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HOW DIO WROTE HISTORY: DIO CASSIUS' INTELLECTUAL, HISTORICAL,
AND LITERARY TECHNIQUES

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation explores the process of history-writing by Dio Cassius through comparative literary-historiographic analysis. By examining Dio's *Roman History* as an integral historiographic endeavor, the dissertation attempts to reconstruct Dio's overarching methodology. This task is achieved through the analysis of Dio's own editorial asides and the comparison of Dio with parallel historical accounts, as well as by means of observing consistent features in Dio's compositional design. The dissertation addresses such aspects of Dio's methodology as his critical approach to sources, his principles involved in selection, reworking, and presentation of the historical material, his treatment of variant versions, and his use of literary allusions. A more in-depth discussion is devoted both to the role which dreams, portents, and prodigies, as well as wisdom expressions play in the system of causation developed by Dio, and to the historiography of Dio's speeches.

The dissertation revisits the traditional preconceptions regarding Dio's extensive reliance on Thucydides, and in particular subjects to a systematic critique the hypothesis that Dio shared a Thucydidean pessimistic view of human nature, perceived as a constant. The dissertation analyzes the multi-step procedure of Dio's causation and his emphasis on

retrospective logical analysis of the motivations of influential individuals which determine the outcomes of the historical events. A systematic treatment of the typology, function, and patterns of presentation of speeches in Dio is undertaken in the concluding part of the study. This discussion revisits the traditional dichotomy in interpretation of Dio's speeches (whether they are just rhetorical set-pieces akin to the *progymnasmata* of the rhetorical schools or they truly represent the author's own views) and points toward new interpretative directions which take into consideration other types of intellectual discourse of the period, including those formed by the system of formal rhetorical education.

The dissertation draws a portrait of the historical work of Dio Cassius as a mirror of the intellectual and cultural preoccupations of his own time. It treats the *Roman History* of Dio Cassius as belonging simultaneously to many intellectual orbits: in cultural sense, to both the Greek and the Roman worlds; in generic, linguistic, and literary sense — both to the traditions of classical Attic historiography and to new intellectual trends brought forth by the spirit of the Second Sophistic.

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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS

In this dissertation, original Greek and Latin passages and also their translations, unless otherwise noted, derive from the latest edition of the Loeb Classical Library series for each particular author. For Dio Cassius, Earnest Cary's nine-volume text and translation in this series was used (Cary, Earnest, *Dio's Roman History*, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1914-1927). I have preserved the spelling of Cary's translation throughout.

Translations from Russian, Ukrainian, and German are mine.

Ancient Greek and Latin authors and the titles of their works are abbreviated according to the conventions adopted in Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* and the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* respectively, except Dio Cassius, whom I abbreviate as DC throughout, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who is abbreviated as DH.

In order to maintain clarity (in particular in the *Appendices*), in addition to the conventional references to Dio according to book, chapter, and section, e.g., 46.35.1, I have used references according to volume and page of Cary, e.g., 5.69, designating "Cary, volume five, page sixty-nine" (or Zon. 7.26, 1.244-46, designating "Zonaras 7.26 in Cary, volume one, pages two hundred forty-four through four hundred forty-six").

INTRODUCTION

As the review of modern scholarship on book fifty-two of Dio Cassius clearly shows, his *Ῥωμαϊκά* is open to a range of different interpretations. However, this multi-faceted work has been primarily used as a source of decontextualized material in support of various historical arguments. There have been very few attempts to re-examine Dio Cassius' history as a whole and, instead of evaluating its credibility on individual issues, to address the question whether it may have had an innovative character in the context of the intellectual culture of Dio's own time. The research on Dio Cassius' work during the entire twentieth century primarily focused on book fifty-two. Many suggestions concerning the interpretation of the famous debate between Agrippa and Maecenas have been brought to the fore. However, the value of such suggestions is seriously undermined by the failure to establish the debate's place within the compositional and methodological framework of the entire work. Frequently insisting on the completeness of his history, Dio's history reveals many consistent features in its composition; it is these features that uncover the true unity of his historiographical design. Only through careful analysis of them can we approach the question of interpretation of historiographical intention. This dissertation will make an attempt to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of Dio's *Roman History* as a literary whole by examining traditionally overlooked, but consistently prominent, aspects of Dio's methodology, such as the use of maxims, his attitudes about divination and prodigies, his approach to causation, and by offering a more systematic treatment of the speeches in Dio. I shall re-evaluate the validity of much of the scholarly consensus on

Ῥωμαϊκά, for example, Dio's overwhelming stylistic and interpretational dependence on Thucydides and, in particular, his understanding of history through the lens of the concept of the unchanging human nature. In the process of investigating some general traits of Dio's history that pertain to his methodology, I am hoping to contribute to a fundamental understanding of his intellectual, historical, and literary techniques.

Were it not for the fact that Dio Cassius is an important witness to history of Rome, one of the few remaining sources for such important contexts as Augustan period and his own Severan age,¹ he would perhaps receive little consideration as a reliable historian and as a writer worthy of close attention. Millar points out that modern historians use Dio selectively, whenever the need arises to support a statement with the evidence from a primary source: "It is hardly surprising that he [Dio Cassius] has been used mainly as a source of individual facts and examined simply for his 'credibility'."² Unfortunately, the same tendency is observable in the studies devoted to the research on Dio Cassius in general: selectiveness and arbitrariness in the choice of analyzed material, lack of a contextualization of such material within the framework of ancient historiographic tradition or within the historical conditions under which the work was written.

On the other hand, the fact that Dio Cassius' *Ῥωμαϊκά* is a valuable source of factual information for the different epochs of Roman history and that it is heavily referenced in modern historiography hardly requires extensive demonstration.³ Nonetheless, as much as Dio is ubiquitously used as a source, the general, non-specialized historiographical literature perpetuates a view of his *Roman History* as an inferior work, in Millar's words,

¹ Reinhold 2002, 77.

² Millar 1999, 28.

³ See, e.g., Makhilajuk 2008, 39.

“not a work of the first rank”⁴ and a source which requires a cautious and selective approach because of its questionable credibility and historical accuracy. This standard list of Dio’s deficiencies travels from one scholarly article to another:

Dio’s shortcomings and limitations are patent: bookishness, rhetorical extravagances, penchant for patterned antitheses, lack of expertise in military strategy and tactics, proneness to stereotypical descriptions of battles and sieges, studied imitation of predecessors, especially Thucydides, simplistic economics, chronological displacements, anachronisms retrojected for the structuring of paradigms and parallels as edification for his own perilous times. Despite his experience and stature in Roman administration, he could even suffer from lapses of knowledge of law. (Reinhold 1988, 5-6)⁵

In contrast to the view represented above, some modern specialized treatises on Dio show a tendency to vindicate him from this type of charge or to rehabilitate him as a trustworthy historian. Titles such as “Cassius Dio: A Reexamination,” “In Praise of Cassius Dio” *vel sim.* bear curious witness to these opposing impetuses to recast our view of the historian.⁶ This equivocal position in regard to the assessment of literary qualities of Dio Cassius is especially traceable in late twentieth-century scholarship. Many scholars recognized Dio Cassius as “a major source ... for the reign of Augustus, for which no extant historian provides a comparable chronological framework.”⁷ To some, the recovery of Dio’s manuscript in the sixteenth century “revolutionized knowledge of Augustus.”⁸ However,

⁴ Millar 1999, 28.

⁵ Cf. the following quote from an established Soviet textbook on Roman history. This is, perhaps, a rather extreme view (Mashkin 2006, 32): “In the manner of exposition Dio Cassius imitated Polybius and Thucydides, but this imitation in many cases remained superficial. Dio Cassius has no well thought-out philosophy of history. Historical process remains irrational for Dio, it cannot be explained by human reason; events may depend on Fortune and supernatural forces. The miraculous plays a great role even in those parts in Dio Cassius which were recorded on the basis of his own memories. ... Rhetoric plays a great role in Dio Cassius. For the sake of [dramatic] effect the events sometimes have been adorned by him and even distorted to a certain degree. The speeches of the historical figures are characterized by “longueurs” in Dio Cassius.”

⁶ Harrington 1970 and Reinhold 2002 respectively.

⁷ Townend 1965, 307.

⁸ Reinhold 1993, 156, n. 2.

others often regarded Dio's history merely as "the work of a rhetorical plagiarist, anachronistic where he attempted to explain the past, and valuable in his own right only when he approached his own times."⁹ Those who were not so radical in their assessment of Dio's work agreed at least that it is "underrated".¹⁰ Therefore, Dio cannot boast of consistently favorable reception by the modern historical scholarship. Even Millar, whose study of Dio Cassius remains seminal on this subject, speaks of Dio's original contributions to the historiography only in but reticent terms.¹¹

Dio Cassius is not the only historian subjected to this kind of scholarly disquiet. Suetonius, for example, also was accused of lack of historicity and failure to develop in his biographies a strong historico-political conception — the very charges often being brought against Dio as well. Gasparov thinks that these accusations are not fully equitable with respect to Suetonius. The historian should not be examined against the modern standards or standards set by generally acclaimed works, like those of Tacitus or Plutarch. Gasparov asserts that instead the yardstick of Suetonius' own intentions and the audience which he had in mind while writing his biographies must be applied to the work.¹² The supposed lack of historicity and Suetonius' blurred historico-political conception resulted from the fact that he probably addressed his work to the broad mass of curious readers, not to a sophisticated group of highly educated intellectuals,¹³ and, most significantly, stand as the result of the ideological demands of his time:

⁹ McDonald 1966, 318-19.

¹⁰ Hammond 1932, 90.

¹¹ E.g., Millar 1999, 76-77.

¹² Gasparov 2001, 293.

¹³ Ibid., 307.

Tacitus wanted to intimidate the reader showing him the fatal inevitability of degeneration of imperial Rome; Plutarch wanted to console the reader offering him moral examples to be followed and to be avoided. ... Tacitus feels that the atrocities of the previous emperors may resume under any new ruler, Plutarch knows that virtues and vices of ancient men remain an example and a lesson for all times. This feeling is unfamiliar to Suetonius. For him, the present has already arrived at the solution to all questions which occupied the minds of ancients, the truth has been attained, the mistakes of times past were left behind the threshold and will not occur again... This is why, looking back at them, he observes only the outer side of the events, ... tries not to edify, but to entertain. (Gasparov 2001, 299)

Therefore, Suetonius' abilities as a historian should be examined in the context of the intellectual, literary, and political climate of his time. The same rule should be applied to *Roman History* of Dio Cassius, especially since Dio not only was highly aware of the historiographical tradition before him and relied on it, but his writing also clearly reflected the concerns of his own time. By the former, Dio's reliance on Thucydidean style is usually meant;¹⁴ by the latter – the so-called “constitutional debate” in book fifty-two which, being set in 29 BCE, tackles issues current in the third century CE.¹⁵ This patent feature of the debate of Agrippa and Maecenas, which no longer is viewed as simply an anachronism, in essence makes book fifty-two into a political pamphlet “addressed against the ‘senatorial’ policy of Severus Alexander.”¹⁶ It was Millar who revisited the chronology of Dio's work on his history and concluded that Caracalla, not Severus Alexander, was the addressee of Dio's suggestions regarding the changes in political regime.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the theory that book fifty-two was a sort of political manifesto is an assumption which generally most scholars recognize now.

¹⁴ Litsch 1893 and, more recently, Kordoš 2010.

¹⁵ Meyer 1891; recently Makhrajuk 2008, 47-55.

¹⁶ This is the main thesis of Meyer's dissertation (Meyer 1891).

¹⁷ Millar 1999, 102-104.

Indeed, every new epoch in Roman history, every major change in the system of political organization of the state, every new ideological paradigm often calls for the revision of the views of the past.¹⁸ Sometimes this revision is employed as a tool to legitimize current power relations by equipping them with the authority of historical continuity, sometimes the revision is necessary in order to correct the bias of the historians of the previous generations, when a new balance of political powers makes it possible to expose the oppressive character of the previous regime and its violations against freedom of speech. Historiography, asserts Fornara, is a medium that “more than most takes shape and character from the conditions of its political and cultural environment.”¹⁹ These conditions impel an ancient historian to choose what Hose called an “interpretational paradigm”. It is from the point of view of this paradigm that we must approach the question of an historian’s aims and methods. Hose, speaking of Dio Cassius, conceptualizes this choice in terms very similar to those which Gasparov used (above) in his meditation on Suetonius’ authorial intentions:

Dio was confronted with a problem in the internal composition of his work: previous interpretational paradigms of Roman history were rendered impractical... For it was not possible to portray Roman history as the “success story” of a state that attained world dominion (as Florus does), or as development and expansion in which ultimately a (good) monarchy was equated with a general state of well-being (as Livy does in a preliminary way), or as a final necessary unification of the Mediterranean region (Appian). Dio’s own dark temporal horizon did not even permit a conception like that of Tacitus, who depicted a recent evil past against the foil of a felicitous present... In short, Dio was unable to establish rudimentary “teleological” principles such as found in Herodotus, Polybius, or Diodorus. (Hose 2007, 467)

The social and political settings of any new historical era (if recognized as such) define the choice of interpretational paradigm; literary conventions and historiographical tradition –

¹⁸ Cf. Gasparov 2001, 310 and, especially, Fornara 1983, 73.

¹⁹ Fornara 1983, 61.

the choice of literary style (in the broad sense) and selection of material; summarily, they define the methods and intellectual procedures of a historian. Therefore, if assessments as to quality of Dio Cassius' history are to be made, they should involve the analysis of the historico-political conditions and literary standards of Dio's own generation.

One of the determining literary influences on Dio was, without a doubt, a new cultural trend, the Second Sophistic, often referred to as the Greek cultural revolution in Rome of the imperial period during the first three centuries CE. The Second Sophistic was a vibrant and prolific time in the Roman intellectual and literary milieu and was mainly characterized by two critical factors: the importance of rhetorical education and rhetorical discourse in the intellectual life of the elite and, on the other hand, the vogue for imitating classical, primarily, Attic authors. Fundamental to the understanding of the intellectual *Zeitgeist* of the time was —

the absolute centrality of display oratory to elite Greek culture of the first centuries of our era. Oratory was not just a gentle pastime of the rich: it was one of the primary means that Greek culture of the period, constrained as it was by Roman rule, had to explore issues of identity, society, family, and power. (Whitmarsh 2005, 1)

Similarly,

the Greek authors of the second century thought of themselves as the inheritors of a glorious past, whose values they sought to perpetuate. One way of showing their respect for the great figures of earlier times was to fill their writings with allusions to them — quotations, imitations, verbal echoes. (De Lacy 1974, 4-10)

The influence of rhetoric on the writing of history in general is undeniable: Wiseman's famous *Clio's Cosmetics* (1979) was probably the first work in the recent scholarship, since Burgess' *Epideictic Literature* (1902), to underscore once again the relation of historiography to rhetoric, which was not confined only to the use of speeches in histories. Dio Cassius,

being if not a product of, then at least the contemporary of the Second Sophistic, is probably to a greater extent than, for example, Livy, subject to the influence of rhetoric:²⁰ “A much more pervasive influence [on Dio, than the influence of Thucydides] was that of rhetoric, the canons of which supplied what there was of historiographical theory in the ancient world.”²¹ Should we apply these canons to our analyses of Dio, we would easily and necessarily come to the conclusion that his work was highly influenced by the rhetorical (or novelistic and, generally, imaginary) discourse.

A truly pervasive influence of the rhetorical discourse of the Second Sophistic on Dio may explain why the modern historians, whose interest transcends an appreciation of Dio’s literary achievements, become easily frustrated with the limitations which Dio sets for us in the extraction of historical detail. Their growing concerns arise from determining the possibility of finding the objective facts behind the ancient historical accounts, or of separating what is called “hard” history from the tangle of rhetorical devices, literary conventions, author’s biases and purely legendary and mythological material in the text. Yet the “literary approach” to historiography has developed to include, along the study of purely literary aspects of a given historical work, the analysis of a historian’s methods from the standpoint of his aims, shaped by the effects of the social-cultural context of his time and more:²²

Because so much of the evidence for vanished events is itself contestable, and because any story that a historian writes itself forms a text that may later be used to construct a new model of these vanished events, the form of a text can contribute as much to its

²⁰ Dio’s epideictic *τόποι* (as Burgess calls different kinds of rhetorical elements) are noted here and there in the literature in passing (Millar 1999, 42-43; Burgess 1902, 207; 212-13), but have never received a systematic treatment.

²¹ Millar 1999, 42.

²² For the “literary approach” see, e.g., Cameron 1989, 1.

meaning as does its content.²³ And if under ‘form’ we include such intangible elements as the political context in which the text was written, the likely bias of the author, ... the literary expectations of any original audience, and finally the norms and codes of the genre of history-writing itself, then it becomes clear that the *way* a story is told is as important as (indeed, a part of) the story itself.²⁴ (Kraus and Woodman 1997, 2)

Being in agreement with Kraus and Woodman’s ideas as expressed here, the present study will have as its research object the “form” of Dio Cassius’ *Ῥωμαϊκά*, as defined above in this wider sense. Perhaps, the main hypothetical assumption of the present dissertation is that these “intangible elements” listed above are capable of being isolated and interpreted. The main goal of the dissertation is, thus, to evaluate critically Dio’s intellectual contribution, his input into the development of historiography from the point of view of the innovative elements which he introduced into the traditions which existed before him.²⁵ In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the text of Dio Cassius is itself a document of the Severan age, its ideology and attitudes, both in political and intellectual spheres. Batstone remarked: “The Roman historians have a double status. They are ... traces themselves, the remainders of a world of men and action and intentions that is now gone and that we, if we are curious, may try to interpret.”²⁶ I share the optimism of Batstone regarding the potential for decoding these attitudes and intentions from the mass of historical description of *Ῥωμαϊκά*.

Hose dubbed the historical era of Dio’s lifetime an “age of anxiety”. Around 207 CE, by the time Dio embarked – after ten years of careful research – on writing his main

²³ Emphasis mine.

²⁴ Cf. Cameron 1989, 1-2 and Reinhold 2002, 70-71 quoted *infra*.

²⁵ The necessary assumption here is that Dio was not just an epitomizer and that his intellectual input should be palpable. At least – it would be reasonable to insist – he set out to write a history with an intention to introduce something new to the tradition already prominently exemplified by, for example, Livy. Otherwise, what motivation would Dio have had for re-writing the history of Rome *ab urbe condita* on such a scale?

²⁶ Batstone 2009, 30.

historical endeavor, he had lived through a civil war and the reigns of five emperors of whom only two died of the natural causes.²⁷ It would be hard to disagree with Hose's insight according to which Severus' first political steps after his ascension to power should have utterly shocked Dio-the-senator:

It is easy to appreciate the horror Dio personally felt at the transformation that Severus' relationship with the Senate underwent, ... especially since Severus [in the speech delivered to the Senate] now styled himself the brother of Commodus, the despot, whose deserved horrible end (73 [72].22) Dio had described previously amid applause for Severus (73 [72].23.3). (Hose 2007, 463)

Such an emotional reaction is even easier to ascribe to Dio knowing that he was a man whose formative years were spent under the relatively stable reign of the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius and whose nostalgic political ideal belonged in that period (DC 72(71).34.2: εἶχε μὲν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἀπάσας, καὶ ἄριστα διὰ πάντων τῶν ἐν κράτει τινὶ γυνομένων ἥρξε, "In addition to possessing all the other virtues, he [Marcus Aurelius] ruled better than any others who had ever been in any position of power"). About the time when Dio nearly finishing his work, perhaps during the reign of Elagabalus or early into the reign of Severus Alexander, the probability that an emperor would not rule for longer than a few years and would meet a violent death had become a reasonable expectation. It is not a coincidence or a tribute to some rhetoric convention that Dio recognized the death of Marcus Aurelius as the crucial point which marked a sharp transition between two historical epochs:

²⁷ In the year 207 CE, according to Millar's reconstruction (1999, 193). Dio lived between 155 and 235 CE (so Lesky 1996, 849). Millar conjectured that Dio was born in the year 163 CE and this date is accepted by many (e.g., Hose 2007, 462). The emperors were Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, and Septimius Severus. I shall briefly discuss Dio's own pronouncement about the stages of writing his history in section 1.2.2; see also Millar 1999, 28-33.

ἀπὸ χρυσῆς τε βασιλείας ἐς σιδηρᾶν καὶ κατιωμένην τῶν τε πραγμάτων τοῖς τότε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν καταπεσσοῦσης τῆς ἱστορίας. (DC 72(71).36.4)

Our history now descends from a kingdom of gold to one of iron and rust, as affairs did for the Romans of that day.

Under such historical conditions, Dio himself was perhaps highly aware of the ability of political regimes to change historical discourse. Dio was in search of a new interpretational paradigm that would correspond to the new socio-political realities.

Moreover, the strengthening of oppressive and totalitarian features in the imperial court was combined with its unpredictability, the absence of logical linear progression or perceived “grand design” in the development of these tendencies from one emperor to another. These circumstances may have implanted in the historical mind of Dio and the elite of his generation the idea that too much in the historical process is dependent on the personal, often deliberately petty, disposition of one man. In 218 CE, Dio was made a *curator* (overseer of the financial affairs) of Pergamum and Smyrna:

He was not alone, and the administration of the province seems to have been decent enough during the next few years. In fact, the issue that divided Dio and others from their patrons had nothing to do with how they managed things, and everything to do with what no one seemed able to control: the behavior of the emperor. (Potter 2009, 247)

Therefore, for Dio and his contemporaries it became more natural, than perhaps in any of the preceding epochs in Roman history, to see more direct correlation between the personal character of the rulers and historical events. In the absence of the traditional extended programmatic introduction in Dio’s history, it would be instructive to quote a part of such an introduction by one of Dio’s contemporaries, Herodian, especially since it

addresses the issues which may reflect the general concerns regarding history-writing after

Marcus Aurelius:

μερισθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ Ῥωμαίων ἀρχὴ ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐξήκοντα ἐς πλείους δυνάστας ἢ ὁ χρόνος ἀπῆτει, πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἤνεγκε καὶ θαύματος ἄξια. τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν πρεσβύτεροι διὰ τὴν ἐμπερίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιμελέστερον ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ὑπηκόων ἤρξαν, οἱ δὲ κομιδῇ νέοι ῥαθυμότερον βιώσαντες πολλὰ ἐκαινοτόμησαν· διόπερ εἰκότως ἐν ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἐξουσίαις διαφοροῖς οὐχ ὅμοια γέγονε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. (Hdn. 1.1.5-6)

In a period of sixty years the Roman empire was shared by more rulers than the years warranted, so producing many strange phenomena. The more mature emperors took greater care to control themselves and their subjects because of their political experience. The very young ones led rather less disciplined lives and brought in many innovations. This disparity in age and authority naturally resulted in different activities.

Yet, the realization of the fact the major historical events could be and were driven by the actions of the individuals and that, consequently, the reasons (*αἰτίαι*) thereof should be sought in the sphere of human psychology, is not something specific for Dio or even for Dio's time in general:

nobis in arto et inglorius labor; immota quippe aut modice laccessita pax, maestae urbis res et princeps proferendi imperi incuriosus erat. Non tamen sine usu fuerit introspicere illa primo aspectu levia, ex quis magnarum saepe rerum motus oriuntur. (Tac. Ann. 4.32)

Mine is an inglorious labour in a narrow field: for this was an age of peace unbroken or half-heartedly challenged, of tragedy in the capital, of a prince careless to extend the empire. Yet it may be not unprofitable to look beneath the surface of those incidents, trivial at the first inspection, which so often sent in motion the great events of history.

Tacitus, however, in what appears to be a part of a long methodological aside, does not seem to hide his aversion to the type of history which is devoted to scrutinizing the court intrigues and is mainly concerned with the events in Rome itself. At the same time, he expresses some degree of nostalgia toward the ages of old where grand battles, sieges of the cities, and political struggles provided ample material that could contribute to shaping a

historiographic work of the truly “grand design”.²⁸ One commentator summarized this passage with the following paraphrase: “Tacitus was confined within a narrow area of petty events: the older historians had a wide field to career through of great and stirring events.”²⁹ In Tacitus’ view, the battles, sieges, and struggles also delight the reader the most in a historical work. Conversely, it was that “tragedy” mentioned by Tacitus (I believe that this is an apt translation for *maestae urbis res* in this context despite being rather non-literal) which became in Dio’s time an accepted and customary part of the political life; usage of this very word in the characterization of Marcus Aurelius as prudent and moderate ruler is telling:

τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέσχε συμπλάσαι τινὰ ἐπιβουλὴν ἐψευσμένην καὶ σκευωρήσασθαι τινα τραγωδίαν μὴ γεγενημένην, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς φανερώτατα ἐπαναστάντας αὐτῷ καὶ ὅπλα κατὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ λαβόντας ... ἀφεῖναι. (DC 72(71).30.3)

So far, indeed, was he from inventing any imaginary conspiracy or concocting any tragedy that had not really occurred, that he actually released those who had in the most open manner risen against him and taken up arms both against him and against his son.

While Tacitus complains that the grand historical events are now overshadowed by some minor intrigues in the city of Rome, Herodian and certainly Dio both find in this sort of intricacies of their own time not merely a didactic value for their readers. The individual-centered causational system had become an accepted and preferred model in historiography. Everything which happens in Rome, in the imperial palace, in the heads of the capricious emperors, every rumor, every eccentricity, and every uncanny incident — is

²⁸ For the analysis of this digression from the point of view of the reversal of the historiographic conventions traditional for such asides, see Woodman 1988, 180-86.

²⁹ Frost 1872, 198.

important for the reconstruction of the causes of the events.³⁰ Everything was decided in Rome: in order for the historian to remain well-informed about the most significant contemporary historical events, he must be present there.³¹

Yet Dio would often make a remark to the effect that the material introduced by him offends the “dignity of history”.³² This is, of course, a homage paid by Dio to the old historiographic convention. Under the pretence of being constantly concerned about adhering to the highest quality standard in his work Dio uses such pronouncements merely as excuses to continue populating his history with the most scandalous and obviously sensationalist anecdotes about different places, personalities, and occurrences which, in fact, is one of Dio’s most recognizable trademarks.³³ These, together with his obsession with recording portents, dreams, and prodigies, seeming abuse of the aphorisms or

³⁰ Ironically, however, the historical era during which Dio and Herodian lived was also full of events which Tacitus deemed best fitting historical narrative. Hdn. 1.1.3-5: εἰ γοῦν τις παραβάλοι πάντα τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ χρόνον, ἐξ οὐπερ ἡ Ῥωμαίων δυναστεία μετέπεσεν ἐς μοναρχίαν, οὐκ ἂν εὔροι ἐν ἔτεσι περί που διακοσίοις μέχρι τῶν Μάρκου καιρῶν οὔτε βασιλειῶν οὔτως ἐπαλλήλους διαδοχὰς οὔτε πολέμων ἐμφυλίων τε καὶ πόλεων ἀλώσεις τῶν τε ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς βαρβάροις, γῆς τε σεισμούς καὶ ἀέρων φθορὰς τυράννων τε καὶ βασιλέων βίους παραδόξους πρότερον ἢ σπανίως ἢ μὴδ’ ὅλως μνημονευθέντας· ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐπιμηκεστέραν ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δὲ πρόσκαιρον τὴν δυναστείαν· εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ μέχρι προσηγορίας καὶ τιμῆς ἐφημέρου μόνης ἐλθόντες εὐθέως κατελύθησαν, “A comparative survey of the period of about two hundred years from Augustus (the point at which the regime became a monarchy) to the age of Marcus would reveal no such similar succession of reigns, variety of fortunes in both civil and foreign wars, disturbances among the provincial populations, and destruction of cities in both Roman territory and many barbarian countries. There have never been such earthquakes and plagues, or tyrants and emperors with such unexpected careers, which were rarely if ever recorded before. Some of these men ruled for quite a long time, others held only transient power; some hardly reached the title and fleeting honour before they were deposed.” Cf. Sorek 2012, 138.

³¹ DC 80.1.2: Ταῦτα μὲν ἀκριβώσας, ὡς ἕκαστα ἠδυνήθην, συνέγραψα· τὰ δὲ δὴ λοιπὰ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεξελθεῖν οὐχ οἶός τε ἐγενόμην διὰ τὸ μὴν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διατρίψαι, “Thus far I have described events with as great accuracy as I could in every case, but for subsequent events I have not found it possible to give an accurate account, for the reason that I did not spend much time in Rome.” But see Pitcher 2012 for some adjustments to this view.

³² The episode describing bizarre habits of Domitian is illustrative in this sense. DC 65(66).9.4: ἐν γοῦν τῷ Ἀλβανῷ χωρίῳ τὰ πλεῖστα διάγων ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα ἐπραττε, καὶ τὰς μυίας γραφεῖσις κατεκέντει. τοῦτο γὰρ εἰ καὶ ἀνάξιον τοῦ τῆς ἱστορίας ὄγκου ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γε ἱκανῶς τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ ἐνδείκνυται, ἀναγκαιῶς ἔγραψα, καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅτι καὶ μοναρχήσας ὁμοίως αὐτὸ ἐποίει, “At any rate, he spent most of his time at the Alban Villa and did many absurd things, one of them being to impale flies on a stylus. Unworthy as this incident is of the dignity of history, yet, because it shows his character so well and particularly because he still continued the practice after he became emperor, I have felt obliged to record it.” On the “dignity of history”, cf. Lesky 1996, 850.

³³ It is important to point out that this is not to suggest that Dio was not striving to adhere to such traditional standards of seriousness.

pronouncements of universal value, and patent artificiality of the speeches, are usually seen as weak points of his historiographic design. I do not agree that the compositional elements listed above necessarily devalue Dio's work. He and his contemporaries acknowledged the special *Zeitgeist* of the contemporary historical epoch; they witnessed the increasing role of the individual and the consequences of individual decisions on the course of rapidly changing history. Perhaps, this new view of history, new tastes of the audiences, and new intellectual standards brought forward by the Greek cultural revolution called the Second Sophistic required implementation of new tools for writing history – history which Dio understood as true historiographic research.

It is exactly the role of these consistently employed elements in Dio's methodology (as prominently representing the unique features of his general historiographic design) that I shall primarily try to uncover in this dissertation. After offering some insights toward reconstruction of Dio's techniques of selection and arrangement of the historiographic material (**chapter one**), I shall proceed with discussing the role of dreams, portents, and prodigies and their relation to Dio's concept of historical causation (**chapter two**). **Chapter three** shall be devoted to the analysis of Dio's usage of wisdom expressions, or *gnomai*; in this chapter I shall continue exploring Dio's causational system by stressing the role of *gnomai* in it. Paradoxically, both records of the miraculous occurrences and maxims, being one of the most salient features of compositional structure of Dio's history, have received minimal attention in the scholarship.³⁴ Following Millar's lead, modern historians dismissed them as unimportant, trivial, and almost accidental inclusions in the history.

³⁴ For example, regarding Dio's "uncritical" use of portents and his taste for the miraculous, attempts have been made to explain away his preoccupation with the marvelous simply through the commonness of this

Apart from such formal statements of his [Dio's] political position there are numerous comments on politics and human nature scattered throughout the text, most of them pessimistic. Human nature is the key and he [Dio] looks no further for the explanation of events. ... Most of his judgments are no more than commonplace. (Millar 1999, 76)

I do not share such view of Dio's explanatory strategies. Moreover, I have not found a well-grounded analysis of the evidence for such claims. Conversely, I shall attempt to demonstrate that *gnomai* are purposefully employed in the system of Dio's, in essence, anthropocentric, historical explanations. Contrary to the commonly accepted opinion, I shall claim that Dio did not admit the determinism into his view of history (whether based on the predictability of human nature or on the will of gods). His view of history did not hinge upon the concept of human nature as remaining unchanged, despite that some aphorisms in Dio are comparable with Thucydidean pronouncements of the same ilk and seem to point to that conclusion.³⁵ The by-product is the more systematic analysis of *gnomai* undertaken in this dissertation is the full list of *gnomai* used in Dio's history compiled in

Appendix II.

Chapter four of the present work will examine Dio's speeches: in particular, their function and the idiosyncrasies pertaining to the choice of the speech occasions, borrowing

trait among ancient historians. This observation is quite in keeping with the recent trend to "exculpate" Dio Cassius: "Dio's failure to be critical of supernatural events in his sources cannot be held against him since all ancient historians accepted supernatural interventions and signs" (Harrington 1970, 26).

³⁵ This is one of the old stereotypical assumptions which gained broad currency before having been substantiated. Most recently, for example, Adler (2012) freely used the notion of Dio's adoption of Thucydidean "anthropological constant" as an axiom. In his analysis of Dio's book fifty-two, this axiom helped Adler to correlate – I suggest, mistakenly – the political position of both interlocutors of the constitutional debate with that of Dio himself. Adler 2012, 515: "Dio's conception of human nature also speaks to other similarities between his Agrippa and Maecenas orations. We have noted that Dio's speakers both largely contend that the political future is predictable. To some extent, this must relate to the character of the debate itself. ... But the dialogue's stressing of the predictability of later events also seems to accord with Dio's own perception of human nature, which maintains that human motivations are fixed. This disparaging view of his fellow men may have compelled Dio to stress the inevitability of future events." In this dissertation, instead of arguing against this type of conclusions, I shall uncover the fallibility of their initial premises.

from other sources, avoidance of duplication, and unique features of their composition in Dio's *Ῥωμαϊκά*. I deliberately avoided engaging in the direct analysis of Agrippa-Maecenas debate in this dissertation, perceiving the overwhelmingly complex character of the questions it poses. This important portion of Dio's work not only has attracted unprecedented scholarly attention, but, more interestingly, well illustrates the problem of an *interpretation* of Dio's account as a historical document. Makhrajuk wrote:

The debate of Agrippa and Maecenas ... is not only of the greatest interest among the inserted speeches of the *Roman History*, but also of the greatest difficulty in respect to the interpretation from the point of view of its general purpose, political and ideological orientation... Is this sort of discussion historical? What is its compositional role in the general structure of the *Roman History*? Which emperor of the Severan dynasty could be its addressee? Within those speeches, what is the relation between generalities, rhetorical and ideological clichés and Dio's own political views? How real or utopian are the suggestions formulated by him? These and other questions ... have been under active discussion for already 130 years, but to this time there are no unequivocal and generally acknowledged answers to the most of them. (Makhrajuk 2008, 48)

While I shall suggest some justifications for doubting that Dio's book fifty-two should be read as a serious excursus into the motivations and cause-and-effect relations of a historical context that is characterized by major change in political structure, I shall still hold that the constitutional debate requires re-interpretation from the standpoint of the questions suggested by Makhrajuk. In order to be better equipped for this re-interpretation one must first and foremost possess a systematic understanding of the general methodological principles employed by Dio. This dissertation intends to contribute some insights about Dio's intellectual, historical, and literary techniques, with the arsenal of which the complexity of the constitutional debate will be readdressed in the future.

My dissertation, then, will attempt not simply to evaluate the quality of Dio Cassius' work but rather to move toward elucidating with specificity the process of history-writing in the third century CE while at the same time analyzing the status and originality of Dio's *Roman History* within the political, cultural, and literary processes of his time. The objective of my study was foreshadowed by Millar's *A Study of Cassius Dio*, where he observed: "In particular this book might provoke some scholar to attempt a full analysis of the intellectual and literary procedures involved when a man composed, from many different sources, a continuous narrative covering the entire history of Rome."³⁶ Such an undertaking seemed especially attractive to me because, unlike in the case of such authors as Thucydides, one would observe that our historian willingly shares with his reader the inner workings of his creative mind.³⁷ Dio explains his justification for inclusion or omission of certain material, announces the procedures that he will be following while dealing with problematic instances of causation, multiple versions of events, and absence of reliable information; Dio is open about the structure of his logical reasoning when deduction is employed for the purpose of reconstructing the truth. Methodological, or "editorial", asides are unusually frequent in Dio, which makes him "one of the most intrusive narrators in ancient historiography."³⁸ Kemezis suggested that Dio's editorial asides are "disingenuous" and "almost certainly not true."³⁹ The question of the ingenuity of Dio's methodological pronouncements is addressed in chapter one. Deeper analysis of

³⁶ Millar 1999, viii. Having been first published in 1964, Millar's work still remains seminal on Dio, as recognized by most today (e.g., Gowing 2009, 347).

³⁷ Oost (1975, 187) observed regarding Thucydides: "Investigating the mind of Thucydides is not a facile undertaking, for only upon fairly uncommon occasions does he give us an insight into the workings of his mentality – as almost all his readers have repeatedly noted." Quite the opposite tendency prevails with Dio.

³⁸ Kemezis 2006, 9. His is the term "editorial asides".

³⁹ Ibid., 59.

these asides may help us place Dio in the context of ancient discourse on historiography, but shall remain beyond the scope of the present work. However, *Appendix I* will present the future student of Dio with a useful tool for such endeavor – the full list of editorial asides in *Παραίτητά*, and suggest a version of these asides’ typological classification.

* * *

As I am inclined to think, the principles of Dio’s work are fundamentally different from previous comparable histories and resemble the principles of the research of a modern historian for whom literary texts are the main sources for historical investigation. The text of Dio Cassius asks for a deep re-examination with a set of new research tools. If one desires to use Dio as a primary source for Roman history, one needs to find the keys to understanding his intellectual techniques, including the real purpose of his history, and to be able, at least, to envision the intellectual expectations of his contemporary audience. Only against the standards established both by Roman historiography before our author and by the literature of the Second Sophistic can we evaluate whether Dio achieved his goals or not. In turn, the goal of the present dissertation is to establish a unique position of Dio’s history within these two contexts.

In simpler terms, we need to find the key to discerning, what is, for example, exaggeration in Dio, where the seeming departure from the historic truth serves certain methodological aims (inasmuch as we must remember that most probably Dio’s readers were already quite familiar with the basic established version of the events), where Dio provokes his reader by providing him with an unusual version, and where his intention is

to merely entertain the reader with an anecdote. If we understand the real aims of Dio Cassius and envision the real addressees of the *Ρωμαϊκά*, we will be able to unlock the enigmas of the historian.

CHAPTER ONE

DIO'S METHODOLOGY AND METHODS FOR STUDYING DIO

1.1. ISOLATING DIO'S AIMS AND METHODS: TYPES OF EVIDENCE

1.1.1. Historian's Original Input: "Value Added" to the Historiographic Tradition¹

In one of the most famous dialogues in Dio's work, the so-called *Consolatio ad Ciceronem*,² a philosopher named Philiskos who met Cicero in his exile in Macedon advises Marcus Tullius to keep his spirits up and, in his forced retirement, find pleasure in composing historical works that imitate Xenophon and Thucydides: ὥστ' εἴπερ ὄντως ἀθάνατος καθάπερ ἐκεῖνοι γενέσθαι ἐθέλεις, ζήλωσον αὐτούς, "If, then, you wish to become really immortal, like those historians, emulate them."³

These two are among the very few names of historians to which Dio ever refers. However, there should be no doubt regarding Dio's familiarity with the standard examples of the historical literature, mostly Roman, whose work covered more or less the entire time-span from the foundation of Rome to his times.⁴ More so, Dio's selection of the material, the ways in which he indirectly referenced, alluded to, and echoed other historians also assumes his readers' knowledge of examples of their works. The question arises, then,

¹ The following two sections constitute a critical reaction to Kemezis' understanding of Dio's methodology (2006, esp. pp. 57-81), which, nevertheless, does not deny the insightfulness of his perception. The idea of looking at the relation of Dio's history to "previous literary" sources from the point of view of "value added" also originated with Kemezis (ibid. 79-80), although I view this "value added" in much broader terms: see *infra*. This section's analysis shall mainly concentrate on four methodological asides of Dio: 1 fr. 1.2; 46.35.1; 53.19; and 73(72).18.3-4. Only the relevant portions of these passages shall be quoted for the sake of clarity of each of the presented points. For the translations of the full versions, see *Appendix I* #1; 38; 52; and 81.

² DC 38.18-29. Cf. the usage of the term "*Consolatio ad Ciceronem*" in Millar 1961, 16-17.

³ DC 38.28.2.

⁴ See the very useful charts in Marincola 1997, 289-92.

considering the availability of a range of historical works which had acquired the status of classical by Dio's generation, what motivated Dio to embark upon writing yet another version of history *ab urbe condita*?

Under modern conditions, when so much has been lost, one can easily forget that for every period of Roman history Dio deals with, other than his own, there were several other well-known authors who wrote in greater detail, were closer to the action and at least equalled Dio in their literary skills and probably the physical accessibility of their texts. Ancient readers must have surely been aware of this, and might have been inclined to ask Dio "why should I read your account rather than theirs?" Dio might of course simply answer "because mine is shorter and easier to read." His ambitions, however, are distinctly higher than that. (Kemezis 2006, 76)

It is hard to disagree with Kemezis' insight, especially with the last statement in the preceding quote. Assuming the guise of an ancient reader and reconsidering the question "why should I read your account rather than theirs?" would be useful for ascertaining Dio's view of his task as a historian. How Dio viewed this task is, in turn, crucial for understanding his methodology as a whole. In the following sections, I shall offer a few arguments on the fundamental topic of Dio's historical aims.

Marincola suggested five standard arguments with which ancient historians commonly justified their writings: (1) absence of coverage by predecessors; (2) incompleteness of the previous accounts or (3) their bias; (4) promise of improved factual accuracy; and even (5) promise of stylistic improvements.⁵ Dio's text did not preserve any such direct justification or an overt declaration of his purpose. On the basis of other evidence, still, it appears to be inherently difficult to correlate Dio's aims and his historical task with any of the earlier justifications for writing history. On the other hand, from Dio's numerous editorial asides it becomes clear that he recognized that the intellectual climate of the time called for a new

⁵ Marincola 1997, 112-17.

type of scholarly approach to history, compared to the writers of history before Marcus Aurelius.

These multiple editorial asides also reveal that Dio firmly placed his work within existing historiographic traditions but at the same time insisted on the validity and usefulness of his own input accordant with the demands of his era. “In short, he openly acknowledges the existence of a tradition that mediated between him and the events that make up the fabula of his story.”⁶ The following aside, perhaps, one of the most famous and often-quoted passages from our historian, is an example of Dio speaking of his task from a position of intellectual authority. As Syme summarizes this passage, “[w]hen he comes to narrate the Principate of Augustus, Cassius Dio complains that the task of the historian has been aggravated beyond all measure – under the Republic the great questions of policy had been the subject of open and public debate: they were now decided in secret by a few men.”⁷ For these reasons, Dio says,

... καὶ ἐγὼ πάντα τὰ ἐξῆς, ὅσα γε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται εἰπεῖν, ὡς που καὶ δεδήμωται φράσω, εἴτ' ὄντως οὕτως εἴτε καὶ ἐτέρως πως ἔχει. προσέσται μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας, ἐς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, ἐν οἷς ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ θρυλούμενον ἡδυνήθην ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν ἀνέγνων ἢ καὶ ἤκουσα ἢ καὶ εἶδον τεκμήρασθαι. (DC 53.19.6)

... I also will narrate events from this point, or as many of them as is necessary, just as they became known to the public, whether they really happened that way or some other way. To these, however, will be added where possible something of my own opinion, wherever the great amount that I have read, heard and seen allows me to bring up some further evidence over and above the general rumor.⁸

⁶ Kemezis 2006, 65.

⁷ Syme 1967, 407. Dio means that since the time of the Principate of Augustus no governmental decisions were made in public. It was an outcome of the formation of “cabinet government” (using Syme’s terminology) in which the decisions bypassed the senate and the creation of policy was not shared with the people. For this reason, everything which became publicly known was distrusted as propaganda and a result of possibly deliberate fabrication of information. Dio also points out the difficulty of colligating the facts starting with this historical period because of the significant expansion of the Roman empire.

⁸ Translation by Kemezis (2006, 67).

Of course, this aside is a disclaimer, which Dio inserts because of an objective reason, i.e. inability to ascertain the trustfulness of the sources, to explain that he was no longer able to employ the highest standards of inquiry. It may be also implied in this passage that these standards could have been used by Dio when he narrated the events that preceded the Principate and, in addition, would also be used for contemporary periods of the history.

For a diligent reader who is familiar with the habitual phraseology of Dio in his methodological asides it would also be obvious that Dio has simply re-emphasized his exclusive role in the process of selection, arrangement, and interpretation of historical material and that he has presented himself as a “necessary adjunct to Roman history, a mediator in the present without whom the past is only a series of disparate facts and events that cannot be correctly understood.”⁹ It is as if Dio felt pressured (we may add, by overwhelming authority of his literary/historiographic predecessors) to insist on a justification of his intellectual position and thus repeat this claim of authority periodically throughout his work, sometimes in a manner too assertive for modern tastes:

καὶ μέντοι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ πραχθέντα καὶ λεπτουργήσω καὶ λεπτολογήσω μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερα, ὅτι τε συνεγενόμην αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὅτι μηδένα ἄλλον οἶδα τῶν τι δυναμένων ἐς συγγραφὴν ἀξίαν λόγου καταθέσθαι διηκριβωκότα αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἐμοί. (DC 73(72).18.4)

And, indeed, all the other events that took place in my lifetime I shall describe with more exactness and detail than earlier occurrences, for the reason that I was present when they happened and know no one else, among those who have any ability at writing a worthy record of events, who has so accurate a knowledge of them as I.

In these two asides quoted above, 53.19.6 and 73(72).18.4, Dio opposes himself (or, rather, his method) to the authors of some written records of past events (in the first example) and, in the second passage, his contemporary fellow-historians. He recognizes, quite in

⁹ Kemezis 2006, 60.

traditional terms, the dual purpose of history: it is, on the one hand, ascertaining the very truth of the affairs (truth appeal) and, on the other, delighting the reader (stylistic consideration).¹⁰

However, the key terms, in which he describes his own original input compared to his predecessors or competitors all strongly point to the predominance of this first aspect of historiographic inquiry in Dio's design: Dio sets out to "judge from signs, conjecture" (τεκμήρασθαι), express personal opinion (τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας) of the facts (πραχθέντα) – the facts which, importantly, need to be "elaborated" (λεπτουργήσω) and "examined minutely" (διηκριβωκότα). Therefore, Dio perceives himself better equipped for the task exactly from the point of view of an investigator, the one who (re-)examines the authenticity, probability, logical consistency of the facts subjecting the known accounts (ὥς που καὶ δεδήμωται) to the scrutiny of logical and factual analysis. In one word, it is the process which falls under the umbrella of the term *probare* used by Quintilian in a passage on the nature of the historical genre. Curiously, Quintilian's view of the aims of history here seems to contradict Dio's approach:

historia ... est enim proxima poetis et quodammodo carmen solutum, et scribitur ad narrandum non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem, sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur. (Quint. Inst. 10.1.31)

For history has a certain affinity to poetry and may be regarded as a kind of prose poem, while it is written for the purpose of narrative, not of proof and designed from beginning to end not for immediate effect or the instant necessities of forensic strife, but to record events for the benefit of posterity and to win glory for its author.

¹⁰ This duality is underscored in the very first paragraph of Dio's history (in Boissevain's edition), DC 1 fr. 1.2: μὴ μέντοι μὴδ' ὅτι κεκαλλιπημένοις, ἐς ὅσον γε καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψε, λόγοις κέχρημαι, ἐς τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν διὰ τοῦτό τις ὑποπεύσῃ, ὅπερ ἐπ' ἄλλων τινῶν συμβέβηκεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω, ὥς οἶόν τε ἦν, ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶσαι, "I trust, moreover, that if I have used a fine style, as far as the subject matter permitted, no one on this account question the truthfulness of the narrative, as has happened in the case of some writers; for I have endeavoured to be equally exact in both these respects, so far as possible." See section 4.1.2 for further discussion of this passage and this dichotomy in Dio's method in general.

However, Dio's description of his investigative method fully conforms with the requirements for a good history-writing by another rhetorician, although this is an individual we would now also call a satirist, Lucian:

τὰ δὲ πράγματα αὐτὰ οὐχ ὥς ἔτυχε συνακτέον, ἀλλὰ φιλοπόνως καὶ ταλαιπώρως πολλάκις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνακρίναντα, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν παρόντα καὶ ἐφορῶντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἀδεκαστότερον ἐξηγουμένοις προσέχοντα καὶ οὓς εἰκάσειεν ἂν τις ἥκιστα πρὸς χάριν ἢ ἀπέχθειαν ἀφαιρήσειν ἢ προσθήσειν τοῖς γεγονόσι. κἀνταῦθα ἤδη καὶ στοχαστικός τις καὶ συνθετικός τοῦ πιθανωτέρου ἔστω. (Luc. Hist. Conscr. 47)

As to the facts themselves, he should not assemble them at random, but only after much laborious and painstaking investigation. He should for preference be an eyewitness, but, if not, listen to those who tell the more impartial story, those whom one would suppose least likely to subtract from the facts or add to them out of favour or malice. When this happens let him show shrewdness and skill in putting together the more credible story.

This could be seen as an evidence for the change of the view of historian's task since the time of Quintilian and the reversal of scholarly focus of the historian, in Quintilian's own terminology, from *narrando* to *probandum* (but we have always to be aware of the difficulty of separating ironical and satiric elements in the work of Lucian from the vestiges of what might have been a serious formulation on history-writing). In yet another comparable methodological aside, Dio explains the nature of his method also in terms of a certain *logical operation with the facts*. This testimony about his methodology resonates with Lucian's recommendations as well:

καὶ γὰρ καὶ παιδείσεις ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχῃ καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ. (DC 46.35.1)

For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of the former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts.¹¹

¹¹ For an attempt of its interpretation, see section 3.2.1.

This methodological aside of Dio reads almost as a clarification and elaboration of what Lucian had advised as desirable in contemporary history-writing. In both authors the task of the historian is presented in terms of some probative procedure that resembles criminal investigation based on inference or deductive reasoning (note the presence of this connotation in the vocabulary used by both, Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 47: ἀνακρίναντα, “examine closely, interrogate, inquire into” compared with DC 46.35.1: ἐλέγχῃ, “cross-examine, question, bring to the proof”).

In summation, quite in the spirit of his time, Dio perceives his mission as a historian as a task that reaches beyond mere compilation of the historical facts. Ideally, the facts should be drawn from the observation; in the absence of such a possibility, from the various sources. These sources are mostly written but also could derive from hearsay. Indeed there is nothing original in such declarations, since all of them are deeply rooted in the historiographic tradition reaching back to Thucydides.

What is different in Dio’s time, however, is that the sources are not exclusive, but could well be familiar to a significant contingent of Dio’s readers. Often Dio felt compelled to present a (pretended) apology whenever he was not able to add much to this polling of the generally known facts or to the tradition (as represented by the formulation τὸ θρυλούμενον and also by a phrase very common in Dio, ὥς δεδήμωται). However, a guiding principle appears to emerge that the historian should not focus so much on the critique of or on polemic undertaken with his predecessors as rather on reconstructing the true story.¹² If, from the point of view of the historian, the sources are trustworthy, the truth may be deduced by comparing the multiple surviving historical accounts. Significantly, the

¹² For some examples of the “polemizing” historians, see section 1.3.2.

existence of multiple versions of events is recognized as given by default and even desirable because this plurality of opinions ensures a better chance of deducing the truth:

πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἔς τε τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον πάντα, καὶ εἰ πόρρω που συμβαίη, ἐσεφέρετο· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τε αὐτὰ ἐμάνθανον καὶ πολλοὶ συνέγραφον, καὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια αὐτῶν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ φόβῳ τινὰ καὶ χάριτι φιλίας τε καὶ ἔχθρᾳ τισὶν ἐρρήθη, παρὰ γοῦν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ γράψασι τοῖς τε ὑπομνήμασι τοῖς δημοσίοις τρόπον τινὰ εὐρίσκετο. (DC 53.19.2)

Formerly, as we know, all matters were reported to the senate and to the people, even if they happened at a distance; hence all learned of them and many recorded them, and consequently the truth regarding them, no matter to what extent fear or favour, friendship or enmity, coloured the reports of certain writers, was always to a certain extent to be found in the works of the other writers who wrote of the same events and in the public records.

This judgement can also indicate that it was the *apriori* assumption of Dio that no single source could be good enough by itself, although, naturally, the whole tradition which Dio set out to re-evaluate must also weigh upon the historian with its immense authority – that tradition which is to be understood not only as a body of historical facts, but also as a nexus of developed stylistic, narratological, and hermeneutic conventions and stereotypes:

The writer of non-contemporary history, therefore, was not as free as the historian of his own times to shape the tradition (since it was already established), and it is important to note that no ancient historian ... takes the radical step of tearing the whole edifice down and starting from the beginning. (Marincola 1997, 106)

Nevertheless, a historian of Dio's subsequent time possessed an advantage in retrospectively embracing various sources and versions of the events of the past. Even if he did not add new information to this known body of facts, the historian's original input consisted of his re-inquiring into the tradition, re-evaluating it, and, through a process of probation, bringing the multiple accounts to a common denominator:

ἀνέγνων μὲν πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα, συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα. (DC 1 fr. 1.2)

Although I have read pretty nearly everything about them that has been written by anybody, I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select.

In the process of working on his own historical project Dio sifted through all the information available (ἀνέγνων μὲν πάντα), selected the appropriate information and reassembled it (οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα) employing the best available standard of scholarship of the time that he represents.¹³ As a result, it is his history that would be that one source, which alone is sufficient, “good enough” to be consulted by a reader:

... ἵν' ἐνὶ χωρίῳ πάντα γεγραμμένα ῥαδίως τὸν βουλόμενόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν μαθεῖν διδάσκη. (DC 55.24.1)

... my purpose being that, if any one desires to learn about them [the legions], the statement of all the facts in a single portion of my book may provide him easily with the information.¹⁴

Dio made sure to inform his reader that this work has been undertaken by him carefully and studiously. The necessary qualification for this enterprise is the ability of a real scholar, appropriate education, social position, and assiduousness.¹⁵ If the sources are in short supply or of suspect quality, as Dio complains in 53.19, the historian cannot apply the highest standard of historical inquiry. Instead, he will approach the existing sources less

¹³ Again note DC 46.35.1: παιδευσίς ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τήν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχῃ καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριῷ..., “For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning...”

¹⁴ Appendix I #64.

¹⁵ This is, of course, the role that Dio assumed as an author of the non-contemporary history. On the difference of approaches to the exposition of contemporary and past history in Dio, and the claims of authority made in each of these cases, see section 3.2.3. Cf. Marincola 1997, 105, and his illustration from Plin. Ep. 5.8.12 (translation of Marincola): “[I]t is fair to say that the ‘methodology’ of non-contemporary history was to consult the tradition, what previous writers had handed down. ... The younger Pliny distinguishes between contemporary and non-contemporary history solely by nature of the inquiry and the temptations to bias:

Shall I write on older topics, those already written up by others? The inquiry has been done, but comparing accounts is burdensome (*parata inquisitio sed onerosa collatio*).”

critically, but he will express his opinion and thus still supply the fuller record than that of his predecessors. Based on the historian's wide reading (53.19.6: *ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν ἀνέγνων*), this record will still contribute to the knowledge of posterity by adding extra detail to the received account:

... καὶ ἕτερόν τινα νόμον ἔγραψε, περὶ οὗ διὰ πλείονων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅπως σαφέστερος τοῖς πολλοῖς γένηται. (DC 38.13.3)

... he [Clodius] proposed another law, concerning which it is necessary to speak at some length, so that it may become clearer to the general public.¹⁶

In what could have been a very first sentence of Dio's history, one containing the declaration of the purpose of the work, Dio underscored the more complete and systematic character of his account, in contrast to the standing tradition which was dispersed among various other sources:

σπουδὴν ἔχω συγγράψαι πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ εἰρηνοῦσι καὶ πολεμοῦσι ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπράχθη, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μήτε ἐκείνων τινὰ μήτε τῶν ἄλλων ποθῆσαι. (DC 1 fr. 1.1)

It is my desire to write a history of all the memorable achievements of the Romans, as well in time of peace as in war, so that no one, whether Roman or non-Roman, shall look in vain for any of the essential facts.

Thus the authorial contribution, as it was envisaged by both Dio and Lucian, should be distinguishable and palpable in the work of our historian. Dio promised his reader careful historiographic research based on a wide range of sources. It is this research, and not only Dio's own opinions, *τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας*, which mainly constitutes the "value added" to these sources: definitely not merely "general arguments and themes" or musings about "how the Roman state works."¹⁷ Comparing Dio to his sources, we should be able to trace back his

¹⁶ Cf. DC 7 fr. 32 and 43.43.5 (##5 and 32 in Appendix I).

¹⁷ Kemezis 2006, 79-80.

reasoning procedures and unlock his methodology by using such clues as expressed, for example, in DC 46.35.1 as an idiosyncratic key to his methodology. Such attempt will be made in chapter four of this dissertation.

However, what must interest us in Dio's intellectual techniques includes a much wider spectrum of constituent elements. They may include Dio's aims, methods, judgments, biases, and the like, but also Dio's relation to the historiographic tradition. This tradition should be understood both in the sense of the stories handed down from one historian to another, and also as regards the conventions regulating the ways these stories should be told:

The modern historian of Rome, dependent as he often is on Dio, must constantly be wary of his selection of events, his ordering of them, and his judgments on them. These patterns were, in varying degree, the outcome of his historiographical methods and literary style, the techniques and conceptions of the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition that he inherited, and his relationship to the sources he drew upon and compressed. (Reinhold 2002, 70-71)

This is why the comparative method is of special importance for us in the process of isolating the elements that constitute a historian's original input. In such undertaking, we should also not overlook the rich body of internal evidence comprising Dio's frequent, almost intrusive, methodological asides.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. Kemezis 2006, 64-65 who views these editorial asides as acts of self-positioning to justify his role as an authoritative narrator: "[B]y the time he tells the story of showing his work to Severus [73(72).23], readers already know that he [Dio] has intruded into his own story many times and will probably continue to do so. Conscious acts of self-portraiture recur throughout both Dio's contemporary and non-contemporary sections, and he talks constantly about his work as a historian."

1.1.2. Internal Evidence vs. Application of the Comparative Method; Their Limitations

From the phrasing of DC 53.19.6 (the aforementioned editorial aside that is fundamental for understanding Dio)¹⁹ and in particular from the use of ὡς δεδήμωται and τὸ θρυλούμενον, we conclude that there is implicitly a certain historiographic tradition with which Dio expects his reader to be familiar. To this tradition (from his claimed position of high erudition) Dio promises to add new information which differs from the accepted version(s) or, every time such opportunity presents itself, to offer his opinion. If so, comparing Dio with the sources that constitute this tradition shall expose Dio's own understanding of history, his political views and, in general, his methodology. One serious challenge to this analytical approach is that Dio understands the tradition in collective terms. Hence he had good reason to refer but rarely to specific authors or works. As a rule, every time we try to compare Dio to his potential sources we discover multiple influences and parallels, but each *indicium* is not strong in itself to aid in identifying Dio's models. This ambiguity is the direct outcome of his methods of working with sources.²⁰

Would it be then possible to lay aside the comparative method completely and rely solely on Dio's editorial asides? Without exaggeration, Dio stands apart prominently from the remaining cohort of Roman historians as marked out by the sheer number of such methodological asides in his history. Why would we not trust such testimony which is a seemingly direct guidance into Dio's own method? In assenting we recall how Dio closely followed the precepts of good history-writing as they were suggested by Lucian.

¹⁹ See p. 23 of this dissertation.

²⁰ See the next section, 1.1.3.

Kemezis started his analysis of some of the methodological passages with this unexpected disclaimer about what he regards as their doubtful frankness:

In fact, much that Dio says about his own working methods is disingenuous, and some of it is almost certainly not true. He means not to tell us about himself and how he works, but to explain what sort of a person should be writing history and how. (Kemezis 2006, 56)²¹

In order to offer potential rationales for adopting Kemezis' doubt, let us consider the following example. Contemplating the self-sacrifice of consul Decius Mus in the battle of Veseris in 340 BCE, between Romans and the Latin tribes, Dio says:

θαυμάζω μὲν γὰρ εἰ ὁ θάνατος ὁ τοῦ Δεκίου τὴν μάχην ἀνώρθωσε καὶ τοὺς μὲν νικῶτας ἤττησε, τοῖς δὲ δὴ κρατουμένοις νίκην ἔδωκεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ συμβαλεῖν ἔχω δι' ὃ τοῦτ' ἐγένετο. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὰ πραχθέντα τισὶν ἐπιλέξομαι (πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη πολλοῖς τοιαῦτα συνενεχθέντα ἴσμεν), οὐ δύναμαι τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀπιστῆσαι· ὅταν δὲ δὴ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἐκλογίσωμαι, καὶ πάνυ ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίσταμαι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ πιστεύσειέ τις ἐκ τοιαύτης ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπιδόσεως τοσοῦτο πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἔς τε τὴν σωτηρίαν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐς τὴν ἐπικράτησιν μεταβαλέσθαι; καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὅπη ποτὲ καὶ δι' ἧς αἰτίας οὕτως ἔχει ζητεῖν ἄλλοις μελήσει. (DC 7 fr. 35.7-8)

I marvel that the death of Decius should have set the battle right again, and should have defeated the side that was winning and given victory to the men who were getting worsted; and yet I cannot conjecture what did bring about the result. When I reflect what some have accomplished, — for we know that many such experiences have befallen many persons before, — I cannot disbelieve the tradition; but when I calculate their causes, I become involved in a great dilemma. For how is one to believe that by such a sacrifice of a single man so great a multitude of men turned at once to safety and to victory? Well, the truth of the affair and the causes responsible for it should be left to others to investigate. (DC 7.35.7-8)

What can this passage tell us about Dio's methods and the quality of his source-criticism?

This is one of the several editorial asides where Dio expressed a pronounced attitude to supernatural events. From the ancient point of view such reservation of belief may satisfy or perhaps even surpass the degree of critical judgment expected from an ancient historian,

²¹ However, in the same work, Kemezis corrects this somewhat categorical statement by saying that there are two ways of looking at these traditional programmatic statements in ancient historians. In his discussion, Kemezis says, he will concentrate only on one of the aspects: "They [programmatic statements] can be seen both as conscious acts of self-positioning and as accurate descriptions of the practices of the historian as reflected in his or her work" (2006, 64).

especially when taking into consideration Quintilian's view of a historian's task: (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.31: *historia ... scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum*).

From the point of view of modern standards, however, we are probably bound to admit that, although Dio's inquisitive sense is historical, because it rises above accepting the legendary version of the event in its search for a pragmatic causality (which testifies to his method as being truth-oriented), he is not critical enough of his sources.²² He does not go beyond mere questioning of them and refuses to investigate his doubts further (*καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὅπη ποτὲ καὶ δι' ἧς αἰτίας οὕτως ἔχει ζητεῖν ἄλλοις μελήσει*).²³ This could itself be a *topos*, one of the instances that Wiseman interprets as "I'm reporting what I was told, I don't necessarily believe it," and thus employed here in order to create the semblance of historical authority: "Historians make this declaration at random, to give the illusion that the rest of what they say is guaranteed."²⁴ Moreover, Lucian even prescribes using this very tool when dealing with the mythological material:

καὶ μὴν καὶ μῦθος εἴ τις παρεμπέσοι, λεκτέος μὲν, οὐ μὴν πιστωτέος πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ θετέος τοῖς ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰκάσουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ: σὺ δ' ἀκίνδυνος καὶ πρὸς οὐδέτερον ἐπιρρεπέστερος. (Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 60)

Again, if a myth comes along you must tell it but not believe it entirely; no, make it known for your audience to make of it what they will – you run no risk and lean to neither side.

²² Cf. Lendon 2009, 34: "[W]hether or not the Latin historians in fact achieved truth, the truth-orientation of their craft controlled or influenced nearly everything they did: ... history was indeed a genre of its own, with its own rules. ... [T]o understand the writing of Roman history not as free creation but as a constrained art – where the author practiced his creativity within a tight box of acknowledged fact, of the tradition upon which he drew, and of the audience's expectations – offers an escape from some of the more anachronistic and solipsistic of today's analyses of the Latin historians."

²³ Cf. the wording in the similar disclaimer in, for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.74.5): *ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων ἑτέροις παρίμεν σκοπεῖν*.

