THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE AND COUNTERING TERRORISM IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

The Impact of the United Nations on Counter Terrorism: The Role of Counter Terrorism

Committee and Countering Terrorism in Russia and Turkey

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9/11 has been a milestone to redefine terrorism and how to counter it. It has been revealed that a global anti-terrorism alliance is required to overcome such an enormous threat for all countries. Thus, the UN has taken initiatives very effectively just following 9/11 by urging the entire world what to do against terrorism which is a common threat for humanity. A counter terrorism regime has emerged, and adopted mandatory regulations for member countries including Russia and Turkey.

Having changed the perception and understanding of terrorism, the UN's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) has been established as enforcement unit evaluating states' stance towards terrorism, and recommending them how to fill the gaps in countering terrorism. Russia and Turkey have also submitted reports to the CTC, and made some counter terrorism regulation accordingly.   Overall, the main assumption of this study, 'the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11', has been examined through the related literature and interviews, and confirmed. Truly,

the UN has become a global security actor, to some extent affecting counter terrorism

policies implemented by Russia and Turkey.

Key Words: Terrorism, counter terrorism, 9/11, the United Nations and Counter

Terrorism Committee.

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This dissertation is dedicated to the whole humanity especially to terror victims and those who suffer from terrorism, to my country, to Turkish National Police, and to those who have demonstrated an honorable stance towards all types of atrocities in Turkey and around the world.

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ABREVATIONS

AML   Anti Money Laundering

CFT   Countering Financing of Terrorism

CT   Counter Terrorism

CTC   Counter Terrorism Committee

CTED   Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate

CTTF   Counter Terrorism Task Force

EAPC   Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EC   European Council

EU   European Union

FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation

FSS   Federal Security Service

GA   General Assembly

KGB   Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PKK   Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan(Kurdistan Workers' Party)

SC   Security Council

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

USA   United States of America

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Unquestionably, terrorism has become an international threat that affects all nations. Therefore, counter-terrorism strategies must be established on a global basis in order to defeat terrorist networks. Specifically, universal cooperation as well as a multifaceted and strategic approach that includes a wide range of counter-terrorism policy tools are required.[1] Terrorist attacks are no longer considered to be domestic issues that affect only the host state. For example, the 9/11 attacks against the United States resulted in devastating consequences that affected not only America but all nations throughout the world. Thus, global efforts aimed toward preventing similar terrorist acts will remain insufficient and weak unless a powerful determination is demonstrated by all states.[2]

In the aftermath of 9/11, the European Union (EU) in addition to numerous regional and international organizations strongly emphasized that full international collaboration would be required to punish the perpetrators and preempt any future terrorist attacks.[3] In other words, terrorists might possibly be deterred through the development of a broad-based coalition.[4] Without an international alliance, for example, even the United States cannot tackle the problem alone as exemplified by its counter-terrorism strategy implemented after 9/11.[5] The 9/11 Commission, for example, strongly

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[1]Wilkinson. P. (2001)., *Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response*. Frank London, UK: Cass & Co.
[2]*Ibid.*
[3]Boer, M. D. (2003). *9/11 and the Europeanisation of anti-terrorism policy: A critical assessment*. Notre Europe, Policy Papers.
[4]Wanandi, J. (2002). A global coalition against international terrorism. *International Security* (2002):184-189.
[5]Byman, D. (2006). Remaking alliances for the war on terrorism. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Vol*(3), 767-811.

emphasized that *"practically every aspect of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy relies on international cooperation."*[6]

Global Threat Response

The events of 9/11 confirmed the belief that terrorism can be considered as the "dark side" of globalization. Specifically, regional economies, societies, and cultures have become integrated through an ongoing global-spanning technological exchange that affects all aspects of our daily lives (i.e., the spread of mass communication and transportation). Thus, innovative trends and approaches have been implemented to help understand the changing faces of social phenomena that many nation states continue to severely suffer from, namely terrorism and ethnic conflicts. In relation to globalization and terrorism, Onwudiwe focused on two crucial points: *"terrorism may be a result of global inequality, and dependency may encourage terrorist acts.*"[7]

Globalization has removed the boundaries between states, and has essentially resulted in our world becoming smaller and in international institutions having to embark upon fundamental problems at a global level. Although globalization is often identified in economic terms that can be interpreted as worldwide financial activities, the term involves other dimensions as well. Khan, for example, claimed that "while globalization facilitates global terrorism, terrorism itself will put the brakes on globalization."[8] Globalization has become a factor that increases the risk of attacks by providing terrorists with enhanced mobility through advanced means of transportation and communication.[9]

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[6]National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 379. Washington, DC: Norton.
[7]Onwudiwe, I. D. (2001). *The globalization of terrorism* (p. 4). Farnham Surrey, UK: Ashgate.
[8]Khan, M. (2004). *Teaching globalization in the era of globalization*. Retrieved from http://www.ijtihad.org/globalterror.htm
[9]Sandler, T., & Siqueira, K. (2006). Global terrorism: Deterrence versus pre-emption. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, *39*(4).

For example, Martin argued that the number of terrorist incidents has increased over the past three decades due to the widespread use of the internet and other hi-tech communication devices. In effect, terrorists have benefited from the outcomes of globalization.[10]

Since terrorism creates insecurity that greatly affects the economic dimension of globalization in countries, and globalization is exploited by terrorist groups, this relationship forces all counter terrorism parties to take into consideration new global trends. Khan also emphasizes that relationship between terrorism and globalization:

> It is ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, was facilitated by globalization and now it has become the biggest challenge to globalization. Global terrorism depends on the success of globalization. In fact, one may very well conceive of global terrorism as a facet of the global culture resulting from globalization. Will the rise of terrorism arrest or even reverse globalization? One of the dictums of Globalism is that globalization is not only inevitable but also irreversible.[11]

Although there are on-going debates with respect to the 9/11 attacks, the common perception of global insecurity has resulted in adopting new ideas related to worldwide threats and responses. Thus, cooperative and strategic counter-terrorism responses by governments and law enforcement agencies are necessary due to the global nature of terrorist threats.[12] Since terrorist networks are spread throughout the world as a result of globalization, they have become increasingly decentralized and self-reliant. In order to counter this multifaceted and complex threat, a broad and cooperative effort is required

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[10]Martin, G. (2006). *Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
[11]*Ibid.*
[12]Byman, *op. cit.*

that involves legal, economic, political, nonmilitary, and military cooperation from virtually every nation in the world.[13]

The assumption that 'a global threat requires a global response' led to significant UN initiatives. Before 9/11, to some extent the UN has taken some measures which have been ratified following the certain events having endangered peace and security both locally and internationally. For instance, following the terrorist attack against the West Germany Embassy in Stockholm in 1975, the West German Government insisted on a convention that would include a specific measure named 'taking hostages'. Of the twelve counter terrorism instruments, the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages was adopted in 1979.

Twelve Counter Terrorism Conventions between 1963 and 1999 have been the basis of the UN's efforts of countering terrorism. However, if they are compared the UN's firm stance following 9/11, those measures did not include mandatory characteristics, and hence, they were not perceived as so important issues by all countries. It was assumed that terrorism was a local threat endangering only the target countries. Thus, the rest of the world ignored such a threat. Trans- boundaries characteristic of terrorism had not been recognized yet prior to 9/11. Following a specific terrorist event, the UN displayed efforts to name what kind of threat it was, and what type of measures should be taken against a similar event. However, other countries perceived that specific event as a domestic problem of the vulnerable country.

The UN's post 9/11 measures have been uncompromising and the perception of terrorism has been inclusive. After the 9/11 attacks, it has been recognized that terrorism was a global threat operating beyond national borders. Furthermore, the requirement of a

[13]*Ibid.*

global alliance towards terrorism was revealed because even a superpower country was unable to overcome such threat.

Having confirmed terrorism as a global threat to world peace and security and despite having 193 member countries and structural units with complex relationships,[14] the UN successfully enacted Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001. It allowed the UN and member states to take military measures against both perpetrators and supporters of terrorism by applying the armed conflict law.[15] With the Resolution 1368, the terrorism was named as a threat against world peace and security, and self defense right was recognized.[16]

Following enactment of Resolution 1368, Resolution 1373 was adopted and passed by the UN on September 28, 2001.[17] This resolution was an unprecedented international response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks that condemned the attacks, and established a Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) designed to create a global anti-terror regime by focusing on four objectives:

1. Acquiring, encouraging, and helping states to adopt proper anti-terrorism legislation to include suppressing the provision of safe havens, sustenance, or support for terrorists.

2. Countering financing of terrorism, and anti-money laundering (CFT/AML).

3. Promoting international standards of border control.

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[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Taft IV, W. H. (2003). Law of Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, The. *Yale J. Int'l L., 28*, 319.

[16] The UN Resolution 1368 (12 September, 2001). Retrieved from: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement on November 11, 2011.

[17] Happold, M. (2003). Current legal developments. Security council resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations. *Leiden Journal of International Law, 16.*

4. International cooperation including ratification and implementation of existing counter-terrorism instruments and cooperating with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, and prosecution of those involved in terrorist attacks.

Resolution 1373 required that each state take specific action to meet these objectives.

In addition, the UN Security Council (SC) approved Resolution 1624 following the 2005 Istanbul bombings perpetrated by Al-Qaeda. Strong emphasis was placed on the necessity of international cooperation in establishing measures to counter terrorism. Following each terrorism incident, it has been a tradition for the UN to condemn it, and to issue a Resolution touching upon it.

As repeatedly emphasized, 9/11 became a turning point that changed numerous perceptions and structures related to terrorism. For example, the UN as well as state level authorities and institutions were able to recognize that terrorism was used beyond national borders.[18] On September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373 followed with its binding character having forced the member States to effectively take measures concerning international terrorism ─the common enemy.[19] In addition, the UN's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established under the UN umbrella in order to create a global anti-terror regime by coordinating all counter-terrorism efforts displayed by the member countries.[20]

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[18]Rostov. N. (2001-2002). Before and after: The changed UN response to terrorism since September 11th. *Cornell International Law Journal, 35,* 475-491
[19]Happold, *op. cit.*
[20]*Ibid.*

Paradoxical Observation

The main focus of this study is the UN's role in countering international terrorism. Specifically, its ability to launch an effective and cooperative strategy between nations in efforts to battle post-9/11 international terrorism is examined. Dating back approximately five decades ago, international attempts to combat global terrorism began much earlier than 9/11; however, the 9/11 attacks prioritized efforts to combat terrorism through a multilateral perspective which imposed a much heavier responsibility on the UN. For example, the 9/11 attacks not only changed the perception towards terrorism but also strongly emphasized that "the history of USA and the entire world will henceforth be divided into before 9/11 and after 9/11."[21]

While terrorism was evaluated as a local phenomenon before 9/11, and the UN was insufficient for taking effective counter terrorism measures, 9/11 has changed this understanding, and determined exactly what to do at national, regional and international levels towards terrorism. The necessity of a strong alliance of countering terrorism led by the UN was revealed. The UN and other international organizations have believed in the requirement of a much stronger and determined counter-terrorism regime in this new era.

Apart from international organizations, countries and even local organizations have changed their stance towards terrorism and how to counter it. It is emphasized that both aftermath atmosphere of 9/11 attacks and the UN's new counter-terrorism approach have been influential on this policy change at various levels. From this point of view, no countries can ignore terrorism causing insecurity and instability beyond their borders in any country in the world because either all or none of the countries will be safe anymore.

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[21]Pojman, L. P. (2006). *Terrorism, human rights, and the case for world government* (p. 2). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

9/11 gives opportunities for the UN to provide a global framework and to become a more effective institution. In addition to the UN's supportive legislative efforts in terms of law enforcement and judiciary departments, all member countries demonstrated genuine enthusiasm in becoming a part of the emerging global counter-terrorism regime. To date, most countries have ratified the international instruments including 16 UN conventions related to terrorism. The CTC has therefore proved to be successful in terms of international norm setting as evidenced by 1,472 reports submitted by States following Resolutions 1373 and 1624 enacted in 2001 and 2005, respectfully. Thus, international counter-terrorism cooperation led by the UN was declared successful as indicated by reports submitted to the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) on behalf of member States following Resolutions 1373 and 1624.

Yet, there are limitations to the role and capabilities of the UN to deal with terrorism. Although the UN's counter-terrorism efforts were taken seriously into consideration by all member States following 9/11, only two countries, the UK and Botswana─ signed all 12 counter-terrorism conventions prior to 9/11.[22] The UN succeeded to some extent in coordinating all counter-terrorism initiatives after 9/11; however, its immense body still had some limitations, including the number of countries involved in the decision process, the complex relationship between the UN organs, and the UN's bureaucracy.[23]

While terrorism is a global as well as a state level threat, it takes time to apply proper counter-terrorism measures from the standpoint of sovereignty and the national interest. Each member country has its own interests and benefits to consider. Therefore, it

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[22]Rosand, *op. cit.*
[23]Rostov, *op. cit.*

might be argued that some limitations exist due to the UN's structural deficiencies in countering terrorism. First, the organization has an enormous body consisting of 193 countries; hence, it might take time to agree and decide promptly on specific issues.[24] And second, unequal national representation of member countries might be perceived as another obstacle in forming an international alliance against terrorism.[25] For example, with their veto rights, super five countries (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) might cause suspicion while making decisions for all member countries because the rest of the countries do not have a right to veto any decision opposing to their own interests.

Furthermore, although the UN provides essential leadership related to global problems, its power is limited in three important ways. First, the UN cannot compel states to obey international laws since it lacks the capability of enforcement. In other words, the organization operates through international consensus as well as political pressure and sanctions but does not have a body of police who are authorized to enforce these laws.

Second, there is an issue involving legislation. Although national governments sign the UN treaty agreements that bind them, these are not self-executing and have little effect until they are adopted. For example, each member state has a different procedure for international treaties to become a national law. Therefore, governments' determinations and actions are essential to transforming UN's provided leadership into effective international anti-terrorist cooperation.

Third, competent law enforcement units are crucially important to the success and effectiveness of this type of international regime given that they provide the courts with proper evidence to track and prosecute suspected terrorists.

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[24]Orttung, R. W. & Makarychev, A. (2006). *National counter-terrorism strategies.* Amsterdam: IOS Press.
[25]Weiss, T. G. (2003). The illusion of UN Security Council reform. *Washington Quarterly, 26*(4), 147-161.

Briefly, effective anti-terrorist cooperation within a global regime is based not only on the international cooperation among governments to implement them, and the cooperative acts of law enforcement units to secure each country because overcoming such a huge problem absolutely requires a strong harmony among law enforcement agencies operating in the same country.

Apart from an international stance towards terrorism, national awareness and change in countering terrorism have occurred in two ways:

1-Urging conditions of post-9/11 period resulted in tough measures at all levels with the fear of a possible terrorist attack. That was an interior mechanism of social and governmental reaction caused by the atmosphere of the 9/11 attacks. Harsh measures were taken, and for the sake of security fundamental human rights were violated.

2-In addition to those national reflex demonstrated towards terrorism, the UN has attempted to take much more initiative by adopting the resolutions which had mandatory characteristics on member countries. Following this determined step taken by the UN, the countries had to act accordingly, and legislated new counter terrorism laws and regulations. From this perspective, national adoption of the UN resolutions is of great importance.

The motivations at the state level to effectively implement the UN resolutions can be generally categorized as follows:

1. Lack of counter terrorism measures and regulations.

2. The wish to be a part of counter terrorism alliance led by the UN and the US.

3. Benefiting from the outcomes of new counter terrorism era to overcome both the internal disputes and terrorism.

4. Avoiding devastating effects of terrorist attacks that will result in social unrest, and loss of trust towards government.

These factors can affect the level of compliance for states. There might be some similarities among nations, but there is no nation identical to another one. Thus, many discrepancies can be expected from member states in terms of obeying the same counter terrorism regulations adopted by the UN following 9/11. Apart from this general approach, any state might have its own characteristics such as geographical position, ethnicity and religion. For instance, while Turkey has suffered mainly from ethnic-separatist terrorism, Russia's priority was to struggle with terrorist groups abusing religion for the last several decades.

The primary impact of 9/11 has happened in minds. All nations even superpowers were shocked, and the perception of terrorism has changed. With the first shock waves of the attacks, people felt hopeless and deeply worried about their future. That was what terrorists wanted. However, to some extent the UN imposed hope to that pessimistic atmosphere by determining what to do and how to do to combat terrorism. All member states ratified effective counter terrorism laws according to the resolution 1373 which had mandatory characteristics. By conducting before/after analysis for each state, the effectiveness of the UN inspired counter terrorism measures can be evaluated.

Significance of the Study

Despite the vast literature related to terrorism, relatively few researchers in the field of counter-terrorism have focused on the role that the United Nations and multilateral mechanisms play. Basically, various works have been directed either exclusively or primarily toward the U.S. policy.

Guiora (2005) in his study focuses on the US approach by deeply evaluating the counter terrorism policies applied by various US presidents from the Nixon Administration to George W. Bush Administration. Many aspects of countering terrorism such as legislation, perception and using force are assessed. The study starts with the Nixon Administration because the American government first witnessed terrorism in terrorist attacks which were committed against Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympiads. The first step of countering terrorism in the history of the US was to establish a special counter terrorism unit named Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF). All views and points obtained through evaluation of various US administrations are compared to those which are in Israel, India, Russia and Spain.

In their editorial book Buckley and Fawn (2003) also point out that the US demonstrated a leading position in countering terrorism following 9/11. The US oriented policies are revealed and praised while the roles of other Western countries except the UK are criticized. The countries and regions which are vulnerable to terrorism are also examined. Furthermore, international institutions such as the UN, EU and NATO are blamed for not taking effective measures against terrorism. The US policies are emphasized while mentioning insufficiencies of those international organizations.

The EU Stance After 9/11:

Aftermath the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has been perceived as a global uncontrolled threat towards humanity anymore and the EU has acted accordingly. While Gijs De Vries ,the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, puts very strong emphasis on that threat targeting fundamental human rights and values, he also wisely reveals how to counter it:

"We must protect our security – but in doing so we must be equally determined to preserve our liberties".[26]

On September 21, 2001, in Brussels, the European Council (EC) strongly declared the catastrophic 9/11 attacks to be;

> …..an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies. They are a challenge to the conscience of each human being. The European Union will cooperate with the United States in bringing to justice and punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1368, a riposte by the US is legitimate. The Member States of the Union are prepared to undertake such actions, each according to its means. The actions must be targeted and may also be directed against States abetting, supporting or harboring terrorists. They will require close cooperation with all the Member States of the European Union.[27]

The conclusions of the EC meeting held just after the 9/11 reveal that the EU as a regional power shall support international corporation against terrorism, which is crucial and inevitable.[28] A policy change requiring collaboration of states and institutions has occurred in EU member states, and owing to this changed approach against terrorism, European security and law enforcement agencies have succeeded in preventing many terrorist attacks in EU countries.[29]

The NATO Stance After 9/11:

When the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was first established its aim was to provide and sustain peace and security in member states by not only taking military measures but also applying economic, social and political policies (Nato

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[26] Vries, G., D. (2004). The European Union's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism: Liberal International Conference Paper. 13 May 2004. Sofia. p.1

[27] Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinaray European Council meeting (September 21, 2001). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/ terrorism/documents/concl_council_21sep_en.pdf

[28] Boer, M., D. (2003). 9/11 and the Europeanisation of anti-terrorism policy: A critical assessment. Notre Europe, Policy Paper 6.

[29] Vries, G., D. (2004). The European Union's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism: Liberal International Conference Paper. 13 May 2004. Sofia.

handbook). One of the primary objectives of this most powerful peace and security organization was to develop strategies towards the Soviet threat. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has also resulted in some mentality change for the NATO because the other side did not exist anymore. Thus, with the Rome and the Washington Summits in 1991 and in 1999 a new strategy named 'new security concept' was first initiated and then developed. It has granted authority to intervene any international crash in the world. The NATO has aimed to be a global actor, and to prevent any activity against peace and security, including terrorism.

When the US has become vulnerable to terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, transnational dimension of terrorism was recognized and declared much more obviously by all of the countries in the world. Apart from country level reactions, NATO several hours after the attacks and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on the following day condemned the 9/11 attacks, and declared they allied with USA. Besides, some practical counter-terrorism steps were taken by NATO: 1-Implementation of the 5th Article of Washington Agreement which was based on corporate defense. 2- Operation Eagle Assist (October 9, 2001 –May 16, 2002), and 3- Operation Active Endeavor (October 26,2001-…) Following 9/11 in Prague Summit in 2002, it has been emphasized that countering terrorism is one of primary tasks of the NATO.[30]

Emerging a Global Counter Terrorism Regime:

Despite providing significant insights for a better understanding of the emergence of a global CT regime, those studies have failed to acknowledge the contribution of the UN to global counter-terrorism.

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[30] Johnson, R. & Zenko M. (2003). "All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terrorism", *Parameters,* Winter: 48-63.

Studying the UN's efforts and responses by countries are crucial factors in understanding how an effective global anti-terror regime can emerge and how lessons from others can help build a more effective method of countering global terrorism. To be effective, however, all legislation requires execution; therefore, researching documents and agreements without practical implementation may sometimes lead nowhere. By directing attention exclusively to the practical side of this issue, my proposed exploratory study is therefore intended to result in findings that will serve as important policy implications for practitioners. In addition, the results will help to enlighten future research by evaluating international cooperation regarding terrorism that has affected numerous countries, in particular Turkey and Russia.

Selecting appropriate cases represents the primary purpose for conducting a comparative case study.[31] I selected Russia and Turkey for the following reasons: (a) both countries suffer from terrorism; (b) both countries have experienced similar types of ethnic and religiously justified terrorism; (c) both countries are non-EU states; thus, the UN's impact will be accurately measured; and (d) both countries are important regional powers due to their geo-strategic position between two continents: Europe and Asia. From a comparative perspective, Russia and Turkey demonstrate similar characteristics that will make it possible to obtain generalized speculations and policy implications for counter-terrorism strategies developed after the 9/11 attacks on America.

More specifically, Turkey is a country located at the crossroads of civilization that has played an essential role with its geo-strategic regional position and diverse social fabric. In attacks perpetrated by the PKK, Al-Qaeda, and minor terrorist groups that were

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[31]Lijphart, A. (1975). The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research. *Comparative Political Studies, 8*(3), 165.

carried out over the entire country, more than 30,000 people were killed since 1984 including police, soldiers, and civilians.

Similarly, Russia has been in the operative fields of great social movements, revolutions, and wars throughout its history.[32] In particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union following the Cold War era triggered numerous ethnic based and religiously justified terrorist activities on Russian soil that were too broad and diverse to be governed from one center.[33] Like Turkey, Russia still suffers from various types of even more brutal terrorism despite the tough measures its president took following 9/11.[34] Although terrorist groups operate and commit attacks in other countries (e.g., India, Iraq, Spain, the UK, the United States, etc.), Turkey and Russia were chosen for this study after taking their similarities into account. For example, attacks on these countries perpetrated by terrorist organizations have cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives lost each year, not to mention the decreased quality of life through the spread of fear.

This study seeks to generate more positive and effective counter-terrorism approaches and policies initiated by the UN and other international institutions that apply to any given country.

Hence, I will examine the general literature related to terrorism in Turkey and Russia, the effects of globalization, the UN's counter-terrorism efforts, the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) reports, and evaluations by the countries and the CTC. Comparisons based on similarities and differences between implementation by Russia and Turkey (*cross-national*) before and after 9/11 (*cross-temporal*) may possibly reveal

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[32]Aron, L. (2004). *Responding to terrorism: Russia at a crossroads*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
[33]*Ibid.*
[34]*Ibid.*

limitations and strengths relevant to current counter-terrorism strategies imposed by the UN. By addressing the issues through a global manner that requires collaboration between states, state level institutions, and international actors, namely the United Nations, my proposed research may provide a better understanding of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the UN's contribution to the field.

Literature Review

Due to the global and trans-boundary scope of the common threat of terrorism, there is a vast amount of literature regarding global antiterrorism regimes that emerged through international organizations as well as ways to counter the threat. While there are various types of terrorism classified according to their scope, perpetrators, and motivations, scholars generally agree that defining and classifying terrorism are daunting tasks to achieve.[35]

Apart from the realist, liberal, and cosmopolitan perspectives through which terrorism and counter-terrorism will be evaluated, the regime theory will be applied to investigate international organizations—the United Nations in particular. Since universal trends have resulted in international organizations which were established to address global issues that a nation cannot do alone, regime theory proponents (similar to the cosmopolitan view) also emphasize that the world continually changes; thus, new multifaceted issues of world politics require new approaches of collaboration and communication provided by multilateral institutions. This is because a single state– even a superpower– cannot defeat global level threats but rather require a wide-ranging

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[35]Chenoweth, E., & Lowham, E. (2007). On classifying terrorism: A potential contribution of cluster analysis for academics and policymakers. *Defense and Security Analysis 23(4)*, 345-357.

alliance.[36] Over the past several decades, new global actors have mitigated the power of state given that they can no longer overcome global level economic and social problems that threaten the people's welfare. Therefore, authorities other than states must effectively implement strategies to solve problems over which governments have no more control. Finally, the traditional state inspired by the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 has been unable to create and apply effective strategies in order to deter and stop terrorist attacks and organized unlawful activities in the 20th century.[37]

Defining Terrorism

Before focusing on various definitions of terrorism, the scope of the issue should be precisely understood in order to impose proper policy changes. Its wide-range scope was revealed and recognized following the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11. As a result, perceptions and approaches among countries have changed accordingly. Still, the concept has remained undefined in spite of the many definitions imposed by countries according to their national interests. Although to some extent country representatives have approved of countering terrorism by signing international conventions and treaties, they have been unable to agree upon a universal definition.[38]

Due to the ever-increasing extent of terrorism that has existed over the past few centuries, Dolgova argued that terrorism should obviously be defined in order to bring an effective solution to terrorist activities.[39] Accordingly, he conceptualized terrorism as one kind of violence that consists of three approaches.[40] In the first approach, terrorism is

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[36]Nye, J. S. (1990). *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power.* New York, NY: Basic Books
[37]Orttung & Makarychev, *op. cit.*.
[38]Tolipov, F. (2006). Multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism in fighting terrorism in the SCO area. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4*(2).
[39]Dolgova, A. I. (2004). Theoretical problem of terrorism and of the struggle against it. *Statutes and Decisions, 40*(5), 57.
[40]*Ibid.*

defined as "dangerous forms of violence which in content are criminal and terrorist," whereas the second approach recognizes terrorism as "a kind of political violence perpetrated with the aim of changing the political and legal order."[41] Scholars including Shnaider, Zhalinzkii, and Martynenko supported the second approach in which terrorism is considered to be

> characterized by extremely cruel forms of armed violence—murders, explosions in places frequented by large numbers of citizens, on transport, and in residential buildings, hijackings of aircraft and seizures of hostages—the victims of which are completely innocent people. The essence of terrorism is the intimidation of political and other opponents.[42]

In the third approach typically supported by law enforcement officers, terrorism might consist of various motives used to obtain political goals through psychological or physical violence against innocent victims. This type of violence is intended to cause insurgency and panic in societies and to put more pressure on the government.

