

An ASSESSMENT of the CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES of POLICE  
PEACEKEEPERS:  
MINUSTAH as a CASE STUDY

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## **ABSTRACT**

An Assessment of the Conflict Management Attitudes of Police Peacekeepers:  
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The essence of conflict has changed from inter-state to intra-state in post-Cold War era. That change sparked off many humanitarian intervention operations conducted by intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and the EU all around the world. As of March 2014, the UN itself runs 17 peacekeeping field missions operations in various regions around the globe. More than 12.000 police officers from 122 countries serve in the field missions. Diversity in staff members causes problems in human relations inevitably. Different levels of language fluency, different levels of professionalism, and different understandings on the essence of the peacekeeping and so on lead to interpersonal conflicts among police peacekeepers.

Interpersonal conflicts might occur in every organization for sure; however, high level of diversity increases the potentiality of those kinds of conflicts. Police

peacekeepers spend their daily life under stress conditions. Many factors such as being foreigner in a foreign land, being away from their families, home countries, and so on may contribute to their levels of stress. Thus, interpersonal conflicts are inevitable and what is worse, they bear guns in field missions. Interpersonal conflicts among police peacekeepers could potentially create more serious results compared to other peacekeepers.

Most of the studies examined police component of peacekeeping forces from political standpoint. However, organizational side of peacekeeping missions is also crucial for their success. In the UN, in which diversity is highly promoted as a core value, problems caused by diversity remain still untouched. This study seeks to understand whether police peacekeepers' conflict handling behaviors are contributed by factors such as gender, position in the mission, experience, and field mission.

**Key Words:** Peacekeeping, conflict management styles, conflict, police peacekeepers, police,

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CTO	Compensatory Time-Off
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DVs	Dependent Variables
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IVs	Independent Variables
MINUSTAH	The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MINURSO	The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIPONUH	The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MNCs	Multinational Companies
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ROCI	Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory
SRSG	Special Representative of Secretary General
UN	The United Nations
UNAMID	The African Union and the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNESCO	The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	The United Nations Headquarters
UNIFIL	The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIH	The United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIS	The United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOL	The United Nations Civilian Police
UNSMIH	The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTMIH	The United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNVs	The United Nations Volunteers
US	The United States of America
WFP	World Food Programme

## **CHAPTER-I INTRODUCTION**

Decolonization sparked the emergence of many new states throughout the world, particularly after World War I. For example, the United Nation's (UN) member states have increased in number from 51 in 1945 when the UN was established, to 194 in 2014. Not all of these new states have, however, succeeded in setting up a stable system of governance. Consequently, "failed states" are not all that unusual in today's world.

Broer and Emery (1998) attribute the significant increase in political and military conflicts in the past two decades to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to these authors, the fear of nuclear war contributed to the stabilization of international affairs in the bi-polar world. However, many unprecedented "brush-fire" conflicts have occurred in the post-Cold War era. Most of them have generally been intra-state rather than interstate conflicts (Harris & Morrison, 2003). The nature of conflict has shifted from conflicts between states to conflicts within states. Historically, inter-state conflicts required traditional methods of coercive diplomacy and crisis management strategies to deal with these given the rivalry between the two superpowers; but today's intra-state conflicts require the international community to handle these situations (Duffey, 2000). The destabilized nature of the new-born states and inter-state/intra-state conflicts has led to human rights violations, civil wars, and insurgencies, and has placed an immense burden on states and other global/regional institutions to take responsibility in resolving conflict situations as Travis, Montville, and Wexler (1999) asserted.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) become more salient at this point. The UN for example has developed many

peacekeeping operations to deal with inter-state conflicts since it was established in the mid-1940s. Humanitarian assistance in the context of civil wars expanded substantially in the 1990s. Duffey (2000, p. 142) notes that during the period 1948-1978, 13 UN operations were established. The following decade witnessed no UN operations. But during the 1990s the number of UN operations increased dramatically. By the end of 1998, 35 UN operations had been established.

In addition to the UN as an institution functioning on a global scale, regional governmental bodies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) have undertaken many conflict management activities in their respective areas (Scholte, 2000). The European Union (EU) has also established many field missions in the unstable regions within Europe.

Along with the increase of the number of third party interventions, their role and functions in conflict situations changed, as well. Deployment of a small, unarmed or lightly armed military force designed to monitor an armistice agreement between the two conflicting parties used to be the primary method of conflict management in traditional operations. Intra-state conflicts in the post-cold war era, in turn, have required an increasing number of highly sophisticated, multilateral and multifunctional operations. Therefore, the traditional function of a third party intervention which merely involved monitoring the conflict expanded to include multiple tasks such as humanitarian assistance, electoral monitoring, human rights observations, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Fortna, 2004). It should be noted that traditional third party interventions merely functioned on military grounds, whereas from the 1990s on, many other functions have been added to the IGOs' service portfolio. Such functions place other institutions,

such as the police force, health-care providers, political observers etc. rather than the military in the forefront of these interventions.

The role of peacekeeping encountered widespread and severe criticisms due to the international debacles that emerged in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somali in the second half of the 1990s. Extremists advocated annulling the peacekeeping system altogether, minimalists defended the ideas of limited deployment keeping the missions the way they used to be, and optimists argued for peacekeeping, while accepting the fact that the peacekeeping tool had to be strengthened through a series of reforms. The two most salient problems were:

*“financial constraints and lack of resources; the abandonment of the fundamental principles of peaceful third party intervention (that is, consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force); occasional violation of human rights, ambiguous mandates; inadequate logistical planning; command, control, and communication difficulties; and the lack of coordination between the military and civilian components” (Duffey, 2000, p. 143).*

Despite its success in addressing the recognized shortcomings of peacekeeping, the international community has failed to consider the link between cultural diversity and the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Although culture is somehow related to all the problems mentioned above, cultural aspects are mostly ignored in peacekeeping debates. Therefore, all the aforementioned shortcomings need to be partly reframed within the context of culture.

Culture has a tremendous effect on the peacekeeping environment either in a positive way or in most cases in a negative way. Diversity in peacekeeping missions has increased not only in terms of the numbers of participating countries, but also in terms of the organizations that take place in peacekeeping missions. The superpowers and a handful of powerful players in the sphere of global politics used to handle peacekeeping



in the Cold-War era; however, new players, mostly middle level powers, such as Canada, Austria, Chile, Sweden, and Denmark, took the lead in providing crucial financial and material support in the post-Cold War era (Lebovic, 2004). With regard to personnel support, Bobrow and Boyer (1997) indicated that 32 activist nations contributed to the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping missions in the pre-1988 period, whereas the number of personnel-contributing countries had risen to 77 in 1997. According to UN documents (2010a), as of December 2009, the US, Japan, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, China, Canada, Spain, and Republic of Korea (South Korea) were the top ten financial contributors, respectively to peacekeeping missions. The top ten personnel contributors were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Egypt, Nepal, Jordan, Rwanda, Ghana, and Uruguay.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, organizational diversity has increased, as well. Peacekeeping missions during the Cold War era sought to provide and maintain peace and stability through military actors. As the functions of peacekeeping missions increased and expectations from them grew, new institutions such as police forces, the judiciary, health care providers, educators, election observers, etc., began to participate in peacekeeping missions. That is why organizational homogeneity vanished.

Increased diversity led to the rise of problems associated with culture in contemporary missions. Although culture-related conflicts had occurred in traditional peacekeeping missions as well, they were not as evident as they have been recently. *"Today's missions are multiculturally composed and transnationally executed across a diversity of cultural contexts."* (Duffey, 2000, p.143). From the mission planners in the UN headquarters in New York to those deployed in the field missions, to the local

population who face peacekeeping missions, everybody involved in peacekeeping is somehow a part of a cultural framework. This cultural framework provides the context within which the actors' beliefs and actions are constructed, expressed, interpreted, and understood (Rubinstein, 1989).

From this standpoint, cultural diversity in the peacekeeping missions deserves systematic analysis. Cultural diversity and the challenge it poses to the peacekeeping environment have not been sufficiently examined. It would seem that the literature on conflict resolution should pay more attention to the cultural contexts in which the conflicts occur.

## **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

There are many studies regarding cultural diversity and its effects on social life. Parekh (2000), for example, analyzed cultural diversity issues in terms of equality, political structure, intercultural dialogue, and the reconstruction of the modern state. He argued that multicultural social structures necessitate new approaches to equality, politics, the modern state, and intercultural dialogue issues. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) focused on the citizenship concept in the wake of immigration flows mostly from the Middle East and Northern Africa to European countries. They argued that national citizenship regimes have to be abandoned by European governments due to the recent unprecedented increase in immigration. Berry (1997) examined the acculturation and cultural adaptation process of new immigrants to Canada.

In fact, having different values, culture, religion, and so on could easily cause misunderstandings and conflicts between people. Lack of fluency in a host country's language is another factor that contributes to conflicts most of the time.

Increased immigration has contributed to the diversity in social structures in Western countries. The labor class has received its share of diversity, as well. According to Green, Lopez, Wysocki, and Kepner (2002), employees in current public and private sectors serve in more multicultural workplaces compared to employees in the 1950s. That is why workplace conflicts have gained another dimension -- cultural diversity.

Multinational companies (MNCs), in particular, face many problems due to workplace cross-cultural conflicts. Behfar, Kern, and Brett (2006) analyzed the difficulties of managing multicultural teams as opposed to same-culture teams, in MNCs, noting that it is commonplace in modern business forces MNCs to hire people from different parts of the world in order to be more innovative. They indicated that this new cosmopolitan approach to employment increased those interpersonal workplace conflicts caused by the cultural differences. Moran, Harris, and Moran (2007) appreciated the complexity of doing business with people from other cultures, while providing useful tips on how to be on the same team and do business with Middle Easterners, Latin Americans, Asians, Australians, Europeans, Africans, and North Americans. Morris, Williams, Leung, Larrick, Mendoza, Bhatnagar, Li, Kondo, Luo, and Hu (1998) approached cultural differences in joint ventures of business from an individualism-collectivism perspective, as they sought to understand the differences between American managers and Chinese managers. There are numerous other studies that have stressed finding of interpersonal conflicts stemming from cross-cultural misunderstandings in MNCs.

Like MNCs, other forms of international organizations employ people from all over the world. Inevitably, cultural differences also cause interpersonal conflicts in these

situations. Both intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have diverse employment contexts. The UN, the IMF, and World Bank, for example, hire people from all around the world. Likewise, NGOs, such as the Global Policy Forum (2010), the Earth Charter Initiative (2010), and the World Safety Organization (2010), seek talented persons to hire from all around the world.

Interpersonal conflicts within international organizations have not been studied as much as conflicts in MNCs. The literature regarding conflicts in international organizations touches upon political conflicts at the interstate or intrastate level, which are much broader than those at the interpersonal level. Cross cultural conflicts at the interpersonal level in international organizations have not been sufficiently studied, aside from a few publications. Interpersonal conflicts in international organizations potentially pose more serious problems than they do for MNCs. Moreover, workplace conflicts at MNCs are less problematic since at least one of the parties can be discharged if the problem becomes more serious; while in most cases failures in managing interpersonal conflicts in international organizations create irreparable problems, since discharge or repatriation of the parties in conflict is more complicated.

Joint peacemaking, peace-building, and peacekeeping endeavors in fragile parts of the world force people from different countries, different cultures, and different experiences to come together to take collective action. And this is where the problem begins. A considerable body of literature discusses workplace conflicts in business and the public sector where most workers have the same cultural background. Likewise, literature regarding workplace conflicts in multinational corporations (MNC) can be accessed through web searches. But workplace conflicts among peacekeepers remains

untouched except for a handful of book chapters and articles (See Duffey, 2000; Danieli & Mahmoud, 2002; Britt & Adler, 2003). Interpersonal conflicts among police peacekeepers are worthy of study, in part because of the potential implications arising from the fact that the parties to the conflict bear arms in most cases. Military peacekeepers bear arms while on duty, too; however, interaction with other peacekeepers from different countries is limited to ranking officers only. Police peacekeepers, on the other hand, have daily interactions with people from different cultural backgrounds.

Even though military officers have more limited interactions with each other compared to police peacekeepers in peacekeeping missions, the topic of interpersonal and/or organizational conflict in military elements in peacekeeping missions has been studied by many scholars (See Euwema & Emmerick, 2005; Ramarajan, Bezrukova, Jehn, Euwema, and Kop, 2002; Wall & Druckman, 2003; Euwema & Emmerick, 2006; Rubinstein, Keller, and Scherger, 2008; Mills & Smith, 2004; Rubinstein, 2003; and Cian & Raphel, 1999 for detailed discussions). Police peacekeepers would seem deserving of at least the same level of attention as their military peacekeeper counterparts. They do not live together in barracks as military staff do. Instead, they have to rent accommodations on their own. That is why they interact with locals to a much greater extent when compared to the military. A police peacekeeper's day passes in a diverse work setting along with other police officers from different countries. A military officer; however, has to work with officers from other countries only in joint operations.

## **SIGNIFICANCE of the STUDY**

The nature of peacekeeping has changed in the last two decades since the numbers of contributing countries have significantly increased. Peacekeeping missions

became more diverse. Diversity has increased in terms of organizational capacity as well as the number of participating/contributing countries. Peacekeeping missions used to consist of military and diplomatic organizations before the 1980's. However, by the end of the 1990s, besides military and diplomatic staff, civilian police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, other governmental agencies (education, health, justice, election observing and etc.) have been added to the organizational structure of peacekeeping missions. In addition, some field missions host several armed peacekeeping forces from different international institutions. In the Darfur mission, for instance, the UNPOL and the African Union peacekeeping force hold joint patrols and work together. This increased diversity has contributed to conflicts at the organizational, inter-group, intra-group, and interpersonal levels.

Any form of conflict can affect organizational, group, and individual performance. The effects of these conflicts would seem to be especially heightened in peacekeeping missions. All staff members of a mission represent both their own country and the UN. Interpersonal conflicts effect this representation in a negative way. They also foster an unprofessional image of the peacekeepers. Moreover, since the peacekeepers possess guns as part of their duty in the mission, their conflicts can have tragic consequences. That is exactly what makes this study significant.

## **PURPOSE of the STUDY**

This dissertation study sought to develop a better understanding of interpersonal workplace conflicts through the lens of cultural diversity at the UN. When we look at the literature, there are not many studies regarding workplace conflicts among peacekeepers. Therefore, the area still remains somehow untouched, whereas many incidents showed

that there is a need to focus on workplace conflicts among peacekeepers. For example, on April 17, 2004, a Jordanian police officer working for the UN in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Mission opened fire on newly recruited American correction officers in a detention centre in Mitrovica, killing three and wounding eleven others (Becker, 2010). Another example is from Afghanistan; where four UN employees were killed by gunfire that stemmed from the Afghan Police on October 28, 2009 (Civilian Police, 2010).

## **DEFINITION of TERMS**

This chapter includes the definitions of the key terms that are frequently mentioned in this study. Definitions of the key terms are derived from the literature, and are explained briefly below.

### *Peacekeeping*

The terms peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building are mostly used by conflict theorists and are easily confused. These three terms are steps in the conflict resolution process. Peacekeeping refers to the process of keeping people from others' attacks by maintaining some kind of barrier between them. This barrier is usually made up of neutral soldiers – peacekeepers – from the UN or neutral nations. The intermediate soldiers simply keep two sides apart, without doing anything to settle the dispute or to negotiate between two parts.

### *Peacemaking*

Peacemaking refers to a process in which a settlement between disputing parties is developed through direct negotiations and/or mostly third party mediators. Third parties usually handle the communication process, solve communication problems, and help parties to work effectively on a peace accord. Negotiations usually go on between official

diplomats, while citizens' involvement in the peacemaking process happens much later. However, citizens do not negotiate final accords. Citizen diplomacy becomes a common way for initiation of the peacemaking process, while ultimate steps are finalized through official diplomatic efforts.

### *Peace-building*

Peace-building is the final step for the peace process. Following the peace accord, peace-building involves normalizing relations and reconciling the differences between parties to the conflict.

### *Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs)*

As a new actor of international relations along with states, which are considered to be the main actors, intergovernmental organizations are the non-profit institutions that are comprised of at least three member states, a plenary body, permanent secretariat, and corresponding headquarters. Intergovernmental organizations can be either global (i.e. the UN) or regional (for example the European Union, Arab League, etc.) in terms of the scope of membership. Their purpose can be peacekeeping/international security and cooperation (i.e. OSCE-Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), economic (IMF-International Money Fund, the World Bank), and administration (ICAO-International Civil Aviation Organization, IAEA-International Atomic Energy Agency, etc.). The UN is one of the prominent IGOs (International Relations, 2010).

### *International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs)*

INGOs are actors of global governance too. They have the same distinctive features as IGOs, such as members from at least three different states, a plenary body, and secretariat. What makes INGOs distinct from IGOs is at least some representatives of



INGOs are not government officials. INGOs are non-profit organizations; they constitute transnational/global civil society (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2012).

### UNPOL

The term UNPOL (The United Nations Civilian Police) refers to police officers hired by the UN to be placed at peacekeeping missions for maintaining law and order, monitoring the local police force of the hosting country, providing advisory services for local police in terms of policing applications, and the structure of the police force. (Ryan, 2000). They are hired as seconded staff for a limited time period, which is a maximum of 12 months (United Nations, 2000). However, some countries, such as Germany and Canada, send police officers to the UN peacekeeping missions for only 9 months. It should be noted that a UNPOL assignment could be extended up to 24 months upon a staff member's application and the approval of both the contributing country and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York.

### Peacekeeper

The term peacekeeper refers to the armed forces of a peacekeeping mission. Peacekeepers could be both military and police personnel. Other civilian staffs attending a peacekeeping mission are not considered as peacekeepers, since they are not armed.

### **The CASE of MINUSTAH:**

According to the UN records (The United Nations, 2010b) , MINUSTAH (La Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti in English the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) was established on April 30, 2004 based upon the UN Security Council's resolution # 1542/2004. In fact, the UN has been involved in the Republic of Haiti since the provisional government requested it to observe the

preparation and conduct of elections in Haiti in 1990. However, the UN established a peacekeeping mission (UNMIH-United Nations Mission in Haiti) in Haiti in 1993 following political turmoil after the 1991 military coup, which overthrew the legitimate President. Besides UNMIH the UN conducted three other peacekeeping stabilization missions between 1994 and 2000; the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).

The last and ongoing peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH was established due to the armed conflicts between insurgents and Haitian local authorities in 2004. The UN Security Council assumed the conflicts in Haiti as a threat to peace and security in the region. The Haitian government failed to maintain law and order within its borders. That is why, the UN took over the responsibility of providing the stabilization resources required and mediated between the two parties involved in the political and armed conflict. The occupation of the shanty town of Cite Soleil (a city in Northern Haiti) by armed gangs and the failure of the Haitian Police Force to enter the city were the main reasons for the UN Security Council's resolution to intervene in Haiti (Renieris, Ranjbar, & Steinachter, 2008).

As of April 30, 2010 8,304 troops, 2,261 police, 471 international civilian personnel, 1235 local civilian staff, and 207 UN volunteers have worked for MINUSTAH in Haiti (The United Nations, 2010c). The mission's approved annual budget is \$611.75 million (The United Nations, 2010a).

The military component of MINUSTAH is led by the Brazilian Army and the commander is Brazilian. MINUSTAH is the first mission that the Brazilian army has led.

As for contributing countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, India, Japan, Jordan, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, United States, and Uruguay contribute to the military needs, while Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guinea, India, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, and Yemen contribute to the police force (The United Nations, 2010c).

The mission's mandate has four main objectives for the peacekeepers;

1. To ensure a secure and stable environment
2. To support the constitutional and political process in Haiti
3. To support efforts by the Government, Human Rights Institutions, and groups to promote and protect human rights
4. To support efforts of the Government of Haiti to pursue a comprehensive border management approach (MINUSTAH, 2009).

On January 12, 2010 a devastating earthquake hit Haiti resulting in more than 220,000 local deaths, many thousands of others injured/permanently disabled, and more than 1.5 million homeless. Ninety six UN peacekeepers including the Special Representative of the Secretary General, his principal Deputy, and Police Commissioner also fell in the line of duty in the earthquake. Therefore, the UN Security Council implemented another resolution (resolution # 1927) to increase the number of peacekeepers in Haiti on June 4, 2010 (The United Nations, 2010b).

MINUSTAH is a bilingual mission. The mission languages are French and English. Since Haiti used to be a French colony, the local language is Haitian Creole, which is the largest French-derived language in the world, with 12 million fluent speakers in total (Wikipedia, 2010). Initially initiated as a Francophone mission equipped with military force, MINUSTAH turned to a bilingual mission law enforcement mission, which increased the demand for UNPOLs in Haiti (International Crisis Group, 2005). MINUSTAH faced problems recruiting French-speaking police officers to the mission, due to the shortage of French-speaking peacekeepers (UNHCR Refworld, 2010). Demand was higher than supply, which resulted in France, Canada, and some other French speaking countries becoming the main the source for UNPOLs recruited by MINUSTAH. In fact, MINUSTAH was the third Francophone mission along with the UN peacekeeping missions in Cote d'Ivoire and Congo. However, due to the increasing demand for UNPOLs in Haiti, MINUSTAH officials had to give up policy of recruiting Francophone peacekeepers, which made MINUSTAH bilingual (Haiti Democracy Project, 2005).

## CHAPTER-II LITERATURE REVIEW

### DEFINING CONFLICT

The earliest definition of conflict was provided by March and Simon (1958), as the failure of the mechanisms of decision-making, so that a group or an individual faces difficulty in selecting an alternative. This definition seems narrow, however, if it is to be used for research purposes. In addition, the March and Simon understanding of conflict was limited solely to the “organizational” meaning of conflicts.

Pondy’s (1967) approach to conflict echoed that of March and Simon. She identified conflict as a dynamic process underlying organizational behavior. Her definition is very broad and does not incorporate group and individual levels of conflict.

Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1973, p. 232) provided a more accurate definition than previous scholars. They viewed conflict as *“an interactive state in which the behaviors or goals of one actor are to some degree incompatible with the behaviors or goals of some other actor or actors.”* It is acknowledged in this definition that “actor” refers to any social entity, from the individual to the corporate body itself.

According to Harris and Morrison (2003), conflict is a daily reality that stems from differing needs, values, goals, resources, scarcity, and competition. It is an inevitable and indispensable part of life. One can argue that the ability to resolve conflicts without using force is the most important skill of a modern employee.

Hocker and Wilmot (1985) defined conflict as an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties, who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and

interference from the other party in achieving their goals. So conflict is the perceived, if not actual, opposition of needs, interests, and values.

According to Smith (1966), the term “conflict” refers to *“a situation in which the conditions, practices, or goals for the different participants are inherently incompatible.”* Litterer (1966, p. 180) defined conflict as *“a type of behavior which occurs when relative deprivation from the activities of or interacting with another person or group.”*

In sum, Litterer (1966) sees conflict as a type of behavior, while Smith (1966) considers it as a situation. However, both of these scholars and Tedeschi et al. (1973) understand the term ‘conflict’ to denote the result of incompatible or oppositional goals, activities, or interactions among social entities. Based upon an analysis on recent definitions of conflict, Baron (1990, p.199) raises the following overlapping elements:

1. *Conflict includes opposing interests between individuals or groups in a zero-sum situation;*
2. *Such opposed interests must be recognized for conflict to exist;*
3. *Conflict involves beliefs, by each side, that the other will thwart (or has already thwarted) its interests;*
4. *Conflict is a process; it develops out of existing relationships between individuals or groups and reflects their interactions and the contexts in which these took place; and*
5. *Actions by one or both sides do, in fact, produce thwarting of others’ goals.*

According to Baron (1990), conflict does not necessarily occur simply because there are incompatibilities between social entities. It has to exceed the threshold level of intensity, before parties become involved in a conflict. In other words, disagreements must be serious enough to cause a conflict. Individuals have different levels of threshold of conflict awareness or tolerance before becoming involved in a conflict. Some individuals may become involved in conflicts sooner than others.

Rahim (2001) classifies conflict in two ways: sources and levels of conflict. In terms of sources, he lists conflict types as follows: affective conflict, substantive conflict, conflicts of interest, conflicts of values, goal conflicts, realistic versus nonrealistic conflicts, institutionalized versus non-institutionalized conflict, retributive conflict, misattributed conflict, and displaced conflicts. In terms of conflict levels, he mentions intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflict levels.

As opposed to organizational, intergroup, or intragroup conflict, this study focused on interpersonal conflict, which can be defined as **an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance between managers and subordinates and between peers in an organization.**

### **EARLY STUDIES on INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

A great many studies have been performed with respect to how conflicts are managed at the interpersonal level. Follett (1940), for example, categorized conflict handling styles as either primary or secondary. The primary ways of dealing with interpersonal conflicts, according to Follett, were domination, compromise, and integration. Secondary means of conflict management included avoidance and suppression.