²⁴ Wiseman 1993, 135.

Therefore, Dio's aside on the legend of Decius Mus (7.35.7-8) could be interpreted both "in favor" and "against" the historiography of Dio depending upon what interpretative theory we choose to rely. If we follow Wiseman, should we simply discard this passage, like any other editorial aside in Dio, because it represents nothing more than a rhetorical turn, a traditional but unsubstantiated claim of authority?

In such way, the internal evidence from Dio's text alone does not allow us to come definitively to the conclusions about his methodological procedures, even when this evidence is amassed. Instances like this naturally call for a comparative analysis, since the editorial asides could be a result either of certain deeply rooted historiographical conventions or simply a rhetoric commonplace.

How do Dio's sources treat the story of Decius Mus? Could this methodological aside in Dio be suspect because the historian's disbelief in reversing the outcome of the battle through the heroic deed of one person *had been already a part of the tradition* from which Dio borrowed his information? Does this passage demonstrate Dio's real — i.e. skeptical — attitude toward miraculous in general or was it simply inherited from the historiographic conventions developed over centuries of narrating this particular legend?

In fact, the comparison of the episode describing the self-sacrifice of Decius at Veseris in 340 BCE reveals that the latter may be the case. Livy's and Dio's accounts are quite consistent on the factual side.²⁵ Notably, both authors fail to state with any precision the real factors behind the outcome of the battle with Latins. However, already in Livy we may gather a certain sense of discomfort about accepting the supernatural version as the sole

²⁵ Although Livy adds some additional details concerning the religious ritual performed in this context and the prayer which was pronounced by Decius while the pontifex Valerius was participating in the ceremony (Livy 8.9.1-2).

cause of the reversal in the course of the battle (or even as one of the probable causes). Livy suggested two possible causes for the victory of the Romans: it was the result of the divine will placated by the *devotio* of Decius or military competence exercised by the other consul, Manlius. One could argue that Livy came down on the side of Manlius' role rather emphatically. Some even see here an attempt to "play down" the supernatural element and rationalize the story.²⁶

Ceterum inter omnes cives sociosque praecipua laus eius belli penes consules fuit, quorum alter omnes minas periculaque ab deis superis inferisque in se unum vertit, alter ea virtute eoque consilio in proelio fuit ut facile convenerit inter Romanos Latinosque qui eius pugnae memoriam posteris tradiderunt, utrius partis T. Manlius dux fuisset, eius futuram haud dubie fuisse victoriam. (Livy 8.10.7-8)

For the rest, of all the citizens and allies, the chief glory of that war went to the consuls; of whom the one had drawn all the threats and menaces of the supernal and infernal gods upon himself alone, and the other had shown such valour and ability in the battle that it is readily agreed by both Romans and Latins who have handed down an account of this engagement that whichever side had been led by Titus Manlius would undoubtedly have been victorious.

Clearly, both authors faced the dilemma, how to preserve the traditional story and at the same time evade the details that were problematic for probabilistic explanations. Perhaps, in contrast to Livy's times, Dio's reader would eagerly criticize the author for fondness of supernatural/mythical explanations – I think such an indication is provided by the quite unusual word choice, "danger", in Lucian's advice above: σὺ δ' ἀκίνδυνος (Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 60). Hence Dio chose to openly acknowledge the difficulty with the interpretation of the

²⁶ Oakley 1998, 427-28: "[I]t then appears that the decisive factor in the Roman success was not so much the self-sacrifice of Decius as the skill with which Torquatus delayed the charge of his *triarii*. One might perhaps regard this as a failure to integrate two of the dominant themes of the narrative, *devotio* and the manipular tactics employed by both sides; but it is possible that L. was deliberately trying to play down the supernatural aspects of the battle and to provide a double motivation, human and divine, for the Roman victory."

story. Livy's attitude, on the other hand, is not overt, but could be collected from the summing-up statement for this episode:

Haec, etsi omnis divini humanique moris memoria abolevit nova peregrinaque omnia priscis ac patriis praeferendo, haud ab re duxi verbis quoque ipsis, ut tradita nuncupataque sunt, referre.
(Livy 8.11.1)

These particulars, even though the memory of every religious and secular usage has been wiped out by men's preference of the new and outlandish to the ancient and homebred, I have thought it not foreign to my purpose to repeat, and in the very words in which they were formulated and handed down.

It seems reasonable to draw two conclusions about Livy's comments. Firstly, speaking in abstract terms, Livy conforms to Lucian's recommendation more closely than Dio. He avoids making direct comments on the plausibility of any elements of the story, but records an episode which retains value as an illustration of an old virtuous tradition (yet another *exemplum*). Secondly, since, he says, the traditional story is retold verbatim, *verbis ipsis* (possibly meaning "in the very exact words of my source" or also, "according to the oral tradition, without adding any interpretative element"), it does not call for further investigation or critical examination. In other words, Livy's emphasis falls on why Decius committed *devotio* (an ancient moral and ritual tradition), and not on its efficacy.

Quite the opposite prevails with Dio. He constantly subjects the tradition to careful scrutiny, and not only from the point of view of general probability, but as well from that of logical consistency between the details. We recall that Dio's announced method for this procedure here was *συμβαλεῖν ... ὃ τοῦτ' ἐγένετο* and *τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἐκλογίσωμαι*. This approach also resonates well with the passages in which Dio described the nature of his method, the ones that we have considered above: DC 46.35.1; 53.19; and 73(72).18.3-4. In his analysis, however, Dio rejects any possible interpretation in which a causal link is made

between the act of *devotio* and the reversal of enemy successes in the battle; and rejects these as based on supernatural and not logically deducible grounds. Because Dio is unable to supply any other explanation, he abandons further investigation altogether with a commonplace disclaimer, *καὶ ταῦτα ... ζητεῖν ἄλλοις μελήσει*. However, the difference between Dio and Livy is clear: Dio perceives the tradition as the object of critical investigation, and not merely as a source of educative facts worthy of recording for the sake of setting out the *exempla*.²⁷

This allows us to formulate some preliminary conclusions. Although Dio uses the conventional historiographical and rhetorical devices in self-reflective statements, it does not necessarily mean that the way he describes his intellectual procedures is not in earnest. The problems which Dio addresses in his editorial asides (in this case, the impossibility of logically reevaluating the probability of an event based on alogical, i.e. supernatural, premises) are not always an outcome of Dio's original insight; at times they are inspired by old controversies in his sources, but his way of re-addressing such problematic issues is fully independent and original. In the example provided, Dio was not able to establish the cause-and-effect relation, but the declaration of intent already testifies that it remained his main concern. Dio, no matter what the result of his own inquiry was, so to speak, put a stamp that guaranteed that the matter had been investigated to the limit of his ability, and thus still underscored his original input. Unlike Livy, who refrains from thus challenging the tradition, Dio feels obliged to express his opinion (cf. DC 53.19.16: *τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας*).²⁸

²⁷ On the relation of Dio to the Roman *exempla* tradition, see Gowing 2009, 332-47.

²⁸ This opinion is unequivocal and even categorical, as is demonstrated further by Zonaras' rendition of this same editorial aside in question (Zon. 7.26, 1.244-46). The decisive victory of the Romans was anything but the result of the self-sacrifice of Decius: *τέως δὲ τελευτήσαντος τοῦ Δεκίου τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἡ νίκη καθαρώς συνηνέχθη*,

In this case this approach might clash with Lucian's advice in *Hist. Consr.* 60. The editorial aside considered in this section is consistent with the methods announced throughout: history, in Dio's understanding, is a process of re-evaluation of the facts using logical criteria.

Therefore, as it has been demonstrated, the two suggested ways of isolating Dio's historiographic techniques (or, more broadly, methodology, as it was defined in my introduction) both have serious limitations. The generalizations based on Dio's own editorial asides about the intellectual procedures involved in the writing may not reveal the real intentions of the author because the asides themselves may sometimes be, and perhaps often are, a part of the (literary and stylistic) convention of history-writing. On the other hand, the comparative analysis of parallel passages from Dio and other historical works (potentially Dio's sources) is complicated by the problematic state of the *Quellenforschung* for our historian.²⁹

καὶ οἱ Λατῖνοι πάντες ἐτράπησαν, οὐ πάντως δὲ διὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Δεκίου· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις πιστεύσειεν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς τοιαῦδε τελευτῆς τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν φθαρῆναι, τὸ δὲ σωθῆναι καὶ νικῆσαι περιφανῶς; “When Decius had how perished, a decisive victory fell to the Romans and the Latins were all routed – yet certainly not on account of the death of Decius. For how can one believe that from such a death of a single man so great a multitude of human beings was destroyed in the one case and in the other was saved and won a conspicuous victory?”

²⁹ In addition, the results of such comparative study would be of value if they assumed a systematic character and covered substantial continuous portions of Dio's text, which is far beyond the scope of the present work.

1.2. DIO AND HIS SOURCES

1.2.1. *Dio and the Problem of Quellenforschung*

There is not a controversy regarding the question of *Quellenforschung* for Dio's history, simply because no sustained review of the evidence had been offered. Millar, for example, notoriously discarded the question of sources as irrelevant to the study of Dio because, he claimed, real probative evidence could not be found, unless the source was referenced directly (and even in this case that would not prove that the Dio actually consulted this source directly).³⁰ Also, Millar had doubts whether the tentative guesses based on the comparing parallel accounts in different historians could be ever conclusive or useful for understanding Dio's use of this or that author.

Not only is this question quite complicated because we simply do not have a technique, besides comparing the existing accounts, to know what Dio's sources were, but the multiple attempts to address this question have not progressed, unfortunately, much beyond the conclusions offered in 1914 in the introduction of Cary's translation of Dio in the Loeb series (largely based on Schwartz' article in *RE*). According to Cary, Dio might have used Livy to a certain extent; also Polybius and Tacitus, but probably did not make use of Sallust and, generally, relied on multiple sources rather than merely having followed just one at a time.³¹ The more recent attempts to re-address the problem of sources of Dio Cassius, by Harrington (1977) and Libourel (1968), do not provide any significant clarification of the question. Harrington adds Suetonius and Cicero to the list, while

³⁰ Millar 1999, 34-38. For this position Millar was subjected to a vigorous criticism from his reviewers (e.g. Townend 1965; Morris 1965; Salmon 1966).

³¹ Cary 1914, vol. i, pp. xv-xvi.

Libourel sees the influence of Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Dio as being more consistently felt than that of Livy. Libourel suggested an unknown “source X”, which he thinks Dio must have used, but did not make any definite claims about this source’s identity.

Unfortunately, the dissertation by J. Libourel (1968) is the only recent attempt known to me at the systematic comparative study of Dio and his possible historiographic sources. Libourel sets as his main goal the refutation of the old theory of Schmidt who “regarded Dio’s account of early Roman history as basically a conflation of Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and consequently of little value to the study of the literary history of this period.”³² Besides Livy and Dionysius (and also Plutarch, Appian, and others) Libourel investigated Dio’s dependence on the Roman annalists, among whom with some depth he considered Fabius Pictor, but also Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius.³³ The results of this comparative study, mainly based on detailed comparative analysis of passages from Dio and parallel accounts in other historians, may seem disappointing to those hoping to advance the question of our historian’s sources.³⁴

These results, which fully concur with my own observations, are however, of more value for my present purposes, that is, reconstruction of Dio’s working procedures and discovering his unique input into Roman historiography. It appears that while the influence Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus cannot be fully discarded and “the greater

³² Libourel 1968, 45.

³³ Ibid., 186-203.

³⁴ It is important to note that Libourel limits his study to Dio’s account of the Early Republic, the latest passages being considered belonging to the Second Samnite war.

part of Dio's account is not much different from the accounts given by these authors,"³⁵ there is yet no evidence of Dio relying closely and solely on these authors. Quite the opposite, Dio often insistently prefers the versions listed as variant in these authors, sometimes being closer to Livy, sometimes to Dionysius.³⁶ Also frequently, preserving the mainstream trend of the tradition for each of the stories considered by Libourel, Dio introduced material not found in Livy or Dionysius. This led Libourel to suspect Dio's usage of another, alternative but unknown to us source which he named "source X".³⁷

The same predicament remains valid in comparative analysis with the republican annalists who are possible common sources for Dio, Dionysius, and Livy: the extent of their influence cannot be proven, although some echoes of our author's consulting them should not be ignored. In fact, the answer to this question may be relatively simple; and Libourel himself recognizes that (a) "Dio used a considerable number of sources in its [history's] composition," (b) he shows a tendency to combine "disparate historical sources," (c) it is hard to find any evidence that Dio used "any single source as his basic source."³⁸ These tendencies are traceable in Dio on both linguistic and thematic levels and significantly complicate the comparative analysis where its goal is *Quellenforschung*.

In fine, the claim of wide reading, which, as I shall insist, is one of the important keys for our understanding of Dio's methods, seems to find its confirmation also in the results of the comparative analyses: "Although I have read pretty nearly everything about them

³⁵ Libourel 1968, 49.

³⁶ Ibid., 47.

³⁷ Ibid., esp. 54-56.

³⁸ Ibid., 186-87.

that has been written by anybody, I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select” (DC 1 fr. 1.2).³⁹

The purpose of the next section is to consider the examples that illustrate ample, if elusive, traces of Dio’s working procedure that reveal an attempt at blending together all that was available to him out of (mostly historiographic) source material.

1.2.2. Dio’s Note-Taking Process: Blending or Conflation of Source-Material

In another often quoted methodological aside Dio hinted that his working procedure comprised two steps:

συνέλεξα δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις μέχρι τῆς Σεουήρου μεταλλαγῆς πραχθέντα ἐν ἔτεσι δέκα, καὶ συνέγραψα ἐν ἄλλοις δώδεκα. (DC 73(72).23.5)

I spent ten years in collecting all the achievements of the Romans from the beginning down to the death of Severus, and twelve more in composing my work.⁴⁰

In fact, Lucian advises that this same twofold procedure be followed by a diligent historian.

During the first stage of composition, a historian will have put together a series of notes:

καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀθροίσῃ ἅπαντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα, πρῶτα μὲν ὑπόμνημά τι συνυφαινέτω αὐτῶν καὶ σῶμα ποιείτω ἀκαλλὲς ἔτι καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον· εἴτα ἐπιθεὶς τὴν τάξιν ἐπαγέτω τὸ κάλλος καὶ χρωννύτω τῇ λέξει καὶ σχηματίζετω καὶ ῥυθμίζετω. (Luc. Hist. Conscr. 48)

When he [historian] has collected all or most of the facts, let him first make them into a series of notes, a body of material as yet with no beauty or continuity. Then, after arranging them into order, let him give it beauty and enhance it with the charms of expression, figure, and rhythm.

If we possessed that set of Dio’s notes, by comparing them with the text of his *Ῥωμαϊκά*, we would be able to crystallize, as in the process of vaporization of sea water, the salt of Dio’s

³⁹ Ἀνέγνων μὲν πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα, συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ’ ὅσα ἐξέκρινα.

⁴⁰ During the first ten years Dio was occupied with extensive reading, as we remember from 1 fr. 1.2 (see n. 39 above).

own views, historical attitudes, his methods of literary arrangement, as well as his own comments.⁴¹ As has been pointed out, however, the current state of our knowledge does not allow us to ascertain with a reliable degree of confidence what Dio's sources were: "Hopeless uncertainties prevail in the field of source-criticism."⁴² Although I strongly disagree with Millar that the question of Dio's use of sources is completely irrelevant to the study of the historian's methodology, in this dissertation I shall still avoid a systematic *Quellenforschung* of my own as I deem our evidence to be too ambiguous for the results of such source criticism to be conclusive. However, an attempt to reconstruct Dio's process of working with the sources on the basis of comparative evidence and also of the clues suggested by the historian himself (in his methodological pronouncements) can be useful for understanding his broader techniques and methods. This understanding shall, in turn, lead us to generalizations about, for example, Dio's historical aims, and the function of those especially prominent compositional elements in his history, such as the speeches and wisdom expressions.

Dio's working procedures while writing history, i.e. collection, selection, and stylistic re-working, as envisaged by Millar, may explain his rare references to his sources.⁴³ It might be also taken for granted that the absence of references to the authorship or provenance of borrowed materials was a common trait of ancient historiography in general.⁴⁴ During the first stage of composition (192 to 207 CE), Dio read the available sources and made

⁴¹ Note the contrasting view in Millar 1999, 38: "The question of exactly which authorities an ancient historian used in each section of his narrative, while important for those whose sole concern is with the truth or falsehood of the facts he records, is not essential for the study of the historian himself. What was distinctively his was not any new array of facts but the composition of a new literary narrative on the basis of accepted facts." For Millar's controversial opinion on *Quellenforschung* in general see *ibid.* 1999, 34-38.

⁴² Millar 1999, 34.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 28-33.

⁴⁴ Cf. Lendon 2009, 55.

excerpts collecting them in the chronological order on papyrus.⁴⁵ Between 207 and 219 CE, it took him twelve years for the composition of the narrative itself. During this time he revised the notes, selected and arranged the material, and subjected it to the literary treatment. “It would be also at this point [during the second stage of composition] that he inserted not only his references to events after 207 but his personal comments and explanations and also his numerous and lengthy speeches.”⁴⁶ This latter procedure presupposes a great deal of personal input from Dio. The free re-arrangement of material from his notes into a continuous narrative (as opposed to mere compilation) in a sense ascribes a type of true authorship to Dio.

Another question involves which material these notes actually contained. Were they a collection of verbatim quotes from his sources, which Dio later reworked into his narrative and speeches, or a more varied aggregation — a compendium of facts, excerpts, paraphrases, Dio’s own contemplations, drafts of certain passages for the future work, even “bullet-points” of some sort; all inspired by, rather than directly borrowed from, multiple historical works that Dio read as he proceeded by examining one historical episode after another? Most probably the latter was the case, although it could probably still be claimed with assurance that Dio was at times borrowing a word, at times a phrase or a sentence, still other times larger portions of his source while never sticking too close to a single authority. Far from being mere conjecture, this reconstruction of Dio’s compositional techniques is validated by the observations provided by some comparativists, for example Litsch, who traced Dio’s borrowings from Thucydides on different levels, from lexical, even

⁴⁵ Millar 1999, 32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

morphological, to syntactical (including many parallels in the usage of individual words, expressions, constructions, utterances, and descriptions).⁴⁷

Litsch's now rather elderly inquiry into Dio's text has a telling title, *De Cassio Dione imitatore Thucydidis*, which reflects a popular conception of Dio still prevalent in scholarship. Yet at the very end of the work Litsch also admits to discerning a specific character to Dio's borrowing. Inasmuch as the parallels are ubiquitous, the departures from the original are also significant, although, says Litsch, Dio made sure that the reader could easily make a mental correlation between his text and the Thucydidean original elements. Hence Litsch would not advise anyone to emend Thucydides on the basis of Dio (!). From his comparative analysis Litsch gained an impression that Dio was not taking notes of Thucydides or making the excerpts from the historian, but, having perused the text, he utilized in his own composition those Thucydidean words, expressions, and constructions that most adhered in his memory.⁴⁸ In other words, during the first stage of composition, Dio put together his notes from the memory of his wide reading and, perhaps, this is exactly the procedure that Dio's Philiskos intended by ζήλωσον αὐτούς when he advised Cicero to emulate Thucydides and Xenophon (DC 38.28.2).

However, it is not indeed the imitation of other historians which should strike us as unusual in Dio's historiographic method, but that in composing his own narrative (and his speeches) he relied on several authors at once while leaving, perhaps deliberate, traces (or hints) of this very methodology. This is why, when we compare Dio, especially in the earlier parts of his history, to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and Livy, we may often find

⁴⁷ Litsch 1893, 45-46.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 46.

evidence of this seemingly haphazard way of borrowing from multiple authors at once and close enough, but not verbatim, derivatives, as if indeed coming from his memory and not from the quotes excerpted word-by-word from the sources. Possibly, this is also the reason for the inevitable lack of conclusiveness in the comparative studies of Dio, as was also evident from the findings of Libourel's work which has been discussed above.

If the approach to Dio employed by Litsch is proper (recognizing lexical, phraseological, and syntactical parallels between Thucydides and Dio as borrowing or imitation, when such are found in comparable thematic contexts), we may illustrate the specificity of Dio's process of borrowing from the sources with some examples. Even a cursory comparative analysis of Dio's account of the reigns of Romulus and Numa in book one reveals a number of rather close, however random or arbitrary, parallels with Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy:

αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως αὐτοῦ φέρουσι τὴν τε ἄφεσιν τῶν ὁμήρων, οὓς παρὰ Οὐιεντανῶν ἔλαβεν, ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώμης γενομένην παρὰ τὸ εἰωθός. (DH 2.56.3)

... and the reason they allege for his [Romulus'] murder is that he released without the common consent, contrary to custom, the hostages he had taken from the Veientes.

μάλιστα δὲ ὅτι βαρὺς ἤδη καὶ αὐθάδης εἶναι ἐδόκει καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκέτι βασιλικῶς ἀλλὰ τυραννικώτερον ἐξάγειν. (DH 2.56.3)

... but chiefly because he now seemed to be harsh and arbitrary and to be exercising his power more like a tyrant than a king.

καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς Οὐιιένταις ἀπέδωκε καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ κοινῆς γνώμης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ ἐγίγνετο. (DC 1 fr. 5.11)

... he [Romulus] returned the hostages of the Veientes on his own responsibility and not by common consent, as was usually done.

ὅτι ὁ Ῥωμύλος πρὸς τὴν γερουσίαν τραχύτερον διέκειτο καὶ τυραννικώτερον αὐτῇ προσεφέρετο. (DC 1 fr. 5.11)

Romulus assumed a rather harsh attitude toward the senate and behaved toward it much like a tyrant.

Direct lexical parallels are naturally harder to establish when Latin and Greek are being counterpoised; however, the following two passages in Livy, in which he offers a comparison of the policies of two kings, Romulus and Numa, are paralleled in Dio rather closely and the similarities are striking: note especially *ισχυρά ... καὶ εὖκοσμος* vs. *cum valida tum temperata*; τοῦ μὲν τὰ πολεμικά ... τοῦ δὲ τὰ εἰρινικά vs. *ille bello, hic pace*:

Qui regno ita potitus urbem novam, conditam vi et armis, iure eam legibusque ac moribus de integro condere parat. (Livy 1.19.1)

Ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia via, ille bello, hic pace, civitatem auxerunt. ... Cum valida tum temperata et belli et pacis artibus erat civitas. (Livy 1. 21.5)

When he had thus obtained the kingship, he prepared to give the new City, founded by force of arms, a new foundation in law, statutes, and observances.

Thus two successive kings in different ways, one by war, the other by peace, promoted the nation's welfare. ... The state was not only strong, but was also well organized in the arts both of war and peace.

οὕτω μὲν δὴ δι' ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς καὶ *ἰσχυρὰ ταχὺ καὶ εὖκοσμος* ἡ πόλις ἐγένετο, τοῦ μὲν *τὰ πολεμικά* αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίως ἄτε καὶ *νεόκτιστον οὔσαν* ἀσκήσαντος, τοῦ δὲ *τὰ εἰρινικά* προσεκδιδάξαντος, ὥστ' αὐτὴν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ὁμοίως διαπρέψαι. (DC 1 fr. 6.6)

In this way because of both of them [Romulus and Numa] the city quickly became strong and well ordered; for the one gave it practice in the arts of warfare, — of necessity, since it was but newly founded, — and the other taught it, in addition, the arts of peace, so that it became equally distinguished in each.

The famous speech with which Romulus' wife Hersilia, together with other Roman women, stopped the fighting between the Romans and the Sabines (DC 1 fr. 5.5-7), appears to be echoing both Plutarch and Livy at the same time, being closer to Livy in its arguments and stylistically, but closer to Plutarch in compositional design. Once again, the evidence for Dio's borrowing from both Plutarch and Livy is strong, especially on lexical and syntactical levels, but the character of the borrowing is situational and idiosyncratic. A

pronounced proclivity toward the use of anaphora is a typical Livian feature to which we compare Dio's style:

“τί ταῦτα” ἔφασαν “ποιεῖτε, πατέρες; τί ταῦτα, ἄνδρες; μέχρι ποῦ μαχεῖσθε; μέχρι ποῦ μισήσετε ἀλλήλους; καταλλάγητε τοῖς γαμβροῖς, καταλλάγητε τοῖς πενθεροῖς.” (DC 1 fr. 5.5-6)

Why do you do it, fathers? Why do you do it, husbands? When will you cease fighting? When will you cease hating each other? Make peace with your sons-in-law! Make peace with your fathers-in-law!

On the other hand, the climactic clause of the speech reads almost as a paraphrase from parts of the collective speech of the Sabine women addressed to the fighting parties in Livy (the order of the arguments is reversed in Dio):

Tum Sabinae mulieres ... orantes, ne se sanguine nefando soceri generique respergerent, ne parricidio macularent partus suos, nepotum illi, hi liberum progeniem. “si adfinitatis inter vos, si conubii piget, in nos vertite iras; nos causa belli, nos vulnere ac caedium viris ac parentibus sumus; melius peribimus quam sine alteris vestrum viduae aut orbae vivemus.” (Livy 1.13.1-3)

Then the Sabine women ... beseeching ... that fathers-in-law and sons-in-law should not stain themselves with impious bloodshed, nor pollute with parricide the suppliants' children, grandsons to one party and sons to the other. “If you regret,” they continued, “the relationship that unites you, if you regret the marriage-tie, turn your anger against us; we are the cause of war, the cause of wounds, and even death to both our husbands and our parents. It will be better for us to perish than to live, lacking either of you, as widows or as orphans.”

ὥς εἶγε ἀκαταλλάκτως ἔχετε καί τις ὑμᾶς σκηπτὸς μανίας ἐσπεσὼν οἰστρεῖ, ἡμᾶς τε δι' ἃς μάχεσθε προαποκτείνετε, καὶ τὰ παιδιά ταῦτα ἃ μισεῖτε προαποσφάζετε, ἵνα μηδὲν ἔτι μήτ' ὄνομα μήτε σύνδεσμον συγγενείας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχοντες κερδάνητε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τοὺς τε πάππους τῶν παίδων καὶ τοὺς πατέρας τῶν ἐκγόνων φονεύειν. (DC 1 fr. 5.6)

But if you are indeed irreconcilable and some bolt of madness has fallen upon your heads and drives you to frenzy, then first kill us on account of whom you are fighting, and first slay these children whom you hate, that with no longer any name or bond of kinship between you you many avoid the greatest of evils — the slaying of the grandsires of your children and the fathers of your grandchildren.

The main argument here (that the combatants should avoid pollution associated with killing their own kin and also that the warriors should kill the women instead, as the ones over whom the war is being waged) is borrowed from Livy and absent in Plutarch.

However, a few quite close parallels with Plutarch are prominent in this episode for Dio as well:

καὶ κλαυθμὸς ἅμα διὰ πάντων ἐχώρει, καὶ πολὺς οἶκτος ἦν πρὸς τε τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἔτι μᾶλλον. (Plu. Rom. 19.2)

καὶ συνῆλθον εἰς λόγους οἱ ἡγεμόνες. (Plu. Rom. 19.5)

ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα συνέθεντο, μέχρι νῦν Κομίτιον καλεῖται· κομίρε γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ συνελθεῖν καλοῦσι. (Plu. Rom. 19.7)

Sorrow ran through the ranks, and abundant pity was stirred by the sight of the women, and still more by their words.

And the leaders held a conference.

The place where these agreements were made is to this day called Comitium, from the Roman word “conire,” or “coire,” *to come together*.

ὥστε ἐκείνους καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἤκουον καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐώρων κλαῦσαι καὶ τῆς τε μάχης ἐπισχεῖν καὶ ἐς λόγους αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ εἶχον, ἐν τῷ κομιτίῳ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο κληθέντι συνελθεῖν. (DC 1 fr. 5.7)

Moved by what they heard and saw the men began to weep, and they desisted from battle and came together for a conference there, just as they were, in the *comitium*, which received its name from this very event.

And, finally, Dio also follows Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.45-46) in making Hersilia the speaker as the head of this embassy of women (in Plutarch and Livy, it is a collective body of the Sabine women who delivered this touching plea amidst the armies).

An objection may be brought forward, however, to the effect that Dio, Livy, and Plutarch may all be borrowing from the same authority, unknown to us “source X”. Yet Dio’s context for writing dictated the author’s familiarity with the forerunners held

authoritative, namely these very historians and the biographer Plutarch. And so, more significantly, Dio could not ignore his audience's knowledge of them and expectation of their use. Rather, it would be in keeping with Dio historical aims, as we have outlined in section 1.1.1, to make an effort to follow an abstract "collective" historical tradition even while not being faithful to one particular source, and to endeavor to generalize that amalgam for the reader. By virtue of his claim to comprehensive research, Dio's *Ρωμαϊκά* undoubtedly enters in a dialogue with this tradition, even if these authors were not always used by Dio as his direct sources in all the expected places.

This is the reason why I find the comparison of Dio's account with that of Livy (or those of Plutarch, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cicero, Suetonius, and Tacitus where appropriate) a valid procedure, regardless of whether they were Dio's immediate sources for the juxtaposed passages or not. Livian and Tacitean versions of events would have always present in the minds of Dio's ideal readers, and Dio must have been aware of this. Just as the histories of Livy and Tacitus (and other *comparanda*) are available to us, they were surely available to Dio who claimed competence in nearly all the existent historical literature: "I have read pretty nearly everything about them that has been written by anybody." In Millar's words, Dio "could hardly have made such sweeping claims to wide reading if Livy at least were not included."⁴⁹

In this context the function of Dio's deliberate allusions to the parallel historical accounts, even if they were not always used as sources, could be inferred by us with some certainty. Naturally, considering the intended scope of Dio's project, the necessity to make his inquiry concise was a limiting factor for him; likewise the authority of other sources so

⁴⁹ Millar 1999, 34.

famous that merely to duplicate them would be beyond a rational or necessary strategy. Instead of following this model closely, by making an occasional intertextual connection with a famous source, Dio provided hints for the readers and reminded them that the source thus referenced had been read and worked through by Dio; in other words, being in one way or another factored into Dio's own version. This serves as yet another way to underscore Dio's authority as a narrator and validate his historiographical endeavor.

Thus recognizing the importance of the comparative evidence, I shall proceed with the method of qualitative comparison even though acknowledging its limitations. In doing this, I shall be guided by the hypothesis, just formulated, that even if Dio did not follow in manifest derivation *comparanda* proposed by me for each of the narrative contexts, the indirect influence of any *comparanda* could be inferred on the basis of their belonging to the general historiographic tradition to which Dio has emphasized his intellectual relationship. Qualitative comparison will further reveal Dio's other methods of working with sources. One of them manifests itself when a commentary metaphor is applied to the comparative study of Dio and his potential sources.

1.2.3. Dio's Method as Commentary

A comparison of Dio's compilation method to a modern-style commentary on an ancient text inevitably comes to mind when Dio's text is read side-by-side with Tacitus, and it becomes especially noticeable when familiar anecdotes from both authors are being counterpoised. Let us further consider more closely a "classic" example, the story of the trial of the historian Cremutius Cordus in Tac. Ann. 4.34-35 and DC 57.24.2-4, and observe what the application of this "commentary" metaphor may tell us about Dio's methods of collection and selection of his material. In the following textual illustration, I have arranged the parallel passages of both historians in a way which imitates the format customary for modern commentaries:

4.34 Cornelio Cosso Asinio Agrippa consulibus Cremutius Cordus postulator, novo ac tunc primum audito crimine: οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔγκλημα ἐπαίτιον λαβεῖν ἡδυνήθη (καὶ γὰρ ἐν πύλαις ἤδη γήρως ἦν καὶ ἐπιεκέστατα ἐβεβιώκει) ὥστε ἐπὶ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ, ἣν πάλαι ποτὲ περὶ τῶν τῷ Αὐγούστῳ πραχθέντων συνετεθείκει καὶ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ἀνεγνώκει, κριθῆναι.⁵⁰

quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset: ὅτι τὸν τε Κάσσιον καὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἐπήνεσε, καὶ τοῦ δήμου τῆς τε βουλῆς καθήψατο, τὸν τε Καίσαρα καὶ τὸν Αὐγούστον εἶπε μὲν κακὸν οὐδέν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ὑπερεσέμνυνε.⁵¹

4.35 Libros per aediles cremandos censuere patres: sed manserunt, occultati et editi: καὶ τὰ συγγράματα αὐτοῦ τότε μὲν τὰ τε ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐρεθέντα πρὸς τῶν ἀγορανόμων καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τῶν ἐκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων ἐκαύθη, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξεδόθη τε αὐθις (ἄλλοι τε γὰρ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ Μαρκία συνέκρυψεν αὐτά).⁵²

⁵⁰ Tac. Ann. 4.34: "The consulate of Cornelius Cossus and Asinius Agrippa opened with the prosecution of Cremutius Cordus upon the novel and till then unheard-of charge..." DC 57.24.2-3: "He was on the threshold of old age and had lived most irreproachably, so much so, in fact, that no serious charge could be brought against him, and he was therefore tried for his history of the achievements of Augustus which he had written long before and which Augustus himself had read."

⁵¹ Tac. Ann. 4.34: "... [charge] of publishing a history, eulogizing Brutus, and styling Cassius the last of the Romans." DC 57.24.3: "He was accused of having praised Cassius and Brutus, and of having assailed the people and the senate; as regarded Caesar and Augustus, while he had spoken no ill of them, he had not, on the other hand, shown any unusual respect for them."

⁵² Tac. Ann. 4.35: "The Fathers ordered his books to be burned by the aediles; but copies remained, hidden and afterwards published." DC 57.24.4: "[of his writings] those found in the city at the time were destroyed

Nam contra punitis ingeniis gliscit auctoritas: καὶ πολὺ ἀξιοσπουδαστότερα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ Κόρδοῦ συμφορᾶς ἐγένετο.⁵³

Both historians inserted the story of trial and execution of Cremutius Cordus in the context of description of the emperor Tiberius’ atrocities which were cloaked within the application of the *Lex maiestatis*. Dio’s version appears to be very synoptic, which reads almost as a summary rendition of Tacitus. The two versions do not disagree on any major points, but they bear no close compositional, lexical, syntactic, or phraseological parallels which could serve as evidence of Dio using Tacitus as his (only) source. At the same time, however, juxtaposing Dio’s treatment with Tacitus’ account creates an impression that Dio had Tacitus’ text before him as he wrote. Dio, so to speak, relied on his reader’s knowledge of Tacitus, or at least some mainstream, traditional version of the story.

Dio, however, added the details not present in Tacitus (see above). Curiously, Dio omitted mentioning the manner of Cordus’ death (this information having been supplied by Tacitus), but provided the detail regarding who had been responsible for the preservation of the history: it was Cremutius’ daughter, and her name was Marcia. Therefore, Dio’s aim in his interpretation of the story, which is much shorter than that of Tacitus, was to specify the details further pertaining to the episode, possibly even to underscore his authority as based on superior knowledge of the sources by demonstrating familiarity with the minute particulars of the account. If we accept the supposition that Dio indeed wrote this episode “around” the Tacitean version, we may claim that Dio also corrected some inconsistencies. In the speech pronounced by Cordus before the senators

by the aediles, and those elsewhere by the magistrates of each place. Later they were republished, for his daughter Marcia as well as others had hidden some copies.”

⁵³ Tac. Ann. 4.35: “On the contrary, genius chastised grows in authority.” DC 57.24.4: “... and they [his writings] aroused much greater interest by very reason of Cordus’ unhappy fate.”

(Tac. Ann. 34-35), the defendant provided examples of Julius Caesar's and Augustus' tolerance toward political attacks and personal invectives (*probra, contumelia*). The speech in large is structured around examples that describe the historical precedents for the actions for which Cordus himself had been accused: many previous historians, he says, had represented Brutus and Cassius in positive light without any consequences. However, the reference to Caesar and Augustus in this context may seem illogical because no such accusations (i.e. for speaking ill of them) were recorded by Tacitus as having been brought forward against Cordus. We may assume that Dio noticed and corrected this by adding, "as regarded Caesar and Augustus, while he had spoken no ill of them, he had not, on the other hand, shown any unusual respect for them" (57.24.3). From the information provided by both Tacitus and Dio the hypothetical reader may gather a logically connected exposition of the story: Cremutius in his trial defense speech refuted the accusation of not being respectable enough in his writing to Caesar and Augustus. He did so by providing an example of forbearance and wisdom (*moderatio, sapientia*) of these men, who were able to tolerate and not to react even to personal insults. Notable in Dio is also the omission of the speech itself.⁵⁴

Therefore, from this (albeit speculative) evidence it would be natural to suppose that the combination of two versions would provide the reader with the fullest, yet still succinct, account of the story. Nonetheless, Dio did not recount the Tacitean version first, thus working, in this instance, merely as a commentator. Therefore, this technique, i.e. avoiding duplication while assuming readers' familiarity with a (famous) episode, may very well be

⁵⁴ For the examples of the omission of speeches on the occasions where a speech is present in other historical sources, see section 4.2.2.

intentional and reflect the new condition of history-writing in Dio's time (possibly with the additional purpose of economizing on space, or because of other compositional or stylistic considerations). Such a tendency, that is "skirting around" his sources, is a recurrent feature in Dio, and the hypothesis that this selective approach to the detailing of episodes constitutes a special technique also finds its confirmation in Dio's system of preferences for the selection of speech occasions for his history.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ See section 4.2 of this dissertation for further examples of Dio's criteria for the inclusion of a speech.

1.3. DIO'S LITERARY AND HISTORICAL TECHNIQUES

1.3.1. *Speeches in Dio Cassius: Introductory Remarks. Political Analysis vs. Rhetorical Conventions*

Speeches, an important compositional element in Dio's history, provided him with an ample opportunity to display his creativity and oratorical skills. It is at narrative contexts where there is a necessity to introduce a speech, Lucian says, "that you can play the orator and show your eloquence."⁵⁶

In section 1.2.1, we have discussed Millar's reconstruction of Dio's twofold process of composition during the second stage of which Dio "inserted not only his references to events after 207 but his personal comments and explanations and also his numerous and lengthy speeches."⁵⁷ Speeches are traditionally viewed as a medium for expressing the author's political views and attitudes to the events he describes. The Agrippa-Maecenas debate in book fifty-two is no exception; it has received a lot of scholarly attention from the perspective of this same preconception. According to Adler, "we have strong reason to believe that this invented dialogue can tell us much about Dio's own political proclivities" since "the dialogue contains many of the historian's own opinions."⁵⁸ As such, this dialogue, as well as Dio's speeches in general, would be of particular interest for isolating our historian's original input into the development of historiographic tradition.

However, there is another antipodal point of view, although now going out of fashion among the students of Dio. According to it, speeches in Dio and the so-called

⁵⁶ πλὴν ἐφεῖται σοι τότε καὶ ῥητορεῦσαι καὶ ἐπιδείξαι τὴν τῶν λόγων δεινότητα (Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 58). Cf. section 4.2.1 of this dissertation.

⁵⁷ Millar 1999, 33.

⁵⁸ Adler 2012, 483.

constitutional debate of book fifty-two in particular do not reflect any original analytic thinking of the author. Rather, because of the perceivable artificiality of their composition and more so by their conforming to certain known rhetoric standards, conventions, and *topoi*, they resemble, and probably are in fact, rhetorical exercises, akin to the *suasoria* and *controversia* of the imperial rhetorical schools. Characterizing the constitutional debate Reinhold stated: “Because of its general, largely theoretical nature, Agrippa’s speech is usually dismissed as conventional rhetoric, following a pattern of the traditional *suasoria* of the schools, filled with rhetorical *topoi*.”⁵⁹ I think that we must side with Reinhold’s position, and I shall try to substantiate this view with abundant evidence on the function of speeches in Dio’s *Ῥωμαϊκά* which are discussed in chapter four of this dissertation.

At this point, with one comparative example, I would like to illustrate the elusiveness of the object of my inquiry, namely Dio’s aims and methods, and his intellectual techniques. On the material of the following *comparanda* I intend to emphasize the importance of adducing another type of literary evidence: theoretical treatises belonging to Dio’s time.

The standard logical and inferential procedures involved in the process of comparative study of parallel passages like, for example, Tacitus *Ann.* 1.9 and DC 52.18.1-3, may lead us to erroneous conclusions about the nature of Dio’s own historical analysis, especially when these conclusions concern speeches, which are highly standardized compositional elements that were influenced by traditional rhetorical, historiographic, and literary conventions.

⁵⁹ For the references to the seminal works defending each of these two opposing views, see Alder 2012, 483, nn. 23-25.

In the following example, Tacitus records public opinion of Augustus (*de Augusto sermo*) at the time after his death and, in particular, the tendency, among “men of intelligence” (*apud prudentes*), to exculpate Augustus of his atrocities during his early years:

According to some, “filial duty and the needs of a country, which at the time had no room for law, had driven him to the weapons of civil strife – weapons which could not be either forged or wielded with clean hands. He had overlooked much in Antony, much in Lepidus, for the sake of bringing to book the assassins of his father. When Lepidus grew old and indolent, and Antony succumbed to his vices, the sole remedy for his distracted country was government by one man. Yet he organized the state, not by in a monarchy or a dictatorship, but by creating the title of First Citizen.” (Tac. Ann. 1.9)⁶⁰

The parallel place in Dio is taken from the constitutional debate. At a first glance, this excerpt from the speech is not a mere invention: it addresses some public concerns and opinions presented in the Tacitean narrative as facts. At the same time, it contains Dio’s own comments and interpretations which he put in the mouth of Maecenas:

Again, what man is there who does not know the circumstances which constrained you to assume your present position? Hence, if there be any fault to find with these compelling circumstances, one might with entire justice lay it upon your father’s murderers. For if they had not slain him in so unjust and pitiable a fashion, you would not have taken up arms, would not have gathered your legions, would not have made your compact with Antony and Lepidus, and would not have had to defend yourself against these men themselves. That you are right, however, and were justified in doing all this, no one is unaware. Therefore, even if some slight error has been committed, yet we cannot at this time with safety undo anything that has been done. Therefore, for our own sake and for that of the state let us obey Fortune, who offers you the sole rulership. (DC 52.18.1-3)⁶¹

⁶⁰ *hi pietate erga parentem et necessitudine rei publicae, in qua nullus tunc legibus locus, ad arma civilia actum quae neque parari possent neque haberi per bonas artis. multa Antonio, dum interfectores patris ulcisceretur, multa Lepido concessisse. postquam hic socordia senuerit, ille per libidines pessum datus sit, non aliud discordantis patriae remedium fuisse quam ut ab uno regeretur. non regno tamen neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rem publicam.*

⁶¹ ἔπειτα δὲ τίς οὐκ οἶδε τὴν ἀνάγκην ὑφ’ ἧς ἐς τὰ πράγματα ταῦτα προήχθη; ὥστε εἴπερ τι αἰτίαμα αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς σου σφαγεῦσι δικαιότατα ἂν τις αὐτὸ ἐγκαλέσειεν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι μὴτ’ ἀδίκως μὴτ’ οἰκτρῶς οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀπεκτόνεσαν, οὐτ’ ἂν τὰ ὅπλα ἀντήρῳ, οὐτ’ ἂν τὰ στρατεύματα συνελέξω, οὐτ’ ἂν Ἀντωνίῳ καὶ Λεπίδῳ συνέθου, οὐτ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους ἡμύνω. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐποίησας, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ· εἰ δ’ οὖν τι καὶ πεπλημμέλῃται, ἀλλ’ οὐτι καὶ μεταθέσθαι ἔτ’ ἀσφαλῶς δυνάμεθα. ὥστε καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πόλεως πεισθῶμεν τῇ τύχῃ τῇ τὴν μοναρχίαν σοι διδούσῃ.

Yet one cannot overlook Dio's special emphasis, in comparison with Tacitus, on the justification of Augustus' actions during the civil war. Dio perceives it as needed to underscore the legitimacy of Augustus' actions; he seemingly has qualms about the potential implication drawn from the assertion *necessitudine rei publicae, in qua nullus tunc legibus locus*, that anything goes under the general state of lawlessness. Dio insists that it was Augustus' response to the unlawful actions of Caesar's assassins which was the true cause of the civil war.

Such a choice of emphasis in Dio is not surprising, since Tacitus, in the very next chapter (Tac. *Ann.* 1.10), supplied an opposing view, which presented Augustus as a violent usurper who, motivated by the lust of dominion (*cupidine dominandi*), used this very same filial duty as a cover for unlawful actions.⁶² Maecenas-Dio, on the other hand, here sides with only one view, that favorable to Augustus, while implying his knowledge of the other. If so, Dio had to substantiate the choice of one of the two versions, especially knowing his reader's familiarity with both, favorable and unfavorable, interpretations of Augustus' role in the civil war. More so, while defending the favorable version, Dio-Maecenas seems to polemicize with the unfavorable. Close parallels between Tac. *Ann.* 1.9 -10 and DC 52.18 signal that Dio established this intertextual link with Tacitus, the object of this hidden polemic, purposefully:

⁶² These misdeeds included suspected involvement in the assassination of the consuls Hirtius and Pansa, extorting from the senate the consulship for himself, stirring the civil wars, a role in proscriptions, and still more.

μὴ προῆ καὶ σεαυτὸν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, ἵνα
μὴ δοξῆς τισὶν ἐθελούσιος τῆς ἀρχῆς
ἐφεῖσθαι. (DC 52.18.1)

Do not abandon your country merely in
order to avoid giving the impression to
some that you deliberately sought the
office.

*Dicebatur contra: pietatem erga parentem et
tempora rei publica obtenui sumpta; ceterum
cupidine dominandi concitos per largitionem
veteranos...* (Tac. Ann. 1.10)

On the other side, it was argued that
“filial duty and the critical position of
the state had been used merely as a
cloak: come to facts, and it was from the
lust of dominion that he excited the
veterans by his bounties...”

Therefore, according to Dio, at the time when Augustus was to become the sole ruler, the task of engendering the desirable public opinion of himself put him into a difficult situation as to how to explain the atrocities committed during the civil war which now appeared to have been publicly known. The decision was made to shift the blame onto the assassins of Caesar, emphasizing the forced character of Augustus’ response to the extremely violent actions of these murderers. Not only this, but also the assumption of the position of princeps was presented as a measure enforced by emergency.

Yet the crucial question remains, is this Dio’s genuine interpretation? That is, did Dio use the speech as an opportunity to provide arguments in support of his pro-Augustan point of view and, at the same time, to reflect on the process of creating the right public image of the emperor and illustrate that public opinion may be manipulated?

Not until we bring in other *comparanda* does it become clear that this may not be the case. Ps.-Hermogenes helps us consider the problem from yet another angle, notwithstanding Brunt’s characteristic of his corpus as a “farrago of indiscriminating

absurdity.”⁶³ In *On Invention*, Hermogenes explains the rules for the usage of a rhetorical device called *prokatastasis* should an orator be talking about the matters of war and peace:

Similarly, if we introduce a motion to go to war with someone or to end a war, we shall use *prokatastases* as follows. If we are introducing a motion to go to war with someone, we shall run over earlier complaints and say that “we ought to have gone to war with these people long ago, for they are enemies and have committed many other wrongs against us before these,” then coming to what now happened. The earlier wrongs provide a *prokatastasis* of the *diegesis*, and (*an account of*) the present wrongs, for which you propose the war constitutes the *diegesis*. (Ps.-Hermog. *Inv.* 114)⁶⁴

Prokatastasis amplifies the meaning of *diegesis* (narration) by foreshadowing the events which need reasoning. *Prokatastasis*, then, is an illustration from the past recalled to emphasize the legitimacy of the current situation. It could be employed in a variety of situations. In DC 52.18.1-3, therefore, we see this device in action: the assumption of the position of *princeps* is *diegesis* amplified by *prokatastasis*, which is the wrong-doings of Brutus and Cassius.

Now, what does Dio’s passage in question tell us about his methods? Does it reflect Dio’s unique mode of interpretation or is it just a simple rhetorical device that he had learned in school? In other words, was the speech of Maecenas simply a *suasoria* the topic of which was the justification of the civil war, proscriptions, and murders from the point of view of Augustus? (We must remember that Lucian characterized the function of speeches in a historical work almost as a playground for the use of oratorical sophistries.) In fact, the very last words of this section of Maecenas’ speech read almost like a formulated topic (τὸ ζήτημα) for such *suasoria* or declamation. Maecenas advises Augustus to accept sole rulership in order that by taking good care of the state he could —

⁶³ Brunt 1992, 200.

⁶⁴ Ὁμοίως καὶ πολεμεῖν γράφωμέν τισιν ἢ καταλύειν πόλεμον, χρησόμεθα ταῖς προκαταστάσεσιν οὕτως· ἂν μὲν γράγωμεν πολεμεῖν τισιν, εἰς τὰ πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἀνατρέχοντες καὶ λέγοντες ὅτι «τούτοις πάλαι ἐχρῆν πολεμεῖν· ἐχθροὶ γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἄλλα εἰς ἡμᾶς πολλὰ εἰργασμένοι», εἶτα καταβαίνοντες εἰς τὰ νῦν γεγενημένα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἀδικημάτων προκατάστασις ἐστὶ τῆς διηγήσεως, αὐτὰ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸν πόλεμον γράφεις, ἢ διήγησις.

... δείξης ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἄλλοι καὶ ἐτάραξαν καὶ ἐκακούργησαν, σὺ δὲ δὴ χρηστός εἶ. (DC 52.18.4)

... prove to all mankind that those troubles were stirred up and that mischief wrought be other men, whereas you are an upright man.

Did Dio simply illustrate a possible way of conclusively arguing in favor of one of the two points of view? I believe that this question could be answered only on the basis of the general tendencies observed in Dio Cassius. Thus, the only way to solve this problem objectively would be to add a statistical dimension to our inquiry. For example, the proof of consistent usage of the rhetorical devices by Dio in like instances (as will be clear from the analysis of multiple parallel passages) would testify in favor of the second option. This is what chapter four of our study is aimed at investigating.

It is, however, important to point out that, even if Dio's speeches *were* intended as completely artificial compositions, that is, they were inserted into the history for purely epideictic purposes, it does not necessarily mean that they were resolutely separated from the historical context and that nothing in these speeches could be correlated to the historical facts. This observation is true even of didactic and technical genres themselves: some model *suasoriae* by Seneca the Younger involve the real details from the lives of Cicero and Antony (Sen. *Suas.* 6 and 7); the formulations for the topics for declamations suggested in such abundance in chapter two of Apsines' *Ars Rhetorica* mostly derive from the verifiable historical facts belonging to classical Greek antiquity (Aps. *Rh.* 242-49).

Even the words of Maecenas just quoted above (DC 52.18.4) are themselves not without certain historical groundings; perhaps, they testify to some vagueness and even uncertainty in the historiographic sources about the moral implications of Augustus'

actions during the time of the civil wars, which Dio possibly was trying to address in this section of the speech. In the very next chapter of this speech Maecenas gives the following advice to Augustus regarding the reform of the senate:

Φημί τοίνυν ... σε ... τοὺς μὲν ἀρετὴν τινα αὐτῶν ἔχοντας κατασχεῖν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀπαλεῖψαι. μὴ μεντοι καὶ διὰ πενίαν τινὰ ἀγαθὸν γε ἄνδρα ὄντα ἀπαλλάξῃς, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρήματα αὐτῷ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δός. (DC 52.19.1-2)

I maintain, therefore, that ... such of them as possess any excellence you ought to retain, but the rest you should erase from the roll. Do not, however, get rid of any good man because of his poverty, but even give him the money he requires.

That this had become the actual policy of Augustus, we know from Suetonius. Importantly, such knowledge was also available to Dio's intended readers, and this awareness might have derived likewise from Suetonius:

Senatorum censum ampliavit ac pro octingentorum milium summa duodecies sestertium taxavit supplevitque non habentibus. (Suet. Aug. 41)

He increased the property qualification for senators, requiring one million two hundred thousand sesterces, instead of eight hundred thousand and making up for those who did not possess it.

In the following (and quite curious) example which also illustrates the “historicity” of Dio's speeches, one of the suggestions offered to Augustus by Maecenas finds its confirmation as the actual practice of the *princeps* as attested not in a literary, but epigraphic source.

Maecenas suggests a proper course of dealing with the subject communities, especially with a view of avoiding rivalry and enmity between them:

Καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστι ... τὰς τε ἔχθρας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς φιλοτιμίας τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους παντάπασιν ἐκκόπτειν, καὶ μήτε ἐπωνυμίας τινὰς κενὰς μήτ' ἄλλο τι ἐξ οὗ διενεχθήσονται τισιν ἐφίεναι σφίσι ποιεῖσθαι. ῥαδίως δέ σοι πάντες καὶ ἐς ταῦτα καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ πειθαρχήσουσιν, ἂν μηδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα μηδέποτε συγχωρήσῃς τινί· ἡ γὰρ ἀνωμαλία καὶ τὰ καλῶς πεπηγότα διαλύει. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδ' αἰτεῖν τι ἀρχήν, ὃ γε μὴ δώσεις, ἐπιτρέπειν σφίσι δόφειλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἰσχυρῶς φυλάττειν σφᾶς ἀναγκάζειν, τὸ μηδὲν ἀξιοῦν τῶν κεκωλυμένων. (DC 52.37.10-11)

It is well ... to eradicate their mutual enmities and rivalries, and not to permit them to assume empty titles or to do anything else that will bring them to assume empty titles or to do anything else that will bring them into strife with others. And all will readily yield obedience to you, both individuals and communities, in this and in every other matter, provided that you make no exceptions whatever to this rule as a concession to anybody; for the uneven application of laws nullifies even those which are well established. Consequently you ought not to allow your subjects even to ask you, in the first place, for what you are not going to give them, but should compel them strenuously to avoid at the outset this very practice of petitioning for what is prohibited.

The inscription, which comes from Aphrodisias and is a copy of Augustus' letter to the *demos* of Samians, provides a surprisingly strong material evidence for the historical character of all three main concerns voiced in this passage by Maecenas in regards to the communities: avoiding rivalry between them, refraining from granting privileges too easily, and discouraging them from making such requests:

vac. αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ θεοῦ Ἰουλίου υἱὸς Αὐγουστος Σαμίους ὑπὸ τὸ ἀξίωμα ὑπέγραψεν ἔξεστιν ὑμεῖν αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶν ὅτι τὸ φιλάνθρωπον τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐδενὶ δέδωκα δῆμῳ πλὴν τῷ τῶν [Ἀφροδισιέων] ὃς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τὰ ἐμὰ φρονήσας δοριάλωτος διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὖνοιαν ἐγένετο οὐ γάρ ἐστιν δίκαιον τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθρωπον εἰκῇ καὶ χωρὶς αἰτίας χαρίζεσθαι ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμεῖν μὲν εὖνοῶ καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν τῇ γυναικί μου ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν σπουδαζούσῃ χαρίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ οὐχ ὥστε καταλῦσαι τὴν συνήθειάν μου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν χρημάτων μοι μέλει ἢ εἰς τὸν φόρον τελεῖτε *vac.* ἀλλὰ τὰ τειμιώτατα φιλάνθρωπα χωρὶς αἰτίας εὐλόγου δεδωκέναι οὐδενὶ βούλομαι. (Reynolds 1982, 104-106 = SEG 32, 1982.833 = BE 1983.374 = *AnnEpig* 1984, 867 = SEG 34, 1984.1044 = SEG 35, 1985.1081)

Imperator Caesar Augustus, son of divus Julius, wrote to the Samians underneath their petition: You yourselves can see that I have given the privilege of freedom to no people except the Aphrodisians, who took my side in the war and were captured by storm because of their devotion to us. For it is not right to give the favour of the greatest privilege of all at random and without cause. I am well-disposed to you and should like to do a favour to my wife who is active in your behalf, but not to the point of breaking my custom. For I am not concerned for the money which you pay towards the tribute, but I am not willing to give the most highly prized privileges to anyone without good cause.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Translation from Reynolds 1982, 104.

The inscription records the rejection of Augustus of the petition to grant *ἐλευθερία* and *ἀτέλεια* to Samos, but was inscribed on a wall of the theater in Aphrodisias. To follow Toher's explanations, "The Aphrodisians, in all probability, inscribed this copy of the letter out of pride in the statement ... that they were the first city to be granted *eleutheria* by Augustus."⁶⁶ The inscription should not be rashly discarded as the evidence Dio's familiarity with a detail of which seems improbable or unascertainable. The original letter is dated variously between 38 BCE and 22 BCE, but the inscription found in Aphrodisias was carved, according to Reynolds, in the second or third centuries CE.⁶⁷ Dio might have heard some rumors about this rather odd act of the Aphrodisians (and one two hundred years after the fact) displaying their pride at the expense of the reputation of the Samians.⁶⁸

Many believe that the constitutional debate was designed as a propaganda pamphlet, the real addressee of which was Severus Alexander or, as Millar argues, Caracalla, and thus it "(with trivial exceptions) relates to the early third century and not the time of Augustus."⁶⁹ This question is beyond the scope of my analysis. However, it is worth pointing out that exactly for this reason Dio could have been less constrained by necessity to correlate, as in the examples above, the points of advice given to Augustus, the *dramatis persona* of this debate, with what was eventually implemented during the principate of Augustus, the historical figure in question.

⁶⁶ Toher 1985, 201.

⁶⁷ For the dating of both original letter and its copy on the wall of the theater in Aphrodisias, see Reynolds 1982, 105-106 and Toher 1985, 202.

⁶⁸ However, *ἐλευθερία* was eventually granted to Samos by Augustus in 20 BCE (DC 54.9.7). The fact that Livia interceded for some cities, which is mentioned in the inscription, may be indirectly confirmed in DC 54.7.2. See Toher 1985, 202.

⁶⁹ Millar 1999, 104. See *ibid.*, 102-105, for author's argumentation in regard to the question which emperor was the real addressee of the debate.

Nevertheless, as shall be further argued in chapter four, Dio by means of different devices deliberately created a clear distinction between the two modes of narration in his history: narrative proper (= factual and analytic core) and speeches (= epideictic ornamentation).⁷⁰ One of these devices is a recurrent feature of Dio's design: should a factual matter, first introduced in a speech, become important in the subsequent narrative, Dio re-introduces this fact anew as though a speech alone was not a proper source for a reader to get trustworthy historical data. Book fifty-two provides several of such correlative examples, and I list just a few: 52.20.4 and 53.14.2 (on the military authority of ex-consuls and ex-praetors); 52.31.1 and 53.21.6 (on the embassies being introduced to the senate); 52.33.6 and 53.21.3 (on Augustus being open to advice from anybody); 52.33.4 and 55.25.4 (on Augustus requesting the individual opinions of the senators being written on the tablets/books); 52.36.1-2 and 53.2.4 (on religious attitudes). Nor is this tendency confined to book fifty-two.

The address of Marcus Aurelius to his soldiers in DC 72(71).24-26 is a very unusual speech for Dio. Hardly conforming with the conventions of a general's address to the soldiers, this entire oration took the form of conversation with himself, where Marcus laid down a very detailed (and philosophical in spirit) rationale why the rebellious legate Avidius Cassius should be spared and forgiven. Yet in the main narrative Dio repeated the same sentiment which had been minutely elaborated in the speech just a few sections

⁷⁰ Cf. Kemezis 2006, 65, n. 176: "In all of these instances [*Consolatio ad Ciceronem* in book thirty-eight, the constitutional debate of book fifty-two, and the dialogue between Augustus and Livia in book fifty-six] the private nature of the conversations is clearly signposted so as to suggest that the material that follows has a quite different truth value from that in the surrounding narrative of public events."

before. Not only did Dio reintroduce the point which had been presented to the reader in all clarity in the speech, but supported it with independent arguments based on examples:

ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ πάνυ τι πιστεύω ὅτι καὶ τὸν Κάσσιον αὐτόν, εἴπερ ἐζωγρήκει, πάντως ἂν ἐσεσώκει. καὶ γὰρ πολλοὺς καὶ εὐηργέτησε τῶν σφαγέων, ὅσον τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ. (DC 72(71).30.4)

Hence I verily believe that if he had captured Cassius himself alive, he would certainly have spared his life. For he actually conferred benefits upon many who had been the murderers, so far as lay in their power, of both himself and his son.

This tendency may serve as additional corroboration of the hypothesis that the function of Dio's speeches is solely epideictic and therefore they were not intended as a medium for Dio's own political views and historical commentary. From the perspective of the examples discussed above it becomes clear that although speeches were firmly placed in the real historical context of the time of their potential delivery;⁷¹ it is, however, arguable whether the speeches contained significant traces of the author's original analysis, if at all.

⁷¹ One famous example of Maecenas' proposition which could not be correlated with historical *realia* of Augustus' principate is the creation of the office of *subcensor* (ὑποτιμητής). For different interpretations, see Hammond 1932, 91; Millar 1999, 113; and Reinhold 1988, 191-92.

1.3.2. Dio's Handling of Variant Versions

The passages from Dio and Tacitus, which we compared above and which addressed the ambiguous attitudes to the actions of Augustus, demonstrated that, when Dio faced a choice between different versions, he did not necessarily preserve the attitudes of his source. Nor in this case did Dio adopt the approach of distant impartiality characteristic of Suetonius. The latter, for example, when he speaks of Augustus' character and achievements, does not hide any negative or even gruesome details, while, at the same time, listing Augustus' good traits, as if giving the readers a chance to decide for themselves. The opposite is true of Dio's approach. Contrary to what is usually concluded about Dio's method, he, in fact, shows a strong tendency to combine versions or, more accurately (as revealed under the comparative analysis), he leaves traces of an intellectual procedure that aimed at reconciling the existing historical accounts when a divergence exists in his sources.

This reading of Dio contradicts the traditional approach. Kemezis, for example, generalized about Dio's attitude to variant versions in the following way:

He [Dio] also does not insist on one unquestioned and unproblematic account of the facts, of the type associated with Thucydides. He is quite willing to see doubts, alternative versions and, in many cases, downright *aporia*. (Kemezis 2006, 65)

My interpretation, however, provides support for another insight to the effect that in Dio's mind, when writing history was concerned, there could be no multiple truths; moreover, one true interpretation was almost always ascertainable. The following formulation (in the context of describing Caesar's calendar reform) is telling: ἤδη μὲν γὰρ τινες καὶ πλείους ἔφασαν ἐμβληθῆναι, τὸ δ' ἀληθές οὕτως ἔχει, "Some, indeed, have declared that even more [days] were intercalated, but the truth is as I have stated it" (DC 43.26.2).

This reconstruction of Dio's general approach to history correlates well with his apparent concern for originality and for presenting his own intellectual contribution as not only valuable, but indispensable. If so, tracing back Dio's procedures connected to the handling of extant versions would be important for examining Dio's intellectual input. Marincola remarked: "An examination of how historians choose from among variant versions sheds some light on the methodology assumed in writing non-contemporary history."⁷² He continues:

[T]he selection of the certain sources by a historian is an important element in his own credibility, for it is by selecting, criticizing, and improving his predecessors that he makes his own abilities and character manifest to the reader. (Marincola 1997, 286)

This topic, in application to Dio's *Περὶ τῆς ἱστορίας*, was never an object of a separate study, although I find it highly in need of a diligent examination. However, such study would require an extensive and systematic comparative research which the nature of the present work could not permit. In this section, however, I shall disagree with a somewhat simplistic interpretation of this problem offered by Millar, and shall limit myself to providing a few considerations which will point out the directions for the future research.

Let us examine the traditional view first. Millar in passing observed that in cases when Dio's sources showed a divergence in opinions, he tended to resort to one of two techniques: "to disclaim all power of interpretation" or subject the problem to the "test of common sense."⁷³ From this point of view, Dio's approach to the problem of variant versions may seem not very different than that which has been adopted by his predecessors. In some historians, however, a polemic attitude is apparent: for example, Polybius and

⁷² Marincola 1997, 280.