Despite the general consensus concerning terrorism's history that has spanned over 2000 years, Laqueur argued that there remains to be no single definition of terrorism that is accepted by all scholars and law enforcers.[43] Although scholars, governmental agencies, policy makers, and practitioners more or less agree with the essence of terrorism, there still remain open questions concerning motivation, ideology, and perpetrator (i.e., state or non-state actor).[44] In addition, there are often many definitions used by various official agencies within one state. For example, "the United States Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have differing definitions of what constitutes terrorism, broadly reflective of their areas

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[41]*Ibid.*

[42]*Ibid.*, 60-61.

[43]Laqueur, *op. cit.*

[44]Bergesen, A. J., & Han, Y. (2005). New directions for terrorism research. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 46(1-2), 134

of competence and operation."[45] While Title 22, § 2656f(d) of the United States Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience," the United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.[46] Finally, Title 28, § 0.85 of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses terrorism as a term to describe "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."[47] Depending upon the base, origin, and aims, the FBI focuses on two main types of terrorism: domestic and international.

- Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

- International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the

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[45]Lentini, P. (2008). Understanding and combating terrorism: Definitions, origins and strategies. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 43*(1), 134.
[46]U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 2656f (d).
[47]U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Section 0.85.

jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.[48]

While Russia and the United States had very similar discourse against terrorism following 9/11, the Russian approach in terms of defining terrorism was somewhat different than that of the United States by including various Russian national concerns.

> In Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code, terrorism is defined as the commission of an explosion, act of arson, or other acts that create a danger to people's lives, of significant property damage, or of the occurrence of other socially dangerous consequences, if these acts are committed with the aim of violating public security, intimidating the population, or exerting pressure on the decision making of state bodies, and also the threat to commit the aforementioned acts with the same aims.[49]

Despite having been a serious concern for the international community since the 1970s, the UN has been unable to obtain a common definition of terrorism that all states and institutions can agree upon. During a panel session organized by the UN in November 2004, however, an academic perspective towards terrorism was developed in which the term was depicted by Kofi Annan as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a

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[48]*Ibid.*
[49]Russian Criminal Code, Article 205.

population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act"[50]

As Langhorne asserted, it is not possible to find a common definition of terrorism accepted by all parties due to political concerns.[51] Similarly, Kruglanski and Fishman surmised that one man may be perceived as a terrorist by a state, whereas the same man may be labeled as a freedom fighter by another state.[52] For example, Turkey characterizes the PKK as a terrorist organization, whereas PKK members may be perceived as freedom fighters by Iraq. Langhorne further emphasized that "terrorism is a political violence directed against civilians for political purposes."[53] While focusing on political goals that turn violence into terrorism, Langhorne pointed out that there remains deep controversy of defining terrorism depending on who is the operator.[54] In other words, whereas some scholars emphasize that only perpetrators can be non-state actors, others argue that terrorism is referred to as state terrorism if operated by any states. Described as the weapon of the weak, terrorism has intense psychological effects that target the mind and emotion of an entire population and causes fear and horror. From this point of view, Chaliand and Blind claimed that terrorism and its impact can be identified in a different way.

> Nowadays, terrorism beats out guerrilla warfare as the preferred and practically exclusive weapon of the weak against the strong. Its primary target is the mind. In that sense, terrorism is the most violent form of psychological warfare, and its psychological impact is commonly understood to be far greater than its physical

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[50]United Nations General Assembly Secretary General (2005). *Report of the Secretary*-General *In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all.* Chapter 3, para. 91.
[51]Langhorne, R. (2006). *The essentials of global politics*. London, UK: Hodder Education.
[52]Kruglanski, A. W., & Fishman, S. (2006). The psychology of terrorism: Syndrome versus tool perspectives. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2),* 193-205.
[53]Langhorne, *op. cit.,* p. 347.
[54]*Ibid.*

effects. Stooping to often pathetic means, terrorism is a way of creating power in the hope of seizing from below that which the state wields from on high.[55]

State antiterrorism legislations might reflect the understanding that terrorism may have on today's society. Thus, terrorism as defined by state laws is of great importance. From the Turkish stance, this can be observed in its anti-terror legislation described in Article 1 of the Turkish Terrorism Prevention Act of 2001.

> Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security.[56]

Classification of Terrorism

Chenoweth and Lowham pointed out that "while defining terrorism is a daunting task, so is classifying terrorist groups as evidenced by the hundreds of terrorist typologies that exist in the literature."[57] They further suggested that the vast number of typologies can be reduced by forming clusters according to the type of attacks, range of activity, objectives, and motives. For example, various departments and institutions in the United States employ different methods to classify terrorist groups. To illustrate, the U.S. Department of State classifies terrorist attacks according to who committed the attack rather than the motivations behind the attack.

Due to the wide range of terrorist activity, not only is the definition of terrorism debated but how to classify terrorist acts is equally debated. Of the many types of terrorism, "criminal, political, economic and religious terrorism" appear to be the most

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[55]Chaliand & Blind, *op. cit.*, p. viii.
[56]Turkish Terrorism Prevention Act (2001), Article 1.
[57]Chenoweth & Lowham, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

frequent reasons for carrying out an attack.[58] However, Dolgova emphasized that a single method for classifying terrorism is not sufficient enough to include the entire number of terrorist organizations since all terrorist groups do not have the same motivations and justifications.[59] Given that each type of terrorism has its own complex characteristics, it is not an easy task to focus on a unique definition; therefore, "each terrorism must be understood in its unique cultural, historical, and political context."[60] As depicted in Figure 1,

Figure 1 Post's (2005) classification of terrorism

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[58]Dolgova, *op. cit*., 63.
[59]*Ibid.*
[60]*Ibid,* p. 57.

Post focused on sub-state terrorism under political terrorism with four types of terrorism─ two of which were nationalist-separatist and religious extremist.[61]Both countries, Russia and Turkey have been suffering from two types of terrorism named ethnic (separatist) terrorism and religious fundamentalist terrorism.

Ethnic (Separatist) Terrorism:

Ethnic terrorism can be described as a form of violence used by a group of people from the same ethnic background in an effort to obtain superiority or dominance over another ethnic group that shares the same landscape. As Ignacia emphasized, political motivation is the core component of violence to be committed. Small groups identify with the dominant group as colonizing and oppressing power that occupied their homeland.[62]

According to Volkan, the PKK in Turkey, ETA in Spain, IRA in Northern Ireland, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka are considered to represent some of the world's ethnic terrorist groups.[63]

Religiously Based Terrorism (Terrorism Abusing Religion):

Islam is a religion with more than a billion believers; as such, it is inappropriate to associate an entire religion with terrorism given that there are also Christian, Jewish and Hindu fundamentalists throughout the world who prefer terrorism in accordance with their own interpretation concerning their faith.[64]

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[61]Post, J. M. (2005). When hatred is bred in the bone: Psycho-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism. *Political Psychology, 26*(4), 615.

[62]Ignacia, S. C. (2007). The dynamics of nationalist terrorism: ETA & the IRA. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 19*:3. 289-306.

[63]Volkan, D. V. (1997). *Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press.

[64]Nassar, J. R. (2009). *Globalization and terrorism: The migration of dreams and nightmares*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks proved how dangerous and devastating terrorism threats can be by abusing people's faith. For example, Islamist groups deal with misinterpreted Islamic faith as their key justification for social change and prefer a theocratic regime to a secular one.[65] The perpetrators of this new form of terrorism operate trans-nationally, are based on terrorist networks with their own unique finance channels, and are motivated by fanaticism and so called religion. Conversely, earlier forms of terrorists were inspired by political motivations, namely extreme left wing and nationalism ideologies.[66] Thus, It can be claimed that the growth of religiously-inspired terrorism began in the early 1990s following the Cold War era.[67] For example, a vast majority of terrorism literature was devoted to religiously motivated terrorism which sharply increased the number of terrorist attacks during the 1990s (i.e., the 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing; the 1994 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect; and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by the Christian-inspired Timothy McVeigh).[68] Rapoport pointed out that religion was the only justification for terrorism during the pre-modern age; however, there are terrorists who have political motivations other than religion.[69] For example, in dealing with the 9/11 attacks, Islam was not the major justification but was politically interpreted thus leading to a perverted version.[70] In other words, if terrorist groups are defined or labeled according to their religious backgrounds, this may cause false generalizations. Thus, it should be recognized that a few hundred

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[65]Robison, K. K., Crenshaw, E. M., & Jenkins, J. C. (2006). Ideologies of violence: The social origins of Islamist and leftist transnational terrorism. *Social Forces, 84*(4), 2009-2026.

[66]Duyvesteyn, I. (2004). How new is the new terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27(5), 439-454.

[67]Simon, S., & Benjamin, D. (2000). America and the new terrorism. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, *42*(1), 59-75.

[68]Juergensmeyer, M. (2001) *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

[69]Rapoport, D. C. (1984). Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions. *The American Political Science Review, 78*(3), 658-677.

[70]Duyvesteyn, *op. cit.*, 439-454.

bloody bandits cannot represent an enormous Muslim community with a world population of 1.4 billion.

Varieties of Approaches and Interpretations

Among various scholars exploring terrorism, Bergesen and Lizardo emphasized that the acts gained much more global characteristics during the early 1990s. For example, the term was referred to by various names such as 'new terrorism', 'new wave terrorism', and 'new generation of terrorists'.[71] Successive waves have been identified. Political violence perceived as terrorism today is the product of the first wave known as 'modern terrorism' having begun in the 1880s and ended together with World War I in 1918.[72] The first and major figure of that wave was Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), a Russian terrorist organization that carried out attacks toward authoritarian Russian tsars[73] and is accepted as the first modern terrorist group in the world.

The second wave of terrorism referred to as anti-colonialism or the nationalism period began at the end of World War II and continued until the mid-1960s.[74] Although countries dealt with terrorism as a minor problem during the 1940s and 1950s, the third wave or the age of terrorism that began in the mid-1960s started to become more significant.[75] During the third wave, major terrorist groups included the German Baader Meinhoff, the Italian Red Bridges, Spain's Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA or Basque Homeland and Freedom), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of Northern Ireland, the

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[71]Bergesen & Lizardo, *op.cit.*, 38-52
[72]*Ibid.* p.49
[73]*Ibid.* p.46
[74]*Ibid.* p.42
[75]*Ibid.* p.43

revolutionary terrorist groups in Latin America, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the Middle East.[76]

The final and current fourth wave began in the 1990s and still continues with dominantly religious inspired terrorist groups who were stimulated by two crucial events: (a) the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79 in the Shiite dominant country of Iran, and (b) an invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan, a Sunni dominant country.[77] It might be argued that religious-based terrorist organizations, namely Hezbollah and Al-Qaida, were inspired by those two events to some extent.

Various Views: Realist, Liberal, Cosmopolitan and Regime Theory Perspectives

Realist, liberal, and cosmopolitan schools have their own interpretations of terrorism and thus of counterterrorism. Proponents of the realist point of view, such as Alexander Hamilton, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan insist on tough military measures taken by states while countering terrorism, because it can be defeated only through war, and state is the only actor and authority that can use power accordingly.[78] They argue that public peace and order can only be maintained through applying coercive means by the state.[79] Furthermore, realist thinkers believe that states constrain themselves if they share their authority and act as members of an international organization.[80] Thus, the realist perspective does not attach adequate attention to international institutions that share states' authority.[81]

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[76]*Ibid.* p.42

[77]*Ibid.* Shughart II, W. F. (2006). An analytical history of terrorism, 1945–2000. *Public Choice*, *128*(1-2), 7-39.

[78] Holsti, *op. cit.*, 35-65.

[79]Russett, B. R., Oneal, J. R., & Davis, D. (1998). The third leg of the Kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950-85. *International Organization, 52*(03), 441-467.

[80]Holsti, *op. cit.*, 35-65.

[81]Waltz, *op. cit.,* 5-41.

The liberal perspective places strong emphasis on economic and institutional paths in order to maintain security through collaboration of states and organizations.[82] From this point of view, it might be argued that an effective counter-terrorism policy can be implemented by coordinating all efforts among countries. Regarding the issue of international organizations, liberal proponents tend to be much more optimistic than realist advocates[83] For the sake of liberal values to be implemented globally, liberals tolerate international organizations to partially use the states' authority. For example, Liberal thinkers do not directly reject international organizations or the UN for the sake of distributing liberal values and ideas.[84] Liberal scholars, like Ripsman, believe that "liberal international institutions can create incentives for states to cooperate by providing a forum for dispute resolution, linking issues, and reducing transaction costs that can impede cooperation."[85]

Cosmopolitans believe that terrorism is an international threat requiring a global response beyond the borders. Beck placed strong emphasis on denationalization and trans-nationalization in order for states to be capable of overcoming their national problems.[86]Denationalization is also known as privatization, and based on the idea of transferring government tasks to non-governmental firms or individuals to increase the quality of service and productivity. It is a process of outsourcing conducted by government. Trans-nationalization is a complicated process transcending national boundaries with various non-state and non-domestic actors to contribute policy making.

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[82]Ripsman, *op.cit*., 669-694.
[83]Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization, 53*(4), 699-732.
[84]*Ibid*.
[85]Ripsman, *op. cit*., 670.
[86]Beck, U. (2001). The cosmopolitan state. *Der Spiegel News.* Munich, Germany.

Beck focuses on both concepts, denationalization and trans-nationalization, for the sake of national interest and security, and emphasizes that international cooperation is required to provide national security.[87] In short, the cosmopolitan view strictly avoids dealing with terrorism in harsh courses such as 'war on terrorism', 'axis of evil', and 'with us or against us' as appeared in the aftermath of 9/11.[88] The primary rationale of the cosmopolitan approach is not to cause future terrorism while preventing current terrorism. [89]In terms of how to respond to terrorism, cosmopolitanism is based on three phases: (a) understanding, (b) learning, and (c) setting measures to prevent further terrorist attacks.[90]

Proponents of cosmopolitanism emphasize that emerging international nongovernmental structures is an unavoidable process and further claim that there is simply no way of turning back the clock to a world of sovereign nation-states and national societies.[91] From this perspective, adherents of cosmopolitanism share similar ideas with supporters of the regime theory.

According to the regime theory, international collaboration among states and institutions at local and regional levels are required.[92] As a consequence, the necessity for an effective international community noticeably emerged. International institutions, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN, are the main focal points of the regime theory.[93] The regime theory assumes that international organizations are

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[87] Beck, U. (2001). The cosmopolitan state. *Der Spiegel News.* Munich, Germany.
[88] Brassett, J. (2008). Cosmopolitanism vs. terrorism: Discourses of ethical possibility before and after 9/11. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 36*(2), 311
[89]*Ibid.*
[90]*Ibid.*
[91] Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006). Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda. *British Journal of Sociology, 57*(1), 10.
[92] Orttung & Makarychev*, op.cit.*
[93]*Ibid.*

regimes that affect states. According to proponents, namely Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, the regime theory emphasizes the importance of collaboration among countries in order to achieve common goals.[94] These scholars argued that the world continually changes; therefore, new dilemmas concerning world politics require innovative approaches of collaboration and communication provided by multilateral institutions given that a single state cannot handle massive threats and disputes.[95] From this point of view, it is rational for states to join international coalitions and institutions for their own common interests.[96] For instance, terrorism is a type of threat that is not bothered by borders but requires trans boundary collaboration among states and institutions.[97] In this regard, collaboration is compulsory for small and weak states as well as every state worldwide to take part in the international alliance against terrorism—a common threat for all.[98] Crenshaw pointed out that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by terrorist groups who abused the globalization outcomes which changed everything including states.[99]

Thus, it might be argued that realists and liberals cannot understand the exact advantages and contributions of international organizations for society as do cosmopolitanists and regime theory proponents.[100] Despite applying all technological means and capabilities at a national level, for example, the USA was unable to prevent the 9/11 attacks since an effective global alliance against terrorism had not been founded

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[94]Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, *op. cit.*
[95]*Ibid.*
[96]*Ibid.*
[97]Orttung & Makarychev, *op. cit.*
[98]Nye, *op. cit..*
[99]Crenshaw *op. cit.*, 379-399
[100]Barnett & Finnemore, *op. cit.*

by that time.[101] In addition, it has been revealed that since terrorists can easily target a single state by abusing the outcomes of globalization (i.e., means of communication and transportation), international alliances are essential in overcoming a global threat, namely terrorism.[102] Thus, the UN as an international organization began to play a more significant role in countering terrorism following 9/11.

Methodology

Research Design

In my study, the research design is formulated in order to explore the assumption that the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11. First, terrorism and counter terrorism in terms of perception and implementation before and after 911 are evaluated. In order to gain additional information concerning the counter terrorism efforts before and after 9/11 demonstrated by Russia and Turkey, their state reports submitted to the UN-CTC are examined in detail. Second, a comparison is made between Russia and Turkey's responses in evaluating pre- and post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures taken by law enforcement units in their respective countries. Third, an attempt is made to develop an effective counter-terrorism strategy by assessing reports, resolutions, and implementations. This is done through conducting personal interviews with high ranking Russian, Turkish, and UN-CTC officials, security liaison officers working in Turkey, and mid-level Turkish National Police (TNP) executives who are employed in antiterrorism units. Specifically, I address the evaluations of counter-terrorism in these two countries at the following two levels: (1) policy responses to the UN, and (2) effective changes in counter-terrorism implementation.

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[101]Beck, *op. cit.*
[102]*Ibid.*

My research design is based on qualitative data analysis in which components of Russia and Turkey is compared in accordance with the two levels mentioned above: (1) how Russia and Turkey responded to CTC that was established by Resolution 1373 (policy responses to the UN), and (2) whether the UN initiated any counter-terrorism policies in Russia and Turkey (effective changes in counter-terrorism implementation). The differences and similarities between counter-terrorism strategies in Russia and Turkey will be revealed during the legislation and enforcement stages.

In addition, the UN's influence on the states' counter-terrorism policies will be determined by comparing legislative structures in Turkey and Russia before and after the 9/11 analysis. Thus, choosing a qualitative two-case study approach in researching terrorism and counter-terrorism in Russia and Turkey pre- and post-9/11 will be methodologically improved. Finally, comparative analyses plays an essential role in social research by providing the researcher with invisible and unpredictable dimensions of specific cases. Thus, by following this strategy, my intention is to answer the "what" questions pertaining to archival analysis as well as the "how" questions pertaining to case studies.

Research Questions (RQs)

The central research question in my proposed cross-temporal and cross-national comparative two-case study is:

RQ1: How much (or to what extent) has the UN been effective in countering terrorism before and after the 9/11 attacks?

The guiding sub-research questions will include:

RQ1: How did the UN respond to global terrorism before 9/11?

RQ2: What are the general results of Russia and Turkey's reports to the CTC?

RQ3: What are the specific measures that Russia and Turkey have taken in response to relative UN resolutions?

Using a qualitative cross-temporal and cross-national comparative case study design, the UN's assumed efficacy efforts to create a global antiterrorism regime are explored. Specifically, data is collected from relevant CTC reports and country reports as well as from interviews conducted with elite Turkish and Russian UN ambassadors, experts employed by the Turkish National Police (TNP) who actively implement counter-terrorism strategies, and liaison officers from various states who work in Turkey.

First, a content analysis of the reports submitted to CTC by Turkey and Russia is conducted. After identifying the key findings through five independent variables ─legislation, countering financing of terrorism (CFT])/anti-money laundering (AML), border control, security agencies, and international cooperation ─open-ended and semi-structured interviews are conducted in order to measure and examine findings based on the UN's impact regarding counter-terrorism. In particular, self method of categorizing the contents into major topics is used to code, organize, and analyze the interviews, country reports, and the CTC according to the independent variables. Interviewees consist of police liaison officers from relevant countries who are currently deployed in Turkey. In addition, a select number of experts from key law enforcement units in Turkey and other countries (e.g., UN staff who handle global terrorism) are interviewed. Using purposive and convenience sampling techniques, respondents ($N = 20$) provide insight regarding the UN's efficacy efforts to combat global terrorism and how such an international regime can emerge.

Case Selection

Selecting appropriate cases for any research is an important yet extremely difficult step to take when conducting a well-organized comparative case study. Since a conceptual framework is tested in my proposed research, a comparative case study approach is considered to be appropriate when investigating complicated terrorism-related issues.

My selection of Russia and Turkey can be justified for four reasons: (1) both countries represent two major states that suffer from terrorism; (2) both countries have experienced similar types of ethnic and religiously justified terrorism; (3) both countries are non-EU states and therefore the UN's impact is accurately measured; and (4) both countries are important regional powers due to their geo-strategic position.

Data Collection

Primary data sources used in my cross-temporal (pre/post 9/11) and cross-national (Turkey and Russia) comparative case study are obtained from terrorism and counter-terrorism literature related to Russia and Turkey in particular. Other chief sources include books, journal and newspaper articles, governmental reports, specific legislation addressing counter-terrorism, corporations initiated by the UN and other international institutions, CTC reports and implementation surveys, and interviews in which questions addressing the issue will be asked. In addition, It might be possible to measure the extent to which police adapt and apply UN CTC-imposed strategies by conducting interviews with police experts in the counter-terrorism field and liaison officers representing various police organizations,.

Collecting data is the most important stage of a research project. Thus, every effort is made to reflect the ideas of all parties by obtaining a wide range of open sources written in both English and Turkish. A review of the literature revealed that cited books and journal articles written in English can be located through Academic Search Premier and Google Scholar. In addition, newspaper articles addressing counter-terrorism issues, UN documents and reports, government reports, and related laws in the two states can be accessed in both English and Turkish.

Sampling is a significant phase when interviews are utilized as a tool to collect data. Therefore, questions should be asked to appropriate subjects selected through purposive sampling methods. In a majority of qualitative studies, for example, all sampling might be understood as purposive; hence, "the sample is always intentionally selected according to the needs of the study."[103] In qualitative research, convenience sampling is one of the most frequently used non-random techniques of purposive sampling.[104] Despite being less rigorous, convenience sampling will be used in my proposed study given that purposive sampling is more appropriate in developing an understanding of complicated issues related to human behavior, namely terrorism and counter-terrorism.[105] On the other hand, convenience sampling relies on selecting the most accessible individuals to be interviewed in the related field of study. As applied in my study, interviews were conducted with only subjects whom I was able to contact.

The sampling size included total number of 20 subjects who were chosen according to the unit of analysis (the UN, Russia, and Turkey) by applying convenience

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[103]Coyne, I. T. (2008). Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling; Merging or clear boundaries? *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, *26(*3), 629.

[104]Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (200*3*). *Handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research*: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[105]Marshal, M. N. (1996). Sampling for qualitative research. *Family Practice, 13(*6*).

techniques of the non-random purposive sampling method. In the United States, total number of selected interviewees were six, and they were originated from the UN, CTC, Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), Counter-terrorism Implementation and Task Force (CTITF), the Turkish Mission to the UN, and the Russian Mission to the UN including:

1) The Turkish ambassador to the UN (chair of the CTC)

2) A consular staff at the Turkish Mission to the UN

3) & 4) Two consular authorities from the Russian ambassador to the UN

5) The chair of CTITF

6) The chair of CTED

In my proposed cross-temporal and cross-national comparative case study, the majority of interviews were conducted in Turkey with the following 14 interviewees:

7) An elected parliament member at the Turkish Great National   Assembly

8) A retired attorney general of regional state security court in Ankara, Turkey

9) – 10) & 11) Three officials from Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) at Turkish National Police (TNP) Headquarters in Ankara, Turkey

12) Izmir police commissioner

13) Izmir Deputy Police Commissioner responsible from Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU)

14) Head of the CTU in Izmir

15) Head of the Intelligence Department in Izmir

16) An official from CTU, Istanbul

17) – 18) – 19) & 20) Four attorneys in Istanbul

The subjects selected to be interviewed were chosen primarily among individuals who know and actively deal with counter-terrorism at both the national and institutional levels. Essentially, they are experts in terms of the UN's implementation imposed on counter-terrorism strategies. To some extent, all interviewees were considered subjects who can reveal findings related to the five independent variables: (a) legislation, (b) CFT/AML, (c) border control, (d) security agencies, and (e) international cooperation. All data derived from the interviews was categorized according to the independent variables and analyzed by getting related parts. The following interview research questions will be designed in a manner that might perhaps assist in examining the issue:

1. How do you assess the role of the UN in the field of terrorism before 9/11?

2. How do you assess the adoption conditions of the new UN regulations after 9/11?

    *   Negotiations-objections-consensus

    *   Objectives of the new regulations

3. How do you evaluate the states' responses to the CTC following the 2001 resolution of 1373 and the 2005 resolution of 1624?

4. After evaluating 1,472 reports submitted to the CTC, have you observed any changes regarding how states perceive terrorism?

5. How do you calculate the impact of the UN resolutions on domestic counter-terrorism?

    *   Changes in national legislations

    *   Reactions to the UN efforts

- Move towards more multilateralism

- Use of the UN system, states reaffirming their sovereignty through the fight against terrorism

6. How do you evaluate the impact of the fight against terrorism on the UN?

   - Increased opportunities for the UN to be an international security actor

   - Spill-over effects in other areas

7. At the national level, there has always been debate and tension between security concerns and civil liberties-human rights. How do you analyze the UN perspective in terms of civil liberties and human rights while fighting against terrorism?

Unit of Analysis and Data Process

The units of analysis consist of three major components that are examined from a global point of view: Russia, Turkey, and the UN. Specifically, comparative data analysis is used to evaluate terrorism and counter-terrorism in Russia and Turkey by placing significance on their national differences and to the UN in regard to its structure and characteristics.