Bales (1950) brought the terms “agreeableness” and “activeness” to the fore in conflict behavior debates in his 1950-dated study analysis that focused on the interaction process. Agreeableness here refers to conflict behavior that has peaceful and agreeable, rather than stressful qualities. Activeness reflects a notion that is responsive, rather than having slow and/or inactive qualities.

In 1964, Blake and Mouton (1964) classified interpersonal conflict management styles based on business managers' behaviors into five categories, such as forcing, confrontation, smoothing, withdrawal, and compromising. In addition, two dimensions were assigned to these five conflict management styles: concern for production and concern for human relations. Hall (1969) was another scholar who used a two dimensional grid in his studies. Later, Blake and Mouton's classification was reinterpreted and improved by Thomas (1976). Another study by Ruble and Thomas (1976) yielded support for these dimensions. Although Thomas adopted the same conflict management styles that had been classified by Blake and Mouton, he redefined two dimensions of these styles as cooperativeness and assertiveness.

Thomas was not the only scholar who was interested in Blake and Mouton's theory. Rahim and Bonoma (1979) also reinterpreted the same theory in 1979, and they redefined the two dimensions of interpersonal conflict behavior as "concern for self" and "concern for others." Concern for self reflects the degree (high or low) to which a person tries to satisfy his/her own concerns, while concern for others explains the degree (high or low) to which a person tends to satisfy concerns of other while dealing with a conflict. Rahim and Bonoma used two dimensions to understand individuals' reaction within interpersonal conflicts and their motivation in determining conflict management styles. They also asserted that the combination of these two dimensions reflected the individual's specific conflict management style. Five conflict management styles were mentioned in their study: integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising styles (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979). Ruble and Thomas (1976) and Van de Vliert and



Kabanoff (1990) supported the two-dimensional model of conflict behavior in their studies.

In 1982, Putnam and Wilson (1982) propounded another conflict management model, which contained three styles: control, non-confrontation, and solution-orientation. Putnam and Wilson's model had similarities to Rahim and Bonoma's five-style model, where control was similar to dominance, while non-confrontation resembled the avoidance and solution-orientation approach of conflict management integration.

De Dreu and De Vliert (1997) developed a four-style conflict management theory (contending, yielding, problem-solving, and avoidance) based on their research.

Another study of Putnam, along with Jones (1982), brought the 'communication' concept to the center of conflict debates. Their experimental studies resulted in the emergence of particular strategies such as promise, concessions, and threats that helped to foster a better understanding of human conflict behavior. Pruitt's (1983) laboratory studies provided empirical evidence of four styles of handling conflicts: yielding (obliging), problem solving (integrating), inaction (avoiding), and contending (dominating). These styles were based on the dual-concern model suggested by the aforementioned scholars (Sirivun, 2001). According to Pruitt (1983) and Pruitt and Carnevale (1992), problem solving (integrating) is the best style of handling interpersonal conflicts.

Later studies (Lee, 1990) propounded the view that conflict handling styles differed considerably within the hierarchy (superiors, peers, and subordinates). Ting-Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, Yang, Kim, Lin, and Nishida (1991) preferred a five-style conflict management theory rather than a three-style one, emphasizing that potential

differences between various cultures (individualist vs. collectivist for example) are not well presented in the three style conflict management approaches. They also alleged that personality and cultural differences serve as the main inputs for understanding cross-situational conflict management styles.

Rahim's subsequent studies (1992) explained the five conflict management styles in detail. These styles are explained under the following title, since they are the main elements of the theory applied to this dissertation. Therefore, they are not covered in this chapter.

Rahim's five-style conflict management theory has been validated by many other studies in organizational and social contexts. Weider-Hatfield and Hatfield (1995), for example, analyzed the relationship between conflict management styles and the level of intrapersonal conflicts using two versions of the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory (ROCI), an instrument developed by Rahim to measure people's conflict handling style preferences in conflict situations.

Gross and Guerrero (2000) assessed the appropriateness and effectiveness of five conflict handling styles mentioned in Rahim's theory and observed that the integrating style is perceived as both appropriate and effective in the eyes of employees, while the dominating style is found inappropriate. Rahim's (2000) later research on his own theory showed that cooperative conflict management styles produce more constructive conflict management approaches than other styles.

Research by Munduate, Ganaza, Peiro, and Euwema (1999) suggested that applying more than one conflict management styles produces more effective results than applying a single conflict handling style.

## RAHIM'S FIVE STYLES of HANDLING INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

Rahim explained human reactions to interpersonal conflict as falling into five styles: integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising. He differentiated these styles of handling conflict within two basic dimensions: concern for self and concern for others. Figure 1 illustrates Rahim's model.




Figure 1 Two-Dimensional Model of the Styles of Handling Interpersonal Conflict (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979, p. 1327)

### Integrating Style

An integrating style bespeaks to the presence of a high concern for the self and others. It is also known as problem solving. Individuals who adopt the integrating style present with collaborative attitudes, such as openness, they exchange information, and examine differences to reach a solution with other party of the conflict. Gray (1989, p. 5) describes collaborating as *“a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”* Follett (1940) emphasized the role

of openness in the integrating style of conflict resolution and argued that putting one's cards on the table is the first rule towards achieving integration.

According to Prein (1976), the integrating style has two distinctive elements: confrontation and problem-solving. Confrontation requires open communication, clearing up any misunderstandings, and analyzing the underlying causes of the conflict. Problem solving requires identification of the problems, while trying to find solutions to these problems in order to provide maximum satisfaction to both parties. Confrontation is considered as a prerequisite for problem solving.

The integrating style is widely considered to be the most effective way of handling interpersonal conflict. Gross and Guerrero (2000), for example, found that the integrating style is associated positively with perceptions of effectiveness, relational appropriateness, and situational appropriateness for both self and partner perceptions. Friedman, Tidd, Currall, and Tsai (2000) emphasized the fact that this style is also associated with a lower level of task conflict.

### Obliging Style

The obliging style bespeaks a low concern for self and a high concern for others. It is also known as an accommodating style. The obliging style involves downplaying the differences and underlining the commonalities to satisfy the concerns of the other party in the conflict. Since individuals prefer to please the other party in this style, they neglect their own concerns. This style involves generosity, charity, and obedience to another party's order (Rahim, 2001).

Boulding (1962, p. 171) characterizes individuals presenting with an obliging style as a "*conflict absorber*" and defines this term as a "*person, whose reaction to a*

*perceived hostile act on the part of another has low hostility or even positive friendliness.*” Gross and Guerrero (2000) found that although the term obliging is applied in the context of conflict situations, it is generally perceived as a neutral style. However, Friedman et al. (2000) argued that obliging behaviors can provide a positive approach to handling conflict. Individuals having the tendency to be obliging will be less likely to be involved in a conflict situation, and will have less stress compared to those who prefer a dominating style.

### *Dominating Style*

In contrast to an obliging style, a dominating style bespeaks a high concern for self and a low concern for others. It is also known as a competing style and has been identified with a win-lose orientation. A dominating person goes to any lengths to reach his/her own goals, often ignoring others’ needs and expectations. A dominating style sometimes means standing up for one’s rights and/or defending a position that the party believes to be correct. A dominating person sometimes wants to win at any cost. If he/she is a supervisor, he/she will use his/her position to impose his/her own wills over their subordinates. If he/she is not in a supervising position, he/she would wield power by deceit, by bluffing, by bringing in superiors, and so on (Rahim, 2001). A dominating style may work to resolve a matter sooner; however, it creates a short-lived and one-sided solution. Gross and Guerrero (2000) found that participants perceived this style as inappropriate when used by others; however, they expressed the view that it would be effective when used by the participants in combination with an integrating style. A dominating style can increase the stress level for one employing this style. Friedman et al. (2000) argued that the use of a dominating style could lead to higher levels of conflict.

According to Rahim (1983-a), even though the dominating style is not credited in the conflict management literature, it is widely employed by managers when faced with a conflict situation. Quinn, Faerman, Thompson, and McGrath (2003) believe that this style is best utilized when quick and decisive action is needed for the common good of the group; however, it often creates dysfunctional outcomes. Creativity is sacrificed due to the win-lose type of confrontation, which characterizes this style.

### Avoiding Style

The avoiding style of conflict management, which is also known as suppression, indicates a low concern for self and others. Rahim (2001, p. 29) depicts this style as “*see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil situation*” and emphasizes that an avoiding style is associated with withdrawal, buck-passing, and sidestepping. This style is identified as a “lose-lose” scenario. Avoiding can surface as two behaviors, as either a withdrawal from a threatening situation or postponement of forming a solution to the problem until a better time. An avoidant person usually presents an unconcerned attitude towards the issues or parties of the conflict. Such persons often ignore problems, and they may refuse to acknowledge in public that there is a problem to be dealt with. Therefore, they fail to satisfy both their own and others’ concerns in a conflict situation.

The avoiding style is perceived as indirect and uncooperative. One study by Gross and Guerrero (2000) revealed that the avoiding style of behavior in conflict resolution situations is perceived as ineffective and inappropriate. Friedman et al. (2000) asserted that the avoiding style of dealing with conflicts leads to an increase in stress and conflict behaviors in the workplace. Thus, while attempting to avoid conflict situations, an avoidant person can create more conflict in the workplace as a result. However, Rahim,

Buntzman, and White (1999) emphasized the fact that the avoiding style could be ethically defensible if there are other matters that have greater moral importance at the time. According to Quinn et al. (2003), the avoiding style is not harmful on every occasion. Sometimes it provides both parties time to remove themselves from the conflict, so that one or both parties might bring a fresh perspective to the conflict. On the other hand, it requires much more time to manage the conflict.

The avoiding style is widely used by managers, although almost all of the related literature reveals it is not an appropriate style for handling conflict. Managers avoid conflict situations physically and/or psychologically by simply leaving the conflict scene. They may also refuse to get involved in a conflict by keeping silent or changing the topic of the conversation (Tosi, Rizzo, and Carroll, 1995).

### *Compromising Style*

The compromising style bespeaks an intermediate concern for self and others. Rahim (2000) indicated that compromising involves give-and-take or sharing attitudes. Both parties give up something in order to reach a mutually accepted decision. A compromising individual gives up more than a dominating person, but less than an obliging one.

Compromising is characterized as “no win-no lose” scenario, in which some of one’s goals are achieved while maintaining a relationship. Thus, it is relatively effective. It is the most appropriate style when integrative solutions cannot be found (Rahim et al., 1999). According to Gross and Guerrero (2000), the compromising style fits somewhere in the middle of the integrating and avoiding styles.

Blake and Mouton (1964) emphasized the view that the compromising style is seen as fairly direct and cooperative. Compromisers look for an intermediate solution by splitting the difference, meeting the other party halfway, maximizing wins while minimizing loses, and offering a short-term quick solution in a conflict situation (Hocker & Wilmot, 1998). They are in search of feasible solutions through techniques such as trading, bargaining, or voting. However, even though the compromising style seems to provide more of a middle ground approach to solving a conflict, nobody is a clear winner when this style is employed in conflict situations. Nevertheless as Rahim (1983-b) indicated, compromising is validated as the best style that managers should employ when faced by conflicts.

### **INTEGRATIVE and DISTRIBUTIVE DIMENSIONS**

Walton and McKersie (1965) explained Follett's (1940) five styles of conflict management in a different way. From their perspective, conflict management styles have two dimensions: integrative bargaining and distributive bargaining. Later on, Thomas (1976) argued that interpersonal conflict handling styles can be organized according to the integrative and distributive dimensions of labor-management bargaining styles proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965). Two dimensions are represented by the heavy lines in Figure 2 below.






Figure 2 Integrative and Distributive Dimensions of the Styles of Handling Interpersonal Conflict (Rahim, 2001, p.31)

The integrative dimension (integrating-avoiding) represents the extent (high or low) of satisfaction of concerns perceived by self and others. The distributive dimension (dominating-obliging) represents the ratio of the satisfaction of concerns perceived by self and others (Rahim, 2001, p. 30).

When analyzed in detail along the integrative dimension, the integration style looks for unique solutions that will satisfy both parties' concerns and are acceptable to both parties. The avoiding style, instead, leads to a reduction of satisfaction of both parties' concerns. In the distributive dimension, the dominating style can satisfy concerns of self, while providing low satisfaction of others' concerns. The obliging style leads to satisfaction of others' concerns, while ignoring concerns of self. In other words, the integrative dimension represents the amount (low or high) of satisfaction of **both** parties' concerns, while the distributive dimension represents the amount of satisfaction of **one** (self or others) party of the conflict. Thus, where the compromising style stands is at the

point of intersection of these two dimensions. This point is a middle-ground position, where both parties obtain some of their goals by renouncing some of their other goals. Therefore, they receive an intermediate level of satisfaction of their concerns.

Rahim (2001) reconceptualized Walton and McKersie's (1965) distinction of two dimensions of conflict management styles. He reconceptualized the distributive dimension as a bargaining dimension and the integrative dimension as a problem-solving dimension. He argued that the distributive dimension could be employed to deal with conflicts involving routine matters, while the integrative dimension could be utilized to deal with strategic and complex conflicts. Therefore, his conceptualization seems more helpful to practitioners and managers rather than Walton and McKersie's.

## **GENDER and INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT**

Early studies on the relationship between gender and the style of interpersonal conflict-handling behaviors revealed that gender has a distinctive role to play in conflict management style preferences. Rahim's study (1983-b) suggested that women carry out integrating, avoiding, and compromising strategies to greater extent than men, whereas men are less obliging. Renwick (1977) found no evidence for the belief that women are less assertive while dealing with workplace conflicts. Terhune (1970) asserted that women prefer straightforward and accommodative (obliging) solutions in conflict situations. He further stated that women tend to be more compromising and avoid competition. Men, instead, prefer a tit-for-tat strategy, and they tend to be cooperative (integrating) in response to tit-for-tat behaviors. Chanin and Schneer's (1984) study suggested that men prefer collaborating (integrating) more than women do, while women prefer using a compromising style more than men do. According to Wall's (1976) study,

women were found to be more conciliatory and less aggressive than men in conflict situations. However, Duane's (1989) study revealed that women are more competitive (dominating) than men. In addition, male managers are more willing to accommodate (obliging) their opponents in conflicts compared to female managers. Finally, a study by Shockley-Zalaback (1981) suggested that there is no statistically significant difference between the preferences of women and men's conflict handling styles.

Earlier studies regarding gender and interpersonal conflict handling styles revealed that gender and conflict handling styles relationship differ from study to study. Almost all studies present different findings. Therefore, there is no agreed upon pattern for predicting conflict handling styles and gender relationships. Table 1 summarizes the findings in the above-mentioned studies pertaining to the role of gender and conflict handling styles.

<b>Table 1 Summary of the Studies on Gender and Conflict Handling Styles</b>		
<b>Scholar's Name</b>	<b>Females</b>	<b>Males</b>
Rahim	Compromising Integrating Avoiding	Less Obliging
Terhune	Compromising Obliging Avoiding	Integrating
Chanin&Schneer	Compromising	Integrating
Wall	Conciliatory Less Aggressive	
Duane	Dominating	Obliging
Shockley-Zalaback	No difference	

According to Table 1 studies by Rahim, Terhune, Chanin, and Schneer indicate that females prefer compromising styles, while studies by Terhune and Chanin and Schneer emphasize that males are more integrative in conflict situations. That is why, in this study, the hypotheses tested were those outlined below;

- ✓ *Female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style for handling conflicts.*

- ✓ *Male peacekeepers would prefer an integrating style for handling conflicts.*

## **ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS (rank) and INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT**

The relationship between conflict handling styles and the individual's status in an organization has been analyzed in numerous studies. Oetzel, Myers, Meares, and Lara (2003), for example, described human behaviors in a conflict situation with superiors, subordinates, and peers via face-negotiation theory, which characterizes human behaviors in conflict situations as a self-face concern, others-face concern, and mutual-face concern. Self-face concern is associated positively with dominating and emotionally expressive styles. Others-face concern is associated positively with obliging, compromising, and integrating styles. Mutual-face concern is associated positively with obliging, compromising, and integrating styles. Their study suggested that subordinates tend to employ obliging style and others-face concern with superiors, and superiors tend to use dominating style and self-face concern with subordinates. Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, and Rosenthal (1964) indicated that individuals usually prefer to use an obliging style in communications with superiors rather than with peers and subordinates. In addition, studies showed that subordinates are more likely to withdraw from a conflict situation. The avoiding style is also more often used with superiors than with peers and more often with peers than with subordinates. Philips and Cheston's study (1979) suggested that a forcing (dominating) style is commonly used by superiors when faced with conflict with subordinates, while it is not common in conflict situations with superiors. Rahim (1983-b) indicated that a compromising style is expected to be more common in conflicts with peers. Likewise, an observational study by Munduate, Luque, and Baron (1997) revealed that there is a greater tendency to employ an obliging style

with superiors than with peers and subordinates, than that of compromise with peers than subordinates and superiors, and finally, that they would use the dominating style more with subordinates than with peers or superiors. According to Aquino (2000), high status employees using avoiding, obliging, and dominating styles are less likely to be workplace victims compare to low status employees using the same conflict handling styles.

Earlier studies regarding organizational status and interpersonal conflict handling styles indicated that in general, people in managerial positions tend to dominate in conflict situations over people with lower status in the organization. Inversely, these individuals tend to present obliging and avoidant behaviors in attempts to resolve conflicts with their supervisors. In peer to peer conflicts individuals tend to compromise. Table 2 summarizes the findings in the above-mentioned studies pertaining to organizational status and conflict handling styles.

**Table 2 Summary of the Studies on Organizational Status and Conflict Handling Styles**

<b>Scholar's Name</b>	<b>Conflicts with superiors</b>	<b>Conflicts with peers</b>	<b>Conflicts with subordinates</b>
Oetzel et al.	Obliging		Dominating
Kahn et al.	Obliging Avoiding		
Philip&Cheston			Dominating
Rahim		Compromising	
Munduate, Luque & Baron	Obliging	Compromising	Dominating

According to Table 2, studies by Oetzel et al., Kahn et al., and Munduate, Luque, and Baron indicated that people prefer using an obliging style in conflicts with their superiors, while studies by Oetzel et al, Philip and Cheston, and Munduate, Luque, and Baron emphasized the fact that people are more dominant in conflict situations with their subordinates. According to Rahim's and Munduate, Luque, and Baron's studies people

compromise in conflicts with their peers. That is why, in this study, the hypotheses below were adopted;

- ✓ *All peacekeepers would tend to employ an obliging style when in conflict situations with superiors.*
- ✓ *All peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates.*
- ✓ *All peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeping officers are not influenced by certain factors.*

### **LENGTH of TENURE (years of experience) and CONFLICT HANDLING STYLES**

Studies regarding the relationship between conflict handling style and the length of tenure are mostly associated with an employees' age. Balay's study (2007) study on organizational commitment and conflict management styles of teachers in Turkey revealed that as teachers get older and as their length of tenure (service in organization) increases, they are more likely to use problem solving conflict management styles (integrating, compromising, and avoiding). Pelled, Xin, and Weiss's study (2001) on conflict behaviors in a Mexican production facility indicated that younger workers with short tenure tend to avoid conflicts with older workers with longer tenure. However, there are studies arguing that there is no relationship between conflict handling style and the length of tenure. One study by Lam, Zhang, and Baum (2001) on Chinese employees' job satisfaction in the service sector of Hong Kong revealed that Chinese workers tend to use avoiding, obliging, and compromising styles, which proves there is no relationship

between the length of tenure and conflict handling styles in the Chinese culture. Hull and Umansky's study (1996) is another that negates this relationship.

Table 3 summarizes studies conducted on the association between organizational tenure (years of experience) and conflict handling styles.

**Table 3 Summary of the Studies on Length of Tenure (years of experience) and Conflict Handling Styles**

<b>Studies</b>	<b>Less Experienced</b>	<b>More Experienced</b>
Balay		More likely to use integrating, compromising, and avoiding
Pelled, Xin, and Weiss	Avoiding	
Lam, Zhang, and Baum	No relationship	
Hull and Umansky	No relationship	

According to Table 3, Balay's study emphasized the idea that people with more experience are more likely to use integrating, compromising, and avoiding styles. The study by Pelled, Xin, and Weiss indicated that people with less experience are more likely to use avoiding styles. While both studies by "Lam, Zhang, and Baum" and "Hull and Umansky" rejected any relationship between the two factors, the literature does not present a consistent pattern on this issue and did not provide any definite means of predicting these interrelationships. That is why, the current researcher used his personal experience and field observations to develop an additional hypothesis as follows;

*Peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer an avoiding style.*

## **STRESS FACTORS and INTERPERSONAL CONFLICTS in the UNITED NATIONS**

Peacekeeping has extended beyond its original task of monitoring ceasefires and troop withdrawals (simply called as traditional peacekeeping) to include policing, administering, balloting, and human rights monitoring (comprehensive peacekeeping), and recently to institution-building (third generation peacekeeping). Therefore, the word

“peacekeeper” is used to define not only soldiers as it used to be in the past, but also UNPOL, human rights officers, electoral workers, and civil administrators (Downie, 2002).

As a rule the UN peacekeeping missions are managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) located at the UN Headquarters in New York. However, peace missions without military components, such as electoral missions, are managed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

As of April 2001, 15 peacekeeping missions were managed by DPKO and included 33,500 troops, 1,650 military observers, 7,700 UNPOLs, 3,600 civilians, and 9,000 local staff in total. The allocated budget for these 15 missions reached \$2.5 billion. Troops and UNPOLs are provided by the member states, while international civilian peacekeepers are hired individually by the UN. They are composed of the UN headquarters staff and “mission appointees” staff from other UN agencies, UN volunteers (UNVs), and local staff (of the host country) (Downie, 2002). There is no single unified training system provided by the UN. Instead, each contributing nation is responsible for the selection, training, screening, and evaluation of personnel it sends out as a part of its national contingent. For military and UNPOL staff this national training is guided (but not provided) by the Training Unit within the DPKO (Kidwell & Langholtz, 1998).

The literature on conflict and its UN relationship is highly dominated by political conflicts and the UN’s role in handling political conflicts. However, some studies about stress factors in field missions, the cultural diversity of the UN’s personnel structure, and problems that peacekeepers face touch this issue indirectly. Danieli and Mahmoud (2002), for example, indicated that the working environment where peacekeepers,



humanitarian aid workers, and media workers operate has changed drastically since the end of Cold War. Military and non-military threats to international peace and security used to stem from these inter-state conflicts. Today threats come from intra-state dissent caused by social, economic, environmental, and demographic factors. Ineffective governments and repressive practices by states and/or non-state actors lead to human rights violations.

In fact, civilian populations are often caught in the cross fire and face death and destruction in countries where civil strife turns into an open conflict and where state armed forces are engaged in battling armed insurgents. In the past decade alone internal armed conflicts have turned over 40 million people into refugees and displaced persons (Danieli and Mahmoud, 2002). Combatants mix with civilians in the chaotic situations, which endangers not only the lives of regular people, but also the lives of peacekeepers, medical, and humanitarian relief workers. Bertini (2002) noted that the number of casualties in humanitarian missions has risen shockingly and unacceptably to a very high level. The UN lost 198 civilian employees to violence, terrorism, and aircraft accidents between 1992 and 2000. In 1998, the number of civilian workers, who fell in the line of duty, was higher than the number of casualties of armed and trained UN military peacekeepers. In 1998, 228 civilian employees were targeted for kidnapping and hostage-taking incidents. Among all of the UN agencies, employees of the World Food Programme (WFP) had the highest death toll.

Majekodunmi (2002) indicated that in several instances, in fact, the UN and NGO staff members were killed deliberately by state soldiers or armed opposition groups in order to prompt the evacuation of international staff from their country. The UN declares

its first purpose is “to maintain international peace and security” in its preamble (Harris & Morrison, 2003). However, according to Russler and Brownell (2002) the UN has not invested enough for even its own staff’s security in the field. The UN spends only \$21 per staff member annually. With so many priorities confronting the UN, security has been considered as a luxury until recently. It has been seen as a part of price of doing business. That is why staff security has never been a budget item.

Being active in a mission is a life-changing experience for many peacekeepers. The first peacekeepers arriving to a mission usually witness death, displacement of the locals, and destruction of the infrastructure. Moreover, being away from their families and friends and acclimatizing to the mission area contributes to the trauma that peacekeepers go through. Downie (2002) implied that the main stressors for peacekeepers are witnessing trauma, being the subject of attacks, interpersonal conflicts, the lack of mission amenities, the multinational dimension of peacekeeping, the frustration of not understanding the local population, despair at seeing preventable deaths, and not being able to help everyone. They find themselves in distant countries under poor work and life conditions. Majekodunmi (2002, p. 142) depicted this dilemma by stating “*We have to be humble, yet firm; patient, yet determined; sensitive to local reality, yet consistent with an international standard. We must be black and white, yet also color blind, embracing differences to the extent they are no longer such*”.

