturing in Spain on the advantages of the autoservicio; and in late 1959, he spearheaded SPAR’s arrival to Spain, the chain’s ninth country.\textsuperscript{74} SPAR Española’s subsequent growth was meteoric. By January 1961, Spain’s SPAR network boasted 100 self-service grocers, by August it had 201, and, by year’s end, 300 – half of Spain’s total number of autoservicios. One and a half years later, in May 1963, SPAR Española operated 810 autoservicio, organized into distribution zones that covered most of the country.\textsuperscript{75} VéGé expanded with similar speed, and both chains did so in smaller towns like Yecla (Murcia) and Amorebieta (Vizcaya) as well as cities like Barcelona.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, the chain listed “dignifying the [grocer’s] profession” as one of the SPAR system’s five benefits. See “El Sistema SPAR”, \textit{SPARCO} No. 1 (Mar., 1960), 1, in AGA-CAT 29621/2, Subfolder 1.


As it expanded, SPAR advanced the introduction of foreign food ways and commercial practices to Spain, as well as the idea that Spain was part rather than outside of the Western international community. Even more so than at CAT supermarkets, the opening of a new SPAR or the conversion of a traditional grocer into a SPAR offered customers new, foreign shopping experiences. In towns with newly-opened SPARs, these stores transformed the urban landscape with logotyped signs and large window displays (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Inside these new autoservicios, SPAR elevated such stores’ typical concern with best practices in lighting, store hygiene, background music selection, and myriad other issues to obsessive levels. Indeed, in the March 1961 issue of SPARCO, Spanish SPAR’s member bulletin, one article preached that “to light is to sell,” SPAR head Ortíz de Zárate challenged readers to find “[a]ny truly modern establishment [that was] cloaked in darkness,” while another article even specified the best kind of music to

Figure 3.3: Model of a well-signed and renovated SPAR autoservicio

Figure 3.4: Autoservicio SPAR-Amancio Ortuña, Oviedo, 1962


and Amorebieta, see “Establecimientos SPAR de Autoservicio,” SPARCO, No. 11 (Jan., 1961), 4-5; and, “Establecimientos SPAR de Autoservicio: ¡201!,” SPARCO, No. 18 (Aug., 1961), 6-7.


play during the Christmas shopping season. Finally, SPAR sought to introduce a more modern and efficient way of shopping that maximized customer flow through stores by eliminating the bottleneck of traditional Spanish marketplace socializing.

This international exposure was not always smooth, for the experiences on offer at SPAR were sometimes so foreign as to be disconcerting, but the chain worked actively to render its foreignness familiar and even appealing rather than off-putting. Shoppers struggled with the unfamiliar burden of finding their purchases themselves, of choosing between pre-packaged product sizes they did not always trust, and of having to buy SPAR-brand products, which had displaced the brands they knew—a substitution typical throughout Europe, but unusual in Spain. SPAR responded by instructing chain members on how to reassure customers about the store brand’s quality and affordability. This was in contrast with CAT grocery stores, which sold familiar Spanish products like Artiach cookies and Chistu marmalade. Meanwhile, the word ‘SPAR’ itself was sufficiently foreign-sounding that La Familia SPAR made a point of translating the name into Spanish to build customer familiarity.

83 A.O. de Z., “Mensaje para Ud., Señora,” La Familia SPAR, No. 3 (Aug., 1960), 1. This column went on to explain the history of the chain, placing heavy emphasis – as did other, similar articles – on the store’s 30 years of experience and staple nature elsewhere in Europe. See for example, “La Cadena se Fortalece,” La Familia SPAR, No. 11 (Apr., 1961), 1, which actually spoke of “the familiar fir tree” spreading across Spain.
The modernization of Spanish food retailing was also never something that SPAR meant to pursue alone. Rather, the chain consistently sought to partner with the CAT, for like other Spanish grocers, SPAR expected that self-service’s transformation of life in Spain would ultimately happen at the hands of the Franco regime. To this end, between 1959 and 1962, Antonio Ortíz de Zárate steadily courted the CAT’s favor. He lobbied the agency concerning SPAR’s initial struggles to secure a license to sell frozen goods. He sought to cultivate goodwill by sending the agency complimentary copies of SPARCO and company pamphlets. And later, Ortíz de Zárate lobbied the CAT again to secure a special Finance Ministry grant for the modernization of local grocery stores.84

Most especially, SPAR as well as other grocers and industry professionals looked to the CAT to resolve a series of legal and infrastructural obstacles that they believed stood in the way of the supermarket’s spread and the Spanish grocery trade’s rise from Ortíz de Zárate’s “centuries-long lethargy” to a foreign standard of modernity. These included Spain’s inadequate network for storing and transporting frozen goods, which SPAR Española’s president warned could lead to the “tragic” spoilage of more than half of Spain’s fruits and vegetable crops.85

More pernicious and lasting were the legal obstacles that self-service faced throughout the 1960s, which Ortíz de Zárate and his colleagues again looked to the CAT to fix. Among these were Spain’s economatos, low-price company stores that Ortíz de Zárate and others argued were relics of Spain’s autarkic “Hunger Years,” and now only

84 For lobbying regarding frozen goods, see “Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate to Dr. Ramiro Matarranz, Director-General of Domestic Commerce,” 7 Dec., 1959, AGA-CAT 29621/2, Subfolder 1; and, “Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo,” 20 Feb., 1960. For the sending of SPARCOs and SPAR pamphlets, see “Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo,” 13 Sept., 1961, AGA-CAT 29621/2, and, “Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo,” 21 Jan., 1960, AGA-CAT 29621/2, Subfolder 1. For lobbying regarding grant money, see “Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate to Antonio Pérez-Ruiz Salcedo,” 8 June, 1961, AGA-CAT 29621/2, Subfolder 1.
served to undercut free enterprise and hinder the supermarket’s spread. These obstacles also included laws that allowed municipalities to set their own tax rates on food products or raise property taxes on renovated rented spaces such as newly-converted autoservicios. These codes, per a 1963 SPARCO editorial, represented “significant barrier[s] to the progress of Spanish food distribution” by pricing grocers out of being able to convert to self-service – barriers that SPAR looked to the CAT to remove.

Meanwhile, the SPAR chain itself also worked to professionalize the grocers or “SPARistas” who affiliated with it, for SPAR Española’s leadership believed that the spread of self-service and the modernity that Ortíz de Zárate had switched careers to bring to Spain required the professionalization of the nation’s grocers as a whole. Years after SPAR’s arrival in Spain, Ortíz de Zárate recalled its early strategy: “We chose retailers and wholesalers and modernized them. We began with the head: a change in mentality [through] courses [and] formación. That was first of all.” Through these courses (including early ones held in Germany) and this emphasis on formación – systematic, technical professional education rather than simple training – SPAR sought to disseminate rationalized, modern commercial techniques among its affiliates, including

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87 Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate, “Carta del Director – Arbitrios y Servicios Municipales,” SPARCO, No. 30 (Jul., 1962), 3-6; and, “La Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos, freno comercial,” SPARCO, No. 39 (Apr., 1963), 4, 7. It should be noted that the Ministries of the Interior, Commerce, and Finance had by 1963 abolished the first of these two laws, the Ley de Arbitrios Municipales, which took effect 31 Dec., 1962. The other would undergo the first of a series of reforms in 1964, but would remain contentious for at least the next eight years. See “Gracias Gobierno!,” SPARCO, No. 36 (Jan., 1963), 4; “Decreto 4104/1964 – Texto Refunido de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos,” Boletín Oficial de Estado (henceforth BOE), No. 312 (29 Dec., 1964), 17387-17405.
visual point-of-sale marketing methods rarely seen at the time at Spanish groceries.\textsuperscript{88} SPARCO shared this didactic mission. It offered diagrams showing how to plan store layouts to streamline customer traffic flow and a succession of long technical articles replete with detailed figures that promoted modern book-keeping practices and inventory rotation, in addition to its detailed guidance on store lighting and music. The bulletin also advised SPARistas on how best to sell to their primary, female customer base, whose budgetary clout SPARCO (echoing AMA) repeatedly underlined.\textsuperscript{89} Profit was the desired result of these measures; but so too was was the improvement of Spanish food distribution, making SPAR’s efforts akin to AMA’s professionalizing designs on homemakers.\textsuperscript{90}

SPARistas enthusiastically shared in this work. They wrote letters and participated in interviews that SPARCO regularly printed in dedicated recurring columns. Therein, they called on their fellow affiliates to embrace the professional knowledge transmitted in SPARCO, and most especially, to take the plunge and convert to self-service. In a December 1961 interview with the bulletin, Agustín Muñoz, manager of a recently-converted SPAR affiliate in Madrid, reassured readers that the commonly-feared problem of shoplifting had not materialized for him after the switch to self-service.

\textsuperscript{88} “Interview with Álvaro Ortiz de Zárate”. For the difference between training and what formación meant at SPAR, see “Formación,” SPARCO, No. 11 (Jan., 1961), 6.

\textsuperscript{89} For SPARCO as a medium of professional knowledge, see Álvaro Ortíz de Zárate, “Carta del Director – Cree “SPARCO”,” SPARCO, No. 23 (Dec., 1961), 3, and especially the magazine’s new subtitle, debuted in that issue, “Technical-Informative Sales Monthly”. For accounting and stock rotation, see for example “Control Administrativo,” SPARCO, No. 26 (Mar., 1962), 7. For store layouts, see Miguel Ángel Alonso, “Planificación de Autoservicios,” SPARCO, No. 47 (Dec., 1963), 9, and, “Vista de pájaro de los movimientos de compras de cien clientes en un Supermercado,” SPARCO, No. 50 (Mar., 1964), 12-13. For women as shoppers, see, “El hombre gana…y la mujer gasta: La importancia de la mujer como compradora,” SPARCO, No. 15 (May, 1961), 8; “¡Arriba las Ventas!: ¿Por qué una cliente entra en tu establecimiento?,” SPARCO, No. 36 (Jan., 1963), 5-6.

Rather, he concluded, “It’s a shame we didn’t do this a year earlier! We’ve almost doubled sales…!” SPAR member Manuel Blasco Zaldívar’s February 1962 letter to the bulletin told the same story, while another from SPARista Jesus Sánchez Ramiro underlined the chain’s calls to make store hygiene a priority, to read SPARCO, and to make productive use of SPAR product signage. These accounts and others like them mattered. SPARCO’s influence as one of the few grocery trade publications circulating in Spain was such that, according to Joan Carles Maixé-Altés, “it in a way explains the dynamism that part of the [grocery] sector displayed in those years,” suggesting that affiliates’ testimony had an impact that extended well beyond SPAR itself.

Letters and interviews like Zaldívar’s and Agustín Muñoz’s, moreover, formed part of an emerging epistolary culture among SPARCO’s readers. They offered a kind of secular, self-service conversion narrative, not just of a physical conversion of a store to self-service, but of their own thinking to zealous belief in the self-service principle. In March 1963, SPAR affiliate José Caballé told readers the story of how joining SPAR and converting to self-service had saved the initially small, struggling grocery store he had opened three years earlier in an outlying, working-class neighborhood of Barcelona. Now it was a nearby competitor who had closed. “[A]utoservicio” had become to him “a marvelous word [that] I can’t stop thinking about.” All of this success, Caballé concluded, “[he] owe[d] entirely to SPAR.” SPARCO in those same terms titled him,


“Don José Caballé, a man who saved himself with SPAR.” Another SPARista, Diego Martínez, recounted how SPAR’s administrative help saved his store during a long illness he suffered, ending with a fervent: “I owe SPAR everything.” Not always so forceful, such letters nevertheless appeared regularly in columns like “¿Quieres Colaborar?” (“Do you want to collaborate?”) and “SPARISTA 100%.” The bulletin supplemented these tales of personal conversion with other morality tales. In May 1961, SPARCO contributor P.P. offered the parable of a travelling merchant named Tendel. Initially, he struggled to sell the rich fabrics in which he traded because of his own shabby appearance. After allowing a young lady to clean him up and help him better present his wares, he did a brisk business. Caballé could have written the moral of the story: “SPAR is the young lady who wants to transform you. Pay attention. There may lie your salvation.”

And to its core, this was salvation defined in foreign terms. SPAR, the CAT, and the Spanish grocery trade measured the national prosperity and modernity that they hoped to produce through the autoservicio against the achievements of Spain’s neighbors and the United States – a club of prosperous nations they wanted Spain to join. In 1961, SPARCO cautioned affiliates against complacency:

> In Spain modern distribution techniques are unknown; American “merchandising”….is among us taking its first steps….now what we need is that extra push that elevates us to the respectable heights we deserve to occupy among the European concert of nations.  

When early critics suggested that adopting self-service was unwise because “Spain [was]  

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95 “El Instituto de la Alimentación,” SPARCO, No. 15 (May, 1961), 1; Other such statements abounded. Two months later, for instance, the bulletin called SPAR, “an injection of faith, confidence, mutual cooperation…. when we [the Spanish] are so in need of these….resources for success.” See, “2o Aniversario,” SPARCO, No. 17 (Jul., 1961), 1, and also note 1.
not America,” SPAR countered that the trend toward self-service was both global and inexorable. Myriad columns in *SPARCO* profiled the successes of Austrian and English *SPARistas*, closely followed the trajectory of self-service in America, or, often, stressed the modernizing challenge posed by the newly-formed European Economic Community. The CAT’s files on SPAR reflected these same comparisons, containing not just the early *SPARCOs* that Ortíz de Zárate mailed the agency, but also copies of French, English, and German SPAR bulletins, likely also sent by the SPAR president.

Not all of these comparisons revealed anxiety at Spain’s perceived backwardness. An article published in *ICA* a year after *SPARCO*’s call for an “extra push,” and encouraged by the autoservicio’s at times storied but on the whole rapid spread throughout the nation, professed that “[Spain’s] next generations will live in a country with high salaries and European consumption levels.” *CONAUTA*, the eponymously-titled journal of Spain’s state-run national self-service grocers’ cooperative, followed this two years later with the boast that, though the need to monitor foreign innovations remained, “Spain’s self-service grocers [we]re up at the level of foreign ones.”

Both SPAR and the CAT’s embrace of these comparisons led them to move beyond rationalizing the distribution and use of Spanish foodstuffs. Instead, in mid-1963

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they began direct attempts to reengineer Spanish diets. They pushed ordinary Spaniards to not just shop like other Europeans, but to adopt foreign diets that these authorities judged more nutritionally efficient. A 1964 article in CONAUTA pressed Spaniards to stop eating homemade soup noodles, unpopular abroad, and instead conform to the international norm of eating more nutritious, Italian-style semolina pasta dishes, whose benefits the magazine revisited throughout the remainder of the decade. The magazine also regularly profiled foreign products like new wheat strains being introduced into Spain and Japan’s counterpart to Spanish wine, sake. SPAR, meanwhile, promoted a diet heavier in meat and vegetables, like that of England, arguing in a May 1963 SPARCO article that as things stood, “Spaniards [ate] much in quantity but of poor quality.”

Though seemingly limited measures, such advocacy contributed to the Europeanization and Americanization of Spain through the assimilation of foreign food ways. By 1966, according to CONAUTA contributor R. C. Cañaveral, Spanish housewives had begun to incorporate foreign products like pineapple, bacon, and paté, into their families’ diets as Spain more generally adopted a Western European identity and other foreign mores such as a more urgent pace of life. And as the 1960s advanced, this internationally-oriented, modernizing mindset prompted organizations like CONAUTA and VéGé to project their hopes for a prosperous national future beyond the

every day consumer items available in autoservicios and beyond Spain’s mere adoption of foreign products, and onto the image of Spain as innovator. This is evident in their fascination with the as-yet unrealized products of foreign as well as Spanish food research, including instant coffee, a high-protein rice flour developed in Valencia for an international competition in 1969, and contemporaneous American attempts to conserve meat via irradiation.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, \textit{CONAUTA} repeatedly warned that to not pursue such research meant surrendering Spain’s best hope of becoming internationally competitive and condemning the nation to “technological [and] economic colonialism.”\textsuperscript{104}

\textit{“Nowadays, You Can Achieve Anything With Good Advertising”: The Professionalization of Spanish Advertising and Sociocultural Change in Spain}\textsuperscript{105}

As the Spanish grocery trade transformed over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Spanish advertising sector experienced a similarly concentrated expansion and professionalization, during which an assortment of new advertising agencies, organizations, and technical journals proliferated. Manuel Fraga’s Ministry of Information and Tourism passed the \textit{Estatuto de la Publicidad}, the advertising trade’s first regulatory charter. And the field of public relations arrived in Spain, largely at the hands of Joaquín Maestre, who, in joining a series of international organizations


\textsuperscript{104} Raimundo de los Reyes, “Es necesaria y urgente una mayor colaboración entre el capital y la investigación alimentaria,” \textit{CONAUTA}, No. 36 Year V (Sept., 1968), 29-30; Raimundo Algora, “La falta de ayuda oficial igual a colonialismo económico,” \textit{CONAUTA}, No. 47 Year VI (Oct., 1969), 5.

\textsuperscript{105} This quote is taken from one of the songs in the film \textit{Relaciones Casi Públicas} (1968), which two of the period’s biggest stars, Manolo Escobar and Conchita Velasco, and followed the misadventures of a young, female public relations agent, played by Velasco, and Escobar’s “Pepe de Jaén,” an up-and-coming singer of some popularity in the area around his rural Andalusian home village, as Velasco attempts to make Pepe de Jaén famous through a series of poorly-planned PR stunts. This line, sung by Velasco as she makes promises of Pepe’s future successes reveals the sense to which advertising and public relations had come to be seen as a powerful force in Spain. See \textit{Relaciones Casi Públicas}, directed by José Luis Sáenz de Heredia, (Arturo González, 1968), DVD, (Divisa Home Video, 2003).
including IPRA and the PRSA, paved the way for others to do the same. Like the grocery trade, the Spanish advertising profession took on an international character as it professionalized. This is manifest in the foreign – specifically, American – pedigree that Maestre’s chosen discipline displayed, his decision to join international professional organizations, and, most especially, a contemporaneous wave of agency-level affiliations that within the span of just a few years partnered or even merged most of Spain’s premier advertising firms with foreign advertising giants like the McCann-Erickson advertising agency. These changes further eroded Francoist notions of Spanish difference and advanced perceptions of Spain as European, this time among Spanish advertising professionals. Like the CAT and SPAR, these admen became convinced that the nation’s future prosperity lay in becoming a member of a prosperous, Western, and capitalist international community.

If the first rumblings of these changes were to be had in Prat Gaballi’s professionalizing proposals and the arrival of a new generation of admen in the 1950s, the early 1960s brought a burst of professionalization in the guise of new credentialing and regulatory structures, as well as a proliferation of professional associations. Richard Hall and Harold Wilensky have noted that professionalization usually involves some kind of occupational closure – restriction of entry into the new profession to select qualified candidates, typically trained in special schools and certified by professional associations. Though never truly a closed profession, in 1961 Spanish advertising gained its first technical school for admen. This was followed in 1964 by a second, official school run by the state, and an equally official but as-yet voluntary credentialing

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These two measures were in turn products of another pair of measures enacted that year by Manuel Fraga’s Ministry for Information and Tourism: advertising’s seminal and much-debated first official professional charter, and a second law that established an official regulatory association for the profession, the National Advertising Institute (INP). Paralleling Europe’s alphabet soup of professional advertising associations, such as the European Community for Advertising Organizations (CEOP), myriad new professional organizations also formed, including 1961’s Association of Public Relations Technicians (ATRP), and, in 1965, the Young Spanish Publicists’ Group (AJEP), the Association of Spanish Advertisers (AEA), and the Spanish Center for Public Relations, CENERP, which was the result of a merger between the ATRP and Madrid’s local association.

Spain’s advertising sector took still another step toward professionalization when, in 1962, it gained a pair of new trade journals in which Spain’s admen could debate the emerging organization of their profession. The first of these magazines was the public relations journal Relaciones Públicas, which after 1965 operated under CENERP. The
second, *I.P.: Información de la Publicidad*, quickly became a central organ of the advertising profession in Spain, serving as a clearinghouse for all news related to the field at home and abroad. Countless *I.P.* articles discussed how the INP, the *Estatuto*, and even the reader surveys that *I.P.* occasionally conducted ought to be structured. One 1965 editorial, for instance, dismissed these polls as filled with the “overly self-serving opinions” of Agency Directors who owed their positions to nepotism, not ability. Meanwhile, a digest section on the latest news about Spain’s ad agencies fostered professional awareness, and a sense of belonging among Spanish admen.111

These changes were underpinned by another contemporaneous shift that took place in Spanish admen’s discourse about the state of their trade, as many began to voice a rising and acute concern over the need for Spanish advertising to professionalize – what Richard Hall has termed an “attitudinal” professionalization. These admen consequently tended to greet new measures and lament as-yet unrealized reforms with a sense of urgency. In April 1963 adman Julio Campos, for instance, called for admen and their clients to force periodicals to adhere to their official edition figures, warning, “to do otherwise is to play at being serious.” Conversely, in 1964, agency director Roberto Arce spoke out against excessive government meddling, arguing that only advertisers’ own hard work could truly sort out agencies’ problems.112

111 For an example of opinion articles having to do with the organization of Advertising in Spain – specifically, having to do with Article 15 of the *Estatuto* – see “La clasificación de agencias, solución al Artículo 15,” *I.P.*, n.n. (Sept., 1964), 5-7; for the 1965 editorial, see Ricardo de Iriondo, “Libre Opinión – Una sección polémica escrita por los lectores - Las opiniones de los Directores de Agencias son muy parciales,” *I.P.*, No. 16 (Mar., 1965), 13.

112 Hall, 92-94; Julio Campos, “Bien a Control Si, pero…,” *I.P.*, No. 3 (Apr., 1963), 5; Roberto Arce, “Tengo la Palabra: El Síidol Ministerial,” *I.P.*, n.n. (Nov., 1964), 7. The contrast between these examples highlights how varied the responses to new and proposed regulation, as well as the lack thereof, could be. Not all calls were strident, nor all proposals quite so fraught. If a requirement in 1964’s *Estatuto*, which stated that all admen seeking official credentials had to pass a government exam, proved bitterly controversial, the creation in that same year of an official Advertisers’ Syndicate was less so, with the
The sheer number and density of agencies operating in Spain, finally, also expanded— as one editorial put it in 1962, “extraordinarily” so. Ad agencies were nothing new to Spain, many of the boom era’s foremost names having been in operation for over a decade. These included Alas, with clients like Trans-World Airlines, and Ruescas, which by 1960 was arguably the nation’s most innovative and important ad firm. But from this base, the number of ad agencies in Spain swelled during the 1960s. This figure reached a total of 1,040 independent agencies in 1963, roughly one for every 30,000 Spaniards, and by mid-1970 rose to 2,531, or one for every 13,000 citizens.