Comparisons are used to gain a more in-depth knowledge and understanding of specific characteristics reflected by each case. Therefore, comparative data analysis is utilized to develop a common point of view towards terrorism and counter-terrorism in which researchers and law enforcement personnel can bring a concrete solution to a chronic social phenomenon. Framing the scope of a complicated issue such as terrorism is a crucial stage in revealing the whole picture and recommending certain policy

changes. Comparative analysis is of great importance in social science as further emphasized by Hallin and Mancini:

> Comparative analysis is valuable in social investigation, in the first place, because it sensitizes us to variation and to similarity, and this can contribute powerfully to concept formation and to the refinement of our conceptual apparatus, and it makes it possible to notice things we did not notice and therefore had not conceptualized, and it also forces us to clarify the scope and applicability of the concepts we do employ.[106]

By using comparative analysis, false generalizations can also be avoided that might prevent the researcher from capturing the whole picture. In addition, the researcher can rely on objective criteria while evaluating the cases rather than being trapped in personal bias.

Finally, comparative analysis enhances a researcher's ability to assess different cases in the future. "The central insight behind unobtrusive methods in historical and comparative investigations is that we can improve our understanding of social processes when we make comparisons to other times [before/after 9/11] and places [Turkey and Russia]."[107] If some patterns can be developed through examining counter-terrorism strategies applied by Russia and Turkey following 9/11 and Resolution 1373, they may possibly be used by other states to effectively struggle with terrorism.

Timeframe of the Study: 1995-2006

Even though it is extremely difficult to apply some time limitations for a research, it is recommended for researcher not to digress from the core points of a certain study. It cannot be possible to cover all in wide-range duration. If the timeframe of a research is not determined to some extent, it may always be an option to miss some important

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[106]Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 2-3
[107]*Ibid.* p. *386*

dimensions that will provide us an obvious understanding. Thus, with some exceptions, the researcher has strived to determine the timeframe as between 1995 and 2006 as far as possible.

<div align="center">**Strengths and Limitations**</div>

Strengths

The first strength of my study is to consist of empirical research pertaining to the UN's efficiency in the field of counter-terrorism. It is thus based on a multidimensional analysis in which three aspects are pointed out: (1) an evaluation of the UN's role; (2) the effectiveness of the UN's actions; and (3) the UN's impact on Russia and Turkey.

Second, this study determines that international collaboration is inevitable towards terrorism which operates beyond national borders. All of the countries have emphasized the transnational dimension of terrorism after 9/11 explicitly although it acted at international level before 9/11. By analyzing a long period of terrorism before and after 9/11, my study touches upon required strategies that should be implemented by countries and international organizations.

Finally, my study reflects upon well-informed assessments pertaining to terrorism and counter-terrorism through interviews with experts in the field. Through their personal experiences and professional opinions of dealing with terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, a better understanding as well as different viewpoints may be reached.

Limitations

First, one may be argue that two cases are not enough to examine the CTC's impact on worldwide counter-terrorism. Thus, the restricted number of cases to be compared can be perceived as a restraint given that it is difficult to determine common

characteristics reflected by most parties. Because my study reveals a number of assumptions regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism in Russia and Turkey only, it may therefore be impractical to generalize the measures taken against terrorism due to global structural differences among the states. Out of approximately 200 countries worldwide, however, only Russia and Turkey are examined since available data is collected through personal interviews. Certainly, two countries do not represent the entire world; nevertheless, focusing only on Russia and Turkey contributes to further research concerning widespread global terrorist acts and counter-terrorism strategies.

Second, my study concludes with precise predictions and outcomes due to its qualitative nature. Thus, quantitative data analysis might have resulted in more precise predictions. In addition, there is no balance between qualitative and quantitative findings since my study is based primarily on qualitative data derived from related literature and interviews with experts in the field.

Finally, it takes time to collect and analyze data in my qualitative study, whereas procedures in a quantitative study usually take much less time. To illustrate, a qualitative study takes a great amount of time in reviewing the literature in-depth and interviewing professionals one by one, while it takes much less time to collect data by conducting surveys in quantitative studies.

CHAPTER II: TERRORISM IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY BEFORE 9/11

Introduction

In this chapter, Russia and Turkey will be discussed in relation to their historical backgrounds, various types of terrorism tactics used, and governmental antiterrorism legislation passed before 9/11. From this context, the purpose will be to address terrorist activities and counter-terrorism policies in both countries pre-9/11 in order to better determine whether or not the United Nations' (UN) strategies have influenced antiterrorism policies post-9/11.

Revolutionary terrorist groups were claimed to have been considerably more effective in Russia until the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. During the last quarter of the 19th century, for example, a variety of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by anarchists who held revolutionary ideas. By the end of World War II, ethnically inspired terrorism became even more effective followed by religiously justified groups after the Soviet Union's collapse. In addition, scholars have argued that the Soviet Union's dismantling resulted in nationalist ideas to become powerfully supported by many ethnicities in the Union.

From a Turkish point of view, Turkey has had the most varied types of terrorist groups that have operated since 1923 when the New Republic was established.[108] For example, no fewer than 10 religiously justified radical terrorist groups currently exist in addition to several leftist (Marxist) groups, and the PKK–Turkey's one ethnic group yet the most effective that continues to commits devastating attacks throughout the

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[108]Sozen, A. (2006). Terrorism and the politics of anti-terrorism in Turkey. In R. W. Orttun & A. S. Makarychev (Eds.), *National counter-terrorism strategies: Legal, institutional, and public policy dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia* (pp. 131-144). Fairfax, VA: IOS Press Inc.

country.[109] Thus, it can be argued that Marxist terrorist groups which were ideologically inspired by the Soviet Union weakened following the Union's collapse; on the other hand, religiously justified and ethnic groups have remained much more powerful.

Russia: Historical Background of Terrorism

Russia has endured a long history of terrorism that was rooted in the 19th century and inspired by the 1789 French Revolution. If terrorism is considered to be a concept associated with revolutionary socialism, anarchism, and nationalism stemming from the French Revolution, two terrorist groups—the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) and the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party—were active from the 1870s until Russia's First World War. According to modern French secular political beliefs, these groups became a challenge towards state authority and had intended to create a mass revolt similar to that held against King Louis XVI by the French Revolution.[110] Russia's four major terrorist groups today include the revived Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), the Nihilist Movement, the Circle of Tchaikovsky, and the Land and Liberty—all—of which embrace terrorism as a tool based on revolutionary ideas that reject government authority.

The Narodnaya Volya Party is a revolutionary group also defined as an individual type of terrorism relying upon the idea of 'propaganda by deed'.[111] Morozov, the Party's leading ideologist , determined that 'neo-partisan warfare' (later referred to as 'terrorist warfare') was originally the primary method in which individuals were placed in the

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[109]Karmon, E. (1997). Radical Islamic political groups in Turkey. *Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1*(4).

[110]Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics, 13*(4), 379-399.

[111]Iviansky, Z. (1977). Individual terror: Concept and typology. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *12(*1), 43-63.

center.[112] This final wave of individually adopted terror resulted in the Narodnaya Volya Party's ultimate goal—the 1917 Russian Revolution.[113] Apart from revolutionary terrorist groups operating in Russia during the 19th century, current antiterrorism units deal more frequently with ethnic (separatist) and religiously based Islamic (so called) terrorist groups.

Ethnic Terrorism

Approximately 85%, or a majority of worldwide countries, have at least two ethnicities within their boundaries.[114] In the case of Russia, numerous ethnic identities are harbored on its vast soil. In addition to increased ethnic terrorism following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, a nuclear terrorism threat against Russia might be considered as well.[115]

Initially, ethnic terrorism began with the Chechnya occupation by Russian troops following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.[116] Essentially, Chechens also expected independence from Russia when Lithuania and Estonia obtained theirs following the Soviet Union's collapse.[117] Thus, a homegrown type of insurgency appeared in Chechnya that continues today in the form of ethnic terrorism on Russian soil.

In addition to measures taken against terrorism by both the Chechens and oppressive Russians, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in ethnic conflicts between

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[112]*Ibid*, p. 4.
[113]*Ibid.*
[114]Toft, M. D. (2010). The geography of ethnic violence: Identity, interests, and the indivisibility of territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[115]Allison, G., & Kokoshin, A. (2002). The new containment. An alliance against nuclear terrorism. *The National Interest, 69*, 35-43.
[116]Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism*: Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
[117]*Ibid.*

the Russians as well as the Uzbeks. More especially after policy changes following 9/11, political violence has been used against Russia by Chechens and Uzbeks alike.[118]

Religiously Based (Islamist) Terrorism

Due to perverted ideas and misinterpreted meanings of Islam during the early 1990s, terrorist groups began to increase their influence and become exceedingly more effective in the former Soviet Union and Central Asia. As a result of available opportunities for contacting and communicating with one another, the Afghanistan War followed by the Chechen War became important stages for future radical Islamist groups.[119] Therefore, the lack of authority after the collapse of the Soviet Union created safe havens for religiously based terrorist groups to easily operate throughout the country.[120] For example, Chechnya has become a safe haven for Al-Qaida, and the Uzbek-Russian border has become an operational region for the Uzbekistan's Islamic Movement.[121]

To some extent, other minor extremist religiously justified terrorist groups and certain organized crime syndicates in the region have connections with Al-Qaida─a network-based terrorist organization that operates without a concrete location.[122] Thus, one might argue that the wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Bosnia have served as recruitment fields for radical Islamist groups, namely Al-Qaida.[123] For

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[118]Moore, C. (2007). Combating terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20*(2), 303-323.

[119]Aktan, G. S. & Koknar, A. M. (2002). Turkey. In Y. Alexander (Ed.), *Combating terrorism: Strategies of ten countries* (pp. 260-298). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

[120]Karmon, *op. cit.*

[121]Moore, *op. cit.*

[122]Aron, L. (2004). *Responding to Terrorism: Russia at a crossroads*. Washinton, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

[123]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*

example, warriors from Muslim nations have kept ties with one another—some of whom have been either Al-Qaida representatives or cells in their respective countries.[124]

Antiterrorism Legislation in Russia Pre-9/11

As the primary legislative instrument, the Russian Federation Constitution was adopted in 1993 after a period of socialist legal tradition between 1917 and 1991 based on collective rather than individual rights.[125] Although the new constitution relies heavily on civil law tradition, the effects of Soviet and Czarist legal systems might be perceived as well.[126] For example, the notion of society's collective needs currently exists whereas individual protections are underestimated.[127] As noted, Articles 55 and 56 of Russia's Constitution are related to counter-terrorism legislative measures:

> Article 55(3) of the Russian Constitution provides that 'human and civil rights and liberties may be restricted by the federal law only to the extent required for the protection of the fundamentals of the constitutional system, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons, for ensuring the defense of the country and the security of the state'. Of course, anti-terrorism measures are always adopted in order to ensure 'the defense of the country and the security of the state'. Furthermore, to the extent a state of emergency is declared 'throughout the territory of the Russian Federation', or 'in individual areas thereof', Article 56 of the Constitution allows for 'individual restrictions of rights and liberties with identification of the extent and of their duration … in order to ensure the safety of citizens and protection of the constitutional system'.[128]

Following the Soviet Union's collapse, the new Russia had to adjust relations with the world due to its vast land stretching from Eastern Europe to Far East Asia.[129] Essentially, the country had to establish strategic objectives, address threats towards

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[124]*Ibid.*

[125]Beckman, *op. cit.*

[126]*Ibid.*

[127]*Ibid.*

[128]*Ibid,*.p.128

[129]Godzimirski, J. M. (2000). Russian national security concepts 1997 and 2000: A comparative analysis. *European Security, 9*(4), 73-91.

national security, and devise methods to overcome these difficulties.[130] From this point of view, numerous reforms were implemented in Russian agencies as a way to struggle with various forms of terrorism operating on Russian soil.[131] Nonetheless, structural changes did not alter the Russian mentality that justified all repressive war-setting measures taken against Chechens and other minorities.[132] By containing a unique military culture, for example, this approach depends heavily on the idea of "policing against public rather than a police force serving the public, and this trend continues to shape attempts to combat terrorism."[133] Therefore, one might argue that following the Union's collapse, numerous attempts were made to transform Russian law enforcement into agencies that were able to tackle global threats, namely terrorism; however, these agencies remained at an initial stage and simply changed their names.[134]

On the other hand, scholars such as Aydinli and Rosenau dealt with the problem more optimistically by claiming that until the Russian Law on Security was passed in 1992, security issues were handled through a stricter, militarist, and traditional view by Russian security agencies. With the influence of globalization, however, changes reflecting a new understanding of security were perceived in which the 1992 law emphasized three levels of security: "freedom from internal and external threats to vital interests of the individual, society and state."[135] In addition, the law did not focus solely on the military aspects of security but placed sufficient emphasis on social, economic,

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[130]*Ibid.*

[131]Moore, *op. cit.*

[132]*Ibid.*

[133]*Ibid,* p. 309.

[134]*Ibid.*

[135]Aydinli, E., & Rosenau, J. (2006). *Globalization, security, and the nation state: paradigms in transition.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

and ecological issues given that it was impracticable to observe the whole picture from an outdated narrow frame of mind.[136]

In 1996, Articles 205, 208, 277, and 360 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation adopted classified terrorism related crimes and their punishments.[137] While there were various endeavors pointed out and necessary policy changes shaped prior to 1997, the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation was the primary step taken in December 1997.[138]

Since terrorism is perceived as the most significant threat to Russia's national security, the country's government emphasized the scope of this effective threat through national documents, namely the 'National Security Concept' and the 'Foreign Policy Concept'.[139] As a result, numerous high level officials referred to the various types of extremism and international terrorism that had located appropriate areas in which to operate as well as grounds to motivate spreading from Ossetia to Tajikistan ─the most conflicted regions on Russian soil.[140] Thus, one might claim that the Russian government had to adapt itself to the changing nature of the threats by enacting reforms.

First, the Russian 'National Security Concept' was ratified in December 1997 as an attempt to integrate its security concept with the West as well as to fill the gap in understanding national security.[141] Prior to 9/11, the primary legal standards pertaining to Russian counter-terrorism relied upon this document to frame terrorism and counter-

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[136]*Ibid.*

[137]Guiora, A. N. (2005). Legislative and policy responses to terrorism: A global perspective. *San Diego International Law Journal, 7*(1), 125-172.

[138]Godzimirski*, loc. cit.*

[139]Allison & Kokoshin, *loc. cit*.

[140]*Ibid.*

[141]Godzimirski, *loc. cit*.

terrorism.[142] The 'National Security Concept' was also claimed to have become a new updated version of the Russian military doctrine[143] that was published in January 2001 just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.[144] However, both the old and new versions of the concept documents ignored the needs and expectations of citizens by focusing on militarist perspectives.[145] Besides policy level changes having been implemented, there were also legislative dimensions concerning the issue.

Second, according to the specified Russian law on 'Fight against Terrorism' enacted in 1998, there are five departments responsible for countering terrorism as well as developing new strategies towards terrorism in Russia: (a) the Federal Security Service (FSB), (b) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), (c) Service of external intelligence (SVR), (d) Federal protection service (FSO), and (e) Ministry of Defense.[146]The fight against terrorism law pointed out the following broad definition of terrorism:

> … terrorism is violence or the threat of violence against individuals or organizations, and also the destruction (damaging) of or threat to destroy (damage) property and other material objects, such as threaten to cause loss of life, significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences and *are implemented with* a view to violating public security, intimidating the population, or influencing the adoption of decisions advantageous to terrorists by organs of power, or satisfying their unlawful material and (or) other interests; attempts on the lives of statesmen or public figures perpetrated with a view to ending their state or other political activity or out of revenge for such activity; attacks on representatives of foreign states or staffers of international organizations enjoying international protection, and also on the official premises or vehicles of persons enjoying international protection if these actions are committed with a view to provoking war or complicating international relations (Article 3).[147]

[142]Soldatov, A., & Borogan, I. (2005). Terrorism prevention in Russia: One year after Beslan. *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Centre, 1*.

[143]Allison & Kokoshin, *loc. cit.*

[144]Godzimirski, *loc. cit.*

[145]Giles, K. (2009). Russia's national security strategy to 2020. *NATO Defense College report*.

[146]Aydinli & Rosenau, *op. cit.*

[147]Russian Federation Federal Law No. 130-FZ (July 25, 1998). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm

Furthermore, the Russian Federation Federal Law No. 130-FZ addressed the importance of terrorism and determined the following basic principles of counter-terrorism in Article 2:[148]

1. Legality
2. The priority of measures to prevent terrorism
3. The inevitability of punishment for terrorist activity
4. The combination of overt and covert methods of fighting terrorism
5. The integrated use of legal, political, socioeconomic, and propaganda preventive measures
6. The priority of defending the rights of persons exposed to danger as a result of terrorist action
7. Minimum concessions to terrorists
8. One-man command in the leadership of forces and resources involved in conducting counterterrorist operations
9. Minimum disclosure of technical methods and tactics for the conduct of counterterrorist operations, and also of the list of participants in the aforementioned operations.

Russian authorities have been dealing with religiously and ethnic based terrorism since the 1980s. In fact, if the 1998 law of counter-terrorism is examined in detail, signs of the Chechen experience might be recognized.[149] Moreover, it has been claimed that the Russian 'National Security Concept' ratified in 1997 affected the government's approaches towards national security issues.[150] Consequently, one might argue that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian legislative efforts began in 1992 and continued until the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (see Figure 2).

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[148]Guiora, *loc.cit.*
[149]*Ibid.*
[150]Giles, *op. cit.*

Counter-terrorism Legislation in RUSSIA Before 9/11
1. The Security Law (1992) 2. The Russian Federation Constitution (1993) 3. The Foreign Policy Concept-I (April 23, 1993) 4. Criminal Code (1996) 5. The National Security Concept –I (1997) 6. Law about Fight Against Terrorism (1998) 7. The National Security Concept –II (Jan 10, 2000) 8. The Foreign Policy Concept-II (June 28, 2000) 9. Presidential Decree (Jan, 2001)

Figure 2 Counter-terrorism legislation in Russia before 9/11

Turkey: Historical Background of Terrorism

Turkey is an EU candidate country located in both Europe (15%) and Asia (85%) with a Muslim-dominant population (99.8%) consisting of approximately 75 million people. Following the collapse of the Ottomans, Turkey was founded by Ataturk as a secular democratic country totally prone to the West and its values after the First World War in 1923.[151]

Despite having experienced several coups between 1960 and 2010, a vast majority of the Turkish people supported democracy and its liberties. Furthermore, the EU candidacy process indicates that Turks largely support the government in its efforts to gain full membership. Due to Turkey's regional diverse social fabric and its geo-strategic position, the country has always attracted numerous terrorist groups that operate both inside and outside of Turkish soil.

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[151]Rodoplu, U., Arnold, J., & Ersoy, G. (2003). Terrorism in Turkey. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 18*(2), 152-160.

Due to Turkey's cross-road positions between Asia and Europe, there has always been a natural bridge between these two continents.[152] Thus, one might argue that Turkey has suffered the most varied types of terrorism in the new millennia ranging from ethnic based to revolutionary and religiously justified violence.[153] Sozen emphasized that although the 1980 coup d'état suppressed numerous terrorist groups since the 1990s in particular, Turkey's terrorist groups can be logically categorized into three major groups: "1-Kurdish separatist, 2-Radical Islamist, and 3-Leftist (Marxist)."[154] In addition, It has been claimed that the above mentioned terrorist organizations have become primary threats aimed at destabilizing Turkey.[155]

Although Yayla argued that terrorism in Turkey had its beginnings with radical university student movements during the late 1960s, the roots of ethnic terrorism evolved based on two major uprisings: the 1880 Sheikh Ubeydullah and the 1925 Sheikh Said.[156] The only figure of ethnic-separatist terrorism currently operating in Turkey is the PKK (**P**artiya **K**arkeran **K**urdistan-Kurdistan's Labors' Party). Yayla described terrorism as two chronological waves, the first that began between 1968 and 1973 and the second that began between 1975 and 1980.[157] In relation to events following 1980, it might be reasonable to add two more waves of terrorism: a third occurring from 1980 to 9/11 and a fourth occurring after 9/11.

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[152]Oztekin, Y. (2000). *Terrorism in Turkey*: DTIC Document.
[153]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*
[154]Sozen, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
[155]Lesser, I. O. (1999). Countering the new terrorism: Implications for strategy. *Countering the New Terrorism, 94.*
[156]Ankara Paper 9 (2004).
[157]Yayla, A. (1982). Terrorism in Turkey. *The Turkish year book of international relations, 10.*

Turkey's First Cycle of Terrorism

Tremendous social and political turmoil which occurred during the 1960s resulted in radical social movements and terrorist activities. During that period of time, factors that stimulated social instability included rapid urbanization, poor economic rates, public uprisings in southeastern Kurdish provinces, and leftist and Islamist university student movements.[158]

In order to understand the nature of terrorism in Turkey, both the first coup in 1960 and its new liberal constitution should be mentioned. Following the coup, the most unfortunate event in the history of the Republic occurred: Prime Minister Menderes and his cabinet members—Zorlu and Polatkan—were executed by a Yassiada military court. Thus, the 1961 constitution was adopted with a wide range of liberties.

Numerous scholars have embraced the late 1960 university student movements as the beginning of terrorism in Turkey.[159] For example, Marxist and Leninist ideologies of communism motivated radical student groups during the first cycle of terrorism. In 1968, for example, a group of leftist Marxist-Leninist students headed by Deniz Gezmis occupied colleges in order to proclaim three objectives: (a) to struggle against the government, (b) to resist the political system, and (c) to remove government out of colleges.

Initially, the left wing student groups were organized under the Federation of Revolutionary Youth Associations (Dev-Genc). Between 1965 and 1969, these fundamental groups did not have terror on their agenda. Rather, they preferred to have relations with the only legal Marxist political group known as the Turkish Labour Party.

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[158]Rodoplu, Arnold, & Ersoy, *loc. cit.*.
[159]Yayla, *op. cit.*

After losing the 1969 elections, however, they began to believe that a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Turkey would not occur peacefully.[160]

Following the 1969 elections, radical leftist students, namely Deniz Gezmis and Huseyin Inan, traveled to Jordan to attend the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) camps. Their purpose was to be trained in guerilla warfare tactics practiced by left wing terrorists throughout the world.[161] Thus, three terrorist organizations were founded: (a) Deniz Gezmış' Turkish People Liberation Army (TPLA), (b) Mahir Cayan's Turkish People Liberation Party-Front (TPLP-F), and (c) İbrahim Kaypakkaya's Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army (TWPLA).

Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnic based terrorism has existed as a major threat mitigating the quality of life and democracy in Turkey since its establishment.[162] Over the past several decades, for example, the country has suffered brutally from PKK terrorist group attacks.[163] In addition, student movements during the 1960s and 1970s made both ethnic and religiously justified groups powerful and effective.[164] Because the Soviet Union's collapse weakened leftist Marxist terrorist groups, the integration of an Islamist party to the system affected radical Islamist groups in the same way that the PKK ethnic terrorist organization became the only intimidation against Turkey.[165]

When compared to all other terrorist organizations in terms of the number of attacks and fatalities, Turkey's predominant terrorist organization has been the PKK since

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[160]*Ibid.*
[161]*Ibid.*
[162]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[163]Zakheim, D. S. (2011). What 9/11 has wrought. *Middle East Quarterly*, *Fall 2011, 18(*4*)*. pp.3-13.
[164]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[165]*Ibid.*

the 1980s. As previously mentioned, its roots were founded on two major uprisings: the 1880 Sheikh Ubeydullah and the later 1925 Sheikh Said. On the other hand, two primary trends in the Kurdish community ─traditionalists and socialists ─took place between the 1960s and 1970s.[166] Traditionalists and conservatives, for example, believed that the Kurdish community could struggle in a democratic system by taking advantage of democratic institutions to voice their demands; conversely, socialists who emerged from the extreme leftists rejected a peaceful process and argued that the only way was through "armed struggle against what they perceived to be an imperialist and fascist Turkish state."[167]

In addition to Turkey's historical Kurdish background, matters including language, cultural identity, religion, demographic structure, and socio-political positions should be elucidated in order to grasp the entire picture.[168] Otherwise, it may not be possible to develop a proper approach towards ethnic-based conflicts without a detailed knowledge of Turkey's Kurdish ethnic identity. Hence, the Kurdish ethnic identity is of crucial importance in understanding the issue.

Religiously Based (Islamist) Terrorism

Initially, religiously based terrorist groups began their activities during the 1960s in order to change the constitution according to their perverted understanding of Islam.[169] Whereas Hizbul Tahrir, Islamic Jihad, and Islami Buyuk Dogu Akincilar Cephesi (Islamic Great Orient Raiders Front─IBDA-C) were major terrorist groups until the

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[166] Ankara Paper 9, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[167] *Ibid.*
[168] *Ibid.*
[169] Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*

1990s, Hizbullah (not Lebanese Hezbollah) has currently become the most dominant figure in Turkey's religiously based terrorism.[170]

In an effort to support other mujahedeen from further Muslim countries, members of major fundamental Turkish religious groups voluntarily joined the wars taking place in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Kasmir. Beginning in the 1980s, the emergence of religiously based terrorist groups was due to the ties kept with mujahedeen following the wars.[171] Therefore, Islamist terrorist groups operating in Turkey have augmented their activities since the late 1980s by recruiting individuals who had made contact with other Muslim warriors in Asia, Europe, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

While some Islamist terrorist groups appeared in the 1960s with the goal of establishing an Islamic state, Islamic Jihad has been a major threat in Turkey since the 1980s following the assassination of several Arab diplomats.[172] In addition, the Soviet Union's collapse resulted in a lack of authority in the region. In turn, this provided an opportunity for fundamentalist religiously justified terrorist groups in both Turkey and post-Soviet countries to become organized in order to perpetrate devastating terrorist attacks. Of those, the Turkish groups became much more effective by securing support from Iran during the 1990s.[173] By 1996, measures taken against Islamic groups were so lenient and limited that an Islamist Party known as Refah Partisi (RP) won the elections.[174] From a different perspective, radical Islamic groups have been marginalized thus becoming ineffective due to the integration of Refah Partisi (RP) that currently

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[170]*Ibid.*
[171]*Ibid.*
[172]Karmon, E. (1997). Radical Islamic political groups in Turkey. *Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1*(4).
[173]*Ibid.*
[174]*Ibid.*

governs Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) in the Turkish political system.[175] Consequently, it might be confusing to monitor approximately ten of the following Islamist terrorist groups that presently operate: (1) the Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), (2) the Turkish Islamic Liberation Front (TIK-C), (3) Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), (4) the Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), (5) the World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO), (6) the Universal Brotherhood Front-Sharia Revenge Squad (EKC-SIM), (7) the Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), (8) the Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic War of Liberation (EIK-TM), (9) the Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO), and (10) the Turkish Sharia Revenge Commandos (TSIK).[176]

Antiterrorism Legislation before 9/11

Given that Turkey has combated various types of terrorism from the time the country was founded in 1923, antiterrorism legislation before 9/11 afforded proficiency to the field.[177] For example, the country's first counter-terrorism legislative effort was observed following the 1925 Sheik Said Kurdish uprising. In addition, the Independence Tribunal was formed to punish the Kurdish rebels as well as other adversaries of the newly established Republic.[178] In regard to nationalist and religiously based movements, one might therefore claim that the government took excessive measures through the Independence Tribunal.[179]

Although terrorist activities increased with student movements during the 1960s and 1970s, the most extreme forms were taken through two military coups in 1971 and

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[175]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[176]Karmon, *op. cit.*
[177]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[178]*Ibid.*
[179]Olson, R. (2000). The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937-8): Their impact on the development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. *Die Welt des Islams, 40*(1), 67-94.