In addition, many peacekeepers are hit by the homecoming experience that affects everyone to some extent. They find many things changed in their life. Young children grow significantly even within six months, neighbors move, colleagues are promoted and

so on. Relationships with children, spouses/partners, social groups, work colleagues need to be reestablished or redefined.

Moreover, they are not accepted by locals in some cases, and that leads to stress among the UN staff. Local level officials are frequently not even aware of a UN mandate's existence and in some cases they feel more vulnerable to the UN's investigations and monitoring work compared to national authorities. They feel that the responsibility for violations will be directly linked to them and may affect their careers. Local police officials are extremely sensitive particularly about human rights issues. Since most of the peacekeepers, working at human rights offices, are from wealthy nations, their presence in a much poorer country can be perceived as a new form of colonialism. In some cases peacekeepers from countries, which have poor human rights records, are questioned on moral grounds. Majekodunmi (2002, p.140) illustrated this situation by stating the following “ *‘go and preach human rights at home’ they tell us*”.

Another stressor is the incompetence or sub-standard capabilities of some peacekeepers. It is a common complaint among genuinely committed and hard working peacekeepers. Downie (2002) denoted that Svend Fredericksen, who was a police commissioner in Kosovo, pushed DPKO to send 400 police officers from two developing countries back home, because they could not speak English, drive a vehicle, and use a gun adequately. Likewise Jessen-Petersen (2002) emphasized the stressors stemming from the organizational structures as job security, rotation, **interpersonal relationships**, **abuse of power**, poor performance management, lack of clarity of tasks, and long working hours.

The number of peacekeeping missions dramatically increased in the 1990's. Morisset (2002) argued that this created a concern among the UN staff counselors that stress and trauma among peacekeepers and civilian staff had increased, as well. In particular, the civilian staff were the main target of stress and post-conflict trauma after being "thrown" into high-risk regions.

Stress and other illnesses that are caused by stress are one of the major problems observed among the UN staff. The peacekeepers are the personnel who are most exposed to stress. That is why, in 1944 the UN, UNHCR in particular, established a post of Senior Staff Welfare Officer, who provided counseling services to the staff. In 1996, the "Peer Support Personnel Program" was put into operation. According to this program volunteer staff members are trained in identifying signs and symptoms of cumulative traumatic stress, which is aimed at providing psychological aid by facilitating, and simply listening to the affected colleague. In 2000, 20 UNHCR field staff safety advisors from various field missions throughout the world were trained for this purpose.

Jessen-Petersen (2002) argues that in dealing with traumatic stress the UNHCR needs to work with people of different origins. They had the opportunity to observe cultural differences and to shape their work according to these differences. In some cultures, for example, dreams and nightmares are believed to be from spirits containing certain messages making them taboo. In other cultures, talking about negative experiences weakens one's strength, so that one should forget these visions and move on.

On the other hand, peacekeepers should be aware of the cultural characteristics of the local people they interact with. Otherwise the results could be severe. Heyzer (2002) recounts a case that happened in Kosovo in an attempt to respond to the massive numbers

of women, who had been raped during the civil war and genocide, and thousands of displaced men, women, and children had gathered in a stadium. A man with a megaphone called for all women who had been raped to report to a particular area. Needless to say, none of the women reported any rape incident. They did not take the risk of identifying themselves, even though it meant losing a life-saving support and/or opportunity to hold their aggressors accountable. They avoided the potential repercussions of being known as a raped woman (potentially seen as no longer pure and innocent) in a closed society.

In a proactive approach, at the beginning of 1990s UNESCO implemented a program named the Culture and Peace Program in order to promote cultural awareness among the peacekeeping forces. Kimmel (1998) indicated that the interoperability of the UN forces requires training programs in cultural awareness and intercultural communication. In those trainings peacekeepers should learn about biases of their cultural experiences and feelings in the mission area. However, what he misses in his proposal is that peacekeepers are not only influenced by their feelings about the ongoing conflict they are dealing with, they are also impacted by their prior feelings and cultural experiences in their relationships with their other fellows, who work for the UN as peacekeepers just like themselves. Since the UN forces come from different countries and are working in a non-familiar environment, culture shock and cultural misunderstandings are inevitable. Communication stands as a major challenge in an intercultural endeavor as is the case in the peacekeeping missions. Inevitably communication problems create tension between international police officers leading them to conflict situations, which results in unprofessional representation of the UN to locals.

Moreover, the UN faces challenges of hiring police officers from countries, which have had political and/or armed conflicts in their recent history. Thus, the repercussions of these conflicts show up in the context of peer relationships between the officers coming from those particular countries and who are working together for the same purpose.

Elron, Halevy, Ari, and Shamir's study (2003) seems the most comprehensive one on interpersonal conflicts among peacekeepers. They analyzed conflicts in three groups; task conflicts, relationship and emotional conflicts, and process conflicts. Their study was based on interviews with peacekeepers from five different peacekeeping missions and suggested that most of the conflicts resulted from cultural differences that were described as task related. It also indicated that the level of emotionality and importance given to conflicts increased in more dangerous missions. They emphasized the fact that cultural differences and communication problems often lead to a lack of trust between peacekeepers. Interviewees agreed that there was a relative peace within the peacekeeping forces; however, they all indicated more tension behind the closed doors or beneath the surface than what appeared on the surface.

In spite of the UN's endeavors to attain standardization, a professionalism gap among the armies and police forces was reported (Elron et al., 2003). Although this was a technical problem more so than a cultural problem; it had cultural manifestations. Armies from developing countries are perceived as less professional by the officers from the developed countries. The same argument can be raised for police forces, as well. This problem is discussed mainly by those peacekeepers, who participate in more dangerous field missions (such as Kosovo), where the consequences of being less professional can

be more severe. Officers from the developed countries suggest that in order to avoid severe conflicts, less professional armies and police forces should be assigned to either complicated tasks (such as guarding a camp) or separate geographical areas for their activities.

Some interviewees in Elron et al.'s study (2003) indicated that they preferred to work with people of similar cultural backgrounds rather than adjusting to values of more distant cultures. One of the Austrian officers working at UNTSO (the UN observers' force headquartered in Jerusalem and the oldest mission of the UN) depicted this distinction as follows *"The Chinese are a lot more of an authoritarian organization that we are, and essentially they obey senior present, regardless of the situation. Of course, most of the Europeans are not like that and there is a difference"* (Elron et al., 2003, p. 265). The similarity-attraction paradigm (Bryne, 1971) provides a basis for understanding why people prefer to interact with those who are similar to themselves. According to Brewer (1981) people think that people similar to them are more trustworthy and easier to communicate and work with.

Interviewees also emphasized communication problems stemming from the lack of fluency in English and different meanings attached to words. One of the interviewees in commanding position explained this as follows:

*"It is very important that when someone gives the message that they make sure that the person is receiving it, that they actually listen, that they have the ability to listen. Then secondly, that they understand what you are saying. You have to do that almost by testing them, asking them 'do you understand?'"* (Elron et al., 2003, p. 268).

A Polish officer emphasized the necessity of adhering to English at all times even in social settings, although there was no official rule on it (Elron et al., 2003). When two of the officers speak the same language that others do not understand, it creates

discontent among other peacekeepers. Elron et al. (2003) suggested that language barriers could be overcome by using repetitions, a slowing pace of speaking, and multiple verifications.

Since peacekeeping missions are cosmopolitan in their nature and many cultures are represented in the same location in the field missions peacekeepers are supposed to learn their peers' cultural attributes in order to build good relationships with each other. Learning about others' culture involves many friendly talks and making comparisons with his/her own culture. When peacekeepers engage in small talk with one another, they simply learn more about other's values, culture-based assumptions, habits, and norms. In addition, eating, drinking, partying together in an informal setting helps to create sentiments for cooperation and affiliation. Seeking interaction opportunities in an informal setting, eating and drinking together signals commonality and provides for relaxed circumstances for purposes of interaction.

It is worthwhile to note that peacekeepers are not only vulnerable to factors of culture, they are also affected by personality differences. However, mankind has a tendency to develop stereotypes. Peacekeepers are no exceptions to this rule. If they have a perception about one of their peers, they tend to generalize it to all the police officers from the same nation. A peacekeepers' behaviors should be interpreted as both a unique individual character and an under or overarching set of cultural values. Some countries have a reputation for not working; however, you may find officers from that country who are astonishingly hardworking and dedicated. That is why, peacekeepers should avoid stereotyping others.



Diversity in the UN field missions is perceived as a disadvantage in terms of the effectiveness of the mission; however, it could also be an advantage. Being composed of people from countries from all over the world could extend the UN's ability to resolve conflicts. People from different cultural backgrounds can look at the conflict situation from different perspectives and this could help the UN to resolve local conflicts. Police officers, who have similar cultural backgrounds to that of the local people in the conflict area where the UN has intervened, could serve as mediators in efforts to alleviate the situation. From this perspective, the peacekeeping missions could be helpful to its police peacekeepers as this helps them to understand how people feel about things. Therefore, peacekeeping missions could develop and educate their staff members not only from a work point of view, but also from a social point of view.

## CHAPTER-III METHODOLOGY

This was an exploratory study that aimed to examine the relationship between conflict management styles and gender, experience, position in the mission, and the particular field mission among the UN peacekeeping missions. The research design and methodology are described in this chapter. This includes the research questions, the hypotheses, variables, instruments, data-collection procedures, and the statistical data analysis process. Maxfield and Babbie (2001) noted that exploratory studies are necessary and useful when the problem is not well known, some policy change are being considered, and/or where theory has a limited ability, if not inability, to explain the research findings.

### RESEARCH QUESTIONS and HYPOTHESES

There might be many factors that can have an effect on police peacekeepers' preferences for conflict handling styles. However, it is not feasible to examine all of the possible factors in one study. That is why this study focused on demographic factors and their effects on conflict handling styles in peacekeeping missions. The factors that were taken into consideration were gender, experience, position in the mission (command or non-command), and the particular field mission. Although the term "peacekeeper" refers to all UN personnel including the military, the police, human rights officers, and civil administrators, this study only focused on police officers (UNPOL) working for the UN. This study was designed to seek answers to one question and three sub-questions below:

**Research Question:** What factors affect interpersonal conflict management styles among UNPOL participants on UN peacekeeping missions?

**Sub-Question 1:** Does gender have any impact on these particular personal conflict management styles?

**Sub-Question 2:** Does position in the mission have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?

**Sub-Question 3:** Do months of peacekeeping experience have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?

In addressing these questions, the following assumptions were drawn from the background materials for this research:

- 1:** The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by certain factors (gender, years of law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience the last/current field mission that peacekeepers participated, position in the mission, name of mission in Haiti, and name of mission in Kosovo).
- 2:** Female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style for handling conflicts.
- 3:** Male peacekeepers would prefer an integrating style for handling conflicts.
- 4:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ an obliging style when in conflict situations with superiors.
- 5:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates.
- 6:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeping officers would not be influenced by certain factors.
- 7:** Peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer an avoidance style.

**8:** The particular mission would have no effect on the subject's interpersonal preferences for handling conflicts.

## **VARIABLES**

There were five dependent and four independent variables in this study. The five styles of handling interpersonal conflict in Rahim's model -- "*obliging*", "*dominating*", "*avoiding*", "*integrating*", and "*compromising*" -- were the dependent variables used in the study.

The independent variables were "*gender*", "*position in the mission*", "*experience*", and "*the field mission in which the peacekeepers work*".

The independent variable "gender" was used as a dichotomous variable denoting male and female.

The independent variable "position in the mission" was another dichotomous variables coded as peacekeepers in command posts and peacekeepers in non-command posts.

The independent variable "experience" was analyzed in three different dimensions. Therefore there were three different questions about experience; years of law enforcement experience, total months of experience in the UN, and months of experience in the current/last field mission. These continuous variables were then collapsed into categorical variables. For law enforcement experience "years" were taken into consideration because all peacekeepers are required to have at least five **years** of experience to be eligible to attend peacekeeping field missions. The independent variable of years of law enforcement experience was then collapsed into five categories as follows; 1= 5-10 years, 2= 11-15 years, 3= 16-20 years, 4= 21-25 years, and 5= 26 and

over. For total months of experience in the UN, “months” of experience were taken into consideration because all peacekeepers attend field missions for at least twelve months and extensions for service are granted for six months each time for a maximum two extensions. The independent variable of total months of peacekeeping experience was subsequently collapsed into eight categories as follows; 1= 1-12 months, 2= 13-18 months, 3= 19-24 months, 4= 25-30 months, 5= 31-36 months, 6= 37-42 months, 7= 43-48 months, and 8= 49 and over months. For months of experience in the current/last field mission “months” was taken into consideration for the same reason. The independent variable of months of experience in the last/current field mission was subsequently collapsed into six categories as follows; 1= 1-12 months, 2= 13-18 months, 3= 19-24 months, 4= 25-30 months, 5= 31-36 months, 6= 37 and over months.

The reason for asking two questions about the peacekeeping experience was that an international officer could have peacekeeping experience from another field mission; however, he/she could have just attended the field mission at the time he/she responded to the survey. Each field mission has its own set of sensitivities. At least the reasons for political conflict and parties of these conflicts are different. That is why; experience in the field mission was the focus of attention while deploying police peacekeepers to command posts.

For the field mission peacekeepers attended, most of the respondents were from MINUSTAH (167 out of 260) and UNMIK (84 out of 260). There were also 5 respondents from UNTAET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) and 4 respondents from the UN Headquarters in New York. Responses from UNTAET and UNHQ were disregarded as they were not statistically significant. During the analyses, the responses

from MINUSTAH were coded dichotomously as peacekeepers from MINUSTAH and others. Also, the responses from UNMIK were coded dichotomously as peacekeepers from UNMIK and others.

In this study more independent variables, which would have helped to reach a better understanding of stress level of police peacekeepers, could have been considered for sure. For example religious affiliation, political affiliation, age, race, marital status, educational level, number of children, level of perceived stress, collective vs. individualistic culture and so on. However, since the UN promotes diversity and adopts it as a core institutional value, it is strictly forbidden to speak about those topics. Therefore, questions regarding to those issues would have been highly likely approached in skepticism and would have been left unanswered. It was worried that such questions would have decreased the level of response to the survey. As for the cultural style (individualistic vs collective) there is only one study (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 2010) classifies the cultures all around the world. On the one hand, Hofstede et al.'s study (2010) is highly criticized from the methodological perspective. On the other hand their study is the only one that could be referenced for cultural studies. Even though there are studies that references Hofstede et al.'s classification (see Ting-Toomey et al, 1991 and Euwema & Emmerick, 2005), it is not commonly reflected in conflict management literature. That is why, Hofstede et al.'s classification of cultural styles of countries all over the world was not taken into consideration as a key variable for data collection, which would have made it subject to criticisms. In other words, above mentioned study was not found so reliable to apply it as a pillar to this study. However, along with all its weaknesses from methodological perspective, since it is the only study in the field that

classifies the cultures around the world, it is referenced in the discussions in this study. Literature for interpersonal conflicts does not reflect any association between conflict handling behaviors and marital status and number of children. That is why, they were disregarded. Level of perceived stress would have been another independent variable. An instrument could have been added to the survey. The survey would have been longer in this case. Baruch and Holtom (2008) assert that as the surveys get longer and have more questions, the response rate decreases. It was not easy to convince police officers from all around the world to participate a survey. Response rate would have been less if more questions were asked to participants. As for educational level, educational system varies from country to country. For example being a police officer requires only a 6 months training at police academies after high school in the US, while it requires a two year community college training in Turkey. Due to the difficulty of standardizing such data for peacekeepers from 37 different countries, educational level was disregarded, either.

One other reason to have four independent variable was sample size. The researcher had to stay a week in Haiti and another week in Kosovo to increase the response rate. With that, he reached 260 responses. Adding more independent variables would have been surface a sampling problem.

Table 4 summarizes independent variables as follows;

**Table 4 Summary of Independent Variables**

Gender		Dichotomous	Male vs. Female
Position in the Mission		Dichotomous	Peacekeepers in command posts vs. peacekeepers in non-command posts
Experience	Years of law enforcement experience	Ordinal	
	Total months of experience in the UN	Ordinal	
	Months of experience in the last/current field mission	Ordinal	

Field Mission	Name of mission Haiti	Dichotomous	Peacekeepers from Haiti vs. others
	Name of mission Kosovo	Dichotomous	Peacekeepers from Kosovo vs. others

## INSTRUMENTATION

The Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-II (ROCI-II) is a widely used instrument for measuring the five independent dimensions that represent the styles of handling interpersonal conflict (Rahim, 2001). The ROCI-II was used in this study. It is a conflict handling-measurement survey developed by Rahim in 1983. It is mainly a self-reporting tool, which measures the five independent dimensions of conflict handling styles with either one's superior(s) (Form A), subordinate(s) (Form B), or peer(s) (Form C). This instrument consists of 28 items in total; six items for Avoiding, four items for Compromising, five items for Dominating, seven items for Integrating, and six items for Obliging style. It uses a five-point Likert scale (Likert & Likert, 1976) for each statement ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A higher score represents greater use of a particular conflict style.

A cover letter explaining the aim of this study and five questions seeking demographic information was included along with the ROCI-II. The survey was conducted via the Internet using [www.questionpro.com](http://www.questionpro.com). The survey is presented as appendix B at the end of this study. As Table 5 illustrates, in the survey, statements 1, 4, 5, 12, 22, 23, and 28 were designed to measure integrating, statements 2, 10, 11, 13, 19, and 24 was designed to measure obliging, statements 8, 9, 18, 21, and 25 was designed to measure dominating, statements 3, 6, 16, 17, 26, and 27 was designed to measure



avoiding, and finally statements 7, 14, 15, and 20 were designed to measure compromising behaviors.

**Table 5 List of statements according to the conflict handling styles they measure**

Integrating	Peers	1A, 4A, 5A, 12A, 22A, 23A, 28A
	Others	1B, 4B, 5B, 12B, 22B, 23B, 28B
Obliging	Peers	2A, 10A, 11A, 13A, 19A, 24A
	Others	2B, 10B, 11B, 13B, 19B, 24B
Dominating	Peers	8, 9, 18, 21, 25
	Others	8, 9, 18, 21, 25
Avoiding	Peers	3A, 6A, 16A, 17A, 26A, 27A
	Others	3B, 6B, 16B, 17B, 26B, 27B
Compromising	Peers	7, 14, 15A, 20
	Others	7, 14, 15B, 20

### **CONSTRUCT VALIDITY and RELIABILITY of the INSTRUMENT**

The ROCI-II is theoretically grounded and has been systematically tested with diverse random samples in different relational contexts (Rahim, 1983-a; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 1990). It has been designed through lengthy and repeated feedback from subjects and by factor analyses of various sets of items. Detailed information about how ROCI-II developed is provided in Appendix A.

As for reliability, this instrument was developed in order to increase reliability and validity over other conflict instruments such as the Hall Conflict Management Survey, the Lawrence and Lorsch Proverb, and the Thomas-Kilmann Mode Instrument (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Hall, 1969). Test-retest reliability coefficients ranged between .60 and .83 ( $p < .001$ ), and the internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) ranged from .72 to .77. The ROCI-II factor structure was further confirmed by Rahim and Magner (1995). They provided evidence for both the

convergent and discriminant validities of the subscales on diverse samples in their study. The ROCI-II has subsequently been used in many other published studies, and has been generally accepted for research purposes such as those outlined here (See Chen & Ma, 2002; Cogliser & Schriesheim, 2006; Morris et al., 1998; Bowles, 2009; Lee, 2002; Goodwin, 2002 for further readings).

## **DATA COLLECTION**

Castro (2003) indicated that data collection is the most crucial part of research in social science. According to Maxfield and Babbie (2001), the survey, as a research method, is the most appropriate mode of observation in social science, particularly when people's perceptions, attitudes, and other unobservable information are sought. There are two modes of survey data collection methods: self-administered and interviewer administered. Technological advancements, computerization and the internet in particular, have brought new survey data collection alternatives to the fore. Tourangeau and Smith (1996) suggested that computer-aided techniques of survey data collection facilitated participation in surveys, since they provide confidentiality and anonymity for the respondents.

This study sought to understand police peacekeepers' attitudes and perceptions in conflict situations; and thus a cross sectional survey was the most appropriate method for this study. The subjects were police peacekeepers who were actively working or who had worked previously in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and other field missions.

Data was collected through a web-based and self-administered questionnaire. The subjects were provided with a statement in which the purpose of the survey, information

about the researcher, the time required to complete the survey, and the rules and procedures for participation were covered. All data collection procedures including posting the questionnaire, delivery, and questionnaire completion were done through the internet. There were approximately 350 police peacekeepers that were eligible to participate in the study. MINUSTAH is a bilingual mission and the primary language of the country is French. But because of the increased demand for peacekeepers in Haiti, combined with a shortage of French speaking candidates, more and more English speaking police peacekeepers have been employed in the mission. In order to increase the response rate the survey was translated to French and emailed to French speaking peacekeepers. In July 2011, the researcher himself visited MINUSTAH for five days in order to increase response rate and to conduct interviews. In addition, three reminder emails were also sent to the entire target group in order to increase the response rate. The survey also targeted peacekeepers in other missions. As the researcher had previously served in UNMIK as a peacekeeper, he used his personal network to increase the response rate. Therefore most of respondents not from MINUSTAH are from UNMIK.

The survey was done with the help of Turkish National Police officers, who worked at MINUSTAH in the UNPOL program. This researcher emailed the officers explaining the study, and they were asked to circulate the request to participate to their internal mailing lists. Each peacekeeping mission had its own mailing list for purposes of formal and semi-formal communication, and those were used to invite people to participate in the study. Electronic communication is the most cost-effective and fastest way of communication, and thus was used in this study. Web-based survey systems have

also a feature to identify non-respondents. This allows a researcher to do follow-ups only with those non-respondents. There was no missing data for the survey.

In addition to the web-based survey, face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted with police peacekeepers. The researcher aimed to provide information on real life experiences along with quantitative data in this study. Eighteen individuals were interviewed. Ten interviews were conducted face-to-face, while eight other questions were telephone interviews. All face-to-face interviews were recorded with consent of the interviewees and transcribed. In telephone interviews notes were taken by the researcher. Fourteen interview questions and the informed consent form are provided as Appendix C. In sum, multi-methods were employed in this study.

With respect to the researcher's background and experience to conduct such a study, the researcher has 18 years of police experience in the Turkish National Police, along with 8 years of specific education in policing and law enforcement. In addition, the researcher served as a police peacekeeper for one year in the UN's peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) between 2003 and 2004 -- two thirds of this service within the UNMIK was in a command position.

## CHAPTER – IV FINDINGS

In this chapter, findings from the survey and interviews are analyzed. This study had one research question along with three sub-questions as follows:

**Research Question:** What factors affect interpersonal conflict management styles among Civpol participants on UN peacekeeping missions?

**Sub-Question 1:** Does gender have any impact on these particular personal conflict management styles?

**Sub-Question 2:** Does police rank have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?

**Sub-Question 3:** Do years of experience/age have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?

The following hypotheses were developed in seeking answers to these questions.

**1:** The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by certain factors (gender, years of law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience the last/current field mission that peacekeepers participated, position in the mission, name of mission in Haiti, and name of mission in Kosovo).

**2:** Female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style for handling conflicts.

**3:** Male peacekeepers would prefer an integrating style for handling conflicts.

**4:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ an obliging style when in conflict situations with superiors.

**5:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates.

**6:** All peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeping officers would not be influenced by certain factors.

**7:** Peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer an avoiding style.


**8:** The particular mission would have no effect on the interpersonal preferences for handling conflicts.

First, descriptive measures related to both the quantitative and qualitative data are provided, and then all eight hypotheses are tested statistically. The findings of the statistical analyses are triangulated with the findings of the interviews.

## UNIVARIATE ANALYSES- DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES

This study was mainly based on an online survey. However, interviews were also conducted to triangulate the findings of the survey and to add real life experiences to the quantitative findings of the research. In total, 260 peacekeepers participated in the online survey and 18 peacekeepers were interviewed. Descriptions of the participants are indicated in the following section.

### Gender



**Figure 3 Gender**

Gender was one of the independent variables of this study. Table 6 and Figure 3 show the


gender distribution of the participants in the online survey. Two hundred thirty four participants were male, representing 90 percent of the sample; 26 females responded to the survey, representing just 10 percent.

**Table 6 Gender**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	234	90	90	90
Female	26	10	10	100
Total	260	100	100	

In addition, among the eighteen police peacekeepers who were interviewed, two were female and sixteen were male. This breakdown is not unusual given that policing is a male dominated profession. Males constitute the vast majority of the cadres of the police forces, and the same is true for the peacekeeping missions. As of July 9, 2011, for example, MINUSTAH had 243 females out of a total of 2261 police peacekeepers.

#### Position in the Mission



**Figure 4 Position in the mission**

It is important to note that the UN peacekeeping missions are non-rank missions. There are no ranks and all peacekeepers are considered equal.