⁷³ Millar 1999, 35.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus tend to enumerate the versions, name their authors, and present the arguments against the ones which do not seem credible from the author's perspective.⁷⁴ Dio, as has been stated earlier, rarely states the provenience of his source passages. Nor does he, as do the aforementioned authors, enter into a dispute with his sources by closely following another historian's argument on this or that problem with the purpose of offering criticism (akin, for example, to Polybius' polemic against such historians as Philinus and Fabius at 1.14-15 and his critique of his predecessors' versions of the outbreak of the First Punic war).

But Dio seems to share the following common trait with most ancient historians. In the first place, he acknowledges the fact of existence of more than one version, if it is the case with his sources, and, secondly, he addresses in some depth the rationale for his own interpretation, or the reason for preferring one version over another.⁷⁵ Generally, Dio's predominant attitude to variants could be illustrated with the following formula, which by no coincidence is almost a verbatim reproduction of a formula used by Tacitus:

In tradenda morte Drusi quae plurimis maximaeque fidei auctoribus memorata sunt rettuli: sed non omiserim eorundem temporum rumorem, validum adeo, ut nondum exolescat. (Tac. Ann 4.10)

In recording the death of Drusus, I have given the version of the most numerous and trustworthy authorities; but I am reluctant to omit a contemporary rumour, so strong that it persists to-day.

ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτω τοῖς τε πλείοσι καὶ τοῖς ἀξιοπιστοτέροις γέγραπται· εἰςὶ γάρ τινες οἱ καὶ ... ἔφασαν... (DC 56.31.1)

This, at any rate, is the statement made by most writers, and the more trustworthy ones; but there are some who have affirmed that...

⁷⁴ See, for example, DH 2.38-40 for Dionysius' treatment of the variants of Tarpeia's treason story.

⁷⁵ For a general overview of how ancient historians approached the problem of variant versions, see Marincola 1997, 280-86.

Nonetheless, both Kemezis' and Millar's statements about Dio's usual ways of dealing with variant versions seems to derive from a consideration of internal evidence alone.

Nonetheless, their conclusions are naturally justified by the evidence in Dio's text, but only to a certain extent. There is quite a number of instances where Dio provides more than one version of a fact, event, or interpretation. However, some of these, like variant versions that "revolve around the motives of individuals" should be dismissed, following Marincola's advice, as not reflecting the existing controversy in the sources, but rather being a simple story-teller's device.⁷⁶ Yet some other variant versions (often regarding the matters historically rather insignificant) recorded by Dio are not mutually exclusive, and both variants could be accepted as valid without a qualm. Some such instances are the result of special way of phrasing a statement, possibly in imitation of some other author. A story of the suicide of Cato Uticus provides a good example of a case where the variants are not inherently contradictory (Cato may have asked for Plato's book because of *all* of the listed reasons):

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑσπέρα ἐγένετο, ξιφίδιον τέ τι κρύφα ὑπὸ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον ὑπέθηκε, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος βιβλίον τὸ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένον ᾗτησε, εἴτ' οὖν πόρρω τῆς ὑποψίας τοῦ τι τοιοῦτο βουλευσασθαι τοὺς παρόντας ἀπαγαγεῖν σπουδάσας, ὅπως ὡς ἥμισυ παρατηρηθῇ, εἴτε καὶ παραμύθιον τι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ἐπιθυμήσας. (DC 43.11.2-3)

But when evening was come, he secretly slipped a dagger under his pillow, and asked for Plato's book on the Soul. This was either in the endeavour to divert those present from the suspicion that he had any such purpose in mind, in order to be observed as little as possible, or else in the desire to obtain some consolation in respect to death from the reading of it.

However, it would not be unreasonable to conjecture that the exposition of events and facts which seems unproblematic in Dio may appear as such only because Dio's deliberate

⁷⁶ Marincola 1997, 280, n. 1.

endeavor. His approach had been undertaken with the purpose of reconciling the versions by conflating them in one account, where such a procedure was feasible on logical grounds. These instances are impossible to detect without a careful comparative examination.

Here I would like to discuss briefly just a few examples. The story of the apotheosis of Romulus (Ioann. Antioch. fr. 32 M, 1.23-25) is recorded in multiple sources, among which Liv. 1.16; DH 2.56 and 63.3-4; Plu. *Rom.* 27-28 and *Num.* 2. The controversy, or rather, uncertainty about the circumstances of Romulus' death was deeply embedded in the tradition:

ἡφανίσθη δὲ νῶναις Ἰουλίαις ὡς νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς δὲ τότε, Κυντιλίαις, οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν βέβαιον οὐδ' ὁμολογούμενον πυθέσθαι περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἀπολιπών, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν χρόνον, ὡς προείρηται. (Plu. *Rom.* 27.3)

He disappeared on the Nones of July, as they now call the month, then Quintilis, leaving no certain account nor even any generally accepted tradition of his death, aside from the date of it, which I have just given.

The aggregate account of the story drawn from all the sources would necessarily contain the following elements: Romulus disappearing in a violent storm; the existence of two explanations of his disappearance: divine apotheosis proper and suspicion that he was killed by his own fellow citizens; and the report of Julius Proculus who saw Romulus descending from the sky, supposedly supplying proof to the former explanation (significantly, the message translated through Proculus differs in all accounts). It would be an exaggeration to claim that only Dio's version (*apud* John of Antioch) is an attempt at rationalizing of the story.

Even Livy, who apparently favored the divine version of Romulus death, vaguely alludes to the possible validity of another, rational one, whereby Romulus was killed by the

senators (*patrum manibus*); regarding this latter version he says, *manavit enim haec quoque sed perobscura fama*, “for this rumour, too, got abroad, but in very obscure terms” (Liv. 1.16.4).

Plutarch provides two versions but does not seem to take sides; he presents both versions as equally deserving consideration, since, he explains, no convincing material evidence was found, similarly to the case of Scipio Africanus: οὐκ ἔσχε πίστιν οὐδ’ ἔλεγχον ὁ τρόπος τῆς τελευτῆς, “there is no convincing proof of the manner of his end” (Plu. *Rom.* 27.4).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on the other hand, starts off with an explicit critical judgment: the apotheosis version, he says, does not stand any criticism: οἱ μὲν οὖν μυθωδέστερα τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ποιοῦντες ... φάσιν, “those who give a rather fabulous account of his [Romulus’] life, say...” (DH 2.56.2). Such approach, however, reveals a difficulty inherent in the traditional account of the story once Dionysius takes on substantiating the other, rational account, οἱ δὲ τὰ πιθανώτερα γράφοντες πρὸς τῶν ἰδίων πολιτῶν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, “but those who write the more plausible accounts say that he was killed by his own people” (DH 2.56.3). It appears difficult for him to integrate other elements of the plot into this rational explanation: what does the storm have to do with this version, since it is obvious that this meteorological detail was originally invented to provide justification for another version against which Dionysius protests? Dionysius’ solution is to isolate the account of the storm into a separate third version. The testimony of Julius Proculus of course presented the same type of problem, i.e. difficulty in being reconciled with the rational explanation offered by Dionysius. He nevertheless incorporated the speech into his account, but only a few chapters later when already speaking about Numa; Proculus’

words were used in that context as a supporting explanation for the establishment of the temple of Quirinus by Numa to honor his predecessor, Romulus (DH 2.63.3-4).

And this is exactly the predicament which Dio had to face as well, since his professed purpose as a historian was not only to amalgamate all the accounts of his predecessors but also to re-investigate them. Dio's methodology of rationalizing the traditional account was tripartite: (1) while fusing the versions from different historical works into a one composite account, he strived to (2) keep every element of the legend (understood in broader sense, as preserved by his sources collectively), but also (3) attempted at taking away the ambiguity of the earlier accounts. The result of this process of blending appears somewhat awkward and artificial, at least as it was handed down by John of Antioch.⁷⁷ But at the same time Dio did not leave his reader in doubt toward which version, with divine or human overtones, Dio inclined, simply because he stitched both together into one and subjected it to one unquestionable logical sequence:

... but toward the senate his [Romulus'] attitude was very different. As a result the latter hated him, and surrounding him as he was delivering a speech in the senate-house they rent him limb from limb and so slew him. They were favoured in their desire for concealment by a violent wind storm and an eclipse of the sun, – the same sort of phenomenon that had attended his birth. ... Now when he had thus disappeared, the multitude and the soldiery made diligent search for him; but his slayers were in a dilemma, unable either to declare their deed or to appoint another king. While the people were thus excited and were planning to take some action, a certain Julius Proclus, a knight, having arrayed himself as if he were just returning from somewhere, rushed into their midst and cried: "Grieve not, Quirites! I have myself beheld Romulus ascending to the sky. He bade me tell you that he has become a god and is called Quirinus and also bade me admonish you by all means to choose someone as king without delay, and to continue to live under this form of government." At this announcement all believed and were relieved of their disquietude. They straightway

⁷⁷ Some may dismiss this entire passage as coming from John of Antioch who is known not to follow Dio as diligently as did Zonaras. See Mariev 2008, 35 for the general overview of John of Antioch's customary ways of excerpting from Dio. I, however, shall trust Boissevain's judgement and his decision to include this passage in his edition of Dio's text.

built a temple to Quirinus, and unanimously decided to continue to be ruled by a king. (Ioann. Antioch. 32M, 1.23-25)⁷⁸

Dio reversed the Livian *fabula*: the point of departure in Dio's narrative is not the fact of Romulus' *disappearance*, but that of his *assassination*. Next step was to incorporate the motif of the storm without creating an alternative complication in the story, as was done by Dionysius. Dio makes all heavenly signs/celestial phenomena simply attendant to the event, as if by chance; which the conspirators just used to their advantage. The main controversy (was Romulus murdered or ascended to heaven?) is transformed into a more mundane, human question, but concomitantly also one less problematic for rational explanation, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν μήτε ἐξειπεῖν τὸ πραχθὲν ἔχοντες μήτε βασιλέα καταστήσαι δυνάμενοι, "but his slayers were in a dilemma, unable either to declare their deed or to appoint another king." This "dilemma" also provided an excuse to introduce the story element of Julius Proculus. The speech of Proculus is modified and employed not with a purpose of justifying a version of apotheosis or, in general, to reconfirm the heavenly origin of Romulus, but rather to resolve the dilemma of the conspirators themselves, by providing a formal reason to declare Romulus departed and thus proceed with choosing a new king. Such original arrangement of the *fabula* also provided Dio with a smooth transition to the

⁷⁸ πρὸς δὲ τὴν γερουσίαν οὐχ ὁμοίως διέκειτο· ὅθεν μισήσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ περιέχοντες ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ δημηγοροῦντα διεσπαραξάν τε καὶ διέφθειραν. συνήρατο δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν ζάλη μεγίστη τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ ἔκλειψις ἡλίου· ὅπερ ποῦ καὶ ὡς ἐγεννᾶτο γέγονε. ... ἀφανισθέντος τε οὕτως αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται μάλιστα ἐκείνον ἐζήτουν. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν μήτε ἐξειπεῖν τὸ πραχθὲν ἔχοντες μήτε βασιλέα καταστήσαι δυνάμενοι. ταρασσομένων οὖν αὐτῶν καὶ τι παρασκευαζομένων δρᾶσαι Ἰούλιός τις Πρόκλος, ἀνὴρ ἱππεύς, στειλάμενος ὡς καὶ ἐτέρωθεν ποθεν ἦκων, εἰσεπήδησεν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, καὶ ἔφη· "μὴ λυπεῖσθε Κυρίται· ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὸς τὸν Ῥωμύλον εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνιόντα εἶδον· καὶ μοι ἔφη εἰπεῖν τε ὑμῖν ὅτι θεὸς ἐγένετο καὶ ὅτι Κυρίνος ὀνομάζεται καὶ προσπαραινέσθαι ὑμῖν βασιλέα τε πάντως εὐθὺς ἐλέσθαι τινὰ καὶ τούτῳ πολιτεύματι κεχρησθαι." λεχθέντων τούτων ἅπαντες ἐπίστευσαν καὶ τῆς ταραχῆς ἀπεπαύσαντο· εὐθὺς τε ναὸν Κυρίνῳ ὠκοδόμησαν καὶ πᾶσι μὲν ἐδόκει βασιλεύεσθαι.

next topic traditional in this canon of legends about Romulus: the appointment of *interreges*.

Another example is the notorious account of the suspected incestuous connection between Nero and his mother Agrippina (DC 62(61).11.3-4; Suet. *Nero* 28.2; Tac. *Ann.* 14.2). The main controversy in this story revolved around the uncertainty regarding which one of the pair was the prime mover of this crime. Modern reader may be perplexed by the question, that is, why resolving such a controversy would ever be significant in a historical work. However that may be, Suetonius offers a rather straightforward and unproblematic statement: Nero desired intimacy with his mother: *nam matris concubitus appetisse ... nemo dubitavit*, “that he even desired illicit relations with his own mother ... was notorious” (Suet. *Nero* 28.2). This supposition is confirmed by two facts: that Nero had a concubine (*meretricem*) who was rumored to closely resemble his mother. Another piece of gossip that existed concerned a characteristic stain that had been noticed on Agrippina’s dress after a ride in a litter with Nero (*ibid.*).

Tacitus, on the other hand, not only recorded the two versions, but gave the names of the authors of these versions: according to Cluvius, says Tacitus, Agrippina “desired the union,” according to Fabius Rusticus, it was Nero. Tacitus maintains his ambiguous attitude and does not overtly support any of the two versions. However, he offers a general value judgment both in favor and against the version that made Agrippina the initiator of the incestuous bond. On the one hand, this was the more popular version, on the other, he says, it may not be based on facts, but on probabilistic suppositions deriving from

Agrippina's behavioral patterns, including her earlier incestuous marriage with her uncle

Claudius. Let us compare the corresponding passages in Tacitus and Dio:

sed quae Cluvius eadem ceteri quoque auctores prodidere, et fama huc inclinat, seu concepit animo tantum immanitatis Agrippina, seu credibilior novae libidinis meditatio in ea visa est quae puellaribus annis stuprum cum Lepido spe dominationis admiserat, pari cupidine usque ad libita Pallantis provoluta et exercita ad omne flagitium patrum nuptiis. (Tac. Ann. 14.2)

ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐχ ἱκανὸν ὃν ἐς μυθολογίαν ὅτι τὸν θεῖον τὸν Κλαύδιον ἐς ἔρωτα αὐτῆς ταῖς τε γοητείαις ταῖς τε ἀκολασίαις καὶ τῶν βλεμμάτων καὶ τῶν φιλημάτων ὑπηγάγετο, ἐπεχείρησε καὶ τὸν Νέρωνα ὁμοίως καταδουλώσασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν εἴτ' ἀληθῶς ἐγένετο εἴτε πρὸς τὸν τρόπον αὐτῶν ἐπλάσθη οὐκ οἶδα· ἃ δὲ δὴ πρὸς πάντων ὠμολόγηται λέγω, ὅτι ἐταίραν τινὰ τῇ Ἀγριππίνῃ ὁμοίαν ὁ Νέρων δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἠγάπησε, καὶ αὐτῇ τε ἐκείνῃ προσπαίζων καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνδεικνύμενος ἔλεγεν ὅτι καὶ τῇ μητρὶ ὁμιλοῖ. (DC 62(61).11.3-4)

The other authorities, however, give the same version as Cluvius, and to their side tradition leans; whether the enormity was actually conceived in the brain of Agrippina, or whether the contemplation of such a refinement in lust was merely taken as comparatively credible in a woman who, for the prospect of power, had in her girlish years yielded to the embraces of Marcus Lepidus; who, for a similar ambition had prostituted herself to the desires of Pallas; and who had been inured to every turpitude by her marriage with her uncle.

As if it were not notoriety enough for her that she had used her blandishments and immodest looks and kisses to enslave even Nero in similar fashion. Whether this actually occurred, now, or whether it was invented to fit their character, I am not sure; but I state as a fact what is admitted by all, that Nero had a mistress resembling Agrippina of whom he was especially fond because of this very resemblance, and when he toyed with the girl herself or displayed her charms to others, he would say that he was wont to have intercourse with his mother.

It may, of course, seem that Dio dismisses the account of the incest wholesale using the

argument actually borrowed from Tacitus, that the entire story has been concocted

(ἐπλάσθη) as fitting the base character of them both. However, Dio's fusing technique

appears to be far more sophisticated under a closer examination. While not fully adopting

either the Tacitean stance, or that of Suetonius, Dio managed in his account to record all

available versions, thus making his account the fullest of the three: unlike Suetonius, Dio makes Agrippina the perpetrator; unlike Tacitus, who does not mention the courtesan resembling Agrippina, Dio introduces this motif and thus admits also the plausibility of Nero seeking sexual relationships with his mother. This blending of the versions was made possible because Dio shifted the focus of the controversy from the question, who initiated incest, to the question, was the entire story true? Notably, here Dio also demonstrated that he did not feel obliged to side with the version supported by the most historians (*et fama huc inclinat*), but rather, he used the evidence agreed by most (ἀ δὲ δὴ πρὸς πάντων ὁμολόγηται λέγω) to formulate his own cast to the story.⁷⁹

If Dio had doubts about the plausibility of this account, why did he not omit the mention of this episode altogether? Could Dio's technique be the result of the challenge with which he was constantly confronted, namely, how to find the balance between, on the one hand, reassuring the reader that all accounts have been considered and, on the other, keeping the narrative concise and balanced (we remember that Dio took on the task of covering 900 years of Roman history)? By integrating the elements of other known accounts into his own, even if he did not fully agree with them, Dio demonstrated to the reader that he remained faithful to his promise to maintain the highest standard of careful and authoritative investigation.

While working on his history, Dio oftentimes faced such choices. I believe that a complete comparative analysis should reveal a strong tendency toward conflating the

⁷⁹ See Miller 1977 for additional examples.

conflicting accounts in Dio. The instances whereby Dio did resort to listing the variants were often indeed accompanied by a comment disclaiming “all power of interpretation”:⁸⁰

καὶ ὅπως μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἀφίκετο ἢ ὅπως διέμεινεν, οὐ δύναμαι τὸ σαφὲς πολλῶν λεγομένων εὐρεῖν· ὃ δ' ἀκριβῶς ἐπίσταμαι, φράσω. (DC 36.11.1-2)

As to how these reached them or how they [statue of Artemis and the descendants of Agamemnon in Cappadocia] remained there I cannot discover the truth, since there are various stories; but what I understand clearly I will state.

These may well be his earnest declarations of inability to combine the versions using the method of logical reasoning which had been adopted by him (we remember Dio's formulation in 46.35.1: τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων...).

Another important aspect of Dio's handling of parallel versions appears from the comparison with Dionysius of Halicarnassus. For Dionysius, a problematic and controversial account, especially when it contains some inherent dispute, warrants a closer examination (DH 1.72.1). It is very characteristic of Dionysius, and unusual for Dio, to lead the reader through process of author's reasoning:

For I did not think it sufficient, like Polybius of Megalopolis, to say merely that I believe Rome was built in the second year of the seventh Olympiad, nor to let my belief rest without further examination upon the single tablet preserved by the high priests, the only one of its kind, but I determined to set forth the reasons that had appealed to me, so that all might examine them who so desired. In that treatise, therefore, the detailed exposition is given; but in the course of the present work also the most essential of the conclusions there reached will be mentioned. The matter stands thus. (DH 1.74.3-4)⁸¹

Contrary to that, Dio normally does not provide comments on why he preferred one version over another and does not share the steps of his investigative procedure (τὸ σαφὲς

⁸⁰ Cf. pp. 33-34 of this dissertation.

⁸¹ οὐ γὰρ ἤξιουν ὡς Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης τοσοῦτο μόνον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἔτος τῆς ἐβδόμης ὀλυμπιάδος τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκτίσθαι πείθομαι, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσι κειμένου πίνακος ἐνὸς καὶ μόνου τὴν πίστιν ἀβασάνιστον καταλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιλογισμούς, οἷς αὐτὸς προσεθέμην, εἰς μέσον ὑπευθύνους τοῖς βουλευθεῖσιν ἐσομένους ἐξενεγκεῖν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἀκρίβεια ἐν ἐκείνῳ δηλοῦται τῷ λόγῳ, λεχθήσεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας αὐτὰ ἀναγκαιότατα. ἔχει δὲ οὕτως.

εὔρεῖν) with the reader. Dio's reader was always presented with a ready-made product: the evidence has been examined, evaluated, the choices have been weighed, and the final result has been formulated by Dio himself. Dio kept reassuring the reader that this final result is the "true" version: ταῦτα μὲν ἀληθέστατα, "this is the truest account" (DC 44.19.5); καὶ μηδεὶς ἀπιστήσῃ, "let no one doubt this statement" (DC 73(72).22.3).

One significant outcome of this observation: Dio, unlike Livy, Polybius, or Dionysius, rarely transfers the "responsibility" for questionable versions to his sources. At the same time, in the process of re-investigating his evidence, Dio did not familiarize the reader with his thinking process, something to which Dionysius often resorts. To compensate for it, Dio felt the need to intrude once and again in the narrative to underscore his authority, to reassure his reader that the information that he offered had been carefully researched. This could serve as one of the possible explanations for the abundance of the intrusive editorial asides in Dio.⁸² Many of them are analysed in the subsequent chapters, but the complete list and their typology is provided in the *Appendix I*.

⁸² See Hidber 2004 for an alternative interpretation and a general overview of Dio's methodological statements.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DRIVING FORCES OF HISTORY IN DIO CASSIUS: DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCIES

2.1. THE ROLE OF THE MIRACULOUS IN DIO'S HISTORIOGRAPHY¹2.1.1. *Dreams, Portents, and Prodigies within Explanatory Framework of a Historian*

Smilda's index in the fourth volume of the Boissevain's edition *s.v. prodigia* contains just over 520 individual instances of the miraculous events or, accordingly, one *prodigium* for every two years of the one-thousand-year period of Roman history covered by Dio.² This is, of course, just an illustrative calculation: in the text of *Πρωταίχά* these miracles are organized in clusters of several prodigies, and Dio does not seem to be striving to mark every single

¹ The object of this chapter's study is a broad range of marvelous and often supernatural manifestations recorded by Dio which fall under the umbrella of *prodigia* that are usually defined in very broad terms. For our purposes, I shall adopt Rasmussen's definition of prodigy as "any unusual occurrence [*sic*] in society which is reported to the senate and accepted by that body as a *prodigium publicum* requiring ritual expiation. Examples of such prodigies may be cult-statues dripping with sweat, weeping or bleeding, cows speaking, mules giving birth, the discovery of hermaphrodites, the raining of stones or blood, earthquakes, solar eclipses etc." (Rasmussen 2000, 11). The examples listed represent a selection very typical for Dio. Different kinds of prodigies are often discussed in even more general context of divination which, in turn, is understood as "all activities purported to be communication with the gods, whether solicited or unsolicited" (Ripat 2006, 155, n. 1). Since dreams are often treated as instances of such communication, in this chapter, I shall discuss dreams side by side with other prodigies and acts of divination. See Rasmussen 2000, 21, n. 11 and Ripat 2006, 155, n. 1-2 for the basic bibliography on prodigies and divination in the Roman world. I stress that such concepts as fate, dreams, the supernatural, the miraculous, divination, and even the fabulous are discussed together throughout this chapter, notwithstanding the potential objection from a scholar of ancient belief and ritual that a sharper differentiation among these categories might be employed. I would argue that Dio himself was not much concerned about delineating clear and meaningful boundaries between these notions (e.g., DC 41.14 and 44.17). In part, such conceptual amalgamation or synthesis in this thesis can be justified by an understanding that is well formulated by Potter: "Marcus Aurelius was representative of his age in turning to the gods when disaster struck in the form of plague, earthquake, storm, or dearth. His belief that the gods would speak through oracles and that they might respond to his prayers, stemmed from the Stoic philosophy that he strove to have govern his dealings with others. It was the basic tenet of Stoicism that fate was identical with the will and body of Zeus; this made it possible for the gods to communicate with mortals, and for mortals to think that they could live in accord with nature" (Potter 2009, 222; however, even without accepting unconditionally the claim that Dio was a stoic, we must remember that his formative years coincided with the rule of Marcus Aurelius).

² Boissevain, vol. iv, pp. 532-42.

year with a list of such occurrences. However, the sheer number of them is still impressive and, perhaps, unprecedented. One would safely assert that dreams, miracles, oracles, divination — in short, the miraculous — play an important role in Dio's narrative, even if one judged solely on the basis of the number of portents and prodigies recorded by our author, which is in the truest sense immense.³

However, Millar in his analysis, in essence, discarded Dio's portents as "harmless and trivial, not affecting his treatment of events."⁴ He asserted that "it would be going much too far to say that divine intervention functions as an alternative type of historical explanation in his [Dio's] History."⁵ Millar's solution is unorthodox; but the reason with which he justified the dismissal of the problem points to an approach very common in modern historiography, i.e. studying the phenomenon of divination in conjunction with the explanatory paradigm of a historian. Such approach is of course inspired by a dichotomy between Herodotean and Thucydidean historiographic methods which is perhaps artificially created. One of the most readily seen dissimilarities between those two authors' views of history is that divine agency receives a drastically different degree of significance as a causative factor in their historical works. Expressed differently, one simply notes that Herodotus considered divine intervention as an acceptable explanation for historical occurrences, while in Thucydides, history is "guided by human reason".⁶ It is in

³ Cf. Millar 1999, 77.

⁴ Millar 1999, 77.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Oost 1975, 186. Comparing Herodotus and Thucydides through the lens of these notions, in fact, is a scholarly commonplace. Lesky (1996) provides a good summary of this line of analysis. Concerning Herodotus, he says: "[B]elief in predestination is connected with the other belief in signs and prophecies by which fate is declared. This explains the large part which oracles play in Herodotus: they are firmly rooted in his conception of the world" (Lesky 1996, 323). Also: "[G]od or divinity works through fate in a particular way, which here and there in the narrative is expressly characterized. Evidently Herodotus took ideas which

consideration of this variation that we may feel forced to approach Dio's *Ῥωμαϊκά* as well, especially given that the scholarly tradition firmly insists on the major influence of Thucydides on Dio.

Yet not all the scholars agree with Millar regarding the insignificant role that the supernatural plays as a driving force in Dio's history. Potter, emphasizing Dio's personal belief in the miraculous and divination, the proof of which derives from Dio's own testimony about presenting the emperor Severus with a book on portents and dreams (discussed below), asserts that the divine intervention was among the important causal factors in his history:

Dio tends to reflect the interest and attitudes of his class. Unlike Tacitus, who may have been a somewhat anomalous intellect, he was not one to question the role of fate. He is explicit about the dream that encouraged him to continue his historiographic enterprises after he had received a warm response to his work on dreams from Severus (72.23.3-5), and in his history reveals a firm belief in the reality of divine intervention. It was convenient, and perhaps more personally satisfying than frustrating, to know that the gods controlled the events of his lifetime that were beyond his own control. (Potter 1994, 164)

While the role of the divine in Dio's history may still be a subject for various interpretations, I do not agree with the claim of the absence of critical attitude to the miraculous, the communication medium between gods and mortals, in Dio. In fact, Dio often displays a rather critical, sometimes skeptical, attitude to the miraculous events which he seems to record with an exceptional care. As we shall see, this critical approach is far more pronounced in Dio than most scholars have been willing to admit. On the other

were deeply rooted in Greek thought and raised them to a level at which they served to interpret history" (Ibid., 324). The Thucydidean approach, on the other hand, is characterized thus: "When the responsible statesman has taken into account all the factors accessible to his intelligence, there still remains a realm from which his plans may suffer hindrance or total frustration. This incalculable element is called Tyche. By this word Thucydides does not mean some divine power: he does not make irrational into metaphysical entity. He only means in the simplest terms that human planning for the future has its limits, outside which is the unforeseen" (Ibid., 479).

hand, the rather marginal role that oracles and dreams play in Dio's system of causation would also be apparent to even an unsophisticated reader. This duality poses an inherent contradiction in Dio's attitude to the miraculous: on the one hand, one observes Dio's proclaimed personal interest in portents further validated by the readiness with which Dio described his dreams and especially his own experience of eye-witnessing and interpreting miracles and heavenly signs. In addition, one should not forget an impressive number and the recurrence of the recorded prodigies throughout the work, regardless of the historical period that Dio was describing. On the other hand, we notice a tendency in Dio to marginalize the historical role of supernatural deliberately. The abundance of pronouncements that signaled an ambiguous and skeptical attitude to the miraculous is also easily detectable. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, we shall briefly examine the textual evidence which will further illustrate Dio's contradictory attitude to divination. It would be not out of place, however, to discuss a third way of interpreting the role of supernatural in Dio, one that is different from Millar's and Potter's approaches.

Swan prefers to see divine and human agencies as working side by side and having an equal share in the system of cause-and-effect relationships, as they were understood by Dio in his history:

In short, Dio's universe admits both human and divine free will, so that, if the heaven-willed *telos* of a well-ordered cosmopolis under good Roman emperors was to be achieved, this could come to pass only through voluntary collaboration of humankind with heaven. ... For Dio history was a web of many threads. Events in his *History* can be arranged along a spectrum from the divinely caused to fully independent and voluntary human actions. (Swan 2004, 11)

Such a reading is in keeping with the generalization that Dio makes at 39.51.1. One of its possible interpretations could be that Dio defines historical progress as determined by the

duality of the two independent factors, human actions, on the one hand, and divine action, on the other:

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωποι τοιαῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἐποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ δὴ θεῖον κεραυνῷ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνθὺς τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔτους τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ Διὸς ... βάλλον. (DC 39.15.1)

While mortals were acting thus under the influence of money, Heaven at the very beginning of the next year struck with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter.⁷

Contrary to Swan's understanding of the role of the miraculous in Dio, albeit seemingly supported by Dio's own testimonies, in this chapter I shall also argue that, while the duality itself must be recognized as an inherent feature of his narrative design, the human and the divine spheres are not counterpoised in quite just the way Swan suggested; nor they are connected or interchangeable, but enter upon yet another, rather paradoxical, posture in Dio. Our author manifestly preferred the human sphere as an instrument of historical explanation, but, at the same time, he could not abandon the divine. Naturally, we cannot expect an ancient history-writer, however innovative he was or whatever "anomalous intellect" he possessed, to cross out the centuries of annalistic traditions in historiography and in his own work completely abandon such deeply-rooted compositional element as the lists of prodigies were. In addition, as we shall see in this chapter, the contradiction in the attitude to prodigies and omens was an inherent element of that very tradition which Dio inherited together with these lists.

Therefore, the question of Dio's stance on the miraculous (whether or not he himself perceived it as contradictory) has bearing on his vision of the historical development and thus it is important for our investigation of his historical methods. None of the three interpretations of the role of portents and divination in Dio suggested so far should satisfy

⁷ Such turns of phrase are, in fact, very common for Dio, cf. DC 65(66).8.2.

us, since they are based on the assumptions that could be contested.⁸ The problem calls for a more careful, *ab ovo*, re-examination of primary evidence. This re-examination shall be based on consideration of the following questions, which illustrate all sides of the controversy or inconsistency in Dio's attitude to the miraculous. They are: (1) What do we know about Dio's personal religious attitudes? Did he believe in the omens and prodigies? (2) What is the textual evidence for Dio's skepticism toward the miraculous? (3) How do Dio's views correlate with the traditions of annalistic historiography? (4) What role do the portents and prodigies play in causal system developed by Dio? (5) How does Dio approach causation in general? (6) What are the possible ways of explaining the controversies and inconsistencies in Dio's attitudes to the wonders, omens, and signs?

⁸ Cf. Scott 2008, 32: "Dio reports not only omens that he could very well have observed himself, but also others that must derive from current rumors. Clearly they must be *post eventum* explanations for major historical events, but it is not possible to fully understand the author's attitude toward and use of the omens. Since Dio very seldom provides his own analysis of historical events (Millar 1964: 76), it may very well be that he used the omens as explanations for what was happening around him." In the present chapter, I shall try to provide the evidence against the hypothesis expressed by Scott in the last sentence of this quote. The statement in general clearly illustrates the vagueness which dominates the scholarly opinions on the function of omens and prodigies in Dio.

2.1.2. *Dio's Religious Beliefs and His Interest in the Miraculous*

The entire conceptual design of this chapter would necessitate the investigation of Dio's method by involving dichotomies, such as divine/human, rational/irrational, or analytic/intuitive. One may rightfully raise an objection that the mind of an ancient historian did not operate on these distinct categories.⁹ This is probably the reason why many studies which attempted to ascertain a historian's religious beliefs (or simply whether he took omens and portents seriously) and attempted to approach the problem from a standpoint of such dichotomies have been frustratingly inconclusive.¹⁰

We have discussed Dio's proclaimed pursuit of truth and his insistence on the rational method of investigation.¹¹ We shall also consider the examples of Dio's occasional expressions of doubts regarding the probability of the miraculous occurrences or reservations about their causative potential in his interpretation of historical progress.¹² Notwithstanding these factors which contribute to the "rational" qualities of his historical method, Dio, of course, could not escape the mental framework generally shared in Roman imperial culture of his time, the turn of the second and third centuries CE. Religion still played an integral role in this culture and also sustained the political functionality of the state, so much that religious observances and divination were quite literally a mainstay of the everyday life of Dio's contemporaries:

⁹ Modern authors, however, widely apply such dichotomies to the analyses of Herodotus and Thucydides; a good example is Oost 1975.

¹⁰ A good illustration could be found in Morgan 2000, 27-29.

¹¹ See section 1.1.1.

¹² One characteristic example of Dio subjecting prodigious signs to the doubt (DC 7 fr. 35.7-8) has been also discussed above in section 1.1.2.

Provided that they [observations and recording of dreams, oracles, and signs] were soundly practiced – by experts, not charlatans – Dio counted divination, astrology, and dream interpretation as departments of science as readily as we exclude them. (Swan 2004, 8-9)

We should start the investigation of evidence with a statement that Dio had a private interest in the miraculous that resulted in a little book on divination or, more specifically, on dreams and portents which heralded Severus' ascension to power, a precursor to his main historical project. Dio tells us about the history of his own composition in detail, and this important methodological pronouncement deserves to be quoted in full:

After this there occurred most violent wars and civil strife. I was inspired to write an account of these struggles by the following incident. I had written and published a little book about the dreams and portents which gave Severus reason to hope for the imperial power; and he, after reading the copy I sent him, wrote me a long and complimentary acknowledgement. This letter I received about nightfall, and soon after fell asleep; and in my dreams the Divine Power commanded me to write history. Thus it was that I came to write the narrative with which I am at this moment concerned. And inasmuch as it won the high approval, not only of others, but, in particular, of Severus himself, I then conceived a desire to compile a record of everything else that concerned the Romans. Therefore, I decided to leave the first treatise no longer as a separate composition, but to incorporate it in this present history, in order that in a single work I might write down and leave behind me a record of everything from the beginning down to the point that shall seem best to Fortune. This goddess gives me strength to continue my history when I become timid and disposed to shrink from it; when I grow weary and would resign the task, she wins me back by sending dreams; she inspires me with fair hopes that future time will permit my history to survive and never dim its lustre; she, it seems, has fallen to my lot as a guardian of the course of my life, and therefore I have dedicated myself to her. (DC 73(72).23.1-5)¹³

¹³ Πόλεμοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ στάσεις μέγισται συνέβησαν, συνέθηκα δ' ἐγὼ τούτων τὴν συγγραφὴν ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης. βιβλίον τι περὶ τῶν ὀνειράτων καὶ τῶν σημείων δι' ὃν ὁ Σευήρος τὴν αὐτοκράτορα ἀρχὴν ἤλπισε, γράψας ἐδημοσίευσεν· καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκεῖνος πεμφθέντι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἐντυχὼν πολλὰ μοι καὶ καλὰ ἀντεπέστειλε. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἤδη λαβὼν κατέδαρθον, καὶ μοι καθεύδοντι προσέταξε τὸ δαιμόνιον ἱστορίαν γράφειν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ταῦτα περὶ ὧν νῦν καθίσταμαι ἔγραψα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ γε τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Σευήρῳ μάλιστα ἤρεσε, τότε δὴ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις προσήκοντα συνθεῖναι ἐπεθύμησα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκέτι ἰδίᾳ ἐκεῖνο ὑπολιπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐς τήνδε τὴν συγγραφὴν ἐμβαλεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι, ἵνα ἐν μιᾷ πραγματείᾳ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα, μέχρις ἂν καὶ τῇ Τύχῃ δόξῃ, γράψας καταλίπω. τὴν δὲ δὴ θεὸν ταύτην ἐπιρρωννύουσάν με πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν εὐλαβῶς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ὀκνηρῶς διακείμενον, καὶ πονοῦμενον ἀπαγορεύοντά τε ἀνακτωμένην δι' ὀνειράτων, καὶ καλὰς ἐλπίδας περὶ τοῦ μελλοντος χρόνου διδοῦσάν μοι ὥς ὑπολειφομένου τὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀμαυρῶσοντος, ἐπίσκοπον τῆς τοῦ βίου διαγωγῆς, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἵληχα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀνάκειμαι.

Potter in his own analysis corroborates this passage with important contextual information: Severus, according to Herodian, was himself a sincere believer in the foretelling power of dreams and publicized these very dreams which indicated his future ascension to rule in his biography (Hdn. 2.9.4; cf. 2.9.7: ὁ Σεβήρος ... ἐλπίζων τε θεία προνοία ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν [αὐτὸν] καλεῖσθαι, “Severus ... believing that it was by divine providence that he was called to rule”). Potter adds an unexpected angle to the interpretation of Dio’s passage. Dio could have opportunistically used the emperor’s fondness of relating his lucky fortune to the divine will in order to win a favor with Severus: “One sign of the reaction to this sort of direct imperial indication of taste is Cassius Dio’s first historical work, an account of the portents that inspired Severus to take the throne.”¹⁴

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that, only because the book on portents may have had a marked element of flattery, the entire episode reflected not Dio’s but rather his patron’s personal penchant for oracles and dreams. In the later parts of his work, Dio often introduces his own self as a real participant of the contemporary events, and in many of such instances – with an evident purpose of emphasizing his role as a witness and the interpreter of the ominous occurrences. Oftentimes, also, Dio seems to be anxiously in search of an opportunity to provide an “insider” view of the events, and to share with his reader the sensationalism of the occurrence witnessed by him personally. Thus Dio’s taste for investing fortuitous coincidences with a veil of the miraculous often betrays such anxiety. A sequence which had portended the death of Commodus was essentially based on a few, rather trivial, coincidences, but, in Dio’s mind, recounting it was valuable because he was personally present at the described events as an observer and interpreter of

¹⁴ Potter 1994, 164.

the unusual signs. Commodus, about to perform as a gladiator, convinced the senators to appear to the amphitheatre wearing woolen equestrian clothes: something which, Dio says, the senators did only if an emperor passed away. Commodus' helmet was also carried out through the gates used to take out the deceased. These signs, the senators agreed, indicated a gloomy future for the emperor:

ἐκ γὰρ τούτων καὶ πάνυ πᾶσι πάντως ἀπαλλαγὴ τις αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι ἐνομιζέτο. Ἀπέθανέ γέ τοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνγρέθη, οὐκ ἐς μακράν. (DC 73(72).21.3-22.1)

These events caused absolutely every one of us to believe that we were surely about to be rid of him [Commodus]. And he actually did die, or rather was slain, before long.

With a similar emphasis on his own participation in a recorded historical event, a portentous sign is introduced by Dio at 74(73).14.3-5, where he describes the sacrifices offered by the emperor Didius Julianus before the senate house in 193 CE. At these sacrifices three stars appeared in the sky during the day time which prophesied a grim fate for Julianus. In retrospect Dio-the-historian knew exactly what this omen signified: three stars represented the three contenders for imperial power: Severus, Niger, and Albinus. The soldiers who attended to the ceremony also concluded that some terrible fate awaited Julianus; Dio-the-participant and the other senators, out of the fear, did not dare to look at the sky in the presence of the emperor, however strongly they wished that soldiers' interpretation was true. While the narrative of the episode mainly focused on the behavior of the senators, the description of this incident could still serve as an illustration of a genuine attitude to the signs and portents which was common in Dio's time: at the very least, representatives of different social classes did pay attention to them:

οὕτω γὰρ ἐκφανεστάτοι ἦσαν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας συνεχῶς τε αὐτοὺς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀντεπιδεικνύειν, καὶ προσέτι καὶ διαθροεῖν ὅτι δεινὸν αὐτῶ συμβήσεται. ἡμεῖς γὰρ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἠυχόμεθα ταῦθ' οὕτω γενέσθαι καὶ ἠλπίζομεν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γε τοῦ παρόντος δέους οὐδ' ἀναβλέπειν ἐς αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ παρορῶντές πως, ἐτολμῶμεν. (DC 74(73).14.4-5)

These stars were so very distinct that the soldiers kept continually looking at them and pointing them out to one another, while declaring that some dreadful fate would befall the emperor. As for us, however much we hoped and prayed that it might so prove, yet the fear of the moment would not permit us to gaze up at them save by furtive glances.

It would be wrong to limit these manifestations of “mysticism” only to non-elite representatives of the Roman society of Dio’s time as did Krauss when talking about Tacitus’ and Livy’s attitudes to portents and prodigies. Indeed, Krauss claimed that the beliefs of the “enlightened” and the masses were radically different. The minds of the educated Romans, such as Livy and Tacitus, he claims, transcended the irrational understanding of history and rejected any “superstitious notions” which the portents and prodigies entailed.¹⁵ They were “merely recording” such supernatural manifestations; any remarks that could serve as evidence of these historians actually believing in the supernatural were simply “the expression of what the masses themselves liked to read into the events of the time.”¹⁶ This is quite selective reading.

From Dio, however, we gather a different notion of the elite attitude to the miraculous. Even such educated and learned men as Sextus Quintilius Condianus, were affected. Here is how Dio speaks of his education: Κονδιανὸς δὲ Σέξτος ... φύσει τε καὶ παιδείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων, “Sextus Condianus ... surpassed all others by reason both of his native ability and his training.”¹⁷ Sextus was a fugitive from the atrocities of Commodus; he sought and

¹⁵ Krauss 1930, 29.

¹⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹⁷ DC 72(72).6.1. Sextus came from a distinguished family. His father and uncle are given the following characteristics by Dio: “they [the Quintilii] had a great reputation for learning, military skill, brotherly accord, and wealth” (DC 73(72).5.3).

received an oracular response in a form of a dream in the city of Mallus in Cilicia. Both Dio and his father saw the sketch of that dream drawn by Sextus in an attempt to interpret it. The nature of the dream that Sextus received and represented as a drawing was “a boy strangling two serpents and a lion pursuing a fawn.” Dio links the boy with Commodus because of the latter’s emulation of Hercules (Commodus killed the brothers Quintilii, Sextus’ father and uncle, and they were said to have been strangled – in correlation with the myth), and the fawn with Sextus himself (73(72).7.1-2).

However, in Dio’s analysis, it is not the portent which determined the fate of Quintilii and additionally that of many other prominent men of the time; it happened as a result “of false accusations or unjustified suspicions or because of their conspicuous wealth, distinguished family, unusual learning, or some other point of excellence” (73(72).7.3). Quintillii also were “displeased with existing conditions” (73(72).5.3); this was the real cause for Commodus’ suspicions and his persecution of the brothers. As banal as the suggested interpretation was, it is important to recognize that oracular sanctuaries like this one of Amphilochus in Mallus still functioned, and were consulted by the representatives of the Roman elite, as the example of Sextus Condianus clearly shows.

Naturally, should we assume that Dio possessed a mind completely devoid of superstitious inclinations and that he rejected any belief in the miraculous, we may still explain the inclusion of some portentous or supernatural accounts in his history on the rational grounds. There is always a possibility of an unusual occurrence or fortuitous coincidence causing a lot of attention and rumors and in this way starting to affect public opinion, which could be justifiably included in the history. Dio, however, seems to be

doing more than just recording these instances of socially significant manifestations of divine will. In the contemporary part of this work, he often familiarized his reader with exclusive, private portents — of which Dio had a privilege to be informed because of his social standing and education. It is important to note in this connection, that the Quintilii seem to be introduced into the narration just as a pretext for talking about the oracle which Dio happened to witness and interpret personally, and not vice versa (there were many others who suffered from the persecutions of Commodus and may have deserved a mention).

These selected pieces of evidence ought to be sufficient to support the conclusion that in Rome of Dio's generation religious matters, divination, oracles, portents, and dreams were more than just an esoteric sphere of culture that attracted the keen interest of a few enthusiasts, as Dio or even Severus might appear in the examples provided above. It would be wrong to surmise that Dio did not have personal interest in the miraculous, even although it might appear some form of superstitious belief.

Moreover, official Roman religion remained a powerful social institution in Dio's times. That the emperors of Dio's lifetime cultivated reverence toward traditional Roman gods is evident from the beginning of *Legatio* by Athenagoras, roughly a contemporary of Dio. In his *Legatio* he addressed Marcus Aurelius with the words which may shed some additional light on the social attitudes and personal religious beliefs at the end of the second century CE:¹⁸

¹⁸ Athenagoras, a Christian writer one generation older than Dio addresses Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Commodus with a letter, known as the *Plea* (*Legatio*) and written between 176 and 178 CE, in defense of the Christians against various accusations. Translation by W. Schnoedel (1979).

ἐνὶ λόγῳ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ δῆμους θυσίας κατάγουσαν ἅς ἂν θέλωσιν ἄνθρωποι καὶ μυστήρια. ... καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπετε καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ οἱ νόμοι, τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴδ' ὅλως θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀσεβὲς καὶ ἀνόσιον νομίσαντες, τὸ δὲ οἷς ἕκαστος βούλεται χρῆσθαι ὡς θεοῖς ἀναγκαῖον, ἵνα τῷ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον δέει ἀπέχωνται τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. (Athenagoras *Leg.* 1.1-2)

In a word, the various races and peoples of mankind perform whatever sacrifices and mysteries they wish. ... All these both you and the laws permit, since you regard it as impious and irreligious to have no belief at all in a god and think it necessary for all men to venerate as gods those whom they wish, that through fear of the divine they may refrain from evil.

Dio's intended reader perhaps would not be surprised or bothered by his special emphasis on supernatural manifestations. The sphere of divine and miraculous was truly integrated into the lives of the educated elite in one way or another and was hardly deemed to be irrational. For this reason we must abandon usage of the polarity rational/irrational. For us, however, the crucial questions become, to what extent does Dio's personal investment in the miraculous affect his view of history and whether Dio's diligent, even pedantic, care in recording instances of portents, dreams, and oracles represents just an antiquarian interest?¹⁹ Next, we shall concentrate on some examples of Dio's criticism or skepticism on the subject of divination and the supernatural as expressed by his authorial comments.

¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that Dio was definitely not the first historian to introduce (or to attempt at interpreting) the portents and prodigies that occurred during the year. Tacitus, for example, records a list of prodigies for 51 CE, during the reign of Claudius (*Ann.* 12.43), and its usage and function within Tacitus' history may be construed as similar to Dio's. However, J. Jackson, the translator of Tacitus' volumes in the Loeb series (1986, 376-77), comments on this list saying that Tacitus started mentioning these prodigies only in the last five books of the *Annals*. This would suggest, according to Jackson, that Tacitus shifted to a different source, in this case possibly Pliny. It would be safe to assert, nevertheless, that Dio is unique in his special and consistent care in recording these portents, as opposed to a haphazard, situational attention to them that was determined by the use of his sources.

2.1.3. Dio on Portents and Prodigies vs. the Conventions of Annalistic Historiography

The text of *Ρωμαϊκά* preserved quite a number of explicit editorial asides which seem to conflict with Dio's consistent habit of recording dreams, prodigies, and prophecies. In his history, Dio unquestionably invested them with prominence; even if we base our judgment solely on their frequency in the work. This contradiction epitomizes Dio's uncertainty regarding the function of the miraculous, and it has bewildered generations of scholars: "Although he [Dio] expresses himself in guarded terms on the meaning of portents, they bulk large in his work, even in the account of his own time."²⁰ As I have already stated above, the expressions of incredulity toward the miraculous are probably too frequent and manifest to be dismissed as some rhetorical turn of phrase. The following are the most characteristic examples of such pronouncements.²¹

(1) This passage is the simplest illustration of a passing comment regarding the trustworthiness of a reported miracle:

ἐν γὰρ τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ ἐκ τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦ Διὸς αἷμα τρισὶν ἡμέραις, μίᾳ δὲ μέλι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρᾳ γάλα θρυλλεῖται ἀναδοθῆναι, εἴ τῳ ταῦτα πιστά. (Zon. 8.1, 1.275)²²

On the Capitol blood is reported to have issued for three days from the altar of Jupiter, also honey on one day and milk on another — if anybody can believe it.

²⁰ Millar 1999, 179.

²¹ Not infrequently these pronouncements take a form of reminders and warnings which were inserted when a portent described by Dio went too far beyond the reasonable limits of probability. The examples discussed in this section will also reveal curious (albeit irrelevant for our analysis) indications regarding what could potentially transgress the boundaries of the believable within what one supposes was the shared cultural mindset of Dio and his readers.

²² The usage of *θρυλλεῖται* seems to confirm the overt expression of skepticism to the listed portents with the clause *εἴ τῳ ταῦτα πιστά*. On the negative connotation of *θρυλλεῖται* in Dio, see p. 189, n. 25 of this dissertation.

(2) Notable is Millar's statement which refers to the passage quoted below: "But it is clear also that, for all the inconclusiveness of the one passage where he discusses the genuineness of portents, he really believed in them."²³

"Οτι περὶ μαντικῆς καὶ ἀστρονομίας φησὶν ὁ Δίων «ἐγὼ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τούτων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκ μαντικῆς προλεγομένων τισὶ συμβαλεῖν ἔχω· τί γάρ που καὶ βούλεται τὸ προσημαίνειν, εἴ γε πάντως τέ τι ἔσται καὶ μηδεμία ἂν αὐτοῦ ἀποτροπὴ μήτ' ἀνθρωπίνῃ περιτεχνήσῃ μήτ' αὖ θείᾳ προνοίᾳ γένοιτο; ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἐκάστω δοκεῖ νομιζέσθω.» (DC 15 fr. 57.22)

With regard to divination and astrology Dio says: "I, however, cannot form any opinion either about these events or about other that are foretold by divination. For what does prophesying mean, if a thing is going to occur in any case, and if there can be no averting of it either by human skill or by divine providence? Let each man, then, look at these matters in whatsoever way he pleases."

In my reading, the final clause of this statement leaves both Dio's or his reader's belief in portents irrelevant, but reveals an unresolved (in the historian's mind) methodological difficulty. According to Dio's general attitudes concerning the driving forces of history, the main focus of his historical interest remains the human skill, ἀνθρωπίνῃ περιτεχνήσις (which is never predestined and wholly dependent on every individual's disposition and actions). Dio saw history as driven solely by the human motives. Later in the work he prefaced the exposition of the occurrences of the year 64 BC, otherwise uneventful, with the following words:

Τῷ δὲ ἐχομένῳ ἔτει, τοῦ τε Φιγούλου καὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος τοῦ Λουκίου ἀρχόντων, βραχεία μὲν, μνήμης δ' οὖν ἄξια πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων παραλόγους συνηνέχθη. (DC 37.10.1)

In the following year, when Figulus and Lucius Caesar were in office, the events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions in human affairs.

²³ Millar 1999, 77.

Such an attitude cannot be fully reconciled with another factor familiar to classical historiography, i.e. understanding *τύχη* as the force that irreversibly determines the actions of humans. Since Dio was never even close to espousing fatalistic attitudes in his history, one may interpret these two asides as testifying to Dio's earnest rejection of a profound role for portents, as a fortelling agency of gods or indeed *τύχη*.

(3) The following remark is inserted as a summary statement in the story of self-sacrifice of Curtius.²⁴ We should note that what appears to be an appeal to the reader could be also interpreted here as a hint regarding Dio's own attitude to the fabulous, *μυθώδη*:

ταῦθ' οὕτω τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἱστόρηται· εἰ δέ τῳ μυθώδῃ κριθείη καὶ μὴ πιστά, ἔξεστίν οἱ μὴ προσέχειν αὐτοῖς. (Zon. 7.25, 1.235)

This is the way the story is related by the Romans; should any person judge it fabulous and not to be credited, he is at liberty to pay no attention to it.

(4) A further editorial aside suggests a somewhat more clearly expressed reflection on the same issue raised in my passage (2), namely, the role of portents and predictions in determining the actions of individuals. Dio might or might not have believed in the miraculous, but he deliberately and explicitly detached this belief from his system of the explanation of history. However, naturally, Dio could not be responsible for the cases when the actions of his characters were grounded in those characters' personal credence in the importance of portents and dreams. Dio could not deny his protagonists such faith. Still, Dio resisted the interpretation based on divine intervention/assistance even in these instances, by sometimes suggesting an alternative version or a guess compliant with logical reasoning. This will be evident in such examples as Augustus' reaction to Varus' defeat and Cleopatra and Antony's flight from Actium discussed below. In this passage, however, Dio

²⁴ See section 4.2.1 for the analysis of the episode.

provided a brief analysis of the human mentality and presents it as prone to turn to the supernatural, especially in the times of crises.²⁵

“Ὅτι πολλὰ τέρατα τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς συμβάντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μάτην θρυλούμενα ἐλογοποιήθη· ὅταν γάρ τινες ἰσχυρῶς φοβηθῶσιν καὶ σφισι καὶ ἐκεῖνα ὡς ὄντως γενόμενα ἀποδειχθῇ, πολλάκις ἕτερα προσφαντάζεται· καὶ ἅπαξ τι καὶ ἐκείνων πιστευθῇ, προπετῶς ἤδη καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τε τὴν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ σφισιν ἄκεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὑποπτευομένου διάφευξιν εἰώθασιν ποιεῖν ἐγίγνετο. ἀλλὰ καὶ γὰρ φιλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις παρὰ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐλπίζοντες πιστεῦσαι, καὶ τότε, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ τοῦ προσδοκωμένου κινδύνου μέγεθος ἐνόμιζον ὅτι καὶ τὸ τραχύτατον αὐτοῖς συμπέσοι, ὅμως ἤλπιζον μὴ ἡττηθῆσεσθαι. (DC 14 fr. 57.7)

Many portents, some of which had actually occurred and others which were mere idle talk, became the subject of conversation. For when people get seriously frightened and certain portents are proved to them really to have occurred, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any one of the former class is believed, immediately the rest likewise are rashly accepted as true. Accordingly, the sacrifices men are in habit of performing for the cure of their momentary terror and for escape from expected disaster. But most men are wont to trust hopefully in such agencies, contrary to their true interest; and so at this time, even though, because of the magnitude of the danger anticipated, they believed more strongly than ever that the harshest fate would befall them, they still kept hoping that they might not be defeated.

(5) Therefore, the extent of the influence which oracles and dreams could exercise on the action of individuals, the actors of his historical work, Dio also subjects to doubt. This is further confirmed by the remark about one eccentricity of Augustus added by Dio to the list of the examples of the emperor's display of generosity and humility. Augustus demonstratively rejected the proposals to erect his statue and refused to accept donations for this purpose, however:

ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἤκουσα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀργύριον ἐκ λογίου τινὸς ἢ καὶ ὀνείρατος παρὰ τῶν προστυχόντων οἱ, ὡς καὶ προσαιτῶν, ἐν μιᾷ τοῦ ἔτους ἡμέρᾳ ἐλάμβανε. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν, εἴ γε τῷ πίστον, οὕτω παραδέδοται. (DC 54.35.3-4)

I have also heard the story that on one day of the year, following some oracle or dream, he would assume the guise of a beggar and would accept money from those who came up to him. This is the tradition, whether credible to any one or not.

²⁵ This sentiment was repeated at least twice in the form of *gnomai*: 1 fr. 6.3 and 6 fr. 24.1.

(6) In 9 CE, death was foretold to Drusus by a deity who appeared before him in a guise of a woman “of superhuman size” (55.1.3-5). Dio’s comment on this episode sharply contrasts with the report of his own, Dio’s, communication with τὸ δαιμόνιον at 73(72).23.1-5.²⁶

What did Dio expect his reader to conjecture regarding the plausibility of such contact with the divinity? In which of the two cases is Dio not earnest? I believe that this was a deliberate provocation on Dio’s side:

θαυμαστὸν μὲν οὖν τό τινα φωνὴν παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου τοιαύτην τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἔχω· παραχρήμα γὰρ ἀπέβη, σπουδῇ τε ὑποστρέψαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ νόσῳ τινί, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥήνον ἐλθεῖν, τελευτήσαντος. (DC 55.1.4)

It is indeed marvelous that such a voice should have come to any man from the Deity, yet I cannot discredit the tale; for Drusus immediately departed, and as he was returning in haste, died on the way of some disease before reaching the Rhine.

(7) One incident involving clairvoyance is recorded by Dio in the context of assassination of Domitian in 95 CE. On the day of assassination, according to this report, Apollonius of Tyana, from across the Aegean in Ephesus, was knowledgeable of Domitian’s murder, the name of the perpetrator, and the manner of the death and announced it to the populace:

Ἔχω δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι εἰπεῖν παραδοξότατον, ὃ ἐπειδὴν περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς αὐτοῦ φράσω, σημανῶ. (DC 67.17.1)

I have one more astonishing fact to record, which I shall give after describing Domitian’s end.²⁷

After relating the details of the murder, Dio continues:

Ὁ δ’ εἶπον ὅτι ὑπὲρ πάντα τᾶλλα θαυμάσας ἔχω, τόδ’ ἐστίν. Ἀπολλώνιος τις Τυανεύς ἐν τε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ καὶ τῇ ὥρᾳ αὐτῇ ἐκείνῃ ἐν ᾗ ὁ Δομιτιανὸς ἐσφάττετο (τοῦτο γὰρ ὕστερον ἐκ τῶν ἐκατέρωθεν γενομένων ἠκριβώθη) ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τινα λίθον ὑψηλὸν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, ἣ καὶ ἐτέρωθι, καὶ συγκαλέσας τὸ πλῆθος ταῦτα εἶπε· “καλῶς, Στέφανε, εὖ γε, Στέφανε· παῖε τὸν μαιφόνον. ἔπληξας, ἔτρωσας, ἀπέκτεινας.” τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως ἐγένετο, καὶ μυριάκις τις ἀπιστήσῃ. (DC 67.18.1-2)

²⁶ In DC 73(72).23.4 this goddess, who inspired Dio for writing history, is also styled τῇ θεῶν ταύτῃ.

²⁷ The more proper translation for παράδοξος would be “contrary to expectation, incredible.”

The matter of which I spoke, saying that it surprises me more than anything else, is this. A certain Apollonius of Tyana on that very day and at that very hour when Domitian was being murdered (as was afterwards accurately determined by events that happened in both places) mounted a lofty rock at Ephesus (or possibly it was somewhere else) and having called together the populace, uttered these words: “Good, Stephanus! Bravo, Stephanus! Smite the bloodthirsty wretch! You have struck, you have wounded, you have slain.” This is what actually happened, though one should doubt it ten thousand times over.

Although in the summarizing statement of this episode Dio’s clearly stated that, in his opinion, the accident had actually occurred, Dio’s emphasis on the unusual character of this event and anticipation of the readers’ doubt regarding its verity seems to be very emphatic in the text.²⁸

(8) Another (and very important) instance of an expression of the critical attitude to miraculous occurs at DC 7 fr. 35.7-8 (*devotio* of Decius) and was discussed above.²⁹

We may be tempted to conclude that such comments (some being more implicit than explicit) cumulatively form a system that reveals Dio’s attitude to the miraculous and postulate that Dio rejected supernatural manifestations as imagined, not adequately

²⁸ There might be a specific reason why Dio acknowledged the telegnosis of Apollonius of Tyana as a fact, even though he had branded the incident as highly incredible just before giving an account of it. Another contemporary work where this story was recorded in a realistic vein is Philostratus *Vita Apollonii* 8.26-27. From Philostratus’s own testimony (ibid. 1.3), it follows that Julia Domna, being a lover of all kinds of refined literature (καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς πάντας λόγους ἐπῆνει καὶ ἡσπάζετο) herself commissioned a revision of the memoirs of Apollonius’ follower, Damis of Nineveh, the result of which was Philostratus’ *Vita Apollonii*. We remember Severus’ personal interest in astrology, predictions, and dreams. Considering the character of Apollonius and the stories associated with him, it seems that Julia Domna, as well as the entire imperial family of Severi, also had a certain penchant for mysticism. It is doubtful that Dio would suffer any severe consequences had he completely rejected the veracity of the account and thus contradicted the empress’ possible inclination to believe the legends about Apollonius. Certainly, as Potter remarked (p. 90 above), Dio was responding to the imperial tastes, of which, however, Dio makes no secret: “And inasmuch as it [the book on portents] won the high approval, not only of others, but, in particular, of Severus himself, I then conceived a desire to compile a record of everything else that concerned the Romans” (DC 73(72).23.3). I disagree with Makhilajuk on the hypothesis that Dio’s account of the episode is based on that of Philostratus (Makhilajuk 2011, 84, n. 145); with most probability Dio have not read it at all: the discrepancies between the accounts are too radical. As we remember, it was in Dio’s habit to create an intertextual link with his source in order to indicate that it has been consulted. Such link is absent in the surviving portion of Dio’s account of the Apollonius of Tyana’s story.

²⁹ See section 1.1.2.

authenticated, or going beyond acceptable limits of believable. Rawson remarked:

“Collections of prodigies taking place before a war or disaster were of course a common *τόπος* in Greek and Latin historical works, in verse or prose.”³⁰ It seems, however, that the very ambiguity about a historian’s stance on the portents and prodigies was itself a *τόπος* borrowed by Dio from Latin annalists.³¹ One commonplace paradox prevails in the historical works, and in particular in Tacitus and Livy. The historians were committed to record the ominous signs and wonders, invest them with a greater or lesser degree of importance in the narrative structure or even in the network of the explanatory paradigms of their historical work. At the same time, not infrequently they expressed overt doubts regarding probability, verity, or efficacy of such signs and omens. For example, Tacitus furnished the account of the sighting of an unusual bird which coincided with the defeat of Otho’s forces and his eventual suicide with the following comment:

Ut conquirere fabulosa et fictis oblectare legentium animos procul gravitate coepti operis crediderim, ita vulgatis traditisque demere fidem non ausim. Die, quo Bedriaci certabatur, avem invisitata specie apud Regium Lepidum celebri luco consedissee incolae memorant... (Tac. Hist. 50)

While I must hold it inconsistent with the dignity of the work I have undertaken to collect fabulous tales and to delight my readers with fictitious stories, I cannot, however, dare to deny the truth of common tradition. On the day of the battle at Bedriacum, according to the account given by the people of that district, a bird of unusual appearance settled in a much-frequented grove near Regium Lepidum...

³⁰ Rawson 1971, 165.

³¹ As we remember, Lucian specifically advised the writers of history to keep the attitude to the mythical material ambiguous: “if a myth comes along you must tell it but not believe it entirely” (Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 60). Cf. Livy 1 *Praef.* 6-7: *Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec adfirmare nec refellere in animo est. Datur haec venia antiquitati, ut miscendo humana divinis primordia urbium augustiora faciat*, “Such traditions as belong to the time before the city was founded, or rather was presently to be founded, and are rather adorned with poetic legends than based upon trustworthy historical proofs, I purpose neither to affirm nor to refute. It is the privilege of antiquity to mingle divine things with human, and so to add dignity to the beginnings of cities.”

Ascertaining an author's religious beliefs could provide that firm ground from which one could try to explain this paradox away. However, the ancient historians, as if by the way of provocation, tended to obscure the issue to such an extent that modern scholars oftentimes find themselves possessing equally convincing evidence to argue both for and against a historian's personal belief or unbelief in the miraculous.³² Even ancient theoreticians on the subject of divination were far from adhering to one consistent and unequivocal attitude and, for example, two distinct and contrasting attitudes to the prodigies have been recognized in Cicero (in fact, this observation was made already by Augustine), one expressed in his speeches, and another in his philosophical works.³³

I shall refrain from providing illustrations of this dual attitude towards the supernatural that prevailed among Latin historians, in particular Livy and Tacitus, for this evidence was conveniently collected by Krauss.³⁴ This evidence shall suffice to prove the point that Dio's expressions of unbelief in the miraculous, discussed in this section, are heavily influenced by age-old historiographic conventions. However, it is worth quoting one example and pointing out the striking resemblance of both its argument and phrasing to Dio's passage (4) discussed above:

³² A good illustration on the example of Tacitus is found in Morgan 2000, 27-28. Note his remark (*ibid.*, 27): "[I]f we are going to talk about omens in Tacitus, we ought to address the question of his religious views – and this is a veritable quagmire." Cf. Krauss 1930, 27, n. 21.