1980.[180] As a result of suppressive post-coup measures and legislation such as the Martial Law, many members of terrorist organizations were arrested, and terrorist activities almost came to an end.[181] In the aftermath of the two coups, for example, counter-terrorism legislation became even harsher. Following the 1971 coup, the Martial Law (Act #1402) was ratified on May 13, 1971, and justified by the Turkish Constitution. In other words, the Constitution gave legitimacy to the law by 1983 but ignored fundamental human rights and liberties while countering terrorism. Essentially, Turkey's Martial Law which applied for more than a decade was replaced by the State of Emergency Law's lenient form (Act #2935) enacted in 1983 following the 1980 coup. Both the Martial Law and the State of Emergency Law might be considered as special legislative tools in countering terrorism.[182]

Following the 1971 coup, state security courts were established in 1973 to deal with crimes against the Republic and national security that included terrorism. As a result, all terror cases were tried in the special security courts until they were replaced by the high criminal courts in 2004. Arguably, the state security courts created negative effects on counter-terrorism policies by giving the police more authority and power and by weakening the court.[183]

On the other hand, certain effective approaches before 9/11 might be emphasized, namely the Repentance Law.[184] In particular, the law was an excellent step taken by the Turkish government in the 1980s to provide a return to the criminal justice system with a

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[180]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[181]*Ibid*
[182]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*
[183]Phillips, D. L. (2004). Turkey's dreams of accession. *Foreign Affairs., 83*, 86.
[184]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*

reduced sentence for all terrorists.[185] As a result, approximately 3,000 terrorists surrendered to the Turkish security agencies until 2000; therefore, the law might be declared as having been a success.[186]

Although effective counter-terrorism legislation procedures were carried out in the late 1980s, one might argue that Turkey's National Security Council the constitutional advisory structure to the country's government has always been the dominant power in determining national security strategies.[187] The Council's dominant members are from the Turkish Army that determines all national security policies to be implemented and considers itself to be the only guardian in the country that was established by Ataturk.[188] Decisions made by the Council have a binding effect over all policies implemented by the Turkish governmental agencies. In fact, even the Turkish Parliament performs its tasks under the Council's influence. Thus, efforts of the legislative authority remained insufficient to some extent prior to 9/11. Furthermore, it might be claimed that militarist and repressive counter-terrorism laws reflect the National Security Council's main concerns. Further, Karaosmanoglu emphasized that military influence on civilians and the Turkish Parliament indirectly continues through decisions imposed by the Council.[189] For example, the Army not only shapes the policies determined by the Council but also intervenes in every area of public life.[190]

As a first attempt to frame both terrorism and counter-terrorism, the Law to Fight Terrorism (Act #3713) was ratified in 1991 with the primary goal being to effectively

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[185]*Ibid.*

[186]*Ibid.*

[187]Karaosmanoglu, A. L. (2000). The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey. *Journal of International Affairs─Columbia University, 54*(1), 199-216.

[188]*Ibid.*

[189]*Ibid.*

[190]Cizre, U. (2004). Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*(1), 120.

fight against the PKK—Turkey's only separatist (ethnic) terrorist organization.[191] Due to the changing nature and scope of terrorism, however, the Act has undergone numerous amendments and partial cancellations since 1991.[192] For example, it profoundly included re-entry and rehabilitation aspects and focused on separatist terrorism rather than other minor types which were not as effective as the PKK.[193] In short, the Turkish antiterrorism act has effectively determined ways in which to counter the country's terrorist groups since its adoption on April 12, 1991. Accordingly, the act defined terrorism in the following manner:

> Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security.[194]

In addition, the act defined terrorist offenders and organizations as well as terrorism related crimes specified in the Turkish Penal Code.[195] Despite not being currently in effect, the Turkish Penal Code (#765) enacted in 1926 included terrorism-related crimes in Articles 125, 131, 146, 147, 148, 149, 156, 168, 171 and 172.[196] Notably, the Code was applied until it was replaced in 2004 by the #5237 of the Turkish Penal Code.

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[191]Turkey: Counter-terrorism (2001, January). Retrieved from http://legislationline.org/ topics/country/50/topic/5
[192]*Ibid.*
[193]*Ibid.*
[194]Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991, April 12). *Resmi Gazete*
[195]*Ibid.*
[196]Turkish Penal Code (March 1, 1926). Retrieved from http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov. tr/html/401.html

Due to the end of the Cold War and democratization reforms during the 1990s and 2000s, terrorist activities decreased.[197] Especially from the beginning of terrorist attacks committed by the PKK, the Turkish government has always dealt with terrorism activities as a domestic law and order issue and has avoided identifying this struggle as a war against another nation.[198] Furthermore, it has been claimed that this gradually moderating counter-terrorism approach has weakened some leftist groups as well as integrated certain Islamic groups into the Turkish political system.[199]

For decades, Turkey's problem-oriented and lenient trend pre-9/11 was never considered to be a constraint in its way of combating terrorism. For example, numerous lessons were learned from the experiences of Ireland and Spain. Additionally, it has been well understood in Turkey that harsh militarist measures are not as effective as they often appear to be.[200] In fact, the country still insists to some extent on those methods of countering terrorism due to the military's dominance in Turkish politics.

Currently, the primary obstacle lying before the Turkish authorities is to have a sufficient and determined legislative approach in targeting terrorism that does not affect the rights and liberties of citizens. Turkey's present constitution is a product of the 1980 coup and thus supports militarist views. Before 9/11, however, both coups' Martial Law that had existed for years restricted the ability of politicians to effectively struggle with terrorism.[201] Thus, it might obviously be argued that pre-9/11 counter-terrorism laws and regulations were shadowed by the Turkish Army's influence which still remains the most

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[197]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[198]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*
[199]Sozen, *op. cit.*
[200]Ahmad, E., & Barsamian, D. (2001). *Terrorism: Theirs and ours.* Canada: Seven Stories Press.
[201]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*

important figure in Turkish politics.[202] Because the Constitution allows the Army to play such a role, legal reforms at the constitutional level might perhaps be needed to determine more effective counter-terrorism strategies.[203]

As a result, it might be observed that pre-9/11 counter-terrorism legislative measures were first taken following the establishment of the new Republic in 1923. In addition, extreme forms of counter-terrorism laws were adopted immediately following two coups—one in 1971 and another in 1980 (Figure 3).

Counter-terrorism Legislation In TURKEY Before 9/11
1. The Turkish Penal Code-I (1926)
2. Martial Law (1971)
3. Turkish Constitution (1982)
2. State of Emergency Law (1983)
3. The Repentance Law (1988)
4. Law to Fight Terrorism (1991)
7. Law to Fight Terrorism-Amendments (1995)
8. The Repentance Law (1999)
9. Law to Fight Terrorism-Amendments (1999)

Figure 3 Counter-terrorism legislation in Turkey before 9/11

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[202]Cizre, *op. cit.,* pp. 107-125.
[203]*Ibid.*

CHAPTER III: THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE 9/11

Introduction

In 1919 following World War I, the League of Nations—a predecessor of the United Nations—was established with the Treaty of Versailles "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security." Consequently, the League's activities ceased after being unable to prevent World War II.[204] In 1945, a delegation consisting of 50 countries met at the United Nations' Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco in order to shape the United Nations' Charter proposals that representatives from China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the UK had researched since August 1944.[205] As a result, the Charter was signed by representatives from all 50 countries joined by Poland marking the 51st country. Thus, the UN was officially born on October 24, 1945, when the Charter was ratified by China, the UK, USSR, USA, France, and a majority of other signatories.[206] On April 18, 1946, the League of Nations terminated its existence after making necessary preparations to be replaced by the United Nations.[207] At a ceremony held in Geneva on August 1, 1946, the end of the League of Nations was declared, and a fresh new start began with an international institution known as the United Nations (the UN).

As a field of international cooperation, the UN was created to determine an effective new approach to the world's fundamental goals of maintaining peace and security.[208] In becoming a wide-ranging international voice for virtually all states

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[204]United Nations. Dept. of Pub. Info. (2008). *The United Nations Today*: United Nations Department of Public Information.
    [205]*Ibid.*
    [206]*Ibid.*
[207]Goodrich, L., M. (1947). From League of Nations to United Nations. *International Organization, 1*(1)*,* 3-21.
[208]*Ibid.*

throughout the world, the UN was prone to claim that the old League was a failure and ineffective in dealing with enormous world problems. For example, it was unable to prevent World War-II despite obvious signs of a coming war. For the newly established institution, ineffectiveness of the former served as a supportive factor in removing any doubts as well as the risk of losing acceptance and success in adapting innovative needs and conditions following a devastating world war.[209] In addition, it should be emphasized that the UN was built on the basis and experiences of the former League of Nations which was unable to adapt to a changing world. In support of the League of Nations, Sir Alfred Zimmern highlighted that the UN could not be perceived as a total rejection by the previous structure:

> The League of Nations was never intended to be, nor is it, a revolutionary organization. On the contrary, it accepts the world of states as it finds it and merely seeks to provide a more satisfactory means for carrying on some of the business which these states transact between one another. It is not revolutionary in the more limited sense of revolutionizing the methods for carrying on interstate business. It does not supersede the older methods. It merely supplements them.[210]

Despite differences between the UN and the League, Goodrich further emphasized that "the UN does not represent a break with the past, but rather the continued application of old ideas and methods with some changes deemed necessary in the light of past experience."[211]

As a major difference between the League of Nations and the United Nations, the UN's Security Counsel (UNSC) was granted sufficient power to tackle global issues. Thus, it might be argued that with its Security Counsel, the organization became much more powerful than the League's Council. Furthermore, some decisions taken under

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[209]*Ibid.*

[210]Zimmern, A. (1936). *The League of Nations and the rule of law* (p. 4). London, UK: Macmillan and Co., LTD.

[211]Goodrich, *op. cit.*

Chapter VII of the UN's Charter had binding influence on all member States. In spite of having been based on voluntary cooperation, the UN's Charter provides exceptional authority to the UN's organs when compared to the League of Nations' Covenant.[212] Finally, the League enforced post-war treaties even if they were unjust and unfair, whereas the UN implements its own unique Charter to promote world peace and security.[213]

The UN's Goals

Following World War II in which 72 million people were killed, the United Nations was established as a guardian of international peace and security in an effort to make the world a better place to live.[214] As a new global organization, four primary goals were listed in its Charter:

- First was to safeguard peace and security in order ''to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.''

- Second was ''to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.''

- Third was to uphold respect for international law.

- And fourth, the new organization pledged ''to promote social progress and better standards of life.''[215]

The UN's role in contributing to world security and peace in order to solve international disputes required bilateral and multilateral methods. As emphasized in its Charter, a primary objective was to expand international law legislation that would meet new

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[212]*Ibid.*
[213]*Ibid.*
[214]Hanhimäki, J. M. (2008). *The United Nations: A very short introduction* (Vol. 199): Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, USA. p.1.
[215]*Ibid.*

conditions and satisfy the latest community needs.[216] As Briggs pointed out, the Charter appeared to be an adequate procedure for developing effective legislation designed to tackle chronic international State disputes.[217] Rather than adopting multilateral treaties when dealing with problems such as drug trafficking, for example, various regional differences may have also required identical bilateral treaties in addressing a specific phenomenon.[218]

From the UN's early beginnings, security and peace have been underlying concerns due to ongoing conflicts within and between States as well as the threat of global terrorist activities. Hence, numerous legislations were adopted by the UNSC in order to prevent threats against world security and peace. However, it has not been an easy path for the world's only existing international organization to achieve this goal even though Chapter 7 of its Charter provided a wide range of authority to the Security Council.[219]

UN's Counter-terrorism Legislation: Pre-9/11

Conventions, Protocols, and Resolutions

The United Nations has always dealt with terrorism as a serious threat against humanity by legislating antiterrorism conventions during the pre-9/11 era and later expanding them to a greater degree.[220] Especially prior to the early 1990s, however, member States did not consider the issue so seriously until terrorism groups committed large scale global attacks. Furthermore, the UN's point of view towards terrorism was

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[216]Briggs, H., W. (1947). The United Nations and international legislation. *The American Journal of International Law. 41(*2*),* 433-435

[217]*Ibid.*

[218]*Ibid.*

[219]Hanhimäki, *op. cit.*

[220]Alvarez, J. E. (2003). UN's war on terrorism. *The. International Journal of Legal Information*, *31(*2*)*, 238.

somewhat different in that there were no compelling powers for member States to implement specific measures.[221] Thus, events of 9/11 became a worldwide turning point for all countries as well as international organizations including the UN and the European Union (EU).

The United Nations' counter-terrorism efforts before the 9/11 attacks against the United States became known as the 'Twelve Instruments of Countering Terrorism'; however, only two State delegates representing the United Kingdom (UK) and Botswana signed each one of the conventions.[222] After having examined Resolution 276 (1970), the UN's International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed its binding character in 1971.[223] According to the decision as it appeared in the resolution—"declares and calls upon all states"—the ICJ had a compulsory feature.[224] As outlined below, one priority imposed by Resolution 1373 of 2001 was to compel states to ratify the 12 conventions in order to effectively prevent terrorist threats and ensure global security.[225]

The UN's 12 Conventions

1. 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Aircraft Convention):

   a. Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;

   b. Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, where necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft; and

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[221]Happold, M. (2003). Current legal developments. Security council resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations. *Leiden Journal of International Law, 16.*

[222]Ward, C. A. (2003). Building capacity to combat international terrorism: The role of the United Nations Security Council. *Journal of Conflict and Security. 8(2),* 289-305.

[223]ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at 53, 114-115.

[224]*Ibid.*

[225]Rosand, E. (2003). Security council resolution 1373, the counter-terrorism committee, and the fight against terrorism. *American Journal of International Law, 97*(2), 333-341.

c. Requires contracting States to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.

2. 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure Convention):

   a. Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight to "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so;

   b. Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties"

   c. Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and

   d. Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the Convention.

3. 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of (Civil Aviation Convention):

   a. Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; to attempt such acts; or to be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;

   b. Requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties"; and

   c. Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.

4. 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (Diplomatic agents Convention):

   a. Defines an "internationally protected person" as a Head of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representative or official of a State or international organization who is entitled to special protection in a foreign State, and his/her family; and

   b. Requires parties to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature," the intentional murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an

internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an accomplice."

5. 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention):

   a. Provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention."

6. 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention):

   a. Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer or theft of nuclear material and threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury or substantial property damage.

   Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

   a) Makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport; and

   b) Provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences or sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

7. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety) (Airport Protocol)

   a. Extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

8. 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Maritime Convention)

    a. Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation; and

    b. Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships.

9. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol)

    a. Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.

10. 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives Convention)

    a. Designed to control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing);

    b. Parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked" and undetectable plastic explosives;

    c. Generally speaking, each party must, inter alia, take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry into force of the Convention; ensure that all stocks of unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that State.

11. 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings(Terrorist Bombing Convention)

    a. Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place.

12. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention)

    a. Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or gun running;

    b. Commits States to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts; and

    c. Provides for the identification, freezing, and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to cooperate.[226]

The Resolutions:

Apart from these 12 conventions, several resolutions such as the Security Council's Resolutions 1127 in 1997, 1173 and 1176 in 1998, 1269 in 1999, and 1333 in 2000 were adopted to effectively address the issue.[227] Of these resolutions, Resolution 1269 placed strong emphasis on vigorous counter-terrorism measures at both the national and international levels.[228] Nevertheless, the resolution was virtually ignored by all states throughout the world given that there was no obligation imposed and no monitoring

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[226]UN Action to Counter-terrorism: International Instruments of Counter-terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml
[227]Bianchi, A. (2006). Security Council's Anti-terror Resolutions and their Implementation by Member States. *Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4*(5), 1044.
[228]Ward, *op. cit.*

mechanism to ensure compliance.[229] Even worse, some states harbored terrorists on their

soils rather than developing an effective counter-terrorism strategy.[230]

Soon after Resolution 1269, the UN General Assembly again strongly
underscored the importance of international collaboration regarding counter-terrorism
tactics by stating on January 1, 2001:

> Stressing the need to strengthen further international cooperation between States
> and between international organizations and agencies, regional organizations and
> arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat and eliminate
> terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomsoever
> committed, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, international law and
> relevant international conventions, strongly condemns all acts, methods and
> practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever
> committed, and reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
> state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
> political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
> considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
> other nature that may be invoked to justify them.[231]

When considering the 12 conventions, Resolution 1269, and how the UN's

General Assembly has struggled with terrorism, one might argue that, to some extent,

various legislative efforts can be observed; nevertheless, the perceptions held by member

States are not always as they should be. In other words, countries have not yet become

fully aware of the full scope posed by terrorist threats. Further, it has been argued that not

all counter-terrorism measures taken by the UN succeed because they were not

mandatory for member States.[232] On the other hand, the UN's actual legislative initiative

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[229]*Ibid.*

[230]*Ibid.*

[231]UN.doc.S/RES/55/158. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/

[232]Ward, *op. cit.*

was claimed to have been initially recognized on September 28, 2001, with the adoption of Resolution 1373.[233]

To some extent, the UN's two main organs—the Security Council and the General Assembly—demonstrated determination to tackle a huge problem known as terrorism that began to operate beyond borders in 1973 (see Figure 4).

The United Nations Stance Towards Terrorism Before 9/11	
General Assembly	**Security Council**
1.Convention-I (1973)	1.Sanctions-Libya (1992)
2.Convention-II (1979)	2. Sanctions-Sudan (1996)
3.Resolutions-24 (Dec 1972-Jan 2001)	3. Sanctions-Taliban (1999)
4.Declaritions-3 (Feb 1995-Jan 2001)	4.Committee 1267 (1999)
5.Reports- to the 6th Committee-11 (Dec 1987-Nov 2000)	5. Sanctions-Al-Qaida (2000)
	6.Resolutions-12(Jun1989-Jul 2001)
6. Reports to the Ad Hoc Committee-5 (Feb 1997-Feb 2001)	7.Presidential Statements-7 (Nov 1989-Dec 2000)

Figure 4 The United Nations stance towards terrorism before 9/11

Characteristics and Weaknesses of the UN

Characteristics

"The UN is the only organization that has the worldwide membership, the global reach, impartiality, and the legitimacy needed to successfully address new complex and global challenges that no country can resolve on its own."[234] Furthermore, some scholars such as Hanhimäki (2008) claim that "it is the only truly global organization in the history of mankind. With 193 member States as of 2012, the UN covers the entire globe.

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[233]Talmon, S. (2005). The Security Council as world legislature. *American Journal of International Law, 99*(1), 175-193.
[234]United Nations. Dept. of Pub. Info., *loc. cit.*

In its six decades of existence it has almost quadrupled its original membership of 51."[235] Due to the UN's unique guidance and contributions, leaders can now gather around a desk to discuss the most complicated and controversial issues that no one once dared to talk about.[236]

The United Nations has a Charter that represents the organization's constitution and six principal organs which have been established: (a) the General Assembly (GA), (b) the Security Council (SC), (c) the Economic and Social Council, (d) the Trusteeship Council, (e) the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and (f) the Secretariat.[237] The UN's official languages include English, Chinese, French, Spanish, and Russian. Later, Arabic was added to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council.

As can be referred to as the UN family, the organization's system is made up of a complicated structure comprised of the Secretariat, funds and programs (e.g., UNDP and UNICEF), specialized agencies (e.g., WHO and UNESCO), and related organizations.[238] Given that a complex body including 28 sub-structures requires a high level of coordination, the UN system's Chief Executive Board (CEB) for coordination considers this imperative responsibility as being the highest coordinating mechanism chaired by the Secretary General.[239] The CEB's main objective is to harmonize the UN system's activities as per the common goals of member States.[240]

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[235]Hanhimäki, *op. cit.,* p. 5
[236]United Nations Dept. of Public Info., *loc. cit.*
[237]*Ibid.*
[238]*Ibid.*
[239]*Ibid.*
[240]*Ibid.*

Those who founded the UN following World War II agreed upon a simple mechanism known as 'the veto power' which gives superior authority to five countries: The UK, China, France, Russia, and the USA.[241] The Permanent Five (P-5) of the SC may block any decision that appears to be against their own interests.

Weaknesses

A huge body such as the UN may confront certain challenges when trying to achieve its goals. For example, it is argued that the UN's greatest challenge has been an impossible wide gap between its ambitions and capacities.[242] Thus, In order to bring a better understanding of the issue, the UN's goals and whether they have been accomplished will be addressed.

First, the UN vowed that the world would be a safer place following the total loss of 72 million lives between 1939 and 1945.[243] Hence, a system containing all instruments was created to prevent future conflicts and disputes that might constitute a major security threat against member countries. In addition, The SC was granted unlimited power in cases of peace violations. Furthermore, the resolutions had a binding character, and the Military Staff Committee could conduct armed service operations if needed.[244] However, this system failed since its military force was not permanent and did not have worldwide air-force bases. Although the UN was extremely active during the Cold War, the organization was unable to prevent or stop regional conflicts such as in Cyprus, Korea, the Middle East, Africa, and Vietnam. Besides, the UN peace keeping interventions were often delayed for years due to sovereignty concerns expressed by many countries.

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[241]Hanhimäki, *op. cit.*
[242]*Ibid.* p. 3.
[243]*Ibid.*
[244]*Ibid.*

Second, one of the goals that the UN pursued was to draw attention to human rights and international laws.[245] Thus, international declarations, legal instruments, and treaties were increasingly set in order to prevent human rights abuses as well as oblige countries before the law. Even though some steps were taken, they did not prove to be as effective as expected due to the UN's limited power and authority over sovereign member States.

Finally, the UN also promised social and economic development of member countries, and hence, establish institutions such as the World Bank and the UN Development Program (UNDP).[246] However, the system did not work effectively: "On the one hand, there was no agreement on how to promote progress. On the other hand, the different organizations had different resource bases and organizational structures."[247] Besides, lack of resources and corruption may have been other factors having affected the system.[248]

The UN operates worldwide to contend with numerous costly policies and programs in various areas (e.g., political affairs, international justice and law, international cooperation for development, public information, human rights and humanitarian affairs, etc.).[249] The organization's primary source for its annual budget is derived from the contributions of member States with the amount depending on disputes and/or disasters that occur per annum. For example, the total amount of expenses for 2006 and 2007 was $3.8 billion as opposed to $3 billion alone in 1995 when expensive

[245]*Ibid.*
[246]*Ibid.*
[247]Hanhimäki*, loc. cit.,* p. 5.
[248]*Ibid.*
[249]United Nations. Dept. of Public, I. (2008). *The United Nations today*: United Nations Department of Public Information, p.17.

missions began in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.[250] As an enormous body comprised of approximately 200 states, the UN might therefore display limitations in terms of implementing policies developed to solve problems and disputes among states and ethnic groups.

Since there are a large number of UN states including failed and failing ones that obstruct the decision making process, it takes time to develop and implement new policies geared towards urgent issues, namely terrorism and natural disasters.[251] However, any delays might result in even more complicated problems that cannot be easily resolved.

