ISLAMOPHOBIA FROM THE INSIDE: HOW TURKISH IMMIGRANTS
RESPONDED TO THE SECURITIZATION OF INTEGRATION IN GERMANY AND
THE NETHERLANDS

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Islamophobia from the Inside: How Turkish Immigrants Responded To the Securitization of Integration in Germany and the Netherlands

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Although there is a vast literature on the securitization and Islamophobia phenomena in Western societies, there is relatively less research about the perceptions and mobilization of Muslim immigrants in the West, especially Turks, with respect to these phenomena. Therefore, the research set out to explore whether there has been any change in the forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration. The present comparative study identified not only the changes after 9/11, but also the main similarities and differences between the two cases. Characteristics of Turkish immigrants and the context of reception, as well as the subjective aspects (such as perceptions, feelings, emotions, and so on) related to the issue were taken into account in the study. From the methodological perspective, the study employed a mixed methods research approach by including interviews, participant observation, and a quantitative analysis of population and political representation data. In total, in Germany and the Netherlands, 27
face to face semi-structured interviews were conducted with either the representatives of Turkish organizations or the political party members that originated from Turkey.

The study concluded that Turkish immigrants in both countries have been negatively affected by the securitization process. They felt that they faced more problems (such as discrimination, hate crimes, more restrictive policies towards them, and so on) in their contexts after 9/11. Along with these perceptions, the changes in their characteristics and the context of reception played an important role in their mobilization in this process. The study revealed that they became more mobilized and organized after 9/11.

After evaluating the motives and objectives of mobilization and acculturation strategies of Turkish immigrants, the study identified three main forms of mobilization (political, social, and cultural) as a response to the securitization of integration. Not only differences between the characteristics of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands but also dissimilarities in their receiving contexts resulted in differences in their political mobilization approaches. However, their social and cultural mobilization approaches in both countries have mainly been similar.

**Keywords:** Immigrant mobilization, securitization, Islamophobia, global security, Muslims, Turkish immigrants.
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

1. Paradoxical Observation

Islamophobia is a hotly contested issue in the contemporary world, especially in Western societies, and thus, there is a vast literature on this specific form of discrimination. Most of the studies on Islamophobia focus on the increasing fears of Western societies regarding Islam and Muslims, anti-Muslim attitudes, prejudice towards Muslims, and discrimination against Muslims (Allen, 2010; Bleich, 2011; Bravo Lopez, 2011; Cherribi, 2011; Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009; Moors, 2010; Taras, 2012; Valk, 2012). In addition, there are many studies analyzing the securitization of integration. These studies mostly concentrate on the factors of securitization, the integration of Muslims into society, integration policies and legislations, the impact of security concerns, and controversies regarding the accommodation of Islam in Western societies (Anil, 2005; Cesari, 2009; d’Appollonia, 2008 & 2010; Heckmann, 2010; Humphrey, 2009; Huysmans, 2002; Joppke, 2007; Kaya, 2007 & 2009; Peter, Tosuner, Vermeren, & Pagano, 2010; Peucker, 2010; Rudolph, 2010; Vervoort, 2011). However, there is relatively less research about the perceptions and reactions of Muslims, especially Turks in this process. As a result, the voice of Muslims is not adequately heard in our efforts to understand all the issues related to this phenomenon. In this respect, it appears reasonable to suggest that articulating Muslim voices in the face of the securitization of integration would be a useful approach for better understanding the issue.

In this sense, the security discourse has changed over time from one that involved protecting the state to one that involves protecting the society and the term ‘security’ has
emerged to address all fields of life (Kaya, 2009). The securitization process itself has been especially intensified due to the increasing immigration trends that have accompanied globalization. As can be seen in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, the numbers of immigrants increased after the 1960s as a result of recruitment agreements with third countries in order to supplement the prevailing labor force deficits that occurred in both countries at that time. Although the German and Dutch governments expected these ‘guest workers’ to return to their home countries at the end of their recruitment programs, most of the immigrants did not return and the immigration process has continued (Şen, 2003; Bevelander & Veenman, 2006).

In the face of increasing numbers of immigrants, the native population has become anxious and doubting the will as well as the capability of these immigrants to integrate. The suspicions of natives about the intentions and loyalties of immigrants increased public support for policies aimed at placing more restrictions on immigrants (Rudolph, 2010). The states responded to this process, especially in the face of globalization, by “renationalizing” migration policies. As a result, migration has since been seen as posing a threat to national security, leading to the implementation of further restrictive measures (Jackson & Parke, 2006).

Before 9/11, the link between immigration and security issues had already been stressed by the governments. However, along with the 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, this association became more concrete. Muslim immigrants in particular have been especially viewed as a threat to internal security although most of them have been living in Western Europe since the mid-1900s (Togral, 2011; Nyiri, 2010). Muslims have been increasingly perceived after 9/11 not only as being ‘foreign’ to their country of residence, but also as
potential extremists, having no willingness to integrate into the Western societies (d’Appollonia, 2010). In addition, the idea of an ‘enemy within’ became more prevalent especially after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. The negative views of Islam among the German population have been more prevalent in comparison to most other European countries, including the Netherlands. However, the negative opinions about Islam and Muslims among the native Dutch have also been high. Therefore, securitization has remained at the top of the agenda of both countries since 9/11.

The security concerns that deepened after 9/11 have produced more restrictive policies that have been applied in both Germany and the Netherlands. New counter-terrorism legislation has been introduced and the legislation related to immigrants and citizenship has been reviewed. Police raids and searches of Muslims have intensified and many Muslims have been closely monitored by intelligence agencies. Naturalization has become more difficult and several additional requirements and tests for citizenship have been introduced in both countries. The Netherlands has moved away from its more flexible and multicultural policies which were aimed at the recognition of different cultures and equal treatment of all religious and cultural groups. Additionally, the Netherlands was the first country in the EU to come up with the idea that integration should start in the immigrant sending country before immigrants arrive in the host country (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009).

A more security-based approach does not always provide more security for the society, nor can it solve societal problems. Many scholars (such as Cesari, J., d’Appollonia, A.C., Dalgaard-Nielsen, A., Eijkman, Q., Fekete, L., Ireland, P., Kaya, A.,
Nyiri, Z.) have claimed that the securitization process results in alienation of immigrants and the hindrance of their integration, which means, in the long run, greater insecurity. The products of this process are extremism, radicalization, marginalization, the formation of an underclass, and the emergence of a ‘parallel society’. Thus, the consequences of this process are higher crime rates, societal conflicts, and increases in terrorists’ recruitment. As in the German case, the introduction of more restrictive policies failed to prevent terrorist recruitment after 9/11 and terrorists abusing religion have continued to threaten the internal security of the nation. There were several failed terrorist attacks in Germany between 2006 and 2011. One of the suspects of a failed bombing attack in Germany in September 2007 was a Turkish immigrant. This challenged the official idea that Turkish immigrants were able to resist radicalization (Humphrey, 2009). In addition, Muslims and ‘Muslim looking’ populations have become more vulnerable in the society as an outcome of the categorization of nonnationals as suspects, criminals or terrorists. For example, the number of Islamophobic incidents sharply increased shortly after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 (EUMC, 2006a).

As a result of security concerns, both social and economic integration has become more difficult and Muslims have faced more problems after than before 9/11 in the Netherlands and Germany. Discrimination against Turkish immigrants in several fields of life has increased even though some anti-discrimination measures have been taken by governments. The security concerns of natives have also adversely affected the perceptions of Muslims regarding the host society even if they feel integrated. Especially after 9/11, they have felt more discriminated against in several areas such as the workplace, housing, health, social service, and security services, etc. For example,
according to the 2008 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, 29% of Turks in the Netherlands and 31% of Turks in Germany felt discriminated against and Turks in Germany were notably discriminated against when looking for a job (FRA, 2009b). Moreover, several controversies related to the accommodation of Islam have occurred in the Netherlands and Germany. Several issues related to the headscarf, veil, halal slaughter, Islamic education, mosque construction, and the use of loudspeakers for Azan have been on the agenda of Germany and the Netherlands but in different contexts. In sum, the Muslim population has been negatively affected by the securitization process, and it is a paradox that Germany and the Netherlands desire to integrate Muslims into the society but the security concerns of natives hinder it by discriminating against Muslims.

Moreover, the security concerns and their negative impacts on Muslims have led to the growing need for Muslim representation. However, in both countries, the opportunity to participate in political activities and engage in society is different. There are several factors that have an impact on this opportunity, such as the right to participate in elections, the situation of migrant organizations in the state system, the media, access to the same opportunities as natives, and the availability of group rights. In this respect, the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands seem to have more opportunity. In Germany, the only way to achieve political participation for Turkish immigrants is to have German citizenship. Therefore, most Turkish immigrants in Germany have formally remained foreigners and are subject to legislation that refers to foreigners and thus, most Turkish immigrants cannot participate in political activities. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, the majority of Turkish immigrants has acquired Dutch nationality and
enjoys citizenship laws. They can also participate in local elections without having Dutch citizenship if they stay in the Netherlands more than five years.

Turkish organizations and movements have played a key role in the civic and political participation of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. The first Turkish religious organizations were mosque organizations dealing with the basic religious needs of Muslims. After the late 1970s, they began to deal with other problems of the Muslim population such as child care, language and Qur’anic lessons etc. Later, these organizations and communities enlarged in number and size and the needs of the Turkish Muslims have usually been represented by these organizations and communities (Demant, Maussen, & Rath, 2007).

Muslim immigrants in Western states have searched for various forms of mobilization because of the negative impacts of securitization process on Muslims. In defining mobilization, I mean both reactive and proactive forms of claims making, organization, and actions of immigrants as a response to the securitization. Political participation, dialogue, press release, meetings, gatherings, protests, violence, and so on can be included in the mobilization processes. To understand how Turkish immigrants have perceived the securitization process and organized themselves as a response to securitization issues, especially since 9/11, would be one of the key aspects of Islamophobia. Therefore, my main research question is “Has there been any change in the forms of mobilization among Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration?” In order to address this question, there is a need to study the attitudes of Turkish immigrants before and after 9/11 and their mobilization as a response to the securitization of integration considering
not only political participation but also other forms of mobilization. Therefore, the following sub-questions were addressed in order to contribute to the answer of the main research question; “How have Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands perceived 9/11 and the securitization of integration?”, “How has the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands changed after 9/11 as a result of the security concerns of the host society?”, and “How differently have Turkish immigrants organized themselves in Germany and the Netherlands as a response to the securitization of integration since 9/11?”. This study aims to explore the key aspects of these questions from a comparative perspective by considering the different forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands.

2. Explanatory Dimensions of the Research

There are several reasons for selecting Germany and the Netherlands as case studies for comparison. First, most Turkish immigrants in Europe live in these two countries. In both countries, the Turkish population is the largest minority and Islam is the second most commonly practiced religion. There are similar Turkish organizations and movements in each country. In addition, Germany and the Netherlands have many similarities such as similar democracy and economic development levels. Moreover, the Turkish population in both countries increased after the 1960s due to bilateral agreements for the recruitment of ‘guest workers’. Furthermore, there are high levels of Islamophobia in both countries, and the 2008 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey revealed that the levels of discrimination experienced by Turks in the Netherlands (29%) and Germany (31%) are very similar.
On the other hand, there are many differences affecting the context of integration, such as state-Muslim relations, political participation of the immigrants, citizenship regimes, and legislations. The controversies regarding accommodation of Islam in both countries have both similarities and differences. For example, the issues related to cemeteries are similar in context since separate parts of cemeteries have been assigned for Muslims in many cities in both countries; however, face covering veils draw a different picture because they are banned in the Netherlands, but not in Germany. Comparing these two cases makes it possible to illustrate both similarities and differences in Turkish immigrants’ responses to the securitization of integration. In order to conduct this comparative perspective, different options are evaluated by considering that the impact of context in both countries can have differences and the characteristics of Turks in comparison with other Muslims are different. Turks are considered as being close in culture to the Western societies and Turkey is the only Muslim country which is a candidate for membership in the European Union.
CHAPTER II- MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

1. Presence of Muslims in Europe

Although there have been some Muslims in Europe throughout history, as Sinno (2009) reported, the Muslim population in Europe has increased since the 1970s. In 1990, the number of Muslims in Western Europe was less than 10 million, and it was estimated that the total Muslim population living in Western Europe was about 17 million by 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2010).

Current Muslims in Western Europe originated mainly from workers from Muslim countries or former colonies (Kettani, 1996). Sinno (2009) pointed out the importance of Muslim minorities in Western Europe by addressing the continuing immigration and higher fertility rates among European Muslims. Therefore, the growing numbers of Muslim populations in Europe has fueled several tensions and debates along with this presence.

Klausen (2005) sought to answer the question of “why are there suddenly problems?” regarding Muslims in Europe. She has argued that the growing presence of Muslims, the suspicions about their loyalty to Western values, and the fears about recent terrorist events linked to mosques have resulted in several problems in Europe. In addition, Silvestri (2010) stressed the fact that the relationship between religion and state in Europe has been shaped by the interaction between governments and Christian Churches; however, this relationship has been challenged by the growing presence of the Muslim population in Europe. There are differences among national contexts since the position of each European society towards accommodation of Islam varied.
Saint-Blancat (2008) put an emphasis on the presence of Muslims in European urban space, and she has asserted that urban space has become a place where the negotiation of legitimacy of Muslims’ presence has taken place. The visibility of Muslims in urban space came to the fore through mosque building and young Muslims’ demands, and it implied three changes; mutual acknowledgement, growing religious pluralism, and “a new conception of the employment of the religious dimension in public space” (Saint-Blancat, 2008, p. 117). She identified two different types of strategies in the context of Muslims’ presence in urban space. The first is isolation from European societies. The second one is developing new forms of social interactions with European society and accessing citizenship through “a quiet affirmation of diversity” (Saint-Blancat, 2008, p. 112).

Khan (2000) highlighted that “the presence of Muslims in Europe is testing the notions and principles of liberal pluralism in European societies” (p. 29). He argued that although the relations between minority and majority produce tension, “confrontational tension, … could be positive for society as a whole, as long as it is managed so that it contributes constructively towards harmony and equality” (p. 41). Moreover, Schiffauer (2006) discussed the issue within the sense of ‘moral panic’. He analyzed citizenship, minority rights, and access to minority rights in Germany in order to explore how moral panic functions. He argued that when Muslims carried their causes to the courts and became successful, these attempts resulted in several reactions by German natives. Accessing German citizenship has been seen as suspicious and the applications of Muslims who have membership in certain religious organizations have been denied by German authorities. Moreover, public support of the projects of the Muslim Youth
organization was terminated after several allegations that linked the organization with the Muslim Brotherhood. The responses by Germans due to moral panic was, however, potentially counterproductive because of their regressive results. Schiffauer (2006, p.112) hence asserted that “to neglect (or to reject) the challenge of developing a vision of organizing diversity and recognizing difference can be dangerous. It can function as a self-fulfilling prophecy since it can polarize Muslim immigrants and German society.”

2. **Muslim Identity in Europe**

Identity is an important factor influencing mobilization. Ramadan (2002) argued that Islam in Europe is in the early stage of developing its identity and the development of Muslims’ voice on many issues will take time. Muslim communities have begun to focus on their common concerns such as their Muslim identity, their public presence, and ‘European Muslim culture’. The culture mobilized by Western Muslims considers national customs and respects Islamic principles and values.

Kastoryano (2004) examined the religious and national identity of Muslims by comparing France, in which religion is excluded from public sphere, and Germany, in which religious institutions can exist as corporate bodies, in the context of public law. In France, the headscarf affair was seen a challenge to the existing relationship between religion and the state. In this debate, proponents of the French perception of national identity upheld the laïcité viewpoint. As a response to this mobilization, and from the collective identity perspective, North African Muslims’ religious identity has become more prevalent in comparison to a national one. In France, the interplay between the
native and immigrants has led to this religious identification. Contrary to France, in Germany, nationality became the basis of ethnicity.

3. Islam and Western Civilization

Several scholars (such as Cesari, 2007; Delanty, 2012; Huntington, 1996; Mitri, 2007; Kalın, 2011) addressed the relationship between Western civilization and Islam from different perspectives. Huntington (1996) viewed the relationship between Islam and Christianity as problematic by stating that

the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the interiority of their power. The problem for Islam is … the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. (p. 217)

Similar discourses that argue the incompatibility of Islam with Western civilization took place in Europe. Cesari (2007) emphasized that these negative perceptions that have been gradually accumulated over centuries have resulted in a tendency towards the consideration of “Islam as a problem or obstacle on the path towards modernization” (p. 57). She also claimed that the negative consequences such as poverty and social problems due to segregation and low socioeconomic status of Muslims in Europe are mostly used for associating Islam with poverty by extreme right movements in Europe. By doing so, the extreme right movements have intended to prove that Islam is a threat in the West and is incompatible with Western cultures.

Contrary to Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory, Delanty (2012) highlighted that European civilization has developed by interactions, and its borders have become
vague. Thus, these interactions and transformations should be considered in understanding European modernity that has been shaped by Judeo-Christian, Islamic-Turkish, and Russian-Slavic civilizations. Europe has never been purely Christian, and mutual cultural borrowings, translations, and interactions took place. In this sense, Islam has an important role to play in the civilization of Europe. In a similar vein, Kalın (2011) affirmed that multiple interactions and networks between Western societies and Muslim population result in a blurring of the conceptual and physical lines among them. As these interactions become more interwoven, ‘interpenetration’ which means “a process that transforms all of the actors involved” can be experienced (Kalın, 2011, p.17). In addition, Mitri (2007) argued that although regional and local events throughout history have affected the relations between Muslims and Christians, “conflicts overshadow peaceful experiences and reproaches drown the voices of comprehension” (p.17). After expressing two contrasting views, the study focuses on the accommodation of Muslims in Europe and the debates about Muslims in Europe.

4. Accommodation of Muslims in Europe

The accommodation of Muslims and Islam in Europe has taken place in the contexts of liberalism, multiculturalism, and secularism. Kalın (2011) argued that the current debate regarding Islam is related to the debate over multiculturalism that is shaped by liberal-secular ideals. Modood (2007) addressed the issue of multiculturalism in the context of the accommodation of minorities. He stressed that multicultural accommodation develops new forms of belonging, sustains diasporas, and results in the emergence of hyphenated identities such as the British-Muslims. These identities are “a legitimate basis for political mobilization and lobbying, not attached as divisive or
disloyal” (Modood, 2007, p. 49). Multiculturalism is a two-way integration process, but it additionally requires different treatment for different groups by considering ‘equal dignity’ and ‘equal respect’. Modood (2007, p. 14) asserted that multiculturalism is a form of integration that “best meets the normative implications of equal citizenship” and is one of the main themes of this century.

From the liberal perspective, Parekh (2006) put an emphasis on the Muslim question in Europe by arguing that the nature of European anxiety about the integration of Muslims relied on three factors; the logic of integration, religion, and rationalism. He asserted that while integration was considered as an alternative to assimilation, in terms of political and moral distance, they were very close. Yet, Muslims do not meet liberal expectations since they prefer to stay away from some areas of life although they have succeeded in achieving economic and political integration. However, the view that cultural unity is a must for political unity causes several problems and anxieties. From the liberal point of view, Islam reopens the controversies about the relationship between state and religion, and challenges secularization. In addition, rationalist liberals “want Muslims not only to accommodate themselves to their way of life but also to give it their whole-hearted moral allegiance” (Parekh, 2006, p. 197). Therefore, such expectations result in panic and worry among liberals.

Cesari (2011) argued that Islam’s arrival in Western societies led to the reconsideration of the relationship between religion and state. Although the secular culture portrays several differences at the national level, it is widespread throughout Europe. As a result of the immense secularization in politics, media and intellectual spheres throughout Europe, religious dimensions have been ignored. In addition, Modood
and Kastoryano (2006) stressed that secularism has been regarded as one of the defining feature of modernity and a settled characteristic of Western societies. For a couple of decades, the attempts by Muslims in Europe to express their identity has challenged the principle of secularism and its interpretation in particular contexts. These authors asserted that “secularism simpliciter can be an obstacle to pluralistic integration and equality” (Modood & Kastoryano, 2006, p. 173). They affirmed that in order to accommodate Muslims in Europe, the appropriate approach is “pluralistic institutional integration/assimilation” rather than “a radical public/private separation in the name of secularism”. Here, they suggested the reconceptualization of secularism and equality, and “a pragmatic negotiated approach to dealing with controversy and conflict” (p. 173).

In a similar vein, Modood (2005) argued that multiculturalism and radical secularism are theoretically incompatible. If the society includes religious minorities, this incompatibility becomes more prevalent in practice and “moderate secularism offers basis for institutional compromises” (Modood, 2005, p. 149). However, 9/11 made this relationship more difficult as a result of the moral panic concerning Muslims. More secularist approaches concerning Muslims in Europe will result in a retreat from multiculturalism while promoting polarization. After the emergence of the Muslim political agency, ‘intolerant, exclusive nationalism and secularism’ has been strengthened. Modood considered the political integration and participation of Muslims as crucial in terms of both ‘egalitarian multiculturalism’ and security.

Soper and Fetzer (2009) stated how Germany, France, and Britain accommodated the religious needs of Muslims and explored their differences in a comparative way. They claimed that the presence of Muslims poses new challenges to the relationship between
the church and state. However, the existing church-state institutions are different in these three states. These institutions have played a significant role in the accommodation of Islam. Thus, Muslims have found opportunities or have encountered limitations in each system with respect to mobilization or claims-making. Soper and Fetzer shed light on the role of secularism, and the state and its relationship to the future of European Muslims. They affirmed that political elites who see Islam as a threat to Europe will support more secular public policies. On the other hand, as a response to secular challenges, prospective European Muslims, Jews, and Christians may act together to “protect the very idea that religion has a legitimate public political role to play” (Soper & Fetzer, 2009, p.45).

Cesari (2011) affirmed that the conflict between Islamic values and European secularism addresses a broader challenge. The accommodation of Islam in Europe requires the recognition of the equality principle between cultures; however, current multicultural policies limit diversity and equality. In order to deal with this challenge, she suggested the emergence of a ‘societal culture’ that requires gathering around a ‘shared language’ as in the example of American society. By doing so, such differences will not be considered as a limitation to Muslim integration into Western societies. Moreover, by comparing group demands of Muslim immigrants in the UK, the Netherlands, and France, Statham, Koopmans, Giugni, and Passy (2005, p. 455) suggested “more domesticated national forms of Islam, whose demands are more easily included within existing frameworks”. “Failure by political institutions to recognize and include the specificities of Islam may lead to grievances, turning future generations either towards
political ideologies which challenge the West, or a life of alienation and anomie” (Statham et al., 2005, p. 455).

Fetzer and Soper (2003) found that the church-state structures are significant for shaping public policies and elite attitudes in Germany, France and the UK; however, they do not have similar significance on the views of individuals about accommodation of Muslim practices. In another study, Fetzer and Soper (2005) stressed that education and religious practices best explained the natives’ support for the accommodation of religious practices of Muslims. Thus, higher education and higher religious practices among natives have had a positive relationship with higher support of this issue. On the other hand, 9/11 negatively affected support for the accommodation of the demands of Muslims as regards their religious practices.

Joppke (2009) claimed that the Islamic headscarf has functioned as a mirror of identity and has been treated differently in several Western European states. He asserted that Germany has dealt with the headscarf issue in the harshest way in comparison to France and the UK. On the other hand, Fetzer and Soper (2005) did not consider Germany’s actions as being the worst actions, and they argued that “Germany has been less accommodating to the religious needs of its Muslim population than has Britain, but has been more generous than France” (p. 129). Thus, Muslims in Germany are in better position vis-à-vis France.

Bowen (2007), who focused on the Islamic headscarf issue in France to explore the process of the headscarf ban in public schools, asserted that there many factors that have played a key role in putting the headscarf issue on the agenda, and all of these
factors led to the headscarf ban in public schools in 2004. These factors are the French model of secularism that is sensitive to the presence of religion in public spaces, the anxieties about ‘communualism’, ‘Islamism’, and ‘sexism’ which have been increasingly linked to the headscarf issue, and the increasing presence of proponents of the headscarf ban. He argued that the French model has been challenged by the accommodation demands of differences in an equal way. In this respect, the French model of integration has been too narrow and has hardly considered legitimate differences in religious practices and institutions. In addition, asking Muslim immigrants, who have been in France many years and worked for rebuilding the country, to change their way of life is not an effective way to demonstrate gratitude. Therefore, the integration issue has appeared as a barrier between Muslims and state officials.

From a broader perspective, Tatari (2009) considered the institutional framework of Islam in order to account for Western European states’ accommodation of Muslims’ demands other than the four main theories; political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, church-state structure, and ideological theories. She also demonstrated dynamic interactions between the state (political opportunity structure), and Muslim minorities, as well as variables such as resource mobilization, the institutional framework of Islam, the church-state structure, ideology and policy outcomes by addressing this two way interaction in a ‘dynamic-compound framework’. However, this two-way interaction process reveals a highly challenging situation that demands urgent and effective solutions. Tatari thus suggested implementing existing laws equally and fairly in order to promote European liberal and democratic values and the integration of Muslims.
From a legal perspective, Ferrari (2004) affirmed that Muslims in Europe, who are primarily a religious minority, require a model of minority protection because religious minorities are protected by international and national laws. However, the organizational structures of Islam and Christianity differ from each other. In this sense, while the organizational structure of Churches facilitates the representation of the entire community in the context of the state, the lack of same organizational structure in Islam leads to persistent difficulties for Muslims in Western Europe. However, Ferrari emphasized that “the presence of Muslim community does not pose legally unsolvable problems or, on close examination, particularly new ones” (Ferrari, 2004, p. 4). In this respect, there is no need to modify existing legislation; instead, there is a need to apply it with ‘equanimity and farsightedness’.

5. Transnational Networks of Muslims

Immigrant Muslim populations in Europe are linked by both formal and informal networks beyond the borders of the different countries where they reside. These Muslim based transnational networks are very important contexts for understanding the nature of Muslims’ activities, organization, or mobilization efforts.

First and foremost, these transnational networks of Muslims help to promote forms of identity and to keep contact with the country of origin. In the globalization process, the significance of transnational networks has been raised since communication and mobility have become easier and cheaper. Thus, the presence of homeland media (radio, satellite TV, press, social media), cheaper and easier travel to the home country, and less costly communication with cross borders (mobile, internet, telephone) have all
affected the Muslim immigrants in their respective contexts (Allievi, 2003). In terms of the transnational networks of first generation Muslim immigrants, several religious organizations that already existed in the countries of origin have been established throughout Western Europe. However, those of the second generation have increasingly participated in the society. Thus, several religious organizations have adapted themselves to the changing environment while keeping their transnational networks active. In this respect, transnational networks have played a significant role in the integration of Islam in Europe (Nielsen, 2003).

In this process, several concerns about integration of Muslims have been raised as a result of growing networks with the country of origin. For example, the Dutch government has considered the increasing access to Turkish media as a hindrance to the integration of Turkish immigrants while an empirical study found no negative relationship between these two variables (Cankaya, Güney, & Köksalan, 2008). However, it is a fact that the degree of influence of homeland politics on immigrants can be also associated with growing transnational networks. In this sense, one can claim that the organization and mobilization of immigrants can be affected by the politics of country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

From a transnational perspective, Kastoryano (2004, p. 1250) asserted that “even though the political identity of Muslim immigrants has been shaped and developed primarily according to their specific relations with each state, the international agenda for Muslims is expressed through transnational network throughout Europe and beyond.” In terms of claiming collective interests beyond the boundaries of states, Islam has become a unifying identity for Muslims in Europe. However, she argued that the diversity of
Muslims’ nationalities and sects has remained a challenge to Muslim unity. Kastoryano highlighted the interaction between transnational and national claims by stating that “all claims at national level imply a parallel pressure at the European level and, conversely, all claims on the European level aim to have an impact on decisions taken at the national level within each of the member states” (p. 1253).

6. Islamophobia in Europe

Islamophobia, which originally developed after the late 1990s, is an emerging and contested concept. There is no consensus on the definition of the term among social scientists. In some sense, the concept is an old one, but the term is new. It is the fear of Islam and Muslims for some scholars, while for some others it involves more than fear and includes taking concrete actions against Muslims and Islam (Bleich, 2011). In this context, Bravo Lopez (2011) argued that Islamophobia is more than a form of religious intolerance or racism, although it could be mixed with these other forms of rejection in certain circumstances.

Bleich (2011, p. 1581) analyzed the various definitions of Islamophobia used in recent years and defined Islamophobia as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed against at Islam or Muslims.” Allen (2010) suggested a broader definition of Islamophobia:

An ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetrates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not necessarily as a continuum, subsequently pertaining influencing and impacting upon social action, interaction, response and so on, shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes in the social
consensus—shared languages and conceptual maps—that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Others. (p. 194)

Pratt (2011) affirmed that the negative perception of Muslims and Islam by the West fuels Islamophobia and the political views of those who control the media have significant impacts on these perceptions. Moreover, one of the claims that accounts for the increasing Islamophobia prevailing in the contemporary world is the dissemination of negative views concerning Muslims that has occurred in the media for over 30 years. However, there is evidence that the Muslim population in Europe has become a security threat after 9/11 (Nyiri, 2010).

Kaya (2009) claimed that the increase in the violent incidents initiated by Al-Qaeda and radicalized persons among some Muslim communities have fueled Islamophobia in the EU. In this respect, anxieties concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants have increased in Western countries. The ‘enemy within’ has also become more prevalent especially after the Madrid and London bombings and the revelation of the existence of terrorist cells in Spain (Kaya, 2009). This placed an emphasis on the mobilization process in the context of the securitization of integration, which is a result not only of the terrorist attacks already mentioned, but also the controversies about Islamic symbols such as the headscarf, veil, and minarets, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the turmoil over the Prophet Mohammed caricatures, and the riots in France and the UK. In addition, the belief that the Islamic culture is subverting Western values has gained currency in Europe (Togral, 2011). Nyiri (2010) argued that negative perceptions of Islam have influenced the current policies towards the Muslim population in the EU. In terms of inter-faith dialogue between Muslims and Christians in Germany, general skepticism and distrust towards Muslims have increased after 9/11, anti-Muslim
discourses became more prevalent, and the proponents of Muslim-Christian dialogue were criticized. As a result, the dialogue between the Muslims and Christians was interrupted. However, interfaith dialogue initiatives have been restored and developed since the mid-2000s (Mühe, 2007).

The increase in Islamophobic incidents against visible symbols of Islam (such as mosques) in Europe illustrates the increase in Islamophobia in Europe. Anti-Muslim demonstrations include campaigns by extreme right-wing organizations, violent incidents such as arson, graffiti, and criminal damage inflicted against mosques in the EU, and bans placed on the use of loudspeakers in the mosques (as illustrated by the legislation of Denmark and Norway since the late 1990s) (Valk, 2012). From the point of view of Muslims, the Europeans have increasingly displayed Islamophobia and have become hostile towards them. The multiplication of legislative measures targeting Islamic symbols and practices, as well as the growing influence of anti-immigrant and extreme right parties support this claim (Nyiri, 2010).

Mühe (2007) affirmed that the German media usually present one-sided newscasts about Muslims and Islam. Muslims are often presented in the media as a backward and frightening mass. Particularly after 9/11, Muslims were mentioned in the context of all types of crimes, such as terrorism, female oppression, and honor killings. The misinformation of the public about Muslims can be observed in the media. Schiffer (2008) studied Islam in the German media and found that all mosque raids were cited on the front page of newspapers. Although almost all the raids on mosques drew a blank, the results of the raids were written in small print in the middle pages or were missing. In addition, Schiffer claimed that the headscarf has been used as an image in almost all news
related to foreigners in the newspapers and TV news. This image strengthened the notion that “Islam equals strangeness” and is “a foreign issue” (Schiffer, 2008, p. 5).