One of these new agencies was SAE de RP (Sociedad Anónima Española de Relaciones Públicas, or Spanish Public Relations Corporation). It was the first dedicated public relations firm in Spain, which Joaquín Maestre and Juan Viñas Bona, another young DANIS talent, founded in a small Barcelona office in July 1960. Immediately, Maestre and the agency became archetypal participants in the professionalization and growth of Spanish advertising. The agency took on ambitious projects like a meticulously coordinated, over-the-top, week-long fiftieth-anniversary celebration for Almacenes Jorba, the city’s most beloved department store. Maestre himself contributed to I.P., largely uncontroversial comments centering primarily around the need for the new syndicate to be flexible, strong, and truly national in scope. See “La Entrevista del Mes: Es muy necesario un sindicato fuerte, al que ha de llegarse por la flexibilidad, el dinamismo y la diversidad coordinada, declaraciones de Alejandro Fernández Soto,” I.P. No. 12 (Oct., 1964), 18. As Arce’s comment shows, too, the desirability of more government regulation for the trade was not a given. On the whole, though, this new discourse, this attitudinal professionalization, was ubiquitous, and in particular, as mentioned above, served as the motivating spark for many of the period’s banner reforms.


For Maestre Morata’s tenure and introduction to Public Relations at DANIS, as well as the initial founding of SAE de RP, see note 33.

For SAE de RP, see José María Soler Vilá convinced that Jorba’s sales and advertising practices were, by contrast, antiquated and unprofessional. For Jorba and SAE de RP, see José
and by December 1964 had also served as the Spanish correspondent for *Public Relations Review* for at least a year. Most importantly, he was an especially active participant in Advertising’s push toward affiliation, having by December 1963 joined the Advertising Club of Barcelona, the ATRP, the Public Relations Committee of the city’s Sales Managers’ Club, and even the Spanish Psychological Society.\(^{116}\)

As in the grocery trade, these changes occurred amid acute concern among both members of the profession and officials over Spain’s perceived secondary status within international advertising, and, more broadly, over the state of Spain’s international prestige and ability to join the EEC. These concerns served as a driving force for policy change during this period both within and beyond advertising.\(^{117}\) The crop of reformist officials and technocrats who rose to power within the Franco regime during the late 1950s and early 1960s, including Alberto Ullastres and Manuel Fraga, responded to this concern by working to render Spanish exports more competitive and to promote tourism to Spain.\(^{118}\) In other commercial areas like fashion, Spanish journalists, professionals, and officials organized events and interpreted their countrymen’s participation in foreign shows through the lens of an ongoing comparison between Spanish and foreign levels of

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\(^{117}\) Thus, for instance, in 1965 *I.P.* speculated concerning the likelihood that Spain would be able to join the so-called “Common Market,” or *Mercado Común*. See “Puntos de Vista – España y el Mercado Común,” *I.P.*, No. 23 (Oct., 1965), 7.

\(^{118}\) For the work of Manuel Fraga and the technocrats in these areas, see for example, Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 467-479; and, Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship*, ch. 5.
achievement. In the advertising trade, such concern could be found behind most of the professionalizing measures of the day. I.P., for instance, served as a vehicle for the entry of foreign methods and notions. These included the use of direct mailers as well as the opinions of prominent foreign admen such as Belgian agency director Fernand Hourez. From the start, these ideas arrived laden with notions of prosperous modernity whose pursuit was I.P.’s self-proclaimed raison d’être. Thus, the magazine’s first issue declared,

[I.P. appears]…under [a] European sign, [with the mission of] informing Spanish admen…about news, events, and measures having to do with Advertising…throughout the world,” having recognized that, “The Common Market is an unquestionable fact that offers our best hope for success, [that] we are nothing without Europe. This fixation on Spain’s ability to operate as an equal within the international community similarly marked the creation and reception of the Estatuto de la Publicidad in 1962. The charter, Fraga declared in his first public statement on the subject, was being created because modern advertising wielded “more money, and thus more influence [on a newspaper], than d[id] its readers.” The reaction in I.P. was immediate, and rooted in the question of Spanish international prestige. “Really,” one anonymous editorialist wrote,

In a country that is trying to integrate itself into Europe, this kind of regulation is long overdue, if what we want is to be able to establish an effective, constructive dialogue with the various [advertising]…organizations of the Old World. If we admit – and it is indisputable – that advertising is another facet of the global economic game, this is self-evident. This is nothing more than an initial, but indispensable step.

119 For examples of such comparisons in fashion, see Chapter II, note 146 and 147; for the same within department store retail, see Chapter I, note 114.
123 Ibid.
Overdue or not, such commentary did not stop Alejandro Fernández Sordo, the new President of the National Advertisers’ Syndicate, from invoking the question of Spain’s international status in a more triumphal vein in October 1964. The recently-passed Estatuto, he boasted, did not just achieve the goal of placing Spanish advertising at foreign levels, but, “like so many other achievements during the last twenty-five years,” surpassed them.\textsuperscript{124}

In this spirit of European and global integration, Spain’s agencies invested considerable energy into cultivating connections abroad, taking and then publicizing their work with foreign clients. SAE de RP, for example, included a list of past clients as part of every project proposal packet it prepared for potential client; this list featured the agency’s international accounts prominently, which by 1963, already included the Japan External Trade Organization, based in Tokyo; two separate Spain-based campaigns for the U.S. Department of Agriculture; H.J. Heinz Ltd. of London, and the International Wool Secretariat, a key player in Spanish efforts to integrate into the international fashion community.\textsuperscript{125} This was again about more than simple trade. It was about a discursive as well as monetary investment in a new model of Spanish greatness – about a new national identity, under which Spain belonged to and counted within the western-capitalist international community. And, on a smaller scale, it was about the reidentification of Spanish advertising and specific Spanish agencies as members of, not just participants in, the international advertising community – a subtle but important distinction. Thus, SAE de RP’s promotional literature did not just list the agency’s international clients, but underlined that SAE de RP was an agency with considerable international experience, an

\textsuperscript{124} “La Entrevista del Mes…declaraciones de Alejandro Fernández Soto”.
\textsuperscript{125} “SAE de RP,” AGUN/144/003/008.
extensive network of highly accomplished foreign contacts and references (often listed as well), and a dedication to executing international as well as domestic campaigns.\textsuperscript{126} SAE de RP, in other words, cast itself as an organization of international rather than strictly national scope. This was fitting, given that even the domestic enterprises whose business the agency solicited, including Almacenes Jorba, often showed a marked interest in foreign consumption and commercial practices.\textsuperscript{127}

The integration of SAE de RP and other Spanish advertising and PR agencies into the broader international advertising community unfolded most dramatically through the professional affiliations they pursued as part of the professionalization of their trade. These included domestic organizations such as the AEA or CENERP as well as international groups like the International Public Relations Association (IPRA). Coincidentally, some of the first advertisers to so affiliate worked for Galerías Preciados rather than an ad agency, and became linked to the Intercontinental Group of Department Stores when the store joined that group several years before SAE de RP’s founding. But Spain’s ad agencies were not far behind – and Maestre, and with him SAE de RP, were again among the vanguard. Following his initial exposure to public relations in 1958, when he coincided in Belgium with IPRA’s annual meeting, and with Lucien Matrat, the father of European public relations, by 1962 Maestre was enrolled in PR correspondence courses through Italy’s \textit{Instituzione Superiore Internazionale per lo Studio delle Relazioni Publiche}; joined the Institute for Public Relations of London and the PRSA by 1963, and

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Along with Jorba, other potential domestic clients included the MIT and the Barcelona department store Gales. For SAE de RP and Gales, see Ibid., and also, “Gales, S.A. – Semblanza de la Compañía,” 7 Dec., 1963, AGUN/144/003/004; “Operacion ‘Falsa Compra’,” 22 Jan., 1965; AGUN/144/003/004; and, “Gales, S.A. – Rapport de Trabajo No. 4,” n.d. [1964], AGUN/144/003/005. For SAE de RP’s proposal to the Ministry of Information and Tourism, see “Ministry of Information and Tourism Campaign Proposal,” n.d., AGUN/144/009/002; and for another such proposal, “Análisis de la Situación actual de la Costa Brava y Estudio de una posible Acción de Relaciones Públicas en pro de la misma,” n.d., AGUN/144/009/002.
after a year-long application process, joined IPRA in 1964.\footnote{Rodríguez Salcedo, 287. For the ISIRP course, see Joaquín Maestre to Dottor Guido de Rossi, 4 Jan., 1962; ISIRP, “Quota partecipaciones Corso ISIRP,” 11 Jan., 1962; and, Joaquín Maestre Morata to Guido de Rossi del Lion Nero, 20 Sept., 1962, all in AGUN/144/490/001. For Maestre’s memberships in 1963, see “Information for the International Wool Secretariat,” 4 July, 1963, AGUN/144/003/001. For Maestre and IPRA, see Correspondence between Joaquín Maestre Morata and Guido de Rossi del Lion Nero, IPRA General Secretary, 8 Apr., 1963 – 12 July, 1963, AGUN/144/490/001; John A Keyer, Chairman, IPRA to Joaquín Maestre Morata, 8 May, 1963, AGUN/144/490/001.}

All of these memberships benefitted and indirectly included SAE de RP, but this last affiliation in particular advanced SAE de RP’s status and work in several ways. First, membership in IPRA, which styled itself as an association of the world’s elite PR specialists, carried with it a code of conduct – a staple of Hall and Wilensky’s model of professionalization – that Maestre was obliged to impose on his agency. SAE de RP literature touted this fact as a “label of guarantee[d quality].”\footnote{Guido de Rossi del Lion Nero to Joaquín Maestre Morata, 12 June, 1963, AGUN/144/490/001; “International Public Relations Association Code of Conduct,” in “International Public Relations Association Application for Membership – José Manuel Rico Zorrilla,” n.d. [1968-1969], B AGUN/144/003/003; “SAE de RP,” AGUN/144/003/008. For Hall and Wilensky, see Hall, 93; and, Wilensky, 139, 141, 145-146.} IPRA membership also furthered the agency’s ability to represent itself as part of an extensive international network with headquarters in a host of world capitals. Indeed, late 1960s and early 1970s correspondence between Maestre, IPRA leadership, and Spanish admen José Rico Zorrilla, Manuel Ortiz, and others reveals that by this time, Maestre, had assumed a leadership role as IPRA’s liaison with its Spanish members, which involved him in decisions on membership and sundry other association business.\footnote{For Maestre’s involvement in membership applications, see for example, Joaquín Maestre Morata to Manos B. Pavlidis, 13 Jan., 1969, AGUN/144/490/004; and, Joaquín Maestre Morata to Jean-Jacques Wyler, 30 Apr., 1971, AGUN/144/490/005. For Maestre and late dues, see, Joaquín Maestre Morata to Keith Kentropp, 3 May, 1971, AGUN/144/490/005; and, Memorandum from Keith E. Kentropp, Honorary Treasurer, to Messrs. Traverse-Healy, Pavlidis, Wyler, Buckle, and appropriate corresponding Council members, n.d. [1972], AGUN/144/490/005. For Maestre as Corresponding Council Member, see Robert L. Bliss to Joaquín Maestre Morata, 7 Dec., 1965, AGUN/144/494/003; and, D.H. Buckle to Jean-Jacques Wyler, 7 Nov., 1972, AGUN/144/490/005.}

Maestre and SAE de RP’s integration into IPRA’s international network only grew as a result of his (and SAE de RP’s) work coordinating IPRA’s annual meeting in
1966, which Maestre hosted in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{131} Over the course of almost a year’s time, Maestre corresponded extensively with top IPRA leadership, with whom he worked closely to organize the meeting, as well as with members as far away as India.\textsuperscript{132} He collaborated with Georges Serrell, a past president of IPRA and one of Europe’s most important admen, and traded barbs with former association president John Keyser as well as fellow member Francis Shuster over the conference’s promotional literature. He flirted with Denny Griswold of the New York-based \textit{Public Relations News}. And via a steady stream of conference-related correspondence, he cultivated a friendship with Connecticut State Senator Robert Bliss, who was IPRA’s sitting president, highly-placed in the PRSA, and Director of the Robert L. Bliss & Co. ad agency.\textsuperscript{133}

The meeting itself illustrated the hopes that Spanish admen hung on this push to affiliate internationally. Spanish Development Plan Deputy Secretary Vicente Mortes delivered one of the inaugural speeches on, Spain’s position, past, present and future in the world of affairs; the importance of meetings of this type to the development of world understanding, and the stake that Spain has in a fuller understanding of its development potential in the congress of nations for a peaceful world with greater enjoyment of the potential

\textsuperscript{132} Such figures included future IPRA Secretary Manos Pavlidis, from whom he secured membership lists, serving IPRA President Robert L. Bliss, and a series of other well-known figures. For Manos Pavlidis, see for instance, Joaquin Maestre Morata to Manos Pavlidis, 15 Apr., 1966, AGUN/144/490/002; for other IPRA figures, see below. For New Delhi, see, Joaquin Maestre Morata to Satya Prakash, 29 Mar., 1966; AGUN/144/490/002.
that is in the soul of man.\textsuperscript{134}

This claim was loaded. Mortes’ speech reveals that to the regime, the IPRA conference, like other international conferences that Spain hosted during this period, represented an opportunity to claim for the country more ties of greater importance to Europe and the wider world. It also was an opportunity to sell a new version of Spanish national identity, one rooted in global political and economic influence, to the conference’s prominent foreign attendees. Mortes lingered on Spain’s recent industrial and commercial achievements and its growing levels of investment from abroad. He also noted public relations’ role in aiding economic growth throughout the world through the dissemination of information and stressed especially its service to Spain’s economic development. Lastly, Mortes closed by underlining the importance that the meeting, as a result of being held on Spanish soil, had “for the development of [mutual] international understanding.”\textsuperscript{135}

These ambitions toward a greater Spanish prominence abroad as well as Joaquín Maestre’s increased foreign involvement gained added force by virtue of coming at a moment when IPRA’s own international profile was growing substantially. In September 1964, after three years of lobbying, the association had won consultative status with the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council.\textsuperscript{136} IPRA’s mission had already been grandly international in scope – to set an international standard for public relations and

\textsuperscript{134} Joaquin Maestre Morata to Laureano López Rodó, 29 Apr., 1966, AGUN/144/494/004; Joaquin Maestre Morata to Laureano López Rodó, 18 June, 1966, AGUN/144/494/004; and, Joaquin Maestre Morata to Vicente Mortes, 18 June, 1966, AGUN/144/494/004.

\textsuperscript{135} “Información para prensa: Inauguración oficial de la asamblea de la Asociación Internacional de Relaciones Públicas en el salon de ciento del ayuntamiento de Barcelona,” n.d. [26 May, 1966], AGUN/144/494/003. For other conferences hosted in Spain during the 1960s, see for example, L.G., “El G.I.G.A., en Sevilla,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 113, Year XII (June, 1961), 6.

establish a global network for the exchange of professional knowledge.\textsuperscript{137} Now, the organization began to consult with the UN Commission on Human Rights concerning aid to underdeveloped and developing countries, and in 1966 issued a report recommending measures like the creation of talent-identification and public relations professional development programs for candidates in such nations.\textsuperscript{138}

This new form of outreach represented another opportunity for Spanish involvement abroad, and indeed, Joaquín Maestre joined IPRA’s humanitarian work in May 1966, submitting a proposal for IPRA-organized public relations campaigns to support UNESCO’s efforts to fight global illiteracy.\textsuperscript{139} As Vicente Mortes did for Spain, IPRA made claims to global influence and moral authority, in this case the ambition of making public relations and IPRA itself, “a force for human betterment, for world progress, and for the elimination of those elements which threaten our civilization and, indeed, our very existence”\textsuperscript{140}. Maestre himself aspired through IPRA to nothing less than “…expan[ding]…consumer markets all over the world, rais[ing] the level of education, and [helping people] attain…a higher standard of living.”\textsuperscript{141}

Finally, as historian Núria Puig has noted, Spain’s admen and agencies also pursued ties abroad through mergers and contracts to represent foreign agencies locally, while other European and American agencies opened offices in Spain directly.\textsuperscript{142} In 1963, Alas proudly became the J. Walter Thompson ad agency’s sole Spanish representative. J.

\textsuperscript{137} For IPRA’s professional aims, see “Pamphlet on the IPRA association”, Nov., 1971, AGUN/144/490/004.
\textsuperscript{138} Untitled Report on IPRA Liaison to the U.N. Activities, n.d. [mid-1966], AGUN/144/494/004.
\textsuperscript{139} Joaquin Maestre Morata to Ernst Kottow, May 1966, AGUN/144/490/002.
\textsuperscript{140} Untitled Report on IPRA Liaison to the U.N. Activities, n.d. [mid-1966], AGUN/144/494/004.
\textsuperscript{141} Joaquin Maestre Morata to Ernst Kottow, May 1966, AGUN/144/490/002.
Walter Thompson later opened its own office in 1966, reestablishing a presence the agency had not had in Spain since 1936. In December 1964, France’s Synergie agency took over Publicidad Tiempo of Barcelona, becoming Tiempo-Synergie, which *I.P.* interpreted as an indication of “the interest being garnered by the business possibilities on offer in Spain.” By 1965, too, the American multinational ad agencies Colmon, Prentiss & Varley, and Kenyon & Eckhardt had each established branches in Spain. But the outstanding example of this trend was the merger in late 1963 between the Ruescas ad agency and the North American advertising juggernaut McCann-Erickson, becoming Ruescas-McCann-Erickson, S.A.

The new agency’s literature and ads announcing the merger spoke eloquently to what the firm either truly believed about the fusion, or otherwise to what it wished to publicize about this event and therefore believed was deployable discourse concerning its choice to forge such ties to the American business world. In a two-page special announcement from June 1963, the agency referred to the hyphen connecting the Ruescas and McCann Erickson names as “the most significant…to have ever been placed in Spanish advertising,” because it was “like a bridge [connecting] the Spanish prestige and ability of Ruescas” with the world-class McCann Erickson agency. Per the ad, this was a watershed moment for Spain: over this bridge a mass of personnel would flow between Spain and the wider world, and foreign expertise would enter from the United States.

143 “Noticias de las agencias – Alas, Compañía General de Publicidad, Sociedad Anonima, se ha establecido definitivamente en el Edificio Lima,” *I.P.*, No. 4 (June, 1963), 41; Puig, 2, 14-15. Worth noting too is that earlier, from the postwar through to its partnership with Alas, J. Walter Thompson had worked through another Spanish agent, none other than Ruescas.
146 For a brief account of the negotiations surrounding Ruescas Publicidad’s merger with McCann-Erickson, see Puig, 14-15.
147 “El más significativo guión que se coloca en la publicidad en España, Ruescas-McCann Erickson,” *I.P.* No. 4 (June, 1963), 16-17.
benefitting McCann Erickson’s clients, the media, admen in Spain who would have a greater opportunity to cultivate and expand their talent, and most especially, Spanish consumers.\textsuperscript{148} The spacial and modern new offices that the agency occupied offered another, this time visual representation of its self-proclaimed international identity: an entryway that featured a relief map of the world – the agency’s new sphere of action – and reflected the firm’s new logo, which incorporated a pair of globes (see Figures 3.5).

Figure 3.5: Agency Logo and Entrance, Ruescas-McCann-Erickson, S.A.

The result of both these types of affiliation, as well as the rhetoric coming out of \textit{I.P.}, was an erosion of boundaries. This was an at times subtle rather than spectacular process, manifesting not in direct declarations like Sears’ claim that on the day it launched a new Spanish branch in 1975, “borders did not exist,” but gradually, through an elevation of Spanish advertising to international respectability.\textsuperscript{149} It proceeded via articles such as \textit{I.P.’s} celebratory May 1963 coverage of Spain’s participation in the Lyon International Products Show; in motivational research pioneer Dr. Ernest Dichter’s stops in Spain during his European lecture tours, stops that \textit{I.P.} contributor Jaime Puig termed...
“obligatory…”[because Spain’s] ad and businessmen are up-to-date on everything having to do with good motivational research…”; and in Joaquín Maestre’s speeches before the 1966 IPRA assembly, which stressed that Spain’s Public Relations was not yet “with it” but would soon be “not only…with it but w[ould] be way out ahead.”

Through the connections that Maestre and others like him fostered, the advertising communities of Western Europe and the United States converged with Spain’s. This contributed to Spain’s larger integration into the Western European and American capitalist-democratic commercial community and chiselled away at remaining notions of Spanish difference.

As I.P. reader Roldán Martínez asserted in an article, “NO to “Spain is Different”,” in which he responded to Fraga’s famous 1964 tourist slogan,

[While] there is no doubt about the quality of the phrase “Spain is different”…[as] a strong phrase that, in a moment in which the flow of tourists [into Spain] has already begun, awakens interest without the need to explain what Spain was and is…unfortunately, due to a number of factors that do not require discussion here, Spain does not currently enjoy “good press” internationally. Europe (and I refer to this continent in particular because it produces the majority of our tourists), does not know us, interprets us wrongly. Europe without a doubt has preconceived notions concerning Spain.

Spain is different, to be sure; but not by the average European’s measure. Spain has cars, radio, TV, industry and many other things besides flamenco, bulls, and donkeys with drinking jugs [botijos].

Martínez’s editorial offers a necessary qualification to Justin Crumbaugh’s argument that “normalization does not exclude difference.” As Francoist Spain

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modernized, Crumbaugh argues, discourses of a folkloric, touristic national difference such as Fraga’s slogan were not conservative holdovers, but a display behind which the regime could obscure its increasingly obvious political exceptionality. And because it was “overtly hollow” in content – because those who mattered were aware of the ploy – this display of difference did not impinge on the nation’s growing self-congratulatory belief in its successful achievement of modernity.\textsuperscript{152} Such a trick, though, could only work when onlookers accepted that modernity and this touristy cultural difference could coexist. Martinez’s editorial reveals two ways in which this strategy could and did go awry, both of which sparked the adman’s indignation. First, Fraga’s narrative of Spanish difference could be mistaken as sincere, undermining Spanish claims to having become a modern Western European state. And, secondly and relatedly, foreign consumers ignorant of Spain’s modernizing achievements could, under the combined effects of Fraga’s slogan and the “preconceived notions” Martinez cited, conclude that Spain was indeed “different” – that is, not fully developed, not modern.

Yet Spain’s admen, and Maestre specifically, deployed these same discourses of difference as they pursued international ties. They represented Spain to the foreign gaze – to the visiting colleagues with whom they sought those ties – in the very culturally reductionist ways that Manuel Fraga and ambassadorial groups like the Sección Femenina’s folkloric song and dance troupes employed.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, as they planned the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{152} Crumbaugh, 38-39.
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1966 IPRA conference, Maestre and his team at SAE de RP scheduled a program of events filled with supposedly typical cultural experiences, including the chance to participate in a bullfight (featuring goat-sized calves rather than full-grown bulls) staged in a ramshackle, purpose-built ring outside of Barcelona – a part of Spain where bullfights were not nearly as synonymous with local culture as was the case in, for example, Andalucía – and accompanied by a joking rulebook-cum-waiver titled, “Bullfighting without Toil” that digested the affair into cultural kitsch. At one planning meeting in January 1966, Maestre and his staff mulled over a list of potential conference souvenirs dominated by similarly stereotypical products such as castanets, mantillas, peinetas, Toledo-forged letter-openers, and bullfighting programs inscribed with attendees’ names. And they promoted the conference with fliers that, in addition to images of Barcelona’s Columbus Monument, also featured flamenco dancers and beach scenes that sold well to these business travelers-cum-tourists, but which represented a largely flattened, uniform vision of Spanish culture and national identity (see Figure 3.6). This was exacerbated by Maestre’s choice of the quintessentially Spanish figure of Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote as the cartoon logo for the conference (see Figure 3.7), which Maestre followed up on by commissioning wooden Quixote statuettes – one of the options discussed the previous January – as conference souvenirs.