National representation might be perceived as one of the major problems in international organizations, namely the EU and the UN.[252] According to the EU's member State population, a rearrangement may be necessary unlike the UN's case in which the General Assembly's rule of a one State vote applies.[253] However, the Security Council's membership for Permanent Five (P-5) countries—Russia, the USA, the UK, France, and China—and their right to veto are considered as primary obstacles before the UN's credibility.[254] Given that the world has not remained the same as it was in the late 1940s, the five States mentioned above were the superpowers of their time. As the world has changed, however, the UN has also had to fundamentally change in terms of structure and representation. On the contrary, it might be argued that P-5 states constitute an

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[250]*Ibid.*
[251]Orttung & Makarychev, *op. cit.*
[252]Taagepera, R., & Hosli, M. O. (2006). National representation in international organizations: The seat allocation model implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament. *Political Studies, 54*(2), 370-398.
[253]*Ibid.*
[254]Weiss, T. G. (2003). The illusion of UN Security Council reform. *Washington Quarterly, 26*(4), 147-161.

impediment for any reforms and changes that might be made in order to increase the UN's reliability for the sake of safeguarding their unique privilege.[255]

Following the 9/11 attacks in particular, countries recognized how vulnerable they were to terrorism and its devastating consequences. In addition, no country alone can overcome such a serious threat without collaborating with the rest of the world. As a result, an urgent need emerged for an effective international antiterrorism regime and alliance. Thus, an incapability to form necessary international cooperation as well as cooperation between countries can be considered as another weakness displayed by the UN.[256] An international strategy against these global phenomena could only have been developed through effective information-sharing which would have made it possible to grasp the whole picture.[257]

Despite the UN's limitations mentioned above, it remains to be the largest international institution in the world that counters terrorism on a global range. Thus, it has a potential to make a difference on the issue. Because terrorism is a global issue, it requires a coordinated multilateral response in which the UN is a relevant forum to determine effective strategies to counter the problem.[258] In addition, UN-led counter-terrorism efforts include the development of international norms and capacity.[259] Basically, it has been determined that the UN has sufficient power, capability, and legitimacy to form such a collaborative stance with its 193 member countries against terrorism.[260]

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[255]*Ibid.*
[256]Orttung & Makarychev, *op. cit.*
[257]*Ibid.*
[258]Cockayne, J., & Mikulaschek, C. (2008). *Transnational security challenges and the United Nations: Overcoming sovereign walls and institutional silos*. New York, NY: International Peace Academy.
[259]*Ibid.*
[260]*Ibid.*

Finally, Cardenas emphasized that following 9/11, the UN stimulated worldwide awareness towards terrorism with its resolutions binding upon all member countries.[261] Furthermore, it might be claimed that establishing a unit referred to as the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) has been the cornerstone of the UN's counter-terrorism efforts.[262]

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[261]Cardenas, E. (2003). United Nations Security Council's quest for effectiveness, The. *Mich. J. Int'l L., 25*, 1341.
[262]*Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV: THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER 9/11

Introduction

The United Nations was not established as a world government with supranational powers that would allow it to force its members into implementing certain commands.[263] Rather, as an intergovernmental organization with 193 member countries, the UN's primary objective is to maintain peace and security by addressing new global issues and threats, namely terrorism.[264] Essentially, the new general security organization coordinates and harmonizes the efforts of all member States in order to obtain their common goals.[265] Following 9/11, it has been argued that a wide array of power and authority were applied to fulfill the common benefits of all countries.[266]

Although the UN took action against terrorism (more especially Al-Qaida) by adopting Resolutions 1193, 1214, 1267, 1269, 1333, and 1363 before 9/11, the Security Council (SC) reformed its law-making mentality by acting as both legislator and executer after 9/11.[267] Using post-9/11 resolutions as an indication of its firm new determination, the SC explicitly ordered all member countries how to take action against terrorism.[268]

Even though devastating terrorist attacks were perpetuated long before 911, states throughout the world as well as the UN were caught unprepared for global terrorist activities on September 11, 2001.[269] By contrast, 9/11 stimulated a wide range of alliances against terrorism as a new paradigm for communities to combat terrorism—a

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[263]Fomerand, J. (2009). *The A to Z of the United Nations.* Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
[264]*Ibid.*
[265]*Ibid.*
[266]*Ibid.*
[267]Alvarez, J. E. (2003). UN's war on terrorism. *The. International Journal of Legal Information*, *31(*2*)*, 238-251.
[268]*Ibid.*
[269]Ward, C. A. (2003). Building capacity to combat international terrorism: The role of the United Nations Security Council. *Journal of Conflict and Security. 8(*2), 289.

trend analyzed by experts such as Ward.[270] Apart from counter-terrorism policies developed at state and regional levels, the United States and the EU demonstrated intensive efforts to build a worldwide antiterrorism coalition in which the UN was determined to be the organizational body responsible for generating a momentum on counter-terrorism.[271] Including the UK, many countries supported the UN's leading position in countering terrorism and further believed that the organization should play a more proactive role in deterring terrorism.[272]

Immediately following 9/11, the UN's Security Council grasped a leading position by encouraging intensive international cooperation among member States to overcome terrorism—the common enemy of humanity.[273] In effect, the Council's response was extraordinary, quick, firm, and unequivocal.[274] Thus, the SC performed an intense duty by beginning its legislative phase with the adoption of Resolutions 1368 and 1373. As a result, the UN became the only world legislature binding all member States. In particular, Resolution 1373 emphasized UN measures to be taken and how to implement them in combating terrorism.

In addition to the UN's legislative dimension, structural changes were also applied. For example, additional units including the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), the Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and the Counter-terrorism

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[270]*Ibid.*

[271]Rees, W. (2006). *Transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation: The new imperative*: New York, NY: Routledge Press, p. 129.

[272]Alexander, Y. (2002). *Combating terrorism: strategies of ten countries*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

[273]Ward, *op. cit.,* p. 292.

[274]*Ibid.*

Implementation Task Force (CTITF) were established. Further, the Global Counter-terrorism Strategy was ratified by the UN to effectively deal with terrorism.[275]

The UN's Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism

Approach Resolutions and Declarations:

During the post-9/11 period, the UN demonstrated its determination by adopting various resolutions and declarations in order to address counter-terrorism in detail. With its binding character, the organization imposed counter-terrorism obligations on all member countries:

> … criminalizing the financing of terrorism, freezing terrorists' assets, denying terrorists safe haven, and bringing terrorists to justice, that all member States must undertake as part of a global counterterrorism campaign, regardless of other, more pressing priorities or the perceived level of the threat. In turn, these requirements generated a host of counter-terrorism responses at the regional, sub-regional, and national levels around the globe.[276]

First, the UNSC passed Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001, in which the legal basis for further measures against international terrorism was addressed and defined as a threat to world peace and security.[277] As a result of Resolution 1368, international legitimacy was provided for taking military actions against terrorist attacks from both perpetrators and supporters of 9/11.[278] From a post-911 atmosphere, Resolution 1368 might further be understood as the UN's first step taken in which the application of armed conflict law began.[279] However, the UN's war imposed by the U.S. included the

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[275]*Ibid.*
[276]Rosand, *op. cit.*
[277]Ward, *op. cit.,* p. 292.
[278]*Ibid.*
[279]Taft I. V., & W. H. (2003). Law of Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, The. *Yale J. Int'l L., 28*, 319.

risk of how it would be applied—multilaterally or unilaterally.[280] With Resolution 1368 the UNSC was

> 1. Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 2. Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, 3. Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.[281]

Although Resolution 1368 was adopted on September 12, only one day after the attacks, Resolution 1373 was considered to be the most significant measure taken by the UN.[282]

Second, Resolution 1373 which stimulated a global response to international terrorism was unanimously adopted by the SC on September 28, 2001:[283]

> Each member state of the United Nations, by virtue of the mandatory character of the resolution, is obligated to create the prescribed legal framework in its national laws and institutions to combat terrorism, and to co-operate fully with other states on a global scale in this effort. Full and effective implementation of Resolution 1373 has the potential of realizing a principal objective being pursued in the drafting of an international comprehensive anti-terrorism convention, that is, creation of national legal and executive capacity in all countries with the ability and the political will to engage co-operatively, thereby establishing an international legal framework to combat terrorism.[284]

In short, Resolution 1373 contains a binding characteristic in which all State members are compelled to comply with[285] and further places meticulous emphasis on the prevention and suppression of terrorism financing by forcing States to take additional tough measures:

> … All states shall refrain from providing any form of support to terrorists, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons; take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other

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[280]Alvarez, *loc. cit*.

[281]The UN Resolution 1368 (12 September, 2001). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement.

[282]Rosand, *op. cit.*

[283]Bianchi, A. (2007). Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council's anti-terrorism measures: The quest for legitimacy and cohesion. *The European Journal of International Law. 17(5),* 881-919.

[284]Ward, *op. cit.,* p. 294.

[285]Bianchi, *op. cit.*

states; 27 deny, and not provide, safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts or harbor terrorists. Furthermore, it is made obligatory on all states to preclude any one within their territories or jurisdictions from in any way aiding or abetting the planning, promoting, financing, executing, or otherwise supporting acts of terrorism against other states, and to ensure that such persons are brought to justice, and that the punishment reflects the seriousness of the crime. States also are required to afford each other the greatest level of co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts. The mandatory requirements also aim at preventing the movement of terrorists across borders through effective border controls and other measures.[286]

As briefly mentioned earlier, most counter-terrorism conventions before the 9/11 attacks were ignored by UN member States. After 911, however, all member States submitted their reports to the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC).[287] Given that the member countries refrained from any probable sanctions for non-compliance, they fulfilled almost all obligations urged by the United Nations.[288] By strictly monitoring Resolution 1373's implementation, the CTC strongly urged all UN member countries to implement the following measures intended to strengthen their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities on their soils, in their regions, and around the globe:

- Criminalize the financing of terrorism;
- Freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism;
- Deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups;
- Suppress the provision of safe havens, sustenance or support for terrorists;
- Share information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts;
- Cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in such acts; and
- Criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice.
- The resolution also calls on States to become parties, as soon as possible, to the relevant international counter-terrorism legal instruments.[289]

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[286]The UN Resolution 1373 (2001). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/ sc2001.htm
[287]Bianchi, *op. cit.*
[288]Cardenas, E. (2003). The United Nations Security Council's quest for effectiveness, *Mich. J. Int'l L., 25*, 1341.
[289]Security Council-Counter-terrorism Committee. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sc/ ctc/aboutus.html

The adoption of Resolution 1373 filled the conceptual gap by defining terrorism as a major threat to international peace and security and determining its scope.[290] In addition, the resolution placed strong emphasis on criminalizing financing of terrorism and mandated national governments to legislate effective laws against financing and harboring terrorists in their countries.[291] This was the first strong and effective step in addressing the extent of terrorism which proved that additional steps should be taken in a multilateral manner.[292] Furthermore, it might be claimed that Resolution 1373 expanded the meaning of terrorism as well as urged a corporate counter-terrorism strategy for all countries.[293]

With Resolution 1373, the Security Council established the Counter-terrorism Committee as a way to monitor the resolution's implementation by indicating how seriously the UN was dealing with the situation.[294] To assist accordingly, the CTC also determined the specific needs of each corresponding State.[295] Because Resolution 1373 has a binding character, a majority of the States submitted their reports to the CTC within 90 days following its adoption. The CTC then conducted an implementation survey in order to evaluate each State's report. In brief, the CTC's tasks can be categorized into three major stages: (a) to check whether member States have adequate legislation to cover Resolution 1373; (b) whether member States have effective agencies to implement legislation; and (c) whether member States implemented their legislation.[296] Although the CTC was established to monitor whether member countries fulfilled counter-terrorism

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[290]Rees, W. (2006). *Transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation: The new imperative*. New York, NY: Routledge Press.
[291]Talmon, *op. cit.*
[292]*Ibid.*
[293]Yalcinkaya, A. (2011)
[294]*Ibid.*
[295]*Ibid.*
[296]*Ibid.*

measures mandated by the SC, the committee was unable to effectively perform its duties.[297] For example, the Committee acted upon related tasks according to only written documents and reports but ignored realities and applications in the field since Resolution 1373 did not clearly authorize them to check and see what happens.[298] Thus, it was discovered that the CTC had an implementation gap in which this limitation became a structural inability.[299]

The UN developed its counter-terrorism strategies according to the changing nature of threats by designing innovative counter-terrorism instruments. In addition, a new structural body of coordination was needed to effectively utilize all counter-terrorism tools. In 2004, the Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) was established by the SC with Resolution 1535 being a part of the CTC in order to fill the structural gap and to revitalize the committee and its functions.[300] The resolution's primary objective was to assess to what extent member countries implemented Resolution 1373 by conducting site visits to countries once a month on a regular basis.

Due to a lack of harmony between the UN's units dealing with anti-terrorism, Secretary General Kofi Annan established the Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in 2005. In 2006, the CTITF was endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 60/288 and referred to as the UN's Global Counter-terrorism Strategy[301] made

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[297]Cardenas, *loc. cit.*
[298]*Ibid.*
[299]*Ibid.*
[300]Foot, R. (2007). The United Nations, counter-terrorism and human rights: Institutional adaptation and embedded ideas. *Human Rights Quarterly, 29*(2), 489-514.
[301]The UN's CTITF (Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force) Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/office.shtml

up of a task force including 23 UN entities and Interpol.[302] The primary functions of the

CTITF include:

The United Nations Stance Towards Terrorism After 9/11	
General Assembly	**Security Council**
1. Resolutions-51 (Sep 2001-Jun 2012)	1.Counter-terrorism Committee (2001)
2.Declaration (Jan 2003)	2.Resolutions-33 (Sep 2001-Dec 2010)
3. Reports- to the 6th Committee-11 (Nov 2001-Nov 2011)	3. Presidential Statements-54 (Apr 2002-May 2011)
4. Reports to the Ad Hoc Committee-10 (Jan 2002-Apr 2010)	4. Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate –CTED (2004)
5.International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (4 April 2005)	5. Committee 1540 (2004)
6.Global Counter-terrorism Strategy (May 2006)	6. Committee 1566 (2004)
7. The First Review of the Strategy (2008)	
8. The Second Review of the Strategy (2010)	
9. Symposium on Promoting Dialogue, Understanding and Countering the Appeal of Terrorism (2012)	
10. The Third Review of the Strategy (2012)	

Figure 5 Figure 5. The United Nations stance towards terrorism after 9/11

a)To ensure coordination and coherence in the overall counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system and assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling related tasks; b)To provide leadership for United Nations system-wide collective initiatives, such as those undertaken through CTITF working groups, to support the implementation of the Strategy; c)To facilitate and support initiatives and activities of the United Nations system entities in areas of their respective mandates and expertise for assisting in the implementation of the Strategy in its entirety; d)To carry out core secretariat functions for the substantive, outreach, organizational and administrative conduct of the work of the CTITF and for the functioning of the CTITF as an efficient UN system-wide coordination tool in counter-terrorism; and e)To mobilize and manage extra-budgetary resources for

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[302]Rosand, *op. cit.*

the CTITF initiatives in support of technical assistance delivery for the implementation of the Strategy and its four pillars.[303]

Following the 2005 UN World Summit, outcomes were adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 as Resolution 60/288 (see Figure 5). As a General Assembly Resolution, the UN's Global Counter-terrorism Strategy was endorsed by member States on September 8, 2006, in an effort to coordinate national, regional, and international counter-terrorism throughout the world.[304]

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[303]The UN's CTITF (Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force), *op. cit.*
[304]*Ibid.*

CHAPTER V: RUSSIA AFTER 9/11

Introduction

The 9/11 attacks on the United States were a milestone that changed the world's nature concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism. Consequently, "a market for anti-terrorist services" emerged in the greater Central Asia region that includes Russia.[305] In addition, it has been emphasized that 9/11 was an attempt to reshape the international system that had transformed following the Cold War era.[306] In fact, numerous regional and international alliances having bilateral as well as multilateral features have emerged during the post 9/11 era. For example, counter-terrorism strategies were implemented in numerous countries; however, they were too complex due to the lack of experience among them. Conversely, this was not the case for Russia given that a variety of structural and conceptual changes occurred prior to 9/11 and continued to increase.

In the early 1990s, Russia attempted to regain its position as a global power by solving its country's major problems—primarily in Chechnya.[307] Although various structural reforms were made following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more determined steps were taken after 9/11. Beginning with Putin's presidency in 2000, for instance, Russia's Energy Policy controlled counter-terrorism methods by focusing on Islamic radicalism—namely the Taliban—to compel post-Soviet regimes to develop close alliances with Russia.[308] Following 9/11, however, a major counter-terrorism policy change was observed when Russia unexpectedly joined the U.S.-led antiterrorism

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[305]Tolipov, F. (2006). Multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism in fighting terrorism in the SCO Area. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4*(2),153.

[306]*Ibid.*

[307]Yalcinkaya, A. (2011). BM Guvenlik Konseyi Kararlarinda Teror Kavrami. In O. Basibuyuk, A. Sozer & N. Altun (Eds.), *Terorle Mucadelede Makro ve Mikro Perspektifler* (pp. 215-238). Ankara-Turkey: Polis Akademisi Yayinlari.

[308]Baev, P. K. (2006). Turning counter-terrorism into counter-revolution: Russia focuses on Kazakhstan and engages Turkmenistan. *European Security, 15*(1), 3-22.

coalition by allowing deployment of U.S. troops to Central Asia.[309] Taken from this stance, one might claim that the 9/11 attacks afforded a significant opportunity for the Russian Federation to overcome its domestic problems.[310] In fact, Russian counter-terrorism policies were extremely rigorous pre-9/11 yet became much more severe following Resolution 1373.[311] Further, it should be emphasized that two permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, provided international legitimacy in their struggle against ethnic minorities—a mandatory task in accordance with post-9/11 UN resolutions.[312]

One might argue that following 9/11, the Russian Federation's Constitution adopted in 1993 framed and controlled counter-terrorism policies implemented by law enforcement agencies.[313] Due to Russia's socialist tradition, however, the Constitution focused on the majority's rights and expectations while ignoring the rights and liberties of individuals.[314]

Current Counter-terrorism Approach

As globalization has affected virtually every concept in society, it has also triggered a wide array of social changes ranging from the world's economy to its security. Inevitably, Russia obtained its share by redefining its country's current national security procedures.[315] Furthermore, it might be argued that globalization affected the Russian government's mentality as well as fundamental changes that occurred in

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[309]*Ibid.*

[310]Yalcinkaya, *loc. cit.*

[311]Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism.* Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers.

[312]Yalcinkaya, *loc. cit.*

[313]Beckman, *op. cit.*

[314]*Ibid.*

[315]Aydinli, E., & Rosenau, J. (2006). *Globalization, security, and the nation state: paradigms in transition.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press

understanding Russia's security. One such change involved gradually rejecting the traditional military-based understanding of security and accepting a much broader approach towards policies implemented by Russia's security and law enforcement agencies.[316] Conversely, Beckman argued that Russia's counter-terrorism strategy—even after 9/11—relied on taking severe militarist measures in the event of war against a foreign nation.[317]

As was briefly mentioned, Russia's major counter-terrorism policy shift occurred following 9/11 when it joined the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition and allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in former Soviet countries, namely Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.[318] Thus, it has been argued that post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures were politically motivated and criticized due to the thousands of Chechens who died as well as other minorities who demanded more civil liberties and independence.[319] Despite the fact that counter-terrorism policies remained severe during both pre- and post-911, Russian authorities justified their position by referring to Chechnya's insurgency.[320]

In demonstrating how serious President Putin dealt with counter-terrorism issues, he enacted the first set of presidential decrees in 2001, 2003, and 2006. Although designed to effectively struggle with terrorism, these laws also included certain traditional views that were influenced by the new constitution. As a crucial part of Russia's war on terror, governors were either assigned or dismissed in taking control over the regions.[321]

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[316]*Ibid.*
[317]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[318]Baev, *loc. cit.*
[319]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[320]*Ibid.*
[321]*Ibid.*

Historically, presidential decrees were frequently applied by Russian presidents to effectively implement new policies during the post-communist era.[322] Supposedly, they played a significant role in planning, starting, and continuing policies. Due to the presidential appointment decrees, for example, the president could assign representatives and new governors to obtain central authority in their regions.[323] In other words, he had acquired further power by

approving decrees that would impose stricter measures on countering terrorism. As a result, human rights groups, namely Human Rights Watch, the European Court of Human Rights, and Amnesty International frequently criticized Russia due to the use of excessive and disproportionate force, basic human rights violations, tortures, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions in Chechnya.[324]

The terrorist attacks committed by Chechens in Moscow in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004 each had a great impact on Russia that resulted in considerably more stringent anti-terrorism laws from a militaristic approach than the one adopted in 1998.[325] Under this new counter-terrorism legislative measure that went into effect on March 6, 2006, detention periods for terrorism suspects increased from 10 to 30 days. During the first stage, the new law also granted President Putin the authority to use armed forces when terrorism was encountered on Russian soil. However, four months later in July, 2006, the first amendment was ratified that extended Putin's authorization by giving him the power to use army and special forces in countering terrorism outside of Russia as well.[326]

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[322]Protsyk, O. (2004). Ruling with decrees: presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies, 56*(5), 637-660.
[323]*Ibid.*
[324]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[325]*Ibid*.
[326]*Ibid.*

Essentially, legislation of this new law was influenced by recent terrorist attacks as well as affected by the nature and content of Resolution 1624. Although the 2006 counter-terrorism decree gave federal law enforcement agencies too much power and limited the liberties enjoyed by ordinary citizens, it did not, however, provide an exact definition of terrorism. Rather, it depended heavily on the unilateral power of the Russian president similar to his American counterpart.[327] Thus, one might argue that Russia exploited the post-9/11 atmosphere led by the U.S. and the UN in order to make the Russian stance towards terrorism harsher.

Russia's Post-9/11 Counter Terrorism Strategy: From Authoritarian to More Authoritarian

While 9/11 has changed various dimensions of both terrorism and counter terrorism, Yalcinkaya (2011) claims that Russia was able to use post-9/11 atmosphere to prevail over its domestic problems.[328] Even before 9/11, Russia has already been criticized continuously for having applied harsh, excessive and militarist measures towards its ethnic minorities. However, as Beckman (2007) stated, it has gone worse by providing much more authority for the agencies which have been applying brutal force against minorities for few decades.[329] For instance, two incidents have demonstrated the Russian way of becoming much more authoritarian following 9/11:

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[327]*bid.*

[328] Yalcinkaya, A. (2011). BM Guvenlik Konseyi Kararlarinda Teror Kavrami. In O. Basibuyuk, A. Sozer & N. Altun (Eds.), *Terorle Mucadelede Makro ve Mikro Perspektifler* (pp. 215-238). Ankara-Turkey: Polis Akademisi Yayinlari.

[329] Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism*. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers.

1. The seizure of Moscow's Dubrovka Theater on October 22nd , 2002, which led to the deaths of 160 men, women, and children on the 26th of October 2002. About 900 people were taken hostages by around 40 Chechen insurgents

2. On the September 1st , 2004, a group of Chechen terrorists took hostage and two days later murdered at least 335 schoolchildren and parents in Beslan, a town in the Russian republic of North Ossetia.

These two terrorist incidents have sufficiently proved that using disproportionate brutal force towards any type of attacks is constant characteristic of Russia. In other words, Russian units dealing with terrorism has always been authoritarian, preferred excessive use of force, and ignored human rights and liberties for the sake of safety because the majority is much more important than individuals.

As observed at Dubrovka and Beslan experiences, excessive and harsh interventions of Russian forces are based on both post communism new constitution and Putin's Presidential Decrees providing much more authority to governors and local administrators to implement those more authoritarian new policies effectively.[330]

Overall, although the UN has been effective on Russia's counter terrorism policy following 9/11, and caused some legal and structural changes; traditional authoritarian way of countering terrorism remained the same. Moreover, the strategies applied in Beslan theatre point out that Russia has been more authoritarian by getting power from post-9/11 environment. As the last point of view, Beckman (2007) puts a very strong emphasis on the idea that even following 9/11 the Russian forces dealt with terrorism not

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[330] Protsyk, O. (2004). Ruling with decrees: presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies, 56*(5), 637-660.

as a social phenomenon but as warfare against a hostile country.[331]Thus, every type of measures was tolerable and applicable for them.

New Counter-terrorism Legislation Recommended by the UN

As a member of numerous international and regional organizations, the Russian Federation does not ignore the UN's Security Council (SC) but finds it helpful to the country's foreign policy.[332] Thus, it might be derived from this argument that the UN was effective during which time the Federation was reconstructing its legal approach towards terrorism. The reports submitted to the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) might also be an indicator of this influence.

Contrary to the UN's stance depending on multilateralism that requires the participation of many parties (more than two participants), to some extent, Russia has insisted on one-sided approach of unilateralism through which effective counter-terrorism strategies are not possible to build.[333] Therefore, this Moscow-centered point of view which is camouflaged by international cooperation has not succeeded because of political concerns aimed at Russian dominance.

Apart from the effect of UN resolutions, the Ingushetia and Beslan attacks expedited new countering terrorism reforms initiated by the Russian Ministry of Interior in the same way that the 9/11 and 2004 Madrid March 14 attacks triggered fundamental reforms in the U.S. and Spain.[334] As a result of the Moscow and Beslan attacks in 2002 and 2004, for example, the new counter-terrorism law was enacted in 2006 due to the

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[331] Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism*. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers.
[332]Baev, *loc. cit.*
[333]*Ibid.*
[334]Aydinli, & Rosenau, *op. cit*.

binding character influence of UN counter-terrorism resolutions.[335] Basically, the legislation gave authority to use armed forces in Russia, and four months later an amendment was approved to use armed forces abroad as well.[336]

Although the new antiterrorism law gave too much power to federal counter-terrorism units while ignoring civil liberties, it brought about a professional perspective by determining how to deal with the issue as well as identifying exactly which departments were authorized to combat terrorism. In addition, the 2006 legislation granted a leading position to the Federal Security Service (FSS) for taking required counter-terrorism measures both in and outside Russia thus replacing the Soviet KGB. Furthermore, the law increased the effectiveness of terrorism-related domestic statutes by accurately defining terrorism acts and describing how to combat them by focusing on three primary areas: "preventing terrorism, combating it, and minimizing and eliminating its consequences."[337]

In 2007, an amendment made to the 2006 law provided compensation for victims of terrorism that took place on the Russian soil.[338] Contrary to the fundamental human rights and liberties suggested by the UN, the law provided additional authorization to the FSS and the government to limit citizens' civil rights and freedom of the press.[339]

In addition to Russia's domestic counter-terrorism legislation, it has also played a significant role as a member of the Group Eight (G8) responsible for harmonizing antiterrorism laws among G8 countries consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy,

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[335]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[336]*Ibid.*
[337]Yamshanov, B. (2006, March 21), Antiterrorism under the law. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*
[338]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[339]Saradzhyan, S. (2006, April 21). Confiscations could be commonplace, *The Moscow Times*.

Japan, the United Kingdom, United States, and Russia.[340] Further, Russia ratified the UN

General Assembly's 'International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism', or the 13th UN counter-terrorism convention.[341] Russia has also been

involved in numerous joint law enforcement collaborations with the United States,

including a task force between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal

Security Service (FSS), and has joined several regional organizations designed to develop

an effective counter-terrorism strategy.[342] Finally, the Russian government issued several

reports submitted to the UN's CTC shortly after the Security Council's resolutions were

adopted following 9/11.

Influence of Russia's Reports Submitted to the SC's CTC

All UN member countries including Russia reacted to Resolution 1373 ratified on

September 28, 2001, by submitting a total of five implementation reports[343] in response

to the CTC—four of which related to Resolution 1373 and one relating to Resolution

1624.[344] Both resolutions focused on terrorism and how to counter attacks in a

multilateral manner by sealing all legislative and methodological gaps at the national,

regional, and international levels.

Resolution 1373 aimed at "raising the average level of government performance

against terrorism across the globe. This means upgrading the capacity of each nation's

legislation and executive machinery to fight terrorism."[345] Parallel to this idea, the first

report was submitted on December 27, 2001, by the Russian Federation to the Security

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[340]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[341]*Ibid.*
[342]*Ibid.*
[343]Rosand, E. (2003). Security council resolution 1373, the Counter-terrorism Committee, and the fight against terrorism. *American Journal of International Law, 97*(2), 333-341.
[344]Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/index.html
[345]Rosand, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

Council's Counter-terrorism Committee which accepted all required measures mandated by Resolution 1373.[346] The following steps taken by Russia were declared one-by-one in the report:[347]

1. As a measure to counter financing of terrorism, Presidential Decree 1263 was signed by the president of the Russian Federation on November 1, 2001.