Moors (2010) stressed the view that the terrorist attack of 9/11 resulted in the polarization of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. Quick surveys and polls became popular shortly after 9/11. The number of Islamophobic incidents subsequently increased. In 2003, one school banned 3 students from wearing face coverings, and in 2008 the Dutch cabinet intended to place some bans on face veils. The issues related to Islam constituted a large component of the political agenda. In a similar vein, Valk (2012) emphasized that the Gulf crisis in the 1990s, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the murder of Van Gogh in 2004 resulted in the increase and intensity of the incidents against mosques in the Netherlands. Between 2005 and 2010, there were 117 acts of violence against mosques. The available data on violent acts against mosques illustrates that Turkish mosques are attacked relatively more often than other Muslim mosques in the Netherlands.

Several scholars addressed the negative effects and consequences of Islamophobia. Fekete and Sivanandan (2009) argued that police raids and searches have increased in Germany as a result of increasing Islamophobia. During the raids on private residences of Muslims and Muslim organizations’ offices in Stuttgart, Freiburg, and Manheim, 617 Muslims were checked in Germany, and the raids led to distrust of the police and intelligence services among the Muslim population. As a response to these arbitrary police raids, several Muslim organizations declared their discontentedness. Taras (2012) clarified the nexus between security and discrimination on the grounds of Islamophobia. According to him, profiling Muslim groups and individuals has been on
the agenda of European internal security agencies in their desire to make Europe more secure. However, new security problems may arise as a result of such profiling.

Furthermore, Islamophobic acts hinder the integration of Muslims in the West and relevant pressures towards Muslims move them away from self-criticism. Muslims may not take a step to criticize Muslims whose acts are not compatible with Islam, if they face Islamophobic incidents (Kalın, 2011).

7. Factors of and the Concerns Raised by Securitization

After World War II, the main concern of states was their external security which required improving their defense capabilities. Therefore, immigration policies were concerned with strengthening alliances with other countries and reconstructing the postwar economy. As a result of the relative decline in external security threats and changes in global societal structure, receiving countries of immigrants began to focus on policies designed to curb immigration flows (Rudolph, 2010). However, international immigration flows continued to increase in line with increasing globalization. Germany and the Netherlands in particular, experienced this process after the 1960s.

European countries signed agreements with less developed European countries in order to address their labor shortage. Germany and the Netherlands signed a recruitment agreement with Turkey (in 1961 and 1964 respectively). The number of Turkish immigrants in these two countries thus increased substantially in the following years, and reached a peak in 1973. That same year, both Germany and the Netherlands adopted a “closed door” policy in order to stop labor immigration. Both countries also expected that many Turkish workers would return to Turkey at the end of their work contract.
However, immigration to Germany and the Netherlands from Turkey continued through the channels of family unification, politically motivated immigration, and illegal labor immigration (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006; Şen, 2003).

Facing increasing numbers of immigrants, the native population in Germany and the Netherlands became anxious and doubted the will and capability of the immigrants to integrate. In addition, several demands by the immigrants, for example for dual citizenship, raised anxiety among the native population because this was seen as a hindrance to the integration of these immigrants (Rudolph, 2010). The states responded to this process, especially in the face of globalization, by renationalizing migration. Migration was then seen as a threat to domestic security and more restrictive measures regarding immigration began to be applied. While the link between immigration and security issues had been stressed by governments before 9/11, this association became more concrete after 9/11 (Togral, 2011).

In the securitization process, the nativist movements in Europe also played an important role. The emergence of anti-immigrant parties in Germany and the Netherlands resulted in the politicization of immigration issues (d’Appollonia, 2008). Anti-immigrant and extremist right parties showed up after the early 1990s and prioritized national preferences. They claimed that foreigners in the country were posing a security threat to their society and the only solution was cultural purity. The discourses supporting nativism increasingly appeared in the media, thus, mainstream parties and society were strongly influenced in this process. Their notion that immigrants need to have basic knowledge of European society has increasingly affected national policies, as illustrated
by the introduction of restrictive measures such as citizenship tests and linguistic requirements (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009).

In conclusion, it is clear that Islamophobia increased in Western societies after 9/11 and Muslims have been increasingly perceived as a security threat by their host societies; as a result, more restrictive measures have been applied towards targeting Muslims, while discrimination against Muslims has become more prevalent. Thus, several concerns about the negative effects of securitization have been raised. The securitization process has brought about adverse effects such as exclusion, resentment and frustration for Muslims in Europe and resulted in the hindrance of their integration. As a result, this process has led to insecurity rather than advanced security through increasing exclusion, resentment, and, at the end, radicalization which makes people more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment (d’Appollonia, 2010; Ireland, 2010). In this context, d’Appollonia (2008, p. 204) argued that “more security creates more insecurity.” To give Muslims in Europe a voice as a response to securitization, it is very important to understand the phenomenon in a comprehensive way.
CHAPTER III- MUSLIMS IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS

1. Facts and Figures

In Germany, Islam is the second largest religion (Human Rights Watch, 2009). According to various estimates, the Muslim population in Germany reaches about 4 million (between 3.8 and 4.3 million), representing 4.6 to 5.2% of the total population. The largest Muslim group in Germany is the Turkish population. Among the Muslim groups living in Germany, Sunnis account for 74% of the Muslim population, Alevis for 13% and Shiites for 7% (Haug, Müssig, & Stichs, 2009).

In the Netherlands, the percentage of the Catholic and Protestant populations in 2005 was 28.8 and 16.8 percent, respectively. The percentage of the Muslim population was 5.8 percent (Davelaar, van den Toorn, de Witte, Beaumont, & Kuiper, 2011, pp. 13-15). Approximately, 58 percent of the Dutch population has a religious affiliation. There are about 850,000 Muslims, between 100,000 and 250,000 Hindus, and 52,000 Jews in the Netherlands (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010).

2. Muslims in Germany

Faas (2010) drew a general picture of Muslims in Germany. He argued that the unemployment rate is high among Muslims, especially Turks, and marginalization in housing, education, and employment hinders the integration of Muslim immigrants. He asserted that Germany responded late to the presence of Muslims in comparison to other European countries. While several European countries began to develop ‘assimilation-based approaches’, the Germans’ initial approach towards economic immigrants was seen
as one that involved assimilating them into ‘a mono-cultural conception of Germany’ without recognizing their diversity. He affirmed that the ignorance of immigrants’ cultural diversity can still take place in the statements of some German policymakers. He suggested that policymakers should enhance integration and social cohesion through ‘a common language’, citizenship, and valuing cultures other than the German one.

Amiraux (1996, p. 49) claimed that, after the mid-1980s, Islamic organizations in Germany began to be involved in a new form of cultural and social activism that coincided with the beginning of hate crimes against Turks and “the awakening of the objective differences between second generation and host country”. Faas (2010) analyzed the interaction between German natives and Muslims in Germany from a cultural and structural point of view. He noted that Turkish immigrants in Germany originate from economically less developed parts of Turkey (rather than the more modernized Turkish cities), and thus represent the ‘traditional Turks’. He also argued that Muslims have been excluded as ‘foreigners’ as a result of the ethnocentric citizenship context in Germany. The terms ‘foreigners’ and ‘foreign citizen’ are still used by policymakers for qualifying immigrants, and Muslims are still the ‘cultural and religious others’.

Şen (2008) argued that the Muslim identity has been influenced by this negative categorization. He found that the Muslim identity has moved towards ‘a modern-liberal orientation’; however, religion continues to play a significant role in the lives of Turks in Germany and the second and third generation still identify themselves in terms of religious affiliation. From a legal perspective, Rohe (2008, p. 75) asserted that the current problems due to the presence of Muslims in Germany are “not rooted in religion, but in education, language skills, a certain degree of xenophobia among groups of society, and
tendencies of self-segregation”. On the other hand, Stowasser (2002), using young Turks in Germany as an example, affirmed that even though there is increasing participation in the German educational system and in obtaining proficiency in German, this has not eliminated the barriers between young Germans and young Turks. She emphasized the fact that young Turks still feel excluded from the majority culture even after they have taken up German citizenship, and they still face identity problems. She asserted that in order to position Islam among the legally recognized religions in Germany, Islamic organizations have begun to cooperate with each other despite the fact that competition and diversity among them remains.

Pfaff and Gill (2006) analyzed Muslim organizations in European polities by focusing on Germany. They argued that although they expected a large-scale political mobilization in Germany as a result of several problems that Muslims have faced, the picture that emerges does not support this idea. The lack of principal interest in organizations and civil rights organizations among Muslim organizations is contrary to what social movement theory would predict. Therefore, these researchers argued that the decentralized and nonhierarchical organization of Muslims, their different interpretations and views about religion, and church-state structure have affected their development of a collective movement, and in turn, their political mobilization. In this respect, the non-acceptance of small factions of the Muslim community towards cooperation affects the efforts towards political cooperation between Muslims and others. They highlighted the divided and weak voices of Muslims and the existing institutional structures in Germany that precludes Muslims to act collectively. While they expected to find more broadly based organizations among those of the same ethnicity, their case study showed that
Turkish immigrants in Germany are divided along homeland lines. They consequently asserted that this separation is a barrier to their effective organization and political integration.

3. Muslims in the Netherlands

Sunier and Kuijeren (2002) argued that the place of Islam in the Netherlands has been influenced by three factors; ‘the constitutional principle of religious equality’, ‘the era of pillarization’, and ‘Dutch minority policies’. They asserted that before the end of the 1970s, the immigrants were defined by their ethnic origins; however, after the late 1970s their religious and cultural identities played a crucial role in debates regarding their position in Dutch society. From the beginning of 1980s, the government acknowledged their presence in the country and applied an integration policy based on the principle ‘integration with preservation of identity’. Several dramatic events such as the Iranian revolution and the murder of the president of Egypt resulted in the ‘discovery’ of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants as ‘Muslim immigrants’. This identity has increasingly been used to explain their collective behavior and their societal problems in the Netherlands. The idea that the least integrated immigrants are Muslims became more prevalent over time. As a consequence of the Rushdie Affair, the image of Muslims deteriorated, Muslims were linked to violence, and were increasingly perceived as a threat to Dutch society.

Along with this process, the integration policy changed. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the integration policy has shifted from one of socio-economic participation to socio-cultural adaptation. At the same time, the unity of the Dutch society
in line with common Dutch values and basic norms has gained more significance. Thus, the persistence of socio-cultural diversity is seen as a limitation to integration, and the integration policy has increasingly developed according to political and public concerns regarding social cohesion and the national identity (Scholten, 2011).

In addition, when taking the policies towards Muslims in the Netherlands into account, Sunier (2010) asserted that two significant factors, ‘pillarization’ and integration policies since the 1980s, have been key factors influencing the political agenda. Sunier claimed that these integration policies are not multicultural despite the inclusion of attitudes towards cultural diversity and governmental supports for religious and cultural activities, and have only been temporary, because the main objective has always been the assimilation of immigrants. In addition, the constitutional principle of equal treatment for all religious denominations is still valid in principle, but not at the same level as in the Dutch history of pillarization. Finally, he affirmed that the level of religious autonomy has shifted along with the presence of Islam in the Netherlands and has been replaced with more strict control mechanisms.

In a similar vein, Shadid (2006) argued that the recent developments in the Netherlands indicate that “the Dutch policy on minorities has changed from cultural pluralism to integration with characteristics of assimilation, and from group oriented identity approach to emphasizing an individually directed sense of citizenship” (p. 19), and these developments have affected the accommodation of Muslims in the Netherlands. He claimed that the current multiculturalist discourse in the Netherlands does not detail any prerequisites for real multiculturalism. Therefore, this discourse, such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘our culture’ and ‘their culture’, in society excludes Muslims from society, and
thus, Dutch Muslims face problems that limit their minority rights. Shadid (2006) found this policy counterproductive and stresses that Muslim immigrants “feel more alienated than ever before, the attitude of the host society at large has never been more negative than now, and mutual interethnic contacts are continuously decreasing” (p. 20).

Sunier and Kuijeren (2002) emphasized that there are two key contrasting approaches regarding multiculturalism and cultural diversity, as regards Islam in the Netherlands. The first view is “a slightly revised version of the neoliberal view on individual rights” (p. 150). The proponents of this view claim that “members of religious or ethnic collectives cannot claim specific collective rights on the basis of cultural peculiarities with respect to their position in society, since this would jeopardize equality” (p. 150). The contrasting view addresses the history of pillarization in the Netherlands and supports granting collective rights to religious groups. These researchers argued that these contrasting positions have shaped the recent multiculturalism debates in the Netherlands. In this process, several concepts, namely integration, equality, emancipation, and freedom, have been given different meanings by these groups. They stressed that young Muslim women have increasingly been involved in these debates and their self-awareness has recently grown. In addition, young Muslims have become visible in higher positions in the society and they desire to show the compatibility of modernity and Islam.

Moreover, several events have negatively affected Muslims in the Netherlands. Buijs (2009) affirmed that 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh influenced Dutch policy concerning Muslims and the position of Muslims in the country. That is, these events fueled the problems regarding Muslims and affected the perceptions of society towards
Muslims in the Netherlands. Buijs affirmed these events resulted in an ideological struggle among Salafi movements which can be classified as violent and nonviolent (political and apolitical).

4. Comparative Perspectives on Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands

There have been several studies that have compared both Germany and the Netherlands from several perspectives related to Muslim immigrants. In this respect, Yükleyen (2012) focused on Turkish Islamic organizations in the Netherlands and Germany. He has argued that Turkish Islamic organizations have a significant role to play in providing social and religious services to Muslims in Europe. As a result of comparisons of Turkish Islamic organizations, Yükleyen asserted that Islamic organizations are sensitive to the changing needs of Muslims, and they are able to develop positive relationships with the state agencies. He further stressed the differences in the views of Turkish Islamic organizations as regards integration, which affected their forms of claim-making as well as their activities. He argued that both Turkish communities and the native Dutch population have several concerns about integration. While Dutch officials are doubtful about the contribution of Islamic organizations as regards Muslim integration, on the other hand, Turkish representatives have several concerns about the integration policy which is changed from socioeconomic to cultural integration.

Yükleyen (2010) assessed the impact of state policies and Islamic associations by comparing two similar Turkish Islamic organizations established in different countries; Dutch Millî Görüş and German Millî Görüş. He affirmed that both assimilationist and
multicultural policies may not promote rapid Muslim integration. However, when the multicultural policies are applied rather than assimilationist policies, the Islamic organizations are possibly able to find more opportunities to “integrate and adopt their Islamic interpretation of Islam to their European settings”, and this can thus enhance the participation of Muslims in the public sphere (Yükleyen, 2010, p. 460).

Moreover, Østergaard-Nielsen (2001), who focused on transnational political practices by examining Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands, found that transnational political movements may use several different resources in comparison to other immigrant movements. As well, if the political structure is more inclusive, homeland politics and the transnational political practices of Turks and Kurds may be less bounded by the host countries context. In this respect, she argued that the national political opportunity structure is not sufficient to explain the transnational political structures of Turks and Kurds in either Germany or the Netherlands.

5. Turks in Germany and the Netherlands

The Muslim population with a Turkish migration background in Germany is made up of between 2.5 and 2.7 million persons, and 63% of the total Muslim population is Turkish (Haug et al., 2009). According to the Federal Ministry of Interior, the Turkish population is constituted by about 3 million persons. This constitutes 24.1 % of the foreigners in Germany (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011). The majority of the people with a Turkish migration background are Sunnis (78%). Alevi is the second largest group accounting for 17% of the Turkish population (Haug et al., 2009). While the number of third- and fourth-generation of Turks in Germany is high, estimates of the
populations of first to fourth generations are very difficult to attain (Mühe, 2007). About 40% of Turks in Germany are under 24 years of age, and only 4.2% are above 65 years of age. Thus, they make up a younger generation when compared to the native Germans. The Turkish population is spread across almost all states in Germany. The majority of Turks live in North Rhine-Westphalia (35.3%), Baden-Württemberg (18.8%), and Bavaria (14.1%). The average number of household members among Turks in Germany is 4 (Haug et al., 2009). By the 31st of December 2010, the number of Turkish citizens who have been living in Germany for more than 20 years was 944,403 (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011).

In the Netherlands, there are about 850,000 Muslims who constitute about 5.8% of the total population (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010; Davelaar et al., 2011). In 2011, the total population of the Netherlands was 16,656,000. The Turkish population in the Netherlands of 393,000 persons constitutes around 2.3 percent of the total population. Between 2000 and 2012 the Turkish population increased 27 percent. By 2012, Turks were the most prevalent immigrant community in the Netherlands. However, the Moroccan population (363,000) and Surinamese population (347,000) were close in numbers to the Turkish population. By 2011, the numbers of first and second generation immigrants who had originated from Turkey were around 197,000 and 192,000 respectively. The number of live births to parents with a Turkish background decreased between 2005 (6,400) and 2010 (5,300) (Statistics Netherlands, 2012b). The number of Turkish immigrants born in Turkey was 175,476 in 1999. By 2011, this number increased around 12.5 percent (197,368) (Eurostat migr_pop3ctb).
In Germany, 4.2% of Muslim Turkish immigrants are unemployed and job-seeking and 52.5% of them are gainfully employed. Other populations are retired, trainees/apprentices, and/or staying at home. About 56% of Muslim Turkish immigrants are blue collar workers which may be an indicator of low-socioeconomic status. About 27% of them are white collar workers and 16 percent are self-employed such as lawyers, restaurant owners, doctors, and grocers (Haug et al., 2009). Several studies and educational statistics have focused on showing that the standard of Turkish immigrants’ school education is lower than that of other immigrants. Only 28% of them have high standard of school education and 17% have not completed any school. The main reason accounting for the low educational qualifications of Turkish immigrants is that the most of them came to Germany as labor migrants because of their low socioeconomic status which hindered their educational life (Haug et al., 2009). The mathematical ability and reading levels of the children with Turkish migration backgrounds are not sufficient to be successful in professional or traineeship capacities. They rarely use the German language in their daily lives (Mühe, 2007).

In the Netherlands, the net labor participation of Turkish immigrants increased from 48 percent in 2005 to 54.4 percent in 2011 and their unemployment rate decreased from 14.8 percent in 2005 to 10 percent in 2009. However, the unemployment rate among Turkish immigrants is fairly high in comparison to Dutch natives’ unemployment rate (Statistics Netherlands, 2012a). The unemployment rate of young Turks in the Netherlands increased to 33 percent in early 2012. However, over the same period, 9 percent of young Dutch natives were unemployed (Eijkman, 2012). By 2010, the number of low income Turkish households was 27,000. While the average annual income of
Turkish immigrants was around 17,500 Euros, Dutch natives’ average annual income was around 26,000 Euros (Statistics Netherlands, 2012a). Around 50 percent of Turkish immigrants have a salaried job and many of them are self-employed. More than 50 percent of Turks have entry level elementary or lower level jobs. Only 28 percent of native Dutch work at those levels. However, Turks have increasingly obtained medium or high level jobs (Demant et al., 2007). Second generation Turkish immigrants are in a better situation in the labor market vis-à-vis first generation immigrants (Open Society Foundations, 2010).

In Germany, although some Muslim organizations publish magazines such as the Islamische Zeitung, they have limited followers (Rohe, 2012). However, the Turkish press in Germany has reached most of the Turkish population. Ranging from right to left views, it provides a broad range of views. In this context, Turkish immigrants have a great opportunity to remain in a close relationship with their home country. Currently, Hurriyet, Zaman, Miliyet, Sabah, Turkiye, Evrensel, and Milli Gazete are Turkish dailies and perşembe, Dünya Hafta, and Cumhuriyet Hafta are Turkish weeklies. In addition, the IGMG perspective and the Alevilerin Sesi are Turkish periodicals related to Turkish religious organizations in Germany (Schumann, 2008). In the Netherlands, minorities have a wide opportunity to establish their media resources. The changes in immigration policy have negatively affected minority media, however. They are organized under the political or religious organizations rather than ethnic groups (Cankaya et al., 2008). In addition, many Turkish TV channels have established special programs for Turks in Europe (Kaya, 2009). TRT International, Euro ATV, TGRT Avrupa, Euro Star Euro Show, Samanyolu Avrupa, Kanal 7 Avrupa are some of them.
CHAPTER IV- LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Securitization and Discrimination

In the previous chapters, it was argued that securitization as well as discrimination can have several detrimental effects on the society. Securitization is strongly associated with antagonism between subordinate and dominant groups and uncertainty in a society. In this respect, understanding the theoretical approaches to intergroup relations in the society may be a useful approach for fostering a better understanding of the securitization phenomenon. In addition, discrimination and perceived discrimination also brings with it several societal problems, and accordingly, the question of identification, a key factor influencing mobilization, arises. This section focuses on the securitization and discrimination phenomena from the social psychological perspective. In addition to the context and traditional SES variables which are discussed in the following section, a better understanding of mobilization should include subjective aspects, both at the individual and collective levels. Subjective aspects can be useful for providing an explanation of the motives and objectives of mobilization, and the selection of acculturation strategies by immigrants.

A. Intergroup Relations and Uncertainty

In terms of intergroup relations, Social Identity Theory provides a core explanatory approach in the extant literature. It includes several interrelated concepts and sub-theories that are designed to analyze the role of self-conception in intergroup relations and group membership from the social psychological point of view. Several phenomena such as intergroup conflicts, discrimination, group polarization, and prejudice
can be explained by this theory (Hogg, 2006). Social identity can be described as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). The members of social groups are provided with a social identification which leads to comparison with the members of the out-group. The aim of the intergroup comparisons is to differentiate the in-group from the out-group considering the dimensions that favor the in-group. In this sense, groups compete for positive distinctiveness due to a need for self-esteem (Turner, 1975).

In this context, according to Turner, (1975, p. 40), Social Identity Theory focuses on three theoretical principles;

1- “Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity.”

2- Positive social identity stems from comparisons between in-group and relevant out-groups.

3- If social identity is not satisfactory, individuals will act in two ways; “to leave existing group and join some more positively distinct group” and “to make their existing group more positive”.

Since people tend to like to maintain and/or increase their collective self-esteem, they are likely to protect their valued social identities, which are significant sources of self-esteem, from perceived threats (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Crocker & Park, 2004; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). In addition, if objective resources are unequally distributed, antagonism between subordinate and dominant groups will increase. Since the inferior or disadvantaged group position results in a negative social identity for the member of relevant group (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986), the subordinate group declines to accept a negative self-image, and tends to work in order to develop a positive group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), the reactions to negative social identity are diverse. These reactions are classified as individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition. In the first case, the more the belief systems of individuals approach their society as permeable and flexible in terms of the structure and nature of intergroup relations, the more they will be likely to leave their existing group, and, on an individual basis, try to join a higher status group. In this respect, this is a form of disidentification with the previous in-group.

In the second case, in the social creativity strategy, the elements of the comparative situation between the in-group and out-group are redefined or altered in order to be able to achieve positive distinctiveness for in-group. Contrary to the first case, this is a group based strategy. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 43), options at the collective level include;

1- “Comparing the in-group to the out-group on some new dimension”

2- “Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that comparisons which were previously negative are now predicted as positive” as in the example of “Black is beautiful.”

3- “Changing the out-group (or selecting the out-group) with which the in-group is compared -in particular, ceasing or avoiding the use the high status out-group as comparative frame of reference.”
In the last case, direct competition with the out-group is a strategy for seeking positive distinctiveness. In this case, more antagonism is expected between the in-group and the out-group in comparison to two other strategies.

The last two strategies are based on the belief system of social change which refers to the fact that the structure and nature of intergroup relations is perceived as “characterized by marked stratification” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 35). In this belief system, individuals perceive that it is very difficult or impossible to leave their group and to join another group. They interact as members of their groups rather than as individuals. The consequences of this belief system are likely to develop in the form of collective actions.

Hogg (2000), a theorist of social identity, placed an emphasis on uncertainty reduction in order to address intergroup relations. According to this theorist, a feeling of certainty is one of the most important human needs since it makes people feel confident in what to expect from their world and how to act. Uncertainty about one’s feelings, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and about oneself is aversive, therefore people search for certainty. The cognitive effort in uncertainty reduction is not expected in all aspects of human life, but only subjectively significant ones.

In efforts to emphasize the importance of uncertainty reduction, social psychological approaches take two dimensions into account, the self and societal dimensions. There are also many theories (e.g. self-enhancement, self-verification, self-assessment, self-affirmation, and self-completion) that employ the uncertainty phenomenon. In addition to these approaches, Hogg (2000) proposed a self-
categorization approach to address the topic of subjective uncertainty reduction.

According to this approach, uncertainty provides people with an incentive to affirm a social identity and form or join groups, and this self-categorization process reduces subjective uncertainty. Accordingly, self-categorization:

- depersonalizes self in terms of the ingroup prototype. Self is contextually transformed so that self-conceptualization, attitudes, feelings and behaviors are governed by the ingroup prototype; a prototype which is both descriptive and prescriptive, and which should be clearly and consensually defined. (Hogg, 2000, p. 233)

An intergroup struggle for certainty can be observed in intergroup relations. Dominant groups are characterized by relative certainty. For example, reliable income, secure jobs, media power are all associated with dominant groups. On the other hand, unreliable housing, job insecurity, etc. are linked to sub-ordinate groups which are characterized by uncertainty. In this context, there have been struggles for reducing uncertainty for one’s own group which have a role in social change. In addition, “at the social structural level, large scale economic and historical forces continually redefine the nature of social categories and their relations to one another” (Hogg, 2000, pp. 246-247).

There is another significant theoretical approach, Integrated Threat Theory, that is used to explain prejudice and attitudes towards out-groups. It highlights four types of threat, which are realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes, that result in prejudice. Threats to the economic and political power, existence, and material and physical well-being of the in-group are regarded as realistic threats. The realistic threats are not necessarily to be real, instead they should be perceived by the in-group or its members. Symbolic threats are the perceived threats to beliefs, values, and attributes of the in-group (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Intergroup
anxiety suggests that when people interact with out-group members, they often experience the feelings of being threatened since they are worried about experiencing negative emotions (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). The last type of threat is known as negative stereotypes. That is, if the expectations are negative, intergroup interactions will likely be conflicting (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Attitudes toward out-groups can be predicted by using these four types of threat. In this respect, the prejudice is associated with negative emotional and evaluative reactions towards other groups. However, two antecedents were added by Stephan and Stephan (2000) for attitudes towards out-groups. These are;

1) Strong in-group identification makes people react to threat with prejudice.
2) Positive contact decreases feelings of threat.

Prejudice is promoted by ignorance and contact increases the knowledge about the out-group, thus more positive intergroup attitudes are expected when the people interact with each other (Leibkind et al., 2004). Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) argued that the relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice among majority and minority groups may vary. In order to develop positive intergroup relations, the establishment of optimal conditions in the contact situation is important. Equal status, institutional support, and cooperation can be considered among these conditions. However, they asserted that these conditions are more effective in promoting positive intergroup attitudes for the members of majority groups than for the members of minority groups. In terms of minority group members, the perception of ongoing recognition of devaluation of their group may prevent the positive outcomes of any inter-group contact. In this respect, it can
be claimed that perceptions and attitudes have a key role to play in determining intergroup attitudes.

Leibkind et al. (2004) took into account group size and group status in the issue of the effects of intergroup contact on intergroup attitudes. They asserted that while insecure majorities feel threatened and enact intolerant and defensive behaviors toward outgroups, secure majorities are more tolerant to minorities. Secure minorities are assertive and confident, and it is expected there will be heightened intergroup conflict among secure minority and insecure majority in the form of intergroup discrimination. They also found that higher status majority group members and lower status minority group member were associated with more positive attitudes toward out-group members, and majorities had more positive intergroup attitudes than minorities.

Verkuyten (2005) examined group evaluations between the (Dutch) majority and the (Turkish) minority groups and ethnic group identification considering the assimilation and multiculturalism hypotheses. The study revealed that minority group members were more likely to endorse multiculturalism than majority group members. For the members of minority group, the endorsement of multiculturalism was positively associated with the identification of their ethnic in-group and the presentation of positive in-group evaluation. On the other hand, for members of majority group, this was negatively related to identification with their ethnic group and the presentation of negative out-group evaluations. In this sense, these findings illustrated that multiculturalism leads to positive end results for intergroup relations.
B. Perceived Discrimination and Identification Question

According to Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg (2010), when one categorizes oneself as a group member, one depersonalizes oneself in terms of one’s group prototype. “The relatively idiosyncratic and individuated self is transformed into a collective self that shares prescriptive group attitudes” (Hogg et al., 2010, p. 74). In that process, norms are internalized, and people identify themselves with their groups. In the group identification process, self-related uncertainty is reduced since identification clarifies several questions about feelings, behaviors, and perceptions about us and others.

Several identification models that consider prejudice and perceived discrimination have been developed. In the Rejection-Identification Model (RIM), prejudice is harmful to the psychological well-being. If members of disadvantaged groups perceive that the mainstream society does not treat them fairly and accept them, they will increasingly identify with their group as a response to prejudice directed against them. In this respect, group identification decreases the negative effects of prejudice by promoting a sense of belonging. Accordingly, psychological well-being is enhanced, and the need for feeling accepted is satisfied. At the end, this process will increase self-esteem and minority group identification (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002).

In a similar context, Verkuyten (2007) examined the Dutch national and religious group identification among Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. In terms of Dutch identification, the study made a distinction between high and low identification. However, he stressed the difference between low identification and de-identification which indicates a strongly disagreeing Dutch nationality. In the first case, there was a
sense of belonging to the mainstream society but even this sense was weak. However, the latter case implies that there was a rejection to belonging to mainstream society. Since these two identifications (low identification and de-identification) are not the same, their consequences are also different. The first case may result in an indifference towards the national group, whereas the second case can lead to an oppositional identity.

However, the perspectives of Verkuyten (2007) and Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim (2009) differ from each other. While Verkuyten (2007) approached this issue from the point view of low identification and de-identification, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009) noted this process as one they termed disidentification, which “refers to the process of disengagement from superordinate national in-group, presuming that there has been some identification in the past” (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009, p. 110). In this context, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009) proposed the Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM). It is assumed by RDIM that if ethnic minorities perceive that the superordinate national group discriminates against them, they will feel less belonging to the superordinate national in-group. Then, this process can result in an inclination to disengage from the superordinate national in-group, and minorities will be likely to distance themselves from the mainstream society. At the end, disidentification will lead to an increase in hostility towards the natives. In this sense, perceived discrimination seems a serious problem in the processes of developing a common national identity.

From the socio-psychological point of view, an increase in the size of a minority raises a sense of threat and perceived exclusionary practices of minorities as the out-group populations follows. However, Semyenow et al. (2004) focused on the attitudes toward foreigners in Germany and found that the perceived -rather than actual- size of the
foreign population was strongly associated with perceived threat and discrimination against foreign populations.

Skrobanek (2009) asserted that a member of minority group perceive the non-permeability of group boundaries after experiencing a sense of being discriminated against. As a result of this perception, his or her ethnic identity is strengthened. Discrimination may be perceived at two levels; personal and group levels. However, perceived group discrimination rather than perceived personal discrimination plays a more significant role in the (re)-ethnicization process.