³³ Rasmussen 2000, 16: "Comparing Cicero's attitude towards prodigies as expressed in speeches with his presentation of the subject in the philosophical works – especially *de divinatione* – one finds some of the contradictions that have tormented modern scholarship and made a manipulating hypocrite of Cicero. The problem stems from the fact that some 10 years after he had treated of prodigies with great seriousness in his speeches, Cicero is found making fun of prodigies in *de divinatione*." On St. Augustine's opinions of Cicero (August. C.D. 5.9. and 4.30), see *ibid.*, 10.

³⁴ Krauss 1930, 26-31.

Romae aut circa urbem multa ea hieme prodigia facta aut, quod evenire solet motis semel in religionem animis, multa nuntiata et temere credita sunt. (Liv. 21.62.1)³⁵

In Rome or near it many prodigies occurred that winter, or — as often happens when men's thoughts are once turned upon religion — many were reported and too easily credited.

The dominance of traditional idiom in Dio's comments on the subject of the prodigies and portents may seriously undermine our ability to judge about his personal attitude to the miraculous and their function in his work, if we do so solely on the basis of his own testimonies. Nevertheless, such appeal to the common stock of rhetorical and historiographic commonplaces itself is hardly surprising and was a part of a deliberate strategy by means of which Dio legitimized his claim of being an authoritative narrator. By creating in his text recognizable associations with his predecessors, Dio communicated to his readers that his own work built upon the literary and historical achievements of such giants as Thucydides, Livy, Dionysius, Plutarch, and Tacitus.

On the other hand, Dio boasted of his own intellectual contribution to historiography. We remember Dio's formulation of the nature of his method: ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχει καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ, "... when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts."³⁶

Now, since we have acknowledged as problematic the task of ascertaining Dio's personal religious beliefs and his stand on the miraculous, we may attempt to approach the question of the role of supernatural in his history from another angle. How were the

³⁵ Cf. Liv. 3.5.14 for the same sentiment. The similarity of the disclaimer voiced by Tac. *Hist.* 50 (see above, p. 102) to passages numbered (5) and (6) here also serve as a good illustration for the assertion about the commonplace character of Dio's expressions of skepticism toward the miraculous.

³⁶ DC 46.35.1.

prodigies and omens integrated in Dio's original research strategy (as it was formulated in the methodological pronouncement quoted above)? Were the divinatory manifestations, such as omens, wonders, and dreams considered the "facts" (τὰ ἔργα) and, accordingly, subjected to the "reasoning" (τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων) of the historian? If they were excluded from this causal system, what was their function?³⁷ We shall next take a closer look at how the miraculous was incorporated into the system of Dio's historical explanations.

³⁷ Again, consider Millar's, Potter's, and Swan's divergent views on the problem discussed in section 2.1.1 above.

2.2. THE CAUSES OF DIVINE AND HUMAN ORIGATION IN DIO'S EXPLANATORY SYSTEM

2.2.1. The Role of (High-Profile) Individuals in Dio's Narrative and His Understanding of Historical Progress

The causational paradigm that Dio developed can be formulated through an analysis of multiple instances wherein Dio offered an excursus into the reasons for various historical events (with the word for “reason” being very often *αἰτία* in Dio). In the first place, Dio clearly expresses his devotion to the pursuit for reporting the truth; moreover, he also declares that investigative methods must be dominant in his history (DC 1 fr. 1.2; 46.35.1). In Pelling's words, in Dio we detect a “pervasive concern with narrative interpretation.”³⁸

This investigative interest in *αἰτίαι* takes his analysis beyond the level of merely separating the “alleged” and “true” reasons of the historical events:³⁹ patent in Dio is also a concern for the “real” motives behind human actions. Such special interest in human psychological motives was probably in large part determined by his personal experiences as a Roman politician and his insider knowledge of the dirty intricacies involved in affairs of the imperial office as he observed the rapid change of its occupants. Dio extended this approach into the exposition of earlier periods of Roman history. Pelling was among the few scholars who noted this peculiarity in Dio; he observed the biographical features in Dio's historiographic technique, especially evident starting from the early Principate.

³⁸ Pelling seconded the opinion originally expressed by Rich: “His [Dio's] methods were more complex than the proponents of source-criticism suppose, and he was not a mere narrator but an interpretive historian” (Pelling 1997, 123, n. 29).

³⁹ On Dio's differentiation of “true” and “alleged” causes, especially in relation to Thucydidean method, see section 3.1.2.

Pelling called this feature “biostructuring”. Biostructuring must be understood not only in the literary sense, i.e. arranging the narrative about the rule of an emperor in a manner customary to biographies, employing, for example, segments on birth, education, personal life, achievements, sayings, death etc. What is more important, biostructuring presupposed explanation of the historical events on the basis of analyzing the motives of dominating individuals:

There is the interpretative point as well. History had changed, and Dio’s technique changes with it: it is indeed hard to deny the impact of imperial personality on many of the areas Dio found of concern – military campaigns, urban politics, and particularly the interaction of emperor and senate. Thus he does make Gaius’ character *explain*, not merely articulate, what happened during his reign. (Pelling 1997, 122)

Therefore, Dio’s patent interest in portents, prodigies and dreams did not generate a contradiction with his pursuit after reporting the truth (reports of portents were a part of the official records). However, it did contradict his causational system “centered around the struggles of ... massive figures.”⁴⁰ Dio was never able to reconcile these spheres in a satisfactory manner; he was not sure how to incorporate divine intervention into the system of causation. This system traced the reasons of historical events to the personal concerns, decisions, mistakes, and eventually the way of thinking and reasoning of individuals.

As has been demonstrated when we considered Dio’s overt comments on the nature of supernatural material above, a truly consistent attitude to the miraculous is lacking in Dio.⁴¹ Dio’s solution was to separate the functions attributable to the divine and human domain clearly. Humans are the agents responsible for their actions. While Dio believes in

⁴⁰ Pelling 1997, 121.

⁴¹ See section 2.1.3.

and attributes importance to heavenly signs, “heaven’s” role is factored out of his system for explaining the causation. Its function is restricted to foretelling, but even the role of foretelling in the progress of historical events remained unclear or limited overall.

For example, the report of the dreams and portents that prophesied Severus’ future ascent to imperial power (75(74).3) might be seen as incorporation of parts of the original book on dreams and portents that Dio mentioned in 73(72).23.1-5 into the main body of his *Roman History*. The list of such occurrences connected to Severus personally is framed by the phrases virtually identical in meaning, DC 75(74).3.1: *Σημεῖα δὲ αὐτῷ ἐξ ὧν ἡγεμονίαν ἤλπισε, ταῦτα ἐγένετο*, “The signs which had led him to hope for the imperial power were as follows” and 75(74).3.3, *τὴν μὲν οὖν ἡγεμονίαν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῷ προεδήλωσε*, “These, then, were some of the signs that pointed in his case to the supreme power.” Notable is the extent of the impact that the dreams described have on the course of the events: *ἤλπισε, προεδήλωσε*. Dio was never comfortable in allowing the miraculous to influence history on a scale more profound than phrased by him here.

Instead, Dio time and again displayed his profound interest in the human factor, which he saw as determining the outcomes of historical events, not some inescapable divine predestination. Dio’s history is driven by the actions of powerful individuals, and their personal decisions become dominant in Dio’s system of causation, despite the fact that the outcomes of these actions might have been clearly foretold far in advance by heavenly signs.

Although some may be inclined to see faults with Dio's skill of characterization and individuation of historical actors,⁴² significantly, his characters cannot be considered static, nor they are invested with purely stereotypical traits whereby their behavior could be easily predicted, and, by the same token, the consequences of that behavior calculated beforehand. In simpler terms, in Dio neither the righteous predictably succeed, nor do villains always suffer defeat, being justifiably punished for their mischief by the gods.⁴³ The plot of Avidius Cassius against Marcus Aurelius fails not because it would a natural outcome of the situation when the "evil" conspirator rose against the "good" emperor. The downfall of Cassius was a result of a mistake (*ἡμαρτεν*), the responsibility for which laid solely with Cassius himself, firstly, because he rashly trusted the influence of Faustina, not being able to recognize the personal ambition behind her motivations; secondly, because he laid claim to the throne without checking the rumors of Marcus' death; and, finally, since he persevered with the initial plan against all odds.⁴⁴ Had he taken another decision, the course of the history would be different. After all, Dio says, this is the sort of man Cassius was (72(71).22.2): *ἀνὴρ δὲ ἄριστος ἐγένετο, καὶ ὅποιον ἂν τις αὐτοκράτορα ἔχειν εὖξαιτο*, "an excellent man and the sort one would desire to have as emperor."

⁴² Pelling remarked (1997, 137): "When we reach the Empire that interest in psychology is still there; yet, when he comes to the dominating individuals, the psychological interest seems to produce curiously colourless results." Also see *ibid.*, 137-44.

⁴³ Cf. the observation on the use of the principle of "retributive justice" in the explanatory system of Velleius Paterculus (Marincola 2011, 124): "Velleius in a number of cases seems to employ the same notion of retributive justice familiar from a historian such as Herodotus. This suggests that Velleius has a belief (though that is perhaps too strong a word) that wrong conduct is punished, and such a notion can serve partly as an explanation for some actions."

⁴⁴ DC 72(71).22.2-23.2.

In Dio's conception of causation, therefore, there is no behavioral constant predetermined by either anthropological or divine factors.⁴⁵ On the other hand, neither fate nor any other goddess is invested with the power to suddenly change her disposition, and thus become a cause of military victory or defeat, rise or downfall of an individual, or other historically significant occurrence. Notably, in one aside to which we shall return later, Dio, even when seemingly musing on the capriciousness of *τύχη*, unequivocally implied that the causes of all historically significant events could always be traced back to the "unstable choices" that people make. This is just one (cautiously but rather overtly expressed) example of Dio's overall rejection of determinist conceptions of history present to the lesser or greater extent in the works of his historiographic predecessors:⁴⁶

οὕτω που οὐδὲν πάγιόν ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τε ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἀνθοῦντες καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ ταπεινοτάτῳ ὄντες ἀσταθμῆτά τε αἰροῦνται, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τύχας σφῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους καὶ τοὺς ψόγους τὰς τε τιμὰς καὶ τὰς ἀτιμίας λαμβάνουσι. (DC 64(65).1.2)

So true is it that there is nothing constant in human affairs; but alike those who are most prosperous and those who are in most humblest station make an unstable choice and receive praise or blame, honour or dishonor, according as their fortunes shift.

⁴⁵ This assertion contradicts cardinaly the traditional view which perceived Dio as highly indebted to Thucydides for the adoption of his concept of unchanging human nature. See Rich 1989, 89. I shall develop this hypothesis in chapter three.

⁴⁶ Cf., e.g., the role assigned to *τύχη* in methodological pronouncements that express the conception of history by the historians traditionally regarded as "rational". Plb. 1.4.1-2: τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας πραγματείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς καιρῶν τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅτι, καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἓν ἐκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύννοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ὃ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν, "For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune having guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and having forced them to incline towards one and the same end, a historian should bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose" (cf. also Tac. *Hist.* 2.38). One may argue that Polybius did not attribute a crucial significance to the mysterious workings of the fate, this pronouncement being merely a tribute to some rhetorical convention. Dio, however, consistently avoids such formulations, whereby *τύχη* is presented as a driving force of history, even though not being as a rule in a habit of shunning old historiographic commonplaces or *τόποι*.

Arguably, in this example, *τύχη*, which is stripped of its divine connotation, is used in a technical sense, better translation for *πρὸς τὰς τύχας σφῶν* being thus, “according to their respective stations in life.”

Metaphorically speaking, the goddess that reigns supreme in Dio’s system of historical explanation is *σωφροσύνη*, “prudence, discretion”. Ultimately, every success or fault of an individual could be explained solely on the basis of this one criterion, how well the person was able to exercise moderation (*μετριάζω*, a very commonly used word Dio’s analysis) and calculate beforehand the possible consequences of his or her actions – in other words, a very (in the modern sense) rational and anthropocentric approach which probably transcends the traditional boundaries of historiographic convention is dominant in Dio’s causation. In Pelling’s words, “[t]ime and again we see the same thing: a real interest in psychological reconstruction, which surfaces particularly in a tendency to assign motives; and a real intelligence in carrying that through.”⁴⁷

Let us briefly consider the characterization of Pertinax by two contemporaries, Dio and Herodian. Both share a positive view of that emperor (we may note some degree of enthusiastic admiration in Herodian). The rule of Pertinax in general resembled that of Marcus Aurelius and was prominent because of a more “orderly government” and anti-tyrannical tendencies, while the attitude to the subjects, Roman and non-Roman, was based on the principles of humaneness and equity.⁴⁸ Why then, if Pertinax in his actions adhered to the course that could but benefit the state, did he become a subject of a plot and be assassinated? The question itself reflects the traditional historical conception of

⁴⁷ Pelling 1997, 137.

⁴⁸ Following Hdn. 2.4.

determinism, consistent with the belief in the workings of natural human and divine laws; a conception falsely assumed to be dominant in Dio as well.⁴⁹ Within the same historical mindset, if something happens against that sort of expectation, it could be explained by the capriciousness of the fate, the actions of which may not be questioned, since the reversal of fortune is itself acknowledged as a universal existential constant. In Herodian, we do find a reflection of that viewpoint:

τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, οὐδ' ὅλων μηνῶν δύο τῆς βασιλείας αὐτῷ προκεχωρηκυίας, ἐπιδειξαμένου τε ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ σώφρονα καὶ χρηστὰ ἔργα ἐλπίδων τε ἀγαθῶν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ὑποφαινομένων ἐβάσκηκε πάντα καὶ ἀνέτρεψε πονηρὰ τύχη ἐκώλυσέ τε θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἐπωφελῆ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἔργα ἐς τέλος ἀχθῆναι. (Hdn. 2.4.5)

But before Pertinax had completed two months of his rule, during which brief period he had transacted a number of sensible and valuable reforms, which raised the hopes of his subjects, an ill chance put a blight on everything and reversed the trend by preventing the completion of some magnificent schemes of aid for the subjects of the empire.

It would be, of course, a mistake to read this statement too literally: both Herodian and Dio know that the ultimate cause of Pertinax' downfall was the discontent of the praetorians who, having accustomed themselves to plunder and, in general, to a lack of restraint, were now resisting the emperor's attempts to instill discipline. However, in Dio's view, the grim outcome for Pertinax could have been avoidable, if he, an experienced general, had been able to foresee the potential complications connected with the rapid implementation of reforms, no matter how fair or beneficial these reforms were:

οὕτω μὲν ὁ Περτίναξ ἐπιχειρήσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πάντα ἀνακαλέσασθαι ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδὲ ἔγνω καίπερ ἐμπειρότατος πραγμάτων ὢν, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀθρόα τινὰ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, καὶ πολιτικὴ κατάστασις καὶ χρόνου καὶ σοφίας χρήζει. ἐβίω δὲ ἔτη ἑπτὰ καὶ ἐξήκοντα τεσσάρων μηνῶν καὶ τριῶν ἡμερῶν δέοντα, ἧρξε δὲ ἡμέρας ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ. (DC 74(73).10.3)

⁴⁹ Perhaps the best brief survey of ancient historiography from the point of view of the place of human nature in the causative paradigm of a historian could be found in Reinhold 2002, 45-53.

Thus did Pertinax, who undertook to restore everything in a moment, come to his end. He failed to comprehend, though a man of wide practical experience, that one cannot with safety reform everything at once, and that the restoration of a state, in particular, requires both time and wisdom. He had lived sixty-seven years, lacking four months and three days, and had reigned eighty-seven days.

In the explanation provided here (and elsewhere) by Dio we detect traces of a radically different approach to causation, one which rejects blunt determinism in the analysis of the human motives.

We shall now move to the analysis of the episode whereby Dio discussed the events leading to the formation of the First Triumvirate (DC 37.52-58). Pelling thought highly of this treatment, and it is indeed worth of examining in greater detail as an excellent exemplar of Dio's technique of "psychological reconstruction":

[I]n the Republican books he [Dio] was at his most impressive when he became interested in psychology and tried to illustrate people's motives: for instance, those of the principals for joining the First Triumvirate (if one may call it that) at the end of book 37. It may well be guesswork, but we can admire it as rather intelligent guesswork. (Pelling 1997, 137)

According to Dio, Julius Caesar received the omens which portended for him his future glory and success. They were the dream of intercourse with his mother, predictions of the soothsayers (DC 37.52.2; at this point Dio also relates the famous episode of Caesar wailing in front of the statue of Alexander), and a horse (that would only submit to Caesar alone and would not tolerate anyone else) being born with the clefts in the hooves (DC 37.54.2). However, according to Dio, it is because Julius Caesar possessed powerful personal ambition (DC 37.52.1: *δόξης τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν ... οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐφρόνει*, "he was eager for glory ... his aspirations were anything but small") that he spared no effort to become a consul. This ambition, not merely favorable predictions, motivated him in the year 60 BCE

to sacrifice the celebration of a triumph for the prospect of succeeding as a leading political figure in Rome.

The factual core of the episode and the cause-and-effect relationships involved in it, as presented by Dio, are the following. Caesar managed to reconcile Pompey and Crassus, because he realized it would be futile to attempt to advance into a position of power without having secured the support of these powerful individuals (DC 37.55.1; 56.1). Moreover, he was able to anticipate the difficulties connected to their personal strife, should he ally himself with just one of the future triumvirs:

κἂν τὸν ἕτερον ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν προσεταιρίσῃται, ἀνταγωνιστὴν τε διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἕτερον ἔξει καὶ πλέον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σφαλῆσεται ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ συναιρομένου οἱ κατεργάσεται. (DC 37.55.1)

[A]nd if he made a friend of either of them alone, he would by that very fact have the other as his opponent and would meet with more failures through him than successes through the support of the other.

The validity of such reasoning is confirmed with a *gnome*: men are more zealous in plotting against the enemies than in cooperating with the friends (DC 37.55.2).

Therefore, the portents might have inspired Caesar with hopes, gave him encouragement, or invested him with confidence (DC 37.54.2: *ἐφ' οἷς μέγα αἰεί ποτε ἐφρόνει*) but they were not the principal motivators of his decisions, because the portents received by Caesar, in the way Dio represents them, did not guarantee the success of Caesar's undertaking. Conversely, it was his innate "shrewdness" (DC 37.54.4: *σοφία*) that allowed him to anticipate political events and carefully calculate his actions in advance. Therefore, in this episode (and hardly anywhere in Dio) there is not just a simple logical or consequent link for Dio between, on the one hand, the act of receiving the prediction and, on the other, the realization of this prediction, which Dio punctuated here with one of his

habitual expressions, *καὶ ἔσχεν οὕτως*, “And so it came about.” Between them stands an inherently human variable, the workings of which Dio sets out to investigate (we remember, for example, Dio’s remark at 37.10.1: *μνήμης δ’ οὖν ἄξια πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων παραλόγους συννηέχθη*, “the events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions in human affairs”).

2.2.2. *Narratological Functions of the Divine Agency in Dio*

The pervasive focus on the individual motives, such as in the examples discussed above, is so consistent in Dio that, I believe, it would be safe to assert that Dio in his explanatory system not only gave preference to causative factors based on the analysis of personal motivations, but also deliberately marginalized the miraculous and assigned it a role that did not interfere with his causation. Dio suppressed the role of the divine with the purpose of underscoring the idiosyncrasy of his historical method which, if not being strictly “rational”, was at the very least built upon the anthropocentric understanding of history. The interpretation of history, according to Dio, presupposed psychological analysis of individual motives, which he saw principally distinct and independent from the factors of divine origination.

On the other hand, although Swan is ready to ascribe to the divine in Dio a more profound degree of involvement in the historical events, as acting through mediation of natural phenomena or “eliciting human action,”⁵⁰ the extent of such divine involvement in Dio, in my reading, remains limited. Instead of subjecting every manifestation of the miraculous to a critical re-investigation from the standpoint of its veracity, probability, and

⁵⁰ E.g., in DC 72(71).8.1-4, the rain was sent from heaven to save the army from thirst (Swan 2004, 11-12).

authenticity, Dio in his history built an explanatory system based on a coherent understanding of cause-and-effect relationships in history, which also revealed Dio's general intellectual attitudes to the miraculous. The consistency of this system's application constantly reminded Dio's readers that his exegesis would remain within a rational framework, whereby the manifestations of the miraculous were marginalized to the narrative periphery. In other words, the divine materializations in the form of signs, omens, and wonders were probably not even considered as historical *events*: although they were carefully listed, the omens and prodigies were excluded from the historical analysis based on the formula that Dio outlined at 46.35.1, subjecting the *facts* to reasoning:⁵¹

καὶ γὰρ καὶ παιδευσίς ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχει καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ. (DC 46.35.1)

For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts.

I have already suggested a hint regarding why Dio refrained from completely ridding his history of the omens and prodigies.⁵² However, a more important question in the light of my hypothesis is, how did he justify their inclusion? Next, I shall provide evidence against Potter's and Swan's conceptions of Dio's view of causality.⁵³ We shall discuss, first, by what means Dio suppressed the role of the miraculous in the causation and what narratological role he ascribed to them instead. Secondly, we shall consider the question of how Dio

⁵¹ Notable exceptions are the pronouncements that express overt skepticism toward the miraculous listed in section 2.1.3. I have hypothesized that they may be of little value for establishing Dio's real stand on the portents and prodigies, since such pronouncements were firmly established *τόποι* and belonged to the sphere of historiographical (or rhetorical) conventions. Nevertheless, even if these methodological asides were expressed in earnest, Dio's doubt about the veracity, plausibility, or authenticity of the miraculous manifestations does not contradict his overall attitude.

⁵² See p. 104 above.

⁵³ See section 2.1.1.

justified the inclusion of omens and prodigies and how they were integrated into the narrative.

One of the means of such suppression was counterpoising the divine and human in a way that revealed the divine as just an attending, passively observing force. Dio used this technique when, for example, summarizing his exposition of the First Triumvirate as an alliance, the circumstances of which thus Dio manifestly explains through the personal motives of Caesar.⁵⁴ According to Dio, divine agency communicates with humans through portents, natural disasters, and miraculous occurrences, but they are easy to overlook and better interpretable (if not only) in hindsight. It is exactly from this retrospective position that Dio suggests the following model for the relationship between the divine and the human:

Ἐς τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τότε τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράγματα οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι προήγαγον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὅσον τὴν συνωμοσίαν σφῶν ἀποκρυψάμενοι. ἐποιοῦν μὲν γὰρ ὅσα ἐδέδοκτό σφισιν, ἐσχηματίζοντο δὲ καὶ προεβάλλοντο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, ὅπως ἔτ' ἐπὶ μακρότατον διαλάβωσι, μέχρις ἂν ἱκανῶς παρασκευάσωνται. Οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον τὰ πραττόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἡγγόει, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ τοῖς τι συνεῖναι τῶν τοιούτων δυναμένοις εὐθὺς τότε πάντα τὰ ἔπειτα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐσόμενα ἐξέφηνε. ... ἐκεῖνα μὲν δὴ οὖν καθάπερ εἰκὼν τῶν μελλόντων σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι συμβήσεσθαι προεδείχθη. (DC 37.58.1-4)

This was the condition into which these men brought the affairs in Rome at that time, after concealing their alliance as long as possible. For they did whatever they had decided on, while feigning and putting forward utterly opposite motives, in order that they still remain undiscovered for a long period, until they should have made sufficient preparations. Yet Heaven was not ignorant of their doings, but then and there revealed to those who could understand any such signs all that was to result later because of them. [A description of a very violent storm follows.] These signs were revealed in advance, as an image of what should befall the people both on land and on water.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ See my analysis above, pp. 113-15.

⁵⁵ Such a dichotomous relationship between the human and divine is probably not Dio's invention. For example, purely on the conceptual level, it is also implicit in the legal language of the Empire, cf. *Lex de imperio Vespasiani: utique quaecunque ex usu rei publicae maiestateque diuinarum humanarum publicarum priuatarumque rerum esse censebit, ei agere facere ius potestasque sit, ita uti diuo Augusto, Tiberioque Iulio Caesari Augusto, Tiberioque Claudio Caesari Augusto Germanico fuit*, "That whatsoever he will regard as deriving from the advantage of the state or the majesty of affairs divine or human, public or private, he shall have the legal

Within this model, let us trace the narratological functions of the miraculous. The main function of the δαιμόνιον (or often also τό θεῖον) is to foretell the events: ἐκφαίνω, προδείκνυμι. The instruments of foretelling are portents/prodigies (τέρας), oracles (χρησμός), and omens/signs (σημεῖον). They may be frightening, alarming, or alerting, but they are not changing the course of events or directly interfering with the actions of the humans. The impact of the prodigies and signs is described differently, including the following expressions: ἐθορύβει, “disquieted” (DC 37.8.1); προέλεγον, “warned” (44.17.1); ἐταράχθησαν, “disturbed” (43.2.1); ἀνερρώσθη, “gave courage” (49.5.5); προδηλοῦντα, “revealed in advance” (65(66).1.2). In the system of Dio’s causation, however, they are introduced as secondary and attendant motives, which are almost always paired with the psychological or circumstantial explanations. These latter strongly contribute to such interpretation of events according to which divine premonitions, although recorded, often seem irrelevant: after all, in this very example, Ἐς τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τότε τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράγματα οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι προήγαγον, “This was the condition into which these men brought the affairs in Rome at that time.”⁵⁶ In Dio’s understanding, omens and the signs bear merely some symbolic significance regarding the future, εἰκὼν τῶν μελλόντων.

Secondly, portents require interpretation.⁵⁷ Such skill does not seem to be, in Dio’s mind, inaccessible to all or restricted to few, but may be not apparent to a layperson, and some expertise is, after all, required. Portents could be more easily revealed to τοῖς τι συνεῖναι τῶν τοιούτων δυναμένοις, “those who could understand any such signs.”

right and the authority to undertake and execute it, as did the Deified Augustus, Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus, and Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus” (CIL 06.31207 = ILS 244; translation by Hicks 2011, 2).

⁵⁶ DC 37.58.1.

⁵⁷ DC 65(66).1.4: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐρμηνεύσεως ἔχρηζεν, “These portents needed interpretation.”

Nevertheless, there are no indications in the text of Dio claiming that this interpretation calls for special knowledge.⁵⁸ We have noted Dio's emphasis on his personal role in interpreting "private" portents which he has himself observed as one having access to the imperial court.⁵⁹ Most of the signs recorded in Dio's history were, however, not so "exclusive". In most cases Dio does not reserve a special authority on the interpretation of omens for himself: cf. his brief remark before providing a list of omens attending to Augustus' death: *τέρατα δὲ ἄρα ἐς τοῦτο φέροντα οὔτε ἐλάχιστα οὔτε δυσσύμβλητα ἐγγεγενητο*, "Indeed, not a few omens had appeared, and these by no means difficult of interpretation, all pointing this fate for him."⁶⁰ In his history, Dio did not fully assume an authoritative position in this regard, as the only one or one of a few who can rightly interpret these signs. This indiscriminatory access to the interpretation of omens further undermined the possible rationale for including them. Essentially, what interpretation of the miraculous meant for Dio, was correlating the significant events with the portents and signs that attended and prefigured them.⁶¹

In the third place, another reason why the oracles, portents, and dreams could not, in Dio's understanding, be causes of the historical events, is that these miraculous occurrences could be comprehended and interpreted only in hindsight. Dio

⁵⁸ The soldiers present at the sacrifices performed by Didius Julianus noticed three stars in the sky and were able to interpret the sign themselves, as portending "dreadful fate" to the emperor (DC 74(73).14.2-5). It is Dio, however, who was able to correlate this omen with the three generals aspiring for the control of power, namely, Severus, Niger, and Albinus, the first of whom became the source of Julianus' ruin. See pp. 91-92 for the analysis of this episode.

⁵⁹ See pp. 90-94 of this dissertation.

⁶⁰ DC 56.29.2.

⁶¹ We may also claim that this explains why unfulfilled portents are not recorded. Cf. Swan 2004, 9: "For him [Dio] a sign that was not fulfilled was self-evidently false and so irrelevant." In rare instances, Dio seemed to have trouble connecting a portent with a historical event of any significance for a given year. E.g., DC 48.50.4: *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὅπη ποτ' ἐσήμαινεν, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ ἀξιαφήγητα ἐθεασάμην, φράσω*, "Now what this imported I cannot say; but I will go on to tell of everything else worth reporting which I saw in that place."

communicated this idea to his reader rather clearly. For example, notable in this sense is Dio's commentary on an incident at the court of Caracalla during the emperor's stay in Nicomedia. At the end of a banquet there, Antoninus, as our historian prefers to call him, personally addressed Dio with a few lines from Euripides.⁶² The lines themselves were in no way unusual, perhaps only so because of discrepancy between the occasion for their recitation (banquet) and the gloomy mood of Euripidean verdict that gods often bring about things contrary to human expectation. Notably, Dio himself recognized that —

παραχρήμα μὲν γὰρ ἄλλως ἀπολεληρηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἔδοξεν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐς μακρὰν ἀπώλετο καὶ τελευταίαν ταύτην φωνὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔρρηξε, καὶ πάνυ κεχρησµωδηκέναι τρόπον τινὰ τὰ συμβησόμενα αὐτῷ ἐνομίσθη. (DC 79(78).8.5)

At the time these verses seemed to have been quoted with no particular meaning, but when he [Caracalla] perished not long afterward and these words proved to be the last he ever uttered to me, it was felt that he had foretold in a truly oracular manner what was to befall him.

This remark by Dio serves as yet another illustration of his acknowledgment of the fact that a portent or sign could be easily overlooked by the addressee of such a heavenly premonition. A seemingly trivial comment like this one reflects Dio's general attitude. In most cases, the meaning of portents can be interpreted only in retrospect; signs could be misinterpreted; some portents are acted upon, some not. Even if the addressee is a

⁶² According to Cary's comment at 9.356, these were the "lines that occur at the end of several of Euripides' dramas." DC 79(78).8.4: "κάλλιστα, ὦ Δίω, καὶ ἀληθέστατα ὁ Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκεν ὅτι

*πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων,
πολλὰ δ' ἀέλπτως κραίνουσι θεοί,
καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
τῶν δ' ἀδοκῆτων πόρον εὗρε θεός.
τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα,"*

"Well, and truly, Dio, has Euripides said:

«O the works of the gods — in manifold wise they reveal them:
Manifold things unhop'd for the gods to accomplishment bring.
And the things that we look'd for, the gods deign not to fulfil them;
And the paths undiscern'd of our eyes, the gods unseal them,
So fell this marvellous thing»."

believer in this type of prognostication, Dio is hesitant to acknowledge the divine signs as valid motivational factors and always tends to supply additional variant explanations based on rational, logically deducible motives.

Thus, fourthly, Dio underscores his skepticism toward the miraculous as a causative factor in history by subjecting to doubt even the personal motivations of the actors of his history, when such motivations could be based on these historical characters' religious beliefs or superstitions. I am referring to the cases when, in Swan's words, "[h]eaven could also elicit human action by communicating its counsel or attitude through signs and prophecies."⁶³ A brief clarification must be made at this point: if a historian implied that the portents play a role in the motivations of "the actors about whom he is writing,"⁶⁴ it does not necessitate that a historian would have come to the same conclusion that his actors had. For example, Nicias interpreted the eclipse at Syracuse to require a delay before leaving, but no one would charge Thucydides himself with gullibility regarding portents.

Thucydides' explanation is rather unambiguous:

καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος) οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλευσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρὶν, ὥς οἱ μάντιες ἐξηγοῦντο, τρεῖς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μείναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθεῖη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν ἐγγένητο. (Thuc. 7.50.4)

Nicias also, who was somewhat too much given to divination and the like, refused even to discuss further the question of their removal until they should have waited thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. Such, then, was the reason why the Athenians delayed and stayed on.⁶⁵

⁶³ Swan 2004, 12.

⁶⁴ Morgan 2000, 28.

⁶⁵ One may prefer to argue that the eclipse was not a primary motivating factor for Nicias: he was originally opposed to the idea of withdrawing the troops (Thuc. 7.48-49) and could have used the eclipse as a pretext to insist on continuing to remain. Cf. Brenk 1977, 45: "Nicias' prime considerations are Athenian public opinion, and a possible disintegration of the Syracusans' morale rather than any warning from the eclipse; and outside of one sentence there is nothing describing him as superstitious." Cf. also Oost 1975, 192.

Dio should have been aware of this principle; however, he takes a different approach. The over-rationalization of the personal motives by Dio in many cases may seem superfluous to us, and rightly so. For our purposes, it would suffice to conclude that the examples such as those below demonstrate a certain level of anxious uncertainty for Dio about the problem of correlating the inclusion of portents and prodigies with his conception of historical sequence and causation.

Let us briefly consider Dio's exposition of the finale of the battle of Actium. Having suffered a series of reverses Antony and Cleopatra decided to flee. Dio, in seeming contrast with my interpretation of his causational paradigm, presented a supernatural reason as the motivation for Cleopatra's decision by using an unequivocal expression: *ταύτην γὰρ τὴν γνώμην ἔσχεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ σημείων ἐταράχθη*, "She had reached this opinion as the result of being disturbed by omens."⁶⁶ However, unlike Thucydides in the example quoted above, Dio weakened the possible role of the divine intervention by also adducing rationally deducible reasons. It was not solely as a result of being scared by portents that Cleopatra convinced Antony to flee. After all, according to Dio:

ἔκ τε οὖν τούτων καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ ἀθυμίας ἐπ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρρωστίας ἣ Κλεοπάτρα αὐτὴ τε ἔδεισε καὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἐξεφόβησεν. (DC 50.15.3)

In consequence of these portents and of the resulting dejection of the army, and of the sickness prevalent among them, Cleopatra herself became alarmed and filled Antony with fears.

⁶⁶ DC 50.15.1. In fact, on the basis of statements such as this, some scholars conclude that Dio did believe in portents and sometimes allowed the divine intervention some role in his explanatory system (cf. Freyburger, 1994, xxxi-xxxii). The omens to which the word *σημεῖα* refers here were the following (DC 50.15.2): "For swallows had built their nests about her tent and on the flagship, on which she was sailing, and milk and blood together had dripped from beeswax; also the statues of herself and Antony in the guise of gods, which the Athenians had placed on their Acropolis, had been hurled down by thunderbolts into the theatre."

Dio, therefore, suggested various reasons for the decision reached by Antony and Cleopatra, omens being only one of them. Dio, in fact, suggested some additional possible causes which led to Cleopatra's "fear". For example, in 50.14.3-4, Dio mentions the defeats of Antony's armies in naval and cavalry battles and the shortage of provisions as a result of being cut off from their grain supply. We may claim that these "rational" reasons rendered the omens that Cleopatra received less significant as an explanation in Dio's interpretation. Strikingly, even the portents themselves and her reaction to them still seem to provide additional explanation for the personal, individual *decision*. And whatever prompted Cleopatra's fear, her and Antony's flight was a result of a *decision*: *διαγνώμην ἐποιήσατο πότερον κατὰ χώραν μέιναντες διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἢ μεταστάντες*, "he held a council to deliberate whether they should remain where they were and hazard an encounter or should move somewhere else."⁶⁷

Finally, on the compositional level, we also observe a tendency to separate quite literally the manifestations of divine will or premonitions from the affairs of humans when Dio introduces the miraculous into his narrative structure. Although not uniformly for every occasion, but still persistently, Dio leans toward organizing his lists of portents into clusters, or, at least, clearly marks the transitions from the historical narrative to catalogues of miraculous occurrences associated with particular events or just a certain year. Such clustering, "serving up prodigy reports ... in slabs of material at the start or the end of the year" is usually thought to be a very "Livian" feature.⁶⁸ Yet sometimes Dio is more consistently "Livian" in this sense than Livy himself. A good comparative example is the

⁶⁷ DC 50.14.4.

⁶⁸ Morgan 2000, 28-29.

account of the dream which Hannibal saw when crossing Iberus (Ebro). In this dream, he received a guide from the gods who ordered him to follow without looking back. Hannibal, however, disobeyed and saw a huge serpent and a great cloud going closely behind him heralding the future devastation of Italy. In Livy (21.22.5-9) this episode is integrated into the continuous narrative about Hannibal's exploits in Spain. Dio, on the other hand, takes care to preface the incident (which he, notably, combines with the lists of other miracles) with the following introductory remark:

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ δεύτερον ἐπολέμεσαν. καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον τὰ γενησόμενα προεσήμηνεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἀνθρωπίνως ἐλάλησε βοῦς... (Zon. 8.22, 2.83)

In this way, then, and for these reasons the Romans and the Carthaginians went to war for the second time. Now Heaven had indicated beforehand what was to come to pass. For in Rome an ox talked in a human voice...⁶⁹

Judging from this five-fold evidence, as well as from the analysis of Dio's approach to causation in general, we may conclude that Dio unequally delimited the extent of possible influence of the divine and the human on history and made a clear differentiation between them. One important result of such technique was that his reader was able to identify the difference between the portions of the history where Dio explained the causes of events and where he just delighted the reader with a curious, provocative, or exotic detail. Dio used this technique to his advantage, and often in a deliberate and playful manner he presented the miraculous elements in such a way that they appeared to be on the very verge of believable. Hence one notes a paradoxical feature of Dio's history, a liberty that Dio takes: I shall call it "miracularization", investing an (often trivial) episode

⁶⁹ Cf. Zon. 9.1, 2.135: Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν ἦσαν τὰ χρησμοδήματα, τὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις συμβάντα οὕτως ἐγένετο, "Such were the oracular utterances; now what befell the Romans was this."

with additional marvelous details. This method operates through the following protocols.

In some cases, Dio securely divorces these instances from the contexts which call for explanation or interpretation. For example, in recounting the sudden unisonous chanting of the spectators at the horse races, with the demands to put stop to the civil war in 196 CE, Dio adds a comment contradicting his usual attitude: οὕτω μὲν ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἐνεθουσίασαν, “In all this they were surely moved by some divine inspiration.”⁷⁰ Sometimes, the liberty to add an extra miraculous dimension to a story is warranted by an explicit remark expressing the doubtful character of the tradition that Dio was bound to follow.⁷¹

In the context of the *devotio* of Marcus Curtius, the chasm between Capitoline and Palatine hills is said by Livy to have opened as a result of an earthquake (7.6.1). Dio insists that it happened “without any preceding earthquake or other natural phenomenon” (Zon. 7.25, 1.229). Yet in other places the technique of “miracularization” is disguised as a figure of speech, a sort of poetic expression. For the year 54 BCE, Dio provides a description of the flooding of the Tiber river. Although the natural causes for this occurrence are listed as well, Dio adds: εἴτε καὶ μᾶλλον, ὥς ὑπωπτεύετο, ἐκ παρασκευῆς δαιμονίου τινός, “or, still more probably, as was surmised, by the act of some divinity.”⁷²

Naturally, the more Dio marginalized the miraculous, the harder it became to him to integrate this material seamlessly into the narrative. This difficulty reflects the contradiction inherent in Dio’s methodology. As previously noted, Dio never developed a consistent attitude to the significance of prodigies, signs, and dreams. Nevertheless, this

⁷⁰ DC 76(75).4.5.

⁷¹ Zon. 7.25, 1. 235; number (3) in section 2.1.3.

⁷² DC 39.61.1. Cf. the opposite interpretation by Millar (1999, 77): “[T]his [Dio’s belief in portents] is shown most clearly in a passage where he gives alternative explanations of the flooding of the Tiber banks but rejects natural causes in favour of divine intervention.”

hesitation was paired with Dio's fastidiousness in recording these instances and unceasing, almost antiquarian, interest in them. The habitual way for Dio to justify the inclusion of such material, antiquarian in its form, is repeated use of the pronouncement which contains the observation that the most significant historical events are always accompanied by heavenly signs of notably indicative nature:⁷³

Πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν σημείων τῶν τότε συμβάντων σφίσι τεκμήρασθαι ὅτι μέγιστος διαφανῶς ὁ ἀγὼν αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο· τὸ γὰρ δαιμόνιον, ὥσπερ που καὶ αἰὶ πρὸ τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων φιλεῖ προσημαίνειν, πάντα σφίσιν ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ τὰ ἐκβάντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προεμαντεύσαντο. (DC 47.40.1)

We may infer also from the portents which appeared to them at that time that it was manifestly a supreme struggle in which they were engaged; for Heaven, even as it is ever accustomed to give warning signs before the most unusual events, foretold them accurately both in Rome and in Macedonia all the results that would come of it.

Such explicit statements are not unparalleled in Dio and remain the only means of validation of the seemingly extraneous inclusions into Dio's narrative structure.⁷⁴ These pronouncements remind us of the instances whereby Dio resorted to justifying other inclusions or digressions (anecdotal, curious, or sensational detail, sometimes also ethnographic sketch or an explanation of a natural phenomenon) as if not being in accordance with some accepted formal norms of the historiographic genre or even offending the "dignity of history".⁷⁵ The fact alone that Dio needed to make such disclaimers regarding the portents and prodigies, once again lays bare a certain lack of ease with intergrating miraculous occurrences as narrative components, however much he may have perceived them as noncompliant with his explanatory strategies.

⁷³ This concern is, of course, springs from his private interest in portents, as clear from Dio's own testimony at 73(72).23.1.

⁷⁴ Cf., e.g., DC 46.40.1; 53.33.5; 54.29.7; 67.16.1; 79(78).30.1.

⁷⁵ Some examples are: DC 37.18.1-2; 43.22.4-23.1; 43.43.5; 45.16.1. On the "dignity of history", see, e.g., 65.66.9.4: τοῦτο γὰρ εἰ καὶ ἀνάξιον τοῦ τῆς ἱστορίας ὄγκου ἐστίν.

2.2.3. Understanding Unresolved Contradictions in Dio's Stand on Prodiges and Divination

In Dio's case, was such formally antiquarian approach to the miraculous justified in its inclusion in an *ab urbe condita* or all-encompassing type of Roman historical composition? As I have already noted, contradictions in his attitudes to portents and prodigies have long since been noted by modern scholars in many historiographic works, and certain interpretational strategies have been suggested, and some of them are worth considering when the answer to this question is being sought. There are three traditional lines of approach to the explanation of the function of the miraculous and portentous in a historiographic work in which the author expresses skepticism or disbelief in such manifestations. First one is based on stylistic considerations; the second tackles the problem from the point of view of the dichotomy of the educated position of the author and the less refined tastes of the masses; the third approach explores the function of the miraculous through the notion of the authoritative claims of the historian. Let us briefly discuss each of these interpretative strategies in application to Dio's historical work.

In Millar's opinion, the miraculous "could serve a literary and dramatic aim in forming a prelude to a great event or, alternatively, act as light relief and contrasting detail."⁷⁶ Did the inclusion of *prodigia* really contribute to enhancing the compositional and stylistic design of *Ῥωμαϊκά*? Naturally, Dio's deliberate effort to present the portents and prodigies as devoid of explanatory function and to organize them into self-contained clusters diminished the effect that Morgan described with a cinematographic metaphor, where he compared the inclusion of portents and prodigies in historiography to "the 'scary music' in

⁷⁶ Millar 1999, 77.

a horror film, as the villain prepares to commit his next atrocity.”⁷⁷ Now, one problem which Dio undoubtedly faced while compiling his work – and which is easy to overlook for the modern audience – was that his readers already knew the progression of almost all events that Dio described in his *History*. His readers’ *a priori* familiarity with versions of these events as presented by the “classical” authors, the predecessors of Dio, burdened him with a special challenge. Responding to this challenge, Dio intended to write not a mere encyclopedia of facts, but a history that would also entertain his readers. At the very least his history should not be boring to read;⁷⁸ Dio acknowledges the concern for his readers’ experiences in several places, e.g., 44.14.3: ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ὀνόματα οὐδὲν δέομαι καταλέγειν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ δι’ ὅχλου γένωμαι, “There is no need to give a full list of the names, for I might thus become wearisome.” This concern could also serve as a supporting explanation for Dio’s taste for the sensational, the scandalous, and the exotic; and also for the phenomenon which I have named miracularization. Dio could afford any amount of licentiousness in his description of portents and prodigies, as soon as the reader perceived that there was a sharp line between the main narrative, the factual basis of which has been researched and the accuracy of information verified, and the self-contained units, which he populated with the most fantastic details. In this connection, note the formula, very common for Dio, which he used to preface a segment on signs that predicted the death of Caracalla: καί μοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου θαυμάσαι πάμπολλα ἐπέρχεται, “At this point also in my narrative many things come to mind to arouse my astonishment.”⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Morgan 2000, 35.

⁷⁸ Cf. Hidber 2004, 195.

⁷⁹ DC 79(78).7.1.

Dio not only was burdened by the requirement of avoiding duplication but also needed to justify his entire historiographic undertaking by claiming his own, unique input. The inclusion of the miraculous, even if it was simply an entertaining, exotic embellishment to his work, partly served as such justification and constituted a part of this authorial input, while at the same time promoting Dio's claim for originality. Framing the most important, in Dio's view, events with reports of dreams, prodigies, and portents not only added another dynamic dimension to Dio's work and enhanced the reading experience, but also contributed to maintaining Dio's authority as a trustworthy historian.

In fact, it has become customary in scholarship to correlate the appearance of supernatural elements, such as divination, with a writer's claim of authority. The implication here is that the author, a representative of the Roman elite, shared, as Ripat puts it, a "measure of divine favouritism" and as such claimed an authority to interpret signs and prodigies.⁸⁰ Yet it is difficult to agree with Ripat fully that the function of the miraculous in Dio is contingent solely upon the claim of such authority. Although the question of Dio's audience remains one of the most complicated problems in the scholarship, we can hardly envisage his reader as other than a member of that same educated elite; thus not being a layperson to whom this claim to authority might be juxtaposed. For this very reason, we must reject the theories according to which "the enlightened of the day," that is historians, even though they did not believe in prodigies, signs, and superstitions, still incorporated them in their works solely because such beliefs were widespread among the masses and, accordingly, the active involvement of the divine and the supernatural was what "the masses themselves liked to read into the events of the

⁸⁰ Ripat 2006, 155-56.

time.”⁸¹ Yet Dio, of course, could not ignore the peculiarities of the intellectual climate of his time (I have already noted that the Severan family did not make a secret of its interest in astrology and divination). Perhaps, the contradictions in Dio’s attitude to the miraculous were to a great extent conditioned by the tendencies prevailing among the intellectual and political elite of the time, whose worldview intricately combined the traits of mysticism and rationalism.⁸²

These tendencies fully manifested themselves in a newly rediscovered genre, the novel, which explored the narrative possibilities of fantastic plots within which different kinds of marvelous occurrences, prodigies, and divine interventions were far from being a foreign element. Hägg has provided some examples of how the novelistic discourse was influenced by historiography: “Creative story-telling within the bounds of credibility, and with prose as its medium, is the novel’s inheritance from the classical historians, above all Herodotus, Xenophon, and Ctesias.”⁸³ Here I will limit myself to suggesting one example of that influence being directed in reverse. I believe it would be safe to conjecture that the spread of the popularity of the novel during the Second Sophistic and its further development along the lines traditional for the canon of this genre in a way trivialized the meaning of the portents and prodigies across all the genres, and contributed to the association of the

⁸¹ Krauss 1930, 27. Also cf. his remark regarding Livy’s and Tacitus’ attitudes toward the miraculous (*ibid.*, 29): “Both Livy and Tacitus comment sufficiently upon the portents and prodigies which they record, to make it quite clear that they are merely recording them and are in no wise in sympathy with the superstitious notions which they entail. These two premier historians represent the common reaction of the educated folk of the late Republic and of the early Empire to those beliefs that had their origin in the main, with the masses, that were circulated by the masses, and that were most widely believed by the masses.”

⁸² This is a characteristic assigned by Soviet historian Mashkin (2006, 487) to the emperor Hadrian. These traits in Hadrian, according to Mashkin, were concordant with the general intellectual patterns of the epoch of the “beginning of the fall of the ancient world.” I find this a characteristic appropriate in application to the period of the Second Sophistic as well.

⁸³ Hägg 1983, 112; cf. Rutherford 1998, 1-2.

miraculous with the fantastic and the exotic, something which aroused awe and was the object of curiosity rather than reverence or veneration. Such attitudes are clearly traceable in Dio, for example, in 67.16.1: *ὁ δὲ δὴ μάλιστα διὰ πάντων ἄξιον θαυμάσαι ἐστί...*, “But the most remarkable circumstance of all was the following;” cf. 67.18.1: *ὁ δ’ εἶπον ὅτι ὑπὲρ πάντα τᾶλλα θαυμάσας ἔχω, τόδ’ ἐστίν*, “The matter of which I spoke, saying that it surprises me more than anything else, is this.”

Still, the function of the miraculous in Dio could be interpreted as a means for substantiating authority, but of a different kind. Especially when one is concerned with the earlier books, where the claim to better knowledge of events cannot be warranted by the author’s personal observation of the events described, the authority of Dio as a writer is largely grounded on his declaration of wide reading and broad erudition (1 fr. 1.2). The failure to include an accurate record of the miraculous occurrences attending the historical events (so firmly rooted in the historiographic and biographic tradition) would have compromises Dio’s station as an expert on that tradition and would render questionable his justification for re-writing history *ab urbe condita*.⁸⁴ A similar conclusion was suggested by Marincola in his discussion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ treatment of the mythological elements of the tradition, in particular, the instances where the author included these mythic accounts only to subject them to rational criticism:

⁸⁴ This principle was very aptly formulated by Syme (1958, 522): “The recording of omens was a traditional feature in the annals of the Romans, and the effect of premonitory signs on the minds and actions of men provided a suitable commentary to great events. Idle fables were to be deprecated, but a serious author had no right to omit a well-authenticated manifestation.”

One may well ask why Dionysius narrated the mythic account at all if it was only going to be dismissed. The answer here is the role expected of a non-contemporary historian, that of a collector of accounts (λόγοι). Just as Dionysius' model, Herodotus, had been forced to rely on native accounts – some of which would contain the fanciful or marvellous – so too Dionysius needed to collect and preserve epichoric traditions. (Marincola 1997, 123)

By analogy, we may also interpret Dio's relationship with the miraculous or supernatural through the notion of the "role expected of a non-contemporary historian ... a collector of accounts." In other words, the inclusion of dreams and portents testified to Dio's intellectual authority, illustrated his broad reading, served as evidence of better access to sources, and indicated his abilities as scholar. He was qualified not only to record portents, but to coordinate them with the relevant historical events.

Yet another attractive theory which could be applied to explaining Dio's dilemma as a historiographer should be mentioned here. Explaining the seeming inconsistency in Cicero's stand on the significance of prodigies, Rasmussen protested against the modern hypotheses which either suspected hypocrisy on Cicero's side or proposed a thesis in support of natural development in his philosophical or personal attitudes to the divinatory matters. Instead, she suggested that Cicero might have embraced two different attitudes at the same time, without perceiving them as contradictory. The serious attitude naturally sprang from his knowledge of, respect for, and pride regarding Roman religious heritage on the one hand; the irony and skepticism toward prodigies, on the other hand, derived from the traditions of "Greek philosophical thinking," an intellectual milieu in which Cicero also took pride in participating:

In his speeches we find his religious attitude, rooted in Roman practice — *mos maiorum* — the very same attitude reflected in his pride at his own status as an *augur publicus* from 53 BC. In *de divinatione* we find his philosophical attitude rooted in Greek theory — *studium sapientiae*. ... Making fun of prodigies is thus not a personal attack on this aspect of divination, but a literary strategy in a philosophical inquiry and a consequence of the Academic view. In dealing with, for instance, causal relations within natural phenomena Academics, as opposed to Stoics, must doubt that prodigies are godgiven signs. (Rasmussen 2000, 17-18)

Similarly, if one acknowledges the significance of this kind of split “between Roman tradition and Greek philosophy,”⁸⁵ Dio’s intellectual position on the miraculous, perhaps, may be also approached from the point of view which admits the symbiosis of two different attitudes, one of an inquisitive historian of the age of the Greek cultural revival, one raised and educated within Greek intellectual orbits, but also that of a Roman senator, politician, a confidant of the emperors.⁸⁶

Therefore, because of the combination of the reasons outlined above, divine agency is as strongly present in Dio’s work as factors of human origination. Naturally, sometimes it was not easy for Dio to divorce their roles completely and to separate the portents and prodigies from the explanatory system devised in his history (which, if my argument is correct, he nevertheless attempted to undertake). Hence, when making judgments regarding the principles of Dio’s causation, we should take in consideration the tendencies

⁸⁵ Rasmussen 2000, 20.

⁸⁶ Or at least the one who presents himself as such (DC 79(78).10.1-3): ἐμοὶ δὲ δὴ, καὶ πρὶν ἐς τὴν μοναρχίαν καταστῆναι, προεδηλώθη τρόπον τινὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα γράψοιμι. ἐν γὰρ πεδίῳ μεγάλῳ τινὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν ἐξωπλισμένην ὄρᾳν τεθνηκότος αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἔδοξα, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸν Σεουήρον ἐπὶ τε γηλόφου καὶ ἐπὶ βήματος ὑψηλοῦ καθήμενον διαλέγεσθαι τι αὐτοῖς. καὶ με προσσάντα ἰδὼν ὅπως τῶν λεγομένων ἀκούσω, “δεῦρο,” ἔφη, “Δίων, ἐνταῦθα πλησίον πρόσελθε, ἵνα πάντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ μάθῃς,” “As for me, even before he [Caracalla] came to the throne, it was foretold to me in a way by his father that I should write of these events also. For just after his death methought I saw in a great plain the whole power of the Romans arrayed in arms, and it seemed that Severus was seated on a knoll there, on a lofty tribunal, and conversing with them; and seeing me standing near to hear what was spoken, he said: «Come here, Dio; draw near, that you may both learn accurately and write an account of all that is said and done».”

of his general explanatory strategies. When interpreting the cases in which the divine sphere was represented by Dio as seemingly instrumental in bringing about certain historical outcomes, we must remember that Dio rejected the conception of historical development based on the notions of unchanging human nature or divine retributive justice.⁸⁷ The questions of how Dio explored these concepts through wisdom expressions, or *gnomai*, his favorite type of narrative digression, and how the *gnomai*, in turn, were employed in Dio's system of causation, shall be discussed in the next chapter.

⁸⁷ Some episodes will appear more difficult to interpret than others from the standpoint of the theses propounded in this chapter. The limitations of the present work do not allow me to offer an extensive review of the problematic cases. I shall merely indicate one example: DC 63(64)7-64(65).2.

CHAPTER THREE

WISDOM EXPRESSIONS (*GNOMAI*) IN DIO CASSIUS

3.1. UNIVERSAL WISDOM, HUMAN NATURE, AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS

3.1.1. *Gnomai*: Ancient and Modern Definitions

One of the particularly salient features of the composition of *Ρωμαϊκά* is the use of so-called wisdom expressions, or *gnomai*, a typical example of which is the following:

οὕτω που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρὸς τε τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον. (DC 1 fr. 5.12)

So, no doubt, it is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not submit to be ruled by that which is like it and familiar to it, partly through jealousy, partly through contempt of it.

Or:

οὕτως οὐτ' ἄλλο τι κατὰ χώραν ὡς πλήθει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μένει. καὶ αἱ εὐπραγίαι συχνούς ἐς συμφορὰς ἀντιρρόπους προάγουσιν· ἐξαίρουσαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν ὁμοίων, τοῦ τε πλείονος ἀεὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐπορέγεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐναντιώτατον σφαλέντας καταβάλλουσι. (DC 7.26.3)

So true it is that nothing in human affairs, as a rule, remains fixed; and success, in particular, leads many people on into catastrophes equally great. It raises their hopes for continued good fortune, makes them always strive for more, and, when they fail, hurls them into the very opposite extreme.

Within the text of *Ρωμαϊκά*, wisdom expressions are an important compositional element and are worthy of closer examination not solely because of their frequent occurrence (according to the definition of *gnomai* accepted in the present dissertation, 216 in the surviving portion of the text, with fifty in the books one through ten alone). As will be argued here, there is strong evidence that *gnomai* (although they are commonplace and the

origination of their underlying ideas cannot be unequivocally ascribed to Dio) represent Dio Cassius' deliberate initiative toward structuring the text and, unlike asides on etymology (which often are derivative from Dio's sources), had an explanatory function. Understanding the role of *gnomai* in Dio Cassius, this chapter will argue, illuminates an important aspect of his conception of historical causation.

Wisdom expressions, or maxims, are not uncommon in classical Greek historiography.¹ In Thucydides, for example, maxims are used widely in speeches and become instrumental in the rhetorical canvas for helping to explain and justify political decisions reached in the debates. Consistently using these generalizations in his history, Thucydides also draws a connection between the laws of historical development and the motivations behind the behavior of individuals, which can be interpreted as a patent methodological feature of *History of the Peloponnesian War*.² Since imitation of Thucydides has traditionally been viewed as an established tendency in our author, *gnomai* in Dio Cassius should not perhaps require extensive analysis except for the purpose of ascertaining their relative frequency and the extent of Dio's dependency on Thucydidean usage. It is this analytical approach, that is, how Dio adopted and interpreted Thucydidean conceptions of history, which is employed in the two existing studies on *Gnomik* in Dio by Reinhold and Markov.³ Although both scholars acknowledge the complexity of the question of how consistently Dio's *gnomai* which reference "human nature" are correlated to his conception of the determining factors of historical process, analytical procedures they have used for Dio are

¹ A closer examination of maxims in Herodotus and Thucydides was undertaken recently by Shapiro 2000 and Morrison 2006 respectively.

² Morrison 2006, 116 and 132.

³ Reinhold 2002, 45-53 and Markov 2009, esp. 234.

borrowed from the theoretical framework developed for the analysis of Thucydides. It was Lintott who shaped the now prevailing opinion about the nature of *gnomai* in Dio by proposing that his wisdom expressions were stylistic derivatives from Thucydides: “Stylistically Dio imitates Thucydides sometimes by borrowing phrases, more often by borrowing ideas and trains of thought.”⁴

However, my observations here will derive from the comparative analysis of Dio and of some of his possible content sources (Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch). Also juxtaposition of evidence from material of the Second Sophistic reveals that maxims were a more conscious and original contribution by Dio than the stricter imitation theories would allow our historian. Before proceeding to the analysis of usage of *gnomai* in Dio, it is necessary to correct two major shortcomings, which in the scholarship of Reinhold and Markov, in my opinion, may distort their conclusions regarding Dio’s use of *gnomai*. In the first place, both these authors limit the scope of *gnomai* they analyze to the ones containing the word *ἀνθρώπειον* itself, the phrase *ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις*, or the derivatives thereof. To be more precise, they examine the explicit concept of human nature, which is mentioned almost exclusively within maxims, whereas most maxims in Dio Cassius, although conceptually referencing human nature, do not contain the word *ἀνθρώπειον* or its associates. In other words, *ἀνθρώπειον*-maxims constitute only one variety of the rich ore of wisdom expressions in Dio. Therefore, the corpus of Dio’s *gnomai* will not be restricted below to only the *ἀνθρώπειον*-maxims, and we shall extend the definition of *gnomai* beyond the requirement of containing terminology linked to *ἀνθρώπειον*. Secondly, this

⁴ Lintott 1997, 2500. More so, Millar (1999, 76-77) famously dismisses gnomonic expressions in Dio as mere commonplace.

requirement limits the corpus to only twenty such *gnomai*, four references to human nature outside the context of a *gnome* (but immediately preceding or following it), and twenty-one instances where human nature is implied (by the usage of the word φύσις or the phrases like, e.g., οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων or ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). Consequently, this approach limits and skews the interpretative results of an examination of patterns of *gnomai* distribution throughout the work. For example, ἀνθρώπειον-*gnomai* in Dio become less frequent in the narrative of the imperial period and virtually disappear starting with the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Markov suggested that this evolution revealed the progression of explanatory paradigms in Dio: the Thucydidean model used by Dio for the regal and republican periods was not fitting for his exposition of imperial Roman history.⁵

However, Dio favored personal observation and the interrogation of witnesses as the most trustworthy approach and thereby underscored the continuity between his own and Thucydidean methodology.⁶ Therefore, Markov's explanation becomes problematic once one poses a critical question: why would Dio use the Thucydidean model, which was devised by the Athenian historian for processing current events, in order to narrate the regal and republican periods, while subsequently abandoning this model for the very period during which eye-witness accounts might be readily available to him? This chapter will, accordingly, suggest an alternative explanation for the patterns of *gnomai* distribution that is based on the analysis of all 216 maxims in Dio, including instances which comply with both modern and ancient definitions of a *gnome*.

⁵ Markov 2009; cf. Hose 2007, 464.

⁶ Simons 2009, 18-19.

Aristotle defines γνóμη as a “general statement about the objects of [human] actions dealing with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them.”⁷ Aristotle observes *gnome*’s close relation to *enthymeme* and proverb,⁸ distinguishes two types of maxims, depending on whether they are appended by the “epilogue” containing demonstrative proof (ἀποδείξις in ἐπιλόγος), and recognizes the advantage of the moral (ethical) aspect of maxims. Aristotle also explains one peculiar functional characteristic of a *gnome*: because *gnomai* generalize some common traits of human behavior (Rh. 21.11) and often relate to personal experiences of the listeners (21.15), they are accepted as axiomatic truth and therefore are suitable to be used in both narrative and proof (3.17.9).

The author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* seconds this idea, recognizing an element of generally accepted truth as inherent to maxim: “The hearer, when he perceives that an indisputable principle drawn from practical life is being applied to a cause, must give it his tacit approval.”⁹ In his short treatment of maxims, the author closely follows Aristotle’s theoretical premises and his definition of *gnome* (*sententia*) is: “a saying drawn from life, which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life.”¹⁰

Modern definitions hardly alter the ancient conceptual understanding of *gnomai*. The following is a standard definition of *gnomai* employed in modern historiographic works, and it may be accepted as a working definition for the purposes of the present work as well:

⁷ Arist. Rh. 2.21: ἔστι δὴ γνóμη ἀπόφανσις ... περὶ ὧν αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἃ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. In the text is a rather liberal paraphrase of Freese’s translation in the Loeb series. W.R. Roberts (in Ross 1946) translates: “General statement ... about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided.”

⁸ Arist. Rh. 2.21.12: “Some proverbs are also maxims.” Dio uses proverb as a maxim only once in 72(71).25.2: οὕτε γὰρ ἀετὸς κολοιῶν ἢ καὶ λέων νεβρῶν ἡγῆσάμενος ἀξιόμαχος γίγνεται, “an eagle is not formidable when in command of an army of daws nor a lion when in command of fawns.”

⁹ Rhet. Her. 4.17: Et necesse est animi conprobet eam tacitus auditor cum ad causam videat adcommodari rem certam ex vita et moribus sumptam. Translations from Rhet. Her. are H. Caplan’s in the Loeb edition (1954).

¹⁰ Rhet. Her. 4.17: Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita quae aut quid sit aut quae esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit.

gnomai are short sayings containing some universally accepted truth; they are recognized as compositional elements of a historiographical text¹¹ and their function extends into both the stylistic and interpretational spheres of the text:

Ein weiteres charakteristisches Element der Historiographie sind Gnomen beziehungsweise Sentenzen. Das sind knapp formulierte allgemeingültige Aussagen. Sie gleichen einem Urteilspruch und würzen eine Rede oder einen Text mit einprägsamen fundamentalen Wahrheiten. Sie sind also Teil des rhetorischen Ornaments. Ihre Funktion erschöpft sich freilich nicht im rhetorisch-stilistischen Schmuck, sondern sie können zentrale Elemente einer grundlegenden historiographischen Argumentation enthalten. (Näf 2010, 128)

Another characteristic element of historiography are *gnomai* or maxims. They are densely formulated commonly accepted utterances. They resemble a verdict and embellish a speech or a text with easy-to-remember fundamental truths. They are, therefore, a part of the rhetorical adornment. Naturally, their function is not limited to the rhetorical-stylistic ornamentation, but they can contain the central elements of the core historiographic argumentation.