2. In order to block the recruitment of terrorist groups and the supply of weapons to terrorists, Federal Act No. 52289-3 has been submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on the introduction of amendments and additions to the Federal Act "on measures to combat terrorism" concerning the issues of exchange of intelligence information, compensation for damage caused by terrorist acts, and additional measures to combat illegal trade in weapons, explosives and ammunition.

The second report was issued on August 6, 2002, in which the government made mandatory amendments according to the requirements of Resolution 1373:

> The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 28 June 2002 adopted Federal Act No. 97528-3 'On the introduction of amendments and additions to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.' This Act establishes increased liability for the recruitment and training of terrorists and the financing of terrorist activities and organizations.[348]

The report also focused on the proliferation of weapons, criminal investigation of terror crimes, drug trafficking, financial tracking, and border control.[349] Furthermore, the

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[346]The Russian Report 1 - S/2001/1284. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/203/16/PDF/N0220316.pdf?OpenElement
[347]*Ibid.*
[348]The Russian Report 2 - S/2002/887. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/520/19/PDF/N0252019.pdf?OpenElement
[349]*Ibid.*

importance of procedures regulating the manufacture, sale, possession, storage, and transport of weapons and explosives within the Russian Federation were emphasized.[350]

The third report was submitted to the SC's CTC on August 27, 2003, that primarily addressed the extent to which the counter-terrorism requirements of Resolution 1373 were achieved.[351] In addition, the report announced the establishment of the Committee of the Russian Federation for Financial Monitoring by the Russian Federation Resolution 211 on April 2, 2002.[352] Furthermore, amendments to the Federal Act 152289-3 on measures to combat terrorism were adopted as Duma Resolution 3880-111 on April 11, 2003.[353]

The fourth and final report in response to Resolution 1373 was sent to the CTC on February 13, 2006, that could possibly be considered as an expanded executive summary of counter-terrorism efforts and measures taken by the Russian government on all dimensions.[354] For example, the report reemphasized how seriously the government dealt with the requirements of Resolution 1373 by reflecting on all steps taken by the Russian authorities.

Basically, the Russian government's achievements pursuant to Resolution 1373 were organized in detail: (a) Legislative measures—new laws, amendments, Duma resolutions, and presidential decrees; (b) Special counter-terrorism units and foundations such as the Committee of the Russian Federation for Financial Monitoring, Russian

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[350]*Ibid.*
[351]The Russian Report 3 - S/2003/839. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N03/488/41/PDF/N0348841.pdf?OpenElement
[352]*Ibid.*
[353]*Ibid.*
[354]The Russian Report 4 - S/2006/98. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N06/244/63/IMG/N0624463.pdf?OpenElement

Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and Counterterrorism Committee (NAK);[355] (c) Regional and international collaborations, agreements, and treaties with countries and organizations such as NATO, OSCE, and Shanghai Co-operation Organization(SCO); (d) Explosives, firearms, and border control regulations; and (e) Civil aviation safety measures to secure local and international flights.

In response to Resolution 1624, Russia submitted a report to the CTC on June 30, 2006, that focused on the specific implementation of Resolution 1624 adopted in 2005.[356] Specifically, the following issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism were addressed: legislative dimensions of counter-terrorism; ensuring that Russian soil was not to become a safe haven for terrorists; cooperation with other countries; border control to prevent terrorists from borders, interfaith and intercultural initiatives to prevent indiscriminate attacks towards different religions and cultures; measures to prevent extremism of all kinds, and respect for human rights and liberties.[357]

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[355]*Ibid.*

[356]The Russian Report 1 (Resolution 1624). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/420/94/PDF/N0642094.pdf?OpenElement

[357]*Ibid.*

CHAPTER VI: TURKEY AFTER 9/11

Introduction

Although Turkey has its own historical and cultural background in determining security strategies,[358] the country is currently experiencing a transformation period by relying on democratic values and fundamental human rights.[359] As a result, the new counter-terrorism stage has weakened the PKK—Turkey's major ethnic terrorist group—due to further cultural rights held by Kurdish minority inhabitants as well as numerous perceived developments in social, political, and economic areas.[360]

As Bozeman maintained, each society develops its own approach towards foreign relations in keeping with its particular traditions and values.[361] Similarly, "cultures comprise ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits and preferred methods of operation which are specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience."[362] Thus, if evaluated according to cultural codes, historical backgrounds, and new understandings of a specific issue, one might argue that national security culture is not static but rather can change over time.[363]

Given that nothing resists the influence of time-changing viewpoints and cultural codes, Turkey has also been affected by various factors in dealing with terrorism over the past few decades. Although the military and National Security Council remain dominant forces in determining Turkey's security policies, the UN has also been effective in countering terrorism through legislative and operational phases—particularly after 9/11.

[358]Karaosmanoglu, A. L. (2000). The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey. *Journal of International Affairs—Columbia University, 54*(1), 199-216.

[359]Bal, I. (2011, September 5). *Turkiye'nin Terorle Mucadelesi.* Haber Turk Gazetesi

[360]*Ibid.*

[361]Bozeman, A. B. (1960). *Politics and culture in international history* (p. 324*).* Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.

[362]Gray, C. S. (1999). *Modern strategy* (p. 131). Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

[363]Karaosmanoglu, *loc. cit.*

On the other hand, Turkey had already begun raiding ethnic, leftist, and religiously based terrorist groups while the world stood in a state of shock following the 9/11 attacks.[364]

Due to Turkey's counter-terrorism experiences over a long period of time, the country has developed a keen awareness involving terrorism. In fact, various counter-terrorism legislative measures were taken prior to 9/11. Influenced by the UN's CTC, for example, new laws and amendments to former ones were enacted in addition to developments at the institutional level. Basically, the Turkish government began the ratification process of two UN counter-terrorism conventions and made amendments to the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Law and the Penal Code.

Further, one might argue that UN-led counter-terrorism efforts compelled not only Turkey but Western countries as well, namely Germany, to review their counter-terrorism approach. Supposedly, increased terrorist activities following 9/11 expedited national legislative arrangements in Turkey as well as the emergence of an international coalition against terrorism.[365]

Current Counter-terrorism Approach: Struggling with Terrorists or Terrorism?

Due to the ruthless and devastating effects in various countries throughout the world, terrorism has typically been identified as only a security oriented problem. For example, Turkey defined the act as a threat toward security while ignoring its other aspects. In addition, the country's counter-terrorism policies have relied chiefly on harsh militarist measures since 1984 when the PKK perpetrated the group's first terrorist

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[364]Aktan, G. S., & Koknar, A. M. (2002).). 'Turkey.' In Y. Alexander (Ed.), *Combating terrorism: Strategies of ten countries* (pp. 260-298). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
[365]Halatci, Ü. (2006). 11 Eylül Terörist Saldırıları Ve Afganistan Operasyonu'nun Bir Değerlendirmesi.

attacks while operating in the southeastern region. Still, however, "there are social, economic, political, physiological, and other cultural factors feeding terrorism."[366]

Although Turkey's history of countering terrorism during its very early stages is widely accepted, the country still depended on struggling with terrorists while ignoring its dimension and root causes by 2003. As shown in Figure 6, Bil divided counter-terrorism experiences into three categories,[367] whereas Ozeren dealt with the issue in four periods.[368]

COUNTER-TERRORISM PHASES OF TURKEY

| 1ST PERIOD	2ND PERIOD	3RD PERIOD	4TH PERIOD
Denial of the Problem and Lack of Perception 1984-1990	Perception As a Security Problem 1990-1999	Struggling with Terrorism and Respecting Human Rights (1999-2009)	Process of Democratic Development (2009-….)

Figure 6 Turkey's counter-terrorism phases

The first and most difficult period began with the PKK's first attack in 1984 that continued into the '90s. According to Ozeren, the basis of the problem at this stage was claimed not to have been accepted but rather as one in which the right policies were perceived to be established.[369] Therefore, one might argue that terrorist organizations exploited those mistakes in order to justify their activities and recruit new members. More especially, the PKK has had the advantage of law enforcement agencies, namely

[366]Ozeren, S. (2011). Turkiyede paradigm degisimi ve terorle mucadele. In S. Ozeren, & M.Sever (Eds.), *Terrorism paradoksu ve Turkiye.* (pp. 23-54). Ankara, Turkey: Karinca Yayinlari.
[367]Bal, I. (2010). Turkiye'de Terorle Mucadele :PKK Ornegi. I.Bal & S. Ozeren (Eds.), *Dunyadan Orneklerle Terorle Mucadele.* Ankara, Turkey: Karinca Yayinlari.
[368]Ozeren, *op. cit.*
[369]*Ibid.*

the police, military, and correctional staff committing abuses against human rights.[370] Similarly, scholars such as Bal, Ozeren, and Laciner emphasized that the wide misinterpretation of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the 1980s exacerbated the situation.

The second period included all counter-terrorism approaches that occurred between 1990 and 1999. During this period, antiterrorism strategies relied heavily on militarist measures while other aspects were underestimated.[371] In effect, too many abuses of human rights have become a way of countering terrorism.

In the third period between 1999 and 2009, developments in human rights and individual rights increased in conjunction with Turkey's EU candidacy process.[372] Besides struggling with terrorists, effective counter-terrorism policies were ascertained, and countering terrorism was no longer accepted as being only a security oriented problem. Accordingly, socioeconomic, cultural, and political strategies have been implemented.[373]

The fourth period might also be assumed as an ongoing segment of the third period that began in 2009 with government's announcement of the Process of Democratic Development. Currently, the period continues and has proved its efficiency by focusing on four aspects: (a) discourse changes, (b) new structural units in countering terrorism, (3) more democratic legislation and implementation, and (d) efforts in international diplomacy:[374]

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[370]Miroglu, O. (2009, August 26). Gecmisle Hesaplasma ve Bes Nolu Bellek. *Taraf Gazetesi*
[371]Ozeren, *op. cit.*
[372]*Ibid.*
[373]*Ibid.*
[374]*Ibid.*

Due to Turkey's intensive counter-terrorism experiences having lasted for more than three decades, the country has completely recognized that terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon; thus, a militarist approach has been determined to be insufficient and ineffective in solving the issue.[375] Furthermore, one might argue that a counter-terrorism strategy with a single perspective only exacerbates the situation. In other words, terrorism has other motives, namely political, economical, and socio-cultural; hence, all counter-terrorism units including the police, intelligence, military, and non-governmental organizations should join together harmoniously.[376]

New Counter-terrorism Legislation Recommended by the UN: Pre- and Post-9/11 Periods

Including Turkey, the 9/11 attacks against the United States affected the entire world that resulted in a number of conceptual changes concerning terrorism and how best to counter the violence. As a country still struggling with an extensive variety of terrorism ranging from revolutionary leftists to religiously justified to ethnic conflicts, Turkey displays an intensive public awareness and sensitivity towards terrorism due to the great loss of lives and property.[377] However, the country has also experienced changes in the perception of terrorism and implementation of counter measures at all levels.

By 9/11 and the ensuing few years, one might claim that Turkish counter-terrorism strategies relied solely on a militarist approach, thus rejecting any form of

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[375]Yilmaz, S. (2011). Question of strategy in counter-terrorism: Turkish case. *International Journal of Business and Social Science. (2)*1, 40-151

[376]*Ibid.,* p. 150.

[377]Aktan & Koknar, *loc. cit*.

negotiation.[378] In other words, as in the case of the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), one might argue that a compromise is required for prolonged disputes.[379] Until 9/11, for example, the Turkish government applied very intense and militarist counter-terrorism strategies resulting in a number of shortcomings, namely the lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies (i.e., the police, military. and intelligence), ineffective anti-terrorism legislation, a corrupt correctional system, corruption among all law enforcement personnel, and an inadequate traditional response to the new forms of terrorism.[380]

While terrorism uses globalization means to perpetrate faultless and devastating attacks (i.e., mass communication and transportation), Turkey has insisted on outdated militarist counter-terrorism strategies that have resulted in the loss of countless lives and billions of dollars. Therefore, fundamental mentality and enforcement changes were needed. As such, the Turkish government's current approach contends with terrorism as an unlawful act yet an enforceable law and order problem. Furthermore, social, cultural. and political rights were expanded for minorities, and new counter-terrorism legislations were adopted post-9/11 due to the UN Security Council's influence.

Following the attacks on America, definitional gaps were filled with a new act adopted in 2001. In particular, Turkey's first response to Resolution 1373 was submitted on December 27, 2001. However, the ruling party that won the 2002 elections insisted on legislative reforms that were enacted under the influence of international organizations, namely the United Nations. Although the Turkish terrorism act included extremely harsh articles intended to deter terrorists, the post-9/11 environment forced virtually all

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[378]*Ibid.*

[379]*Ibid.* p. 14

[380]Aktan & Koknar, *op. cit.*

countries in the UN system (including Turkey) to mandatory adoption of the Security Council's resolutions. From a Turkish stance, the country adapted to the new wide ranging counter-terrorism alliance led by the UN by transforming the current legislative approach to terrorism and financing the new one .

Turkey has never ignored the new regulations and counter-terrorism measures recommended by the UN after 9/11. Moreover, the country has supported all antiterrorism coalitions formed against terrorism and has collaborated with all countries and institutions as well. For example, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was created under Turkey's command as unconditional support of the antiterrorism alliance led by the United States.[381]

Soon after 9/11, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1368 and 1373 in which the attacks were condemned, and a wide range of counter-terrorism measures were determined with an extensive to-do list for member States.[382] In addition to forcing member countries to ratify the 12 antiterrorism conventions adopted by the Security Council prior to 9/11, Resolution 1373 pointed out crucial measures concerning financing and effective counter-terrorism legislation. Finally, all states were urged to establish cooperation on an international level.[383] In response to the UN's SC, Turkey took various steps in an effort to counter-terrorism.

First, two UN conventions were sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be ratified.[384] In particular, freezing the assets of an Al-Qaida related person in Turkey

[381]Hill, F., & Taspinar, O. (2006). Turkey and Russia: Axis of the excluded? *Survival, 48*(1), 81-92.
[382]Mango, A. (2005). *Turkey and the war on terror: For forty years we fought alone*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
[383]*Ibid.*
[384]The Turkish Report -1- S/2001/1304. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N02/207/48/PDF/N0220748.pdf?OpenElement

might be accepted an important step in countering terrorism.[385] Further, new amendments to the Repentance Law following 9/11 became much more effective by changing the law's criticized character of humiliating the Kurdish identity.386 According to the amendments that were legislated in Anti-Terror Law 3713 in 2006, definitions of terrorism-related crimes were changed, and criminalizing financing of terrorist activities was listed as a separate offence under Article 8.387 In order to increase the length of incarceration, membership in a terrorist organization was criminalized as an offence under the Turkish Penal Code Article 314.388 Although the scope of the Turkish counter-terrorism legislation includes all types of national and international terrorist groups, the main focus remains on the PKK and rehabilitation of its members.389 In order to effectively struggle with financing antiterrorism, a special enforcement unit known as the Working Group on Terrorist Financing (WGOTF) with experts from the related departments was established and began its duty under the chairmanship of the Finance Ministry's Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK).[390]

Influence of the Reports Submitted to the SC's CTC Following Resolution 1373:

Each member country was required to submit a report to the Security Council (SC) within a certain period of time that would then be evaluated by the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC). From the very beginning of 9/11, the United Nations spent more than two weeks deciding what steps to take against terrorism at a country level. As

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[385]*Ibid.*

[386]Moustakis, F., & Chaudhuri, R. (2005). Turkish-Kurdish relations and the European Union: An unprecedented shift in the Kemalist Paradigm? *Mediterranean Quarterly, 16*(4), 77-89.

[387]Turkey: Counter-terrorism (2011, January). Retrieved from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/50/topic/5

[388]*Ibid.*

[389]*Ibid.*

[390]The Turkish Report-4 S/2004/832. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/578/57/PDF/N0457857.pdf?OpenElement

a first reaction, the SC adopted Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001, in which the UN condemned the 911 attacks and called for an international collaboration against terrorism in addition to implementing related conventions and resolutions.[391] Second, Resolution 1368 was followed by the adoption of Resolution 1373 with its binding character which on September 28, 2001. Similarly, Resolution 1373 urged member countries (including Turkey) to do more in countering terrorism by determining all steps to be taken at national and international levels.[392] The UN's CTC was also established with Resolution 1373 in which the Committee called on all member countries to issue a report within 90 days of the resolution's adoption.[393]

Turkey submitted a total of five reports to the CTC—four that addressed Resolution 1373 and one that addressed Resolution 1624.[394] After condemning the 911 attacks in its first report submitted on December 27, 2001, the importance of international cooperation was emphasized in bringing the terrorists to justice as well as preventing further attacks.[395] In addition, the report indicated that Turkey had suffered from terrorism for the past several decades yet is still a major target.[396] After confirming full agreement concerning measures mentioned by the SC in Resolution 1373, the following points were seriously addressed:

    a. Current legal and regulatory provisions for the prevention of financing terrorist activities.

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[391]Rostow, N. (2001). Before and after: The changed UN response to terrorism since September 11th. *Cornell Int'l LJ, 35*, 475.
[392]*Ibid.*
[393]*Ibid.*
[394]Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/index.html
[395]The Turkish Report-1 S/2001/1304. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/207/48/PDF/N0220748.pdf?OpenElement
[396]*Ibid.*

b. Immediate freezing of all Al-Qaida related persons' assets.

c. Intensification of collaboration and exchange of intelligence.

d. Two of 12 conventions that had not yet been ratified were sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

e. As an EU candidate and NATO member country, Turkey's stance towards terrorism was explained in detail.[397]

The second report issued on August 21, 2002, consisted entirely of measures taken by Turkey that were written in the form of specific answers to questions asked by the CTC concerning its understanding of Turkish legislative and enforcement counter-terrorism machinery. A total number of 20 questions were answered. By carefully reading the report, the reader will be able to clearly grasp the whole picture and understand to what extent the measures imposed by the SC were effectively implemented.[398]

Turkey's third report was submitted on August 25, 2003, in response to a letter sent by the CTC on May 9, 2003.[399] More especially, the report focused in detail on legislative measures against counter financing of terrorism. In addition, the Committee demanded that they review the Turkish Law on the Fight against Terrorism (LFAT). Specifically, their questions related to Turkish regulations pertaining to the manufacture, sale, possession, storage, transport, import and export of explosives were fully responded to in the report.[400]

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[397]*Ibid.*
[398]The Turkish Report-2 S/2002/948. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/545/87/IMG/N0254587.pdf?OpenElement
[399]The Turkish Report-3 S/2003/856. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/492/07/PDF/N0349207.pdf?OpenElement
[400]*Ibid.*

The fourth report was submitted on October 18, 2004, in response to the letter sent on July 16, 2004.[401] Primarily, the report focused on implementation measures, criminalizing terrorist activities, and their financing.[402] In addition, the newly established department known as the Working Group on Terrorist Financing (WGOTF) with experts from Ministries of Justice, Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs and the Treasury began its duties under the chairmanship of the Finance Ministry's Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK).[403]

Before mentioning the fifth report, it should be pointed out that Turkey's reports to the CTC were categorized into two parts: (a) reports by member States pursuant to the Security Council's 2001 Resolution 1373; and (b) reports by member States pursuant to the Security Council's 2005 Resolution 1624.[404] The final report was undersigned by Turkey on February 27, 2006, in response to the letter dated December 2, 2005, from the CTC and pursuant to the Security Council's 2005 Resolution 1624.[405] Primarily, the report focused on implementation measures taken by the country given that Resolution 1624 asked that member countries report these to the CTC.[406] Further, the report exposed the criminalizing of terrorism from all aspects of Turkey's entire criminal justice system

[401]The Turkish Report-4 S/2004/832. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/578/57/PDF/N0457857.pdf?OpenElement
[402]*Ibid.*
[403]The Turkish Report-4 S/2004/832. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/578/57/PDF/N0457857.pdf?OpenElement
[404]Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/index.html
[405]The Turkish Report-5 S/2006/147. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/267/66/PDF/N0626766.pdf?OpenElement
[406]Bianchi, A. (2006). Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council's anti-terrorism measures: The quest for legitimacy and cohesion. *European Journal of International Law, 17*(5), 881.

as well as emphasized how the country fulfilled the requirements imposed by Resolution 1624.[407]

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[407]The Turkish Report-5, *Ibid.*

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS

To exhibit the whole picture of the present research, the conclusion part of the study has been divided into five sections: General Outlook, Findings, Implications, Lessons Learned from the UN, Russia and Turkey and Concluding Remarks. The researcher has focused on a conceptual framework based on findings obtained from archival research and data derived from interviews. Therefore, these findings have provided an insight for the researcher to clarify the issue by exploring the facts concerning the impact of the UN on counter terrorism in the world especially in Russia and Turkey. In order to make this clear, the researcher will deal with key findings and policy implications of this research.

A-General Outlook

Terrorism has been a social phenomenon and a huge threat for humanity since the ancient ages when the most extreme form of terrorism used.[408]As nothing was able to resist against change, terrorism has also changed throughout history. Since metamorphosis is inevitable to become a butterfly, in a global world it is crucial for all parties to adapt themselves to new trends in order to be able to operate. Like a living body improving itself, terrorism has had also a long term of improvement from ancient times to 9/11, even after 9/11. Thus, it has been essential for all governmental and nongovernmental structures that will struggle with terrorism to be one step ahead by transforming themselves to much more developed agencies which will be able to overcome terrorism.

Law enforcement agencies used to apply traditional measures to prevent or to investigate terror incidents without separating them from ordinary crimes. However,

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[408] Whittaker, D. J. (2002). Terrorism: understanding the global threat. London: Longman/Pearson.

those traditional approaches included using excessive military force which was ineffective, and gave terrorists opportunity to justify their attacks and to recruit more people.   Therefore, a vicious circle in which nobody wins has been formed, and terrorist attacks have continued for decades. The more excessive force is used, the more resistance is faced. A different stance was needed to tackle terrorism.

The Reason to Conduct This Study

Especially following the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has been a world-wide threat intimidating all of nations in the world. Therefore, a strong joint stance towards this trans-national phenomenon has been an obligation. While the entire world was suffering from terrorism, many steps have been taken, and many changes were made by governments, law enforcement units and scholars. The main objective was to exactly define, and understand the issue in order to develop effective strategies to counter it accordingly.

As an effort to find out a better approach and understanding, through various dimensions of terrorism and counter terrorism, this study was initiated.   More specifically, it was conducted in order to examine whether the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11. In particular, the stance taken against terrorism by the United Nations, Russia, and Turkey before and after 9/11 was portrayed and analyzed through several phases:

First phase; in helping one to better understands terrorism, the concept was dealt with and defined in detail as a global threat. Notably, efforts to define the term precisely became a fundamental objective among scholars in the field of counter-terrorism because it is crucial to determine proper and effective policies and strategies towards terrorism. In

addition, an understanding of terrorism and counter-terrorism both before and after 9/11 was evaluated through the related literature and regime theory, realist, liberal, and cosmopolitan perspectives. For instance, while the states, Russia and Turkey had to implement effective counter terrorism strategies to protect itself from terrorism and at the same time the UN has been much more effective by determining both national and international level policies through responses to reports submitted to the CTC by states.

Second phase; the United Nations was examined in order to measure its impact on counter-terrorism before and after 9/11. Essentially, the regime theory provided a perspective from which to understand international organization and rationale of its existence: collaboration among countries and participating to international coalitions in order to achieve their common goals and interests. For example, pre-9/11 antiterrorism instruments, post-9/11 resolutions, and newly established units (i.e., CTC, CTED and CTITF) were scrutinized to determine whether the UN had increased its influence in the respective fields. Finally, interviews including 20 subjects provided additional information concerning the UN's perceptions regarding terrorism.

Third phase; Russia and Turkey's different points of views concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism were established and then compared. Specifically, the phenomena were assessed before and after 9/11 through interviews in order to grasp the whole picture. In addition, reports submitted to the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) from both countries provided accurate information pertaining to the stances demonstrated towards terrorism following 9/11.

Fourth phase; according to data obtained through analysis of interviews, by the percentage ranking, 100% (20 out of 20) of interviewees concurred that in comparison of

before/after 9/11 periods, while the UN has been much less effective before 9/11 it has been more effective following 9/11 (Figure 8). Further, as an indication of great importance attached to international collaboration, 100% of the interviewees believed that 9/11 resulted in full cooperation among countries (Figure 9). It has been pointed out, and confirmed that international cooperation is required between countries to overcome terrorism. Another strong emphasis was made on the way to counter terrorism: 100% of the interview subjects center upon 'counter terrorism must be legal, and respect individuals' rights'.

Overall, data derived from literature and interviews were analyzed to investigate the main assumption: The UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11. In the following section, new policy implications and recommendations are presented followed by lessons learned from the UN, Russia, and Turkey.

B-Key Findings

Findings Obtained from Archival Research (Literature Review)

Related literature on terrorism and counter terrorism in English and Turkish languages has been reviewed as one of primary data sources for this cross-temporal (pre-post 9/11) and cross-national (Russia-Turkey) comparative study. It included books, journal and newspaper articles, governmental reports, and specific legislation addressing counter-terrorism in Russia and Turkey, global and regional corporations initiated by the UN and other international institutions, the UN's CTC reports and its implementation surveys pointing out whether member countries fulfilled their requirements suggested by CTC.