In addition, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2012) assessed the effect of perceived discrimination and in-group norms on host national and religious group identification by focusing on Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany. One of the findings of the study illustrated the significance of in-group norms in the group identification process. Another finding not only supported the previous research findings about the strong relationship between perceived discrimination and Muslim group identification, but also showed that Muslim minorities’ identification process can vary as a response to discrimination based on the perceived incompatibility between the out-group and the in-group values. The perceived incompatibility may reflect both the views of the minority and the perception of the majority views by the minority. In this respect, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2012) claimed that:

instead of stimulating further integration of Muslims, the current trend of blaming Muslims for failed integration and depicting Islam as a system of values that undermines the liberal values of the host societies might produce exactly the opposite, namely further distancing from the receiving nation. (p. 900)
From the social psychological perspective, radicalization can be taken into account as an identification question. Religions as types of social groups have a key role to play in reducing uncertainty because they address the nature of existence, daily moral practices, rituals, and ceremonies. Therefore, particularly in times of uncertainty, religions become more attractive. While most religious people are not associated with extremism, religious extremism is a fact and a social problem in the contemporary world. In fact, the conditions of uncertainty may make people inclined to extremism (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). When the people feel that their lifestyles, values, security, etc. are under threat, they are likely to be inclined to identify with a group that can buffer or remove the relevant threat. Under extreme uncertainty, people may have a tendency to identify with assertive radical groups (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010).

In conclusion, the social psychological approaches take into account emotions, perceptions, values, etc. and link them to the social outcomes such as identification with a group, attitudes towards out-group, and inter-group relations. In this respect, the social psychological perspective can provide valuable and insightful explanations for understanding the nature and the objectives of migrant mobilization as a response to securitization and discrimination.

2. Migrant Mobilization

A. Theories Focusing on the Context of Reception
I. Socioeconomic Context

As regards the socioeconomic context of theories that focus on the reception of migrants, Koopmans and Statham (2000) stressed that many migrant studies have approached migrants as “passive objects of policies for incorporation into the national host society with the patterns of their presence strongly determined by economic and demographic trends, for example, in the labor market, housing, or education” (pp. 14-15). Given the criticism of this approach, two key theories that concentrate on the relationship between migrants and their collective action have prevailed. These are the class theory and the race/ethnicity theory.

Class theory addresses the political participation and actions of immigrants from the point of view of the socioeconomic and structural position of immigrants. In this approach, the structural problems of industrial capitalism appear to have led to the racialization of the working classes, who are divided by economic lines. This shared experience is seen as a form of class identity, and the collective actions of immigrants are explained in this theory by their class identity. The political participation of immigrants is in turn, accepted as “evidence for an emergent class consciousness of migrant workers,” and the organizational activities of immigrants are explained as “a condition of processes of industrial modernization in the capitalist economy, rather than as responses to the political environment” (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.15). However, in this approach, the relationship between political institutions and migrants has not clearly been articulated.
The race/ethnicity theories approach this issue in a similar manner to the class approach; however, the main difference is that race/ethnicity approaches do not view the ethnic and racial identities of immigrants as a “false consciousness waiting to be unveiled by the forces of history and class warfare” (p.16). On the contrary, it is asserted that the basis of the collective actions of immigrants is formed by the ethnic and racial identities of immigrants, rather than by class identity (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). In the ethnicity approach, “migrants’ mobilization was seen as determined by the specific cultural traits of a given ethnic group whose members homogeneously embodied it” (Però & Solomos, 2010, p. 8). In addition, societal cleavages are the result of ethnic differences. The shared experiences of discrimination and racism in the receiving context and the cultural characteristics of immigrants are of importance for the determination of their collective actions. In this approach, as in the class approach, the relationship between political institutions and migrants has been neglected in debating the issue of migrant activism (Koopmans & Statham, 2000).

Modernization theory, the third approach, concentrates more directly on collective actions and social structures in comparison to class and race/ethnicity theories. In this approach, urban riots and xenophobic violence are seen as forms of social disintegration and ethnic competition in a society, and socioeconomic change has been explained through this lens. Thus, it is asserted that migration in the receiving economy results in the existence of losers in the process of modernization. The anomie and psychological frustrations among these people, and in turn, their violent mobilization in response to increasing social inequalities are seen as evidence for the pressures resulting from migration. This approach has been widely used to explain urban riots, ethnic urban
violence, extremist behaviors, extreme right wing voting, and xenophobic mobilization. For instance, “perpetrators of racist violence or holders of right-wing values are seen as reacting to a loss of prestige and status that is caused by structural modernization process, such as industrialization and individualization” (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.16).

II. Social Movement Approach

In the 1970s, American scholars mostly concentrated on the ‘Resource Mobilization’ (RM) approach to social movement organization, while most Western European scholars focused on the ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM) approach to the organization of social movements. The NSM approach usually implies structural and cultural issues, while the RM approach concentrates on individual, group, and organizational level factors (Tarrow, 1998). Over time, the political process model that developed absorbed the key elements of the RM, and the model has become a more dominant one in the context of the social movement approach. In this model, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structure (POS), and cultural framing factors have accounted for “the power generated by movements, the energizing cultural content of movements”, and the origins and outcomes of movements (Morris, 2000, p. 446).

From the point view of the collective actions of immigrants, the social movement approach emphasizes the fact that immigrants suffer from political disadvantages, and thus, they must first act politically. The main focus is not economic, but political. Because political actions change societies, participation, struggle, and citizenship rights are important concepts in this approach. Social change is the outcome of groups’ organization that promotes conflict and leads to alternative institutions. In this respect,
“immigrants must find their place in society as groups by organizing into social movements” (Heisler, 1992, pp. 635-636).

In the social movement approach, the political opportunity structure (POS) has played a significant role in terms of explaining the mobilization of immigrants. It has become the most common approach for addressing immigrant mobilization. This approach was initially used in the field of social movement research, and then, used in immigration studies (Però, 2008). In this respect, the following sections will examine this approach.

III. Traditional Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

The main assumption of the POS for mobilizing collective action is that “mobilization is not a direct reflection of social structural tensions, problems and grievances, but is mediated by available opportunities and constraints set by the political environments in which mobilizing groups, in the case at hand migrants, operate” (Koopmans, 2004, p. 451). In most models, four variables were included in the POS: ‘the degree of openness or of closure of the polity’, ‘the stability or instability of political alignments’, ‘the presence or absence of allies and support groups’, and ‘divisions within the elite or it tolerance for protest’ (Tarrow, 1988, p. 429).

The dimensions of the POS are varied. First, national cleavage structures are political opportunities for challengers to mobilize around their contentions. In this context, the existing politicized cleavages in the host society, such as class conflicts, conflicts over national identities, and periphery-centre conflicts shape the chances of these efforts. Second, “formal institutional or legal structures refer to the set of
institutional actors in a polity and the legal arrangements which define their relationship and competencies” (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p. 34). In this dimension, the separation of powers, the centralization of political institutions, and the electoral system play a key role for challengers in accessing the polity. In this respect, while the formal institutional structures may be more open for purposes of dealing with specific types of challengers, they may relatively be more closed for others. Third, the concept of informal procedures and prevailing elite strategies means that the procedures and rules have evolved within a polity from the past to the present in order to deal with the challengers and to resolve conflicts. In this respect, the traditional approaches of elites as regards resolving conflicts, for instance class conflicts or conflicts between the state and church, and in turn, emerged political traditions will also shape official attitudes to new challengers.

Alliance structures, a fourth dimension of the POS, refers to “the specific balance of power relationship between actors at a given time and place, including the composition of the party system, and the relative strengths of political parties and the government” (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p. 34). In this respect, if elites are internally divided, the challengers are more likely to try to involve themselves in strategic alliances with political actors to change the balance of power.

The success of the challengers’ claims is dependent on three elements; ‘visibility, resonance, and legitimacy’. Firstly, the collective actors and their claims should be visible in the public arena. However, many claims may not be reported by the media, or attract little attention. Secondly, the claims of challengers should resonate with and reach other actors. If the claims have become publicly visible, but no one reacts to them, nothing will change in the political arena. Thirdly, even though the claims have achieved
these two goals, the challengers will not succeed if their claims have not become a legitimate contention. Thus, collective actors and their claims should be legitimized publicly by “resonating positively in the reactions of a significant number of other actors, who are willing to declare at least partial support by acknowledging that something has to be done about the problem” (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p. 37).

Ireland (1994) (as cited in Però & Solomos, 2010) applied the POS approach, which had been previously developed for explaining the emergence of social movements, to the immigration field. Ireland’s study made the POS salient in this field. Ireland examined the differences in the political involvements of the same ethnic groups in different institutional contexts and stressed the impact of institutional settings of states on the mobilization of immigrants. After Ireland’s study, other scholars increasingly applied the POS approach to examine the collective actions of immigrants (Però, 2008).

Koopmans & Statham (2000) argued that conceptions of citizenship can also be considered as a theme in regards to all aspects of traditional POS approaches. This is because, first of all, they are a part of the national cleavage structure. If the conception of the nation is a contested issue in a country, there will be greater conflicts about the issue of citizenship. In addition, citizenship as a formal institutional dimension has a key role to play in accessing the political system of a country. If the naturalization process is easier in a country, immigrants will be more influential in the political decisions of that country in comparison to other countries where the naturalization process is more difficult for the immigrants. Moreover, citizenship configurations also reflect prevailing elite strategies for coping with societal conflicts. For example, the Dutch history of pillarization has resulted in the extension of existing rights to ethnic minorities. Thus,
ethnic minorities have had an opportunity to make claims for their cultural rights and their organizations have been officially recognized by the Dutch state. Finally, controversies over citizenship have played a key role in the determination of alliance structures in the context of migration politics. According to Koopmans & Statham (2000):

Elite divisions and shifting alignments over these issues will particularly enhance the opportunities for challengers from below if such controversies are not limited to more or less technical discussions of immigration control and minority integration, but become framed in terms of the ‘deep’ cultural idioms of citizenship and nationhood. (pp. 38-39)

In this context, the topic of citizenship has long been discussed in the literature. Kastoryano (2002) defined citizenship as “the individual’s belonging to a political community” (p.142). Citizenship embodies cultural, political, and social rights and duties. However, he asserted that the key difference between German and French models stem from citizenship laws, which are “regulating citizenship and affecting both the means of participation” (p.143), as well as the agents’ strategies. In this respect, one can claim that states are the only power that can set the limits of citizenship and citizenship reorganization and permit identities to be negotiated.

Benhabib (2004) described national citizenship as the regulated form of membership of the modern nation state, and stressed that national citizenship has increasingly been disaggregated in the globalization age. As a result of disaggregation, new modalities of citizenship have emerged. Disaggregated citizenship has enabled immigrants to keep and establish multiple attachments and networks within receiving and transnational contexts. However, she argues that these networks can contribute towards democratic citizenship through loyalty to and engagement with representative
institutions. Otherwise, they may enhance extremism. In addition, the transformation of citizenship regimes such as the shift from one of cultural identity to one of residency indicates that cosmopolitan norms have been expanding, and in turn, different cultures and norms have increasingly been sharing the same context.

Moreover, Duyvendak (2011) emphasized the fact that the citizens in a country may have different ethnic and cultural backgrounds in the contemporary world. Therefore, the assumption of national citizenship as mono-cultural entity may not be true in all cases today. As a result of having transnational roots, immigrants may not feel attached to only one country. In this paradox, the ‘native’ culture has increasingly been seen as being under threat, and new ‘feeling rules’ have been applied to citizenship requirements. A feeling of belonging and attachment is expected from newcomers. Therefore, dual citizenship has been perceived as demonstrating a lack of loyalty to the host country because these actions represent the immigrants’ feelings.

Gerdes and Faist (2007) focused on dual citizenship and argued that dual citizenship policies have been shaped not only by national political parties, but also by the institutional structures of political systems. They emphasized the fact that dual citizenship has become an obstacle and has been regarded as a challenge to national unity. In terms of individual rights, the proponents of dual citizenship have made the equality principle more salient. On the other hand, the opponents of that principle have claimed that it gives special privileges to specific groups such as accessing citizenship rights in two states. In addition, the proponents of dual citizenship support their claims by stressing the fact that citizenship rights can serve as a facilitator of integration for immigrants. On the contrary, the opponents of dual citizenship assert that immigrants
should first integrate in order to gain citizenship rights. They also argued that institutional opportunity structures have a key role to play in shaping citizenship legislation that will either accept or reject dual citizenship.

Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) noted two dimensions of citizenship; the individual equality dimension and the cultural difference dimension. The individual equality dimension of citizenship, emphasizes that “every legal resident in state’s territory has access to equal citizenship rights, regardless of his or her race, ethnicity, or cultural background” (p. 34), and these three aspects differentiate the conception of each state’s citizenship regimes. As regards the second dimension of citizenship, the cultural difference dimension, which “concerns differential rights based on group membership” (p. 51), this should be distinguished from the assimilation and multicultural positions. While the first viewpoint is against the implementation of poly-ethnic rights, the latter supports these rights in most cases. The universalist position is the third approach and emphasizes that “the state must stick to a position of strict nationality in relation to the cultural and religious practices of its citizens, neither privileging the culture of dominant ethnic or religious groups nor extending rights or exemptions from duties to minority groups” (p. 51). This position differentiates the cultural and religious practices of groups outside of public institutions and within public institutions.

Koopmans et al. (2005) also argued that the cross-national differences in the context of issues of ethnic relations and immigration are based on variations in the conceptions of national identity and citizenship, and integration policies specific to each nation. These policies and conceptions constitute not only discursive and institutional opportunities, but also constitute constraints for collective actors. From the institutional
point of view, they are of importance for the determination of immigrants’ rights, duties, resources, and institutional opportunities.

IV. Current Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

The traditional approach to the POS to immigrant mobilization was criticized by several scholars (such as Garapich (2008), Koopmans et al. (2005), and Però (2008)). Koopmans et al. (2005) criticized the traditional political opportunity structure approach by stressing three related inherent shortcomings. The first was the one-sided approach of traditional POS as regards institutional opportunities. In addition, there was little emphasis on discursive opportunities and constraints. Institutional opportunities determine the chances of collective actors attaining new advantages and “the likelihood of repression and facilitation from the side of power holders” (p. 19). Discursive opportunities determine the likelihood of collective actors and demands to “gain visibility in the mass media, to resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse” (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 19, original in emphasis).

Their second criticism focused on the tendency to address POS too generally, and a lack of focus on the characteristics of the collective actors and contexts. It is not possible to defend a “one-size-fits-all approach”. In this respect, the conditions that result in membership in the political community for immigrants are of significance. The impact of POS on claims making is both direct and indirect. The ability to access citizenship has a direct impact on immigrants’ claims making. Thus, immigrants can have more opportunities for positive hearings of their demands as voters and the legitimacy of their
demands can be increased. In terms of its indirect impact, the POS can play an important role in immigrants’ aims, identities, and relations with the wider society.

The third shortcoming of the POS perspective that Koopmans et al. (2005) argued is its insufficient emphasis on the dynamic and interactive dimensions of contentious politics. The new collective actors have always been confronted with the established actors in the field on the grounds of alliances, opposition, or competition. In this respect, the relations between antiracist and extreme right wing movements have a role to play in immigrant mobilization. In addition, political contention can lead to a shift in the nature of the POS.

Garapich (2008) also pointed out the limitation of the POS approach by stressing that the POS approach “concentrates on what tools are available, not why they are used by some people and not by others”. A key point is that the situational and dynamic construction and the relational features of national and ethnic identities have great importance. By considering this point, “the political functions of symbols, myths, nationalistic narratives, and dialectics of inclusion and exclusion associated with the emergence of transnational citizenship” can be reassessed (Garapich, 2008, p. 141). Thus, in terms of European transnational citizenship, the tensions between old and emerging forms of citizenship are negotiated not only between immigrant groups and the host society, but also within ethnic communities themselves. Therefore, an ethnic group should be assumed to be heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous.

Moreover, Però (2008) stressed the limitations of the POS when considering the diversity and changing nature of mobilization of immigrants in stable contexts. He also
criticized the narrow definition of the POS. Accordingly, not only institutional and policy environment factors of the host society that warrant consideration, but also the collective actions of migrants should be considered in the POS. In addition, the POS approach is insufficient for explaining the collective actions of immigrants. In this respect, the backgrounds, values, experiences, social capital, networks of immigrants, and their living conditions which may be characterized by exclusion, marginalization, etc., should be taken into account in migrant mobilization studies. In this respect, Però (2008) suggested that there should be “a rethinking in more comprehensive, loose, actor-oriented and interactive terms” (pp. 120-122).

As a response to criticisms of the POS approach, several researchers have begun to point out other dimensions to the POS approach. Discursive, specific, and perceived opportunities, and changes from conditions to mechanisms can be considered to be part of the current perspective. Perceived opportunities indicate that in order to seize an opportunity it must be perceived. If an existing opportunity is ignored or not perceived by the challengers, this cannot be an opportunity for addressing these opportunities. In addition, in the current POS approach, the mechanisms and processes that underlie mobilization have been focused on rather than the conditions that prevent mobilization. Thus, cognitive, relational, and environmental mechanisms have become salient (Giugni, 2009).

In this respect, one can claim that in addition to the traditional POS, civil society, pro-migrant organizations, churches, networks, and unions play a crucial role in current POS approaches. Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009) focused on the role of these structures. In this context, advocacy groups are the facilitators for immigrants and
provide grounds for naturalization and claims making. Political parties concentrate on naturalized immigrants and try to obtain their votes. Labor unions, schools, and religious and civic organizations try to enhance the immigrants’ civic participation. Home-country organizations may also foster political incorporation into the host country. Government agencies may provide some relevant resources for immigrants to participate in political activities, and may help them become acclimated. In addition, Però (2008) focused on Latin Americans’ mobilization in London and has found that the POS has been effective in fostering their mobilization and the presence of trade unions has played an additional role in Latin Americans mobilization around class. He also concentrated on describing a social networks approach to migrant mobilization and argued that the migration process and migrant networks in both the home and host countries, plus transnational flows affected migrants’ claims making and social movement participation. In a similar vein, Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt (2010) found social networks and media can affect the extent of political participation by immigrants. However, social networks have a stronger affect than media in this regards.

Moreover, Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio, and Montoya (2009) conducted a study of the mobilization that occurs in new immigrant destinations by focusing on 2006 immigrant-rights protests in the USA. They found that the use of new communication devices and information technology, changes in local politics, and a growing migrant civil society as well as newly emerging POS approaches have affected the migrant mobilization process in new immigrant destinations such as Atlanta, Omaha, Charlotte, etc. In addition, in another study that focuses on 2006 immigrant-rights protests in the USA, Cordero-Guzmán, Martin, Quiroz-Becerra, and Theodore (2008) argued that these
demonstrations should be seen “the result of long-standing cooperative efforts and networks of immigrant-serving nonprofit organizations” (p. 598) such as social services providers, community based organizations, and advocacy groups. These organizations have cooperated by holding advocacy campaigns and establishing networks, and their activities have resulted in the internalization of participation in civic and political activities by immigrants. For example, the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) has about 80 member groups, including religious groups, unions, educational institutions, and community organizations, and has advocated for immigrants’ rights in the Chicago region. In addition, umbrella organizations that connect several organizations which have common goals and ‘highly networked lead organizations’ have been shown to play a significant role in the mobilization of immigrants.

Furthermore, Fetzer and Soper (2005) focused on Muslims’ demands in several European countries. They argued that the inherited church-state structures in Germany, France, and Britain are varied, and the public policies concerning the accommodation of Muslims’ demands in these countries has been affected by these structures. In Britain, the existence of church’s close link with public policy and politics has provided an opportunity for Muslims to make claims about the recognition of their religious practices and to demand a more public role for religion. On the other hand, Muslims in France have difficulties making arguments for the accommodation of their religious practices due to the strict separation between the state and church that exists. In Germany, this relationship is complex and the state can act in favor of any particular religion although
the church and state are separated from each other. For common purposes, church and state can work closely together.

**B. Theories Focusing on Migrant Characteristics**

The assimilation and integration approaches to immigration have focused on several variables that are related to the characteristics of immigrants. Schneider and Crul (2010) differentiated these two terms as follows. They suggested, the “term *assimilation* used linguistically implies a referent to which immigrants and/or their offspring can become similar”, while the “term ‘integration’ includes the *structural* aspects of incorporation into society, especially with regard to educational achievements and access to labor market”; however, “especially with regard to cultural aspects the term *integration* actually means something pretty similar to *assimilation*” (Schneider & Crul, 2010, pp. 1144-1145, original in emphasis). In addition, Brubaker (2001) differentiated the two key meanings of assimilation; one of them was defined as becoming similar, and the other was defined as complete absorption. Vermeulen (2010) emphasized the fact that while the term assimilation has been more prevalent in the American literature, the term integration is the common term used in Europe, though there is currently a minor difference between them.

In the classical assimilation view, it is assumed that there is a natural process by which diverse ethnic groups come to share a common culture and to gain equal access to the opportunity structure of society; that this process consists of gradually deserting old cultural and behavioral patterns in favor of new one. (Zhou, 1997, p. 976)
As well, the distinctive ethnic characteristics such as native language, culture, and ethnic enclaves constitute a constraint to assimilation. However, as new generations of immigrants arrive, the ethnic barriers that impact negatively on assimilation will be reduced and the immigrants will be more similar to people in the host society. Thus, Zhou stressed that this process is determined by language skills, length of stay, the level of exposure to host culture, education, employment, etc. In this respect, scholars have employed several measures to examine immigrant assimilation. These measures are socio-economic status, language assimilation, spatial concentration, and intermarriage (Waters & Jiménez, 2005, p. 108).

However, Zhou (1997) argued that several anomalies such as the “persistent ethnic differences across generations”, “divergent rather than convergent outcomes” in economic attainment, and levels of schooling across generations contradict with the classical view of assimilation. In this respect, segmented assimilation theory has tried to fill the gap of the classical straight-line assimilation approach. In terms of American society, segmented assimilation theory tries to explain “what determines into which segment of American society a particular immigrant group may assimilate” considering three possible patterns; the upward mobility pattern (integration into middle class), the downward mobility pattern (integration into underclass), and “economic integration into middle-class America with lagged acculturation and deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values solidarity” (Zhou, 1997, p. 984). Determinants of immigrant adaptation may occur at the individual-level or at the contextual level. Education, birth place, the length of stay, language proficiency, age upon arrival, and other factors related to exposure to the host society are individual level factors.
Socioeconomic background, race, and place of residence are among the structural factors. The segmented assimilation theory focuses on the interaction between these individual and contextual level factors. In terms of the cultural characteristics of immigrants, the segmented assimilation approach emphasizes that “individual and structural factors are intertwined with immigrant culture and predisposed group characteristics to shape the fates of immigrants and their offspring” (Zhou, 1997, p. 993). These cultural characteristics of immigrants may be seen as barriers or facilitators to adaptation to the host society. In addition, the approval by a larger society of the immigrant culture could make this culture an advantageous one, whereas the immigrants could be viewed as having a deficient culture and could thus be ‘stigmatized’. Vermeulen (2010) asserted that the segmented assimilation theory can be applied to the European context; however, it is not clear “how much of the cross-national differences in the ways immigrants and their children integrate can be explained by it” (p. 1226).

Morawska (2003) argued that transnational engagement and the assimilation of immigrants are concurrent processes and Morawska’s research thus focused on different constellations of circumstances that produce assimilation-transnationalism combinations. After examining these combinations, she revealed about 40 factors that shape these variations. In terms of the characteristics of immigrants, she indicated several factors such as cultural and social capital, race, gender, socioeconomic status, isolation or contact with natives, number of years lived in host country, sojourn or permanent migration, level of attachment to home country, and possessions and family members in home country are all influential. She examined several cases from a socioeconomic perspective. In this respect, middle class and highly educated Asian Indian immigrants to the US tend to
sustain their transnational networks as a result of the notion of family loyalty in the Indian culture. In addition, they invest in their home country and are intensively involved in the politics of their home country. However, their transnational engagements have not become a barrier to their assimilation into the host society. Their characteristics such as socioeconomic positions and language skills have played an important role in their participation in US society. The lower-class Dominican immigrants in New York have more strong networks and are more ethnic in character, and their assimilation has been slower in comparison to middle class Asian Indian immigrants.

The networks of social relations of immigrant families consist of social control and social supports which may channel immigrants to carry out particular behaviors. In this respect, social capital is of great importance for maintaining the cultural characteristics of immigrants and accessing other opportunities in the society for them (Zhou, 1997). Tillie (2004) addressed social capital at the individual and group level. In this sense, the number of organizations, the density of their networks, and the variety of their activities determine the social capital that exists at the group level. Moreover, at the individual level, the membership of ethnic organizations enhances social capital, and thus, increases the prevailing degree of social trust, as well as political trust. As a result, the political integration of immigrants is significantly influenced by the prevailing degree of social capital.

Diani (1997) focused on the movement actors’ structural positions in social networks, and argued that the position of movement actors in a social network affects the social influence of that movement. In fact, the structural position of movement actors has usually affected the impact of movement actors as regards cultural production and
political decisions. From the social networks perspective, she saw these ties “based on sentiments of mutual trust and mutual recognition among actors involved” as ‘social capital’ (p. 130). Social capital is of significance since it establishes connections between social and political elites and movement actors. It can make elites more open to demands, and thus, can be regarded as a determinant of greater openness for the POS. In addition, if social capital is seen as locally integrated, the awareness about and trust in groups and members will be enhanced. Therefore, the mobilization of this group will be easier. Moreover, one should take into account the fact that the structural position of members among elites can be a key determinant of the effectiveness of movements or groups on a political system.

C. Theories on Mobilization

There are several approaches to the organization, mobilization, and collective actions of immigrants. First, it is widely stressed that migrant organizations have a key role to play in the mobilization of immigrants. Their role in cultural as well as political mobilization can be observed in their activities. In terms of cultural mobilization, they aim to maintain their cultural heritage and act in line with that goal. Some of their activities may take place in the political arena even if they classify these as cultural organizations. Such cultural activities may involve network building, aid collection, language training, informal socializing, gatherings and meetings, and so on (Predelli, 2008). In addition, the impact of immigrant organizations on the political participation of immigrants has been positive (Jacobs & Tillie, 2004).
Però (2008) stressed that while migrants and their organizations have played an important role in the politics of the host society, most scholars who have studied migration have viewed immigrants as objects of politics, but not subjects of politics. The reasons for not looking at immigrants as political actors have been varied; when pointing out the issue from the perspective of the receiving state, the effects of structuralist paradigms, and the lack of formal political rights of immigrants prevails. However, recently, immigrants have been considered as political actors by scholars and their activities and actions have attracted attention. In this context, not only the political opportunity structure, but also some other factors such as values and experiences have shaped the mobilization of immigrants. In addition to these factors, Però and Solomos (2010, p. 10) added a further factor: emotions and feelings of migrants, and considered this factor in migrant mobilization in order to “balance rational choice approach” and “enable more comprehensive explanations of such mobilizations.” From the identity aspect, Baubock (2007) clarified immigrants’ identity options in their contexts by categorizing the key and mixed alternatives. In terms of the basic alternatives, migrants may choose migration, assimilation, autonomy, and secession. In addition, they may act between these basic alternatives in three different ways; developing diasporic identities, majority ethnic identities, or condominium.

In order to explain migrants’ claims making, Koopmans et al. (2005) drew up an alternate model and argued that immigration patterns, the socioeconomic context, and the characteristics of immigrant groups all have a role to play in explaining immigrant mobilization; however, political opportunities and constraints in a context are more powerful for explaining such mobilization. They supported their claim by stressing that
the same ethnic group may not mobilize in the same direction in different contexts and different ethnic groups may respond similarly in the same context. In addition, they argued that three factors, ‘national citizenship regimes and integration models’, ‘collective identities of migrants’, and ‘homeland influences’ determined the claims making of immigrants.

In terms of citizenship regimes, two dimensions of citizenship were said to have different impacts on immigrants’ mobilization. From the individual dimension, accessing individual rights had a positive impact on immigrants in terms of their involvement in public debates. From the group rights perspective, granting group rights at a certain level had an encouraging role to play in the involvement of immigrants in political processes. However, they asserted that a strong emphasis on cultural differences may result in moving immigrants’ activities away from the common public arena. They also expected that immigrants were likely to make claims if a state provided opportunities for them. In addition, the policies of the sending country as regards its emigrants and the political situation in the home country such as ethnic conflicts and civil war etc., can play a key role in the process of any migrants’ mobilization. The collective identities of migrants such as their religion, ethnic identity, race, the level of attachment to home country are the last factor to consider. These identities are influenced by the other two factors mentioned above, and thus, new categories of identification may emerge in any particular receiving context. These categories may be defined as foreigner, ethnic minority, and immigrant categories. In addition, these diverse forms of identification may be revised due to the policies of the receiving state which supports some migrant identities, while discouraging others. For instance, immigrants may see themselves as German, Dutch,
Muslim, or black among the other identifications they bring along to the new country. In this context, the status categories offered by the policies of receiving country, race, religion, and ethnicity are four main types with which immigrants may identify themselves. (Koopmans et al., 2005)

In addition, Statham et al. (2005) focused on the dimensions of group demands by addressing those of Muslims in the Netherlands, France, and the UK. They asserted that exceptional, parity, and collective identities are the main types of group demands. The first two types represent demands for rights, and the last type is used for purposes of describing the mobilization of the collective identity of groups in the public arena. The exceptional type refers specifically to new or exclusive group rights for migrants. The ‘parity’ type refers to demands for equal treatment with other minority groups or religions which have already been given special privileges in their new contexts.

From the perspective of ‘motivational impetus’, group demands can be categorized as proactive and reactive. Proactive group demands are not directly related to actions of the host society or the state. On the other hand, the reactive form of group demands is a response to the actions of the state and host society. In addition, the types of action that occur can be categorized as demonstrative, confrontational, and violent forms. Moreover, the overall strategic orientation of claims making may be dissociative or acculturative. When all dimensions of groups’ demands are considered together, one can expect that exceptional demands are dissociative and also reactive. On the other hand, parity rights’ demands tend to be more acculturative since these demands aim to adopt the existing political frameworks of the receiving context (Statham et al., 2005).
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) argued that three types of dynamics affect the civic and political incorporation of immigrants. These are place, group, and organizational types. First, the characteristics of place are of importance for affecting the organization of immigrants. The size of cities, the proportion of immigrants living in a place, “the types of formal institutional arrangements and informal norms” (p. 24) that affect interactions between civic groups and governments, civic and political culture, and political institutional structure (electoral and parliamentary systems, federalism, etc.) in a place play a key role in the political and civic engagements of immigrants.

Second, the immigrants’ national origin can be a factor that explains the variations that arise among the extent of any civic and/or political engagement. Other common attributes such as culture, language, legal and socioeconomic status, discrimination histories, and residency length will also influence engagement. For example, it is expected that more stable legal status and higher socioeconomic status will result in stronger immigrant organizations. While the visibility and viability of migrant organizations and their orientation toward transnational versus domestic issues have been influenced by “the recency of immigration and the mix of immigrant generations within an ethnic group” (Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad, 2008, p. 25), the relationship between civic and political engagement and the groups’ resources are complicated, and can be changeable as a result of organizational forms, place, political institutions, culture, and so on. In addition, religion, as a group resource, may provide an opportunity or an obstacle within a context. If a group’s religious identity and mainstream religious identity in a context are the same or coherent, the group will easily develop a relationship with the host society. Not only other faith traditions that are largely ethnically defined and not
“easily organized in formal houses of worship” (p. 26), but also religions that are seen as problematic have resulted in greater assimilation problems within the receiving context. In addition, religious discrimination, the continuous image of foreignness, and the perception of the model minority affects the political and civic presence of relevant immigrant groups.

The last dynamic that influences the civic and political engagement of immigrants is organization type. The motivating goal (religious, social, cultural etc.), the resources, and the degree of institutionalization (formal, informal, non-profit etc.) that exist also affect the civic and political mobilization of immigrants. In addition, “the internal dynamics of recruitment (recruitment to leadership and of member), decision making, and organizing, and the external dynamics of cooperation and forming coalitions” (Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad, 2008, p. 27) should be considered in discussing the issue of organization type.