From this perspective, a police commissioner, who is considered the highest authority of the international police peacekeeping force in a field mission, and a patrol officer, who is considered to hold the lowest position within an international peacekeeping force are paid

equally. The peacekeeping missions are not vertical, but they are non-hierarchical organizations. There are not ranks, but rather posts. The posts can be command or non-command. The peacekeepers holding command posts are in a decision-making capacity over non-command post peacekeepers.

Table 7 and Figure 4 illustrate the distribution of participants in terms of their organizational status. One hundred and thirty of the participants hold or held command posts in one of the peacekeeping missions representing 50 percent of the sample. The other 50 percent of the sample held or were holding non-command posts.

**Table 7 Position in the mission**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Command	130	50	50	50
Non-command	130	50	50	100
Total	260	100	100	

Out of eighteen interviewees, six of them held command-posts. Of these six interviewees who had command-posts, one was female.

### Experience

The independent variable experience was considered in three dimensions; years of experience in law enforcement, months of total peacekeeping experience, and months of experience in the current or last mission in which the participants worked. The participants' policing backgrounds were considered, because police officers participate in peacekeeping field missions in their late careers in some cases. Also, officers from some countries, such as the US, prefer to take part in the missions after they retire.

Months of total peacekeeping experience was considered another dimension of experience. The participants might have had prior peacekeeping experience, while they




began a new one. Many of the participants stated that they took part in more than one mission. However, having prior peacekeeping experience and being experienced at a particular peacekeeping mission are not the same. For example, officer A might have attended three peacekeeping missions before, but he/she might have attended field mission A for the first time and he/she might not have been experienced enough for that particular mission. Finally, months of experience in the current or last mission the participants worked was considered another dimension of experience.

Both dimensions of peacekeeping experience were measured in months, while policing experience was measured in years. Police peacekeepers are hired for twelve months first, unless the contributing country has different policy. The German government, for example, allows German police peacekeepers to stay in a field mission for only nine months and does not allow their stay to be extended by the UN. Moreover, some police peacekeepers apply for extensions of their stay and if the field mission authorities, the UN General Headquarters, and the contributing country agree, the police peacekeepers are granted an extension for six months. That is why, measuring the peacekeeping experience in months was thought to be more realistic than any other method. In order to avoid confusion the words “years” and “months” were bolded in the context of the relevant questions.

One might think of multicollinearity since all three questions for experience seem quite correlated to each other. However, peacekeeping missions are full of officers with long years of law enforcement experience but less experience in peacekeeping. Many peacekeepers from the US, for example, are retired police officers, who preferred to attend peacekeeping missions in their later years. That is why, having more law

enforcement experience and being more experienced in peacekeeping are different things. A deeper analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data of this study revealed that there were police peacekeepers with more law enforcement experience, but less peacekeeping experience, while there were others with less law enforcement experience, but more peacekeeping experience.

#### Years of Law Enforcement Experience:



**Figure 5 Years of experience in law enforcement**

Participants have various levels of law enforcement experience.

Since, police peacekeepers are required to have at least five years of policing experience

in order to be eligible to attend a field mission, the categorization began with a baseline of five years. That is, none of the participants had less than five years of law enforcement experience. Figure 5 and Table 8 show that 7.7 percent of the participants had law enforcement experiences for less than 10 years, 49.23 percent of them had between 11 and 15 years of policing background, 25.77 percent had between 16 and 20 years of experience, 8.84 percent had between 21 and 25 years of policing background, while 8.46 percent of them had worked at various law enforcement agencies for over 26 years. Thus,

the majority of the answers (197 participants', representing 75 percent of the sample) ranged from 11 up to 20 years for this question.


**Table 8 Years of experience in law enforcement**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
5 to 10	20	7.7	7.7	7.7
11 to 15	128	49.23	49.23	56.93
16 to 20	67	25.77	25.77	82.7
21 to 25	23	8.84	8.84	91.54
26 and over	22	8.46	8.46	100
Total	260	100	100	

Interviewees were categorized according to their law enforcement experience.

Results show that seven of them had between 5 and 10, four of them had 11 and 15, 3 of them had 16 and 20, 3 of them had 21 and 25 years of law enforcement experience. One of the interviewees was a retired police officer with 30 years of policing background. He had been in Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes for 36 months.

#### Total months of peacekeeping experience in the UN:



**Figure 6 Total months of peacekeeping experience in the UN**

Their levels of peacekeeping experience were also different.

Figure 6 and Table 9

illustrate the responses of the


participants about their total peacekeeping experience. Responses were classified on a 6 months basis, because the vast majority of the contributing countries send their officers for at least 12 months and extensions are given for 6 months each time after the first 12 months are served. The majority of the participants (36.15 percent) had up to 12 months of total peacekeeping experience, while the prevalence of participants with less than 18 months experience was 10 percent. Forty five peacekeepers had from 19 months up to 2 years of experience, representing 17.3 percent of the sample, while 6.15 percent of them had from 25 months to 30 months experience. Approximately 13.09 percent of the sample had from 31 months up to 3 years of experience. In total, 17.31 percent of the peacekeepers had over 3 years of experience.

**Table 9 Total months of peacekeeping experience in the UN**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 to 12	94	36.15	36.15	36.15
13 to 18	26	10	10	46.15
19 to 24	45	17.3	17.3	63.45
25 to 30	16	6.15	6.15	69.6
31 to 36	34	13.09	13.09	82.69
37 to 42	7	2.7	2.7	85.39
43 to 48	13	5	5	90.39
49 and over	25	9.61	9.61	100
Total	260	100	100	

As for total peacekeeping experience, eight of interviewees had 12 months or less peacekeeping experience in total. Two of them had between 13 and 18 months, four of them had between 19 and 24 months, one of them had 36 months, one had 48 months, one had 84 months, and the remaining individual had 120 months of total peacekeeping experience. Those with longer experiences attended more than one mission.

Months of experience in the current or last mission the participants worked:



**Figure 7 Months of experience in the current/last mission the participants worked**

Another question of experience that was posed for purposes of providing a deeper

analysis was the

participants' experience within the current peacekeeping mission they worked. As Figure 7 and Table 10 illustrate 52.31 percent of these subjects had less than 12 months experience and 20 percent had up to 18 months of experience, while 11.92 percent extended their stay up to 2 years. The remaining 15.77 percent had more than two years of experience in the field mission where they worked.

**Table 10 Months of experience in the current/last mission the participants worked**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 to 12	136	52.31	52.31	52.31
13 to 18	52	20	20	72.31
19 to 24	31	11.92	11.92	84.23
25 to 30	17	6.54	6.54	90.77
31 to 36	11	4.23	4.23	95
37 and over	13	5	5	100
Total	260	100	100	

As for the months of experience in the current or the last field mission where the interviewees worked, thirteen out of eighteen had twelve or fewer months of experience, one had eighteen months, one had two years, one had four years, one had 7 years, and the remaining one had ten years of experience in the current or the last mission where they worked. This interviewee, who had been working at her last field mission for ten years, worked at the UN General Headquarters in New York. The subject, who had been working in the mission for 7 years, was a police commissioner (the highest authority of the peacekeeping force in a field mission) in one of the peacekeeping missions.

### *Ethnic Background*

A wide range of participants were reached and invited to participate in the survey.

Table 11 shows where the participants attended the various peacekeeping missions.

Police peacekeepers from 37 different countries participated in the survey.

**Table 11 Home countries of the survey participants**

<b>Home Country</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Canada	37	14.25	14.25	14.25
Egypt	12	4.63	4.63	18.88
United States	26	10	10	28.88
Italy	6	2.3	2.3	31.18
Great Britain	12	4.63	4.63	35.81
Tunisia	1	0.4	0.4	36.21
Turkey	27	10.4	10.4	46.61
Ireland	5	1.92	1.92	48.53
Jordan	9	3.5	3.5	52.03
Benin	5	1.92	1.92	53.95
France	9	3.5	3.5	57.45
Brazil	7	2.7	2.7	60.15
Romania	7	2.7	2.7	62.85
Pakistan	15	5.77	5.77	68.62
China	4	1.55	1.55	70.17
Greece	7	2.7	2.7	72.87
Jamaica	2	0.8	0.8	73.67


India	12	4.63	4.63	78.3
Nigeria	3	1.15	1.15	79.45
Bangladesh	11	4.23	4.23	83.68
Sweden	4	1.55	1.55	85.23
Argentina	6	2.3	2.3	87.53
Germany	3	1.15	1.15	88.68
Netherlands	3	1.15	1.15	89.83
Bulgaria	1	0.4	0.4	90.23
Russia	3	1.15	1.15	91.38
Spain	2	0.8	0.8	92.18
Philippines	5	1.92	1.92	94.1
Sri Lanka	1	0.4	0.4	94.5
Croatia	1	0.4	0.4	94.9
Poland	2	0.8	0.8	95.7
Cameroon	1	0.4	0.4	96.1
Norway	3	1.15	1.15	97.25
Australia	3	1.15	1.15	98.4
Hungary	2	0.8	0.8	99.2
Thailand	1	0.4	0.4	99.6
Guatemala	1	0.4	0.4	100
Total	260	100	100	

According to Table 11 Canadian participants constituted the majority of the sample (14.25 percent) and they were followed by the Turkish and American participants by roughly 10 percent per nation. Egyptian, British, and Indian participants were others that represented slightly less than five percent of the entire sample. The survey was conducted on the basis of snowballing. In order to avoid accumulation of responses from Turkish police peacekeepers, they were asked to stop responding the survey themselves after a while. They were, instead, asked to invite police peacekeepers they knew to participate.

Four of the interviewees were from Turkey, three from Canada, and two from India. In addition, one police peacekeeper from Brazil, Hungary, Bulgaria, Bangladesh,

Romania, Russia, the US, Jordan, and Italy were interviewed. A national balance was intended in the endeavors to find police peacekeepers to interview.

### Field Mission



**Figure 8 Field Missions**

**Table 12 Field missions**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
MINUSTAH	167	64.23	64.23	64.23
UNMIK	84	32.3	32.3	96.53
UNTAET	5	1.93	1.93	98.46
UNHQ	4	1.54	1.54	100
Total	260	100	100	

As for the current or the last field missions the participants attended, 167 respondents worked at MINUSTAH (Haiti) representing 64.23 percent of the sample, 84 of them served at UNMIK (Kosovo) representing the 32.3 percent, and the remaining 3.47 percent worked at either UNTAET (East Timor) or UNHQ (The United Nations Headquarters in New York). Table 12 and Figure 8 display the field missions the peacekeepers attended. Three out of four field missions in the table were visited personally. Short-term trips to UNMIK, MINUSTAH, and UNHQ contributed response



rate from these missions. Many police peacekeepers were asked to participate in the survey face by face.

Responses from two other field missions, UNAMID (Darfur) and UNMIS (Sudan) were expected initially; however, both these regions were in political turmoil due to the negotiations of secession of Sudan into two countries as North Sudan and South Sudan. That is why, one police peacekeeper whom the researcher contacted refused to help for data collection emphasizing that he could not deal with this issue since the country was on a kind of slippery slope when the survey was being conducted.

Eight out of eighteen peacekeepers interviewed worked at MINUSTAH (Haiti), seven of them worked at UNMIK (Kosovo), and three worked at UNHQ. All three field missions were visited. Four of the interviews were done over the phone, while others were done face to face.

## **BIVARIATE ANALYSES**

Using bivariate analyses, several independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to better understand whether there was any significant difference between,

- ✓ Males and females,
- ✓ Peacekeepers in command posts and the one's in non-command posts officers,
- ✓ Peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and the one's in other field missions, and
- ✓ Peacekeepers in UNMIK and the one's in other field missions

in terms of 10 different conflict resolution styles as follows;

- ✓ integrate\_peers,
- ✓ integrate\_others,

- ✓ oblige\_peers,
- ✓ oblige\_others,
- ✓ avoid\_others,
- ✓ avoid\_peers,
- ✓ compromise\_peers,
- ✓ compromise\_others,
- ✓ dominate\_peers, and
- ✓ dominate\_others.

The level of significance is evaluated at  $p=0.05$  and  $p=0.1$ . The reason for evaluating of significance level of the variables at  $p=0.1$  level is that the significance levels of some of the variables exceeded the  $p=0.05$  a bit. Thus, some variables were evaluated at the level of  $p=0.1$ .

First, independent samples t-tests were run to examine whether there was a significant difference between males and females. These tests, as Table 13 illustrates, revealed significant difference between gender groups only for “avoid other” behaviors,  $t(258)=2,009$ ,  $p<0.05$ . On average, female peacekeeping officers displayed more avoiding type behaviors towards others than male officers  $M$  (males)=3,2051,  $SD$  (Male)=0,66098,  $M$  (Females)=3,4808,  $SD$ (Females)=0,69013.

**Table 13 Means of 10 Different Conflict Resolutions for Males and Females**

	Females		Males		
	(n=26)		(n=234)		
	M	SD	M	SD	<i>t</i> -test
Integrate Peers	4.20	0.29	4.24	0.41	n.s.
Integrate Others	4.02	0.36	4.13	0.45	n.s.
Oblige Peers	3.43	0.42	3.51	0.45	n.s.
Oblige Others	3.46	0.54	3.47	0.54	n.s.
Avoid Peers	3.36	0.55	3.23	0.64	n.s.

Avoid Others	3.48	0.70	3.20	0.66	2.01*
Compromise Peers	3.88	0.50	3.81	0.53	n.s.
Compromise Others	3.80	0.54	3.74	0.52	n.s.
Dominate Peers	2.92	0.79	2.84	0.66	n.s.
Dominate Others	2.92	0.79	2.85	0.66	n.s.

\* $p < .05$

Note. M=Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. n.s.=not significant

The second independent samples t-test was conducted to understand whether there would be a significant difference between the peacekeepers having command posts and those in non-command positions. The test results are shown in Table 14. The results indicated significant differences existed between the peacekeepers in command positions and the peacekeeping officers in non-command positions for the three dependent variables as interpreted below;

“oblige\_peers” (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ),  $t(258)=0.979$ ,  $p<0.1$ . On average, peacekeepers in non-command positions tended to oblige their peers in conflict situations more frequently when compared to the peacekeepers in command posts.

“compromise\_peers”,  $t(240,170)=1.842$ ,  $p<0.05$ . On average, the peacekeepers in non-command positions displayed more compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in command posts.

and “compromise\_others””,  $t(239,208)=2.290$ ,  $p<0.05$ . On average, the peacekeepers in non-command positions displayed more compromising behaviors towards their superiors in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in command posts.

**Table 14 Means of 10 Different Conflict Resolutions for Peacekeepers in Command Posts and Peacekeepers in non-command Posts**

	Peacekeepers in non-command posts (n=130)		Peacekeepers in command posts (n=130)		<i>t</i> -test
	M	SD	M	SD	
Integrate Peers	4.26	0.36	4.23	0.42	n.s.
Integrate Others	4.14	0.45	4.11	0.44	n.s.
Oblige Peers	3.53	0.40	3.48	0.50	.98**
Oblige Others	3.58	0.51	3.36	0.55	n.s.
Avoid Peers	3.32	0.63	3.17	0.63	n.s.
Avoid Others	3.39	0.68	3.08	0.62	n.s.
Compromise Peers	3.88	0.45	3.76	0.60	1.84*
Compromise Others	3.82	0.44	3.68	0.60	2.29*
Dominate Peers	2.87	0.64	2.84	0.70	n.s.
Dominate Others	2.87	0.64	2.84	0.70	n.s.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Note. M=Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. n.s.=not significant

Another independent samples *t*-test was implemented to better understand whether there would be a significant difference between the peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and those in other field missions. Test results are shown in Table 15. The results indicated significant differences between the peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and the peacekeeping officers in other field missions only for the dependent variable “oblige\_peers” (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ),  $t(258)=1,798$ ,  $p<0.1$ . On average, peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to oblige their peers in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in other missions.

**Table 15 Means of 10 Different Conflict Resolutions for Peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and Peacekeepers in Other Field Missions**

	Peacekeepers in other field missions (n=93)		Peacekeepers in MINUSTAH (n=167)		<i>t</i> -test
	M	SD	M	SD	
Integrate Peers	4.24	0.46	4.24	0.35	n.s.
Integrate Others	4.12	0.46	4.13	0.44	n.s.
Oblige Peers	3.57	0.51	3.47	0.41	1.80**
Oblige Others	3.48	0.59	3.46	0.51	n.s.

Avoid Peers	3.22	0.66	3.26	0.62	n.s.
Avoid Others	3.19	0.66	3.25	0.67	n.s.
Compromise Peers	3.88	0.59	3.78	0.49	n.s.
Compromise Others	3.79	0.58	3.73	0.50	n.s.
Dominate Peers	2.87	0.68	2.85	0.67	n.s.
Dominate Others	2.87	0.68	2.85	0.67	n.s.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Note. M=Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. n.s.=not significant

The last independent samples t-test analysis was conducted to help achieve a better understanding of whether there would be a significant difference between the peacekeepers in UNMIK and those in other field missions. These test results are shown in Table 16. The results indicated significant differences between the peacekeepers in UNMIK and the peacekeeping officers in other field missions only for the dependent variable “integrate\_peers” (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ),  $t(258)=.367$ ,  $p<0.1$ . On average, peacekeepers in UNMIK were less likely to integrate their peers in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in other missions.

**Table 16 Means of 10 Different Conflict Resolutions for Peacekeepers in UNMIK and Peacekeepers in Other Field Missions**

	Peacekeepers in other field missions (n=176)		Peacekeepers in UNMIK (n=84)		t-test
	M	SD	M	SD	
Integrate Peers	4.23	0.37	4.25	0.44	n.s.
Integrate Others	4.12	0.45	4.12	0.44	n.s.
Oblige Peers	3.48	0.42	3.55	0.51	.06**
Oblige Others	3.48	0.51	3.44	0.59	n.s.
Avoid Peers	3.26	0.62	3.20	0.66	n.s.
Avoid Others	3.26	0.67	3.17	0.65	n.s.
Compromise Peers	3.80	0.50	3.85	0.59	n.s.
Compromise Others	3.75	0.51	3.75	0.57	n.s.
Dominate Peers	2.85	0.67	2.86	0.69	n.s.
Dominate Others	2.85	0.67	2.86	0.69	n.s.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Note. M=Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. n.s.=not significant

In order to provide a complete overview of the results of all independent samples t-test analyses at a glance, a summary of independent samples t-test analyses is presented in Table 17.

**Table 17 Summary of independent samples t-test Analyses**

DVs	Significant IVs	<i>p</i> level
oblige_peers	Position in the mission	0.1
	Name of mission Haiti	0.1
	Name of mission Kosovo	0.1
avoid_others	Gender	0.05
compromise-peers	Position in the mission	0.1
compromise-others	Position in the mission	0.1

After the independent samples t-test analyses, several correlations tests were conducted in order to examine whether there would be a significant correlation between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last/current field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and conflict resolution behaviors.

The first correlation was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*integrate\_peers*” behaviors. As Table 18 illustrates, the police peacekeepers’ integration behavior towards peers in conflict situations and years of law enforcement experience were positively correlated,  $r(260)=.161, p<0.1$ . This implies that as the police peacekeepers’ law enforcement experience increased, their tendency to integrate in conflict situations towards their peers increased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the variables of integrate behavior towards peers and total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission of the peacekeepers.

Table 18 Bivariate Correlations between Integrate\_Peers and Independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Peers</i>
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	.16**
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.04
Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission	-.004

N=260, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01

A second correlation was conducted between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*integrate\_others*” behaviors.

Table 19 summarizes the results of this test. The results show that the police peacekeepers’ integration behavior towards others in conflict situations and years of law enforcement experience were positively correlated,  $r(260) = .224, p < 0.1$ . This means that as the police peacekeepers’ law enforcement experience increased, their tendency to integrate in conflict situations towards others (their superiors or their subordinates) increased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the variables integrate behavior towards peers and total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission of the peacekeepers.

Table 19 Bivariate Correlations between Integrate\_Others and independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Others</i>
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	.22**
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.03
Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission	-.003

N=260, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01

Another correlation was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*oblige\_peers*” behaviors. Table

20 summarizes the results of the test. The results showed that the police peacekeepers' obliging behavior towards their peers in conflict situations and total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.113, p < 0.1$ . This shows that as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to oblige to their peers in conflict situations decreased.

There was no significant correlation observed between the oblige behavior towards peers variable and years of law enforcement experience, and months of experience in the last field mission of the peacekeepers variable.

<b>Table 20 Bivariate Correlations between Oblige_Peers and Independent Variables</b>	
<b><i>Independent Variables</i></b>	<b><i>Integrate Others</i></b>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.063
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.113**</b>
Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission	-.067

N=260, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Another correlation test was conducted between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*oblige\_others*” behaviors. As Table 21 illustrates, the results of the test indicated that the police peacekeepers' obliging behavior towards others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations and total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.105, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to oblige others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations decreased.

Also the police peacekeepers' obliging behavior towards others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations and months of experience in the last field



mission of the peacekeepers were negatively correlated,  $r(259) = -.110, p < 0.1$ . This indicated that as the police peacekeepers get more experienced in their last peacekeeping mission, their tendency to oblige others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations decreased.

There was no significant correlation between the variable of employing obliging behavior towards others and years of law enforcement experience.

**Table 21 Bivariate Correlations between Oblige\_Others and Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<i><b>Integrate Others</b></i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.046
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.105**</b>
<b>Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission</b>	<b>-.110**</b>

N=260, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Another correlation test was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*avoid\_peers*” behaviors. As presented in Table 22, the results of the test showed that the police peacekeepers’ avoiding type behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations and the total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.117, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to avoid conflict situations with their peers decreased.

Also, the police peacekeepers’ avoiding type of behaviors towards their superiors or their subordinates in conflict situations and months of experience in the peacekeeper’s last field mission were negatively correlated,  $r(259) = -.106, p < 0.1$ . This shows that as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in their final peacekeeping mission, their tendency to avoid conflict situations with their peers decreased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the use of avoidant type of behaviors towards their peers and years of law enforcement experience.

**Table 22 Bivariate Correlations between Avoid\_Peers and Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<i><b>Integrate Others</b></i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.061
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.117**</b>
<b>Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission</b>	<b>-.106**</b>

N=260, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01

Another correlation was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*avoid\_others*” behaviors. These test results are presented in Table 23. These results indicated that the police peacekeepers’ avoiding behavior towards others (their superiors and their subordinates) in conflict situations and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place were negatively correlated,  $r(259) = -.135, p < 0.05$ . That is, as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in their final peacekeeping mission, their tendency to avoid conflict situations with their superiors or subordinates decreased.

Also, the police peacekeepers’ avoiding behavior towards others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations and total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.109, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to avoid conflict situations with their superiors or subordinates decreased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the use of avoidant behaviors towards others in conflict situations and years of law enforcement experience.

Table 23 Bivariate Correlations between Avoid\_Others and Independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Others</i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.055
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.109**</b>
<b>Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission</b>	<b>-.135*</b>

N=260, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01

Another correlation was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*compromise\_peers*” behaviors. As Table 24 shows, the police peacekeepers’ compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations and months of experience in their last field mission were negatively correlated,  $r(259) = -.165, p < 0.05$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in their final peacekeeping mission their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with their peers decreased.

Also the police peacekeepers’ compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations and total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.115, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with their peers decreased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the use of avoidant behaviors in conflicts towards their peers and years of law enforcement experience.

Table 24 Bivariate Correlations between Compromise\_Peers and Independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Others</i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.055
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.115**</b>
<b>Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission</b>	<b>-.165*</b>

N=260, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01

Another correlation was conducted between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*compromise\_others*” behaviors. These test results are presented in Table 25. The results indicated that the police peacekeepers’ compromising behavior towards others (their superiors and their subordinates) in conflict situations and months of experience in their last field mission were negatively correlated,  $r(259) = -.175, p < 0.05$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in their last peacekeeping mission, their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with their superiors or subordinates decreased.

Also, the police peacekeepers’ compromising behavior towards others (their superiors or their subordinates) in conflict situations and total months of the UN experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.113, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions, their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with their superiors or subordinates decreased.

There was no sign of any significant correlation between the use of compromising behaviors towards others and years of law enforcement experience.

**Table 25 Bivariate Correlations between Compromise\_Others and Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<i><b>Integrate Others</b></i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.073
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.113**</b>
<b>Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission</b>	<b>-.175*</b>

N=260, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Another correlation was run between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*dominate\_peers*” behaviors. As data in Table 26 show, the police peacekeepers’ dominating behavior towards their peers

in conflict situations and total months of the experience in the UN were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.137, p < 0.05$ . That is, as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN, their tendency to dominate in conflict situations with their peers decreased.

Also the police peacekeepers' domination behavior towards their peers in conflict situations and years of law enforcement experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.162, p < 0.1$ . This shows that as the police peacekeepers' years of law enforcement experience increases, their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with their peers decreases.