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154 The booklet, for instance, repeatedly underlined that the calves only spoke Spanish; glibly (if also, for safety’s sake, wisely) jettisoned whole portions of the traditional bullfight, including the matador’s sword and the banderillas or darts that the bullfighter traditionally lance into the bull’s back; and asked, in the event of an injury, if the prospective matador wanted a “smashing blonde, mysterious brunette, [or] fiery redhead” as their nurse. See Fernando Díaz de San Pedro, “Pamphlet – Bullfighting without Toil”, AGUN/144/494/003; “Photograph – Bullring and Novillada [bullfight featuring a calf]”, n.d. [1966], AGUN/144/494/004.


Conclusions

The heyday of Spanish advertising was still some years away. A second wave of international affiliation would arrive by the mid-1970s, sweeping up DANIS among other agencies, while Spanish advertising’s own creative revolution, according to adman Julián Bravo, would not arrive till the 1980s. Conversely, for the autoservicio, the halcyon days in which they occupied the vanguard of Spanish food distribution were arguably soon to end with the arrival in 1973 of a powerful new competitor, the hipermercado or hypermarket, superstores imported into Spain by the French store chain Pryca (1973) and the Dutch Cash and Carry chain MAKRO (1974). Still, by the mid-1960s both the Spanish food distribution and grocery trade on the one hand, and the advertising and public relations fields on the other, had undergone a sea change. In the latter instance this was a result of the arrival and spread of the self-service grocery store in and throughout Spain. In the latter it was due to an intense burst of professionalization – an

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157 Puig, 10-11, 23-25.
158 Maixé-Altés, “Americanization,” 18, 20-21, Table 5.
experience that the grocery trade shared – as well as the introduction of public relations to Spain at the hands of Joaquín Maestre Morata.

The transformations these trades experienced were markedly international and internationalizing in character. In 1956, despite having already spread through Europe in previous decades, the supermarket had yet to cross the Pyrenees. Yet ten years later, in great part through the work of the Comisaría de Abastecimientos, autoservicios were a familiar staple in Spanish cities and towns both great and small. With their new, large window-displays, prominent signage, and bright lighting self-service chains like SPAR and VéGé transformed the visual landscape. Autoservicio offered the possibility of rationalizing food distribution in Spain, and thus increasing national prosperity, to degrees never before possible. Consequently, the Comisaría and SPAR worked through women’s magazines like AMA to secure the cooperation of the nation’s housewives, whose place in Spanish society now took on an additional, if ultimately unsubversive importance. At the same time, CAT and SPAR worked to instill a sense of professionalism and raise the level of technical proficiency among Spanish grocers through publication of technical journals like CONAUTA and SPARCO as well as the creation of new training programs.

The professionalization of Spanish advertising and the introduction of public relations were similarly underpinned by acute concern with achieving technical parity with their foreign counterparts. This motivation stretched back to the early twentieth century work of Spanish advertising pioneer Pedro Prat Gaballi, and by the early 1960s existed in the context of a broader anxiety within Spanish society and the Franco regime about Spain’s ability to compete and deal as an equal with its trading partners in Western
Europe and North America. Spanish advertising had begun to take shape as a profession in the late 1940s and 1950s, when a crop of young innovators entered the field, including Maestre and DANIS founder Joan Fontcuberta. Over the course of the early 1960s, this process accelerated with the creation of Spain’s first technical advertising school (1961), of several professional journals in which the nation’s admen would thereafter debate and further shape their trade (1962), and of an official regulatory charter for the profession, passed by the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1964. Meanwhile, Joaquín Maestre had in 1960 founded the nation’s first public relations agency, SAE de RP, and quickly began building that discipline’s fledgling reputation in Spain by taking on prominent international as well as Spanish clients. A wave of internationally-oriented affiliationism meanwhile unfolded, which saw Maestre and other Spanish admen seek ties with international associations like the International Public Relations Association (IPRA), as well as the forging of partnerships between Spanish and foreign advertising agencies. The Alas advertising agency, for example, partnered with J. Walter Thompson from 1963 to 1966, and other agencies merged outright with foreign counterparts as Ruescas and the American giant McCann-Erickson did in 1963. By 1966, the year that Maestre hosted IPRA’s annual meeting in Barcelona, Spanish Advertising, like the nation’s grocery trade, boasted extensive links to commerce abroad. Indeed, Maestre himself merited description in a 1965 letter from IPRA President Robert Bliss to Manuel Fraga as, “a leader in our field, not only in Spain but in professional circles in Europe.”

These processes were not untroubled or without controversy. The unique dirigiste path by which the supermarket came to Spain produced early clashes and ongoing

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159 Robert L. Bliss to Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism, 20 Oct., 1965, AGUN/144/494/003.
tensions between the CAT and private grocers over the extent of the regime’s involvement in running Spain’s autoservicios. These clashes reveal the practical limits and choices the regime faced in trying to harness self-service to its own project of national socioeconomic progress, including CAT efforts to secure housewives’ cooperation with government export drives and its attempts to rationalize Spanish diets. The Ministry of Information and Tourism similarly encountered resistance from Spanish admen as it shaped the profession’s soon-to-be promulgated charter, which contained a controversial grandfather clause that granted professional licenses to trade veterans despite their lack of otherwise mandatory technical schooling.160 The affiliative trend that produced Ruescas-McCann-Erickson also met with a cold welcome by the smaller local agencies that did not command such foreign interest, and, left out of this process, quickly saw the one advantage they had once enjoyed – competitive pricing – disappear in the face of rising demand for multinational agencies’ cutting-edge methods.161 This hostile camp also unexpectedly included Francisco García Ruescas himself, who resigned from the firm he had founded and, in a 1967 speech, “Problematics of Foreign Investment in Spain,” condemned the influence these largely American firms increasingly wielded in Spain. In it, he equated what he called the United States’ imperialist economic colonization of the world with the conquest by force of arms and ideology that the Soviet Union, the great villain of the Cold War, was undertaking.162

Most of all, the coming of self-service to Spain and the rapid professionalization of the Spanish Advertising and Public Relations trades during the early 1960s continued the erosion of early Francoist discourses of Spanish national difference and sociopolitical

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160 For debates over the Estatuto de la Publicidad’s grandfather clause, see note 112.
161 Puig, 11.
162 García Ruescas, Problemática de las Inversiones Extranjeras, 4, 12-14.
separation from Western Europe that the department stores and consumer magazines of the 1950s had set in motion. These notions had already grown increasingly untenable in the face of Spain’s ever-greater diplomatic, economic, but also social convergence with its neighbors and the United States. They became more so as the many grocers who became SPAR and VéGé affiliates during these years, their Spanish customers, and the Spanish admen who joined international organizations or found themselves suddenly working for a newly-absorbed Spanish branch of a foreign multinational, encountered foreign lifestyles, business practices, and new professional colleagues and trade associations. For each of these experiences inserted these Spaniards into an international community of which Spain increasingly saw itself a member, helping to pave the way for Spain’s social transition to democracy, and for its full integration into Europe.
CHAPTER IV

In late 1975, Spain’s youngest department store chain, founded in 1964, launched a new branch on Barcelona’s Avenida Meridiana. For the occasion, the chain, a multinational giant, flew in high-level executives from its European headquarters in Brussels, from its world headquarters in Chicago, and, naturally, from the Spanish central office in Madrid. The international character of and distances traveled by this audience were not lost on the store’s employee bulletin, which waxed rhapsodic: “The … day,” it reported, “came at last. Our most distinguished executives met at the Meridiana store…on that day, borders did not exist.”¹ Two years later, the new branch’s managers again had cause to celebrate, having just bested their Madrid sister store in a friendly inter-city sales competition. This time, the store bulletin printed a photograph of the remarkable way that these Spanish businessmen chose to mark their victory: dubbed the store’s “Confederate high command” by the bulletin, they posed before an American flag, costumed in American Civil War-era Union Army uniforms (see Figure 4.1).²

Though it seems strange at first glance, this choice to celebrate a purely Spanish sales victory through a display of Americana actually made perfect sense. And while the store bulletin’s 1975 article specifically referenced the distances traveled by executives like Chicago-based Vice President of International Operations John F. Gallagher, its claim about Spain’s borders rang true. The store chain, though a staple of commerce in

¹ “Gran…Inauguracion de la tienda de Meridiana!,” Noti-Sears, No. 4 Year IV, (Oct-Dec, 1975).
² It is unclear why the bulletin referenced the Confederacy. There are several possible reasons: the term “confederate” (confederado) was perhaps more exotic than “union.” The article’s unnamed author, presumably Spanish and unfamiliar with the details of the nineteenth-century conflict, may simply erred out of ignorance. Finally, the choice may have been political, meant to draw a parallel between a defiant American South and a culturally similarly rebellious Catalonia.
Madrid and Barcelona, was American in origin. It arrived in Spain as part of a sharp influx of foreign investment driven by the nation’s economic boom of 1959-73. And like Galería Preciados in the 1950s and SPAR in the early 1960s, but more so, this store had since its arrival introduced Spanish customers to new foreign products and emphasized its own as well as Spain’s growing ties to a sophisticated, modernity-laden commerce abroad. Integrally part of a multinational organization that transcended Spain’s social, cultural, and political borders, the store functioned as a hybrid Spanish-American space, the kind that could produce a tableau of Spaniards in American Civil War uniforms. As this took place, the retailer also contributed to the flourishing of the Spanish mass consumer society that had been in development since the 1950s; the similarly long-gestating Americanization and Europeanization of Spanish consumer lifestyles; and concomitantly, the continued integration of Spain into a broader western-capitalist international community. The bulletin’s name was Noti-Sears, and the store was none other than Sears Roebuck & Company.

Figure 4.1: Sears-Barcelona’s “Confederate High Command”

Source: “Barcelona ganó la gran batalla de los satélites” Noti-Sears, No. 36, Year VI (Jan.-Feb., 1977).
Sears was not alone in these contributions. Various scholars have noted the international orientation that marked the expanding Spanish mass consumption of the 1960s; while Sears Roebuck de España represented an especially acute example of how a department store specifically contributed to this foreign interest, its contributions were ultimately symptomatic rather than unique. As the store established itself, Galerías Preciados and other Spanish retailers built new branches in Spanish cities that had not previously possessed such modern commercial venues, transforming the Spanish urban landscape and providing sites in which the nation’s developing mass consumption could take place. If not quite as internationally-linked as the explicitly multinational Sears, Spain’s homegrown counterparts like Galerías Preciados nevertheless displayed an even more pronounced cosmopolitan bent than they had in the 1950s – the culmination of this earlier interest in foreign consumer ways. These stores pursued reputations as world-class commercial landmarks, publicizing their international (especially American) clientele and offering Spanish customers a new crop of foreign products and commercial innovations. Among these products and innovations were gender-bending unisex fashions, sold in novel ‘youth’ departments in which Spain’s otherwise sex-segregated teenagers could mingle over clothes that subverted the regime’s National-Catholic patriarchal gender norms. Meanwhile, a flood of new Spanish consumer magazines promoted these same fashions and alternative gender relations as well as measured spirit of social progressivism encoded therein, further undercutting Francoist patriarchy and at times challenging the regime’s authority directly.

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3 For reference to the international orientation of 1960s and 1970s Spanish mass consumption, see for example Alonso and Conde, 88-90; Crumbaugh, 5; Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, 139-153; Cazorla Sánchez, ch.4, especially 152-155, 162, 171-172; and, Sergio Rodríguez, Busque, compare y, si encuentra un libro mejor, ¡cómprelo!: los anuncios que se quedaron en nuestra memoria (Barcelona: Random House Mondadori, 2009), 34-35. For reference to its precursors in the 1950s, see Alonso and Conde, 137-139.
The principal consequence of this increased turn abroad by Spain’s department stores and consumer magazines was exactly this kind of destabilization of existing mechanisms of social, and to a lesser degree, political control, with particularly dire consequences for the Franco regime itself. This influx of foreign consumer ways and the subversive ideas that accompanied them threatened even the department stores that imported them. Most especially, the totalizing institutional cultures that Galerías Preciados and a few competitors built during the 1940s and 1950s, inspired by the regime’s own social politics, began to deteriorate as store clerks in the new consumption-oriented Spain abandoned their employers’ calls to corporatist self-sacrifice and complete identification with the store. And Almacenes Siro Gay and Galerías in particular also struggled to adapt to changing gender norms as the regime instituted a series of tepid reforms in the early 1960s meant to appease the international community – a community that even Franco himself increasingly (if also reluctantly) sought to join.

As for Franco’s regime, the boom-era intensification of Spanish retailing’s cosmopolitan turn not only subverted its gender paradigm but – concluding a process begun in the 1950s and driven forward by Spanish grocers and admen in the early 1960s – had a profoundly corrosive and ultimately fatal effect on the regime’s founding discourse of Spanish national difference. Sears introduced American products. Galerías Preciados ran employee exchanges with their foreign counterparts. And magazine articles expressed concern over Spanish fashion’s comparative status in Western Europe, establishing Europe and the United States rather than Spain itself as national social, cultural, and political reference points. All of these developments contributed to the circulation of a new, alternative, and internationally oriented Spanish national identity.
Luis Enrique Alonso and Fernando Conde have limited themselves to loosely comparing this shift to a conflation in modern-day Spanish politics current of the concepts of freedom, Europe, and the EEC. Yet this equating of ‘Europe’ with concepts like ‘freedom’ and ‘prosperity’ is precisely what Spain’s commercial cosmopolitanism promoted among the Spanish consumer masses, with far stronger consequences to the regime’s sociopolitical project than Alonso and Conde have recognized. For if early Francoism’s Spain was exceptional, a counter-model for the West’s decadent democracies, the international Spain of the 1960s and 1970s aspired to be an equal, if also an especially economically vibrant and cosmopolitan, member of the Western-capitalist concert of nations.

**Becoming World-Class Stores, Imagining a Cosmopolitan Spain**

The consummation of this process of international integration began with a second wave of rapid expansion at Spain’s premier department stores. Fueled by the booming Spanish economy of the 1960s and early 1970s, this continued and intensified the earlier growth that these stores had experienced during the 1950s. Retailers like Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés built myriad new branches in which an increasingly prosperous Spanish public could consume. They introduced foreign innovations such as a system that produced made-to-measure suits in just four days. They pursued initiatives such as a stress on the need for greater mastery of (mainly foreign) retailing methods and foreign product exhibitions that turned shop floors into international spaces. And, crucially, these stores undertook these measures to win recognition as world-class retailers, and more broadly, to raise Spanish retailing and

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4 Alonso and Conde, 84-85.
5 Ángel Cruz, “Desde Jaén – Ante una nueva sección…Medida Industrial,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 167, Year XVII (Dec., 1966), 11
Spain as a whole to a perceived American and Western European standard of professionalism and modernity. They laid claim to cosmopolitan, modern, and European identities – and performed them before their Spanish as well as foreign customers. And as they did so, these stores also claimed a similarly modern and European identity for Spain.

Between 1958 and 1975, the number and geographic diffusion of major department store branches in Spain rose sharply. Galerías Preciados increased its expansionary pace. The store added branches in provincial capitals such as Cádiz (1958), Seville (1969), and Bilbao (1959 and 1971). In Madrid, Galerías opened Nuevas Galerías (1968), a model store that opened in a brand-new building next to the chain’s flagship branch. And in Barcelona, the store absorbed Almacenes Jorba (1963), which it relaunched in 1965 as Jorba-Preciados.6 The competition, meanwhile, also flourished. Jorba’s takeover took place in response to the opening of El Corte Inglés’ first new location in Spain at a prime spot on the northeastern edge of Barcelona’s Plaza de Cataluña, the center of life in the city. Siro Gay built a bargain “Bazar” store in Ávila in 1960 and two new locations in Valencia in 1961 and 1962. And in 1964 Botas’ main branch added an annex, the Nueva Tienda (“New Store”), which featured a new customer cafeteria that the retailer, reflecting the foreign mania of the times, dubbed its “Snack-Bar” and touted as European in style.7 Lastly, Sears Roebuck launched its new Spanish

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Corporation in September 1964 and opened its first branch on Barcelona’s Plaza de Calvo Sotelo in 1967, followed by a second on Madrid’s upscale Calle Serrano (1971); another on Barcelona’s peripheral Avenida Meridiana (1975); and a constellation of “satellite stores” – neighborhood outlets that operated in partnership with the chain’s three branches.  

Organizationally, these stores continued to grow by offering customers new services like in-store supermarkets and adding new layers of experiences to the workplace cultures within which their employees operated. Most notable among the latter were a series of employee bulletins launched at Siro Gay (“Gay”: Revista Mensual de Almacenes Siro Gay, launched 1957), Almacenes Botas (Boletín de Botas, 1962), Sears (Noti-Sears, launched 1968 and relaunched 1971), and El Corte Inglés (Cortty, 1969). As at Galerías, these new magazines occupied a central place in their stores’ institutional cultures, serving as clearinghouses for messages from management, company news, and with the exception of Cortty, social announcements. Notably, while Cortty was more strictly practical and less given to preaching about retailing’s spiritual

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9 For Galerías’ self-service department and other new consumer services, see See Toboso, Pepin Fernández, 240-242; Zafra Aragón, 53. For more on Galerías’ in-store supermarkets see also, “Transcript – Interview with Jorge Fernández Menéndez, Galerías Preciados,” n.d., AGA-CAT 29645/1, Subfolder 4; and, “Press clipping – Boletín de Cámara de Comercio,” AGA-CAT 29645/1, Subfolder 4.

10 Other workplace initiatives included the introduction of summertime vacation packages to the Mediterranean coast, which continued the Club de Galerías Preciados’ earlier work of colonizing clerks’ private lives. See for instance, “Vacaciones Veraniegas para Nuestro Personal,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 130, Year XIV (Mar., 1963), 5.

virtues than its counterpart at Galerías, it did share some of the latter’s totalizing impulse in the form of content that sought to guide employees in their romantic and medical choices beyond the workplace, as well as their professional lives.¹²

Driving this new and unprecedented wave of expansion was a similarly heightened concern, shared by managers at Galerías Preciados, Botas, El Corte Inglés, and Siro Gay, with their respective stores’ prestige abroad and ability to meet the expectations of Spain’s growing flood of foreign tourists. This spurred managers to stress more than ever the need for employees to constantly improve themselves professionally, and especially to master técnica – the technically sophisticated professional knowledge that was similarly becoming a major concern in the Spanish grocery and advertising trades.¹³ Throughout the early 1960s, Botas and Galerías Preciados executives like Galerías legal counsel Blas Sandalio Rueda harped on the importance of formación (professional development), declaring this a moral as well as professional imperative, and warning that failure to achieve technical mastery would render Spanish retailers internationally uncompetitive.¹⁴

When not expressed so directly – one 1963 Boletín de Botas article likened underdeveloped Spain to Africa’s impoverished former colonies – this foreign fixation instead fueled suspiciously strident boasts of having already achieved world-class status

¹² For the magazine’s professional content, see for example, “Nuestro Apoyo Publicitario,” Cortty, year No. 6, Year II (Apr., 1970): 10; for its efforts to regulate employees’ private choices, see for instance, “Estimular los deseos – AMOR,” Cortty, No. 9, Year II (Aug., 1970), 10.
¹³ Notably, this drive toward professionalization built on the tradition of professional development that these stores had established in the 1940s and 1950s. See Chapter I, notes 19, 36, 39-40. For preoccupation over technical mastery in the grocery and advertising trades, see s, notes 73, 88-89, 112.
and initiatives that projected such a cosmopolitan image.\textsuperscript{15} At Botas, for instance, this included measures such as window-displays that praised the public relations work of the special commission (headed, notably, by Galerías’ José Manuel Fernández) in charge of managing Spain’s highly popular pavilion at the 1964 New York World’s Fair.\textsuperscript{16}

Galerías Preciados courted this kind of cosmopolitan reputation most of all. There was ample precedent for this in the store’s constantly (and publicly) restated official memory. This memory had as early as 1934 and Sederías Carretas’ founding linked both Galerías and its founder Pepín Fernández to commerce beyond Spain, especially to Havana’s El Encanto department store, and located these ties as part of a larger transatlantic relationship between Spain and Cuba.\textsuperscript{17} These claims only grew in frequency after the Cuban Revolution and El Encanto’s razing in 1961. They were particularly evident in bulletin articles that emphasized the Cuban store’s influence on Galerías’ institutional culture, and in Pepín’s own behavior. He joined a newly formed Spanish aid society for Latin American immigrants, began to hire Cubans and returning Spanish émigrés fleeing Castro, and later celebrated when several of these exiles achieved the rank of interesado in 1964. This he took as an opportunity to publicly remember Galerías’ departed “sister across the sea and….spiritual womb.”\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16} “Correo,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 19, Year III (May, 1964), 5.

\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, in various hagiographic texts on Pepín Fernández, the physical embodiment of Galerías in the store’s official culture, these ties reached back beyond the chain’s founding to El Encanto, where Pepín developed the skills he later used to build Galerías Preciados. See, for instance, José Maria Pérez Lozano, “El nombre y el hombre,” \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados}, No. 192, Year XX (May, 1969), 2; and, Elvira Daudet, \textit{Los Empresarios} (Barcelona: DOPESA, 1974), 74-76.

\textsuperscript{18} “Honor y Responsabilidad: Los nuevos interesados, Palabras de nuestro Presidente,” \textit{Boletín de GP}, No. 138, Year XV (Jan 1964), 14-15; Toboso \textit{Pepín Fernández}, 322. Among the later figured José Suárez Murelle, who returned to Spain in 1961 and worked in Galerías during the late 1960s as an administrative assistant, before retiring in 1969. See “Jubilados,” \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados}, No. 191, Year XX (Apr.
Prompted by the newly common sight of foreign tourists, businessmen, and American military personnel in the early 1960s, Galerías redoubled its efforts to attract this potential foreign clientele and to proclaim itself a modern and internationally oriented establishment. The store published testimonials from American customers like U.S. Air Force Col. Raymond Buckwalter, former commander of the Torrejón de Ardóz (Madrid) airbase. It also hosted special events for American customers, like special fashion shows for the ladies of Sevilla’s San Pablo airbase. Through such initiatives Galerías represented itself as a world-class store that appealed to Americans as well as Spaniards, and thus as a key figure in the warming relationship between the two nations. Col. Buckwalter echoed this discourse in his testimonial, declaring, “I’d dare say that ‘Galerías Preciados’ plays a large role in bettering the relationship between our two countries.”