Andersen (2008) emphasized three aspects of place that can form opportunities for immigrants’ political participation. The first aspect is the geographical location of a city. If a city is isolated and small, state level organizations in that city may be reluctant to act and this can be considered a disadvantage for the political activities of the immigrant. In addition, refugee resettlement centers may be advantageous for promoting the political incorporation of immigrants. The refugees in these areas often receive governmental supports, and several organizations may play an active role thereby providing housing and resettlement assistance, and job placement assistance, etc. These activities help the building of immigrant communities. Moreover, political connections are another important dimension that influences immigration processes. If a group
develops useful networks with well-positioned and larger groups and organizations, the organizational capacity within the immigrant community will be enhanced.

Martiniello (2009) classified the legal political participation and mobilization of immigrants according to two dimensions, the “geographical-political level of action and the contrast between state and nonstate politics” (p. 38). In terms of state politics, he noted three different forms of ethnic participation: electoral, consultative, and parliamentary politics. In terms of nonstate politics, involvement in union politics, political parties, and other pressure groups as well as direct ethnic community mobilization are the four venues of mobilization that influence the political participation of immigrants.

Brettell (2008) focused on the political mobilization of immigrants through the internet. He stressed that, in the globalization process, the internet has become a space for political mobilization that has enabled the establishment of “a virtual coalition of immigrants who have been empowered by their online contacts to formulate a political strategy” (p. 241). Even though the immigrant cannot vote, they can participate in civic and political activities by using the internet as a means of communication.

Furthermore, migrants’ claims making has a transnational dimension. In this respect, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguished three types of transnational claims making processes. The first was ‘transnational homeland politics’ in which “migrants make claims in the country of settlement, but these refer in all other respects to the country of origin” (p. 126). In the second type, the claims are targeted towards the country of origin: however, migrants use political opportunities and organizational networks in their
country of settlement to carry these out. In the last type, the reverse structure of the second type prevails, and the interests of migrants are focused on the country of settlement, and to that end, migrant groups use their “homeland-based organizational resources and opportunities” (p. 127).

Representing the last theoretical framework that describes the political incorporation of immigrants, Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009) proposed a very broad model. In this model, they addressed “individuals as well as groups, attitudes and beliefs as well as interests, processes as well as outcomes, exclusion as well as inclusion, and change caused by immigrants’ action as well as changes in those actions” (pp. 16-17). As such, the conditions in the immigrant receiving country affect the political incorporation of immigrants. At the individual level, states may classify the legal standing of immigrants as having legal permanent residence, legal temporary residence, short-term stay, political exceptionalism, and legal entry status (Schuck, 2009). At the group level, such categorizations may include citizenship laws; however, in most states, these no longer exist as a result of the commitment of states to liberal universalism. In each state, there are hence several conditions for citizenship, and a few countries grant non-citizens the right to vote in local elections (Hochschild & Mollenkopf, 2009).

In this context, according to Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009), the entry into the host country is the first step towards political incorporation; however, it is not sufficient. The characteristics of individuals and groups and political actors, practices, and institutions in the host country affect their (non)entry into the political arena. First, the legal immigration status of an individual plays an important role in his or her ability to enter the political space. In addition, several distinctive characteristics “such as
nationality, parents’ immigration status, duration of stay, date of entry, age of entry, the level of democratization of the home country, and perceptions of nativist threat” (p. 18) as well as the values and attitudes of immigrants should be taken into account in the context of this issue. For example, a perception of discrimination may be a push factor for an immigrant as far as entering or leaving the political arena. Second, group characteristics are another significant element influencing this issue. Groups from former colonies or from neighbor countries may also act differently when considering other groups. Additionally, the actual and perceived size of the group and a group’s density in a place can have an impact on the ability of group members to engage in the political space. “Large, spatially concentrated groups, as long as they are not isolated, have more political resources and internal channels of communication than do small groups thinly scattered among the native-born or people of other nationalities” (p. 19).

Third, political actors who are already politically active in the host society can mobilize immigrants to enter the political arena. This may affect how immigrants become incorporated into the political space. Advocacy groups, political parties, immigrant organizations, labor unions, and government agencies are all players in this arena. Fourth, in the context of the POS, political institutions can act as facilitators or constraints for immigrants in the political arena. The POS affects not only political actors, but also particularly affects immigrants. The requirements for granting citizenship or membership in a party, the electoral structure, the ease of accessing the judicial system, the language and residency requirements for political participation, etc. all play a key role in how immigrants manage their resources and how others position themselves.
Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009) further stressed that, after entering into the political arena, the next step for immigrants is their involvement in the political arena. This can take place through winning an elective office, establishing alliances and coalitions by using resources, organizing protests in favor of the immigrants’ interests, attaining public sector jobs and appointive offices, and so on. As another step, the responsiveness of the political system is of importance. Immigrants may have several interests, claims, values, norms, etc. and may enter the political arena in order to achieve their goals. “One measure of successful incorporation is the promulgation and implementation of policies to meet a reasonable share of these goals” (p. 23). To that end, it is expected that policy changes in several areas such as education, regulations, etc. or new policies to respond to immigrants’ values will be among these changes.

According to Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009), other than policy changes, changes in political institutions and practices will also be significant factors that affect the political incorporation of immigrants. These changes, of course, affect the political opportunity structure. There may also be a variety of changes such as changes in citizenship requirements and laws, the revision of political practices, etc. In terms of religious rights and values, the practices of a polity may change as well. For example, religious holidays of immigrants may be accepted as official holidays, and wearing headscarves in schools, offices, etc. may be recognized as a right. However, the impact of polity is a two-way street. In a society, immigrants may not only change the polity, but may also be changed by the polity. Thus, their norms and values may be reshaped along with these changes. They may increasingly be involved in the politics of the host country while moving away from the politics of the home country.
However, incorporation is not linear and the continuum of the process of incorporation may not be guaranteed. The immigrants may also choose not to incorporate, or they may be intentionally excluded from political incorporation. First, they may not (or illegally) enter into a host country, thus they cannot obtain citizenship rights. They may be isolated from the political arena as a result of segregation, and xenophobic public opinions. In addition, they may keep away from political incorporation themselves. Many factors may explain such non-incorporation such as feeling hostile towards the host society, attempting to try to keep their culture unchanged, or attempts to reject or misunderstand Western democracy, etc. Moreover, the immigrants may seek incorporation, but they may face an insufficient representation problem and remain powerless. Furthermore, in the final stages of incorporation, policies may not be changed in response to the immigrants’ desires. The civic society itself, plus its state agencies, interest groups, etc. may refuse to implement such changes. Moreover, there may be “hostile legislation, judicial decisions, agency treatment, or advocacy group protests” (Hochschild & Mollenkopf, 2009, p. 26). Thus, immigrants may respond to these barriers by carrying out hostile actions and by non-incorporation actions, and even radicalization might be expected though they are completely involved in the political realm (Hochschild & Mollenkopf, 2009).

D. Traditional Assumptions

When the mobilization of Muslims in Europe has been examined, it can be seen that two main trends have traditionally been assumed. The first trend involves a retreat from the host society, and the second is the increasing involvement in society. There may also be a mixture of these trends.
In the first trend, perceived discrimination and securitization may lead to people leaving the political arena, and retreating from mainstream society, as well as deidentification from their national identity, and alienation, which, in turn, may preclude the integration of immigrants. The outcomes of this process may be violence, extremism, radicalization, and the formation of an ‘enemy within’, a ‘parallel society’, and an underclass. Sinno (2009) asserted that Muslims face several problems such as access to citizenship, racism, Islamophobia, and discrimination in their various contexts, and Muslims have responded to these problems in several ways. Some have advocated for “self-empowerment that sometimes touches on separatism, confrontational political activism, and even the use of violence” (pp. 4-5). Cesari (2007) affirmed that Muslims may react towards dominant discourses and politics by avoidance or separation from the non-Muslim environment. Additionally, Klausen (2006) stressed that “restrictive access to naturalization is a barrier to immigrant participation in mainstream political organizations” (p. 3). In this respect, the worst outcome of this process is one “of ghettoized, young, and embittered Muslims becoming an irreconcilable part of society with their own separate and parallel institutions” (Sinno, 2009, p. 5).

However, perceived discrimination and securitization may alternatively lead to people entering the political arena, feeling a need to be more organized, and thus, immigrants are likely to be more proactively mobilized to promote their causes. In this context, some Muslims have established organizations to engage in institutional activities in their prevailing contexts (Sinno, 2009). In addition, Cesari (2007) stressed the fact that changes have occurred among the Muslims in Europe by touching on the fact of the “acculturation of Islamic references to a secularized context” (p. 56). Cesari did this by
pointing out the emergence of a new generation of Muslim leaders and third and fourth generation Muslims who do not carry the same national and ethnic identifications as the first generation. Klausen (2006) also evaluated the willingness and activities of Muslims towards integration into European society and concluded that these were a way of seeking reforms that make practicing their faith and being European possible. In this sense, according to Sinno (2009), the best outcome of this process is

of Western Muslims integrating effectively into their societies but feeling that their identity, lifestyle, and beliefs are welcomed and appreciated. They would enrich the cultures of their countries, consolidate their democratic institutions, help invigorate their economies, and stabilize declining European populations without engendering feelings of xenophobia or threat. (p. 5)

In addition to these trends, Berry’s (1997) acculturation model may provide possible directions that Muslims in Europe can follow in their contexts. In the acculturation framework, there are different levels of strategies; integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. In the integration option, immigrants wish to maintain their cultural identity and participate in the society. In the assimilation strategy, immigrants interact with natives, but they are not motivated to keep their culture. In the separation case, the maintenance of cultural values is important for immigrants, but they do not want to interact with larger society. In the last strategy, marginalization, immigrants are interested in neither the maintenance of their culture nor interaction with others.

As argued in the introduction chapter, the securitization of the integration process results in a search for various forms of mobilization in terms of the Muslims in Europe. However, the literature is not sufficient to address different options concerning the mobilization of Muslims in Europe. There are many options in mobilization as well as
more questions than provided answers to this phenomenon. Thus, one can conclude that this issue is more complex than anticipated. Therefore, the questions raised by the diversity of mobilization should be approached from different perspectives by focusing on a specific group in two European countries since the same ethnic group may not mobilize in the same way in different contexts. In addition, each country has different conditions, backgrounds, structures, and policies. Thus, these factors in different countries affect the mobilization of immigrants that originate from the same ethnic background. In this sense, there should be a comprehensive approach to understanding this phenomenon.

3. Critical Evaluations and a Model of Immigrant Mobilization

It is clear from the theoretical explanations of migrant mobilization that immigrants may be active in their contexts and may be involved in the politics of the receiving contexts. Thus, the context is very important, and how they are treated in their contexts (both opportunities and constraints) may be the most important determinant of their mobilization efforts. In addition, immigrants have several characteristics such as legal status, language skills, education, socioeconomic status, etc. and these characteristics can also affect their mobilization activities in their contexts quite considerably. Moreover, social psychological approaches to intergroup relations enrich these aspects and enable one to assess the perceptions of immigrants in the securitization process. The theoretical explanations show that the perceptions of immigrants concerning securitization and discrimination can influence their identification, as well as their attitudes towards the host society, and their relations with out-groups. In this respect, the
predictions of Social Identity Theory and Integrated Threat Theory should also be taken into account when assessing this phenomenon.

In this sense, three factors, the characteristics and perceptions of immigrants and their contexts, are found to have an influence on the nature and objectives of their mobilization, and in turn, the forms of mobilization. Therefore, one can conclude that the evaluation of these factors (perceptions, characteristics of immigrants, and context) can serve as the most useful approach for explaining the mobilization actions of immigrants as a response to securitization. All in all, Figure-1 indicates a general model of mobilization of immigrants as a response to securitization.
Figure 1. A Model of Immigrant Mobilization as a Response to Securitization

Factors of Mobilization

- Characteristics of Immigrants
- Perceptions of Immigrants
- Context of Reception

Nature and Objectives of Mobilization

- Motives of Mobilization
- Objectives of Mobilization
- Acculturation Strategies

Forms of Mobilization

- Political Mobilization
- Non-Political Mobilization
CHAPTER V- RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. Research Approach

In order to understand the mobilization process of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands as a response to the securitization of integration, a research approach that clarifies the key components affecting the mobilization of Turkish immigrants is needed. The political opportunity structure (POS) approach has usually been applied to guide migrant mobilization studies and to explain the immigrant mobilization. However, recently, it has been pointed out that the notion of the POS approach is insufficient for addressing the diversity and the shift in the mobilization of immigrants, and thus, there should be a more comprehensive approach which includes factors such as socio-economic conditions, backgrounds, values, etc. In addition, considering the feelings of migrants will add to the approach and provide a more comprehensive way to explain such mobilizations (Però & Solomos, 2010). In this respect, three dimensions - the contexts in two countries, the characteristics and perceptions of Turkish immigrants, and the forms of mobilization- have to be considered as a whole to better understand the phenomenon.

Firstly, the contexts in both countries may be the most important dimension that affects mobilization of Turkish immigrants. As partly mentioned in the previous section, Germany and the Netherlands both have similarities but there are also differences in contexts. The key components in the context of two countries have been identified as citizenship regimes, integration policy, legislation, counter-terrorism policy and police practices, fears and prejudices towards Turkish immigrants and Islam, discrimination against Turkish immigrants, hate crimes, accommodation of Islam, the migrant
organizations, and media. Some of the factors such as right to vote, the situation of migrant organizations in the state system, and access to equal opportunities as natives have been applied to enhance the opportunity for claim making (Koopmans et al., 2005).

Secondly, the characteristics and perceptions of Turkish immigrants are another important dimension influencing this issue. The population, their legal status (citizen or foreigner), language level, education, socioeconomic status, religion, transnational ties to the home country, and social capital are key influential characteristics of Turkish immigrants. In addition, considering their perceptions and feelings can provide a more comprehensive explanation of the mobilization of Turkish immigrants. In this respect, the predictions of Social Identity Theory and Integrated Threat Theory provide some insightful explanations for the nature and objectives of their mobilization.

Forms of mobilization will constitute the last dimension to be examined in this study. In this respect, the researcher will consider not only political mobilization, but also other non-political forms of mobilization such as social and cultural ones. This mobilization may be through participation in elections, or the activities of immigrant organizations and movements, or even radicalization and searching to carry out violence. In addition, the options of not to take action or retreat from society will also be taken into account. By examining these different key components, it will be possible to evaluate how differently Turkish immigrants are mobilized in Germany and the Netherlands.

2. Research Methodology and Design

This study sought to understand the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands as a response to the securitization of integration. The main
research question is whether there has been a change in the forms of mobilization among Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration. Thus, the study claims that the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands has evolved especially after 9/11 as a response to securitization.

The study followed a dynamic research process where the researcher questioned and collected all the pieces of evidence and pieced them together appropriately. A dynamic research process provides an opportunity to evaluate the research question at each research stage which varies from theory and conceptualization to reporting the findings (Ackerly & True, 2010).

Fonow and Cook (2005, p. 214) stated that “researchers must become more aware of the rationale for the selection of methods and of those methods’ strengths and weaknesses in studying specific settings and topics.” This study required a mixed methodology approach due to the complex social and political environment of each subject analyzed. Mixed research methodology involves both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

Observations and interviews were the primary sources of data collection in the qualitative approach. An interview is a tool for collecting data through producing oral histories, and an appropriate method for answering many research questions. Observation is a form of data collection which specifically utilized by ethnographical studies (Ackerly & True, 2010). While observation is a primary method for gathering information, a participant observer can gather data from different sources that are readily available in
many field settings (Jorgensen, 1989). Participant observation is a requirement for fostering a deep understanding of any phenomenon, and reaching the subject participants. In sum, participant observation and in-depth interviews are crucial for understanding the context and data collection. This approach is a valid form of knowledge acquisition (Ackerly & True, 2010).

Besides interviews and observations, some other complementary sources were used to support the research. Secondary sources for this study were the EU and governmental reports and data, relevant scholarly, peer-reviewed books and articles, magazines, newspapers and documents. First, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) reports and data related to religion based discrimination were important in this regard. After 1999, the Agency published annual reports which include the detailed country based data regarding hate crimes and discrimination rates by ethnicity and religion. In addition, it has monitored human rights violations in the EU countries and conducted several research studies regarding these issues. Moreover, the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Surveys (EU-MIDIS) provide relevant data collected from selected ethnic minority and the immigrants who are resident in the EU Member States. In addition, Eurostat and statistical offices house several country based data reports regarding Germany and the Netherlands. Finally, population and political representation data supplemented the primary resources of the present study via quantitative methods.

A. Sampling

The population was “all those cases to which the research question applies”
(Ackerly & True, 2010, p. 145). In this respect, the population of the study was constituted by Turkish immigrants living in the Netherlands and Germany. Sampling was used to select subject participants in order to collect data.

To this end, the researcher employed purposive sampling. The rationale for purposive sampling is that this can enable the selection of ‘information-rich cases’ for purposes of acquiring a better understanding about the issue in question (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). Therefore, the study sought selected participants who were representative of Turkish organizations and communities and political party members with Turkish origin in the Netherlands and Germany. It was felt they could provide relevant information about the Turkish community in Germany and the Netherlands and their mobilization approaches.

The subjects’ organizations were largely religious and cultural in nature since their activities were believed to be strongly related to the dissertation topic. Additionally, it was felt important to carry out a comprehensive approach to examining the issues of Turkish immigrant groups living in Germany and the Netherlands. In this sense, since it was not possible to include all sections of the Turkish community in both countries, the largest and most influential organizations and communities were selected by searching the literature. In Germany and the Netherlands, the organizational structures of Turkish community are similar. The Suleymanli, Diyanet, Milli Gorus, Alevi, and Gulen Communities are the largest and most influential communities in both countries (Yükleyen, 2012). In addition to the organizations of these communities, nationalistic (e.g. Nationalist Action Party) and secularist (e.g. Social Democratic and left-wing) organizations were included in the study. By doing so, representatives of the majority of
Turkish immigrants in both countries were selected to respond to the issues addressed by the study. The list of Turkish organizations whose representatives participated in the study is presented in Appendix 1.

Additionally, the researcher reached political party members with Turkish origin through the representatives and other political party members who had a Turkish origin. The investigator aimed to reach representative political party members in the diverse political parties as far as was possible. As a result, in the Netherlands, the political party members from CDA, VVD, and PvdA, and in Germany, the political party members from CDU, The Greens, and BIG were included in the study. The positions of party members in political parties were varied such as parliamentarian, deputy mayor, the member of city council, the leader of a political party in a city, and so on. The researcher also realized that some of the representatives of organizations also actively participated in several political parties before they were promoted to their current positions. Thus, this provided an enriching dimension to the study.

The total numbers of subject participants were 27; 14 from the Netherlands and 13 from Germany (Table-1). While most relevant positions were occupied by men, the study aimed to include female participants. As a result, a total of 4 female subject participants (1 from the Netherlands, 3 from Germany) were included in the study.

Table 1. The Position of Subject Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of Organizations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Members</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, as a requirement for this study, the subject participants identified themselves as belonging to the Turkish minority in the Netherlands and Germany. Furthermore, in order to be able to evaluate the evolution of mobilization before and after 9/11, the investigator included subject participants living in one of these countries since at least 2000.

**B. Data Collection**

Several data collection methods such as conducting an oral history, carrying out observations, interviews, and surveys can be used in this process (Ackerly & True, 2010). The study employed observations and interviews as methods for collecting data. Participation in the research and answering any question of the interview depended on the participant’s consent.

In this context, the data collection process was carried out by visiting the Netherlands and Germany. First, the investigator traveled to the Netherlands and contacted or visited the relevant Turkish organizations that had been previously selected. While reaching the largest organizations which are organized in the forms of federation or confederation was the first priority, the researcher could not reach some of them. Some of the representatives refused to participate in the research and some of them were not available at that time. In that case, smaller organizations, which were under the umbrella of relevant organization and close to the place where the investigator stayed, were targeted. The investigator conducted in-depth and semi-structured face-to-face interviews
with the subject participants. The average length of an interview was about one hour. The prepared interview protocol can be found in Appendix 2.

In addition, the observation process is very crucial for supplementing the interviews. Towards that aim, where possible, the investigator carried out observations in relevant organizations, participated in their activities (e.g. fast breaking events, Friday prayers, and the Teravih prayer which is an optional prayer in the month of Ramadan), and found opportunities for making informal conversations with the members of Turkish community in these settings. The experiences about the study (e.g. the structure of organizations, the general thoughts of people about securitization and discrimination) were noted in the form of field notes for further analysis. Finally, the same process was applied in Germany in order to be able to compare the similarities and differences that existed in Germany and the Netherlands.

Most of the interviews were conducted in the relevant organizations or the offices of political party members. In some circumstances, the interviews were conducted in public places such as cafés and restaurants. Before starting interviews, the investigator asked the consent of subject participants about recording their voices. All participants accepted they would have their voices recorded in a digital recording device. The researcher kept these voice recordings in an encrypted storage device in order to prevent it from being accessed by unauthorized persons. For providing confidentiality of information, the researcher kept the research data in a secure location and limited the access of persons to it. In order to mask the identity of participants in the study, they were given a seven digit unique code. The first two digits indicated the country of participants (NL for the Netherlands and DE for Germany). The next digits represented the position
of participants (ORG for the representatives of Turkish organization and PPM for political party members). Finally the last two digits indicated the unique number of the respondent from 01 to 10.

C. Analysis

To analyze the data, there are several techniques such as providing a rich description, using illustrations, triangulation, comparisons, contextualization, and counterfactual logic, eliminating possible counter-arguments, qualifications, casual inferences, and writing (Ackerly & True, 2010). Comparison is the mode of analysis used in the present study. This technique provided an opportunity to evaluate the similarities and differences surrounding the research question. Exploring the differences between the cases was used to potentially help us to analyze critical elements that we seek to understand more ably (Ackerly & True, 2010). Therefore, a comparison model designed to analyze and compare the differences and similarities between the Netherlands and Germany considering 9/11 as the cut off period was used. Additionally, the factors, nature, and objectives of mobilization are included in the comparison model in this regards.
NVivo 10 software, which facilitates qualitative analysis, was used for analyzing the data. This program provided the researcher with an opportunity to sort, classify, and examine the data. The first step in data analysis is documentation which is important in the research since “it provides a way of developing and outlining the analytic process and it encourages ongoing conceptualizing and strategizing about the text” (Schutt, 2011, p. 326). To that aim, the investigator transcribed all interviews and logged field notes into the computer through word processing software, then, imported these documents to the NVivo 10 software.

Then, the researcher focused on the coding and categorization of the data. Coding of the transcribed data is another important process in data analyzing because it enhances the ability of the researcher to make appropriate judgments (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). There are two main approaches to data categorization; preset and emergent categorizations. In the preset categorization, themes are identified before the categorization of data, and then data is coded according to these themes. In the second
method, emergent categorization, categories are defined after work with the data. In addition, there may be a combination of these two approaches (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). In a similar vein, several other scholars addressed this process on the grounds of inductive (data-driven) and deductive (theory-driven) coding and theme development (Boyatzis, 1998; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). In this sense, the main categories covering the research questions were defined in line with the literature review of the study. Then, the main categories were broken down into subcategories in order to provide greater differentiation between the contexts and make appropriate comparisons. However, since it was not possible to preset all subcategories, the emergent categories were defined after grouping similar codes that did not fit the existing labels. In order to prevent any potential bias and ensure the reliability and validity of the analytic process, the data was carefully re-read and re-coded.

After completing the coding and categorization, the investigator analyzed the responses of the interviewees from Germany and the Netherlands and compared them by running several queries through NVivo 10 software (e.g. the comparison of coded references in categories, the word frequency analysis). Several findings could be visualized by means of this software in order to better picture the relevant phenomena. In addition, several memos were written during the data analysis process. This assisted the researcher in classifying the codes and categories and in clarifying thoughts about the study.

Additionally, trend analyses were performed on the quantitative data in order to deeply understand the phenomena. Finally, the primary findings from the interviews and observations were triangulated with previously addressed secondary sources and findings.
from quantitative analysis. As a result, the investigator was provided with an opportunity to compare the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands as a response to the securitization of integration.

The participants’ native language was not English; therefore, the quotes from the interviews were translated into English by paying attention and trying to keep their original meaning. In this step, a native speaker of English also edited the quotes in order to provide a more accurate translation to English.

D. Strengths and Limitations

Participant observation has some strengths and weaknesses. It can cover events in real time as well as the context of the events, and can provide insightful information into the motives and behaviors of people (Yin, 2008). In addition, it can enhance the quality of the data and the quality of the interpretation of data (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010). Moreover, it can provide a rich experiential context which makes the accession of differences and unexplained facts possible. This approach can also help the researcher to review and adapt his/her theoretical approach to his or her field of study (Becker & Geer, 1957). On the other hand, these processes are time consuming and costly. Selectivity and reflectivity are some weaknesses of this approach (Yin, 2008). In this regard, the strengths and weaknesses of the participant observation process were taken into account in this study.

The insider/outsider position in research is a complex and controversial issue in the literature. While both positions in the research are legitimate and valid (Merriam et al., 2001), one of the important issues for a researcher is to examine his/her position in a
research study and the possible influence of this position on the research. Instead of emphasizing a strict insider/outsider approach to the position of a researcher in a community based research study, it is recommended researchers occupy ‘the space between’ (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009).

The present investigator had many similarities as well as many differences with the target audience. Being from Turkey, having the same language, culture, background, and so on with subject participants in Germany and the Netherlands placed the researcher in an ‘insider’ position. On the other hand, the participants were not living in Turkey, and their ways of life, status, experiences, problems, multiple identities, and so on in their contexts made the investigator an ‘outsider’. Thus, taking into account ‘the space between’, the researcher was both an outsider and an insider. In this sense, the position might be considered from the standpoint of ‘Outsider Within’. “To be an outsider within means that in spite of one's involvement/identification as an insider one can never be totally accepted by the community in question”; however, it “allows one to retain a critical perspective to understand aspects of behavior not immediately obvious to the insider” (Beoku-Betts, 1994, p. 419). In this respect, the researcher devised opportunities to observe their differences and critically evaluated their responses from a different perspective. In addition, the ability to interact with the Turkish population facilitated access to the participants and helped the investigator to conduct appropriate observations and interviews.

On the other hand, an insider position may present a limitation in terms of potential biases in a study since “researchers are only human, after all, and must rely on their own senses and process all information through their own minds” (Schutt, 2011, pp.
332-333). However, “disciplined bracketing and detailed reflection on the subjective research process, with a close awareness of one’s own personal biases and perspectives, might well reduce the potential concerns associated with insider membership” (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009, p. 59). Thus, the researcher was fully aware of his position in the research, and in order to deal with relevant limitation, he kept reflexive notes which allowed him to be constantly cognizant of his position at all stages of the research process.
CHAPTER VI - FINDINGS ON SECURITIZATION

This chapter mainly focuses on the securitization in Germany and the Netherlands and the perceptions of Turkish immigrants about the securitization of integration. Firstly, the impacts of security concerns and the perception of these impacts by Turks are emphasized. Then, the perceived discrimination by Turks in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 is elaborated. By doing so, it becomes possible to include in the study the feelings and emotions of Turks in accordance with the suggestion of Però and Solomos (2010) and to address the study’s first sub-question which is how Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands have perceived 9/11 and the securitization of integration. In this sense, this chapter constitutes a base for the next chapter which is about the mobilization of Turkish immigrants as a response to the securitization of integration.

1. Impact of Security Concerns

It was discussed in previous chapters that the Muslim population in Western states has been perceived as posing a security threat. The 9/11 terrorist attacks strengthened this perception and made it more prevalent. The difference between terrorists and Muslims has rarely been taken into account, and Islamophobia sentiments have caused Muslims in Europe to be viewed as ‘others’. Western societies have believed that Muslims have not demonstrated the willingness to integrate and extremism is rising among them (d’Appollonia, 2010). As a result, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, security driven changes in policies and legislation have been observed. The security concerns have also affected the practices of security agencies, the relations between Turkish
immigrants and native population, and in turn the perceptions of Turkish immigrants about their contexts.

A. Integration Policy

As a result of security concerns, several policies towards immigrants have been implemented in order to provide cultural homogenization. Pluralism and diversity have been increasingly criticized (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009). The Netherlands has moved away from its multiculturalist policy, and the unity of Dutch society in line with common Dutch values has gained greater significance in recent times. The persistence of socio-cultural diversity has been seen a limitation to integration, and subsequent integration policies have developed according to these concerns (Scholten, 2011). In Germany, integration efforts such as the National Integration Plan target Muslims who are resistant to integration and have different cultural values (Peter et al., 2010). In this respect, these recent integration efforts tend to focus more on attitudinal, linguistic and cultural integration than on economic, social, and political incorporation (Kaya, 2009).

The perception that the integration policies after 9/11 have especially targeted Muslims is widespread among interviewees. The policy changes were perceived as forms of “assimilation”, “rehabilitation policy”, and “discrimination”. It has been usually stressed that integration and security policies have been implemented together after 9/11. For example, five respondents from Germany criticized the transformation of the German Islam Conference (which aims to enhance the integration of Muslim immigrants in Germany) into a “security conference”. In a similar vein, a large plurality of participants believed that the Netherlands has moved away from the policies that give priority to
human rights, diversity, and social rights after 9/11, and policies have prioritized security and become more restrictive for Muslims.

B. Legislation

After 9/11, in Germany and the Netherlands, several pieces of legislation related to immigrants were enacted. These included several changes in citizenship, immigration, and counter terrorism legislation. Previously, having sufficient knowledge of the host society or basic language skills was required for the naturalization of immigrants; however, additional requirements and tests for naturalization have been introduced in both countries. The Netherlands gave up its liberal naturalization policy and adopted a more restrictive and exclusive policy after 9/11. Since the Citizenship Law of 2003, the naturalization test which includes having knowledge of the Dutch language, society and politics has become compulsory (Koopmans et al., 2005). Although the German Citizenship Law of 2000 makes German citizenship easier for immigrants, a naturalization test which assesses the applicants’ knowledge of the German legal system and society was introduced after 1 September, 2008, as in the Netherlands (Diez & Squire, 2008; Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011).

The first country in the EU which came up with the idea that integration should start in the immigrant sending country before immigrants arrive in the host country was the Netherlands (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009). According to the Dutch law on integration of 2007, for family reunification, applicants have to undertake an integration test abroad before obtaining a temporary residence permit (Joppke, 2007). As in the Netherlands, the New Immigration Act of 2007 in Germany introduced some restrictions such as requiring
basic German language skills for family reunification (Urbanek, 2012). The Residence Act of 2005 contained provisions in line with the Counter Terrorism Act to improve the internal security of Germany. The Act to Implement Residence and Asylum Related Directives of the European Union has carried these security provisions further and enhanced the cooperation among those authorities that issue residence permits in Germany (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011). In the Netherlands, in July 2006, revisions to the civic integration law were approved by the Dutch parliament. The government privatized the integration courses and increased its restrictive involvement in integration (Joppke, 2007). The Dutch Aliens Act has also given Dutch officials the authority to expel immigrants if they are a threat to domestic security (Koopmans et al., 2005). Moreover, after 9/11, the Council of European Union Framework Decision and Common Position on combating terrorism signed in December 2001 as a result of security concerns was adopted into domestic law (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009).

In Germany, the Counter-Terrorism Act came into force on 9 January, 2002 (Diez & Squire, 2008). In the Netherlands, the specific counter terrorism policy was relatively new and the counter terrorism act was passed in 2004 (Roex & Riezen, 2012). After the Counter Terrorism Act of 2004, the Act on Expanding the Scope for Investigating and Persecuting Terrorist Crimes was entered into effect in 2006 in the Netherlands (Eijkman, 2012).