There was no significant correlation between the variables of dominating behavior towards peers in conflicts and the months of experience in the last peacekeeping mission peacekeepers participated.

Table 26 Bivariate Correlations between Dominate Peers and Independent Variables	
<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Others</i>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.162*
Total Months of Experience in the UN	-.137*
Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission	-.102

N=260, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

The last correlation was conducted between the continuous IVs (years of law enforcement experience, total months of UN experience, and months of experience in the last field mission that the peacekeepers took place) and “*dominate\_others*” behaviors. As Table 27 illustrates, the results indicated that the police peacekeepers' dominating behavior towards others (their superiors and their subordinates) in conflict situations and total months of the experience in the UN were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.137, p < 0.05$ . That is, as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN, their tendency to dominate in conflict situations with others decreased.

In addition, the police peacekeepers' compromising behavior towards others in conflict situations and years of law enforcement experience were negatively correlated,  $r(260) = -.162, p < 0.1$ . As the police peacekeepers' years of law enforcement experience increased, their tendency to compromise in conflict situations with others decreased.

There was no correlation between rates of peacemakers dominating behavior towards others and the months of experience in their final peacekeeping mission.

**Table 27 Bivariate Correlations between Dominate\_Others and Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Integrate Others</i>
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	<b>-.162*</b>
<b>Total Months of Experience in the UN</b>	<b>-.137*</b>
Months of Experience in the Last/Current Mission	-.102

N=260, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

Table 28 provides a summary of the study's significant correlations.

**Table 28 Summary of Correlation Analyses**

<b>DVs</b>		<b>Significantly correlated IVs</b>	<b><i>p</i> level</b>	<b>Direction of the relation</b>
Dominate	Peers	Years of law enforcement experience	0.1	Negative
		Total months of the UN experience	0.05	Negative
	Others	Years of law enforcement experience	0.1	Negative
		Total months of the UN experience	0.05	Negative
Oblige	Peers	Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative
	Others	Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative
		Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
Integrate	Peers	Years of law enforcement experience	0.05	Positive
	Others	Total months of the UN experience	0.05	Positive

		Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.05	Negative
Avoid	Peers	Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative
		Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
	Others	Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.05	Negative
		Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative
Compromise	Peers	Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
		Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative
	Others	Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
		Total months of the UN experience	0.1	Negative

### **MULTI VARIATE ANALYSES: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE POLICE PEACEKEEPERS' CONFLICT HANDLING BEHAVIORS**

Multiple regressions were conducted to determine which factors contributed to the police peacekeepers' conflict handling behaviors. Data was screened for multivariate outliers before conducting each regression analysis. All cases with Mahalanobis distance exceeding the chi square ( $\chi^2$ ) criteria were deleted ( $X^2=11,34$ ,  $p<.001$  with  $df=3$ ).

Also, the data set was pre-examined for normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Mertler and Vannatta (2005) indicated that there are two essential approaches to testing the assumptions in multiple regressions. The first approach advocates for a routine pre-analysis of bivariate scatter plots for linearity, Q-Q Plots, values of skewness and kurtosis for normality and Box's M test for homoscedasticity. The alternative approach suggests looking at the scatterplot for standardized predicted values by standardized residuals. The alternative approach was adopted in this study.

Pre-examinations of the data revealed that among all three assumptions, none were violated for any of the analyses. According to Mertler and Vannatta (2005, p.55) *“residuals may be clustered on the top or bottom of the plot (non-normality), may be curved (non-linearity) or may be clustered on the right or left side (heteroscedasticity)”*, when the assumptions of the regression analysis are not met. In all the regression analyses conducted in this study and the related scatterplots of standardized predicted values by standardized residuals revealed reasonably dispersed scores throughout the plot by creating an approximately rectangular shape with a concentration in the center.

In addition to that, collinearity statistics were checked for all the regression analyses conducted in this study. Collinearity checks revealed that all tolerance statistics exceeded 0.1 and emphasized there was no multicollinearity problem for any of the analyses conducted in this study.

In the survey, some statements measuring conflict handling behaviors were repeated in order to acquire a better understanding as to whether there were specific behavioral approaches adopted based on the status of the party involved in the conflict situation. In this context, participants were asked to answer three versions of the same questions. However, they answered only two of the questions depending on whether they held a command post, or not. For example one question stated;

*I negotiate with my peers so that a compromise can be reached.*

*I negotiate with my supervisors so that a compromise can be reached.*

*I negotiate with my subordinates so that a compromise can be reached.*



In addition, 5 (five) dependent variables “dominate, compromise, oblige, integrate, avoid” were analyzed for each of these items using two versions, for example “*compromise\_peers*” and “*compromise\_others*”.

In order to test the hypotheses of this study, multiple regression analyses were conducted for each type of conflict handling behavior. However, in light of the above mentioned facts, two different multiple regressions were conducted for each DV. Thus 10 (ten) different multiple regression analyses were conducted in total.

In testing the study hypotheses, first the analyses were conducted and then their results were typed out in statistical terms. Then, these results were interpreted for each hypothesis. Based on these interpretations, hypotheses were rejected or accepted. The level of significance is evaluated at  $p=0.05$  and  $p=0.1$ . The reason for evaluating of significance level of the variables at  $p=0.1$  level is that the significance levels of some of the variables exceeded the  $p=0.05$  a bit. Thus, some variables were evaluated at the level of  $p=0.1$ .

The results of the regression analyses run with “*compromise\_peers*” as a factor revealed that the overall model significantly predicted the effect of the independent variables on peacekeepers’ rates of compromising behaviors ( $R^2=.058$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.032$ ,  $F(7, 258)=2,227$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). A summary of the regression coefficients is presented in Table 29. Only two variables (months of experience in the last field mission (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) and the name of the mission in Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) were significantly linked with the police peacekeepers’ compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations. As the police peacekeepers’ months of experience in their final field mission decreased, they tended to use more compromising behaviors in conflict situations.

Inversely, as they became more experienced in their last field mission, they were less likely to be compromising towards their peers. As for the second independent variable “name of the mission in Haiti”, peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to employ compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

**Table 29 OLS Regression of Compromise Peers on other Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	-.01	.11	-.84	0.4	-.052
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.01	.01	1.01	.31	.06
Total Months of Experience in the UN	-.00	.00	-.04	-.52	.60
<b>Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>-1.71</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>-.12</b>
Position in the Mission	-.11	.07	-1.60	.11	-.10
<b>Name of Mission Haiti</b>	<b>-.32</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>-1.74</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>-.29</b>
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.22	.19	-1.18	.24	-.20

N=260,  $R^2=.058$ ,  $F=2.227$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Another multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict peacekeepers’ compromising attitude in conflict situations with others. The term “other” referred to the supervisors of the peacekeepers in non-command posts and to the subordinates of the peacekeepers in command posts.

The results of the regression model run with “*compromise\_others*” as a factor indicated that the overall model significantly predicted the effect of the independent variables on the peacekeepers’ rates of compromising behaviors ( $R^2=.260$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.068$ ,  $F(7, 258)=2,601$ ,  $p<.05$ ). A summary of the regression coefficients is presented in Table 30. Three variables (position in the mission (at the level of  $p=.05$ ), months of experience in the last field mission (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) and the name of the mission in Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.1$ )) were significantly linked with the police peacekeepers’ compromising behaviors towards peers in conflict situations. Results indicated that the position in the

mission (having command post or not) significantly contributed to the rates of compromising behaviors reported by police peacekeepers. Peacekeepers in non-command positions were less likely to be compromising towards their superiors in conflict situations however, compared to those peacekeepers having command posts. Also, compromising behavior was predicted by the independent variables of months of experience in the last field mission the participants participated in and for MINUSTAH as the field mission the peacekeepers participated in (both at the level of  $p=0.1$ ). This data showed that as the police peacekeepers' months of experience in the last field mission decreased, they tended to use more compromising behaviors in conflict situations. Inversely, as they became more experienced in the field mission they were less likely to carry out compromising behaviors towards their superiors or subordinates. As for the independent variable "name of the mission in Haiti", peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to employ compromising behaviors towards others in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

**Table 30 OLS Regression of Compromise Others on other Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	-.07	.11	-.61	.55	-.04
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.01	.01	1.31	.19	.08
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-.37	.71	-.03
<b>Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>-1.83</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>-.13</b>
<b>Position in the Mission</b>	<b>-.14</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>-2.04</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>-.13</b>
<b>Name of Mission Haiti</b>	<b>-.35</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>-1.90</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>-.32</b>
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.29	.19	-1.55	.12	-.26

N=260,  $R^2=.260$ ,  $F=2.601$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Results of the regression analysis for "avoid\_others" showed that the overall model significantly predicted peacekeepers' use of avoidant behaviors in conflict

situations ( $R^2 = .083$ ,  $R^2_{adj} = .057$ ,  $F(7, 258) = 3.248$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). A summary of the regression coefficients is presented in Table 31. Only two variables; gender and position in the mission (both at the level of  $p = 0.05$ ) were significantly linked with the police peacekeepers' use of avoidant behaviors towards subordinates or superiors in conflict situations. Gender data was coded dichotomously as females=0 and males=1. So a negative link between "*gender*" and "*avoid\_others*" indicated that female police peacekeepers tended to use more avoidance strategies in conflict situations compared to male peacekeepers. Female peacekeepers were more likely to prefer using avoidance behaviors towards superiors or subordinates in conflict situations compared to male peacekeepers.

Results also indicated that position in the mission (having command post or not) significantly contributed to rates of avoidant behaviors towards superiors or subordinates (depending on the peacekeepers' position) among police peacekeepers. The peacekeepers in command position were less likely to use avoidance strategies in dealing with their superiors in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers having command posts.

**Table 31 OLS Regression of Avoid Others on other Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>Beta</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>-.28</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>-2.07</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>-.13</b>
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.00	.01	-.37	.71	-.02
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-.59	.55	-.04
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	-.00	.00	-.76	.45	-.05
<b>Position in the Mission</b>	<b>-.29</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>-3.46</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>-.22</b>
Name of Mission Haiti	-.18	.23	-.78	.44	-.13
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.19	.23	-.82	.41	-.14

$N=260$ ,  $R^2 = .083$ ,  $F=3.248$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Results of the regression analysis for “avoid\_peers” showed that the overall model did not significantly predict peacekeepers’ avoidance behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations ( $R^2 = .083$ ,  $R^2_{adj} = .057$ ,  $F(7, 258) = 3.248$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). A summary of the regression coefficients is presented in Table 32. None of the dependent variables was linked with the police peacekeepers’ avoidance behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations.

**Table 32 OLS Regression of Avoid Peers on other Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	-.13	.13	-.94	.35	-.06
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.00	.01	-.54	.59	-.03
Total Months of Experience in the UN	-.00	.00	-1.13	.26	-.08
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	-.00	.00	-.53	.59	-.04
Position in the Mission	-.11	.08	-1.37	.17	-.09
Name of Mission Haiti	-.05	.22	-.21	.83	-.04
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.07	.23	-.32	.75	-.05

$N=260$ ,  $R^2 = .083$ ,  $F=3.248$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Results of the regression analysis for “integrate\_peers” showed that the overall model did not significantly predict the effect of gender on integration behavior ( $R^2 = .043$ ,  $R^2_{adj} = .016$ ,  $F(7, 258) = 1.610$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). However, as Table 33 illustrates, the factors, years of law enforcement experience (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ), name of the mission Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ), and name of the mission Kosovo (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) contributed significantly to observed rates of integrating behaviors towards peers. As their law enforcement experience increased, the likelihood of the peacekeepers performing integration behaviors increased. Thus, police peacekeepers with higher law enforcement experience tended to integrate more than those who had less policing experience.

Moreover, police peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and UNMIK were more likely to employ integrating behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to those peacekeepers in other missions.

**Table 33 OLS Regression of Integrate Peers on other Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	.05	.08	.54	.59	.03
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.18</b>
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	.30	.76	.02
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.37	.72	-.03
Position in the Mission	-.04	.05	-.76	.45	-.05
<b>Name of Mission Haiti</b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>1.77</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.30</b>
<b>Name of Mission Kosovo</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>1.80</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.30</b>

N=260,  $R^2=.043$ ,  $F=1.610$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Another regression analysis was conducted to test whether integration behavior towards others (towards supervisors for the peacekeepers having non-command posts and towards subordinates for the peacekeepers having command posts) was predicted by any of the independent variables. The regression results showed that the overall model significantly predicted the integration behaviors of the peacekeepers ( $R^2= .063$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.037$ ,  $F(7, 258)=2,419$ ,  $p> 0.05$ ). A summary of the regression coefficients (See Table 34) revealed that only one variable (years of law enforcement experience) was significantly linked with the police peacekeepers' integration behaviors towards others in conflict situations. Police peacekeepers with more experience in law enforcement agencies, tended to display integrative behaviors more often in conflict situations than those with less personal experience.

**Table 34. OLS Regression of Integrate Others on other Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	.11	.09	1.18	.24	.07
<b>Years of Law Enforcement</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>.24</b>

**Experience**

Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	.02	.98	.00
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.23	.82	-.02
Position in the Mission	-.04	.06	-.71	.48	-.05
Name of Mission Haiti	.18	.16	1.16	.25	.19
Name of Mission Kosovo	.17	.16	1.09	.28	.18

N=260,  $R^2=.063$ ,  $F=2.419$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Another multiple regression was conducted to determine the factors that contribute to the use of obliging attitudes towards others by police peacekeepers. In the survey statements measuring conflict handling behaviors were repeated in order to better understand whether there was and behavioral influence depending on the status of the party they faced in conflict situations. The participants had to answer three versions of the same question. However, they answered only two of the questions depending on whether they held a command post, or not. For example;

*I usually accommodate the wishes of my peers.*

*I usually accommodate the wishes of my supervisors.*

*I usually accommodate the wishes of my subordinates.*

Responses explaining their conflict handling attitudes towards peers were represented by the dependent variable “*oblige\_peers*” and likewise, responses explaining their behaviors towards their superiors or subordinates were represented by the dependent variable “*oblige\_others*”. Therefore, only “*oblige\_others*” was taken into consideration in the regression.

Results indicated that the overall model significantly predicted the effect of the independent variables on the use of obliging attitudes to resolve conflicts among police peacekeepers ( $R^2=.073$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.047$ ,  $F(7, 258)=2,808$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). A summary of the

regression coefficients is represented in Table 35, and this table shows that the independent variables position in the mission (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ), name of the mission in Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ), and name of the mission in Kosovo (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) contributed significantly to explaining rates of obliging behaviors towards others. Police peacekeepers with no command-post tended to display obliging behaviors more often in conflict situations compared to those having command posts in peacekeeping missions. In addition, peacekeepers serving/ having served in MINUSTAH and UNMIK were less likely to use obliging strategies in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in other field missions.

**Table 35 OLS Regression of Oblige Others on other Independent Variables**

<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	.00	.11	-.02	.98	.00
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	.01	.01	.98	.33	.06
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-.65	.52	-.05
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.49	.63	-.03
<b>Position in the Mission</b>	<b>-.23</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>-3.33</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>-.21</b>
<b>Name of Mission Haiti</b>	<b>-.37</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>-2.01</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>-.33</b>
<b>Name of Mission Kosovo</b>	<b>-.36</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>-1.90</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>-.31</b>

$N=260$ ,  $R^2=.073$ ,  $F=2.808$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Results of the regression analysis for “oblige\_peers” showed that the overall model did not significantly predict the rates of using integrated conflict resolution behaviors among the police peacekeepers ( $R^2= .041$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.014$ ,  $F(7, 258)=1,516$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). However, as Table 36 illustrates, the factor name of the mission in Haiti contributed significantly to the rates of using obliging behaviors towards peers. Police peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to employ obliging behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other missions.



Table 36 OLS Regression of Oblige Peers on other Independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	.06	.09	.64	.52	.04
Years of Law Enforcement Experience	-.01	.01	-.97	.33	-.06
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-1.08	.28	-.08
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.15	.88	-.01
Position in the Mission	-.05	.06	-.82	.42	-.05
<b>Name of Mission Haiti</b>	<b>-.33</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>-2.06</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>-.35</b>
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.24	.16	-1.49	.14	-.25

N=260,  $R^2=.041$ ,  $F=1.516$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Another multiple regression analysis was employed to determine the contributing factors to peacekeepers' dominating attitudes in conflict situations. Although, the model did not significantly predict the contributing factors to dominating behaviors ( $R^2=.044$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.017$ ,  $F(7, 258)=1,656$ ,  $p>0.05$ ), results of the regression indicated that years of law enforcement experience significantly contributed to the peacekeepers' preferences of using a dominating style in conflict situations, as presented in Table 37. Police peacekeepers with fewer years of policing experience tended to use dominating behaviors more than those with more experience. In other words, as experience in policing increased and as the police officers got older, their tendency to dominate their subordinates or supervisors in conflict situations decreased.

Table 37 OLS Regression of Dominate Others on other Independent Variables

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	-.08	.14	-.59	.56	-.04
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>-2.25</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>-.14</b>
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-1.47	.14	-.11
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.59	.56	-.04
Position in the Mission	.02	.09	.19	.85	.01

Name of Mission Haiti	-.12	.24	-.50	.62	-.08
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.09	.24	-.35	.73	-.06

N=260,  $R^2=.044$ ,  $F=1.656$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Results of the regression analysis for “dominate\_peers” showed that the overall model did not significantly predict the integration behaviors of the police peacekeepers ( $R^2=.044$ ,  $R^2_{adj}=.017$ ,  $F(7, 258)=1.656$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). However, as Table 38 illustrates, the factor, years of law enforcement experience significantly contributed to the police peacekeepers’ preferences for carrying out dominating behaviors towards their peers. The police peacekeepers with fewer years of policing experience tended to use dominating behaviors more compared than those with more experience. In other words, as experience in policing increased and as police officers got older, their tendency to dominate in conflict situations decreased.

**Table 38 OLS Regression of Dominate Others on other Independent Variables**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Gender	-.08	.14	-.59	.56	-.04
<b>Years of Law Enforcement Experience</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>-2.25</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>-.14</b>
Total Months of Experience in the UN	.00	.00	-1.47	.14	-.11
Months of Experience in the Current/Last Mission	.00	.00	-.59	.56	-.04
Position in the Mission	.02	.09	.19	.85	.01
Name of Mission Haiti	-.12	.24	-.50	.62	-.08
Name of Mission Kosovo	-.09	.24	-.35	.73	-.06

N=260,  $R^2=.044$ ,  $F=1.656$ ,  $p<.05$ .

Table 39 lists the IVs that contributed significantly to the DVs according to the results of the regression analyses.

**Table 39 Summary of the Regression Analyses**

DVs		Significantly contributing IVs	<i>p</i> level	Direction of the contribution
Dominate	Peers	Years of law enforcement experience	0.05	Negative
	Others	Years of law enforcement experience	0.05	Negative
Oblige	Peers	Name of Mission Haiti	0.05	Negative
	Others	Position in the Mission	0.05	Negative
		Name of Mission Haiti	0.05	Negative
		Name of Mission Kosovo	0.1	Negative
Integrate	Peers	Years of law enforcement experience	0.05	Positive
		Name of Mission Haiti	0.1	Positive
		Name of Mission Kosovo	0.1	Positive
	Others	Years of law enforcement experience	0.05	Positive
Avoid	Peers	None		
	Others	Gender	0.05	Negative
		Position in the Mission	0.05	Negative
Compromise	Peers	Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
		Name of Mission Haiti	0.1	Negative
	Others	Position in the Mission	0.05	Negative
		Months of Experience in the Last Field Mission	0.1	Negative
		Name of Mission Haiti	0.1	Negative

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS and HYPOTHESES

**Research Question:** *What factors affect interpersonal conflict management styles among Civpol participants on UN peacekeeping missions?*

In order to answer this question an initial hypothesis was developed as follows.

### First Hypothesis:

**H<sub>0</sub>:** *There would be no standard manner of handling interpersonal conflict among police peacekeepers. In other words, the handling of interpersonal conflicts would not be influenced by certain factors.*

**H<sub>1</sub>:** *The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by certain factors (gender, years of law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience,*

*months of experience in their last/current field mission, position in the mission, name of the mission in Haiti, and name of the mission in Kosovo).*

H.0. proposed that the police peacekeepers' conflict handling behaviors would not be influenced by factors such as gender, law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience, the last/current field mission that peacekeepers participated in, position in the mission, name of the mission in Haiti, and name of the mission in Kosovo. However, the bivariate (independent samples t-tests and correlations) and multivariate analyses (regressions) conducted above showed that police peacekeepers' conflict handling behaviors were influenced by the above-mentioned factors.

Based on the independent samples t-test results, rates of *oblige\_peer* behaviors differed significantly between command and non-command officers, between officers in Haiti and other missions, and between officers in Kosovo and other missions. Similarly, *avoid\_others* behavior differed significantly between males and females; *compromise\_peers* and *compromise\_others* behaviors differed significantly between command and non-command officers (See Table 17).

Based on the correlation tests,

*dominate\_peer* behavior was significantly correlated with the years of law enforcement experience and months of total peacekeeping experience (both in a negative direction);

*dominate\_others* behaviors was significantly correlated with the years of law enforcement experience and months of total peacekeeping experience (both in a negative direction);

*oblige\_peers* behaviors was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience (in a negative direction),

*oblige\_others* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission (both in a negative direction);

*integrate\_peers* behavior was correlated with years of law enforcement experience (in a positive direction);

*integrate\_others* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience (in a positive direction) and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission (in a negative direction);

*avoid\_peers* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission (both in a negative direction);

*avoid\_others* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission (both in a negative direction);

*compromise\_peers* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission (both in a negative direction); and finally

*compromise\_others* behavior was significantly correlated with months of total peacekeeping experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current mission in (both in a negative direction) (See Table 28).

The regression test results indicated that years of law enforcement significantly contributed to the variables of:

*dominate\_peers* and *dominate\_others* behaviors (both in negative directions),

*integrate\_peers* and *integrate\_others* behaviors (both in positive directions);

gender significantly contributed to *avoid\_others* behavior (negatively);

position in the mission significantly contributed to *oblige\_others*, *avoid\_others*, and *compromise\_others* behaviors (all in negative directions)

Name of mission in Haiti significantly contributed to *oblige\_peers*, *oblige\_others*, *compromise\_peers*, and *compromise\_others* behaviors (all in negative direction)

*integrate\_peers* behavior (positively); and finally

Name of the mission in Kosovo contributed significantly to *oblige\_others* (negatively) and *integrate\_peers* (positively) (See Table 39).

All test results explained above emphasized the fact that the police peacekeeper's conflict handling styles were influenced by several factors (gender, years of law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience in the peacekeeper's last/current field mission, position in the mission, name of the mission in Haiti, and name of the mission in Kosovo) depending on the conflict handling style.

Thus, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 was rejected.

***Sub-Question 1:*** *Does gender have any impact on these particular personal conflict management styles?*

In order to answer this question, hypotheses H.2 and H.3 were developed.

Second Hypothesis:

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *There would be no difference in rates of compromising behaviors in handling conflicts between males and females.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *Female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style for handling conflicts.*

An independent samples t-test analysis for *compromise\_peers* and *compromise\_others* behaviors indicated that there was no significant difference between gender groups for “compromising” behavior (See Table 13).

According to the regression analyses for *compromise\_peers* and *compromise\_others* behaviors gender did not significantly contribute to peacekeepers’ compromising behaviors (See Tables 29 and 30).

As the independent samples t-test regression analyses verified the H<sub>0</sub>, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 was accepted.

Third Hypothesis:

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *There would be no difference in rates of integrating behaviors for handling conflicts between males and females.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *Male peacekeepers would prefer an integrating style for handling conflicts.*

An independent samples t-test analysis for *integrate\_peers* and *integrate\_others* behaviors indicated that there was no significant difference between gender groups for integrating behavior (See Table 13).

According to the regression analyses for *integrate\_peers* and *integrate\_others* behaviors gender did not significantly contribute to the peacekeepers’ integrating behaviors (See Tables 33 and 34).

As the independent samples t-test regression analyses verified the  $H_0$ ,  $H_0$  was accepted.

***Sub-Question 2: Does organizational status have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?***

In order to obtain an answer to this question, hypotheses H.4., H.5., and H.6. were developed.

**Fourth Hypothesis:**

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *There would be no difference in rates of showing an obliging style when handling interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers in command posts and those in non-command posts.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *All peacekeepers would tend to employ an obliging style when in conflict situations with superiors.*

The independent samples t-test analysis for *obliging\_others* behaviors indicated that there was no difference between the peacekeepers in command positions and peacekeepers in non-command positions for obliging behavior (See Table 14).

However, the regression analysis showed that position in the mission contributed significantly to the usage of obliging behaviors by police peacekeepers in interpersonal conflict situations. Police peacekeepers in non-command positions tended to use obliging strategies in conflict situations with their supervisors to a greater extent compared to those having command posts in peacekeeping missions (See Table 35).