As evident from this brief theoretical excursus, the definition of maxim implies the sphere of human behavior as a general focus of reference, but does not require human nature to be the actual object of this reference. In the following illustration, both *gnomai* are the examples of the extended maxims containing the reasoning part, *epilogos*, and both satisfy the above definition, in spite of Dio's *gnome* being somewhat wordier:

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅς τις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ· ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἐστὶν ἢ τύχης. (Arist. Rh. 2.21.2)

There is no man who is happy in everything, for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.

οὕτω που οὐδὲν πάγιόν ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τε ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἀνθοῦντες καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ ταπεινοτάτῳ ὄντες ἀστάθμητά τε αἰροῦνται, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τύχας σφῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους καὶ τοὺς ψόγους τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς ἀτιμίας λαμβάνουσι. (DC 64(65).1.2)

¹¹ Meaning elements of structuring of text; i.e. *gnomai* can be on the same compositional level as speeches, inserted stories, or etymological excurses, not to be categorized with tropes or merely rhetorical ornamentations.

So true is it that there is nothing constant in human affairs; but alike those who are most prosperous and those who are in the humblest station make an unstable choice and receive praise or blame, honour or dishonor, according as their fortunes shift.

Clearly, both *gnomai* contain a similar moral sentiment pointing out in quite general terms the vicissitudes of human affairs (τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων [πράγματων]). Although the object of reference of the *gnome* is different in Aristotle and Dio (ἀνὴρ and ἀνθρωπίνον [πράγμα] correspondingly), it is easy to infer that the general meaning and moral appeal of Dio's *gnome* will not change if we rephrase it by substituting its referent, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, with ἀνὴρ. In fact, Dio uses a variety of nouns, pronouns, and participles to signify the object of reference of his maxims: ἄνθρωποι, πάντες, τινες, πλείοις, νοῦν ἔχοντες etc. While the ἀνθρώπειον-maxims in Dio possess a set of formal characteristics for being qualified as *gnomai*, the remainder of Dio's corpus of maxims also convey the moral generalizations pertaining to the dominion of human experience, i.e. ἀνθρώπειον, and they deal with human interaction or human response to the uncontrollable factors of life. Therefore, ἀνθρώπειον-*gnomai* shall be recognized as a particular instance of usage of *Gnomik* in Dio, but deserve to be analyzed together with the maxims containing different referents. In my opinion, singling out ἀνθρώπειον-*gnomai*, especially as illustrating a consistent conception of human nature shown to be capable of driving historical events, reflects a rather simplistic approach to Dio's methodology which is inspired by the analyses of Thucydidean view of history and the acknowledgment of the pervasive influence of Thucydides on Dio.

The tendency to view Dio's *Gnomik* as exponent of his view of human nature, which, as in Thucydides' case, is understood as "fundamental, 'architectonic' ... concept,

omnipresent as an explanation,”¹² is a result of interpreting Dio’s historical method as partly a recognition and appropriation of a Thucydidean “anthropological constant”.¹³ The logic behind such conclusions is well illustrated by Kuhn-Chen: the thoughts expressed in Dio’s wisdom expressions repeat themselves often throughout the work, therefore they reflect the author’s core attitudes and are the “central factors of his view of history;” Dio’s principle of interpreting history through clearly defined *gnomai* that are employed to explain the motivations behind the actions of individuals does have a certain affinity to Thucydidean usage; Dio recognizes the universal and unchangeable character of human nature (DC 36.20.1: *ἕως δ’ ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾗ*); thus, in this view Dio’s historical aims and view of history must be borrowed from Thucydides.

Da die in ihnen [d.h. Sentenzen] enthaltenen Gedanken sich oft wiederholen, scheint es sich dabei um Grundüberzeugungen des Autors zu handeln, auch wenn sie nicht immer auctorial geäußert werden. Das Prinzip der Geschichtsdeutung durch ausgeprägte Gnomik im Bereich der endogenen Handlungsmotivationen könnte bereits ein Rückgriff auf Thukydides sein, der ebenfalls zentrale Faktoren seines Geschichtsbildes in ... Sentenzen faßt. ... Die Erklärung geschichtlicher Abläufe durch die grundsätzliche Unveränderlichkeit der menschlichen Natur ist ein ausdrücklicher Rückgriff auf Thukydides. (Kuhn-Chen 2002, 144)

Since the ideas which are contained in the maxims are often repeated, it seems that they have something to do with the basic convictions of the author, even though they are not always expressed with authorial maxims. The principle of historical explanation through categorical gnostic statements pertaining to the sphere of the inherent motivations for actions may be traced back to Thucydides who also makes maxims the central factors in his view of history. ... The explanation of historical development through the fundamentally unchanging character of the human nature is an unequivocal reference to Thucydides.

¹² Hunter 1983, 66; cf. Pouncey 1980, xi and 20-23.

¹³ Cf. Hose 1994, 383.

Although both Thucydides and Dio utilize “generalizations presented as universal truths”¹⁴ for the explanation of historical process, the functional aspects of usage of *gnomai* are radically different in two authors. In fact, the functional analysis of maxims in Dio and Thucydides based on the comparison of a number of parallel examples establishes that *gnomai* in Dio serve different purposes in comparable contexts and are never just stylistic borrowings from Thucydides. In Dio, maxims serve a more technical purpose and are regularly employed in the context of direct causative argumentation in the main narrative.

3.1.2. *Thucydidean Influence on Dio's Use of Maxims*

One of the most notorious examples usually brought into comparison to illustrate Dio's imitation of Thucydides is Thuc. 1.23.4-6 and DC 11 fr. 43.1-3, where both authors contemplate the reasons for the military conflict, *διαφορά*, between Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Romans and Carthaginians respectively. Reinhold points to Thucydides as the source of Dio's insistence on categorizing the causes of historical events into the alleged and the true (*λόγῳ ... ἔργῳ*), as well as in the case of Dio's view of human nature: “Dio was, indeed, the ultimate heir of Thucydides' conception of human nature as an operative force in history, his search for the reality lying behind the mask of appearance, and separation of ‘real’ motives from ostensible ones.”¹⁵ Setting aside the question of this causative dichotomy in both authors, let us concentrate on Dio's use of *gnomai* and their functionality in the process of explaining of historical events' *αἰτίαι* in general:

¹⁴ Reinhold 2002, 48.

¹⁵ Reinhold 1988, 26.

And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the thirty years' truce, concluded between them after the capture of Euboea. The reasons why they broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great a war. The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows. (Thuc. 1.23.4-6)¹⁶

The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were – on the side of the Romans, that the Carthaginians has assisted the Tarentines, on the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are seeking their own advantage but are ashamed to be thought to be doing so. The truth is otherwise. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly stronger, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were led into war partly by the desire of continually acquiring more – in accordance with the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful – and partly also by fear. Both sides alike thought that the one sure salvation for their own possessions lay in obtaining also those of the others. If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two peoples which were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other by a very short distance, so to speak, considering the quickness of the voyage, to rule alien tribes and yet be willing to keep their hand off each other. (DC 11 fr. 43.1-3)¹⁷

In Dio's passage, there is one *gnome* closely interwoven with the thread of author's

argumentation: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ αἰεὶ πλείονος κατὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ

μάλιστα' ὅταν εὖ πράττωσιν, ἔμφυτον, "the desire of continually acquiring more – in

accordance with the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most

¹⁶ ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς αἱ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν. διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἰδ' ἦσαν ἐκατέρων, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.

¹⁷ ὅτι αἰτίαι ἐγένοντο τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορᾶς τοῖς μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ὅτι Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς Ταραντίνιοις ἐβοήθησαν, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδόνιοις ὅτι Ῥωμαῖοι φιλίαν τῷ Ἰέρωνι συνέθεντο. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, οἷά που πεφύκασιν οἱ τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ πλεονεκτεῖν βουλόμενοι τὴν δὲ δόξαν αὐτοῦ αἰσχυρόμενοι, σκήψεις ἐποιοῦντο· ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἄλλως ἔχει. δυνάμενοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, αὐξανόμενοι δὲ ἤδη οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀλλήλους τε ὑφεωρῶντο, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ αἰεὶ πλείονος κατὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ μάλιστα' ὅταν εὖ πράττωσιν, ἔμφυτον, τὰ δὲ καὶ φόβῳ προήχθησαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκάτεροι τῶν οἰκείων σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ τὸ τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων προσκτῆσθαι νομίζοντες εἶναι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ χαλεπώτατον ἀδύνατόν τε ἦν δύο δήμους ἐν τε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει φρονήματί τε ὄντας, καὶ βραχύτατον ὡς εἰπεῖν ταῖς τῆς ναυτιλίας οὐξύτησι διεστηκότας, ἄλλων μὲν τινων ἄρχειν, ἀλλήλων δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐβέλῃσαι.

successful.”¹⁸ Under the closer examination of both passages it shall become clear that Dio does not simply attribute the causes of war to the human sphere, as reaffirmed by the usage of a *gnome* with τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων as an object of reference (which would be the expected assumption of the imitation theories), but, contrariwise, the usage of *gnome* by Dio in the absence of such in the asserted Thucydidean model, testifies to a different way of perception of causative factors in Dio and to a different intellectual procedure behind the inquiry into the causes and motivations for war.

Even though Dio seemingly copies Thucydides’ train of thought while explaining the reasons for the conflict between Romans and Carthaginians, he, in fact, finds fault with the Thucydidean syllogism according to which the reason for war was “the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war,” τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ... μεγάλους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. For Dio, there is a logical gap between growing strength of both Carthaginians and Romans and the fact of war between them. Increasing power leads to mutual jealousy and fear, but this has to be explained, too. This is an additional step in argumentation: but especially notable is Dio’s interest in this inquisitive procedure, not the explanation itself, for which he chooses to use the *gnome*. Growing powers are prone to look into possessions of others, and this is a natural factor which *explains*, in Dio’s view, this jealousy and fear. He takes an additional effort to substantiate this explanation by appealing to a generally

¹⁸ It is notable that Zonaras’ epitome, otherwise closely following Dio’s fragment here, omits this maxim, which is his consistent practice judging from other available parallel passages. On the one hand, it serves as a testimony that Zonaras does not recognize maxims as a legitimate tool for explanation of history. On the other, this consistent exclusion of *gnomai* from his epitomes (preserving the general semantic structure of a turn of thought) proves their syntactical and compositional independence, which is one of the important factors for classifying them as such.

accepted principle, or at least to what is presented as an axiomatic statement, in fr. 43.3: it is extremely difficult for two powerful nations in such geographic proximity to keep their distance from each other.¹⁹

Employment of *gnomai* in this kind of reasoning is Dio's own. Even the adoption of Thucydidean dichotomy of "alleged" and "true" reasons (in Dio's case, *σκήψεις* opposed to *ἀλήθεια*) is justified by a gnome-like utterance at fr. 43.1: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οἷά που πεφύκασιν οἱ τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ πλεονεκτεῖν βουλόμενοι τὴν δὲ δόξαν αὐτοῦ αἰσχυρόμενοι, σκήψεις ἐποιοῦντο, "but these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are seeking their own advantage but are ashamed to be thought to be doing so." Therefore, human motive is not imputed²⁰ but rather, according to Dio, could be inferred through deduction. The suitability of this inquisitive effort is confirmed by the universally acknowledged truth in a *gnome* (as Aristotle's definitions noted above indicate).

It must be noted, however, that our analysis primarily focuses on the usage of *gnomai* in the narrative, or authorial *gnomai*, as reflecting Dio's methodology.²¹ For these, Thucydides will hardly provide any substantial comparanda, since in his history he uses authorial *gnomai* only twice, while out of total of 216 maxims in Dio, where the context has allowed such classification, 93 are personal (i.e. *in-persona*, used in speeches) and 101 are authorial.²² No importance is usually attached to this statistical dichotomy, although as

¹⁹ A gnome-like utterance. The usage of past tense of the verb "to be", *χαλεπώτατον ἀδύνατόν τε ἦν δύο δήμους ... ἀλλήλων δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐθελῆσαι*, weakens the "universal" appeal of the statement. For this reason it was not included into my roster of *gnomai*.

²⁰ "Imputation of human motive" is one of the aspects of historical explanation, the evolution of which Derow (1994, esp. 79) observes in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius.

²¹ To use the classification of Kuhn-Chen's (2002, 144): *auktoriale* oder *personale* Sentenzen, which I will translate as authorial and *in-persona gnomai* correspondingly.

²² It must not be inferred that *gnomai* have explanatory function only if used in the main narrative. The most recent attempt to analyze wisdom expressions in Herodotus through the lens of their explanatory function

long as we distinguish two different modes of historical presentation in speeches and in the main narrative, the functional meaning of authorial and in-persona *gnomai* will be different. It is not a coincidence that Dio puts much emphasis on the auctorial maxims, which are in most cases directly employed in the explanation of historical events. Therefore, considering that Thucydides uses maxims predominantly in speeches (out of approximately 200 maxims only two appear in the narrative),²³ it would perhaps be a mistake to assume the direct derivation of Dio's *Gnomik* from Thucydides.²⁴

However, even in the comparable speeches in Dio and Thucydides, which are usually brought forward as examples of the "influence of Thucydides both on Dio's concept of the aims of history and on his literary style,"²⁵ Dio's handling of *gnomai* proves to be

was undertaken by Shapiro (2000). Maxims (often contradictory) uttered by the participants of so-called verbal duels (like the famous constitutional debate in 3.80-83) not only express individual opinions of the speakers, but also, in the broader context of the narrative, serve as a tool of historical explanation: "Contradictory *gnomai* are used in verbal duels not only to clarify and distinguish two (or more) opposing points of view, but also (after one of these views has been proved correct by later events) to provide an explanation of why events turned out the way they did" (Shapiro 2000, 108). The speech of each participant of the debate is concluded with a *gnome* substantiating the validity of each speaker's proposition. The proposition of Darius ends with the maxim which appeals to the ancestral traditions. After the conspirators have voted for retaining monarchy, this *gnome*, which had been the central point of Darius' argumentation, in retrospect becomes a historical explanation in the following way: "the Persians retained their monarchy not because they saw no other alternative, but because they decided to reaffirm their traditional form of government" (ibid.). Shapiro also points out that, more generally, repeating patterns of maxims on the transitory nature of human happiness are validated by the subsequent events in the *History* and form a certain leitmotif of the whole work (ibid., 109).

²³ Morrison 2006, 116.

²⁴ The seemingly obvious example of derivation that contradicts this assertion is Dio's verbatim quote of the phrase *ἕως δὲν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἤ* (DC 36.20.1). It originally appears in Thuc. 3.82.2 where Thucydides uses it in the context of his deliberations about the Corcyraean *stasis*. Hornblower calls it "an important sentence for the understanding of Th.'s method, and a pioneering scientific statement in itself" (1991, 481). Dio inserts it when relating Pompey's campaign against piracy in 67 BCE. Judging from the context, this *gnome* has no explanatory function. I believe, especially considering an instance of contradictory *gnome*, that *που τὸ ἀνθρώπειον δι' ὀλίγου τε ἔστιν ὅτε μεταβάλλεται* (DC 39.6.1; cf. Reinhold 2002, 52), it is no more than a deliberate allusion to the Thucydidean section on piracy in "Archaeology" (1.7-8) and should not be interpreted as a programmatic statement reflecting Dio's view of the historical process. This allusion in a way substantiates Dio's statement that "pirates always used to harass those who sailed the sea," *οἱ καταποντισταὶ ἐλύπουν μὲν αἰεὶ τοὺς πλεόντας* (DC 36.20.1), but I think it would be far-fetched to use it as a basis for proving the derivation of Dio's historical method from Thucydidean.

²⁵ Lintott 1997, 2499.

independent of Thucydidean usage, even considering the patent intertextuality between selected passages. For example, the speech discussing the unwarranted character of extreme punishment in the context of the case of Fabius Rull(ian)us (DC 36.1-4) is often compared to Diodotos' arguments in the Mytilene debate (Thuc. 3.45) and displays close similarity to Thucydides even on the level of the word choice (esp. DC 8 fr. 36.2 with Thuc. 3.45.4). However, the two comparable *gnomai* from these same passages testify to Dio's independent creative effort:

ἀπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἶεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμωμένης προθύμως τι πράττειν, ἀποτροπὴν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ δεινῷ. (Thuc. 3.45.7)

It is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is whole-heartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.

ἡ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις οὐκ ἐθέλει ἑαυτῆς πρὸς τὰς ἀπειλὰς ἐξίστασθαι. (DC 8. fr. 36.2)

Human nature refuses to leave its regular course for any threats.

Other factors that set apart Dio's methods in this instance of comparison are adaptation and reorganization of Thucydidean reasoning so as to render it suitable for the occasion of the speech (the propriety of applying punishment: in Dio's case, towards the individual, in Thucydides, toward a whole population). Dio also adds another argument against capital punishment, that reasonable forbearance is the better way for correction of the individuals than punishment. It is supported by two maxims which do not find counterparts in Diodotos' speech in Thucydides:

δεινὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ δουλώσαι καὶ σωφρονίσαι φρόνημα γενναῖον εὐλογος φιланθρωπία. (DC 8 fr. 36.3)

Reasonable forbearance is a mighty force for subduing and correcting a noble spirit.

πείθεται γὰρ πᾶς ἥδιον ἢ βιάζεται, καὶ ἐκούσιος ἀκούειν τοῦ νόμου βούλεται μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνάγκη.
(DC 8. fr. 36.3)

Every one would rather obey than be forced, and prefers voluntary to compulsory observance of the law.

Overall, in this case, for the purpose of establishing Dio's relation to Thucydides, I believe it to be a more correct comparative procedure to analyze this speech (fr. 36.1-4) in connection with its potential prototype in Livy 8.33-35, keeping in mind the question, why Dio consciously creates a link to Thucydides' Mytilenean debate here.²⁶

Thematically, Dio's *gnomai* cover a vast range of topics. It would hardly serve any constructive purpose to sort the corpus of Dio's maxims according to their thematic principle, a method assumed by Meister, who classified Thucydidean *Gnomik* into four thematic categories. They are: (1) psychological foundations of human behavior; (2) the essence of the state; (3) the *ἀρχή* and allies; and (4) the nature of the war.²⁷ In Dio, *gnomai* are used abundantly in speeches pronounced by generals, political leaders, and emperors. However, the authorial *gnomai*, i.e. Dio's "own animadversions",²⁸ are employed to present causation in a variety of different contexts: reasons for war (2 fr. 7.3; 11 fr. 43.2) and various kinds of social conflicts (1 fr. 5.12; 5 fr. 18.4); explanation of political and economic decisions (4 fr. 17.6; 37.55.3) and social attitudes (6 fr. 24.1; 56.45.1); reasons for military defeats or successes (7 fr. 25.4; 42.1.4-5); foreign affairs (8 fr. 38.1; 9 fr. 39.3 and fr. 40.6); the rise to power and downfall of individuals (45.4.2; 73.10.3); sometimes maxims support Dio's own contemplations on more abstract topics (41.56.3; 44.2.1).

²⁶ Cf. n. 96 in chapter four of this dissertation.

²⁷ Meister 1955, 77-87.

²⁸ Reinhold 2002, 52: "Not only is there no consistency in Dio's view of human nature, but it is to be noted that all his comments, whether his own animadversions or those he puts into the contrived speeches of historical figures, concern (almost without exception) Roman senators and emperors."

3.1.3. Maxims in the System of Dio's Causation

Through the comparative analysis of Dio, Livy, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus it becomes apparent that our author displays a marked tendency to employ *gnomai* in the process of providing the underlying causes for events, where Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus fail to do so. This tendency is consistent with Lintott's observation on the shift of Dio's focus from "detailed narrative to generalised reflection and interpretation."²⁹ Early books of Dio exhibit a greater degree of dependency on his potential sources, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and Plutarch; therefore, the following results are largely based on examples drawn from books one through ten of *Ῥωμαϊκά*.

For instance, in Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch, Numa's "peaceful policies" and his innovations in the religious sphere are explained through his effort to regulate social relations by promoting the reverence of gods and establishing new priesthoods: "Numa wished to use religion as a political tool to secure a disciplined and harmonious community."³⁰ This motive of *pia fraus*, in particular Numa's feigning an intimate association with goddess Egeria, is presented as a means to gain control over the vulgar crowd. Its account varies but a little in three authors and reflects a view rooted in the tradition, for which another confirmation we find also in Polybius (6.56):

ὑπὸ τοῦ Νόμα τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἥγερίας λόγον, ἵνα ῥᾶον αὐτῷ προσέχωσιν οἱ τὰ θεῖα δεδιότες καὶ προθύμως δέχωνται τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τιθεμένους νόμους, ὥς παρὰ θεῶν κοιμιζομένους. (DH 2.61.1)

... the report concerning Egeria was invented by Numa, to the end that, when once the people were possessed with a fear of the gods, they might more readily pay regard to him and willingly receive the laws he should enact, as coming from the gods.

²⁹ Lintott 1997, 2499-500.

³⁰ Ogilvie 1965, 90.

positis externorum periculorum curis ne luxuriarent otio animi, quos metus hostium disciplinaque militaris continuerat, omnium primum, rem ad multitudinem imperitam et illis saeculis rudem efficacissimam, deorum metum iniciendum ratus est. qui cum descendere ad animos sine aliquo commento miraculi non posset, simulat sibi cum dea Egeria congressus nocturnos esse; eius se monitu, quae acceptissima diis essent sacra instituere, sacerdotes suos cuique deorum praeficere. (Liv. 1.19.4-5)

And fearing lest relief from anxiety on the score of foreign perils might lead men who had hitherto been held back by fear of their enemies and by military discipline into extravagance and idleness, he thought the very first thing to do, as being the most efficacious with a populace which was ignorant and, in those early days, uncivilized, was to imbue them with the fear of Heaven. As he could not instill this into their hearts without inventing some marvelous story, he pretended to have nocturnal meetings with the goddess Egeria, and that hers was the advice which guided him in the establishment of rites most approved by the gods, and in the appointment of special priests for the service of each.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄτερος λόγος ἔχει τι φαῦλον, ὃν περὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Νομᾶ καὶ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἀνδρῶν λέγουσιν, ὡς δυσκάθεκτα καὶ δυσάρεστα πλήθη χειρούμενοι καὶ μεγάλας ἐπιφέροντες ταῖς πολιτείαις καινοτομίας, προσεποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν, αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις πρὸς οὓς ἐσχηματίζοντο σωτήριον οὔσαν. (Plu. Numa 4.8)

Indeed there is no absurdity in the other account which is given of Lycurgus and Numa and their like, namely, that since they were managing headstrong and captious multitudes, and introducing great innovations in modes of government, they pretended to get a sanction from the god, which sanction was the salvation of the very ones against whom it was contrived.

We do not know how closely Dio has followed these authors' exposition of the episode, because only one fragment unquestionably related to this episode remains (fr. 6.3).

Notably, however, it contains a *gnome* and particularly interesting are Dio's reasons to use it here:

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εὖ ἠπίστατο τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ὁμοφυές σφίσι καὶ σύννομον ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ ὡς μηδὲν βέλτιον ἑαυτῶν ὃν ποιουμένους, τὸ δὲ ἀφανές καὶ ἀλλοῖον ὡς καὶ κρεῖσσον πιστεῖ τοῦ θείου θεραπεύοντας, χωρίον τέ τι ταῖς Μούσαις ἰέρωσεν. (DC 1 fr. 6.3)

For since he understood well that the majority of mankind hold in contempt what is of like nature with themselves and in daily association with them, through a feeling that it is no better than themselves, but, as a result of their belief in the divine, worship that which is unseen and different, as being superior, he dedicated a certain piece of ground to the Muses.

For Dio, it appears, this act of pious fraud is a fact which, by the aid of the *gnome*, he subjects to the test of common-sense reasoning. With the *gnome*, Dio confirms the validity of the argument, borrowed from Dionysius, Livy, or Plutarch: deception of ignorant people for their own good was Numa's deliberate policy.³¹ Also, it seems, this maxim allows Dio to avoid the necessity of going into detail to explain the plausibility of physical contact between god and human, which is explored at length by Plutarch (*Numa* 4.1-7) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.60.5-7), because the *gnome* also implies Dio's rejection of these supernatural factors in support of the rational one.

Similar *gnome* is repeated in DC 6 fr. 24.1, where the reasons for the spreading of foreign cults are provided in the context of events of 428 BCE:

φιλεῖ γάρ πως τὸ ἀνθρώπειον ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς τοῦ μὲν συνήθους, καὶ θεῖον ᾗ, καταφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀπείρατον θαυμάζειν. (DC 6 fr. 24.1)

Human nature is for some reason accustomed in trouble to scorn what is familiar, even though it be divine, and to admire the untried.

Predictably, Livy's explanation³² in corresponding passage (4.30.9) is limited to the statement of the fact of proliferation of foreign superstitions and a brief supposition that mercenary motives of some individuals were a contributing factor for it:

... *animos quoque multiplex religio et pleraque externa invasit, novos ritus sacrificandi vaticinando inferentibus in domos, quibus quaestui sunt capti superstitione animi.*

... a horde of superstitions, mostly foreign, took possession of their minds, as the class of men who find their profit in superstition-ridden souls introduced strange sacrificial rites into their homes, pretending to be seers.

³¹ Ogilvie 1965, 95.

³² Cf. DH 12.6.3, which is a small fragment containing no comparable information for the purposes of our analysis.

It is hard to avoid the observation that Dio's *gnome* provides a sort of commentary on this line of Livy and explains the plausibility of such event through appealing to the natural disposition of men in the state of misfortune.

The office of the tribunes, according to Livy, was established as a result and an outcome of the confrontation between plebeians and patricians (year 483 BCE). The episode is sequenced thus: an intermediary Menenius Agrippa is sent to negotiate with plebeians → Agrippa delivers a speech that causes the plebeians to relent → negotiations start → the magistracy of tribunes of the plebs is established (2.32-33, esp. 2.33.1). For Dio, again, a link is missing in this series between the earlier events and the establishment of the office. That gap is bridged by Dio by adding an explanation (possibly borrowed from another source) that adds an integrated personal motive for the plebs: they feared (φοβηθέντες) the possible dissipation of their agreements with the patricians as a result of their disbandment as the group; therefore, they elected the tribunes as the representatives of their interests (Zon. 7.15, 1.125). The validity of such an aggregate personal motive of apprehension, when combined with foresight, is confirmed by the *gnome*: the large unions of people based on common violent intentions tend to be divided in the long run:

ὅταν πολλοὶ καθ' ἓν γενόμενοι πλεονεκτήσωσι βιασάμενοι, παραχρῆμα μὲν ὁμολογία τινὶ ἐπιεικεῖ θρασύνονται, διαλυθέντες δὲ ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλην πρόφασιν δικαιοῦνται. (DC 4 fr. 17.14)

Whenever a large number of men band together and seek their own advantage by violence, they have for the time being some equitable agreement and display boldness, but later they become divided and are punished on various pretexts.

Similar methodology is apparent in the narration of events surrounding the Coriolanus episode. In comparison with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, it becomes clear that Dio adds an extra dimension to the causative system suggested by Dionysius: that is, the verification of

validity of the explanation by universally acknowledged principles expressed in a *gnome*.

While Livy simply lists the events and does not explain the circumstances that led to Coriolanus' exile, Dionysius provides the explanation. According to Dionysius, Coriolanus, in the first place, became at variance with the tribunes and populace, having been provoked by the people's opposition when he sought the office of consul; second, he expressed his radical ideas too openly and without precaution. Finally, he became haughty and conspicuous as a result of assigning much importance to his advantage of having a wide circle of associates (DH 7.21). Dio, however, is particularly concerned with a seeming logical inconsistency between the former military successes, prowess, and honors of Coriolanus, on the one hand, and his sudden exit from the populace's favor on the other.

This inconsistency is resolved with the *gnome*:

Οὐ γάρ ἐστι ῥᾶδιον οὔτε ἐν πᾶσί τινα ἰσχύειν οὔτε ἐν ἑκατέροις ἅμα τοῖς τε πολεμικοῖς καὶ τοῖς εἰρηνικοῖς πράγμασιν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν· οἳ τε γὰρ τοῖς σώμασιν ἰσχυρίζομενοι ἀνοηταίνουσιν ὡς πλήθει, καὶ τὰ ἀθρόως εὐτυχῆσαντ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὡς ἐπὶ τό πολὺ ἀνθεῖ. (DC 5 fr. 18.2)

For it is not easy for a man either to be strong at all points or to possess excellence in the arts both of war and of peace at the same time. Those who are physically strong are, as a rule, weak-minded, and success that has come in unstinted measure generally does not flourish equally well everywhere.

The same methodological principle is observable in Dio's rationalization of Coriolanus' decision during his exile to join his former enemies Volscians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus addresses the difficulty and paradoxical character of such a decision, but explains it through Coriolanus' desire to avenge himself by taking the Volscian army under his command and by his readiness to face any dangers connected with such an endeavor (DH

8.1, esp. 8.1.2-3).³³ Dio picks up on what is, again, a *non sequitur* for him: Coriolanus' readiness to persevere with his chosen plan does not logically correlate with an expectation that the Volsci would potentially accept him. The inconsistency is resolved by the maxim:

ὑφ' ὧν γὰρ ἂν τις σφόδρα κακοπαθῇ, πρὸς τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ εὖ πείσεσθαι, βουλομένων γε καὶ δυναμένων εὖ ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἐλάχιστα πιστεύει. (DC 5 fr. 18.6)

For when one has suffered severe injuries at the hands of any persons, one is strongly inclined to expect benefits as well from these same people in case they are willing and also able to confer favours.

Of the events of 487-85 BCE only one brief fragment devoted to Spurius Cassius remains in Dio.³⁴ It contains Dio's deliberations about the reasons for the fall of the former consul supported by the *gnome* (5 fr. 19): multitudes show no loyalty and destroy even men most devoted to their interests. Dio's version is comparable to Livy's (2.41) and Dionysius' (8.77-9) accounts because both Augustan authors also assign a certain instrumental role in the episode to the *plebs*: Cassius' "fall ... may have been due to the fact that the *plebs* were not yet confident enough or vocal enough to come to his rescue when the aristocracy counter-attacked."³⁵ This example is peculiar because it illustrates an attempt of the rational verification of a human motive, although the *gnome* itself appeals to the irrational behavior of the crowd:

³³ Livy's account of Coriolanus is quite cursory. Regarding this incident, we have merely (2.35.6): *damnatus absens in Volscos exsulatum abiit minitans patriae hostilesque iam tum spiritus gerens. Venientem Volsci benigne exceptere benigniusque in dies colebant, quo maior ira in suos eminebat crebraeque nunc querellae, nunc minae percipiebantur*, "Condemned in his absence, he went into exile with the Volsci, uttering threats against his country, and even then breathing hostility. When he came among the Volsci they received him with a kindness which increased from one day to the next, in proportion as he allowed a greater hatred of his own people to appear, and was more and more frequently heard to utter both complaints and threats."

³⁴ It is one of the several examples, especially abundant in the fragments of books one through ten, where the fragment preserves only the *gnome* or, perhaps, is preserved only for the sake of the *gnome*.

³⁵ Ogilvie 1965, 338.

... πιστὸν οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πᾶν σφίσι προσκειμένους οὐχ ἥττον τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούντων ἀπολλύουσι. (DC 5 fr. 19)

... there is no sense of loyalty in multitudes. On the contrary, they destroy men who are altogether devoted to them no less than men guilty of the greatest wrongs.

However, since the fact that multitude's behavior is not governed by reason conforms to universal commonsense perceptions (the *gnome*'s function is to provide proof for this conformity), it suffices for the explanation.

One other patent aspect of Dio's methodology is the explanation of events through personal motives of individuals.³⁶ Dio commonly employs *gnomai* in this process of providing the motivation for personal decisions. For example, the so-called First Triumvirate of 60 BCE is presented in Dio as a direct outcome of Caesar's ambitions for power and in particular his efforts to canvass for consulship (DC 37.54-56, although Pompey's and Crassus' personal positions are also outlined).³⁷ This focalization of the narrative on one individual is not something particularly unusual for Dio, as has been noted by Pelling (especially regarding events after the establishment of principate): Dio organizes his narrative around a dominating individual, an element of what Pelling calls "biostructuring".³⁸ However, of especial interest is Dio's version of how the Triumvirate itself came about, where Dio follows what seems to be well-established pattern in the system of his causation: (A) circumstances of the event → (B) explanation of the event through the decision of the individual → (C) validation of the explanation by *gnome*. Here is how the episode in question fits this pattern: (A) Caesar sets out to seek the office and reconciles Pompey and Crassus (37.54); (B) understanding the magnitude of their power at

³⁶ See chapter two of the present dissertation, esp. section 2.2.1.

³⁷ See pp. 113-15 of this dissertation.

³⁸ Pelling 1997, 118-19, esp. n. 6; cf. pp. 106-107 of this dissertation.

the moment, he realized that his own advancement was dependent on the alliance with them, while this goal was reachable only through the association with both, because having one of them as an ally and the other is opponent would involve more dangers than benefits (37.55.1); (C) men work more zealously against their enemies than they cooperate with their friends: πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀντιπράττειν ἢ συναγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις (37.55.2).

In 48 BCE, when Caesar and Pompey lined up their troops just before the battle of Pharsalus, they continued to delay and even exchanged the propositions of friendship; to some, Dio says, it even seemed that they were about to reach a reconciliation (41.53.1-2). The reason for the failure of this attempt is also explained here through personal motivation: Caesar and Pompey were both too ambitious and laid too much confidence in their military success, while also being skeptical about the prospect of real reconciliation in future. Confirmation of the validity of such a supposition is suggested in the form of the universally accepted axiom, some “men can least endure to be outdone by their equals and intimates.”³⁹

Notably, the reasons for Pompey’s defeat at Pharsalus are also presented as an outcome of personal miscalculations on his side (DC 42.1.2-3). The result of his unexpected defeat was the beginning of his fast and definitive downfall. Dio is also interested in the reasons for Pompey’s inability to recover from this disaster: “consequently, as soon as he was defeated, he became greatly terrified and had no opportune plan or sure hope to enable

³⁹ DC 41.53.3: πρὸς τε γὰρ τῶν ἴσων καὶ πρὸς τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἥκιστα τινες ἐλαττούμενοι φέρουσιν.

him to face the danger anew.”⁴⁰ This motive is justified by the *gnome*; Dio implies that it is perfectly in keeping with the characteristics of human nature that poor judgment rendered him defenseless when the unexpected defeat stripped his panic-stricken mind of the ability to reason:

ὅταν γάρ τι ἀπροσδοκῆτως τέ τινι καὶ μετὰ πλείστου παραλόγου προσπέσῃ, τό τε φρόνημα αὐτοῦ ταπεινοῖ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον ἐκπλήσσει, ὥστ’ αὐτὸν κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀσθενέστατον τῶν πρακτέων κριτὴν γενέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ λογισμοὶ τοῖς φόβοις συνεῖναι. (DC 42.1.4-5)

Thus it is that whenever an event befalls a man unexpectedly and contrary to all calculation, it humbles his spirit and strikes his reason with panic, so that he becomes the poorest and weakest judge of what must be done. For reason cannot dwell with fear.

Gnomai not only validate individual decisions according to their conformity with universal stereotypes of human behavior, but also suggest explanations for the counter-intuitive, miscalculated, or generally erroneous actions of individuals. In this case, a *gnome* provides a certain moral, or rather psychological, yardstick, the failure to comply with which explains the lack of success in a certain human endeavor. For example, according to Dio, a more general cause of the tragic end of Pertinax, whose reign is depicted in rather positive terms, was the abruptness of his politico-economic measures and the ambitious attempt to reform everything at once.⁴¹ The *gnome* here is a validation *ex contrario*:

ἀδυνατόν ἐστιν ἀθρόα τινὰ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανορθοῦσαι, ἀλλ’ εἶπερ τι ἄλλο, καὶ πολιτικὴ κατάσταση καὶ χρόνου καὶ σοφίας χρήζει. (DC 73(74).10.3)

One cannot with safety reform everything at once, and the restoration of a state, in particular, requires both time and wisdom.

⁴⁰ DC 42.1.4: καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐνικήθη, δεινῶς ἐξεπλάγη καὶ οὔτε τι βούλευμα καίριον οὔτ’ ἐλπίδα βεβαίαν ἐς τὸ ἀνακινδυνεῦσαι ἔσχεν.

⁴¹ DC 73(74).3.4. Cf. pp. 111-13 of this dissertation.

It is the failure to comply with this common-sense principle that led him to disaster.

Notably, Millar calls this gnome “a firm and apposite political judgment.”⁴²

Even when *gnomai* are employed to support the explanation of individual decisions through personal, human motives, cumulatively they do not constitute a verdict on the state of human affairs, as defined by the unchangeable character of human nature. Human nature is not a constant in Dio’s view. It is also confirmed by the fact that, while some maxims repeat the same thought even though applied to different situations, many *gnomai* come into contradiction with each other. For example, in the speech in defense of Fabius Maximus Rullus, his father, coming out against capital punishment, says that seasonable pardon is capable of correcting the offenders (DC 8 fr. 36.3), while in the famous constitutional debate Agrippa suggests that the majority of men are not brought to reason by admonition or example, therefore punishment is absolutely necessary (DC 52.7.1). In one place Dio states that peace creates and preserves wealth (DC 13 fr. 55.1), in another, that war preserves man’s possessions, while peace destroys them (DC 13 fr. 55.3). Similarly, contradictions appear in 5 fr. 18.6 and 5 fr. 19.1; 46.34.2 and 73(72).17.6; 1 fr. 5.4 and 50.24.2-3; 8 fr. 36.14 and 52.34.11; 55.14.4-5 and 55.19.6. These contradictions, in fact, comprise an inherent and predictable feature of *gnomai*, as is clear from their very definition: maxims are commonplace utterances which generalize the broad and complex range of human cultural experiences. This is especially noticeable from proverbs that often have contradictory pairs: “Many hands make light work” vs. “Too many cooks spoil the broth;” “New things are fairer” vs. “An old ox makes a straight furrow.”⁴³ Since

⁴² Millar 1999, 136.

⁴³ Nichols 1996, 693.

“agglomerations of commonplace maxims are not mediated by any united, overarching conceptual stream, whether tradition or doctrine,”⁴⁴ the function of *gnomai* in Dio is not to reaffirm the universal validity of the anthropological constant. By the same token, Dio does not offer explanations for human actions through the preconceived axiomatic notion that human nature does not change.

On the contrary, Dio's *Gnomik* emphasizes the leitmotif that events shaped by the individuals depend on the choice of the right course of action. Dio is interested in observing how the actions of his characters comply with the principle of *τό σῶφρον* or *ἡ σωφροσύνη* and makes this principle prominent in his system of historical causation. Besides the direct statement that human nature sometimes changes, *που τὸ ἀνθρώπειον δι' ὀλίγου τε ἔστιν ὅτε μεταβάλλεται*,⁴⁵ Dio provides many other indications that blind, non-amicable fate does not always prevail or wholly predetermine the outcome of human actions. Human nature tends to reveal many gloomy aspects, but it is the knowledge of human propensities which allows men to choose the right course and navigate amid disasters by predicting the consequences of their decisions. For example, Hannibal comprehended that men are concerned only with their own interests and are untrustworthy, and he was able to use that knowledge to direct his actions in such a manner as to avoid being an object of a plot:

τούς τε γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐς μόνον τὸ συμφέρον σφίσι πιστοὺς ὄρων ὄντας, αὐτός τε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῖς προσεφέρετο καὶ ἐς ἐκείνους ταῦτόν ὑπώπτευσεν, ὥστε πλεῖστα μὲν ἀπατήσας τινὰς κατορθῶσαι, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἐπιβουλευθεὶς σφαλῆναι. (DC 13 fr. 54.5)

⁴⁴ Ibid., 691.

⁴⁵ DC 39.6.1.

Since he saw that most men were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself dealt with them on this principle and expected the same treatment of them, so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom failed by being the object of a plot.

Overwhelming success dazzles people and often is a cause of ruin for them. However, ruin is not an unavoidable sentence for all who reach great military successes. It is the unawareness of this principle and lack of moderation in their actions, which inspired the Tarentines with the extreme self-confidence and became the cause of the disaster for them in 283 BCE:

καὶ αἱ εὐπραγίαι, ἐπειδὴν ἔξω τοῦ συμμέτρου τισὶ γένωνται, συμφορῶν σφισιν αἵτιαι καθίστανται· προαγαγοῦσαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὸ ἔκφρον (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐθέλει τὸ σῶφρον τῷ χαύνῳ συνεῖναι) τὰ μέγιστα σφάλλουσιν, ὥσπερ που καὶ ἐκεῖνοι [Ταραντῖνοι] ὑπερανθήσαντες ἀντίπαλον τῆς ἀσελγείας κακοπραγίαν ἀντέλαβον. (DC 9 fr. 39.3)

Even success, when it comes to men in undue measure, proves a source of misfortune to them; for it leads them on into folly — since moderation will not dwell with vanity—and causes them the gravest disasters. Just so these [Tarentines], after enjoying exceptional prosperity, met in turn with misfortune that was an equivalent return for their insolence.

Finally, contemplating the uncertainty of life when he describes Antony's atrocities of 43 BCE, Dio in a form of a *gnome* reconfirms (in a rather optimistic vein) the importance of sober calculation and moderation in dealing with the vicissitudes of fate. This attitude is hardly in agreement with a Thucydidean anthropological constant (that one might posit as his paradigm):

οὕτως ἔκ τε τῶν ἀπορωτάτων πολλοὶ περιγίγνονται καὶ ἐκ τῶν θαρσύντως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἀπόλλυνται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ μήτε ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον πρὸς τὰς αὐτίκα συμφορὰς ἐκπλήττεσθαι τίνα μήτε ἐς τὸ ἀφρόντιστον ὑπὸ τοῦ παραχρῆμα περιχαροῦς ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸ μέσον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ μέλλοντος τιθέμενον ἀσφαλεῖς ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τοὺς λογισμοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. (DC 47.11.5)

So it is that many come out safe from the most desperate situations, while just as many who feel no fear lose their lives. Hence one should neither be so alarmed in the face of the calamities of the moment as to lose all hope, nor be so carried away by his immediate elation as to be reckless, but, by placing his expectation of the future midway between the two, should make reliable calculations for either event.

A perception of history as driven by individuals, “fully independent and voluntary human actions,”⁴⁶ explains the necessity to test the individual motivations by common human factors. This testing is accomplished through the employment of *gnomai*, which also become an instrument for validation of the causative arguments while selecting and processing the historian’s source material.

⁴⁶ Swan 2004, 11.

3.2. FUNCTIONAL AND STATISTICAL ASPECTS OF WISDOM EXPRESSIONS IN DIO

3.2.1. *Gnomai as an Instrument for Validation of the Causative Arguments*

Functional aspect of Dio's *Gnomik* undoubtedly reflects a novel way of approaching causation in ancient historiography. Earlier it was shown that, in comparison to his predecessors, with the systematic application of *gnomai* Dio exhibits a peculiar investigatory interest in the analysis of motivations and, more broadly, the human constituent of historical process. What is, then, the intellectual procedure behind the usage of *Gnomik* in Dio? This methodological aside, already quoted above, may once again shed light on the working principles of our author:

καὶ γὰρ καὶ παιδείσεις ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχει καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ. (DC 46.35.1)

For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts.

This short passage has traditionally presented interpretational difficulties for modern historians.⁴⁷ The logical construct of this methodological aside is of course far from being simple. Suggesting different ways of translation, Millar and Lintott, however, agree that here Dio proclaimed an important methodological principle, that “history is by definition the meaningful interpretation of past events and not merely a record of them.”⁴⁸ At the same time, Millar denies that this principle was applied, at least for a large-scale analysis, by Dio. Is it entirely true?

⁴⁷ Schwartz, *RE* 3, col. 1689; Millar 1964, 45; Lintott 1997, 2499-50, esp. n. 10; Markov 2012, 45-46; Kuhn-Chen 2002, 143, esp. n. 33.

⁴⁸ Millar 1999, 45.

It is interesting that in another place the term λογισμοί is used directly referring to a *gnome*. Explaining the reason for Pompey becoming hostile to Caesar and forming a compact with Crassus in 56 BCE, Dio uses a *gnome*, according to which friendships are destroyed by fear and envy, unless the persons are equal in fame and strength (DC 39.26.1-2). Immediately following, in 39.26.3, is a statement: τοιούτοις οὖν δὴ τισι λογισμοῖς ὁ Πομπήιος ἐπὶ τὸν Καίσαρα ὠπλίζετο, suggesting the *gnome* itself as the antecedent of τοιούτοις λογισμοῖς. Of course, λογισμοί, reasoning, can hardly be a definition of *gnome* or equated with it, but it could be reasonable to infer that Dio implies that *gnomai* could be the integral part or a product of that reasoning. Λογισμοί are employed with the purpose of discovering (ἐλέγχῃ) the nature of the facts (ἐκείνων φύσιν).⁴⁹ The second part of the procedure that Dio describes in 46.35.1 is the validation of reasoning by assessing the degree of its correspondence to facts. But how this validation could be conceived and what are the criteria for such assessment? I believe it is a *gnome*, employed in the process of reasoning, which can ultimately serve as this criterion to confirm the adequacy of historian's explanation before the final arbiters, the readership of the history.

For example, narrating the circumstances surrounding Catiline's defeat in 62 BCE, Dio justifies Catiline's choice to engage in the battle with former consul Gaius Antonius suggesting that Catiline hoped that Antonius, considering his part in conspiracy, would let himself be beaten (DC 37.39). However, Antonius' disposition towards Catiline had changed (this is the fact, ἔργα). To explain this, Dio applies the following reasoning (λογισμοί): Antonius knew that Catiline's position was already weak. The nature (φύσις) of

⁴⁹ Or by "testing" or "probing" or "investigating" in order that one τεκμηριοῖ ("reveals the truth") of the nature of the ἔργα.

the event is implied: Antonius acted out of motives of personal advantage. *Gnome* at 37.39.3, “most men form both friendships and enmities with reference to others’ influence and their own advantage,”⁵⁰ confirms the plausibility of Antonius’ behavior and thus demonstrates the validity of such reasoning (= τούτους [λογισμούς] ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων [ἔργων] ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ).

Although the suggested interpretation is rather assumptive than deductive or probative, Dio provides plentiful evidence that *gnomai* are integrated in the system of his causation. It is especially apparent on the syntactic level: often Dio summarizes the causes for this or that event with a sentence which starts with διὰ τοῦτο, διὰ ταῦτα, τούτων δὴ οὖν ἔνεκα or similar with the preceding *gnome* serving as antecedent of the demonstrative pronouns. Such examples are not rare: 2 fr. 8.2; 37.56.1; 49.4.4; and 36.26.3 (which was discussed above), and many more throughout the work.

Dio never gives his definition of what constitutes a *gnome* and the nearest approximation from which we can infer his views of their function is the episode set in 36 BCE, concerning, in particular, Dio’s deliberations about Agrippa’s reasons not to pursue Pompeian fleet after Mylae (49.4). There are two versions. One of them Dio adopts as true, namely that Agrippa’s ships “were heavy and slow” and that there existed “the danger on the shoals to his ponderous ships and the need to rest the troops.”⁵¹ According to another, related by “some” (ὥς δέ τινες λέγουσιν), Agrippa, as a loyal subordinate, did not want to assume all the glory of the military success for himself on the grounds that he was fighting for Augustus, and so he was cautious not to instigate jealousy but “reserve the success” to

⁵⁰ πρὸς τε γὰρ τὰς δυνάμεις τινῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐαυτῶν συμφέροντα καὶ τὰς ἑχθρας τὰς τε φιλίας οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦνται.

⁵¹ Reinhold 1998, 25.

his superior.⁵² Dio (49.4.2-4) substantiates this version through a *gnome* with the extended probative part, “successful subordinates ... undertake the difficult tasks, leaving successes to their master, while those in power play it safe, seeking easy victories.”⁵³

δεῖν οὖν ... τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σωθησόμενον τῆς μὲν δυσχερείας αὐτοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπαλλάττειν, τὴν δὲ δὴ κατόρθωσιν σφῶν ἐκείνοις φυλάττειν. (DC 49.4.4)

The man who expected to come out alive should relieve his masters of undertakings which involve great difficulty and reserve for them the successes.

Although Dio rejects this as a reason for this particular event, his explanation for such rejection clearly testifies to the fact that the generalized wisdom contained in the *gnome* could be a causative factor elsewhere:

ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι μὲν ταῦθ' οὕτω πέφυκε καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ἀγρίππας ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν οἶδα, οὐ μὲν ἔν γε τῷ τότε παρόντι τοῦτ' αἴτιον τῆς οὐ διώξεως αὐτοῦ γράφω· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' εἰ πάννυ ἐβούλετο, οἷός τε ἦν ἐπισπένθαι σφίσιν. (DC 39.4.4)

As for me, I know that all this is naturally so and that Agrippa paid heed to these principles, but I am not saying that on that particular occasion this was the reason for his failure to pursue; for he would not have been able to catch up with the foe no matter how much he might have desired it.

In addition, some inferential information about Dio's attitude to maxims could be collected from Caesar's speech at DC 43.15.2-18.5. In 46 BCE, just after entering Rome, Caesar delivers a speech in the senate, in which he assures the senators of his commitment to policies of moderation and to refraining from atrocities in connection with punishing former political opponents. His assurances that he is not being puffed up by honors and power and has not changed his disposition against violence are based on his declaration of adherence to the principles expressed in a string of *gnomai*: it is not noble or just to commit the same things that one rebukes in his opponents; good fortune combined with

⁵² Cf. *ibid.*, 26

⁵³ *Ibid.*

moderation and self-control preserves the acquisitions while the abusers of power are often plotted against, because the subordinates fear and suspect the ruler who is not master of his own power (DC 43.16). Caesar reaffirms his devotion to these principles in the following words, where the antecedent of ταῦτα is clearly the preceding *gnomai*:

ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως ἐφιλοσόφησα, ἀλλ' ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐκ ἐς ἐπίδειξιν, οὐδ' ἀπ' αὐτομάτου νῦν προσπεσόντα αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ πρέπειν μοι καὶ συμφέρειν κρίνας καὶ φρονῶ καὶ λέγω. (DC 43.17.1)

These statements that I have made are no mere sophistries, but are intended to convince you that what I think and say is not for effect nor yet thoughts that have just chanced to occur to me on the spur of the moment, but rather are convictions regarding what at the outset I decided was both suitable and advantageous for me.

This declaration is of course itself a rhetoric commonplace, however, it provides indirect evidence regarding the function of maxims through analogy: their usage is not limited to adornment of speech (οὐκ ἐς ἐπίδειξιν), they generalize some principles which could form someone's conviction (καὶ πρέπειν μοι καὶ συμφέρειν κρίνας), and they are a part of some sort of philosophical, deductive mode of thinking (ἐφιλοσόφησα).

In summary, both internal evidence and the results of comparative analysis point to one judgment, that Dio uses *gnomai* in the process of discovering the causes of events. This process subsumes reasoning based on several probatory operations, during one of which Dio validates the provided proof with a *gnome* by appealing to irrefutable general principles. In fact, the reasoning commonly used by Dio is very similar to the logical procedures prescribed as a part of confirmation of the proof in the rhetorical textbooks written during the Second Sophistic: *κατασκευή* in Ps.-Hermogenes, or *πίστις* in Anonymous Seguerianus. *Pistis* is a multi-step procedure, which, according to Ps.-Hermogenes, includes *epikheireme* ("laying hands on, grasping," circumstantial argument, sometimes also, more generally,

“artificial” proof or the same as *enthymeme*), *ergasia* (elaboration and confirmation of *epikheireme*), *enthymeme* (rhetorical syllogism, proposition with a reason), and *epenthymeme* (supplementary or supporting *enthymeme*). Although ancient nomenclature for this topic is quite varied and definitions are different in different traditions, Ps.-Hermogenes’ breakdown of *κατασκευή* seems to be a variation of the Hellenistic understanding of *epikheireme* as a five-part argument consisting of proposition → supporting reason → proof of reason → embellishment → conclusion.⁵⁴ Elements of such syllogistic procedure are often found in Dio (e.g., 12 fr. 43.25), and the division of the argument into several components which amplify each other is apparent in DC 37.54-55 analyzed above. Since the detailed analysis of Dio’s adherence to the rhetoric conventions is out of the scope of the present inquiry, it will suffice to point out simply that the conventional devices of rhetorical reasoning frequently found a way into his historical work.

⁵⁴ Rabe 2005, 86-87.

3.2.2. *Gnomai as a Familiar Rhetorical Device*

Dio may have readily adopted such diction in his history through his immersion in rhetorical devices of the Second Sophistic. Apparent in the rhetorical textbooks of this period is frequent employment of *gnomai* as a part of *pistis*, especially appropriating the function of *enthymeme* or *epenthymeme*. The following example of the application of the *pistis* for a proposed heading (κεφάλαιον) has a *gnome* for *enthymeme*:

οἷον εἰ λέγοι τις “δεινὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν πατρίδα”, εἴτα ἐργάσαιτο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου “χρὴ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν πολεμίους”, εἴτα ἐνθύμημα θείη ὅτι “χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν ὁ πολίτης ἀδικῶν τοῦ πολεμίου, ὅτι ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ γένος συγγνώμην ἔχει, ὁ δὲ ἐπιτείνει διὰ τὸ πολίτης εἶναι τὸ μισεῖσθαι”, τούτῳ εἰ προσγένοιτο τῷ ἐνθυμήματι τὸ “καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν ὁ πολίτης φαίνεται τούτους ἀδικῶν, οὓς ἐδόκει πρότερον εὖ πεποιημέναι”, λοιπὸν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ἀληθινὸν ἐπενθύμημα... (Ps.-Hermog. *Inu.* 153-54)

If someone were to say, “It is a dreadful thing to wrong the fatherland,” then added an *ergasia* from the opposite, “for it is necessary to wrong enemies,” then put an *enthymeme*, saying, “The citizen who does wrong is worse thing than the enemy, because the latter is excused because of his origin while the former increases hatred of himself because of being a citizen;” and if to this *enthymeme* is added “and especially if the citizen is shown to be wronging those whom he earlier seemed to have benefited,” the result is a true *epenthymeme* from the nature of the subject...⁵⁵

In another treatise, *On Method of Forceful Speaking*, *gnomai*, defined as καθολικοί λόγοι, are classified among the devices of abundance (ἡ περιττότης) as such that are used interchangeably with *epenthymemes* for proof:

πρὸς μὲν τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ αὐθάδη διανοήματα ἐπενθυμήσεις παραλαμβάνονται, ἵνα μαλάξωσι τὰ ἤθη, πρὸς δὲ τὴν πίστιν τῶν ἰδίων λόγων οἱ κοινοὶ λόγοι καὶ καθολικοί. ... πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐθαδὲς αἱ ἐπενθυμήσεις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἄπιστον οἱ καθολικοὶ λόγοι. (Ps.-Hermog. *Meth.* 418-19)

Epenthymeses are added to difficult and presumptuous thoughts in order to soften their character, and common and general statements are introduced for proof of particular statements. ... *Epenthymeses* are thus directed toward presumptuous remarks and general statements to those that are unpersuasive.

⁵⁵ Translations of Ps.-Hermogenes are from Rabe 2005.

Dio's *pisteis* involving *gnomai* without exceptions are part of so-called artistic proof. The difference between artistic and non-artistic proof is very well defined in Anon. Seguerianus:

τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔντεχνοι· ἄτεχνοι μὲν ἃς ἐξ ἐτοίμου πορίζομεθα, ἔντεχνοι δὲ ἃς ἐκ τῆς τέχνης λαμβάνομεν. δέ εἰσιν οἷον μαρτυρίαι, ψηφίσματα, συμβόλαια, χρησμοί, τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα ἔγγραφα. ἄτεχνοι δὲ λέγονται ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς ἐπινοίας ἐστὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἃ καὶ ἰδιώτης εὔροι. (Anon. Seguerianus 145)

Some *pisteis* are non-artistic, some artistic; those are non-artistic which we provide from material at hand, and those are artistic which we derive from the art (of rhetoric). Non-artistic proofs are, for example, witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles, such things, as many as are written down. They are called “non-artistic” since nothing comes from the thought of the speaker but is what any ordinary person might discover.

The rhetoric handbooks of the Second Sophistic abounded in examples drawn from classical historiography while contemporary historiography itself used or even overused rhetorical precepts and formula, which in particular was an object of Lucian's criticism (*Hist. Conscr.* 43-46). If most of Dio's work is the result of elaborating the histories of his predecessors (1 fr. 1.2: ἀνέγνω μὲν πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα, συνέγραψα), his recourse to the non-artistic proof was necessitated by the nature of his sources, where access to original “witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles” was limited or impossible. In the process of compiling his own history according to the principle of subjecting the facts to the scrutiny of his own reasoning (45.36.1) he draw his methods of explanation from familiar rhetorical modes and patterns. This could be one source of Dio's *gnomai*, which, as has been illustrated, are often used as *enthymemes* or other elements of rhetorical syllogism.

Instructive is Dio's taste in inventing such proofs when his sources do not have them. This is, however, consistent with the requirements for narration, as defined by Anon. Seguerianus in *The Art of Political Speech* (63; 89-93). Persuasiveness is one of the virtues of

narration, along with brevity and clarity (63). The rhetorical treatise advises its readers to achieve persuasiveness by logically coordinating all the provided facts, avoiding contradictions and dissonances, and by taking care to append a reason for all actions described: ἐφ' ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις αἰτίαν προσθετέον· ἐπακτικώτατον γὰρ αὕτη πρὸς πειθῶ (93). These precepts are akin to Dio's methodological principles proclaimed in 46.35.1 (see above).

It should be noted that although the Second Sophistic rhetorical treatises just analyzed do not define *gnomai per se* or delineate their function with any precision, it is still obvious that use of maxims was a common and widely used tactic of speech in the literature of the time.⁵⁶ The familiarity of this figure may have affected Dio's usage as well. Philostratus' *Vitae Sophistarum* provides a rich exemplification of the functionality of *gnomai* in non-technical literature. From Philostratus we also gather another function of *gnome*: it is a medium for conveying authority and legitimizing author's claim to knowing the truest version of events. For example,

προοίμια γοῦν ποιεῖται τῶν λόγων τὸ “οἶδα” καὶ τὸ “γινώσκω” καὶ “πάσαι διέσκεμμαι” καὶ “βέβαιον ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν” ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἰδέα τῶν προοιμίων εὐγένειάν τε προηγεῖ τῶν λόγων καὶ φρόνημα καὶ κατάληψιν σαφῆ τοῦ ὄντος. (Philostr. VS 480)

He introduces his speeches with such phrases as “I know,” or “I am aware,” or “I have long observed,” or “For mankind there is nothing fixed and sure.” This kind of introduction gives a tone of nobility and self-confidence to a speech and implies a clear grasp of the truth.

⁵⁶ According to Anon. Seguerianus, *gnomai* make the narration delightful, ἡδεῖαν (99); Apsines (*Rh.* 26) suggests the use of *gnomai* for refutations (refutation from a universal principle, ἐκ κοινότητος ἢ λύσις); according to Ps.-Aelius Aristides (*Rh.* 1.22), employment of *gnomai* invests the speech with solemnity or dignity (γνομολογεῖν δὲ τῆς σεμνότητος ἐστίν) and honorable, authoritative quality and also force (2.60: ἀξίωμα μὲν γὰρ καὶ δύναμιν περιτίθησιν); for Ps.-Demetrius (*Eloc.* 9), it is a sign of great skill to compress “much thought into a little space” with a *maxim*; in his view (110), its function is not purely ornamental; frequent employment of *gnomai* is characteristic of “Aristippean” manner of exposition, which is contrasted to Socratic and that of Xenophon, abundant with moral precepts (296).

Philostratus admires Antiphon's speech *On Concord* for "brilliant philosophical maxims and a lofty style of eloquence."⁵⁷ Skilled and frequent use of *gnomai* is also a sign of good education, thus with the example of the fifth-century oligarchic leader and "sophist" Critias (VS 501: ἄριστα μὲν ἦν πεπαιδευμένος, γνώμας δὲ πλείστας ἐρμενεύων, "he had been highly educated and frequently delivered himself of philosophical maxims").

Therefore, *gnomai* are a part of Dio's system of causation; within this system their function is also to impart authority to historian's choices in the process of selecting the source-material and validate his interpretations of it. The examples provided above illustrate the influence of contemporary rhetoric on historiography. Rhetorical treatises often suggest the suitability of utilizing *gnomai* for refutation and artistic proof. This could be one source of Dio's maxims as he borrowed rhetorical probative devices and employed them in the process of his own argument, according to the method he laid down as fundamental for his history, i.e. to discover the nature of the facts by subjecting them to reasoning. Rhetorical requirements of persuasiveness, on the other hand, explain the shift of the emphasis from narration to explanation, as plainly exemplified by Dio's history. Also, the popular nature of *gnomai* and their presence in the contemporary discourse qualify their frequent usage in our author. If insertion of *gnomai* is an inherent feature of the methodology of causation chosen by Dio, how can we explain the variation in occurrence? Let us consider statistical data first.

⁵⁷ Philostr. VS 500: γνωμολογαί τε λαμπραὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι σεμνὴ τε ἀπαγγελία.

3.2.3. Patterns of Gnomai Distribution in the Text

In order to make the bare statistics more comprehensible and recognizing that there is a certain conventionality and artificiality in the division of Dio's history by books, I have grouped the data according to what are traditionally recognized as more meaningful structural divides of the text: by the form of government, by decades, and pentads.⁵⁸ In the following analysis, I include the data for the characterial *gnomai*, but will concentrate primarily on the conclusions regarding the usage of auctorial *gnomai* as reflecting Dio's methodology.




Fig. 1. *Gnomai* distribution by form of government

⁵⁸ Such divisions were suggested by Gutschmid *apud* Boissevain, vol i, pp. lv-lvi and Hose 1994, 360-63. The numbers in the charts are not absolute, therefore the data represent only very general tendencies of the distribution of *gnomai*. Under "Total", all utterances classified as *gnomai* are counted. However, there are four *gnomai* of unknown origin (##85-88 in *Appendix II*). They were included into Fig. 1: to do so was a purely conventional decision following Cary's placement of them at the end of the second volume of his edition, after book 30. However, since the original location of these *gnomai* cannot be ascertained, these *gnomai* are excluded from Fig. 2 and 3, making the total of all maxims 212. Similarly, when the context did not allow for categorizing a *gnome* as auctorial or in-persona, these *gnomai* were not counted. Thus, the sum of auctorial and in-persona maxims does not equal the total. The potential questions of *gnomai* placement connected to the different systems of numbering the books 61-80 (see Swan 2004, 383-85) were factored into the analysis, but did not happen to be an issue.




Fig. 2. *Gnomaï* distribution by decades




Fig. 3. *Gnomai* distribution by pentads

We observe that distribution of *gnomai* is fairly balanced according to the division of the work according to the form of government (Fig. 1), with a tendency to diminish proportionally towards the end of the history (auctorial *gnomai*: 2.5 per book in regal period; 1.53 in republican time, and 1.0 in the period of empire).

Note the poor state of preservation of the text of the first 36 books and consider what is still the consistently great number of maxims in them even compared to books 36-60, where the text is preserved in its entirety. Thus we must surmise an even greater number of *gnomai* in the original text of books 1-36. Accordingly, one must conclude that the prevalence of *gnomai* in the earlier parts of the history seems to gradually diminish towards the end of the work (Figs. 2 and 3).