All these pieces of legislations have affected Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. The common idea that comes out from interviews is that the changes in foreigners and immigration laws have become more restrictive for Turkish immigrants. Family reunification became more difficult in both countries by these changes. For
example, Human Rights Watch has evaluated the Dutch integration test as discriminatory and has criticized the introduction of the integration test by the Dutch government as a result of declining immigration applications (FRA, 2009c). In addition, according to interview findings, nine respondents from Germany criticized the prevention of obtaining dual nationality for Turkish immigrants by the Citizenship Law while dual citizenship is possible for some other nationalities. It was stressed that the differentiation in legislation of Turkish immigrants who have been in Germany about 50 years leads to a feeling of “otherness”, “resentment”, and “disappointment”. Moreover, there are different views about the changes in the counter-terrorism legislation in both countries. About 60% of the participants in both countries stressed the fact that the counter-terrorism legislation and policy has targeted Muslims and has negatively affected them. On the other hand, three interviewees from the Netherlands found the changes in counter-terrorism legislation positive for Turkish immigrants. They believed that Turkish immigrants are not a security problem in the Netherlands, and thus, this legislation is targeting immigrants other than Turks.

C. Policing and Intelligence

In Germany, deportation has become easier and getting a residence permit has become more difficult with these changes. The approval of the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has become a requirement for acquiring a residence permit and citizenship. Immigrants can be deported if they are evaluated as a threat to internal security of Germany. This position gives the police considerable power over immigrants (Diez & Squire, 2008). The BfV has been assigned to categorize Muslims as ‘real’ and ‘misguided’. If one organization is categorized as Islamist by the BfV, the
members of this organization will not be permitted to work in a security field and they will have difficulties in the naturalization process and with obtaining a work permit. Moreover, Muslim organizations and mosques are under frequent observation and sometimes, they can witness raids and searches by police at a Friday prayer meeting in certain mosques (Mühe, 2007).

In Germany, the more restrictive policies passed after 9/11 failed to prevent terrorist attacks. Terrorists abusing religion have continued to threaten the internal security of the country. There was a failed bombing attempt in 2006 in Germany. In 2007, one suspect was arrested before exploding a bomb. A terrorist killed 2 US Air Force personnel and wounded 2 more at the Frankfurt Airport in 2011 (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011). In addition, in 2011, four people who had plans for a terrorist attack in Germany were arrested (Europol, 2012). Moreover, there is evidence that the practices of security agencies in Germany make Muslims appear as ‘others’ and result in the stigmatization of certain groups. For example, a representative of Turkish organization in Germany expressed the fact that they have paid dearly for being seen as a security threat by security agencies:

We have been under surveillance by the BfV and security agencies since the establishment of the organization under color of being radical and extremist…. They warned the others to keep away from us…. These have affected our dialogue with other groups…. Interestingly, security agencies have been the bodies that want to work with us to enhance security while they try to keep away from us…. If you request to cooperate on the ground of countering terrorism by presenting all Muslims as suspicious, sorry but, we will not accept this. We have paid dearly for this.

In 2005, The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) was established by the Dutch government in order to coordinate the activities of several security
organizations in the Netherlands such as the police and the AIVD which is the national intelligence service. As for security agencies in the Netherlands, religion abusing terrorism is seen as the biggest security threat. As a result of police operations, 153 suspects were arrested with regards to terrorism abusing Islam and only 20 of them were convicted in the Netherlands (Roex & Riezen, 2012).

Security agencies in Germany and the Netherlands have profiled Muslims. German security services profiled Muslim foreign students as a high risk group, and shortly after, they extended this religious profiling to the private sector. They collected about 6 million personal records, and focused on 20,000 people as potential suspects though they had no tangible evidence against them. This religious profiling was also initiated by the Dutch government after 9/11. Some 800,000 Muslims were surveyed on their beliefs and activities in order to flush out fundamentalists (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009). However, the present study found that there is not much awareness about this profiling among the participants from the Netherlands. Besides, they are more positive about security agencies in comparison to the participants from Germany.

D. Intergroup Relations

All respondents confirmed that 9/11 was a watershed event that affected Muslims and their relations with wider society in their contexts. However, some other events were also very important in this regard. The other most important event that affected particularly Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany was the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004. In addition, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician, in 2002 made Turks in the Netherlands worried before the assassin, who was an animal rights
activist, was arrested. Moreover, other terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 also negatively affected them in their contexts, but not to the same degree as the events of 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh.

All the respondents attested to the fact that Islamophobic incidents increased in both countries especially shortly after 9/11 terrorist attacks and the assassination of van Gogh in 2004. For example, in Germany, although the physical attacks against Muslims were very rare, verbal attacks significantly increased shortly after 9/11. In the Netherlands, between 25 September and 19 October 2001, a total of 42 Islamophobic incidents took place (EUMC, 2001). In addition, the EUMC 2006 report clarified the fact that shortly after the murder of Dutch filmmaker van Gogh on November 2, 2004, the number of Islamophobic incidents dramatically increased between the 2nd and 30th of November of that year in the Netherlands. One hundred and six of the 174 violent racist incidents were incidents of anti-Muslim violence. Forty seven violent incidents were targeted against mosques. The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia noted that thousands of anti-Muslim statements were expressed in Internet forums. For instance, a website owner removed about 5,000 anti-Muslim comments after the first days of the murder. Between 11/23/2004 and 3/13/2005, 44 anti-Muslim violence incidents occurred. Thirty one of them were targeted at mosques and Islamic schools (EUMC, 2006a).

According to the interviewees, the visible identifiers of Islam and Muslims were targeted mostly on the grounds of Islamophobic concerns. A total of 15 participants (8 from Germany and 7 from the Netherlands) stressed that the Muslim females who wore headscarves were insulted and attacked and might be the most affected by these incidents.
In addition, the arson of mosques and Islamic schools and the graffiti on the walls of mosques were the other most prevalent Islamophobic incidents. They placed the blame on for these events on racists. Moreover, one respondent stated that the impact of such incidents on the perceptions of Turks was the fact that: “Whenever a Turk’s house got burn, we began to think that racists had set fire to this house” (DE-ORG-10). However, six participants (4 from Germany and 2 from the Netherlands) stated their anxiety by highly stressing that the hostility sentiments of racists began to be expressed in increasing intensity and spread to the mainstream society after 9/11, which was seen as being very dangerous for the society. NL-PPM-01 expressed this process:

While the expressions of hostility targeted towards Muslims are supposed to be condemned, it was asserted that these expressions are normal since they have fears about Muslims… Thus, this leads to the normalization of such types of treatment…. If this will continue 20 more years, what will happen? It may be compared with how the Nazi government treated the Jews in Germany in the Second World War by normalizing this reasoning and stating that they deserve this treatment… If this perception will spread to mainstream society, Muslims may be seriously affected.

There is evidence that Turkish immigrants also felt that the natives increasingly looked at them with suspicion after 9/11. The respondents stated that Turkish immigrants were asked by natives about the events in other countries and even asked them whether they approved of violent and terrorist events there or not. DE-ORG-09 criticized the exaggeration of skepticism: “Whenever a sparkler bomb exploded anywhere in the world, you were expected to condemn it. If you did not condemn it, they [the natives] say that look, they did not condemn it, so they are looking at it in sympathy.” Another participant from the Netherlands argued that they had allocated most of their time after 9/11 to give an account of issues related to security concerns rather than to express themselves and
their activities in discussion at meetings. In addition, “if a Muslim grew a beard and went to the mosque for prayer, he was suspected of being a terrorist” (DE-ORG-01). A respondent sometimes felt he was guilty: “In some places, I felt that being a Muslim is an offense. Therefore, I could not readily express my identity” (NL-PPM-04). In the face of these suspicions, Muslims felt “otherness”, “sadness”, “resentment”, and “foreignness”.

Eleven participants (5 from Germany and 6 from the Netherlands) had sometimes felt that the natives do not want them in Germany and the Netherlands although they see these countries as their homelands. As a result, it affected their trust level, and in turn, their intergroup relations. NL-ORG-02 expressed the fact that “there is a huge difference in my friendliness with natives before and after 9/11 since they showed me clearly their suspicions about me after 9/11.”

Although eight of the participants from both countries argued that Turks still have serious problems in the society because of security concerns, two participants asserted that they have been experiencing a decrease of security concerns for the last 2-3 years. A participant from Germany emphasized the decrease in security concerns:

I can give you an example. It was the first time that an Iftar dinner\(^1\) was organized in the North Rhine-Westphalia Parliament last week. The parliamentarians from all political parties participated to this dinner…. I can say that it was not possible to think about that after 9/11. The number of these events is increasing. (DE-PPM-02)

**E. General Perceptions about Securitization by Turks**

The general perception about securitization among Turkish immigrants is negative. Almost all participants strongly emphasized the negative effects of the

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\(^1\) Muslims fast every day in a month of year called Ramadan. They break their fast at the time of sunset. This evening meal is called Iftar.
securitization process especially after 9/11.

Twenty three participants (12 from Germany and 11 from the Netherlands) felt that the perceptions about Muslims by natives had become more negative in both Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11. A participant from Germany noted that not only the terrorist events in the USA and Europe, but also the identity and economic crisis in Western Europe have played a crucial role in the increase of the security concerns of the natives. Three participants argued that Muslims have begun to be differentiated as good or bad in this process. In addition, some examples were provided to represent the negative impacts of these changes on Turkish immigrants after 9/11. Firstly, several Turks in strategic positions were fired or quit their jobs. For example, a Turk who had been working in a weapons development company in the Netherlands was treated with suspicion, he was removed from the projects that he involved in, and consequently, he was left with no choice but to quit his job (NL-PPM-01). Secondly, a participant from Germany claimed that the procedure for establishing a mosque lasted between 6 months to a year before 9/11. However, after 9/11, this procedure took between one year and two years for several mosques. Thirdly, a participant from the Netherlands argued that having those Turkish immigrants with dual citizenship had been increasingly perceived as disloyal in the Dutch society while Westerner’s having dual citizenship were not affected. The last example is about the subsidy for projects of Turkish organizations. A Turkish organization in the Netherlands prepared a project that needed a subsidy from governmental institutions. In the beginning, an institution agreed to support this project. However, it suddenly refused to subsidize the project after the negative news about Muslims was published in the media.
In order to point out the negative effects of the security concerns on Turkish immigrants, three participants asserted that, for the last 10-12 years, some Turkish scholars in both Germany and the Netherlands preferred to go back to Turkey rather than stay in their host countries, which is not a desired outcome of this process. In addition, it was argued that similar preferences can be seen for Turkish immigrants with high socioeconomic status. However, securitization should not be considered the only reason for this preference. The recent socioeconomic developments in Turkey may also have played a role in this issue.

There is evidence that the security concerns not only affected Muslims, but the wider society as well. With respect to the securitization process, first, civil rights were reduced as a result of security concerns. Then, many equality and nondiscrimination principles were eliminated by discriminating against Muslims in the name of countering possible discrimination against women (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009). This can be summarized as demonstrating that “more security leads to fewer civil liberties” (d’Appollonia, 2008, p. 204).

There is evidence that moving away from the basic principles and rights for the sake of security in the Netherlands and Germany resulted in anxiety among Turkish immigrants. The analysis of responses of participants revealed that Turkish immigrants have begun to lose their trust in the state and society, and in turn, they may define this process as a “double standard”, “insincere”, and “disappointing”. A participant from Germany (DE-ORG-09) expressed his disappointment: “I perceived Germany as a country that is liberal and prioritizes freedom; however, something happened and I felt like that it was not possible to protect Muslims’ rights here.” Two participants from
Germany stated their concerns about the security of Turkish immigrants in Germany and distrust about the state practices. One of them claimed that the security threats coming from racists were neglected by German police while one sided security approaches targeted Muslims were implemented. He argued that, between 2000 and 2006, the members of NSU (National Socialist Underground) murdered 10 people (including 8 Turkish immigrants) in Germany. This illustrates the lack of concern by the German police. According to European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey in 2008, the percentage of victimization of Turks in Germany on the grounds of racist/ethnic motive was higher than that in the Netherlands. The percentage of Turks in the Netherlands who experienced serious harassment, threat, or assault in the past 12 months were 5 percent of the total Turkish population in the Netherlands while this percentage in Germany was about three times higher than that in the Netherlands (FRA, 2012b). These figures may be an explanation of why German participants put more emphasize on the security of Turkish population in Germany.

**F. Who are more affected? Turks or Other Muslims?**

In Germany, there are about 4 million Muslims. The majority (about 63%) of the Muslim population is from Turkey. The other Muslims are mainly from former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iran. While the Muslims from former Yugoslavia are the second largest Muslim community in Germany, their population is only about 20% of Turkish population in Germany (Haug et al., 2009). By considering the Muslim population in the country, Faas (2010) emphasized the fact that Muslims have been usually equated with Turkish immigrants in Germany. This finding was also confirmed by the participants from Germany. There is no consensus among participants
about who are the most affected Muslims in Germany even though there are other Muslims from different countries. The relatively high population of Turkish immigrants in Germany in comparison to other Muslims and the equation of Muslim and Turkish identities leads to confusion in this issue. Since the Turkish population is high in Germany, six participants argued that the Turks were more affected in the population as a result of the securitization process. However, two participants claimed that the Arab immigrants were more affected in comparison to other Muslims. In addition, two participants provided an equal response for being affected since they were not sure which group was more affected.

In the Netherlands, the largest Muslim communities are Turks and Moroccans. Together they constitute about 70% of the total Muslim population in the Netherlands (FORUM Institute for Multicultural Affairs, 2012). Sunier (2010) drew attention to the mixed composition of Muslims in the Netherlands since, unlike Germany, the Muslim population has not been equated with a particular ethnic background. All the participants from the Netherlands agreed that Moroccans are the most affected Muslim population in the Netherlands. Five of them argued that Turkish immigrants have a more positive status in the Netherlands than Moroccans. Three participants also claimed that the relatively higher crime rates among the Moroccans also influenced this perception. For example, 4.7 percent of Moroccans older than 12 were suspected of a crime in the Netherlands in 2010 while this percentage for Turks was 2.7 (Boom, Weltevrede, Wensveen, Van San, & Hermus, 2010).
2. Discrimination and Perceived Discrimination

In Germany, in the summer of 2009, the Centre for Studies on Turkey surveyed 1000 Turkish adults in North Rhine-Westphalia on several issues including their experience with discrimination. The survey results revealed that 67% of Turkish respondents had experienced discrimination. This percentage was lower than in previous years. It was 71% in 2008 and 79.9% in 2003. However, perceived discrimination increased in the workplace, the courts, among the police, and neighborhoods. About 28.4% of the participants experienced discrimination in their neighborhoods. About 21.3% of respondents reported discrimination in the healthcare system; however, their experience of discrimination in the health system was lower than in other areas of life (Peucker, 2010). When the Centre for Studies on Turkey repeated the survey in 2010, it demonstrated a marked increase in experienced discrimination among Turkish immigrants, going from 67% to 81% (FRA, 2012a).

Ethnic discrimination in employment is widespread in Germany. In 2003, discriminations at the workplace and in the employment area were more frequently reported by Turkish immigrants in Germany (EUMC, 2004). In 2006, a report related to discrimination in employment was published. The report revealed that stereotypes and prejudices against Turkish immigrants by employers was a barrier to getting a job (EUMC, 2006b). According to a national survey in Germany in 2009, 50% of Turkish immigrants experienced discrimination in the workplace and 43% when looking for a job (FRA, 2010). A report of a systematic discrimination testing survey related to discriminatory recruitment practices was published in 2010. It revealed that applicants
with a Turkish name had a 14% lower chance in receiving a call back by employers than the applicants with a German name (FRA, 2011).

In general, Muslim employees do not usually face problems when they pray in the workplace. They have found several solutions to carrying out this activity. They usually use their vacation time for the ‘id al-fitr’ and ‘Id al-adha’. However, the female Muslims who wear headscarves can experience some challenges in the workplace. The employers do not want to allow them to wear headscarf when the job requires dealing with the public. In the state of Hessen, one female employee who wore a veil was noticed by the employer and she was warned that her contract would be terminated owing to her refusal to work without a headscarf. The employee took her case to the Labor Court of Appeal of Hessen; however, the court dismissed the appeal (Rohe, 2008). In addition, a recent survey conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia revealed that, 50.6 percent of Turks had perceived discrimination in workplace and school. The survey of the Centre for Studies on Turkey in NRW in 2010 revealed that the highest rate of discrimination was in education (60.3 %) (FRA, 2012a).

In Germany, economic crises have affected neighborhoods negatively, and segregation between the Turks and Germans has increased. Another factor that affects the neighborhood is the quality of the schools. Actually, this segregation started when the first foreigners come to Germany because of the discrimination they faced in the housing market. Many immigrants, at first, wanted to live in German areas; however, a large number of property owners discriminated against the immigrants. The exclusion of immigrants led to an increase in segregation in neighborhoods. However, the Anti-Discrimination Law was not sufficient to prevent this segregation. This law is criticized
by anti-discrimination organizations because it allows for unequal treatment in the housing sector. Room rentals are one of the exceptions to the law although this is not mentioned in the EU directives. Property managers are allowed to refuse potential tenants accommodation to keep the cultural and social mixture in the house or neighborhood balanced (Mühe, 2007). A discrimination testing project about housing was conducted in 2007 and 2008 in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. According to the result of the project, Turkish testers were rejected twice as often than German testers (FRA, 2010). In addition, in 2012, 47% of Turkish immigrants experienced discrimination in housing (FRA, 2012a).

Turkish immigrants have still faced discrimination in German society despite their German citizenship. For example, German origin landlords still continue to reject their tenant applications and see them as foreigners, even though they are German citizens (Yükleyen, 2012). Two researchers who examined the discrimination perception of Turkish immigrants revealed that every third respondent with a Turkish origin felt discriminated against in his social life. In addition, one fifth of them had been a victim of insults or offences because of their “other” identity (Mühe, 2007).

In Germany, the headscarf ban for teachers has been perceived as a form of discrimination on the grounds of religion. The wearing of headscarves by teachers is banned in some states in Germany by legislation while excluding Christian and Jewish symbols (EUMC, 2005). However, Bremen and Lower Saxony restricted all religious dressing in schools. In addition, the headscarf ban was extended to other civil services in Hessen and Berlin (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In this context, in some states, banning Muslim teachers from wearing a headscarf while allowing nuns in public schools to wear
religious clothing has been regarded as discrimination against Muslims (Fogel, 2006). Moreover, Muslim groups and some women’s group argued that the headscarf ban obstructs the successful integration of Muslims because it fosters alienation and diminishes Muslim women’s social status instead of empowering them. They also argued that this ban is a human rights violation and is not coherent with European values such as rights to privacy and self-expression, right to equal protection, right to religion, and minority rights (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Eijkman (2012) emphasized that, in the Netherlands, 26 percent of Turks felt discriminated against in 2005; however, this percentage decreased to 17 percent in 2009. Additionally, a survey conducted in Rotterdam in 2006 revealed that 57 percent of Turks felt that Muslims and Turks were negatively represented in the media (Open Society Foundations, 2010). According to the Rotterdam Youth Survey, 20 percent of young Turks have faced structural discrimination. They have mostly experienced discrimination in neighborhoods, in contacts with the police, and in the context of social services (Demant et al., 2007).

In the Netherlands, like in Germany, discrimination occurs particularly in employment. The candidates from an immigrant background compared to natives are less likely to get a job or succeed in a job interview (Valk, 2012). According to the Ministry of Justice’s study in 2006, around 60 percent of Turkish jobseekers thought that they were rejected due to their origins. In addition, one of four Turkish employees experienced discrimination in the workplace (FRA, 2007).
In addition, socioeconomic inequality between Turks in the Netherlands and Dutch natives can be seen in official Dutch documents. Data records from Statistics Netherlands have indicated that ethnic minorities, particularly Turks and Moroccans, have been concentrated in low quality and low-cost housing areas in the large cities (EUMC, 2004). From a positive perspective, unlike Germany, house owners have little opportunity to reject tenants on the grounds of their ethnic origins or race in the Netherlands (FRA, 2008).

In the Netherlands, several unequal treatment cases were reported; however, many cases were related to unequal treatment on the grounds of religion. Several complaints about discrimination in schools due to dress code have been submitted to anti-discrimination agencies or the Equal Treatment Commission. In the Dutch school system, expressing religious belief is allowed. However, some schools have attempted to forbid or limit religious symbols and in 2003 a number of girls wearing the veil were expelled. The Equal Treatment Commission advised that the schools can ban the veil if they can provide concrete justification that the veil challenges the school order. However, the headscarf can only be banned if it is not compatible with the religious orientation of the school (EUMC, 2004). Although schools do not have a policy regarding wearing a headscarf in most cases, the directorate often discusses this issue with the students (Demant et al., 2007). In addition, a Muslim female teacher was dismissed from the school since she refused to shake hands with men because of her religious beliefs in 2009. The Central Appeals Board ruled that the dismissal was not due to discrimination because shaking hands with men is a widespread custom in Dutch society and the demand of school administrative was legitimate (FRA, 2010). However, in the context of
a similar issue - physical contact with men-, the decision was carried forward in favor of the student. A school in the Netherlands did not admit a Muslim student to a training programme since she shunned physical contact with men. The Equal Treatment Commission found the school guilty on the grounds of violating the principle of equal treatment (FRA, 2007). In addition, the Equal Treatment Commission found a Christian school guilty because they rejected the application of a Muslim teacher owing to his religious beliefs (FRA, 2008).

In 2010, in the Netherlands, the Equal Treatment Commission decided that the employment agency that did not interview a Muslim female because of her headscarf violated the law. In contrast, in 2010, a Muslim male, who was refused a job since he held a religious belief that shaking women hands is forbidden, lost his unemployment benefits due to this refusal of a job offer. The Dutch court found the municipality’s action legitimate (FRA, 2011). Moreover, in 2009, a female police force employee demanded her right to wear her headscarf while connecting with general public and her demand was refused by the Amsterdam Police. The Equal Treatment Commission acknowledged that the Amsterdam police did not discriminate against the female police employee (FRA, 2010). In addition, face-covering was pointed out as a limit to communication. A day nursery refused to admit a child since the mother rejected a request to take off her face covering veil when she came to nursery to pick up or take her child. The Equal Treatment Commission expressed its opinion on May 2009 in favor of the day nursery stating that the face-covering veil was barrier to effective communication and interactions (FRA, 2010).
There is also a valuable survey that enables the comparison of the discrimination against Turks in Germany and the Netherlands. According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey that focused on Muslim groups in 2008, 29% of Turks in the Netherlands and 31% of Turks in Germany felt discriminated against. The Turkish immigrants who had been discriminated against experienced an average of 5.8 incidents in Germany and 5 incidents in the Netherlands. When looking for a job, Turks in Germany (28%) were notably discriminated against. In addition, Turkish immigrants in Germany were placed among the top 3 European countries in which Muslim minorities were discriminated against by social services personnel (10%) and school personnel (11%). Moreover, Turks in the Netherlands experienced more discrimination in cafés, restaurants, or bars than those in Germany (FRA, 2009a). Furthermore, about 27 percent of Turks in the Netherlands and 24 percent of Turks in Germany were stopped by the police in a one year period. However, 37 percent of Turks in Germany perceived that they were stopped because of their ethnic profile, while this perception rate among Turks in the Netherlands was just 25 percent. In terms of Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, a similar pattern can be observed in the perception of ethnic profiling when stopped by border controls (FRA, 2009b).

About 45 percent of Turks in Germany and 33 percent of Turks in the Netherlands said ‘No’ to the question of “Is there a law that forbids discrimination against people on the basis of their ethnicity/immigrant background when applying for a job?” In addition, the second least informed minority in Europe as regards the existence of anti-discrimination bodies in the country are Turks in the Netherlands (FRA, 2009b). Interestingly, although Turks in the Netherlands were less aware of anti-discrimination
body in the country, they reported more discrimination incidents in comparison to Turks in Germany. Twenty two percent of Turks in the Netherlands and 17 percent of Turks in Germany reported discrimination incidents. They rarely reported discrimination incidents because most of them believed that nothing would happen. However, this perception is more common among Turks in Germany (81%) than Turks in the Netherlands (41%) (FRA, 2009a). This may be the answer of why Turks in Germany reported fewer discrimination incidents than Turks in the Netherlands.

Two Special Eurobarometer - Discrimination in the EU Surveys were conducted in 27 member states of the EU in 2009 and 2012. The participants were not just immigrant populations, but members of the general population. As demonstrated in Figure 3, the perceived level of discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin was widespread in both Germany and the Netherlands. However, this perception was more prevalent in the Netherlands than in Germany. The surveys also revealed that the perceived level of discrimination on the grounds of religion was less widespread in both countries in comparison to the perceived level of discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin. According to the results of surveys, the perceived level of discrimination on the grounds of religion was widespread in the Netherlands, but not in Germany. However, in 2012, this perception decreased in the Netherlands, while it increased slightly in Germany (European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 2012).
According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey in 2008, 61 percent of Turks in the Netherlands and 48 percent of Turks in Germany believed that discrimination was widespread on the grounds of religion and belief (FRA, 2009a). When this figure was compared to the results of the Eurobarometer survey in 2009, it was seen that the percentage of the general population (59%) and Turkish immigrants (61%) in the Netherlands had close views concerning the perception of discrimination on the grounds of religion. On the other hand, there was a big difference in Germany in this regard. While the percentage was 32 for the general population in 2009, it was 48 for Turkish immigrants. This shows that Turkish immigrants in Germany perceived a higher degree
of discrimination on the grounds of religion and that this is prevalent among Turkish immigrants in comparison to the general population in Germany.

One of the significant results observed from the analysis of the interview responses concerned the changes in perceptions about discrimination against Turkish immigrants after 9/11. Twenty two of the 27 participants felt that discrimination against the Turkish population had increased to some extent after 9/11. Others were not sure whether it has increased or not. This result indicated that Turkish immigrants were negatively affected in their contexts by perceiving more discrimination after 9/11, which may lead to more marginalization, segregation, otherness, and so on which have been crucial elements in their identification, motivation, objectives, and in turn, their mobilization.

As demonstrated in Figure 4, the perception of discrimination in employment was very high in both countries. Education came second in Germany in this regard. These findings from interviews are consistent with the results of the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey in 2008 that were stressed previously.
Figure 4. Number of Coded Categories Indicating Perceived Discrimination by the Participants.

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From NVivo-10 Program

In the Netherlands, the common view among the interviewees was that the discrimination they perceived was not widespread. This result drew a different picture in comparison to the Discrimination in the EU Surveys in 2009 and 2012 by European Commission since these surveys found that the general population (Muslims and non-Muslims included) felt that the perceived level of discrimination was widespread.

According to the interview findings in the Netherlands, the discrimination against Turkish immigrants was perceived as high when looking for a job. The other main fields where discrimination had been perceived were education, government offices, police, banks, and night clubs. Applying for a job with a Turkish name and wearing a headscarf were seen as the main barriers to access to an employment. One of the respondents (NL-PPM-04) mentioned his experience: “I and my wife went to a job application for my wife. My wife wears headscarf. When we went there, they told us that they were looking for a more modern employee.” However, while a couple of participants believed that
discrimination on the ground of religion was widespread, most respondents believed that this was not too widespread. The beliefs that the media and politicians manipulated and exaggerated the existing fears and the perceptions of decrease in the discrimination towards Turkish immigrants in recent years were key determinants of this perception.

Five respondents from the Netherlands said that natives usually do not overtly discriminate against Turks; however, the respondents were aware of a climate of suspicion, feeling distrust, and discriminatory attitudes. In this respect, two of them described this as a form of ‘hidden discrimination’ which cannot be proved. On the other hand, two participants stated that they had not perceived discrimination in their life, however, they had heard about this from other people.

In Germany, the views about discrimination against Turkish immigrants appeared as more negative in comparison to those of the Netherlands. In this sense, the study reached a similar conclusion with the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) in 2008. However, there was no apparent difference between Germany and the Netherlands in the EU-MIDIS in 2008.

According to interview findings, in Germany, while seven respondents noted that discrimination towards Turks is widespread, but not severe, two argued it was not common. However, one of them felt that ‘hidden discrimination’ was common. The most prevalent area where they perceived discrimination was in employment as in the Netherlands. However, as demonstrated by Figure 4, there were apparent differences in the discrimination perceptions in education and housing between Germany and the Netherlands while the discrimination perceptions in the other areas were similar. In
Germany, as in the Netherlands, a Turkish sounding name and wearing a headscarf played a negative role in getting a job.

In Germany, six participants placed emphasis on the unequal treatment in education. One participant stated that:

Some teachers have the idea that the son of a worker will be a worker. If a teacher gives a high score to a German boy, she/he can give lower scores to a Turkish boy who has the same capability and knowledge as the German boy. (DE-PPM-01)

In a similar vein, an interviewee argued that “Turkish children are treated as mentally retarded and their development is precluded systematically and consciously in schools” (DE-ORG-08). In addition, a participant asserted that discrimination against Turkish immigrants in schools was a kind of ‘institutional discrimination’ (DE-ORG-10).

The answer to the question of whether Turkish immigrants were more or less discriminated against in comparison to other Muslims had a similar pattern with the “Who are more affected?” section. Although there was no consensus among the participants from Germany, the view that Turkish immigrants were discriminated less markedly than other Muslims was prevalent in the Netherlands. One can argue that, in Germany, the relatively high population of Turkish immigrants compared to the population of other Muslims leads to such perceptions.
CHAPTER VII- FINDINGS ON MOBILIZATION

1. Factors Affecting the Mobilization of Turkish Immigrants

   A. The Characteristics of Turkish Immigrants

   According to the results obtained from interviews, two characteristics, language skills and immigrant generation, have been important in both countries from the standpoint of the motives and objectives of mobilization and selected acculturation strategies employed by Turkish immigrants. The participants provided detailed information about the differences between the first wave of Turkish immigrants who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s and current immigrants.

   The first wave of Turkish immigrants came to Germany and the Netherlands to work and wanted to return their homelands after fulfilling their working contracts. They were first placed into segregated areas that were close to the factories. Therefore, their priority was not to learn the language of the host country and to integrate into society. For example, according to a participant from the Netherlands, they had limited opportunity to have language courses until the 1980s. Hence, their language skills were limited. Since they considered themselves as guests in society and had limited language skills, they could not defend themselves when experiencing discrimination and assault. Besides, they could not be aware of whether they were discriminated against or not. They preferred to keep limited contact with host society. In addition, they were more attached to their home country and less educated in comparison to the current immigrants.
On the other hand, Turkish youngsters have been educated in the schools of their host countries. Thus, they have advanced language skills, and have been increasingly involved in their society. They can easily understand the discrimination against them and have the ability to respond to unequal treatments and verbal assaults. For that reason, sometimes, there can be quarrels and fights between Turkish youngsters and non-Muslim native youngsters who have racist ideas. They feel freer to express themselves. In addition, they are better educated and have better socioeconomic status in society in comparison to the first wave of Turkish immigrants. Some of them are employers not workers.

Figure 5. Number of Coded References Indicating the Characteristics of Turkish Immigrants which are related to Mobilization.

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From NVivo-10 Software
In general, as illustrated in Figure 5, the other significant characteristics affecting the nature and objectives of mobilization that were addressed by the respondents in both countries are attachment to home and host country, culture and belief, education, social capital, and socioeconomic status.

Eight participants (5 from Germany and 3 from the Netherlands) criticized Turkish immigrants as being more interested in Turkish politics rather than the politics of their country of residency. In fact, Turkish immigrants have strong transnational ties with their home country. About 94 percent of Turks in Germany visit relatives in Turkey and 66 percent of them go to Turkey at least once a year (Kaya, 2009). A study in the Netherlands revealed that all immigrants originating from Turkey visited their home country between 1999 and 2003 at least once (Mugge, 2011). According to a survey carried out in 2006 regarding the media use by Turkish people with immigrant background in Germany, 47% of the participants used both German and Turkish equally. Twenty percent of the participants used mostly German and 33% of them used mostly Turkish (Trebbé, 2007). Additionally, a survey conducted in Rotterdam in 2006 found that 20 percent of Turks read both Dutch and Turkish newspapers at least once a week. While 8 percent of Turks exclusively read Turkish newspapers, 39 percent of Turks exclusively read Dutch newspapers (Open Society Foundations, 2010). These figures indicate that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are more attached to their host countries in comparison to Turks in Germany. The multiculturalist policies implemented throughout Dutch history may explain this outcome.