As the regression analyses negated  $H_0$ , Hypothesis 4 was accepted.



*Fifth Hypothesis:*

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *There would be no difference observed in use of a dominating style for handling interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers in command post and those in non-command posts.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *All peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates.*

An independent samples t-test analysis for *dominating\_others* behaviors indicated that there was no significant difference between peacekeepers in command positions and peacekeepers in non-command positions for dominating behavior (See Table 14).

Regression analysis showed that position in the mission does not significantly contribute to dominating behavior of police peacekeepers in interpersonal conflict situations (See Table 37).

As regression analyses verify  $H_0$ , null hypothesis is accepted.

*Sixth Hypothesis:*

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *All peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeping officers would not be influenced by certain factors.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *Employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeper officers would be influenced by certain factors.*

$H_0$  proposed that the police peacekeepers' tendency to compromise in conflict situations would not be changed by factors such as gender, law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience in the last/current field mission peacekeepers participated in, position in the mission, name of the mission in

Haiti, and name of the mission in Kosovo. In other words, all peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style of behavior in conflict situations with their peers regardless of the influence of any other independent variable. They would use compromise type behaviors independently of their gender, position in the mission, experience, and etc. However, the bivariate analyses (independent samples t-tests and correlations) and multivariate analyses (regressions) conducted above showed that the police peacekeepers' compromising behaviors was influenced by the above-mentioned factors.

An independent samples t-test analysis for *compromising\_peers* behaviors indicated that there was a significant difference between peacekeepers in command position and peacekeepers in non-command position for compromising behavior (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) (See Table 14). On average, peacekeepers in non-command positions displayed more compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in command posts.

Correlation analysis showed that peacekeepers' compromising behavior towards their peers in conflict situations was negatively correlated to months of experience in the last/current field mission they participated in (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ) and months of total experience in the UN (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) (See Table 24).

Regression analysis showed that months of experience in the last mission that the peacekeepers participated and name of mission Haiti significantly contribute to compromising behavior of police peacekeepers in interpersonal conflict situations with their peers (See Table 29).

As the analyses falsified  $H_0$ , the alternative hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) was accepted.

***Sub-Question 3: Do years of experience/age have any impact on these personal conflict management styles?***

In order to obtain an answer to this question, H7 was developed.

**Seventh Hypothesis:**

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *There would be no difference in the use of an avoiding style of behavior in interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers having more law enforcement and peacekeeping experience and those having less policing and peacekeeping experience.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:*** *Peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer using an avoiding style of conflict resolution.*

The regression analyses did not indicate that there was any significant contribution of the IVs of law enforcement experience, months of total experience in the UN, and months of experience in the last/current field mission as regards both *avoid\_peers* and *avoid\_others* behaviors in conflict situations (See Tables 31 and 32). However, correlation tests indicated a significant correlation (in negative direction) between the police peacekeepers' use of avoiding behavior towards their peers in conflict situations and the total number of months of the UN experience and months of experience in the peacekeepers last field mission (both at the level of  $p=0.1$ ). There was no sign of any significant correlation between rates of avoidant behaviors (both for peers and others) and years of law enforcement experience (See Tables 22 and 23).

As the regression analyses verified the H<sub>1</sub>, the null hypothesis was rejected.

**Eighth Hypothesis:**

***H<sub>0</sub>:*** *The particular mission would have no effect on the interpersonal preferences of the subjects for handling conflict.*

***H<sub>1</sub>:** The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by the particular peacekeeping field mission.*

An independent samples t-test analysis results indicated significant differences between the peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and the peacekeeping officers in other field missions for conflict behaviors of oblige\_peers (See Table 15). Another independent samples t-test analysis showed significant differences between the peacekeepers in the UNMIK and the peacekeeping officers in other field missions for conflict behaviors of oblige\_peers (See Table 16).

The regression analysis results showed that the name of the mission Haiti was significantly linked with the police peacekeepers' compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) (See Table 29). The peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to employ compromising behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to the peacekeepers in other field missions.

Another regression analysis result showed that the name of the mission in Haiti was significantly linked with the police peacekeepers' compromising behaviors towards others in conflict situations (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) (See Table 30). The peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to employ compromise types of behaviors towards others in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

Yet another regression analysis result showed that both the name of the mission in Haiti and the name of the mission in Kosovo were significantly linked (both at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) with the police peacekeepers' integrating behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations (See Table 33). The peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and UNMIK were

more likely to employ integrating behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

Another regression analysis pointed out that the independent variables, name of the mission in Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ) and name of the mission in Kosovo (at the level of  $p=0.1$ ) contributed significantly to rates of using obliging behaviors towards others (See Table 35). Peacekeepers serving/having served in MINUSTAH and UNMIK were less likely to oblige others in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

Another regression analysis indicated that the independent variable, name of the mission in Haiti (at the level of  $p=0.05$ ) contributed significantly to obliging behaviors towards peers (See Table 36). The peacekeepers serving/having served in MINUSTAH were less likely to oblige others in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions.

As the regression analyses negated the  $H_0$ , the alternative hypothesis was accepted.

**Table 40 Summary of hypotheses testing**

<b>Hypotheses</b>		<b>Accept/Reject</b>
<b>1</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no standard manner of handling interpersonal conflict among police peacekeepers. In other words, the handling of interpersonal conflicts would not be influenced by certain factors.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by certain factors (gender, years of law enforcement experience, months of total peacekeeping experience, months of experience the last/current field mission that peacekeepers participated, position in the mission, name of mission Haiti, and name of mission Kosovo).</p>	Null hypothesis is rejected.
<b>2</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no difference in rates of compromising behaviors in handling conflicts between males and females.</p>	Null hypothesis is accepted.

	<b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> Female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style for handling conflicts.	
<b>3</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no difference in rates of integrating behaviors in handling conflicts between males and females.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> Male peacekeepers would prefer an integrating style for handling conflicts.</p>	Null hypothesis is accepted.
<b>4</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no difference in rates of showing an obliging style when handling interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers in command posts and those in non-command posts.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> All peacekeepers would tend to employ an obliging style when in conflict situations with superiors.</p>	Null hypothesis is rejected.
<b>5</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no difference in use of a dominating style for handling interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers in command post and the one's in non-command post.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> All peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates.</p>	Null hypothesis is accepted.
<b>6</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> All peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeper officers would not be influenced by certain factors.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> Employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeper officers would be influenced by certain factors.</p>	Null hypothesis is rejected.
<b>7</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> There would be no difference in use of an avoiding style of behavior in interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers having more law enforcement and peacekeeping experience and those having less policing and peacekeeping experience.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> Peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer using an avoiding style of conflict resolution.</p>	Null hypothesis is rejected.
<b>8</b>	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub>:</b> The particular mission would have no effect on the interpersonal preferences of the subjects for handling conflicts.</p> <p><b>H<sub>1</sub>:</b> The handling of interpersonal conflicts would be influenced by the particular peacekeeping field mission.</p>	Null hypothesis is rejected.

## CHAPTER – V      DISCUSSIONS and CONCLUSION

### *Are Conflict Handling Behaviors Universal or Situational?*

The independent samples t-tests presently reported indicated that there were significant changes in the nature of the police peacekeepers' conflict handling behaviors relative to the level of influence they had in the mission. Commanding peacekeepers tended to oblige their peers to a greater extent than other peacekeepers in the context of conflict situations. The analysis of the interviews and their responses also verified this finding. Of the eighteen interviewees, only two stated that they would take all necessary steps if they believed something needed to be done. Others said that they would, somehow, reconcile their thoughts with the opponents' opinions in conflict situations.

One of the interviewees emphasized the difficulties of being in the position of a command post in peacekeeping field missions as follows;

*“The people you work with have various characteristics. Chief of, let's say, Forensics Unit value more to protect his officers, while you pay heed to interoperability of the units for the missions overall cause. I think, officers from some countries see being in command post as acting as a father of their personnel. They are so protective. They don't want to send officers to the villages that have the potentiality of armed conflicts for patrol. However, this is the job that needs to be done by police peacekeepers. This attitude might be personal rather than cultural. But, I think, somehow, culture has also its share on these kinds of management attitudes to some extent.”*

Apparently, this kind of working atmosphere leads those peacekeepers who are in supervising positions to carry out obliging behaviors in conflict situations with their peers / chiefs of other units. Otherwise, a deterioration in the relationship between the chiefs of the various units of a peacekeeping field mission might affect the interoperability and effectiveness of the overall field mission.

In some cases interpersonal conflicts can spark nationalist feelings among police peacekeepers as one of the interviewees indicated;

*“If you are at odds with an officer from ....., all ..... officers in the force oppose you in different times in different places. Even with the ones you don’t know personally.”*

Therefore, interpersonal conflicts could result in potential national oppositional situations.

It was also reported that interpersonal conflicts place police peacekeepers in trouble in indirect ways. What happened to one of the interviewees illustrates this very clearly.

*“I had a problem with one of my staff members. He was an ..... guy. Deputy regional commander was also from ..... They were very close friends and lived at the same house. The deputy regional commander, my immediate supervisor, started pushing me afterwards. We were very good with deputy regional command before the conflict I had with that ..... guy. We had never a good relationship again with the deputy until I come back from the field mission.”*

As the real life experiences discussed in interviews showed, any involvement in an interpersonal conflict results in police peacekeepers being placed in a distressed condition. That is why, they tend to stay away from conflict situations and if they still remain emerged in these conflicts they are prone to try to squirm out of these.

Studies of other sectors have revealed different results. In healthcare sector, for example, two cases of interpersonal conflicts, given in Kressel, Kennedy, Lev, Taylor, and Hyman’s study (2002), bring out the fact that one of the parties preferred the use of dominating behaviors in both cases, while the other party looked for help from a mediator. In the first case, two nurses had fallen out over time-off schedules. The older nurse had demanded more off-time using coercive methods over the younger nurse, who sought help from the nurse manager in the Emergency Room. The nurse manager had to



use her power to make clear to the older nurse to stop her coercive behaviors. The second case was an interpersonal conflict between a nurse and an authoritarian physician, who had a bad reputation for treating her subordinates in a disrespectful and coercive manner. The nurse asked for help from hospital authorities. Several meetings with both parties separately and together resulted a mutual understanding and ability to work together more constructively.

Two independent samples t-tests analyses interestingly revealed two significant results, namely that peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and UNMIK are less likely to oblige in conflict situations compared to peacekeepers in other field missions. However, the interviews did not verify this finding.

In order to understand whether a particular field mission had an influence on peacekeepers' preferences for handling interpersonal conflicts, the interviewees were asked whether they would employ various conflict handling behaviors depending on the field mission they attended. In other words, would peacekeeper A prefer using obliging behaviors in conflict situations, while serving in MINUSTAH and prefer, for example, the use of dominating behaviors while serving in any other peacekeeping field mission? All interviewees were asked to respond to the questions below;

*How would you decide how to behave in conflict situations?*

*Would you employ different styles of behavior in different conflict situations?*

*Would you employ different styles of conflict resolution behavior in different field missions?*

The responses were clear cut. All interviewees indicated that the field mission had no influence over the interviewees' preference for the type of conflict handling behavior they would use.

*"It depends. I don't know. I could behave depending on the situation I involved in. I mean I could compromise if other party convicts me for his cause..... I behave depending on my addressee sometimes. To be honest, if I see the conflict I had could damage my credit and my position in the mission, I could retreat. At least do my best to stay out of it. See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil (Here she laughs)..... I don't think I would consider the field mission in decision of what to do in conflict situations. Far from it."*

Another interviewee emphasized the irrelevance between conflict styles and the place where the conflict might take place as follows;

*"What I think is... I think how you react in conflict situations are just about you character. It's personal than situational. I don't think I would act depending on the field mission. I don't think I would do that."*

Hence, the interviews did not verify the results of the quantitative data analysis.

### **The Nexus between Gender Issues and Conflict Handling Styles:**

The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325 in October 2000. This resolution focused on how women and children are affected in the post-conflict areas and recognized that women's participation in peace processes can significantly contribute to the peace and security in the post-conflict territories of the world. Since the adoption of the resolution 1325, the issue of women's and children's security has continued to gain attention with growing recognition and women's active participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities has been promoted (Ou, 2012). Currently women make up 8 percent of the total police peacekeeping force and 2 percent of the military force. The UN aims to increase women's participation up to 20 percent (The

United Nations, 2013). The increase of the number of female peacekeepers in field missions in accordance with the UN policies brought gender issues to the fore.

Although the literature regarding the role of gender and conflict handling styles revealed no systematic pattern, a second hypothesis, proposed that female peacekeepers would prefer a compromising style in conflict situations, in order to contribute the literature. However, unlike the hypothesis, the independent samples t-test conducted in this study revealed that female police peacekeepers displayed more avoidance behaviors in conflict situations compared to male peacekeepers.

Both female officers interviewed indicated that they preferred avoidance tactics in efforts to resolve such problems. They preferred using avoiding behaviors even though they thought they were right in terms of the conflict. Peacekeeping missions are male-dominated missions. The vast majority of the staff members are male officers. Moreover, the institutional culture fosters masculinity. Police officers do not hesitate to use improper language regardless of the female officers' existence in work settings as one of the interviewees emphasized. She said that

*“Male officers curse in my country, too. But they do not do it if there is any female around. Officers or not. It does not matter. Sometimes I hear when they curse, but if they notice my existence they come and apologize. In mission that was the first thing I was stunned and felt uncomfortable about. I preferred to avoid being in such positions, tried to get away as soon as possible when I hear improper language”.*

A female interviewee, with more than 15 years of peacekeeping experience (ten years of in the General Headquarters in New York and three years in three different field missions) illustrates how tough being a woman in peacekeeping field missions is in her explanations;

*“Being a woman in missions is tough. Officers from some countries treat you in different ways. They look down to women. They don't want to be with you. They*

*don't want to work with you. It is embarrassing for them. So, the task, which you are assigned with them, creates problems potentially. Cultural differences bring the challenge. For the Europeans it was easier, but with other people there were challenges. For ..... and ....., for example, women are in different position culturally. They did not want to take orders. But, I didn't face any major opposition from them"*

Both of the female interviewees indicated that they simply avoided conflict situations in order not to face some possible side effects.

*"I tried to avoid conflicts, sometimes ignored these. In my first field mission, we were six women in entire mission staff members. We were being chased by other officers after working hours sometimes. We also received some nasty text messages. The messages including words of insult, bad language, curse, damn and so on. Having said that, we had also women officers that only looked for European or American officers to get married. They did not care about the job they were supposed to do. That might be another reason for that chases and text messages. I was chased, too. I would have report it to Gender Unit. Anyway, I wanted to be away from all of it, and tried to avoid conflicts."*

What follows is another female perspective of the UN peacekeeping field missions and challenges they faced during their service;

*"In my first mission I was the only female at the station. France and Ireland had females in Headquarters. There was a ..... in charge who had never worked with females..... A lot of them don't have females on their police force.... But they usually learn. They just didn't want any complication..... I was basically running it anyway" (Chappel & Evans, 1999, p. 240).*

Here is another good example of the cultural differences also bring challenges such as misunderstandings and prejudices to female peacekeepers;

*"At the first mission there were three of us. Two of us were together in a house. We didn't have any problems, but the people assumed we were married."*

According to some cultures a male and a female can only stay at the same house only if they are married. Therefore officers from some countries would not understand the concept of housemate.

Findings of both quantitative and qualitative research verified Rahim's (1983-b), Terhune's (1977), and Chanin & Schneer's (1984) studies, which revealed that females prefer avoiding type behaviors in the presence of conflict situations compared to men.

In addition, studies, in which ROCI-II instrument was used in different settings, were also reviewed. The ROCI-II instrument was also used in this study. The ROCI-II instrument was also used in this study. Marcus (1989), for example, indicated that male healthcare managers are more dominating at all levels (subordinates, peers, and supervisors), while female managers were more avoiding. A study by Barrow-Green (2004) on the relationship between conflict handling styles and the quality of the dyadic relationship between the leader and the follower in a private sector institution revealed that gender is not associated with the styles of conflict management both in the leader and the follower levels. Another study by Kimball (2004) focusing on organizational conflict management styles and employee emotional engagement in public sector displayed no significant dependence between the gender and the conflict management styles. No significant differences emerged between male and female managers in the apparel industry in the North East region of the US in terms of utilization of the emergent avoiding, compromising, dominating, integrating, and obliging behaviors in Verdun's study (2004). A study by Bowles (2009), showed communication styles of university students in conflict situations did not differentiate females from males. Finally Sirivun's study (2001) displayed no differences between males and females managers in international enterprises in Bangkok, Thailand in assessing the use of conflict handling styles.

The third hypothesis in this study proposed that male peacekeepers preferred integrating style in conflicts. However, quantitative analyses did not verify the hypothesis. Terhune (1970) and Chanin & Schneer (1984) asserted that in conflicts men employ integrating approaches to a greater extent compared to women. Based on the questionnaire results this was not true for the male police peacekeepers. However, data compiled from the interviews showed that male police peacekeepers also tended to avoid conflict situations as much as they could. An interviewee, who had been a police commissioner (the highest police authority within the field mission) for over 8 years, answered the question “*What are the differences between males and females in such conflicts? If yes, what sort of differences?*” as follows;

*“I think these sorts of things are personal. I mean it is hard to generalize. But I can say that in general police peacekeepers avoid conflict situations. No matter male or female. I think males are more liable to use avoiding tactics. Because there are strict UN regulations. International officers are asked to sign a letter of undertaking when they first arrive to field mission. With that letter, they are being notified about the UN regulations on sexual harassment, exploitation and etc. The rules are so strict and disobedience results in repatriation and being banned from UN missions. There are also rules specifically valid for the each field missions. In the UNMIK for example officers involved in physical fighting are repatriated. Discipline Unit enforces the mission regulations. I think those rules deter officers from becoming involved in conflicts. They usually reduce the degree of personal relationship when they witness something that would annoy them. Having said that, I have seen many cases of compromise, too. If they work at the same unit, personal relationship are inevitable, and if it is not possible to be redeployed to another unit, they compromise. I mean in general.”*

Another case of avoidance;

*“In MINURSO police commissioner was ..... and Chief of Staff was ..... We were very close friends with ..... guy (Chief of Staff). A divergence emerged between the police commissioner and the Chief of Staff. I cannot recall now what the reason was. Police commissioner sent ..... guy a letter intimidating him breaking his leg.*

*(Here he laughs)*

*He really threatened the chief of staff by breaking his leg. Why do you want to break my leg? Oh, God! I don't understand.*

*-What did Chief of Staff do? Did he report it to higher authorities in the mission?*

*-No. He just ignored it. A week later they started acting as if it never happened between them (Here he laughs again)."*

From another perspective, conflict handling style depends on the personality. That is why it cannot be generalized. An interviewee denied the ability to use generalizations as follows;

*"I think it is rather personal. Even the same person acts in different ways in different conflicts. So generalization might cause misdirection. A person cannot be in the same mood every time. We face a lot of adversities here in the field mission. Being away from the family and the lifestyle you are accustomed, being involved in a desperate struggle to keep people safe in an environment in where they don't understand you, they even sometimes don't want you. Conflicts when you are deeply upset end up with different results than conflicts when you are OK."*

Sixteen out of 18 interviewees were males. From the language they used and the perspective they took, they gave the impression that avoiding the conflict was the common behavior among male peacekeepers as well as females. The reason for that changed from person to person. Some indicated they had problems regarding their fluency in English, which can be seen below:

*"Many things bothered me during my service in the mission, but I preferred to stay out of it. I always had doubts of my English. I never believed in myself about my English. I thought that I could not express myself in a stressing conflict situation. That is why, I kept out conflicts. I kept silent."*

Some others thought that conflicts would not lead to a solution, but harm.

*"I personally do not see any benefit in interpersonal conflicts. Most of the fellow colleagues do not want to get involved in conflicts to reach a mutually agreed solution. They just try to impose their ideas. So conflicts are sort of pissing contests with no winners. Because people, who are too ambitious, take those conflicts personally and they are either reassigned to another place or are refused to get extension. I don't like getting involved in conflicts. I like to stay out of this. Even though it sometimes tries my patience, it is better to be leave the scene and never mention t the conflict situation again"*

Interestingly, five interviewees indicated that nationalism surpasses fairness and equity in peacekeeping missions. Predominantly, officers from third world countries held that idea. One of the interviewees words supported that perception very well.

*“The last thing you should do to mess with any Westerners. You are going to be repatriated. This is their show. Do not even try to get a supervision position. You will not get it. They will give to one Westerner, even though he is less qualified compared to you. Do not try to show yourself. What you should do is playing three monkeys; see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil. Shut your mouth and take your money. That is it.”*

Other interviewees’ words were not that clear and direct; however, listening to them gave the perception they were being treated like second-class citizens.

Only one interviewee indicated that he would go for his thoughts whatever it took;

*“We are here to work. Some officers are not willing to work. They just want to hang on the internet and make money in the mission. Nothing more. I came here for a purpose. I go for it whatever it takes.”*

Although there were different thoughts about peacekeepers’ conflict handling styles, it seemed that male police peacekeepers tended to avoid conflict situations. Apparently being involved in interpersonal conflicts is a “lose-lose” scenario for peacekeepers. As one interviewee indicated a motto commonly uttered by the peacekeepers was “*Another day another dollar*”. Hence, the peacekeepers perceived it unreasonable to oppose each other and jeopardize their existence in the field mission area.

Moreover, cultural diversity clearly made certain features of communication difficult. Due to the issue of fluency (or lack of fluency most of the times) in English and different meanings attached to words, the communication process across cultures is complex and demanding as Elron et al. (2003) put it. Bearing in mind that interpersonal



conflicts could be caused by perceived misunderstandings and cultural differences, police peacekeepers who were interviewed tended to avoid conflict situations.

### **Position in the Mission and Conflict Handling Styles:**

Three hypotheses (H.4, H. 5, and H. 6) in this study were developed in order to better understand the relationship, if any, between the individual's position in the mission and the conflict handling styles they used most often. H.4 proposed that police peacekeepers would tend to use obliging behaviors in conflicts with their superiors. An independent samples t-test (See Table 14) rejected this relationship, while a regression analysis showed that position in the mission contributed significantly to the usage of obliging behaviors by police peacekeepers in interpersonal conflict situations. Police peacekeepers in non-command positions tended to use obliging strategies in conflict situations with their supervisors to a greater extent compared to those having command posts in peacekeeping missions. Qualitative data also verified H.4. One of the interviewees' statements illustrates the tendency to try to oblige in conflict situations with superiors as follows;

*"I do whatever I am told to do. National differences do not matter. We are united for the same purpose in the mission. Commanding officers give the orders and others do what they are told. That is the rule and what should be done. Nobody will benefit from a conflict with his boss."*

The same opinions surfaced in another peacekeeper's statements.

*"If your boss is satisfied with your service, you will never have problems in getting CTOs (compensatory time off - author's note) and annual leaves. If you want to be in peace in the mission, keep your boss happy and be away from conflicts with the guys you work with."*

However, two other interviewees pointed out the role of avoidance in their statements. Statements by one interviewee, a police commissioner in one of the

peacekeeping missions with more than ten years of experience within the UN system, included this valuable opinion.

*“In usual internationals (international police peacekeeper – author’s note) avoid conflicts. Some of them squirm out of situations that might lead to conflicts by following a low profile relationship. They just come to work and go back home. They avoid interactions with their superiors. So, they avoid conflicts. Some of them prefer direct interactions. I mean they go to their chief’s office and talk about the conflicts directly. “-You did this, you did that, it is not true”. Like this. I think this way of behavior is more common among officers from Europe and America. This might be about their culture. Officers from eastern countries, as far as I observe, avoid direct confrontation. They don’t state their thoughts to supervisors with ease. In disaccords they express their thoughts to some extent at the beginning. However, as the disaccord deepens, they stop developing opposing arguments and do what they are told even if they are not convinced. This is about their culture I guess. What I sometimes witness is they keep their problems to their selves for a while and finally they make a complaint to the top authority of the field mission, which creates problems. Nevertheless, what I think is it is all about personal characteristics.”*

The differences in conflict handling styles could stem from both cultural attributes and personal characteristics. On the other hand, there could be other reasons for this variance. Officers accustomed to strict hierarchical management structures in their home countries might bring their professional habits to the peacekeeping field mission. However, peacekeeping missions are non-ranking missions. Therefore, all police peacekeepers taking part in the missions, whatever their rank is in their home country, are regarded as equal and non-ranked international police officers. This can be observed through the following statements of one interviewee;

*“....., and ..... for example, couldn’t discontinue their habits coming from their colonial past. They are in “-Yes, Sir” mood all the time. They get into the offices of their supervisors by clicking their heels and nodding their heads. (Here he laughs – Author’s note.) ..... and ..... can even put their feet on the table of their supervisor. They are so cool with their supervisor. In conflict situations, too. We had a Chief of Investigations putting his feet onto the Regional Commander’s desk. Regional commander was ..... and Chief of Investigations was ..... ((Here he laughs again– Author’s note.)”*

A careful reading between the lines of the interviews showed avoidance behaviors did occur among police peacekeepers. Nevertheless, conflict handling styles changed from person to person depending on the personality and the cultural background of the police peacekeepers. Some officers preferred obliging styles of behavior and kept their thoughts to themselves in conflicts with their superiors, while others preferred direct communication and insisted on their views to the end.