According to Fig. 2, however, it is clear that, while generally the occurrence of maxims in each decade is relatively uniform, the frequency drops between books 51 and 60 and continues to be low to the end of the work.

Figure 3 allows us to trace the exact point where the usage of authorial maxims drops abruptly: it is in the pentad between the triumvirate and beginning of monarchy (books 47-51). In this pentad, out of six authorial *gnomai* one is used in book 47, four in book 48 and one in book 49. Starting with book 50 we observe the number of authorial *gnomai* plummeting to 0. The next auctorial *gnome* occurs in book 55 and the number remains low (0 to 3 per book) through the end.

This change in distribution neatly coincides in the *History* with an important methodological disclaimer made by Dio at 53.19, which I shall suggest as an explanation for Dio's sudden abandonment of the habitual figure of speech. In 53.19, Dio

acknowledges the difficulties in collecting trustworthy source material for Augustan period as well as for the following imperial epoch. Syme, when talking about what he called the beginning of the era of cabinet government, provides a good paraphrase of Dio's methodological aside in question:

When he comes to narrate the Principate of Augustus, Cassius Dio complains that the task of the historian has been aggravated beyond all measure – under the Republic the great questions of policy had been the subject of open and public debate: they were now decided in secret by a few men. (Syme 1967, 407)

Dio questions the reliability of the historical sources of the period, since the access to public information has been compromised as a result of the decision-making process in the political sphere having become the prerogative of the few: the official versions of the events must thus be distrusted as politically biased, while other accounts may be discarded as potentially fabricated:

ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ χρόνου ἐκείνου τὰ μὲν πλείω κρύφα καὶ δι' ἀπορρήτων γίγνεσθαι ἤρξατο, εἰ δὲ πού τινα καὶ δημοσιευθεῖη, ἀλλὰ ἀνεξέλεγκτά γε ὄντα ἀπιστεῖται· καὶ γὰρ λέγεσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι πάντα πρὸς τὰ τῶν αἰ κρατούντων τῶν τε παραδυναστευόντων σφίσι βουλήματα ὑποπτεύεται. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ μὲν οὐ γιγνόμενα θρυλεῖται, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πάνυ συμβαίνοντα ἀγνοεῖται, πάντα δὲ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλως πως ἢ ὡς πράττεται διαθροεῖται. (DC 53.19.3-4)

But after this time most things that happened began to be kept secret and concealed, and even though some things are perchance made public, they are distrusted just because they can not be verified; for it is suspected that everything is said and done with reference to the wishes of the men in power at the time and of their associates. As a result, much that never occurs is noised abroad, and much that happens beyond a doubt is unknown, and in the case of nearly every event a version gains currency that is different from the way it really happened.

The change in the nature of the sources, according to Dio, necessitated an alteration in his working method:

ὁθενπερ καὶ ἐγὼ πάντα τὰ ἐξῆς, ὅσα γε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται εἰπεῖν, ὡς που καὶ δεδήμωται φράσω, εἴτ' ὄντως οὕτως εἴτε καὶ ἐτέρως πως ἔχει. προσέσται μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας, ἐς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, ἐν οἷς ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ θρυλούμενον ἡδυνήθην ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν ἀνέγων ἢ καὶ ἤκουσα ἢ καὶ εἶδον τεκμήρασθαι. (DC 53.19.6)

Hence in my own narrative of later events, so far as they need to be mentioned, everything that I shall say will be in accordance with the reports that have been given out, whether it be really the truth or otherwise. In addition to these reports, however, my own opinion will be given, as abundant evidence which I have gathered from my reading, from hearsay, and from what I have seen, to form a judgment that differs from the common report.

Application of reasoning to the facts (46.35.1: τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τήν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχῃ) is no longer a valid or practical procedure, and Dio abandons the principles of critical investigation in the selection of source material altogether (or – to be less categorical – he finds it necessary to make a disclaimer to this effect, which saves him the necessity to do so every time the poor quality or quantity of his sources hinders his adhering to the scholarly standards which he had promised the readers from the outset). Instead of validating his choice of a variant version of an event (53.19.4: πολλὰ μὲν οὐ γιγνόμενα θρυλεῖται, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πάνυ συμβαίνοντα ἀγνοεῖται) by his usual procedure of invention of the logical (syllogistic) proof compliant with his understanding of cause-and-effect relations in a particular episode, he will now merely list the existing versions.⁵⁹ Instead of deducing the proof by reasoning (λογισμοῖς), Dio will simply append his own opinion (53.19.6: προσέσται μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς δοξασίας).

If the choice of historian's method is dependent on the quality of the source-material, it also would be reasonable to infer that *gnomai* are used only when Dio is elaborating the written sources. That, in turn, will help us explain the low number of *gnomai* in the later books of the *History* (71-80), where personal observation and interrogation of witnesses prevails as a methodology. Certainly, the state of preservation of the last decade of Dio's

⁵⁹ And indeed, starting from this pentad (books 47-51) we shall observe the tendency to provide several versions of an event more frequently than in the earlier books, where Dio prefers to merge variant versions into one (see section 1.3.2).

Πρωμαϊκά imposes great limitations on our assurance about the results of our statistical observations concerning the distribution of *gnomai*. The 12 maxims preserved in the epitomes of books 71-80 do not necessarily reflect the scale of the decrease in their occurrence in the lost original. For comparison, we possess 50 *gnomai* from the first ten books of the *History* even considering the fact that Zonaras almost always omits them in his abridgment of Dio. However, if *gnomai*, on the one hand, represent Dio's technique of selection and reworking the written source material, and, on the other, are instrumental in conveying the authoritative claims of the author, a lesser number of *gnomai* in the last part of the *History* seems a sensible hypothesis.

With the shift to more reputable sources, the claim of authority based on the author's commitment to substantiate the veracity of historical facts by application of his own reasoning is replaced by a more significant claim, that of eye-witness acquaintance with the observed historical occurrences:

καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ ἐπ' ἐμοῦ πραχθέντα καὶ λεπτοურγήσω καὶ λεπτολογήσω μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερα, ὅτι τε συνεγενόμην αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὅτι μηδένα ἄλλον οἶδα τῶν τι δυναμένων ἐς συγγραφὴν ἀξίαν λόγου καταθέσθαι διηκριβωκότα αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἐμοί. (DC 73(72).18.4)

And, indeed, all the other events that took place in my lifetime I shall describe with more exactness and detail than earlier occurrences, for the reason that I was present when they happened and know no one else, among those who have any ability at writing a worthy record of events, who has so accurate a knowledge of the as I.

In other words, once Dio turns to oral sources, his creation of artistic proof for narrated events based on reason, observation of human affairs, and rhetorical principles is no longer necessary, since the claim for authority is substantiated by his underscoring of his own role in these events.

CHAPTER FOUR

SPEECHES IN *ῬΩΜΑΪΚΑ*

4.1. THE FUNCTION OF SPEECHES IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

4.1.1. *Rhetoric and Historiography*

As markedly exemplified in scholarship on classical historiography, virtually every discussion of speeches in a historiographical work traditionally and necessarily revolves around the question of authenticity of those speeches, their verbatim accuracy¹ or, more generally, evidentiary value,² viz. “to what extent the speeches in the histories we have represent what was actually said.”³ Thucydides’ famous programmatic statement at 1.22.1, which could not be out of place here as well, is usually a focal point of such discussions:

Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοὶ τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλουσιν· ὥς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν μοι ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.

And as for all the things which each side said in speech either when they were about to go to war or when they were already in it, it was difficult to remember precisely the exactness of what was said, both for me, regarding the things I myself heard, and for those reporting to me at one time or another from elsewhere. But as it seemed to me that each would have said especially what was necessary for the given occasion, so it has been written by me, holding as closely as possible to the entire argument of the things that were truly said.⁴

¹ To follow Brock 1995, 209.

² The formulation derives from Damon 2010, 440.

³ Marincola 2007, 120.

⁴ Translation is from Marincola 2007, 121. Cf. an alternative translation by C.F. Smith in the Loeb series: “Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion...”

The relationship between τὰ δέοντα εἰπεῖν, “what was necessary to say” and τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, “things that were truly said,” as formulated here by Thucydides, is not to be understood as dichotomous but rather as dialectical. While some historians strived to observe ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης, “closeness to the entire argument,” the allowable extent of departure from τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων presents interpretational difficulties for modern scholars (as much as Thucydidean precept has persisted in the historiographical tradition).⁵ However, most scholars tend to exculpate ancient historians against the charges of inventing speeches, their exoneration being mostly a redefinition of how the relation between ancient rhetoric and historiography is perceived. Essentially, the two concepts of truth and probability are no longer viewed as principally distinct in the appreciation of the veracity of an ancient historian.⁶

While explicit methodological statements are a regular feature of Dio’s history,⁷ he never directly describes his procedures or rationales for inserting speeches. However, an appropriation of the Thucydidean approach (for overcoming the difficulty of reproducing the exact content of the speeches by adding the interpretative element based on the notion of τὰ δέοντα, “the necessary”),⁸ postulated in 1.22.1, is traceable in Dio, especially in instances when he omits a speech and acknowledges that it was delivered noting that what was said was “appropriate” or “fit” for the occasion:

⁵ Fornara 1983, 145: “Thucydides’ methodological rule proved authoritative.” For the overview of the development of this Thucydidean convention, see *ibid.*, 145-54.

⁶ Marincola 2007, 120-27.

⁷ See *Appendix I*.

⁸ Cf. Marincola 2007, 121.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις πολλὰ μὲν παραπλήσια δ' οὖν ἀλλήλοις παρήγεσαν, εἰπόντες πάνθ' ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πρὸς τε τὸ αὐτίκα τοῦ κινδύνου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔπειτα πρέπει λέγεσθαι. (DC 41.57.1)

Therefore they delivered to their soldiers also many exhortations, but very much alike on both sides, saying all that is fitting to be said on such an occasion with reference both to the immediate results of the struggle and to the subsequent results.

γενόμενου δὲ τούτου προσπαρώξυνεν αὐτούς, ἐπειπὼν ὅσα ὁ καιρὸς ἀπῆτει. (DC 41.4.1)

After this was over he further aroused them by adding such words as the occasion demanded.

In as much as Dio's adherence to at least some Thucydidean methodological principles is an axiom for the majority of modern scholars and a number of examples of Dio's modeling his speeches after Thucydidean exemplars has been pointed out,⁹ I shall suggest that we approach the question of our author's attitude toward speeches from a different angle. I want to redirect our discussion away from the traditional "antithesis between 'the general purport of what was actually said' and 'what the situation seemed to me to require each party to say'."¹⁰ The entire historico-literary context under which Dio wrote, requires our emphasis to shift to another, no less significant aspect of history-writing, namely, how Dio overcame the problem of reproducing speeches found in other (especially well-known) authors when confronted with the task of simultaneously preserving historical accuracy and maintaining the originality of his own work by avoiding duplication. In fact, in facing this dilemma, Dio must have found himself in a peculiar situation because of the ready availability in the second century CE of many of his potential sources and their authority.

⁹ E.g., Rees 2011, 65-86. More particularly, for the comparison of DC 1 fr. 1.2 and Thuc. 1.22.2 on the pursuit of ἀκριβεία in the process of selection of sources, see Kordoš 2010, 253. For references on Thucydidean influence on Dio in general, see Adler 2012, 510, n. 91 and esp. Adler 2008, 178-79, n. 27.

¹⁰ Walbank 1965, 11.

Among these sources, modern scholars usually name Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, Sallust, Tacitus, and Suetonius as having possibly influenced Dio.

Later in this chapter we will examine a tendency in the *Ῥωμαϊκά* to avoid inclusion of the “published” or otherwise widely known speeches. Dio’s practice is in keeping with the general trait observable in ancient historiography that “ancient historians as a general rule avoided treating in direct speech those orations which were accessible to the reading public.”¹¹ On the other hand, examples of recasting speeches which were found previously in other historians are not rare in Dio. Finally, the last decade of Dio’s history provides no single example of a full-scale speech, except the speech of Marcus Aurelius at 72(71).24-26.¹² This circumstance seems almost counter-intuitive, if we consider how it is precisely contemporary history that would have provided Dio a fine opportunity to implement Thucydidean methodology when selecting and recording speeches.

What intellectual principles, then, were at work when Dio selected speeches for inclusion in his history? In order to elucidate Dio’s methods in composing his speeches and to gain insight into the general function of a speech in his history, I will, accordingly, employ a comparative analysis of three typical patterns of presentation: (1) Dio writing an original composition, viz. “inventing” the speech (either attested in other sources as having been delivered or not), and sometimes even creating the occasion for such a speech in a known historical context; (2) omitting the speech recorded in another known source, with

¹¹ Brock 1995, 209.

¹² See section 1.3.1 for a brief analysis of this speech.

or without referencing the speech event itself;¹³ (3) rewriting, viz. recasting, a “published”¹⁴ speech with varying degrees of departure from the original.

Here are some of the anticipated problems that arise from such an analysis. Firstly, how do the three patterns correlate and what is the rationale behind choosing one over another in the narrative’s given context? Secondly, the third pattern, although following the seemingly generic convention,¹⁵ is of particular interest. Indeed, why, while deliberately omitting some speeches, did Dio undertake the task of adapting and remodeling others, particularly already published ones, so that he was in this way purposefully inviting his readers to supply additional meaning from the comparative reading of two (or more) versions, Dio’s own and that of his predecessor? Is Dio’s version of a speech always an improvement, in his mind or from our point of view as well? Finally, if the choice of inventing, omitting, or recasting a speech is based on some criteria (be they historic, rational, narratological, or stylistic), how do these criteria relate to the truth-appeal of the history in general and, in particular, Dio’s historical aims?

¹³ Swan 2004, 26, n. 117.

¹⁴ Cf. Brock 1995, 219: “there is a sufficient number of cases in which we can observe historians avoiding coverage of published speeches...; this observation can be added to our awareness of the generic conventions of ancient historiography.” Terminological usage must be clarified at this point. Brock (*ibid.*, 111-12) uses the term “published” only referring to the *senatus consulta*, *acta diurna*, publications in *samizdat* form or *commentarii* (some of these are, however, questionable in terms of their containing verbatim speeches). Hence his generalizations about historians’ avoidance of published speeches concern exclusively the sources made public in the form mentioned above, and only under the condition that they were available in circulation at the time of writing a history. On the other hand, he notes, ancient historians, and Roman ones in particular, do not shy away from creatively reusing the speeches (see n. 15 here). In Dio, however, we cannot find any example of avoidance of the speech on the basis of its availability in the originally published form. It will be assumed that Dio used only historiographic sources for his speeches in the absence of opposite evidence. In order to avoid terminological over-complication, I will use the term “published” speeches in reference to those known from other written sources in general (predominantly historiographic).

¹⁵ Brock 1995, 219: “In Roman historiography, Livy and Tacitus have no hesitation in paraphrasing, adapting and improving the speeches found in their predecessors, whether Greek or Roman, and they are also ready to recycle material in a completely different context.”

By analyzing all three patterns for inclusion of a speech in Dio, I hope to arrive at conclusions regarding the role of speeches in Dio as a reflection of his methodology and the way this methodology relates to the principles of accurate and truthful representation of historical events.

One of the functions of speeches in historiography, according to the traditional and generally accepted formulations, is an “abstract analysis of the underlying issues at stake in actions that were seen as important or distinctive.” Thus speeches are “political, almost philosophical, analyses in miniature.”¹⁶ Millar, although finding some traces of such analyses in Dio, expresses the opinion that Dio’s speeches, even in comparison with Livy’s, do not comply with the standards of proper political analysis.¹⁷ They are lacking depth, historical detail, and, generally, are banal and unoriginal,¹⁸ the only exception being the famous constitutional debate of book fifty-two. So then, in the case of the oration of Fabius Rull(ian)us the Elder:¹⁹

Livy’s speech belongs in its setting, Dio’s could have been put in at any point in his History at which the relevant moral situation occurred. It illustrates what is a general, though not quite universal, tendency in Dio, to use his speeches not to focus a particular political situation or a particular character, but to set forth the moral sentiments appropriate to the situation. (Millar 1999, 79)

It is indeed clear that in Dio there is a persistent tendency to place the politico-philosophical analyses in the main narrative (e.g. DC 44.2-3) and isolate speeches as purely rhetorical elements. Swan pointed out Dio’s practice of divorcing the speech from his own political meditations: “It would be mistaken, however, to take the speeches as intended

¹⁶ Marincola 2007, 119.

¹⁷ Millar 1999, 78-83.

¹⁸ Ibid., 83.

¹⁹ For additional considerations about this speech, see pp. 219-20 of the present dissertation with nn. 98-100.

primarily to propagate Dio's own views."²⁰ This tendency is often noted as a feature of later historians (imperial and beyond), in that their speeches have become artificial rhetorical compositions.²¹ An apposite formulation of the role of speeches in this historico-literary period is provided by Fornara (although in a different context) as he, in an attempt to reconcile Thucydidean programmatic statement at 1.22 with observations regarding the rhetorical, "sophistic" character of the Melian dialogue, suggests the following:

[T]his [the choice of the form of dialogue which takes the dramatic form with philosophical overtones] is not to suggest that Thucydides was on the watch for an opportunity to insert a dialogue, like some rhetor of imperial times with a list of devices that he must interpolate at the proper time into his work. (Fornara 1983, 157)

The analysis of speeches in Dio and the operational modes involved in their composition will eventually bring us to some conclusions in the same spirit as Fornara's insight.

Rhetorical considerations were predominant for our author over other concerns in the process of shaping historical speeches and making decisions regarding their insertion into the work. Dio departs from Thucydidean methodological principles (1.22) and his concerns were not limited to reproducing what would be appropriate for a speaker to say in a given situation. Dio was, in fact, "on the watch" for the appropriate and plausible situations to insert a speech so as to correspond to his rhetorical aims. While expressly presenting his profound interest in and care for the oratorical element in his history,²² Dio, however, underscores with different means the very artificiality of his rhetorical compositions. This peculiarity, discussed below, undoubtedly reflects an original feature of Dio's method, a new understanding of the function of speeches in historical writing which,

²⁰ Swan 2004, 28.

²¹ Walbank 1965, 19.

²² Swan 2004, 26: "The fact that speeches occupy about a quarter of Dio's fully extant books (36-54) indicates how fundamental a constituent of historiography he deemed them to be."

nonetheless, is not directly expressed in any of his methodological asides. Yet some conclusions about Dio's method and his views on oratory's place within a historiographic work can still be inferred from internal evidence in *Ρωμαϊκά*.

4.1.2. Dio's Conception of the Function of Speeches

In the *exordium* to Antonius' funeral oration for Caesar (DC 44.36-49) the speaker confesses that it is an uneasy task to find the words appropriate for such a great historical figure as Caesar. We may assume cautiously that in this rhetorical turn (which reminds of Cicero's apology for the use unusual kind of locution albeit fitting his defendant, Archias),²³ Dio elaborates on one of the crucial problems connected to the insertion of speeches in his history. This is the closest to which Dio approximates a formulation of the method he uses in regard to speeches:

λέγω δὲ ἐν εἰδόσιν, ὥστε μήτε τι ἀρχὴν ψεύσασθαι, καὶ γὰρ ἂν αὐτόφωρος ἀλισκοίμην, μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ὀγκῶσαι, καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἐς τοῦναντίον οὗ βούλομαι καθισταίμην. (DC 44.38.3)

I speak among those who know the facts, so that I shall not falsify in the least degree, since I should be caught in the very act, nor heap up exaggerated praises, since then I should accomplish the opposite of what I wish.

τὸ γὰρ συνειδὸς τῶν ἀκροωμένων, οὐχ ὁμολογοῦν τῷ πεπλασμένῳ, πρὸς τε τὴν ἀλήθειαν φέρεται, καὶ τάχα ἀρκεσθὲν αὐτῇ... (DC 44.38.5)

For the knowledge of the hearers, not agreeing with the fictitious report, takes refuge in the truth, where it quickly finds satisfaction.

A similar sentiment is repeated in Tiberius' *laudatio funebris* for Augustus (DC 56.35-41):

οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἐγὼ εἶπω καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρετὴν κρινεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ σύνιστε καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις βοηθήσετε, ἀναπληροῦντες τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν γεγονότων ... ἐμοῦ τε ὥσπερ ἐν χορῷ τινὶ τὰ κεφάλαια ἀποσημαίνοντος, καὶ ὑμῶν τὰ λοιπὰ συνεπηχούντων. (DC 56.35.4)

²³ Cic. Arch. 34.

For you will judge of his excellence, not from what I may say, but from what you yourselves know, and you will come to the aid of my discourse, supplying what is deficient by your memory of the events. ... I, like the leader of a chorus, merely give out the leading words, while you join in and chant the rest.

If these words spoken by Antonius and Tiberius are extrapolated to bear on Dio's attitude to speeches in particular, they would probably imply his acknowledgment of the challenge that was relevant to Dio's own working method: he was aware of existing prototypes for his speeches and worked from the assumption that his readers were familiar with his major sources. This awareness, even though not necessarily entailing the promise of verbatim accuracy of reporting, charged the author with a certain degree of responsibility toward his readers and also, on the other hand, opened up a possibility, for whatever reason the author deemed justifiable, to evade certain details which the readers may have supplied from their own knowledge, be it a phrase or an entire speech. This important realization, one crucial to my analysis, shall in part explain the tendency to avoid the inclusion in Dio's history of examples of speeches that were most widely-known from other accounts (see below). The validity of this assertion is indirectly confirmed by the following observations.

In the first place, as has been discussed in chapter one, selectiveness in the presentation of historical material is one of the core methodological principles of Dio (*συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα*, "I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select").²⁴ One of the possible criteria for exclusion or deliberate omission of certain types of information is the broad coverage of material in other (historical) sources, as we gather from DC 40.15.1, where Dio speaks about the Parthians:

²⁴ DC 1 fr. 1.2.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε γένους καὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς τε ιδιότητος τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων αὐτῶν πολλοῖς τε εἴρηται καὶ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐν γνώμῃ ποιοῦμαι συγγράψαι.

Now about their race and their country and their peculiar customs many have written, and I have no intention of describing them.

Secondly, notable in this context are several instances where Dio expressed his general distaste for a trivial, known, notorious, or popular historical detail. For example, describing Nero's suicide and the assassination of Julius Caesar, it is hard not to notice Dio's reluctance to add their last words, the famous expressions, which by Dio's time have become trite, τὸ θρυλούμενον:²⁵

αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀπέκτεινε, τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐκεῖνο εἰπὼν, “ὦ Ζεῦ, οἷος τεχνίτης παραπόλλυμαι.” (DC 73.29.2)

He killed himself, after uttering that oft-quoted remark: “Jupiter, what an artist perishes in me!”

Similarly, in the episode describing Caesar's death, his famous last riposte to Brutus is mentioned in passing only after the brief report of the murder in the senate-house is summarized with the words “this is the truest account.” Thus, perhaps, the trivial, irrelevant, or unimportant character of this notorious remark is communicated by Dio:

ταῦτα μὲν ἀληθέστατα· ἤδη δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκεῖνο εἶπον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸν Βροῦτον ἰσχυρῶς πατάξαντα ἔφη «καὶ σύ, τέκνον;» (DC 44.19.5)

This is the truest account, though some have added that to Brutus, when he struck him a powerful blow, he said: “Thou, too, my son?”

²⁵ We can gather that there was some negative connotation to τὸ θρυλούμενον from Isoc. *Ep.* 6.7 where the author is using this word to express a similar sentiment – a reluctance to employ the well-known, often repeated thought or idea. Also, in Dio (14 fr. 57.7) τὸ θρυλούμενον appears in the sense of “idle talk”: πολλὰ τέρατα τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς συμβάντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μάτην θρυλούμενα ἐλογοποιήθη, “many portents, some of which had actually occurred and others which were mere idle talk, became the subject of conversation.”

Another important point which might help us ascertain Dio's attitude to speeches on the issue of verbal fidelity²⁶ (viz. the modern theoretical dichotomy of verbatim representation vs. what was appropriate for the occasion) is the use of pronouns (also adverbs and nominal constructions) referencing the speech about to be delivered or summarizing the speech already recorded: "The historians generally indicate the approximate nature of their speeches by the various expressions introducing them: a character spoke "such things" (*toiauta*) rather than "these things" (*tauta...*)."²⁷ Dio interchangeably used only a few expressions to introduce or summarize his speeches (*τάδε, τοιάδε, ταῦτα, τοιαῦτα, ὥδε*, once *τοιούτων ... λεχθέντων* and once *δημόσιον τοιόνδε*); and distinguishing in such fashion seems to be irrelevant for him, a peculiarity also observable in Xenophon.²⁸ The obvious proof of interchangeability of Dio's usage is that in the same context, in the debate over the *Lex Gabinia* (DC 36.25-36), Pompey's speech is summarized with *ταῦτα* (DC 36.27.1), Gabinius' oration with *τοιαῦτα* (DC 36.30.1), while Catulus' speech is introduced by *τοιάδε* (DC 36.30.5). Similarly, Otho's oration at 64(63).13 is introduced by *ταῦτα* (DC 64(63).12.1) but summarized with (DC 64(63).14.1) *τοιαῦτα*.

However, several instances where some direct quotations are singled out as ones which are reproduced verbatim might have some bearing on Dio's methodology. On certain occasions, introducing an (almost always brief) *in-persona* remark of a character, the historian takes care to emphasize that the quote is given word for word, e.g., *ἔρω γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ λεχθέν*, "I give his exact words."²⁹ Especially notable are Severus' last words to his sons at his

²⁶ As put by Marincola 2007, 120.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ DC 59.26.9; cf. 62.15.1 and 63.26.4.

deathbed (containing the advice to be in harmony with each other and to support the soldiers) which are prefaced by the following remark: ἐρῶ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ λεχθέντα, μηδὲν ὅ τι καλλωπίσας, “I give his exact words without any embellishment.”³⁰

Does this imply that on other occasions, when no indication of verbatim accuracy is provided, Dio recognizes the possibility and acceptability of embellishing or otherwise altering a speech? Another, and rather perplexing, example of Dio’s situational methodological commentary on this question comes from the narrative of the reign of Nero, where Dio addresses the problem of the relation of truthful reporting of the events and speeches to the “dignity of history” and how these affect another. After quoting the words of senators’ acclamation to Nero on the occasion of his pseudo-triumph of 68 CE, Dio notes:³¹

τί γὰρ δεῖ περιπλέκειν καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ λεχθέντα δηλοῦν; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ’ αἰσχύνῃν τινὰ τῇ συγγραφῇ τὰ ῥηθέντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κόσμον τὸ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἀποκρυφθῆναι φέρει. (DC 62(63).20.6)

I might, to be sure, have used circumlocutions, but why not declare their very words? The expressions that they used do not disgrace my history; rather, the fact that I have not concealed any of them lends it distinction.

These two remarks of Dio affirm his commitment in these particular cases to reproduce the quotes verbatim, but, simultaneously, admit to the possibility of at least two stylistic operations in reporting another’s words: adornment (καλλωπίζω, “beautify, embellish, adorn”) and paraphrase or contextualization (περιπλέκω, “complicate, entangle, wrap up in words, i.e. in circumlocutory and indirect phrases”). The latter might be used – we infer

³⁰ DC 77(76).15.2.

³¹ Cf. Takács 2009, 59-60. The words chanted by the senators were: Ὀλυμπιονῖκα οὐᾶ, Πυθιονῖκα οὐᾶ, Αὔγουστε Αὔγουστε. Νέρωνι τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, Νέρωνι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι, ὡς εἰς περιόδονίχης, εἰς ἀπ’ αἰῶνος, Αὔγουστε Αὔγουστε. ἱερὰ φωνή· μακάριοι οἱ σου ἀκούοντες, “Hail, Olympian Victor! Hail, Pythian Victor! Augustus! Augustus! Hail to Nero, our Hercules! Hail to Nero, our Apollo! The only Victor of the Grand Tour, the only one from the beginning of time! Augustus! Augustus! O, Divine Voice! Blessed are they that hear thee!”

from that remark at 62(63).20.6 – to maintain a certain consistency of the style by avoiding vulgar, offensive detail (*αἰσχύνη*). In this instance, however, it is important for Dio to reproduce senators' acclamation word for word, perhaps, with the purpose of amplifying the moral point he intended to make: "In contrast to the senators of Nero's time who disgraced themselves by uttering these praises, Dio's remarks recall the duty of every member of the Roman elite to act honorably in all circumstances."³²

Both operations (*περιπλέκω* and especially *καλλωπίζω*) bring to mind the second part of the general methodological pronouncement that Dio makes at the very beginning of his work:

Ἀνέγων μὲν πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα, συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα. μὴ μέντοι μὴδ' ὅτι κεκαλλιεπημένοις, ἐς ὅσον γε καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψε, λόγοις κέχρημαι, ἐς τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν διὰ τοῦτο τις ὑποπτεύσῃ, ὅπερ ἐπ' ἄλλων τινῶν συμβέβηκεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα, ὡς οἶόν τε ἦν, ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶσαι ἐσπούδασα. (DC 1 fr. 1.2)

Although I have read pretty nearly everything about them that has been written by anybody, I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select. I trust, moreover, that if I have used a fine style, so far as the subject matter permitted, no one will on this account question the truthfulness of the narrative, as has happened in the case of some writers; for I have endeavoured to be equally exact in both these respects, so far as possible.

If the commitment to truthful reporting had been declared already here in 1 fr. 1.2 (*ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ... [viz. πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους] ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶσαι ἐσπούδασα*), it is hard to conceive the meaning and purpose of Dio's subsequent warnings – remarkably occurring only on certain occasions – concerning whether he has used the exact words of the speaker (*ἔρω γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ λεχθέν*). Unless, perhaps, there is a general convention shared by Dio and his reader that speeches need not represent what was actually said by the speaker.

³² Takács 2009, 60.

The existence of such a convention might actually be implied inherently in the very fragment in question. I interpret this fragment as constituting not a statement about Dio's intent to maintain the balance between adherence to the truth and stylistic enhancement in the writing at all times,³³ but rather as a differentiation of two approaches to the choice of style: ornate style (*κεκαλλιεπημένοι λόγοι*) for the speeches, on the one hand, and plain style, suitable for discovering the truth of the facts (*ἀλήθειαν*), for the narration of events, on the other.³⁴ Indeed, it seems to be indicated in this passage that only certain occasions allow for the usage of this elevated style (*ἐς ὅσον γε καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψε*, "to which extent the circumstances [i.e. narrated events] allowed"). Naturally, there would be no better occasion for Dio than a speech for displaying his rhetorical talents, so to speak, to "exceed" in oratory. This interpretation is in keeping with the role of speech in Lucian's ideal history:

"Ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ λόγους ἐροῦντά τινα δεήσῃ εἰσάγειν, μάλιστα μὲν εἰκότα τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τῷ πράγματι οἰκεῖα λεγέσθω, ἔπειτα ὡς σαφέστατα καὶ ταῦτα. πλὴν ἐφεῖταί σοι τότε καὶ ῥητορεῦσαι καὶ ἐπιδείξαι τὴν τῶν λόγων δεινότητα. (Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 58)

³³ This meaning could be gathered from Cary's translation (Loeb series) above, depending on the interpretation of the English text. The original sentence, it appears, allows for two interpretations: "In my style of narration I will use embellishments, as far as subject-matter allows, but it should not compromise the truthfulness of what is expressed in fine style" and "On certain occasions I will use elevated style, but that fact should not compromise the rest of my narrative, where I will follow the truth." I will strongly favor the latter. It is clear from the Greek text that this variation in meaning is contingent upon what is taken as the antecedent of *αὐτῶν*. In the phrase *ἐς τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν ... ὑποπτέυσῃ*, literally, "would doubt the truth of them," *αὐτῶν* could be taken not with *λόγοις*, but with *γεγραμμένα* of the previous sentence (Cary seems to have taken it into account and his translation preserves the ambiguity of the Greek original).

³⁴ We should agree on these general points with Markov (2006, 34): "Dio's style is far from being uniform. It varies according to contents. For example, elevated style characterized by archaisms, pathos, and abundance of rhetorical embellishments dominates in the description of dramatic events (be they battles, natural catastrophes, or political repressions). Plain style, which is defined by dryness and simplicity, prevails in ethnographic and geographic sketches. The choice of style in the process of writing the historical work, according to the canons of ancient literature, depended on the plot and the aims set forth by the author. For example, the high style was used to "excite" the reader, while the historical accuracy in this case did not matter. Plain style, conversely, was considered most proper for explanation."

If a person has to be introduced to make a speech, above all let his language suit his person and his subject, and next let these also be as clear as possible. It is then, however, that you can play the orator and show your eloquence.

If the usage of high style is set in opposition to the truthful reporting (which seems to be a case here in Dio), there is no need for additional indicators or warnings that a speech will temporarily depart from this latter principle: the speech's stylistic peculiarities already signal that. Dio's speeches are clearly marked with the use of *κεκαλλιεπημένοι λόγοι* and "exploit rhetorical possibilities."³⁵ It finds its expression in generally elevated style and care to follow rhetorical precepts in the compositional division of the speech, as well as in the usage of appropriate tropes and figures.³⁶ The fact that speeches are often not accommodated to the character of the speaker,³⁷ together with the author's multiple allusions to the known examples of rhetorical art and, in particular, his frequent imitation of Thucydides, which itself renders Dio's speeches anachronistic, betray the speeches as ones deliberately set apart from the main narrative as *artificial* rhetorical exercises:

Therefore, stylistic variations in combination with the specificity of the topic and the plot-line are *sui generis* indicators which point to Dio's priorities in describing certain events and allow us to ascertain what was more important to the author, to delight and excite his readers or to convey new information. (Markov 2006, 34)

Thus, if such a perception of the function of speech was shared by Dio and his readership, a remark such as *ἔρω γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ λεχθέν* was needed when the occasion demanded reproducing the exact words of the speaker in order to warn the reader that the narrative was not then switching into the rhetoric, epideictic mode.

³⁵ Gowing 1992, 245.

³⁶ According to Markov's observations (2006, 33): symmetrical periods, antithesis, *isocolon*, *paramiosis*, and *parachesis*.

³⁷ Gowing 1992, 244: "When he does include a speech, it is a long and involved creation, usually with scant relevance to the specific situation. It was unimportant that the speech might appear inconsistent with his own characterization of the speaker... Speech as a means to characterization or dramatic effect was something that Dio generally eschewed."

We can now move to the examples of speeches which illustrate each of the three patterns or intellectual principles that were at work when Dio selected speeches for inclusion in his history while also keeping in mind the following methodological observations. Dio was reflective of parallel historical accounts and presumed upon his readers' knowledge of them. Accordingly, he particularized the choice and arrangement of his narrative material within the frame of this proviso. He exhibited a distaste for trivial and hackneyed detail. When introducing speeches, Dio disregarded consistency in his usage of formal markers that might underscore the verbal accuracy of the oration. Reservation of this formal emphasis for especially meaningful occasions, exclusively short quotations, emphasizes the artificiality of extended speeches and neutralizes the reader's concern over Dio's fidelity to the exact words of the speaker. Stylistically speeches are set off from the main narrative and the deliberate character of this operation is directly communicated by Dio: speeches belong to the realm of rhetoric, main narrative to that of *ἀλήθεια*. If, then, a sharp line is becoming clear between the main narrative and speeches, questions about the latter's historicity naturally come to fore. The "unhistorical", rhetorical character of Dio's speeches was pointed out long ago by Millar:

Essentially, Dio's preoccupations in inserting speeches are not historical, that is to say it is his normal rule to write one only where the sources justify it, and to use the opportunity, not to illuminate the situation, but to write a rhetorical elaboration, often in the form of a debate, of the moral issues involved in it. (Millar 1961, 15)

The first set of examples belongs to the first pattern, namely, an "inventing" of a speech not paralleled in other historical sources.

4.2. INVENTION, EVASION, REINVENTION

4.2.1. *Dio's Original Rhetorical Compositions: Their Epideictic Nature and Relation to the Conventions of Progymnasmata*

The speech of Marcus Curtius preceding his self-sacrifice confirms Millar's insight about the lack of "historicity" in Dio's speeches.³⁸ It also illustrates that in his search for a narrative juncture appropriate for a speech, Dio was eager to seize the opportune occasion to insert an oration not already covered in writing by his historiographic predecessors.

This famous episode is well summarized by Rackham: "In 362 B.C. a chasm opened in the forum, which the soothsayers said could only be filled by throwing into it Rome's greatest treasure. M. Curtius mounted his horse and leaped into it, and the earth closed over him."³⁹ In Livy, the speech of M. Curtius is only vaguely alluded to: Curtius rebuked (*castigasse*) the citizens for not being able to interpret the prodigy (Livy 7.6.3). Dionysius of Halicarnassus' version (14.11) is marked with more detail.⁴⁰ In one sentence Dionysius provides a paraphrase of the speech: Curtius affirmed the "valor of men" as the most valuable possession of the Romans and thus explained both the need for a human offering and his readiness to sacrifice himself (DH 14.11.21). However, it is only Dio who provides a rather elaborated oration. Oakley comments: "The vacuity of this speech will have been peculiar to Dio."⁴¹

³⁸ DC 7 fr. 30.2, cf. Zon. 7.25, 1.230-32, and Tzetzes, p. 136, 17, 1.232-34.

³⁹ In his translation of Pliny's *HN* in the Loeb series (1945), vol. iv, p. 324, note *a*.

⁴⁰ Cf. Oakley 1998, 99.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

It is, however, the doubtful historicity of the episode, as overtly indicated by Livy and Dio, which makes the speech of M. Curtius particularly interesting as regards Dio's attitude to speeches in general, as this juxtaposition with Livy shows:

nunc fama rerum standum est, ubi certam derogat vetustas fidem; et lacus nomen ab hac recentiore insignitius fabula est. (Livy 7.6.6)

As it is, one must hold by the tradition, where antiquity will not allow us to be certain; and the name of the pool is better known from this more recent legend.

ταῦθ' οὕτω τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἱστόρηται· εἰ δέ τῳ μυθώδῃ κριθείη καὶ μὴ πιστά, ἔξεστίν οἱ μὴ προσέχειν αὐτοῖς. (Zon. 7.25, 1.234)

This is the way the story is related by the Romans; should any person judge it fabulous and not to be credited, he is at liberty to pay no attention to it.

Oakley explains that Livy denied M. Curtius a speech on this occasion because of the suspected ahistorical and legendary character of this incident: "[H]e [Livy] may have found this tale of the miraculous somewhat embarrassing to his rationalism."⁴² And elaborating on the meaning behind the usage of the term *fabula* in reference to the entire episode, he notes:

Since *historia* was expected to narrate the truth, no historian would want it to be said that his work contained *fabulae* ... but by admitting, as here, that a tale was fabulous one both warned one's readers of its improbability and deflected hostile criticism. (Oakley 1998, 102)

As we saw, Dio (if we trust Zonaras) is even more pronounced in his skepticism towards this episode. In Dio, to be judged from the context, *ιστόρηται*⁴³ and *μυθώδῃ* serve the same function as *fabula* in Livy, as Oakley's interprets it: a disclaimer with which the author

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ The word *ιστόρηται* is rather unusual choice for Dio when referring to the sources of his information, the following expressions being predominant: *γράφω δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα* (38.13.5) or *ὥς που καὶ δεδήμωται φράσω* (53.19.6). The usage of *ιστόρηται*, in my opinion, amplifies Dio's reserved and cautious attitude to the episode.

admits to reservations about the historicity of the related episode on the one hand, but on the other rationalizes his choice to record it on the basis of merely following the established source tradition. While this same reservation is shared by both Livy and Dio, we detect a different attitude to speeches in the two authors. Livy, says Oakley, “distances himself” from the episode,⁴⁴ and the suspected factual improbability of the event is the reason for omitting any speech as being by default fictional. For Dio, it appears, an opportunity to show originality by composing a unique speech is more compelling than the concern for historicity. Since, however, both these aspects, as I shall argue, are equally important elsewhere for Dio and form a dialectical unity in his methodology, rather than representing conflicting binaries, another conclusion suggests itself. In exploiting rhetorical opportunity, Dio rather consciously isolates his speeches from the main narrative-interpretative structure of the text as an epideictic element, as we shall soon see in further detail.

M. Curtius’ speech itself, of which a fairly substantial fragment remains and which is partly doubled in Zonaras, may remind us of the beginning of Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae* (Sal. Cat 1.1-4). For the purpose of my argument, I will temporarily side with Millar’s consistently skeptical attitude on Dio’s speeches (as noted throughout this chapter): M. Curtius’ oration consists of the series of commonplaces and might have occupied a place in virtually any other context, being too general and offering universal, and at the same time pleonastic, concepts in the flow of its reasoning.

Especially striking in this same sense is the example of Augustus’ address about marriage (DC 56.2-9) which exemplifies how deeply this speech can be rooted in the conventions of a school rhetorical exercise. The “speech occasion” for this particular

⁴⁴ Oakley 1998, 99.

oration can be found in Suetonius (*Aug.* 89.2; cf. *Liv. Per.* 59). A good illustration of Dio's employment of commonplaces in this speech could be made by the comparison with Libanius' *Progymnasmata* and would not be out of place here, since the chronological gap between two authors would only strengthen this point. Marriage is what characterizes a real man:

Lib. *Thes.* 1.2: τοὺς δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνδρός
ἐστὶ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀναγκάσωμεν.

Let us compel others to do what
belongs to a man with good sense.

DC 56.3.8: μόνοι γὰρ ἂν ἄνδρες δικαίως
ὀνομάζοισθε.

For you alone [the married crowd]
may properly be called men.

Even gods marry, and that is the best proof that marriage is just, good and noble:

Lib. *Thes.* 1.6: εἰ δὲ τὸ γαμεῖν οὐ καλὸν
ἦν, οὐτ' ἂν οἱ θεοὶ ποτε τοῦτο μετήλθον.

If marriage were not noble, the gods
would never have participated in it.

DC 56.2.5: οὕτω καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ...
καλὸν εἶναι δέδοκται καὶ γάμος καὶ
τέκνωσις.

Even among these beings [gods] ...
marriage and the begetting of
children have been approved as a
noble thing.

Married life makes a man have more self-control and curtails extreme emotions:

Lib. *Thes.* 1.23: ὃ τε γὰρ πρότερον
ἐπαινούμενος θαυμαστότερος γίνεται
μᾶλλον δοκῶν σωφρονεῖν οἷς τέ τινες
ἦσαν πρὸ τῶν γάμων αἰτίαι λύονται.

The man who was praised before
becomes more greatly admired, as he
is thought to have more self-control,
and those who had any faults before
marriage are absolved of them.

DC 56.3.3: πῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄριστον
γυνὴ σώφρων ... τοῦ τε νέου τὴν ἐμμανῆ
φύσιν καθεῖρξαι καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὴν
ἔξωρον αὐστηρότητα κεράσαι;

For is there anything better than a
wife who is chaste ... to restrain the
mad passion of youth and to temper
the unseasonable harshness of old
age?

Other no less common *τόποι* include the arguments concerning a wife who shares the pleasure of good times and provides consolation in bad times (Lib. *Thes.* 1.14 and 16, cf.

DC 56.3.3), the necessity to rear children for the benefit of the state, to make it stronger with men (Lib. *Thes.* 1.11, cf. DC 56.4.4-5 and 2.2-3), and also the comparisons to the animal world (Lib. *Thes.* 1.9, cf. DC 56.6.6). Particularly interesting is the usage of a gnomic utterance in both authors to refute the argument that marriage comes with some unpleasant things (Libanius explains that these might be, for example, conjugal infidelity and the death of children):

ὅλως δὲ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος ὦν ζητεῖ τινα πρᾶξιν καθαρὰν δυσκόλων, οὐκ οἶδε ζητῶν ἅ θεῶν ἐστι μόνων. ἐπεὶ τίνι τῶν πάντων οὐ συνέζευκται λυπηρά; (Lib. *Thes.* 1.28)

But in general, if someone being human seeks a practice that is free from trouble, he does not know that he is seeking what belongs to the gods alone. Since, is there anything in the world to which painful things have not been wedded?

Καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν οἰέσθε με ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔστι τινα καὶ ἐν τῷ γάμῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τεκνοποιίᾳ καὶ δυσχερῇ καὶ λυπηρᾷ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθε, ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν ὃ μὴ καὶ ἀνιαρόν τι παραμέμικται, καὶ τοῖς γε πλείστοις καὶ μεγίστοις αὐτῶν πλείστα καὶ μέγιστα συμπέφυκεν. (DC 56.8.2)

And let none of you imagine that I fail to realize that there are disagreeable and painful things incident to marriage and the begetting of children. But bear this in mind, that we do not possess any other good with which some unpleasantness is not mingled, and that in our most abundant and greatest blessings there reside the most abundant and greatest evils.

Therefore, although the speech contains references to the contemporary events, for example, to some of the provisions of the *Lex Iulia* of 18 BCE (56.7.2-3)⁴⁵ and thus is not entirely separated from the historical context, it bears close affinity to one of the types of school rhetorical exercise, *προγυμνάσματα*, and in particular to one of its “usual topics”, *θέσις*.⁴⁶ “The *προγυμνάσματα* ... as a whole had an important bearing upon history and the

⁴⁵ Cf. Swan 2004, 230-31.

⁴⁶ “An argument for or against an assumed question” (Burgess 1902, 108-109, n.1).

fact is frequently referred to by rhetors.”⁴⁷ Notably, Ps.-Hermogenes, giving a definition of *θέσις*, discusses “whether to marry” as an example of the questions appropriate for discussion in this form of *προγυμνάσματα*. Since it is the only example included into his discussion, we may surmise that it was one of the, if the most, common and traditional topics for a *θέσις*:

ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ θέσις καθολικῆς συμβολῆς τόπον ἐπέχειν οὐ πρὸς τι πρόσωπον ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς κοινῶς πρὸς ὅτιοῦν κατὰ ἀναθεώρησιν μόνων τῶν προσόντων τῷ πράγματι τὴν διέξοδον λαμβάνουσα· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξετάσωμεν, εἰ γαμητέον... (Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 24)

They have given a definition of thesis to the effect that it is a consideration of some subject viewed apart from any specific circumstance; for thesis seems to take the place of a general piece of advice, not directed to any specified person but with quite general application to any person, basing its development solely on the attributes of things. Whenever we investigate whether one should marry...⁴⁸

The speech seems to have been actually delivered, according to Livy *Per.* 59. It was originally an oration of censor Quintus Metellus simply read by Augustus before the senate *velut in haec tempora scriptam*, “as though written for the present day.” Suetonius mentions this same occasion in the context of Augustus’ interest in Greek and Latin literature, especially for the purpose of finding useful precepts and examples (Suet. *Aug.* 89.2). Dio ignores the reference to the real authorship of the speech. Moreover, he makes Augustus deliver it not in the senate but in the Forum on the occasion of the triumphal games in honor of Tiberius in 9 CE. These two inconsistencies between Dio and Livy might be interpreted as one of Dio’s numerous “chronological liberties”⁴⁹ – Livy’s version suggests 18 BCE for this speech – or simply as a mistake.

⁴⁷ Burgess 1902, 199. Also see below, n. 52 in this chapter.

⁴⁸ Translation is by Kennedy (2003, 87). Cf. suggested by Hermogenes’ logical divisions of this thesis on marriage in Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 26.

⁴⁹ Swan 2004, 227.

However, considering the general attitude to speeches already observed in Dio and the pointedly artificial, “scholastic” character of the oration itself, I shall suggest this example as yet another illustration of how Dio separates an epideictic element of his history from the main narrative through deliberately elevating a speech to a high level of abstraction and universality.⁵⁰ This elevation, as has been already noted, serves the reader as a *sui generis* signal of the transition to epideictic mode, the pause in the factual narrative and the beginning of what, in essence, is a form of *προγυμνάσματα* or, in Roman terms, of *suasoria* or *controversia*.⁵¹ Thus generic differentiation of narrative modes within the history is important for Dio. Therefore, in the situation, when the speech no longer has a direct relation to the immediate historical context of the main narrative, and it does not explain that context or provide any real historico-political commentary, such as in Augustus’ addresses to married and single men, such details as the year and circumstances of delivery are not crucial, as long as the inclusion of the speech is justified by some established and well-known historical fact:

[I]n these speeches, first to husbands and fathers, then to the unmarried, we have mainly Dio, not Augustus... Still, Dio may have been inspired by knowledge that in advocating his legislation “on the marriage of the orders” Augustus recited to the Senate (and published by edict) a speech “on increasing offspring” (*de prole agenda*) of Q. Caecilius Metellus. (Swan 2004, 227)

⁵⁰ Kemezis 2007 offers a good examination of Dio’s treatment of *Lex Iulia* and *Lex Pappia Poppaea*. *Inter alia*, Kemezis notes (ibid., 275): “The speeches that Dio gives Augustus in Book 56 are both highly general in nature... It appears that Dio wrote a set-piece passage about Augustus and marriage, which he could have put anywhere, and he chose, at some cost in rhetorical verisimilitude, to put it in Book 56.”

⁵¹ The most common types of *προγυμνάσματα*, the topics of which traditionally intersected with history, were the following: fable, narrative, anecdote, refutation and confirmation, encomium, invective, comparison, personification, ecphrasis, and thesis. “For most of the exercises the theorists recommend specific passages in the historians to memorize and imitate” (Gibson 2004, 108-109). Cf. Burgess’ classification (1902, 108-109, n. 1).

While it is commonly recognized that school rhetorical exercises and historiography mutually influenced each other, it is primarily the usefulness of reading history and drawing examples from it for rhetorical elaboration that is emphasized as valuable for an orator.⁵² However, in Dio we may clearly trace the reverse direction of this mutual influence: the introduction of the abstract rhetorical exercise in the almost unassimilated form of *προγυμνάσματα* into the canvas of the historical narrative. This fact might seem not very flattering for a historiographic work, especially considering how modern scholars prefer to see the function of the speech in history.⁵³ Still, observations about historians' structuring of their speeches according to the models, precepts, and conventions of *προγυμνάσματα* have been made occasionally in the literature, and the evidence has been convincingly interpreted by Gibson:

[A]s imperial-era Greek literature richly attests, writers trained in the progymnasmata continued to deploy the forms of these basic exercises long after their formal education was complete. This must have been true for historians, as well. (Gibson 2004, 105)⁵⁴

⁵² E.g., Burgess 1902, 199-200: "The most specific instances of a direct relation between epideictic writing and history may be found in the frequent introduction of set speeches and in the formal descriptions so often introduced into history. The *προγυμνάσματα* ... as a whole had an important bearing upon history, and the fact is frequently referred to by rhetors. There is a notable tendency in many of its divisions to choose some historical character or situation as the theme to be developed rhetorically. This would be in harmony with the epideictic coloring of most history at that time [5-4 cent. BCE], and would also assist in making the rhetorical features of history prominent." For the examples of historical events (recorded in Livy) taken as material for exercises in refutation and confirmation (*ἀνασκευή* and *κατασκευή*), see Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.18-19. For a topic for a popular *suasoria* suggested by historian Asinius Pollio, see Sen. *Suas.* 6.14-15 with Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.46. For usefulness of reading history, see, e.g., Quint. *Inst.* 2.5. Bloomer suggests an interesting perspective on the relation of *suasoria* and history (2010, 303-304): "Yet the *suasoria* does not present a radical fantasy. We know the answers to their rhetorical questions just as we know the questions are rhetorical... The titles [of the *suasoriae*] call for tradition and history to be defended against innovation. The exercises probe not so much alternatives to reality and history as the motives that animate an approved choice."

⁵³ See section 4.1.1.

⁵⁴ Cf. Millar 1961, esp. pp. 19-20.

Gibson supports these ideas with the statements of the ancient rhetoricians. For my own interpretation of the meaning of the phenomenon in question it is significant to quote the following formulation by sophist Aelius Theon (first or second century CE):

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παρεθέμην, οὐ νομίζων μὲν ἅπαντα εἶναι πᾶσιν ἀρχομένοις ἐπιτήδεια, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι πάνυ ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τῶν γυμνασμάτων ἀσκησις οὐ μόνον τοῖς μέλλουσι ῥητορεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις ἢ ποιητῶν ἢ λογοποιῶν ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν λόγων δύναμιν ἐθέλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα οἶονεὶ θεμέλια πάσης τῆς τῶν λόγων ιδέας, καὶ ὥς ἂν αὐτά τις ὑπάγεται τῇ τῶν νέων ψυχῇ, ἀνάγκη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν. (Theon Prog. 70).

Now I have included these remarks, not thinking that all are useful to all beginners, but in order that we may know that training in exercises is absolutely not only to those who are going to practice rhetoric but also if one wishes to undertake the function of poets or historians or any other writers. These things are, as it were, the foundation of every kind of discourse, and depending on how one instills in the mind of the young, necessarily the results make themselves felt in the same way later.⁵⁵

Therefore, it will be important for my argument to acknowledge fully that at least the original speeches in Dio (i.e. composed according to the first pattern) bear close affinity (in terms of form and contents) to formal school rhetorical exercises and, significantly, not only are influenced in some way by contemporary rhetorical discourse, but are, in fact, exemplary specimens of *προγυμνάσματα* that are constructed carefully according to rhetorical models and finally incorporated into history.

The more opportune the choice of the speech occasion, the better such “artificial” speech will be integrated into the general canvas of the narrative. That is why the search for and choice of an appropriate “speech occasion” is meaningful by itself and has its own significance as an element of author’s creativity. In Dio, it seems, no matter to which extent

⁵⁵ Translation by Kennedy (2003, 13).

the contents of a speech is historical or is not, the speech occasion is always justified by some known historical fact, and it has an easily traceable “historical starting-point”:⁵⁶

[W]as noch wichtiger ist, dass er [Dio] nur da Reden eingelegt hat, wo er in der Überlieferung die Nachricht fand, dass wirklich solche gehalten waren. (Schwartz, *RE* 3, col. 1719)

What is more important, is that he [Dio] inserted the speeches only if in the sources he found the report that such speeches had been indeed delivered.

For example, the dialogue of Philiskos and Cicero (DC 38.18-29) is to the highest degree a case of generalized speech in the style of a philosophical tract of a type usually referred to as being *Περὶ φυγῆς*.⁵⁷ The most obvious counterpart to this exercise is Plutarch’s *De exilio* since multiple parallels have been noted between the two.⁵⁸ Millar, for example, comparing Dio’s invented dialogue also with other works, including Teles, Musonius, Seneca, and Cicero himself, notes “the conventional nature of the consolation given to Cicero.”⁵⁹ Burgess, on the other hand, classifies this speech as an example of *ἐγκώμιον*,⁶⁰ which is another rather common topic of *προγυμνάσματα*, an especially useful exercise for an epideictic orator.⁶¹ However, even such an abstract speech as the comments of Philiskos has

⁵⁶ Term is Millar’s (1961, 17).

⁵⁷ Millar 1961, 16. The same author (*ibid.*, 15-16) provides a good summary of the dialogue which was a consolation offered to Cicero on occasion of his exile from Rome by some philosopher Philiskos (who was probably invented by Dio): “Philiskos meets Cicero and in a long conversation counsels and fortifies him. ... Philiskos reproves Cicero for his weakness in spite of education and his failure to prepare himself points out that he has physical health and needs nothing more, that his soul is unaffected; that his exile was destined, that many people live abroad anyway, including famous men who left to avoid dishonour, and some who were later successful again. Cicero has had honour enough, he can afford to retire to an estate by the coast, to farm and write history, like Thucydides and Xenophon...”

⁵⁸ *Plu. Mor.* 599-607.

⁵⁹ Millar 1961, 16.

⁶⁰ Burgess 1902, 207.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 108-109, n. 1. Moreover, the historical context, moral appeal, topic, and the “division” of Philiskos’ speech are comparable with Seneca’s “Ciceronian” *suasoriae* and, in principle, it could be interpreted as one, alongside two other attested topics, “Cicero deliberates whether to beg Antony’s pardon” (*Suas.* 6) and “Antony promises to spare Cicero’s life if he burns his writings: Cicero deliberates whether to do so” (*Suas.* 7).

a recorded historical fact as its starting-point. Plutarch has documented the facts of Cicero's despair and thoughts of suicide, lack of fortitude to face the hardships of his exile.⁶² Dio used this condition as a speech occasion, and also as an attractive opportunity to develop another epideictic oration in the form of *encomium*. A basis for comparison is offered by Plutarch's treatment of the mood of Cicero after the vote for exile went against him:

πολλῶν δὲ φοιτῶντων ἀνδρῶν ὑπ' εὐνοίας καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων διαμιλλωμένων πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς πρεσβείας, ὅμως ἀθυμῶν καὶ περίλυπτος διῆγε τὰ πολλά, πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες, ἀφορῶν, καὶ τῷ φρονήματι μικρὸς ἄγαν καὶ ταπεινὸς ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς γεγονώς καὶ συνεσταλμένος, ὥς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄνδρα παιδεῖα συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτῃ προσεδόκησε. (Plu. Cic. 32.4)

But although many people visited him out of goodwill, and the Greek cities vied with one another in sending him disputations, still, he passed his time for the most part in dejection and great grief, looking off towards Italy like a disconsolate lover, while in his spirit he became very petty and mean by reason of his misfortune, and was more humbled than one would have expected in a man who had enjoyed so lofty a discipline as his.

The consolation of Dio's Philiskos begins with reproaching Cicero for losing heart despite being a man of such prominent education:

“οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ,” ἔφη, “ὦ Κικέρων, θρηνῶν καὶ γυναικείως διακείμενος; ὥς ἔγωγε οὐποτ' ἂν σε προσεδόκησα οὕτω μαλακισθῆσθαι, πολλῆς μὲν παιδείας καὶ παντοδαπῆς μετεσχηκότα, πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ συνηγορηκότα.” (DC 38.18.1)

“Are you not ashamed, Cicero,” he said, “to be weeping and behaving like a woman? Really, I should never have expected that you, who have enjoyed such an excellent and varied education, and who have acted as advocate to many, would grow so faint-hearted.”

Apparently, this beginning is so close to Plutarch's statement quoted above that Philiskos' first words may be perceived as a paraphrase of Plutarch's comment about dissonance between Cicero's psychological state and his education (esp. Plutarch's ὥς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄνδρα παιδεῖα συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτῃ προσεδόκησε as compared with Dio: ὥς ἔγωγε οὐποτ' ἂν σε

⁶² Cf. Millar 1961, 15-16.

προσεδόκησα οὕτω μαλακισθῆσθαι, πολλῆς μὲν παιδείας καὶ παντοδαπῆς μετεσχηκότα).⁶³ If so, we observe here an example of a deliberate allusion to another source, the purpose of which is to justify through a literary reference the inclusion of an abstract rhetorical exercise by providing a link to historical context.

The interpretation of Dio's speeches suggested here (at least concerning the ones belonging to the first pattern) will provide an alternative understanding which responds to Millar's almost uncompromisingly negative attitude to Dio's speeches. However, this reading is not attempting to challenge his objective observations regarding their "historicity" or, rather, lack thereof:

The dialogue [between Philiskos and Cicero] has no function within the History, unless to underline the weakness of Cicero's character, and no justification from historical evidence. ... If there were earlier rhetorical pieces using this theme and setting, we do not know of them. As the evidence stands, we have a rare, probably unique, case of initiative in composition by Dio... (Millar 1999, 51)

Apparently, in his preoccupation with the search for historical analysis in Dio's speeches, Millar failed to appreciate this new and, perhaps, unique operational mode in Dio: writing the speeches by the canons borrowed from *προγυμνάσματα*. This form, introduced by Dio into his history, provided him with the ideal conditions for, in the spirit of the time, *καὶ ῥητορεῦσαι καὶ ἐπιδείξαι τὴν τῶν λόγων δεινότητα*, "play the orator and show your eloquence."⁶⁴ But this approach concomitantly ousted the analytical element from

⁶³ I take the meaning of both Philiskos' reproach and Plutarch's comment in such way: the education of such breadth and quality should have invested Cicero with such a philosophical outlook and given him the mental strength to face his hardships. Plutarch develops a little bit further: *καίτοι πολλάκις αὐτὸς ἡξίου τοὺς φίλους μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον· φιλοσοφίαν γὰρ ὡς ἔργον ἡρῆσθαι, ῥητορικῇ δ' ὀργάνῳ χρῆσθαι πολιτευόμενος ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας. ἀλλ' ἡ δόξα δεινὴ τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ βαφήν, ἀποκλύσαι τῆς ψυχῆς...*, "And yet he often asked his friends not to call him an orator, but a philosopher, because he had chosen philosophy as an occupation, but used oratory merely as an instrument for attaining the needful ends of a political career. But public opinion has great power to wash away reason, like a dye, from the soul of man..." (Plu. Cic. 32.5).

⁶⁴ Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 58.

speeches.⁶⁵ Philiskos' speech, however, is not a unique instance of Dio's initiative in speechifying. More speeches are becoming recognized in recent scholarship as Dio's original compositions.⁶⁶ These are compositions for which Dio discovered the occasion himself and the occasion seems so opportune that another written source is often suspected behind Dio's speech.

Denying Dio a share of originality has been a common response and the search of a prototype for every one of his speeches is an all too well established tendency in the scholarship.⁶⁷ The pursuit of sources can be seen as misinterpretation of one feature of Dio's method in composing original speeches. Often Dio, in an attempt to place a speech within some historico-literary context makes such an unmistakable, almost verbatim, reference to a well-known work, so that this latter is suspected as Dio's source. It could be traced on the example of series of speeches in the context of *Lex Gabinia* of 67 BCE (DC 36.25-36), where, at the end of Catulus' speech opposing the proposition to invest Pompey with extraordinary political power, Dio includes a famous, almost anecdotal quote, which is very close to Cicero's version of the incident mentioned in *De Lege Manilia*:

Κάτλου δέ τινος τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκότος πρὸς τὸν δῆμον «ἐὰν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐκπεμφθεὶς σφαλῇ, οἷα ἔν γε ἀγῶσι πολλοῖς καὶ τούτοις θαλαττίοις φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, τίνα ἄλλον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀναγκαιότερα εὐρήσετε;» ὁ ὅμιλος σύμπας ὥσπερ ἀπὸ συγκειμένου τινὸς ἀνεβόησεν εἰπὼν «σέ.» (DC 36.36a)

⁶⁵ We remember, for example, that Ps.-Hermogenes defines *θέσις* as a general discussion of a matter which must avoid personal or specific detail; for this reason the speech of Augustus about the benefits of marriage written in this form bears a merely conventional and negligible link to concrete historical circumstances, and, like many other speeches in Dio, could have been inserted in other places of his work. Cf. Rodgers 2008, 297: "Dio's choices of speakers and occasions often serve his philosophical or moralizing agenda better than they serve history."

⁶⁶ E.g., a quite argumentative proof of the originality of Catulus' speech in Dio may be found in Rodgers 2008.

⁶⁷ Some examples are listed in Rodgers 2008, 297, n. 8.

Catulus, one of the aristocrats, had said to the people: “If he fails when sent out in this errand — as not infrequently happens in many contests, especially on the sea — what other man will you find to take his place for still more urgent tasks?” Thereupon the entire throng, as if by previous agreement, cried out and exclaimed: “You!”

qui cum ex vobis quaereret, si in uno Cn. Pompeio omnia poneretis, si quid eo factum esset, in quo spem essetis habituri, cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum ac dignitatis, cum omnes una prope voce in eo ipso vos spem habituros esse dixistis. (Cic. Man. 59)

When he asked you, if you entrusted everything to Pompey alone, on whom you would rely if something happened to him, he received a great reward for his valor and standing when you all with practically one voice said you would place your hopes on him himself.⁶⁸

The episode referenced by Dio is also known from several other sources besides Cicero:

Sal. Hist. fr. 5.24 M; Vell. 2.32.1-3; V. Max. 8.15.9; Plu. Pomp. 25.5 — and is rather firmly embedded in the historiographic tradition. However, several features of the composition of the entire debate between Pompey, Gabinius, and Catulus, as presented in Dio, have a pointedly unhistorical character. They are the following. The debate is placed in the wrong year: in Dio the speeches are delivered in the context of the discussion of *Lex Gabinia* in 67 BCE, not *Lex Manilia* of 66 BCE as it should have been according to Cicero (as evident from Cic. Man. 51-52).⁶⁹ In 67 BCE, Catulus should not have spoken at all; rather Hortensius spoke twice in reaction to Gabinius’ proposition, while in 66 BCE the debate took place between Hortensius, Catulus, and Cicero. More importantly, Pompey’s and Gabinius’ speeches in Dio (and, to the lesser extent, that of Catulus), as it appears, on the *Lex Gabinia*, are filled with parallel arguments to those of Cicero’s *Pro Lege Manilia*:

While Dio certainly read many of Cicero’s orations and much else in addition to narrative histories, he employed orations as sources only for his speeches, not for his narrative, and one can show that he mined Cicero’s *Pro lege Manilia*, which he might

⁶⁸ Translation by Rodgers 2008.