Galerías also maintained a much-publicized corps of interpreters that embodied the store’s international orientation. Local interpreters like Carmen Tarrazo, who Col. Buckwalter declared to be “the best friend the American woman has in Spain,” and foreign-born colleagues like Dutch student Jetty Kentie, who worked at Galerías while in Madrid improving her Spanish, mingled with one another and the store’s multicultural clientele. This placed the store’s Spanish clerks and customers alike in contact with

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1969), 3. Indeed, Pepín even maintained ties with Cuba’s ousted ex-president Fulgencio Batista. See Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 322.
19 For the arrival of American businesses to Spain in the 1950s, including the American Express Company, Hilton Hotels, and Hollywood producer Samuel Bronston’s film studio, see Neal Moses Rosendorf, “Be El Caudillo’s Guest: The Franco Regime’s Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of U.S. Tourism to Spain,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 3 (June, 2006): 367-407. For growing American tourism to Spain, see Ibid., 385; Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, chs. 4-5.
21 Ibid.
individuals from other, more democratic European societies. Kentie’s story was especially common in reverse – Galerías employees frequently participated in exchanges with sister stores abroad, as when the store sent telephone operator Paquita Martínez Almazán to better her English at Selfridge’s in 1964.

These and other such interpersonal cultural encounters, of just the sort that tourism to Spain contemporaneously produced, directly and plainly eroded Francoist notions of Spanish national difference. Ramón Hernández, who spent December 1961 at Stockholm’s Ahlen Holm department store, reported finding the Swedish capital strange, but only because of its weather and urban layout, not its residents. Almazán was still more direct about her time at Selfridges: “not for a moment,” she reported, “did I feel as if in a foreign country, for everyone gave me a wonderful welcome.” Like Hernández, she missed sunshine, and Galerías’ idiosyncracies, but did not perceive Londoners as alien.

Occasionally, even these stores’ physical spaces became international zones, as they played host to special exhibitions of foreign products and lifestyles such as 1962’s “París en “Galerías”,” 1966’s “Norteamérica en “Galerías”,” as well as three “Extremo Oriente” (Far East) events held at Botas and Galerías Preciados between 1964 and 1973. Perhaps the most notable example of this phenomenon took place in 1970 at El

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23 “Seis Meses en Londres: Paquita Martinez Almazan (Centralita Telefonica),” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 139, Year XV (Feb., 1964), 5.
Corte Inglés’ Bilbao branch, where in response to a craze for English fashion then sweeping through Spain, the store created an “English Men’s Shop.” This boutique-like space, which was set apart from the rest of the store by dark wooden walls with columns shaped like Big Ben and a separate corps of sales clerks dressed in special English-style uniforms, offered every male-gendered English-made product that the store sold in a single boutique-like space.26

Lastly, capitalizing on its status as Spain’s premier department store, Galerías Preciados began in the late 1950s to pursue organizational ties with foreign counterparts. Galerías’ 1958 readmission to the Intercontinental Group of Department Stores linked the Spanish store to august names such as Selfridge’s, Karstadt, and Japan’s Takashimaya – all fellow members.27 Of the well publicized foreign delegations that visited Galerías, many came from these stores.28 And, in 1964, Galerías’ relationship to North American retailing developed more formal and monetary ties akin to Spanish ad agencies’ affiliationism when the store sold a ten-percent share to Federated Department Stores, Inc., Macys’ parent company. News of the sale, tellingly, broke at a joint Spanish-American colloquium on Spanish industry that was held entirely in English.29

Spain’s most active department stores, then, displayed a pronounced cosmopolitan bent. Botas pushed employees to embrace Asturian culture for subsequent consumption by the store’s foreign tourist-cum-customers and self-consciously insisted

27 Galerías had initially joined the IGDS in 1951, but temporarily left the group in 1957, as the import restrictions that the regime maintained at the time prevented the chain from enjoying many of the benefits IGDS membership provided. The reforms of 1958-1959 remedied this situation, prompting the store’s reincorporation. See Chapter II, note 141, and Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 262-264.
28 Perhaps most notable among these visits was the IGDS’ XIII Sales Promotion event, which Galerías hosted in 1961 at its Sevilla branch, and which the Boletín chronicled in detail and discernible pride. L.G., “El G.I.G.A., en Sevilla.” For others, see Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 264-265.
29 José Antonio Flaquer, “‘Galerías’ agasaja a los analistas financieros norteamericanos,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 146, Year XV (Nov., 1964), 3-4.
on its world-class status. Galerias, with its Cuban roots, offered ordinary Spaniards the ability to buy products from across the globe while surrounded by similarly diverse shoppers and clerks, the latter of whom enjoyed a support network that facilitated travel abroad. Certainly, these stores’ aims differed. Almacenes Botas, as the CAT had done with the supermarket, aspired to achieve a European standard of service and modernity that its own discourse deemed still beyond reach. Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, by contrast, already considered themselves beacons of modernity, and in the former case, the equal of its IGDS colleagues. Meanwhile Cortty boasted in 1970 that Spanish merchants and consumers felt “neither inferior, nor provincial, nor backwards,” and store executive Cesar Conde quipped, “From Japan I would only bring …the customers.”

Department Stores, the Built Environment, and Spanish International Integration

As Galerías and El Corte Inglés grew into international zones, they and other such establishments also transformed the urban areas surrounding them. In so doing, they altered the daily experiences of, and provided encounters with new foreign consumer ways to, an urban populace that ranged beyond those who could afford to shop at these stores. Autoservicios had begun to transform Spanish urban landscapes with their sleek storefronts; Spain’s spreading department stores only accelerated this transformation. They helped remake urban spaces like Madrid’s Puerta del Sol, over which the architecturally incongruous white structure of El Corte Inglés’ flagship store loomed (see Figure 4.2), or the city’s Plaza de Callao, which in 1966 saw the historic Hotel Florida

replaced with Nuevas Galerías’ concrete face (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).\textsuperscript{31} Granada’s city center was even more sharply transformed when Galerías opened a branch there in 1975.

![Figure 4.2: Puerta del Sol, 1971](image)


![Figure 4.3: Hotel Florida, 1964](image)

![Figure 4.4: Nuevas Galerías](image)

\textit{Source: Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 283.}

The massive new store – second only to the flagship in size – offered pedestrians the spectacle of an expansive storefront, the likes of which the city had never before possessed, ringed with the largest number of display windows in Spain. Its construction

\textsuperscript{31} This last change was so dramatic that urban biographer Ignacio Merino has described the new storefront as “an aesthetic aberration built without shame or respect for its surroundings.” See Ignacio Merino, \textit{Biografía de la Gran Vía} (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2010), 176; Toboso, \textit{Pepín Fernández}, 278-281.
also produced an agreement between Galerías Preciados and the mayor’s office under which the Madrid retailer paid to install new streetlights along the two avenues that bordered the store, transforming the commercial district’s evening landscape. Finally, Galerías-Granada’s arrival touched off a debate concerning the legally-mandated closure of businesses on Saturday afternoons, a policy whose repeal the chain successfully championed. This altered the rhythm of Granadan consumer life, producing new scenes of weekend shoppers walking into Galerías and past its many store windows.

Meanwhile, the growing popularity of the automobile in Spain also began to influence store locations. The number of cars in Spain rose from just 257,000 in 1953 to two million by 1964; indeed, so dense was the traffic in Barcelona by 1961 that the city eliminated its venerable streetcar network to accommodate the automotive flood. As previously in the United States, this embrace of the automobile spurred the development of new commercial areas – shopping centers – well outside traditional downtown commercial districts, to which customers drove rather than walked. Surely inspired by Vizcaya province’s automotive density, which was among the nation’s highest, Galerías Preciados built its second Bilbao branch in 1969 at just such a location: Spain’s first


34 Fundación FOESSA, Informe Sociológico…1966, 77-79; Buisán. Indeed, photographer Eugeni Forcano images of daily life in 1960s Barcelona, many of which featured automobiles in the background, bore at times unintentional witness to their centrality to life in the Catalan capital. See, for example, Eugeni Forcano, Daniel Giralt-Miracle, and Roser Martínez Rochina, Eugeni Forcano: La meva Barcelona (Barcelona: Lunwerg, 2010), 24-25, 28-30, 54-55, 168-169, 172-173.

35 For the automobile as a factor in the rise of shopping centers in the United States, see for example Cohen, ch. 6; and, Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 258-259.
shopping center, which had recently opened on the city’s peripheral Plaza de Zabálburu.

As at Galerías’ other recently-constructed locations, the shopping center’s architecture, which included a subterranean parking garage with space for 1000 cars, betrayed the store’s (and the public’s) growing expectation that life in Spain would soon be thoroughly motorized.36 Galerías Preciados itself fueled this advancing car culture both by hosting events such as the 1969 launch for Spanish car-maker Barreiros’ new SIMCA 1200 model, as well as through Club and store initiatives that offered employees cars at discount prices and placed them in contact with driving schools, directly increasing the number of cars and drivers on Spanish roads.37 By 1970, the automobile was so common a part of the Spanish shopping experience that Cortty declared the American adage of “No parking, No business” similarly an imperative in future store planning in Spain.38

These were also expectations of an impending rise to a specifically foreign modernity, which pervaded the Zabálburu center’s advertising. One newspaper ad run in late 1969 by developers Construcciones Alcorta boasted that, as a result of the Zabálburu project, Bilbao had now joined a “Shopping Center Common Market” – a reference to the European Common Market that had become synonymous in Spain with cosmopolitanism,

36 Nuevas Galerías for instance, featured a parking garage with 250 fixed spaces spread out across three underground levels – in practice, the Boletin underlined, enough space for 400 cars – and tellingly, boasted a new “Parking Packages” service, whereby customers could make their purchases throughout the store and pick them up at a central location in the parking garage. “Visitas a las Obras,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, Special Issue, Year XVIII (Sept., 1968), 4–7; “Las últimas fotografías – Planta y Escaleras en Septiembre de 1968,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, Special Issue, Year XVIII (Sept., 1968), 8.
37 This launch, notably, was a markedly international event both due to its multinational audience, which included companies like Firestone Tires and the Avis car rental group, and Barreiros’ own status as a subsidiary of Chrysler automobiles. In fact, the SIMCA itself was of French, not Spanish design. See “Presentación del “SIMCA 1.200” en Galerías,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 196, Year XX (Nov., 1969), 9; Hugh Thomas, Eduardo Barreiros and the Recovery of Spain (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2009), 186–192; 195; 208–211; 234–237; “Club – Nueva oferta para el carnet de conducir,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 191, Year XX (Apr., 1969), 8; “Venta de coches al personal,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 204, Year XXII (July, 1970), 24
38 “Sin aparcamiento, no hay negocio – el comprador, su coche y el comercio,” Cortty, No. 8, Year II, (June, 1970).
international integration, and prosperity. Another listed Bilbao among the European pioneers of the shopping center, which included world cities like Paris and Frankfurt. And Galerías similarly boasted that its new store, which Pepín Fernández declared to be Spain’s prettiest, was located in the nation’s “most modern commercial zone.”

**Fashion Further Integration and the Erosion of Spanish Difference**

This focus on raising Spain to a foreign standard of modernity and prosperity emerged with similar force in the Spanish consumer press and more specifically the nation’s coverage of Spain’s participation in the world of international fashion. Over the course of the 1960s, the number of consumer magazines circulating in Spain multiplied still more sharply than during the previous decade. Among the new titles that appeared on Spanish newsstands were the haute-bourgeois and avant-garde men’s fashion journal *Don: Revista Masculina Española* (“Don: Spanish Men’s Magazine,” founded 1962); Catalan textile manufacturer PK’s bulletin-cum-fashion newspaper *PK Press* (founded 1966); and the widely-circulating seminal cultural and political journal (and regular target for government censors) *Triunfo* (“Triumph,” launched 1962). As their predecessors

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41 *Don: Revista Masculina Española* (Barcelona, 1963-1967, henceforth *Don*), like *Alta Costura* and *Señor*, was haute-bourgeois in both price and content, costing 150 pesetas per issue, over twice the daily minimum wage, and marketing itself toward an audience wealthy enough to spend thousands of pesetas on clothes each season. Mitigating this, however, was the journal’s biannual frequency, and in a new twist on *Alta Costura’s* situation in the 1940s, the affluent lifestyles that the magazine offered drew rather than repulsed the increasingly consumerist Spanish middle class. See “‘Ud. debe leer DON porque es…’” *Don*, No. 4 (Fall-Winter, 1964). For prices, see Paul Hofmann, “After 25 Years, Franco is Still a Sphinx,” *New York Times*, 19 Apr., 1964, SM36, and “Presupuesto DON,” *Don*, No. 4 (Fall-Winter, 1964). For *Triunfo*’s circulation, see Raquel Maciucci, “Triunfo en Perspectiva,” *Olivar* 1 (2000), accessed 14 Oct., 2008,
had, these magazines displayed a marked penchant for foreign fashion. In these magazines’ pages, too, Spanish journalists boasted or otherwise fretted over the Spanish fashion industry’s place within the international community of fashion-producing nations, and thereby, over Spain’s place within a prosperous postwar West – the same concern that contemporaneously fueled the arrival of the supermarket. And like the grocers who exposed Spanish consumers to European shopping experiences, journalists voiced these concerns, which naturalized the notion that Spain was properly a Western European nation like any other, in a medium where myriad ordinary Spanish readers could see them and internalize this concept of a European Spain.

International fashion was as constant a presence in Spain’s newest fashion journals as it had been in Mujer and Alta Costura a decade earlier. Señor printed reviews of Belgian, German, and Italian fashion shows and lines, as well as surveys detailing what the French were wearing; Triunfo profiled French designer Pierre Cardin; and PK Press noted Hollywood’s sartorial influence in Spain, predicting that Spanish retailers would soon copy foreign counterparts in marketing James Bond’s shirts and ties.42 Most of all, leading into the 1960s these magazines admiringly followed English men’s fashion, with even the regime-sponsored homemaking journal AMA praising its classicism, elegance, and aesthetic hegemony as the global menswear standard. As the 1960s progressed and new styles from London’s Carnaby Street – dynamic, daring, and


youthful – began to make their way into Spain, this originally conservative Anglophilia expanded with ease to include them.\textsuperscript{43} Don, for instance, went from hailing England’s sartorial conservatism during the early 1960s to declaring Carnaby Street “the World Mecca of men’s fashion” in 1967.\textsuperscript{44} PK, meanwhile, named its “Terlenka YOUNG” collection in English and peppered its publicity with English buzzwords, describing the line as its latest “hit,” in an attempt to capitalize on the rising popularity of British popular culture in the 1960s, as exemplified by The Beatles.\textsuperscript{45} It was this Anglophilia, too – an enduring fondness for Bond Street’s traditional elegance as well as Carnaby Street – that in 1970 motivated El Corte Inglés to found its “English Men’s Shop,” which occupied a space explicitly designed to convey the high quality and exclusivity popularly associated with Albion. In fact, the entire section, set atop a 25 centimeter-tall platform, stood literally as well as figuratively above neighboring departments.\textsuperscript{46}

Driving this international focus was desire for Spain to become part of the select international ‘club’ of trend-setting nations, coupled with ongoing anxiety over Spain’s perceived backwardness within an increasingly prosperous Western Europe. Like \textit{CONAUTA} in the grocery trade or \textit{I.P.} in advertising, around 1960 Spanish fashion professionals and consumer magazines began to worry whether Spain’s fashion industry would reach European aesthetic, production, and quality standards, or conversely boasted


\textsuperscript{44} See note 105; “Carnaby Street,” \textit{Don}, No. 7 (1967).

\textsuperscript{45} “Terlenka YOUNG: Una Nueva Moda a Ritmo Joven,” \textit{PK Press}, No. 6 (Feb. 1967); “Ciudades Europeas y su Moda”. For the Beatles and the British Invasion see note 107.

(with suspicious force) about Spain’s growing status as a fashion power. In 1960 Señor, for instance, hoped that the next meeting of the Assembly of European Fashion Industries would see Spain poised to match its colleagues’ achievements. And Men’s Modes warned Spanish tailors in 1966 that their penchant for the cape – now passé – could hinder such progress, while Don instead declared in 1963 that Spain’s technical prowess had “fully integrated [its fashion industry] into [the world of] European fashion design.”

This concern crystallized especially around the Salón Nacional de la Confección, or Spanish National Fashion Show, which debuted in Barcelona in April 1961 and was one of the Spanish fashion industry’s signal efforts to achieve the longed-for European standard. Officially, the show’s purpose was to promote the national fashion industry, yet the shadow of Spain’s past shortcomings vis-à-vis Europe remained fixed in the background of Señor’s coverage. It lurked in praise such as, “the national fashion industry ha[s] never [before] held an event of which it could be truly proud.” It also lay behind the unflattering comparisons that canvas manufacturer José de Calasanz Martí and Señor columnist Sempronio implied when they declared the inaugural Salón’s use of a historic venue to be a European break with Spain’s traditional sacralization of old objects, and the show itself part of the fight to win the respect of Europe’s sartorial hegemons.

The result was that Spanish clothiers, menswear-minded magazines like Señor, and other fashion-oriented professionals increasingly participated in, hosted, and paid

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47 In 1970, Triunfo’s own survey of the state of Spanish fashion would gainsay all of these hopes, concluding that sartorially, Spain remained “Europe, but less” – that is, aesthetically European, but not yet actually able to provide consumers that level of quality. See, “Asamblea General de la Asociación Europea de las Industrias del Vestir,” Señor, No. 20 (Oct., 1960); Los(?),te, “La Moda,” Men’s Modes: The Custom Tailor’s Journal (Edición en Español) (henceforth Men’s Modes), No. 109, Year XXVI (1966), 7; “La Facilidad del Bien Vestir,” Don, No. 2 (Fall-Winter, 1963); and, for Triunfo, José Eduardo Mira, “El sistema de la moda en España,” Triunfo, No. 440, Year XXV (Nov., 1970), 26.

48 “Creaciones de Confecciones Albert, S.A., Empresa que ha participado en el I Salon Nacional de la Confeccion con su marca Bailet’s,” Señor, No. 23 (Summer, 1961).
ever-closer attention to international as well as domestic fashion shows, product launches, and trade conferences, all of which only bolstered the hopes of those advocating for Spanish integration into the world of international couture. Domestically, the National Fashion Show was so successful that it expanded to include women’s wear and became an annual fixture.\textsuperscript{49} Its second and third editions even prompted \textit{Señor’s} Manuel Vigil and Jaime Huguet to boast – betraying their hopes for the show – that “Spain’s fashion industrial firms ha[d] set their watches to the European hour,” and that as a result Spain was no longer “isolated to this side of the Pyrenees… [the] limit of Chateaubriand’s Europe.”\textsuperscript{50} Abroad, various Spanish designers presented the \textit{Menhir} line at Italy’s 1963 XII Festival of Men’s Fashion, to what \textit{Don} triumphantly declared a warm and surprised reception. Spanish barbers likewise entered the 1961 Hairstyling World Cup and 1962 European Hairstyling Championship, to similar acclaim in \textit{Señor}. And in February 1962, Barcelona became the third city to host the International Industrial Measurements Congress.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{The Challenges of Cosmopolitanism}

Unrest accompanied this apparent progress. As store chains like Galerías Preciados transformed Spain’s urban landscapes and rendered Spanish consumer life more international, at Almacenes Botas and Jorba-Preciados, the changing times also

\textsuperscript{49} Thus, for reference to its tenth annual edition, see, “Salon Nacional de la Confeccion, Consagracion de la Maxifalda,” \textit{Cortt}, No. 5, Year II (Mar., 1970), 10.
\textsuperscript{51} “XII festival de la moda masculina en San Remo,” \textit{Don}, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1963); “La Moda 1961 en el Peinado Masculino,” \textit{Señor}, No. 22 (Spring, 1961); “Untitled Hairstyling Photographic Spread,” \textit{Señor}, No. 25 (Spring, 1962); “III Congreso de la Medida Industrial,” \textit{Señor}, No. 26 (Spring, 1962). While the majority of such boasts now appear concentrated in \textit{Señor}, it is likely that these had been common and simply abated as Spain Europeanized during the 1960s, with \textit{Señor} the only magazine old enough to have caught them in print. The few instances of such anxiety in \textit{Men’s Modes} and \textit{Don} support this thesis.
fostered (tame) reassertions of Spain’s minority Asturian and Catalan cultures and languages. At Botas, this fueled cultural events such as bolos (Asturian-style bowling) matches and Asturian Cultural Circles as well as columns in the Boletín de Botas celebrating Asturias’ natural beauty and national character, lent extra folkloric charm by Asturian-language fragments scattered throughout. In one 1963 editorial, too, bulletin contributor “Julio” chastised Asturias’ youth for no longer possessing even basic knowledge of their own culture, Bable and bolos included. Comparatively muted performances of Catalan identity – especially subtle given the muscular expressions of Catalanism developing at this time – similarly began to develop at Jorba-Preciados during the 1960s. For instance, Jorba-Preciados began to honor exemplary employees with a pin shaped like a Phrygian cap or barretina, one of Catalonia’s national symbols, and also participated in local Catalan cultural events.

Still, these particular expressions of regionalism did not pose much of a challenge to the regime or its unitary and centralist conception of Spanish identity. Jorba-Preciados and Botas both reduced regional practices and culture to folkloric curios, stripping them of the ability to describe true alternatives to Francoist Spain’s approved Castilian cultural identity. Jorba-Preciados’ Catalanism simply extended Almacenes Jorba’s participation

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52 There exists an ample, if at times also politicized scholarship on the Franco regime’s storied and often repressive relationship with the Catalan language. For a damning account of the dictatorship’s immediate postwar efforts to stamp out the public use of Catalan, see Josep Benet, *L’intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya* (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1995). For accounts of longer scope, see for instance Josep M. Solé i Sabaté, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya, 1938-1953* (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1985), or Montserrat Guibernau, *Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition, and Democracy* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), chs. 2-3. For a general reference on Catalonia’s trajectory under Francoism, see Centre d’Estudis sobre les Époques Franquista i Democràtica (CEFID), *Catalunya durant el franquisme – Diccionari* (Vic: Eumo Editorial, 2006).


in regional festivals and its inclusion of Catalan in *Revista Jorba* and other printed materials; Asturian culture, from which the Franco regime appropriated what it wished and stigmatized the rest as low culture, presented even less of a threat.\(^{56}\) Thus Botas’ own “Julio” classified the Asturian language and *bolos* as “old,” “local color,” and “tradition,” by contrast with a vibrant, modern (and Castilian) popular culture. And in 1965, when Jorba-Preciados hosted a Spanish cultural exhibition that included the Catalan *sardana* dance, the store presented it as safely part of a unitary Spain’s national patrimony, reinforced by a massive image of Don Quixote – the Castilian symbol *par excellence* – that dominated the store’s façade and the proceedings.\(^{57}\)

If this regionalism failed to present a substantive challenge to the regime as Galerías and other Spanish stores continued to expand, these stores nevertheless did find themselves navigating more serious challenges. Some of these challenges were new, linked to the changing times and these stores’ intensified expansionary pace, while others were an enduring legacy from their earlier growth in the 1950s.