Counter-terrorism Legislation	RUSSIA	TURKEY
Before 9/11	1. The Security Law (1992) 2. The Russian Federation Constitution (1993) 3. The Foreign Policy Concept-I (April 23, 1993) 4. Criminal Code (1996) 5. The National Security Concept -I (1997) 6. Law about Fight Against Terrorism (1998) 7. The National Security Concept -II (Jan 10, 2000) 8. The Foreign Policy Concept-II (June 28, 2000) 9. Presidential Decree (Jan, 2001)	1. The Turkish Penal Code-I (1926) 2. Martial Law (1971) 3. Turkish Constitution (1982) 2. State of Emergency Law (1983) 3. The Repentance Law (1988) 4. Law to Fight Terrorism (1991) 7. Law to Fight Terrorism-Amendments (1995) 8. The Repentance Law (1999) 9. Law to Fight Terrorism-Amendments (1999)
After 9/11	1. Presidential Decree (Jun, 2003) 2. Criminal Code Amendments (2004) 3. Presidential Decree (Feb, 2006) 4. New Anti-Terrorism Law (Mar, 2006) 5. New Anti-Terrorism Law Amendments (Jul, 2006) 6. New Anti-Terrorism Law Amendments (Jan, 2007) 7. Ratification of the UN Counter-terrorism Convention (2007)	1. Ratification of the UN 1997 Counter-terrorism Convention (May, 2002) 2. Ratification of the UN 1999 Counter-terrorism Convention (Jun, 2002) 3. Cancellation of Emergency Law (Jul,2002) 4. Back Home Law-Repentance (Jul, 2003) 5. The Turkish Penal Code-II (2004) 6. Active Repentance Law (2004) 7. Law to Fight Terrorism-Amendments (2006)

Figure 7 Counter-terrorism legislation in Russia and Turkey Before and After9/11

Before 9/11, the UN's counter-terrorism procedures were generally ignored by member States due to the lack of capability involving implementation. Following 9/11,

however, member countries submitted reports to the CTC including the Russian Federation and Turkey—two countries that supported international anti-terrorism collaboration at the national, regional and global levels. To a certain degree, structural and legislative changes observed in both countries was a result of the new position taken by the UN. Although both countries had their own counter-terrorism laws prior to 9/11, the attacks also resulted in new regulations as shown in Figure 7. To some extent, for example, Russia and Turkey both changed their approach toward terrorism. In addition, structural transformations were applied in some cases as an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Thus, it is emphasized that both countries focused on legislative dimensions as important tools used in their strategies to counter terrorism.

9/11 Has become a turning point, and resulted in some structural and perceptional changes at institutional and country levels. By conducting cross-period analysis through a compare-contrast approach, those institutional changes are determined. To illustrate, the UN's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) has been founded by the Resolution 1373 adopted by the Security Council (SC).   Many similarities in terms of state level changes can be observed in both Russia and Turkey cases accordingly. For instance, many security oriented counter terrorism laws were adopted in both countries. Besides, some extra structures were also established to overcome terrorism that has ever been so effective by exploiting all technologic advances. Those alterations in both countries have had similar motivations as well.

Primary motivation for those immediate changes is the UN's pressure on all member countries. Contrary to its stance before 9/11, the UN has been more influential

on the member states owing to the post 9/11 ambiance and mandatory characteristics of the Resolutions adopted by the SC.

Apart from the UN's compulsory approach, the new domestic motivations in both countries have also been determinant factors for the state level changes. Just aftermath 9/11, the initials steps taken by states can be defined as immediate reaction to the attacks. Probability of being vulnerable to similar threat has caused some psychological effects such as fear, anxiety, intimidation and hopelessness on governments and citizens. Those factors have been the basis of domestic motivations. However, it can be found out that for states, the will to cooperate with the UN and domestic motivations have had the same or overlapping aim which was to provide security for their citizens. For the sake of this common goal, either with domestic reasons or with the UN's pressure, states have taken effective and tough measures towards terrorism. Furthermore, to some extent, states have felt alienated due to the pressure demonstrated by counter terrorism alliance led by USA and the UN, and had to implement new measures against terrorism. The main motivation of that action was the fear to be classified as others.

To evaluate from the Regime Theory point of view which urges states to collaborate for their common interest, following 9/11, both interior and exterior conditions forced states to act together, and confirmed the main assumption of the theory.

The Impact of the UN on Russia and Turkey After 9/11

9/11 did not only change the perception of terrorism at national and global levels but also affected countries and international organizations in their ways to combat terrorism. In spite of being known as a transnational concept by all countries since 1970s, the real dimensions of terrorism have been recognized following 9/11 attacks. Thus, in

order to effectively tackle terrorist groups and prevent any attacks, many countries such as Russia and Turkey have joined international alliance against terrorism, and accepted some local counter terrorism regulations suggested by the anti-terrorism coalition led by the UN.

Before 9/11 many states and some regional organizations such as the EU dealt with terrorism as a domestic issue for each country having suffered from terrorist attacks. However, 9/11 attacks caused awareness for both states and organizations, and terrorism has been accepted as an international phenomena operating beyond national borders by all parties. Furthermore, similar to the regime theory perspective, vulnerability of a superpower has pointed out that a single state cannot overcome a global problem. Thus, the requirement of multilateral collaborations among states at local, regional and international levels for their own common interests confirm the regime theory view.[409]

Apart from the change of perception, the states such as Russia and Turkey have also adopted some state level laws and regulations caused by two motivations: domestic concerns and the UN pressure. For a better understanding each motivation should be evaluated separately.

1- The UN Pressure: Contrary to the situation prior to 9/11, the post 9/11 decisions and measures of the UN have been mandatory for all member countries. No member country refused acting according to the new regulations compelled by the Resolution 1373. The CTC was established with this Resolution adopted by the UN, and it has acted as the executive force following up the steps to be taken by member countries. To some extent, all of the states responded to the CTC by submitting reports, and then making necessary amendments for their counter terrorism structures and applicable laws. For instance,

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[409] Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, *op. cit.*

Russia and Turkey have responded to the CTC, and taken necessary measures recommended by the UN. To some extent, the UN pressure was perceived in both Russia and Turkey, and hence, some changes were made; because no country wanted to be seen at the side of terrorists.

2- Domestic Motivations: While each country felt the UN pressure, at the same time there were some domestic factors forcing the country to act accordingly.

- Security concerns – Every country has worried about similar terrorist attacks towards its citizens following 9/11 because even the US was unable to prevent such tremendous terrorist attacks. National security has been an imperative priority for each country in the world. Thus, it might be claimed that security concerns forced states to act pro-actively, and to take necessary measures for secure and safe habitats for their citizens. Since both Russia and Turkey have been struggling with various terrorist groups on their soil for several decades, every step to be taken is of great importance.

- Demands of the citizens – Basic needs for human beings are essential components of their daily lives. Maslow categories those needs into five layers at his pyramid called 'hierarchy of needs', and emphasize the relations between layers.[410] Maslow's five basic needs are sorted as follows:[411]

    1. Physiological (Biological) Needs

    2. *Safety (Security) Needs*

    3. Needs of Love, Affection and Belongingness

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[410]Simons, J. A., Irwin, D. B., & Drinnien, B. A. (1987). *The Search for Understanding: Maslow's hierarchy of needs.* New York, NY, West Publishing Company
[411] *Ibid.*

4. Needs for Esteem

5. Needs for Self-Actualization

Maslow points out that if the demands at the first level cannot be satisfied person does not feel the second one. For instance, if a person is hungry, without fulfilling this biological need, he cannot feel the second layer's safety needs; and the third layer's needs require fulfilling of security (safety) needs, and so on.[412]


Figure 8. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Pyramid

Security (safety) is one of those basic needs just coming after Physiological (Biological) Needs, and affects latter layers of the pyramid. From this point of view,

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[412] *Ibid.*

it can be claimed that the citizens in Russia and Turkey insist on a secure environment to fulfill their basic need as illustrated above. If the citizens' primary expectation cannot be fulfilled, the social fabric of the community is spoiled, and the ruling government is replaced at the next elections.

- The opposition parties' arguments and opinions: In free and democratic countries, there are political parties using the power of government for the citizens' benefit if they are elected through elections. One of the priorities of elected governments to reduce the risk of threats such as terrorism and natural disasters.[413] Otherwise, in politics, any disputes or security gaps affecting society might be manipulated by political rivals to. Thus, ruling party cannot completely ignore the opposition parties' views aiming at the common benefits of society. To some extent, governments should pay attention to others' opinions to lower probable risks, and to find out proper solutions towards the treats threatening the whole society. Various perspectives contribute to appropriate   approaches to overcome huge social problems such as organized crimes and terrorism.

- Reform requirements for related agencies: Likewise many government institutions, law enforcement agencies in many countries might resist any structural changes even if they are required to fulfill society's new needs and expectations. However, traditional strategies fall short of providing safety and security while criminals develop new ways, and use technology to perpetrate crime. Therefore, it has been mandatory for agencies struggling with terrorism to

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[413] Moser, G. (2008) Homeland Security Strategy and Policy Choices: A Local Government Perspective. In P. R. Viotti, M. A. Opheim & N. Bowen (Eds.), *Terrorism and Security: Thinking Strategically About Policy* (pp. 171-189). Boca Raton, FL. CRC Press.

adapt themselves to new trends of countering terrorism. Otherwise it would not be

possible to tackle a new phenomena

by applying out-dated methods. The reforms were made by both adopting

effective anti-terror law, and establishing new counter terrorism units which are

specialized only to struggle terrorism.

While states cannot accept easily any limitation to their sovereignty, post 9/11

conditions have changed this perception, and in addition to domestic factors, they

voluntarily started cooperating with other states and international organizations. For

instance, following 9/11 all member countries of the UN made some internal regulations

for their law enforcement agencies to effectively combat terrorism. From Regime theory

point of view, states can collaborate with each other and international organizations for

their common good.[414] Furthermore, Regime Theory scholars such as Hasenclever,

Mayer, and Rittberger claim that for their own benefits, states can join any international

alliance.[415]Implementation of the UN resolution by states might be evaluated through this

assumption. It is not contrary to state interests to apply the UN resolutions because it is

beneficial for all parties.

 Findings Obtained from Interviews

Interviews

All data derived from interviews are categorized according to the content of what

was declared by the participants. While the interview questions have been determined at

the beginning of the study, the content was constituted when the interviews were totally

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[414] Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, *op. cit.*
[415] *Ibid.*

completed. Some patterns have been derived from what interviewees had declared during interviews.

Interview Questions (IQs) vs. Research Questions (RQs):

The interview questions of this study have been determined following formulating of the research design. The main assumption is 'the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11'. Since the most dominant figure of the main assumption is the UN, the interview starts with the question addressing the role of the UN before 9/11. Due to lack of time to start interviews in the US, there might be a limitation for interview questions to address the whole picture. The interview periods have had two different sides, one is researcher, myself, and the other side is interviewee(s) who I asked those interview questions below:

1. How do you assess the role of the UN in the field of terrorism before 9/11?

2. How do you assess the adoption conditions of the new UN regulations after 9/11?

   - Negotiations ─ objections ─ consensus

   - Objectives of the new regulations

→ The first two interview questions (IQs) above are related to the primary research question of this cross-temporal and cross-national study: How much (or To what extent) has the UN been effective in countering terrorism before and after the 9/11 attacks?, and to the secondary question1: How did the UN respond to global terrorism before 9/11?. Furthermore, these two questions provide an extra understanding of the main assumption of the study: The UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11.

→ The IQs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are related with the three core components of the study: The UN, Russia and Turkey. Following 9/11, the UN adopted some mandatory Resolutions urging what to do at national and international levels. The member states had to respond to the UN's CTC. The IQ3-4 have focused on the reports submitted to the CTC by countries. It might be claimed through interviews and reports that the perception of terrorism has changed. It has been confirmed that new multidimensional approach is needed to overcome such an issue operating beyond national boundaries. The local effects of the resolution have been detected in both Russia and Turkey. Besides, while having affected the member states, terrorism has also affected the UN by forcing it to be a global security actor. The questions below can also be referred to the secondary research questions 3 and 4: What are the general results of Russia and Turkey's reports to the CTC? and what are the specific measures that Russia and Turkey have taken in response to relative UN resolutions ?

3. How do you evaluate the states' responses to the CTC following the 2001 resolution of 1373 and the 2005 resolution of 1624?

4. After evaluating 1,472 reports submitted to the CTC, have you observed any changes regarding how states perceive terrorism?

5. How do you calculate the impact of the UN resolutions on domestic counter-terrorism?

- Changes in national legislations

- Reactions to the UN efforts

- Move towards more multilateralism

- Use of the UN system, states reaffirming their sovereignty through

the fight against terrorism

6. How do you evaluate the impact of the fight against terrorism on the UN?

- Increased opportunities for the UN to be an international security actor

- Spill-over effects in other areas

7. At the national level, there has always been debate and tension between security concerns and civil liberties-human rights. How do you analyze the UN perspective in terms of civil liberties and human rights while fighting against terrorism?

PATTERNS DERIVED FROM THE INTERVIEWS: QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

While patterns obtained from a raw bunch of data (interviews) can enlighten your way as a researcher, direct quotations might give some priceless insight to all parties in their way to exactly comprehend this study. Moreover, they might reduce the complexity of the contents, and help researcher simplify interviewees' approach towards a specific issue. Thus, following the categorization below, direct quotations will provide more precise views about the content of interviews:

Taken from the viewpoint of interviewees, Figure 9 finds out that all (100%) of the participants (*n*=20) believe that in comparison with two periods, before and after the 9/11 attacks, the UN has been much less effective before 9/11 and more effective following the events of 9/11. While the first column of the Figure 9 compares effectiveness of the UN in terms of before and after 9/11, the second and the third columns focus on how the UN acted before and after 9/11. In addition to the researcher's

remarks tabled above as Figure 9, there might be some nuances which can be derived from exactly how they responded.

Table: A	THE CONTENTS OF INTERVIEWS (CATEGORIZATION OF THE CONTENTS)		
SUBJECTS (CODED) ↓	UN has been much less effective before 9/11 & more effective after 9/11	Before 9/11, the UN made norm settings according to the incidents	Following 9/11 UN have strengthened its CT structure & focused on CT legislation at country level for each member
A	5%		5%
B	5%		
C1-2-3-4	20%	20%	20%
D	5%	5%	5%
E	5%	5%	5%
F1-2	10%	10%	10%
G1-2	10%	10%	10%
H	5%		5%
K1-2-3	15%	15%	15%
L	5%		5%
M	5%	5%	
N	5%	5%	
P	5%		5%
n=20	100% = 20	75% = 15	85% = 17

Figure 9. Interview: Table A

Total number of the coded subjects is twenty (n=20) all of who put a strong emphasis on "the UN has been much less effective before 9/11 and more effective following the events of 9/11". However, some slight differences can be observed among interviewees:

Q1: How do you assess the role of the UN in the field of terrorism before 9/11?

Q2: How do you assess the adoption conditions of the new UN regulations after 9/11?

- Negotiations ─ objections ─ consensus

- Objectives of the new regulations

All 20 subjects have perceived above 2 interview questions as one question comparing the UN's efficiency before and after 9/11, and responded accordingly. The responses for the first and second questions are as follows:

Subject A, said that "I do not know exactly about what the UN has done in countering terrorism before 9/11. However, I should confess that the UN counter terrorism policies have been perceived. Thus, I can admit that following 9/11, the UN has been more effective than it had been before 9/11".

Subject B, states that "According to me, the UN has been more influential after the 9/11 attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaida terrorist groups in 2001. I do not have any specific data indicating this opinion but following 9/11 a kind of counter terrorism awareness has been provided by the UN in member countries including Turkey".

Subjects C1, C2, C3 and C4 responded similarly as "I believe that before 9/11 the UN was unable to react terrorism incidents effectively but following 9/11 it has been more operative towards terrorism, and applied new counter terrorism strategies. Prior to 9/11, the UN contented itself with just verbally condemning terrorists when a terrorist attack was committed".

Subjects D, E, F1, F2, G1 and G2 replied more detailed than other interviewees due to their positions at the UN. The way each of this group replied depends on his position. For instance, **subject D -** "I state that following 9/11 the UN has been much more effective because the UN and member countries started implementing new sufficient measures at national and international levels. What each member country will particularly do in terms of effectively countering terrorism is determined and controlled by the UN".

Subject E says that "while to some extent terrorism has been perceived an important issue prior to 9/11, countering terrorism has been primary task for the UN following 9/11. Thus, some special counter terrorism units such as CTC, CTED and CTITF were established not to miss any dimension in countering terrorism. Thus, I can claim that if compared to pre-9/11 period, the UN has been much more effective following 9/11".

Subjects F1 and F2 touch upon the importance of country level counter terrorism regulations which were determined through member countries' reports submitted to CTC: -"We should state that before 9/11 there was not any UN unit responsible for enforcing counter terrorism measures. Besides, terrorism was not dealt with as a global problem affecting all countries around the world. Furthermore, the UN was able to determine new measures just after terrorism incidents happened. However, 9/11 attacks demonstrated that terrorism is a huge threat for humanity, and has been operating beyond borders. Thus, a new and effective counter terrorism regime led by the UN has been initiated. All member countries obeyed mandatory implementations recommended by the UN. It has been much more effective following 9/11 by enforcing effective counter terrorism measures".

Subjects G1 and G2 have demonstrated the UN dominant views through their reply. "The UN has always been an important international actor dealing with international disputes since its establishment. Some counter terrorism regulations were adopted before 9/11 but member countries did not fully implemented them. Terrorism was not perceived as seriously as it has been following 9/11. Some countries might have their own local counter terrorism implementations, and need some extra measures.

Following 9/11, many countries suffering terrorism have adopted new counter terrorism policies determined by the UN and their governments. All member countries have joined the UN's counter terrorism alliance, and fulfilled the requirements such as CTC reports and specific counter terrorism laws. This is an indication of the UN's effectiveness after the 9/11 attacks".

By comparing the UN's stance before and after 9/11; **subject H** has emphasized that "the UN was not so visible in the area of international relations to deal with such big issue like terrorism before 9/11, but following 9/11 as indication of determination some effective concrete steps were taken by the UN in spite of its huge body. I do not know what kind of counter terrorism measures were taken prior to 9/11. However, following 9/11, in the area of countering terrorism, the UN has refreshed itself by taking reasonable steps internationally and at country level to prevent any further terrorist attacks".

Since **subjects K1, K2 and K3** have worked at the same counter terrorism department in which national counter terrorism policies were developed, there was conformity in their way to respond the first and the second questions. "We undeniably say that terrorism has always been a huge problem to be dealt with carefully and intensively through both multi-dimensional and multilateral ways. From this point of view, the UN was much less effective before 9/11 because the extent of terrorism has not been perceived adequately by member countries".

As response to interview questions 1 and 2, **subject L** says "terrorism has always been a threat for all countries. Countries have had specific laws and units to struggle with terrorism not only after 9/11 but also before 9/11. The UN has also taken some counter terrorism measures following 9/11, and become much more effective. I believe that

countries have had some preventive measures following 9/11 under the influence of the UN".

Subject M states that "the UN is the greatest international organization in the world operating in many countries such as Cyprus and Lebanon which have dealt with disputed issues since 1950s. Besides, it has taken some minor steps towards terrorism prior to 9/11. However, countries' perception of terrorism has changed following 9/11. Therefore, all member countries have participated in the UN's anti-terrorism coalition. The UN's much more active role in countering terrorism in the post-9/11 era cannot be ignored"

The interview with **subject N** was the briefest one due to the interviewee's high level position. He has admitted the UN's much more effective role displayed following 9/11 by saying "the UN has demonstrated undeniably important effort for all countries in their way to combat terrorism effectively. Turkey has also taken some concrete steps such as new anti-terror policies and participation to the UN's counter terrorism alliance"

Subject P was reluctant during the interview. He emphasized the increasing authority of the UN following 9/11: "When I compare the UN's position as before 9/11 and after 9/11, it is so obvious that post -9/11 atmosphere has provided extra power for the UN in the area of countering terrorism. Since countries have realized that terrorism is such an enormous threat which was able to target even the only super power of the world fearlessly, they accepted what the UN had recommended for them at country level".

In the second column, 75% of the subjects (*n*=15) pointed out that before 9/11, the UN made some regulations just following the terrorist incidents were committed. However, 85% (*n*=17) emphasized that following 9/11, the UN enhanced its counter

terrorism capability, and focused on country level counter-terrorism legislation for being much more effective (cf., Graph 1 and Figure 9).

It is also indicated in Figure 9 that interviewees believe that the UN clearly determined how member States should take action against terrorism following 9/11. In particular, States were compelled to approve effective laws pertaining to countering financing of terrorism (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML).[416] Finally, it can be derived from Index A that 85% of the subjects emphasized that post-911 measures do not include only CFT (countering financing of terrorism) and AML (anti-money laundering) legislation at country level but also structural changes in the UN body—such as the creation of the CTC. It means all countries and the UN have recognized that the laws on CFT and AML are the important components of countering terrorism following 9/11. Besides, it might be emphasized that the UN has first determined how to struggle with terrorism, and then countries have adopted some internal regulations such as CFT and AML.

A Cross-temporal analysis of 9/11 has been made (cf.,Graph 1 and Figure 9) to evaluate the UN's stance towards terrorism before and after 9/11. For instance, out of 20 (N), 15 interviewees, 75%, agree with the idea of 'before 9/11, the UN has made norm settings following the specific terror incidents' while 85%, n=17, claim that 'the UN has taken much more concrete measures following 9/11'.

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[416]Alvarez, *loc. cit.*

Graph 1 UN regulations and terrorism legislation post-9/11

Pre and post 9/11 approaches of the UN have not been the same. Some differences can be observed in terms of perception and action (cf.,Graph 1). Graph 1 indicates the measures taken by the UN before and after 9/11. While out of 20, 15 participants claim that the UN has not been pro-active, and just made regulations following terror incidents, 17 of them believe that following 9/11 the UN has been much more pro-active, and focused on counter terrorism legislation (CTL) at state level. Post 9/11 stance of the UN has been much more effective due to perception and awareness caused by the terrorist attacks against the super power of the world.

Table B:

| Table: B	THE CONTENTS OF INTERVIEWS (CATEGORIZATION OF THE CONTENTS)			
SUBJECTS (CODED) ↓	BORDER CONTROL Regulations After 9/11 (Country Level)	SECURITY AGENCY Regulations After 9/11 (Country Level)	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION After 9/11	CFT / AML Legislation by UN and Countries After 9/11
A			5%	5%
B	5%		5%	
C1-2-3-4	20%	20%	20%	20%
D		5%	5%	5%
E		5%	5%	5%
F1-2		10%	10%	10%
G1-2		10%	10%	10%
H	5%		5%	5%
K1-2-3		15%	15%	
L	5%		5%	5%
M	5%	5%	5%	5%
N	5%	5%	5%	5%
P	5%		5%	
n=20	50% = 10	75% = 15	100% = 20	75% = 15

Figure 10 Interview: Table B

As illustrated by Figure 10, specific counter-terrorism measures, namely border control, security agency regulations and counter terrorism legislation were implemented following 9/11 by states. Out of a total of 20 subjects, 100% placed the strongest emphasis on international cooperation. Actually, the UN demonstrated a strong determination following 9/11 by instructing all countries what to do against terrorism,[417] and further obliged them to come together and form an anti-terrorism alliance.[418]

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[417]*Ibid.*
[418]Ward, C. A. (2003). Building capacity to combat international terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 8*(2), 289.

**Graph 2 Comparison between post-9/11 policies**

Graph 3 International cooperation vs. Legality

As it is assumed by the regime theory, all of the interviewees put a very strong emphasis on international cooperation (cf., Graph 2), and the 9/11 attacks have caused some deep conceptual changes one of which is perception of terrorism. Before 9/11 it was assumed by many states that terrorism was a local and national problem towards which national governments take necessary measures.

However, following 9/11, it has been obvious to all that it was a transnational issue, and a wide-range international alliance is required to struggle with terrorism effectively. Thus, 100% of those who participated to interviews believe that international cooperation is indispensable to overcome terrorism operating beyond borders.

The Secondary Policy Implications

BORDER CONTROL (n1)=10
SECURITY AGENCY (n2)=15
CFT / AML Legislation (n3)=15

Graph 4 Secondary Policies Recommended post-9/11

Table C:

Table: C	THE CONTENTS OF INTERVIEWS (CATEGORIZATION OF THE CONTENTS)			
SUBJECTS (CODED) ↓	There was much less or no awareness in many states before 9/11. No common definition.	9/11 revealed the real face of terrorism, and proved that is bad for all	9/11 increased security concerns, and caused human rights violations	Countering terrorism must be legal, and respect individual rights
A	5%			5%
B			5%	5%
C1-2-3-4	20%		20%	20%
D	5%	5%	5%	5%
E	5%	5%		5%
F1-2	10%	10%	10%	10%
G1-2	10%	10%		10%
H	5%	5%	5%	5%
K1-2-3			15%	15%
L			5%	5%
M			5%	5%
N			5%	5%
P	5%		5%	5%
***n*=20**	65% = 13	35% = 7	80% = 16	100% = 20

Figure 11 Interview: Table-C

The pre-9/11 era became a period of understanding and identifying terrorism and its effects on both the UN and countries throughout the world. It was not known to what extent terrorism could damage nations and institutions before 9/11. Basically, terrorism awareness was much less than it would be following 9/11 because there was not a common definition of terrorism. As shown in Figure 11, there was not even a common definition to describe the brutal acts as reported by 65% (*n*=13) of the subjects. Conversely, only 35% (*n*=7) of the subjects believed that after 9/11 people have understood exactly what terrorism was. In other words, a majority of participants (65%) was aware of its basic meaning from their own perspective before 9/11, but how

immensely terrorism could affect nations and states remained unknown (cf., Figure 11, second column).

Apart from awareness, definition and effects of terrorism, according to 80% of interviewees, Figure 11 (index C) also reveals that 9/11 attacks have increased security concerns, and thus caused some human right violations while countering terrorism. It can be derived from this point that there is a significant relationship between security concerns and human rights violations: While having higher security risks, there will be more human rights violations to provide security.

Referring back to Figure 11, the 9/11 attacks also affected one's perception of safety and security as indicated by 80% (n=16) of the subjects. Essentially, individuals became concerned about their personal security, and for the sake of safety they accepted excessive policy applications which included some human rights violations. Hence, human rights violations increased following 9/11; similarly, 80% believe that counter terrorism measures adopted following 9/11 was responsible for more human rights violations because it has been revealed how much devastating terrorism can be for states. However, any kind of human rights violations cannot be tolerated by the UN because one of the four primary goals listed in the UN's Charter is ''to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights''.[419]

To some extent, each country had to change its position towards terrorism following 9/11 in addition to developing its own method of adapting to a new era of

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[419] Hanhimäki, J. M. (2008). *The United Nations: A very short introduction* (Vol. 199): Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, USA. p.1.

countering terrorism. Turkey, for example, made internal structural as well as legislative changes and further supported anti-terrorism coalitions on a global level.[420]

The Contents Related to the Cases of Russia and Turkey

It should be noted that due to unbalanced number of interviewees from Russia and Turkey, the interview contents related to applications in both countries cannot be generalized. Each country's stance towards terrorism should be evaluated separately not to cause any misperception.

