DescriptionThis dissertation asks how autocrats can resolve domestic commitment problems that inhibit investment and growth. This is a particularly salient issue with respect to developing countries attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Many scholars have explored how bilateral investment treaties (BITs) may help governments provide policy assurance to multinational firms and attract FDI. Unfortunately, this research remains inconclusive. I argue that a credible commitment to property rights protection is the key factor in attracting FDI, not the level of property rights per se. I further argue that the impact of BITs on FDI depends on a country’s domestic political institutions. In particular, BITs can help some authoritarian governments reach the credibility threshold and attract foreign direct investment. I use a combination of formal and quantitative methods to assess my theory. I first construct a signaling model that shows how a BIT can help firms distinguish between committed and less committed governments. In addition, I use the theory of global games to illustrate how a BIT can facilitate the coordination of investment decisions by multinational firms. Next, I use multilevel models to examine the variation in BIT formation across developing countries, and matching and instrumental variables models to assess the impact of BITs on FDI among authoritarian regimes. In sum, my analysis shows that the impact of BITs on FDI depends on the type of authoritarian regime: BITs attract more FDI in military and multiparty authoritarian regimes. It also explains the variation in BIT formation and FDI across authoritarian regimes. My findings that the effects of international treaties are contingent on domestic political institutions which may be reinforcing in some instances, and undermining in others, has implications beyond the literature on property rights and development to issues of international security and human rights.