As in that decade, Spain’s premier department stores faced the danger that their increasingly far-flung personnel would lose a sense of connection with one another, of belonging to a single organization. This was especially true at Galerías Preciados, which remained heavily invested in viewing its employees as a professional ‘family’ joined together by genuine bonds of affection born of daily teamwork toward a shared goal, and

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57 Thus too, a 1964 issue of the *Boletín de Botas* featured a traditionally-garbed Asturian cultural troupe dancing and playing the bagpipes in front of an old stone church in the mountains, alongside the caption “Asturias is thus!” See [Cover Illustration], *Boletín de Botas*, No. 21, Year III (Aug., 1964); note 54; and, Mencía, “‘Jorba-Preciados’: El I Salon de la Artesania Española,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 154, Year XVI (July, 1965), 11.
consequently faced its possible atomization. Galerías Preciados continued to make aggressive use of its social structures, including the *Boletín de Galerías Preciados* and the *Club de Galerías*, to foster inter-branch communication and preserve the chain’s traditional shared *esprit de corps*. As the Madrid-based chain added branches, these began to report local news and to profile particularly popular branch employees within an ever-expanding section of the *Boletín* devoted to goings-on at the store’s provincial locations and most especially their local *Club* chapters. While 1957 issues of the *Boletín* featured only a motley assortment of such columns scattered throughout its pages, by the mid-1970s its well-defined recurring sections on the *Club* and other store-wide social activities could take up as much as half of each issue.\(^5^8\)

These activities included one of Galerías’ primary methods for preserving its internal cohesion, particularly as social unrest began to grow in Spain: inter-store tourism. This consisted of sending sales clerks from branches in the Spanish periphery on visits to other Galerías host cities (especially Madrid), where they toured the local Galerías Preciados and befriended colleagues – their extended Galerías “family” – who they had never before met, building camaraderie across the store chain. Such trips were not an entirely new invention. In 1958, for instance, a pair of distinguished employees at Galerías’ Valencia and Barcelona buying offices won trips to Madrid and the flagship...

\(^5^8\) The June-July 1974 edition of the bulletin’s “Caminando por los Clubs” (“Strolling through the Clubs”) section, for instance, which surveyed the activities of the *Club*’s many local chapters, spanned 28 pages alone. It was much shorter in the previous issue, at five pages, but a separate column dedicated specifically to the *Club*’s sports programs spent ten pages on the subject. See “Sumario,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 239 (June-July, 1974), 2; “Sumario,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 238 (Apr.-May, 1974), 2. For social coverage in just one issue of the 1957 *Boletín*, see for example, “Saltos de agua,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 74, Year VIII (July, 1957), 7; Mencia, “Usted “No” Es Así – El Señor Rojo,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 74, Year VIII (July, 1957), 8; “De viaje a las Agencias – Costa nos cuenta sus impresiones,” *Boletín de Galerías Preciados*, No. 74, Year VIII (July, 1957), 10. See also, Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 165-166.
store, whose size, inventory, and density of customer traffic awed them. Yet by the late 1960s, these visits were both more frequent and different in tone. Once just welcome side-effects, the store pride, collegiality, and inter-branch unity that these trips inspired had become their point – and the Club’s reason for organizing them, as the Boletín de Galerías eventually acknowledged in 1975. Thus, in 1969-1970 alone, groups from Valencia, Murcia, Córdoba, Seville, Bilbao, Eibar, and Don Benito all traveled to Madrid with the purpose of at last seeing “their” flagship store and the much-remarked Nuevas Galerías, visits that Pepín Fernández used in a Boletín interview to underline that every Galerías branch and employee formed part of a single “Great Galerías Family.”

The social context for this new inter-store tourism was also much changed, for as Justin Crumbaugh has noted, tourism had by the late 1960s become a “model of thought, a way to frame … [the] experience” of Spain’s boom-era rise to modernity, even as it also represented one of the principal symbols of that same modernity. In Crumbaugh’s signal example, the 1967 comedy film El Turismo es un Gran Inventario (“Tourism is a Grand Invention”), the mayor and town secretary of the village of Valdemorillo travelled to the Spanish beach resort of Torremolinos to personally observe – as tourists – the spectacle of boom-era Spanish tourism. Just so, the Club’s trips turned travelling

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62 Crumbaugh, 9, 22-23.
63 Ibid., 23.
employees into tourists of Galerías’ presence in other Spanish cities, whose employee-denizens and ‘attractions’ – Murcia’s delegation noted the flagship store’s underground parking and cafetería, for example – they took in alongside more mainstream tourist sights and through much the same tourist gaze that the Valdemorillo pair displayed. Indeed, the Galerías-Murcia contingent even responded like their filmic counterparts, resolving to bring this modernity – mass tourism in one case, the flagship store’s modern methods and workplace culture in the other – back home, thus rendering tourism not just a symbol of, or a lens through which to view Spanish modernity, but also a vehicle for its reproduction.\textsuperscript{64}

Store soccer clubs were another community-building strategy used by nearly every major Spanish department store, as well as other kinds of commercial enterprises. They were so common that whole tournaments and leagues formed around these company teams.\textsuperscript{65} By 1963, the Club de Galerías Preciados, which continued to work to insert the store into employees’ leisure activities, had organized such teams at the store’s Las Palmas, Bilbao, Córdoba, and Sevilla branches, as well as at the flagship Callao store. As new store and Club branches opened over the course of the next decade, more teams formed, such that by 1974, it was rare for a branch not to have one – between them, the Madrid stores alone had eight.\textsuperscript{66} Again seemingly in imitation of Galerías, Almacenes Botas’ own Club formed an employee soccer club in 1965, which in one tournament that year faced a squad fielded by the local branch of American soft drink-

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid; Cerón, “Valencia y Murcia nos visitan – Una memorable excursión,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 192, Year XX (May, 1969), 8-9
\textsuperscript{65} See for instance, “Campeonato de Empresa de Fútbol,” Boletín de Botas, No. 28, Year IV (Mar. 1965), 2.
maker Pepsi-Cola.\textsuperscript{67} By 1971, Sears’ Spanish Corporation too had organized a team that the following year placed third in an international tournament for company teams, in which Parisian retailer Prisunic came fourth and last, and El Corte Inglés took top honors.\textsuperscript{68} And these were only these stores’ tournament squads. Both the \textit{Club de Galerías} and Sears frequently organized morale-boosting intramural matches that pitted a branch’s married salesmen against its bachelors, for example, or its executives versus the shop floor, as well as inter-store tests such as 1976 match played between “Meridiana F.C.” and “Real Calvo Sotelo” – representing the two branches that Sears then operated in Barcelona – or a 1974 game between Galerías-Zaragoza and Jorba-Preciados.\textsuperscript{69} They also organized teams and tournaments in other sports such as basketball.\textsuperscript{70}

Galerías and Sears were both open about the community-building motive behind these sports clubs. In a 1974 feature titled “Sport as a Tie of Unity,” the \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados} proclaimed “the fomenting and development of human relations between the [store’s] personnel...[to be] one of the principal tasks and goals of the clubs.” After citing examples of various soccer and basketball matches, the store underscored, “We will achieve the task we pursue of fostering fellowship and understanding between all of the Company’s personnel via different means, but sport is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} FAROAR, “Pepsi-Cola 2, Botas Club 1,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No 29, Year IV (Apr., 1965), 3, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{68} “Brillante Desarrollo: I Trofeo de futbol internacional San Isidro,” \textit{Noti-Sears}, No. 9, Year II (June, 1972), ACRM 296583/1.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Part of a larger meeting between the two stores staged in the Catalan port town of Salou, which also featured performances by regional dance tropes from both stores, this event blurred the line between sport and store tourism, as did a visit to the flagship store that Jorba-Preciados’ men’s and women’s basketball teams made while en route to a nearby tournament. José María Tarrosa, “Arte, Deporte y Hermandad: Barcelona y Zaragoza reunidas en Salou,” \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados}, No. 239 (June, 1974), 74-75; “Visita de Jorba,” \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados}, No. 194, Year XX (July, 1969), 13. For intramural matches at Sears, see for instance, J. María Rubio, “Fútbol: Partido entre Gerentes y Jefes de Sección” \textit{Noti-Sears}, No. 22, Year IV (July, 1974); and, “Gran partido de fútbol: Gerentes contra Jefes de Sección,” \textit{Noti-Sears}, No. 38, Year VI (May-June, 1977).
\end{itemize}
one of the principal ones.” Similarly, an early issue of Noti-Sears lauded Sears’ own sports initiatives, citing their role in cultivating “true conviviality and dialogue for all of us [Sears employees] who should spend most of our days united by a common goal and labor.” More broadly, these sports clubs constituted attempts by managers to manipulate and represent their respective stores’ identities to the employees they oversaw. They were, in other words, what Spanish Public Relations pioneer (and contemporary of Joaquín Maestre) Jaime de Urzaiz termed “internal public relations,” or the act of representing a company to itself. At Galerías, these efforts consequently formed part of the store’s longer-term discursive construction of a “Galerías family” – a kind of imagined community, whose contours were marked by store employment-‘citizenship’ and by shared values of productivity, self-sacrifice, as well as Pepín Fernández’s cult of personality. Football matches contributed to the construction of this family through performance of the same fictive ties of brotherhood, intimacy, and mutual affection that underpinned Boletín articles a decade earlier.

The crucial role that such initiatives played in preserving the esprit de corps that various department stores worked to cultivate within their ranks is highlighted by the outlying case of El Corte Inglés, which expanded quickly during the 1960s, but possessed no Club-style social structure to bind it together. By contrast, after the founding of the

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71 “El Deporte Como Lazo de Unión,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 239 (June-July, 1974), 60.
74 In my use of the concept of the imagined community, I follow Benedict Anderson, who defined nations as imagined political communities inasmuch as members of a nation are likely to never meet, yet consider themselves tied by national sentiment and shared values to their fellow citizens. This label, I argue, could be applied with little adaptation to Galerías, whose rapidly-growing employee ranks encompassed thousands of individuals based at often geographically distant branches, and showed in its discourse pretentions to ‘nation-like’ claims on employees’ loyalties and identities. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 6-7. For “citizenship” at Galerías, see Chapter I, notes 55-72. For ties of affection in earlier Boletín discourse, see note 90-92; and Chapter I, note 50.
seemingly Galerías-inspired *Club de Botas* in 1959, both Galerías and Botas possessed social clubs; at Botas, moreover, the lack of a national store network saved its club from Galerías’ burden of preserving a sense of familiarity between distant employees. Sears Roebuck de España, though it lacked such a formally-constituted social division (the store would finally found one in 1979), was nevertheless active socially, organizing morale-boosting contests, day trips to places like Catalonia’s scenic Sau valley, and of course the store’s sports teams, in addition to using *Noti-Sears* to publicize employees’ personal achievements like Barcelona department head Francisco Ballbé’s successes as a competitive chess player.\(^75\) Siro Gay possessed a store network and lacked a *Club*, but was as of the early 1960s more concerned with the more basic problem of declining sales and resulting overstock than issues of morale.\(^76\) At El Corte Inglés, meanwhile, warehouse worker Jesús Benito Sánchez complained in 1970 that for want of a physical space where employees from different departments could mingle – a staple of every *Club de Galerías* chapter – the store’s warehouse staff had become demoralizingly isolated from the rest of the El Corte Inglés “family.”\(^77\)

Raising the underlying stakes for El Corte Ingles was the fact that these unifying measures responded to not one but two separate challenges that emerged as the 1960s progressed. Alongside the atomization that threatened chains like Galerías, disenchantment with these stores’ cultures of loyal self-sacrifice began to spread among

\(^75\) “Jefe por 14 días: promoción días de Barcelona,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 1, Year I (Nov., 1968); “Con gran entusiasmo la Tienda de Barcelona eligió su ‘Jefe por 9 Dias’,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 8, Year II (May, 1972); “Barcelona – Sau,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 2, Year I (Mar., 1971); F.M., “Dialogando con un campeón,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 12, Year II (Dec., 1972); “Calvo Sotelo-Club de Empleados Sears,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 47, Year VIII (Jan.-Feb.-Mar., 1979), 12.
their employees – and both emerged in step with a growing disaffection in Spain with the politically stagnant Franco regime. Beginning in the mid-1960s, Galerías began to lose a steady stream of veterans, including Jorba-Preciados’ Director-General. This was due to its new practice – a response to the technical demands of the new mass commerce – of hiring and rapidly promoting recent university graduates to positions that the store’s disaffected veterans considered theirs by right of seniority. A loss of investment in Galerías’ official set of values among the store’s remaining ranks meanwhile caused employee volunteerism to plummet by the early 1970s, forcing the store’s employee retirement fund, for instance, to delay elections for its representative to the Ministry of Labor due to a lack of candidates (ultimately one person volunteered). It also drove a sharp drop in attention paid to both official memoranda and the Boletín, a traditional vehicle for the store’s official values and the cultivating of inter-branch community. Indeed, readership of the bulletin had so dwindled by 1971 that the ordinarily sanitized journal noted it bitterly. A critical reading of early-1970s Boletín insistence on the importance of the Club de Galerías suggests that its membership too was falling. Meanwhile, at Botas, employee contributions to the store bulletin had grown so lackluster that the magazine had to delay publication repeatedly, and once printed, complained

78 Antonio Cazorla Sánchez has noted that central to the political consensus that characterized the early dictatorship was not just the regime’s violent repression of any signs of dissent, but also a widespread war-weariness that led the bulk of the Spanish populace to choose resigned, if also fearful, submission to Francoist rule. See Cazorla Sánchez, 4.
79 Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 201-202. See also Zafra Aragón, 79.
about both a lack of volunteerism and a larger decline in employee devotion to duty.\footnote{Examples of such complaints abound, particularly in the recurring humor/gossip column “Y tú que dices” (“And what do you have to say?”). See, for instance, “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 68, Year VII (Jan., 1969), 4; “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 69, Year VII (Feb., 1969), 4; “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 71, Year VII (Apr., 1969), 4; and, “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 73, Year VII (June, 1969), 4. Thus too, the \textit{Boletín de Botas} published columns emphasizing with suggestive force the necessity of virtues such as “participation and responsibility,” followed up with barbs in “Y tú que dices” challenging readers, “what do you do that is praiseworthy?,” or after noting that productivity may be measured both by what one does as well as what one leaves undone, demanding, “in which camp do you belong?” See “Participación y responsabilidad,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 73, Year VII (June, 1969), 3; “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 74, Year VII (July, 1969), 4; and, “Y tú que dices....,” \textit{Boletín de Botas}, No. 75, Year VII (Aug., 1969), 4.}

Such protestations, issued in magazines that were traditionally managerial mouthpieces, themselves represented one attempt by store executives to right their company ships; other attempts included awards for seniority and excellence that began to proliferate at these retailers just as discontent did. In 1959, Galerías introduced its Gold Insignia program, which the \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados} quickly mobilized didactically. It used 1960 insignia recipient Crisanto Ortega both as a model of the store’s embattled culture of loyalty and, because he was well-known across the store chain, as a source of the same unifying sense of familiarity the bulletin had sought to elicit in its 1953 article on Tangier branch head Luis García. To these ends, the \textit{Boletín} lingered especially on Ortega’s raw emotions at receiving Galerías’ highest honor after 25 years of giving everything – even his son, Fabio – to the store, painting an intimate and endearing picture of the visibly shaking veteran’s nerves and attempts to calm himself with a smoke.\footnote{José Javier Alexandre, “Nueva insignia de oro: Crisanto Ortega,” \textit{Boletín de Galerías Preciados}, No. 104, Year XI (July, 1960), 5. For the bulletin’s 1953 article on Galerías-Tangier’s Luis García, see Chapter I, note 50.} In 1968, as social unrest and the commercial threat posed by El Corte Inglés both grew, the \textit{Boletín}’s editors turned to another award, Galerías’ gold keychain for 25 years of service, to underscore the need for “continuity, healthy tradition, and fidelity to [the store’s] normative principles,” especially an unflagging service ethic and sense of
Meanwhile, a series of award statuettes, insignia lapel pins, and medals similarly proliferated at Botas, typically accompanied by speeches that, in keeping with the store’s aspirations to modernity, stressed the need for employees to work hard and improve themselves in order for Botas to succeed in the new mass consumer age.85

Finally, these stores struggled to adapt as Spanish gender politics slowly began to shift. This shift began with the 1958 and 1961 reforms to women’s legal status and continued through the end of the decade as Spanish feminists, housewives’ associations, and the Sección Femenina itself demanded greater public agency for Spanish women, efforts only lent added force by similar campaigns and the rise of second-wave feminism abroad, as well as the Franco regime’s own attempts to appear moderate internationally.86

Initially, Spanish department stores met the mild egalitarianism of these reforms with palpably grudging acquiescence and by questioning their own saleswomen’s professional commitment. In a 1960 interview, for instance, Pepín Fernández doubted younger, supposedly marriage-crazed saleswomen’s professionalism, while two years later, “Gay” warned its shop girls that now that they would be paid like men, they would...

85 Sears, by contrast, granted its own lapel pins for seniority without such philosophizing – however, this was not their purpose, as these awards were administered by the Sears Roebuck & Company parent chain rather than Sears de España. Thus, Edmund Dusek of the Spanish Corporation central office reached 15 years’ service in 1968, just four years into that Corporation’s existence. See “La Gran Familia Sears – Aniversarios,” Noti-Sears, No. 1, Year I (Nov., 1968). For Botas, see for instance, “Mensaje de nuestro gerente a los colaboradores,” Boletín de Botas, No. 30, Year IV (May, 1965), 11-12, 19; and, “El futuro es de aquellos que se preparan para él,” manifiesta nuestro gerente, “Boletín de Botas,” No. 42, Year V (May, 1966), 12-13, 19.
have to also work as hard as them – implying that this had hitherto not been the case, a claim that store executive José Luis Gay later made explicitly. In this same vein, Galerías Preciados’ 1959 revision of its internal regulatory code preserved termination as the default for new brides, even as it incorporated pay equality, and Galerías, a short-lived women’s magazine that the store launched that year, stressed the need to raise properly feminine girls while tepidly defending the modern working woman.

As the decade progressed, and particularly by the early 1970s, more charitable views concerning women’s work gained ground at Spain’s department stores, but skepticism and a continued loyalty to the traditional gendered division of labor also persisted. Thus, Boletín de Galerías Preciados contributor “Manises” declared in 1963 that women were if anything more productive than men, and in 1969, Botas executive Marisol Llerandi González similarly argued that being female had no bearing on one’s professional abilities – statements that moved beyond the paternalistic and perhaps not even sincere affirmations of women’s equal professional potential that had characterized post-1958/1961 responses like José Luis Gay’s. Just so, in 1970, the editors of Cortty made a point of noting that the store’s convivial work culture hinged upon respect for colleagues of the opposite sex, and, if the magazine continued to portray women as

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89 More specifically, responses like Gay’s affirmed women’s equal professional ability, but also their inferior performance to date, by framing the latter as a problem of commitment and motivation, one that in typically paternalist fashion fell upon management to solve through programs and opportunities that would teach saleswomen to have ambition. See note 87. For more progressive responses, see Manises, “También ellas sirven,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 134, Year XIV (July, 1963), 2; Valcarcel, “Quién es Quién – Hoy, Marisol Llerandi González,” Boletín de Botas, No. 70, Year VII (Mar., 1969), 5, 15.
flighty shoppers, it increasingly cast men as equally biddable, and comparatively ill-informed to boot.  
And in 1975, the International Women’s Year, both El Corte Inglés and Galerías Preciados celebrated the landmark event in their bulletins. *Cortty*, the more active of the two, ran columns detailing the Women’s Year and the activities of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women; chronicling the long struggle for women’s legal rights; surveying (with detailed supporting sociological data) Spanish women’s contemporary social and legal status; and profiling feminist Betty Friedan without the hostility that feminism had historically experienced in Franco-era Spain.  

Yet opinions like Llerandi’s and Manises’ remained far from universally shared, and, throughout the 1960s, gestures of the sort that Galerías Preciados later made in 1975 were not necessarily of substance or sincere. In November 1963, for instance, Sederías Carretas salesman Luis Molina Romero echoed Pepín Fernández in declaring men better workers than their marriage-obsessed female colleagues, while in 1970, *Boletín de Botas* contributor “Conchita,” like José Luis Gay, blamed saleswomen’s lack of professional advancement on their own supposed poor performance.  

Galerías Preciados’ participation in the International Women’s Year, meanwhile, was scant by comparison with El Corte Ingles’. It also offered a conservative social vision similar to that of the *Sección Femenina*, which ostensibly liberalized its stance on women’s rights during the International Women’s Year and even sent a delegation to the 1975 United Nations’

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90 “La Propietaria de una Boutique,” *Cortty*, No. 9, Year II (July, 1970), 3.  
World Conference on Women, but in fact changed its position very little. Thus, while reporting on an event recognizing Galerías’ saleswomen, the Boletín de Galerías Preciados specially praised women’s divinely-ordained work as mothers, helpmeets, and homemakers, sentiments that Spanish feminist Maria Aurelia Capmany contemporaneously decried as toxic to women’s advancement in the public sphere.

Unisex and Youth Culture

Such shifts in discourse on gender roles had a far sharper impact in the Spanish consumer press, more specifically fashion journalism, and most especially its messages concerning normative notions of masculinity. Like their predecessors of the 1950s – notably, Señor and Mujer – Don, Triunfo, PK Press, and 1960s Spain’s other new consumer magazines focused an increasing amount of attention on developments in foreign fashion, especially menswear. As the 1960s dawned, the gender roles on display in this content remained conservative and seemed innocuous to Francoist eyes. Yet as the decade advanced, the range of content and social ideas that Spanish readers encountered in these magazines expanded. The cross-cultural connections that the Spanish press’ interest in foreign trends had built during the 1950s and early 1960s now served as points of entry for new trends that arrived accompanied by sociopolitical ideas that subverted the Franco regime’s ordering of Spanish society. In particular, incoming trends like youth and unisex fashion advanced gendered discourses – youth-centered models of gender relations built on a greater equality between the sexes – that undercut early Francoism’s patriarchal social order and came dangerously close to challenging the regime’s authority.

directly, contributing in another way to Spain’s gradual transition to a more open society—and eventually, a democratic one.

Struggles over clothing could have such a profound effect because Spaniards of the boom era, as in the 1950s, believed that sartorial choices were capable of exerting a profoundly constitutive effect on male identity, that clothes could indeed “make the man,” as Señor had noted in 1958. Indeed, the transformative power of dress was if anything greater in the 1960s because the stakes that Don and other new members of the Spanish consumer press associated with clothing were similarly higher. In the 1950s, Señor established dress as an external performance or self-(mis)representation to achieve social acceptance, or, as scholar Alison Lurie has put it, merely ‘dressing for success’.