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 297-300.

instead have adapted to highlight the political quarrel in 66, to create arguments for and against Pompey's command in 67. (Rodgers 2008, 296)

These corresponding passages between two works in question are so clearly identifiable that they point to not merely Dio's knowledge of Cicero, but rather a deliberate, insistent indication of this very fact.⁷⁰ At the same time, Dio (perhaps on purpose) subverted the value of *Pro Lege Manilia* as the original source: first of all, the well-known speech was lacerated and adapted for use in a different context. Secondly, the chronology of the debate was displaced.⁷¹ Finally, the debates on two different laws, as it stands, were merged into one. I do not think that the reason for this was merely Dio's famous "anti-Ciceronianism".⁷² In few places of the history, Dio does indeed make some hostile remarks to the effect that Cicero did not deliver some of his most famous speeches (a judgment which, theoretically, could give Dio license to use freely and alter them as not being original historical sources in the first instance), but this criticism does not necessarily mean that Dio is setting his own methodology against that of Cicero:

ἢ οἶει τινὰ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι μηδένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν σου τούτων λόγων οὐς ἐκδέδωκας εἴρηκας, ἀλλὰ πάντας αὐτοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα συγγέγραφας, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἱπάρχους τοὺς πηλίνους πλάττοντες; (DC 46.7.3)⁷³

Or do you think any one is ignorant of the fact that you never delivered one of those wonderful speeches of yours that you have published, but wrote them all out afterwards, like persons who fashion generals and cavalry leaders out of clay?

Similar observations about questionable historicity of Dio's speeches have been made in this chapter regarding M. Curtius' speech, the Philiskos debate, and Augustus' speech on

⁷⁰ For the examples, see *ibid.*, 308-309.

⁷¹ In order to be fully accurate, it must be acknowledged that Dio is not the only one to have made such chronological mistake regarding this episode: Rodgers (*ibid.*, 298) names Plutarch, Sallust, and possibly Livy.

⁷² See Millar 1964, 46-55, esp. 48-49 and 55; cf. Rees 2011, 102-105.

⁷³ Cf. DC 40.54.2-4 for the same sentiment.

the privileges and advantages of marriage. Therefore, the starting point for the interpretation of the function and historical authenticity of the Pompey-Gabinus-Catulus debate at 36.25-36 may lie, too, somewhere in the realm of conventions of school rhetoric, and the debate itself may be recognized as an example of Dio's tendency for epideictic speechifying using the formula of the *προγυμνάσματα*. Moreover, the entire debate in question should remind us of yet another popular educative technique of the rhetorical schools: inventing a fictional speech in response to some famous published oration. The evidence for such practice is well documented:

Tum causas vel easdem quas agi audierit stilo et ipse componat, vel etiam alias, veras modo, et utrimque tractet... Melius hoc quam rescribere veteribus orationibus, ut fecit Cestius contra Ciceronis actionem habitam pro eodem, cum alteram partem satis nosse non posset ex sola defensione. (Quint. Inst. 10.5.20)

Then he [student of rhetoric] should write up for himself either the Causes he has heard in court or others (so long as they are real) and argue both sides... This is better than writing replies to old speeches as Cestius did to Cicero's speech for the same defendant [Milo], although he could not know the other side of the case sufficiently from the defense alone.

Notable too is the Seneca's comment about popularity of such replies, which probably, testifies to the standardization and formalization of rhetorical education in the first century CE. These processes reveal preoccupations with the formal aspect of training; from Seneca we can gather an echo of the intellectual *Zeitgeist* of his time, in particular, that rhetoric was being studied for the sake of rhetoric:

pueri fere aut iuvenes scholas frequentant; hi non tantum disertissimis viris, quos paulo ante rettuli, Cestium suum praeferunt sed etiam Ciceroni praeferrent, nisi lapides timerent. Quo tamen uno modo possunt praeferunt, huius enim declamations ediscunt, illius orationes non legunt nisi eas quibus Cestius rescripsit. (Sen. Con. 3 Praef. 15)

It is boys, usually, or youths who throng the schools: and they prefer their Cestius to the eloquent men I have just mentioned – and they'd prefer him to Cicero if they didn't fear a stoning. They do prefer him to Cicero, in fact, in the one way open to them: they learn off Cestius' declamations while not reading Cicero's speeches – except the ones to which Cestius has written replies.

This practice by analogy may be extrapolated to bear on the debate between Cicero and Calenus at DC 45.18-47 and 46.1-28: in particular, on Calenus' reply to the speech of Cicero, which may be construed as a type of fictional response to a famous oration, the very kind that Quintilian had in mind.⁷⁴ This way of looking at the debate between Cicero and Calenus should help us explain the character of Cicero's speech as a medley of multiple *Philippics*.⁷⁵ It does heavily rely on all *Philippics*, especially, as Millar notes, on the first eight⁷⁶ and represents a very particular pattern of speech-writing, "a fictional speech for a real orator who had been involved in a real historical context."⁷⁷ Unless the rationale for inclusion of this debate is purely rhetorical, it would be hard to explain satisfactorily the function of such pastiche in an historical work, especially considering the conspicuously

⁷⁴ In support of such presupposition, see Millar 1961, 19: "[T]he material of anti-Ciceronian invective was a common possession of rhetoricians." Cf. *ibid.*, 20: "To praise or attack a famous name was a common exercise of the schools and such oration might be given a historical setting, of varying credibility. ... To show the existence of this literary genus of rhetorical exercises is not, of course to prove that Dio used anything of the kind, only that it was a commonplace and could have affected, or deceived, a historian."

⁷⁵ In DC 45.18-47, which Brock named "the ideal Philippic" (1995, 217), Dio's Cicero, in the context of the events of 43 BCE, declares the situation dangerous and denounces Antony's actions as unconstitutional (abandoning the province of Macedonia, taking control over Caesar's Parthian legions, changing and forging the acts of Caesar, embezzlement of public funds, selling privileges). Also personally attacks Antony (faults of education, debauchery, squandering, vomiting, appearing naked at a public festival). He appeals to historical examples for illustrations of dignity now lost. He presents Antony as an actual military threat. He points out the unacceptability of sending embassies to Antony as being equivalent to sending embassies to their own fellow citizens. He brings forward his own merits and recalls his service to the country, and manifests firmness before the danger and readiness to assume leadership.

⁷⁶ The similarities are indeed striking and have been discussed extensively in the literature. Relatively recent lists of these parallel passages may be found in, e.g., Millar 1999, 54 with n. 9; Ramsey 2007, 13 with n. 16; Gowing 1992, 238 with n. 34.

⁷⁷ Brock 1995, 216.

ahistorical character of Cicero's speech. As it is purely fictional, therefore, "it is in fact fruitless to attempt to give an actual point at which ... Dio's ... debate took place."⁷⁸

Calenus' response is an exemplary exercise in *ψόγος*⁷⁹ that Dio wrote using an opportunity to fill up what he perceived as the vacant place in the literature for a debate,⁸⁰ in order to provide "a showcase for the historian's rhetorical talents."⁸¹ It is definitely not a failed attempt to "sum up in the two balanced speeches the complex political situation at the beginning of 43 B.C.," as Millar asserted.⁸² Technically, of course, the speech of Cicero in the form of the summary of all *Philippics*, was not absolutely necessary in order to provide a context for Calenus' reply: Calenus briefly (and at point almost verbatim) sums up the arguments from Cicero's speech that he is about to refute, the arguments that ultimately go back to the original *Philippics* (e.g., DC 45.27.2 = 46.12.1 = Cic. *Phil.* 2.53). Similarly to Cestius' students who, not being the admirers of Cicero's talent, still needed to read those Ciceronian speeches to which Cestius wrote replies in order to appreciate the latter (above), Dio's audience is being prepared for Calenus' speech by reading through a epitome of the fourteen *Philippics*, the "fifteenth *Philippic*", first. This approach not only engages the reader in active comparison of Dio's Cicero with the real Cicero while at the same time reminding him about the contents of the *Philippics*, but also helps the readers to orient themselves better in the system of references to the original orations when reading Calenus' reply. In addition, it provides Dio with the opportunity to show his skill in the art

⁷⁸ Millar 1999, 52.

⁷⁹ Defined by Burgess (1902, 108-109, n. 1) simply as "the opposite to *ἐγκώμιον*."

⁸⁰ Cf. Brock 1995, 216.

⁸¹ Gowing 1992, 235.

⁸² Millar 1999, 52.

of imitation⁸³ and, in general, to signal and emphasize the artificiality of the entire debate by, on the one hand, openly and extensively borrowing from Cicero and, on the other, freely rearranging the borrowed material.

It was Burgess who first pointed out the great extent of permeation of school rhetoric into Dio's speeches: "Dio Cassius has many long speeches, all in general epideictic style."⁸⁴ Every speech that Burgess mentions in his brief analysis of Dio's epideictic features, could be, in principle, correlated with a certain type of rhetorical exercise: for example, the speeches of Gabinius and Philiskos Burgess qualifies as *ἐγκώμια*; the orations of Antony and Tiberius (on the occasion of deaths of Caesar and Augustus respectively) are structured as *ἐπιτάφιοι*; there are abundant speeches of exhortation pronounced by the generals before battles that contain *τόποι* specific to this type of set oration.⁸⁵ We should add the speech of Augustus (considered above) as an example of *θέσις*, and Catulus' speech as an illustration of *ψόγος*. No scholarly study of the Agrippa-Maecenas debate of book fifty-two can disregard the fact of its close connection to conventional rhetoric. Patterns of school *suasoria* have been observed in Agrippa's speech.⁸⁶ Zawadski called this speech a "mere rhetorical declamation that fails to rise to the level of a political program."⁸⁷ Maecenas' reply, on the other hand, was qualified as "a pure treatise *περὶ βασιλείας*," yet another type of oration

⁸³ On the importance of imitation for the education of an orator, see Quint. *Inst.* 10.2. Cf. Sen. *Con.* 1 *Praef.* 6.

⁸⁴ Burgess 1902, 207.

⁸⁵ Although general's speech is not listed in theoretical treatises as a form of *προγυμνάσματα*, it is mentioned in this context by Theon and Ps.-Hermogenes, and, most importantly, "[a]ll speeches of this character follow with varying exactness a well-defined series of *τόποι* and are artificial in the extreme" (Burgess 1902, 211).

⁸⁶ Reinhold 1988, 170.

⁸⁷ Zawadski 1983, 283, quoted *via* Adler 2012, 483, n. 24.

with a very particular set of characteristic *τόποι*.⁸⁸ The deeper implications of these observations, however, were largely ignored in the scholarship.

4.2.2. *The Significance of Omissions*

Appreciation of Dio's speeches in this vein can help us approach a better understanding of the other patterns of presentation as well, in particular, omission of speeches. Indeed, as has been noted, Dio's speeches are relatively few throughout the work,⁸⁹ while even cursory analysis of the themes chosen for orations testifies to the tendency toward diversifying the range of topics. Speeches by generals, the most common and developed type in historiography,⁹⁰ do not have absolute predominance in Dio. The rest of orations in *Ῥωμαϊκά* represent a variety of speakers, topics, and situations (although this feature, of course, is not exclusive to Dio), including types such as the speech of a woman (Hersilia, 1 fr. 5.5-6, and Boudicca, 61.3-6), the speech of an adversary (Hannibal, 14 fr. 57.4 and 5), an address to the mutinous troops (Caesar, 41.27-35), a consolation to an exile (Philiskos, 38.18-29), and a spouse's advice (Livia, 55.14-21). In the debates the speakers polemicize over a wide range of concerns, from the personal qualities and trustworthiness of a single person (Cicero and Calenus against and for Antony, 45.18-47 and 46.1-28) to the choice of

⁸⁸ Burgess 1902, 206, n. 2. Cf. also the opposite view of Millar (1964, 107) who identifies Maecenas' speech, at least its second half, starting with chapter 18, with a political pamphlet: "[i]t has little relation to the conventional oration *περί βασιλείας*, whose whole burden is moral, concentrating on the personal behaviour of the ruler. ... It is a serious, coherent, and fairly comprehensive plan for coping with what Dio conceived to be the evils of his time."

⁸⁹ Gowing compared the narratives of Appian and Dio belonging to the so-called triumviral period, 44-35 BCE and counted 38 speeches in Appian and only 4 in Dio, which, however, occupy 39% of the text in our historian (Gowing 1992, 227). According to Schwartz (*RE* 3, col. 1722-23), the total number of speeches and debates (including those speeches the presence of which could be surmised from the fragments) is thirty-four, with a tendency to become fewer after book fifty-one. Millar points out two omissions in Schwartz's list (Millar 1964, 78, n. 1).

⁹⁰ Burgess 1902, 209.

a political system (Agrippa vs. Maecenas about democracy and monarchy, 52.2-40). At the same time, while not every speech occasion is utilized by Dio, a single type of a set oration usually does not occur more than twice in the surviving history.

In this way, the omission of the two eulogies, διπλοῦς ὁ ἐπιτάφιος, by Augustus and Tiberius over the body of Drusus in 9 BCE, could simply be explained by the fact that in his history Dio planned to provide only two versions of the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, one at 44.36-49 (Antony for Caesar) and the other at 56.35-41 (Tiberius for Augustus). Remarkably, in this particular case Dio has sacrificed a seemingly attractive speech occasion: not only was the opportunity for a speech left vacant in Tacitus, but we also learn from Tacitus about the particularly splendid character of this funeral and the special honors that Augustus paid to Drusus, facts which could have provided additional material for rhetorical elaboration in the ἐπιτάφιος, had Dio decided to write it.⁹¹

Similarly, Gowing is somewhat puzzled by the absence of orations in direct speech in Dio before the battle of Philippi.⁹² Yet at that point of the narrative Dio not only references the fact of their deliverance by both antagonists, Brutus (or Cassius) and Antony, but also provides a brief outline of the arguments (DC 47.42.3-5). Gowing assumed that in Dio's sources these counterpoised speeches must have been present – such

⁹¹ Tac. Ann. 3.5 (in the context of the funeral of Germanicus in 19 CE): *Fuere qui publici funeris pompam requirerent compararentque quae in Drusum patrem Germanici honora et magnifica Augustus fecisset. ipsum quippe asperissimo hiemis Ticinum usque progressum neque abscedentem a corpore simul urbem intravisse; circumfusus lecto Claudiorum Iuliorumque imagines; defletum in foro, laudatum pro rostris, cuncta a maioribus reperta aut quae posteris invenerint cumulata*, "Some there were who missed the grandeur of a state-funeral, and contrasted the splendid honours conferred by Augustus on Drusus, the father of Germanicus. «Then the emperor himself,» they said, «went in the extreme rigour of winter as far as Ticinum, and never leaving the corpse entered Rome with it. Round the funeral bier were ranged the images of the Claudii and the Julii; there was weeping in the forum, and a panegyric before the rostra; every honour devised by our ancestors or invented by their descendants was heaped on him»."

⁹² Gowing 1992, 244-45.

was the importance of this historic moment – and finds unusual the absence of correspondent versions in Dio.⁹³ That Dio was independent of his sources when selecting and utilizing speech occasions seems to be evident, but what is in fact unusual in this episode, is the summary of the speeches in *oratio obliqua*, which technique, in principle, is not characteristic of Dio. Summarizing the speeches of Brutus (Cassius) and Antony, which contained everything proper to be said on the occasion,⁹⁴ Dio points to the fact that Brutus, when talking about possible outcomes of the battle and obviously alluding to Antony's tyrannical inclinations, employed for his argument a comparison of the democratic and monarchical political systems (DC 47.42.3-5). Nevertheless, here Dio refuses to develop this theme or elaborate the standard rhetorical form, the general's speech, in *oratio recta*. The juxtaposition of democracy and monarchy would be more appropriate for a *suasoria*, not a general's speech, and was, in fact, employed in Maecenas' oration a few books later. On the other hand, the examples of the exhortation speech and the occasions for it were many as they are in the history. Therefore, I believe that the reason for an omission of the speech occasion in this case (as with any other type of set oration that is omitted) is simply the existence, as a part of Dio's creative design, of a certain "quota" both for generals' speeches (including the paired ones, a sort of ἀμύλλαι

⁹³ Ibid., 244-45, n. 45: "Dio included speeches only when he found them, or versions of them, in a source." This statement may be a misinterpretation of Millar's opinion that it was Dio's rule to write a speech "only where the sources justify it" (Millar 1961, 15). As has been shown in this chapter, the presence of speech in a source is not a necessary condition for Dio to speechify; rather, he was in search of an apt speech occasion which could be justified historically or an indication of the fact of its deliverance, as in the example of Augustus' speech about the benefits of marriage (DC 56.2.9). Cf. also Schwartz's statement noted on p. 205 of this dissertation (to which both Gowing and Millar refer in *op. cit.*).

⁹⁴ DC 47.42.2: ὡς δ' ἀντικατέστησαν, παραινέσεις ... ἐγένοντο, πολλὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτίκα τοῦ κινδύνου ἀναγκαῖα πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀρμόζοντα αὐτῶν λεγόντων, ὅα ἂν τινες ἐν τε τῷ παραχρῆναι κινδυνεύουσιν καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι προκείμενοι εἴποιεν, "When they had taken their stand facing each other, exhortations were addressed ... and much what was said consisted of the necessary advice called for by the immediate danger and also of sentiments that bore upon the consequences of the battle, – words such as men would speak who were to encounter danger at the moment and were looking forward with anxiety to the future."

λόγων) and for disputes regarding the advantages of one political system over another. In addition to this explanation, of course, it would be logical also to accept Gowing's argument according to which Dio held off the big paired orations of the generals until the occasion he deemed more significant, namely, the battle of Actium: "This was a more significant occasion than Philippi: it marked the end of the Republic and the inception of the Augustan principate."⁹⁵

In this chapter, I have hypothesized that the role assigned to all speeches in Dio is purely epideictic; they are often divorced from the actual given historical circumstances and, more significantly, from their real historico-political analysis.⁹⁶ Several factors already mentioned in this chapter point to this very conclusion: stylistically speeches are separated from the main narrative; they display the features of careful compositional design consistently employing rhetorical *τόποι* appropriate for this or that type of oration; speeches tend to universality; often the internal line of argument is built entirely on the chain of *gnomai* that explain one another in succession (a good example is the dialogue between Livia and Augustus regarding clemency to plotters, DC 55.14-21); in choosing whether to include or omit a speech, it seems, stylistic and compositional design criteria prevail for Dio over considerations of historicity. The combination of these factors, and especially the markedly conventional character of Dio's rhetoric is the main reason which necessitated careful selection of speech occasions and limitation of the number of speeches and precluded Dio (as a general rule) from composing more than two speeches of a given type.

⁹⁵ Gowing 1992, 245.

⁹⁶ Nor they are an instrument for explaining causation or a medium for introducing new information into the narrative. With a few exceptions, if any new factual information is introduced with a speech, it is repeated in the main narrative. This consistent tendency also speaks in favor of the hypothesis suggested in this chapter. Similarly, speeches from other historical works never become the sources for Dio's narrative (Rodgers 2008, 296; Millar 1964, 54-55).

Without repeating certain clichés, such set orations cannot be varied *ad infinitum* simply by being applied every time anew to some concrete situation. We have already observed one such cliché repeated twice in two epitaphs by Antony and Tiberius: “I do not feel fit for the task of speaking about such a man,” “I cannot find appropriate words to describe the virtues of the deceased.” This is a commonplace for an *exordium* of an epitaph apparently descending originally from Pericles’ funeral oration (cf. DC 44.38.3-6 and DC 56.35 with Thuc. 2.35.1). Throughout the work, however, Dio manages to maintain a fair amount of balance between, on the one hand, inclusion of commonplace rhetoric elements and, on the other, avoiding repetitiveness and duplication. This same principle, probably, was also at work when Dio made a decision whether or not to rewrite a speech already published in another historian.

In this sense illustrative may be the omission of the debate concerning the disposition of the Catilinarian’s case in Dio. It would be, perhaps, difficult to exploit this context for the purpose of inventing an exemplary (in rhetorical sense) debate between Caesar and Cato without employing a well-trodden *τόπος* that involves considerations for and against capital punishment, with the obligatory allusion to the famous Mytilenean debate in Thucydides.⁹⁷

The opportunity for such debate was already utilized by Dio earlier in the work, in the episode concerning Quintus Fabius Maximus Rull(ian)us⁹⁸ and Dio purposefully makes a

⁹⁷ On the influence of Mytilenean debate on the Caesar-Cato debate in Sallust see, e.g., Drummond 1995, 51-56 and Marincola 2010, 279-87.

⁹⁸ Because of the fragmentary character of Dio’s text (DC 8 fr. 36.1-7), I will borrow the summary of this episode from Lipovsky’s analysis of Livy (1981, 116-17): “After the dictator Papirius has received doubtful auspices, he sets forth to Rome to take them again. First, however, he orders his *magister equitum*, Fabius, not to engage the foe in his absence... Fabius, however, taking advantage of the enemy’s carelessness..., attacks and wins a great victory at Imbrinium... It is this victory, fought against orders, which endangers military

reference to Thucydides thus welcoming the reader to make a corresponding reflection.⁹⁹

The rhetorical potential of already clichéd topic would have been exhausted at this point, making similar debate redundant in the context of Catiline's conspiracy and the author thus self-imitative. Omission of polemics between Caesar and Cato can also be explained by the eminence of Sallustian version, but the main methodological principle remains the same: Dio strives for originality and novelty in his rhetorical compositions. Originality is seen even in the very fact that for a rhetorical *étude* in Thucydidean style he did not choose the obvious candidate, but used a more intriguing and fresh opportunity, the Fabius Rull(ian)us' episode.¹⁰⁰

This methodological principle seems to be dominant in Dio. Brock, when talking about Diodorus' tendency to avoid the speeches already covered in Thucydides, deduced a

discipline and occasions the quarrel between two magistrates... Papirius attempts to secure Fabius' execution in order to restore military discipline." The episode culminates with the speeches of Marcus Fabius, father of the *magister equitum*, and Papirius himself and resolves in Papirius yielding to the collective pleas of elder Fabius, senate, tribunes, and populace. Strictly speaking, there are no positive indications of the actual *debate* in Dio. However, such supposition could be justifiably made on the basis of Livy's version. Most importantly, even if there was solely speech of Rullus' father in the original text of Dio, the connection to the Mytilenaeian dialogue seems to me clearly traceable nevertheless.

⁹⁹ Cf. DC 8 fr. 36.2: ἡ δέους τινὸς ἀνάγκη ἢ θάρσους ὑβρεῖ ἀπειρίας τε θρασύτητι καὶ ἐξουσίας προπετεία, ἢ καθ' ἑτέραν τινὰ συντυχίαν ... ἀμαρτάνειν ἀναπείθεται, "Some compelling fear or insolent audacity together with courage born of inexperience and rashness sprung from power, or some other combination of circumstances such as often occurs quite unexpectedly in the lives of many, leads men to do wrong" and Thuc. 3.45.4: ἡ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τι τούτου δέος εὐρετέον ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὑβρεῖ τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ... ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους, "And therefore, either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion ... impel men to danger." Although the direct derivation of Dio's passage from Thucydides is not immediately apparent, it would be, however, hard to imagine Dio writing this sentence without having Thucydides' text in front of him. I will interpret it as an example of habitual to Dio direct allusion: so similar is, in fact, the flow of abstract reasoning between the larger contexts of the provided quotes, in DC 8 fr. 36.1-3 and Thuc. 3.45. The meaning of this allusion is to emphasize the "artificiality" and universal appeal of Fabius' speech. Dio uses it as if inviting the reader to appreciate purely literary, rhetorical aspect of his composition.

¹⁰⁰ For the sake of the same argument, it is worth mentioning that Dio here departs from Livy significantly. The reasoning of Marcus Fabius' speech is arranged around the contrast of "the *moderatio* of earlier dictators with the *superbia* and *crudelitas* of recent ones" (Oakley 1998, 706). Dio, on the other hand, decided to develop it along the lines of Thucydidean moral sentiment, that *naturam humanam legibus non coerceri*, cf. Thuc. 3.45.3 and 3.84.2 (Litsch 1983, 34-35).

formula which I think perfectly describes the gist of Dio's method as well: "Diodorus and his source(s) are skirting round Thucydides, keeping the overlap with his debates to bare minimum."¹⁰¹ Likewise, most of the examples considered in this chapter illustrate well how Dio is "skirting round" his sources. To put it differently, Dio creatively uses the speech opportunities left vacant by his sources while still freely recycling the literary material borrowed from them.¹⁰² This feature of Dio's method was especially apparent in the example of the "fifteenth *Philippic*", in the debate over the *Lex Gabinia*, and partially in Marcus Fabius' speech.

4.2.3. Writing a Version of a "Published" Speech

From this point of view it would be appear hard to account for the third pattern as defined at the beginning of this chapter, that is, repetition (or, rather, reusing and reinterpretation) of the speeches found in other historical sources. Naturally, however, no ancient historian displays, either theoretically or practically, a consistent and unequivocal preference for one of the two strategies, total avoidance of speeches published by predecessors, on the one hand, and engagement in adapting them or remodeling them liberally, on the other.¹⁰³ Dio on occasion reuses already published material (as most clearly seen in the example of the "fifteenth *Philippic*"), but his rationale may differ in each individual case and may require

¹⁰¹ Brock 1995, 215.

¹⁰² I extensively rely on Brock's phrasing in this statement as well as in the entire paragraph (Brock 1995, 216).

¹⁰³ Certain general tendencies are observed instead. However, the ways in which they are interpreted may vary drastically. Burgess, for example, claimed that "[t]he conditions of historical writing preclude, as a rule, the repeated intrusion of the same topic, or the presence of the same speech in many different authors" (1902, 209), the appeal of the women to Coriolanus being one of the rare exceptions. Brock, on the other hand, asserted that historians exhibited a consistent tendency for omission of the speeches known in their original form, but, especially in Roman historiography, had "no hesitation in paraphrasing, adapting and improving the speeches found in their predecessors" (1995, 219).

different explanations. I shall now briefly consider a few examples belonging to this third approach.

In the case of Coriolanus, his mother Veturia delivers a short speech in which she desperately beseeches her son to lay down the arms that he raised against the Romans after having gone over to the Volscians' side. The episode in general and Veturia's speech in particular (*oratio recta* in all ancient historians under analysis here) received various literary treatments. In Livy (2.40.5-9), her speech, a short address, yet not devoid of manifest dramatic qualities, contains a rather bitter reproach towards Gn. Marcius (Coriolanus). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (8.46.2-54.1) develops an actual debate (in its "division" closely resembling a *suasoria*) between Marcius and his mother. At great length it addresses, among other aspects, the moral dilemma involved in the situation: the implications of the violation of promise given to Volsci, should Coriolanus yield to his mother's request. In Plutarch (*Cor.* 35.1-36.3), we observe a combination of a tragic plea with some pragmatic advice given to Coriolanus pertaining to the situation. Veturia's speech in Dio (5 fr. 18.8-10), on the other hand, presents a plethora of interpretational difficulties: the opening lines of the speech, for example, do not relate to the immediate context. Veturia asks her son about the reason for his surprise, a complete *non sequitur* from the preceding narrative. The possible traces of the source for this blunder on Dio's side we may find in Plutarch's and partly in Livy's version:

προσήκατο γὰρ αὐτὰς εὐθύς, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα παρούσας ἦσθετο, καὶ λόγου σφίσι μετέδωκεν, ἐπράχθη τε ὧδε· αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι σιωπῶσαι ἔκλαον, ἡ δὲ δὴ Οὐετουρία «τί θαυμάζεις,» ἔφη, «τέκνον; τί δὲ ἐκπέπληξαι;» (DC 5 fr. 18.8)

For he admitted them at once, as soon as he learned they were there, and granted them an interview, the course of which was as follows. While the rest wept in silence, Veturia began: "Why are you surprised, my son? Why are you startled?"

ὥς οὖν εἶδε προσιούσας τὰς γυναῖκας, ἐθαύμασεν. (Plu. Cor. 34.2)

When, accordingly, he saw the women approaching, he was amazed.

"nisi me frustrantur," inquit, "oculi, mater tibi coniunxque et liberi adsunt." Coriolanus prope ut amens consternatus ab sede sua... (Liv. 2.40.4-5)

"Unless my eyes deceive me, your mother is here and your wife and children."
Coriolanus started up like a madman from his seat...

In short, the speech of Veturia in Dio creates an impression of a somewhat careless summary of Plutarch's and Livy's material, although, as Libourel shows, Dio's account proves to be fully independent of all three authors in question.¹⁰⁴ If anything, within the given literary context, we should expect the omission of the Veturia's speech in Dio: Dionysius seems to have left no opportunities for further development of the topic. Why, then, did Dio decide, nonetheless, to include this rather short and uninspired oration?

Comparing Dio (5 fr. 18.2-12) with Livy, Plutarch, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, while also taking into account Zonaras' epitome, we may claim that Dio, indeed, strived to compress the episode presenting it summarily and skipping the detail. He probably did not intend to unfold a full-scale speech of Coriolanus' mother, producing instead what appears to be a very laconic adaptation of Livy's and Plutarch's material. Even Livy's short version of the speech is marked with a dramatic turn, the double *περιπέτεια*: "Coriolanus, when he recognizes his mother ... turns from disregard to affection, Veturia from tears to anger."¹⁰⁵ Dio, too, finds a way to invest the summary outline of the episode with an element of

¹⁰⁴ Libourel 1968, 97-105.

¹⁰⁵ Oakley 1965, 334.

tragic dramatization, by suggesting a sensational and original detail, unique to our historian.¹⁰⁶ Veturia bares naked her chest and pronounces (DC 5 fr. 18.10): “ἰδοῦ,” ἔφη, “τέκνον, αὐτὴ σε ἔτεκεν, οὗτοί σε ἐξέθρεψαν,” “See, my child, this brought you forth, these reared you up.”

We may surmise, therefore, that the speech of Veturia (or rather a brief sketch of it) serves a single (and purely narratological) purpose: it creates the context for and promptly guides the episode toward this dramatic denouement which is deliberately structured as a focal point of the related incident concerning Gn. Marcius. The entire episode is thus perhaps also an example of compression of historical narrative in Dio.

Caesar’s speech at Vesontio (DC 38.36-46) illustrates that Dio may utilize even a published speech if he finds the opportunity suitable for unfolding a set oration, even if his oration is based mostly on a creative exploitation of *τόποι*. The speech has attracted wide scholarly interest and its interpretations vary, from the oration being the reflection of Dio’s “views on Roman expansionism” to an “example of persuasive rhetoric.”¹⁰⁷ Significantly for my thesis, the comparison of Caesar’s *Commentarii* and Dio should convince us that it is Dio’s independent artistic effort,¹⁰⁸ and that he followed a purely rhetorical purpose in recycling Caesar’s material. The chief rationale behind this assertion has been stressed throughout this chapter, for which I find yet another confirmation in that Burgess has chosen this speech in order to illustrate how epideictic *τόποι* are used in exhortation

¹⁰⁶ Libourel 1968, 104.

¹⁰⁷ For bibliographic references, see Kemezis 2006, 113, n. 332. The most recent work providing detailed analysis of the Vesontio speech is Rees 2011, 213-28. He, for example, claims that “Dio ‘shows’ Caesar here exploiting his command for the personal and political credit after which he lusts. The war is displayed as the result of his *ἐπιθυμία* and his *φιλοτιμία*, and it is a clear case of Caesar using military might, his ability to manipulate and handle other men and his leadership skills to achieve goals that are otherwise very questionable” (ibid., 228).

¹⁰⁸ Rees 2011, 213: “Dio’s account differs noticeably from Caesar’s.”

speeches in historians: out of twelve common *τόποι* for this kind of speech, Caesar's oration at Vesontio in Dio employs seven.¹⁰⁹ While the *oratio obliqua* of Caesar's speech in *De bello Gallico* is itself constructed largely of rhetorical commonplaces, Dio's version departs from it significantly even in its "factual" part. For example, the "original" Caesar starts the speech with the (pretended) supposition that Ariovistus was seeking friendship with the Roman people and that, therefore, the war was not impending (Caes. *Gal.* 1.40.2-3). In Dio, conversely, Caesar depicts Ariovistus as the Romans' bitterest enemy.¹¹⁰ This discrepancy merits some attention because Dio here substantially departs just not from any literary predecessor, but from the supposedly original, first-hand source of the *commentarii* which arguably have the authority of a documentary source.¹¹¹

I have already noted that Dio does not use the speeches of other historians as a source for the narrative part of his history and that, when borrowing from the published sources,

¹⁰⁹ Burgess 1902, 212-13. For the discussion of Thucydidean and Demosthenic influences on this speech that further confirm my hypothesis, see Rees 2011, 217-20. The speech itself could be divided into two parts; the composition of the first part (DC 38.36-41) rests for the most part on rhetorical stock elements. Dio's Caesar, responding to soldiers' concerns as to whether the war with Ariovistus is warranted, elaborates on the dichotomy of private and public interests and develops the speech into more general contemplations about the questions of duty and patriotism. In the second part of the speech (DC 38.42-46) Caesar turns to more specific discussion of the current situation and shows why the war with Ariovistus is justified from moral and pragmatic aspects.

¹¹⁰ DC 38.42.2: *ὅτι τοίνυν καὶ ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἔχθιστός ἐστιν ἡμῖν, πῶς ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἐλεγχθεῖη ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐποίησεν*; "Now how could it better be proved that he is hostile, nay, most hostile toward us than by what he has done?"

¹¹¹ One possible way to explain the fact that Dio evidently ignored the general layout and argument of Caesar's speech when composing his own version is that he was not familiar with this source. Such is the opinion of few authors (see Rees 2011, 213, n. 3). However, some close parallels are still traceable in both accounts: "[O]ne could cite a host of passages in Dio which paraphrase, indeed on occasion translate, Caesar's narrative ... closely" (McDougall 1991, 618, quoted *via* Rees 2011, 213, n. 3). I believe those parallels are the examples of Dio's habitual intended method of allusion which is employed, in fact, to make the reader aware that Dio knows the original source. Rees examines one important parallel example (2011, 214), but the most striking is Caesar's appeal to his favorite tenth legion at the end of the speech, displaying close similarity in both versions (Caes. *Gal.* 1.40.15 with DC 38.46.3), and especially both authors' comments about the predilection that Caesar had toward this unit. Cf. Caes. *Gal.* 1.40.15: *Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime*, "This legion Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confidence" and DC 38.47.2: *ἐξαίρετον δὲ δὴ τὸ δέκατον στράτευμα ἐποίησατο*, *ὅτι εὖνοιάν πως αἰεὶ αὐτοῦ εἶχεν*, "He had specially singled out the tenth legion because for some reason he always felt kindly toward it."

he recycles the material freely according to his esthetic aims. We must conclude that not only the speeches which are Dio's own inventions, but also speeches found in other authors were perceived by Dio as belonging to the sub-realm of literary embellishment and rhetoric, and not to history proper. Dio makes a clear distinction between the two, and I have mentioned a reality in which the methods of interpretation, stylistic arrangement, and recording of "hard" historical facts differ considerably from the methods employed for composition of the speeches. This shall help explain the absence of fully developed speeches in the last ten books of the history. These speeches were probably still in the memory of Dio's generation or existed in the form closest to the original and thus still truly belonged to the historical sphere. This circumstance precluded Dio from using them as material for rhetorical treatment in its various forms: these speeches were still too conspicuously tied to the personality of the original speaker and context to allow enough room for free rhetorical invention. Thus this discrepancy seems to dramatize Dio's primary interest when including speeches into his work.

Caesar's speech at Vesontio illustrates how deeply this principle is embedded in Dio's historical method. In Dio's mind, *De bello Gallico* is in the first place a literary source and, probably (as in the case with Cicero's *Philippics*), was under suspicion as having undergone alteration as literary treatment, experienced some amount of stylistic polishing, and been "contaminated" by author's prejudices. Therefore, Dio shows no regard for the fact the speech came from a work written by the original speaker. Nevertheless, Dio was interested in the speech occasion. Dio found the circumstances surrounding the Vesontio episode proper material for a *suasoria*, and the concrete historical example provided the fitting

frame for the display of rhetorical sophistication and for the exploitation of the potential for persuasive argumentation.¹¹² The topic of this *suasoria* could be surmised as follows: Caesar turns the accusation of personal ambition (*ἰδία φιλοτιμία*) into the successful war propaganda.¹¹³

One important point for understanding Dio's use of the third pattern (recycling and reinterpreting the orations found in other literary sources) is that Dio's methodology and his view of the function of speeches did not compel him to include one on every occasion documented in other historical works.¹¹⁴ Selection of the proper juncture for a speech is therefore carefully weighed. In the process of this selection, certain considerations sometimes prevail for Dio over and beyond the habit of "skirting round" published speeches (which has been suggested as being the dominant tendency in Dio). They might

¹¹² Similar conclusions could be extrapolated on the Boudicca's speech (DC 61.3-6) which finds its counterpart in Tacitus (*Ann.* 14.35.1-2). Cf. Adler 2008, 178: "Such speeches [exhortations before the battle] contain certain stock elements and themes in common, which suggests that dramatic and rhetorical considerations weighed heavily on their inclusion." See the comparative analysis in Adler (*ibid.*, 173-95) for both further confirmation of my general thesis and for some different opinions.

¹¹³ On propaganda, see Kemezis 2006, 113-14. Cf. Dio's remarks before and after the speech. Before, DC 38.35.2: *καὶ ἐθρύλουν ὅτι πόλεμον οὔτε προσήκοντα οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν ἀναιροῦντο, καὶ προσεπηπείλουν ἐγκαταλείψειν αὐτόν, ἂν μὴ μεταβάληται*, "And the talk was that they were undertaking a war which was none of their business and had not been decreed, merely on account of Caesar's personal ambition; and they threatened also to desert him if he did not change his course." After, DC 38.47.1: *Ταῦτα τοῦ Καίσαρος εἰπόντος οὐ μόνον οὐδεὶς ἀντείπεν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τινες τάναντία σφίσιν ἐγίγνωσκον, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνήνεσαν πάντες, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ δι' ὑποψίας αὐτῷ ὄντες, λογοποιεῖν ἃ ἤκουσαν*, "At the end of this speech of Caesar's not only did no one raise an objection, even if some thought altogether the opposite, but they all agreed, especially those who were suspected by him, to spread the ideas they had heard."

¹¹⁴ As has been argued in this chapter, speeches do not serve the purpose of advancing a narrative, nor they are the instrument of causation or to the true extent are they the means of personal characterization (unlike the usage of other historians). So Gowing (1992, 217) asserts, when talking about the instances when a speech is omitted in Dio where the fact of its delivery is, however, referenced: "They [speeches in Dio] fulfill ... no profound purpose but are mentioned simply because expected." Also, this is why Rees and Stekelenburg reach completely different conclusions about Caesar's speeches in Dio. Rees examining the Vesontio speech asserts that it is in keeping with the character of Caesar as Dio portrays him in the main narrative and "relevant to the speaker and to the situation" (Rees 2011, 228). Stekelenburg, contrary to that judgment, insists that Caesar's speech at Placentia (DC 41.27-35) is full of "worn-out clichés" and does not correspond to the real *persona* of Caesar: "His [Dio's] Caesar speech cannot stand the test of acceptability because Dio has attributed to Caesar a dimension which never was his, but purely the author's: that of a moralising dabbler" (Stekelenburg 1976, 58).

have several explanations: Dio may have found the historical occasion already covered in other historians still too attractive for unfolding a certain type of *προγυμνάσματα* of his own, or too compelling for investing his version of a speech with a new, unexplored set of moral arguments. Or he was drawn by an opportunity for the introduction of a fresh combination of *τόποι* that would fit the situation in some original way. Concerns for balancing the distribution of speeches throughout the work were apparently of importance to Dio.¹¹⁵ Dio's own perception of whether the speech was well-known or available in his time (in the sense so as to determine to which extent his own version would have a share of novelty) naturally differed from our modern perception as well. In addition, the polemical aspect as a motivating factor for recycling known speeches should not be excluded: "For the writer was to see himself not just as an imitator, but also as a competitor. Critics often explain a writer's achievement by his conscious efforts to rival his predecessors."¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ As evident from, for example, Schwartz' catalogue of Dio's speeches in *RE* 3, col. 1717-19.

¹¹⁶ Marincola 1997, 13; cf. Brock 1995, 219.

4.3. PAIDEUSIS: DIO'S HISTORY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIS TIME

Modern scholars are somewhat wary of the conclusion that the speeches in historiography, and particularly in Dio, were specimens of “empty rhetoric”, rhetoric for its own sake. They try to counterbalance the apparent observation about the rhetorical and commonplace character of speeches with the attempts to find the traces of other meaningful discourses in them. For example, among customary conclusions is that through speeches, which were the vessels of historical *exempla*, ancient historians attempted to re-examine the relation of present to past, redefine the meaning and purpose of history.¹¹⁷ Yet Adler, analyzing the speech of Boudicca in Dio, remarks: “Overall, modern scholars have been less likely to view this speech – or almost any other penned by Dio – as concerned with much more than ostentatious displays of philosophical musings and oratorical common places.”¹¹⁸ However, just to be qualified as a skilled rhetorician, one who composed speeches mainly for the sake of rhetorical display, would not, perhaps, bear all our negative modern connotations for Dio and his contemporaries. What is, then, the meaning of this clear tendency in Dio to elevate the speeches to the highest level of abstract discourse and construct them according to the conventions developed in school rhetorical declamations on historical topics?¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Marincola 2010, esp. 266-69 and 289.

¹¹⁸ Adler 2008, 184.

¹¹⁹ As Gibson showed (2004, esp. 124), these types of conclusions could be extended to much classical and especially post-classical historiography as well. The tight connection between the modes of rhetoric discourse of the *προγυμνάσματα*, on the one hand, and historiographical discourse, on the other, has been pointed out in scholarship, but modern historiography lacks methodology to undertake the analyses intended to show “how ancient historians used the formal blocks of the progymnasmata to construct their histories” (ibid.). In this chapter, I have merely tried to show how Dio’s speeches serve as an illustration of this fundamental, in my opinion, principle, voiced by Gibson. Dio’s speeches call for more extensive and careful rhetorical analysis that could potentially correlate every speech in Dio with a certain type of *προγυμνάσματα*. I have attempted to do so only with a few, and the most ready, cases.

Indeed, one may raise the objection, his *Ρωμαϊκά* was not intended as a text-book on *προγυμνάσματα*.

In a sense, however, this last statement may not be as far-fetched as it seems. Let us briefly consider the historical and intellectual conditions of Dio's time under which a contemporary historical work would enter into wide circulation. According to his own testimony, Dio sent a draft of one of his first historical endeavors, a history of the Severan age, to Severus himself and to some friends, and this work was praised by them:

καὶ ἐπειδὴ γε τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Σεουήρῳ μάλιστα ἤρεσε, τότε δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις προσήκοντα συνθεῖναι ἐπεθύμησα. (DC 73(72).23.3)

And inasmuch as it won the high approval, not only of others, but, in particular, of Severus himself, I then conceived a desire to compile a record of everything else that concerned the Romans.

The question of Dio's audience becomes most important for ascertaining his methodology, although at the same time one of the most complicated problems for a student of Dio: "It is difficult to assess how many people actually read historical accounts like those of Herodian or Dio Cassius (or listened to public readings of these accounts)."¹²⁰ However, the circle of Dio's friends, even if including such figure as the emperor, cannot be envisaged as Dio's only intended audience, as this readership was not quite commensurate with the ambition of Dio's undertaking:

τὴν δὲ δὴ θεὸν ταύτην ... καὶ καλὰς ἐλπίδας περὶ τοῦ μελλοντος χρόνου διδοῦσάν μοι ὥς ὑπολειπομένου τὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀμαυρώσοντος. (DC 73(72).23.4)

This goddess ... inspires me with fair hopes that future time will permit my history to survive and never dim its lustre.

¹²⁰ Schmitz 1999, 90.

This is Dio's version of Thucydides' famous formulation regarding the enduring significance of his work: *κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ* (Thuc. 1.22.4). But how could this goal ever be achievable in Dio's time? As Gibson has convincingly argued, on the one hand, the contemporary school curriculum (which was geared to rhetoric, an all-embracing type of intellectual activity under the Second Sophistic) played a formative role for development of the standards of discourse used by historians.¹²¹ On the other hand, however, the rhetorical schools and the system of education in general was one of the major ways through which the historical works were reaching their readers. Apart from the declamation of parts of history by authors themselves, the classroom was a very important setting for history to be learned and discussed.¹²² In other words, during the Second Sophistic, it was in rhetorical contexts that historiography was consumed as a literary product. Rhetorical treatises of the first and second centuries CE recommend historical works in general and certain passages from them in particular as specimens for instruction and imitation.¹²³ One may surmise that if Dio hoped for long-lasting glory of this work, Dio must have realized that one of the surest ways for his history to survive was to become discussed, referenced, and eventually imitated in the rhetorical schools.

Although this assertion might seem somewhat speculative, in *Ῥωμαϊκά* there are traces which show an attempt at adaptation of the compositional structure of the work for use in the schools. Composing the speeches according to conventions developed for different

¹²¹ Gibson 2004, 126: "[H]istory, much less the writing of history, was not a subject studied in the schools. Rhetoric was. In fact it was *the* subject. At its worst, rhetoric could encourage artificiality, bombast, even unforgivably deceptive treatment of historical people and events. ... Rhetoric shaped every aspect of the composition process, from initial selection of topic to final draft."

¹²² Ancient *testimonia* of this practice are also extant, e.g., Sen. *Con.* 10 *Praef.* 8. On the declamation of history, see Schmitz 1999.

¹²³ Gibson 2004, 108-18.

kinds of *προγυμνάσματα* has been the object of analysis of this chapter. Also, as Aalders observed, Dio shows special interest, particularly in the early books of the history, with the Roman magistrates and political institutions. Aalders rightly points out that these “elaborate expositions” would be superfluous for Roman educated elite while, concomitantly, I suspect that “ordinary Greeks ... reasonably educated ... but with a rather vague knowledge of the history of the overruling Roman empire” are an equally unlikely target audience.¹²⁴ At the same time, the students, young representatives of the Roman elite in the future, would seem the most appropriate addressees of such digressions in Dio. In addition, in Dio we observe the organization of material into clusters, easily separable from the context. This phenomenon not only embraces, for example, ethnographic sketches, abundant in Dio, but also episodes which receive a special dramatic or dynamic treatment, like the description of Sulla’s proscriptions (fr. 109.6-21).¹²⁵ In these episodes, we may surmise deliberate organization of the text in such manner to serve the purposes of quick reference (and also for imitation, as in the case of the account of Sulla’s proscriptions). We shall note exactly this kind of justification in a remark with which Dio, having enumerated the Augustan legions, prefaces the list of legions that were organized after Augustus:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἅπαξ ἐς τὸν περὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων λόγον προήχθην, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ νῦν ὄντα, ὥς που πρὸς τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα αὐταρχησάντων κατελέχθη, φράσω, ἵν’ ἐνὶ χωρίῳ πάντα γεγράμμενα ῥαδίως τὸν βουλόμενόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν μαθεῖν διδάσκη. (DC 55.24.1)

¹²⁴ Aalders 1986, 290-91.

¹²⁵ Millar (1964, 43) – unusually – holds this passage in high regard for its stylistic and dramatic qualities: “But above all there is his [Dio’s] account of the proscriptions carried out by Sulla, which comes near to being a piece of great writing... But, dramatic as is the detail which he uses ... it is conspicuous that the passage contains not a name nor a figure nor any indication of the course of events. The design is to create a certain emotional climate, not to reproduce particular facts.”

Now that I have been once led into giving an account of the legions, I shall speak of the other legions also which exist to-day and tell of their enlistment by the emperors subsequent to Augustus, my purpose being that, if any one desires to learn about them, the statement of all the facts in a single portion of my book may provide him easily with the information.

Especially notable is Dio's word choice here: *μαθεῖν, διδάσκη*. It would be highly improbable that Severus and his *amici*, although the only certain readers explicitly attested by Dio himself, were the implied subjects for this *διδάσκω*. It is rather the classroom setting that Dio has in mind – so strongly does this word suggest the connotation of formal teaching or training. Finally, it is by no coincidence that *παιδείσεις* is at the very core of Dio's historical method, as I have interpreted it in the first chapter. *Παίδευσις*, after all, is the ultimate goal of the history:

καὶ γὰρ καὶ *παιδείσεις* ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχῃ καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ. (DC 46.35.1)

For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts.

The similar *educational rhetoric* and, in fact, the idea of the importance and significance of good *education in rhetoric*, permeates Dio's history: it becomes a very important criterion in the characterization of individuals for ascertaining their personal motivations. Of

Victorinus, a city prefect under Commodus, Dio says:

... καίπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μάρκου ἐν τοῖς πάνυ τιμηθείς, καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ τῶν λόγων παρασκευῇ οὐδενὸς τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν δεύτερος γενόμενος. ἀμέλει δύο ταῦτ' εἰπὼν πάντα τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ δηλώσω. (DC 73(72).11.2)

... and yet he had been honoured among the foremost men by Marcus, and in point of moral excellence and forensic eloquence stood second to none of his contemporaries. Indeed, two incidents that I shall now relate will reveal this whole character.

The educational discourse is present in Dio's speeches, e.g., Tiberius' eulogy for Augustus:

ἐκείνῳ τε γὰρ εὐκλείαν ἐξαίρετον λεχθέντα οἴσει, καὶ ὑμῶν τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡδονὴν ἄμεμπτον ποιήσει, τοῖς δὲ νεωτέροις διδασκαλίαν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ τε τρόπου καὶ τῆς καταστάσεως τῆς πολιτείας παρέξει. (DC 56.37.7)

For the recounting of them will not only confer upon him [Augustus] a unique glory, but will also afford the older men among you a pleasure unalloyed while giving the younger men most excellent instruction in the character and constitution of our government.

The phraseology of the last quote is, of course, is an old *τόπος* going back to Thucydidean idiom.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, if my insights are correct, Dio's history betrays the traces of a system of references pertaining to the learning experience, to a kind of intellectual edification based on a studying of already then "classical" literature. Modern historical scholarship tends to overlook as a factor of influence on historiography an intellectual discourse in its own right – that of the formal education with its own traditions, system of conventions, rules, and meta-language. We may gain a new and fresh interpretation of Dio's historical endeavor if, when reading *Ῥωμαϊκά*, we keep in mind the supposition that Dio composed a work that needed to correspond to the intellectual requirements which were set by – first and foremost – the educational system of his time. From this point of view, speeches, even if completely divorced from the historical context, would not be thought of as "empty rhetoric" – and I do not think we should ever be apprehensive of the conclusion that Dio's speeches were a sort of *ars gratia artis*. In Dio's history, instead of being an instrument of historical analysis, speeches refer the reader to another, no less meaningful, discourse. The vector of such reference is not the historical, but literary or, more generally, intellectual reality, the knowledge of and interest in which Dio shared with his readership.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Cf., e.g., Thuc. 2.36.4.

¹²⁷ These two discourses coexist in Dio's work and are intertwined in peculiar ways. For example, notice Dio's usage of a well-known literary reference when talking about the very end of his political career (Gowing 1992,

Therefore, Dio's deliberate and pervasive intertextuality with, say, Thucydides should not be mistaken for crude imitation. Conversely, this intertextuality, through the system of references to Thucydides (also, as we saw, to other authors), allows Dio to position himself firmly in the context of ancient classical historiography and rhetoric as well as underscore his intellectual authority. For Dio to be able to demonstrate his original features of composition, experiment with the rhetorical devices, freely and playfully employ *mimesis* balancing on the verge of factual, probable, and possible; to be able to revamp Cicero's *Philippics* into one single speech – is only possible when both Dio and his readers are aware of the same system of literary and rhetorical coordinates. Both have acquired a good idea about such a system through participation in the same milieu of formal education of the Second Sophistic.

20): "Advised to do so by τὸ δαιμόνιον, Cassius Dio concludes his *Roman History* with a quotation from the *Iliad*, thereby directing a parting shot at the Roman political scene in which he had spent most of his life...:

Hector anon did Zeus lead forth out of the range of the missiles,
Out of the dust and the slaying of men and the blood and the uproar.

Il. 11.163-64

This accurately conveys the mood in Dio's Rome. At least as he describes it, Rome was a veritable battleground where senators either submitted to frequently tyrannical emperors or perished. Retirement to his native Bithynia provided respite from the pressures of public life..."

CONCLUSION

Dio lived in an unquiet historical epoch, amidst rapid and dramatic political changes. When Dio started his historical work, originally conceived as a project covering only contemporary to Dio Severan period of Roman history, he was bound to undertake a historical analysis of the present-day events, of which the cause-and-effect relations were not yet quite apparent; since the tumult, anxiety, and uncertainty of Dio's age barely left any room for teleological approach to history-writing. In more trivial terms, for Dio and other intellectuals, it was, perhaps, extremely hard to make sense of what was for them modernity; Dio's lifetime could hardly provide a historian a stable and simply peaceful intellectual ground for historical reflection whereby the contemporary events could be seen as a part of some grand design that followed its own logic or purpose. Nevertheless, Dio offered his own interpretation of various historico-political occurrences of the second-third century CE. It was based on certain, peculiar to him, intellectual-analytic principles which underscored personal element as causational factor in history. In order to give expression to his idiosyncratic historical outlook, Dio still had to employ the old, traditional but tested by time historiographic devices, methods, and techniques, borrowed from classical exemplars of history-writing and rhetoric – thus dictated the intellectual *Zeitgeist* of the Second Sophistic.

One of such devices were *gnomai*, a true hallmark of Dio's methodology and an important, but often overlooked, compositional element in his history. The abundance of maxims in *Ῥωμαϊκά*, perhaps, led the modern scholars to the postulation of Dio's

adherence to old historical conceptions based on determinism or belief in unchanging character of human nature. And indeed: taken in abstraction, each aphorism by definition seems to underscore the inevitability and repeatability in recurrence of certain patterns of human behavior which, for a historian, would determine the historical process in general.

The historical context of Dio's lifetime has necessitated some adjustments this type of approach to historical interpretation. On the one hand, Dio was aware of the paradoxical feature of *gnomai*: what is represented in one aphorism as a universal irrefutable wisdom may often be convincingly contradicted in another. Men are prone to cowardliness, brutality, and envy, but also often display outstanding audacity, humaneness, and altruism. On the other hand, human nature and its laws are understood by Dio in broader terms; in his history he repeatedly illustrated that inherent human traits, albeit universal, often determine different outcomes in different sets of situations. For this reason, it is the individuality which becomes the focus of Dio's inquisitive interest in his history. Dio, of course, admits to the existence of certain common behavioral traits in humanity, but it must not, in his view, contradict his observations regarding unpredictability of actions and decisions of individuals, which could be determined by a plethora of psychological factors, individual traits of character, inherent virtues and vices of a person, and – important for Dio – his or her education (sometimes, naturally, simply by a blind coincidence). However, in Dio's view, these factors, except the latter, are calculable (at least in retrospect), and he does not hide his keen interest in tracing the reasons of historical events back to the individual motivations. Not once Dio hints to a possible alternative outcome of an event: Salvius Julianus, a popular general, a man "of great renown", could have easily made away

with Commodus right after M. Aurelius' death. He did not do so "because of his own probity and because of the good will that he bore to Marcus."¹

Yet the contemporary history only constituted roughly one eighth of the whole text of *Ῥωμαϊκά*. I contend that the methodology adopted by Dio in his first historical work on civil wars of 193 (the one presented to Severus) also informed his intellectual approaches to the entirety of *Ῥωμαϊκά*, including the parts of which dealt with ancient past. Dio did not share the Livian view that antiquity was a lot of poets;² for Dio the distant past could be subjected to the historical analysis based on rational principles (for the last time, let us recall Dio's formula: "when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts").³ When Dio applied his methodology to the analyses of the events of the distant past, he incurred certain difficulties. How could Dio ascertain the information about the personal character or motivations of, say, Romulus? His usual method of inference was not always applicable in such cases because of the peculiarities of the source-material on which Dio was bound to rely, such as the legendary character of the stories firmly petrified with the old historiographic conventions. Because of this we may observe in the earlier books that *gnomai* are used not to verify or validate Dio's explanations, but substituted the explanations themselves. Traditional for annalistic historiography element — portents, dreams, and prodigies — appeared incompatible with the system of historical

¹ DC 73(72).5.1-2.

² Livy *Praef.* 6.

³ DC 46.35.1.

causation as it was understood by Dio, hence his seemingly ambiguous and contradictory stance on “the precise nature of divine will’s role in terrestrial affairs.”⁴

According to one opinion, Livy, a rhetor and a writer, did not research Roman history, instead, he recounted it.⁵ Dio, a scholar and politician, prioritized his historical tasks differently. Yet, the influence of rhetoric on Dio’s work should not be underestimated. In the spirit of Dio’s time, speeches in *Ῥωμαϊκά* are abundant, elaborated, and reach the highest level of abstraction but also of rhetorical sophistication. In his work, Dio quaintly combined but at the same time strictly differentiated two discourses: historical and literary (i.e. factual and rhetorical). This feature may be difficult for us to grasp since we are accustomed to establishing clear generic boundaries and, in general, compartmentalizing the scholarship. At any rate Dio’s speeches are a part of his literary (rhetorical) contribution to the historiography. However, as long as the speeches that have been pronounced relatively recently were still fresh in the memory of the contemporaries, their potential audience, they remained in the historical (factual) domain, and Dio refrained from subjecting these to literary elaboration — this may explain the absence of long speeches in the last decade of *Ῥωμαϊκά* (unless it is a result of the editorial decisions of the epitomators). Coexistence of these two discourses in Dio’s historical work is only possible when Dio’s reader is aware of the system of markers which signify the switch from one mode of narration to another.

This paradoxical duality is characteristic of the mind of the Roman politician and historian of the time of Greek intellectual revival known as the Second Sophistic. Dio,

⁴ Adler 2012, 501.

⁵ Mashkin 2006, 22.

while remaining within the restricting boundaries of the historiographic and rhetorical traditions, was, nevertheless, in search for new and creative ways of interpreting and preserving the historical past.

APPENDIX I

EDITORIAL ASIDES IN DIO

I suggest the following typological classification of the methodological pronouncements in Dio. We distinguish eight thematic trends in Dio's editorial asides, but each aside may address several such themes. They are: (1) *Selection criteria*, or simply *selection* in the table below: a very common type of editorial aside, where Dio shares the principles for selection of his material, inclusion or omission of certain information. (2) *Appeal to truth*. (3) *Source-criticism*: here I have included all comments directly or indirectly pertaining to Dio's sources. (4) *Aims of history*. (5) *Compositional design*, or simply *composition*: under this category I recorded the textual *testimonia* regarding Dio's rationales for arranging the material in a certain way or order; within which deserving of special interest are cross-references within the work which emphasize the compositional unity of Dio's history. (6) *Personal opinion*: under this heading, I have collected authorial remarks in which Dio himself underscored his authorship of comments, ideas, or judgments. (7) *Procedure*: editorial asides whereby Dio reveals his intellectual procedures and the logic behind his editorial decisions where he has dealt with problematic instances of causation, absence of reliable source information, or variant versions of events. (8) *Meta-reflection* (*meta* in the table): this term shall designate Dio's reflections on what constitutes a proper historiographic work, his examination of the function of its constituents, such as, for example, speeches, records of dreams, portents, and prodigies, anecdotes, ethnographic sketches etc.