H.5. proposed that all peacekeepers would tend to employ a dominating style in conflict situations with their subordinates. Both the independent samples t-test (See Table 14) and the regression (See Table 37) analyses rejected H.5.

Although the quantitative data showed that police peacekeepers in command-posts do not dominate in conflicts with their colleagues in non-command posts, the interviews showed the opposite pattern of behavior. Five interviewees held command posts. One out of five was a female officer. First, some questions were posed twice to help the researcher understand how they perceived any confrontation from their staff members. All interviewees responded to this question saying they did not like confrontation. Personal feelings inevitably affected attitudes. This does not necessarily mean though that they would dominate in conflict situations on all occasions, however.

Further questions asked subjects about their conflict handling preferences. Naturally, nobody used the word “*dominate*” in their statements. However, some of their statements, their body language while they were talking about this subject, and their facial expressions showed that they would advocate for their own cause when confronted by subordinates. One of them, for example, said that

*“I don’t mind being confronted. Conflicts usually happen because of my decisions. Particularly when I make decisions about one of my staff members. In*

*these cases, I try to talk to my staff member about the reason for the decision I made and try to persuade him or her. Having said that we are not here to persuade our officers for our decisions. We do not have time for that. I do whatever I have to do in order to get the job done."*

The interviewee made a face and kept biting his lips while he was speaking about the conflicts he faced. His gestures and facial expressions gave the impression that he had negative feelings about the interpersonal conflicts he was involved in.

Thus, the quantitative and qualitative research strategies produced different outcomes. Although, the peacekeepers in command-posts did not obviously use the term "*dominate*", in-depth analyses of their statements showed that they tended to use dominating approaches in conflict situations.

Nonetheless, position in the mission was not the only factor considered when deciding which style to employ in conflict situations. Another input variable affecting the decision process was the opponent himself/herself. To reach a better understanding of this issue, interviewees were asked how they would react to conflicts with subordinates in different countries. For instance, they were asked "*how would you react the conflicts with a staff member from country A, country B*", and so on and so forth. In the selection of the countries, information about the prior relations between the interviewees' home country and the country name mentioned in the question was considered. Colonized-colonizer relations, alliances, political conflicts, wars that happened in the past were considered in selecting country names for the questions posed to the interviewees. Apparently, the interviewees gave the same answers to all questions. However, their facial expressions changed with each question. They presented negative faces when countries and their home country were somehow at odds, while they presented a positive facial expression when the countries, which had close ties to their home country, were mentioned.

That is why, there are many choices involved in the peacekeepers' decision making processes concerning which conflict handling style they should employ in a given situation. Aside from their personal characteristics, the origin of the staff member was also a factor to consider in conflict situations. One of the interviewees indicated that she had difficulties managing some of her staff members, because they were from the same country as the police commissioner and insisted on giving orders that would have potentially sparked nationalistic sentiments.

One police commissioner interviewed mentioned that he had seen officers using dominating behaviors in conflict situations. However, he added that the excessive and constant use of domination among peacekeepers (regardless of being in a command or non-command position) would lead to trouble.

*“Being dominant in international missions is not an appropriate choice of supervision I must say. In administrative jobs it can be good to be rigorous and regulative. Jobs such as budgeting, personnel issues, maintenance and so on. However, some jobs need deep analyses, risk evaluation, undertaking risks while doing job. Investigative jobs, particularly the ones about illegal drug trafficking, require closer relationships with your staff. You have to trust them. Domination in conflicts could spoil the working environment. Also you must remember that you are being watched by your guys all the time. That’s why you want to be flexible in interpersonal relations. You have to focus the general problems to find solutions instead of the minor ones. Sometimes you see deviant behaviors of your staff members. Both local and international. For example, he asks permission to go home for 30 minutes for some reason and doesn’t come back for three hours. Warning this person, for example, in front of others would create problem. You have to do it in personal. There is something you have to (He said this word with emphasis – Author’s note) be careful I must say. When you warn somebody or talk to somebody about his deviant behaviors you want to have somebody else to witness what you said or what you didn’t say. Otherwise you could face some bad allegations against you. Because you do something people don’t like. They can do whatever they can to have proved right.”*

Although the survey results rejected H.5, the interviews, particularly those with peacekeepers in command positions, showed that police peacekeepers in command-posts did not like opposition coming from their staff members. This does not necessarily prove

that they tended to dominate in conflict situations; however, obviously insurances by subordinates in conflict situations are not favored and affect the supervisors' decisions about the staff member.

*“Officers doing their job without demur and officers opposing everything are not same for me. I value the former more. I wouldn't accept extension requests of an officer questioning every decision of mine”*

H.6. proposed that all peacekeepers would tend to employ a compromising style in conflict situations with their peers. In other words, employing a compromising style in conflict situations by peacekeeping officers would not be influenced by certain factors. That is, they would compromise in conflict situations with their peers regardless of the influence of any independent variables such as their gender, position in the mission, experience, and etc. However, the bivariate analyses (independent samples t-tests and correlations) and multivariate analyses (regressions) conducted above led to the rejection of the H.6 (See Tables 14, 24, and 29). The police peacekeepers' compromising behaviors were influenced by the above-mentioned factors.

As for the qualitative analyses, interviewees provided varied responses to the question of *“Based on your experience and observations, how do you think peacekeepers handle conflict situations with peers?”* Four interviewees, including one female officer, responded to this question by saying this depended on the personality of the peacekeeper. *“It pretty much depends on personality. If the person is so self-centric, then he would prefer dominating style in such conflicts”* one of the interviewees indicated.

Three interviewees stated that the peacekeepers' preferences for handling conflicts depended on who they were in conflict with.

*“If you are at odds with a native speaker, it would be harder for you. Your opponent will be more competent to express himself than you are. That is why; I personally avoided having problems with natives.”*

Another interviewee indicated that having a conflict with an officer, who comes from the same country as the higher authority of the police component comes from, could create a problem for peacekeepers. For instance, if a deputy police commissioner was from country A, becoming involved in an interpersonal conflict with another officer from country A could create serious consequences.

*“The last thing you should do is to mess with a ..... officer. Deputy Commissioner Admin is from ..... He will make you regret if you have problems with any of his fellows”.*

Another interviewee indicated the same thing as follows;

*“I keep myself away from conflicts. Particularly with ..... officers. Station commander is ....., too. We had an ..... guy, who had problems with one of the ..... officers. Station commander refused his request for extension. So he had to go back his home country earlier than he expected. I don’t want to be in the same position. Even though I am right, I keep my mouth shut.”*

The statements above show that those interviewees preferred avoidance tactics in dealing with conflict situations.

Another idea raised by the interviewees was that the peacekeepers’ approach to handling conflict would depend on their psychological mood at the time of the conflict.

*“I don’t know how I would react to conflict situations. I think it depends. If I am in a good mood, I can take it easy. If not, conflicts can be more devastating for me and I can be aggressive. But verbally, not physically. (He laughs here.- Author’s note).”*

Five interviewees emphasized the fact that they would prefer an integrating style of conflict resolution whenever possible. They indicated that if this was not possible, they would prefer to compromise. One of the interviewees stated his preference as follows;

*“If I feel that I am about to involve in a conflict and it is inevitable, I try to find a win-win solution. I listen to other party and try to understand his/her concerns. After listening, I kindly talk about my own concerns letting other party know about my approach to the issue. Then I try to find a solution acceptable for both*

*of us. If I feel that I have to sacrifice some of concerns in order to reach a solution. I would do that."*

Data compiled out of the interviews showed no significant pattern for carrying out compromising behaviors towards peers. Five of the interviewees indicated that they would prefer using a compromising style if interpersonal conflicts were inevitable with peers, while other interviewees stated that their preference for handling conflicts would be influenced by who they were in conflict with, the psychological mood they were in, and their opponents' level of proficiency and fluency in English. Finally, four of the interviewees emphasized that preferences for conflict handling styles would depend on the personality of the peacekeeper.

Interview results are compared with literature. Oetzel et al. (2003), Philips & Cheston (1979), Munduate et al. (1997) stated in their studies that people prefer dominating style in conflicts with subordinates. The interviews showed that many police peacekeepers in command positions did not use the term "dominate", and their statements indicated that they did not like opposition from subordinates. They did not want to work with officers questioning every decision the chiefs made. Moreover, this dislike showed itself in the decision making process of giving CTO's, accepting extension requests and so on. Therefore, officers in non-command positions tended to avoid conflict situations with their chiefs. If they somehow became involved in a conflict they usually obliged their superiors even if they thought they were right. Oetzel et al. (2003), Kahn et al. (1964), Munduate et al. (1997) asserted in their studies that people tend to use obliging behaviors in conflict situations with superiors. The interview results harmonize with the literature, while the quantitative analyses do not. In Rahim's (1983-b) and Munduate et al.'s (1997) studies it was observed that people prefer compromising styles of behavior in



conflicts with peers. The hypothesis developed to test this preference was rejected by both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. There are factors that effect police peacekeepers' preference for compromising behaviors in conflicts with peers. According to the quantitative analyses these factors are position in the mission (being in command post vs. being in non-command post) (See Table 14), months of experience in their last/current field mission (See Table 24), total months of experience in the UN (See Table 24), and name of the mission in Haiti (See Table 29). The interview results showed that police peacekeepers' preference for a compromising style in resolving conflicts with peers was affected by the person they were in conflict with, the psychological mood they were in, and their opponents' the level of proficiency and fluency in English.

In his study on the conflict management styles used by the Korean local government employees with superiors, peers, and subordinates, Lee (2002) conducted mail surveys, in which both the ROCI-II instrument was used as well as face-to-face interviews. The interview and survey results displayed the finding that obliging behaviors styles were used more frequently in conflicts with a superior than with a subordinate. In addition, avoiding was used more frequently with a superior than with a subordinate or peer.

In Elron et al.'s study (2003) one of the interviews they conducted and cited provided an explanatory clue pertaining to the situation of interpersonal conflicts between peacekeepers having different cultures.

*"I didn't see and didn't hear about any tensions between the UNIFIL battalions..... There were however some discreet talks about how sometimes it is difficult for a Westerner to receive orders from a commander who is not."*

Similarly, Duffey (2000) noted that some contingents of peacekeepers would not work with or for other contingents. She adduced the argument that neither the French nor

the Italians were willing to place their units under the operational control of a Pakistani commander.

These examples explain some interpersonal conflicts between hierarchical levels of various peacekeeping operations. Cultural differences could be a further reason for explaining these conflicts. Moreover, fluency in English might provide an advantage to native English speakers who want to obtain higher command posts. That is why peacekeepers, who are non-native English speakers and who lack fluency in English might tend to avoid creating any tensions with Westerners, most of whom are in command-posts in the fields missions.

In their notable study on cross cultural groups and organizations, Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) revealed that national cultures and regional groups of cultures influence organizational and societal behaviors. They classified national and regional cultures into categories as follows:

- ✓ individualism vs. collectivism,
- ✓ uncertainty avoidance,
- ✓ power distance (strength of social hierarchy),
- ✓ masculinity vs. femininity (task orientation vs. person orientation),
- ✓ long term orientation, and
- ✓ indulgence vs restraint.

The concept “power distance” was defined as *“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.”* (Hofstede et al., 2010, p.61). Based on the definition Hofstede et al. (2010) asserted that cultures that endorse large power distances accept the

fact power relations are more autocratic and those below fear the authority of those at higher levels. These people in charge are hard to question and criticize in such cultures. Whereas, cultures that endorse a small power distance accept more consultative and democratic ways of management or leadership.

From this perspective police peacekeepers coming from those societies, in which power distance is large, would have difficulties working with their counterparts coming from societies, in which the power distance is small. Their understanding of leadership would be different and this discrepancy would show itself in interpersonal relations making it inevitable for police peacekeepers to face interpersonal conflicts. Peacekeepers in command-posts would expect the behaviors they are accustomed at their home country from international officers, even from those who come from low power distance societies. Moreover, chiefs who accept the idea of large power distances would tend to dominate in interpersonal conflicts, while chiefs adopting low power distance approaches would tend to be more integrative.

### **Experience and Conflict Handling Styles:**

In this study, H. 7 was developed in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between experience and conflict handling styles. Experience was categorized as having three various dimensions; years of law enforcement experience, total months of experience in the UN, and months of experience in the current/last mission. The reason for this split was, that although all police peacekeepers are required to have at least five years of law enforcement experience, all peacekeepers regardless of past policing experience are seen as equals and have an equal chance of obtaining command posts in field missions. However, along with other factors, experience in the UN and months of

experience in the current field mission are the actual factors considered by the mission authorities per se. For that reason, one can encounter many police peacekeepers experienced in policing, but who are not experienced in peacekeeping in the field missions. There were peacekeepers with prior peacekeeping experience when they attended MINUSTAH or UNMIK. They did have peacekeeping experience from their previous stays in different field missions, while they did not have any experience in working in the mission site where they presently worked. Each mission had its own characteristics and sensibilities. Experience in the mission was considered one of the major inputs for influencing the decision making process when assigning peacekeepers to critical lynchpin posts.

H.7. proposed that peacekeepers with fewer years of experience in the UN would prefer an avoiding style of conflict resolution. In the quantitative regression analyses there was no significant contribution of the IVs of law enforcement experience, months of total experience in the UN, and months of experience in the last/current field mission to predicting either *avoid\_peers* and *avoid\_others* type of behaviors in conflict situations. The correlations indicated a significant negative correlation existed between the police peacekeepers' avoiding behaviors towards their peers in conflict situations and the total number of months of UN experience and months of experience in the peacekeeper's last field mission site. In other words, as the police peacekeepers became more experienced in the UN peacekeeping missions and in their last peacekeeping mission, their tendency to use avoidance behaviors in conflict situations with their peers, supervisors, and subordinates, decreased. There was no sign of any significant correlation between the avoidance behaviors (both for peers and others) and years of law enforcement experience (See Tables 22 and 23). Therefore, the quantitative data led to acceptance of H. 7.

As for the qualitative analyses, the question “Have you ever witnessed a change in peacekeepers’ way of handling conflict as they spend more time in the field mission?” was used to assess H.7. The mean of the law enforcement experience in the interviews was 14.61. That is why, 15 years was considered as the threshold level in this study. The interviewees with less than 15 years of law enforcement experience were considered less experienced officers and others with more than 15 years of experience were regarded as more experienced peacekeepers. Both groups were analyzed separately. Interviewees with more law enforcement experience emphasized the fact that they did not change their attitudes, but they said they had witnessed such a behavioral change in other experienced peacekeepers. The interviewees with less law enforcement experience stated that they had seen a behavioral change in conflict situations as the peacekeeper spent more time in the field mission. Three out of ten less experienced peacekeepers stated that the other parties’ level of experience did not matter when they were involved in an interpersonal conflicts, while the other seven less experienced individuals indicated that they preferred to be away from conflicts particularly with experienced peacekeepers. Only one interviewee disagreed and said that the conflict handling style was really dependant on the personality of the peacekeepers.

Answers by the interviewees pertaining to the relationship between total months of UN experience and avoidance behaviors presented pretty much the same results. The mean for the number of months of UN experience data was 31. Thus, 14 interviewees, who had less than 31 months of experience, were considered less experienced, while the remaining four were considered more experienced. Interviewees with more UN experience said that they did not encounter any behavioral changes as they became more

experienced; however, they had seen such peacekeepers. The interviewees with less experience stated that peacekeepers used less avoidance they became more experienced. They also expressed the view that other parties' experience was one of the things that they would consider in deciding whether to become involved in a conflict.

As for the variable of “months of experience in the current/last mission” the answers resembled those for the previous two variables. The mean was 23.66 for answers to “months of experience in the current/last mission” question. Thus, four interviewees with more than 24 months experience were considered more experienced peacekeepers, while other fourteen were considered less experienced ones. Their answers were quite similar to those for “total months of UN experience”.

While the quantitative data did not display any correlation between avoidance behaviors and law enforcement experience of the peacekeepers, the qualitative data propounded a correlation between the two. Both the qualitative and quantitative analyses revealed a correlation between avoidance behaviours and total months of UN experience and months of experience in the current/last mission. So, both qualitative and quantitative analyses results in the acceptance of H.7.

Findings of both qualitative and quantitative research verified Pelled et al.'s study (2001). In their study on conflict management in an urban healthcare setting Kressel et al. (2002) exemplified a senior nurse being coercive towards a younger nurse as regards time-off schedules. In this example the younger nurse preferred to complain about the issue to the nurse manager rather than oppose the older nurse directly. So she avoided the interpersonal conflict with the older nurse.

One possible explanation for this tendency to avoid conflict might be that for most of the peacekeepers from developing countries being in a field mission means making more money than being in their home country. That creates another split among peacekeepers. All peacekeepers support themselves with a MSA (Mission Subsistence Allowance) paid by the UN each day. For officers from economically advanced countries, the MSA means that money is spent only for their daily needs in the mission. While peacekeepers from developing countries try to save money out of the MSA for their possible future needs. So, they sacrifice some of their needs and most of their luxuries in the mission, which creates a dual prototype of peacekeepers. Those paying higher rents, living in bigger houses, ordering food and drink for local employees of the UN and those living in smaller flats or houses, bargaining for rent, paying for their own expenses. Both are treated in different ways by the local people.

That is why, new peacekeepers to the field mission, particularly those coming from developing countries, would tend to avoid those events and behaviors that would jeopardize their existence in the field mission.

Another explanation would be that a human is afraid of what he/she does not know. So, newcomers to the field mission could behave in a shy and timid way especially if they do not have past peacekeeping experience in other field missions.

### **Field Mission and Conflict Handling Styles:**

The eighth and last hypothesis proposed that the particular mission would have no effect on the interpersonal preferences of the peacekeepers for handling conflict. As most of the respondents were from both the Haiti and Kosovo field missions (MINUSTAH and UNMIK) other responses were disregarded. Two independent samples t-tests displayed

the finding that peacekeepers in MINUSTAH and UNMIK were less likely to act obligingly towards their peers in conflicts (See Tables 15 and 16).

The regression analyses showed that peacekeepers in MINUSTAH were less likely to use compromising behaviors (See Table 29) and to oblige (See Table 36) their peers and were less likely to try to compromise with (See Table 30) and oblige (See Table 35) their superiors and subordinates. They were more likely to apply integrative behaviors with their peers (See Table 33).

The regression analyses displayed the fact that peacekeepers in UNMIK were more likely to use integrating behaviors towards their peers (See Table 33) and were less likely to use obliging behaviors towards their superiors and subordinates (See Table 35).

In the interviews, several questions were used to assess H.8. The interviewees were first asked whether a field mission might have any influence on the peacekeeper's preference for a specific conflict handling style. Then they were asked whether they would act differently in interpersonal conflicts depending on the field mission he/she was serving at. All questions regardless of gender, experience, and nationality of the interviewees were answered negatively. The interviewees emphasized the fact that the field mission had nothing to do with the peacekeepers' preferred conflict handling behaviors.

One possible explanation for this discrepancy might be the timing of the survey. The survey was conducted in July 2011 after the catastrophic earthquake that occurred in January 2010. Many peacekeepers including the Special Representative of Secretary General (the highest authority of the MINUSTAH field mission) and the police commissioner (the highest police authority) were killed in the earthquake. Peacekeepers'



stay and service was extended regardless of their personal desires by the UN's General Headquarters in New York. Therefore most of the peacekeepers were not replaced except for those injured. That might have affected their responses reflecting their state of mind. The researcher noticed this fact during his visit to Haiti in July 2011 for the interviews and field observations.

One other possible explanation might be the peacekeepers' reluctance to give a negative impression about themselves. As mentioned above peacekeeping missions are male dominated missions. The term "oblige" has submissive connotations, which is why male police peacekeepers might avoid giving "non-masculine" impressions. In other words, they might have kept their real thoughts for themselves on the questions pertaining to obliging style.

No studies were found during the literature review regarding the impact of the field missions on peacekeepers' preferences for various conflict handling styles. Therefore this study makes a unique contribution to the peacekeeping literature from this standpoint.

### **Legal Ways of Handling Conflicts in the UN:**

According to the UN regulations disseminated in the UN Civilian Police Handbook (1995) all applications and complaints by peacekeepers are to be done through chain of command. Interpersonal conflicts or complaints about these kinds of conflicts should be made accordingly. Complaints against an immediate superior should be made by skipping one step in the hierarchy. All supervisors have the responsibility to solve problems (including interpersonal conflicts) in their units.

*"Leadership and conflict management are essential skills for a mission startup manager. Few, if any, of the mission staff will have worked together before."*

*Peacekeeping personnel will come from diverse national and professional backgrounds (including from significantly different civilian, military and police working cultures) which may cause friction in a pressurized start-up environment. Internal tensions must be managed proactively, during the early months, to minimize misunderstandings and avoid resentments that could pollute staff relations over the long-term.”* (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 65).

In addition, all field missions have Counseling and Support Units responsible for supporting the staff members on stress management and problems stemming from stress. In these units specialists provide peacekeepers regardless of whether they are uniformed or not with counseling services both in terms of medical and psychological approaches.

Incidents of physical fighting by international officers due to interpersonal conflicts are reported to Conduct and Discipline Unit. The Conduct and Discipline Unit does an internal investigation and decides what administrative sanctions need to be imposed. There are a wide range of administrative sanctions from written warnings to repatriation. Based on the Conduct and Discipline Unit’s recommendation, the Police Commissioner imposes some form of sanction. The sanction of repatriation, which is the severest punishment, has to be approved by the SRSG (Special Representative of Secretary General), who is the highest authority of the peacekeeping mission and who reports directly to Secretary General of the United Nations.

Female peacekeepers can apply to the Gender Unit if the problem they are encountering involves gender issues. Gender Units in field missions are designed to support female peacekeepers on the ground and they can provide counseling services and work closely with the Conduct and Discipline Units in cases of sexual harassment.

In theory, peacekeepers can also officially apply to the Chief of Staff, to Chief of Personnel Unit, to Deputy Police Commissioner, and finally Police Commissioner, if the

problem cannot be solved by supervisors in the regular chain of command. However, in practice, nobody uses this method unless the chips are down.

Police peacekeepers can also report workplace problems to their contingent commanders. All officers from the same country (for example all German police peacekeepers in entire field mission area) are considered contingents and one of them (usually the most senior one or the one with highest rank in his/her home country) is designated as the contingent commander by his/her own country. So, although this is not official policy for the UN, many problems are solved through these types of negotiations. Police peacekeepers who are at odds with their supervisor or with one of their peers can also report this to their contingent commander to find a solution. In this case, the contingent commander talks to the contingent commander of the other party involved in the friction and both contingent commanders negotiate to reach a resolution. This is the most common method of problem solving and works most of the times.

### **Policy Implications:**

The United Nations is a great organization that operates to support international peace and security. Bringing officers from all across the world and getting them to work collectively to achieve global peace is their most critical challenge, as well as their most critical opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency.

Efforts towards bridging the gaps between peacekeepers from different countries and integrating their activities around a common goal will not only benefit the peacekeepers personally, but also the UN and its contributing countries.

The most important preventive measure for reducing the peacekeepers' feelings of discomfort and disorientation when they are taken from their own environment to that of another, would be pre-deployment trainings. The UN encourages police contributing

countries to hold such trainings. A comprehensive report written by a UN official Lakhdar Brahimi (2000) have a great importance in terms of effectiveness of the UN's peacekeeping efforts. Brahimi Report (2000, p.21) states the needs of the UN from the contributing countries as follows;

*“(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system;*

*(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;”*

There are countries conducting such trainings such as Canada, Russia, Italy, Ghana, Turkey, Singapore, and China. Pre-deployment trainings are also promoted by the UN. Canada, for example, is the most prominent contributor to MINUSTAH and has the highest number of peacekeepers on the ground. They conduct a one-week training before sending officers to Haiti and in those trainings the Haitian Ambassador to Canada is invited to talk about his own people, his culture, politics and the social setting in great detail (Chappel & Evans, 1999). Another example is provided by Singapore. Singapore contributed to the UNTAC (United Nations mission in Cambodia) with seventy five officers and before attending the mission all Singaporean peacekeepers went through an eight-week training course including the topics of inter-cultural communication and leadership. Lectures on Cambodian culture, history, and politics were provided by the National Singapore University (Chappel & Evans, 1999, p.222). The researcher himself has visited the training centers in China in 2008 and in Singapore in 2010, in study visits organized by Rutgers University Business School. He has also been giving lectures on intercultural communication in the pre-deployment trainings in Turkey since October

2011. However, even though the number of peacekeeping training centers has increased remarkably and their programs have broadened to include conflict resolution issues, their content is still underdeveloped in terms of cultural content (Duffey, 2000).