According to the interview findings, Turkish culture including religious and ethnic values and beliefs has played an important role in the evaluation of their contexts
and their actions in both countries. For example, religion, native language, and the beliefs about hospitality, tolerance, positive attitude, and not rebelling against state and government have been pointed out among these values and beliefs. In addition, among all ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, the Turkish minority is most devoted to their own culture and thus has strong ties with their own ethnic group (Vervoort, 2011). In a similar vein, Turks in Germany have robust ties with their own ethnic group. Around 98 percent of Muslims that originated from Turkey have a Turkish partner (Haug et al., 2009). This network of relationships may also be an indicator of the strong social capital among Turkish immigrants in Germany and Netherlands. Additionally, according to interview findings, 19 of 27 participants (11 from the Netherlands and 8 from Germany) pointed out the increases in social capital among Turkish immigrants in individual and organizational levels in recent years.

Nine respondents (5 from the Netherlands and 4 from Germany) emphasized that the education levels of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands have been increasing. However, Turks in Germany and the Netherlands have remarkable differences in terms of educational attainment (which affects the socio-economic status). In the Netherlands, around 50 percent of Turks follow a vocational track and 22 percent have access to higher education. In Germany, 75 percent of Turks follow a vocational track and 4 percent have gained to a university degree. The different approaches of two countries have also influenced the socioeconomic positions of the immigrants (Crul & Schneider, 2009).

Although the other characteristics have been pointed out in a similar level in both countries, as presented in Figure 5, there is a salient difference between the emphasis of
the participants from the Netherlands and Germany regarding the legal status of Turkish immigrants. The participants from Germany stated that in terms of the legal status of Turkish immigrants, there were nearly four times more in Germany than participants from the Netherlands. This may be because the majority of Turkish immigrants have Dutch citizenship in the Netherlands whereas more than half of the Turkish immigrants are not German citizens. For example, by 2011, there were 88,028 (about 22 percent) Turkish immigrants who had not obtained Dutch citizenship (Eurostat migr_pop1ctz). On the other hand, in the same year in Germany, there were 1,607,161 Turkish immigrants (around 60 percent) who were not naturalized (Federal Statistical Office, 2014b).

Therefore, the majority of Turks in Germany still remain foreigners. A trend analysis of Turkish immigrants not naturalized in Germany after 2001 (Figure 6) illustrated that the naturalization process of Turkish immigrants was very slow, and most of them were likely to remain as foreigners in the following years (or decades) in Germany if the naturalization process continues at the same speed.

Figure 6. Number of Turkish Citizens who are not naturalized in Germany.

![Graph showing the number of Turkish citizens who are not naturalized in Germany from 2001 to 2012.](image)

Source: Federal Statistical Office (2014b)
B. The Context of Reception

Many components (such as integration policy, legislation, counter-terrorism policy and police practices, fears and prejudices towards Turkish immigrants and Islam, discrimination against Turkish immigrants, citizenship regimes, and so on) constitute the context of reception. Several of these issues were elaborated on in the previous chapters. Accordingly, this section mainly focuses on the political opportunity structures in Germany and the Netherlands by taking into account integration efforts, citizenship regimes, and the networks of Turkish organizations.

I. Formal Institutional or Legal Structures

As argued by Koopmans et al. (2005), the centralization of political institutions, the separation of powers and the electoral system play a key role in accessing the polity. Both countries are advanced democracies and they are based on the principle of separation of powers (legislative, justice, and executive powers). According to the results of the Democracy Ranking 2013, the Netherlands was sixth and Germany was the seventh best democracy in the world in 2011 and 2012 (Global Democracy Ranking).

The centralization of political institutions in Germany and the Netherlands is enacted differently. Germany is a federal state and consists of 16 states. Each federal state has its own government and parliament; however, the German Bundestag is the parliament at the federal level. Its functions and roles are to perform the lawmaking process and the parliamentary inspection of the government, to decide on the federal budget, and to elect the German Federal Chancellor (German Bundestag). In addition, the German Bundesrat (Federal Council) makes it possible for all federal states to directly
participate in the legislative decision-making processes at the federal level (German Bundesrat). Therefore, federalism in Germany has resulted in both opportunity and constraint for Turkish immigrants. For example, the negative effects of a federal policy for Turkish immigrants may be reduced by the state level arrangements since states have privileges to make policies on several areas such as education and integration in Germany. On the contrary, the opposite scenario can be possible (DE-PPM-01).

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. It is a decentralized unitary state in which municipal, provincial, and central governments cooperate together. There are work agreements (such as roads and houses construction and the improvement of living and working conditions) among these different levels of government. At the national level there are two houses; the Lower House and the Upper House. The Lower House has 150 members who are directly elected by the voters, and has legislative functions and roles. The members of the Upper House are selected by the representatives of the provinces. It has right to approve or reject a piece of legislation (Figee et al., 2008).

Obtaining citizenship is one of the key opportunities in the context of reception to access to political system. Several provisions are required for accessing citizenship by immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the Nationality Act of 1984 strengthened the jus soli principle. Between 1992 and 1997, the immigrants were entitled to keep their own nationality along with Dutch nationality (Open Society Foundations, 2010). Thus, the numbers of naturalized Turkish immigrants peaked in this period (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006). Since 1997, dual citizenship has been discouraged by more restrictive policies. In principle, dual citizenship is not permitted. However, retaining foreign citizenship is allowed if surrendering foreign citizenship is
not allowed by foreign state or disadvantages the applicants’ particular benefits in foreign country. In this respect, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands can retain Turkish citizenship in accordance with the latter (Open Society Foundations, 2010). Dutch Citizenship Law of 2003 has introduced stricter criteria for naturalization. The Netherlands requires a minimum of five years of residence for naturalization. In addition, a child-born in the Netherlands automatically obtains Dutch citizenship if at least one parent is also born in the Netherlands. A foreign child born in the Netherlands can acquire citizenship between the ages of 18 and 25 without any condition. Moreover, while social and economic condition of applicants can preclude naturalization in Germany, there is no such restriction in the Netherlands (Koopmans et al., 2005).

The German citizenship law dating back to 1913 has been changed several times; however, the core principle of the 1913 law which is jus sanquinis which means that the citizenship of a child is the same as that of his father remains. The mother’s nationality has been considered after the 1975 amendment. Most Germans obtain their citizenship on the grounds of this principle (Diez & Squire, 2008). Before the German Citizenship Law of 2000, immigrants accessed German citizenship in accordance to the Alien act of 1965 (Anil, 2005). In January 2000, the German citizenship law radically changed. It made German citizenship possible for immigrants;

who are in possession of a permanent residence permit, have lived in Germany for at least eight years, can care for themselves and their dependents, have a sufficient knowledge of German, are not convicted criminals, commit themselves to the liberal democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany, and if they are not EU citizens, are ready to surrender their present citizenship. (Diez & Squire, 2008, pp. 568-569)
After 1 September 2008, passing a naturalization test which assesses the applicants’ knowledge of German legal system and society became a requirement to be naturalized (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011). As a result of these developments, the German citizenship law has become much closer to the jus soli which means that the place of birth is the determinant of citizenship. Nevertheless, the basic principles of citizenship are still related to hereditary and naturalization is considered as an exception. Dual citizenship is an exception for the children who are born in Germany and have foreign parents. However, they are allowed to keep their dual citizenship up to 23 years of age. After that, they must choose one of the citizenship to retain (Anil, 2005; Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011). Moreover, the partners of Germans may be naturalized after at least 2 years of marriage or domestic partnership and after at least 3 years of residence in Germany. In order to prevent the naturalization of extremist foreigners, naturalization authorities check the applicants’ records whether they have involved in any activities against the constitution (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011).

Germany has practiced a more liberal naturalization policy especially after German Citizenship Law of 2000 (Kaya, 2009). However, several questions arose when the numbers of naturalized Turkish immigrants were examined by years. If the new German Citizenship Law was more liberal, why did the numbers of naturalized Turkish immigrants, which was peaked in 1999, decrease after the enforcement of this law? Is there any constraint?
As shown in Figure 7, the numbers of naturalized Turkish immigrants began to decrease after 1999, and almost stabilized after 2004. There are several reasons for the decline in the numbers of naturalized Turkish immigrants by years. Firstly, Zimmermann, Constant, & Gataullina (2009) argued that Muslim immigrants have been more willing to get German citizenship than non-Muslim immigrants, yet Muslims have actually had a lower naturalization rate than non-Muslims. These results indicate that there are some cultural and institutional barriers that hinder naturalization of Muslim immigrants. Kaya (2009) further claimed that Turkish immigrants have been pleased with their social and cultural rights without obtaining citizenship. In addition, their expectations may not be satisfied by the New Citizenship Law of 2000 due to its limitations to dual citizenship. Moreover, Koopmans et al. (2005) asserted that the naturalization process is long and complex in Germany; therefore, the political and bureaucratic challenges may discourage
them to acquire citizenship. Furthermore, Rudolph (2010) emphasized the fact that the low naturalization rates of immigrants may be a result of the perceptions of native hostility and discrimination against them.

The analysis of interview responses confirmed these arguments about the low naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants in Germany. Nevertheless, 11 respondents emphasized the fact that limitations to dual citizenship are the key factor in this regards. In addition, the view that it does not matter (3 respondents), bureaucratic limitations (3 respondents), and the anxiety about losing their rights in Turkey (2 respondents) were other prevalent factors. A respondent who strived to mobilize Turkish immigrants to have German citizenship before 2000 expressed why the numbers of naturalized immigrants were increased sharply before 2000:

We found a loophole in the law and used it. If you had been a German citizen, you could have obtained the citizenship of other nationality. They told us to surrender our Turkish citizenship in order to access to German citizenship. So, we surrendered our Turkish citizenship and obtained German citizenship. After having German citizenship, we applied for Turkish citizenship. Thus, we got dual citizenship. The Turkish immigrants were informed about this loophole, and the number of naturalized Turkish immigrants was suddenly increased. As a response to this increase, they changed the citizenship law, and precluded dual nationality. (DE-ORG-10)

While the new citizenship law may be regarded as more liberal, it has become a constraint for Turkish immigrants not born in Germany by definitely precluding dual citizenship. The word frequency analysis also showed that dual nationality was a more serious problem in Germany than in the Netherlands for Turkish immigrants. While the ‘dual citizenship’ term was stated 56 times in the responses of participants from Germany, the participants from the Netherlands stated this only 10 times.
Citizenship provides an opportunity for participation in politics. In the Netherlands, immigrants cannot automatically have the right to vote in elections or the right to become a parliamentarian or councilor. Dutch citizenship is a requirement for becoming a parliamentarian or councilor. The immigrant who takes on Dutch citizenship can either participate in national, provincial, and local elections or serve as a candidate in elections. The immigrants who have no Dutch citizenship can only participate in municipal level elections if they have resided in the Netherlands for more than 5 years. Therefore, the number of Turks who can vote in local elections is higher than that of the national elections (Van Heelsum, 2005). In Germany, non-EU countries’ citizens have no right to vote in either national or local elections. The only way towards Turkish immigrants’ political participation is to have German citizenship (Yükleyen, 2012). In the late 1980s, the German states attempted to give immigrants the right to vote in local elections as in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that this was in contradiction to the constitution’s statement of ‘all power derives from the people’ because ‘the people’, here, were referred to as German nationals. However, the Court accepted the voting rights of the EU country citizens in local elections a few years later (Koopmans et al., 2005). As a result, it is obvious that the Netherlands is more open to participation in politics for immigrants in comparison to Germany.

Moreover, several representative bodies have been established in the Netherlands and Germany. In the Netherlands, both national and local level representative bodies consist of ethnic organizations and their delegations. The Minister for Integration must meet with these delegations at least 3 times a year. Moreover, the minister must take their
advice about the issues concerning them. In Germany, foreigners are represented at the local level by Foreigner’s Advisory Councils. The Foreigner’s Advisory Council elections are held during local elections. This body has limited power such as making suggestions for all issues concerning foreigners. But this task does not go far beyond being an advisory one (Koopmans et al., 2005). For example, in Nuremberg, the Foreigner’s Advisory Council has 30 members from 16 nations. It advises the City Council about local issues related to foreigners living in Nuremberg (City of Nuremberg).

II. Informal Procedures and Prevailing Elite Strategies

The traditional approaches of elites as regards resolving church-state conflicts have also affected the treatment of Muslim minorities in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany, the relationship between religion and state is regulated by the secularity principle. However, there is a special partnership between them. Religion’s role in the public sphere may vary from one state to another in Germany. The religious communities which are legally registered and those which are not legally registered may be treated differently before the law. It is enough to be registered under private law as a religious organization in many cases (Rohe, 2012). In this respect, ‘Public Law Corporation’ (PLC) may be granted to any religious organizations in certain circumstances such as the size of the organization, persistency, and not being a threat to the constitution. There are about 180 religious groups which have been granted PLC status (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010). There is no formal membership with regard to any form of Islam (Şen, 2008). Thus, it may not be possible to represent all Muslims by an organization. Therefore, Muslims have several problems with having PLC status, and in turn, face some challenges in certain circumstances such as religious education,
allowances for holy days, etc. However, the respondents from Germany noted that Turkish organizations have carried out some initiatives in order to deal with this problem. The main constraint for Turks is the question of which organization can represent Muslims. However, in 2013, there was progress on giving the PLC status for Muslim organizations by the states. In two federal states, Bremen and Hamburg, PLC status was given to Muslim organizations.

In the Netherlands, the relationship between religion and state is regulated by two principles. The equality principle in the Dutch constitution requires treating equally all religious groups by the Dutch state. The second is the pillarization system which allows religious communities to have separate education, health, media, and political organizations. Not only religious but also ideological groups are involved in this system to help maintain the balance of power in society. Although, in Dutch history, the depillarization process began in the 1970s along with a decrease in interest in religion, the legal framework that remained from the pillarization period enabled Muslims to attain several opportunities in the state system. To institute Islamic educational facilities, to get state subsidies in establishing public broadcasting organizations, and to access state supported media can be considered among these opportunities (Yükleyen, 2012).

In this context, in the Netherlands, “to establish an Islamic school is a right; however, to do something related to ethnicity is more difficult.” (NL-PPM-01) On the contrary, in Germany, “to claim something with a Turkish identity can be dealt with in the context of foreigners arrangements; however, to claim something with a Muslim identity is more difficult.” (DE-ORG-07)
In addition, elite strategies in Germany and the Netherlands regarding the integration of Turkish immigrants into the host society have changed since the beginning of Turkish immigration to these countries and this has affected the political opportunities of Turkish immigrants in both countries. Formerly, the Netherlands prioritized multicultural approaches and Germany preferred differentialist approaches in order to deal with immigrants. However, in the securitization process, both of them have increasingly prioritized assimilationist approaches.

In Germany, in 1978, in order to deal with the immigrants, a policy paper, known as ‘Kuhn Memorandum’, was prepared and a long-term immigrant integration strategy was proposed. However, this memorandum was not taken into account in German politics. It was in the context of the coalition agreement of Social Democrats and the Green Party (1998-2005) that “Germany had become a country of immigration and that immigrants had become an integral part of Germany” was recognized (Peter et al., 2010, p. 101). As a result, the differentialist policies that were in place until the beginning of the 2000s were replaced with assimilationist approaches (Brubaker, 2001). In 2006, for the first time, an integration summit was held with the participation of not only German officials, but also immigrant civil society organizations (Peter et al., 2010). The German Islam Conference that aims at improving the integration of Muslim immigrants continued in Germany until 2013 (German Islam Conference). Two participants emphasized that Turkish umbrella organizations have found an opportunity to express and discuss the needs of their communities at these conferences.

In the Netherlands, the integration process was not a policy issue during the guest workers era. By 1981, several policy goals were formulated for the integration of
immigrants (Crul & Doomernik, 2003). First, integration policies were based on multiculturalism which reflects the tradition of pillarization (El Karouni, 2012). The government encouraged immigrants to organize their communities according to their beliefs. Today, the higher number of religious organizations in the Netherlands has been the result of this policy (Crul & Doomernik, 2003). However, since 1998 liberal policies have increasingly been replaced with restrictive policies (Vasta, 2007). The Dutch integration policy has shifted from being one of socio-economic participation to socio-cultural adaptation (Scholten, 2011). As a result, these less liberal policies have become constraints for Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the policies of Germany are more liberal than those of the Netherlands.

III. National Cleavage Structures

Cultural diversity and granting dual citizenship to Turkish immigrants are controversial issues among Dutch and German societies that constitute a constraint in their contexts. Before 9/11, immigrants were accommodated with regards to the multiculturalism principle in the Netherlands; however, retaining dual citizenship and using the language of the home country has increasingly been seen as latent disloyalty by several Dutch officials in the securitization process. It was first Frits Bolkestien, the leader of right-wing party VVD, who protested against the immigrants and Muslims. He saw an incompatibility between Western and Islamic values. Later Pim Fortuyn, the party leader of the LPF defined Islam as a backward culture. He was murdered by an animal activist before the elections in 2002. After Fortuyn, the criticism of the integration policy has increased and several politician, columnists, and scholars joined in this debate. In the 2010 national elections, a far-right party (PVV) was able to attract 15.5 percent of the
total number of votes by using the same rhetoric against Muslims (El Karouni, 2012).

This process illustrates the recent changes in the structure of Dutch society that has increasingly become a constraint for Turkish immigrants. However, one respondent from the Netherlands stressed: “While one part of Dutch society accepts Turkish immigrants, another part of society advocates against us.” (NL-ORG-01)

Although there is no xenophobic mainstream party in Germany, the cultural diversity approach has never been officially favored by German governments (Fekete & Sivanandan, 2009). Therefore, dual nationality is still a problem for Turkish immigrants in Germany. However, according to a respondent from Germany, “one part of society is in favor for dual citizenship in Germany.” (DE-ORG-01) In addition, there are two common views among German society for granting citizenship to immigrants. Conservatives argue that citizenship should be granted after an integration process; on the other hand, liberals assert that citizenship must be the first step in order to successfully integrate people with an immigrant background (Peter et al., 2010). Moreover, one interviewee from Germany stated that:

There are far-rightist in society. They have always hostility towards us. However, there is an opportunity to find different views among natives who are not hostile….If the hostile natives are the majority, it is not possible to live here for us. There is an understanding of caring people as humans in the society. (DE-ORG-02)

IV. The Availability of Alliances

Koopmans and Statham (2000) noted that the strategic alliance with political actors provides an opportunity to change the balance of power. If immigrants cannot find any allies in the political arena for their causes, they may not be successful in this regard.
However, if the political actors are internally divided, they may find more opportunity to achieve their goals.

The participants from both Germany and the Netherlands placed emphasis on the strategic alliances of Turkish immigrants. In Germany, “Turkish immigrants were organized in labor unions at first when they came to Germany. The closest party to these unions has been SDP. For that reason, there is sympathy towards SDP among Turkish immigrants.” (DE-ORG-10) In addition to the SDP, other leftist parties (e.g. the Greens) have been regarded as relatively more open parties to Turkish immigrants. However, one respondent from Germany stressed that a political party can be an ally in an issue with Turkish immigrants; conversely it can also favor an arrangement against them. “While the Greens have advocated for dual citizenship, they have favored the prohibition of circumcision which negatively affects Turks.” (DE-PPM-03) Thus, he argued that there is no political party that truly advocates for the rights of Turkish immigrants.

In a similar vein, in the Netherlands, there have been some political parties that have advocated for the rights of immigrants. For example, the Socialist Party (SP) and the Labor Party (PvdA) have usually been regarded as the proponents of immigrants by Turkish population. On the other hand, PVV was the most criticized party among respondents because of its anti-Muslim approaches. However, two respondents from the Netherlands argued that the increase in Islamophobia in society has negatively affected other political parties because of their concerns of attracting voters. For example, “PvdA, for which Turkish immigrants mostly vote, can support legislation and rules that are more restrictive for Turkish immigrants.” (NL-ORG-03)
V. Migrant Networks

The Consultative Council of Turks in the Netherlands (IOT) was established in 1985. It represents the general interests of Turkish immigrants as an advisory body (Mugge, 2011). In addition, the CMO (The Contact Body for Muslims and Government) established in 2004 is the other key body through which Turkish immigrants are represented in the Netherlands. Several Turkish religious and cultural umbrella organizations are affiliated with these bodies. In this sense, they are seen as providing a crucial opportunity to present the claims and opinions of Turkish immigrants to the Dutch government by the respondents from the Netherlands. In Germany, there are also several Turkish umbrella organizations that represent the Turkish community. Religious Affairs (DITIB), Islamic Community Milli Gorus (IGMG), and The Union of Islamic Culture (VIKZ) are among them (Yükleyen & Yurdakul, 2011). During the last decade, the significance of Turkish immigrant organizations has increased and they have taken on a spokesperson position in the process of integration into German society (Amelina & Faist, 2008). In both countries, these organizations have several networks with governmental agencies, churches, and other minorities which provide an opportunity in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants.

VI. Discursive Opportunities

Koopmans and Statham (2000) addressed the importance of the discursive opportunities that provide for the fostering of visibility, resonance, and the legitimacy of claims and arguments in the mobilization process. Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands have similar problems in terms of discursive opportunities in their respective contexts.
According to the interview findings, in both countries, Turkish immigrants have difficulties when trying to be visible in the national media. A participant from Germany stressed this problem: “Several civil society organizations come together and organize a press conference. The German media showed interest in this conference; however, you could not find even 4-5 sentences in the newspapers about this on the following day.”

(DE-ORG-03) In addition, a participant from the Netherlands gave more details:

The issues against Muslims are expressed in the media every day. Muslims write their arguments about these issues and send them to the relevant newspapers. Nevertheless, the newspapers do not publish these arguments as if they made an agreement with each other not to publish them. I believe that there is a secret censor among the media. The misleading and biased news about Muslims is published; however, you cannot explain that the news is misleading…. At the end, you say where the democracy is. Ok, I am discussing the issues, but I cannot make them heard. (NL-PPM-01)

Five participants from Germany and six participants from the Netherlands also stated similar arguments. In addition, Turks have their own presses in both countries. Nevertheless, their visibility problem still continues. Schumann (2008) argued that almost all the Turkish presses’ articles and news go unnoticed by German politicians and media. The main reason here is that most Germans are not able to read these newspapers in Turkish.

In a similar vein, they have several problems in trying to resonate with other actors in the realm of politics. A participant from Germany noted: “If you have no problem and demand, you can speak with them. However, if you reflect your problems to them, this problem will not go further from just talking.” (DE-ORG-01) In the Netherlands, one respondent stressed the same problem: “Our community cannot make their voice heard. Besides, if we voice our opinions, how much they are considered! There is almost no hearing.” (NL-ORG-03) Since Turkish immigrants have serious
visibility and resonance problems, it is obvious that they may have more serious problems with legitimacy. Nevertheless, their several claims such as dual citizenship can be supported by some political actors that were mentioned previously. In addition, the representative bodies and organizations of Turkish immigrants can find opportunities to convey their issues and make claims thanks to the prevailing governmental initiatives and efforts. As a result, these claims may gain legitimacy to some extent.

2. The Nature and Objectives of Mobilization

A. Motives of Mobilization

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the perceptions of Turkish immigrants have been negatively affected in the securitization process. In this section, as a next step, the main focus is about what may motivate Turkish immigrants to mobilize considering the changes in their perceptions. To support that aim, the author examines concerns about uncertainty, identification, attitudes towards host society, and the motivational impetus of mobilization (reactive or proactive).

I. Concerns about Uncertainty

Hogg (2000) emphasized the role of uncertainty reduction in order to address intergroup relations. A feeling of certainty is crucial since it provides confidence about their environment and future. However, a feeling of uncertainty is detrimental for people, and hence they seek to reduce uncertainty. When all perceptions of Turkish immigrants about the securitization process in Germany and the Netherlands are examined, there is evidence that their feelings of uncertainty were increased after 9/11. Indeed, this was an
outcome of the securitization process. The findings of the study revealed that they perceived more discrimination, an increase in hate-crimes against Muslims, suspicion about Muslims by natives, and more restrictive integration policies, legislation, and practices. Therefore, most of them felt that their environment in their contexts changed negatively especially after 9/11.

As a result, considering what Hogg (2000) asserted, they needed to search for solutions for reducing their uncertainty particularly in what was subjectively crucial for them. This aspect provides an idea about their choice of mobilization approaches. There is evidence that the political arena was very significant for them since they faced more restrictive policies and practices after 9/11. The study also revealed that their relations with the natives were considerably affected in this process. Another important concern of Turkish immigrants that was discussed was the threat to their ethnic and religious identities or what made them Muslim and Turk. As a consequence, one can conclude that the political, social, and cultural forms of mobilization were the most prevalent forms of their mobilization attempts in response to the prevailing securitization processes.

II. Identification

A large plurality of respondents from Germany and the Netherlands placed emphasis on ‘inaccurate images’, ‘misperceptions’, ‘misunderstandings’ about Muslims and Turkish immigrants. These perceptions indicate that they have experienced a negative social identity in their contexts. However, according to the one of the principles of Social Identity Theory (SIT), people try to keep or to achieve positive social identity. In this respect, they are expected to act with the aim of achieving or maintaining positive
social identity. Another principle of SIT concerning the comparisons between the in-group and relevant out-groups for positive social identity can explain one of the dimensions of why participants from the Netherlands felt more positive about discrimination in their context than did the participants from Germany. Turks in Germany may have less opportunity to compare themselves with other minorities because of their respectively high population and the perceptions equating Muslim and Turk. They may generally only compare themselves with the natives. On the other hand, Turks in the Netherlands may have an opportunity to compare themselves not only with natives but also with Moroccan immigrants. As a result, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands may experience a more positive identity when they compare themselves to Moroccan immigrants whom they consider to be more affected.

Three possible disidentification paths as a result of security concerns of natives have been found among Turkish immigrants in the present study. The first change is moving away from a religious identity. This probability may be concurrent phenomena in both countries. However, it seemed less likely to occur among Turkish immigrants as a response to security concerns. Only one participant from Germany stressed this possibility: “Some Turks, who had anxieties in this process, feared to go to certain mosques and moved away from the things that are religious or seemed religious.” (DE-ORG-09)

The second change is moving away from a national identity and increasingly identifying with ethnic and religious groups. This was the most stressed topic, thus 12 participants (5 from Germany and 7 from the Netherlands) placed an emphasis on this type of change. The participants who addressed this change believed that this possibility
was more likely to emerge as a result of the securitization process. The Rejection-Identification Model (RIM) and the Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM) were proposed to account for the identification of minorities as a result of perceived discrimination, otherness, exclusion, and so on. Both models can explain the identification of Turkish immigrants in this process to some extent. The combination of two models may better account for the changes in the identification of Turkish immigrants.

Firstly, according to the Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM), if ethnic minorities perceive that the superordinate national group discriminates against them, they will feel less of a belonging to superordinate national in-group (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). There is evidence that Turkish immigrants felt more discrimination and otherness in their contexts after 9/11; therefore, they were more likely to feel less belonging to the Dutch or German majority and to disengage from the mainstream society. A participant from Germany stated: “While we have approached to German society, they have increasingly moved away from us. Undoubtedly, this resulted in disappointment. For that reason, there may be distancing from host society.” (DE-ORG-04) In a similar way, a respondent from the Netherlands expressed his observations about disidentification from Dutch society as a result of securitization of integration:

There is a perception that they are trying to integrate us forcefully… For example, our youngsters have been angry with that. They may react to native population. They even may try to forget the Dutch language as a reaction to this. They say that if you approach like this, I will deliberately move away from what you want to convert me. (NL-ORG-07)
Secondly, the Rejection-Identification Model (RIM) concentrates on identification with the in-group as a response to prejudice. According to the RIM, in order to decrease the negative effects of prejudice, people increasingly identify with their own group (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). As a response of securitization, Turkish immigrants are more likely to identify themselves with their ethnic and/or religious identity. Participants from both countries stressed that there was a re-ethnicization process among Turkish immigrants. A respondent from the Netherlands expressed the view that:

I purchased a house in a place where there is no Turk. The natives looked askance at me… I felt that they have prejudice since they did not know me. As a result, I felt discomfort, and I looked for Turks around me… We are looking for each other. We feel more comfortable and more secure when we are together. We sometimes may not feel like this with natives. (NL-PPM-02)

In a similar vein, a respondent from Germany noted that:

As a consequence of the exclusion of Turks by the government, politicians, media, and society, Turks felt that they have to search for their own identity. They began to ask about where their country was and who would protect and help them. They automatically inclined towards their home country. (DE-ORG-03)

Additionally, participants emphasized the inclination to religious identity. A participant from Germany stated that:

9/11 can be seen as a watershed in history. The view about Muslims changed rapidly and the approaches based upon security towards Muslims have taken place… The backlash of these concerns has been to recede from the society and the view that if you approach me like this, I will be more attached to my religion. (DE-ORG-10)

Similarly, a participant from the Netherlands noted that:

I saw many Muslims saying that ‘I was not aware of my Muslim identity. I felt I was Dutch. However, after these events I realized I was assimilated. If natives see Muslims as others, I will never be accepted by them.’ Therefore, they became more attached to their religion. (NL-PPM-01)
A participant from the Netherlands emphasized the fact that Muslim youngsters increasingly showed their religious identity in the aftermath the events of the 9/11 and the murder of van Gogh. However, two respondents argued that they do not think that Turkish immigrants became more religious as a result of this process. This indicates that religious identification and religiosity should not be mixed together since Turkish immigrants who increasingly identify with their religion may not be too religious.

The third and last change that was revealed by the study was moving away from both national and religious identity. In terms of this probability, the change in religious identity was realized in the form of changing the existing views about Islam to radical views. Therefore, identifying with radical groups or self-radicalization may be a consequence of this process. Cesari (2007) argued that the implementation of more restrictive security measures towards Muslims after 9/11 influenced the religious behavior of European Muslims. The securitization of integration has thus possibly empowered the motives for radicalization such as “an identification with victims of repression, political discontent and disillusionment over the possibility of change through nonviolent actions, the feeling that Islam is under attack, an experience of discrimination, a sense of marginalization” (d’Appollonia, 2010, p. 129). According to Khosrokhavar (2010), the factors that contribute to radicalization are segregation, the feeling of being hated, stigmatization, and rejection by society and the state. Murshed and Pavan (2011) argued that political factors and socioeconomic disadvantage are of importance in terms of understanding the factors that drive the development of the ‘radicalized collective action’ in Europe.
Turkish immigrants are more aware than before of radicalization among Muslim immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. According to the interview findings, 14 participants (6 from Germany and 8 from the Netherlands) felt that radicalization increased in their contexts to some extent after 9/11. However, the radicalization of Turkish immigrants was not prevalent and only a tiny number of Turkish immigrants were radicalized. Only one participant from Germany argued that Turkish immigrants were not radicalized in this process. Three participants (1 from Germany and 2 from the Netherlands) were not sure whether radicalization increased or whether existing radicalized people had increasingly been presented by the media especially after 9/11. Four respondents from the Netherlands stressed that radicalization were more evident among other Muslims in comparison to Turkish immigrants. A participant from the Netherlands also asserted that radicalization among Turkish immigrants was less prevalent than radicalization among right-wing extremists in this process. Several respondents addressed the reasons for the increased radicalization. The existence of several forms of Salafist movement in Germany and the Netherlands, the increased presentation of radicalized people in the media, the radical changes in society, the negative feelings (exclusion, hatred, discrimination and so on), and societal problems may lead to radicalization.