#	Place/Page in Cary	Translation	Category
1	1 fr. 1.2 (1. 3)	Although I have read pretty nearly everything about them that has been written by anybody, I have not included it all in my history, but only what I have seen fit to select. I trust, moreover, that if I have used a fine style, as far as the subject matter permitted, no one on this account question the truthfulness of the narrative, as has happened in the case of some writers; for I have endeavoured to be equally exact in both these respects, so far as possible. I will begin at the point where I have obtained the clearest accounts of what is reported to have taken place in this land which we inhabit.	Selection, Meta (style), Appeal to truth, Source- criticism
2	1 fr. 2.4 (1.7-9)	Concerning the Etruscans Dio says: "These facts about them have properly been recorded at this point in the story; elsewhere still other facts will be mentioned from time to time, in their proper places, whenever the course of the history, in setting forth the successive incidents, shall involve them. And this same principle must suffice also in the case of other essential facts. For, while I shall recount the history of the Romans in full, to the best of my ability, outside that only what has a bearing on their affairs will be recorded."	Selection, Composition, Aims
3	1 fr. 1.1 (1.25)	It is my desire to write a history of all the memorable achievements of the Romans, as well in time of peace as in war, so that no one, whether Roman or non-Roman, shall look in vain for any of the essential facts.	Aims

#	Place/Page in Cary	Translation	Category
4	Zon. 7.9 (1.53)	Both stories are current.	<i>Procedure</i>
5	7 fr. 32 (1.237)	Accordingly, although not accustomed to indulge in digressions, I have taken pains to make mention of this event and have stated in addition the Olympiad, in order that the date of the migration, of which most men are ignorant, may, from the precaution mentioned, become better known.	<i>Meta (digressions), Composition, Selection</i>
6	8 fr. 36.10 (1.255)	Among the many events of human history that might give one cause for wonder must certainly be reckoned what occurred at this time.	<i>Personal opinion, Selection</i>
7	13 fr. 54.10 (2.69)	Now that this is not idle report about him, but truthful tradition, his deeds are proof.	<i>Source- criticism, Appeal to truth</i>
8	14 fr. 57.7 (2.103)	For when people get seriously frightened and certain portents are proved to them really to have occurred, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any one of the former class is believed, immediately the rest likewise are rashly accepted as true.	<i>Meta (miraculous)</i>
9	15 fr. 57.22 (2.135)	I, however, cannot form any opinion either about these events or about others that are foretold by divination. For what does prophesying mean, if a thing is going to occur in any case, and if there can be no averting of it either by human skill or by divine providence? Let each man, then, look at these matters in whatsoever way he pleases.	<i>Procedure, Meta (miraculous)</i>
10	17 fr. 57.71 (2.247)	... and they put a tax on salt, which up to that time had been free of tax. I have mentioned this measure with a special purpose, since Livius designed it to avenge himself upon the citizens for their vote of condemnation; and he received a nickname from it, for he was now called Salinator.	<i>Meta (digressions), Selection</i>
11	36.11.1-2 (3.17-19)	As to how these reached them or how they remained there I cannot discover the truth, since there are various stories, but what I understand clearly I will state.	<i>Procedure</i>
12	37.10.1 (3.117)	In the following year ... the events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions of human affairs.	<i>Selection, Aims</i>
13	37.17.4 (3.129)	Now as for him [the divinity honored by the Jews], who he is and why he has been so honored, and how they got their superstitious awe of him, accounts have been given by many, and moreover these matters have naught to do with this history.	<i>Selection</i>

#	Place/Page in Cary	Translation	Category
14	37.18.1-2 (3.129)	The custom, however, of referring the days to the seven stars called planets was instituted by the Egyptians ... at any rate the ancient Greeks never understood it, so far as I am aware. But since it is now quite the fashion with mankind generally and even with the Romans themselves, and is to them already in a way an ancestral tradition, I wish to write briefly of it.	Selection
15	38.7.6 (3.211-13)	As these laws, now, are very numerous and contribute nothing to this history, I will omit them.	Selection
16	38.13.3 (3.223-25)	... he [Clodius] proposed another law, concerning which it is necessary to speak at some length, so that it may become clearer to the general public.	Selection, Aims
17	38.13.5 (3.225)	The cause of this custom [sky-divination to obstruct popular voting] I am unable to state, but I set down the common report.	Procedure
18	38.28.2 (3.257)	If, then, you wish to become really immortal, like those historians [Xenophon and Thucydides], emulate them. [Used in a speech of Philiskos]	Aims
19	39.17.1 (3.331)	The year before there had occurred an incident of a private nature which, however, had some bearing upon our history.	Selection
20	39.38.5 (3.363)	Whether this is really so or not I do not know; for some in time past have further declared... [Elephants spared during the games when their behavior was interpreted as calling upon heaven]	Procedure
21	40.15.1 (3.427)	Now about their race and their country and their peculiar customs many have written, and I have no intention of describing them. But I will describe their equipment of arms and their method of warfare; for the examination of these details properly concerns the present narrative, since it has come to a point where this knowledge is needed.	Selection, Composition
22	40.31.1 (3.451)	Of the numerous exploits performed either by himself alone or through his lieutenants I will relate only the most important.	Selection
23	41.4.1 (4.7)	After this was over he further aroused them by adding such words as the occasion demanded. [Caesar at Ariminum, 49 BCE]	Meta (speeches)
24	41.14.4 (4.27-29)	No prefect of the city was chosen for the Feriae [49 BCE], as had been the custom, but the praetors, at least according to some accounts, performed all his duties; others, however, say they did this in the following year.	Procedure
25	41.37.1 (4.65)	Having obtained this [extraordinary powers], he [Caesar] at once instituted an important and necessary reform. [Law regulating securities on loans]	Personal opinion, Selection

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26	41.57.1 (4.97)	Therefore they delivered to their soldiers also many exhortations, but very much alike on both sides, saying all that is fitting to be said on such an occasion with reference both to the immediate results of the struggle and to the subsequent results.	Meta (speeches)
27	42.2.5 (4.119)	I have heard, indeed, that Pompey even thought of fleeing to the Parthians, but I cannot credit the report.	Procedure
28	42.19.3-4 (4.145)	I shall omit those honours which had either been voted to some others previously ... or which, while novel and proposed now for the first time, were not confirmed by Caesar, for fear that I might become wearisome, were I to enumerate them all. This same plan I shall follow in my subsequent account, adhering the more strictly to it, as the honours continuously grew more numerous and more absurd. Only such as had some special and extraordinary importance and were confirmed will be related.	Meta, Selection, Composition
29	43.22.4-23.1 (4.251-53)	In honour of this and of his daughter he exhibited combats of wild beasts and gladiators; but anyone who cared to record their number would find his task a burden without being able, in all probability, to present the truth; for all such matters are regularly exaggerated in a spirit of boastfulness. I shall accordingly pass over this and other like events that took place later, except, of course, where it may seem to me quite essential to mention some particular point, but I will give an account of so-called camelopard, because it was then introduced into Rome by Caesar for the first time and exhibited to all.	Selection, Source- criticism, Procedure, Appeal to truth
30	43.24.4 (4.257)	[A]nd two others were slain as a sort of ritual observance. The true cause I am unable to state, inasmuch as the Sybil made no utterance and there was no similar oracle, but at any rate they were sacrificed in the Campus Martius by the pontifices and the priest of Mars.	Procedure
31	43.26.2 (4.259)	Some, indeed, have declared that even more were intercalated, but the truth is as I have stated it.	Procedure, Source- criticism, Appeal to truth
32	43.43.5 (4.289)	This I have written by way of digression from my history, so that no one might be ignorant of any of the stories told about Caesar.	Selection, Meta (digressions), Aims

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33	43.46.6 (4.295)	Accordingly, in the case of the other consuls I shall name only those who were closely connected with the events mentioned, but in order to secure perfect clearness with regard to the succession of events, I shall mention also those who first held office in each year, even if they make no contribution to its events. [Explaining the meaning of the term "suffect consuls"]	Composition, Selection, Meta (clarity of narration)
34	43.51.4 (4.305)	And praetors were appointed to the number of sixteen; it is not of this, however, that I would write, since there had formerly been just as many, but of the fact that among those chosen was Publius Ventidius.	Selection, Meta (digressions)
35	44.14.3-4 (4.331)	There is no need to give a full list of the names, for I might thus become wearisome, but I cannot omit to mention Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who was also called Junius and Albinus. For these joined the plot against Caesar, notwithstanding that they also had received many benefits at his hands.	Selection, Meta (tediousness of narration)
36	44.19.5 (4.339)	This is the truest account, though some have added that to Brutus, when he struck him a powerful blow, he [Caesar] said: "Thou, too, my son?"	Source- criticism, Appeal to truth
37	45.16.1 (4.435-37)	Besides these events which took place that year, Servilius Isauricus died at a very advanced age. I have mentioned him both for this reason and to show how the Romans of that period respected men who were prominent through merit and hated those who behaved insolently.	Selection, Procedure, Meta (indirectly)
38	46.35.1 (5.69)	I shall now go on to describe the separate events. For it seems to me to be particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of the former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts.	Aims, Procedure
39	46.47.8 (5.97)	For although he acquired another name also, — that of Augustus, — and the emperors who succeeded him consequently assumed it also, that one will be described when it comes up in the history, and until then the title Caesar will be sufficient to show that Octavianus is indicated.	Procedure
40	47.3.3 (5.121)	Everything that had been done before in the days of Sulla occurred also at this time, except that only two white tablets were posted, one for the senators and one for the others. The reason for this I have not been able to learn from anyone else or to find out myself; for the only reason that might occur to one, namely, that fewer were to be put to death, is by no means true, since many more names were posted, owing to the fact that there were more persons making the lists.	Procedure, Aims (indirectly), Appeal to truth

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41	47.10.1 (5.135)	I shall accordingly refrain from giving an accurate and detailed description of all such incidents, since this would be a vast undertaking and there would be no great gain to my history, but shall relate what I regard as most worthy of remembrance.	Selection, Procedure, Meta
42	48.13.1 (5.245)	The most of these [military] operations, especially those involving no great or memorable achievement, I will pass over, but will relate briefly the points which are most worthy of mention.	Selection
43	49.4.1-4 (5.347-49)	Caesar's forces were at last victorious, but they did not give chase. The reason, as it appears to me and as may with probability be conjectured, was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running ashore, since the coast abounded in shoals with which they were unacquainted; but some assert that Agrippa thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries, since he was fighting for Caesar and not for himself. For he was wont to say to his intimate friends that most men in positions of power wish no one to be superior to themselves, but attend personally without the use of agents to most matters – to all, in fact, that afford them an easy victory – and assign the more difficult and extraordinary tasks to others. ... His advice, therefore, was that the man who expected to come out alive should relieve his masters of undertakings which involve great difficulty and reserve for them the successes. As for me, I know that all this is naturally so and that Agrippa paid heed to these principles, but I am not saying that on that particular occasion this was the reason for his failure to pursue; for he would not have been able to catch up with the foe no matter how much he might have desired it.	Procedure (of causation)
44	50.11.6 (5.461-63)	I have even heard the report that he actually transported triremes from the outer sea to the gulf by way of the fortifications, using newly flayed hides smeared with olive oil instead of runways, yet I am unable to name any exploit of these ships inside the gulf and therefore cannot believe the tradition; for it certainly would have been no small task to draw triremes over so narrow and uneven a tract of land on hides. Nevertheless, this feat is said to have been accomplished in the manner described.	Source- criticism, Procedure
45	51.1.1-2 (6.3-5)	Such was the naval battle in which they engaged on the second of September. I do not mention this date without a particular reason, nor am I, in fact, accustomed to do so; but Caesar now for the first time held all the power alone, and consequently the years of his reign are properly reckoned from that day.	Procedure
46	51.7.2 (6.21)	Indeed, I cannot but marvel that, while a great many others, though they had received numerous gifts from Antony and Cleopatra, now left them in the lurch, yet the men who were being kept for gladiatorial combats, who were among the most despised, showed the utmost zeal in their behalf and fought most bravely.	Personal opinion, Procedure

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47	51.22.9 (6.67)	On one of the days of this celebration the senators gave banquets in the vestibules of their several homes; but what the occasion was for their doing this, I do not know, since it is not recorded.	<i>Procedure</i>
48	51.27.2-3 (6.77)	All these operations took a long time; but the facts I record, as well as the names, are in accordance with the tradition which has been handed down. In ancient times, it is true, Moesians and Getae occupied all the land between Haemus and the Ister; but as time went on some of them changed their names, and since then there have been included under the name of Moesia all the tribes living above Dalmatia, Macedonia, and Thrace, and separated from Pannonia by the Savus, a tributary of the Ister.	<i>Source-criticism,</i> <i>Procedure</i>
49	52.1.1 (6.79)	Such were the achievements of the Romans and such their sufferings under the kingship, under the republic and under the dominion of a few, during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years.	<i>Aims</i>
50	53.12.8-9 (6.221)	This same course was followed subsequently in the case of other provinces also, as the progress of my narrative will show; but I have enumerated these provinces in this way because at the present time each one of them is governed separately, whereas in the beginning and for a long period thereafter they were administered two and three together. The others I have not mentioned because some of them were acquired later, and the rest, even if they were already subjugated, were not being governed by the Romans, but either had been left autonomous or had been attached to some kingdom or other.	<i>Selection,</i> <i>Procedure</i>
51	53.14.5-7 (6.229)	For it should be stated that there is a class who ... are sent to the provinces styled the "provinces of the senate and people," — I mean those who serve either as quaestors, being designated by lot to this office, or as assessors [<i>legati</i>] to those who hold the actual authority. For this would be the correct way for me to style these officials, having regard not to their name, but to their duties as just described, although others in hellenizing their title call these also "envoys." ... As to assessors in general, each governor chooses his own, the ex-praetors selecting one from their peers or even from their inferiors, and the ex-consuls three from among those of equal rank, subject to the emperor's approval. For, although a certain change was made in regard to these men also, yet it soon lapsed and it will be sufficient to mention it at the proper time.	<i>Procedure,</i> <i>Source-criticism,</i> <i>Composition</i>
52	53.19 (6.243-45)	Nevertheless, the events occurring after this time can not be recorded in the same manner as those of previous times. Formerly, as we know, all matters were reported to the senate and to the people, even if they happened at a distance; hence all learned of them and many recorded them, and consequently the truth regarding them, no matter to what extent fear or favour, friendship or enmity, coloured the reports of certain writers, was always to a certain extent to be found in the works of the other	<i>Procedure,</i> <i>Source-criticism</i>

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		<p>writers who wrote of the same events and in the public records. But after this time most things that happened began to be kept secret and concealed, and even though some things are perchance made public, they are distrusted just because they can not be verified; for it is suspected that everything is said and done with reference to the wishes of the men in power at the time and of their associates. As a result, much that never occurs is noised abroad, and much that happens beyond a doubt is unknown, and in the case of nearly every event a version gains currency that is different from the way it really happened. Furthermore, the very magnitude of the empire and the multitude of things that occur render accuracy in regard to them most difficult. In Rome, for example, much is going on, and much in the subject territory, while, as regards our enemies, there is something happening all the time, in fact, every day, and concerning these things no one except the participants can easily have correct information, and most people do not even hear of them at all. Hence in my own narrative of later events, so far as they need to be mentioned, everything that I shall say will be in accordance with the reports that have been given out, whether it be really the truth or otherwise. In addition to these reports, however, my own opinion will be given, as far as possible, whenever I have been able, from the abundant evidence which I have gathered from my reading, from hearsay, and from what I have seen, to form a judgment that differs from the common report.</p>	
53	53.21.1-3 (6.247-49)	<p>Augustus ... enacted many laws. I need not enumerate them all accurately one by one, but only those which have a bearing upon my history; and I shall follow this same course also in the case of later events, in order not to become wearisome by introducing all that kind of detail that even the men who devote themselves to such studies do not know to a nicety.</p>	Selection, Procedure, Meta
54	53.22.3-4 (6.251-53)	<p>For I am unable to distinguish between the two funds, no matter how extensively Augustus coined into money silver statues of himself which had been set up by certain of his friends and by certain of the subject peoples, purposing thereby to make it appear that all the expenditures which he claimed to be making were from his own means. Therefore I have no opinion to record as to whether a particular emperor on a particular occasion got the money from the public funds or gave it himself. For both courses were frequently followed; and why should one enter such expenditures as loans or as gifts respectively, when both the people and the emperor are constantly resorting to both the one and the other indiscriminately?</p>	Procedure

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55	54.15.1-4 (6.319)	It is not possible, of course, for those on the outside to have certain knowledge of such matters; for whatever measures a ruler takes, either personally or through the senate, for the punishment of men for alleged plots against himself, are generally looked upon with suspicion as having been done out of spite, no matter how just such measures may be. For this reason it is my purpose to report in all such cases simply the recorded version of the affair, without busying myself with anything beyond the published account, except in perfectly patent cases, or giving a hint as to the justice or injustice of the act or as to the truth or falsity of the report. Let this explanation apply also to everything that I shall write hereafter.	<i>Procedure, Appeal to truth</i>
56	54.23.1-2 (6.339)	This same year Vedius Pollio died, a man who in general had done nothing deserving of remembrance, as he was sprung from freedmen, belonged to the knights, and had performed no brilliant deeds; but he had become very famous for his wealth and for his cruelty, so that he has even gained a place in history. Most of the things he did it would be wearisome to relate, but I may mention that he kept in reservoirs huge lampreys that had been trained to eat men...	<i>Selection, Meta</i>
57	54.24.7-8 (6.347)	[A]nd he [Agrippa] would not accept the celebration of the triumph. For this reason, — at least, such is my opinion, — no one else of his peers was permitted to do so any longer, either, but they enjoyed merely the distinction of triumphal honours.	<i>Personal opinion</i>
58	54.28.3-4 (6.357)	He also delivered the eulogy over the dead, after first hanging a curtain in front of the corpse. Why he did this, I do not know. Some, however, have stated that it was because he was high priest, others that it was because he was performing the duties of censor. But both are mistaken, since neither the high priest is forbidden to look at a corpse, nor the censor, either, except when he is about to complete the census; but if he looks upon a corpse then, before his purification, all his work has to be done over again.	<i>Procedure, Source- criticism</i>
59	54.35.4 (6.373)	This is [Augustus assuming the guise of a beggar] the tradition, whether credible to any one or not.	<i>Appeal to truth, Procedure</i>
60	55.1.4 (6.381)	It is indeed marvellous that such a voice should have come to any man from the Deity, yet I cannot discredit the tale. [Deity in a form of a woman of superhuman size predicting the death of Drusus]	<i>Procedure</i>
61	55.3.5 (6.387)	For such is the general force of this word [<i>auctoritas</i>]; to translate it into Greek by a term that will always be applicable is impossible.	<i>Procedure</i>

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62	55.10.11 (6.411)	I mention this only because it was on this occasion [public performances] that knights and women of distinction were brought upon the stage.	Selection, Procedure
63	55.12.4-5 (6.423)	I here use the name aureus, according to the Roman practice, for the coin worth one hundred sesterces. Some of the Greeks, also, whose books we read with the object of acquiring a pure Attic style, have given it this name.	Meta (language), Procedure
64	55.24.1 (6.455)	Now that I have once been led into giving an account of the legions, I shall speak of the other legions also which exist to-day and tell of their enlistment by the emperors subsequent to Augustus, my purpose being that, if any one desires to learn about them, the statement of all the facts in a single portion of my book may provide him easily with the information.	Composition, Aims
65	55.28.2-3 (6.467)	But I shall not go into all these matters minutely, for many things not worthy of record happened in individual instances and their recital in detail would serve no useful purpose. I shall give simply the events worthy of some mention and very briefly at that, except in the case of those of greatest importance.	Selection
66	56.27.4 (7.61)	These are the laws, as fully as is necessary for our history, that he [Augustus] caused to be passed.	Selection
67	57.3.5 (7.119)	Still, I do not mean to record these stories as giving the true causes of his behaviour, which was due rather to his regular disposition and to the unrest among the soldiers. [Comment after recounting the different versions explaining Tiberius' initial hesitance to overtly accept the functions of the emperor]	Appeal to truth, Procedure
68	57.23.1 (7.179)	And I might narrate many other such occurrences, were I to go into everything in detail.	Selection
69	58.23.5 (7.245)	Evidence of the truth of these records about him [atrocities of Tiberius] is to be found in the events of those days.	Appeal to truth, Procedure
70	59.18.3 (7.317)	There is no need of burdening my readers unnecessarily by going into the details of most of these cases, but one or two of them call for special mention. [In the context of description of Caligula's atrocities and cruelty]	Procedure
71	60.26.5 (7.435)	But now that I have once touched upon this subject, it will not be out of place to give the explanation of a lunar eclipse also.	Procedure
72	62(61).11.4 (8.60)	Whether this actually occurred, now, or whether it was invented to fit their character, I am not sure; but I state as a fact what is admitted by all. [Agrippina allegedly trying to seduce her own son, Nero]	Procedure, Source- criticism, Meta

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73	62(63).20.6 (8.171)	I might, to be sure, have used circumlocutions, but why not declare their very words? The expressions that they used do not disgrace my history; rather, the fact that I have not concealed any of them lends it distinction. [Senators greeting Nero on his return from Greece]	Meta (dignity of history)
74	65(66).9.4 (8.277)	Unworthy as this incident is of the dignity of history, yet, because it shows his character so well and particularly because he still continued the practice after he became emperor, I have felt obliged to record it. [Domitian's feigning madness by impaling flies on the stylus]	Selection, Procedure, Meta (dignity of history)
75	66.17.4-5 (8.295-97)	He had lived sixty-nine years and eight months, and had reigned ten years lacking six days. From this it results that from the death of Nero to the beginning of Vespasian's rule a year and twenty-two days elapsed. I make this statement in order to prevent any misapprehension on the part of such as might estimate the time with reference to the men who held the sovereignty. For they did not succeed one another legitimately, but each of them, even while his rival was alive and still ruling, believed himself to be emperor from the moment that he even got a glimpse of the throne. Hence one must not add together all the days of their several reigns as if those periods had followed one another in orderly succession, but must reckon once for all with the exact time that actually elapsed, as I have stated it.	Procedure
76	67.6.2 (8.329)	I call the people Dacians, the names used by the natives themselves as well as by the Romans, though I am not ignorant that some Greek writers refer to them as Getae, whether that is the right term or not; for the Getae of whom I myself know are those that live beyond the Haemus range, along the Ister. Domitian, then, made an expedition against this people, but did not take an active part in the conflict.	Procedure, Source-criticism
77	67.17.1 67.18.1-2 (8.355-57)	I have one more astonishing fact to record, which I shall give after describing Domitian's end. ... The matter of which I spoke, saying that it surprises me more than anything else, is this. [Apollonius of Tyana foretelling the circumstances of Domitian's death] This is what actually happened, though one should doubt it ten thousand times over.	Personal opinion, Source-criticism
78	68.27.3 (8.413)	I saw another opening like it at Hierapolis in Asia, and tested it by means of birds; I also bent over it myself and saw the vapour myself. It is enclosed in a sort of cistern and a theatre had been built over it. It destroys all living things save human beings that have been emasculated. The reason for this I cannot understand; I merely relate what I saw as I saw it and what I heard as I heard it.	Procedure

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79	72(71).32.3 (9.57)	Therefore I am surprised to hear people even to-day censuring him on the ground that he [M. Aurelius] was not an open-handed prince.	Personal opinion, Source- criticism
80	73(72).4.2 (9.77)	I state these and subsequent facts, not, as hitherto, on the authority of others' reports, but from my own observation. [Marks an important point, start of the reign of Commodus]	Source- criticism
81	73(72).18.3-4 (9.109)	And let no one feel that I am sullyng the dignity of history by recording such occurrences. On most accounts, to be sure, I should not have mentioned this exhibition; but since it was given by the emperor himself, and since I was present myself and took part in everything seen, heard and spoken, I have thought proper to suppress none of the details, but to hand them down, trivial as they are, to the memory of those who shall live hereafter, just like any events of the greatest weight and importance. And, indeed, all the other events that took place in my lifetime I shall describe with more exactness and detail than earlier occurrences, for the reason that I was present when they happened and know no one else, among those who have any ability at writing a worthy record of events, who has so accurate a knowledge of them as I. [Commodus' improper behavior at the games]	Meta (dignity of history), Aims, Selection
82	73(72).23 (9.117-19)	After this there occurred most violent wars and civil strife. I was inspired to write an account of these struggles by the following incident. I had written and published a little book about the dreams and portents which gave Severus reason to hope for the imperial power; and he, after reading the copy I sent him, wrote me a long and complimentary acknowledgment. This letter I received about nightfall, and soon after fell asleep; and in my dreams the Divine Power commanded me to write history. Thus it was that I came to write the narrative with which I am at this moment concerned. And inasmuch as it won the high approval, not only of others, but, in particular, of Severus himself, I then conceived a desire to compile a record of everything else that concerned the Romans. Therefore, I decided to leave the first treatise no longer as a separate composition, but to incorporate it in this present history, in order that in a single work I might write down and leave behind me a record of everything from the beginning down to the point that shall seem best to Fortune. This goddess gives me strength to continue my history when I become timid and disposed to shrink from it; when I grow weary and would resign the task, she wins me back by sending dreams; she inspires me with fair hopes that future time will permit my history to survive and never dim its lustre; she, it seems, has fallen to my lot as guardian of the course of my life, and therefore I have dedicated myself to her. I spent ten years in collecting all the achievements of the Romans from the beginning down to the death of Severus, and twelve years more in composing my work. As for subsequent events, they also shall be recorded, down to	Aims, Procedure

#	Place/Page in Cary	Translation	Category
		whatever point it shall be permitted me.	
83	75(74).12.1 (9.188)	I shall relate a few of the incidents that were in any way marvellous. [Siege of Byzantium]	Selection
84	76(75).13.3 (9.227)	I have no wish, now, to write about Egypt in general, but I do feel fully justified in mentioning what I have learned about the Nile by accurate investigation in many quarters.	Selection, Meta (ethnography)
85	77(76).8.4 (9.255)	I will not conceal what happened to me at the time, ridiculous as it is. I was so disconcerted that I actually felt with my hand to see whether I had any hair on my head. [Boldness announced as a distinguishing feature of the associate of Apronianus who was accused of aspiring to be an emperor and resorting to magic. Entertaining detail]	Selection
86	77(76).15.2 (9.271)	I give his [Severus'] exact words without any embellishment.	Procedure
87	78(77).6.1 (9.291)	Dio, because the slain were very well known in those days, gives a list of their names; but for me it suffices to say that he made away with all the men he wished without distinction. [Xiphilinus' remark]	Selection, Procedure
88	79(78).1.2-3 (9.341)	So Antoninus [Caracalla] ... dug open the royal tombs of the Parthians, and scattered the bones about. This was the easier for him to accomplish inasmuch as the Parthians did not even join battle with him; and accordingly I have found nothing of especial interest to record concerning the incidents.	Selection
89	79(78).2 (9.343)	. . . but truth; for I have read the book written by him [Caracalla] about it.	Appeal to truth, Source- criticism
90	79(78).10.1-3 (9.359-61)	As for me, even before he [Caracalla] came to the throne, it was foretold to me in a way by his father that I should write of these events also. For just after his death methought I saw in a great plain the whole power of the Romans arrayed in arms, and it seemed that Severus was seated on a knoll there, on a lofty tribunal, and conversing with them; and seeing me standing near to hear what was spoken, he said: "Come here, Dio; draw near, that you may both learn accurately and write an account of all that is said and done."	Aims
91	79(78).34.8 (9.419)	Most of the incidents I shall omit, as they are all very much alike and their details have no particular importance; but I will mention in summary fashion the course of events in Egypt.	Selection

#	Place/Page in Cary	Translation	Category
92	80(79).7.4 (9.455)	And let no one be incredulous of my statements; for what I have written about the other attempts of private citizens I ascertained from trustworthy men, and the information about the fleet I personally learned by accurate investigation in Pergamum, close at hand, when I was in charge of that city, as well as of Smyrna, having been appointed by Macrinus; and in view of this attempt none of the others seemed incredible to me.	<i>Procedure, Appeal to truth</i>
93	80.1-2 (9.479-81)	Thus far I have described events with as great accuracy as I could in every case, but for subsequent events I have not found it possible to give an accurate account, for the reason that I did not spend much time in Rome. ... For these reasons, then, I have not been able to compile the same kind of account of subsequent events as of the earlier ones. I will narrate briefly, however, all that occurred up to the time of my second consulship.	<i>Procedure, Composition, Aims</i>

APPENDIX II

LIST OF *GNOMAI* IN *POMAIKA*

This chart represents the first attempt (as far as I know) to catalogue the wisdom expressions in Dio Cassius. I have used Cary's text and adapted the translation in the Loeb series of bilingual texts: the *gnomai* listed here are either verbatim reproductions or paraphrases of that translation. When referring to the place in Cary's edition (column **ii**), in addition to the standard passage numbering (see Swan 2004, 383-85), I have included the following information in the parentheses: the number in **bold** designates the volume of Cary's edition followed by the page number(s) after the dot, e.g., (**1.117**). In column **xii**, I have recorded all instances of usage of the concept of human nature (expressed differently, but frequently with τὸ ἀνθρώπειον) within maxims or in the immediate textual context. This evidence was collected to corroborate my thesis propounded in the introduction and chapter three of this dissertation: in his history, Dio Cassius did **not** suggest, in a Thucydidean spirit, an overarching and consistently formulated concept of human nature, as an unchanging constant that reflects the human condition. In certain instances, it was hard to decide whether a particular wisdom expression may be rightly qualified as a *gnome*. See the list of such *gnome*-like expressions (and the reasons for their exclusion from this chart) below, under Addendum to Appendix II. The list of parallel passages from other historians included in column **xii** derives from my comparative study of the *Gnomik* in earlier books of Dio and thus is not comprehensive and will need to be supplemented starting from book ten.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
Entry number	Place/page in Cary	Book number	Paraphrase or quote of the gnome	Used in speech?	Explanatory?	Integrated?	Introduced with	Anthropoicton?	Extended?	Explains what?	Referent of the gnome and/or comments
1	fr. 5.1 (1.13)	1	It is impossible for mortals to foresee the future.	?	?	—	γά	—	—		ἀνθρώπων.
2	fr. 5.4 (1.17)	1	Those who first suffered injury do not necessarily win.	—	?	+	ῥτι	—	—	Defeat of the Latin tribes (?)	Dio “extended” Livy’s <i>gnome</i> ; contradicts #156; Livy 1.40.4; DH 2.34-37.
3	fr. 5.12 (1.23)	1	Humans do not tolerate to be ruled by equals.	—	+	—	οὔτω	+	—	Senators’ displeasure with Romulus.	φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπων; cf. DH 2.56: with <i>gnome</i> , Dio added a psychological dimension to his causation; Livy 1.15-16; Plu. Rom. 27; DH 2.56; same as #127; cf. #150.
4	fr. 6.3 (1.27)	1	Humans put more trust and reverence into unseen and unusual.	—	+	+	acc. c. inf.	—	—	The rational motivations for Numa’s religious reforms.	τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; the same thought in DH, but not in a form of <i>gnome</i> : DH 2.61; Livy 1.19.5; Plu. Num. 4.
5	fr. 6.7b (1.31)	1	We eagerly submit to the expenses involved in the beginnings of great undertakings.	?	?	?	καὶ γάρ	—	—		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
6	fr. 7.3 (1.35)	2	It is impossible for equals to stay free from strife.	—	+	+	ἐκ	—	—	Impossibility of reaching a peace agreement between the Romans and the Albans.	ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Livy 1.23ff; DH 3.7ff.
7	fr. 8.1 (1.39)	2	Inoffensiveness cannot secure safety.	—	+	+	ὥς	—	+	Marcus' reasons to adopt a more warlike policy.	Dio is very close to Livy, but Livy does not use a <i>gnome</i> ; Livy 1.32.4-5; DH 3.37.
8	fr. 12.1 (1.93)	3	Men's actions are perceived through the lens of their reputation.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
9	fr. 12.2 (1.93)	3	Men prefer the untried to the well-known.	?	?	?	γὰρ	—	—		
10	fr. 12.3a (1.93)	3	Changes are dangerous, especially in the system of government.	?	?	?	γὰρ	—	+		
11	fr. 12.8 (1.95)	3	Every man's fortunes determine his wishes and desires.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
12	fr. 12.9 (1.95)	3	Kingship requires understanding and experience.	?	?	?	—	—	+		
13	fr. 16.1 (1.107)	4	Success is the result of planning.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
14	fr. 17.6 (1.117)	4	Extreme poverty leads to desperation and is difficult to combat.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Why uncompromising attitudes of patricians proved to be disastrous.	Livy 2.30; 31.7-33.3; DH 5.63ff.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
15	fr. 17.7 (1.117)	4	Expediency often proves to be more beneficial, even at the expense of justice.	—	+	+	—	+	—	The same as above.	τῆς τε ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως; DH 5.65 paraphrases the same thought in the speech of M. Valerius but does not provide a <i>gnome</i> . Livy 2.33.
16	fr. 7.14 (1.125)	4	A band of men displays boldness when united in violence, but later becomes divided.	—	+	+	ἔσταν	—	—	Necessity to secure achieved concessions by means of the establishment of the office of tribune.	
17	fr. 7.15 (1.129)	4	It is difficult to attain harmony among men in position of influence.	—	—	+	κατά, γάρ	—	—	Inefficiency of the office of tribunes in the beginning.	φύσει τοῖς πλείστοις; cf. DH 7.65.
18	fr. 18.2 (1.137)	5	It is difficult for a man to possess excellence both in war and peace.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	Failure of Coriolanus to succeed in public affairs.	Livy 2.33.6-40.12; DH 6.92-94; 7.20ff.
19	fr. 18.4 (1.139)	5	When suspecting each other people forget about benefits and act on hatred.	—	+	—	ἔσταν γάρ	—	—	Wrath of the populace against the nobles.	Livy 2.34.7-9.
20	fr. 18.6 (1.141)	5	One may expect benefits from the same persons who had harmed one.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Coriolanus joined the Volsci.	DH 8.1; Livy 2.35.6.
21	fr. 19.1 (1.151)	5	Crowds show no loyalty and destroy those conferring favors on them.	—	+	—	ὥστε	—	+	Downfall of Sp. Cassius.	Livy 2.41; DH 8.77-79; the <i>gnome</i> helps Dio penetrate deeper into the psychological motives; contradicts #20.
22	fr. 20.4 (1.153)	5	It is natural for men to quarrel with the opposing force even beyond what is advantageous.	—	?	—	ἔοικε	+	—		ἔοικε τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
23	fr. 21.1 (1.155)	5	Men give up and fall into despair before numerous and difficult undertakings.	—	+	—	ἔσταν γάρ	—	+	The Romans being at loss before the Etruscan threat.	
24	fr. 21.2 (1.157)	5	Confidence in one's valor tends to go out of control and leads to the reverse outcome.	—	+	—	καὶ γάρ πῶς	—	—	The failure of boldness of the Fabii.	Livy 2.50 (esp. 2.50.5); DH 9.19-22.
25	fr. 24.1 (1.187)	6	Humans, when in trouble, scorn what is familiar and admire the untried.	—	+	—	γάρ	+	+	Adopting foreign superstitions.	φιλᾷ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον; Livy 4.30.9-1; DH 12.6.3; equivalent to #4.
26	fr. 23.5 (1.187)	6	Democracy consists not of equality but of each man obtaining what he deserves.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
27	fr. 25.4 (1.211)	7	Skill contributes to bravery.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	The reason for Roman defeat at the hands of the Gauls.	
28	fr. 26.3 (1.219)	7	Success leads many people to catastrophes.	—	—	—	οὕτως	—	—		ταῖς ἀνθρώποις; Livy 6.20; DH 14.4.6.
29	fr. 29.2 (1.223)	7	Small and accidental events may become a cause of many evils.	—	+	—	ὥς που	—	—	Why Stolo started canvassing for the office of the tribune and why it led to the disastrous results.	Livy 6.34.5-11; DH 14.12(22); a similar sentiment in Livy, but not in the form of a <i>gnome</i> .
30	fr. 29.3 (1.225)	7	In hope of rescue the expectation is often beyond reason.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
31	fr. 36.1 (1.249)	8	Human nature does not change before any threats.	+	?	—	γάρ	+	+		ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
32	fr. 36.3 (1.251)	8	Reasonable forbearance is better than compulsion for subduing and correction of a noble spirit.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	+		Contradicts #162.
33	fr. 36.3 (1.251)	8	Everyone would rather obey than be forced.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	+		
34	fr. 36.4 (1.251)	8	Not to kill a man is the highest virtue.	+	—	+	—	—	—		
35	fr. 36.11 (1.257)	8	Benefits lie in the realm of free will. It is befitting human character to remember good rather than disagreeable actions.	+	—	—	—	—	—		ἀνθρώπων.
36	fr. 36.12 (1.259)	8	The greater is the impact of enmity, the more readily a man submits to the kindness coming from the oppressor.	+	—	—	—	—	+		Same as #20.
37	fr. 36.14 (1.259)	8	Men grieve more about the insults than rejoice about the kindness.	+	?	—	γάρ	—	+		πεφύκασι πάντες ἄνθρωποι; contradicts ##36 and 174.
38	fr. 36.17 (1.265)	8	All means could be justified when directed towards obtaining safety.	?	?	—	—	—	—		πάντων ἀνθρώποις.
39	fr. 36.17 (1.265)	8	Pardon is granted by gods and men for any act committed involuntarily.	?	?	—	—	—	—		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
40	fr. 36.21 (1.269)	8	The wronged do not always conquer; justice on the battlefield is peculiar.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	The harsh treatment of the Samnites at the hands of the Romans, notwithstanding the act of generosity on the part of the Samnites.	Livy 9.15.8; 17.3.4.
41	fr. 36.25 (1.271)	8	Success is not constant and leads many to ruin.	?	?	—	—	—	—		
42	fr. 38.1 (1.293)	8	Military unions not based on kindred blood or on common grievances tend to dissipate.	—	+	+	—	—	+	Reasons for discord among the allies (the Gauls and the Etruscans).	
43	fr. 39.3 (1.297)	9	Success in undue measure leads to ruin.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Why overwhelming success led the Tarentines to folly and miscalculations.	
44	fr. 40.6 (1.309)	9	Desire is apt to deceive one.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Pyrrhus took a rush decision to cross into Italy.	
45	fr. 40.11 (1.315)	9	Alliance based on common transgression is stronger than based on lawful association.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Why Decius made a compact with Mamertines.	συγγοὶ τῶν ἀνθράπων.
46	fr. 40.14 (1.321)	9	Friendship cannot be formed between people brought up under different institutions.	+	?	—	γάρ	—	—		
47	fr. 40.15 (1.321)	9	Distrust is associated with tyrants; it is impossible for them to have friends.	+	?	—	τε	—	+		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
48	fr. 40.16 (1.321)	9	Generalship without the assistance of respectable forces is worth nothing.	+	?	—	—	—	—		
49	fr. 40.38 (1.345)	9	It is preferable to be overthrown by Heaven, than by one's own baseness.	+	+	+	ὥσθ'	—	+	Troubles associated with riches.	Plu. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 19-20.
50	fr. 40.42 (1.349)	9	Every force which is humbled in spirit also loses in strength.	?	?	—	—	—	—		
51	Zon. 8.5 (1.351)	10	No magic can be superior to arms and men.	+	+	+	γάρ	—	—	Why <i>devotio</i> of Decius could not guarantee the victory of Romans.	Pyrrhus' speech.
52	fr. 43.2 (1.381)	11	Men are most active when most successful.	—	+	+	—	—	+	The "real" causes of war between the Romans and the Carthaginians.	κατὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
53	fr. 43.11 (1.395)	11	Victories fall to the lot of the better-equipped.	+	—	+	ἔτι	—	—		In indirect speech.
54	fr. 43.11 (1.395)	11	Skill can be obtained but bravery not.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	Explains a point within the speech.	In indirect speech; φύσει.
55	fr. 43.13 (1.397)	11	Calculation and precaution lead to success.	?	?	—	γάρ	—	—		
56	fr. 43.14-15 (1.397)	11	Moderation and calculation help obtain secure victories, as opposed to boldness without reason.	?	?	—	μὲν	—	+		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
57	fr. 43.17 (1.409)	11	Men are more daring in something untried and more calculated where they have experience.	—	+	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—	The audacity of the Romans before the naval battle of Mylae.	Plb. 1.20.8-16.
58	fr. 43.18 (1.411)	11	It is natural to ascribe military success to armies and failure to the leaders.	—	+	—	τε γάρ	—	—	Why the Carthaginians wanted to sentence Hannibal to death.	
59	fr. 43.19 (1.421)	11	Most men defend their possessions with more zeal than they are willing to fight for those of others.	—	+	+	γάρ	—	—	Why the Carthaginians regarded it equally important both to defend and to conquer.	Paradoxical explanation.
60	fr. 43.25 (2.11)	12	The more strictly one is forbidden to tell a secret, the more he desires to do so.	—	+	+	—	—	+	Why Hamilcar preferred to keep his plans secret.	
61	fr. 46.2 (2.25)	12	Men abide by compacts only as long as it suits their convenience.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why the Carthaginians and the Romans broke the truce.	
62	fr. 50.2 (2.43)	12	First success makes people more eager to pursue the subsequent goals.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	The reason for Gauls' irrational behavior in the face of an obstacle.	πάντες ... ἄνθρωποι.
63	fr. 52.1 (2.65)	13	Sureness is the result of deliberation.	—	+	+	—	—	—	Explains a trait of Hannibal's character.	πέφυκεν.
64	fr. 52.5 (2.67)	13	People are only trustworthy in what concerns their own interest.	—	+	+	γάρ	—	—	The same as above.	The <i>gnome</i> does not perpetuate the pessimistic view of human nature.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
65	fr. 55.1 (2.71)	13	Peace creates and preserves wealth.	+	?	—	—	—	—		Contradicts #67.
66	fr. 55.1 (2.71)	13	All mankind desires to rule over ones willing to yield.	+	?	?	—	+	—		
67	fr. 55.3 (2.73)	13	War preserves men's possessions while peace destroys them.	+	?	—	μὲν	—	—		Contradicts #65.
68	fr. 55.3a (2.75)	13	It is disgraceful to give up once the plan has been approved.	+	?	—	ἄρ'	—	+		
69	fr. 55.3b (2.75)	13	Upright man must plan in advance.	+	?	—	γὰρ	—	+		
70	fr. 55.6 (2.77)	13	Adversity may contain benefit by keeping one from losing their senses.	+	?	—	γὰρ	—	+		
71	fr. 55.8 (2.79)	13	There is a benefit to be received from disasters.	+	?	—	—	—	+		Similar sentiment as in #70.
72	fr. 55.8 (2.79)	13	In order to secure a good reputation it is important to appear to be forced into war rather than to have started it.	+	?	—	—	—	—		
73	fr. 57.1 (2.87)	14	Hopefulness makes men more confident in their victory.	—	?	—	γὰρ	—	—		πάντα ἀνθρώπους.
74	fr. 57.2 (2.89)	14	Allies abandon their hopes of gain when they come close to the conflict (?)	—	+	—	γὰρ	—	+	Spaniards' fear before the engagement with Hannibal.	2.89, n. 1: "The excerptor had apparently abridged Dio very carelessly here."

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
75	fr. 57.10 (2.115)	14	Men in flourishing condition easily bear severe losses, while those exhausted are harmed by the slightest reverses.	+	+	+	μὲν γάρ	—	—		Indirect speech; ὠθρόπους.
76	fr. 57.18 (2.119)	14	Men readily assist the rising powers especially with the purpose of discrediting the ones already in favor.	+	?	—	—	—	+		πεφύκασι.
77	fr. 57.16 (2.121)	14	Excellence depends not on the decrees but on man's spirit, and victory not on ordinances but on man's wisdom.	—	+	+	—	—*	—	The forgiving attitude of Fabius to the decree that gave equal powers to his master of horse.	*τῶν ὠθρῶπύων immediately precedes the <i>gnome</i> .
78	fr. 57.19 (2.125)	14	Disasters chasten those who are not utter fools.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Rufus resigned the command after the defeat.	
79	fr. 57.25 (2.139)	15	Gentleness always yields to boldness.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Causes for the defeat at Cannae.	Plb. 3.107ff.
80	fr. 57.26 (2.145)	15	Ignorance encourages boldness but calculated boldness... (?)	—	+	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—	Soldiers' fear at the battlefield (?)	
81	fr. 57.54-55 (2.227)	17	Youth and good fortune are insatiate of success.	—	+	+	γάρ	—	+	Reason for the dismissal of Scipio.	
82	fr. 57.77 (2.257)	17	Men do voluntarily what they would not do under compulsion.	—	+	+	ὥς που	—	—	"General eagerness ... to aid Scipio" (2.257, n. 1).	
83	fr. 57.79 (2.269)	17	The fortunate party is inclined to audacity and the unfortunate to moderation.	?	?	?	γάρ	—	—		πέφυκε.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
84	fr. 109.2 (2.287)	30 — 35	Adversity promotes virtue.	—	+	+	—	—	—	The change of Sulla's temper.	
85	fr. 110.2 (2.503-5)	?	Titles don't change the man but a man can invest titles with new meanings.	?	?	?	γάρ	—	+		τοὺς τρόπους τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
86	fr. 110.4 (2.505)	?	The majority imitates opinions and deeds of the leaders; nothing leads on an army better than a character of the leader.	?	?	?	γάρ	—	+		
87	fr. 110.5 (2.505)	?	Unfulfilled hopes make people grieve more than the loss of something not hoped.	?	?	?	πῶς	—	+		
88	fr. 110.6 (2.505)	?	It is better to be envied as a result of success than be pitied as a result of failure.	?	?	?	—	—	—		
89	36.1.2 (3.5)	36	A victorious force is never satiated with success.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Reasons for Tigranes and Mithridates to be daring in war preparations.	φύσει.
90	36.25.1 (3.39)	36	All men take pride in benefits conferred upon them by populace.	+	—	—	γάρ	+	—		φύσει πάντες ἄνθρωποι.
91	36.31.4 (3.51)	36	Having held a position of authority men are not willing to abide by ancestral customs.	+	+	—	γάρ	+	—	Why Marius and Sulla were zealous of the dictatorship.	ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
92	36.35.1 (3.57)	36	Great honors ruin even great persons.	+	+	+	τε γάρ	—	—	Why it is dangerous to entrust all affairs to one man.	
93	36.38.4-5 (3.65)	36	Excessive punishments cause people to refrain from accusing others.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	+	Senate's attempt to modify Cornelius' law on bribery.	
94	36.40.5 (3.67-68)	36	People are ready to accuse others but it does not preclude them from committing the same offences.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	The fallacy behind the practice of elevating the accusers in bribery trials.	
95	37.6.1 (3.109)	37	Winner has the right to lay down whatever the laws he pleases.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Pompey's hostility to Phraates.	
96	37.10.3 (3.117)	37	Changing circumstances may reverse fortunes.	—	—	—	οὐτω	*	—		*The <i>gnome</i> explains τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων used in the preceding editorial aside (see <i>Appendix I</i> #13).
97	37.12.2 (3.121)	37	The multitude of subjects does not guarantee the strength of the monarch unless friendship with them is secured.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Reasons for the downfall of Mithridates.	
98	37.23.2 (3.137)	37	All gifts granted to the powerful by the multitude suggest compulsion and flattery.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	+	Reasons for Pompey to reject additional honors.	
99	37.39.3 (3.163)	37	People form compacts and enmities according to their own advantage.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Reason for Antony to break the compact with Catiline.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
100	37.45.2 (3.171)	37	A chaste wife must neither err nor even incur any suspicion.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Caesar divorcing his wife (?)	
101	37.55.2 (3.189)	37	All men work against their enemies more zealously than they cooperate with friends.	—	+	+	μὲν γάρ	—	+	Caesar's motivation for forming a compact with Pompey and Crassus.	πάντες ἄνθρωποι.
102	37.55.3 (3.189)	37	He who keeps another from reaching prominence pleases others as well.	—	+	—	ᾧ	—	+	The same as above.	
103	38.7.2 (3.211)	38	Humans utter promises more easily than they carry them out.	—	+	+	—	+	—	Reason for Metellus and Cato to retract their refusal to swear obedience to the law.	κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον; same as #143.
104	38.11.1 (3.217)	38	The multitude often casts idle slurs upon the powerful in order to draw them into strife.	—*	+	+	γάρ	—	—	Why Caesar ignored Cicero's invectives.	*Caesar's customary words related.
105	38.12.5 (3.221-23)	38	Men are more prone to irritation at the injuries than to gratitude for the benefits.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Clodius thought it better to appease the senators in order to bring ruin to Cicero.	πρὸς τοὺς πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
106	38.18.2 (3.237)	38	Under suffering it is easier to counsel others than to be strong yourself.	+	—	+	ᾧ	—*	—		*ἀνθρώπων follows in the next paragraph; speech of Philiskos.
107	38.19.3 (3.241)	38	When one's physical condition is good the factors essential to happiness are enjoyed.	+	—	—	ᾧ γάρ	—	—	Explains one of the provisional arguments within the speech.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
108	38.20.1 (3.241)	38	Mental cares cause one far more distress than bodily comforts cause pleasure.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same as above.	
109	38.21.3 (3.243)	38	Body contains many dangers in itself and requires much assistance from the divine power; whereas spirit can be trained.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—	The same.	
110	38.23.6 (3.247)	38	Whatever does not pertain to human nature is thought to have no bearing upon a person.	+	—	—	γάρ	+	—	The same.	τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
111	38.24.6 (3.249)	38	We should wish not for whatever we desire but for necessary things.	+	—	+	ἔτι	—	—	The same.	
112	38.26.2 (3.253)	38	Places do not guarantee success or misfortune; every man creates his own happiness.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	
113	38.26.6 (3.255)	38	Men who bear good-naturedly the most adverse fortunes do not regard themselves in any dreadful plight.	+	—	+	ἔτι	—	+	The same.	
114	38.27.2 (3.255)	38	Successes are ephemeral and the more a man succeeds the more he is prone to falling.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—	The same.	
115	38.29.4 (3.259)	38	Those who have passion for power would even betray friends in order to achieve it.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
116	38.36.2 (3.273)	38	Although the man who is least occupied with affairs is also the safest, even in private matters it is necessary to be energetic.	+	—	—	μὲν γὰρ	—	+	The same.	Speech of Caesar at Vesontio.
117	38.40.2 (3.283)	38	It is inevitable that men of many possessions are plotted against by many.	+	—	+	εἰ δ'	—	—	The same.	
118	38.40.3 (3.283)	38	One who fears for his own possessions does not covet those of others.	+	—	+	γὰρ	—	—	Further explains the previous <i>gnome</i> .	Cf. #169.
119	39.6.1 (3.317)	39	Human dispositions change and people expect benefits even from former foes.	—	+	—	οὐτω σου	+	—	Reasons for Pompey to recall Cicero.	τὸ ἀνθρώπων.
120	39.26.1-2 (3.343-45)	39	Fear and envy destroy people's friendship.	—	+	+	τε	—	+	Why Pompey became hostile to Caesar and formed a compact with Crassus.	
121	40.58.4 (3.495)	40	An upright man never shirks the leadership nor exercises it beyond proper limits.	— [*]	+	+	—	—	—	Why Cato never pursued the office of a censor again.	*Paraphrased from what Cato used to say.
122	41.16.1-2 (4.31)	41	Men who hope to attain certain ends and those who have already succeeded do not think or act alike.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	+	Reason why soldiers and the populace were suspicious about Caesar's reconciliation with Pompey.	
123	41.29.1 (4.51)	41	No society can function if the criminal element is not punished.	+	+	—	γὰρ	—	+	Caesar's reasons to punish the mutinous army.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
124	41.29.2 (4.51)	41	Wrong-doers become daring and corrupt the good.	+	—	—	τε	—	+	Further explains previous <i>gnome</i> .	
125	41.29.3 (4.53)	41	To be friendly or hostile is not an inherent characteristic but is determined by actions.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	+	Explains one of the provisional arguments within the speech.	φύσει.
126	41.33.4 (4.59)	41	Principles of ruling and being ruled are in accordance with natural law.	+	—	—	τε γάρ	+	+	The same as above.	φύσει ... ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
127	41.53.3 (4.91)	41	Men can least endure to be outdone by their equals.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	Why reconciliations attempts before Pharsalus did not work.	Same as #3.
128	41.56.3 (4.97)	41	The renown of the vanquished becomes a possession of the victor.	—	—	—	τε γάρ	—	—	Explains Dio's own reflections on the significance of Pharsalus.	
129	42.1.1 (4.115)	42	Fortune often restores the fallen in a moment of time.	—	—	+	ᾧτι	—	—	Paradoxical explanation.	
130	42.1.4-5 (4.115-16)	42	Unexpected adverse event humbles man's spirit and affects his judgment.	—	+	—	ᾧτιαν γάρ	—	+	Why Pompey was not able to retaliate after Pharsalus.	
131	43.16.1 (4.239)	43	It is not noble for a man to be convicted of doing something that he used to rebuke in others.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—		Caesar's speech in the senate: legitimizing his actions.
132	43.16.3-4 (4.239)	43	Fortune combined with self-control and authority with moderation preserve acquisitions.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	+		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
133	43.50.2 (4.301)	43	It is difficult for the same man to excel equally both in war and in peace.	—	+	—	καίτοι	—	—	Why Caesar was merciful to his former enemies.	Paradoxical explanation.
134	44.2.1 (4.311)	44	It does not belong to the majority of men to acquire virtue.	—	—	—	γάρ	—	—		Explains Dio's own contemplation about the nature of monarchy and democracy.
135	44.3.3 (4.313)	44	Excessive honors render even the most modest men conceited.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Part of Dio's reflection on the causes of Caesar's assassination: why he was reluctant of accepting honors.	
136	44.27.1-3 (4.351)	44	The successful do not necessarily win because they were wronged, but all are subject to the whims of fortune.	+	—	—	γάρ	+	+	Explains an internal point within the speech (Cicero).	Same as #2; τῷ παραλόγῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
137	44.27.3 (4.351)	44	When wronged, men become bold beyond their power.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same as above.	
138	44.38.3 (4.373)	44	It is rare that body and mind shine equally in one man.	+	—	—	καίτοι μὲν	—	—		Paradoxical <i>gnome</i> .
139	45.4.2 (4.413-15)	45	Men who were wrong in some undertaking often gain a reputation for good judgment because it was successful.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why rash actions of Augustus still led him to success.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
140	45.8.3 (4.421)	45	After reconciliation that follows great enmity men are suspicious of each other's acts.	—	+	—	ἔτι γὰρ	—	—	Reason for mutual suspicions between Antony and Augustus.	
141	45.18.3 (4.441)	45	An upright man in service of his country should also look to his safety.	+	+	—	γὰρ	—	—	Cicero's justification of his voluntary exile.	
142	45.26.3 (4.457)	45	It is impossible for a person brought up in licentiousness and shamelessness to avoid defiling his entire life.	+	—	—	γὰρ	—	—	ἀνθρώπων.	
143	45.37.5 (4.477)	45	Men who are eager to accomplish something are wont to say different things before and after achieving success.	+	+	—	γὰρ	—	—	Why Antony should be disbelieved.	Same as #103.
144	45.37.6 (4.477)	45	New leaders desire to surpass the achievements of the predecessors.	+	+	—	καὶ	—	—	The same as above.	
145	45.45.4 (4.491)	45	Success depends on an opportune occasion, not strength.	+	—	+	ἔτι	—	—		
146	46.19.2-3 (5.35)	46	Persons in authority do not trust the sincerity of others being conscious of their own wrongful purposes.	+	—	—	γὰρ	—	+		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
147	46.34.2 (5.67)	46	Men remember anger even against their will but willingly forget gratitude.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	+	Why senators should have continually cooperated with one leader in order to avoid injury to the Romans and themselves.	Contradicts #210 and 36.
148	46.45.1 (5.91)	46	People are wont to be bold until they come in sight of dangers.	—	+	+	ἄσπερ	—	—	Why people were aligning against Augustus before his arrival to Rome.	
149	47.11.5 (5.139)	47	Many come out safe from the most desperate situations, while those who have no fear lose their lives.	—	—	—	οὕτως	—	+		
150	48.1.2 (5.221)	48	It is difficult for men of the same rank who are in control of vast interests to be in accord with each other.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Discord between the triumvirs.	Cf. #3.
151	48.8.4 (5.235-37)	48	Arms have no power to make the injured feel friendly to their oppressor.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Augustus making a concession regarding confiscating senators' land to satisfy the demands of the veterans.	
152	48.29.3 (5.281)	48	Perversity of the civil strife makes men choose friends and foes according to the advantages that time dictates.	—	+	—	μὲν δὴ	—	—	Why Augustus had to form alliances with former enemies.	
153	48.33.3 (5.289)	48	Nothing in life is lasting.	—	—	—	γάρ	+	—		τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
154	49.4.2 (5.347)	49	Those in power are jealous of the victories of their subordinates.	—	+	+	ῥτι	—	+	Reasons for Agrippa not to pursue Sex. Pompey's fleet.	*Suggested as a possible explanation but rejected by Dio.
155	50.16.4 (5.473)	50	Experience causes even ignorant to be of some value.	+	—	+	τε	—	—		
156	50.24.2-3 (5.487)	50	Wars and great undertakings of men turn in favor of those who act according to justice.	+	—	+	—	—	+		Contradicts #2.
157	50.27.4 (5.493)	50	It is impossible for one living a luxurious life to perform manly actions.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—		
158	50.30.2 (5.501)	50	The first failure causes despair.	+	—	—	γάρ	+	—		φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον.
159	52.2.6 (6.81-83)	52	Men believe that it pertains to human nature to resort to violence. They ascribe their successes to their intelligence and failures to the divine will.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	+	+		τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει; Agrippa-Maecenas debate.
160	52.3.1-2 (6.83)	52	It is worse for men to fail to hold themselves in check than to hurt others as a result of a failure.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	+	Point within a chain of syllogisms.	
161	52.4.3-6 (6.85)	52	Human race is not content to be ruled forever by the same person.	+	—	—	καὶ	+	+	The same as above.	τὸ ἀνθρώπειον πᾶν.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
162	52.7.1 (6.91)	52	The majority of men are not brought to reason by admonition or example, but only by punishment.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	Contradicts #32 and 33; cf. #184.
163	52.7.4 (6.93)	52	No one believes that those who have the power to use compulsion are acting honestly when they give judgment.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	
164	52.8.5 (6.95)	52	Men of real worth are never lacking in spirit while men coming from a servile sphere do not acquire a proud spirit.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	
165	52.10.4 (6.101)	52	Men who have much power have many troubles.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	+	The same.	
166	52.12.2 (6.103)	52	Everyone thinks well of themselves and wishes to accept benefits from the powerful.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	φύσει.
167	52.12.4 (6.103)	52	People think that they already possess what they set their hearts upon.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	
168	52.18.5 (6.109-11)	52	The privilege of saying and doing what one pleases becomes a source of happiness for the sensible and of disaster for the foolish.	+	—	+	γάρ	—	—	The same.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
169	52.18.5 (6.121)	52	Toils are involved in acquiring the possessions of others, but little care suffices to retain one's own.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—	The same.	Cf. #118.
170	52.32.1 (6.161)	52	Subjects delight in signs of esteem from rulers and submit to the decisions made in consultation with them.	+	—	+	καὶ	—	+	The same.	πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐμφυτον.
171	52.34.1 (6.167)	52	One more eagerly imitates that which is good than avoids evil when it is forbidden by mere words.	+	—	+	καὶ	—	—	The same.	
172	52.34.6 (6.169)	52	Human nature compels men to violate law.	+	—	+	γάρ	—	—	The same.	ἡ φύσις ("human" is implied).
173	52.34.7-8 (6.169)	52	Law cannot conquer nature.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	+	The same.	τῆς φύσεως.
174	52.34.11 (6.171)	52	Nothing so conciliates a man as making him a recipient of kindness.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	Contradicts #36 and 37.
175	53.3.1 (6.199)	53	Everyone is jealous of a superior and prone to disbelieving him.	+	—	+	ὅτι	—	—	The same.	Speech of Augustus.
176	53.9.3 (6.211)	53	It is impossible to please everybody, especially for the one who was involved in many wars.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
177	53.10.1 (6.213)	53	What remains fixed is better than what is changing, even if inferior.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—	The same.	
178	55.10.13 (6.411)	55	Those in command are better acquainted with everything else than their own affairs.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Augustus refused to believe in the report of Julia's immoral behavior.	
179	55.14.4-5 (6.429)	55	A ruler cannot please everybody.	+	—	—	γάρ	—*	+		* τοῦ ἀνθρώπου preceding the <i>gnome</i> ; same as #176; contradicts #186.
180	55.14.7 (6.431)	55	There is no law and no fear stronger than the instincts implanted by nature.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—		τῶν φύσει πεφυκότων ("human" is implied in the context).
181	55.15.1-2 (6.131)	55	No high position is free from envy.	+	—	+	ἔτι	—	+		
182	55.15.4 (6.433)	55	In monarchies rulers have not only enemies to fear, but also friends.	+	—	—	γάρ	—	—		
183	55.16.5-6 (6.437)	55	Those who forgive not only are loved by the objects of their clemency, but respected by the rest.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	+		
184	55.17.3-4 (6.439)	55	Men submit more eagerly to persuasion than compulsion.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	+		Cf. #32 and 33; contradicts #162.
185	55.19.3 (6.443)	55	It behooves a ruler to incur not even the suspicion of wrong-doing.	+	—	—	μὲν γάρ	—	—		

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
186	55.19.4-5 (6.445)	55	A man could be compelled to fear another, but he ought to be persuaded to love him by good treatment and benefits.	+	—	—	μὲν γὰρ	—	+		
187	55.19.6 (6.445)	55	Rulers must punish only those who do wrong to the state and tolerate those who offend them privately.	+	—	—	καὶ γὰρ	—	+		Contradicts #179.
188	55.21.2-3 (6.449-51)	55	Those who offended their ruler become more hostile on account of fear of vengeance, while forgiveness brings positive results.	+	—	+	γὰρ	—	+		
189	56.8.2 (7.21)	56	The greatest evils reside in our greatest blessings.	+	—	+	ᾧτι	—	—		
190	56.45.1 (7.103)	56	Human nature does not understand its happiness in the time of good fortune.	—	+	+	καὶ γὰρ	+	—	Why people yearned for deceased Augustus.	τὸ ἀνθρώπων.
191	57.19.1b (7.165)	57	No one willingly submits to being ruled.	+	—	—	—	—	—		*A habitual saying of Tiberius is quoted; Suet. Tib. 19; same as #194.
192	58.5.3-4 (7.199-201)	58	Those holding a prominent position not as a result of native worth are susceptible to flattery.	—	+	—	μὲν γὰρ	—	+	Why Sejanus kept huge throngs of people around himself.	Tac. Ann. 4.41.
193	58.18.2 (7.231)	58	Every act of insincerity for the purpose of flattery is inevitably suspected.	—	+	—	γὰρ	—	—	Tiberius growing more suspicious of the senate's actions.	Tac. Ann. 6.15.

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
201	64(65).14.3 (8.245)	64	The smallest things can produce great alarm in men who are already exhausted.	—	+	—	οὔτω	—	—	Why Vitellius' followers were panic-stricken and took to flight.	
202	65(66).16.4 (8.293)	65	Even kindness cannot subdue those who are naturally vicious.	—	+	—	οὔτω	—	—	Explains why there was a conspiracy against the “good” emperor Vespasian.	φύσσει κακούς; contradicts #174; cf. #36 and 37.
203	66.8.1-2 (8.297)	66	Men act differently when exercising power as assistants and when having independent authority.	—	+	—	γὰρ	—	+	Reason for Titus to change to a more moderate course.	
204	69.8.1a (8.439)	69	An emperor's word will have more force than arms.	—	—	—	οὔτω	—	—		
205	72(71).24.1 (9.41)	72	It is necessary for those who meet misfortune to indulge in lamentations.	+	—	—	δὲ	—	—		
206	72(71).25.2 (9.43)	72	An eagle is not formidable when in command of an army of jackdaws.	+	—	—	γὰρ	—	—	A point within a speech.	Proverb.
207	72(71).34.4 (9.63)	72	It is impossible to create a perfect assistant for yourself and one needs to employ the existing ones.	—*	+	+	ἔτι	—	+	Explains Marcus Aurelius' leniency and tolerance.	*Marcus Aurelius' words paraphrased.
208	74(73).10.3 (9.141)	74	One cannot safely reform everything at once; restoration of state requires times and wisdom.	—	+	+	ἔτι	—	—	Failure of the policies of Pertinax.	

i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii
209	74(73).14.2 (9.151)	74	Trickery is suspected in every act undertaken beyond propriety.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Why Julianus incurred suspicion while courting the favor of the senate.	
210	74(73).17.6 (9.159)	74	Sensible men grant pardon to those who once erred.	?	?	?	γάρ	—	—		
211	75(74).5.6 (9.171-73)	75	Warlike nature usually ends up harsh and peaceful cowardly.	—*	—	+	—	—	—		*Boissevain (vol. iii, p. 329) suggests that this passage is a part of an epitaph pronounced by Severus (cf. Mashkin 2001, 232, n. 20).
212	78(77).16.8 (9.323)	78	Liars and deceivers are never believed.	—	—	+	ἔτι	—	—		Proverb.
213	79(78).20.3 (9.385)	79	Humans have innate respect for what is superior and contempt for the inferior.	—	+	—	οὕτως	—	—	Why the crowd showed public disregard for Diadumenianus.	
214	79(78).38.3 (9.427)	79	Such is the power of good fortune that it even bestows understanding on the ignorant.	—	+	—	οὕτω	—	—	Macrinus' military success despite the lack of training.	
215	79(78).41.1 (9.433)	79	Not even the strongest could be sure of their power.	—	—	—	οὕτω	—	—		
216	Petr. Patr. Ext. Vat. (9.471)	80	Persons once having shown contempt to a ruler set no limits to using the arms against him.	—	+	—	γάρ	—	—	Assassination of False Antoninus (?)	
Total:		216	Authorial (confirmed):	Authorial (confirmed):			Authorial (confirmed):			101	ἀνθρώπειον or ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις used:
In-persona (confirmed):		93	Explanatory (from among authorial):	Explanatory (from among authorial):			Explanatory (from among authorial):			86	20

ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX II

GNOME-LIKE UTTERANCES IN DIO

(1) fr. 40.13 (1.317)	Too specific reference to the concrete situation ¹
(2) fr. 47.3 (1.381)	Too specific reference to the concrete situation
(3) fr. 47.7 (1.389)	Too integrated in the context
(4) fr. 49.1 (2.33)	Too integrated
(5) fr. 57.20 (2.125)	Too general/vague
(6) 36.20.1 (3.31)	Hard to separate from the context
(7) 36.27.6 (3.45)	Inseparable from the context
(8) 38.39.3 (3.281)	Strong reference to the context outside the <i>gnome</i>
(9) 41.9.1 (4.17)	Too integrated
(10) 42.32.2 (4.165)	Does not contain universal wisdom
(11) 44.37.1-2 (4.371)	No universal appeal
(12) 45.8.4 (4.421)	No reference to the recurrence of the "rule"
(13) 48.3.2 (5.223)	Too integrated
(14) 52.2.2 (6.81)	Lacking a universal appeal
(15) 52.10.2 (6.99)	Too integrated
(16) 52.14.5 (6.111)	Too integrated
(17) 52.26.2 (6.141)	Generalization is too trivial
(18) 55.18.3 (6.441)	Past tense, reads like a statement of the fact
(19) 59.1.3 (7.263)	Too attached to the specific situational context
(20) 71(72).3.4 (9.12)	Too dependent on the context
(21) 74(73).14.2 (9.151)	Too general; trivial generalization
(22) 77(76).5.1 (9.247)	Too integrated
(23) 77(76).5.3 (9.247)	Too integrated
(24) 78(77).12.2 (9.307)	Lacking a true universal appeal
(25) 79(78).24.2 (9.295)	Too integrated

¹ The reason for the exclusion from the main chart is noted for each of the listed items.

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