Don went further and saw outward appearance as a means to cultivate the inner self, arguing that it was not fine clothes, but the refined sensibility necessary to appreciate them that marked a man as successful, a sensibility and success attainable via the magazine’s sartorial advice. Over time, Don refined this relationship between appearance and self into a dialogue, in which cultivation of external appearance ennobled internal sensibilities reflected by exquisite attire. Hence, in 1964 the magazine promised readers that by joining ‘Club DON’—Don’s exclusivity-laden moniker for its readership—they could join a sophisticated elite who understood the 1960s’ new aesthetic, always chose the right drink, music, and clothes, and made contacts easily due to an awareness of others’ unexpressed, even unconscious desires. Similarly, journalist Vicente Verdú

95 See Chapter II, note 147.
96 Lurie, 118-119.
97 “El Hombre y Su Circunstancia,” Don, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1963); see also Maria Luz Morales, “Lo que ELLAS piensan de ELLOS,” Don, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1964), and “Las manecillas del reloj corren implacables para el hombre moderno” Don, No. 3 (Primavera-Verano, 1964).
would argue in a 1971 Cortty retrospective on 1960s Spanish fashion that dress had not only become Spaniards’ primary form of public self-representation, but that it could also influence wearers’ behavior.99

Into the early 1960s, the sartorially-defined masculine identity championed by magazines like Señor, Triunfo, and Don, remained conservative and shot through with strains of the otherwise increasingly marginalized Falange’s “Man-Warrior” ideal. Central to this masculinity were two interrelated virtues that achieved near-ubiquity in these magazines as well as Spanish etiquette manuals: distinción (distinction), or social prominence born of publicly-recognized respectability, which one achieved through elegancia (elegance), the selfsame sartorial taste and social mastery that “Club Don” promised.100 Consisting at their core of a desire to distinguish oneself from the masses, these concepts were of a piece with the “Man-Warrior”’s peacetime struggle for social and professional triumph. And they were embraced by regime officials like MIT provincial delegate Jaime Delgado, who invoked them during his keynote address at Don’s 1963 launch – attesting, furthermore, to their currency, for Delgado was only the latest in a long line of prominent Franco supporters linked to these concepts.101 In this same vein, and continuing the mass-oriented tone they had adopted in the 1950s, Spanish

100 For distinction and elegance in Señor, see, IWS, “El Guardarropa en cada momento,” Señor, No. 24 (Fall, 1961). For Triunfo, see “Vuelve el Dandy,” Triunfo, No. 213, Year XXI (July, 1966), 30, For etiquette manuals, see López Sainz, 33-34.; Olga Bauer, Cortesía y Etiqueta Modernas, 5th ed. (Madrid: Aguilar, 1967); and, Sanchez Moreno.
101 See for example Sánchez Moreno, which included numerous news clippings from major right-leaning Spanish newspapers praising the book and its contents. Even foreign handbooks championed – or could be made to champion – these values, as when Spanish book publisher Daimon promoted its Spanish-language edition of Hervé de Peslouan’s handbook El Hombre en Sociedad (“Man in Society,” 1961) with the same promises of social distinction and success through learned urbanity that “Club Don” offered two years later. See Advertisement for El Hombre en Sociedad,” La Vanguardia Española, 1 Jan., 1961. For Delgado, see “Cocktail en la Terraza Martini,” Don, No. 2 (Fall-Winter, 1963).
consumer magazines presented these values as unbounded by class privilege and as attainable without need for a noble title or wealth, though in practice the lifestyles that *Don* promoted – and *Don* itself – were not cheap.\(^\text{102}\)

More broadly, the fashions and lifestyles that these magazines promoted during the late 1950s and early 1960s reinforced orthodox Francoist masculinity’s socially stable character, as well as the dominant patriarchal gender hierarchy into which this masculinity fit. A reassuring sense of stable understatement was central to *Señor*’s concept of elegance which, the magazine advised in 1961, “[consisted of] dressing well and without calling attention to oneself.” Jaime Delgado echoed this view in 1963, as did Spanish designer Loewe in a 1964 special feature that praised modern male elegance for eschewing “novelty” in favor of sober timelessness, a conservatism that *Triunfo*’s Ignacio Agustí took as a mark of Spanish superiority and a source of national pride.\(^\text{103}\)

For these magazines, this stability was indicative of a broader male superiority over women, who were morally as well as sartorially unstable and in consequent need of male tutelage.\(^\text{104}\) *Don*’s María Luz Morales lauded England’s classic style, quipping that for men even a return to wigs and cassocks was preferable to the chaos of women’s wear.

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\(^{102}\) With that said, *Don*’s accessibility is not entirely clear. Editor-in-Chief José María Fabra Carbó defended *Don* when MIT censors marked it for suspension by claiming a low readership due to prohibitive pricing, but minimizing the journal’s impact thusly benefitted his case, and as noted previously, *Don*’s expensive pricing was mitigated by its biannual frequency, which reduced each issue’s effective monthly price to a reasonable 25 pesetas. See José María Fabra Carbó, “Pliego de Descargos,” AGA-MIT Box 67413, Folder 126. Meanwhile, in 1960 *Señor* compiled a list of Madrid and Barcelona’s 12 most elegant men, and while many of them were commoners, they were also wealthy and prominent figures, like Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, formerly editor-in-chief of *A.B.C.* See “Los Doce Elegantes Españoles,” *Señor*, No. 18 (Spring, 1960). For a categorical assertion of elegance’s availability without regard to wealth, see López Sainz, 33-34.


\(^{104}\) As noted in Chapter Two, scholars Jennifer Paff Ogle and Mary Lynn Damhorst have noted how the conservative men’s business suit, by producing a disciplined, socially stable male body, legitimizes and thus reproduces white male hegemony, while Alison Lurie has similarly argued that dress is most rigidly gendered and gender-bending most taboo under patriarchal systems. See Chapter II, note 134.
and *Triunfo* contrasted the sobriety of 1963’s *Menhir* (Megalith) menswear collection with fashion’s stigma of feminine weakness, while *Señor* declared, “Women designing men’s suits? No! No!,” and that wives could not be trusted to buy their husbands tasteful clothing.\(^{105}\) This dovetailed with Spanish department stores’ disciplining of saleswomen’s bodies through store uniforms, which also visually reproduced gender difference, as did television commercials like one late-1960s spot for the Spanish cognac *Soberano*, which compared the liqueur to the army, labelling each “a man thing” – a privilege reserved for virile Francoist “Man-Warriors.”\(^{106}\)

As the 1960s advanced, however, these and other Spanish consumer magazines began to champion new masculinities whose contours did not conform to, and sometimes even ran counter to, Francoist orthodoxy. In Spain as in the United States and much of Europe, the 1960s were a counter-cultural period: new music by foreign bands like the Beatles crossed the Pyrenees; Catalonia produced the dissident *Nova Cançó* (New Song) music movement; 1968 saw student protests erupt in Madrid and Barcelona as well as worldwide. And, as Spain became “a nation of youths,” as *Cortty* termed it in 1971, citing the fact that half the population was under 30, a new youth-oriented popular culture flourished in Spain, finding a voice in magazines like the popular music-oriented *Quid*.

\(^{105}\) “María Luz Morales, “Lo que ellas piensan de nosotros,” *Don*, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1963), and Morales, “Lo que ELLAS piensan de ELLOS”; Adelaida, “Linea ‘Menhir’ para el Hombre de 1963,” *Triunfo*, No. 39, Year XVIII (Mar., 1963), 53; “¿Que las mujeres diseñen los trajes masculinos? ¡No! ¡No!,” *Señor*, No. 16 (Fall, 1959); “Señora, deje que su marido vista a su gusto,” *Señor*, No. 19 (Summer, 1960).

Scholar Detlef Siegfried has pointed to the broad appeal and impact that such demographic “juvenilization” and resulting youth cultures had in the United States and much of Western Europe at this time. Similarly, under the aegis of this youth culture and its celebration of youthful exuberance, Spanish menswear began to change more rapidly and in ways that had till then been only barely tolerated of young men’s fashion. In 1959, Señor warned that Spanish youths’ flamboyant tastes were only proper among the young; grown men, at “the pinnacle of [male] existence,” rejected such “extravagance.” Yet by the mid-1960s, innovation was not just for women or the young. As early as 1962, Triunfo praised designer Pierre Cardin for rendering menswear as adventurous as women’s fashions. By 1967, “la moda joven” – youth fashion – was inescapable. That year, the Spanish tailoring journal Men’s Modes declared the trend to be no less than the will of Spain’s youth, and called on tailors to “break old molds…and


fearlessly launch new models,” for the young would never again merely accept their parents’ clothes. PK eagerly incorporated the value of youth into the design and marketing of menswear lines like 1967’s Terlenka YOUNG collection, which *PK Press* declared, “youthful, dynamic, daring, sensational, agitated,” and most importantly, aimed at “modern men” of all ages, now converted to the sartorial iconoclasm of the young.

As this previously feminized and stigmatized dynamism won male acceptance, it lost its effectiveness as a category of gender difference, became decoupled from the narratives of feminine capriciousness and social instability that helped support Francoist patriarchy, and contributed to its deterioration. Thus, even as it emphasized *Menhir*’s sobriety, *Triunfo* also welcomed the wardrobe updates that the menswear line would produce, as the magazine predicted this would help women defend their own legitimate desire to shop. And in 1967, *Don* declared the new men’s fashion a step toward gender equality, whose advance alongside a growing Spanish feminism, journalist Vicente Verdú added in *Cortty* in 1971, increasingly promoted clothing as a form of personal expression rather than assertion of power, and inspired a “masculinist” movement that sought an end to male sartorial asceticism. Youth fashion’s creators and promoters could also attack the political status quo directly, particularly when, as in *Don*’s invocation of gender

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111 Los(?)nte, “Moda Joven” *Men’s Modes*, No. 110, Year XXVII (Barcelona: Talleres Simpar, 1967), 7; *Men’s Modes* was a tailoring journal that began publication in 1961, had correspondents worldwide, and was based in Barcelona and New York. It was directly specifically at custom tailors, and consisted primarily of fashion plates and tailoring diagrams, with a few regularly recurring editorials on the state of fashion, including the above.

112 “Terlenka YOUNG: Una Nueva Moda a Ritmo Joven”; like Cardin’s designs, these designs represent radical departures from the traditional business suit, including Regency tailcoats and Mao suits. For other similar lines aimed at “the man of today” or “modern man,” including the brand’s “festival of youth fashion” see “Un Verano imPKblemente joven,” *PK Press*, No. 6 (Feb., 1967), 1; “Este es el festival de la moda joven,” *PK Press*, No. 5 (1967[?]), 4-5; “4 Modelos de la colección PK,” *PK Press*, No. 5 (1967[?]).


equality, they drew or seemed to draw inspiration from surrounding social changes. In 1968, PK ran an ad in the popular women’s magazine Telva under the suggestive title “The rebellion of today’s man for an ‘imPKble’ future.” In it, the brand identified itself with socially conscious students of the kind protesting against the Franco regime in Madrid and Barcelona, students who rejected their elders’ sociopolitical immobilism and springtime “stupid grand spectacles.” These were all jabs at the regime, the last at its military parades, granting a radical tone to the future that PK all but endorsed.115

Meanwhile, a second, related, and similarly subversive trend also made inroads in Spain: unisex fashion, which rejected traditional gendering of clothing, calling instead for neutral outfits that would free individuals from the constraints of gender and focus attention instead on the virtues of youthfulness.116 Internationally, the trend first emerged in the 1950s and flourished in the mid-1960s when the boutiques and youth culture of London’s Carnaby Street, designers like Halston, and the New York department store Alexander’s all embraced it. In Spain, meanwhile, the consumer press also took notice of unisex by the early 1960s, as in a 1962 Triunfo article about women appropriating menswear, a new and increasingly popular trend that had found a champion in the Danish model Maud.117 And coverage in Spain only increased once Carnaby Street took up the cause. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, content devoted to Spanish as well as

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foreign unisex fashion became common in *PK Press, Cortty, and Don*, as did depictions of the unisex ideal of identically-dressed men and women. In 1967, for example, *Don* ran an account of the Carnaby Street phenomenon written by its chief figure, boutique owner John Stephen, in which he termed the convergence of male and female fashion inexorable, citing the pantsuit.¹¹⁸ A photo-editorial in this same issue featured a woman not only wearing a man’s suit, but first seducing its previous owner (the reader, who she pulls into the magazine) and stealing it from him, leaving him in shirttails and helpless – an act not only of appropriation, but emasculation (see Figure 4.5).

As *Don*’s editorial might suggest, unisex represented a direct challenge to the Francoist gender order – though not of the misandrist sort that a reader would perhaps have perceived. National-Catholic moral authorities had abolished coeducation for fear of excess socialization and consequent sin, and had assigned the sexes different social roles; unisex clothes sent a contrary message of gender equality, female ability, and the admissibility of casual social interaction between men and women. In particular, Vicente Verdú argued, these simple “sporty” styles promoted easier mixed-sex friendships between Spanish teenagers, rendered their personalities more similar, and undermined a longstanding misogynistic culture of sexual conquest.¹¹⁹ Unisex also subverted Francoist gender separation by bringing the sexes together physically, as Galerías Preciados (1969), El Corte Inglés (by 1971), and Sears (1972) all built new consolidated youth sections where teenaged boys and girls could purchase – and mingle over – both traditionally

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¹¹⁹ Verdú, “La Moda ya no es Frivolidad”.

gendered and unisex garments. The challenge that unisex posed to the regime’s gender
canon was so clear that as Verdú penned his Cortty article in 1971, PK Press worried that
unisex was ultimately doomed in Southern Europe, because its patriarchal denizens
would never accept women having the same rights as men, much less the same attire.

Figure 4.5: Don Magazine Model Steals Reader’s Suit, Emasculating Him


This bleak assessment had some merit, inasmuch as neither youth fashion nor
unisex lacked for obstacles to their spread. PK still marketed Terlenka YOUNG using the
traditional goal of elegancia, and in 1969 concluded that a lack of hippies in Spain
pointed to a conservative national character inhospitable toward the counterculture of the
1960s. Unisex’s elision of gender differences, meanwhile, faced a challenge in the
early 1970s from a resurgence of gendering in both foreign and Spanish fashion
spearheaded by the popular maxi-skirt, which Cortty proclaimed a harbinger of the end of

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women’s attempts to “eclipse man [by] resembling him.”\textsuperscript{123} And, as scholar Fred Davis has noted, unisex’s own androgynous credentials are questionable, as designers have historically tended simply to dress women like preadolescent boys, leaving male wardrobes untouched and defanging any threat to male social power.\textsuperscript{124}

Still, both trends had by the early 1970s made a notable impact on Spanish society. In 1971, an advertising executive assured Vicente Verdú that youth fashion had grown so broadly influential during the previous decade that where adolescents had once worn versions of their parents’ clothes, now the converse was true.\textsuperscript{125} So too, if most unisex wear in Spain was patterned on traditional male garb, it was hardly infantilizing (see Figure 4.6). Meanwhile, gender-bending fashions for men such as male hand-purses and floral prints rose in popularity alongside the maxi-skirt, which though coded feminine, did not imply subalternity and could represent (and merchants tried to sell it as) a new way for women to rebel against patriarchy by denying one’s legs to the male gaze, just as the miniskirt had done by baring them.\textsuperscript{126} Official censors responded sharply to this daring new sartorial context, underscoring the moral danger they believed it to pose: in 1966, for instance, the otherwise conformist \textit{Mujer} was nearly suspended for showing

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\textsuperscript{123}“La Maxi-Midi o el ‘Ocultismo’,” \textit{Cortty}, No. 11, Year II (Sept., 1970), 9.
\textsuperscript{125}Verdú, “La Moda ya no es Frivolidad”. Indeed, the rise of youth fashion was sufficiently widespread that, Verdú claimed, academic sociological categories separating generations into those that dressed \textit{a la mode}, those that dressed in “yesterday’s fashions” and those dressed even more antiquatedly were gradually eroding away. See also “La Importancia de ser joven”.
\end{flushleft}
two bikini-clad models being body-painted.\footnote{In fact, the bikini represents perhaps the most well-known example of fashion undermining Francoist social doctrine, for while Spanish police initially arrested bikini-clad beachgoers, this soon ceased for fear of harming the Spanish tourist industry’s promotional efforts. See Alonso Tejada, 141-142; and, Pack, “Tourism and Political Change”, 54. See also, “Lo que dice la prensa”, Cortty, No. 6, Year II (Apr., 1970), 15. For Mujer, see “ Expediente de Sanción, Mujer, No. 368”, AGA-MIT 71/12270/39.} And the following year, censor Félix Rodríguez Madiedo fined the deliberately subversive Don for its “degenerate sensuality” and use of “sadist symbols” such as an ad for Copan-brand pants featuring a dominatrix-like woman holding a phallically-positioned chain wrapped sadomasochistically around a supine half-naked man, and the suggestive caption, “Copan Satisfies” (see Figure 4.7).\footnote{For the MIT’s case against Don, see “ Expediente de Sanción, Don No. 7”, AGA-MIT 67413/126. See also Eugeni Forcano, email correspondence with author, 16 Sept., 2008.}

Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, then, consumer magazines contributed to a sociopolitically significant shift in Spanish gender discourse. During this period, Spain’s department stores moved Spaniards away from notions of national difference and toward a view of Spain as a country equal and similar to its Western European neighbors. Similarly, magazine articles and ads that championed of youth and unisex fashion – aided
by new department store ‘youth’ sections that dealt in these fashions – helped shift Spaniards away from an National-Catholic emphasis on gender difference and obedience to adult male authority, and toward individual political conscience and a still-fledgling support for gender equality.

Circa 1960, fashions and models of masculinity that crossed the Pyrenees were largely conservative and capable of reinforcing Francoist patriarchal ideals. But even then, social danger loomed. For instance, in 1960, Señor responded with hostility to a seemingly innocuous American ad campaign that encouraged women to buy their husbands ties as a way of creating a bond with them. Far from harmless, the magazine considered such gift-giving an insidious effort by the submissive sex to dominate men.  

As the 1960s progressed into the 1970s, the threat posed by foreign fashion trends and the social ideas they carried with them only grew as unisex and youth fashion arrived and challenged the Franco regime’s patriarchal authority. Indeed, journalist Vicente Verdú argued in 1971 that as Spain became a socially mobile society with increasingly blurred class and gender differences, such fashions adopted the role of intermediary, making it possible for Spaniards to express ever-narrower social differences, but growing ideological ones – a progressively democratic state of affairs. The change that fashion had helped produce in Spain, Verdú concluded, was total, from “zero to one thousand.”

**Sears Roebuck and the Internationalization of Spanish Retail Commerce**

These changes – Spain’s consumption-mediated international integration and the concomitant Americanization and Europeanization of Spanish consumer lifestyles and social norms – are especially well illustrated by the case of Sears. During its eighteen

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129 “Señora, deje que su marido vista a su gusto”; “Y, hablando de corbatas…,” Señor, No. 19 (Summer, 1960).
130 Verdú, “La Moda ya no es Frivolidad”.

years in Spain, from its founding in 1964 through its 1982 sale to the Spanish holding company RUMASA, *Sears, Roebuck de España* epitomized the role that mass retailing played in late Franco-era Spain’s foreign turn. More than Galerías Preciados, *Sears de España* boasted extensive international ties, simply by virtue of belonging to the international division of a U.S.-based multinational corporation, initially managed from Chicago, and later, after 1974, out of a new European head office in Brussels. Among its employees, the store cultivated a growing cognizance of their place within this multinational chain, and with it, as in the Spanish advertising industry and at the internationally-affiliated Galerías Preciados, a shift in public perception of Spain’s place within a larger interconnected community of nations, and a consequent erosion of Francoist notions of Spanish national difference. As did Spain’s supermarkets (most notably SPAR), department stores, and magazines like *Don* and *Señor*, Sears meanwhile also exposed its Spanish clientele to foreign consumer products and practices that likewise eroded this sense of difference and, as in the case of unisex, engaged with a series of contemporary social changes that helped prepare the way for the Spanish transition to democracy after 1975.

The global Sears chain fostered this sense of connection between Spanish retailing and international commerce in part through its hiring practices. Since its first foray into Mexico in the late 1940s, Sears’ stated policy had been to fill its foreign ranks with locals, believing them best equipped to sell to their countrymen.\(^\text{131}\) Before opening its first Barcelona branch in 1967, *Sears de España* placed classifieds in the city’s leading

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daily, *La Vanguardia Española*, seeking to fill positions ranging from department heads to merchandise buyers to spots in the company’s accounting offices.\(^{132}\) Locals flocked to apply, and at its opening, the new Sears-Calvo Sotelo boasted managers with typically Catalan surnames like Castells, Ferrer, and Cavestany, as well as Barcelona native Alfonso Buisán Pérez as its first Head of Personnel.\(^{133}\) Again per standard practice, but also due to a dearth of job candidates with experience in department stores, *Sears de España* supplemented these Spanish hires with veteran managers from its American and International divisions, including Cuban-born Director of Personnel Ramiro Fernández, and American Ted Hujar, who became Sears-Calvo Sotelo’s first store manager.\(^{134}\) This resulted in a markedly international work environment, in which Spaniards worked alongside North and Latin American colleagues who had often already worked for Sears in multiple countries, a cosmopolitan state of affairs akin to that of Galerías Preciados’ interpreter corps. This quickly became permanent, because Sears never realized its stated goal of eventually replacing its foreign contingent with local talent.\(^{135}\)

It also produced a supporting, steady flow of personnel, professional knowledge and cultural experiences between Sears’ branches in the Americas, Spain, and after 1972,

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\(^{133}\) These names belonged to Montserrat Castells, Management Secretary at the new store, Fernando Ferrer, the store’s Head of Payroll, and Mercedes Cavestany, Head of the Women’s Handbags Department. See “Estas son las personas más ocupadas…preocupadas por presentarle a Vd. lo mejor, en Sears Su Almacén Favorito,” *La Vanguardia Española*, 28 Mar., 1967. For Buisán, see “Nombramiento del señor A. Buisán como gerente de personal de Sears,” *La Vanguardia Española*, 17 Jan., 1967; and, Buisán, 49-50.

\(^{134}\) This lack of candidates had two likely causes: first, as Edward Steinbach has noted, because most retailing in Spain remained small-scale, with the clear exception of chains like Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, and secondly, because of the competition for qualified personnel that these chains’ recently-opened Barcelona branches presented. See, Steinbach, 26. For international hires at *Sears de España*, see for instance, “Estas son las personas más ocupadas…preocupadas por presentarle a Vd. lo mejor, en Sears Su Almacén Favorito” and, “Ted C. Hujar obituary,” *Chicago Sun-Times*, 9 July, 1987, accessed 29 Mar., 2014, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

\(^{135}\) Moreno.
a newly-acquired network of Belgian stores, which underscored the links that tied Sears de España to its parent multinational chain. Alfonso Buisán, for instance, joined Sears in 1966 and spent two months training at branches in Chicago, Mexico City, and Puerto Rico, where he encountered American retail work cultures, but also colleagues whose varied backgrounds underlined Sears’ international character, including Cuban Gustavo Fernández of Sears-San Juan (formerly of El Corte Inglés), and more than one Spaniard, such as Mexico City security chief Athenógenes Sánchez. When Buisán returned to Spain, he arrived armed with training materials to facilitate Spain’s incorporation into the multinational Sears network as well as valuable firsthand experience traveling the length of those ties.\(^{136}\) Meanwhile, American and International Division Sears employees made this journey in reverse, their careers mapping the global Sears network into which Spain now fit. Catalan native Assistant Manager Ramón Tintoré returned to help launch the Barcelona store after eight years at Sears in Venezuela, where he had joined the chain in 1959 as a recent émigré. Ramiro Fernández similarly worked at branches in Havana, Miami, and Colombia before arriving in Barcelona, as did subsequent arrivals like Barcelona store manager (and later, Sears de España President) John Riney, who came to Spain in 1969 by way of Tennessee, Brazil, and Peru, and John Gardner, the Spanish Corporation’s President in the early 1970s, who had previously worked for Sears in the United States, Venezuela, and Peru, and went on to lead its European operations in Brussels before retiring in 1976.\(^{137}\)

\(^{136}\) Buisán, 49-63.