A question that arises here is why Turkish immigrants felt less radicalized compared with other groups. They believed that social control among Turkish immigrants and the activities of Turkish religious organizations play a key role to play in preventing the radicalization of Turkish youngsters. The researcher also observed that the structure and functions of mosques was different from the mosques in Turkey. While praying is the
main objective for building mosques in Turkey, in both countries, there are several mosques and Cem houses that function as not only for praying purposes but also as cultural and educational centers. They may have a classroom, a restaurant, a tea shop, a barber shop, a conference room, even a poolroom. They give some courses to youngsters about Islam and recitation of the Qur’an. In addition, these sites have a significant role to play in the socialization of Turkish immigrants. People have opportunity to meet each other and talk and discuss several issues such as religion and social life in those venues.

A respondent from the Netherlands shared his experience:

One of the chief of police stated in a newspaper that he could readily sleep at nights since a mosque was established there. We stopped by this police chief and asked why he expressed like this. He told that while this mosque stays there, the radicalization in streets ends. (NL-ORG-02)

Moreover, not only the religious organizations but also other cultural and educational organizations were regarded as important for preventing radicalization. Furthermore, the positive inculcation by Imams may be an important factor for preventing radicalization. For example, in a mosque in Germany where the researcher participated in a Friday prayer, the Imam’s sermon was about being tolerant and respectful in society.

### III. Attitudes towards Host Society

The Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) emphasizes four types of threats (realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes) that lead to prejudice. It can be possible to predict attitudes toward out-groups by using these types of threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). There is evidence that all types of threats increased for Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands in the securitization process.
First of all, realistic threats were highly reported by the study participants. Twenty-four of the 27 participants noted these threats. They perceived that hate crimes targeting them increased after 9/11. More physical attacks on Muslims and their mosques, NSU murders in Germany, the anxiety of vulnerable Muslims (e.g. Muslim females wearing headscarves) about being attacked can be regarded as examples among such threats. Therefore, the realistic threats to their existence and physical well-being were increased in the securitization process.

Second, symbolic threats to the values, beliefs, and attributes of Turkish minority were evident. Sixteen respondents (9 from Germany and 7 from the Netherlands) placed an emphasis on symbolic threats. The negative image of Islam in society, the consideration of a linkage of terrorism and their religion by the natives, and the presentation of their culture as a backward culture by some politicians, intellectuals, and media were stressed by the respondents and can be regarded as threats to their values and beliefs. These symbolic types of threats were also perceived as being increased after 9/11.

Third, there was evidence that negative stereotyping also rose as a result of the securitization process. The negative stereotypes such as being unfaithful, twofaced, prejudiced, unfair, and shrewd were stated by the respondents with respect to the natives, politicians, and the media. The unequal treatment of Muslims and the security approaches towards them resulted in them using such expressions about the natives.

Fourth, in this process, intergroup anxiety, which refers to experiencing the feelings of being threatened because of worrying about experiencing negative emotions in intergroup contacts, also increased as a result of security concerns. One respondent
from the Netherlands noted that:

When people have a feeling of not being trusted by others, they will not be pleased. Or some people may feel anxiety about whether they will be excluded in workplace, fired from their job, and said that they will not be accepted to the job beforehand, excluded in school, given less grades, discriminated against, and so on. (NL-ORG-05)

Consequently, it can be expected that there would be more negative attitudes towards the natives in the securitization process by Turkish immigrants according to the prediction of ITT. Nevertheless, two antecedents, in-group identification and contact, were added by Stephan and Stephan (2000) as regards attitudes towards out-groups. Strong in-group identification makes people react to threats with prejudice. Therefore, when the increase in identifying with ethnic and religious group by Turks in both countries is taken into account, it can also be expected there will be an increase in prejudice. Additionally, positive contact with the natives can reduce this prejudice or vice versa.

IV. Proactive or Reactive?

Considering the nature of intergroup relations between Muslims and natives, Statham et al. (2005, p. 443) categorized group demands as proactive and reactive by referring to them as ‘the motivational impetus of a group demand’. In a similar fashion, the mobilization of Turkish immigrants can be categorized as proactive and reactive. The reactive form involves a response to the specific actions of the state and host society. This category, therefore, refers to the direct responses to a particular action of the state and host society by Turkish immigrants. By contrast, if they select the proactive option, Turkish immigrants may not mobilize as a response to a specific action of natives and the
state, yet may proactively and autonomously mobilize to deal with their problems (lessening the current problems or preventing the possible ones) in the securitization process. For example, sending faxes or emails to the authorities condemning a specific case by Turkish immigrants can be regarded as a reactive example; on the other hand, organizing Iftar dinners by Turkish organizations to develop better relationships with natives can be viewed as examples of a proactive response.

In this sense, the responses of subject participants were examined by considering the reactive and proactive options. Figure 8 indicates the numbers of actions of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands in this regards.

Figure 8. Comparison of the Responses of Participants by Categorizing Mobilization as Reactive and Proactive.

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From NVivo-10 Software

Considering all responses of the participants from the two countries, the study found a total of 56 proactive actions. Organizing conferences, Iftar dinners, and dialogue meetings, promoting political participation of Turkish immigrants, supporting the
education of youngsters, and developing social projects were among some of the proactive actions. Additionally, 43 reactive actions were identified in the study. Opening lawsuits, organizing press releases and signature campaigns, protesting, and sending faxes and emails as a reaction to controversial issues (such as halal slaughtering and circumcision) and the practices and policies that have negative impacts on Turkish immigrants were also among some of the reactive actions. As demonstrated in Figure 8, the number of proactive actions (56) was higher than the number of reactive responses (43). The study reached the same result when the two countries are examined separately. In the Netherlands, the number of proactive actions (31) was notably higher than the number of reactive ones (20). On the other hand, in Germany, the number of proactive actions (25) was slightly higher than the number of reactive actions (23). These results indicate that proactive actions were more prevalent among the participants from the Netherlands than in Germany.

B. Objectives of Mobilization

There have been several objectives in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants. In this study, the objectives were clarified by examining the interview responses. As a result, seven main objectives were identified in the study. These were;

- To achieve social change: To achieve or keep positive social identity is one of the main principles of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Turner, 1975). However, there is evidence that, in the securitization process, Turkish immigrants have experienced negative social identity. In order to respond to negative social identity, they may use several strategies based on the belief system of social change (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Therefore, to achieve social change can be said to be one of their main objectives.

- To affect policy: Another main objective may also have been to affect policy, to change a policy towards a more beneficial one, to cancel a policy that was perceived as detrimental for Turkish immigrants, to have a voice in politics, and so on.

- To change the practices of institutions: Other than changing the policy, the objective may be to change the practices of institutions such as security agencies and schools that are seen as negative for Turkish immigrants.

- To have equal rights: If a right was given to a group or a minority by law and Turkish immigrants do not think that they have the same right, their objective can be to obtain equal rights with other relevant groups.

- To have exclusive group rights: Other than equal rights, Turkish immigrants may claim exclusive group rights those were not given to any minority or group.

- To protect their cultural heritage: One of the main objectives of Turkish immigrants may be to protect their culture.

- To be treated equally by the natives: The objective here may be to be treated equally in their contexts by society.

Figure 9 and Figure 10 represent these objectives in Germany and the Netherlands in a hierarchical way.
According to the interview findings, the most valued objective in the mobilization process of Turkish immigrants in both countries was ‘to affect policy’. In the securitization process, there have been more restrictive policies towards Muslims. Therefore, this finding can be expected to be a response to this phenomenon.

The objective of achieving social change is the second most important aspect of the figures depicted for both countries. While this aspect constitutes about 40 percent of the diagram in the Netherlands, it constitutes a quarter of the diagram in Germany. The negative impacts of the securitization process on intergroup relations had a key role to play in having Turkish immigrants intend to decrease these negative effects.
However, there is a big difference in the objectives of having equal rights. While to have equal rights was a highly stressed objective among the participants from Germany, it was emphasized less often by the respondents from the Netherlands. State-religion relations in both countries may be account for this difference. While Turkish organizations in Germany have problems with obtaining PLC status that are granted to other religious groups, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have been enjoying religious rights that are granted to all religious minorities. The other reason for this difference may be the legal status of Turkish immigrants. Dual nationality is a problem for the majority of Turkish immigrants in Germany, while some other minorities have already attained this right.

The other objectives (to change the practices of institutions, to have exclusive group rights, to protect cultural heritage, and to provide equal treatment by natives) were relatively less identified in both countries.

C. Selected Acculturation Strategies

According to Berry’s (1997) acculturation model, there are different levels of strategies; integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. These acculturation strategies are formed by considering four possibilities that are keeping\not keeping one’s own culture and interacting\not interacting with the natives.

The first strategy is assimilation. In this strategy, immigrants interact with natives, but they are not motivated to keep their culture. According to the interview findings, 13 participants (7 from the Netherlands and 6 from Germany) felt that assimilation has been the main objective of their host country in efforts to integrate Turkish immigrants. They
believed that there are currently assimilated Turkish immigrants in their contexts; however, it is less likely for Turkish immigrants to move away from their own culture as a consequence of the security concerns. On the contrary, they argued that, in both countries, the securitization process led to a retreat from the host society by some Turkish immigrants who desired to make contact with the natives.

In addition to retreating from the host society, as a second strategy, Turkish immigrants may also prefer to distance themselves from their own culture. This strategy is referred to as marginalization which contributes to the radicalization of Turkish immigrants. As a response to the security concerns of natives, a Turkish immigrant may retreat from the host society and begin to distance him or herself from his/her own cultural and religious group values while prioritizing other values. This scenario can be found in the form of radicalization which was stressed in the previous section. However, there is evidence that only a tiny number of Turkish immigrants were the subjects of this strategy in Germany and the Netherlands.

The third strategy is separation. In this strategy, the maintenance of cultural values is crucial for immigrants; however, they have no or limited interaction with the larger society. Indeed, this is mainly the case for the first wave of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands that was elaborated on “the characteristics of Turkish immigrants” section. Therefore, most of them had no or limited contact with the natives, as well as while enjoying their retirement. There is a consensus among respondents that particularly the first wave of Turkish immigrants may have problems with integration: however, this should be regarded as normal when their objectives, language skills, age, and socio-economic status are taken into account. Three respondents also argued that the
integration problem of the first wave of Turkish immigrants was not their fault, however, prior policies towards them should be considered in this regards.

Living in segregated areas may also be related to the acculturation strategy of separation. The housing market in Germany causes residential segregation between the natives and foreigners. Around 39 percent of Turkish immigrants live in a residential area in which majority of the population are foreigners, and in turn, find less opportunity to interact with natives (Haug et al., 2009). The similar segregation issue is the case for Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. They have been mostly concentrated in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, and The Hague (Demant et al., 2007).

In addition to that, there is evidence that disidentification and re-ethnicization processes have played a role in separation. The findings of the study confirmed the fact that some Turkish immigrants increasingly identified themselves with their own in-group while they distanced themselves from the native population as a result of the securitization process. A participant from the Netherlands noted the separation of Turkish youngsters:

For example, as long as the youngsters perceive discrimination, are excluded in schools, and feel that they are treated like this because of being seen as foreigners, they tightly attach to their ethnic identity, turn to their own in-group, and cannot interact with Dutch society. (NL-ORG-05)

The fourth and the last strategy is integration. In this strategy, immigrants wish to maintain their cultural identity and participate in the society. All respondents defined the term ‘integration’ in the context of maintaining their culture and values and participating in the host society. However, there have been several questions about what the natives mean by using the term integration, namely assimilation or integration. In this respect, 6
participants proposed the term ‘participation’ instead of the term ‘integration’. A participant from Germany stated that:

When we asked the former interior minister of Bavaria the definition of integration, he defined it as becoming the same as much as possible. In addition, another interior minister said that the best integration is assimilation. If you ask me, without any doubt, I can emphasize participation. (DE-ORG-04)

One of the respondents from the Netherlands stated that: “They cannot tell me to integrate into society. I have been already integrated and a part of society since I was born and educated in here. I can only participate in society.” (NL-PPM-04)

There is evidence that integration is the favorite acculturation strategy among Turkish immigrants. Seventeen participants (9 from the Netherlands and 8 from Germany) noted that Turkish immigrants are attached to their host countries. Four of them stated that Turkish immigrants who are second generation have no integration problem in their contexts. In a similar vein, four of them also noted that most of the Turkish immigrants have already been integrated into the host society. Language skills, to obey the laws and rule, to be familiar with host culture, to understand natives, and even to react the way a native reacts were seen as indicators of integration of Turkish immigrants. On the other hand, three respondents from Germany noted that unemployment cannot be an indicator of integration since it is a societal class problem that a German can also experience in Germany. In addition, four respondents argued that the acceptance of Turkish immigrants by natives is crucial for their integration. Nevertheless, fifteen respondents (8 from the Netherlands and 7 from Germany) emphasized that securitization process have negatively affected the integration of Turkish immigrants.
Most of the Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands may choose integration as acculturation strategy; however this does not mean that they fully accept the current integration policies of their country of residency. According to a Dutch parliamentary report, a study revealed that people found the past integration policy more successful than the current one (Tom, 2006). Seven participants from the Netherlands confirmed this finding. On the other hand, three respondents from the Netherlands emphasized that both integration policies before and after 9/11 were problematic. The prior integration policy was regarded as too soft; conversely, the integration policy after 9/11 was seen as more restrictive. For example, they believed that before 9/11 Turkish immigrants were free to learn the Dutch language and no one cared about this however, after 9/11, they were forced to learn the Dutch language. In Germany, the respondents had difficulties to compare the integration policies before and after 9/11. Five of them noted that there was no integration policy before the beginning of the last decade and the integration policy was only implemented after German politicians accepted Germany as a country of migration. However, one of them stated that social policies were implemented to integrate Turkish immigrants before 9/11 while these were not named integration policies.

3. **Has there been any change in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants?**

The negative impact of the securitization process on Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands was previously emphasized and confirmed by the findings of the present study. In addition, their characteristics and how they were dealt with in their contexts was elaborated on by considering the differences and similarities in both countries. The findings from factors of mobilization pointed out that these factors also
had an impact on the motives and objectives of mobilization and selected of the acculturation strategies. When all the previous findings are taken into account, one can conclude that the mobilization of Turkish immigrants was expected to change as a response to securitization.

**A. More or Less Mobilization?**

In order to address whether there has been any change in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in the securitization process, the main question should be whether Turkish immigrants became more or less mobilized after 9/11. Based on several factors that were reported in the previous sections (such as the negative perceptions of Turkish immigrants (e.g. discrimination, exclusion, and otherness), the increased restrictions against them, experiments of negative social identity, the increase in identifying the in-group, the decrease in identifying the national out-group, and so on) are considered, one can claim that Turkish immigrants may have felt that they should be more active in their contexts to deal with their emergent problems. As a result, they were expected to mobilize more after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration.

The findings of this study confirmed these arguments. In both countries, there was a consensus about the increase in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants after 9/11. Twenty three participants (12 from the Netherlands and 11 from Germany) noted that Turkish immigrants became more active, more organized, and more mobilized after 9/11. One of the respondents from the Netherlands summarized this change:

As a consequence of the suppression by the state and exclusion, we said that we have been increasingly excluded from society, you are a Turk and I am also a Turk, and we should come and work together despite our differences. (NL-ORG-04)
One of the participants from Germany emphasized that: “The organizations who intentionally kept away from each other previously achieved the ability to speak each other after 9/11. We are coming together now; however, we have still problems with acting together.” (DE-ORG-03) In a similar vein, five participants (3 from Germany and 2 from the Netherlands) stressed that the organization of Turkish immigrants is not at a desired level while they are more active in their contexts. Nevertheless, the increase in mobilization of Turkish immigrants may not only be a result of security concerns, but also other factors such as changes in their characteristics regarding their legal status, education, immigrant generation, and socioeconomic status. In addition, fourteen respondents (10 from the Netherlands and 4 from Germany) noted that they had become more organized than the other Muslim communities in Germany and the Netherlands.

**B. What Kind of Mobilization?**

**I. Political Mobilization**

In this section, broadly defining political mobilization, the researcher considers not only the process of electoral participation of Turkish immigrants but also their other activities in the political arena (such as efforts to change a policy and develop relationships with those in the power structure and so on). The previous sections revealed that, Turkish immigrants in both countries perceived more restrictive policies and practices that affected them negatively in their contexts. For that reason, the political arena has been a crucial element for Turkish immigrants in the securitization process. Thus, Turkish immigrants have mobilized with the aim of changing or cancelling the policies that have affected them negatively and have searched for more positive policies.
in this regard. They have also aimed to be represented and have a voice in politics in order to be able to respond to the security concerns of the natives.

As discussed previously, most Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have Dutch citizenship and are able to participate in national elections. In addition, Turkish citizens who stay reside for more than 5 years in the Netherlands can also participate in local elections. On the other hand, in Germany, non-EU countries’ citizens have no right to vote in either national or local elections. The only way for Turkish immigrants to participate in elections is for them to be German citizens. Therefore, citizenship stands as a structural constraint for Turks in Germany who want to participate in politics since most of them are not naturalized. For example, by 2004, only 470,000 German citizens with Turkish origin were eligible to vote (Yükleyen, 2012). Therefore, the low naturalization rate of Turkish immigrants in Germany precludes their representation in the political arena. In this sense, in a comparative perspective, one can argue that Turkish immigrants in Germany have less opportunity to participate in the political process than Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

One of the main differences between Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands is their voter turnout rates. According to a study in the Netherlands, Turkish immigrants participate in elections more than any other ethnic minority in the Netherlands. In the 1998 local elections, their voter turnout rates were about 40 percent in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Van Heelsum, 2005). In addition, in the securitization process, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands began to become increasingly involved in political activities. For example, many Turks participated as voters and candidates in local elections in 2006 in the Netherlands (Kaya, 2009). In
Rotterdam, the Liveable Rotterdam Party was the largest party in power between 2002 and 2006 and focused on the integration of Muslims. On the other hand, in the same period, the Labor Party focused more on active citizenship of all immigrants. In this polarized atmosphere, as a response, more Turkish immigrants participated in local elections in Rotterdam in 2006 in comparison to the 2002 elections and most of them voted for the Labor Party. While in 2002, two Turkish immigrants were candidates for the Labor Party and won 4,200 votes, in 2006, five Turks were candidates for the Labor Party and won around 13,000 votes. Turkish immigrants were the largest participants in the 2006 elections in Rotterdam among all other immigrant minorities. Therefore, they played a key role in the victory of the Labor Party in the Rotterdam elections in 2006 (Open Society Foundations, 2010). In addition, according to an interviewee from the Netherlands, the voter turnout rate of Turkish immigrants in the last election in the Netherlands exceeded 50 percent.

On the other hand, according to interview findings, five respondents from Germany stated that the voter turnout rate of Turkish immigrants was very low (between 20 and 30 percent of total Turkish voters in Germany). The participants from Germany also noted why their voter turnout rate was low. The most emphasized reason (4 respondents) was the common perception about the lack of a political party that cares about them. One participant stated that:

The inventor of first and second class citizens was Merkel. The people who despise our genetic makeup are Social Democrats. The Left Party has many problems with us… All of them produced the perception that they do not care about us; therefore the best thing to do is not to vote. Unfortunately, our low voter turnout rate confirms that. (DE-ORG- 04)
In addition, the apathy of Turkish youngsters to the elections was regarded as another reason by two participants. Contrary to respondents from Germany, five participants from the Netherlands argued that Turkish youngsters are more interested in politics and more conscious about voting. They are interested in party programs and search for a candidate who can represent them.

As a result, Turkish immigrants in Germany participated less frequently in elections in comparison to Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 11\(^2\) show the big gap in the representation of Turkish immigrants in the German and Dutch national parliaments.

Table 2. The Representation of Parliamentarians Originated from Turkey in German Bundestag (German Federal Diet).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Period</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>The Left Party</th>
<th>Alliance 90 / The Greens</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% in pop.</th>
<th>% in house of rep.</th>
<th>Representation Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013- Present</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The number of Turkish representatives in the German Bundestag was retrieved

\(^2\) In these tables and figure, I used representation index which was also used by Bloemraad (2013) to calculate minority representation in the parliaments of European countries. The index is calculated by “dividing the percentage of minority representatives in a particular elected body by the percentage of people from that same minority group among the general population. A figure of 0 indicates an absolute lack of representation while 1 indicates perfect ‘mirror’ representation: there is parity in the minority group’s proportion in the population and their proportion in the elected body. Numbers below 1 indicate under-representation; those above 1 signal more representation in office than we would expect based on demographic data alone” (Bloemraad, 2013, p. 657-658).
from the Official Website of the German Bundestag (www.bundestag.de) and was accessed on 1/14/2014. The population proportions were calculated from the source of Federal Ministry of Interior (2011). Since there was no consensus about the population of Turkish immigrants in Germany between 1994 and 2013, the calculation of the last period concerning their proportion in total population was accepted for all election periods.

Table 3. The Representation of Parliamentarians Originated from Turkey in Dutch House of Representatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Terms</th>
<th>PvdA</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>VVD</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>D66</th>
<th>Green-Left</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% in pop.</th>
<th>% in house of rep.</th>
<th>Representation Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-Present</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The numbers of Turkish representatives in Dutch House of Representatives after 2012 was retrieved from the Official Website of the Dutch House of Representatives (http://www.tweedekamer.nl). The numbers between 1998 and 2012 were obtained by examining previous Turkish representatives from www.parlement.com. The population proportions were calculated from the sources of the website of Statistics Netherlands (http://www.cbs.nl) accessed on 1/5/2014.
Figure 11. Trend Graphic of Representation Index in Germany and the Netherlands.

These numbers and figures indicate that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were overrepresented while Turks in Germany were underrepresented in national parliaments. The high representation may point out that the Netherlands is more open to immigrants to serve as a member of parliament and Turkish immigrants are very active in the political arena in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the low naturalization and voting turnout rates of Turkish immigrants in Germany may lead to underrepresentation in the parliament.

However, the trend analysis illustrated that Turkish immigrants in Germany have been increasingly represented in the parliament. The study reached several conclusions about the reasons for the better representation in the political arena by analyzing the responses of the participants from Germany. While their voter turnout rates were low, they have become increasingly more active in politics in the context of the securitization
process. Two participants argued that Turkish organizations recently better understand
the importance of the political arena in their mobilization. In this respect, Turkish
organizations in Germany have an important role to play in this outcome. They have
increasingly mobilized Turkish immigrants to participate in elections. They have
organized several informative initiatives to introduce the candidates, brief them about
voting, and so on.

Additionally, the present interview findings revealed that Turkish organizations in
the Netherlands have promoted elections in a similar way. Kaya (2009) also reached the
same conclusions in the European context. According to Kaya (2009), Euro-Turks
research has revealed that there is a positive relationship between political participation
of the Turks in the EU and their organizational networks. Turkish organizations can
enhance social and political trust, thus, increasing political participation.

Nevertheless, another argument about the increase of Turkish representatives in
Germany was identified by analyzing the responses of the participants from Germany.
Three participants noted that there was no parliamentarian that originated from Turkey in
the North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Parliament before 2010. Two respondents argued
that the establishment of a new political party (BIG Party - The Alliance for Innovation
and Justice) in February 2010 played one of the most significant roles in the entrance of
five Turkish parliamentarians for the first time to the NRW parliament in the 2010
elections. The representative of the BIG party gave the following details about this
process:

Previously, we were a voter alliance. After establishing this alliance, we had two
seats in the local parliament in Bonn in a month… We were surprised…They
thought what we could not think before. They worried about whether we can
establish a political party since we have the same identity with 5 million people… They called us and asked whether we will enter the state level elections. I decided to annoy them and told that we will enter the elections. Do you know what happened? While there was no Muslim or Turkish parliamentarian in this federal state for 50 years, six people that originated from Turkey were presented as candidates from other political parties. We got the message. As a result, we founded the party.

There is evidence that the foundation of the BIG Party was one of the outcomes of the securitization process. The representative of the BIG Party noted that “I can see what is going on in the background, tricks, and their aims. I said that we need to stop this; however, we cannot do this in current political parties.” According to this individual, there is no political party that shares the point of views and values of Muslims and Turks and protects their values and rights even though they have problems related to diversity and having equal rights in their contexts. Contrary to this participant, DE-ORG-04 evaluated this initiative as useless since it may move Turkish immigrants away from mainstream society.

The perceptions of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands about securitization have an impact on their political party choices. This was confirmed by the interview findings of the study. Thirteen participants (7 from the Netherlands and 6 from Germany) stated that Turkish immigrants have increasingly searched for the prevailing political parties or representatives who are able to defend their concerns in the society in this process. Eleven participants from the Netherlands placed an emphasis on the fact that Turkish immigrants have increasingly selected to support various mainstream political parties. In the beginning they mostly voted for the Labor Party (PvdA). Currently, most of them also vote for PvdA. However, their party choices have changed in the last few years. The other popular parties among Turkish immigrants were the SP, CDA, D66, and Green-Left parties. According to two participants, the main change in recent years has
been the decrease in Turkish votes for the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). One participant stated that:

The CDA had been very popular among Turks until 9/11... However, in the last two election periods, Turkish immigrants voted for the leftist parties. The CDA was considered as being aligned with the right-wing parties such as PVV whose leader is Geert Wilders. Now, PVV represents the right-wing, even the extreme-right wing. While the CDA has never been an extreme party, it was regarded as being close to the PVV by the Turks. They [Turkish immigrants] said that the CDA is a right-wing party like the PVV; therefore, they would vote for the opposing parties that are not right-wing. (NL-PPM-01)

As a result, this mobilization can be regarded as a response to the Islamophobic concerns by right-wing politicians.

Similarly, Turkish immigrants in Germany have increasingly selected mainstream political parties both as voters or candidates. Six participants from Germany emphasized the changes in the votes of Turkish immigrants. They stated that most Turkish immigrants previously favored for SPD and the Greens; however, currently, they can vote for other mainstream parties. Table 2 also indicates the changes in the distribution of Turkish parliamentarians in the parliament. While the parliamentarians originated from Turkey were placed in two mainstream parties in the beginning; presently, they are spread out over four mainstream political parties. On the other hand, the BIG Party received a small number of votes (17,743) in the 2013 federal elections (The Federal Returning Officer). However, one can claim that re-ethnicization as a response to securitization may have played a role in the preference of the BIG Party in Germany among Turkish immigrants.

Turkish immigrants in Germany have more problems than Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands in the political arena. As clarified by their objectives, Turkish immigrants
in Germany have more serious equality problems in their contexts and are more mobilized towards having equal rights. Six participants from Germany noted their claims about equality. In Germany, the claims by Turkish immigrants about having PLC status, religious education in schools, dual citizenship, integration courses for family reunification, and the ban of wearing headscarf for teachers were among the most stressed claims about equality. They stressed that they do not want distinctive rights but only what the constitution gives as rights to other religions and minorities. The German Islam Conferences started in 2006 have been an opportunity to discuss their claims with government and other political actors. They achieved some of their claims in these conferences. For example, according to DE-ORG-06, putting Islamophobia on the agenda, removing Islamism from the agenda, and the acceptance of the establishment of theology departments in colleges were among these successes in the first German Islam Conference. Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands mainly mobilized as a response to several issues such as Halal slaughtering and the integration policy. Three respondents stressed the importance of the IOT and CMO in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in the political arena. They conveyed their claims through these bodies in the Netherlands.

They faced several controversial issues in both countries in the securitization process. In the Netherlands, wearing a veil was prohibited in 2011. The Dutch Council of Ministers accepted the bill that bans face covering veils since it is believed that full-face veils contradict the equality principle (FRA, 2012a). However, according to the interview findings, this was not a crucial issue for Turkish immigrants. Two respondents from the Netherlands stated that they did not respond seriously to this ban since they did not
experience such a problem in the Netherlands for Turkish immigrants. In Germany, the headscarf ban for teachers in public schools was carried at the local, state, and federal courts respectively. In September 2003, the FCC reached a decision that the rights under the Basic Law were violated (Fogel, 2006) and there was “no sufficiently statutory basis in the current law of the Land (state) Baden-Württemberg for a prohibition on teachers wearing headscarf at school and in lessons” (Federal Constitutional Court). This decision resulted in an allowance to each state to forge its own legislation regarding the headscarf issue. As a result, five states banned the headscarf exempting Christian clothing. Bremen and Lower Saxony restricted all religious dressing in schools. In eight states, there is no special legislation related to the headscarf (Human Rights Watch, 2009). According to the findings of this study, Turkish immigrants in Germany responded to the headscarf ban experienced during this period. One respondent from Germany noted that 64 organizations condemned this ban and published a press release. Two participants also stated that they were actively involved in a trial process.

While the warm-blooded animal must be stunned before being slaughtered according to Dutch Law, Jews and Muslims were exempted from this legislation. However, animal rights groups and some political parties were opposed to the ritual slaughter (Koning, 2009). As a result, the Party for the Animals (PvdD) introduced a bill that bans ritual slaughter and this bill was passed on 28 June 2011 by the Lower House (Ettinger, 2012). The responses of interviewees from the Netherlands showed that Turkish immigrants reacted to this ban. Six participants noted that Turkish organizations played an active role in challenging this ban. They also cooperated and developed positive relationship with Jews who would be affected by this ban. However, three of
them emphasized that the participation of Jews in the political arena with them resulted in the rejection of this bill by the Upper House since Jews have more impact on Dutch politics.

The study revealed a similar form of cooperation between Jews and Muslims in the circumcision ban in Germany by the Cologne regional appellate court ruling in 2012. After this ruling, the Turkish organizations in Germany condemned the ruling and claimed that it was a violation of the freedom of religion. They cooperated with the Jewish community and they signed a joint statement about this ban. As a result of these efforts, the German Bundestag adopted a law allowing circumcision under certain circumstances. As in the Netherlands, four participants from Germany also noted that it may not have been possible to change this ban if Jews would not have acted with them.

In the study, 25 processes were identified in the political mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands (Figure 12). The most valued process in the processes of political mobilization in both countries is voting. This process is the method most of the Turkish immigrants use for political participation and it is one of the basic elements of political mobilization. Entering political parties and the political activities in that regard are also very important in both countries. There is evidence that several Turks joined political parties as a result of the securitization process in their contexts. Three respondents (2 from the Netherlands and 1 from Germany) noted that they joined political parties in order to be able to respond to Islamophobia, discrimination, exclusion, and so on. Since the Turkish organizations have become more organized and more active in their contexts they have increasingly cooperated with each other for political purposes while they had weak networks before 9/11. In addition, not only Turkish organizations
but also political party members and councilors of Turkish origin have mobilized Turkish immigrants to vote in both countries.

Figure 12. Comparison of Processes of Political Mobilization in Germany and the Netherlands.

Source: Interview Findings Obtained From NVivo-10 Software

Press releases and opening lawsuits were more emphasized by the respondents from Germany than those from the Netherlands. Thanks to the separation of powers principles in both countries, they have the opportunity to challenge policies by using the justice system. For example, in 2011, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were able to cancel a policy of 2006, which required language skills and having integration courses for family reunification for the Turkish immigrants, by opening a lawsuit. Moreover, cooperating with governmental agencies and other minorities, meetings, briefings,
lobbying, and dialogue were also other important processes of political mobilization for Turkish immigrants mentioned in both countries.

Protests and civil disobedience were more reactive forms of political mobilization. A participant from the Netherlands noted that they had protested a municipal authority by banging pan and pots in order to get a required license for their mosque. Similarly, two participants from Germany stated that some Turkish immigrants preferred civil disobedience to affect the policy regarding unmotivated mosque checks in Lower Saxony. Police routinely check the identification papers of Muslims who enter or leave the mosque. These checks started in 2004 and terminated in 2010. In this time frame, some Turkish immigrants preferred not to show their IDs and were taken away to police stations for ID checks. Furthermore, Turkish immigrants also used information and communication technologies such as the Internet, social media, and fax-email in their mobilization approaches. Additionally, two respondents (one from Germany and one from the Netherlands) noted that they carried their problems (racism and unmotivated mosque checks) to the international arena to be able to affect the policies.