As a country that has been vulnerable to various types of terrorism since the 1970s, Turkey responded very quickly and efficiently to the 9/11 attacks as shown in Figure 11. In addition, the Turkish demonstrated their allegiance after 9/11 by supporting global antiterrorism alliances unconditionally,[421] as well as immediately freezing all assets of persons with ties to or related to Al-Qaida.[422] Taken from this point of view, 75% of the subjects (*n*=15) affirmed that Turkey supported antiterrorism alliances and took further border security measures as well as counter-terrorism financing legislation. In addition, 80% (*n*=16) of the subjects stated that any human rights violations cannot be justified while countering terrorism. Essentially, unlawful acts cannot be applied to suppress any types, whether legal or illegal. Thus, law enforcers must obey all laws and individual rights while countering terrorism. Finally, 100% of the subjects (*n*=20), emphasized the legality of countering terrorism as revealed in Figure 11. In other words, there are no laws that approve of any type of arbitrary violations against individual rights

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[420]Hill, F., & Taspinar, O. (2006). Turkey and Russia: Axis of the excluded? *Survival, 48*(1), 81-92.
[421]*Ibid*
[422]The Turkish Report -1- S/2001/1304. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/207/48/PDF/N0220748.pdf?OpenElement

All countries including Turkey must respect human rights, and illegal methods of countering terrorism cannot be accepted (cf., Graph 4).

Graph 5 Turkey's stance concerning human rights violations

Similar to the Turkish stance, Russia took necessary measures at all levels following 9/11 as well as supported antiterrorism alliances regionally by allowing U.S. troops to operate in Central Asia.[423] In addition, one might argue that under post-9/11 influence, both countries adopted specific laws and regulations in order to efficiently struggle with terrorism operating beyond borders. Furthermore, with its mandatory

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[423]Baev, P. K. (2006). Turning counter-terrorism into counter-revolution: Russia focuses on Kazakhstan and engages Turkmenistan. *European Security, 15*(1), 3-22.

character, the Resolution 1373 forced member countries to fill legislative gaps particularly on financing of terrorism.[424]

**Legislative Dimension of Countering Terrorism for the UN, Russia and Turkey: Pre & Post 9/11**

The attacks committed against the United States on September 11, 2001, have become a turning point for legislation pertaining to countering terrorism. Because current laws in many countries concerning terrorism prior to 9/11 have become ineffective and insufficient, new regulations were determined and adopted at the national and international levels. Similarly, a large proportion of the interviewed subjects (85%) emphasized that counter-terrorism legislation at the country level has been a great priority for the UN following 9/11 (cf., Figure 8 and Graph 1). In addition the UN's mentality and perception towards terrorism has changed as well. For example, the organization has become a pioneer in the new era of terrorism which necessitates that terrorism acts to be dealt with considerably more seriously. In addition, the UN urged all member countries to adapt accordingly. As a result, the focus among member countries has centered around additional counter-terrorism legislation due to the UN's new stance and determination.[425]

All of the interviewees, 100%→N=20, claimed that while the UN was much less effective in countering terrorism before 9/11, it has been much more effective by changing its perception and approach towards terrorism after 9/11 (cf., Figure 8 and Graph 6). From a different vantage point, it might be assumed that the 9/11 attacks helped all member States to realize how dangerous terrorism threats can be for all nations. Hence, the UN made some structural and operational changes in order to

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[424]Bianchi, *Ibid.*
[425]Alvarez, *op. cit.*

overcome this new phenomenon. In particular, the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED were established to fulfill new responsibilities at both the institutional and national levels.

The UN Effectiveness Before & After 9/11

Graph 6 The UN's effectiveness before vs. after 9/11

Apart from its own structural and operational transformations, the UN has also affected countries in their ways of countering terrorism. For example, Russia and Turkey both made changes in order to comply with the new era of counter-terrorism. Essentially, some changes were applied with the UN's influence as well as all member countries. In short, many legislative steps were taken in both countries. In addition to the specific laws, certain amendments to former ones were also adopted. Further, selected structural changes were implemented by newly deployed units in both countries in order to provide

harmony among agencies as an effective counter-terrorism strategy.[426] [427] The Graph 7 indicates that in both Russia and Turkey, the total number of the new counter terrorism regulations is seven following 9/11. Each country have begun implementing new strategies towards terrorism with new specific laws and units in order to effectively struggle with terrorism.

The UN's Stance Before and After 9/11

The primary counter-terrorism measures taken by the UN are referred to as either the 12 instruments of terrorism or the 12 conventions of terrorism. Nevertheless, only a few countries ratified all of the pre-9/11 twelve instruments. In other words, they were adopted as a reaction following specific terrorism events, and just some norm settings were made. It can be seen through Figure 8 that a great proportion (15 out of ~~20~~75%) of interviewees stated that prior to 9/11, the UN was able to act following only specific terrorism incidents, and made some regulations accordingly. However, all (100%→N=10) of the subjects believed that the UN was much less effective before 9/11 while it has been much more effective following 9/11 (cf., Figure 8).

The post-9/11 UN measures are perceived by interviewees as being much more effective than previous ones due to the binding character of the Security Council's resolutions and the common stance demonstrated by both the General Assembly and the Security Council[428] The UN's increasing influence in countering terrorism with its SC and GA can be reviewed through Figure 13 in which there are steps taken by the UN's two primary units before and after 9/11.

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[426]Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism*. Farnham Surry, UK: Ashgate Publishing.

[427]The Turkish Report-4 S/2004/832. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N04/578/57/PDF/N0457857.pdf?OpenElement

[428] Bianchi, *loc. cit.*

Outcome of the Figure 13 can be evaluated through the regime theory perspective which contends that international organizations can be more effective than a single country when struggling with the threat of terrorism. Essentially, international cooperation is required to overcome terrorism that uses globalization outcomes and acts across country boundaries. According to advocates of the regime theory highlight the significance of a strong alliance and collaboration at the global level which will be provided by international organizations in order to triumph over a complicated issue, namely terrorism.[429]From the same point of view, it can be observed through Figure:9 that all of the interviewees,100% n=20, put a strong emphasis on the necessity of international cooperation.

Consequently, while it cannot be exactly measured whether the UN has affected countries to change their count terrorism approach or they have changed their legislation because of domestic concerns; it can be pointed out that to some extent two factors have caused some new regulations in countering terrorism. It can be emphasized that the UN's influence on member countries for effective counter terrorism strategies has overlapped with some domestic motivations such as;

- Deficient counter terrorism measures and regulations that the country has.

- Fear to be alienated by the counter terrorism alliance led by the UN and supported by many countries.

- Anxiety for a probable terrorist attack that will cause chaos in society, and decrease trust toward the government.

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[429] Nye. J. S. (1990). *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power.* New York, NY: Basic Books

Comparing Russia and Turkey: Similarities and Differences

As two cases of this study Russia and Turkey have revealed that in countering terrorism countries can have the same and some different approaches depending on their cultural and historical backgrounds. Both countries have reflected classical approach of a sovereign state which refuses others to deal with its internal issue. Thus, sovereignty concern of realist view might be perceived in both countries while applying harsh counter terrorism measures and the UN's recommendations before and after 9/11. For instance, Russian's stance before 9/11 in countering terrorism was so militaristic, akin to Turkey's counter terrorism stance. However, Turkey's stance toward terrorism has been a bit lenient since 1999 when the third phase of counter terrorism started. [430] Post 9/11 the UN policies at country level supported that Turkish stance. While Turkey has attempted to change its harsh militarist vantage point in countering terrorism, Russia exploited post 9/11 UN counter terrorism policies to justify its brutal approach toward terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in Moscow in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004 have resulted in more inconsiderate anti-terrorism laws.[431]

The Russian Stance Before and After 9/11:

Prior to 9/11, Russia took a more violent approach towards terrorism; following 9/11, however, the UN was effective concerning the country's view of terrorism. Accordingly, some have argued that measures taken by the UN were manipulated by Russian authorities in order to justify their oppressive counter-terrorism actions used against Chechens. Further, one might argue that even post-9/11 legislative measures

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[430] Ozeren, S. (2011). Turkiyede paradigm degisimi ve terorle mucadele. In S. Ozeren, & M.Sever (Eds.), *Terrorism paradoksu ve Turkiye.* (pp. 23-54). Ankara, Turkey: Karinca Yayinlari.

[431] Beckman, J. (2007). *Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism.* Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers.

adopted by the Russian Parliament (Duma) were seen as a chance to suppress certain internal problems.[432] Finally, Russian law enforcers were claimed to have begun implementing harsher counter-terrorism strategies in a militaristic way during the post-9/11 atmosphere.[433]

In referring back to Figure 7, Russia did not adopt anti-terrorism laws only after 9/11; rather, the country had implemented numerous legislative counter-terrorism regulations before 911. To fill the gaps for changing conditions, for example, the Russian government issued amendments and presidential decrees accordingly.

However, those amendments and decrees have been much harsher, and given a wide-range authority to Russian special counter terrorism units and army to operate inside and outside Russia against terrorism.[434]

The Turkish Stance Before and After 9/11

Turkey has a long history of terrorism as well as extensive experience in countering the extremist threats. Thus, one can safely assume that the country demonstrated effective progress at both the legislative and operational levels even before 9/11. Coupled with the UN's influence, additional progress was in fact achieved following the 9/11 attacks.

By 9/11, Turkey had taken a somewhat tough militarist counter-terrorism approach by ignoring individual rights and liberties for the sake of national security. For example, extreme forms of legislative regulations were initiated in cases involving extraordinary situations (i.e., aftermath of the 1971, 1980, and 1998 coups). One might

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[432]Yalcinkaya, A. (2011). BM Guvenlik Konseyi Kararlarinda Teror Kavrami. In O. Basibuyuk, A., Sozer & N. Altun (Eds.), *Terorle Mucadelede Makro ve Mikro Perspektifler* (pp.215-238). Ankara, Turkey: Polis Akademisi Yayainlari
[433]Beckman, *op. cit.*
[434] *Ibid.*

therefore argue that immediately following 9/11, Turkish authorities made good progress by changing their militarist approach and becoming a part of the global anti-terrorism coalition led by the United Nations and the United States. However, Turkey's new stance which has not dealt terrorism only as a security issue, and included its social, cultural and economic dimensions started before 9/11 in 1999.[435]

By examining Figure 7, one can clearly see that Turkey gradually changed its stance towards terrorism due to ineffective conventional strategies as well as the UN's influence following 9/11. In contrast to numerous countries throughout the world, there remained a high level of awareness in Turkey concerning terrorism owing to the country's struggle with the phenomenon for decades. Thus, 9/11 attacks can be claimed to have resulted in some changes involving Turkey; however, they did not cause so major policy applications.

C-Implications

1-Policy Implications

Given that enormous phenomena require greater attention and more effort in developing appropriate strategies and policies towards them, no state can prevent such an atrocity alone. As exemplified on September 11, 2001, even a super power was unable to prevent the devastating terrorist attacks. Thus, determination by all countries should be demonstrated in the first stage.

As a whole, the primary policy derived from my study is the concept of countering terrorism not only inside national borders but also beyond them. In other words, separate steps taken by each country are ineffective and insufficient in our global world of mass communication and transportation; hence, a single-handed effort will not

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[435] Ozeren, *op. cit.*

solve the problem. As vehemently emphasized during the interviews, great importance should be placed on cooperation between countries at both the regional and international levels. It can be monitored in Graph 8 and Figure 9-Interview index: B that all (100%) of interview subjects placed the strongest emphasis on the requirement of international cooperation in countering terrorism —especially following 9/11.

Immediately afterwards, 100% of the total number of the subjects focus on the way how to struggle with terrorism by stating that 'counter terrorism must be legal, and respect individuals' rights' (cf., Figure 10 -Interview index: C). For the sake of security, legitimacy should not be ignored, and all counter terrorism methods must be lawful. Otherwise, for the purpose of overcoming an evil, another one is committed by applying unlawful strategies. For instance, counter terrorism strategies implemented by Russia and Turkey especially before 9/11 did not solve terrorism problem; on the contrary deepened the issue, and were exploited by terrorist groups for justifying their terrorist attacks.

Apart from the primary two policy implications above, the following three guiding sub-policies are depicted in Graph 9:

- Border control⟼ 50% of the subjects, ten out of twenty, believe that following 9/11 countries have taken border control measures to protect themselves from any threat outside. For instance, if Turkey had porous borders between Syria, Iraq and Iran, the terrorist groups operating in those countries would be able to perpetrate attacks towards Turkey as well (cf., Figure 9 -Interview index: B).

- Security agency regulations⟶ 75% of the interviewees claim that effective security agencies must be formed with special units, equipments and regulations to struggle with terrorism. Terrorists should be dealt as criminals not as enemy

soldiers. Thus, legal and contemporary policing methods are much more appropriate to overcome terrorism not classical and militarist ones (cf., Figure 9 - Interview index: B & Graph:9).

- Countering financing of terrorism (CFT) and anti money laundering (AML) legislation→ 75% of the subjects emphasize the importance of financing aspect of terrorism by which it keeps alive. Thus, effective national and international laws on money laundering and financing of terrorism are required to block life channels of terrorism (cf., Figure 9 -Interview index: B & Graph: 9).

2-Future Research Implications

One of the limitations of this study was the number of the countries compared because two cases may not be enough to obtain accurate generalizations to determine new policies and strategies. It cannot be claimed that just two countries can sufficiently represent more than 200 countries around the globe. Besides, there was not a numerical balance in terms of nationality of the interviewees. Interview subjects from Russia and Turkey could not be chosen equally or a bit more balanced way. Thus, the first recommendation future researchers can be to deal with more cases represented equally in order to avoid false results to be implemented.

Qualitative way of researching was adopted in this study, and the research was designed accordingly. The data was derived from related literature and experts' views through interview, and findings may not be as precise as it can be obtained through a quantitative methodology. Therefore, the second suggestion for those who will study in similar topics can be to apply quantitative data for more accurate findings. Quantitative

data takes much less time to collect and analysis because they are numeric and can be tested through certain formulas.

D-Lessons Learned from the UN, Russia and Turkey

1-The UN

To some extent, the UN can change its priorities in order to accomplish common goals. At this point, the international organization should perform a leading position as was achieved following 9/11. For example, in developing updated and effective strategies at the national level, the UN has the authority to adopt compelling regulations for each country to obey. After analyzing data which were obtained for my study, the lessons learned from the UN can be categorized as follows:

1. In all circumstances, the UN should be above member countries, and act on behalf of each country in case of any local, regional and global disputes. Furthermore, national interests and priorities of member countries should be respected by the UN which has been a global security actor leading counter-terrorism alliance.

2. Certain structural changes should be made for a fair and equal representation. While the UN recommend, and in some cases urge countries to be righteous, and not to discriminate, it has to reflect the same manner structurally. For example, it is not fair for 'Super Five' countries (USA, the UK, China, France, and Russia) to determine the destiny of others. This mentality reduces the UN's credibility, shadows its sincerity

3. The UN's post-9/11 terrorism awareness should continue, and the UN should develop new strategies according to changing local and international conditions. Institutions should be organic structures developing themselves

4. The UN should make decisions more quickly in order to intervene on time. Otherwise, it might be too late. For instance, in the early 1990s, it took too much time

5. A fast decision making mechanism should be established for the UN not to cause any tragedies in the world. For instance, since the UN was unable to identify catastrophe in Rwanda, and to intervene on time; more than a million people from Hutu and Tutsi tribes were massacred. Beyond bureaucracy, new practical units under the UN should be formed to operate easily and quickly in case of emergency.

2-Russia

Before 9/11, the UN member countries had various perception of terrorism. While some countries perceive terrorism as a domestic threat of another country, some others suffered from terrorism for decades, and partially believed that terrorism was an issue which had its roots outside countries. As one of the cases of this study, there are some lessons that can be learned from Russia —one of the Super Five countries:

1. As all member countries, in spite of being one of 'super five', Russia also bewares of international and the UN's pressure. Thus, the government submitted reports to the CTC, and then made some changes in different aspects of counter terrorism. All means should be lawful, and all methods should be legitimate.

2. Terrorism should be dealt as a crime but it is very well organized, and operates beyond borders. Thus, special counter-terrorism units should be legally deployed in order to effectively struggle with terrorists.

3. Nobody and no agencies should have unlimited and uncontrolled power for the sake of security and safety. Unlawful activities cannot be tolerated by exploiting individuals' fundamental rights and liberties.

3-Turkey

Given that Turkey has been suffering from terrorism for decades, and has experienced a long history of countering terrorism, there are lessons that can be derived from Turkey case:

1. Extreme forms of countering terrorism are unacceptable and never work effectively. The more oppressive power is used, and the more resistance is demonstrated toward it. For instance, when the British used excessive militarist power in 1970s, the IRA had a reasonable justification for the terrorist attacks, and been much more powerful by recruiting more people.

2. Countering terrorism should be lawful, and all methods should be legitimate. There should be difference between terrorists applying all illegal means to reach their target and law enforcers operating according to laws that give them authority to do so.

3. Terrorism should not be dealt with as only a security-oriented issue; rather, it should be handled as a multi-dimensional social phenomenon having social, cultural, and economic aspects. You can kill all mosquitoes around but you cannot have a total achievement without draining marsh which is their main resource.

4. Counter-terrorism units should be non-military. It should be perceived as a struggle with criminals, not as a war against enemy army. Militarist solutions cause more problems than they solve.

5. All agencies countering terrorism should insist on democratic values and individual liberties. All legal units get their power from related laws. For the sake of security, democratic values and basic human rights cannot be sacrificed.

6. Contrary to fighting a battle, countering terrorism requires patience and care. Therefore, a deep problem having lasted for decades cannot be solved in few days. Long term effective counter terrorism strategies are need to overcome terrorism. For instance, it took more than two decades to peacefully solve the IRA problem through difficult negotiation process in which both sides respected each other, and made some concessions.

E-Concluding Remarks

Although terrorism has become a serious threat for humanity since the ancient age of the Romans, the violence became much more destructive following the 9/11 attacks perpetrated against United States in 2001. Further, one might claim that a new era of global terrorism began with 9/11. While numerous measures have been taken by national and international representatives, the 2001 attacks revealed many insufficiencies at various levels, namely perceptions of the issue and policy implementation.

First, terrorism has been perceived much differently by major international organizations, one of which is the United Nations. As the two main bodies representing the organization, the General Assembly and the Security Council became more

determined to gradually take more effective measures. As a result, Resolution 1368 was adopted on September 12, 2001, as an immediate reaction to somehow get rid of the shock felt on 9/11. Later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373 which became a milestone for the entire world. In addition to the SC's efforts, other steps were taken by the UN General Assembly (i.e., resolutions, declarations, reports, international conventions and global counter-terrorism strategies) as depicted in Figure 14.

In addition to the UN's efforts, virtually all member countries adopted the new approach and transformed their counter-terrorism strategies accordingly. For example, Turkey and Russia ratified some changes at the national and international levels to overcome the global threat as well as becoming members of the antiterrorism alliance led by the United States and the United Nations. In comparison to Turkey and Russia, certain similarities and differences can be monitored. After having witnessed the shortcomings of each country, achievable strategies are indeed possible for all countries throughout the world to develop.

Finally, while realist, liberal, cosmopolitan and regime theory schools have different assumptions, and touch upon different dimensions of social phenomenon; to some extent, they all meet the same point of their common goal and interests: to provide security and safety for everybody in their communities. That is to say, these four schools of social science confirm the main assumption of this study which is 'the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11' even if they have different understanding and approach. Following 9/11, it has been found out that an effective global counter terrorism regime which will be initiated by the UN is needed. For the sake of their common good, countries, such as Russia and Turkey can take part the

UN led counter-terrorism alliance, and take necessary measures to effectively struggle with terrorism against which a single country's efforts will remain weak and insufficient.

APPENDICES

Appendix-1: CHAPTER OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. In spite of having been a problem since ancient times, terrorism has been a global phenomenon following 9/11 attacks towards USA. It has not been perceived as a domestic problem of another country anymore.

2. Since terrorism with its various global networks, has capacity and capability to severely affect almost all nations around the world, an international and multi-dimensional approach is needed: "A global threat requires a global response".

3. Globalization has removed borders among countries, and enhanced international organizations to take more effective role for solving global problems.

4. Post-9/11 conditions urged the UN to take initiative as the largest international organization in the world, and then a world-wide coalition has been established to effectively counter terrorism at national, regional and international levels.

5. With Resolution 1373 the UN established CTC to regulate all counter terrorism efforts, and focused on four objectives: 1-Anti-terrorism legislation, 2-Countering financing of terrorism and money laundering, 3-Border control and 4-International cooperation

6. In comparison with its position toward terrorism before 9/11, the UN has been much more effective following 9/11 attacks because member countries have begun understanding that a single country cannot struggle with a such phenomenon operating beyond borders. Besides, most of post-9/11 anti-terrorism Resolutions have had mandatory character.

7. One of the results of 9/11 attacks is that each country had to take very tough measures against terrorism, and to some extent has tolerated human rights violations for the sake of nation's security.

8. Other international organizations such as EU and NATO has reacted similarly like the UN, and taken required measures against terrorism.

9. To determine the UN's influence on countries in pre and post-9/11 periods, Russia and Turkey have been selected as cases for the comparative study due to some similarities in both countries.

10. In order to generate much more effective counter terrorism strategies at national and international levels, it has been emphasized that defining terrorism exactly for precise understanding is crucial.

11. Even if it is so difficult to classify and define terrorism in a single way, common characteristics and features have been pointed out.

12. Terrorism and counter terrorism have been examined through various views such as realist, liberal, cosmopolitan and regime theory perspectives

13. In order to explore the assumption that 'the UN played a major role in counter-terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11',evaluation of terrorism and counter terrorism in terms of perception and implementation before and after 9/11 by the UN, Russia and Turkey, and of the UN's influence on mentioned countries has been emphasized.

CHAPTER II: TERRORISM IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY BEFORE 9/11

1. Both countries' stance towards terrorism and counter terrorism before 9/11 has been examined.

2. In both countries, historical background of terrorism, types of terrorism and anti-terrorism laws have been discussed to understand the scope of the problem in each country.

CHAPTER III: THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE 9/11

1. Conditions and need for establishment of the UN since the period of the League of Nations have been emphasized to give an idea why and how the UN was established.

2. The UN's goals, counter terrorism approach, legislations such as conventions and resolutions, and characteristics have been dealt.

CHAPTER IV: THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER 9/11

1. Discussion on whether the UN is a world government with supranational powers, or an intergovernmental organization with 193 member countries.

2. It has been claimed that following 9/11, in order to maintain peace and security, the UN has taken more initiative not only as a law maker but also as an executer.

3. In the post-9/11 period, the UN has determined counter terrorism strategies at national and international levels by adopting mandatory Resolutions and Declarations with its two primary units: the SC and the GA.

CHAPTER V: RUSSIA AFTER 9/11

1. Following 9/11, due to changing perception of terrorism, many regional and international alliances have been established in the region where Russia is located.

2. Russia have even been part of anti-terrorism coalition with the USA in Central Asia, and made some structural changes to effectively struggle with terrorism just after 9/11 attacks.

3. It has been claimed that Russia abused post-9/11 atmosphere to apply much harsher measures towards its ethnic groups demanding more liberties.

4. The UN's influence can be observed through post-9/11 anti-terrorism laws and Russia's reports submitted to the UN's CTC.

CHAPTER VI: TURKEY AFTER 9/11

1. Particularly after 9/11, in addition to the Military and National Security Council, the UN has been new actor determining Turkey's security policies because Turkish community had been suffering from terrorism for the last several decades, and there has always been a strong will to be part of a western coalition.

2. Following 9/11, with the UN's influence, the Turkish government started ratification process of the UN's two counter terrorism conventions, and made new anti-terror laws and amendments to effectively struggle with terrorism.

3. It has been claimed that conceptual shift from struggling with terrorists through harsh militarist measures to struggling with terrorism which has other socio-economic dimensions has been achieved.

4. Four phases of terrorism in Turkey have been discussed.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS

1. Terrorism has a changing and developing body which uses all conditions to adapt itself, and it is not possible to overcome it by using static structures which apply traditional outdated strategies.

2. Following 9/11 attacks, it has been recognized that forming a strong international cooperation was necessary because terrorism has been a world-wide threat operating beyond borders.

3. The main assumption, 'the UN played a major role in counter terrorism efforts following the events of 9/11', has been confirmed by interview subjects: 100% (20 out of 20) of interviewees emphasize that the UN has been more effective following 9/11 in comparison with before 9/11, and an international collaboration has been obligatory to struggle with terrorism.

4. While the UN's counter terrorism efforts were not been exactly supported by member countries before 9/11, post-9/11 ones have been unconditionally accepted by all member countries including Russia and Turkey.

5. While as an indication of institutional change the UN has established the CTC to counter terrorism effectively, both Russia and Turkey have given authorization to their new specific units with the influence of the UN and some domestic motivations.

6. Russia and Turkey have some similarities and differences in terms of their perception of terrorism and counter terrorism strategies before and after 9/11.

Appendix-2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Subject: ………………………………………

Date:…………………………………………..

Research Title: The Impact of The United Nations on Counter-Terrorism: The Role of Counter-Terrorism Committee and Countering Terrorism in Russia and Turkey.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How do you assess the role of the UN in the field of terrorism before 9/11?

2. How do you assess the adoption conditions of the new UN regulations after 9/11?

   - Negotiations-objections-consensus

   - Objectives of the new regulations

3. How do you evaluate the states' responses to the CTC following the 2001 resolution of 1373 and the 2005 resolution of 1624?

4. After evaluating 1,472 reports submitted to the CTC, have you observed any changes regarding how states perceive terrorism?

5. How do you calculate the impact of the UN resolutions on domestic counter-terrorism?

   - Changes in national legislations

   - Reactions to the UN efforts

   - Move towards more multilateralism

   - Use of the UN system, states reaffirming their sovereignty through the fight against terrorism

6. How do you evaluate the impact of the fight against terrorism on the UN?

   - Increased opportunities for the UN to be an international security actor

- Spill-over effects in other areas

7. At the national level, there has always been debate and tension between security concerns and civil liberties-human rights. How do you analyze the UN perspective in terms of civil liberties and human rights while fighting against terrorism?

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