\(^{137}\) Ramón Tintoré anticipated this move in 1972, when he was transferred to Brussels manage the recently-acquired Belgian department store chain Galeries Anspach, before returning in 1973 to run Sears-Calvo Sotelo. “Estas son las personas más ocupadas…preocupadas por presentarle a Vd. lo mejor, en Sears Su Almacén Favorito,” La Vanguardia Española, 28 Mar., 1967; for Galeries Anspach’s purchase, see “Belgica: Nuestra Nueva Frontera,” Noti-Sears, No. 9 Year II (June, 1972).
The effect of these frequent comings and goings across national borders was a deemphasizing of these borders’ significance and of Francoism’s sense of Spanish national difference. As Galerías Preciados and Almacenes Botas carved out temporarily foreign spaces within their stores via exhibitions like the 1966 “Norteamérica en Galerías,” this movement of personnel went further, turning Sears’ Spanish branches into internationalized, hybrid Spanish-American spaces linked to counterparts abroad via a larger transnational network of relationships. The store termed this La Gran Familia Sears or the “Great Sears Family,” which the store’s well-traveled managers physically embodied.  

138 Hence, in 1975 Noti-Sears marked the arrival of foreign Sears executives for the launch of the chain’s new Avenida Meridiana branch by declaring, “on that day…borders did not exist.”

Calvo Sotelo display artist and Noti-Sears regular Eduardo “Edy” Llorens, gave special evidence of how fully ordinary employees internalized this notion of belonging to a “Great Sears Family,” and himself reproduced it, through a series of bulletin articles on his international travels. Llorens was a well-known figure at Sears, partly due to his growing success as a pen-and-ink artist, which not only served as a point of pride in Noti-Sears, but so emboldened the at times pompous Llorens that he for instance dared dismiss Pablo Picasso as bad for art. Yet he was still better known for his globe-spanning vacations, which included visits to local Sears branches and often received detailed coverage in Noti-Sears.  

140 These travel articles – like Galerías’ own “store tourism” – represented a tourism-mediated consumption of Sears’ global identity and Sears de
España’s place therein, a use of tourism as a lens through which Llorens and his readers could experience the Spanish Corporation’s ties to a larger community of stores and individuals abroad. The bulletin’s account of Llorens’ 1976 trip to Brazil made special note of how he toured the Rio de Janeiro branch’s many departments, and bonded with its staff over their shared experience of working under John Riney.\footnote{141} And, in a second piece on his 1977 trip to Lake Titicaca, Llorens himself declared, “I could not help but be transported by the mild climate and sweet voices to Barcelona, to rush hour and the metro. ANTI-NATURE! I imagine that few of us, unlike Titicaca’s inhabitants, will reach 90 years old.”\footnote{142} This was an indictment, but also an assertion, of Spain’s achievement of a specifically European and American modernity, as highlighted in Roldán Martínez’s 1964 critique of Manuel Fraga’s tourist slogan: “Spain is different, to be sure; but not by the average European’s measure. Spain has cars, radio, TV, industry, and many other things besides flamenco, bulls, and donkeys with drinking jugs.”\footnote{143}

Institutionally, a broad assortment of policies and programs implemented by the global Sears Corporation further cultivated ties between the chain’s Spanish branches and its multinational network, as well as changing perceptions of Spain’s place in the world. Some, in fact, produced the same transatlantic movement and interpersonal encounters that Alfonso Buisán and Eduardo Llorens experienced, as when Sears flew Repair Service manager Luis Díaz to the Puerto Rican Corporation for a specialized professional seminar in 1973, or brought executives from its many international divisions to Chicago

\footnote{141}{Blanca de Aguirre, “Eduardo Llorens en Brasil,” \textit{Noti-Sears}, No. 34 Year V (Sept-Oct., 1976).}
\footnote{142}{Eduardo Llorens, “A mi aire, por Eduardo Llorens – La Paz y el Lago Titicaca,” \textit{Noti-Sears}, No. 41 Year VI (Nov.-Dic., 1977).}
\footnote{143}{Martínez, “Libre Opinion – Un no a “España es diferente”.}
for a “International Advanced Management Conference” in 1971. And this was only a fraction of Sears’ efforts. Sears de España operated only semi-independently of its American parent. By contrast with the chain’s highly decentralized structure within the United States, management at Sears’ Spanish branches reported simultaneously to a central office in Madrid and the International Division headquarters in Chicago, and after 1974, also reported to a new European head office in Brussels. Training materials and the quotidian operating procedures covered therein were largely standardized across the Sears network, so much so that executives transferred abroad could take up their new positions while still learning the local language. The Sears Extension Institute (SEI), a professional development program that offered ongoing specialized correspondence courses for employees, continued this standardized training and ran contests for most completed courses between Sears of Spain and its sisters abroad. The parent company similarly offered sales competitions that pitted Sears store departments worldwide against each other. All of these contests met with considerable staff buy-in: Spain at one point placed third in the SEI’s 1971 contest for most completed courses, ahead of well-established corporations like Mexico, while Noti-Sears brimmed with pride when the Spanish branches won top honors worldwide for appliance warranty sales in March 1973 and furniture sales two years later.

Indeed, Noti-Sears itself represented one of Sears de España’s most potent ties to

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144 “Nuestros hombres viajan y estudian,” Noti-Sears, No. 16 Year III (July, 1973); “Conferencia Internacional de Gerencia Avanzada,” Noti-Sears, No. 5 Year I (Nov., 1971).
145 Steinbach, 20; Moreno, 175-176.
146 Steinbach, 20-22
147 For the founding of the Sears Extension Institute, see “Mail-Order Education,” TIME, (19 May, 1952), 104; for the SEI and Sears de España, see, for example, “Concurso Internacional – Sears Extension Institute, Operaciones Internacionales,” Noti-Sears, No. 3 Year I (May, 1971). For warranty sales, see “Dos Trofeos de Internacional para España,” Noti-Sears, No. 16 Year III (July, 1973); for furniture sales see “Madrid y Barcelona de Nuevo Campeones de Ventas de Muebles en todo el Mundo Sears,” Noti-Sears, No. 26 Year IV (Mar., 1975).
its brethren abroad. It was part of “the Noti-Sears chain,” eight bulletins that circulated under that name at different Sears Corporations worldwide, which together made up a microcosmic international Sears network of their own.\textsuperscript{148} The magazine linked the Spanish Corporation to its American parent through articles that advanced the store’s official pedagogy. A March 1977 column historicized and stressed Sears’ policy – alien to Spanish commercial traditions – of “Satisfaction Guaranteed or your Money Back.”\textsuperscript{149} It placed employee contributors like Noti-Sears regular África Galeras in contact with foreign colleagues such as Roderick Kevend of the International Division, who she interviewed in 1974 and 1977.\textsuperscript{150} But most of all, as employees’ main source for news about Sears’ activities worldwide, Noti-Sears lent a sense of immediacy to those activities, the global Sears chain, and the Spanish Corporation’s place within it. In its December 1972 article “Sears en el Mundo,” for example, the bulletin offered a detailed overview of the chain’s international presence, its Spanish branches carefully situated therein.\textsuperscript{151} The article took pride in the fact that Sears – “our company,” it repeatedly stressed – “[wa]s the largest commercial organization in the world,” while in other columns, the bulletin’s editors (all employee volunteers) celebrated the company’s latest accomplishments as their own, including the construction of the Sears Tower in Chicago in 1973 and Sears’ winning bid to outfit the 1972 U.S. Olympic Team.\textsuperscript{152} Noti-Sears, in

\textsuperscript{148} Rudy Greer, “‘Presentacion’ - Mensaje del Presidente Sr. Rudy Greer,” Noti-Sears, No. 1 Year I (Nov., 1968), 1.
\textsuperscript{149} “Satisfaccion garantizada, un lema que nacio con la Compania,” Noti-Sears, No. 37 Year VI (Mar.-Apr. 1977). For the foreign nature of Sears’ motto in Spain, see Steinbach, 56-57.
\textsuperscript{151} “Sears en el Mundo,” Noti-Sears, No. 12 Year II (Dec., 1972).
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.; “Torre Sears: La escalada de 443 metros ha sido concluida,” Noti-Sears, No. 17 Year III (Oct., 1973); “Los Departamentos de las Oficinas Centrales empiezan a ocupar la Torre Sears,” Noti-Sears, No.
other words, worked at the discursive level to build the Sears network into a single international interconnected place, a commercially- and corporately-mediated imagined community, and to people it with employees shaped into, as Alfonso Buisán put it in 1968, “Sears citizens.”

Sears stressed this international character just as actively to the Spanish public. Much as Pepín Fernández had done in 1934, Sears bought a full-page ad in *La Vanguardia Española* two months before the Calvo Sotelo branch opened, in which the store introduced itself as both a leading American retailer and an international organization with millions of customers in ten countries, now poised to improve life in Spain via the same modern conveniences, low prices, and fair business practices that the store’s other host nations enjoyed. Like SPAR, Sears exposed its Spanish clientele to new, foreign-seeming consumer practices and experiences. This began with the branches’ physical structures: as Galerías Preciados’ Professional Development department noted in a 1968 internal memo, Sears’ Calvo Sotelo branch featured a windowless façade, something the report called “a relative novelty in Spain.” Anticipating Bilbao’s Zabálburu shopping center, Sears also built its Plaza de Calvo Sotelo store at a site unusually distant from Barcelona’s traditional commercial center, where both Jorba-Preciados and El Corte Inglés stood – far enough, in fact, that at first many locals considered its proper service area to be the city’s suburbs and periphery rather than its

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17 Year III (Oct., 1973); “La Ceremonia de culminación,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 17 Year III (Oct., 1973); “Sears y la Olimpiada de Munich,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 9 Year II (June, 1972).


And, again anticipating Zabálburu as well as Nuevas Galerías (then under construction), Sears’ new store featured a then-unprecedented 400-car underground parking garage, suggesting that Sears management chose this location at least partly influenced by the same American automotive culture and expectations of a largely motorized clientele that soon thereafter shaped the Zabálburu project.\footnote{157}

This foreignness extended to the store’s products. Though roughly 80 percent of them were manufactured domestically per standard Sears policy, they were also items not commonly stocked in Spain, such as unusually large spring mattresses and dress shirts that came in different sleeve lengths. Indeed, the chain reportedly faced considerable trouble securing contracts with local manufacturers skeptical of these products’ salability.\footnote{158} Appliances like refrigerators and washing machines – mainstays of Sears’ business – were similarly a novelty for many Spaniards, who associated such items, as well as the futuristic diet of frozen foods that the refrigerator and Spain’s proliferating supermarkets made possible, with notions of a Spanish rise to a specifically foreign modernity.\footnote{159} Even the way customers bought these products – using Sears’ own charge card system – was different. While store credit was hardly new in Spain, the novelty of Sears’ system was such that the store had to distribute 20,000 Sears Cards prior to the Calvo Sotelo store’s opening.\footnote{160} One year later, this credit system remained new enough to even the store’s own workers that Noti-Sears printed a comic strip explaining how the

\footnote{156} Ibid.\footnote{157} Ibid., see also notes 34-39.\footnote{158} “España – Apertura del Primer Gran Almacen Sears Roebuck,” in “Hoja Informativa – GP Dirección de personal – Departamento de Formación Profesional,” ARCM 88008/5.\footnote{159} For centrality of appliances to Sears de España’s business – the chain’s “satellite stores” specialized in these items – see, Toboso, Pepín Fernández, 375-376; For frozen foods, supermarkets, and modernity, see Chapter II, note 76-77; and, Chapter III, notes 50, 65-66, 81.\footnote{160} “España – Apertura del Primer Gran Almacen Sears Roebuck,” in “Hoja Informativa – GP Dirección de personal – Departamento de Formación Profesional,” ARCM 88008/5.
service functioned, which moreover did so in such inexpertly undiplomatic terms, painting customers as defaulting cheats, that store officials took exception to it.  

*Sears de España* made several other such missteps as it worked to import foreign consumer ways. Some arose from the fact that, notwithstanding the store’s commitment to local employment, the Spanish Corporation’s leadership was from the start mostly American. The resulting lack of local knowledge showed when the retailer decided in 1967 to build brand recognition by selling its products in Spain under a single Sears label rather than using traditional brands like Kenmore. Management failed to note that in Spanish “Sears” sounded almost exactly like SEAT, which ignited a dispute that only ended after the store agreed to add “Roebuck” to the branding on its automotive products. More seriously, historian Pilar Toboso has argued that *Sears de España* ultimately folded because it never quite caught on with the Spanish public, even as individuals like Madrid city councilman Ezequiel Puig Maestro-Amado praised the chain’s revitilization of commerce in areas like the *Salamanca* neighborhood adjoining Sears-Madrid.  

Yet Sears’ tenure in Spain from 1964 to 1982 was far more than an anecdote. Particularly in its last years – the years of resurgent sociopolitical dissidence, Franco’s

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death, and the transition to democracy – the store reflected and contributed to the same social shifts that were then destabilizing Galerías Preciados’ totalizing work culture and which formed part of Spain’s larger transition to a post-authoritarian society. In 1972, Sears built its own “Youth Boutique” to match the youth sections at Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, further fueling youth fashion’s and unisex’s spread and undermining of Francoist patriarchy.164 The store’s introduction of a special credit card for young adults between the ages of 18 and 25 underscored how seriously Sears took Spanish youths’ growing economic as well as social impact. And, the year before, Noti-Sears profiled the daring new women’s fashion of pairing shorts with long coats left open to display one’s legs, declaring in seeming challenge to the moralism of National-Catholic authorities like Cardinals Pla y Deniel and Segura:

No one was confused, no one smiled, no one was scandalized. Civilization continues advancing. Because civilization comes from sociability, affability, courtesy…and all of that without the need for the intervention of a group of pedagogues.165

As Francoism collapsed and a climate of political, social, and in particular, sexual liberation advanced – famously, in the embrace of toplessness known as the Destape (“top removal”) – Sears continued to participate in the changes that Spanish society experienced, and in ways that other Spanish store bulletins did not.166

164 See note 120; and also A. Mateos, “Remodelación de la División 48, Boutique Juvenil,” Noti-Sears, No. 25, Year IV (Jan., 1975).
166 By then, the Boletín de Galerías Preciados was no longer in print, and the outwardly apolitical Cortty offered no content to rival this. For sexual liberation in the wake of the regime’s collapse and the Destape, see for instance Alonso Tejada, 237-260. For the related rise of the “S-Rated” pornographic film genre in late 1970s Spain, see Daniel Kowalsky, “Rated S: softcore pornography and the Spanish transition to democracy, 1977-82,” in Spanish Popular Cinema, ed. Antonio Lázaro-Reboll and Andrew Willis (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004).
example, Sears cartoonist José García peppered *Noti Sears* with cartoons that revelled in raunchy humor unusual in a store bulletin and condemned Spanish police’s violent response to political protests (see figures 4.8 and 4.9). In 1978 and 1979, department heads Jaime Marbá and Jorge López declared their support for sexual freedom, including free access to pornography, abortion, and divorce. And meanwhile, in 1976, secretary María Presentación González Honrado gave more subtle evidence of how changing gender norms had penetrated Sears’ ranks when she proclaimed herself, “married but by the Grace of God childless,” and, after stating that she would not mind a promotion if it did not hurt her marriage, added the aside, “Spanish Husband” to explain her spouse’s chauvinism.

**Figure 4.8: *Noti-Sears* Cartoon, “Nudist Beach”**

![Cartoon image]

*Source: Noti-Sears, No. 37, Year VI (Mar.-Apr., 1977).*

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167 For García himself, see “El Humor y José García,” *Noti-Sears*, No. 33, Year V (July-Aug., 1976).
Conclusions

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed Spain’s economic boom, the Franco Regime’s decline, and the first years of the nation’s transition to democracy. They also saw the consummation of the internationally-oriented expansion of retail commerce and development of a new mass consumer society that had tentatively begun in Spain during the 1950s, with the grocery and advertising professions at the front line of these changes during the early 1960s.

During the 1940s and 1950s, new department stores like Galerías Preciados had established conduits by which professional knowledge and new notions of Western-Europe-centric Spanish national identity gained traction in Spain. Fueled by the same concern that moved Spain’s admen, grocers and their regime liaisons to look beyond the
Pyrenees, Spain’s department stores turned even more fully abroad. As they spread across Spain, these retailers built store branches filled with foreign innovations like underground parking garages. Like SPAR supermarkets’ sleek façades, these garages transformed the Spanish urban landscape along European and American lines, particularly in dialogue with an American culture of automobility contemporaneously on the rise in Spain. Through initiatives like foreign product exhibitions that turned shop floors into temporary international spaces and employee exchanges with sister stores abroad, they courted world-class cosmopolitan reputations. And, when this very same expansion as well as rising social tensions that marked Francoist Spain’s 1960s and 1970s threatened these retailers’ institutional cultures, they responded with further initiatives like store tourism programs and soccer clubs meant to shore up cohesion and loyalty within their ranks.

These social shifts, particularly a popular embrace of youth and social progress over conservative authority, as well as changes in gender relations to which stores like Galerías Preciados and Siro Gay struggled to adapt, manifested with special clarity in the Spanish consumer press. Initially conservative with regard to the gender norms and especially the masculinities they promoted, as the countercultural 1960s progressed new Spanish men’s magazines like Don and industry publications like PK Press and El Corte Inglés’ Cortty embraced and imported the socially destabilizing foreign trends of unisex and youth fashion. Such fashions and their adoption by Spaniards entered Spain along the very pathways for the transmission of consumer practices and associated social notions that periodicals like Mujer and Alta Costura had built in the 1950s. They undercut Francoist patriarchy. And as they imported these new fashions, Spanish consumer magazines like Señor, Don, and PK Press – continuing another process begun in the
1950s, and echoing similar concerns at play within Spain’s department stores as well as the Franco regime – increasingly described Spain as part of, worried over its place within, or boasted of its rise to a modernity proper to a prosperous capitalist West in which they maintained Spain’s future lay.

Finally, as part of a multinational American retailing chain, Sears Roebuck de España epitomized the Americanization and Europeanization of Spanish lifestyles that this influx of foreign products and ideas drove forward. Certainly, Spanish stores like Galerías Preciados ran employee exchanges with foreign counterparts, held foreign product exhibitions and affiliated with the IGDS. Sears de España, however, was actually part of a foreign chain, one that shuttled managers between its American and Spanish branches; trained all of its hires in Spain in highly standardized American commercial methods; and filled its inventory with products that were so alien that local manufacturers balked, but which also promised an equally foreign modernity. In so doing, the store fostered personal connections between employees across its multinational network, and, across the shop counter, introduced its Spanish clientele to foreign consumer mores, both of which highlighted Spain’s growing connection to a broader international community, and, at Sears specifically, underscored that there was not a Spanish Sears and an American Sears, but a single “Great Sears Family,” of which both divisions were members.

The result of these changes was a further erosion of Francoism’s already-beset foundational discourse of Spanish national difference, which had set Spain – supposed bastion of the West’s core Christian values – above Western Europe’s parliamentary-liberal decadence. By courting foreign investment and products, as well as pursuing
Spanish integration into Europe, these stores, magazines, and their patrons turned this discourse on its head. Increasingly, they looked abroad for sociocultural guidance rather than expecting the reverse, and emphasized the commonalities between rather than the differences separating Spain and its American and European trading partners. Thus, Señor boasted as early as 1961, “fashion being a font of progress, nothing stands in the way of believing in the imminence of a great Federal Europe of which Charlemagne first dreamed,” suggesting a future political as well as social convergence of Spain with Europe.170 Indeed, inasmuch as a discourse of Spanish exceptionalism retained currency, it boasted not so much of Spanish difference (save culturally, and to tourists) but rather of the nation’s precocious rise to a European professional and living standard, as in advertisements for the Zabálburu shopping center that listed Bilbao among Europe’s commercial capitals.

More broadly, this shift to an other-centered system of references and embrace of foreign lifestyles undermined the integrity of the late Franco regime’s sociopolitical project, for as ordinary Spaniards increasingly consumed like their European neighbors, this threw the regime’s political exceptionality into the kind of harsh relief evidenced in José García’s 1976 comic strip. And that in turn drove forward what Walter Bernecker has described as a (for the regime, fatal) shift in Spanish mentalities toward support for democratization, sounding the death knell for Francoist domination of Spanish society.171

170 “La Camisa, Prenda Esencial del Hombre Civilizado,” Señor, No. 22 (Spring, 1961).
171 Walter Bernecker, “The Change in Mentalities during the Late Franco Regime,” in Townson, Spain Transformed, 75-76. For another similar argument, see Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain’s International Relations from Franco to Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 136-137.
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE
“The Future is Already Here”

In 1980, Spaniards who tuned in to the radio were very likely to be greeted by the heavily distorted opening riff to *Enamorado de la Moda Juvenil* (“In Love with Youth Fashion”). The first hit song by the band Radio Futura, it provided an anthem for the early 1980s Spanish countercultural movement known as *La Movida*.1 Forty years before, Pepín Fernández had ordered Sederías Carretas’ storefront decorated in honor of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, whose newly-established dictatorship soon distinguished itself by its embrace of an exceptionalist Spanish nationalism, its legal imposition of conservative Catholic morality on the Spanish public, and, relatedly, a socially-imposed reverence for adult paternal authority that found maximum expression in the person of Franco himself as *paterfamilias* of the Spanish people. Now, by contrast, the Paris-educated brothers Luis and Santiago Auserón, Radio Futura’s frontmen, sang,

If you were to listen to me  
Paid attention to me  
I’d tell you what happened  
While I walked through Puerta del Sol

I saw the youth walking  
With such an air of self-assuredness  
That in a moment I understood  
The future is already here

And I fell  
In love with youth fashion  
With the prices and sales that I saw  
In love with you

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Yes I fell
In love with youth fashion
With the guys, with the girls, with the models
In love with you

New shoes (they’re for special occasions!)
Oh, what a tie! (What pants!)
Come on, take off your belt
And the afternoon’s for the two of us…

Radio Futura’s lyrics crystallized the radical sociopolitical changes that Spain experienced during the four decades separating Pepín’s 1939 decree from the band’s own countercultural moment. These words also illustrated the degree to which the growth of a Spanish mass consumer society under the Franco regime was implicated in these shifts. As the Auserón brothers belted the song’s chorus (“and I fell…”), they made it clear just whose fashions, prices, sales, and models had so captivated them. The scene they described took place in the Puerta del Sol, home to El Corte Inglés’ massive white flagship branch and within eyeshot of both Galerías-Callao and Nuevas Galerías. This scene was only possible because of the wave of department store expansions that launched these and myriad other branches throughout Spain from the 1940s onward, as well as the mid-century development of the Spanish mass consumer society in which Radio Futura’s parade of consuming urban youth participated.