In fact, all peacekeepers go through a one-week training upon arrival at the field mission site. In those trainings, brief information on the country's history and politics are covered. Even though local culture is explained to them, they are not informed about the cultural characteristics of their colleagues who will join them in the field mission. Lack of information about the officers they work with and spend at least nine hours every day with could sometimes lead to misunderstandings, misinterpretations of what is being said, biases, and finally a lack of confidence.

The literature of culture and peacekeeping is dominated by the need for peacekeepers and peace builders to be sensitive to the variations in local culture in post-conflict areas in order to achieve more effective peacekeeping or peace building processes (Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2003; Rubinstein et al., 2008; Leeds, 2001). However, the topic of cultural empathy between peacekeepers has not been touched upon sufficiently to create public awareness of this issue. Chappel and Evans (1999, p.199) touched on the need for peacekeepers' training in UNTAC's police commissioner Roos's words as follows;

*“But also within the police force we had to deal with problems related not only to general discipline matters but also to cultural, religious, and professional differences. It's not surprising when you realize that thirty-two countries contributed to CIVPOL. Here a big responsibility exists both for the UN as well as for the countries in preparing and training their policemen for a mission.”*

The UN should consider establishing permanent police component for peacekeeping field missions. A limited number of permanent police cadres could constitute the commanding personnel of peacekeeping, while seconded staff coming from

various countries temporarily could be assigned in non-command positions. These permanent cadres could be deployed for limited time periods to the field missions. For example 2 years in field mission, 1 year in home country, 2 years in another field mission, and 1 year in home country and so on. In fact, the UN promoted contributing countries to constitute a pool of police peacekeepers, who would be deployed to peacekeeping field mission in Brahimi Report (2000). This policy aimed to create a pool of experienced police peacekeepers internationally. However, difficulty of imposing such policy across all contributing countries is obvious. As the number of players increase in a policy, it gets more difficult to impose that policy. That is why, the UN should consider establishing its own permanent cadres in limited number just for commanding positions for peacekeeping field missions.

Another measure to be taken for purposes of conflict management could be pre-deployment training for supervisory personnel. All supervisors are responsible for solving interpersonal conflicts within their unit. A one-week training before their deployment would help peacekeepers in command-posts in their daily management attitudes. A handbook covering salient managerial components in its curriculum can be developed by the DPKO Police Division. Those trainings and the curriculum should include cultural awareness topics.

Peacekeepers should be encouraged to change their behaviors to adjust to their workplace friends' cultures. Personal conversations about different cultures, friendly comparisons of lifestyles, habits, cultural norms, and so on can provide important opportunities for raising awareness of another's culture. Therefore unit chiefs and contingent commanders should be encouraged to create occasions for socialization for

their staff members. Unit dinners, parties and such events can be organized to create a sincere work environment. That will help peacekeepers to overcome any cultural shock they may face.

Another positive measure that might bridge any cultural gaps may require placing more of an emphasis on the superordinate goals of the peacekeeping mission. Stressing the importance of endeavors towards global peace, common goals, interdependence, and the need for collaboration may help to minimize interpersonal conflicts. The shared fate of being away from home country and being “*foreigners in a foreign land*” as Elron et al.(2003, p.271) puts it, can be emphasized to create group dynamism and common shared values among the group members. That would increase intragroup solidarity and interpersonal tolerance, and help to decrease interpersonal friction.

The last policy suggestion would be to deploy international police officers from the same national contingent or from the contingents of countries close to each other (For example Indians peacekeepers with Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Nepali peacekeepers) at a particular locality in the field missions. However, it should also be considered that neighboring countries could have some political frictions with each other. (For instance India and Pakistan have political discontent over Kashmir region.) This has to be kept under consideration while arranging such combinations. Peacekeepers from the same country or from the same region of the world probably have quite similar policing styles, culture, and values. That would ease the interoperability of the peacekeepers and enhance the effectiveness of the peacekeeping endeavors. In a conference on peacekeeping in Singapore in 1995 the wisdom of the UN’s practice of deploying officers from different countries to each locality was questioned. It was argued that it would be useful to think

about deploying officers from the same contingents to the same localities (Chappel & Evans, 1999). This policy could be in contradiction with the UN's policy of diversity. However, police peacekeepers would not waste time by adjusting themselves to each other's culture and policing styles and the ones having difficulty in adjustment process would serve under better conditions.

The peacekeeping service itself is so important that millions of people all around the world are somehow affected by its actions. Therefore the field deserves more attention from researchers. More research on peacekeeping from a cultural perspective will be extremely useful for policy makers in the General Headquarters of the UN. Future research on the nexus between peacekeeping and culture should focus on personal experiences and should use qualitative methods rather than quantitative methods. In-depth interviews could be very useful for examining the cultural shock the peacekeepers face through their eyes and to understand it better. Case studies and case based qualitative researches will product better and more fruitful results. That is why, further studies should employ case based interviews rather than quantitative methods.



## CONCLUSION

After the end of the Cold War, the nature of international conflicts changed. As a result, the traditional bilateral paradigms of the bipolar world are no longer valid. That is, everything is not strictly black or white as it used to be during the Cold War. There are grey areas as well. There are no longer debates on communism vs. capitalism, as supported by the Soviet Union vs. being aided by the US, on TV. International conflicts have been strongly influenced by this shift, and except for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, not many interstate conflicts/wars have since emerged after the Cold War. The political conflicts have shifted from interstate conflicts to intrastate ones; for which the traditional methods of coercive diplomacy and crisis management through superpower rivalry are no longer applicable. Intrastate conflicts require different solutions to be created by the international community. From this perspective, the UN deserves more attention and respect due to its endeavors aimed at maintaining security and enhancing peace in post-conflict areas.

On the other hand, the peacekeeping function has also shifted. Traditional peacekeeping included only diplomatic and military components; whereas now a wide range of new functions have been added to the service of peacekeeping missions. SRSG's in peacekeeping missions must also deal with issues regarding the civilian police, justice, health, education, and so on -- along with the diplomatic and military components. This new style of peacekeeping has brought new challenges to the fore. Peacekeepers have to work in a more cosmopolitan environment than they used to work in the past. Police peacekeepers face this challenge even more so as they carry guns during their service. Differences in culture, policing, notions of professionalism, skills for practicing daily job

duties such as driving, communication skills (fluency in English), use of force, and so on, create frictions among the peacekeepers. So, there is a growing need to focus on interpersonal conflicts and how to deal with them in the field.

This study focused on the interpersonal conflict handling behaviors of police peacekeepers in various field missions. In order to understand how officers react in interpersonal conflict situations, an online survey Rahim's Organizational Conflict Inventory (ROCI-II), was used. The survey was completed by 260 international police officers in total. In addition, interviews with 18 peacekeepers were conducted in order to gain a more in depth understanding of the issues assessed in the survey. The research largely involved the United Nations mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In addition, data were collected from the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Based on both the quantitative and qualitative research approaches used in this dissertation, and in support of findings reported in the literature on conflict management and gender, female peacekeepers tended to practice avoidance behaviors in the context of resolving conflicts. The research literature has reported that males tend to be more integrative in their approach to conflict resolution, but the interview results of this study revealed that male peacekeepers were also more likely to try to avoid conflicts.

In terms of position, those peacekeepers in command positions (vs those in a non-command post) preferred to avoid conflict situations, while the peacekeepers' method of handling behaviors in conflicts with superiors tended to change from person to person. Some preferred to be obliging, while others chose direct communication and insistence on their views. The survey data showed no relationship between position and conflict handling styles, suggesting status is not a factor in predicting conflict resolution

strategies. However, peacekeepers in command posts do not like opposition coming from their subordinates. Peacekeepers who question the decisions of their supervisors are also not popular. Such persons often have their requests for extensions denied. This is a form of indirect rather than direct domination. Although none of the interviewees in command positions explicitly acknowledged or referred their management style as “domination”; nonetheless, a careful reading of their statements shows that their management style can be easily described as “domination”. Yet, both qualitative and quantitative analyses showed that conflict handling behaviors in conflict situations with peers may depend on personality, than on status, suggesting there is no predictable standard behavior that explains conflict handling behaviors of peacekeepers in conflicts with peers.

When it comes to experience, however, peacekeepers with less experience tend to avoid interpersonal conflicts, as both the qualitative and quantitative analyses revealed, hence perhaps less opportunity exists for examining whether resolution attempts differ by status.

Finally the field mission itself does not have any influence on peacekeepers’ conflict handling behaviors, possibly suggesting extrinsic factors are not strong predictors of conflict resolution strategies among police peacekeepers.

There are implications for both the UN and the contributing countries to peacekeeping in attempting to minimize the possibility for interpersonal conflicts. Contributing countries should hold pre-deployment training sessions before sending their officers on a mission. Such training is encouraged by the UN, and there are countries involved in organizing this training. But this needs to be generalized to all contributing countries. In these trainings, the curriculum should be broadened to cover the issues of

cultural empathy while carrying out peacekeeping tasks. For the UN, several preventive measures could be useful. Encouraging police peacekeepers to get together when they are off duty (eating and drinking together, organizing parties and so on); encouraging them to engage in friendly talks (on their cultures, lifestyles, policing styles, and so on); emphasizing the superordinate goals of peacekeeping and getting all peacekeepers to work for the same goal; by emphasizing those commonalities and overriding values that are applicable to all peacekeepers such as “being foreigners in a foreign land” and wanting to succeed. Finally, the UN should not only focus on the cultural attributes of the local people in the mission area, but also the cultural characteristics of all the national police contingents, in all introductory training sessions that are held when peacekeepers arrive in the mission area.

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## **APPENDIX-A ROCI-II INSTRUMENT**

The instrument was filled out by MBA and undergraduate students in business school (n=60) and managers (n=38). After the participants filled out the survey, Rahim initiated an item-by-item discussion. The items that were reported to be difficult, ambiguous, or inconsistent were either replaced or revised.

The data from successive administrations of the instruments were factor analyzed (Ns: students=184, 351, 133; teachers and principals=380; hospital managers=185). Items that loaded  $< .40$  and/or loaded on an uninterpretable factor were discarded at each factor analyses. 105 items were considered for inclusion in the instrument. Instrument, which contained 35 items, 7 items per each style, was finalized on the basis of abovementioned stages. The order of the items was randomized. New version of the instrument was sent to 4000 executives randomly selected from Penton/IPC list of 1.3 million executives from 25 different industries. Usable responses from 1219 executives (response rate was % 31) were factor analyzed using principal factoring and varimax rotation. Eigenvalues of eight factors were  $\geq 1.00$ . First five factors were consistent with prior expectations. 28 items with factor loading  $\geq .40$  were retained in the final version of the instrument. Five factors, which were selected, represented five independent dimensions of conflict styles and named integrating, avoiding, dominating, obliging, and compromising styles, respectively. Different subsamples such as the data from the first batch of 609 questionnaire, the remaining batch of 610 questionnaire, and Forms A, B, and C were factor analyzed separately in order to test the stability of the five factors. In each of five factor analyses factor structures were quite similar. Other orthogonal rotation methods

such as quartimax, equimax, and oblique yielded five interpretable factors consistent with prior findings (Rahim, 2001).

## APPENDIX-B IRB APPROVAL

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY  
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs  
ASB III, 3 Rutgers Plaza, Cook Campus  
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

May 19, 2011

**P.I. Name:** Akdeniz

**Protocol #:** 11-534M

Derin Akdeniz  
Division of Global Affairs  
Engelhardt Hall  
190 University Ave  
Newark Campus

Dear Derin Akdeniz:

✓  
( Initial / Amendment / Continuation / Continuation w/ Amendment )

**Protocol Title:** "An Assessment of the Conflict Management Attitudes of Police Peacekeepers: Minustah as a Case a Study"

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

<b>Approval Date:</b>	3/21/2011	<b>Expiration Date:</b>	3/20/2012
<b>Expedited Category(s):</b>	6,7	<b>Approved # of Subject(s):</b>	415

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:


- **This Approval-**The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted. **This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;**
- **Reporting-**ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
- **Modifications-**Any proposed changes **MUST** be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
- **Consent Form(s)-**Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
- **Continuing Review-**You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project's approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period;

**Additional Notes:** Expedited Approval per 45 CFR 46.110

**Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.**

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself. The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,



Sheryl Goldberg  
Director of Office of Research and Sponsored Programs  
gibel@grants.rutgers.edu

cc: James O. Finckenauser

## APPENDIX–C ASSENT for ONLINE SURVEY

### ASSENT for ONLINE SURVEY

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Derin Akdeniz, who is a PhD Student in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine conflict handling style preferences of police peacekeepers in interpersonal conflict situations.

In order to qualify to participate in this survey you must be working or have worked at any peacekeeping missions within the United Nations. Around 400 people are expected to participate in. If you are qualified and decide to participate in the survey, you will be asked to 34 closed-ended questions. This questionnaire is very easy to fill in and it takes approximately 8 to 10 minutes to answer all questions. Most of the questions are answered by checking one of the answers. If you do not find the exact answer that reflects your opinion, check the one that comes closest to it. This is not a test, so there is no right answer for any question. The only right answer is your opinion. So, it is important that you be as honest as you can in answering the questions.

This research is anonymous. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. This means that I will not record your name, address, phone number, date of birth, etc. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a random code number that will be used on each test and the questionnaire. Your name will appear only on a list of subjects, and will not be linked to the code number that is assigned to you. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for three years.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. In addition, you may receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact myself at (Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 190 University Ave. Engelhard Hall, Newark, NJ, 07102. My email is [dakdeniz@pegasus.rutgers.edu](mailto:dakdeniz@pegasus.rutgers.edu) and phone number is +1-973-652-2890. And you can also contact my study coordinator Dr. James Finckena at School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, 123 Washington Street, Newark, NJ, 07102. Tel: +1-973-353-3311. Email [finckena@andromeda.rutgers.edu](mailto:finckena@andromeda.rutgers.edu).

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University at:  
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey  
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects  
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs  
3 Rutgers Plaza  
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559  
Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104  
Email: [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu)

You will be given a copy of this assent form for your records.

By participating in this study/these procedures, you agree to be a study subject.

**APPROVED**  
Date: 3/21/11

**EXPIRES**

**MAR 20 2012**

Approved by the  
Rutgers IRB

**SURVEY**

Please check appropriate box, which describes you best in following questions.

Gender                      Male ☐                      Female ☐

Years of experience in law enforcement

Years of experience within the UN

Months of experience within the mission you are deployed to. If you are not in a mission right now, but have served in the missions before how long have you served in your last mission?

Your home country. The country you attend the peacekeeping mission from?

The field mission you work or have worked at

Position within the mission  
command post ☐                      non-command post ☐

Do you have any CivPols under your command?                      Yes ☐ No ☐

-----

The term "interpersonal conflict" refers to the differences that we perceive as challenges to something we believe in or need. Literature on interpersonal conflict proposes that conflicts are inevitable in workplaces, where workers have different cultural, religious background. The peacekeeping missions are very good examples for that. Involvement in an interpersonal conflict does not necessarily mean that the parties to the conflict are not good persons. In most of the cases conflicts stem from differences and misunderstandings.

For example misunderstandings or not understanding through radio communication are very common in peacekeeping missions. Usage of shorthand phrases such as "ten four" or "roger" makes it more complex to understand for non-native English speaking peacekeepers. Sometimes conflicts occur due to these misunderstandings.

Keeping these facts in mind please check the appropriate box after each statement, to indicate *how you handle your disagreement or conflict with your subordinates and peers*. The term "subordinate" refer to civilian police officers (police peacekeepers), who report to you at workplace. Try to recall as many recent conflict situations as possible in ranking these statements.

---

---

1 A - I try to investigate an issue with my peers to find a solution acceptable to us.

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Undecided

Agree

Strongly Agree

1 B - I try to investigate an issue with my supervisor to find a solution acceptable to us.

2 A - I generally try to satisfy the needs of my peers.

2 B - I generally try to satisfy the needs of my supervisor.

3 A - I attempt to avoid being "put on the spot" and try to keep my conflict with my peers to myself.

3 B - I attempt to avoid being "put on the spot" and try to keep my conflict with my supervisor to myself.

4 A - I try to integrate my ideas with those of my peers to come up with a decision jointly.

4 B - I try to integrate my ideas with those of my supervisor to come up with a decision jointly.

5 A - I try to work my peers to find a solution to a problem that satisfies our expectations.

5 B - I try to work my supervisor to find a solution to a problem that satisfies our expectations.

Remaining statements were not covered due to copyright issues.

---

The term "interpersonal conflict" refers to the differences that we perceive as challenges to something we believe in or need. Literature on interpersonal conflict proposes that conflicts are inevitable in workplaces, where workers have different cultural, religious background. The peacekeeping missions are very good examples for that. Involvement in an interpersonal conflict does not necessarily mean that the parties to the conflict are not good persons. In most of the cases conflicts stem from differences and misunderstandings.

For example misunderstandings or not understanding through radio communication are very common in peacekeeping missions. Usage of shorthand phrases such as "ten four" or "roger" makes it more complex to understand for non-native English speaking peacekeepers. Sometimes conflicts occur due to these misunderstandings.

Keeping these facts in mind please check the appropriate box after each statement, to indicate *how you handle your disagreement or conflict with your subordinates and peers*. The term "subordinate" refer to civilian police officers (police peacekeepers), who report

to you at workplace. Try to recall as many recent conflict situations as possible in ranking these statements.

- 1 A - I try to investigate an issue with my peers to find a solution acceptable to us.
- 1 B - I try to investigate an issue with my subordinates to find a solution acceptable to us.
- 2 A - I generally try to satisfy the needs of my peers.
- 2 B - I generally try to satisfy the needs of my subordinates.
- 3 A - I attempt to avoid being "put on the spot" and try to keep my conflict with my peers to myself.
- 3 B - I attempt to avoid being "put on the spot" and try to keep my conflict with my subordinates to myself.
- 4 A - I try to integrate my ideas with those of my peers to come up with a decision jointly.
- 4 B - I try to integrate my ideas with those of my subordinates to come up with a decision jointly.
- 5 A - I try to work my peers to find a solution to a problem that satisfies our expectations.
- 5 B - I try to work my subordinates to find a solution to a problem that satisfies our expectations.

Remaining statements were not covered due to copyright issues.

#### **APPENDIX-D INFORMED CONSENT FORM for INTERVIEW**



### INFORMED CONSENT FORM for INTERVIEW

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Derin Akdeniz, who is a PhD Student in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine conflict handling style preferences of police peacekeepers working or worked previously for the United Nations.

Approximately ten (10) subjects between the ages of 25 and 65 years old will participate in the study, and each individual's participation will last approximately 45 minutes.

Participation in this study will involve the following:

- 1-review of the informed consent form,
- 2-responding questions about it, if any,
- 3-signing the consent form,
- 4-giving general information about yourself,
- 4-responding open-ended questions asked to you.

This research is confidential. The research records will include some information about you and this information will be stored in such a manner that some linkage between your identity and the response in the research exists. Some of the information collected about you includes your name, position, agency affiliation, experience within the UN, and experience within the field mission you work in. Please note that we will keep this information confidential by limiting individual's access to the research data and keeping it in a secure location. Your name will be replaced with a pseudonym. I will have list of pseudonyms that matches the real names of all participants. I will keep list of pseudonyms separate from the dataset. So that confidentiality will strictly be maintained.

The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for three years.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. You will not have direct or indirect benefits from this study, except for quietude of contributing literature on peacekeeping.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact myself at (at (Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 190 University Ave. Engelhard Hall, Newark, NJ, 07102. My email is [dakdeniz@pegaus.rutgers.edu](mailto:dakdeniz@pegaus.rutgers.edu) and phone number is +1-973-652-2890. And you can also contact my advisor Dr. James Finckena School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, 123 Washington Street, Newark, NJ, 07102. Tel: +1-973-353-3311. Email [finckena@andromeda.rutgers.edu](mailto:finckena@andromeda.rutgers.edu) .

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University at:

Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey  
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects  
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs  
3 Rutgers Plaza  
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559  
Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104  
Email: [humansubjects@crsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@crsp.rutgers.edu)

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

**APPROVED**

Date: 3/21/11

**EXPIRES**

**MAR 20 2012**

Approved by the  
Rutgers IRB



Sign below if you agree to participate in this research study:

Subject (Print ) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Principal Investigator Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**APPROVED**

Date: 3/21/11

**EXPIRES**

**MAR 20 2012**

Approved by the  
Rutgers IRE

## APPENDIX – E AUDIO ADDENDUM to CONSENT FORM

### AUDIO ADDENDUM TO CONSENT FORM

You have already agreed to participate in a research study entitled: "An Assessment of the Conflict Attitudes of Police Peacekeepers: MINUSTAH as a Case Study" conducted by Derin Akdeniz. We are asking for your permission to allow us to audiotape (sound) as part of that research study. You do not have to agree to be recorded in order to participate in the main part of the study.

The recording(s) will be used for analyses by the researcher for his dissertation studies. The recordings will not be used for commercial purposes.

The recording(s) will include your name as the only identifier.

The recording(s) will be stored in a locked file cabinet and linked with a code to your identity and will be destroyed after three years of completion of this research.

Your signature on this form grants the investigator named above permission to record you as described above during participation in the above-referenced study. The investigator will not use the recording(s) for any other reason than that/those stated in the consent form without your written permission.

You will be given a copy of this Audio Addendum to Consent Form for your records.

Subject (Print ) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Principal Investigator Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**APPROVED**  
Date: 3/21/11

**EXPIRES**

**MAR 20 2012**

Approved by the  
Rutgers IRB

**APPENDIX – F INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

1. What is your general view of peacekeeping missions? Were there a lot of different nations represented in the missions?
2. Are there any particular problems associated with the diversity? How do you get along with them?
3. What about interpersonal conflicts between police peacekeepers?
4. Have you ever witnessed an interpersonal conflict during your service as police peacekeeper?
5. Have you ever involved in such a conflict?
6. If yes, what were they caused by?
7. Are there differences between males and females in such conflicts? If yes, what sort of differences?
8. How do you think female peacekeepers generally react to conflict situations?
9. How do you think police peacekeepers handle conflicts with superiors?
10. How do you think peacekeepers handle conflicts with subordinates?
11. How do you think they handle conflicts with peers?
12. Do you think rank (having a command post) in the mission influences peacekeepers' ways of handling conflict with their colleagues in the mission?
13. Do you think years of experience within the UN influence peacekeepers' ways of handling conflict with their colleagues in the mission? If yes, how?
14. Do you think the particular field mission to which peacekeepers are assigned influences their ways of handling conflict?
15. Is there anything else that you want to add to your comments?

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Derin AKDENİZ

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1974 – Born in Agri, Turkey  
1980 – 1988 Education at Ali Ates Elementary School and at Secondary School  
1988 - 1992 Education at Izmir Police Vocational High School  
1992 – 1996 Education at Turkish National Police Academy (National Police University)  
1996 – Joined Turkish National Police as Police Lieutenant, Bursa Police Department  
1996 – 1998 Worked as Team Leader in various Police Districts in Bursa Police Dept.  
2003 – 2004 Joined the United Nations Interim Peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo  
2005 – Earned MBA Degree from Uludag University, Business School, Bursa, Turkey  
2007 – 2009 Earned Master of Science Degree from Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Graduate School, Division of Global Affairs  
2009-2014 Earned Doctor of Philosophy Degree from Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Graduate School, Division of Global Affairs  
2011-.... Works at Erzincan Police Dept as Police Chief and gives “*Introduction to International Relations*” and “*Turkish Foreign Policy*” courses at Erzincan University, School of Public Administration.

**PUBLICATIONS**

1. Two books as editor: *Computer Crimes in Turkish Penal Code* (in Turkish), 2001 and *Issues in Criminal Justice* (in English), 2009.
2. Four articles: “*Individual Performance Evaluation in Turkish Public Sector*”, “*Change and Progress*” (both in Turkish and published in Turkish National Police Journal), “*Technology Awareness Training in Turkish National Police*” (in Turkish, presented at Police Training Symposium, 2001), and *Turkey's Fight with Narcotics; Law Enforcement in Turkey and Canada* (in English, presented at 2nd Istanbul Conference on Global Security and Democracy, 2007)
3. Unpublished Thesis: *Individual Performance Evaluation in Turkish National Police: A Model Suggestion*, Uludag University, Business School, 2005

**AWARDS:**

- ✓ 8 Letters of Appreciation and money awards in 14 different times during the service in Turkish National Police.
- ✓ A medal for outstanding service and a letter of appreciation given by the United Nations upon my service at the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo.
- ✓ A Letter of Appreciation by Turkey’s Ambassador to Kosovo upon my projects of social responsibility for Turkish and Albanian communities in Kosovo.