The answers to the question of whether political mobilization is the most effective form of mobilization in comparison to nonpolitical mobilization were varied among the participants. Two respondents from Germany and one participant from the Netherlands argued that political participation was more important. On the other hand, six participants (3 of them were political party members) from the Netherlands asserted that non-political mobilization was more effective while no participant in Germany asserted this claim. The others were not sure which was important and stressed the importance of both. One can claim that the political arena may not have satisfied the expectations of the participants
from the Netherlands, while they had more opportunity for this in comparison to
Germany. On the other hand, the participants from Germany may have had higher
expectations about achieving a decrease in the negative effects of securitization process
by better representation in the political arena since they had not experienced this position
to the same extent as in the Netherlands. However, both of them may hold their own
significance, although it is very difficult to compare them.

II. Non-Political Mobilization

In the study, two types of non-political mobilization were mainly identified as a
response to the securitization of integration: social and cultural mobilization. The first
one was related to the efforts carried out to make the social group appear more positively
in the society as a response to the negative social identity that resulted from the
securitization process and related uncertainties. The idea of cultural mobilization was
used to describe a broad idea about maintaining existing (both ethnic and religious)
values, beliefs and customs which were regarded as under threat in the securitization
process.

a. Social Mobilization

There is evidence that the Turkish immigrants felt a negative social identity
during the securitization process. Perceived discrimination on the grounds of religion and
ethnicity and the feelings of exclusion, otherness, and so on have all played a significant
role in the perception of negative social identity. As a result, people began to increasingly
associate themselves with their Turkish and Muslim identities. Turner (1975) argued that
there are two ways for responding by those who experience a negative social identity;
leaving the existing group and joining a more positive one, or making the existing group
more positive. In addition, according to Social Identity Theory, the permeability of group boundaries and leaving the existing group are positively related. Moreover, Skrobanek (2009) argued that perceived discrimination leads to the perception of non-permeability of group boundaries by minorities. In this context, there is evidence that perceived discrimination as well as social control and strong networks among Turkish immigrants had made the group boundaries of Turkish immigrants less permeable. Therefore, the first option (leaving existing group and joining more positive one) was expected to be less likely to occur among the Turkish immigrants. According to the interview findings, only one respondent from Germany noted the possibility of this option. On the other hand, both Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands mostly acted in line with the second option (to make existing group more positive) in a similar way. One participant expressed the view that “Our aim is to decrease Islamophobia and Xenophobia in the course of time and to eliminate them after all.” (NL-ORG-08)

According to Social Identity Theory, in the context of social change, there are several options that people can use as a response to negative social identity. “Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 43) was found to be the most valued option among Turkish immigrants by analyzing the responses of participants. As a response to the devaluation of their religious and ethnic identities in the securitization process, Turkish immigrants have increasingly acted towards upping their valued social identities. A participant noted that “9/11 led to Muslims to be more active in their contexts. We have been left no choice but to express ourselves after 9/11 since there has been a negative image of Muslims.” (NL-ORG-06)
There were two targeted population in this regards; the Turkish population and the larger society. The latter was highly stressed by the participants. The Turkish population was targeted with the aim of improving the members of the in-group in order to help the group to achieve a better standing in society. The larger society was targeted for dealing with the negative perceptions of the larger society as regards Turkish immigrants.

Turkish immigrants mostly targeted the larger society in both countries in a similar way after 9/11. As demonstrated by Figure 13, 15 processes were identified in the study in the context of the social mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands, and dialogue with the out-groups was the most valued process in both countries in the securitization process. Dialogue with other groups was seen to be very important since the members of other groups can have gain more advanced knowledge about Turkish immigrants through that process. Indeed, the main factors that cause the problems in their contexts were regarded as the lack of adequate knowledge about and contact between Turkish immigrants and the larger society by the respondents from both countries. After 9/11, Turkish immigrants mostly felt that they had to deal with these factors. As a result, they acted in order to develop positive relationships with the natives and to express themselves in response to their negative social identity. Twelve respondents (6 from Germany and 6 from the Netherlands) emphasized the importance of knowledge about each other in efforts to overcome the problems in intergroup relations. One participant noted that “our key problems in society are ignorance, dissension, and poverty.... Nevertheless, the ignorance comes in the first place. We have to know the host society, our values, and their values.” (DE-ORG-07) Three respondents also argued that
the events in the aftermath of 9/11 showed that natives and Turkish immigrants do not adequately know each other.

In this sense, Turkish immigrants generally focused on dialogue related activities that could make their group be viewed more positively. The respondents expected positive relationships with the larger society and more commonality, tolerance, and social cohesion in the society. A respondent stated that: “We improve our dialogues with natives…Whenever the people know each other they break the ice and become more tolerant towards each other. They say that you are different; however, I respect your differences.” (NL-ORG-06) One participant noted why they have become more involved in dialogue with larger society: “After 9/11, we have spent much time on our dialogue activities. We have more expressed ourselves since one is hostile to that one does not know. If they knew us, they would not have anxiety about us.” (DE-ORG-09) In addition, three participants emphasized that they should not be understood from what the media portrays but from them personally as a means of dialogue since the media functions as an intensifier of their negative image.
Figure 13. Comparison of Processes of Social Mobilization in Germany and the Netherlands.

Organizing Iftar dinners, conferences and panels, mutual visiting of temples, contacting neighbors, attending funerals, participating in the celebration of holy days and national days, and inviting other groups to celebrate Muslims’ holy days were among the several dialogue activities of Turkish immigrants. As a result, they found opportunities not only to express themselves, but also to inform the public about the ongoing debates about Muslims such as halal slaughtering and wearing the headscarf at a societal level.

Another important process in the social mobilization in Germany and the Netherlands was the social projects. ‘Open Mosque Day’, which refers to a day when all the public are invited to the mosques for introducing what Muslims do there, was highly
organized by several Turkish organizations in both countries after 9/11. According to DE-ORG-09, some natives believed that Muslims have violence training in mosques. By organizing these events, they aimed to eliminate the negative perceptions about mosques by natives in the securitization process. As another example, a participant from Germany noted their neighborhood project:

We have a neighborhood project. Currently, a community consciousness has been developed among people. They visit each other and solve their problems... This leads to the development of unity and solidarity in society. I cannot say we can implement this in the whole society; however, at least, this project is an example of how problems can be solved in a society. (DE-ORG-07)

As discussed in the previous chapters, Turkish organizations have also improved their cooperation among each other especially after 9/11 to deal with societal problems originated from security concerns. They can attend and support the activities of other Turkish organizations that they had serious problems with in the past.

In addition, using the Internet, social media, and Turkish media, publishing informative books, and press releases were the other identified processes of social mobilization that targeted the larger society. Particularly, press releases were used by the organizations after each terrorist event such as 9/11, the murder of van Gogh, London and Madrid bombings, and so on. Turkish organizations mostly condemned these events in the press releases.

Thirteen participants (7 from the Netherlands and 6 from Germany) emphasized that the mobilization targeting the larger society was not adequate for eliminating security concerns. They believed that the Turkish community should be in a better position in the
society morally, economically, and socially in order to be able to eliminate the negative effects of the securitization process. A respondent from the Netherlands stated that:

   In recent years, the numbers of our businessmen, academics, rhetoricians, and writers have been increased. We have many popular players and even referees in football. If the number of these examples increases, the prejudice towards us will decrease in the course of time. (NL-PPM-01)

Another respondent argued that: “We know that if we make our ways in society, they will not care about our headscarves. Successful females can overcome these problems… The successful ones are not evaluated according to their appearance” (DE-ORG-05).

To that aim, they acted in several ways such as motivating their members, encouraging students to go to colleges, assisting children in their school education, educating about moral values, informing the community about the issues of law, culture, and political and social structure of host society. Several participants noted the importance of education in forming a positive image of Turkish immigrants. One participant stated that; “The uneducated youngsters may be inclined to violence. They are harmful for our community not just for host society” (DE-ORG-09). Another participant argued that: “If we look at the youngsters who are problems for society, we can see that they are the ones who did not have religious education and family discipline” (DE-ORG-01). They stressed that they have dealt with such problems by giving religious education in mosques and performing school education supportive courses.

   In addition, they motivate and encourage the youngsters to have a better place in society. A respondent stated that: “We motivate youngsters about being integrated into society, to have a good job, and to be able to take the lead in society” (DE-ORG-03).

Moreover, some of them encouraged the youngsters to go to specific faculties in colleges:
We have been experiencing the lack of intellectuals and scholars although we are in a better place in comparison to past. The organizations have consciously acted in this regards. The channeling of youngsters to social sciences has increased. I was so sad when I heard that every youngster wants to join business schools. I told several of them that they can prefer the faculties about psychology, journalism, and law. (NL-ORG-07)

In addition, according to NL-PPM-04, in Friday sermons, the terrorist events were condemned and Muslims were asked to act peacefully.

Moreover, in order to inform the community about legal issues they cooperated with government agencies such as the police and municipality. To that aim, they organized meetings in both countries to discuss with and have information from government agencies about several issues (such as immigration, integration, and so on).

b. Cultural Mobilization

As an ethnic and religious minority, Turkish immigrants mostly aimed to maintain their values while living in German and Dutch society. All respondents favored integrating into the host society while keeping their ethnic and/or religious values. This indicates that the Turkish and/or Muslim culture and identity is very important for them. In the securitization process, they have increasingly felt that their values are under threat. In this respect, they have mobilized to keep up their values, customs, mother language, religion, and so on.

Although their political mobilization processes are also related to maintaining their values, their cultural mobilization in the non-political arena is discussed in this section. Cultural mobilization was relatively less addressed by the respondents in both countries. Only three respondents (1 from Germany and 2 from the Netherlands)
emphasized this process. The main process in cultural mobilization as a response to securitization was identified as education.

Most of the activities of Turkish organizations are related to maintaining the ethnic and religious values of Turkish immigrants. However, there is evidence that the perception of threat to their culture has resulted in them acting in a more cautious way at the community level. A respondent from Germany noted that:

Currently, we are concentrating on keeping our mother language. We have spent efforts to gain identities to our youngsters. In mosques, we teach our children about their mother language and history. Other Turkish organizations also have spent efforts in this regards. (DE-ORG-03)

In addition, one respondent expressed the following view concerning the mobilization of Turkish parents as a response to the removal of Turkish language lessons from the school curriculum in the Netherlands in 2004:

Turkish language lessons were removed from the curriculum in schools on the grounds that it precludes the integration of Turkish immigrants into the host society. Normally, each Wednesday, there were Turkish language lessons for children. After these lessons were removed, I witnessed that parents organized Turkish language courses by their own efforts. (NL-PPM-02)
CHAPTER VIII- CONCLUSION

The research was set out to explore the changes in the forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands in the securitization process. While there is a vast literature on Islamophobia and securitization of integration in Western societies, there is relatively less research about the activities of Muslims, especially Turks, as a response to these phenomena. In this sense, the study mainly sought to answer whether there has been any change in the forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration. To achieve that aim, three sub-questions were identified to answer the main research question:

1. How have Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands perceived 9/11 and the securitization of integration?

2. How has the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands changed after 9/11 as a result of the security concerns of the host society?

3. How differently have Turkish immigrants organized themselves in Germany and the Netherlands as a response to the securitization of integration since 9/11?

The study compared two contexts by considering not only their differences and similarities, but also changes after 9/11 in both. 9/11 has been regarded as a cut-off period since Muslims in Europe were increasingly affected by security concerns after it.

This chapter, firstly, provides a synthesis of the key research findings with respect to the research questions. Secondly, it focuses on the policy implications of the study.
Thirdly, it employs some recommendation for future research. And, finally, it ends with some concluding remarks.

1. Key Findings

The critical evaluation of the literature concerning the mobilization of immigrants put forth a model of immigrant mobilization as a response to the securitization process. The perceptions and characteristics of immigrants and the context of reception have been identified as the key factors of mobilization. These factors also have an impact on the motives and objectives of mobilization and the acculturation strategies selected by immigrants.

To answer the first sub-question, Chapter VI focused on the perceptions of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands about 9/11 and the securitization of integration. The general perceptions about the securitization process by Turkish immigrants in both countries have been negative. The majority of the study participants felt that Muslims have been perceived more negatively in their contexts after 9/11. Turkish immigrants in both countries widely believed that the integration policies after 9/11 targeted Muslims, and security and integration issues were addressed together. They found immigration and foreigners legislation more restrictive for them. All respondents believed that their relations with the wider society have been affected to some extent in the securitization process. They experienced more Islamophobic incidents and perceived more suspicions towards them. Nevertheless, several respondents had serious anxieties about the spreading Islamophobic sentiments to mainstream society in this process.

Moreover, the majority of the respondents felt that Turkish immigrants have been increasingly discriminated against after 9/11. In both countries, perceived
discrimination in employment was very high. However, the study revealed that the participants from Germany and the Netherlands clearly differed from each other in their perceptions about discrimination and the securitization process. Firstly, the participants from the Netherlands were more positive about discrimination carried out against them in comparison to the participants from Germany. Secondly, the participants from Germany perceived apparently more discrimination in education and housing in their contexts compared with the participants from the Netherlands. Thirdly, the respondents from the Netherlands were more positive about the security agencies than the participants from Germany. And finally, when they compared themselves with other Muslim minorities, the interviewees from the Netherlands agreed that Moroccans have been more affected in the securitization process. Therefore, Turkish immigrants felt a more positive social identity in society. On the other hand, the participants from Germany could not reach a consensus on whether they or other Muslim minorities have been more affected after 9/11 because of their relatively high population in Germany which resulted in the equating of Muslim and Turkish identities by natives.

Considering the second and third sub-questions, Chapter VII evaluated the changes in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 and the similarities and differences in their mobilization in this process. Their characteristics clearly played a significant role in their mobilization. The study found that the most valued characteristics in the mobilization of Turkish immigrants are the immigrant’s generation and language skills. Many differences between the first wave of Turkish immigrants and current immigrants in both countries were identified in the study. The most apparent differences of Turkish youngsters is their language skill, higher
education level, and attachment to the host country compared to the first wave of Turkish immigrants. The attachment to home country, social capital, culture and belief, and socioeconomic status were also among the other significant characteristics of Turkish immigrants that affected their mobilization. The key difference between Germany and the Netherlands is the legal status of Turkish immigrants. While about 80% of Turks in the Netherlands are Dutch citizens, about 60% of Turkish immigrants in Germany have not currently obtained German citizenship.

The opportunities and constraints in Turkish immigrants’ contexts have also played an important role in their mobilization. The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach provided an opportunity to better evaluate the contexts of reception. Germany and the Netherlands have both similarities and differences in this regard. From the point of their similarities, they are both democratic countries and based on the principle of separation of powers. They both provide an opportunity for Turkish immigrants to be represented to some extent by several bodies or in various platforms. In addition, Turkish immigrants can find alliances for defending some of their rights and benefits in political arena. In terms of discursive opportunities, Turkish immigrants in both countries have similar constraints about visibility of their claims and arguments. Similarly, they have difficulties in the realm of resonance and legitimacy of their claims in political arena. And finally, the current integration policies of both countries have prioritized assimilationist approaches while, previously, Germany preferred differentialist policies and the Netherlands prioritized multicultural policies.

On the other hand, there are also several differences between Germany and the Netherlands. Germany is a federal state, whereas the Netherlands is a decentralized
unitary state. Compared with past naturalization policies, Germany has liberalized its naturalization policy while the Netherlands has practiced a more restrictive one. However, dual citizenship is still a constraint in Germany for the naturalization of Turkish immigrants. In addition, the church-state structures of Germany and the Netherlands, which also affects the treatment of the Muslim population, are different from each other. While, in the Netherlands, the pillarization system allows religious communities to have several rights in state system, in Germany, the religious communities did not automatically have any rights before being granted ‘Public Law Cooperation’ (PLC) status.

These similarities and differences in the factors of mobilization also influenced the motives and objectives of their mobilization and the acculturation strategies selected by the Turkish immigrants. Considering these factors, the uncertainty reduction approach, the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT), the Social Identity Theory (SIT), and the Rejection Identification and Rejection Disidentification models all provided insight into their motives and objectives of mobilization in the securitization process. The securitization process led to feelings of uncertainty. Therefore, Turkish immigrants mobilized to reduce their uncertainty in subjectively significant areas (political, social, and cultural). In addition, the study found three possible reactive changes in the identification of Turkish immigrants that affected their mobilization. The moving away from religious identity was identified as the first possibility. However, this was less likely to occur as a response to security concerns. The second possibility was re-ethnicization. This was a prevalent change according to the interview findings. The last possibility was moving away from both national and religious identity, which may lead to radicalization. While this option
was emphasized by a large plurality of respondents, they believed that only a tiny number of Turks may have been radicalized during this process. By evaluating the ITT, the study reached the conclusion that negative attitudes towards the host society were more likely to occur in the securitization process due to the increase in four types of threats (realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotype threats).

The objectives of their mobilization that have been identified by the research showed that they mostly aimed to affect the policy arena and to achieve social change in both countries. The study revealed a key difference between the respondents from Germany and the Netherlands in this regard. The interviewees from Germany highly emphasized to having equal rights in their contexts, which pointed out that Turkish immigrants in Germany have several equality problems such as having dual citizenship and obtaining PLC status.

In the securitization process, assimilation was not a favorite acculturation strategy among Turkish immigrants. While the most selected strategy was integration, most participants stated that security concerns precluded the integration of the Turkish immigrants. Disidentification from their national identity due to securitization and perceived discrimination played an important role in the segregation and marginalization of Turkish immigrants during this process.

When all subjective aspects that were identified in the study are taken into account, it can be argued that their mobilization approaches changed after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration. After 9/11, religious and ethnic identities among Turkish immigrants became stronger, and they perceived negative social identity and faced more problems (such as hate crimes, discrimination, more restrictive policies
towards them, and so on) in both countries. Therefore, they felt a need to be more active in their contexts to deal with the negative impacts of the securitization process. As a result, they became more mobilized and more organized after 9/11 in both Germany and the Netherlands. The changes in their characteristics (education level, socioeconomic status, legal status, language skills, social capital, and so on) may also have played a key role in the increase in their mobilization activities over the securitization process.

Moreover, the study identified three main forms of mobilization as a response to the securitization process in both countries. These are political mobilization and social and cultural mobilizations as non-political examples. The first form of mobilization is political mobilization. The perception of more restrictive policies towards Turkish immigrants in the securitization process has resulted in a search for more representation in the political arena. However, Turkish immigrants in Germany have less opportunity to participate in political space because their naturalization rates are low and their context is less open to have them participate in politics in comparison to the Netherlands. In addition, in Germany, the voter turnout rates of Turkish immigrants were also lower than those of the Netherlands. Turkish youngsters in Germany were less interested in elections compared with Turkish youngsters in the Netherlands. When the more negative perceptions of Turkish immigrants in Germany than the Netherlands about securitization and discrimination are taken into account, one can claim that such perceptions have an impact on the lower interest of Turks in German politics. As a consequence, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have been better represented in national parliament compared with Turks in Germany. Nevertheless, Turkish immigrants in Germany have been increasingly better represented in the German Bundestag, especially in recent years.
This may be because Turkish immigrants, their organizations, and politicians who originated from Turkey have become more active in the political sphere and more aware of the importance of the political arena for their representation.

The perceptions about securitization by Turks have also affected their political party choices in this process. Turkish immigrants in both countries have increasingly searched to support those political parties that can defend their concerns. As a result, their votes have increasingly been spread among various mainstream parties while they mostly voted for specific political parties in the past. However, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have moved away from supporting right-wing parties in this process as a response to Islamophobic concerns of some right-wing politicians. In addition, in Germany, while most Turkish immigrants have increasingly voted for different mainstream parties, a few of them also voted for BIG Party, which argued to defend the benefits of Muslim immigrants, in the last elections.

In the political arena, Turkish immigrants in Germany have also mobilized increasingly to have equal rights when compared to Turks in the Netherlands. Additionally, Turkish immigrants in both countries have responded to the controversial issues such as halal slaughtering and circumcisions in the political arena. To achieve that aim, they cooperated with the Jewish community who had similar concerns in both countries. They used a wide range of processes for their political mobilization. Nevertheless, voting was the most valued process in both countries during this process.

Two more forms of mobilization were identified in the context of non-political mobilization; social and cultural mobilization. Contrary to political mobilization, Turkish immigrants in both countries acted similarly in the non-political arena during the
securitization process. Social Identity Theory provided an insight into the social mobilization strategies of these Turkish immigrants. The perceptions of negative social identity after 9/11 resulted in a search for ways to attain a more positive social identity by Turkish immigrants in both countries. Therefore, over the securitization process, they generally acted in line with making their group more positive. The study found two targeted group in their social mobilization activities; the in-group (Turkish population) and the out-group (larger society). The respondents said that they felt that positive contact with natives and providing adequate knowledge about themselves may solve the problems arising from the security concerns of the natives. Therefore, they focused on dialogue activities and social projects in this regard. They also believed that the social, economic, and moral status of Turkish immigrants may play a significant role in eliminating security concerns of the natives. In this respect, Turkish organizations focused more on the activities that targeted youngsters in order to provide them with a better future position in society.

The third and last form of mobilization was cultural mobilization. Turkish immigrants in both countries mobilized to keep their values, mother language, religion, customs, and so on since they felt that their values had been more threatened than ever during the securitization process.

2. Policy Implications

Globalization has brought about various problems in society. Contrary to the past, there can be several ethnicities, religions, and customs in a community in the contemporary world thanks to globalization. In this period, Western states have increasingly received immigrants from various countries. In this sense, Germany and the
Netherlands applied different policies in the past to deal with their immigrant population. However, especially after 9/11, they both approached their Muslim immigrants from the point view of security and performed more assimilationist policies towards them.

However, the present study revealed that a security approach applied to a minority can be detrimental and impact on the members of this minority. In the securitization process, Turkish immigrants have felt excluded, discriminated against, and so on. Their perceptions about and attitudes towards the host society have been negatively affected. Additionally, intergroup relations have been negatively affected, and thus, more problems (such as marginalization, hate crime, discrimination, quarrels, and so on) have been experienced in this process. As a result of the more security approach, radicalization among Muslim immigrants could not be eliminated; on the contrary, the securitization process resulted in more marginalization and radicalization among them. In this sense, one can conclude that more security directed towards Muslim minorities does not make a society more secure.

In this context, instead of more security interventions, there needs to be more inclusive and multicultural policies towards Muslim immigrants. Only respecting diversity is not sufficient however, in this process. Muslim immigrants should be encouraged by inclusive policies to participate in the society, and in turn, to be a part of the host society. In addition, state authorities should show their interest in them and care about their problems. From this point of view, governments and policymakers have an important role. They could revisit the integration policies by prioritizing participation and inclusion and devaluing security approaches. Separation and marginalization, and in turn, radicalization may be prevented by more inclusive policies. The main problems of the
Turkish population in their contexts (such as employment, discrimination, hate crimes, having equal rights, obtaining dual citizenship, and so on) need to be taken into account by these policies. By doing so, Muslim immigrants will regain and strengthen their trust in the host society. The reestablishment of trust with Muslim communities will result in more support in efforts to deal with security problems. At this stage, there might be more focus on community policing.

If the Islamophobic concerns spread out to mainstream society, as argued by several respondents, it may not be possible to solve societal problems in the near future; on the contrary, there may be more persistent problems in society. In this context, such problems should be dealt with before they become more complex. Governmental bodies and policymakers should focus on not only the Muslim population, but also native population in this regards. In order to realize positive contact between native and Muslim population, there needs to be more focus on social approaches at the community level. Civil society organizations can be encouraged by governmental initiatives and several platforms can be provided towards that aim. If the perceptions of both native and Muslim populations about each other are changed in a positive way, there would be fewer problems in society.

Especially in Germany, the political system needs to be more open for Turkish immigrants. Eliminating structural barriers for their naturalization and participation in the political realm would be a useful approach for integrating them into the host society. They could also be encouraged to discuss their problems in the political arena if there are more opportunities providing them with more representation in the political realm. The German Islam Conference is a good example of such an initiative for giving Muslims a
voice in the political space. However, each state in Germany may have its own issues regarding the Muslim population; therefore, there needs to be similar initiatives at the state level as well as the national level due to the federal state structure of Germany.

3. **Recommendation for Future Research**

Comparative studies can be useful to reaching a better understanding of the issue in question. Thus, the present study compared Germany and the Netherlands to be able better understand the mobilization of Turkish immigrants as a response to the securitization of integration. However, there needs to be more research on similar issues to be able to evaluate the impact of securitization on Muslim minorities in Western societies and their mobilization as a response to securitization. The Islamophobia phenomenon can be better dealt with by articulating Muslim voices since Muslims are the subjects of this phenomenon and may have a crucial role to play in dealing with Islamophobia. In this context, there should be more research that compares Western states considering not only Turkish immigrants, but also other Muslim minorities.

In addition, the comparison of Muslim minorities in a Western state can also move the issue forwards. The present study only explored what Turkish immigrants perceived their position in society was compared with other Muslim minorities. However, this may not be enough to see the big picture. Therefore, comparing at least two Muslim minorities in a country (e.g. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands) and considering their mobilization as response to securitization could provide an insightful approach to examining this phenomenon.
4. Concluding Remarks

This research aimed to explore whether there has been any change in the forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands after 9/11 as a response to the securitization of integration. As argued, it was concluded that their mobilization processes changed during the securitization process. Additionally, the present research identified three main forms of mobilization (political, social, and cultural) as a response to securitization by Turkish immigrants, and the main similarities and the differences between Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands have been clarified in this regard.

As a result, this study has extended the Islamophobia and immigrant mobilization literature by considering the responses of Turkish immigrants and by exploring the different forms of mobilization of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands from a comparative perspective. Both the mobilization of immigrants and Islamophobia are comparatively new issues in the literature. Thus, the present study is significant and unique since it has attempted to fill a significant gap in the literature and contributed to the development of relevant literature by comparing two representative cases.
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2. Appendixes

A. Appendix 1 – List of Organizations

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<th>Name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Association</th>
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<td>Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi (HDV)</td>
<td>Islamic Foundation Diyanet in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Diyanet</td>
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<td>Zaandam Cemevi Alevi Bektaşı Kültür Derneği</td>
<td>Zaandam Alevi Bektasi Cultural Association</td>
<td>Alevi Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform INS</td>
<td>Platform INS</td>
<td>Gullen Community</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hollanda Türkleyeli İşçiler Birliği (HTIB)</td>
<td>The Turkish Workers' Union in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ayasofya Mosque (Amsterdam and Zaandam)</td>
<td>Milli Görüş Community</td>
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<td>Turkish Federation in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Nationlist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey</td>
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<td>Mizaan Foundation</td>
<td>Suleymanli Community</td>
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<td>Federation of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations</td>
<td>Umbrella Organization</td>
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<td>Diyanet</td>
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<td>Alevi Community</td>
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<td>İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş (IGMG)</td>
<td>Islamic Community Milli Görüş</td>
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<td>Kültürlülerarası Diyalog Forumu (FID)</td>
<td>Forum for Intercultural Dialogue</td>
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<td>Türk Sosyal Demokratlar TSD-Köln</td>
<td>Turkish Social Democrats TSD-Cologne</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
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<td>Almanya İslam Konseyi (Islamrat)</td>
<td>Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>Umbrella Organization</td>
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B. Appendix 2 – Interview Questions

i. **Background**
   - Do you identify yourself as belonging to Turkish minority? How do you identify yourself?
   - What is your country of residence?
   - Have you been living in the country at least since 2000?
   - What is your position? The representative of Turkish organization or political party member?

ii. **Islamophobia**
   - How do you evaluate the fears of Islam before and after 9/11? Is there any change?
   - Which events after 9/11 mostly increased these fears in your country?
   - What do you think about the level of Islamophobia in your country?
   - What do you think about the possible factors of these fears?
   - Is there any impact of these fears on you and your community? At what level? How?
   - Do you see your community as sensitive to these fears?
   - Do the fears of Islam more negatively affect Turkish immigrants considering other Muslim communities? Why?
   - Do you have any other concern about the impact of Islamophobia?

iii. **The impact of securitization**
   - How do you evaluate the impact of securitization on Muslims shortly after 9/11?
   - How do security concerns affect public policies in (country)?
   - Who were most affected in your community as a result of these fears? How have Muslim women affected by security concerns?
   - How do you feel as a result of security-driven policies?
   - Do you think that more security policies can fuel the radicalization of Muslims in (country)?
   - How has your relationship with natives and security agencies affected as a result of their security concerns?
   - Do you know anyone in your community who is discriminated against because of his/her Turkish or Muslim identity? Is discrimination common against your community?
   - In which fields does the discrimination against Turkish immigrants occur and at what level?
   - Do you think that Turks are more or less discriminated against than other Muslims?
   - How has discrimination against Turkish immigrants changed after 9/11? Or is it same?
• Do you know anyone in your community who has been a victim of a hate crime?
• How do hate crimes affect you and your community? Is there any change in victimization of Turkish immigrants after 9/11? Or is it same?
• Do you have any other concern about the impact of securitization?

iv. Integration
• How do you understand integration? What kind of integration do you seek, and how can it be best achieved?
• Do you feel attached to your country of residence? How about other Turkish immigrants?
• How do security concerns and policies affect integration of Turkish immigrants?
• Do you do anything to integrate Turkish immigrants into host society?
• Do Turkish immigrants want to be citizen of their country of residence? What limits their naturalization? Their choices, bureaucracy, legislation, no benefit, etc?
• How does socioeconomic status, language proficiency, age, education, gender affect the integration of Turkish immigrants?
• Is it easier or more difficult for Turks than other Muslims to integrate into your host society?
• Which integration policies are more effective? Before or after 9/11? Why?
• Which issues were in the integration agenda in (country) before 9/11? What was the main concern related to integration of Turkish immigrants before 9/11? How has integration policy changed in (country) after 9/11?
• Do you have any other concern about the integration of Turkish immigrants?

v. Mobilization
• What does affect your claim making in your country? Opportunities – Constraints?
• What has changed in your activities, claim making, organization, and mobilization after 9/11?
• How do you evaluate counter terrorism, immigration, citizenship legislations and related policies?
• How have you responded to religious profiling by security agencies, and discrimination on the grounds of religion?
• How have you responded to the biased presentations in media that fuel security concerns?
• How do you deal with the security concerns that hinder the integration of Turkish immigrants?
• What kind of problems do you face with while you make claims before and after 9/11?
• How does the politics of Turkey affect your mobilization?
• What is the relationship of Turkish organizations with state agencies or officials considering integration efforts?
• Have Turkish organizations made coalitions with other Turkish organizations, non-Turkish Muslim organizations, or non-Muslim organizations to mobilize in the face of securitization of integration? If yes, can you give more details?
• How have women organized themselves as a response to securitization of integration and security concerns of natives? Is there any difference considering before and after 9/11? Have they supported by other native female activists?
• How have you gotten involved in political decisions and policies regarding the needs of your community?
• What is the role of Turkish organizations in the participation of Turks in elections?
• What does affect the political participation of Turkish immigrants?
• Do you think that political participation is the most effective form of mobilization? If so, why? If not, what other forms of mobilization do you suggest?
• Is there any change in voting patterns of Turkish immigrants after 9/11? Generally, which parties do Turkish immigrants in your community support? Mainstream, left, right, none of them?
• How do you deal with the youngsters who are radicalized or vulnerable to be radicalized?
• Do you think that Turkish immigrants are more or less mobilized than other Muslim communities in your country?
• Do you have any other concern about the mobilization of Turkish immigrants as a response to securitization of integration?
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