As Chapter One has shown, Galerías Preciados and El Corte Inglés, along with Almacenes Botas, Jorba, Siro Gay, and other smaller retailers began to expand beginning in the late 1940s, even as Franco’s Spain remained mired in postwar food and goods shortages, rationing, and a diplomatic isolation that compounded these problems. These stores built new branches in Spain and Spanish Morocco. Galerías and El Corte Inglés

both developed domestic manufacturing divisions to supplement the inventory they were able to secure through postwar Spain’s rationing system. And – though unmentioned in Radio Futura’s radio hit – all of these retailers constructed the workplace cultures through which their employees experienced the initial emergence of a Spanish mass consumer society during the 1950s.

At Galerías and El Corte Inglés, these institutional cultures were all-encompassing, featuring employee codes of conduct and welfare work initiatives that sought to colonize every aspect of employees’ lives. This on the one hand functioned as part of the early Franco regime’s efforts to assert control over Spaniards’ daily lives through proxies such as Spanish Catholic moral authorities, a style of governance that one Civil War-era thinker termed “subjective totalitarianism.”\(^3\) On the other, this paternalism was also a legacy of El Encanto, early twentieth-century Havana’s premier department store, where Pepín Fernández and Ramón Areces had learned their trade during the 1910s and 1920s and whose controlling management style these businessmen retained when launching their own department stores in 1930s Madrid.

These stores’ early adoption of foreign commercial methods – management methods, in this instance – hinted at the foreign character that Spain’s developing mass consumer society would acquire as it began to take shape in the 1950s. Initially, this shape was insubstantial, imaginary. Chapter Two of this dissertation has revealed how, just as department stores like Galerías Preciados and Almacenes Siro Gay began to spread across Spain, so did a flood of newly-launched consumer periodicals like the women’s magazine *Mujer* and the men’s journal *Señor*. These magazines, which increasingly courted a cross-class audience, invited readers to imagine themselves

\(^3\) For subjective totalitarianism, see Chapter I, note 66.
inhabiting a society in which they and all could freely consume products such as automobiles, home appliances that promised convenience and modernity, and the latest fashions. They sold, in other words, an imagined and aspirational Spanish mass consumer society, oriented strongly around foreign products, consumer notions, and commercial methods. Galerías Preciados embraced not just El Encanto’s management methods, but also foreign sales techniques, and the fashions that Spain’s magazines promoted were those of Paris, London, and Hollywood.

Radio Futura’s youth fashion arrived from just such foreign fashion capitals, particularly London, during the 1960s. As the Spanish economic ‘miracle’ of 1959-73 unfolded, foreign products and advertising flowed into Spain to an unprecedented degree, Spaniards’ buying power rose, and the nation’s formerly imagined mass consumer society became a material reality. Chapter Three has examined how early 1960s Spain’s new foreign-inspired supermarkets contributed to this influx as they quickly spread across the country and placed small-town as well as urban housewives in daily contact with new modernity-laden frozen foods and ways of grocery shopping. These methods were just as novel and foreign to the Spanish grocers who adopted them, particularly those who did so as new members of the handful of foreign self-service grocery chains that rapidly came to dominate food retailing in Spain. Newly-arrived foreign chains like the Dutch SPAR, along with a Spanish government agency, the Comisaría de Abastecimientos y Transportes (CAT), both worked directly to disseminate such foreign techniques, and so to professionalize Spanish food retailing along foreign lines. They did so in the belief that this was the key to Spain’s future prosperity. And in so doing, they echoed similar professionalizing efforts that Spain’s department stores had made during
Meanwhile, the Spanish advertising trade also began to rapidly professionalize. Innovating Spanish admen like public relations pioneer Joaquín Maestre, as well as agencies like Ruescas, embraced foreign methods and pursued affiliations with international trade organizations. Sometimes, as at Ruescas, they even established partnerships or even merged outright with multinational agencies like McCann-Erickson. In tandem with the regime’s Ministry of Information and Tourism, Spanish admen gave their trade the trappings of a true profession – technical schools, credentialling programs, and an official charter that legally established it as a profession – always looking abroad for guidance, just as Spain’s grocers and the CAT did. And, as foreign cultural influences flowed into Spain during the countercultural 1960s, these advertising professionals integrated these cultural imports into their ads and commercials.

Among the nation’s admen, grocers, and thousands of ordinary consumers, these changes together advanced a new perception of Spain as properly part of Europe rather than separate, unique, and exceptional as early Francoist discourse had proclaimed it. Membership in multinational chains like the SPAR network of grocery stores and international organizations like IPRA accustomed Spanish grocers and admen to thinking of their counterparts abroad as professional colleagues rather than foreigners, and to considering Spain simply one more nation among the many linked by these groups. In Spain’s new SPAR supermarkets, Spanish housewives had daily encounters with new foreign products and ways of shopping that underscored their nation’s growing integration into Western Europe and assimilation of European ways. This new hybrid identity found expression in media such as a famous television commercial that Spain’s
Publidis agency created in 1965 for Dutch appliance-maker Philips. Spanish media star Carmen Sevilla declared herself a "flamenca ye-ye" as she literally sang the brand’s praises. In so doing, Sevilla assumed a hybrid identity that incorporated traditional Spanish culture (flamenco) alongside foreign influences such as the ye-ye popular culture of the British Invasion, performing precisely the above kind of consumption-mediated integration of Europeanization of Spanish identity.

Meanwhile, it is telling that Radio Futura’s song was about youth fashion, for over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, a series of important shifts in Spanish beliefs and practices, particularly the emergence of alternatives to Francoism’s conservative official gender relations, unfolded with special force in the youth culture and youth fashions that were among this period’s most symbolically powerful and subversive foreign imports. These fashions, as Chapter Four of this dissertation has shown, arrived in part via Spain’s department stores. These stores added new branches still more quickly than in the 1950s, and contributed to the Europeanization of Spanish life through measures like foreign employee exchanges, which they embraced in pursuit of cosmopolitan reputations. In the aisles of new “youth” departments selling unisex garments that deemphasized the gender differences central to National-Catholicism’s moralistic ordering of society, Spanish adolescents could freely mingle with members of the opposite sex – a rare opportunity in a society that had until recently proscribed such unsupervised interaction, and in which over-familiarity with men could still taint women

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4 Notably, in April 1965, or at virtually the same time that this commercial aired, Philips numbered among the top advertisers on Spanish television. “Estadística de la publicidad,” I.P., No. 19 (June, 1965), 52-53.
5 This culturally hybrid identity was only further emphasized in Philips’ commercial by a costume change that swapped the short, fashionable dress and 1960s bob haircut that Sevilla initially sported for traditional flamenco attire, as well as backing music that fused elements of Spanish pasodoble with 1960s pop. See “Philips Commercial – Familia Philips,” YouTube, accessed 27 May, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HS2LOz3VkAQ; and, Rodriguez, Busque, compare, 48-49.
with disrepute. Spanish consumers encountered these fashions too in the pages of Spain’s similarly-growing number of consumer magazines, including some like the avant-garde men’s journal Don, which offered subversive content that pushed the boundaries of regime censors’ conservative sense of sexual propriety.

The lyrics of “Enamorado de la Moda Juvenil” underscore the lasting impact that youth culture, unisex, and their subversion of Francoism’s conservative gender norms had in Spain. By 1980, Spain’s youth had some cause to walk with an “air of self-assuredness,” despite the political and economic uncertainties of the transition era and the country’s growing number of pasotas – disillusioned young Spaniards who “passed” on any kind of political involvement or social engagement. They and the youth culture that first emerged in Spain during the 1960s had become socially and culturally significant, influencing the fashions their elders wore, and, as Spain’s youth continued to grow in number and economic impact over the course of the 1970s, even prompting the Spanish-American department store chain Sears Roebuck de España to launch a special ‘youth’ credit card. And with this youth culture, unisex, and Don’s sexual subversiveness had come a rejection of Francoist prudery that found expression in Radio Futura’s proposition, “come on take off your belt, and the afternoon’s for the two of us.” In this, Radio Futura echoed both the Destape and late 1970s “S-rated” Spanish softcore pornographic film, which historian Daniel Kowalsky has argued performed Spain’s emergence from Francoism through allegories of young protagonists’ sexual liberation.

These were politically-charged statements, and once again, this dissertation takes

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6 See Cazorla Sánchez, 157-158; Abella, Vida Cotidiana bajo…Franco, ch. 13.
8 Kowalsky, 190, 192-196.
the development of a Spanish mass consumer society seriously as a politically as well as socially and culturally transformative event. Officials within the Franco regime and prominent supporters like Pepín Fernández politicized consumption and retail commerce from the dictatorship’s earliest years. During the Spanish Civil War, Mujer ran columns that promoted the Francoist camp’s preferred conservative model of femininity – the very purpose of the magazine’s founding – as well as the social work of the Falange’s women’s organizations. In the 1940s and 1950s, Galerías Preciados became an extension of National-Catholic efforts to control ordinary Spaniards’ private lives and morality, while Pepín Fernández himself collaborated directly with the regime in its work to parlay Spain’s cultural legacies in Latin America into economic ties, and new politically-tied consumer magazines like Medina continued to disseminate Francoist notions of femininity. Finally, in the 1960s, the Franco regime spearheaded the introduction of the supermarket to Spain and collaborated closely with the Spanish advertising industry in its professionalization, in both cases with the political goal of raising Spanish prestige abroad, and with it the regime’s own international reputation.

Yet, this dissertation concludes, the foreign-oriented mass consumer society that developed under the Franco regime played a profound role in undermining the Franco dictatorship’s sociopolitical project. This was a longer-term and more gradual social and cultural transition to a democratic Spanish society that, as Pamela Radcliff has noted of Spanish civic associations and Sasha Pack has found of Spanish tourism, created a context conducive to political democratization. During the late 1960s and 1970s, for instance, American multinational retailing giant Sears Roebuck operated a chain of store branches and satellite outlets that epitomized both the cosmopolitanism to which local

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9 See Introduction, note 6.
chains like Galerías Preciados aspired and their integration of Spain into international commercial and consumer networks. Sears’ multinational network of national ‘corporations’ across the Americas, in Spain, and as of the early 1970s, in Belgium, itself represented such a set of relationships. This was an international network, moreover, that intersected with others into which Spain had ventured, for in 1965, Sears de España was a client of the Ruescas-McCann-Erickson ad agency, the product of the Ruescas ad agency’s recent merger with McCann-Erickson.\(^\text{10}\)

Importantly, neither the rise of mass consumption, nor the spread of department stores, nor the coming of the supermarket, nor even subversive foreign fashions like unisex directly brought about Spain’s political transition to democracy. That is not this dissertation’s claim. Indeed, it would be dangerous to simply equate modernization with liberalization in Spain, for again, consumption under Franco was at its core politically neutral, available to CAT officials seeking to improve the regime’s image by raising Spanish living standards even as Don and its contemporaries began to test MIT censors’ prudish sensibilities. And in fact, inasmuch as these two government agencies contributed to integrating Spain into European professional and consumer life through the introduction of foreign-style supermarkets and a professionalization of advertising that similarly took cues from abroad – once again, measures meant to strengthen the regime – they nevertheless helped to subvert Francoism’s own discourse of Spanish national difference.

Rather, the causes of the transition to democracy were multiple and contingent – as were the factors underpinning the development of a mass consumer society in Spain. As Pablo Martín Aceña and Elena Martínez Ruiz have noted, Spain’s mass consumer

\(^{10}\)“Noticias de las agencias,” I.P., No. 22 (Sept., 1965), 88-89.
revolution would not have been possible had the European and world economies not then experienced an “extremely expansionary phase,” on which Spanish economic progress relied. The Spanish tourist industry (and thus, the Spanish economy) in particular depended on this foreign prosperity, for by 1973 Spain received over 31 million foreign tourists annually, generating $3 billion in revenues, or over three-quarters of its total foreign trade deficit. Meanwhile, other narratives focused on activities of civil associations, trade unionism, the clandestine political opposition, and the high-political machinations of Prince (later King) Juan Carlos account more directly for the political contours of Spain’s process of democratization in the late 1970s.

Together, these many explanatory threads make up what Pamela Radcliff has recently described as a multicausal model for the Spanish transition to democracy. To that model, this dissertation contributes its own narrative of how the development of mass consumption under the Franco dictatorship helped drive a social rather than (but to a limited degree, also) political transition to democracy in Spain. In his study of the Franco-era tourist industry, Sasha Pack has shown that tourism-mediated cross-cultural contacts fostered a Europeanization of Spanish identity that generated a will to democratize within the Spanish populace. This dissertation goes further, showing how the Europeanization of Spanish mores and national self-perception, as well as Spaniards’ development of a democratizing will, unfolded on a daily and constant basis. Myriad MIT and CAT policy decisions drove this process forward, as did SPARCO’s monthly didactic efforts, and SAE de RP morning meetings in which Maestre’s team organized

11 Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruiz, 45-46.
12 Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, 108, 188.
13 For such narratives, see Introduction, note 5; and Paul Preston, Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).
the 1966 IPRA meeting. Spanish Europeanization was fueled by the quotidian acts of shopping – for food, or less frequently for clothes and other non-comestibles – and reading magazines, each of which placed Spanish consumers and salespersons into daily contact with foreign products and commercial methods that underscored for them Spain’s growing integration into Western European society. And, finally, as Spanish shoppers, retailers, and officials increasingly measured Spain’s national progress by European standards, perceptions of a continued Spanish backwardness in fashion and retailing further fueled the nation’s consumption-driven push to achieve a European modernity – a goal that in the end, as Pack has noted, implied democratization. Indeed, as scholar Laura Desfor Edles has observed, an “obsession” with obtaining foreign validation survived through Spain’s transition to democracy and influenced the politicians who shaped it.

And in fact, at certain points, the processes described in this dissertation underpin the transformations that Pack has found in tourism. Stores like Galerías Preciados sold to tourists – indeed, the retailer’s foreign clientele was the backbone of its claims to cosmopolitan, world-class status – and during the chain’s heyday, Pepín Fernández’s grand flagship store was itself a spectacle for tourists like Spain’s “Tourist Number 15,000,000,” Mr. Tsegaye Aga of Ethiopia, who visited the store in 1966. And as they expanded and professionalized their trade, Spain’s admen promoted and sought to advertise not just material products, but also the Spanish tourism industry. Thus, in 1965,

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16 “El turista 15.000.000, señor Tsegaye Aga, honró “Galerías” con su visita, acompañado por el secretario de Protocolo del Ministerio de Informacion Señor Serra Hamilton, y del de Propaganda, Señor Díez,” Boletín de Galerías Preciados, No. 166, Year XVII (Nov., 1966), 1.
Joaquín Maestre’s SAE de RP deliberated ideas for promoting tourism to the Catalan beach resort town of Playa de Aro, and in another instance submitted a proposal to Manuel Fraga’s MIT for a public relations campaign promoting tourism to Catalonia’s Costa Brava. In this proposal, moreover, Maestre pointed out that foreign tourism was in one way consumption by another name, inasmuch as sales to visiting tourists were a kind of “export without displacement,” whereby Spanish goods reached foreign markets without having to cross borders.

Ultimately, the impact that boom-era Spain’s own influx of foreign and especially American consumerism had was so great that beginning in the late 1960s, it provoked a local backlash, much as Richard Kuisel and other scholars have shown was happening elsewhere in Europe. This backlash focused its concern on the United States’ rising economic influence worldwide and the social dysfunctions that unfettered consumerism had begun to foster in Spain. Thus, in 1966 the Catholic charity Caritas Española founded a sociological institute, FOESSA, to study the social effects of the Spanish boom. And during the next decade, critics like Francisco García Ruescas and dissident journalist Manuel Vázquez Montalbán condemned American investment in Spain as a form of socioeconomic imperialism, accusing the United States of reducing Europe to an economic colony. Indeed, initiatives like Sears Roebuck’s spread to Mexico in the 1940s and the Rockefeller-funded introduction of the supermarket to Italy in the 1950s had formed part of a Cold War “consumer diplomacy” that sought to combat

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18 Ibid.
19 See Introduction, note 32.
20 Ibid.
Communism by exporting capitalist consumerism, an impulse that Sears de España similarly evidenced when it greeted the Spanish transition with a special Noti-Sears column extolling the virtues of the democratic free market. With that said, Sears’ Spanish employees also numbered among American cultural imperialism’s critics at times: Noti-Sears cartoonist José García, for instance, crystallized Spanish fears thereof in a 1979 cartoon in which Spain’s traditional Christmastime gift-bringers, the Three Kings, faced off in a Western-style showdown against American consumerism’s representative par excellence, Santa Claus, who warned of the fate that awaited those who resisted his advance: “sleep[ing] forgotten in oblivion’s darkness” (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Noti-Sears Cartoon, Santa and the Magi at High Noon

Source: José García, [Untitled Cartoon], Noti-Sears, No. 50 Year VIII (Dec., 1979).

Though never forgotten, oblivion was also the fate that ultimately awaited Galerías Preciados, the department store that most visibly championed late Franco-era Spain’s push to integrate into commercial and consumer Europe. In mid-1995, Galerías

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21 Moreno, 174-181; De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, ch. 8; “La Libre Empresa y Vd.,” Noti-Sears, No. 39, Year VI (July-Aug., 1977).
was bought out by its primary competitor, El Corte Inglés, which over the course of the 1980s had become not just Spain’s premier department store, but the nation’s third-largest private company of any kind.\textsuperscript{22} This buyout ended a long process of decline that had begun fifteen years before, when Pepín Fernández’s family had lost control of the store to its creditors, and which had been brewing since the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{23}

The primary cause of the once-mighty retailer’s decline was debt. During the 1940s, 1950s, and much of the 1960s, Galerías had enjoyed undisputed leadership in the Spanish retail sector. However, Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution did more than flood Pepín’s payroll with Cuban exiles; it also brought Cesar Rodríguez back to Spain in 1960, and with him the fortune he had made decades earlier at El Encanto, which he subsequently poured into his nephew Ramón Areces’ store.\textsuperscript{24} This sudden and dramatic influx of funds fueled El Corte Inglés’ rapid expansion during the Spanish boom, which yielded new branches in cities like Barcelona and new divisions like the highly successful travel agency \textit{Viajes El Corte Inglés} (“Voyages El Corte Inglés,” launched 1969).\textsuperscript{25} But it also drove Pepín Fernández to match this growth with store openings of his own – Jorba-Preciados, for instance – which he financed largely on credit just as Galerías began to lose market share to El Corte Inglés, whose new branches were as a rule larger and dealt in more expensive, better-quality merchandise.\textsuperscript{26}

This combination of plummeting business and rising debt worsened once the

\textsuperscript{22} For El Corte Inglés’ rise to dominance of modern-day Spanish retailing, see Cuartas, ch. 27; and, Toboso, \textit{Pepín Fernández}, 360-363, 386-394.
\textsuperscript{23} Toboso, \textit{Pepín Fernández}, 421-434.
\textsuperscript{24} His choice to invest in El Corte Inglés was unsurprising, for while he had been a founding investor in both Sederías Carretas and El Corte Inglés, he had broken with Pepín Fernández in the mid-1940s, but remained nominal president of El Corte Inglés’ board of directors through to 1960. See Cuartas, 221-226; Zafra Aragón, 33; Toboso, \textit{Pepín Fernández}, 168-171, 302-303.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 288-297; Cuartas, 372.
Spanish economy went into recession in 1973-74, and after Galerías posted net losses of over 280,000 pesetas in 1978, its principal creditor, Urquijo bank (Banco Urquijo), quickly took over the store’s board of directors, beginning with Pepín Fernández’s own forced retirement that year. Over the next three years, Urquijo’s men managed to balance the store’s books, but at the cost of a reduced payroll, inventory, and ability to compete commercially, ending with the store’s 1981 sale to RUMASA – the same corporation that one year later bought Sears de España.\(^27\) Thus started the increasingly insolvent store’s fifteen-year decline, during which it passed through the hands of various Spanish and foreign investors before its eventual purchase by El Corte Inglés.\(^28\)

In the end, Pepín’s store failed to outlast the dictatorship with which its founder had cultivated such close ties, but to whose demise it, El Corte Inglés, Almacenes Botas, and other Spanish department stores had contributed through their work to develop a foreign-oriented Spanish mass consumer society. Yet these stores did not do this work alone. If such department stores have sometimes been termed “cathedrals of consumption” – Geoffrey Crossick and Serve Jaumain’s recent edited volume on Europe’s department stores even taking this phrase as its title – then supermarkets were Spain’s parish churches of international consumer modernity. As churches do for the devout, these grocery stores served as visible beacons of virtue – in this instance, the virtue of modernity rather than divine grace – both through the textual claims they issued, and as physical symbols of those claims. SPAR knew this: part of a new SPARista’s expected work in converting his store to the SPAR way was to festoon it, in pre-

\(^27\) For the sale to RUMASA, see Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 372-378; Zafra Aragón, 205-213.
\(^28\) For a detailed description of Galerías Preciados’ subsequent sale to various investors through 1995, most notable among them the Venezuela-based Cisneros Group (1984-87) and the English Mountleigh Group (1987-92), see Toboso, *Pepín Fernández*, 376-386, ch. 12; and for an insider perspective on this process, particularly in its financial dimensions, see Zafra Aragón, chs. 7-14.
determined, highly-studied ways, with myriad, company-issued signs identifying the store as a member of the SPAR network. SPAR, and the supermarket, had a visual identity with powerful associated meanings: modernity, prosperity, convenience, efficiency, and the future, all of an international character. So too, Galerías Preciados, El Corte Inglés, Sears Roebuck de España, and Spain’s other modern foreign-influenced department stores, stood for a new future for Spain, the future that was “already here,” one in which the “great” in “One, Great, and Free” might not mean imperial greatness, but the greatness of economic vibrancy, and of honorable membership in the First World.

To conclude, while these contributions to the sociopolitical transformation of Spain had tangible dimensions in the form of commercial structures – literal as well as figurative – political decisions, and consumer products, it unfolded most of all in discourse and the meanings encoded in these structures. The processes described above are, ultimately, as or more discursive in nature as they are structural. Galerías Preciados adopted its Boletín from Macys, and sent its clerks to Selfridges; SPAR introduced Spanish housewives to a new way of buying, and the concept of the store brand; and, certainly, buying an appliance from Sears was something much more typical of Virginia than the Madrid neighborhood of Vallecas. But more important was what these enterprises and the consumers they served stated and believed about these measures, themselves, and Spain’s place in the world.
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